[Senate Prints 110-45]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
110-45
_______________________________________________________________________
PLAYING WITH FIRE:
COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, AND VENEZUELA
__________
REPORT TO MEMBERS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Tenth Congress
second session
APRIL 28, 2008
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-928 WASHINGTON : 2008
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Transmittal.......................................... v
Background..................................................... 2
Country Perspectives........................................... 4
Colombia..................................................... 4
The FARC at Its ``Tipping-Point''........................ 4
The FARC's Presence in Ecuador and Venezuela............. 5
Venezuela's Military as a Source of Instability.......... 5
The GOC's Take on the Possibility of U.S. Sanctions
Against the Government of Venezuela........................ 6
The Significance of the U.S.-Colombian Trade Promotion
Agreement for Colombian Economic Stability................. 6
Ecuador...................................................... 7
Anger and Frustration Toward Colombia.................... 7
Confronting the FARC the ``Ecuadorean Way''.............. 8
Ecuador-Colombian Border Issues.......................... 8
The ``Reyes Computers'': ``A Mixed Bag''................. 9
Analysis and Recommendations................................... 9
Appendixes
Appendix I.--Resolution of the March 2008 Meeting of the
Organization of American States (OAS).......................... 15
Appendix II.--Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of
the Rio Group on the Recent Events Between Ecuador and Colombia 17
Appendix III.--Report of the OAS Commission That Visited Ecuador
and Colombia................................................... 19
Appendix IV.--Plan Ecuador....................................... 30
Appendix V.--FARC's Presence on the Ecuadorean and Colombian
Border......................................................... 45
Appendix VI.--Permanent Ecuadorean Military Presence on the
Ecuadorean and Colombian Border................................ 46
Appendix VII.--Discussions With Individuals in Ecuador and
Colombia....................................................... 47
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, April 28, 2008.
Dear Colleagues: From March 18-19, 2008, I directed my
senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member
for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to visit Colombia and Ecuador
to investigate their recent conflict in order to develop policy
recommendations.
On March 1, 2008, a Colombian raid on an Ecuadorean camp
controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
sparked the region's worst diplomatic crisis in years,
prompting Ecuador and Venezuela to send troops to their
respective borders with Colombia. As a result of the Colombian
raid, Ecuador and Venezuela cut ties with Colombia. However,
following intense diplomatic efforts, mainly through the
Organization of American States (OAS), both countries promised
to withdraw troops and normalize relations.
Consequently, Colombia pledged not to follow through on
charges against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez at an
international court for reportedly supporting the FARC, a group
classified by the United States, Canada, the European Community
and Colombia as a terrorist organization. But information
gathered at the site of the raid alleges that Ecuadorean
government officials were involved in coordination with the
FARC regarding the trafficking of drugs through Ecuador. This
information suggests that Venezuelan officials were not only
involved in facilitating drug- trafficking through Venezuela,
but that they were also in coordination with the FARC in
efforts to overthrow the Colombian government.
The United States is attempting to promote peace,
prosperity and stability in the region. The robust economic
relationship the Unites States has with all three includes the
recent extension of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA)
with Colombia and Ecuador and the important oil commerce with
Venezuela. In addition, the United States has a strong
relationship with Colombia through Plan Colombia and the
proposed free trade agreement.
Mr. Meacham's report provides insight into the continuing
sources of instability between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela
and serious policy recommendations related to preventing future
``flare-ups'' and promoting U.S. interests.
I hope you find the report helpful as the U.S. Congress
considers how to advance U.S. interests and promote peace and
stability between these countries. I look forward to continuing
to work with you on these issues, and I welcome any comments
you may have on this report.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar, Ranking Member,
PLAYING WITH FIRE:
COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, AND VENEZUELA
----------
From March 18-19, 2008 Senate Foreign Relations Committee
minority staff traveled to Colombia and Ecuador on an official
visit to understand the conflict that commenced with the March
1, 2008 raid by Colombia into Ecuador to eliminate the
FARC's\1\ second in command, Luis Edgar Devia Silva, better
known by his nom de guerre, ``Raul Reyes.'' During this trip,
staff met with senior officials of the Governments of Colombia
and Ecuador and senior officials at the United States Embassies
in those respective countries. (See Appendix VII).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The FARC is a foreign organization that was designated a
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) (FARC FTO designated date: 10/8/
1997; Latest designated date: 10/2/2003; EO 13224 designation date 11/
2/2001) by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations
play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an
effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and
pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business. Office of
Counterterrorism, October 11, 2005. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/
37191.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended
1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as
defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2)
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and
intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must
threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national
security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic
interests) of the United States.
Legal Ramifications of Designation
1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly
provide ``material support or resources'' to a designated FTO.
(The term ``material support or resources'' is defined in 18
U.S.C. 2339A(b)(1) as ``any property, tangible or intangible,
or service, including currency or monetary instruments or
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safe-houses, false documentation
or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more
individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation,
except medicine or religious materials.'' 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(2)
provides that for these purposes ``the term `training' means
instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as
opposed to general knowledge.'' 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(3) further
provides that for these purposes the term `expert advice or
assistance' means advice or assistance derived from scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge.''
2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they
are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances,
removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. 1182
(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).
3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it
has possession of or control over funds in which a designated
FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or
control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Other Effects of Designation
1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to
encourage other nations to do the same.
2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist
organizations internationally.
3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic
transactions with named organizations.
4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist
organizations.
5. Signals to other governments our concern about named
organizations.
At the request of Senator Lugar, the purpose of the trip
was to:
Understand the recent conflict between Colombia and
Ecuador, and the role played by Venezuela;
Determine the outlook for future stability between the
three countries, and what are the risks for another
crisis; and
Develop policy recommendations for the United States
Government (USG).
Background
On Saturday, March 1, 2008, Colombian Defense Minister Juan
Santos, announced that ``Raul Reyes'' had been killed in a
military raid led by Colombian military forces. The attack
occurred in a guerilla camp in Ecuador, and involved both air
force helicopters and Colombian troops fighting on Ecuadorean
soil, two miles from the border with Colombia.
On March 2, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez ordered the
mobilization of ten tank battalions and the deployment of
fighter jets to Venezuela's border with Colombia. Chavez also
shut down the Venezuelan Embassy in Colombia and threatened to
cut off all commerce. Ecuador responded by expressing its
intent to deploy several troop battalions to the border.
That same day, in response to these developments, the
Colombian government publicly released the contents of several
documents allegedly found on laptop computers in the possession
of ``Raul Reyes.'' Among the documents found were what appear
to be letters from Ecuador's Minister of the Interior, Gustavo
Larrea, offering logistical support to FARC commanders and
discussing regional political issues. These letters appear to
document a relationship between the FARC and the governments of
Ecuador and Venezuela. However, it should be noted that
President Correa claims to have dismantled 47 FARC camps inside
Ecuador over the last year and on three occasions carried out
joint operations with Colombian troops.
President Chavez on the other hand has been unambiguous in
his support for the FARC. Recently, President Chavez voiced his
intention to campaign for the removal of the FARC from
international terrorist lists and their reclassification to the
status of ``belligerent army.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Belligerent forces, 1907 Hague Regulations
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/
b1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6
The qualifications of belligerents
Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only
to armies, but also to militia and volunteercorps fulfilling
the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at
a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.In countries where militia or
volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of
it, they are included under the denomination ``army.''
Art. 2. The inhabitants of a territory which has not been
occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take
up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time
to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be
regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they
respect the laws and customs of war.
Art. 3. The armed forces of the belligerent parties may
consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of
capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as
prisoners of war.
On March 5, the Permanent Council of the OAS agreed on a
resolution approved by all 34 Member countries calling the
attacks ``a violation of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international law''
(See Appendix I). However, the resolution did not textually
condemn the raid. The killing of ``Raul Reyes'' resulted in a
series of accusations and tense diplomatic exchanges between
Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa and President Chavez against
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe.
Colombian President Uribe ordered the strike into Ecuador
in order to neutralize a high value FARC target, and safeguard
the stability and democracy of Colombia within the context of a
long standing war. A desire to protect the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of Ecuador animated Ecuadorean
President Correa's response.
