

# THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT,  
INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 30, 2008

**Serial No. 110-133**

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

46-859 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2009

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## THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW

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Wednesday, July 30, 2008

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND  
OVERSIGHT,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Christopher P. Carney [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Carney, Pascrell, and Rogers.

Mr. CARNEY. The subcommittee will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.

Before we get started, I really have to commend the Department staff for getting us Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohn's testimony in such a timely fashion. We truly do appreciate that.

I lost track of how many times DHS testimony has arrived late, but hopefully, this is the new trend, and it will continue for years and years and generations to come.

We are here today to examine efforts at the Department of Homeland Security to complete a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR, by December 2009. People up here on the Hill and downtown in the think tanks have been discussing the need for a QHSR since shortly after the genesis of the Department. The idea is modeled on the Quadrennial Defense Review conducted across the river by our friends in that squat five-sided building over at the Pentagon. The Department of Defense, like DHS, is a sprawling department made up of countless smaller components that, in an ideal world, would collaborate to accomplish a set of common missions. But due to the dynamic nature of the world, DOD decided that it would self-evaluate every 4 years to determine if it was headed in the right direction and, if not, what course corrections were required.

I had the opportunity last week to sit down with Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohn, the DHS official tasked with the QHSR project. We had a very frank conversation, and after he left, I felt very comfortable and confident that he is more than capable of not only completing the QHSR but probably exceeding expectations, which frankly are high.

I understand Mr. Cohn also had a meeting with the committee staff who were left with a similar impression, so congratulations.

I guess that if I am worried about anything, it is that we are about 16 or 17 months from the due date for this fairly comprehensive evaluation and that the time span is not only going to be punctuated by administration transition but also by the ongoing deadlock of the sort of normal appropriations process.

One of the constant themes that I think the subcommittee has mentioned in just about all of our hearings is the lack of common culture at DHS. While DOD has its desperate components, the organization within it is devoted to the QDR. It is massive, and it starts working on the next report as soon as it releases the latest one.

DHS isn't quite there yet in the QHSR, and we really can't expect it to be. But this first effort is really an opportunity to align the member agencies and the personnel with a set core of missions and expectations and not to mention working with HHS and DOD and other Cabinet-level agencies that DHS will have to collaborate with on pieces of the QHSR.

The subcommittee is all too familiar with the lack of common culture DHS. We have heard the stories that if DHS was a corporation, it would have taken 7 years from the time of the merger of the 22 agencies until there was a DHS culture. We have also heard that this process is actually going to take longer at the Department.

The good news is that, even before the QHSR was mandated by law, DHS was requesting funding to complete the QHSR, which I see as a willingness to reflect on accomplishments, missions and, hopefully, shortcomings. The shortcomings are obviously the areas where we will hopefully see the greatest improvement.

We know the things at headquarters will be in tumult come November, December and, frankly, January and a few months beyond I imagine. But I think we are all cautiously optimistic that the QHSR will carry on without much interruption through the transition.

That said, Ms. Wormuth raises some interesting questions in her testimony as to whether all of the transitional activities in collaborative agencies like HHS and DOD and others will hinder the QHSR process. I am sure the subcommittee will be interested in learning more for both witnesses regarding the potential for unintentional static in trying to complete this report.

From my considerations with Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohn, it sounds like he would like to have much empirical data in place prior to the transition. That would ensure that when the new administration arrives, the bulk of the remaining QHSR work will be in analyzing the data and extrapolating from it the common goals and missions of the Department; areas for improvement; and areas where DHS agencies, personnel, and assets are working as envisioned.

No matter which candidate wins in November, I am sure we will see differing views on the subject of Homeland Security than those of the current administration. It is important that the new administration has an opportunity to play an active role in crafting the QHSR rather than just being left something totally crafted by the current administration.

While we are talking about the end of the year, I would be remiss if I didn't mention the issue of appropriations for the QHSR. Some funds were used in fiscal year 2008 with the idea being that dedicated appropriations would be allocated for fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 to ensure adequate resources and staff to complete the review.

There is a good chance the Government will be operating on a continuing resolution for some of fiscal year 2009 and based upon fiscal year 2008 funding. We need to ensure that funds are reprogrammed at DHS for the QHSR to be completed and delivered on time. I am sure this is only the beginning of our oversight of the QHSR process.

Mr. Cohn, I am sure your staff and mine will work closely together.

I look forward to our witnesses' testimony and to your participation in the entire process.

I now recognize the Ranking Member for his opening statement. Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the witnesses for being with us today and to welcome Mr. Cohn to his first congressional hearing and Ms. Wormuth back.

I think you were here with us last month, so it is good to have you back.

Today's hearing will focus on the Department of Homeland Security's preparations for its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review or QHSR. The QHSR will be a significant new tool in the Department's strategy for ensuring our Nation's security. As a Member of the House Armed Services Committee, I have seen how crucial a similar review process is for the Department of Defense to outline its missions and priorities.

In the context of Homeland Security, this strategic review should allow the Department to develop its long-term strategic decision-making and highlight its mission and Homeland Security priorities.

I have also seen on the Armed Services Committee the importance of an annual authorization bill. At a minimum, an authorization bill helps ensure that the Defense Department receives the proper guidance and priority it needs from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Therefore, as we review this effort, we should also consider what steps Congress can take to help the folks at DHS fulfill their mission.

First, we need to pass an annual DHS authorization bill before Congress acts on the Homeland Security appropriations bill. However, this does not appear possible at this point, so we should at least move the annual appropriations bill. If an appropriations bill is not passed, the folks at the Department may not have the resources they need for the review process.

Second, the Congress needs to enact the remaining 9/11 Commission recommendations and consolidate jurisdiction at DHS. Doing so will help ensure officials no longer have to report to 86 committees and subcommittees.

When our witness Ms. Wormuth was last before the committee, she highlighted the need for Congress to consolidate its oversight of DHS, and I couldn't agree more strongly.

Congress must take action to fix this problem so the Department can fulfill its critical security missions, including the implementation of QHSR.

I look forward to hearing from our witness, and I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you.

Since there are no other Members to be reminded that their testimony can be submitted for the record, I don't need to say that.

I welcome our panel of witnesses.

Our first witness is Mr. Alan Cohn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy of the Department of Homeland Security.

Our second is Christine Wormuth, senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

I welcome you both. Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be inserted into the record.

I now ask each to summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes beginning with Mr. Cohn.

**STATEMENT OF ALAN D. COHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

Mr. COHN. Thank you very much Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Rogers, and other distinguished Members of the committee.

Thank you for inviting me here this afternoon to provide an update on the Department's efforts to conduct the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.

As you mentioned, my name is Alan Cohn. Since January 2008, I have been Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of Homeland Security, responsible for the Department's Strategic Planning Office. In that position, I am responsible for directing the Department's strategic planning activities, including the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the completion of the Department's Second Strategic Plan, development of a new strategic requirements planning process and other related activities. I am a career official and a member of the Senior Executive Service.

As the head of the Strategic Planning Office, I serve as the director of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. I have designated a QHSR chief of staff from within my office and maintain a core team of analysts within the Office of Strategic Plans, supplemented by resources from across the Office of Policy and elsewhere in the Department.

The Department is taking an iterative and collaborative approach to the QHSR. We are building on previous and ongoing work by intradepartmental and interagency partners, as well as acknowledged experts in Homeland Security and related fields, including my co-panelist, Christine Wormuth, who authored an important recent report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies on managing catastrophe.

The QHSR team is also looking to capitalize on best practices and lessons learned from relevant previous reviews. DHS is addressing seven legislative priorities for the QHSR in four main study areas. The first two studies look at Homeland Security across



the Federal interagency and our State, local, private sector, non-governmental, and other partners. The last two studies look at the Department of Homeland Security itself.

The first study is a strategic assessment, taking stock of what we have been able to accomplish in 7 years since September 11, 2001, and 5 years since the creation of DHS.

The second study area was a look at our national readiness, leveraging work being conducted in this area already by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department's Office of Infrastructure Protection, the Department of Defense, and other entities.

The third study area is a review of the Department's internal Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system, and the Department's efforts to strengthen and improve its overall business processes.

The fourth study area is a review of DHS's major programs and activities.

The Department is making good progress in implementing the steps laid out in the QHSR Resource Report, which is available on our Web site. From now until the Presidential transition, the QHSR team's priority is to lay a strong analytic baseline in each of the four study areas and construct the framework for further review once a new administration comes in.

Once the new administration has come in, we anticipate a second round of analysis that will focus more closely on the new administration's areas of priority.

