

BEST PRACTICES FOR MAKING COLLEGE CAMPUSES SAFE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 15, 2007

Serial No. 110-36

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor



Available on the Internet:

<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/education/index.html>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

34-744 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2007

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR

GEORGE MILLER, California, *Chairman*

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan, <i>Vice Chairman</i>	Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, California, <i>Ranking Minority Member</i>
Donald M. Payne, New Jersey	Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin
Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey	Peter Hoekstra, Michigan
Robert C. "Bobby" Scott, Virginia	Michael N. Castle, Delaware
Lynn C. Woolsey, California	Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Rubén Hinojosa, Texas	Vernon J. Ehlers, Michigan
Carolyn McCarthy, New York	Judy Biggert, Illinois
John F. Tierney, Massachusetts	Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania
Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio	Ric Keller, Florida
David Wu, Oregon	Joe Wilson, South Carolina
Rush D. Holt, New Jersey	John Kline, Minnesota
Susan A. Davis, California	Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington
Danny K. Davis, Illinois	Kenny Marchant, Texas
Raúl M. Grijalva, Arizona	Tom Price, Georgia
Timothy H. Bishop, New York	Luis G. Fortuño, Puerto Rico
Linda T. Sánchez, California	Charles W. Boustany, Jr., Louisiana
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland	Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Joe Sestak, Pennsylvania	John R. "Randy" Kuhl, Jr., New York
David Loebsack, Iowa	Rob Bishop, Utah
Mazie Hirono, Hawaii	David Davis, Tennessee
Jason Altmire, Pennsylvania	Timothy Walberg, Michigan
John A. Yarmuth, Kentucky	Dean Heller, Nevada
Phil Hare, Illinois	
Yvette D. Clarke, New York	
Joe Courtney, Connecticut	
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire	

Mark Zuckerman, *Staff Director*
Vic Klatt, *Minority Staff Director*

C O N T E N T S

	Page
Hearing held on May 15, 2007	1
Statement of Members:	
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. "Buck," Senior Republican Member, Committee on Education and Labor	3
Prepared statement of	4
Miller, Hon. George, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor	1
Prepared statement of	2
Statement of Witnesses:	
Cornell, Dewey G., Ph.D., forensic clinical psychologist and professor of education, director of the Virginia Youth Violence Project, Curry School of Education, University of Virginia	20
Prepared statement of	22
Healy, Steven J., president, International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA)	7
Prepared statement of	9
Attachment: Accreditation Standards and Critical Incident Manage- ment	12
Kennedy, Louanne, Ph.D., emeritus provost and vice president for aca- demic affairs, Northridge, California State University System	13
Prepared statement of	16
Walbert, Janet E., Ed.D., president, National Association of Student Per- sonnel Administrators, vice president for student affairs, Arcadia Uni- versity	25
Prepared statement of	27

BEST PRACTICES FOR MAKING COLLEGE CAMPUSES SAFE

**Tuesday, May 15, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Education and Labor
Washington, DC**

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. George Miller [chairman of the committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Miller, Kildee, Payne, Andrews, Scott, Woolsey, Hinojosa, Tierney, Kucinich, Holt, Davis of California, Davis of Illinois, Bishop of New York, Sestak, Loeb sack, Altmire, Yarmuth, Hare, Clarke, Courtney, McKeon, Petri, Keller, Wilson, Kline, Boustany, Foxx, Kuhl, Davis of Tennessee, Walberg and Heller.

Staff Present: Tylease Alli, Hearing Clerk; Denise Forte, Director of Education Policy; Gabriella Gomez, Senior Education Policy Advisor; Lloyd Horwich, Policy Advisor for Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary and Secondary Education; Lamont Ivey, Staff Assistant, Education; Stephanie Moore, General Counsel; Joe Novotny, Chief Clerk; Lisette Partelow, Staff Assistant, Education; Rachel Racusen, Deputy Communications Director; Julie Radocchia, Education Policy Advisor; Michele Varnhagen, Labor Policy Director; Mark Zuckerman, Staff Director; Robert Borden, Minority General Counsel; Kathryn Bruns, Minority Legislative Assistant; Amy Jones, Minority Professional Staff Member; Victor Klatt, Minority Staff Director; Linda Stevens, Minority Chief Clerk/Assistant to the General Counsel; and Sally Stroup, Minority Deputy Staff Director.

Chairman MILLER. The Committee on Education and Labor will come to order. I want to welcome everyone this morning to today's hearing on the best practices for making college campuses safe.

Nearly a month has passed since the horrific violence of Virginia Tech, by far the worst campus attack on our Nation's history. It is extremely difficult to make sense of a tragedy like this, and the unanswered questions about the events that unfolded that day will undoubtedly persist for a long time. Virginia Governor Tim Kaine has provided tremendous leadership for the Virginia Tech community and for his State during this painful and difficult time. The work of his Commission will address the ongoing questions about the tragedy on the Virginia Tech campus. We will look to the Commission's work for guidance when it releases its recommendations.

The purpose of our hearing today is to learn from campus safety advocates and school administrators about how the Congress can help colleges and universities across the country to prevent and recover from tragedies. On an emergency preparedness front, we are particularly interested in learning about emergency communications systems that use the latest technologies. Many campuses use broadcast e-mails and text-messaging systems that have proven to be effective in alerting students and staff to emergency situations. Communication, as we have learned, must include ways in which parents and loved ones can receive updates and information about students and staff on campus. The overall safety and emergency preparedness plan is just part of the equation.

Detecting and preventing threats on the campus communities are another part of the equation. Comprehensive mental health counseling and intervention services can be incorporated into the daily student life on campuses to help prevent the individuals from acting on their emotions in a negative way. As we will hear today, having the appropriate personnel for every day of prevention services as well for the tragedies brings us closer to ensuring a safer learning and working environment on campus.

As we examine the state of campuses today, we must also look at some of the more common and pervasive threats to students—alcohol abuse and sexual assault. According to the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, in 2001, more than 1,700 deaths on campuses were caused by alcohol-related injuries. 97,000 students were victims of alcohol-related rape and sexual assaults, and 696,000 students were assaulted by other students who had been drinking heavily. The Federal statistics show that, in 2006, there were more than 2,600 rapes reported by the students, a figure that still may not show us the full picture of the sexual assault trend, especially with these low reporting rates.

Nothing is more important than the safety and well-being of our children, our students and our loved ones. As the Virginia Tech community continues to recover and heal from last month's tragedy, the best service that we can provide to the students and faculty and the staff members of colleges and universities across the country is to first listen and learn. Then we must decide what additional role the Federal Government, if any, can play in better preparing the campuses to be safe.

We look forward to the testimony of our panel of witnesses, and I would now like to recognize the senior Republican of our committee, Mr. McKeon from California.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

**Prepared Statement of Hon. George Miller, Chairman, Committee on
Education and Labor**

Welcome to today's hearing on "Best Practices for Making College Campuses Safe."

Nearly a month has passed since the horrific violence at Virginia Tech—by far the worst campus attack in our nation's history. It is extremely difficult to make sense of a tragedy like this, and unanswered questions about the events that unfolded that day will undoubtedly persist for a long time.

Virginia Governor Tim Kaine has provided tremendous leadership for the Virginia Tech community and for his state during this painful and difficult time. The work

of his commission will address the ongoing questions about the tragedy on the Virginia Tech campus.

We will look to the commission's work for guidance when it releases its recommendations.

The purpose of our hearing today is to learn from campus safety advocates and school administrators about how the Congress can help colleges and universities across the country to prevent and recover from tragedies.

On the emergency preparedness front, we are particularly interested in learning about emergency communications systems that use the latest technologies.

Many campuses use broadcast emails and text-messaging systems that have proven to be effective in alerting students and staff of emergency situations.

Communications, as we have learned, must include a way for parents or other loved ones to receive updates and information about students or staff on campus.

The overall safety and emergency preparedness plan is just one part of the equation. Detecting and preventing threats on a campus community is the other part of the equation.

Comprehensive mental health counseling and intervention services can be incorporated into daily student life on campuses, to help prevent individuals from acting on their emotions in a negative way.

As we examine the state of safety on campuses today, we must also look at some of the more common—and pervasive—threats to students: alcohol abuse and sexual assault.

According to the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, in 2001, more than 1,700 deaths on campuses were caused by alcohol related injuries; 97,000 students were victims of alcohol-related rape or sexual assaults; and 696,000 students were assaulted by another student who had been drinking heavily. And federal statistics show that in 2006, there were more than 2,600 rapes reported by students—a figure that still may not show us the full picture given that sexual assaults tend to have especially low reporting rates.

Nothing is more important than the safety and well-being of our children, our students, and our loved ones.

As the Virginia Tech community continues to recover and heal from last month's tragedy, the best service we can provide to the students and faculty and staff members of colleges and universities across this country is to first listen and learn. Then we must decide what additional role the federal government can play in better preparing campuses to be safe.

We look forward to the testimony by our panel of witnesses.

I now recognize the committee's Senior Republican, Mr. McKeon, for his opening remarks.

Thank you.

Mr. McKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening today's hearing.

It has been nearly a month since the deadliest shooting in modern American history and, without a doubt, our Nation's most unthinkable instance in campus violence. Families across the country and the Virginia Tech community continue to grieve, and we always will, but in the aftermath of that dark April day, our challenge is to learn not only more about what occurred in Blacksburg but also what we can do to ensure that college campuses are well-equipped to handle tragedies such as this.

A response to an event of this magnitude, as all of us would suspect, has been as swift as it has been broad. Local, State and Federal law enforcement immediately engaged both for the purposes of ensuring safety, but also to investigate the sordid details of this sad case. Virginia's governor has assembled a panel of experts to review every conceivable aspect of the campus shooting, and colleges and universities have begun to look inward, reexamining their own emergency response plans.

Today, this committee has the opportunity to contribute to the national dialogue on the safety of our college campuses as well, and

I thank our witnesses for joining us this morning to help us to do just that.

At the outset, I believe it is important to note that this is not a Republican or a Democrat issue. Rather, this is an issue in which we all share feelings of anger, sorrow and, yes, responsibility, not responsibility for what occurred in Blacksburg on April 16th—the responsibility for that day’s events lies squarely with a single gunman, who acted selfishly, brutally and without regard for human life—but responsibility to join with other stakeholders to trigger a national discussion on how to improve response efforts for the next time an emergency situation occurs on a college campus.

The goal of today’s hearing is straightforward, to listen and to learn. As we organized our panel of witnesses and our agenda, we made certain that our objective was not to advocate or to dismiss a particular policy change or a piece of legislation. Rather, we have assembled four men and women who can share their unique perspectives on how to deal with unexpected tragedies on college campuses. For example, I will be eager to hear their thoughts on ways various departments within institutions have coordinated an immediate response to an on-campus incident.

What are campuses doing with regard to emergency notification systems? What research is being done in the area of threat assessments, and how have various campuses dealt with unexpected tragedies?

In short, we are here to discuss with our panel the question of whether there are certain standards or best practices that could be followed for bolstering security and emergency notification on campus. Because a campus security office can take many forms and because campuses can vary from small, one-building colleges to colleges that sprawl several acres, to colleges that are in the middle of a bustling city, trying to develop suggestions for standards that will fit all different types of campuses is difficult. However, it is the responsibility of all stakeholders to take on this challenge, and this committee is no exception.

Mr. Chairman, with that in mind, I will look forward to our witnesses’ testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, Senior Republican Member, Committee on Education and Labor

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening today’s hearing.

It’s been nearly a month since the deadliest shooting in modern American history and, without a doubt, our nation’s most unthinkable instance of campus violence. Families across the country and the Virginia Tech community continue to grieve, and we always will. But in the aftermath of that dark April day, our challenge is to learn not only more about what occurred in Blacksburg, but also what we can do to ensure college campuses are well-equipped to handle tragedies such as this.

The response to an event of this magnitude, as all of us would suspect, has been as swift as it has been broad. Local, state, and federal law enforcement immediately engaged—both for the purposes of ensuring safety, but also to investigate the sordid details of this sad case. Virginia’s Governor has assembled a panel of experts to review every conceivable aspect of the campus shooting. And colleges and universities have begun to look inward, re-examining their own emergency response plans.

Today, this Committee has the opportunity to contribute to the national dialogue on the safety of our college campuses as well, and I thank our witnesses for joining us this morning to help us do just that. At the outset, I believe it’s important to note that this is not a “Republican” or “Democrat” issue. Rather, this is an issue in which we all share feelings of anger, sorrow, and—yes—responsibility. Not re-

responsibility for what occurred in Blacksburg on April 16th, as the responsibility for that day's events lies squarely with a single gunman, who acted selfishly, brutally, and without regard for human life—but responsibility to join with other stakeholders to trigger a national discussion on how to improve response efforts for the next time an emergency situation occurs on a college campus.

The goal of today's hearing is straightforward: to listen and to learn. As we organized our panel of witnesses and our agenda, we made certain that our objective was not to advocate or dismiss a particular policy change or piece of legislation. Rather, we have assembled four men and women who can share their unique perspectives on how to deal with unexpected tragedies on college campuses. For example, I'll be eager to hear their thoughts on ways various departments within institutions have coordinated in immediate response to an on-campus incident; what campuses are doing with regard to emergency notification systems; what research is being done in the area of threat assessments; and how various campuses have dealt with unexpected tragedies.

In short, we're here to discuss with our panel the question of whether there are certain standards—or “best practices”—that could be followed for bolstering security and emergency notification on campus. Because a campus security office can take many forms and because campuses can vary from small, one-building colleges, to colleges that sprawl several acres, to colleges that are in the middle of a bustling city, trying to develop suggestions for standards that will fit all different types of campuses is difficult. However, it is the responsibility of all stakeholders to take on this challenge—and this Committee is no exception.

Mr. Chairman, with that in mind, I look forward to our witnesses' testimony.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much.

I want to welcome all of the members of the panel. Thank you for agreeing to give us your time and the benefits of your experience and your knowledge.

I would like to turn to Mr. Scott for the purpose of introducing Dr. Dewey Cornell.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for allowing me to introduce Dr. Cornell from the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education. I have worked closely with Dr. Cornell on many issues over the years, and I am pleased to see him testifying here today.

His testimony in this hearing is, unfortunately, relevant today in the wake of the shootings at Virginia Tech on April 16th. Virginia Tech held its commencement ceremony this past weekend, and although the physical and emotional scars from this horrific day will continue to affect students and faculty for a long time to come, I am hopeful that this is the first step in restoring a sense of normalcy and healing to the campus.

Dr. Cornell is a forensic clinical psychologist and a professor of education at the Curry School. He is also a director of the Virginia Youth Violence Project and a faculty associate at the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy. He has 24 years of experience in evaluating juvenile and adult offenders, including in the area of school shootings. He has testified in legal proceedings, has consulted with the FBI and has authored over 100 publications in psychology and education on these matters.

From his work, Dr. Cornell has developed threat assessment guidelines that are being used throughout Virginia as well as in other States, and these guidelines are meant to assess the actual threat of incidences in schools in order to help schools evaluate the severity of threats and respond in a targeted and appropriate manner.

He is widely respected in his field, and I would like to thank him for traveling here today to provide testimony about his work on

school violence, and I look forward to hearing his recommendations, and again, I thank Dr. Cornell.

I thank you, Chairman Miller, for the opportunity to introduce him today.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Now, for the purposes of introducing Dr. Luanne Kennedy, we have Mr. McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Luanne Kennedy served as Provost and Vice President of Academic Affairs at California State University Northridge from 1993 until 2003. As Provost and Vice President, she was the primary advisor to the president on all matters affecting academic programming and was responsible for the campus in the absence of the president.

When an earthquake struck Northridge, California in January 1994, Dr. Kennedy, the only senior administrator on campus that weekend, guided the university through the early hours of the disaster. The earthquake was only the second to strike directly beneath an urban area since 1933, and it produced the strongest ground motions ever instrumentally recorded in North America. In those initial days, Dr. Kennedy accurately estimated the number of emergency trailers needed to house the campus. She was a forceful leader on campus in the weeks and months that followed. That is when I first met her, and it was a wonderful experience to see the inspirational leadership that she provided at that time.

Before joining CSU Northridge, Dr. Kennedy served as Associate Provost at Baruch College in the City University of New York system and as Vice President for Academic Affairs at Kean University of New Jersey. She also has served on numerous community organizations and boards, including the regional and corporate boards of the United Way of Los Angeles.

Mr. Chairman, it is my privilege to welcome Dr. Kennedy this morning, and I look forward to hearing her perspective on campus safety and emergency preparedness.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much.

I have the honor of introducing Dr. Jan Walbert. Dr. Walbert has served on various senior student affairs positions at Arcadia University for 18 years. Currently, Dr. Walbert is the Vice President of Student Affairs as well as President of the National Association for Student Personnel Administrators, the umbrella organization for Student Affairs Administrators, representing over 11,000 members at 1,400 campuses. NASPA members serve in a variety of functions and roles, including the Vice President and Dean for Student Life as well as professionals, working with housing and residence life, student unions, student activities, counseling, career development, orientation, enrollment management, racial and ethnic minority support services, and retention and assessment.

Thank you very much for joining us, and we look forward to your testimony. That is a pretty hefty portfolio there.

Congressman Holt wanted to be here to introduce Chief Steven Healy, but he has been detained. So, if I might, I will go ahead and just introduce Chief Healy to the committee.