The issue seemed to have subsided on Friday, March 7, at
the Rio Group\3\ Summit in the Dominican Republic, where
President Correa accepted the apologies of President Uribe
stating: ``with the commitment of never attacking a `brother
country' again and by asking forgiveness, we can consider the
very serious incident resolved.'' President Uribe expressed the
regret of the Colombian government, but stated that it was
necessary ``in the fight against terrorism.'' Subsequently, on
Sunday March 9, Venezuela stated that diplomatic relations with
Colombia would immediately normalize. (See Appendix II for Rio
Group Summit Declaration)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Rio Group is an international organization of Latin
American and Caribbean states. It was created on 18 December 1986 in
the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro by means of the Declaration of Rio
de Janeiro, signed by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (the members of the Contadora Group and the
Contadora Support Group). To some extent it was perceived by some
observers as an alternative body to the Organization of American States
during the Cold War, since that body was dominated by the States. The
Rio Group does not have a secretariat or permanent body, and instead
relies on yearly summits of heads of states. Current member states are:
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From March 9 to March 12, the Permanent Council asked that
an OAS Commission led by OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel
Insulza travel to Colombia, Ecuador and the site of the raid.
As a result of the visit, President Correa said he would like
to reactivate the Bi-national Border Commission (Combifrom)
between Ecuador and Colombia to address border issues, and
President Uribe called for mechanisms to enforce existing
bilateral agreements.
On March 12, in response to an invitation from the
Colombian government, an INTERPOL\4\ team was placed in Bogota
to review and assess the authenticity of the FARC files found
on the laptop computers in the possession of ``Raul Reyes.''
The Venezuelan government called the documents ``a collection
of inconsistent and incomprehensible documents.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ INTERPOL is the world's largest international police
organization, with 186 member countries. Created in 1923, it
facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists
all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent
or combat international crime. INTERPOL aims to facilitate
international police co-operation even where diplomatic relations do
not exist between particular countries. Action is taken within the
limits of existing laws in different countries and in the spirit of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. INTERPOL's constitution
prohibits ``any intervention or activities of a political, military,
religious or racial character.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 17, the OAS reconvened in an ``Emergency Session''
with the attendance of Foreign Ministers from member countries,
per the March 5th Resolution to report on the OAS Commission's
visit to the raid site in Ecuador and to meet with Government
officials in Ecuador and Colombia. The Commission concluded in
a March 17th report that ties of trust between the two
governments have been severely damaged. The Commission also
determined that the Ecuadorean and Colombian versions of the
raid are contradictory and that the situation in the border
area between the two countries is complex in terms of
geographical, territorial, communications and economic aspects
(See Appendix III).
On March 24, 2008, Ecuadorean Attorney General Alfredo
Alvear confirmed that one of the bodies found on the scene of
the guerilla camp in Ecuador belonged to Ecuadorean citizen
Franklin Aisalla (an alleged FARC locksmith). The Ecuadorean
government sought help from the OAS in condemning the killing.
Though concern regarding the worth and legitimacy of the
``Reyes Computers'' exists, on March 17 information derived
from the computers led to the recovery of more than $480,000 in
clandestine cash apparently hidden for several years in Costa
Rica; on March 26, Colombian officials reported recovering 66
pounds of depleted uranium that they allege was originally
acquired by the FARC. Juan Manuel Santos, Colombian Defense
Minister, said that he expected the validation of the files to
be completed by the end of April; ``It is a great deal of
information that is extremely valuable and important.''
On April 9, Ecuadorean Defense Minister, Wellington
Sandoval stepped down, along with the four top military
commanders, after President Correa accused the military of
aiding U.S. operations against FARC rebels.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ BBC News Ecuador's Military Chief Resigns http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7339743.stm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 14, Ecuadorean Minister of Public Administration,
Communications and Information, Vinicio Alvarado, announced
that a formal complaint would be filed with the OAS regarding
statements made by Colombian officials on April 13 accusing
President Correa of stopping Ecuadorean military operations
against the FARC. The Minister said that the Ecuadorean
Government found this to be a violation of the March 17, 2008,
resolution.\6\ As well, on April 17 President Correa warned the
Colombian government--and Colombia's FARC rebels--to stay out
of his country, saying future incursions would be considered an
``act of war.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ El Ecuador presentara queja formal ante la OEA por las
ultimas acciones del Gobierno Colombiano http://www.presidencia.gov.ec/
noticias.asp?noid=13360
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country Perspectives
colombia
The FARC at Its ``Tipping-Point''
Throughout staff's meetings, Colombian officials reiterated
that they had accepted responsibly in their incursion into
Ecuador, and noted that the Government of Colombia (GOC) was
satisfied with the OAS resolution.GOC officials believe that
the computers recovered at the scene of the raid provided
explicit evidence of Venezuelan involvement with the FARC and
support the contention that Venezuela turns a blind eye to FARC
on Venezuelan soil. Furthermore, GOC officials believe that the
death of ``Raul Reyes'' might be a critical blow to the FARC.
GOC officials pointed to the example of Peru's Sendero Luminoso
(``Shining Path''): ``When Abimael Guzman (Sendero Luminoso's
leader) went down, the rest of Sendero went down with him, over
time.''
Reviewing the history of Colombia's conflict with the FARC
over the last decade, the argument was made that FARC behavior,
particularly when offered the freedom of the Demilitarized Zone
(Despeje, in Spanish) during the 1990's, demonstrated that the
organization no longer had political legitimacy. One Colombian
official noted that when the FARC was offered territory and
political control, the group decisively chose narco-
trafficking, banditry and violence. Since then, GOC officials
assert, the gap between rhetoric and reality has only grown,
and information acquired from the ``Reyes Computers''
decisively proves this.
One GOC official also expressed optimism that the ``Reyes
Computers'' would continue to generate more revelations: At the
time this quote was recorded, ``Only ten percent of Reyes'
principal computer has been exploited.'' GOC officials spoke of
a tipping point where the cumulative blows to the FARC may lead
to the implosion of the organization.
More broadly, GOC officials noted that the obtained
evidence of ``Reyes Computers'' demonstrated that the FARC had
developed broad and comfortable ties throughout Latin America
and further afield. GOC officials were quick to point out that
the information obtained from the ``Reyes Computers'' to date
indicated that FARC had fraternal ties with communist parties
in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Spain, as well as
longstanding and deep ties with President Chavez and networks
of Marxists in Venezuela and Colombia.
The FARC's Presence in Ecuador and Venezuela
Prior to the March 1, 2008 raid, GOC officials had
identified some 32 FARC camps operating freely on Ecuadorean
soil. According to Ecuadorean officials the FARC would move
their camps, at Ecuador's behest. GOC officials pointed out:
``the real issue is not that `Raul Reyes' was in his pajamas
and not in his military fatigues when he was killed; the issue
is that he felt comfortable enough in his Ecuadorean base to
feel that he could sleep in his pajamas.'' Clearly, to the GOC
this feeling of FARC security in Ecuador is a real outrage.
Regarding Venezuelan support for the FARC, GOC officials
showed staff a map indicating FARC camps in Venezuela. The GOC
knew that they were there, but could do nothing against them,
GOC officials claimed. The Venezuelans are repeatedly informed
by the GOC that the FARC is actively using Venezuelan soil;
they cite Venezuelan inaction as evidence that Venezuela was
actively supporting the FARC.
Venezuela's Military as a Source of Regional Instability
The Colombian Military believes that the Venezuelan
mobilization at the Colombian frontier was disorganized and
inconsequential. Yet, according to a Colombian Defense Ministry
official, there remains a risk that Venezuela will take this
logistical failure as ``lessons learned'' and improve its
military to enable future action against Colombia. GOC
officials believe that a successful Venezuelan attack on
Colombia in the short term is ``unimaginable.'' Yet,
Venezuela's military shopping remains of deep concern to the
GOC. The possibility that Venezuela may be seeking Man-Portable
Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), as well as plans to purchase
four Kilo-class Project 636 Russian diesel-electric
submarines\7\ and related talks with Russian officials to
purchase additional weapons systems could pose a threat to
Colombian military superiority, according to GOC officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The Kilo-class Project 636 submarines are mainly intended for
anti-shipping and anti-submarine operations in relatively shallow
waters. Venezuela, the fourth largest arms buyer from Russia after
China, India and Algeria, has so far purchased some $3 billion worth of
arms from Russia, including military helicopters, Kalashnikovs and
Sukhoi fighter jets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GOC's Take on the Possibility of U.S. Sanctions Against the
Government of Venezuela
Staff relayed the increased likelihood that the impact of
the information in the ``Reyes Computers,'' if certified by
Interpol, is likely to be followed by pressure in the U.S.
Congress for a determination by U.S. authorities that the
government of Venezuela is supporting an FTO, triggering
mandatory sanctions.