The Department is committed to producing an internally analyzed and researched document to the maximum extent possible. For that reason, the Department has made limited use of contractor support for the QHSR. However, outside assistance, including the support of contractors and federally funded research and development centers, with a wealth of Homeland Security knowledge and experience is essential to accomplish the QHSR goal of an unbiased and objective review of the entire Homeland Security landscape. Nevertheless, please be assured that Government staff from the DHS Office of Policy, from throughout the Department, and from our interagency and intergovernmental partners will extensively review all analysis and will make any ultimate recommendations to senior leadership.

In sum, preparing the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review is a tremendous opportunity and a tremendous challenge. It is a unique opportunity to step back from the Department's essential work of the past 5 years and our Nation's work over the past 7 years, and look in a more long-term manner at the threats and challenges that we face.

The Department of Homeland Security is committed to producing a QHSR that will point the way to a more secure Nation. We will require the support of many others, including our partners in Congress, to succeed.

Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to addressing any questions that you may have.

[The statement of Mr. Cohn follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN D. COHN

JULY 30, 2008

Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished Members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is conducting the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR).

## SCOPE

Section 2401 of the *Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007*, Pub. L. 110-53, directed the Secretary of Homeland Security (the secretary) to “conduct a review of the homeland security of the Nation.” The secretary is required to deliver a report on this review to the Congress by the close of calendar year 2009, and every 4 years thereafter. During this review process, the secretary will comprehensively examine the homeland security enterprise; make recommendations regarding the Nation’s long-term homeland security strategy and national priorities; and provide recommendations to address the challenges facing key programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of DHS. The quadrennial review efforts will help support departmental continuity through the upcoming change of administration by informing the transition teams and the incoming administration on longer-term challenges facing the Department; the Department’s long-term resource planning; strategic decision-making challenges; and other issues critical to improving the Nation’s homeland security posture.

## APPROACH

The Department is taking an iterative and collaborative approach to the QHSR that builds on previous work by intra-Departmental and interagency partners, as well as acknowledged experts in homeland security and related fields. The QHSR assessment is divided into four major areas of study, focusing on key areas for review as described in the implementing legislation. The four major study areas are: (1) A strategic assessment of homeland security missions, functions, and objectives; (2) an assessment of the homeland security readiness posture; (3) a review of DHS organizational alignment and Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) mechanisms; and (4) an exploration of current DHS program issues and challenges.

The Department has cast a wide and inclusive net to collect the thoughts and writings of many in the homeland security community and related fields who have dedicated themselves to considering the core issues of the QHSR. For the strategic assessment, the Department is examining long-term planning documents developed by the Intelligence Community, and will utilize the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ forthcoming Homeland Security Threat Assessment in assessing long-term trends. The Department is reviewing national efforts to develop and implement the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Preparedness Guidelines, the National Response Framework, the National Incident Management System, the Integrated Planning System and the National Homeland Security Plan. The Department is also reviewing academic and policy working papers, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Beyond Goldwater-Nichols IV Report, *Managing the Next Catastrophe: Ready (or Not)?*, the Center for American Progress’s report *Safe at Home*, and the expansive work associated with the Center for the Study of the Presidency’s Project on National Security Reform.

With respect to the readiness assessment, the Department will be reviewing current assessments, such as the Federal Preparedness Report, the State Preparedness Reports, the National Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Report, as well as the Department of Defense’s Capabilities-Based Assessment for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, and similar studies. In a parallel and supporting effort, the Department has begun conducting facilitated intra-Department QHSR working group sessions to solicit and capture the concerns and recommendations of the DHS components, and is examining both new and existing interagency policy groups to serve as forums for discussion of quadrennial review topics. The Department is also investigating the use of new technologies to reach the wide number of non-DHS homeland security stakeholders, including State and local governments, private sector and non-governmental organizations, academic and research institutions, and others.

For our review of DHS organizational alignment and Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) mechanisms, the Department will capitalize on efforts by the DHS Management Directorate and Office of Policy to design and imple-

ment an integrated business process to link strategic goals, objectives, and requirements to investment planning and budgeting. The Department will also look to ongoing efforts to develop a Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision-making (RAPID) to inform the strategic prioritization of homeland security investment, as well as other efforts by the Department's Office of Risk Management and Analysis. The exploration of current DHS program issues and challenges will build off of documents and analysis currently being developed for the Department's transition efforts, as well as analysis done this year as part of the Management Directorate's revitalized program review and investment review processes.

#### PROGRESS

The Department is making good progress in implementing the steps laid out in the QHSR Resource Report. The Department has established an intra-Departmental QHSR working group consisting of approximately 30 to 40 staff representing all major offices and operational components within DHS to discuss quadrennial review-related topics. In an effort to focus effort and limit disruption to the components, this group meets for periodic, facilitated seminars that allow for cross-component discussion of existing studies and newly generated thought papers. In addition to this QHSR-specific group, the Department will also use existing cross-Departmental councils and bodies to discuss specific aspects of the quadrennial review, such as the development of an Integrated Risk Management Framework for DHS and the strengthening of the Department's PPBE structure.

The Department understands the importance of involving interagency partners in the QHSR process, as the review is meant to examine the entire breadth of the homeland security enterprise. The Department is working through existing Federal policy coordinating committees in developing interagency documents that will form part of the quadrennial review process, and will continue to look to those bodies, or similar bodies, as the quadrennial review progresses. These strategy and policy bodies include the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Transportation, the intelligence community, and others. The Department will also look to these bodies to ensure consistency and harmonization among the various defense, homeland security, intelligence, and related reviews currently being conducted.

The Department is also in the process of developing a working group to provide advice on the quadrennial review under the auspices of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. This carefully selected group will consist of individuals from industry, academia, think tanks, and other advisory groups. The demographics of the committee will provide a wide range of viewpoints, affiliations, and backgrounds to ensure as much diversity as possible on how the homeland security mission should be defined and executed. In order to reach a broader community of homeland security stakeholders, the Department is examining technologies such as the Homeland Security Information Network, the Lessons Learned Information System, and wiki-based discussion forums as potential vehicles for broader discussion of QHSR-related topics.

For its core team, the Department has designated the Office of Strategic Plans, within the DHS Office of Policy, as the administrating office of the QHSR. As Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy (Strategic Plans) and head of the Office of Strategic Plans, I serve as the Director of the QHSR. I have designated a QHSR Chief of Staff and maintain a core team of analysts and advisors within the Office of Strategic Plans for the QHSR, which will be supplemented by additional staff from the DHS Management Directorate's Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. In addition, the QHSR is leveraging subject-matter expertise within the rest of the DHS Office of Policy to develop issue papers on a myriad of topics pertinent to the QHSR. These pre-decisional working papers will focus on a variety of homeland security-related topics. These papers, and others solicited from the homeland security community, will be used as a basis for discussion and further QHSR work. By using focused, short-term efforts, we are maximizing our internal analytical capability for the QHSR without severely impacting the ongoing day-to-day work of DHS components and headquarters staff, as well as our interagency and intergovernmental partners.

The Department has made limited use of contractor support on the QHSR. The bulk of policy analysis for the QHSR will be conducted by Government staff in the DHS Office of Policy, throughout the Department, and from our interagency and intergovernmental partners. However, we use external experts to provide outside perspectives, avoid tunnel vision, and encourage a broader range of options. The Department also uses contract support to conduct analysis on discrete subjects within

the larger scope of inquiry. The contract support used to date has been focused on specialized tasks that provide a catalog of existing strategies, policies and directives that govern the homeland security community, and a breakdown of homeland security missions and functions. These preliminary working papers will form the basis for larger discussions and analysis by Government staff and external partners, and ultimately will be used by Government staff to conduct more in-depth analysis and develop recommendations for senior leadership.

#### RESOURCES

The Department has requested \$1.65 million to support the QHSR in fiscal year 2009. The Office of Policy requested \$1.5 million and the remaining \$0.150 million was requested by the Office of the Chief Financial Officer for one full-time equivalent (FTE).

As discussed above, the Department is committed to producing an internally analyzed and researched document to the maximum extent possible. However, outside assistance, including the support of contractors and federally funded research and development centers that have a wealth of homeland security knowledge and experience, is essential to accomplish the QHSR goal of an unbiased and objective review of the entire homeland security landscape. We ask that the committee support our efforts and our fiscal year 2009 funding request, and not constrain those resources in a manner that would prevent us from utilizing contractors and federally funded research and development centers to assist in conducting baseline analysis as part of the larger review effort.

