[Senate Prints 110-35]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
1st Session 110-35
_______________________________________________________________________
THE MERIDA INITIATIVE:
``GUNS, DRUGS, AND FRIENDS''
__________
A REPORT TO MEMBERS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Tenth Congress
First Session
December 21, 2007
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39-644 WASHINGTON : 2007
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Background on United States Counter-Narcotics Assistance to
Mexico......................................................... 1
Overall Recommendations.......................................... 2
Analysis......................................................... 3
The Merida Initiative, How It Came To Be and Why Now......... 4
A Committed Friend: Calderon's Efforts to Fight Narcotics.... 6
Areas for Improvement: North-South Arms Trafficking and
Funding for Central America................................ 9
North-South Arms Trafficking............................. 9
Central America.......................................... 10
Appendixes
Discussions With Individuals in Mexico........................... 13
The Merida Initiative Security Assistance Proposals--Budgets and
Item Breakdown................................................. 15
The Central America Security Assistance (CASA) Proposals--Budgets
and Item Breakdown............................................. 51
Security Strategy for Central America (Translation)--Estrategia
de Seguridad de Centro America (Original)...................... 79
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, December 21, 2007.
Dear Colleagues: From November 6-8, 2007, I directed my
senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member
for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to visit Mexico City to assess
a $500 million supplemental budget request for Mexico. This
request is intended to support regional efforts to address
common threats to our nations by combating transnational crime
and drug trafficking.
The Merida Initiative, as this proposal is called, is an
attempt to seize the opportunity created by Mexico's
invigorated anti-crime campaign. The Initiative would fund key
programs and build stronger cooperation with the United States.
The proposal recognizes that 90 percent of the cocaine
entering the United States transits Mexico and that our efforts
to combat this drug flow and associated criminal activities
depend on a partnership with the Mexican government. It also
recognizes that Central America is the primary transit point
for people and drugs destined for the United States and Mexico
from South America. This illicit activity threatens regional
stability, weakens national economies and exacerbates illegal
migration to the United States.
The legislative process to pass the authorization of the
Merida Initiative began after President Bush submitted his
supplemental request of $45.9 billion to the U.S. Congress on
October 22, 2007. The President made this request to continue
the Global War on Terror and address other urgent national
security needs. Five hundred million dollars for the Merida
Initiative was included as part of this request. In response to
the President's proposal the SFRC held a full committee hearing
on the Merida Initiative on November 15, 2007. Mr. Meacham's
attached report provides significant insight into this
initiative. While his report's primary focus is assistance to
Mexico, appropriate analysis of Merida's counterpart program in
Central America, or Central American Security Assistance
(CASA), is also provided.
I hope you find it helpful as the U.S. Congress considers
support for the supplemental request for Mexico and Central
America. I look forward to continuing to work with you on these
issues and welcome any comments you may have on this report.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.
THE MERIDA INITIATIVE:
``GUNS, DRUGS, AND FRIENDS''
----------
From November 6-8, 2007, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
minority staff traveled to Mexico City, Mexico on an official
oversight visit to assess President George W. Bush's
supplemental budget request of $500 million for Mexico. During
this trip, staff met with senior officials of the Government of
Mexico (GOM), Members of the Mexican Senate, a senior official
of the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry, officials from the Mexican
human rights community, members of the Mexican press, and
senior officials at the United States Embassy in Mexico City.
(See Appendix I for complete list of meetings.)
At the request of Senator Lugar, the purpose of the trip
was to:
Assess the process through which this proposal was
formulated;
Assess the effectiveness of the current proposal and
identify areas for improvement.
Background on United States Counter-Narcotics
Assistance to Mexico
According to the National Drug Intelligence Center
somewhere between 530 and 710 metric tons of cocaine departed
South America bound for the United States in 2006. In that
year, Mexican and U.S. law enforcement estimate that 12.7 tons
of heroin was freshly produced within Mexico, to be shipped
northwards. That accounts for more than a 58 percent increase
in production from the year before. The United States has been
engaged in efforts to combat the flow of narcotics into the
United States from Mexico and Central America for many years.