GOC had an ambiguous position on any such sanctions. From
the GOC standpoint, a decision triggering economic sanctions
could severely limit Venezuelan commercial revenues, including
oil, thus affecting Venezuela's ability to attract funds for
arms purchases. On the other hand, as Venezuela's economic
policies have progressively hollowed out the Venezuelan
economy, and in particular its agriculture, GOC officials noted
that Venezuela has grown into an enormous market for Colombia's
agricultural produce. Any broad economic sanctions that would
inhibit Venezuela's ability to attract capital would lessen
Venezuela's ability to purchase Colombian goods, and any
reduction in Venezuela's ability to purchase Colombian products
would invariably have a negative impact on Colombia's economy.
Moreover, any broad economic sanctions against Venezuela might
result in political pressure for the United States to curtail
economic relations; ultimately, this would rebound to the
detriment of the Colombian economy.
The Significance of the U.S.-Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement for
Colombian Economic Stability
Colombia is highly dependent on Venezuela as an export
market for its products. According to U.S. Embassy officials in
Colombia, commerce between Colombia and Venezuela has returned
to normal after the recent crisis between those two countries
and Ecuador. The Colombian Finance Minister estimates that a
complete shutdown of trade with Venezuela could cost 100,000
jobs.
Venezuela is Colombia's second-largest trading partner
after the United States. Trade between the nations totaled $6.5
billion as of December 2007, according to Colombian government
statistics. Venezuela imported $5.2 billion in goods from its
neighbor, nearly double the 2006 amount because of high demand
for Colombian-made vehicles, car parts and clothing. Colombia,
meanwhile, purchased only $1.3 billion worth of Venezuelan
goods, mostly petrochemical products and plastic goods.
Venezuela currently absorbs some 15 percent of Colombia's total
exports and about one-third of its manufacturing exports.
Venezuela is now Colombia's single most important
destination for non-traditional (other than commodities)
exports, accounting for 32% of such sales. Colombian exports of
food to Venezuela are particularly crucial for Colombia
commercially, and given price controls and shortages of many
staples in Venezuela, for Venezuela as well. Colombian exports
to the U.S. consist of mainly commodities and low value added
products.
In relation to the to the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement, Colombia already gets 95% access to the U.S. through
the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) that is subject to
renewal by the U.S. Congress periodically. But, it is important
to note that ratification of this agreement will not only
provide an extra 5% access to the U.S. economy, once
implemented, the agreement will eliminate tariffs on more than
80 percent of American exports of industrial and consumer goods
immediately and 100 percent over time.
The agreement will also allow for the development of a
stable, long-term environment for broad investment
opportunities that will provide many gains. Preeminent among
these gains, this environment would help Colombia to diversify
its export markets.
ecuador
Anger and Frustration Toward Colombia
According to GOE officials, the GOC had an obligation on
March 1, 2008, to notify Ecuador of its intent to raid the
camp. GOE officials explained that they would not have had a
problem capturing and extraditing Reyes to Colombia if GOC
officials had requested it. According to GOE Military officials
the Ecuadorean military was only minutes from capturing him
last November.
GOE military officials state that unlike Colombia, Ecuador
has cities close to its border, including Quito, suggesting
that Ecuador is more vulnerable to the FARC than Colombia.
GOE officials admitted that they have lost political
confidence in the role the United States could play in seeking
the release of hostages held by the FARC. But, GOE officials
noted that they remain interested in working for the release of
all FARC-held hostages. In this regard, it is important to note
that President Correa has called on the FARC to liberate all
hostages without conditions.
The GOE holds that it has been accused unfairly by the
United States of collaborating with the FARC when it was just
doing its part to work for the release of hostages under a
``humanitarian mandate.''
President Correa has condemned the kidnappings of what the
GOE designates as irregular forces\8\ like the FARC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Irregular Groups/ Irregular Forces (Rexton Kan, Paul. March
2008. Drug Intoxicated Irregular Fighters: Complications Dangers and
Responses. Strategic Studies Institute http://
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
Leadership of irregular group uses the promise of drugs to
their fighters as a reward.
Leadership of irregular group encourages drug use as a
motivation for atrocities against civilians.
Command and control of irregular troops are nearly
nonexistent due to widespread drug use among fighters.
The types of equipment used by irregular forces do not
require a great degree of skill.
Giving drugs to individuals coincides with the tactics
employed by irregular forces.
Over time, drug use among irregular forces generally degrades
combat effectiveness and leads to internal division and
fragmentation.
Their members are not full-time, regularly trained military
professionals. As a result, draftees and conscripts have sought
drugs as a way to cope with an unfamiliar atmosphere and can
behave similarly to irregular troops.
Confronting the FARC the ``Ecuadorean Way''
The GOE explained that the Ecuadorean approach to dealing
with the FARC emphasizes prevention of conflict using social
and economic programs and a police presence. The GOE wants to
invest in sustainable development and community policing rather
than the military.
The GOE believes that the police can do what is necessary
to combat illegal activity and ensure citizen security,
including dismantling the FARC. The GOE is working to increase
its presence in the border area, including medical clinics and
judicial authorities, as well as the police. The objective is
to reduce incentives for Ecuadorean citizens in the border area
to work with irregular forces and to build a law-abiding
society. Ecuador welcomes international assistance in these
areas under a policy proposal devised by the GOE called ``Plan
Ecuador'' (See Appendix IV).
Ecuador-Colombian Border Issues
The GOE believes that it can control the border if the GOC
does so as well. The GOE explained that the FARC are present in
Ecuador as a result of Plan Colombia--which is forcing FARC
personnel to flee to Ecuador--and the inability of the GOC to
contain the FARC within its borders.
GOE officials explained that they will never be able to
make the border completely impassable. Yet, they were quick to
point out that the Ecuadorean military has destroyed 47 FARC
camps since 2007.
GOE officials emphasized that the FARC's 32th and 48th
Fronts are located in southern Colombia (See map, Appendix V).
The GOE has 14 military posts in its border region; according
to GOE officials Ecuador covers the area more consistently than
does Colombia (See map, Appendix VI).
The GOE has fought narcotics trafficking more effectively
than has the GOC, according to GOE officials. Asked whether
they would name the FARC a terrorist group, GOE officials
offered that it would only make Ecuador a target.
GOE officials explained that for years they have welcomed a
large number of Colombian refugees. But, they have never once
received compensation for their care, or for Ecuadorean
properties that were destroyed by the Colombian military during
GOC operations along the border area. Nor has the GOC conducted
impartial investigations when Ecuadoreans are killed during
these operations. According to GOE officials, their requests to
the GOC on this subject have gone unanswered.
One Ecuadorean military official admitted that he believed
that the FARC's actions are ``terrorist,'' and was glad to see
Reyes dead. This same official admitted the conflict with
Colombia is painful; however, he asserted that ``it is
Colombia's fault. A relationship of mutual confidence has been
broken through a chain of lies,'' he said.
According to GOE officials, bilateral mechanisms like the
Combifrom have failed, and observers representing a third party
(e.g., Rio Group, OAS, United Nations (UN)) are needed to
ensure the rule of law.
According to the GOE, the origin of the problem is
Colombia, since there are no Ecuadorean terrorists, mafias, or
troops attacking Colombia. For its part, the GOE will continue
its efforts to improve security, and even redouble them, while
also seeking to address the causes of the conflict.
The ``Reyes Computers'': ``A Mixed Bag''
Going forward, GOE officials stated that they would have
confidence in the documents ``allegedly contained in `Reyes'
Computers' collected during the Colombian military's raid''
only if they were analyzed by an impartial source and handled
in a transparent manner, rather than for political ends as
Colombia is doing, GOE officials said.
Once the GOE has access to the information, it will
investigate. According to GOE officials, some of the
information in the computers will likely turn out to be wishful
thinking on the part of the FARC and some will be
unsubstantiated gossip or hearsay. Other parts, they admit,
will be true.
Analysis and Reccomendations
A violation of the territorial integrity of a country is a
very serious infraction punishable by international law. An
appreciation of Latin American sensitivities regarding
sovereignty and the history in which these sensitivities
developed is needed to place the recent crisis in full context.
The often visceral Latin American response to issues of
sovereignty springs largely from the reoccurrence of border
conflicts between Latin countries and past interventions from
European powers and the United States.
Staff believes that these attitudes serve as a backdrop for
a situation that is still evolving and could escalate in the
near future. In this regard, it is important for the United
States to encourage a constructive regional framework that
features a clear and explicit consensus. This consensus should
unequivocally declare that the methods used by the FARC, and
other like groups, violate both Colombia's sovereignty and the
sovereignty of other countries where they operate, regardless
of how these groups are classified, whether terrorist,
irregular or belligerent.
Given that some countries view the FARC as a legitimate
organization and benefit to some degree from FARC activities,
finding agreement on such a framework presents a major
challenge for the region. However, once the nature of FARC
activities and the alleged relationships of some countries with
the FARC are verified and exposed, it will be difficult for the
complicit countries to continue to support the FARC through
action or inaction.