#### CONCLUSION

Preparing the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review is a tremendous opportunity and a tremendous challenge. It is a unique opportunity to step back from the Department's essential work of the past 5 years, and our Nation's work over the past 7 years that has been aimed at closing security gaps and addressing immediate challenges, and look in a more long-term manner at the threats and challenges that we face. The Department of Homeland Security is committed to producing a QHSR that will point the way toward a more secure Nation. To that end, we will require the support of many others, including Congress, to succeed.

Thank you for your kind attention. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Cohn.

Ms. Wormuth for 5 minutes, please.

#### **STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Ms. WORMUTH. Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Rogers, thank you for having me back. It is a privilege as always to be here.

I would like to focus on a couple of things in my statement today: First, the role of the QHSR; second, some of the challenges that it is facing in my view; and then to reflect a little bit on some lessons learned from DOD's QDR process that I think may be relevant for DHS.

The QHSR has I think the potential to be a very important first step in the strategic planning process for DHS as it looks to the next 4 years. If it is done well the QHSR can set the agenda and define priorities through 2012. It is an opportunity to, sort of, get beyond the year to 18-month issues and chart the course for what the next administration wants to do during its tenure.

It offers the opportunity to look not just at organizational issues, as was done during the Second Stage Review, but also to look the an issues of strategy, policy, program and budget.

While it is a tremendous opportunity, I think the QHSR also poses obviously some significant challenges for DHS. Among these

challenges are the scope of the review, the resources that are dedicated to it, and its timing.

Determining the scope of the review is a major challenge, first of all. I think, as Alan has outlined, what Congress has required for the review and certainly what the current secretary and the next secretary will want for the review is a very, very broad and deep agenda, particularly for a review to be completed in a single year.

Particularly looking at DOD's experience with QDRs, in my view, setting a tight scope for any kind of major review of this kind is one of the biggest determinants of whether a review succeeds or fails. Size matters, and in this case, I would argue bigger is not necessarily better.

Given the scope and complexity of QHSR, not to mention that this is the first review that DHS will be undertaking of this kind, it is difficult, in my view as an outsider, not to be concerned about the resources that the Department has dedicated so far.

First of all, I want to say, as someone who has had the privilege of working with Alan for some time now, there is no one better in my view at DHS to lead this effort. I think we should all take a lot of comfort in that. He is a terrific individual and is going to do a great job.

That said, \$1.65 million and a full time team of 6 people in my view is not going to be enough to get this job done. Just looking at the QDR experience as a point of comparison, DOD already has multiple offices throughout the Department with several people who are working full-time on preparing for their 2010 review. Looking at the last QDR, in 2006, the Office of Policy in the Office of the secretary of Defense alone, just one office, had a bigger budget than DHS has currently set aside for it as an entire department.

A major strategic review is going to be time-consuming, and it is intellectually and bureaucratically demanding, and it is just hard for me to see how DHS going to get this done the way it needs to be done with that level of effort.

I think the timing is another big challenge. As you have said, Mr. Chairman, the Department has got to get this report to you all by the end of next year. That means, in practice, that most of the review, some of the review is going to be conducted during a time when you don't have a lot of political appointees in place. If the past is precedent, a lot of political appointees aren't going to be confirmed until late spring, maybe summer, of 2009.

Although DHS is doing a lot to ensure a smooth transition, there is no getting around the fact that you are going to have a lot of empty offices. When the people do come in, they are going to have a major learning curve and less than a year to get the job done. That is also looking at the fact that, in addition to the fact that there are not going to be a lot of people in place, the White House is going to be writing the National Security Strategy. I think it remains to be seen whether the White House will write one comprehensive strategy that includes Homeland Security issues or whether they do two separate ones, but either way, it is something DHS has got to consider. DOD will be conducting its QDR, which will be on a monumental scale, and somehow DHS is going to have

to keep up with that and try to coordinate those efforts. So that is I think a lot to undertake.

In turning to some lessons I think from the QDR process that may be relevant, there are four that I wanted to highlight: First, DHS's senior leadership has to really take ownership of this review. Looking at the DOD experience, if you don't have the secretary or the deputy secretary fully engaged in the review, it tends to devolve into a budget drill and a lot of arguing over rice bowls. So I certainly hope the new secretary comes in and makes his or her priorities very clear and gives some very good strategic guidance to the process.

Second, I think limiting the scope, as I have alluded to, of the review will be critical. It can't be an A-to-Z review of everything. You have to pick some critical priorities and maintain a laser-like focus on those priorities.

Third, the bureaucracy shouldn't over-prepare and try to present the incoming team with a lot of pre-cooked solutions, because they are going to reject those.

Fourth, I think DHS has got to really reach out to all of its stakeholders, including you all in Congress, early in the process to make sure that everyone is engaged. DHS has more stakeholders than any department in the Federal Government. This is an area where you are going to have to balance bringing in a lot of people with also structuring your review so that it doesn't become totally out of hand and devolve into death by meeting.

So there are a lot of challenges, but I think it is a tremendous opportunity, and I hope it is given every opportunity to succeed.

Thank you very much for having me here and I look forward to your questions.

[The statement of Ms. Wormuth follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH

JULY 30, 2008

Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Rogers, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify on the status of the Department of Homeland Security's Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. It is a subject of critical importance and I am honored to have the opportunity to share my views with you.

I would like to focus in my remarks on the role of the QHSR, the challenges the review seems to be facing initially, and lessons learned from the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review that may be relevant to DHS as it conducts its first review of this kind.

THE ROLE OF THE QHSR

The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review has the potential to be a very important first step in DHS's strategic planning process as it looks to the future. Done well, the QHSR will set the agenda and define priorities for DHS through 2012. It is an opportunity to look beyond the near-term, 12- to 18-month issues and chart a course for what the next administration wants to achieve in the area of homeland security over the next 4 years. The QHSR report will likely include an in-depth discussion of the Nation's homeland security strategy and articulate the new administration's strategic priorities and their programmatic implications. The report should describe how DHS will work with its Federal partners, as well as its many other stakeholders, to coordinate activities and programs to greatest effect.

DHS has not undertaken a strategic level review since 2005 when Secretary Chertoff conducted the Second Stage Review shortly after being named secretary. Moreover, the Second Stage Review was primarily an organizational review while the QHSR offers the opportunity to look not only at organizational issues, but also issues of strategy, policy, process, program and budget. Given the inherently inter-

agency, inter-Government and multidisciplinary nature of homeland security, it is critical that in conducting its quadrennial review, DHS reaches out to a wide array of stakeholders in a way that is unprecedented for a Federal agency. Equally important for DHS will be ensuring that its review process is consistent with the themes and priorities that will be articulated in the new administration's national security strategy, whether that is articulated in a single, consolidated document or two separate documents, a national security strategy and a national homeland security strategy.

#### CHALLENGES FACING THE QHSR

DHS faces considerable challenges as it undertakes its first quadrennial review. Among these challenges are the timing of the review, its scope, resources for the review, and the need to coordinate with a wide array of stakeholders.

By law, DHS must submit a final report on the QHSR to Congress by December 31, 2009. In practice, this means that much of the review will be conducted while there are still very few political appointees in place in DHS to run the process. If past is precedent, many political appointees will not be confirmed until the late spring and summer of 2009. Although DHS is working hard to enable a smooth transition to the new administration, there is no getting around the fact that there will be few appointees in place for the first several months of the QHSR, they will have a steep learning curve, and it will be difficult to conduct a truly strategic review with a relatively small number of senior leaders facing a compressed review timeline and a requirement to include in the review an unprecedented number of internal and external stakeholders.

In a similar vein, at the same time DHS is conducting its review, the administration as a whole is likely to be developing its national security strategy. In an ideal world, the White House would develop and promulgate a National Security Strategy (NSS) first, and then cabinet agencies would begin their quadrennial reviews, guided squarely by the strategic direction provided in the NSS. Given the timelines mandated by law for the QHSR however, DHS cannot afford to delay the review until completion of the NSS. DHS must begin its review as soon as the new leadership of DHS is in place and simply place a premium on coordinating its efforts with the White House as thinking on the broader strategy develops and is refined.

Just as the White House will be developing the NSS in parallel to the QHSR, the Department of Defense also will be conducting its Quadrennial Defense Review, which is likely to have implications for DHS and other Federal agencies, at the same time. Conducting the QHSR while also staying abreast of developments in the QDR process will be an additional challenge for DHS.