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS),
between fiscal years 2000 and 2006, the U.S. government has
provided over $250 million for counter-narcotics assistance to
Mexico. The State Department provided the bulk of this
assistance--$169 million--for port and border security, law
enforcement assistance, interdiction and eradication support,
aviation support and training. USAID provided $30 million for
rule of law and anti-corruption training. The remainder ($58
million) was provided by the Department of Defense through its
``section 1004'' authority (Section 1004 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 authorizes the
Department to provide support to counter-drug activities of
other federal agencies overseas). The Drug Enforcement
Administration also expended $124 million during this period to
support its field offices in Mexico.
Overall Conclusions and Recommendations
American politicians on both sides of the aisle have become
increasingly concerned about inattention to Latin America. Yet
when President Bush recently announced details about the Merida
Initiative, the proposal was greeted with Congressional
skepticism.
Some members have complained about a lack of information
and consultation in the formulation of the proposal and have
voiced concern over corruption and alleged human rights abuses
in Mexico. Others feel more must be done domestically, both in
addressing the underlying demand for drugs in the United States
and the treatment for drug offenders. There are also those in
the U.S. Congress who feel that the proposal for Central
America does not go far enough in funding and equipping efforts
to deal with land, air, and maritime narcotics trafficking.
These are all valid concerns. On human rights, specifically, we
are assured that there would be continued efforts in the
context of this initiative.
But the risks of proceeding with this agreement are small
compared to the large potential payoff of authorizing this
proposal which would include creating the institutional
framework for dealing with many of the problems mentioned by
Democrats and Republicans alike. Mexico's historic mistrust of
its northern neighbor has long prevented closer ties that could
benefit both sides. President Calderon has taken considerable
political risk in reaching out to the United States. He has
done this because it is in Mexico's best national security
interest and because combating this transnational threat
requires closer collaboration. Furthermore, Central American
willingness to act together in favor of their collective
security is an important development that should not have been
overlooked by the Bush administration in putting together their
funding request.
The Merida Initiative represents a rare opportunity to
build a base for sustained cooperation with Mexico on a shared
agenda. To pass on this opportunity would represent a
significant blunder that would have a negative impact on the
bilateral relationship, as well as broader U.S. interests in
the region. In order to increase the effectiveness of this
initiative the following recommendations should be considered.
(1) In cooperation with the Mexican government, the U.S.
Secretary of State should:
Define a comprehensive strategy aimed at disrupting the
traffic of arms to Mexico, which emphasizes preventive
initiatives, effective controls of the sale of weapons
in gun shows, especially along the border.
Improve effective and timely exchange of intelligence on
major U.S. based trafficking of weapons organizations
with links to Mexican and Central American criminal
organizations.
Work with the Secretary of Homeland Security to direct the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) to work closely with other law enforcement
agencies, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), in operations to interdict weapons crossing U.S.
borders and devise new programs to share tracing
capabilities with the appropriate Mexican authorities,
close-off trafficking corridors, expand actionable,
real-time intelligence cooperation, and aggressively
pursue prosecutions, interdictions and arrests of
individuals seeking to move firearms across the border.
Establish a specific program to trace and disrupt the
trafficking to Mexico of high powered weaponry such as
.50 mm rifles, grenades and grenade launchers.
(2) The Merida Initiative will achieve modest results
should substantial assistance for public security, law
enforcement, specialized police training, air, land and
maritime interdiction and interception equipment not be
provided for Central American Security Assistance (CASA).
Organized crime and narco-trafficking in Central America could
directly threaten gains made against the drug cartels in
Mexico. In order to promote a real reduction of violence and
drug trafficking in Central America and ensure broader success
in combating the drug trade in North and Central America, the
Bush administration should find additional funds for Central
America in the FY09 appropriations cycle (funding in the
supplemental request for CASA is $50 million).
Analysis
Along the border between the United States and Mexico, and
far into Central America, there is a war raging. Drug
trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and violence
connected to organized crime are rampant. In the last 10 months
alone more than 2,600 Mexicans have lost their lives in police
action against the drug trafficking organizations active
throughout Central and North America. In response, Mexican
President Felipe Calderon and the Mexican Congress have
authorized nearly $3 billion and 30,000 troops to help combat
the violence.