Chief Healy currently serves as Director of Public Safety at Princeton University. He is also the President of the International

Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, and it is in that capacity that Chief Healy will be testifying before us today. Previously, Chief Healy testified before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in April of this year.

Welcome to the committee. I think, Chief, we are going to start with you.

The lighting system in the committee is such that when you start testifying, the green light will go on, and then, hopefully, an orange light will go on and warn you that you have about a minute to wrap it up, and then the red light means that you will be out of time, but we do allow you to finish a coherent sentence and finish a thought and all of the rest of that. So be comfortable in testifying in the manner that you are most comfortable doing so.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN HEALY, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CAMPUS LAW ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATORS, AND DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. I appreciate that.

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McKeon, members of the committee, my name is Steven Healy, and I am the Director of Public Safety at Princeton University and am the President of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators. IACLEA represents the campus public safety executives at 1,100 institutions of higher education and over 1,800 individual members.

The tragic events at Virginia Tech nearly 1 month ago today heightened the importance of our continuous efforts to enhance campus public safety and to protect students, faculty, staff, and visitors to our campus. I thank and commend the committee for having this very important hearing.

This morning, I want to address several issues related to campus public safety best practices, including mass communication systems and other efforts that we have underway to strengthen communications, initiatives to continually raise the level of professionalism within the campus public safety community, and ongoing efforts to meet Federal crime reporting guidelines.

First, I want to assure this committee and the American people that vigorous efforts are underway to enhance safety and security on our Nation's campuses. With our partners such as the International Association of the Chiefs of Police, College and University Policing Section and several Federal agencies, we are committed to protecting our campuses and maintaining the open environment that is essential to the higher education experience.

As you know, campuses are not immune from threats. We deal with a number of health and safety risks, including high-risk drinking, drug abuse, mental illness, suicide, and various forms of violence against women, including sexual assault. Campus public safety officers are on the front lines, along with many other campus administrators, preventing, intervening and responding to these situations. While there are no one-size-fits-all solutions, ensuring that campus public safety agencies meet high professional standards contributes to effective prevention and response.

IACLEA recognizes that adherence to the highest professional standards is crucial to our effectiveness. Thanks to the Justice Department Office of Community-oriented Policing Services, IACLEA has established an accreditation program based on standards written by the Commission on Accreditation For Law Enforcement Agencies. Our program requires participating agencies to conduct an in-depth self-assessment and then to meet over 225 standards, many of which are specific to the campus environment. Accreditation sets a strong foundation as agencies plan for other important aspects of campus safety, such as communications, which must be dealt with in a holistic manner.

First, we must communicate within our communities during critical incidents to provide detailed instructions, control rumors and maintain order. Second, we must also ensure effective communications between all first responders. Effective emergency notification systems must have the appropriate capacity, security, redundancy, and reliability to reach the community in multiple modes. These systems must use voice messages, text messages, e-mails in addition to other systems such as sirens and horns. No one method is sufficient. We must combine all of these methods to ensure that we reach the community. Effective communication and interoperability between first responders is also paramount, and IACLEA has received significant funding from the Department of Homeland Security to enhance those responses.

In addition to ongoing challenges, colleges and universities must also comply with the Federal Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990, also known as the Clery Act. The Clery Act impacts many areas of campus operations, so it is important for campuses to take a collaborative approach to compliance. To further this collaborative model, IACLEA has joined with Security on Campus, an organization that works to improve campus safety to offer a series of Clery Act training sessions around the country. While many of these efforts have enhanced campus public safety, it is important that we all recognize that there is much more to do, and I offer the following recommendations.

First is the need for a National Center For Campus Public Safety. The need for a National Center For Campus Public Safety was a consensus recommendation from a Justice Department-sponsored summit held in 2004. The National Center would support research, information-sharing, best in model practices, and strategic planning to enhance safety and security.

In conclusion, IACLEA has worked for the past 49 years to advance campus public safety and to support the more than 30,000 campus public safety officers serving our colleges and universities. We firmly believe that campus public safety is a shared responsibility that requires efforts from us all. Thank you for your commitment to this important issue. Your continued support is vital to our success and to our ability to maintain our campuses as safe places. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this important dialogue, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much.

[The statement of Mr. Healy follows:]

Prepared Statement of Steven J. Healy, President, International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA)

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McKeon, Members of the Committee. My name is Steven Healy and I am the director of public safety at Princeton University. I am also the President of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA), an association that represents the campus public safety executives at 1,100 institutions of higher education and over 1,800 individual members.

The tragic events at Virginia Tech nearly one month ago have heightened the importance of our continuous efforts to enhance campus public safety at more than 4,000 institutions of higher education serving nearly 16 million students and millions more faculty, staff and visitors. I thank and commend the Committee for holding this important hearing on campus safety best practices.

I want to address several issues related to campus public safety best practices, including on-going efforts to strengthen communications, initiatives to continually raise the level of professionalism within the campus public safety community and efforts to comply with federal crime reporting requirements.

Before I outline these strategies, I want to assure this Committee and the American people that vigorous efforts have been and continue to be underway to enhance safety and security on our nation's campuses. With our partners, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, College and University Policing Section (IACP) and several federal agencies, we are continuously vigilant and committed to protecting our students and other community members while simultaneously maintaining the open environment that is the centerpiece of the American higher education experience.

It's important to understand the complex nature of our communities and the evolving responsibilities of campus public safety.

Campuses are not immune from safety threats and other dangers facing our society. We must be realistic about these threats and act proactively to prevent and respond to the inevitable crises and incidents that will arise. Campuses deal with a number of critical challenges today, including problems with high risk drinking, drug abuse, mental illness, including suicide, and various forms of violence against women, including sexual assault. Campus public safety officers are on the front lines, along with other campus administrators, as first responders to many of these situations. As we work to develop comprehensive, coordinated approaches to these, and other problems, there is a growing convergence among fields about the best way to prepare for and address complex health and safety issues on college campuses. Rather than recommending one-size-fits-all solutions, both alcohol, other drug and violence (AODV) prevention programs on the one hand, and crisis planning models on the other, emphasize the need for creating comprehensive plans that are tailored to the culture, setting, and physical environment of each campus.

Essential steps in creating these plans include:

- Working in partnerships with multiple campus and community stakeholders;
- Conducting an analysis of local problems, hazards, structures, assets, and resources; and,
- Consulting the research literature for and creating evidence-based practices.

One way to ensure our colleges and universities are able to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from critical incidents is by providing adequate resources for our campus public safety agencies. These resources must include, as a foundation, the best possible training available and support for adherence to the highest professional standards.

Accreditation

IACLEA recognizes that training and professional standards are crucial to our success in crime prevention and control and critical incident response. Several years ago, we embarked upon a process to establish an accreditation program for campus public safety agencies.

Thanks to our partners in the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), IACLEA was provided seed monies to begin developing this program. Based on the standards previously established by the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), we now have a program that supports our commitment to the professionalization of campus public safety.

Our Accreditation program requires participating agencies to conduct an in-depth self-assessment of their policies and procedures and then take significant steps to meet more than 150 campus-specific standards. Some of those standards specifically address critical incident response and we believe that the Accreditation process, in

and of itself, enhances an agency's response to all-hazards (see attached article). IACLEA began accepting applications for the program last year and we are confident that many colleges and universities will support their campus public safety agencies seeking Accreditation.

Accreditation sets a strong foundation so agencies are able to plan for other important aspects of campus safety such as communications. Communicating for effective campus public safety involves several inter-connecting spheres of communication and must be approached in a holistic manner.

Communications

First and foremost, we must communicate within our campus communities immediately following the discovery of a critical incident so we are able to provide detailed instructions, maintain order, and control rumors. Secondly, we must communicate with those responsible for managing and resolving a critical incident: the emergency first responders. For the former, our strategy must consider the unique characteristics of campuses and the fact that we are open, vibrant, active communities, with people always on the move, engaging in academic, social and other activities.

Of particular interest is the need for mass, emergency notification systems that have appropriate capacity, security, redundancy and reliance to reach our community members using multiple forms of communication that do not allow for a single point of failure. These systems must be able to reach community members with voice messages, text messages and emails, in addition to other systems that may already be in place, such as web sites, horns, or sirens. No single method of communication is sufficient.

Secondly, we must communicate effectively with our emergency response partners. This type of communication requires interoperability—that is, equipment, protocols and governance structures that allow agencies to speak to each other in real time. Funding provided by Congress through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Justice aims to enhance interoperability at several levels, yet colleges and universities are not explicitly mentioned as potential grant recipients for this funding. Specifically including campus public safety agencies in existing federal and state programs of emergency preparedness and law enforcement response would address the varying capabilities of campuses to talk to their counterparts in the larger community during critical incidents.

While interoperable equipment is important, so is the need to have established systems, protocols, agreements, and joint training programs that enable multiple agencies to respond in a rapid, effective, seamless fashion. With the support of a U.S. Department of Homeland Security grant, IACLEA created a "Guide to Strengthening Communications between Campus Public Safety Departments and Federal-State-Local Emergency Response Agencies". This Guide recommends that campuses do the following:

- Assess local responsibilities and resources available;
- Determine the state of local emergency communications equipment and training and make recommendations for improvements;
- Develop and maintain a written Emergency Communication Plan that is consistent with federal NIMS/ICS requirements;
- Develop mutual aid agreements and/or memoranda of understanding in cooperation with local law enforcement and other emergency response agencies;
- Train and conduct exercises to validate, enhance, or improve all procedures resulting from developed mutual aid agreements; and,
- Develop and improve communications skills and networks.

To support these goals, IACLEA, with funding from DHS, developed a critical incident management course that involves simulation based training. In its first year of operation, the program has trained more than 700 campus public safety officers and their emergency response partners.

In addition to the on-going challenges of crime prevention, crime control, and critical incident response, colleges and universities must ensure they comply with Federal crime reporting requirements, specifically, the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990, known as the Clery Act.

Clery Act Compliance

The Act requires colleges and universities that receive federal Title IV funding to disclose campus crime statistics and crime prevention information to the public and the Federal government. IACLEA has served as a resource to the U.S. Department of Education by providing feedback on changes to the Clery Act and training for our members. IACLEA has co-sponsored a number of Clery Act training and compliance

workshops and seminars at our Annual Conference, Regional Conferences and other venues.

The Jeanne Clery Act impacts many areas of campus operations and administration; therefore, it is important for colleges and universities to take a collaborative approach to compliance. To further the collaborative model, this year, Security on Campus, an organization devoted to improving campus safety, teamed with IACLEA and the IACP under grant funding from the U.S. Departments of Justice and Education, to offer a series of Clery Act compliance training sessions across the U.S. IACLEA is providing subject matter expert instructors for these courses.

The Clery Act provides students and their families with accurate, complete and timely information about safety on campus, so they can make informed decisions about their safety and security. Our job as the professional association representing campus public safety is to provide our members with the latest training and guidance so they can deliver this information to students, parents and the Federal government. IACLEA is committed to working with our members and with other interested groups to promote Clery Act compliance and training in the future.

IACLEA believes that a current proposal to expand the Clery Act to include additional reporting requirements under a broad definition of “campus law enforcement emergencies,” while well intended, is far too subjective and contains a number of problematic requirements. We have submitted alternative language for this bill and stand ready to assist the U.S. Congress in enhancing campus public safety.

Summary

Providing adequate safety and security for our nation’s campuses is a critical responsibility that requires action by all of us. Campuses are diverse settings, and there is no one-size-fits-all initiative that will work at every institution. Each campus must undertake a comprehensive planning process involving multiple campus and community constituencies, working together to analyze their local problems and assets and developing plans that use multiple, coordinated policies, protocols, and programs. IACLEA has developed several resources that can significantly contribute to these efforts, but we can do more with additional support from the Federal government.

While these existing efforts by IACLEA and other professional associations and our partners in the Federal government lay important groundwork, they should be supplemented to ensure they are:

- Expanded to all campuses;
- Include more partners on campus, as well as local and state partners;
- Supported with funding for appropriate equipment and other infrastructure development;
- Informed by training, technical assistance, and up-to-date information; and,
- Practiced regularly on all campuses.

Recommendations

While IACLEA currently reaches nearly half the traditional higher education institutions, we need to ensure all colleges and universities are committed to and have access to high quality information, best practices, and training. Greater Federal, state and local support for campus public safety agencies—both at public or private institutions—would provide additional opportunities.

First among my recommendations is the need to establish a National Center for Campus Public Safety. The need for a National Center was a consensus recommendation from a Summit held in 2004. The National Center would support research, information sharing, best and model practices, and strategic planning to enhance campus public safety.

For example, in the aftermath of the horrific events at Virginia Tech on April 16, many campuses began examining mass notification systems. Unfortunately, there was little information available to help guide those decisions. A National Center would fill that gap by brokering innovative, forward-looking research for campus public safety needs. The National Center would also aggressively promote the adoption of professional standards, like those in the IACLEA Accreditation Program. The Center would be an invaluable resource for all who have a stake in campus public safety and thus the success of our colleges and universities.

Secondly, we are working with our partners in the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Department of Education to expand previous studies of middle and high school aged shooters, to take a deliberate, campus-focused look at rampage shooting incidents at colleges and universities. This examination and the lessons learned from it will surely result in the identification of best practices. I would like to thank the FBI Office of Law Enforcement Coordination for facilitating this important initiative.

Finally, IACLEA will work with the national associations of higher education and other partners to adopt a four-point risk management strategy that we believe may help us prevent future tragedies:

- Aggressively promote the use of IACLEA's Threat & Risk Assessment tool, developed with federal DHS grant support, to help campuses identify and prioritize vulnerabilities tied to known and potential threats. For this, IACLEA will need additional resources from DHS beyond what our current grant allows.
- Collaborate with others to create behavioral threat assessment models. These models should be centered on multi-disciplinary teams, comprised of student affairs professionals, counselors and psychologists, substance abuse professionals, and campus public safety administrators working together.
- Fast track our efforts to develop a comprehensive tool to assist campuses in evaluating their physical security environments. This tool will help campuses make sound decisions about security technology and mass notification systems.
- Ensure that rapid response training is available to campuses that need it. The Bureau of Justice Assistance has pledged their help in this important endeavor.

We believe this four-point approach addresses potential gaps that may exist on some campuses and establishes a framework to systematically address other safety and security challenges on our campuses.

Conclusion

For the past 49 years, IACLEA has worked to advance campus public safety. We understand the vital role our colleges and universities play in ensuring democracy throughout the world. We will continue to be an advocate for the more than 30,000 public safety officers serving over 4,000 unique communities. Advancing campus public safety is a shared responsibility and requires efforts from all of us. We must all work to ensure we eliminate the fragmentation and isolation of campus safety initiatives and adopt only those activities that are founded in evidence-based best practices.

Thank you for your commitment to this important issue. I would also like to thank DHS, the FBI, the Justice Department and the Department of Education for their support, along with the many state and local agencies, who are our partners. These partnerships are vital to fulfilling our promise to ensure that every campus community remains safe and open.

I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this important and ongoing dialogue.

Attachment

ACCREDITATION STANDARDS AND CRITICAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Recent occurrences in the United States and Canada have underscored the potential for catastrophic events on college and university campuses. Whether man-made, natural or technological in nature, catastrophic events present unique challenges to those responsible for the well-being of students, faculty, staff and visitors. Events such as Hurricane Katrina, in the fall of 2005, illustrate the potential for catastrophes to reach far beyond geopolitical boundaries and render great swaths of infrastructure inoperable. The tragic shootings at Dawson College in Montreal and more recently, at Virginia Tech, demonstrate the sudden, unpredictable, and devastating nature of some criminal acts. These events point out the need for seamless emergency operations procedures at institutional, municipal, regional, state, and national levels. Effective, large-scale emergency operations can only occur after careful consideration and planning have taken place at each level.

IACLEA's efforts to launch an accreditation program began in 1999. IACLEA conducted a member needs assessment survey, which identified the development of a campus public safety agency accreditation process as a priority. The Association created an Accreditation Committee in 2001 and charged it with reviewing existing standards and developing an accreditation process. In 2003, IACLEA sought and was awarded a grant from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) within the U. S. Department of Justice. These funds were designed to defray the start-up costs of creating and implementing the accreditation program. A second COPS grant was secured in 2005 to continue the support of the program through the pilot program phase. The IACLEA Accreditation Program was officially launched in February 2006.

The Accreditation Committee, recently reformulated as a Commission, is the Association's governing body for the IACLEA Accreditation Program. The Commission consists of twelve voluntary members, nine of which are IACLEA members. Particular care is taken to ensure that the Commission membership is representative of the diversity of the Association, including representatives of both two- and four-year institutions, sworn and non-sworn agencies, and public and private institu-

tions. Additional members are drawn from allied associations, including the National Association of College and University Business Officers, the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators, and the American Council on Education.

An often cited benefit of the accreditation process is that the standards provide timely and topical guidance in the “best practices” of public safety management and operations. The standards address areas such as policy development, selection of personnel, training, discipline, use of force, patrol and traffic operations, communications, record keeping, property and evidence handling, transportation and detention of individuals, and emergency response planning.