The scope of the QHSR presents additional challenges. Congress has required that the review result in a report that describes the national strategy for homeland security, outlines and prioritizes critical homeland security mission areas, describes the capabilities, infrastructure, preparedness levels and budget necessary to successfully execute the national homeland security strategy, assesses the organizational adequacy of DHS to its mission, and reviews the ability of DHS to translate homeland security requirements into its budget and acquisition strategy. This is a very broad agenda for a review that is to be completed in 1 year, particularly given that for the first 6 months of the review DHS is likely to have a very small leadership cadre. As I will discuss in more detail in the next part of my testimony, determining an appropriate scope for the quadrennial review is one of the most important determinants of whether the review will succeed or fail. Size matters, and in this case, bigger is not always better.

Given the timing of the QDR as well as its scope, in order for the review to conclude successfully at the end of 2009, work on the review has to begin today—and it has. That said, there is an inherent tension in beginning a review under the current leadership that will conclude under the new administration. No matter what party wins the Presidential election, the incoming team will want to take a fresh look at DHS and is likely to be somewhat skeptical of work done in advance for the QHSR. DHS can make the most of the work it does on the QHSR in the remaining months by focusing its preparatory analysis on framing and describing key issues and options without trying to guide the new team toward predetermined outcomes.

Given the timing, scope and complexity of the QHSR—not to mention that this will be the first QHSR conducted by DHS—it is difficult not to be concerned as an outside observer by the scant resources apparently devoted to the task so far. In its March report to Congress this year, DHS reported that it is requesting \$1.65 million and 2 new positions for the QHSR process. The core QHSR work team will be comprised of 6 personnel. There will be additional QHSR work teams, although their numbers and size were not clear from the report. The QHSR and the QDR

are different processes, and the DoD QDR process is by no means perfect and should not be mindlessly replicated. At the same time, as someone who participated directly in the 1997 DoD QDR process and who observed subsequent QDR processes closely, it is very hard to see how this level of funding and staff resources can be adequate to the demands of a major strategic review process. The Office of the Secretary of Defense already has multiple offices with dozens of personnel working on preparing for the upcoming QDR. The budget for the OSD Policy office alone during the 2006 QDR was more than the current DHS QHSR budget. A major strategic review is time-consuming, intellectually and bureaucratically demanding. To complete a task of this magnitude successfully with 6 people and less than \$2 million would be a truly heroic achievement.

Finally, to be successful, the QHSR will need to involve not just members of the Federal interagency, but also stakeholders in State and local governments as well as tribal organizations, the private sector and the non-governmental sector. This will require an unprecedented level of outreach and will add a significant layer of complexity to the QHSR process. Structuring a major review to be sufficiently comprehensive and inclusive to achieve much-needed “buy-in” while avoiding the pitfalls of “death by meeting” and lowest common denominator solutions is very difficult. Particularly once the new leadership team is in place at DHS, the Department will need to look carefully at how it structures the review process to involve the full range of its internal and external stakeholders without losing the strategic focus on the review. DHS will also need to think carefully about how it can remain abreast of developments in DoD’s QDR process when it does not have the personnel resources to participate in all aspects of what is likely to be another wide-ranging QDR process.

#### QDR LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE QHSR

Although there are significant differences between DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review and DHS’s Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, DoD’s experience with several such reviews do offer certain lessons learned that may be useful to consider as the DHS process gets underway.

*First, DHS’s senior leadership must lead and be engaged in the QHSR process.* Without leadership by the secretary of Homeland Security or the deputy secretary, the QHSR is likely to lack focus, be captured by DHS components and devolve into nothing more than a budget drill. This would be a serious lost opportunity. In light of the compressed time frame for the review and in order to ensure the review has a tight focus and is strategy-driven, the new secretary would be wise to set his or her QHSR priorities as early as possible and develop the new homeland security strategy by early summer 2009 at the latest.

*Second, limiting the scope of the QHSR will be critical.* The QHSR cannot be an A-to-Z examination of every single issue facing the Department of Homeland Security, much less every homeland security challenge facing the Federal Government. A QHSR that tries to solve every pressing problem is likely to provide very few answers at the end of the day. The next secretary should pick a handful of critical issues around which to organize the QHSR, ensure the review retains its focus on those issues throughout the process, and resist the temptation to turn the QHSR into a super program review.

*Third, the DHS bureaucracy should not over-prepare for the 2009 QHSR.* The new secretary and his or her team will have their own views and priorities, and are likely to view what has come before with skepticism. Career civil servants in DHS should focus on identifying and framing key problems and challenges that may be considered in the review without offering point solutions. The new secretary is likely to place a small team of senior appointees and key front office staff in charge of the review, but it would also be wise for the new secretary to supplement this leadership team with a handful of senior career staff to provide continuity and institutional knowledge through the transition period.

*Fourth, DHS should engage its myriad stakeholders—including Congress—early in the process.* Given the role the rest of the Federal interagency plays in homeland security, and the role Congress plays in shaping the DHS budget and overseeing its activities, DHS would be wise to reach out to these stakeholders early in the QHSR process, and in a meaningful way. In addition to the Federal Government and Congress, DHS also has external stakeholders at the State and local government level as well as in the private and non-governmental sectors. DoD has not always engaged successfully with outside stakeholders, often waiting until very late in its reviews to bring those outside DoD into the process. DHS would be well-served to learn from the DoD experience and involve key stakeholders early, both to build



support for its key priorities and to facilitate the QHSR implementation process when the review is complete.

#### CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

DHS faces significant challenges in conducting its first quadrennial homeland security review. The timing of the review is less than ideal, resources being dedicated so far to the review are scarce, the breadth of issues that could be considered as part of the review are daunting, and the range of stakeholders with equities in the review process is unprecedented. In the near term DHS should focus on framing key issues that may be taken up as part of the QHSR process, and avoiding trying to pre-cook results of the QHSR. After the election, the new administration will need to move quickly to identify key priorities and strategic themes, put a leadership team in charge of the QHSR process and reach out early to the full range of stakeholders. Despite the challenges, the QHSR is an important strategic planning opportunity and should be given every opportunity to succeed. Thank you very much for inviting me to testify today, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Ms. Wormuth, for your comments, and—well, not proceed with questions.

You may have questions submitted in writing from other Members who aren't here, but I will recognize myself for 5 minutes to begin with.

Mr. Cohn, and this is probably the most anticipated question of course that you are going to get, and it is about the allocation of the resources. From your perspective, what are the resources allocated toward the project?

Mr. COHN. Let me talk about what we have allocated to the process right now and what we anticipate. What we anticipate devoting to the process as we go forward.

In our Office of Strategic Plans, we have a dedicated Quadrennial Homeland Security Review chief of staff and a core team of analysts who are focused on the first two reviews. We have two analysts from our staff and additional resources from our federally funded Resource and Development Center.

We, in addition, have several members of our staff, additional members of our staff, who are dedicated to working on projects that serve fundamental purposes for the Quadrennial Review. So, for example, in addition to the staff that is dedicated to the QHSR and the Strategic Assessment and Readiness sections we have our Strategic Requirements Planning Team, which as they stood up their pilot this summer, has turned to working on the Department's Integrated Business Process for the efforts to strengthen and enhance that process, working with our partners across all the management directorate and within the policy directorate. That is an additional four full-time employees plus contract and detailed other support.

In addition, we are making use of over a dozen analysts from our Office of Policy Development to begin preparing analytical baseline papers for the Quadrennial Review, in addition to the regular duties as assigned.

Mr. CARNEY. In addition to—so you are taking them away from their assigned duties to do this as well?

Mr. COHN. As much as it is that the work of the Office of Policy, as we are nearing the end of the administration, as new policy initiatives from the Department are slowing down and we are turning our attention more to preparing for a transition and finishing up existing policy projects, we are beginning to use a portion of the time of the policy analysts from the Office of Policy to supplement the work of the analysts in the Office of Strategic Plans.

We have also begun establishing working groups, not only within the Department of Homeland Security but with our interagency partners, to begin discussions on issues associated with each of the four studies. So we are beginning to leverage the expertise of dozens of individuals from across the Department and interagency on specific issues. Again, none of them are full-time resources for the Department. But each of them contributes expertise, each of them contributes a viewpoint that is important to the process.

I would note and highlight on something that Ms. Wormuth pointed out, our philosophy for the review, as we are aware of the way the QDR is conducted, we are of the nature of the issues we are looking at, that wanted to fashion the review, that it was built on a small core team of analysts supported by outside individuals to repair the baseline analysis that would then be put before working groups, subject matter experts and other individuals, not removed from their job and isolated from the front lines but brought in to review issues, to look long term at different issues, to be able to put work in front of them and be able to react to that. In that way, we hope to overcome some of the shortcomings of enormous committees, of removing vast numbers of people from the Department, or the death by meeting that Ms. Wormuth raised.