Though there are other issues that make up the political
landscape regarding this complicated situation, the chief
question the USG may confront in the short term is:
If the information found by Interpol in the ``Reyes
Computers'' is determined to be credible and
verifiable, what policy tools will the USG use to
protect USG interests and, in partnership, the security
of individual nations at risk?
The following are specific points that should be considered
by relevant USG officials to ensure that the United States
protects its interests in the region, advances regional
partnership and plays a constructive role in creating a
positive regional environment to minimize the possibility of
crisis among Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
1. Considerations for Additional Sanctions on Venezuela
Many have suggested that Venezuela be designated as a State
Sponsor of Terrorism\9\ due to its support for the FARC. Should
evidence of closer collaboration between the FARC and Venezuela
come to light from Reyes' computer, pressure in Congress and in
the Administration for such a shift in policy will grow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Country Reports on Terrorism Released by the Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department, April 30, 2007
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Sponsors of Terrorism: Overview
State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-
state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist
groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds,
weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and
conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these
countries also have the capability to manufacture weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and other destabilizing technologies
that could get into the hands of terrorists. The United States
will continue to insist that these countries end the support
they give to terrorist groups. As a result of the historic
decisions taken by Libya's leadership in 2003 to renounce
terrorism and to abandon its WMD programs, the United States
rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism
on June 30. Since pledging to renounce terrorism in 2003, Libya
has cooperated closely with the United States and the
international community on counterterrorism efforts. Sudan
continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the War on
Terror. Cuba, Iran, and Syria, however, have not renounced
terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist
Organizations. Iran and Syria routinely provided safe haven,
substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations.
Venezuela was certified by the Secretary of State as ``not
fully cooperating'' with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The
designation, included in Section 40A of the Arms Export Control
Act, was based on a review of Venezuela's overall efforts to
fight terrorism. Effective October 1, the decision imposed
sanctions on all commercial arms sales and transfers. It
remains in effect until September 30, 2007, when it may be
renewed by a determination by the Secretary. (Venezuela is the
only nation certified as ``not fully cooperating'' that is not
a state sponsor of terrorism.)
State Sponsor: Implications
Designating countries that repeatedly provide support for
acts of international terrorism as state sponsors of terrorism
imposes four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions:
1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.
2. Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring
30-day Congressional notification for goods or services
that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list
country's military capability or ability to support
terrorism.
3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.
4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other
restrictions, including:
Requiring the United States to oppose loans
by the World Bank and other international
financial institutions;
Lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families
of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in
U.S. courts;
Denying companies and individuals tax credits
for income earned in terrorist-listed
countries;
Denial of duty-free treatment of goods
exported to the United States;
Authority to prohibit any U.S. citizen from
engaging in a financial transaction with a
terrorist-list government without a Treasury
Department license; and
Prohibition of Defense Department contracts
above $100,000 with companies controlled by
terrorist-list states.
If events lead to this option, policymakers must ensure
that the law is carefully and flexibly crafted to guarantee
that any enhanced sanctions diminish, rather than solidify,
President Chavez's ability to mobilize public opinion in his
favor, both in Venezuela and in the rest of Latin America.
Staff strongly cautions that policymakers must be wary of
the implications of poorly thought out sanctions which might
isolate the United States and lessen its ability to bring about
constructive reforms and thereby advance USG interests.
Venezuela is currently subject to a number of legal
restrictions, some of which create overlapping prohibitions.
Some relate to the provision of foreign assistance, and some
relate to other programs that do not necessarily utilize
foreign assistance funds, e.g. Foreign Military Sales and
licensing of defense articles and services (full list of U.S.
Sanctions against Venezuela).\10\ Some of these provisions
restrict assistance to the government of Venezuela while others
restrict assistance to the country as a whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Tier 3 Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Pursuant to Presidential Determination (PD) 2008-4 (October
18, 2007), during fiscal year 2008, as in prior recent fiscal
years, the Government of Venezuela is ineligible for non-
humanitarian, non-trade-related foreign assistance (as defined
in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (Div. A, P.L. 106-
386), as amended) including most ESF and DA programs, and FMF
and IMET. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are also restricted.
Except under specific circumstances including anti-TIP related
programs, projects addressing basic human needs or certain
regional projects, the United States must use its ``best
efforts'' to actively lobby against International Financial
Institution (IFI) financing for Venezuela.
Counternarcotics
For the past three years, Venezuela has been found to have
``failed demonstrably'' during the previous 12 months to adhere
to its obligations under international counter-narcotics
agreements and to take certain counter-narcotics measures under
Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY
2002-2003 (FRAA) (P.L. 107-228). This sanction applies to the
country as a whole and not just the government. The restriction
applies to most assistance under the FAA, OPIC programs, sales
and financing under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),
agricultural commodities other than food, Export-Import Bank
financing, but does not apply to humanitarian or
counternarcotics assistance. The President has waived the
sanctions with respect to programs to aid Venezuela's
democratic institutions. See PD 2007-33 (September 14, 2007).
Counterterrorism
Venezuela was designated as ``not cooperating fully'' with
U.S. antiterrorism efforts, pursuant to section 40A of the Arms
Export and Control Act, as amended, in both 2006 and 2007. The
certification will lapse unless renewed by May 15, 2008.
Pursuant to this certification, defense articles and services
may not be sold or licensed for export to Venezuela during the
relevant fiscal year. Prior to this certification taking
effect, the Department of State announced as a policy matter in
August 2006 that it would deny all applications for licenses or
for other approvals to export defense articles or services to
Venezuela.
Designations
Certain individuals and entities with Venezuelan addresses
and/or identification cards have been designated by the
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control,
primarily under its counter-narcotics trafficking sanctions
programs. Any assets belonging to these individuals within U.S.
jurisdiction are frozen, and transactions with these
individuals and entities are prohibited.
Staff advises that any new sanctions regime must not
impinge on U.S. commercial prospects in Venezuela.
It is difficult to conjure all appropriate possibilities
that exist within the flexible framework provided in anti-
terrorism law, although we can recall that the United States
has crafted targeted sanctions against other problematic
governments employing, among other restrictions, sanctions that
have frozen assets and banned the travel of prominent officials
and their families.
Staff believes in this case that U.S. actions are stronger
if they rest on the foundation of regional support. Absent such
support, U.S. sanctions on Venezuela would be less effective.
Indeed, they might be counter-productive. The USG has to act
with care that other Latin American countries do not see
themselves labeled unnecessarily and provocatively as
supporters of terror, or the surrogates of terrorists, simply
because they are carrying out their perceived national interest
in maintaining relations with Venezuela.
It is better for the United States' long term interests in
the region to be seen as respectful of the on-going process
established in the OAS, which up to now has been beneficial in
defusing tensions. On this occasion, rather than ``speaking
softly and carrying a big stick'' the better posture for the
USG to assume is one of speaking with gentle persuasion, and
wise counsel, and letting those ``sticks'' that may need to be
wielded be ones of a multi-lateral rather than a unilateral
nature. Additional sanctions would be perceived as more
legitimate if enacted within a multilateral framework.
This does not mean that support for terrorism is accepted,
or that U.S. interests should be made vulnerable to the
timetable or whims of the collective will of Latin nations. On
the contrary, if evidence is established of serious and
substantive support for the FARC by the Government of Venezuela
then the Government of Venezuela's credibility in Latin America
will be reduced. Venezuela will be viewed as an unreliable
actor that seeks to sabotage the security interests of
countries that do not share its economic paradigm, or its
political views. To put it in context: Venezuela will be seen
as infringing upon the sovereign rights of a Latin American
neighbor, not because the U.S. says it is, but because the
evidence proves it is. This can turn antipathy toward the USG
by any single individual Latin American country into Latin
American regional scrutiny of an intrusive brother country,
whose government has proclaimed itself to be the major foe of
the USG.
In other words, if Venezuela is found to be complicit, the
U.S would be wise to allow for the regional dynamic to take its
course. If the U.S. reacts too strongly, attention will go from
Venezuela's transgressions to yet another example of ``American
intervention'' and strong-arm tactics.
It is in this climate that political space will open for
USG input that seeks to engender effective multilateral action
in reaction to any nation that contravenes U.S. national
security priorities and the collective interests of member
countries of the OAS and signatories of its Charter.
2. Ensure that information gathered from the ``Reyes Computers'' is
disseminated broadly and the process of how it was analyzed is
transparent
If the Reyes information is proven to be authentic, Latin
countries will need time to examine the information with the
utmost transparency. In this regard, the creation of an
official webpage, associated either with Interpol, or another
credible multilateral organization, could serve as the
exclusive venue through which documents are made public.