Generally, the standards identify “what” an agency must do, not “how” to do it. The majority of standards require a “written directive” as a proof of compliance to affirm the agency’s commitment to the standard. Generally, any document that is binding on agency personnel and serves to direct, guide, or govern their activities may be used to meet the written directive requirement. The following standard, addressing emergency response planning, requires a written plan:

46.1.2 The agency has a written “All Hazard” plan for responding to critical incidents such as natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances, mass arrests, bomb threats, hostage/barricaded person situations, acts of terrorism, and other unusual incidents. The plan will follow standard Incident Command System (ICS) protocols, which include functional provisions for: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration.¹

Subsequent standards provide more specific direction concerning the development of a comprehensive and effective emergency operations plan. It is noted that the “command function” should address issues such as establishing a command post, mobilizing personnel, preparing a staging area, requesting outside assistance, and maintaining media relations. The “operations function” should attend to establishing perimeters, conducting evacuations, controlling traffic, and providing on-scene security. The “planning function” should address preparing an incident action plan, collecting and disseminating intelligence, and planning for demobilization, while the “logistics function” should concentrate on communications, transportation, medical support, and equipment and supplies. The standards also require the periodic inspection of the agency’s emergency response equipment to ensure its operational readiness.

Not only does the IACLEA Accreditation Program promote the highest professional standards for campus law enforcement and protective services, but it is committed to enhancing critical incident management through the creation of a web-based Campus Preparedness Resource Center. Funded under a federal Department of Homeland Security grant, the goals of the web based Resource Center are to develop and disseminate resources to strengthen the capacity of campus public safety departments to plan for potential WMD/terrorist threats, to encourage participation in IACLEA’s Incident Command System training program, and to disseminate a strategic vision for campus public safety training. Among the online resources available to the members of the campus public safety profession is a “Model Campus Emergency Operations Plan Guidelines” resource, which offers a sample EOP, emergency support functions and incident specific appendices and other sample documents that may be edited and adapted for use at any institution. This guide can provide a framework to develop an effective and compliant “All Hazard” plan.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Kennedy.

**STATEMENT OF LOUANNE KENNEDY, FORMER PROVOST,
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY AT NORTHRIDGE**

Ms. KENNEDY. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McKeon and members of the committee, on behalf of the California State University, I want to thank you for inviting me to discuss campus emergency preparedness and response. I am going to focus on the events of the early days of the Northridge earthquake and also on the school’s recovery from the event and the changes that we made to emergency preparedness as a result of that event. First, I would just like to say a few words about the CSU.

¹ CALEA, Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies, 5th Edition, Fairfax, VA

We are the largest and most diverse 4-year university system in the country with 23 campuses, about 417,000 students, and we range from the northern area of California to the south. We have awarded about 2 million degrees, and we are also very cost-effective. Our charges average about \$3,200 a year. Cal State Northridge is a campus now of 30,000 students on 369 acres.

On January 17th, 1994, the northwest area of Los Angeles, including our campus, was struck by a 6.7-magnitude earthquake. Damage to the area is estimated at around \$40 billion. Our campus was located about a mile from the epicenter and incurred about \$400 million in damages. The casualties from the quake were relatively minor given the hour of the day, 4:31 in the morning, and the fact that it was the Martin Luther King holiday and that the students were not on the campus. The earthquake resulted in damage to 107 of the 117 buildings. Seven of those buildings were totally destroyed.

For almost a decade, the campus was engaged in teaching and learning activities while simultaneously managing the recovery. We built a temporary campus, coordinated the relocation of classes and offices and worked closely with Federal and State agencies and construction companies, and we opened 1 month later, scheduling 5,000 classes in 400 trailers and 4 Mylark 10,000-square-foot domes. I would like to just talk for a minute about the first day.

We had absolutely no information about what had happened to us beyond a radio station's announcing that the earthquake was in Northridge. What we were able to see, though, was that the science buildings were in flames, that the structures had separated from their main cores. We had no phones, no food, no water, no sanitary facilities, and no safe structures. We had hundreds of people coming to the campus from the outlying areas because we were a place that people came to. Our first contact was with the emergency response unit of the CSU. This contact was by walkie-talkie. We also had one public phone that worked, and we were in search of quarters for quite some time.

The two things we focused on were safety, to make sure that all of the buildings—that we had gone into all of the buildings to make sure no one was inside. This was a difficult task. Since the freeways were down, we had only one person from facilities, three public safety people, two people from student affairs, and myself, because we lived on campus. So I had just moved there from New York and was living in one of the dorms at the time of the earthquake.

Our first task—once we had established safety and there were no students in the buildings and we had everyone on the fields in front of the public safety office, we then began to photograph the entire campus. To continue to work on safety, the chancellor's office sent us staff from other campuses and made the decision that the first thing that had to happen was we had to have telephones established in order that anyone who would call the campus would reach a live person, and we produced a common form, telling them updates on a daily basis. We worked out of two army tents that had been provided for us.

The biggest difficulty that came was that we were unfamiliar with the number of aftershocks that would occur. We built a crisis

management team out of the individuals who were present. No matter what their titles or previous positions had been, if they could man the phones, if they could operate in any way, if they felt safe enough to go into buildings with public safety people, we sent them in.

By the end of day 5, though, we determined that a temporary campus would have to be built because there were 3,000 aftershocks in those early weeks, and buildings that we would claim would be on line on day 1, on day 3, would be off or sometimes between 10:00 and 4:00. With anyone who came onto the campus, we held briefing meetings at 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. We also prepared online telephone reports from student affairs, academic affairs and administrative services so that our staff and students could reach—even if they called through the night, they would be able to reach some update for the day that would talk about opening. Our message was that we would open. We were not sure when, and we were not sure in what structures. As administrators, we also agreed that we would be the last to occupy permanent space and would not move out of our dorms and trailers until every student had classrooms and every faculty member had an office, and we kept that promise, and for the next 8 years, the president and all of the senior administrative officers worked out of these spaces. What I want to talk about now is what we learned from that.

We did not have access to our emergency planning documents, obviously, on the morning of the earthquake, and I must admit, as the administrator in charge, it was sort of the last thing on my mind. I think, in the moments like this, you think about safety. You think about letting people know things, and you want water, toilets and other objects like that; food would have been helpful, too. We have now developed a detailed emergency operations plan that anticipates and does practice, mock events for different kinds of threats, both natural, earthquakes, fire, flooding, hazardous materials, landslides, windstorms, utility outages, and those that are caused by accidental or intentional acts—a national defense emergency, a terrorist attack, aircraft bombs. We have a special plan for the avian flu, acts of violence, a shooting attack or a disturbance by criminal or insane individuals. This plan is updated and reviewed annually, and the university regularly conducts training and exercises.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Kennedy, I would ask if you could wrap up your testimony.

Ms. KENNEDY. Okay. Sure.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Ms. KENNEDY. We have a functioning emergency broadcast system on the main campus; we have redundancy in terms of the emergency operations plans; we have a mobile unit and several on-campus structures, and we recognize, however, that given our own experience with this that it is almost impossible to plan for every single event, but we have built into our activities and our planning and our training both—we had former FEMA Director James Lee Witt conduct vulnerability and disaster assessments, including an active shooter scenario. We maintain mutual aid agreements with local and state public agencies. Unpredictability is inherent in disasters, and planning for such events is a real challenge.

Thank you very much.
 Chairman MILLER. Thank you.
 [The statement of Ms. Kennedy follows:]

Prepared Statement of Louanne Kennedy, Ph.D., Emeritus Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs CSU, Northridge, California State University System

Introduction

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McKeon, and members of the Committee, on behalf of the California State University (CSU) thank you for inviting me to discuss campus emergency preparedness and response. My testimony will focus on my experience as the Provost and Chief Academic Officer of California State University Northridge (CSUN) during the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the school's recovery from that event, and the changes made to campus emergency response planning as a result of the experience. But first, a few words about the CSU.

The California State University

Few, if any, university systems match the scope of the CSU. The CSU is the largest and most diverse four-year university system in the country, with 23 campuses, approximately 417,000 students and 46,000 faculty and staff. The CSU, stretching from Humboldt in the north to San Diego in the south, is renowned for the quality of its teaching and for its job-ready graduates. Since the system's creation in 1961, it has awarded about two million degrees. We currently award approximately 84,000 degrees each year. One key feature of the CSU is its affordability. For 2006-07, the CSU's systemwide fee for full-time undergraduate students is \$2,520. With individual campus fees added, the CSU's total fees average \$3,199, which is the lowest among any of the comparison public institutions nationwide. And while each of the 23 CSU campuses has its own identity, with distinct student populations and programs, all share the same mission—to provide high-quality, affordable higher education to meet the changing workforce needs of the people of California.

The 23 CSU campuses vary greatly in size and structure—from Cal Maritime's 1,000 student cadet environment, to large urban campuses, to more traditional mid-sized residential campus settings. Cal State Northridge (1958) is the intellectual, economic and cultural heart of the San Fernando Valley. One of California's largest universities, CSUN each year educates more than 30,000 students and produces 6,000 highly skilled graduates. The university's superb academic offerings spread between 62 bachelor's and 50 master's degrees include teacher preparation and undergraduate engineering programs ranked among the nation's best. The university also hosts a new, on-campus "learning laboratory" high school; a unique aquatic therapy center; and exceptional programs in the performing arts, sciences and ethnic studies. Northridge is a culturally and ethnically diverse university focused on student-centered learning and success. Its 356-acre campus in suburban northern Los Angeles offers a park-like setting with on-campus housing for 2,200 students. Students enjoy a wide range of support services and extracurricular activities, including more than 200 student clubs and organizations and an intercollegiate athletic program with 20 teams.

The Northridge Earthquake

On January 17, 1994 at 4:31 a.m. the northwest area of Los Angeles, including the campus of CSU Northridge, was struck by a 6.7 magnitude earthquake. Damage to the area is estimated at more than \$40 billion. Thousands of aftershocks continued to devastate structures for weeks after the major thrust.

California State University, Northridge located about a mile from the epicenter incurred more than \$400 million in damages. Overall casualties from the quake were relatively minimal because of the time of day. The campus was closed for break and January 17 was the Martin Luther King holiday. At the time of the disaster, CSUN had 25,000 students and three thousand faculty and staff working in 117 buildings on 356 acres. The earthquake resulted in damage to 107 of these structures, seven of which required demolition. For almost a decade, the campus was engaged in teaching and learning activities while simultaneously managing the process of reconstruction.

The Chancellor's office Emergency Response Unit reached us by walkie-talkie within a few hours of the event to offer assistance. On the morning of January 17, there were very few public safety officers, one Facilities staff, and a few campus and community members on campus. We asked for additional public safety and facilities' staffs to check each of the buildings to make certain no persons were trapped in any structures. The chancellor's office was very helpful in providing additional staff

from other campuses to assist us and this support continued through the years of recovery until the final funding sign-off by FEMA in spring 2007.

We built a temporary campus, coordinated the relocation of classes and offices and worked closely with construction companies and federal and state agencies. My presentation today describes the steps taken to reopen the campus four weeks after the earthquake on February 14, scheduling 5000 classes in trailers, MYLAR domes, playing fields, and borrowed space from local schools and universities. We had no library, no science and engineering labs, no instruments for music or materials for art classes—or the operating systems to access student records and business processes critical to managing a university. Solutions for each of these missing aspects of university life were found.

I will provide just a brief overview of the first day. We had imperfect information yet decisions needed to be made. One of the science buildings was in flames and several buildings were clearly dangerous since sections had separated from their main structures. Firefighters extinguished the fires in the science building but were deployed away from this fire when called to fires where lives were at risk. The fires reignited. Hazardous materials were exposed in two other damaged science buildings. We had no phones, no food, no water, no sanitary facilities and no safe structures. A severe limitation for many key staff was their inability to access roads and highways to get to campus. Faculty, staff and community members who were able to reach campus gathered on the open fields. We used those faculty and staff, regardless of their titles or previous roles, to begin the recovery and to communicate our status. While continuing to assess the structures, we began work to establish a communications center.

Communications: We needed to assure our students and staff that the campus would reopen and classes would begin for the spring semester. Yet all campus buildings were closed except to the professional staff evaluating which buildings might be repaired and returned to use. Exceptions were also made for individuals required to photograph and record the damages. Some faculty were anxious to get into the buildings to personally examine the damage to their offices and labs, an anxiety that did not abate for some weeks. We operated in more of a “command and control” structure than is usual in campus relations. The administration was characterized as authoritarian by some who felt that democratic decision making was a critical component of campus life and must be maintained. We were unable to honor those views and maintain safety and security.

With the help of the Chancellor’s Office, CalState Dominguez Hills Public Safety officers, and the CalState Fullerton telecommunications staff, We had improved safety and operating phone connections on the field outside the public safety office by mid-day on January 18. This area became the new campus operations center. Two army tents arrived with the phone connections and we developed scripts for staff operating the phones. The aim was to make certain that anyone who called the campus was connected to an individual who could answer questions and convey as accurately as possible the status of our buildings. We assured all callers that the campus would reopen. We would indicate the status of buildings we believed could be used. These decisions were based on reports of structural damage. We did not yet understand the extent of damages that would result from the thousands of aftershocks.

Documenting the damages is a critical activity to ensure reimbursement. Part of that filming included making a video “Academic Aftershocks” demonstrating the week to week and month to month progress over the first two years.

Building a Team for Recovery: A Crisis Management Team was formed, made up of the president and senior campus officers and members of the faculty who were experts in planning and who knew the campus geography. The team held 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. briefings from each area: academic, student, and administrative affairs. We were able to communicate now by phone, established phone trees, and added these in person meetings for some faculty and staff directly engaged in recovery efforts. Others were asked not to come to campus. Taped messages were prepared following the last update at 4 p.m. Individuals who called through the night could access the latest summary information.

By the end of day five, we determined that a temporary campus was the only way we could guarantee re-opening. Trying to build a schedule on shifting soil was impossible. We imagined covering the current flat parking areas with trailers, creating new parking, and acquiring 400 trailers and four 10,000 sq. ft. MYLAR domes. These decisions eliminated the uncertainty created when buildings were listed as on-line for use in the 10:00 a.m. meeting and, following aftershocks sometimes as high as 5.5 on the Richter scale, were then taken off the reopening plans at the 4:00 p.m. meetings. Classes were to begin February 14. Local radio stations and newspapers added to our communication network to get the word out to students that

CSUN was “Not Just Back . . . Better!” Information booths were manned at all entry points for the first day. Group and individual counseling was made available for all faculty, students and staff and loans were made to students who could not access their existing accounts.

Developing a schedule and arranging on-line registration involved difficult and sometimes dangerous actions. With the aid of a cherry picker, the Dean of Libraries and Information Services entered the second floor window of the admissions and records area to retrieve student files. When she and a colleague entered the second floor, a 5.5 aftershock hit the campus and that building in particular. The retrieved files were flown to CSU Fresno and installed on their computers. Admissions and Records staff working from their homes, in campus domes, and at CSU, Fresno maintained the records, produced the schedule and enabled students to register as though they were connecting to CSU Northridge. CSU system effectiveness is apparent in these successes.

Radio stations were regularly announcing our status and reopening plans. President Clinton delivered a radio message to the campus. Vice President Gore arrived earlier to assess the situation. On February 14, twenty four-thousand students arrived for the first day of classes.

Opening Day It was a joyful and chaotic opening. The faculty were highly creative in serving students in the areas where trailers were nonexistent or not yet operational. The nonexistent trailer category was the fate of the Business and Economics College. Selected for placement on the fields used as the Command Center, the College’s trailers were delayed in placement. Faculty drove their cars adjacent to the field and placed large placards in the window announcing the car as the new Department Office. Other faculty used bullhorns to gather students for class. For example, a scene on the film has a faculty member shouting “Accounting 401, Behind the Dumpster.” Many classes were held outdoors, though that was forced to end when the rains came.

All administrators agreed that we would be the last to occupy permanent space and would not move out of our domes and trailers until every faculty member had offices and student classrooms were rebuilt. We kept that promise. For the next eight years, academic affairs’ staff worked in a 10,000 sq. ft. dome with neither walls nor windows. Student and Administrative Affairs shared an adjacent dome. The President and her staff worked from a trailer next to the domes. In fall 2002, the senior administration moved into permanent space.

Current Practices for Improving College Campus Safety

The CSU system campuses all have detailed Emergency Operations Plans (EOP). A summary of the CSUN plan is just one example. Cal State Northridge has developed a detailed Emergency Operations Plan and structure that anticipates different threats, both natural (earthquakes, fire flooding, hazardous material’s incidents, landslides, windstorms and utility outages) and those that are caused by accidental or intentional acts (national defense emergency, personal medical emergency, terrorist attack, aircraft crash, bomb threat, avian flu, acts of violence, shooting attack, or disturbance by criminal or insane persons). The Northridge plan is reviewed and updated annually, and the university regularly conducts training and exercises.

CSUN Public Safety Department officers, who have full police powers, have been specially trained and armed to deal with active shooting incidents. CSUN also has mutual aid agreements with other law enforcement agencies such as the California Highway Patrol.

The CSUN Public Safety Department regularly teams with its counterparts in university Student Affairs and Counseling to discuss and assess potentially serious student behavior problems. If warranted, university police conduct threat assessments designed to head off problems.

The University has a functioning emergency broadcast system on the main campus. The system uses speakers mounted on the roofs of major buildings, allow voice broadcasting throughout the main campus.

In an initiative begun after Hurricane Katrina, the University is currently testing another mass notification system called Connect-Ed that can rapidly deliver recorded voice messages (and text messages) to the phones and e-mail in boxes of all students, faculty and staff, including TTY capability for those who are deaf and hard-of-hearing.