Mr. CARNEY. Well, if you don't have a lot of people, you are not going to be able to have a lot of meetings, so I suppose that is one good thing. Death by PowerPoint, by the way, has also been outlawed by the Geneva Convention, I understand.

So do you think these resources are going to be adequate to complete the review?

Mr. COHN. As Representative Rogers noted, we are concerned about the possibility of going on to a continuing resolution and not having the funding that we have requested for fiscal year 2009 available to us, especially when the new administration comes in.

Mr. CARNEY. Well, what do you do in that case?

Mr. COHN. In that case, we will continue to do exactly what we have been doing, is to basically leverage all assets that we can find to make available for the QHSR, analytic resources from across the Department, not only the Office of Policy but other offices as well; analytic resources from our interagency partners, and they have been indicated a great willingness to come in and help us. We are examining the uses of technology; working with others, like our university Centers of Excellence to reach additional individuals and sources of analysis; using leveraging off of current studies; and flexing to look at all available resources that we can. We will continue to do that if we have to go on to a continuing resolution.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Thank you.

We have been called to votes, as you can hear. We have only about 10 minutes left.

Mr. Rogers will proceed for 5 minutes, and then we will break and return for another round of questions.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You have gone into the area I was most concerned about, and that is this appropriations process. Before I go there, though, what about the authorization process? Is the fact that we are not giving you an annual authorization bill, is that going to in any way in-

hibit your ability or detract from your ability to get this done in a timely manner?

Mr. COHN. Well, as you know, our secretary has said on numerous occasions that a strong Committee on Homeland Security and consolidated oversight over the Department are essential. We strongly support that, and we think that that type of an arrangement will greatly assist the Department in completing its responsibilities.

I know that, Representative Rogers, you participated in a discussion earlier today with our deputy secretary on this topic. So you know the Department's views that we very much support a strong committee on Homeland Security and consolidated oversight over the Department.

Mr. ROGERS. What about this appropriations issue? You talked about this concern about a CR. You heard Ms. Wormuth talk about how she felt like, given the staffing, that it was pretty unrealistic to meet that next December goal when you throw in there the change and transition or the change in political appointees, and the fact is I think this very may well be open until summertime. Is this December deadline realistic, given that dynamic?

Mr. COHN. Sir, I think that we are comfortable with the December deadline. Even more than that, we recognize that it is important for us to conduct and complete this review.

As Ms. Wormuth accurately pointed out, at the outset of the new administration, there is going to be the development of a new National Security Strategy, decisions about whether National Homeland Security strategy should be released as separate, or part of that strategy, complimentary or subordinate to that strategy. We feel that it is important for the Department to complete this analysis and put forward its thoughts on Homeland Security, on the strategic assessment of where Homeland Security fits in the overall posture of national security and where, from a strategic vision, we believe that we should go, not only as a Department but as a Homeland Security enterprise with our Federal partners and our nongovernmental partners, our State and local partners and others. So we feel that the December—not only is the deadline reasonable, but we think it is important for the Department to aim to complete its review by that point.

Mr. ROGERS. I think, I know you are, like me, you are an attorney. It was smart for you to use that "aim" for that target, because I think that Ms. Wormuth's testimony was dead on the money. I think it is going to be hard, if not impossible, unless you do what she talked about and keep the scope very narrow. I think that if you really make—which is not I think the overriding purpose of a Quadrennial Review. I think you want to have a broad scope if at all possible.

Let's go to Ms. Wormuth. You talked about the new secretary taking ownership when you went through your four points. Could you elaborate more on how you would like to see the next secretary show a real commitment to this process?

Ms. WORMUTH. Yes, I would be happy to, and I think what I am talking about here is the secretary or the deputy needs to be not just perceived as but also actually leading the effort in terms of first articulating, what are the strategic priorities for the Depart-

ment as it looks to the next 4 years of the next administration? Then the secretary I think or the deputy has to be a continuing presence at the decision meetings that will presumably take place throughout the process of the review to make sure that, A, decisions are made; but that, B, they are consistent with and relate to the priorities that the secretary sets out.

So it is really a question, I think, of the secretary or his representative has to be there to convey that these issues are important. I take this review seriously. I have given you my strategic guidance, and I expect the review to be conducted in accordance with those priorities. Because in the absence of that, if the secretary is perceived as having delegated the review, it becomes much easier, I think, for the components of an agency, particularly one like DHS where you have so many components and they still haven't gelled into a fully coherent organization, to spend the time in the review, again, arguing over parochial issues and who is up and who is down and who is getting more of the budget share.

Mr. ROGERS. My time is about up. We will get you on the next round.

Mr. CARNEY. Since we have to vote, we will stand in recess subject to the recall of the Chair.

[Recess.]

Mr. CARNEY. The committee will come to order.

I don't think we are going to be interrupted between now and the time we adjourn, but who knows?

Okay, Ms. Wormuth I want to talk about the QDR for a second. One of the criticisms of the QDR is that it has not necessarily had a consistently great impact on actual policy development at DOD. Do you see a problem with that for DHS, a potential similar kind of problem for DHS, especially given this the first time? What can we anticipate?

Ms. WORMUTH. I think that is a great point. We actually, at CSI, have been talking with some colleagues from DOD about that very challenge of how do you ensure that a review of this kind is truly strategy-driven as opposed to just being kind of a super program review. I think there is no easy solution to that. It is never easy to be able to do that. I think some QDRs have been more successful than others. But I would argue there are perhaps two primary mechanisms that you can try and use to help maintain that focus. It is certainly something for DHS to consider.

First, as I said, I think secretarial leadership is key and if you have a secretary or a deputy who makes clear what the strategic priorities are and then drives those through the entire process and just relentlessly comes back to, okay, how does this set of subjects that we are talking about in this discussion meeting 4 months into the review how does this relate to what we have articulated as our strategy? How is this going to advance our strategic objectives?

Second tool you can try to use is something like a terms of reference. In the last QDR, the DOD developed sort of a guiding document that elaborated a little bit on the strategic priorities and what the review is going to be about and promulgated that throughout the Department to try and help guide people's efforts and keep the analysis from getting kind of out-of-control. I think that is a tool that DHS can certainly think about using.

Mr. CARNEY. In order to make this whole exercise real and substantial, do you think benchmarks ought to be set or established?

Ms. WORMUTH. Benchmarks in what sense?

Mr. CARNEY. In the sense of what the goals of the DHS are, and benchmarks in the sense of you have to define these things by the end of the process.

Ms. WORMUTH. Well, I think certainly you want to try, in the process of articulating the strategy, and again, it is not clear to me whether the White House might try and develop a single national security strategy that would include a description of the homeland security strategy or whether they would delegate that to DHS. I think it depends a little bit how you proceed. But to the extent that the Department of Homeland Security says here is what our strategy is, and here is what our goals are as a Department, I do think you want to tie the review to those goals and say okay, if one of our major objectives as a Department is to secure the Nation's borders, here is how these particular sets of issues we are going to look at in the review relate to that.

Something else I think the Department might consider which is a little bit related to benchmarks is recognizing that the review can't look at everything A-to-Z and do a good job in the time frame particularly during a transition. Something it might do is say, okay, maybe we be we are going to focus on these top 5 to 7 issues and really focus and do a good job laying analytically how this is going to work.

But we recognize there are 15 other important issues and perhaps as part of the report to Congress, the Department might articulate here is a road map for how we are going to tackle intellectually and analytically these other remaining problems. We are going to do it in the next 2 years and here is sort of the process as a Department that we are going to use to try and attack those issues. I think that is perhaps a way also to try and ensure that important issues get the kind of consideration they deserve.

Mr. CARNEY. I think you have to be somewhat retrospective where you have come since inception of the DHS but that has got to point you to where you are going to go. Now, how many QDRs have we had since 1997, 3 years, something like that? What can we learn from those processes to apply to this for the Homeland Security Department?

Ms. WORMUTH. Well, I think in my view, and I would argue that actually, DOD only started calling them QDRs in 1997 but they had the bottom-up review and the base force so they have been doing 4-year reviews for a while. But Alan and I were talking during the break, in many ways you do want to keep the group, the core group, thinking these issues through for the secretary relatively small, at least in the beginning, particularly when you are looking at things like developing strategy and developing—if DHS pursues a terms of reference, that group should be relatively small, so that you don't wind up with kind of a lowest-common-denominator watered-down agenda. That is one lesson. I think DOD, certainly in the 1997 QDR which I was a part of at a very low level, we had 52 working groups and very rapidly the process became very diluted.