Information that is sensitive to the military should be indexed
appropriately.
This information must be kept and distributed by an
organization that is viewed by Latin governments and people as
impartial. If this does not occur, the information could be
regarded in some Latin sectors as being doctored by the United
States, thus losing its usefulness. This could easily alienate
other Latin American countries. Obviously, this would not be
helpful for U.S interests in the long term.
3. Should the ``Reyes Computers'' not yield credible and verifiable
information that incriminates the highest ranks of the GOE the
U.S. should work with the GOE and OAS to devise a comprehensive
northern border security assistance plan for Ecuador perhaps as
a refurbishment of ``Plan Ecuador''
Staff encourages the U.S. Department of State to consider
advancing in conjunction and partnership with Ecuador an effort
through the OAS for the development of a northern border multi-
lateral security assistance program that involves support for
the GOE's efforts to gain control of the drug trafficking
corridors of the country.
If the information from the ``Reyes Computers'' is not
proven to be credible and verifiable, and assuming affirmative
acceptance by Ecuador, this regional initiative in support of a
sovereign country would be an effective first collective
regional reaction in recognition by Latin America of the danger
represented by the FARC to Ecuador's sovereignty, given the
difficulty of patrolling and controlling the border.
Necessarily this would include regional cooperative engagement
for certain aspects of training and equipping Ecuador's
counternarcotics forces, and the provision of humanitarian
assistance and development components to help Ecuador deal with
Colombian refugees and others displaced by conflict in the
region.
As well, a regional assistance package should provide
assistance to enhance Ecuadorean narcotics interdiction efforts
along the border and at ports facilities. Assistance should
also be considered for radar systems and should include support
for Ecuador's police in the border area, specifically for
procurement and training. Funds should also be made available
for communications equipment, as well as ammunition and
logistical support to enhance the Ecuador military's guarding
of the border region.
In addition, an OAS regional plan developed with strong
acceptance and input from Ecuador and Colombia that performs
the functions associated with Combifrom would be a positive
development for the entire region, and would set an example for
conflict resolution and the primacy of rule of law across Latin
America.
A P P E N D I X
----------
Appendix I.--Resolution of the March 2008 Meeting of the Organization
of American States (OAS)
(SOURCE: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MARCH 2008)
----------
ANNEX 1--RESOLUTION OF THE OAS
PERMANENT COUNCIL
OEA/Ser.G
CP/RES.930 (1632/08)
5 March 2008
Original: Spanish
CP/RES. 930 (1632/08)
CONVOCATION OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION
(APPROVED AT ITS MEETING OF MARCH 5, 2008)
THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, TAKING
INTO ACCOUNT:
That the Organization of American States (OAS) is fully
competent to take cognizance of deeds and events that
jeopardize hemispheric peace and security;
That the purposes of the Organization of American States
include respect for the personality, sovereignty, and
independence of states and the faithful fulfillment of
obligations derived from treaties and other sources of
international law;
That Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States establishes that ``[t]he right of each State to
protect itself and to live its own life does not authorize it
to commit unjust acts against another State'';
That Article 19 of the Charter prescribes that ``No State
or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the
State or against its political, economic, and cultural
elements'';
That Article 21 of the Charter emphasizes that ``The
territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object,
even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures
of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever'';
That the Charter of the Organization of American States
stipulates, in Article 28, that ``Every act of aggression by a
State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of
the territory or against the sovereignty or political
independence of an American State shall be considered an act of
aggression against the other American states'';
That the Charter of the Organization of American States
reaffirms the principle that ``Controversies of an
international character arising between two or more American
States shall be settled by peaceful procedures''; and
That ``[t]o strengthen the peace and security of the
continent'' and ``ensure the pacific settlement of disputes
that may arise among the Member States'' are among the
essential purposes of the OAS Charter;
CONSIDERING:
That on the morning of Saturday, March 1, 2008, military
forces and police personnel of Colombia entered the territory
of Ecuador, in the province of Sucumb!os, without the express
consent of the government of Ecuador to carry out an operation
against members of an irregular group of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia who were clandestinely encamped on the
Ecuadorian side of the border;
That that act constitutes a violation of the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of
international law;
That that act has triggered a serious crisis between those
two countries, leading to the breaking off of relations between
the two states and grave tension in the region;
That, pursuant to Article 84 of the Charter, one function
of the OAS is to keep vigilance over the maintenance of
friendly relations among the member states, using the
procedures provided for in that Charter; and
That this case meets the conditions for convocation of a
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in
light of Articles 61 ff of the OAS Charter,
RESOLVES:
1. To reaffirm the principle that the territory of a state
is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporarily, of
military occupation or of other measures of force taken by
another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds
whatsoever.
2. To constitute a commission, headed by the Secretary
General and composed of four ambassadors designated by him, to
visit both countries, traveling to the places that the parties
indicate, to submit the corresponding report to the Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and to propose
formulas for bringing the two nations closer together.
3. To convene, under the provisions of Articles 61, 62, and
63 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, a
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, to be
held on Monday, March 17, 2008, at OAS headquarters, to examine
the facts and make pertinent recommendations.
Appendix II.--Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the
Rio Groupon the Recent Events Between Ecuador and Colombia
(FINAL REVISED VERSION, 4:50 P.M., MARCH 7, 2008)
(SOURCE: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MARCH 2008)
The Heads of State and Government of the Permanent
Mechanism for Consultation and Policy Coordination--Rio Group--
meeting on the occasion of the XX Summit Meeting, in Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic, mindful of the situation
prevailing between Ecuador and Colombia, have decided to issue
the following Declaration:
1. The entire region views as a matter of grave concern the
events that occurred on March 1, 2008, when military forces and
police personnel of Colombia entered the territory of Ecuador,
in the province of Sucumb!os, without the express consent of
the Government of Ecuador, to carry out an operation against
members of an irregular group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia, who were clandestinely encamped on the Ecuadorian
side of the border.
2. We denounce this violation of the territorial integrity
of Ecuador, and we therefore reaffirm that the territory of a
state is inviolable and may not be the object, even
temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of
force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds.
3. We note, with satisfaction, the full apology that
President Alvaro Uribe offered to the Government and people of
Colombia, for the violation on March 1, 2008, of the territory
and sovereignty of this sister nation by Colombian security
forces.
4. We also acknowledge the pledge by President Alvaro
Uribe, on behalf of his country, that these events will not be
repeated under any circumstances, in compliance with Articles
19 and 21 of the OAS Charter.
5. We note the President Rafael Correa's decision to
receive the documentation offered by President Alvaro Uribe and
which would have been reached the Government of Colombia after
the events of March 1, so as to enable the Ecuadorian judicial
officials to investigate possible violations of national law.
6. We also recall the principles, enshrined in
international law, of respect for sovereignty, abstention from
the threat or use of force, and noninterference in the internal
affairs of other states, underscoring that Article 19 of the
Charter of the Organization of American States stipulates that
``[n]o State or group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing
principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other
form of interference or attempted threat against the
personality of the State or against its political, economic,
and cultural elements.''
7. We reiterate our commitment to peaceful coexistence in
the region, based on the fundamental precepts of international
law contained in the charters of the United Nations and the
Organization of American States, as well as in the essential
purposes of the Rio Group, in particular the peaceful
settlement of disputes and its commitment to the preservation
of peace and the joint search for solutions to conflicts
affecting the region.
8. We reiterate our firm commitment to counter threats to
the security of all states, arising from the action of
irregular groups or criminal organizations, in particular those
associated with drug-trafficking activities. Colombia considers
these criminal organizations as terrorist.
9. We support the resolution adopted by the Permanent
Council of the Organization of American States on March 5,
2008. Likewise, we express our support for the Secretary
General as he carries out the responsibilities assigned to him
by said resolution, namely, to head a commission that will
visit both countries, traveling to the places that the parties
indicate, to submit a report on its observations to the Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and to propose
formulas for bringing the two nations closer together.
10. We urge the parties involved to keep respectful
channels of communication open and to seek formulas for easing
tension.
11. Taking into account the valuable tradition of the R!o
Group, as a fundamental mechanism for the promotion of
understanding and the search for peace in our region, we
express our full support for this effort at rapprochement. In
that regard, we offer the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador
the good offices of the Group to help bring about a
satisfactory conclusion, to which end the Group's Troika will
pay heed to the results of the Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, March 7, 2008
Appendix III.--Report of the OAS Commission That Visited Ecuador and
Colombia
(SOURCE: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MARCH 2008)
OEA/Ser.F/II.25
RC.25/doc. 7/08
16 March 2008
Original: Spanish
TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION
OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
March 17, 2008
Washington, D.C.