This year, the campus opened a new, state-of-the-art \$10 million Public Safety/Parking Department headquarters located in the heart of the campus. The two-story 26,000-square-foot facility included an expanded Emergency Operations Center. Public Safety also maintains a 40-foot command post trailer that can serve as a mobile EOC. Two other sites are also under development. Redundancy for emergency response is built into the development of units at different sites.

Should a disaster occur a Campus Closure Integrated Communication Protocol is activated. This protocol supplements the CSUN Emergency Operations Plan by providing detailed guidelines for communication with members of the campus community when classes are cancelled and the campus is closed due to an emergency or other unforeseen circumstance. The Emergency Operations Plan provides specific guidelines on notifications, mobilization of the Crisis Action Team, and possible activation of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

Currently all 23 campuses of the CSU and the Office of the Chancellor have developed all hazard (natural and man-made) preparedness plans. Each plan has addenda for a specific hazard and many have been in development since the mid 1990s. Initially the campus plans were developed using the State's Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and then revised to comply with the federal mandated National Incident Management System (NIMS).

Communications is the fundamental capability to prevent, react, respond and recover from an event. There is no one size or one technology that fits all situations. Each campus establishes its individual communication plan to operate for a variety of incidents/hazards using their available technologies for the specific event (broadcast e-mail, websites, phones, bullhorns, sirens, etc.).

Training occurs for all levels of CSU employees including Presidents, their designated back-ups and members of the emergency Operations Team. Routine sessions emphasize overall plans and specific facets of the campus plan. Crisis Communications is an area of focus in the CSU leadership training.

Crisis Communications such as occurred in the Northridge Earthquake, Katrina and shooting and terror acts require tough decisions by humans with limited information available as a crisis unfolds. Questions that must be asked are:

- How or can this event escalate in severity?
- What needs to be done immediately to prevent further injury, death or damage to property?

The CSU strives to respond appropriately through its actions and communications to its campus population, community, and for large scale or catastrophic events, local regional, national and international media and populations.

CSU has experienced the misfortune of active shooters over the years and have developed specific campus plans for this type of event. All the events whether in the CSU or in other locations, cause us to re-evaluate and update the campus' overall plans.

In spring 2001, the CSU engaged former FEMA Director James Lee Witt to conduct various hazard/vulnerability assessments, including an active shooter scenario at SFSU. We maintain active "mutual aid" agreements with local and state public safety agencies to assist when an event exceeds our capabilities.

Future CSU Emergency Planning

- Continue to re-assess our active shooter and all hazard plans
- Re-emphasis placed on Prevention, Response, Communications and Recovery from the lessons learned from the Virginia Tech University (VTU) event
- Continue to exercise our plans and test both our capabilities and test for events beyond our abilities and work on shortfalls observed in our practices
- Continue to seek funding and grants to improve our equipment and plan documents
- Training sessions planned for our Presidents at the end of June with James Lee Witt, including crisis communications and lessons learned from VTU
- Continue to work with State Office of Emergency Services including participating in the GAP analysis initiative to identify and quantify what is available and what will be needed in a catastrophic event

The CSU remains vigilant in our efforts to preserve and protect life and property, and prepare to the best of our ability for such an event, to expect the unexpected, communicate our plans to the broadest possible audience, involve our entire campus community in improving our plans and continually seek to improve through routine testing and exercising of our plans for an event we hope will never happen.

Unpredictability is inherent in disasters and makes planning for such an event a challenge.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Cornell.

**STATEMENT OF DEWEY CORNELL, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA
YOUTH VIOLENCE PROJECT, SCHOOL OF EDUCATION, UNI-
VERSITY OF VIRGINIA**

Mr. CORNELL. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McKeon, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today, and thank you, Representative Scott, for your kind introduction and for all of the work that you have done over the years.

In 1999, I assisted the FBI in its study of school shootings which recommended that schools use a threat assessment approach to prevent school violence. Threat assessment is a standard law enforcement approach developed by the Secret Service and used in many different settings. Threat assessment involves identifying a threat, evaluating how serious it is and taking action to prevent it from being carried out. My colleagues and I developed and field-tested a threat assessment procedure for primary and secondary schools that can be extended to colleges. I am going to talk first about school safety and then about threat assessment. Pardon me for speaking quickly. I have got a lot to cover, and you know how professors love to pontificate.

In response to every school shooting, there are calls to increase security and even to arm teachers. Such recommendations focus on crisis response, but prevention can not wait until the gunman is in your parking lot. I am here today to emphasize prevention. We have to study the problem objectively and make sure that our responses are not skewed by extreme cases. After Columbine, many schools overreacted by expanding zero tolerance policies so that students were expelled for actions as trivial as having a plastic knife in their lunch box. Despite the recent shootings, scientific studies cited in my written statement demonstrate that schools are safe and that violence is decreasing, not increasing, both in our schools and on our college campuses. With the exception of this year, there are about 16 murders on college campuses each year. With 4,200 colleges, the average college can expect a murder on campus about once every 265 years. If you include murders in the surrounding community, off campus as well as on campus, the rate is about once every 9 years. Now, of course, we want the number to be zero. We want to prevent every single possible fatality, but we have to look objectively and recognize the challenge that is in front of us to deal with that lofty standard. In addition to homicides, we have less severe but more pervasive forms of violence such as bullying and fighting, and fortunately, a scientific review of more than 200 controlled studies has found that school violence prevention programs can reduce violent and disruptive behavior by about 50 percent. Funding for school violence prevention to the Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools should be protected and expanded. Terms like "school violence" and "campus violence," I think, are misleading, because they imply that the location is the defining feature of the problem. We have had mass shootings in restaurants, but no one talks about restaurant violence. The focus on location leads to unrealistic efforts to make our open public places so secure that they are no longer open or public, so we cannot turn our schools into fortresses.

The Virginia Tech shooting appears to be the act of an individual who was paranoid, delusional and suicidal. This shooting represent

a mental health problem more than a school problem. Our Nation suffers from poor insurance coverage for mental health services and from poor communication and coordination among those services. Even when we know someone needs treatment, there is no effective mechanism to make sure the treatment is delivered and no follow-up to make sure it was effective. College campuses see many students with serious mental health problems. Yet, their staffing levels and resources are limited and are focused on short-term treatment.

Now, both the FBI and the Secret Service recommended a threat-assessment approach because, in almost every school shooting, the violent student communicated his intentions well in advance. At the University of Virginia, we trained threat assessment teams in 35 schools for field test, and each team included a school administrator, a psychologist and a law enforcement officer. Although serious acts of violence are rare, threats are very common, and in 1 year, these teams investigated 188 student threats of violence. All of the threats were not the same. About 75 percent were just statements made in anger or jest that could be readily resolved with an explanation, counseling and an apology. The remaining 30 percent were more serious, and usually they involved one student threatening to fight another student, but we also had threats to shoot and kill that were resolved. In these cases, our teams conducted a safety evaluation that included both the psychological assessment and a law enforcement investigation. Every threat signals a problem that should be addressed before it escalates into violence, and in our follow-up study, we found that none of the threats were carried out. Just six students were arrested, and three were expelled, which is much better than if the schools had used a zero tolerance approach.

A study by the American Psychological Association found that zero tolerance has a damaging effect on student achievement and no evidence that it makes schools safer.

So, over the past 5 years, we have trained thousands of school teams in a dozen States. Memphis City schools adapted our motto, and were able to resolve more than 200 threats without any known violent outcomes and, again, keeping almost all of the students in school, but there has been no Federal program designated to fund threat assessment research or training, and so, when this committee works on No Child Left Behind, I hope you will make threat assessment part of every college's comprehensive school safety plan.

Let me wrap up by saying that threat assessment can be extended to colleges, even though it is easier to monitor and to supervise a high school student than a college student. Threat assessment is used in business and in industry to prevent workplace violence, so this challenge can be overcome.

In closing, our schools and colleges are safe, but in a large nation with thousands of schools, even rare events will occur with troubling frequency and skew our perceptions of safety. We must avoid overreacting to rare events and make better use of prevention methods, including threat assessment.

Thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony. I am pleased to answer any questions.

[The statement of Mr. Cornell follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dewey G. Cornell, Ph.D., Forensic Clinical Psychologist and Professor of Education, Director of the Virginia Youth Violence Project, Curry School of Education, University of Virginia

Student Threat Assessment

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McKeon and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me here today. I applaud you for your efforts to make college campuses safer by convening this hearing.

I am Dr. Dewey Cornell, a forensic clinical psychologist, a member of the American Psychological Association, and Professor in the School of Education at the University of Virginia. I direct the Virginia Youth Violence Project, which studies school safety and violence prevention (<http://youthviolence.edschool.virginia.edu>). For 23 years I have conducted research on the psychological characteristics of young people who commit violent acts, and as a clinician, I have examined many juvenile and young adult offenders.

In 1999 I assisted the FBI in its study of school shootings (O'Toole, 2000). Both the FBI study and another study conducted by the Secret Service (Fein et al., 2002) strongly recommended that schools train their staff to use a threat assessment approach to prevent student violence. Threat assessment is a procedure developed by the Secret Service that has become a standard law enforcement approach used in many different settings (Fein, Vossekuil, & Holden, 1995). Threat assessment involves identifying a threat, evaluating how serious it is, and taking action to prevent it from being carried out. Most educators were completely unfamiliar with "threat assessment" and were unprepared to implement this approach. In response, my colleagues and I at the University of Virginia have developed and field-tested a threat assessment model for primary and secondary schools. I am going to talk first about the safety of our schools and then about our research on threat assessment and how it can be used to improve the safety conditions in our nation's colleges as well as our K-12 schools.

This year we have experienced tragic shootings at the Amish school in Pennsylvania and at Virginia Tech, among others. In response to such horrific events, there have been calls to increase security at our schools, and even suggestions to arm our teachers. There are recommendations to install sirens and cameras and to create high-tech warning systems to alert students to an attack. While these interventions focus on crisis response, it is critically important that our efforts concentrate on prevention strategies. Prevention cannot wait until the gunman is in your parking lot. School shootings can be prevented and I am here today to emphasize prevention.

In order to prevent violence, we have to study the problem objectively and make sure that our responses are not skewed by extreme cases. After Columbine, many schools overreacted by expanding zero tolerance programs so that students were expelled for behaviors as trivial as bringing a plastic knife to school in their lunch box. We continue to see students as young as five years old being arrested for misbehavior that would have been handled much differently ten years ago. We have to be careful that our responses are measured and reasonable.

Schools are safe

First, I want to address school safety from a broader and more positive perspective. Despite recent events, the level of violent crime in our schools and colleges is low. National crime statistics demonstrate that it is safer for a student to be at school than to be at home or on the street. Crime victim research also finds that students are less likely to be harmed at school than in the community (DeVoe, Peter, Noonan, Snyder, & Baum, 2005). These findings hold up for both K-12 schools and colleges. For example, the violent crime rate is lower on college campuses than off campuses and the victimization rate for college students is lower than for persons the same age who are not in college (Baum & Klaus, 2005).

Furthermore, there is no upward trend of increasing violence in our schools. Over the past ten years, the rate of violence in schools and colleges has actually declined substantially (Baum & Klein, 2005; DeVoe, Peter, Noonan, Snyder, & Baum, 2005). The scientific studies to support these conclusions are cited in my written statement.

According to the latest available data from the U.S. Department of Education (2001-2004), there were 95 murders on college campuses in the six years from 1999 to 2004, an average of 16 per year. Since there are approximately 4,200 colleges in the United States, this means the average college can expect to experience a murder on campus about once every 265 years. If you include all 2,808 murders that occurred in the surrounding community—off campus as well as on campus—the rate

is much higher: about once every 9 years. This is a reflection of the much higher rate of violence in the general community.

It was tragic to have 33 deaths in one day at Virginia Tech, but according to the CDC, every year more than 30,000 persons die by firearms through suicide or homicide. This is the equivalent of the Virginia Tech death toll occurring 2 to 3 times every day. This is not to minimize the tragedy of school shootings; we want the number to be zero. But if we are going to prevent these events, we have to start with placing them in a broader context.

Schools need prevention programs

Although research demonstrates that schools are safe and that extreme acts of violence are unlikely, we do have less severe forms of violence such as bullying, fighting, and threatening behavior. These are important problems in their own right, and they are also important because they can escalate into shootings.

Fortunately, we have effective violence prevention programs for schools. There have been more than 200 controlled studies of school violence prevention programs, and we know that school-based mental health programs and counseling focused on helping students learn how to solve problems and resolve conflicts are effective (Wilson, Lipsey, & Derzon, 2003). A scientific review of these studies by researchers at Vanderbilt University found that they can reduce violent and disruptive behavior by about 50 percent (Wilson, Lipsey, & Derzon, 2003). If these programs were more widely used, we could identify and help troubled students before they reach the point of homicide. The main source of funding for school violence prevention is through the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools. Funding for this program should be protected and expanded.

Terms like “school violence” and “campus violence” are misleading because they imply that the location is the defining feature of the problem. We have had mass shootings in restaurants and shopping malls, but no one speaks about “restaurant violence” or “mall violence.” The focus on location leads to unrealistic efforts to make open, public places so secure that they are no longer open or public. We cannot turn our schools into fortresses. We cannot search every backpack on college campuses.

The Virginia Tech shooting appears to be the act of an individual with severe mental illness who was paranoid, delusional, and suicidal. This shooting represents a mental health problem more than a school problem. Our nation suffers from poor insurance coverage for mental health services, and from poor communication and coordination among these services. Even when we know someone needs treatment, there is no effective mechanism to make sure the treatment is delivered and no follow-up to make sure it was effective. College campuses see a substantial number of students with serious mental health problems, yet their staffing levels and resources are focused on short term counseling.

Schools need a threat assessment approach

After Columbine, there was widespread demand for a checklist of characteristics that we could use to identify the next shooter. This is called profiling, and both the FBI and Secret Service have concluded that profiling is not possible for this kind of crime (O’Toole, 2000; Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2002). The backgrounds of school shooters are too varied, and the characteristics they have in common are too general.

However, both the FBI and Secret Service observed that in almost every case the violent student communicated his or her intentions well in advance of an attack. These individuals usually made threats or engaged in threatening behavior that frightened others. The problem was that there was not an effective, systematic response to these threats. The FBI also observed that many potential school shootings were prevented because threats were investigated and found to be credible. In light of these findings, both the FBI and the Secret Service, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Education, recommended that schools adopt a threat assessment approach (O’Toole, 2000; Fein et al., 2002).

Threat assessment is a standardized procedure for investigating a threat, and if the threat is a serious substantive threat, taking preventive action. At the University of Virginia we developed a set of threat assessment guidelines and we trained teams in 35 schools (Cornell, et al., 2004). Each team included a school administrator, a psychologist or counselor, and a law enforcement officer. The teams field-tested the guidelines for a year. Although serious acts of violence are rare in schools, threats are common. The school teams investigated 188 student threats of violence.

All threats are not the same. Some threats are just statements made in anger or in jest, or attempts to gain attention or be provocative. The first step in threat as-

assessment is to determine whether the threat is serious, which we term substantive, or not serious or transient. Fortunately, most threats are transient and can be readily resolved with an explanation, an apology, and some counseling. About 70 percent of the threats were resolved in this manner.

The remaining 30 percent of threats were more serious, usually one student threatening to fight another student, but we had threats to shoot and stab and kill that could not be easily resolved. In these cases, our threat assessment team conducted a safety evaluation that included two components: a psychological assessment of the student and a law enforcement investigation of whether there was evidence that the person was preparing to carry out the threat. The combination of mental health and law enforcement is essential to a threat assessment.

The team takes a problem solving approach—why did this student make a threat and what can we do to reduce the risk of violence? We found students who had serious mental health problems that needed treatment. We found students who were victims of bullying and looking for a way to strike back. We found conflicts over girlfriends and boyfriends. All kinds of threats.

Every threat signals an underlying problem that should be addressed before it escalates into violence. In our follow-up study, we could not find that any of the threats were carried out. Out of 188 cases, we had just six students who were arrested and three who were expelled. This is a much better result than if the schools had used a zero tolerance approach that would have resulted in numerous expulsions. The American Psychological Association's report on zero tolerance (Skiba et al., 2006) found that school expulsions have a damaging effect on student achievement and increase the dropout rate. There is no evidence that zero tolerance makes schools safer.

Memphis City Public Schools has adapted our model and found that they were able to resolve more than 200 threats without any known violent outcomes and again keeping almost all of the students in school (Strong, Wilkins, & Cornell, 2007). Over the past 5 years we have trained thousands of threat assessment teams in a dozen states. But we need more research on threat assessment. There has been no federal program designated to fund threat assessment research. The Secret Service has conducted threat assessment training in conjunction with the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, but this has been a limited effort. We need a strong initiative to make threat assessment part of every school's comprehensive school safety plan. I hope this Committee will keep this need in mind when it works to strengthen crucial federal programs such as those authorized under No Child Left Behind.

Threat assessment can be adapted for colleges, too, even though there are some important differences between K-12 schools and colleges. College students are adults and not under parental control. It is much easier to monitor and supervise a high school student than a college student. On the other hand, threat assessment is used in business and industry to prevent workplace violence (Gelles & Turner, 2003), so these challenges can be overcome.