So maintaining a strategic focus on a core set of issues, working those issues initially with a relatively small group, I think something DOD has not done well to date is reaching out to its stakeholders which includes Congress, our allies, other departments, you know DOD tends to wait to talk to the interagency until very late in the process. As a result you don't, DOD has had trouble sometimes I think getting a lot of buy-in. It hasn't always been able to coordinate its efforts very well. DHS I think can't afford to make that same mistake. So I think one lesson is definitely engage in a meaningful way, not sort of showing you a dog-and-pony show PowerPoint briefing, but engage stakeholders in a meaningful way.

Again another lesson it sounds as if DHS is walking down this path is not to over-prepare and not to try and pre-script what the issue set is, much less what the answers are, because invariably the new team, no matter what party they come from, is going to want to think these issues through on their own and I think if the bureaucracy spends a lot of time developing all sorts detailed models and whatnot, that is very likely to be just swept away when the new team comes in.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. I recognize that Mr. Cohn can't come in here and say he is not going to meet the December deadline. But you were pretty candid and said it is going to be difficult unless he narrows the scope. Let's talk about the scope because you just now made reference to it in the QDR, about remaining focused on a narrow set of areas. Talk about what is realistic in your view for this homeland review, as far as the scope and what is not.

Ms. WORMUTH. Well, I think one, to some extent in my view the deadline is what the deadline is. DHS is going to deliver a report to Congress at the end of December, 2009. The question is what is the quality of that report going to be and how much impact it is going to have? I would argue to some extent that—and I would hope that DHS would work with Congress on this—but you are more likely to have a meaningful review that generates thoughtful analysis and helps chart a smart course for the future if you pick a reasonably small set of issues to focus on.

Frankly, DOD faces a lot of the same challenges. The legislation requirements for the QDR are also very, very broad. DOD faces the same challenges in terms of timing, that DHS is facing. The one difference is it has tons of resources to throw at the problem. But I personally am becoming more and more a fan of the idea of saying look, we can't give you the answers to all of the pressing problems facing DHS in 1 year, especially when the first 6 months is going to be consumed with transition activities. So we are going to pick what we think are the most important issues that we need to tackle right out of the gate to set the course for the next 4 years. We recognize there are other important issues.

Here is what we think they are. Here is how we are going to try and tackle them in a structured methodical way over the next couple of years so you can be assured that we are not going to forget those issues and that we are going to give them the consideration.

So I am almost of the view of you don't try and answer the mail all in 1 piece by December 31, but that you demonstrate in a real

way that there is a process for trying to tackle all of the issues down the road.

Mr. ROGERS. I made reference in my opening statement, and Mr. Cohn talked about it a little bit, as you know, I am very concerned about this lack of consolidation and its effect on the ability of the Department to know which direction Congress is expecting it to go and what its goals and priorities should be, and having these multiple standing committees tugging at it may dilute its concept of what its mission is.

Talk a little bit about that because you just now talked about it needing to focus in on its priorities and know how it needs to get from where it is to where it wants to be. How is this lack of unified oversight hindering that, or is it?

Ms. WORMUTH. I would argue that certainly you would have a much better opportunity, you would have a much better chance of developing a coherent homeland security policy and execution strategy if you had a much more consolidated congressional oversight process. Let's face it. The endeavor—

Mr. ROGERS. And an authorization bill annually.

Ms. WORMUTH. Exactly. The sort of endeavor of homeland security is a very, very complex one by its very nature, even if you had frankly a consolidated oversight capability here in Congress. So there is no question in my mind that it would be easier to make sure that all of the pieces are knit together in a thoughtful way and that Congress is in agreement with the Department about what its priorities are and about where it wants to go in the review. I think that we would have a better QHSR if we had a consolidated structure. I think we would have a better homeland security enterprise if we had a conformed Congressional oversight structure.

Unfortunately, I am not particularly sanguine that we are going to get that any time soon, and certainly not in the time frame under which the QHSR is being conducted. So I think if I were in Alan's position or the secretary's position, you really have no other choice other than to again try and reach out early with the core members in Congress to try and engage them in a meaningful way and head off as much as possible disagreements about what the priorities should be.

It is not an ideal way to go about the process, but I think given the realities, that is basically the option you have available.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Cohn, do you have any thoughts on that?

Mr. COHN. Again, as we said, the secretary, as you know, deputy secretary, favor strong Congressional—strong committee and homeland security consolidated Congressional oversight. I think that—

Mr. ROGERS. Is the lack of consolidation going to hinder your ability to get the focus that we were talking about a few minutes ago, as far as analyzing the mission and the priorities and how we are going to get there? Is the lack of that coherent unified oversight going to hinder that, in your view?

Mr. COHN. The distribution of oversight across multiple committees within Congress obviously places the Department under a burden of responding to a number of different discretions and a number of different priorities. Any effort to consolidate that is welcomed and supported by the secretary and the deputy secretary.

But I am confident that we will conduct the review and we will make a meaningful review regardless of the environment.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

Mr. CARNEY. Chairman recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, for 5 minutes.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cohn, it seems universally that people think you are trying to do the job. That is pretty rare for your Department. I want to congratulate you. I say that with no facetious intent because you have a tough job. At this point in time, in the history of mankind, have you come to any findings that are alarming to you?

Mr. COHN. I assume you are relating solely to the homeland security enterprise. We are really in the base, in an early stage of the review. We are setting the analytical baselines for the review at this point. We are cognizant of the variety of criticism that the Department has faced. We are cognizant of all of the efforts, external to the Department, to help us in our mission. I think that that is one of the benefits of a Quadrennial Review.

We have been working this Department very hard for 5 years, all of us, as a Nation, since September 11, to figure out what we do to better secure our homeland. The Quadrennial Review gives us the opportunity to step back from all of this activity and look to, and take a more measured look at, what we have done, where we are and where we need to go. But at this point, no, we, at this point in the review, we have not drawn conclusions as to which direction that we should go or which things might need fixing. As Ms. Wormuth told us in her opening statement where that is [is/?] really something that we should reserve for later in the review process.

Mr. PASCRELL. That is my question because this is, as we know, a Quadrennial Review, however the subject matter is one that sets off all kinds of alarms. We are talking about the safety of our families and our neighborhoods and the country. So it would seem to me that when you are doing this kind of review which may be finished, hopefully, December 2009 or December 2014, just pick a date out of the air, it would seem to me that because of the nature of the subject matter that as you move along, you would want to bring attention to either the committee, or people within the Department of Homeland Security in order that we can't wait until this thing is complete.

What I am very concerned about and I would like your response on is we have, you mentioned the word, as Ms. Wormuth mentioned the word "continuity." Well, are we going to wait about continuity until December 2009 or whenever, when the very essence of homeland security essentially is based on continuity? I am very concerned about that. We are going to wait, we are going to have a year for the new administration to be there. Now you are going to come and present these findings, and we know how we have tried to keep politics out of this thing and I think both sides have. We, Democrats, have no monopoly on that. How are you going to do this? Is that a legitimate question do you think?

Mr. COHN. I think that is a very legitimate question. I think the way we have been looking at it is first and foremost the Department's priority is ensuring a smooth transition from this adminis-



tration to the next, continuity in the Department, a handoff on January 21 or whenever it becomes appropriate—

Mr. PASCARELL. But each agency is supposed to put together part of that, you know, handover, let's say, as your review is going on. As your review is going on, each agency is going to present to the new administration this is where we are, here are some options, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, if they take it seriously, that is what they are supposed to be doing.

Mr. COHN. This has been the challenge. I serve as the senior transition officer for the Office of Policy in addition to the director of the QHSR and so we coordinate very closely with the transition efforts. We see these things building atop one another. First and foremost is the baseline that each component in our office, as you mentioned, plus our headquarters, is laying for the new administration. These are the issues, this is the Department, these are the issues, these are the decisions that are facing you coming in in the next 30, 60, 90 days. That is our departmental transition process. We are fully supportive of that. We are participating in that and we are making sure that there is synchronization between the transition activities and the quadrennial review.

Mr. PASCARELL. Let me ask the Chairman then, excuse me. I want you to continue. I apologize for interrupting. I want to ask the Chairman: Are we going to be getting these reports before the next administration gets it? What is the role of the Homeland Security Committee in these agency handovers?

Mr. CARNEY. It is my hope that the Oversight Subcommittee and the full committee generally does have, at least, insight into the progress of the report. I don't necessarily think it is quite appropriate that we get completed written chapters of the report before it is done, but I do think we need to be apprised along the way and I hope, Mr. Cohn, that would be your vision as well.

Mr. COHN. I would have to defer to the Under Secretary for Management Duke and Deputy Secretary Schneider, who are running our departmental transition process.

Mr. CARNEY. That is a really appropriate answer. Good job.