In Central America, drug trafficking and its kingpins
exacerbate the declining stability of law and order. Regional
street gangs, which the United States Central Command has
estimated may total 70,000 members, are a major source of
violent crime in a region where the numbers of at risk youth
are staggering.\1\ In Guatemala, 70 percent of the population
is under the age of 29; 50 percent are under 15 and thus highly
susceptible to inducement into criminal behavior when not
presented with better economic opportunities.\2\
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\1\ Other estimates, such as USAID's ``2006 Central America and
Mexico Gang Assessment'' report, cite regional gang membership to be
anywhere from 50,000 to 305,000 individuals.
\2\ According to the Government of Guatemala, the typical entry
age to these gangs is 13. It asserts there have been cases of children
as young as 8 involved in extortion, drug distribution and
assassinations.
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The Merida Initiative was envisioned to help address these
issues. Details of the supplemental request released by the
Department of State include:
Non-intrusive inspection equipment, ion scanners, canine
units for Mexican customs, for the new federal police
and for the military to interdict trafficked drugs,
arms, cash and persons.
Technologies to improve and secure communications systems
to support collecting information as well as ensuring
that vital information is accessible for criminal law
enforcement.
Technical advice and training to strengthen the
institutions of justice, such as vetting for the new
police force, case management software to track
investigations through the system to trial, new offices
for citizen complaints and professional responsibility,
and witness protection programs.
Helicopters and surveillance aircraft to support
interdiction activities and rapid operational response
of law enforcement agencies in Mexico.
(See Appendix II for complete breakdown of the Merida
Initiative Mexico.)
According to U.S. State Department officials 59 percent of
the proposed assistance would go to civil agencies responsible
for law enforcement, and a smaller share, 41 percent, to
operational costs for the Mexican Army and Navy. While the
initial cost for equipment and hardware that the military
required is high, it is expected that future budget requests
will focus increasingly on training and assistance to civil
agencies.
While this request includes equipment and training, it does
not involve any cash transfers or money to be provided directly
to the Government of Mexico or private contractors. ``We won't
be given one cent,'' one Mexican official remarked in this
regard. ``This proposal provides specific equipment, training
and intelligence sharing, it is not a blank check.''
the merida initiative, how it came to be and why now
Since President Calderon assumed office on December 1,
2006, he has conveyed a deliberate interest in working
collaboratively with the United States in combating mutual
threats. In this context, it does not come as a surprise that
the Bush administration would respond to this interest through
an emergency supplemental budget request rather than through
the regular budget appropriations cycle.
Recognizing that the Bush administration is nearing the end
of their term in office, administration officials wanted to
move quickly and seize this window of opportunity. State
Department officials are keenly aware that their time is
running out and that Calderon's willingness to work with the
United States is unprecedented on issues of security, crime,
and drugs. Coupled with the record number of trade agreements
signed during his administration and a proposal on biofuels
with Brazil, there is a desire to do as much as possible
regarding Latin America. ``The President sees Latin America as
his legacy,'' mentioned one State Department official.
If authorized by Congress, the Merida Initiative could lay
the groundwork for deeper cooperation between the United
States, Mexico and Central America. This would start to correct
an imbalance in U.S. policy that has arisen since the September
11, 2001 attacks, when most U.S. focus was directed towards the
Iraq War and Afghanistan. In addition, this proposal could also
counter some of the resentment that many Mexicans and Central
Americans feel regarding the U.S. Congress' failure to enact
comprehensive immigration reform.
In this regard, interest in pursuing this initiative
expeditiously through a supplemental request is understandable.
Though well intended, this approach has sparked suspicion and
intense criticism in a Democratic-controlled U.S Congress.
Many believe that concern pertaining to the proposal stems
from lack of information and consultation involved in its
formulation. Little information about these negotiations was
made available to either the U.S. or Mexican Congresses until
the proposal became public on October 22, 2007, which
exacerbated partisan suspicion in Washington and popular
suspicion in Mexico. Though difficult to understand from a U.S.
legislative branch perspective, from the Calderon
admistration's standpoint, secrecy regarding the formulation of
this proposal was imperative since cooperation with the United
States entails certain political sensitivities.