Conclusions

In closing, our educational institutions have an obligation to maintain a safe and supportive environment that is conducive to learning. Overall, our schools and colleges are safe, but in a large nation with thousands of schools, even rare events will occur with troubling frequency and skew our perceptions of safety and risk. We must avoid overreacting to rare events and make better use of prevention methods that address the ordinary forms of violence as well as the more extreme ones.

Threat assessment is a standard violence prevention approach used by law enforcement in many different settings. Our research supports the use of threat assessment in schools, but we need more research and training to make it a standard practice and to extend it to colleges. We urge you to support research and training on threat assessment for our schools and colleges.

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to present this testimony. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

REFERENCES

- Cornell, D., Sheras, P., Kaplan, S., McConville, D., Douglass, J., Elkon, A., McKnight, L., Branson, C., & Cole, J. (2004). Guidelines for student threat assessment: Field-test findings. *School Psychology Review*, 33, 527-546.
- DeVoe, J. F., Peter, K., Noonan, M., Snyder, T. D., & Baum, K. (2005). Indicators of school crime and safety: 2005 (NCES 2006-001/NCJ 210697). U.S. Department of Education and Justice. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

- Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, F., & Holden, G.A. (1995). Threat assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. National Institute of Justice: Research in Action, 1-7 (NCJ 155000), Available <http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm>.
- Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., Pollack, W., Borum, R., Modzeleski, W. & Reddy, M. (2002). Threat assessment in schools: A guide to managing threatening situations and to creating safe school climates. Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service and Department of Education.
- Gelles, M.G. & Turner, J. T. (2003). Threat assessment: A risk management approach. Bethesda, MD: Haworth Press, Inc.
- O'Toole, M.E. (2000). The school shooter: A threat assessment perspective. Quantico, Virginia: National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- Skiba, R., Reynolds, C., Graham, S., Sheras, P., Conoley, J., & Garcia-Vazquez, E. (2006). Are zero tolerance policies effective in the schools? An evidentiary review and recommendations. A report by the American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Strong, K., Wilkins, D., & Cornell, D. (2007). Student threat assessment in Memphis City Schools. Unpublished report. Memphis, Tennessee: Memphis City Schools.
- U.S. Department of Education (2001- 2004). Summary of Campus Crime and Security Statistics. Washington, D.C. (<http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/crime/criminaloffenses/index.html>)
- Vossekuil, B., Fein, R. A., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W. (2002). The final report and findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the prevention of school attacks in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education.
- Wilson, S.J., Lipsey, M.W., & Derzon, J.H. (2003). The effects of school-based intervention programs on aggressive behavior: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 71, 136-149.

BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Dewey G. Cornell, Ph. D. is a forensic clinical psychologist and Professor of Education in the Curry School of Education at the University of Virginia. Dr. Cornell is Director of the UVA Youth Violence Project and a faculty associate of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry, and Public Policy. As a clinician, Dr. Cornell has 24 years experience evaluating juvenile and adult violent offenders and testifying in legal proceedings, including school shootings and other juvenile homicide cases. He consulted with the FBI in its study of school shootings and developed threat assessment guidelines for schools that are being used throughout Virginia and other states. As a researcher, Dr. Cornell has authored more than 100 publications in psychology and education, including studies of juvenile homicide, bullying, psychopathy, and violence. He is currently directing a statewide study of school climate and discipline practices in 312 Virginia high schools.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.
Dr. Walbert.

STATEMENT OF JAN WALBERT, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STUDENT PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATORS, AND VICE PRESIDENT FOR STUDENT AFFAIRS, ARCADIA UNIVERSITY

Ms. WALBERT. Good morning.

Chairman Miller, thank you for that generous introduction. Mr. McKeon and other members of the committee, I am pleased to be here to testify today.

In addition to representing Arcadia University and NASPA, I am here today due to extensive collaboration among student affairs associations included on the consortium on government relations for student affairs, which, in addition to NASPA, is composed of the American College Personnel Association, the Association of College Unions International, the Association of Student Judicial Affairs,

and the Association of College and University Housing Officers International. There are three primary points I will address.

One, the role of student affairs professionals is central to the implementation of effective education, prevention and intervention systems that do exist on campuses. Given that 17 million students attend colleges and universities, it is worth noting that U.S. News and World Report indicate campuses remain among the safest places in America.

Two, there is considerable evidence that we are facing increases in the mental health issues among students. Research suggests that strategies are effective in dealing with college students, and existing laws protect and support students' privacy as well as serve to protect the community, and most importantly, for today, we can always learn more and work to improve our current systems. I speak now only from my own experiences as a senior student affairs officer, but I also speak on behalf of more than 25,000 student affairs administrators throughout the U.S.

As dedicated educators, vice presidents, deans in those many areas that were mentioned in the introduction, we work with the students 24/7. We enhance students' well-being and ensure that our campus environments are conducive to student learning. Our roles include collaboration on prevention and intervention strategies as well as planning for and responding to those critical situations and campus emergencies. Contrary to the typical perspective that academic endeavors occur only in the classroom, we in student affairs educate at every level and around the clock. For example, I am sure that each of you can think of life skills you learned somewhere other than a classroom as an undergraduate student.

There are no guarantees as we are sadly reminded at this time in our history. The horrific events that occurred at Virginia Tech could have happened anywhere across this Nation. They could have happened on another campus despite the fact that there are extensive systems to deal with crises such as the death of a student by natural causes or suicide as well as natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina. However, primary efforts of prevention and intervention are utilized with much greater frequency. There is no way to count how many crises have been averted. It may not be surprising that we face critical situations so frequently that many of us are quite familiar with communication chains, law enforcement colleagues and mental health resources. When I walk into our local hospital or one time when I was wheeled in as a patient, the staff recognized me and often called me by name. Prevention, intervention and response to critical situations succeed with extensive collaboration. When a serious concern about a student recently surfaced on our campus—and there have been several recently—contacts were made with public safety, faculty and residents' life staff. Ultimately, we engaged the family. With everyone's assistance, the student was admitted to an inpatient facility. Whether the student's life will change enough to help that student survive over time, I may never know, but we do know that cooperation with counseling staff and others allowed us to get that student to a safer place at that time.

Like this example, most incidences occur on campuses without fanfare, with no media exposure, and they result in safe outcomes

for students. Due to the success, we can anticipate that the demands for services will continue to escalate as will the need for additional resources. Students exhibiting disruptive or dangerous behavior may face interim suspensions and administrative or disciplinary action, which may include or require consultation with qualified mental health professionals and parents.

We are constantly learning common and best practices occur at institutions of all sizes and types. Approaches to enhanced counseling services, case management strategies and emergency response protocols are shared regularly. Even with extensive collaboration, sound practices, policies and laws, we cannot eliminate all risks of crises or emergencies. We must plan and intentionally think through these issues.

When a parent called me on the morning of September 11th, he asked, "How are you going to protect my daughter?" I responded quite genuinely.

I said, "Sir, we have not been able to protect the Pentagon today. You can see how it would be irresponsible of higher education to make promises of our ability to absolutely protect the safety of each and every student. We may wish we were sanctuaries, and the public may still consider us as such, but the concept of an ivory tower is long gone."

Thank you for this opportunity to represent my colleagues in the important work that they do. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much.

[The statement of Ms. Walbert follows:]

Prepared Statement of Janet E. Walbert, Ed.D., President, National Association of Student Personnel Administrators, Vice President for Student Affairs, Arcadia University

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McKeon, and Members of the Committee on Education and Labor.

My name is Janet Walbert and I serve as Vice President for Student Affairs at Arcadia University, a coeducational private, comprehensive university located in Glenside, Pennsylvania, in the suburbs of Philadelphia. I also testify to you today in the capacity of President of the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators (NASPA). NASPA is the largest professional association for student affairs administrators, faculty, and graduate students in the student affairs field, representing more than 1,400 campuses in 29 countries around the world.

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify today. I am here to speak not only from my own experiences as a senior student affairs officer, but I also speak on behalf of the more than 25,000 student affairs administrators employed at colleges and universities throughout the nation. We collaborate with many colleagues and other associations. Student affairs administrators on campuses across the country are working to address and enhance students' well-being and to ensure that our campus environments are conducive to student learning. In addition, national student affairs associations are working together to provide additional best practices and policy considerations. The Consortium on Government Relations for Student Affairs is composed of: American College Personnel Association (ACPA); Association of College Unions International (ACUI); Association of Student Judicial Affairs (ASJA); National Association of Student Personnel Administrators (NASPA); and Association of College and University Housing Officers International (ACUHO-I). These organizations collaborate on the development of strategies and public policy issues of concern to student affairs professionals. It is through the efforts of such collaboration that I testify today.

There are five primary points I hope to address through this testimony.

- Student Affairs professionals are meaningfully engaged in the lives and well-being of college and university students.

- Effective systems exist on most campuses and address a large majority of situations, with many situations never reaching a critical point because of effective prevention and early intervention, but there are no guarantees.

- We face increases in the mental health issues among students and these challenges are successfully addressed in most cases.
- Current laws exist to protect and support students' privacy as well as protect the community and allow for communication with appropriate family members when an individual's personal well-being is at risk.
- We can always learn more and we must continue to work on improving systems.

Student affairs administrators, like me, play key roles in educating our nation's students as we work directly with students and the varied support networks of family members and other university colleagues. In addition, our roles include planning for campus emergencies and managing campus crises, which occur at many levels and in a range of magnitudes of visibility and complexities. As professionals we dedicate our daily (and nightly) work with our students, and team with many others to enhance the quality of the learning environments in our campus communities. While there are no guarantees, as we are sadly reminded at this time in our history, we work collaboratively to address prevention, intervention and response to critical situations involving our students.

Student affairs administrators are vice presidents of student affairs, deans of students, mental health professionals, housing officers, student activities administrators, fiscal officers, food service administrators, admissions officers, Greek life advisors, recreation managers, and so much more. It is the job of student affairs professionals to facilitate student learning through action, contemplation, reflection, and emotional engagement, as well as information acquisition. In the college and university environment student affairs departments often work collaboratively with colleagues in of academic affairs to promote the development of the whole student. In order to prepare for professional positions within the field of student affairs, administrators build upon personal experiences and often enroll in graduate school programs, grounded in student development theory as well as counseling and leadership components. Through ongoing professional development provided by postsecondary institutions, professional associations and collegial networks, student affairs administrators are able to ensure that current best practices are implemented on their respective campuses. As educators we are prepare students for effective and engaged citizenship.

Every day, and most nights and weekends, my colleagues across the nation focus their collective energies and attention on how our living and learning environments are meeting the needs of individual students and the expectations of parents. Contrary to the typical perspective that academic endeavors occur only in classrooms, we in student affairs educate at every level, around the clock.

The horrific events that occurred at Virginia Tech on April 16th could have happened anywhere across the nation. They could have happened on another campus despite the fact that higher education administrators generally, and student affairs administrators specifically, have established extensive systems to deal with individual student crises as well as larger catastrophes on campus—whether it is the death of a student by natural causes or suicide, natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina, or acts of terrorism that could potentially harm students, faculty, and staff. Our focus has been and will continue to be on diligence in both efforts of prevention as well as effective response.

The reality is that extremely good systems are fully operational on most of our campuses. Student affairs officers currently share best practices and strategies, meet with experts, and participate in electronic and in-person educational programs throughout the year. Participation in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) is an example of on-line training and efforts to integrate common knowledge and systems into campus-based protocols and policies.

Virtually every college and university campus today has a crisis management plan, clear protocols for managing emergencies, and strategies to communicate with the campus constituencies directly and indirectly affected. These plans were implemented six years ago when our campuses moved swiftly and expeditiously to respond to the events of September 11, 2001—to secure our campuses and to respond to the needs of our students. When Texas A&M University responded immediately to a campus bonfire accident that killed 12 students and injured 27 others, the emergency protocols were successfully enacted. Similarly protocols were in place that helped restore order to the University of Florida following the killing of three college students by a serial murderer. They are implemented any time a student dies on our campuses. It may be considered unfortunate, but not unexpected, that so many campuses deal with crises of one nature or another frequently enough to be familiar with the various aspects of our communication chains, local law enforcement agencies, mental health resources, and community health organizations.

The challenge has always been and remains today that college and university campuses, by their very, nature are open and accessible places. In testimony pro-

vided by Dr. Thomas Kepple, President of Juniata College, in the Pennsylvania Senate Education Committee Hearings on May 2, 2007, he stated: "The founders of America's early colleges were often graduates of universities like Oxford and Cambridge. Unlike those exclusive universities, Americans wanted our colleges to be inclusive. * * * Our colleges and universities are very much physical symbols of a new and very inclusive democracy." Many of the nation's 439 public four-year institutions cover acres of land and enroll in the tens of thousands of students. Some 17 million students attend this country's more than 4,000 colleges and universities. Most campuses do not have single points of entry or any means for controlling access to every square inch of campus. We may wish we were sanctuaries—and the public may still consider us as such—but the concept of academe's ivory tower is long gone.

Reports of disruptive behavior in classrooms, residence halls, and even in surrounding communities are commonly referred to student affairs administrators. To best address both isolated and repeated problems, a coordinated effort from administrators across campus is required. In attempts to identify students at risk, we must constantly work to improve our ability to share information and cover all bases. This includes information from peers, from mental health centers, from faculty, from other students in residence halls, from concerned parents, and from campus police. When a student appears on the radar screen at any corner of campus, we must and do exercise prudent judgment and share information with appropriate constituents on campus. Intervention must be rapid but correct, and points of intervention across campus must be clearly defined and communicated.

Situations where faculty raise questions, students report situations, and other staff members know of special circumstances, such as a death in the family, arise every day on our campuses. We deal with these situations formally, informally, and directly with students. Depending on the magnitude of the situation and the information available from the student, communication with parents or family members may occur. From the time students set foot on our campuses, we build partnerships with parents to enhance communications. Frequently, students engage their parents as a result of the direct involvement of student affairs. The existing laws allow for communication with appropriate family members when an individual's personal well-being is at risk. Balancing the standard thresholds and expectations of when to communicate continues to be at the forefront of the thinking of student affairs administrators, as it has been historically for counselors in confidential relationships with clients.

As part of a college or university's executive leadership team, vice presidents for student affairs and deans of students work hand-in-hand with their senior administrative counterparts and other student affairs and academic affairs staff members to plan, execute, and evaluate campus prevention efforts, crisis protocols, and intervention strategies. Collaboration on campus is essential and common. None of us can do this alone. We also work in coordination with the campus safety departments and local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to enhance safety inside and outside the campus.

At all institutions, students are repeatedly informed of safety protocols. Written and verbal communications ensure that students are informed of campus safety policies and procedures. Programs such as orientation sessions and residence hall meetings facilitate students' understanding of these policies in an effort to augment their own and their peers' safety on and off campus. Students must take some responsibility to understand the importance of this information. All of these mechanisms are also enhanced with the development of electronic communication allowing access to this information at the touch of a fingertip 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Campus security is enhanced with the utilization of electronic surveillance and electronic access to residence halls. Student affairs professionals train resident assistants to identify potential threats to the safety and security of students living in residence halls. While resident assistants cannot take the place of campus safety and law enforcement officials or campus judicial officers, they are well trained and effective liaisons in recognizing and addressing interpersonal conflicts, code of student conduct violations, signs of mental health concerns, and other critical issues relating to the well-being of residents.

Our campuses are inseparable from the very communities and diverse cultures that form this great country. Like thousands of communities across the nation, we have our share of residents who abuse drugs or alcohol, who have been involved in confrontations with faculty members or fellow students, or who have traded threatening e-mails. These situations are not unusual, nor are they taken lightly.

Just like the general population, our student populations include increasing numbers of individuals dealing with mental health issues. In recent years, students increasingly report stress, depression, thoughts of suicide, relationship problems, and

substance abuse problems. In the 2006 National Survey of Counseling Center Directors that includes data provided by directors from 367 counseling centers at institutions across the United States 92 percent of the respondents believed that the number of students with severe psychological problems has increased in recent years. According to the survey, directors reported that 40 percent of their clients have severe psychological problems. In a survey conducted by the American College Health Association-National College Health Assessment (2006) of more than 94,000 students and 123 postsecondary institutions, more than half of the students reported feeling hopeless in the past year, more than 35 percent reported feeling so depressed that they could not function three or more times a year, and nearly 10 percent reported seriously considering suicide in the previous year. Additional research reported in 2006 conducted by Allan Schwartz, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Rochester, indicates when the data related to suicide is analyzed comparing college students and the general population, controlled for age and gender, it appears that counseling centers are effective in treating suicidal students. The bottom line: healthcare professionals have become so good at treating young people with psychological issues that growing numbers are able to attend college and obtain degrees. Thanks to greater student access to psychotherapy, advances in medications to treat psychological problems, and growing public acceptance of antidepressant therapies, we have more students on our campuses that face these mental health problems. In addition, we have many students who, with support and responsiveness of strong campus professionals, manage or overcome their personal hurdles and successfully complete their educational pursuits.

Student affairs administrators are among those who are lowering thresholds of tolerance for aberrant behavior, whether it is the possession of weapons, verbal threats, or stalking. We are swiftly taking action before student behavior becomes harmful to others, and we are making it easier and more comfortable for students to raise concerns to campus staff members in a confidential manner. Hotlines, web access to file reports of concern, information about referral mechanisms, and communication about how to assist others are common on many campuses. The ability to document how many incidents are averted or limited in scope because of expedient responses by student and professional staff is limited. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to document concrete results of prevention efforts. Yet, we know that we are educating about civility, communication, conflict resolution, and understanding diversity across the nation's campuses.