REPORT OF THE OAS COMMISSION THAT VISITED ECUADOR AND COLOMBIA
I. ORIGIN AND MANDATE
By a note dated March 2, 2008, the Government of Ecuador
requested that a special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council
be convened to consider ``the incursion into Ecuador of
Colombian armed forces to conduct an operation against members
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).''
The OAS Permanent Council held that special meeting on
March 4 and 5, 2008. On March 5, it adopted resolution CP/RES.
930 (1632/08), ``Convocation of the Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Appointment of a Commission,''
in which it resolved:
``1. To reaffirm the principle that the territory of
a state is inviolable and may not be the object, even
temporarily, of military occupation or of other
measures of force taken by another State, directly or
indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever.
``2. To constitute a commission, headed by the
Secretary General and composed of four ambassadors
designated by him, to visit both countries, traveling
to the places that the parties indicate, to submit the
corresponding report to the Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and to propose formulas
for bringing the two nations closer together.
``3. To convene, under the provisions of Articles 61,
62, and 63 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States, a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, to be held on Monday, March 17,
2008, at OAS headquarters, to examine the facts and
make pertinent recommendations.''
[See Annex 1--OAS Permanent Council resolution CP/RES. 930
(1632/08.]
Pursuant to operative paragraph 2 of that resolution, the
OAS Secretary General invited the following four permanent
representatives to the OAS to serve on the Commission:
Ambassador Rodolfo Gil from Argentina, Ambassador Osmar Chohfi
from Brazil, Ambassador Aristides Royo from Panama, y
Ambassador Maria Zavala from Peru. In addition, the Ambassador
from The Bahamas, Cornelius Smith, was part of the Commission
in his capacity as Chair of the OAS Permanent Council.
The Commission departed from Washington, D.C., in the early
morning of March 9 in a Brazilian Armed Force aircraft that the
Government of Brazil had made available for that purpose. The
Commission began its work in Ecuador, on March 9 and 10. On
March 10 at night it traveled to Colombia. Then, on March 12 in
the afternoon, it set out on its return journey to Washington.
As established in the Permanent Council resolution, the
Commission visited the places and held the meetings proposed to
it by each of the governments of the states concerned.
The Commission would like to express its appreciation for
the broad cooperation that the officials of both governments
extended to it and for all the information provided to enable
it to carry out its mandate. Likewise, it thanks the
Governments of the Republic of Colombia and the Republic of
Ecuador for providing the delegation with hospitality and
transportation in each of the countries.
The Commission also wishes to express its appreciation to
the Government of Brazil for providing a Brazilian Armed Force
aircraft enabling it to travel from Washington, D.C., to the
capitals of Colombia and Ecuador and thus carry out the mission
entrusted to it. This made it possible for the Commission to
travel to both countries in accordance with its established
agenda and to return to Washington.
It should be mentioned that during the time period between
the adoption of the OAS Permanent Council resolution and the
start of the Commission's mission, the XX Summit of the Rio
Group was held in the Dominican Republic, on March 7, 2008. At
that meeting, the Heads of State discussed tensions in the
region extensively. Following that discussion, they adopted a
resolution supporting the work entrusted to the Commission by
the OAS [See Annex 2--Declaration of the Heads of State and
Government of the Rio Group on the recent events between
Ecuador and Colombia].
It bears noting that the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Ban Ki-moon, publicly expressed that organization's
support for the efforts of the OAS to bring about a
rapprochement between Ecuador and Colombia. In that regard, in
a press release dated March 6, the United Nations Secretary-
General extended his full support for the mediating efforts of
the Organization of American States to address the crisis
between Colombia and Ecuador and said that the resolution
adopted by the OAS Permanent Council on that topic ``provides
(an) impartial mechanism to clarify events and offers both
countries a path to resolve their differences peacefully and
cooperatively.'' [See Annex 3--United Nations Press Release.]
II. VISIT TO ECUADOR
Upon its arrival in the country, as set out in its agenda,
the Commission met with the President of the Republic of
Ecuador, Rafael Correa; members of his cabinet; and other
senior government officials. [See Annex 4--Agenda in Ecuador].
President Correa expressed his appreciation to the OAS and the
Commission for the speed with which the latter had initiated
its work. He explained that the incident had been resolved at
the Rio Group Summit from a political point of view and that,
as a result, tensions between the two governments had started
to abate, even though it would be very difficult for him, from
a personal point of view, to rebuild trust in his Colombian
counterpart. However, he reiterated that it was essential to
ascertain the truth about what had occurred with regard to all
facets of the Colombian military incursion and to determine
whether international humanitarian law had been complied with.
In that connection, he emphasized that the Commission's work
was important because it would make it possible to verify what
had happened on March 1 and, on that basis, to propose
mechanisms or measures to avoid its recurrence in the future.
President Correa raised a few specific concerns about the
incident: (1) whether the bombing took place during a flyover
of Ecuadorian territory; (2) what type of aircraft and
technology was used for it; (3) how long the Colombian Air
Force incursion into Ecuadorian territory lasted; (4) how the
presence of Luis Edgar Devia Silva, alias ``Raul Reyes,'' was
detected and why he was put down in Ecuadorian territory; (5)
what the condition was of the bodies of the deceased members of
the FARC found in the camp; and (6) as some of those who had
died had bullet wounds in the back and had been shot at close
range, whether the rules of international humanitarian law were
obeyed.
With regard to the operations of the Binational Border
Commission between the Republic of Ecuador and the Republic of
Colombia (COMBIFRON), President Correa expressed his strong
desire to see that body reactivated and strengthened so that
diverse border security matters could be resolved in that
context.\1\ Lastly, a video was shown depicting the state of
the FARC camp when the Ecuadorian officials and armed force
officers arrived. [See Annex 6--List of documents received by
the Commission].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ COMBIFRON was established on November 21, 1996, by the
Ministers of National Defense of Ecuador and Colombia. It
``coordinates, evaluates, and supervises compliance with military and
police-related border security commitments signed by both countries,
and proposes mechanisms for helping to solve problems in this area in a
timely fashion and to strengthen relations between these
institutions.'' Statute of COMBIFRON.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After a luncheon hosted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Ecuador, Maria Isabel Salvador, the Commission held a
working meeting at which the following presentations were made:
General information on the border area, operations against
irregular groups carried out by the Armed Forces of
Ecuador, prior incursions by the Colombian Armed Forces
into Ecuadorian territory: presentation by the Minister
of National Defense, Mr. Wellington Sandoval
Military technical report on the bombing site giving
detailed information on the locations hit by bombs and
the type of bombs used: presentation by Air Force pilot
Major Santiago Galarza and Air Force Technical Captain
Eduardo Narvaez
Activities conducted by the Departments of Criminology and
Forensic Medicine of the Ecuadorian National Police
with regard to the incident in the province of
Sucumbios-Angostura sector: presentation by Lieutenant
Colonel Milton Zarate of the National Police's
Criminology Department
Legal analysis of the consequences of the Colombian
incursion into Ecuadorian territory: presentation by
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Integration
(acting)--Jose Valencia
Documents, which may be found in the annexes, were
presented on all of these topics. [See Annex 6--List of
documents received by the Commission].
The Commission visited the Military Hospital where the
three injured women-two of them Colombian and the other
Mexican-who had survived the attack on the camp were
hospitalized, and questioned two of them. The young Mexican
woman, Lucia Andrea Morett, was still in a state of shock and
her version was very confused. The Colombian, Marta, relived
with great clarity the explosions that awakened her in the
middle of the night, the moment at which she realized she was
injured, the noise and the moaning that she heard over a period
of several hours, the arrival of the helicopters and soldiers,
her encounter with them when they asked her about Reyes, the
shooting and screaming, and the announcements that Reyes had
been found. Later she heard that they had found a computer. The
soldiers came to her assistance. First they told her that they
would take her away and they put her on a stretcher, and later
she felt that they had gone away. Then she waited for several
hours, with the Mexican woman close by, until the Ecuadorian
personnel arrived.
At the end of the day on March 9, the Commission also met
with Ecuadorian civil society representatives, with the
participation of the Minister for Policy Coordination, Ricardo
Patino.