Mexican Embassy officials in Washington assert that they
have briefed their Congress on the proposal, but that the
Merida Initiative is not a treaty or a formal agreement or
convention, so it is not subject to Mexican Congressional
approval.
State Department officials only briefed U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff in mid-September after staff
threatened to delay the nomination of David Johnson to be
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement. During the September 22, 2007 briefing, State
Department officials provided only an outline of the type of
assistance contemplated and refused to provide detailed
information or budget data.
Staff learned about this initiative in the media in the
late summer of 2007, but the process had started much earlier.
According to GOM sources, during his visit to Washington in
November of 2006, President-elect Calderon expressed interest
in strengthened bilateral and regional cooperation against drug
trafficking and organized crime. This was followed up by a
March 2007 Bilateral Presidential Summit held in Merida,
Mexico, where the presidents decided to move forward to develop
a specific plan for enhanced cooperation. Mexican interagency
coordinating meetings were held between April and May 2007
where the Mexican Government developed its proposal. On May 22,
2007, U.S. and Mexican foreign ministers met in Washington to
begin bilateral discussions on the basis of the Mexican
proposal.\3\
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\3\ ``Road Map leading to the Merida Initiative,'' Government of
Mexico, November 2007.
November 2006: During his visit to Washington President-Elect
Calderon expresses interest in strengthened bilateral and regional
cooperation against drug trafficking and organized crime.
March 2007: Bilateral Presidential Summit held in Merida.
Presidents decide to move forward to develop a specific plan for
enhanced cooperation.
April-May 2007: Mexican interagency coordinating meetings to
develop Mexican proposal.
May 22, 2007: Foreign ministers meet in Washington to begin
bilateral discussions on the basis of Mexican proposal.
July 13 2007: President Bush calls President Calderon with positive
response.
July 26-27 2007: First bilateral inter-agency meeting held in
Washington.
August-September 2007: Four thematic technical meetings held in
Mexico City.
September-October 2007: Select consultations are held between the
Calderon administration and select members of Mexican Congress.
October 22, 2007: Supplemental request presented to Congress and
release of Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative.
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On Capitol Hill, as a result of the information gap during
the run-up to the proposal's introduction to the U.S. Congress,
ill will prevails, especially among Democrats. Many question
why they should work with the White House on this initiative in
the first place. Many believe the proposal needs major changes.
Others ask why not wait until a new administration--what's the
rush?
``This is a necessary proposal that suffered from poor
marketing,'' stated a member of Mexico's legislative branch.
``The focus of this plan is to help Mexico do a better job
fighting the drug traffickers who send cocaine, heroin,
marihuana and precursor chemicals for methamphetamine into the
United States, it's in all of our interests to do this.''
A COMMITTED FRIEND: CALDERON'S EFFORTS TO FIGHT NARCOTICS
The motivation for president Calderon's invigorated anti-
crime campaign is in large part domestic: drug-related violence
is on the increase, with an estimated 2,650 killings so far
this year already surpassing last year's total of 2,120.
Equally important, Mexico has become a drug consuming nation.
Narcotics' corrosive impact has led to an alarming rise of what
Mexicans call narco-menudeo--small-time drug dealing by
ordinary citizens, poor and middle-class alike.
The Merida Initiative is intended as a vital complement to
President Calderon's own stepped-up efforts against drugs which
he launched when he took office nearly a year ago. Under his
leadership, the GOM has accomplished a great deal in the
interdiction and eradication of illegal drugs, stepping up
efforts already underway in the previous administration. For
example, the policies of manual eradication have continued,
while at the same time interdiction efforts have greatly
increased, aided by the new resources devoted to this mission.
Results include the seizure on October 30, 2007 of more
than 23.5 tons of cocaine in the port city of Manzanillo,
Colima. This is the largest single seizure of cocaine ever
recorded. Earlier that same month another 12 tons were
interdicted in the city of Tampico.\4\
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\4\ ``Mexican Authorities Seize the Largest Shipment ever of
Cocaine in the State of Colima.'' Mexican Embassy, Washington D.C.