Higher education is not above the law. We must protect individual rights and follow the law in dealing with an individual's right to participate fully in campus life. If a student misses a series of classes because they are depressed or they openly discuss suicide or other unacceptable behaviors, we cannot simply banish them from our campuses. It is these very types of situations that, when addressed, are typically resolved before a tragedy occurs.

Our campuses must abide by federal and state confidentiality laws regarding key records and communications and the release of confidential information. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects qualified disabled individuals from being excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. While administrators cannot make the decision if a student's mental health condition qualifies him or her as disabled, mental health professionals on and off campus can provide that assessment. If a student discusses disturbing thoughts during a campus counseling session, the counselor must take precautions to avoid violating the recognized psychotherapist-patient privilege.

To be aligned with our common mission, higher education administrators, including senior student affairs officers, must have the latitude to determine policies from the best educational approach. While we certainly understand the importance of safe environments as a key element for learning, our primary roles focus on the education of all of our students. Engaging the community, opening our doors for participation in campus events such as theater productions, concerts, or use of our libraries, certainly allows a level of exposure, but one most of us maintain is important. When focusing on our students, if students are disruptive—defined as behavior that is typically well-addressed in each institution's student code of conduct—we must hold them accountable through progressive discipline. Dangerous or disruptive behavior (including acts and threats of self-harm) can be, and are frequently, addressed immediately by interim suspension policies, followed by appropriate process for any administrative or disciplinary proceedings. Common practices and administrative processes give students opportunities to tell their stories. Colleges and universities often include or require consultation with qualified mental health professionals to establish that such students do not pose a potential or immediate threat to oneself or the community.

Across the nation, many varied institutions are engaged in common best practices that complement current efforts to minimize crises, address situations that do arise and support the students, faculty, and staff who may be affected. Examples of such best practices include the following:

- Creating expanded counseling services or a counselor-in-residence position. On some campuses with expanded resources counselors may be on call around the clock, have offices in the residence halls, conduct programs, consult with staff, and intervene in crises.

- Coordinating the delivery of resources to students with behavioral or mental health problems via a student assistance coordination committee. Committees exist that develop and implement communication networks and protocols among relevant units to deliver seamless services. Through consultations and referrals, members of the campus community are encouraged to identify and address potential behavioral or mental health problems and to review, update and distribute critical incident response guidelines.

- Holding monthly meetings of a crisis intervention committee to review new and pending disciplinary cases that go beyond ordinary or routine behaviors. Committee membership vary depending on the campus but typically include the chief of police or campus safety, housing representatives, university attorneys, human resources representatives, on-call staff, dean or coordinator, judicial affairs representatives, academic affairs representatives, counseling center staff, and other administrators such as women's center directors or student health services staff.

- Assembling a case management group that meets biweekly to share reports, even anonymous reports, about students of concern and discuss possible interventions.

- Charging the campus police chief or another appropriate campus administrator to assemble, train and exercise an emergency response team. Campuses simulate disaster days annually to fine-tune the team's emergency response plan. In addition, weekly meetings, including key student affairs officers and campus police, are held to review police reports and flag unusual student activities from the previous week.

- Creating a permanent incident command centers with full back-up generators and computers. This includes implementing an emergency communications system for activating the command center and a crisis action team.

The list goes on and on. The above identified activities summarize just a few of the ongoing efforts at a wide range of institution types and sizes, including: large and small; public and private, four-year and two-year; community colleges and research institutions.

It is clear that we must continue to work on improving these systems. While the senior student affairs officer often leads crisis planning and response on campus, other student affairs administrators participate daily in various aspects of response and communication utilizing institutional protocols. Situations are documented and occur with great frequency. These situations occur on campuses across the country without fanfare and with no media exposure, and result safe outcomes for the students, friends, and family. Actions include interventions that maintain reasonable privacy and allow for students to successfully resume typical college activities once the presenting issues are addressed, often without the stigma that more public responses may cause.

As student affairs officers look at old technologies such as bullhorns and public address systems as well as the latest technologies of e-mails and text messages, we must devise systems of swift and clear communication to give students the information they need to make informed decisions. Still, the decision to communicate and what to communicate must be made by well-informed, well-prepared authorities on each campus or in each community. We must be sure behaviors outside the norm are duly noted and responded to in a timely manner. We must work diligently to address communication issues and elicit critical feedback across campus, including information from colleagues on the faculty, in other administrative departments, in residence halls, and other areas in each of our institutions.

Even the best-managed institutions cannot completely eliminate the risk of a catastrophe. But by addressing such risks thoughtfully, institutions can increase their preparedness. When a concerned parent called me on the morning of September 11th, he asked, "How are YOU going to protect my daughter?" My reaction was genuine. "Sir, we have not been able to protect the Pentagon today." You can see how it would be irresponsible of higher education to make any promises in terms of our ability to absolutely protect the safety of each and every student.

As Student Affairs professionals play a significant role in establishing and implementing effective systems which successfully address a large majority of situations, we still face significant challenges regarding the mental health of our students. While we work with the boundaries and expectations of current laws the focus must

be on education and understanding the varied individual student priorities as well as the different communities and campus cultures which exist. As educators, we, too, are always learning and are committed to improving our institutional systems.

Our college campuses are places that encourage free and open discussions and intellectual debate. We have come to treasure their open borders and the freedoms they give our young people as they develop into productive young adults. We cannot begin to close down that access. We cannot change the very nature of these institutions in our attempts to protect our children. According to a recent issue of U.S. News and World Report (April 30, 2007) despite the massive numbers of students enrolled and the growing diversity of our campus environments, college and university campuses remain among the safest places in America. Student affairs professionals in many roles and responsibilities work tirelessly and partner assertively across many institutional lines to contribute to a very positive and productive learning environment for all students.

Thank you for this opportunity to represent the very important roles embraced by my colleagues on campuses across the country and around the world.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you to all of you for your testimony and for your participation.

I would like to pose a question to Mr. Healy and to Dr. Cornell, if I might.

I think the suggestions made here and the suggestions that others have made to other committees sort of tell us that a lot of different things have to be done. There is not a single answer here, and you have all alluded to that aspect.

On this question, Dr. Cornell, of the threat assessments, what intrigues me is the idea that you sort of have an ongoing learning process as you engage these students in the effort to eradicate that threat or to assess the probabilities and deal with the individual cases, as you have done in the Memphis schools. It seems to me that you have somewhat of an adaptive model here where you are sort of continuously learning and improving about students on campus, be it high school and/or college.

I notice, Chief Healy, in your statement, you talk about, as one of the recommendations, aggressive leads to promote IACLEA's threat and risk assessment tool developed through the Department of Homeland Security. You mentioned that you did some of your work through safe and drug free schools, and I just wondered: If we are here to help, how do we work to build a synergy into that process? Because it seems to me that it is a model. The threat assessment and risk reduction is a model that can work both in elementary secondary schools and in college. I do not know if I am correct in that, but that is my assumption. I will just ask if you might comment on that. You sort of both came to the same conclusion, and I just—

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir.

As to the first part, I want to make sure I make a distinction between the IACLEA threat and risk assessment and then the behavioral threat assessment because there are some differences in the two.

The IACLEA threat and risk assessment tool primarily deals with physical security threats, and it has a decidedly all-hazards approach, so it deals with a whole spectrum of threats. The other point that I made in my statement was that we needed to expand the previous studies that have been done on the K through 12 rampage shooting incidents to colleges and to universities.

Last week, I met with the Secret Service and the FBI to solicit their assistance in trying to expand those studies that have been done, which are very good studies, by the way, but they are not campus-focused. So what we are asking them to do is to review ten past shooting incidents that have occurred on college and university campuses and to apply the same methodology, and hopefully, some of those best practices will be the same, but we believe that there are some nuances because colleges and universities are obviously different from K through 12 settings.

Mr. CORNELL. Let me just say that, when the FBI and the Secret Service recommended that schools have threat assessment teams, most educators had no idea what they were talking about because threat assessment is a law enforcement concept, and it needs to be an education concept as well, but schools are learning; schools had to learn to develop crisis response plans, and now every school has a crisis response plan. Well, prevention is different than crisis response. Prevention starts long before you have a gunman in your parking lot.

So what we need to move schools to is the process of now recognizing that they also need a threat assessment program in their schools. Threat assessment ought to be a part of every school's comprehensive safety plan that starts with prevention and works right up through the crisis and the aftermath of a crisis, but with threat assessment, we identify kids long before they are armed. We identify them when they are victims of bullying, when they are depressed, when they are developing symptoms of mental illness, when they are in conflicts repeatedly that frighten their peers and frighten their teachers, and we take a problem-solving approach to identify those problems and to resolve them early.

If you look back at the history of the kids who have committed school shootings, both in colleges and off college campuses and communities, we see these kids in middle school having repeated serious mental health and adjustment problems; we see them in high school having problems, but what we do not have is sort of the infrastructure and the orientation that they are communicating a threat, that that threat signifies a problem and that we need to intervene and work to resolve that problem.

Chairman MILLER. If I just might—my time is running here. You cite that the Memphis City public schools have been able to resolve more than 200 threats. I assume that includes a successful referral to some support service for problems that that student is encountering.

Mr. CORNELL. Absolutely.

Chairman MILLER. So they have built up a base of referral services?

Mr. CORNELL. They ask us to come and teach them the threat assessment model. They adapt it for their urban, large public school system. When students made very serious threats, they were referred to their central mental health organization within the school system. They did an assessment and came up with an individual plan for each student. It might involve the referral to an alternative school, a referral for mental health treatment, conflict resolution, a variety of different interventions individualized to that student to resolve the problem that they were having, okay?

And they had 200 cases in their first year, all of which they were able to resolve.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much.

Mr. McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank each of you for your testimony. This is a very serious issue all of the different kinds of disasters that could confront us, and then there are the different sizes of schools and the areas that they are located in—their geography. Trying to deal with this from Washington, D.C. kind of boggles my mind.

Could each of you tell us what size your school is? We will start with Mr. Healy.

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir.

We have 4,200 undergraduate students, 2,000 graduate students and approximately 5,500 staff and faculty, so we are a community of about 12,000 people.

Mr. MCKEON. In what kind of a setting?

Mr. HEALY. We are in a—I call it a suburban sitting on steroids. Congressman Holt can attest to that as well. We are also located on approximately 600 acres, and we have 160 buildings.

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. Dr. Kennedy.

Ms. KENNEDY. At Cal State Northridge, we have 34,000 students on 369 acres with about 200 buildings. We are in a suburban setting. The campus is open on various sides with public safety people in the entrances but also with temporary people in those entrances as well.

Mr. CORNELL. The University of Virginia has over 20,000 students, but we have trained schools with as few as 20 students to schools as large as the Memphis City public schools where they have 270 schools.

Ms. WALBERT. Arcadia University is in a suburb of Philadelphia. We have 55 acres, 3,400 students, about 300 to 400 employees who are there full-time, and we also own some property adjacent to campus but not on that network of 55 acres.

Mr. MCKEON. Dr. Cornell, you said you have trained schools with as few as 20—

Mr. CORNELL. Yes.

Mr. MCKEON [continuing]. And as large as 270—

Mr. CORNELL. 270 schools with, you know, thousands of students.

Mr. MCKEON. Each of you come from very large schools. You would have the resources to have the safety personnel and the security personnel. A school of 20 people, what could they do in the way of setting up a program?

Mr. CORNELL. In each school, there is an administrator, a principal; there is a psychologist or counselor, and there is a law enforcement officer and maybe a law enforcement officer from the community who is a liaison. As long as you have covered those three bases, you can have a team that deals with the issues in your school.

Mr. MCKEON. In dealing with your colleagues from around the country and in working on these programs, do you feel that we are doing a fairly good job of this on these campuses, at these schools?

Mr. HEALY. As other witnesses have stated today, I think we do a really good job of preventing, and we never hear the stories of

prevention. I would say that we do need to take the lessons that we have learned from the K through 12 studies, and there have been significant resources dedicated to studying K through 12 situations. We have not done the same for colleges and universities, and I really urge you to consider funding research by the Secret Service and by the FBI so we can take the K through 12 model and adapt it for the college and university environment. Our environments are vastly different, and we do not have the same control over students as they do in the K through 12 environment, so I think it is very important that we understand that, while there is work that the Secret Service and the FBI have done on the K through 12 issues, we really need to adapt that for the college and university environment.

Mr. MCKEON. Now, the Secret Service and the FBI would be looking at what kind of disasters or potential disasters?

Mr. HEALY. Specifically, we are talking about the active shooter situations. The study that I am citing is the Secret Service Safe Schools Initiative and the FBI threat assessment model, and those models are the models that I suggest that we take an additional, more deliberative look at the campus scenario and see how those lessons apply.

Mr. MCKEON. Then the earthquake, the Katrina-type disaster, the disaster that happened just recently in Kansas with the tornado, all of those kinds of things would be excluded from that. That would also require some effort and some kind of a program to assess those problems, too.

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. The IACLEA threat and risk assessment tool that was funded by DHS is a great document that really allows campuses to take a holistic examination of all of their vulnerabilities, and it is an all-hazards approach, and so we believe that this document is a very strong document. We also have a campus preparedness resource center that is located on our Web site where colleges and universities can download model emergency operations plans. So there have been considerable investments made in the all-hazards approach. Of course, we can always do more.

Mr. MCKEON. Can I have just one short follow-up on that?

We have about 6,000 just higher ed schools that participate in the Federal financial programs and then they go K through 12. Do these schools all know of this Web site, of this availability?

Mr. HEALY. We are doing everything that we can to make sure that they know. We represent approximately 1,100 higher ed institutions. Any college or university can access that information. We do not exclude any.

Mr. MCKEON. It is just getting the word out.

Mr. HEALY. Exactly, sir.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Kildee.

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Healy, I am addressing this question to you as the President of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators.

In my city of Flint, we have two prominent universities—Kettering and, exactly 1 mile away, the Flint campus of the University of Michigan.

In Michigan, private institutions of higher education do not have the authority to establish a Department of Public Safety composed of sworn police officers. So, at the University of Michigan, they have a fine department of public safety with a number of police officers all trained, all sworn. At Kettering, they do not have that. That must vary throughout the country. Princeton is a private institution. Yet, you have your own police department.

Are these sworn officers?

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. My department is what we call a "hybrid department." we are partly—50 percent are sworn police officers. The other half are nonsworn public safety officers.

Mr. KILDEE. They are sworn, and they work for Princeton?

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir, they work for Princeton. What you find, sir, is, across the country, based on whatever the State law is, the State law will dictate whether a private or a public institution can actually have sworn police officers at their institutions.

Mr. KILDEE. You answered my question. I was going to ask that. That varies then from State to State. So the State of Michigan could authorize that of the University of Detroit, a Jesuit institution, or Kettering. We have a large number of private institutions in Michigan.

So, in your organization then, you would find two types of police forces—one for the public institutions and others for the private institutions?

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. Really, the distinctions that we make are between the sworn officers—the police officers—and the nonsworn officers. Again, I think, if you were to take a survey across the country, you would see that it is about 50/50. About 50 percent of the institutions have sworn law enforcement officers while 50 percent have nonsworn security officers. In fact, some institutions actually contract their security services to companies, to local police, to state police. So we are a very diverse community, but we believe that many of the tools that we are providing to these institutions allow them to enhance their public safety posture regardless of whether they are sworn or nonsworn.

Mr. KILDEE. But as there is a mixture throughout the country, in some States, a private institution could have its own department of public safety and could have the power to swear them in as full police officers?

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. I have worked in three States; New Jersey, Massachusetts and New York. In each of those States, private institutions were able to have police departments.

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you very much.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Keller.

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Cornell, who would you consider to be two or three of the leading experts in the country when it comes to threat assessments for mass murders if we wanted to hear from those folks?

Mr. CORNELL. I would prefer to give you a somewhat longer list than their credentials and depending on their orientation, and but I would certainly speak with folks from the Secret Service and from the FBI, who both have excellent—

Mr. KELLER. I do not need a list. I am pretty familiar with who they are. Have you heard of Dr. Park Dietz?

Mr. CORNELL. Sure, I know Dr. Dietz.

Mr. KELLER. Do you recognize him as a world leading expert in the area of threat assessment?

Mr. CORNELL. Yes.

Mr. KELLER. He testified in the John Hinckley case and in the Jeffrey Dahmer case.

Mr. CORNELL. Yes.

Mr. KELLER. Are you familiar with John Douglas, the former head of the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit?

Mr. CORNELL. Yes.

Mr. KELLER. Do you consider him an expert on things like profiling and threat assessment?

Mr. CORNELL. I do not know him as well as Dr. Dietz.

Mr. KELLER. Okay. Are you familiar with Dr. Jamie Fox at the Northeastern University in Boston?

Mr. CORNELL. Yes.

Mr. KELLER. Is he someone who is familiar and who is an expert in this area?

Mr. CORNELL. Yes.

Mr. KELLER. Okay. Isn't there somebody at the University of Virginia who is sort of famous? I believe he has a MacArthur Foundation grant, and the name escapes me.

Mr. CORNELL. Dr. John Monahan.

Mr. KELLER. Dr. John Monahan.

Do you consider him a leading expert?

Mr. CORNELL. Yes.

Mr. KELLER. Okay. I am familiar with all of those issues based on my prior work in dealing with mass murders, and I have spoken in depth with all of them.