Mr. PASCARELL. I am really concerned about the transition. I don't want to bring alarm to the situation but, this to me is very critical because you are not changing administration, you are going to be changing the nature of the administration, which is possible, and anything is possible in November. We need to be prepared. We can't wait until on-the-job training takes place. You have career folks. You have political appointments. Some political appointments have done better than the career folks.

We have had instances of that right here at committee hearings. I don't care which administration appoints them as long as they did a good job and are doing their job. That is my feeling.

So I am really concerned about this continuity. In view of the lack of communication between certain agencies, the lack of communication between homeland security and the House, and homeland security and the Senate, there are 14,000 miles apart from one another. I am a little concerned about that you might say. So that the next, so we have as best a seamless approach as we continue past November. That is not going to be easy. Your job isn't

easy but that job is not easy either. Right? Ms. Wormuth what do you think about that? How are we going to avoid it?

Ms. WORMUTH. Absolutely, I think there are no easy answers, but I think there are a couple of things you can try and do; I think one, and again DOD is facing many similar changes as it prepares for its next QDR, but on the one hand it would be useful and perhaps this is already going on. It is a bit delicate, but it would be useful to try and reach out to the campaigns and the folks perhaps who are informally advising the campaigns to help educate them about what are the big issues, what are the pressing things that you are going to face when you walk in the door on January 21, or whatever the exact day is so that you give them a little bit of a running start. That is something you can try and do.

I would also argue that these Quadrennial Reviews should not be the vehicle through which you solve the near-term pressing 1-year horizon problems. They should be more forward-looking. But there are absolutely, as you say, immediate issues that have to be dealt with, and I would hope that these immediate issues would have sort of a separate more of an operational assessment type of track where you have the new team come in, they have got a group of people who are focused on the Quadrennial Review and those longer-term issues.

They also have a group of people who are thinking about, okay, we have got hurricane season coming up in June, are we ready for that? Where are we on immigration reform what is going on there, whatever the sort of pressing issues are?

Mr. PASCRELL. In conclusion, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, if I went over the time. In conclusion, let me ask you this question: What you are saying, and what Mr. Cohn says, goes right to the heart of the issue, but if you are doing this review, that is going to conclude, hopefully, within the next 10 years, 2 years, 1 year, and you come across a specific vulnerability that is not being addressed, I hope we are not going to wait until the final report that you bring it to—well, I don't know who you would bring it to, that you would bring it to whomever you think or is designated that should get it so that we can address that vulnerability or isn't this the case?

Mr. COHN. No, sir, that is absolutely the case, and in fact, that is something that we take very seriously. We will not hold immediate-term issues for long-term resolutions. We pass those issues to our partners in our operational components in our office of operations coordination in our Office of Management directorate, if there are management issues, and we will work them in concert with them to make sure that we get a resolution to them.

Our intention is to make sure that those issues are addressed, even if there needs to be an interim solution while we think more long-term about what we want to put into place going forward.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Cohn, we have heard a couple of times now that Ms. Wormuth thinks that the best chance for success for the report is that you limit it in scope. Do you agree with that?

Mr. COHN. Yes.

Mr. CARNEY. What do we limit it to?

Mr. COHN. First, we have tried to take the broad language of the legislation which empowers the Department to look at a wide variety of things and narrow that into four basic study areas, that is strategic assessment, that is readiness assessment, that is look at the integrated business practices and the look at the key programs. Within there, as Ms. Wormuth has said, it can't be a soup-to-nuts review. We have got to focus on the key issues. To us, that means the strategic assessment focuses on strategically what is all the guidance that has been put up until now? What do the strategies say, the directives? All of the pieces of legislation, the committee reports, et cetera, what does all of that say about where we need to go as a Department and as an enterprise? What are those key issues that need to be resolved?

One of the things we were discussing at the break was the continuing discussions about the role of the Department of Homeland Security as opposed to the Department of Defense, how we are working ever more closely together every day, but how defining issues like homeland security and homeland defense need to be clarified on a strategic basis. On the readiness assessment, again, we will not do a top-to-bottom readiness assessment. FEMA is authorized and appropriated to do that job, the Office of Infrastructure Protection, the Department of Defense—where we will add value is to say, what can we see by aggregating the results of what everyone has looked at?

What does that tell us in the aggregate? Second, what has the experience of going through that, each of these entities, told us about what we need in order to gain better detail and gain better fidelity?

One of the issues that Ms. Wormuth and I have talked a lot about is, how do we define requirements in this area, in this distributed system where we have an enormous number of stakeholders and we have to collaboratively determine what that is?

So to focus in on key issues like that, the third study with the integrated business process, that is the backbone upon which the Department will hang. So understanding how are we going to improve that process, all the things that we have done up until now and how that needs to be strengthened. So to go through each of those four areas and identify the key issues within them that need to be studied, need to be presented to the new administration as challenges and then understand the strategic direction that the administration wants to go in on these challenges, and then make recommendations for resolution.

Mr. CARNEY. You are satisfied that all of the components within DHS will be able to meet those four challenges in each of their components in a timely way, given the sort of the history of coordination and organization issues?

Mr. COHN. That is one of the reasons why we have not adopted an approach of a cast of thousands of detailees from all of our components. We have chosen instead to focus on the analytical resources that have been concentrated in offices like the Office of Policy, which was set up for this purpose, to look at these issues, to develop out the analysis and develop out the options and then bring in our partners from our components, from the other Federal departments and agencies, from our other stakeholders to focus

down on the issues as presented, to talk against a piece of analysis, rather than to try to sweep up every issue or every concern that might exist at every level of the Department.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, now the Department has about 208,000 employees, if I am correct. How many employees are dedicated to the process?

Mr. COHN. I am reading off a card, just so that I am sure that I—

Mr. CARNEY. That is fine. Fine, we do it all the time.

Mr. COHN. Within the Office of Strategic Plans, we have a QHSR chief of staff, two analysts and an analyst vacancy. We had a vacancy come open for a reason. We are posting that vacancy. We also have a detailee from the Coast Guard who submitted his resignation papers. He will be leaving us in the fall and we will be looking to fill that position. Our intention is to bring that group up to a total of six. We are filling that with we have brought on board a policy honors fellow, we have brought in a forward analyst from our federally-funded research and development center, and we are looking at, we are talking with the Coast Guard as to whether we can gap-fill that vacancy before the next assignment season.

In addition, as we have talked about our strategic requirements planning team, the team that is standing up and piloting our strategic requirements process, that process has been working well. We are completing those pilots now. We have turned the attention of that team, which is four full-time employees plus a Coast Guard detailee and two contractors to work on this question of study 3, which is really an essential piece for the Department. What is the Department's integrated business process? How will we integrate strategic planning and requirements planning? The planning programming budget and execution system, our investment in acquisition system and our enterprise architect together into a single solid integrated business process. So we have dedicated those folks' time to that activity.

In addition—those are the full-time folks who are dedicated to this effort. In addition, we have the part-time emphasis of a number of folks from across the Office of Policy.

Mr. CARNEY. So right now it is three.

Mr. COHN. Right now it is three who are dedicated to the Quadrennial Homeland Security security team.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. Mr. Rogers? Mr. Pascrell, any further questions?

Okay. Do you see this process as a unifying process for the DHS?

Mr. COHN. I very much hope so. As we had the chance to discuss, the question of an integrated DHS culture is something that we aspire to, but we have already seen the development of a real shared sense of mission within the Department and each of these activities, jointly assessing strategically where we are going and what our mission is, looking at how far along we have come, how do we strengthen our business processes together, and really how do we work more closely together on joint programs and programs of joint interest, I think each of these activities will have the effect of bringing us more closely together as a Department. That is certainly the intention. I do believe that it will have that effect.

Mr. CARNEY. This is for both of you and this will be the last question. What role do you see the subcommittee playing in this process?

Mr. COHN. As I mentioned in my opening statement, you know, our partners in Congress are an important part of this process. That is not just a statement that we put in the statement. Your committee, and Congress as a whole, have spoken to the Department in numerous ways over numerous times and we are fully considering all of the ways that you have spoken to the Department about the expectations that you have. We have come up to visit with your staff several times to talk about the progress of the Review and we intend to continue doing that, and so as to ensure that this committee understands what we are doing, knows what we are doing, is up to speed on our progress, on our status, knows whether we are hitting our milestones and understands again this question that has come up a couple of times today, whether that December, 2009 date is the date that we need to shoot for and also why, why it is so important that we do, that the Department does speak by that date as we mature and we mature into this role, this leadership role, in the homeland security enterprise and a different kind of leadership role than other departments perhaps, not where we are supposed to do this job ourselves, but where we are supposed to lead from the front with our interagency partners, with our State and local partners and with our nongovernmental partners and others. I see an open dialog and I see a regular updating of progress to this committee so that you can have comfort and you understand where we are going with this review.