November 2007.
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U.S. officials also are seeing better law enforcement
cooperation with Mexico--79 criminals have been extradited to
the United States this year, including drug cartel kingpins.
But much work remains to be done especially regarding the
reform of the judicial system within Mexico that some in the
human rights community argue ``has encouraged the coercion of
confessions often through the use of torture.''
All together, such reform efforts by the GOM have resulted
in clear security benefits for the United States. The National
Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) has noted that ``cocaine
availability decreased in several U.S. drug markets during the
first half of 2007, most likely because of a combination of
factors that included large cocaine seizures in transit toward
the United States.'' However, reforms have also caused a
response. It is estimated that the major drug trafficking
organizations are currently reorganizing and readjusting to the
new challenges facing their trade; as a result, drug
availability is once again on the rise.
One recent development is the consolidation of many of the
smaller drug trafficking organizations into powerful alliances,
escalating the violence between the groups vying for control of
the most lucrative smuggling corridors into full fledged turf
wars. A notable example of such coalition building is ``The
Federation,'' led by representatives from the Sinaloa, Juarez
and Valencia cartels.\5\
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\5\ Cook, Collen W., ``Mexico's Drug Cartels,'' Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, October 16, 2007.
Source: United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico,
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November 2007.
In general, the major drug trafficking organizations have
reached a high level of sophistication. Most now maintain their
own paramilitary groups or enforcer gangs; violent rivalry
between these gangs accounts for a majority of drug related
deaths in Mexico. Targeted assassinations of police and
military personnel are also high. Over 200 police have been
killed so far this year. In several instances these
organizations--the Gulf Cartel's Zetas perhaps the most
infamous--draw on considerable expertise from former members of
law enforcement and special forces units.\6\
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\6\ Ibid.
Source: United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico,
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November 2007.
The scale of corruption in the federal police forces has
been used as justification for the increased use of the
military in more traditional law enforcement roles, especially
in States that have seen increased levels of drug-related
violence as noted in the slide above. This move has been
criticized by several human rights organizations. In Mexico,
however, the military remains highly respected among the
general populace; and for its part, the military has accepted
every recommendation put forth by Mexico's National Commission
for Human Rights (CNDH), including training on human rights,
drug and alcohol testing for personnel and a commitment to full
investigations and prosecution.\7\
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\7\ U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, November 2007.
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President Calderon and military leadership know that the
military's participation in domestic law enforcement is
temporary. And in order to hasten a transition of law
enforcement responsibilities back to traditional law
enforcement agencies Calderon has moved to purge those police
units most heavily laden with corruption and to reorganize the
federal police entirely. In a relevant CRS report entitled
``Mexico's Drug Cartels,'' the level of penetration from drug
cartels observed is startling, with ``some agents of Mexico's
Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) believed to work as
enforcers for the Sinaloa cartel, and the Attorney General's
Office (PGR) report[ing] in December 2005 that one-fifth (1,500
of 7,000) of its officers are under investigation for criminal
activity.'' \8\
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\8\ ``Mexico's Drug Cartels.''
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AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT: NORTH-SOUTH ARMS TRAFICKING AND FUNDING FOR
CENTRAL AMERICA
The Merida Initiative is an attempt to seize the
opportunity created by President Calderon's invigorated anti-
crime campaign. The Merida portion, and the funding for Central
America through CASA, recognizes that successful efforts to
combat drug trafficking depend on a partnership with the
Mexican government and the Governments of Central America.
Though staff believes these proposals are long overdue, they
fall short of what is required in two important areas: stopping
north-south arms trafficking, funding, and assistance for
Central America.