My concern is if we lined all of them up—and by the way, those are the four I would consider to be the leading experts in the world on threat assessment for mass murders—and I said, “here are some facts about these three students who are freshman at a school, and they are all narcissistic, and they are all sort of crazy, and I want you to tell me if 4 years from now these four students will commit violence,” I would submit to you that none of them would be able to predict with mathematical certainty 4 years later which ones would commit violence who have a pretty good idea if violence is going to happen within a couple of hours based on recent and specific threats, but I think it would be very difficult for them to predict 4 years later that one of these students, based on what they have heard, is going to commit violence.

Is that fair to say?

Mr. CORNELL. That is very fair to say. That is profiling as opposed to threat assessment.

Mr. KELLER. All right. So my concern is that we could spend a bunch of money on threat assessment and teaching students and school officials in this area, but if the world's leading experts are not going to be able to predict violence 3 or 4 years down the road, I am not sure these students are. What I think—and I will be happy to also ask Mr. Healy about this—is that the keys for threat

assessment and for preventing mass murders on college campuses are three.

First, there must be systems at places on every single college campus that would allow the students and the faculty and the dorm advisors to be able to talk to someone about a troubled student in a confidential, anonymous manner so they are not afraid of being killed.

Two, that college must have some system in place that that report of a threat doesn't fall through the cracks. And, three, that college must have the ability to take action to remove that student where appropriate without fear of being sued by that student or his family.

Mr. Healy, do you want to address that?

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. I think you just described the behavioral threat assessment model. This is the model that we are recommending; this is the model that the FBI recommends in their threat assessment process. All of these systems are obviously very necessary in our environments. You have to have ways for people to speak in confidentiality. That is part of the threat assessment model. You have to have ways for everyone in the community to identify and then report actions that are troubling for a particular reason, and then you have to have an ability to take action to either get help for an individual, or if that individual needs to be removed from the community, to remove him from the community.

Mr. KELLER. Let us take Princeton, for example. You have a freshman sitting in class, and he makes a statement overheard by one of his peers that, man, I really hate this teacher. I would like to kill him some day. And I don't like Sally sitting in the front row because she is a teacher's pet; maybe I should take her with him.

What system would be in place for that student who overhears that to report to the appropriate Princeton official?

Mr. HEALY. I think that that individual would feel very comfortable talking either with their RA or their dean. We have residential college systems, so I think they would feel very comfortable speaking with their dean in their residential college or with their director of studies.

Mr. KELLER. Anonymously even, to protect themselves if they have to?

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KELLER. What system is in place to make sure once that resident or official hears it, that it doesn't fall through the cracks?

Mr. HEALY. That information would be shared with the dean of students office. If we needed to convene a team to discuss that particular action—I doubt if we would in that particular situation—but if we needed to do that, we have a system in place to do that.

Mr. KELLER. Finally, would there be concerns about you being sued by the student or their family who made that weird sort of threat?

Mr. HEALY. There are always concerns about being sued, but I don't think that stops us from taking action when action needs to be taken.

Mr. KELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the witnesses for their testimony.

Mr. Healy, we are very proud of New Jersey to have a great university like Princeton within our borders, and we thank you for being here this morning.

You talk about your organization's creation of standards and the application of those standards to a certification process, and you make particular reference on page 3 of your testimony for the need for mass emergency notification systems that have appropriate capacity, security redundancy and reliance to reach your community members in a hurry; so a texting system or cell phone system.

Do you think that this committee—I won't ask you to testify for your organization, but do you think this committee should require that colleges and universities receive certification from an organization such as yours in order to receive Federal support? Should we require this kind of certification?

Mr. HEALY. Sir, I believe that our accreditation program is in its infant stages, and I would like to think that at some point down the line, maybe 10, 20 years, that the program would be mature enough to then mandate accreditation standards for all campus public safety agencies. As you know, accrediting for institutions has been around for a very long time. Our program has not been around that long, and I wouldn't suggest that we jump into mandating it at this early stage.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think States or Federal Governments should mandate campuses to have the kind of emergency communication systems that you cite?

Mr. HEALY. I think that campuses and universities should surely evaluate their needs and implement systems that meet all of the parameters that I cited in my statement. Obviously I think that is a very important initiative. Whether a State should mandate that, I don't really know.

Mr. ANDREWS. In your years of experience in campus security, have you ever run across a situation where the student privacy laws have precluded you from gaining or sharing information you thought was necessary to protect the campus?

Mr. HEALY. Sir, we are always concerned about FERPA, the Buckley amendment and also the HIPAA provisions. I can tell you that there are exceptions for law enforcement emergencies and health and safety emergencies in FERPA, and so that hasn't affected, but I know my colleagues at the universities are often concerned about that.

Mr. ANDREWS. In your own experience have you used those exceptions to share information with interested parties?

Mr. HEALY. Absolutely.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has there ever been a situation where you have wanted to use that information but felt precluded because legal counsel told you you couldn't?

Mr. HEALY. Not that I can recollect, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Cornell, I am very impressed by what you had to say, and I wanted to cite one thing in particular on page 3, talking about mental illness issues for students. You say: Our Nation suffers from poor insurance coverage for mental health services and from poor communication and coordination among these services. Even when we know someone needs treatment, there is no effective mechanism to make sure the treatment is delivered and no follow-

up to make sure it was effective. College campuses see a substantial number of students with serious mental health problems, yet their staffing levels and resources are focused on short-term counseling.

One of the bills that this committee will be considering is a bill sponsored by Congressman Kennedy from Rhode Island and Congressman Ramstad from Minnesota which would require health insurance companies to offer mental health services on the same basis on which they offer physical health services. So if there is a \$500 deductible for a broken leg, there can't be a \$15,000 deductible for someone seeking treatment for bipolar disorder. Do you think we should adopt such legislation?

Mr. CORNELL. I am not entirely familiar with the bill, but I strongly support the concept that mental health services should be treated with parity with so-called physical. The distinction between physical and mental disorders is more in appearance than in substance. The more we learn about disorders, the more we understand that there are both physical and psychological components to all of these disorders.

Mr. ANDREWS. I agree with you, and I think it would be sadly ironic if we had a good system in place that identified students who are troubled and took appropriate legal action to deal with them and then didn't have the resources to deal with their problems, and their problems wound up manifesting themselves in violence. I, by the way, do not mean to imply that students who need mental health services are always, often or even sometimes violent, but sometimes it does lead to this.

Mr. Chairman, I know that is one of the issues that we are looking at in our jurisdiction. Thank you very much.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Thank you for being with us today. I appreciate each one of your testimony.

Mr. Healy, I would like to start with you. You talked about the accreditation program. If you could tell me how many institutions have actually applied for accreditation.

Mr. HEALY. We currently have 11 institutions that are in our accreditation program. The program, again, is still in its infant stages.

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Could you expand a little bit on some of the standards that will be evaluated in your accreditation process?

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. The standards, there are approximately 225 standards. They range from the certification of the officers all the way to the crime prevention practices that you are required to implement as a result of the program. So it is kind of a broad range. It includes critical incident response, communications systems, dispatching services, training in crime prevention, obviously compliance with the Clery Act. So those are kind of a broad range.

They are basically broken down into four different categories: administration, operations and patrol, investigations, and then crime prevention.

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Thank you.

I would like to ask this of each of you, if you would: Given the tragic events that took place at Virginia Tech and then the other events like the earthquakes and tornadoes and hurricanes, if each one of you could just tell me if you are taking time to reevaluate your safety programs, and if so, what you are doing.

Ms. WALBERT. We certainly are, and I think most institutions are using any incident that occurs for an opportunity to review what it is we need to know, whether it is about how we communicate with our constituents, how we respond to individual situations. Each of those items take away sometimes time from doing some of the other things that are very important to intervene. At the same time, we learn from every situation, and we can build on what has come before us on our own campuses, recognizing the communities that we are in.

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Thank you.

Dr. Cornell.

Mr. CORNELL. I am not here representing the University of Virginia.

Ms. KENNEDY. I think one of the things we put in place are emergency systems, and we also do scenarios related to the shooter incidents or natural disaster incidents. Each of the campuses, the 23 campuses within the CSU, take part in these activities. We also have the crisis intervention piece together with the student affairs, the public safety people and others, and there are practice sessions that go on. Because we are also concerned about natural disasters, each of the departments and areas maintain a supply of water, food and safety equipment at the local level so that in the event of any kind of a disaster where people have to—are looking for those kinds of things, that they can be found in multiple locations.

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Thank you.

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. Again, I do think that all institutions are taking a step back to evaluate their emergency management plans. I know that we have done that at my institution. Because I obviously monitor the list for our association, I know that all institutions are concerned about this. We are very fortunate that we have in IACLEA a model emergency operations plan so that when institutions are evaluating their own plans, or if they are just starting to write a plan, they don't have to start from ground zero; they can use the our model plan and also use our incident command training, which is very important as well. It is important for multiple agencies to be able to respond in an effective and seamless fashion, and our incident command training allows that, and we are rolling that out around the country.

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Do you work collaboratively with colleagues across your States or across the country and work on best practices and benchmarking and those type things that you would do in business?

Ms. WALBERT. I would say absolutely. NASPA and the other professional associations that I represent today provide all sorts of educational opportunities where we share our best practices, we challenge one another. We think about the differences that we each bring, as were mentioned earlier, in terms of the types of campuses that we have, learning about alcohol-related issues, mental health issues, the legal aspects. We learn as much from one another who

have experienced other things as we do from conversations and educational opportunities.

Mr. DAVIS OF TENNESSEE. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Cornell, is there a consensus in your field that substantially more research needs to be done in violence prevention?

Mr. CORNELL. There certainly is.

Mr. SCOTT. The threat to students, is the threat from other students and staff or from the outside? From the events that have occurred, how many have occurred from someone outside of the college community coming in and creating the threat, and how much of it is within the college community?

Mr. CORNELL. Well, certainly both are of concern, and perhaps Mr. Healy could address this more definitively than I, but my understanding is that most of the college campus crime occurs from outside of the formal campus.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Healy.

Mr. HEALY. Sir, if you are specifically addressing what we would consider an active shooter or rampage shooting incident, of the ones we have identified, it is about 50-50; 50 percent have been conducted by outsiders, another 50 percent by people who are within the community. I would like to note, however, that the age difference is very variable in the college and university environment. Many of the active shooters have been either graduate students or much older.

Mr. SCOTT. Dr. Cornell, we have gone back and forth about your ability to identify which individual might in the future cause a problem. Everyone with a mental health issue is not a threat to public safety. You indicated a difference between threat assessment and profiling. Can you elaborate on that?

Mr. CORNELL. Thank you for bringing this up. This is a very important distinction. All of the experts that Congressman Keller cited are important experts, and I think all of them would agree with me that threat assessment and profiling are different procedures. Profiling involves looking for long-term predictions, trying to see far into the future based on an individual's background and characteristics.

The FBI's own profiling unit, including John Douglas, concluded that profiling was not appropriate for school shooters, but they recommended threat assessment, which is a more immediate procedure that identifies individuals who have identified themselves by virtue of making a threat or engaging in some kind of threatening behavior.

We have much more success at distinguishing individuals who have made threats and how serious and dangerous they are than individuals who are involved in profiling. Dr. Deitz, for example, has a threat assessment business that he operates, so certainly he endorses the concept of threat assessment. So this is an important distinction and one that we emphasize in our training.

Mr. SCOTT. In high schools bullying is a major issue in terms of violence prevention. Is that as much a problem in college?

Mr. CORNELL. Bullying probably peaks in middle school and declines through adolescence, but bullying, social bullying, is still a

very prominent issue in colleges. Individuals segregate themselves into social groups, individuals come to feel alienated and withdrawn, and we see the development of adult mental illnesses in those years that complicate the bullying problem.

Mr. SCOTT. Expulsion in high school is often counterproductive. Is it as much a counterproductive issue in college?

Mr. CORNELL. It certainly is for the students.

Mr. SCOTT. What about for public safety? If you expel a high school student, they are out in the street and can cause as much aggravation out there. Is there as much of a problem for public safety for the college students if you expel too often?

Mr. CORNELL. Absolutely. Expulsion is sort of a short-term solution for the school, but it is not a solution for the student or the community as a whole.

Mr. SCOTT. What problems happen when you expel people unnecessarily?

Mr. CORNELL. The American Psychological Association's Task Force on Zero Tolerance looked at expulsion research and found basically it is associated with declining achievement and a higher dropout rate among the individuals that are expelled. It does not improve the safety of the school or the climate in the school, so it is not a very effective solution.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

Mr. Healy, you mentioned communication. Some things cost a lot of money, some things don't. Do most college student have cell phones?

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. Virtually all have computers.

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. You can send a message out instantaneously; is that right?

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. Most of the systems that are currently on the market are instantaneous.

Mr. SCOTT. If you send out an alert like something at Virginia Tech, what would the alert say, and what would the students do?

Mr. HEALY. Sir, I don't want to address specifically what they did or what they could have done there. I know in our situation we would try to send information to advise individuals what to do as a situation unfolds. Again, these messages—and as situations evolve, that is why it is so important to have a system that you can push out information as quickly as possible because of repeated information and updated information. Again, this would serve as a way to provide information so that people can take steps to do what it is that you need them to do, but also to control rumors and try to maintain a sense of order on campus.

Sir, unfortunately, there are a lot of companies in the wake of the very tragic incident of Virginia Tech, a lot of fly-by-night companies out there, and it is very unfortunate. That is why it is very important for colleges and universities to understand what the features of those systems are so that they are not throwing their money away.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Boustany.

Mr. BOUSTANY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First a few comments and then a question. It seems to me that we don't want to create a Federal bureaucracy to deal with this, and given the diversity of so many institutions and size and locations and so forth, having those institutions develop multidisciplinary plans that are very comprehensive, that incorporate elements from the community would be important, as you have all mentioned.

You have all given very excellent testimony and answered some very good questions with very informative answers.

Certainly plans would include threat assessment, prevention, response, and oftentimes with plans, when they have to be implemented, they don't really work as well as everyone would hope. We saw this in my home State of Louisiana after both Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. And scenario planning and so forth, exercises I think are also very important.

One question I have, and Mr. Andrews raised the issue of mental health, every community is plagued with the lack of mental health resources across this country. We all know about the disparity in the way insurance treats it. These issues we are going to try to deal with as we go forward.

But it struck me as I was listening that our universities and colleges have a resource that we may be underutilizing, and that is virtually all have psychological departments, and are those psychological departments being utilized in a more extensive way in a counseling process; as you look at your plans and go through prevention and so forth, are you using those resources to the fullest extent on campus?

Ms. WALBERT. I think it is important that there is a distinction made between the role that the psychology faculty play in teaching and the role we talked about in counseling. It is very clear a faculty member who is an expert clinical psychologist not be in a counseling relationship with a student that they are teaching. On a campus like ours, our psychology program is very strong, and when we have had emergencies, we have used the expertise that exists on that psychology faculty to help us think about other resources and relationships that we have, but we do not use them directly for the counseling role with the students.

Mr. BOUSTANY. I would ask that that might be considered and look at possible best practices, share your information, because it may be worthwhile. It just seems to me that this is a resource on our campuses that may be underutilized in this effort. I do recognize the difference between research and teaching versus clinical psychology, but just about every campus does have clinical psychology and counseling, master's programs in counseling, which is a clinical discipline.

It just seems to me that that is an area that we need to look at a little bit more and maybe share some best practices.

Ms. WALBERT. Sir, if I may, I do believe that we really need to be very cautious on that matter, in large measure because of the confidentiality of the relationship if the faculty member is also in a position to grade a student. The systems that we need need to be built around the network for the student free from that academic pressure. So using them as resources and experts is critical

in terms of any of the faculty on our campuses, psychology, including other areas as well.

Mr. BOUSTANY. I understand that potential conflict, but it seems to me that there should be a little bit more investigation into—any campus as to how those resources could be used.

Dr. Cornell, do you have any comments, being a psychologist?

Mr. CORNELL. Yes. Obviously you are correct that there are some academic psychologists who would not be prepared or trained to do clinical counseling, but at the University of Virginia we have clinical psychologists who also work in a clinic that does provide counseling and clinical services to the student population and the general community, so it can be worked out. There are complications, as Dr. Walbert mentions, but I think in many universities the clinical psychologists on the ground also are involved in some capacity with their mental health services.

Mr. BOUSTANY. Thank you.

Dr. Kennedy.

Ms. KENNEDY. Within the CSU we have a comment that we consider to be odd students, and we don't mention the student's name. And we bring together public safety, counseling, people from the clinical psych area to talk about student A, for example, and to bring together all the information that we have, and then to try to identify what would be a plan relative to that, and then that gets carried out in a designated way depending on the degree of threat. I think that is quite common. I know within the CSU it is a common practice.

Mr. BOUSTANY. Thank you.

I would just say, given the paucity of mental health services really nationwide and from community to community, we ought to leverage everything we have as we look at this effort.

I thank you all.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Ms. Clarke.

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Americans once had a sense of security in the basic institutions that were important in their lives. We used to think our churches and our schools were safe. Recently the tragic events at Virginia Tech have yet again reduced whatever semblance of sense of safety we had left.