On March 10, the Commission took an Ecuadorian Air Force
(FAE) aircraft to go to Lago Agrio (Nueva Loja) in the province
of Sucumbios. From there it traveled by helicopter to the scene
of the events located in the Angostura sector, 1,800 meters
from the Colombian border. The Commission members went through
the camp with Ecuadorian officials, who showed them the craters
produced by the impact of the bombs dropped by Colombian
aircraft, the trees with bullet marks, the locations of the
Direct TV antennas, the different areas used by the FARC
members (kitchen, sleeping areas, a schoolroom, power
generators, a mess area, a corral, and dug-out pools for
bathing), and the area where the bodies and injured victims
were found. The camp is located in a remote forest zone, with
very tall trees, dense vegetation, and no inhabited areas in
the vicinity. According to the Minister of Defense of Ecuador,
Wellington Sandoval, the camp was two to three months old. It
accommodated some 20 to 30 people and received people who came
from outside. AK-47 and M-16 rifles and one machine gun were
found there.
Before leaving the country, the Secretary General and some
Commission members held a meeting with the Ecuadorian chapter
of the Colombia-Ecuador Dialogue Group, sponsored by the Carter
Center with support from UNDP.
The Commission also held a press conference for national
and international media to inform them of the activities
carried out during its stay in the country. That very night,
the Commission traveled to Bogota.
III. VISIT TO COLOMBIA
On March 11, the Commission, in keeping with its agreed
agenda [See Annex 5--Agenda in Colombia] held a working meeting
with officials from the Ministry of Defense and the Colombian
Armed Forces in the Military Transport Air Command (CATAM). At
that meeting, presentations were made on the location of
radars, communications between Colombia and Ecuador at the
foreign ministry level and COMBIFRON, and the description of
Operation Phoenix (Operacion Fenix), which are contained in
this document, and other information, which may be found in the
respective annex. [See Annex 6--List of documents received by
the Commission].
Following the presentations, the Commission departed for
Puerto Asis in the Department of Putumayo in a Colombian Air
Force aircraft. There the Commission held a brief meeting with
the Government of the Department of Putumayo, with three
demobilized FARC members and a local Teteye leader. Later on,
the Commission conducted flew by helicopter over the border
zone with Ecuador. During the flight, the Colombian officials
indicated the location in Colombian territory from which,
according to Colombian officials, the bombing had taken place.
Later the aircraft landed in an area where illicit coca crops
are eradicated by hand.
The Commission then went to Puerto Ospina, located on the
Colombian bank of the Putumayo River, the natural border
between the two countries, where it held a working meeting on
board the river patrol boat ARC ``Pastrana'' with the Colombian
Government delegation and some of that vessel's officers, who
reported on the border river patrol's activities. Upon its
return to the Department of Putumayo, it met with the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, Fernando
Araujo.
On March 12, the Commission had a working breakfast with
the President of the Republic of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe Velez,
which was attended by cabinet members and military officers.
President Alvaro Uribe thanked the Commission for its presence
and drew attention to the support the OAS extends to the peace
process in Colombia through the MAPP. He recalled that the
Colombian Constitution assigned two main responsibilities to
the President of the Republic: (1) the conduct of international
relations; and (2) leadership of the Armed Forces of Colombia
in order to guarantee citizen security. He pointed out that
respect for territorial sovereignty must be tied to respect for
citizen security. He expressed the need to move beyond
political agreements that are necessary to ease tension between
the two countries, by identifying concrete mechanisms that
ensure that existing bilateral and cooperation agreements are
complied with.
Following the meeting with President Uribe, the OAS
Secretary General and some Commission members held a brief
meeting with members of INTERPOL who had come to Colombia at
the request of that country's government to conduct an expert
examination of three computers, three USBs (portable memory),
and three hard disks, which, according to the Colombian
officials, had been found in the FARC camp. The INTERPOL
delegates, accompanied by officials from the Administrative
Security Department (DAS), informed the Commission that the
results of their investigation would be ready in late April.
The Secretary General and some Commission members met with
the Colombian chapter of the Colombia-Ecuador Dialogue Group,
sponsored by the Carter Center with support from UNDP. Lastly,
the Commission held a press conference for national and
international media to inform them of the activities it carried
out during its stay in the country. That same afternoon, the
Commission began its return journey to Washington.
IV. VERSIONS OF THE FACTS
At 00:25 hours on Saturday, March 1, 2008, Colombian planes
bombed a FARC camp located at Angostura, in the province of
Sucumbios, on Ecuadorian territory, 1,800 meters from the
frontier with Colombia, which borders on the Department of
Putumayo.
The Government of Colombia indicates that the operation was
initially planned to take place in Colombian territory because,
according to intelligence information, Raul Reyes was going to
be at that camp that night. At 22:30 hours on Friday, February
29, they received human intelligence information to the effect
that Raul Reyes was at a camp located in Ecuadorian territory.
For that reason they decided to carry out a dual operation on
both of the identified camps. The two operations were carried
out using different planes. During its flight over the area,
the Commission was shown the location of the camp on Colombian
territory and a map showing where the bombs were released [See
Annex 6--List of documents received by the Commission].
The Government of Ecuador expresses doubts about the--in
its view--very short period of time in which the Colombian
authorities decided to carry out the operation and regards it
as unlikely that it was done on the basis of human intelligence
data because of the precision of the bombing. The Government of
Ecuador also states that, according to the investigation
carried out by its Air Force technical staff, six 500-pound
GBU12 bombs were dropped by planes flying from South to North
and four more were dropped by planes flying in a North-South
direction, from Ecuadorian air space. It also points out that,
judging by the remains of the bombs found at the camp, their
delivery required advanced technology, which, they say, the
Colombian Air Force does not possess.
For its part, the Colombian Government maintains that 10
bombs were dropped, which it classified as conventional. It
also specifies that they were delivered from Colombian air
space by five Super Tuscan aircraft and three A37 airplanes.
The A37s dropped GPS-guided bombs, while the five Super Tuscan
aircraft had sufficient technological capacity to drop bombs on
targets with a 5-meter margin of error. The Government of
Colombia adds that, technically, it is possible to verify the
flight and delivery of the bombs in the information stored in
radars located in Colombian territory and in the aircraft
computers. When the Air Force operation was over, Colombian
military and police flew into Ecuadorian territory in
helicopters in order to recover the body of ``Raul Reyes,''
which was the objective of what was called Operation Phoenix.
According to what the Government of Colombia went on to say,
when they were landing on Ecuadorian territory, the Colombian
military clashed with some members of the FARC who had not been
killed by the bombs. Having identified the body of ``Raul
Reyes,'' they proceeded to take it to Colombian territory
together with the body of a person who, it was presumed, could
be Guillermo Enrique Torres, alias ``Julian Conrado,'' an
assumption that was subsequently discarded. They also
transferred the body of one Colombian soldier killed in the
operation. Hours later, the Colombian military together with
personnel from the Public Prosecutor's Office examined the
material found in the camp and the state of the people found
there.
According to information provided by the military
authorities in Ecuador on March 1 at 06:15., the Colombian
military authorities informed them that, on that same day, at
00:30 there had been a clash between the Colombian Armed Forces
and a Colombian irregular armed group in its territory. Along
those lines, President Correa said that he had received
President Uribe's first call informing him that this clash had
taken place and that it had begun in Colombian territory and
had been continued in Ecuadorian territory, in a what was
called a ``hot'' pursuit, resulting in the deaths of 17
irregular forces, the wounding or capture of 11, and the death
of one Colombian soldier. The Commander of the Fourth
``Amazonas'' Jungle Division, having received the information
from the Colombian side, ordered Jungle Brigade No. 19 Napo to
go to that location. Because the initially provided coordinates
were incorrect, that Brigade took longer than expected to
arrive, which it did, finally, at 13:00 hours on that day. That
was when the first Ecuadorian military contingent arrived. It
was followed at 17:40 hours by the Ecuadorian Public Prosecutor
from Lago Agrio, who on March 3 and 4, ascertained the
existence of 22 bodies, some wearing only underwear, three
wounded women, and a number of rifles. If the two bodies found
by the Colombian Army were added in, the total would be 24
victims. Added to this is the body buried near the camp found
on March 7 in a state of decomposition, which, according to the
forensic information available, has most likely been a victim
of the bombing a few days earlier. [See Annex 6--List of
documents received by the Commission].
The preliminary study by the National Police of Ecuador
found that there were three sets of causes of death:
1. From the blast of the explosions.
2. Mixed cause of death due to the blast and to
penetration (with entry and exit orifices) of bullets
shot from firearms.
3. Penetration (with entry and exit orifices) of
bullets shot from firearms.
The different communications exchanged by both parties
between their government and their military officers on these
facts are to be found in the documents delivered to the
Commission and in the press releases issued by the two
countries.
[See Annex 6--List of documents received by the
Commission].