North-South Arms Trafficking
Important concerns remain regarding how the Merida
Initiative would halt arms trafficking from the United States
to Mexico. Though assurances have been made by officials from
the U.S. State Department that more will be done to formulate
agreements to stem the traffic of weapons south of the border,
the problem is worsening as highlighted by the chart supplied
by the GOM of confiscated weapons and ammunition below:
North-South Arms Trafficking--December 1, 2006 to November 7, 2007
(Information provided by the Government of Mexico)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSPF SHCP (AGA- Joint
Concept PGR (AFI) SDN SM-AM (PFP) ACIFA) Others Operations Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Short Weapons 60 417 1 39 1 61 251 830
(DRC)
Short Weapons 2341,199 7 102 169 632 287 2,630
(OC)
Assault Weapons 38 746 0 26 0 29 382 1,221
(DRC)
Assault Weapons 73 1,511 17 42 274 106 318 2,341
(OC)
Ammunition 6,626 134,634 10 3,569 96 3,537 53,855 202,327
(DRC)
Ammunition (OC) 11,096 191,289 4,826 2,892 115,780 11,618 109,940 447,441
Grenades 10 408 0 3 1 7 99 528
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PGR: Procuradura General de la Republica
AFI: Agencia Federal de Investigacion
SDN: Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional
SM-AM: Secretaria de Marina--Armada de Mexico
SSPF: Secretaria de Seguridad Publica Federal
PFP: Policia Federal Preventiva
SHCP: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico
DRC: Drug Related Crimes
OC: Other Crimes.
American guns pass into Mexico through land ports of entry
at the border every day. According to a Mexican government
official, as many as 2,000 weapons enter Mexico each day and
fuel an arms race between Mexican drug cartels.
Mexican government officials suspect that corrupt customs
officials (on both sides of the border) help smuggle weapons
into Mexico. The weapons are often bought legally at gun shows
in Arizona and Texas mostly.
Taking these weapons out of the hands of organized crime
now would allow Mexican law enforcement to fight drug
trafficking in Mexico before they reach the U.S. border; more
importantly, into U.S. communities. It also takes the Mexican
military out of the law enforcement role it has been assigned.
According to a high level SEDENA (Secretaria de la Defense
Nacional, Mexican Armed Forces) official, ``the military does
not want to be involved in law enforcement any more than it has
to, but it has no choice, regular police cannot compete with
Ak-47s and grenade launchers.'' As one GOM official noted: ``We
understand your Second Amendment, but along the border states
thousands of gun shows occur a year, and little is done to make
sure that those guns stay in the U.S.''
American Embassy officials in Mexico confirmed that the
U.S. is a major source of weapons for Mexican gangs and drug
runners.
As the Merida Initiative goes forward, U.S. agencies must
work closely with Mexican officials to address this problem. It
is not in the U.S. interest to create a self-defeating
situation in which a critical foreign assistance program meant
to assist a neighbor and enhance U.S. security is being
undercut by an illegal flow of weapons originating from within
our own borders.
Central America
The Bush administration has requested $50 million in
equipment and training for Central America. Over half of this
amount ($25.7 million) is currently designated for public
security and law enforcement. Within that category, $12.6
million is for the implementation of anti-gang strategies
throughout the region. Another $13.1 million is for specialized
police training and equipment. Early estimates of a country-by-
country breakdown suggest Guatemala would be the largest
recipient ($9.2 million). Honduras would receive $7.4 million;
El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua and Belize would
each receive less than $5 million. These tabulations do not
include some $20 million that has been designated for regional
use or non-country-specific expenditures. (See Appendix III for
complete breakdown of CASA.)
As highlighted by the slide below, Central America is the
primary transit point for cocaine destined for the United
States and Mexico from South America. Though drugs are brought
into Mexico by sea and land, this slide highlights the severity
of the problem by air.
Source: United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico,
November 2007.
Central American officials feel that they will not be able
to confront threats effectively without more assistance. They
fear that gang members and drug traffickers will flee Mexico
for Central America where it will be easier to operate. As one
senior Central American government official stated: ``In this
case Mexico's gain could be our loss.''
Central America ``has among the highest homicide rates in
the world, and in recent years murder rates have been
increasing in several countries,'' according to a recent CRS
Report. ``Latin America's average rate of 27.5 homicides per
100,000 people is three times the world average of 8.8
homicides per 100,000 people. Based on the most recent crime
trend surveys (CTS) data available from the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Guatemala and El Salvador
are among the most violent countries in the world for which
standardized data has been collected.'' \9\
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\9\ Seelke, Clare Ribando, ``Gangs in Central America,''
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 2, 2007.