Ms. WORMUTH. For me, I think that your subcommittee could very usefully play two major roles, and one is to serve as an advocate frankly, for the Department, an advocate up here in Congress for the Department as it conducts the Review, to be the subcommittee that reminds all of the other 85 subcommittees why this review is important, why you all need to try and speak with one voice as much as possible and interacting with the Department and why it is important that the Department get resources to conduct their review.

I think that is very much needed for the Department. I think to the extent that you all can be an advocate you can help improve the likelihood that the Department will produce a quality review at the end of the day. I think the second role your subcommittee can play as the Subcommittee for Management, Investigations, and Oversight is to act as an integrator, again, here on the Hill, to try and bring together what are the different priorities from a Congressional perspective that Congress would like to see focused on as part of the review and to again try and help focus those Congressional voices in a way that it can be, you know, meaningful input to the Department as opposed to trying to sort of respond to, you know, the Tower of Babel chorus of 86 different voices.

Mr. CARNEY. The Tower of Babel is easier to understand actually.

I want to thank you both for your insight and your candor. Mr. Cohn, Godspeed, my friend. Good luck with this. You have a lot to do.

I remind you that you may have some questions in writing. Please return those expeditiously. I appreciate the testimony getting in early this time. It was great. Hearing no further business before the subcommittee, we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

## APPENDIX

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QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR ALAN D. COHN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

*Question 1.* Since its establishment in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security has experienced some difficulty with organization and coordination.

How can we be assured that the key stakeholders will participate in appropriate ways?

Is it possible that the QHSR could be a unifying exercise for the Department?

Answer. DHS aspires to have an integrated culture and a shared sense of mission throughout headquarters and the component offices. Many of the necessary activities of the QHSR, including jointly assessing our strategy and mission; examining the progress of the Department; developing ways to strengthen our business processes; and working more closely together on joint programs will have the effect of fostering departmental cohesion. That is the intent of the review and DHS believes that the QHSR effort will have that effect.

More specifically, DHS has created an intra-departmental working group, representing all Department components and offices, to advise the QHSR team on component-specific issues and interests. DHS is also in the process of standing up a subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC) to advise DHS on the QHSR process. We are also working with our interagency and intergovernmental partners, academia, think tanks and other subject matter experts to ensure that the review incorporates a wide spectrum of viewpoints. We are also examining uses of existing technology such as the Lessons Learned Information System, Homeland Security Information Network, and wiki-based discussion forums as potential vehicles for reaching a wide base of stakeholders and facilitating a broader discussion of QHSR-related topics.

*Question 2.* Many of the critical infrastructure systems that are potential terrorist targets are owned and operated by private companies. Obvious examples are transportation facilities, telecommunications systems, the electric grid, and chemical plants.

How should the Department deal with national security concerns about privately held infrastructure?

Answer. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) were promulgated to address the national security concerns regarding protection of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). The Federal Government has long recognized that it cannot protect the Nation's CIKR alone, and, because the majority of CIKR is owned or operated by the private sector, a partnership that fully engages these partners is required.

To address this need, the NIPP outlines a Sector Partnership framework between Government and the private sector that involves them in joint planning, program identification, and program implementation on the entire range of activities, from deterrence, prevention, and risk mitigation to response and recovery to ensure protection and resiliency of the infrastructures and other key resources of the economy. This Sector Partnership has been in full operation for more than 2 years and continues to mature and improve. Each of the 17 original sectors developed and, in 2007, promulgated Sector Specific Plans that outline goals, objectives, and implementing actions for the specific sector. A newly designated 18th sector, Critical Manufacturing, will soon follow suit with its own SSP.

A major contribution to this partnership by the Federal Government is supporting each Sector to develop a tailored CIKR Sector Information Sharing Environment within which each Sector can coordinate and communicate among its members, with government at all levels, and with other sectors upon which they depend. The Federal Government has an inherent role and capability to identify and develop threat and risk analysis products for each sector and across sectors. The Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), a joint program office between the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), develops these products through a fusion of threat, vulnerability and consequence information for distribution to both public and private sector partners, and often coordinates with these partners throughout the development of products. In turn, the CIKR sectors depend on these products for planning, setting goals and agendas for protection and resiliency programs, and preparing for and managing response to terrorist incidents. In addition, the Department's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) sponsors research, development, testing, and evaluation of technologies that address capability gaps as identified by the Critical Infrastructure Sectors.

The National CIKR Protection Annual Report establishes a framework and provides benchmarks for evaluating existing CIKR priorities and protective programs, and their supporting CIKR Partnership and Information Sharing Environment. It supports actionable recommendations for future risk mitigation activities. The National Annual Report highlights the designated areas of increased emphasis and the progress made by the Department of Homeland Security, sector-specific agencies, the Federal, State, local, tribal and territorial governments, and private-sector security partners in protecting the Nation's CIKR, and includes the National Profile of Terrorism Risks to CIKR.

*Question 3.* Congress has legislated this Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. It is our hope that this exercise will help the Department focus its policy development efforts.

How can this subcommittee be helpful to the Department in doing the QHSR?

Answer. We have appreciated previous opportunities to brief subcommittee staff on the progress of the QHSR, and we intend to continue to do so throughout the process. As discussed during the July 30, 2008 hearing, it will be most helpful for the subcommittee to remain committed to maintaining an open dialog and facilitating regular progress updates so that we may keep you apprised of QHSR efforts. Additionally, DHS would value the subcommittee serving as an advocate and point of coordination within Congress for the QHSR effort, coordinating and consolidating input and advice from our numerous House oversight committees. Finally, the subcommittee can assist in ensuring that DHS is appropriated the full \$1.65 million in the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request, without limitation on use and in the most expeditious way possible, to support development of the best possible product.

*Question 4.* A recurring question in national security agencies is how they can move forward with structured programs, yet maintain the flexibility to deal with new challenges, such as the Katrina episode or indeed the events of 9/11 themselves. It strikes me that the QHSR should really deal with this.

Do you have any thoughts on how the Department should address this issue in the QHSR?

Answer. The Department has given extensive consideration to the inherent challenge of planning and organizing for asymmetric, low probability/high consequence events such as Hurricane Katrina and 9/11. As described in the *National Preparedness Guidelines* (2007), a principal means of addressing this challenge is through the development of capabilities that are useful across a broad range of threats. Specifically, capabilities-based preparedness is defined as preparing, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of challenges while working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice. It is a way to make informed choices about how to manage the risk and reduce the impact posed by potential threats. It focuses decisionmaking on building and maintaining capabilities to prevent and protect against challenges (e.g., intelligence analysis, critical infrastructure protection, etc.) and to respond and recover when events occur (e.g., on-site incident management, medical surge, emergency public information, and economic recovery). Capabilities are developed to address a wide range of threats and therefore bring an inherent flexibility into an organization's readiness posture.

More fundamentally, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (2007) called for the Federal Government to "establish a more deliberate and comprehensive system that will ensure unity of effort and help maximize success as we work to prevent and disrupt terrorism, protect the American people, critical infrastructure and key resources, and respond to and recover from incidents that do occur", and calls on DHS to lead a national effort to create and transform homeland security principles, systems, structures, and institutions across four key pillars of homeland security. The Strategy also highlights the need for risk to inform homeland security decisionmaking. Executing against this guidance and building a comprehensive system will enable the Government to more efficiently align homeland security policy, strat-



egy, plans, and operational activities against new threats and ever-evolving priorities.

The QHSR can reinforce and support these approaches while also fostering closer relationships with similar reviews underway in the defense and intelligence communities.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY OF PENNSYLVANIA FOR CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

*Question 1.* The Quadrennial Defense Review has been conducted three times between 1997 and 2006. But the Department of Homeland Security is not the Department of Defense. There are major differences in mission, organization, scale, and so on.

What are these differences?

What do they tell us about how the QHSR should be conducted in a different way? Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

*Question 2.* The QHSR has been timed to be conducted during the initial year of each new Presidential term. The thought was that this would help focus homeland security policy development. But the second Quadrennial Defense Review was published in 2001, prior to the 9/11 attacks, and many thought it to be irrelevant.

How can we be assured that the analytical work and recommendations are acted upon even in the event of a homeland security crisis?

Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

*Question 3.* Congress has legislated this Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. It is our hope that this exercise will help the Department focus its policy development efforts.

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Answer. Response was not provided at the time of publication.

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