V. INVIOLABILITY OF THE TERRITORY
The Ecuadorian Government has asserted that Colombian
troops entered Ecuadorian territory without its authorization.
The Colombian Government acknowledges that fact.
This incursion of military forces of one State into the
territory of another, without authorization, violates the
principle established in Article 21 of the OAS Charter. Article
21 states:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be
the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or
of other measures of force taken by another State,
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No
territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained
either by force or by other means of coercion shall be
recognized.
This principle is one of the cornerstones of the
international legal order and, in particular, the inter-
American legal system, and a principle that from has always
been indisputably linked to the principle of peaceful
settlement of controversies between States and cooperation to
safeguard peace, security, and development.
Already in 1888, when the Secretary of State of the United
States of America, invoking the authorization granted by the
Senate, issued invitations to the First International
Conference of American States, held in Washington, D.C. from
1889 to 1890, which later gave rise to the Pan American Union,
the origin of the OAS, he said that one of the purposes of that
Conference was to consider:
First. Measures that shall tend to preserve the peace
and promote the prosperity of the several American
States.
Seventh. An agreement upon and recommendation for
adoption to their respective Governments of a definite
plan of arbitration of all questions, disputes, and
differences that may now or hereafter exist between
them, to the end that all difficulties and disputes
between such Nations may be peaceably settled and wars
prevented.
Thus, on April 18, 1890, the Conference adopted a
resolution on the ``Right of Conquest'' condemning wars of
conquest and affirming that the insecurity of national
territory would lead fatally to the ruinous system of armed
peace.
From then on, the principles of territorial inviolability
and peaceful settlement of disputes among American States have
been the cementing factors that have enabled States in the
Americas to preserve peace in their relations with one another
like no other region in the world.
To cite only one example prior to the OAS Charter, one can
mention the ``Convention on Rights and Duties of States,''
adopted at the Seventh International Conference of American
States (Montevideo, 1933). Among other principles, this
Convention establishes that:
Article 8--No state has the right to intervene in the
internal or external affairs of another.
Article 10--The primary interest of states is the
conservation of peace. Differences of any nature which
arise between them should be settled by recognized
pacific methods.
Article 11--The contracting states definitely
establish as the rule of their conduct the precise
obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or
special advantages which have been obtained by force
whether this consists in the employment of arms, in
threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other
effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is
inviolable and may not be the object of military
occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by
another state directly or indirectly or for any motive
whatever even temporarily.
These principles were reaffirmed in 1948 when the OAS
Charter was drafted. As in Chapter V of the OAS Charter,
numerous conventions before and after that Charter referred to
the obligation to peaceably resolve differences between States
and that has been the path chosen by our States.
There are also numerous agreements reaffirming the
importance of cooperation in respecting each State's internal
legal order. To take just two recent examples, let us recall:
a. Inter-American Convention against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials
(1997, especially its Articles III (Sovereignty), XIII
(Exchange of Information), XIV (Cooperation), and XV
(Exchange of experience and training), XVI (Technical
Assistance), and XVII (Mutual Legal Assistance).
b. Inter-American Convention against Terrorism
(2002), especially its Articles 7 (Cooperation on
Border Controls), 8 (Cooperation among Law Enforcement
Authorities), and 9 (Mutual Legal Assistance).
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Article 2.c. of the
OAS Charter proclaims as one of the Organization's essential
purposes ``[t]o prevent possible causes of difficulties and to
ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among
the Member States.''
As for universal instruments, the Charter of the United
Nations cites among the principles governing its member states
that of sovereign equality among them and the need to settle
their disputes by peaceful means, as well as to refrain from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of
any state. These principles were then developed in the
``Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations'' (Resolution 2625 of
the United Nations General Assembly in 1970), particularly in
reference to the principle of the sovereign equality of states,
pointing out that ``the territorial integrity and political
independence of the State are inviolable.''
The United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) establishes, in its
Article 4, that:
1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations
under this Convention in a manner consistent with the
principles of sovereign equality and territorial
integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the
domestic affairs of other States.
2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party
to undertake in the territory of another State the
exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions
that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of
that other State by its domestic law.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
On the morning of Saturday, March 1, 2008, military forces
and police personnel of Colombia entered the territory of
Ecuador, in the province of Sucumb!os, without the express
consent of the Government of Ecuador to carry out an operation
against members of an irregular group of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia who were clandestinely encamped on the
Ecuadorian side of the border.
That act constitutes a violation of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of
international law, as indicated in the Declaration of the Heads
of State and Government of the Rio Group on this matter and in
resolution CP/RES. 930 (1632/08), ``Convocation of the Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Appointment
of a Commission.''
At the XX Summit of the Rio Group, President Alvaro Uribe
pledged, on behalf of his country, that these events would not
be repeated in the future under any circumstances, in
compliance with Articles 19 and 21 of the OAS Charter.
Accordingly and taking into account the information that
this Commission received from the two governments during its
visit, the Commission has reached the following conclusions:
1. The ties of trust between the Governments of
Colombia and Ecuador have been seriously damaged.
2. The Ecuadorian and Colombian versions of the
manner in which the incursion took place are
contradictory.
3. The situation in the border area between Ecuador
and Colombia is complex and difficult in terms of
geographical aspects, territorial control,
communications, and the economic and social situation,
among other factors.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Operative paragraph 2 of resolution CP/RES. 930 established
that the Commission headed by the OAS Secretary General should
visit both countries, traveling to the places that the parties
indicate, submit the corresponding report to the Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and propose
formulas for bringing the two nations closer together.
Accordingly, chapters II and III of this report provide a
detailed report on those visits. On the basis of the
aforementioned conclusions, the Commission suggests or proposes
the following recommendations:
1. The restoration of diplomatic relations between
Colombia and Ecuador and reactivation of existing
political consultation mechanisms.
2. The formation of an OAS mission for follow-up on
and verification of commitments assumed and agreements
reached by the two countries for cooperation on border
issues and other matters of common interest.
3. The strengthening of border mechanisms for
dialogue and cooperation, and study of a possible
bilateral early-warning system.
4. The development, with the support of international
organizations and entities like the IDB, the CAF (ADC),
and the UNDP, among others, of border area cooperation
and integration programs, including environmental
projects.
5. The provision of incentives to dialogue among
civil society organizations in the two countries.
6. The strengthening of relations among business
organizations of the two countries, to identify ways to
increase bilateral trade, including border-area trade.
In this context, the Commission deems it especially
important to develop confidence-building measures
between the two countries by means of periodic
consultations and meetings among officials responsible
for border control and security.
ANNEXES
Annex 1.--OAS Permanent Council resolution
Annex 2.--Declaration of the Heads of State and Government
of the Rio Group on the recent events between Ecuador and
Colombia
Annex 3.--Press Release by the United Nations Secretary-
General
Annex 4.--Agenda in Ecuador
Annex 5.--Agenda in Colombia
Annex 6.--List of documents provided to the OAS Commission
by the officials of both countries solely for the preparation
of this report
Appendix IV.--Plan Ecuador
----------
Appendix V.--FARC's Presence on the Ecuadorean and Colombian Border
----------
Source: Ecuadorean Ministry of Defense, March 2008.
Appendix VI.--Permanent Ecuadorean Military Presence on the Ecuadorean
and Colombian Border
----------
Source: Ecuadorean Ministry of Defense, March 2008.
Appendix VII.--Discussions With Individuals in Ecuador and Colombia
----------
ECUADOR
Ecuadorean Government Officials
Under Secretary for Bilateral Affairs, Diego Stacy,
Director General for North America, Santiago Chavez,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Government and Police, Fernando Bustamante
Under Secretary General, Juan Sebastian Roldan
Chief of Staff, David Vaca for Minister Bustamante
Under Secretary General of Defense, Miguel Carvajal
Under Secretary of National Defense, Jorge Pena
Ecuadorean Opinion Leaders
Berta Garcia, Catholic University, Military Analyst
Cesar Montufar, Simon Bolivar Andina University, Political
Analyst
Franklin Barriga Lopez, Academic Director of Ecuadorian
Institute of Studies of International Relations, Journalist
United States Department of State, U.S. Embassy Quito, Ecuador
Linda Jewell, U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador (DAS, POL, RA,
MLGP, DATT)
COLOMBIA
Colombian Government Officials
Vice Minister of Defense, Juan Carlos Pinzon
Brigadier General, Rafael Parra, Deputy Director, Colombian
National Police
Brigadier General, Alvaro Caro, Director Counternarcotics,
Colombian National Police
Minister of Trade, Luis Guillermo Plata
United States Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota, Colombia
William Brownfield, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia (DAS, POL,
NAS, ECON, MLGRP, ORA, RSO)