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Gangs have emerged as major social forces in the region,
and they have been expanding their influence in relatively
ungoverned areas that they exploit for their drug trafficking
operations. Drug lords now openly finance political campaigns
and in some instances have shown interest in running for public
office themselves.
Many of these gang members are prison-hardened former
members and associates of U.S. street gangs who were deported
directly back to their home countries in Central America after
serving their sentences. Central American leaders and public
opinion--especially in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras--
have characterized this situation as a regional emergency
requiring an urgent response.
In the past, political wrangling and resource constraints
have hampered Central American governments' response to the
drug trade.\10\ Recognizing that they all share these problems,
Central American countries have agreed to strengthen regional
security through the Central American Integration System
(CICA). Together they have produced an unprecedented
comprehensive regional security strategy demonstrating a new
found political will to work to guarantee their collective
security. Unfortunately, the U.S. financial response has not
been commensurate with current Central American political will
to come together and fight the drug trade. (See Appendix IV for
Central American comprehensive regional security strategy--
original and English translation.)
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\10\ The United States provided a total of $139.4 million in
counternarcotics assistance to Central America from FY2000 to FY2006.
Just over $77 million in assistance was administered by the Department
of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL). This total includes money provided for Latin America
regional programs. State Department does not provide a breakdown of
which countries benefitted from overall Latin America regional
assistance. Of the money administered by INL, just over $47 million was
provided through the International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) account and nearly $30 million was provided through
the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) account.
Nearly $63 million in counternarcotics assistance was provided
through the Department of Defense under its section 124. Section 124
authority designated the Department of Defense as the lead agency for
the detection of aerial and maritime drug shipments.
A P P E N D I X I
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DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN MEXICO
Staff held discussions with the following individuals in
Mexico:
Mexican Government Officials
Sigrid Arzt, Office of the President of Mexico (cabinet-
level anti-drug adviser to President Felipe Calderon)
Marcela Celorio (Centro de Investigacion y Seguridad
Nacional--CISEN)
Juan Carlos Foncerrada (CISEN)
Jose Luis Santiago Vasconcelos (Procuraduria General de la
Republica--PGR)
Carlos Rico (Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores--SRE)
Cecilia Romero Castillo (Instituto Nacional de Migracion--
INM)
Senior level officials (Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional--
SEDENA)
Mexican Legislative Branch
Sen. Luis Alberto Coppola Joffroy (Partido de Accion
Nacional, PAN)
Sen. Eloy Canta Segovia (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional, PRI)
Sen. Sen. Tomas Torres (Partido de la Revolucion
Democratica, PRD)
Officials from Foreign Governments
Luis Fernando Andrade, Deputy Foreign Minister for the
Republic of Guatemala
United States Department of State, U.S. Embassy Mexico
City, Mexico
Tony Garza, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico (DCM, POL, NAS,
ECON, USAID, DEA, OPAD, CPB, ICE, CONS, LEGAT)
Mexican Human Rights Organizations
Comision Nacional de Los Derechos Humanos
Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez
Mexico Unido contra la Delincuencia
Centro de Estudios e Investigacion en Desarrollo y
Asistencia Social A.C.
Mexican Media
Dr. Jorge Chabat, El Universal Newspaper
Ana Maria Salazar, El Universal Newspaper
Consultants and Collaborators
Peter Hakim, The Inter-American Dialogue
Armand Peshard-Sverdrup, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)
Alex Currie, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations (SFRC)
A P P E N D I X II
----------
THE MERIDA INITIATIVE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS--BUDGETS AND ITEM
BREAKDOWN
A P P E N D I X III
----------
THE CENTRAL AMERICA SECURITY ASSISTANCE (CASA) PROPOSALS--BUDGETS AND
ITEM BREAKDOWN
A P P E N D I X IV
----------
SECURITY STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA (Translation)--ESTRATEGIA DE
SEGURIDAD DE CENTRO AMERICA (Original)