Equally as tragic is the daily violence encountered by students in our inner-city schools. In New York City alone, which is where I am from, there are a reported 654 serious incidents in schools categorized as persistently dangerous schools. These acts of violence point to the larger problem of school safety both at the secondary and postsecondary level and points to the importance of the creation of threat assessment teams of mental health professionals, educators, social service workers, law enforcement officials and others in key strategy in averting potential dangerous incidents.

In fact, since the Columbine incident in 1999, much of the school safety literature has stressed the importance of schools forming these types of broad-based threat assessment teams to analyze threats and campus safety. However, schools seem to be a bit reluctant not only in the creation of such teams, but also on the creation and implementation of student alert systems.

I want to direct my questions to the entire panel. I am looking at what has happened in New York City and how we can engage our educational communities in emergency preparedness and sort of expecting the unexpected. After 9/11 we had a lot of schools in the area of the World Trade Center, and after 9/11 it seems as though that level of consciousness has still not quite awoken.

For instance, New York City passed—well, the mayor basically passed a public school cell phone ban, so the types of messaging that you would talk about in the event of an emergency is not available to public school students, particularly high school students, and there is a concern about whether that technology is good in a public school setting, or does it present a larger threat in terms of violent interactions during the school day or after with gang members and things of that nature, sort of creating that balance.

But how do we create a consciousness within the educational community and surrounding communities around expecting the unexpected, using threat assessment as a tool in an urban environment? Can I just ask you folks, particularly those of you who have larger environments in which you work or have had that experience?

Mr. HEALY. Ma'am, I believe that one of the ways that we do that is through professional associations like my own, by creating a sense of the awareness of what is available and making it easier for institutions to develop their emergency management plans. I don't think that there is any institution out there that doesn't want to engage in emergency management planning, it is just such a daunting task, and that is why resources like we attempted to provide in IACLEA are very helpful to help facilitate and move the process along.

I do think that it is a critical role for the professional associations to reach out to their membership to ensure that they understand. It is also important for us to work together, and that is why we are constantly trying to develop closer relationships so that I can present at a NASPA conference and talk about the importance of emergency management, and someone at NASPA can present at one of our conferences, talking about working together with the student affairs professionals. So I think it has to be a collaborative approach.

Mr. CORNELL. Schools really have a tremendous burden, and with No Child Left Behind, many responsibilities that have to do with academic achievement and accomplishments there, and that is their first priority, and so it is sometimes difficult to provide them with the time, the energy and the funding to think about crisis response and threat assessment, which I see as two separate components.

The Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, that funding is really critically important to schools being able to implement programs. In almost every school division that we have gone to, we have gone to 12 States, gone to hundreds of different schools, they use that Safe and Drug-Free Schools money to do their threat assessment training, to do their bullying prevention. And when that money is threatened, those programs go away.

Ms. KENNEDY. Yes, I wanted to respond, too.

Within the CSU, given that we have almost half a million students that we are serving, and we also provide services to our local education, K-12 educational systems as well, one of the things that we do is we do provide violence, antiviolenace training within the public schools. We do principals' training in the same way. And everyone within the system is trained to try to prepare themselves for disaster.

The difficulty always is that you are prepared for the last disaster, and that when you mention the ability to plan for the unexpected, it is just not possible. You can put all the tools together, and you can bring that emergency preparedness action and crisis management to the event at hand, but I think it is very difficult to anticipate some of the things that actually do happen.

Ms. CLARKE. I think sort of key to responding is to have a tool that enables people to act. New York City decided to ban cell phones in its schools, and there has been a real debate around whether, in fact, it facilitates being able to address an emergency or it creates a crisis situation for those who would use it as a tool in order to promote some sort of violent action. Any response to that?

Ms. WALBERT. I would just say that we have had to communicate all the decades we have been around. Thinking about the best way to communicate is essential. We used to hang signs. That was all we had. Now we have other tools. But to assess whether or not they will accomplish the primary purpose in that particular case, that needs to be done in advance. That is how we can prepare to think about which tools we would use under which circumstances and what makes the most sense.

Mr. HEALY. I would just add, ma'am, that, of course, no one method is best. I think it really has to include several different methodologies and modes of communication. Some of those methods are as simple as hanging a sign, but obviously we have to continue to evolve as the technology evolves. We have to continue to add layers on so that we are then able to communicate.

I think obviously with the issue around cell phones in K-through-12 schools, that is an issue that has to be resolved. But cell phones are not the only way. I think K-through-12 schools are much smaller than colleges and universities, much more contained. I think just the word of mouth is a very effective tool as well.

Chairman MILLER. The gentlewoman's time has expired.

Mr. Heller.

Mr. HELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank everyone here today. Great discussion today. I certainly do appreciate your input.

I wanted to direct some of my questions towards Ms. Kennedy. How large did you say your campus was again?

Ms. KENNEDY. Right now it is 34,000 students.

Mr. HELLER. Thirty-four thousand students. You had to live through earthquakes, and I understand how difficult that can be. I went to the University of Southern California. But for that reason I am looking at some of your issues and comments on emergency preparation plans. How long would it take you to evacuate your campus if you had to do so?

Ms. KENNEDY. It would depend very much on the time of day, the day of the week.

Chairman MILLER. Maybe take a week at the wrong time of day.

Ms. KENNEDY. Depends on the traffic. I couldn't really say. We have evacuated the campus at different times over utility crises where we had no electricity. We evacuated—we have done it over mudslides and other activities, and usually it has been around—my own personal experience, it has been around 4:00 in the afternoon, which means they can evacuate the campus, but not the area.

Mr. HELLER. Right, right. I didn't live through the Rodney King riots at the University of Southern California campus, but my sister-in-law did, and under that scenario they did try to evacuate the campus and had a difficult time even in the middle of the afternoon trying to get students off the campus. It was in the middle of finals. They were in the library, they were on campus, they were in their fraternities or sororities. Very, very difficult for them to get that evacuation and get that completed, and very concerned.

In your emergency preparation plans, have you determined how long it would take to contact 100 percent of your students under an emergency situation?

Ms. KENNEDY. In an emergency situation we actually have a system of public address on the top of every building on the entire campus and including in the dorm areas, and so we can do a public address telling people where to go. We have automatic systems that go to the cell phones and go—not the cell phones, to the computers, everybody's individual account, giving them instructions. And then we have teams of people that will be located—that will move immediately to particular areas to tell people what to do. Residential people have one set of issues, the classrooms have another.

Mr. HELLER. Very good.

Mr. Healy, you mentioned, or it has been mentioned, obviously, the technology of the laptop, cell phones, and I realize, as you mentioned, that no single technology is going to be a fix-all. But I will tell you as you move forward in this, and I think it is an intriguing idea, I would think that you could expand that. For example, as a parent sitting here with a child in the elementary school right now, that parent would also be notified. But not only students on campus, but those parents.

I think that is one of the biggest concerns of what came out of the incident at Virginia Tech, was the lack of communications. I think if not only were the students, but the parents at the same time—I would love—if my child's elementary school today had to be evacuated, I would love to have that ring on my cell phone right now saying come pick up my child.

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. One of the factors that we will be asking our peers and our other campus public safety executives around the country as they look at purchasing such a system to consider is whether parents should be added to the system. I know, in fact, the system we have at Princeton actually started in the K-through-12 environment primarily for parents and has evolved into a system that is used in the higher ed. So I do know that those systems are used widely in K through 12.

Mr. HELLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Yarmuth.

Mr. YARMUTH. I wanted to pursue the issue of the diversity of campuses a little bit. I come from a district, metro Louisville, and we have eight or nine different campuses, none of which I would say resembles Virginia Tech in the sense that they are very self-contained, very few residential students anywhere. And I worked at the University of Louisville for 3 years, and it seemed to me that the approach to campus safety there was more of like a community police force, a community approach.

So I am interested in the idea that we are using a K-through-12 model to talk about safety when, at least looking at the variety of campuses in my community, it appears that it resembles more of a workplace model than it does an educational setting. Does that make this exercise meaningful in any respect, because I understand at least three of you come from large campuses. I don't know about Arcadia. We have campuses that you really couldn't call them campuses, institutions that are in high-rise office buildings. So it is exactly like a workplace setting.

So I would like you to respond to how applicable these standards are.

Mr. HEALY. Yes, sir. That is why I think it is so important that we expand the previous studies that have been conducted in the K-through-12 environments to include campuses. I know I have said that several times because I am really committed to trying to make this happen. In fact, I mentioned that I met with the FBI and the Secret Service to gauge their interest in expanding their studies.

But I do think that there are some particular nuances in college and university environments that may make some of the recommendations and some of the behavioral threat assessment models distinctively different in college and university settings, so that is why I really urge you all, as you consider funding for the Secret Service and the FBI or whomever, the COPS bill, that we set aside some money for this research because I think it is vitally important.

Ms. KENNEDY. I would just like to say that for the CSU we have small residential campuses as well as primarily commuter campuses. For Cal State North, for example, of those 35,000, only 2,200 are living on campus. The rest are living around, or they are commuting in. That is why I mentioned earlier on the time of day.

But what our emergency preparedness has done as a system is to identify what are the needed systems that have to be in place depending on what that campus looks like, and that is what we have put in place. When we do the scenarios, the first one that was done on the possibility of a shooter, active shooter, was done at San Francisco State, which is an urban setting. We will now repeat that in a residential setting and in a mixed setting such as the one that I am most familiar with.

So we are very conscious that a setting does create a different kind of response.

Mr. CORNELL. Again, there is an important distinction between the crisis response and threat assessment. Crisis response, the buildings matter a lot, and the location and what you are going to do, but that is an immediate situation. Threat assessment is pre-

vention, and there the buildings matter less, and the people matter more.

So when someone is engaged in threatening behavior, what is important is that you interview that person, you interview the witnesses, you contact the teachers, and you communicate among your staff. So it is more person-oriented.

Now, threat assessment actually originated for workplace violence and for protecting our President, who is moving all over the world. So the issues of geography have been dealt with and overcome, so I wouldn't want to think that because we have got a model in K-through-12 schools, that we can't adopt it to colleges, because it has been used in tougher environments even than colleges already.

Ms. WALBERT. I would just add that the community you mentioned is critical on different size campuses, and understanding what the community that the institution resides in expects from that relationship is essential as well. We have many commuter students that we would have very different expectations of how we would contact them than the students that live on campus. Many institutions, over 4,000 institutions, there are many different ways to pull those groups together and identify the best way to communicate and what the expectations of the students, the parents, the faculty and the staff that are there really are.

Mr. YARMUTH. I guess I am just curious about how much the fact that it is an educational institution changes the safety dynamic in many of these institutions we are dealing with.

Ms. WALBERT. I think that gives us an opportunity to engage everyone in that environment, particularly at the collegiate level, educating that students have a responsibility for what happens in the community, to make that contact anonymously or otherwise if they are concerned about a peer or someone else. It gives us that leverage.

Very few of our missions actually say we will keep students safe. We talk about education, we talk about the focus on the long-term citizenship of those students. We do want it in a safe environment.

Mr. YARMUTH. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here. I think it has been an excellent discussion. You have talked—maybe this is to the whole panel, but I think, Dr. Cornell, you have been speaking about the crisis response versus threat assessment. Is there a sense of proportionality here? If you were to look, all of you—if you were to look at what campuses are doing, would you be interested in knowing how much more in resources has been put into security measures in buildings versus thinking about the threat assessment, and what would that proportionality be? How would it be if I went to my campus, several major campuses in San Diego, for example, and asked them to tell me about those issues and whether or not adequate resources were being put into either one? How would you assess that? Is it equal, or is it in truth something else?

Mr. CORNELL. I would say most people think about crisis response when they think about the active shooter incident because that is very vivid and emotional, and they spend their resources on

that, and it is a more expensive process because hiring security and equipment.

Threat assessment is much less expensive. You train your staff, and they continue to do threat assessments. But I would say it is probably 90 percent focused on crisis response and security and much less on the sort of early prevention threat assessment.

Mr. HEALY. That is why I think it is so important for us to have this conversation, because one of the things that we try to tell our peers is that you do need an all-hazards approach. We need to consider all of the risks that we potentially face. Congressman Clarke was mentioning earlier it is hard to get people to imagine the unimaginable. That is what I am here to do. I have to help my institution, my peers have to help their institutions, imagine the worst possible scenarios.

Now, that doesn't mean that you can plan or that you commit resources for every possible scenario, but you have to look at the likely, more probable scenarios and plan, and I do think that obviously this conversation is an important conversation and one in which we hope that people will begin to think not just about critical incident response, but also about behavioral threat assessment.

Ms. WALBERT. I would agree with Mr. Healy, but I wouldn't agree necessarily that everything is unimaginable. Many of the things that we deal with are very real. Dealing with the individual students in advance, reinforcing that connection, educating peers as well as faculty is essential in helping identify where those sources of problems may be. That may be where many of the resources need to go, and we continue to escalate.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I guess these resources, is it mostly in research or working within the institutions? Because I think, Mr. Healy, you mentioned that you monitor other institutions and what they are doing. I am interested in the obstacles that they face. Is it a mindset issue or a resource issue?

Ms. WALBERT. I would argue—

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. What is our role? How would you like to relate to it in order to raise the consciousness, whether it is the research or something else?

Ms. WALBERT. Pulling together research is very valuable to us, but not necessarily what we use on the ground day in and day out. And understanding that the decisionmakers have to think about the very real things that are happening in that environment at that point in time, whether it is after an earthquake or when a student comes in and says, I am worried about the person that was sitting next to me in class, that decisionmaking ladder has to be well-informed and clear and understood, and I think sometimes it gets fueled by other outside agencies, and we are trying really hard in being very effective at identifying the most important elements.

Ms. KENNEDY. I think what has changed as a result of our continued investment in both public safety and in the crisis management and threat prevention has been a coming together of the different units of the university in ways that had not happened before. I think when I first came into higher education, the last thing I would have thought is I would be meeting with a counselor, a public safety person, someone who is an expert in crisis management and facilities and talking about student issues and faculty

issues and putting together counseling following events. But that is very common now on campuses. It certainly is very common within the CSU and within California, and it is between public and private agencies, between the police department and the local area, and when they are called by our police.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I could interrupt, is it correct to say that when it comes to a credible threat, that we are using more tools at universities, and that personnel there actually know what to do with that threat and to reach out in some ways?

Ms. KENNEDY. Increasingly they know what to do with it, and they know how to reach out to the community because they have been practicing this over and over again.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Loeb sack.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This has really been a pretty fascinating discussion. I appreciate all the time that you folks have put into this and the wonderful questions of my colleagues. I taught at a small college for 23 years, Cornell College as opposed to Cornell University. But also in my district is the University of Iowa where in 1991 we had a mass shooting, and whenever something like what happened at Virginia Tech happens, it really does cause a lot of trauma in the area, certainly at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, but at the smaller institutions such as Cornell College in the area. I actually had a little bit of e-mail contact with Cornell's college chaplain when the Virginia Tech incident happened. So I am doing my best to try to stay in touch with folks in the district about these issues.

I do want to also thank Dr. Walbert and Dr. Cornell for your responses to my colleague Mr. Boustany's question about sort of utilizing local campus resources and the extreme caution. As a former academic myself and knowing clinical psychologists who are also in academics, I am very aware of that distinction that has to be maintained there as well.

But I have kind of a practical question, and maybe it is more related to profiling than threat assessment, because I am still sort of grasping what the difference is, not being an expert in this area. I served on an admissions committee at Cornell College a number of times for a number of years, and I know a lot of institutions sort of have the same procedure that Cornell has, and that is not everyone who applies goes before that committee. A lot of people are automatically admitted if they meet certain admissions criteria.

And there could be a number of people obviously who have mental health problems, and I thank you very much for drawing attention to that concern, or might be a threat of one sort or another to themselves or to their colleagues, and so they are not assessed in any way, shape or form. They may have had problems in high school, but we don't know about that when they get to the college level. They are admitted automatically, and, unbeknownst to administrators or faculty, they have these problems.

So my question would be is there any way that we could—should we know that information before they are admitted to college? And then if, for example, they come before a committee, should a committee be aware of that information, and to what extent should the committee take that into account? And should there be a pipeline

of sorts where the information about someone's proclivity to violence in high school might follow that person through a career?

I guess at least the two of you can answer that question, maybe Mr. Healy as well.

Ms. WALBERT. I will give it a shot. I think that there are lots of anecdotal experiences that tell us that students, individuals that have had trouble in the past can be very successful citizens, and we have to walk that tightrope very, very carefully. However, I think when we have information that indicates that a student either would have difficulty in the transition to the institution, the transitional issues are significant, they have been in an environment where something else has erupted, and it is similar, it is very worthy of those contacts to try to ascertain whether or not there should be any question about that participation level.

I would much rather have that conversation at a point in time where as an educator I can help that student later on make the most of those opportunities, and we can talk about all sorts of mental health issues, and I can name any number of people that are successful citizens that have worked through that.

So I think that it is a slippery slope, and while we must be careful for the community, we need to attend to the individuals as well. And as educators we are in a great position to be able to do that.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you.

Dr. Cornell.

Mr. CORNELL. There is not a checklist or a profile that we can say, oh, don't admit these students because they would be violent. We really aren't in a position to do that. Naturally, any admissions committee, I assume, would be concerned if a student has a criminal history or history of violent behavior and would have to weigh that in making a decision.

But I think much more important is how do they function on the campus. Do they show signs of disturbance, trouble, and can we reach out to them soon enough to sort of deal with the problem when it is at a lower level? I think our colleges need more resources and more orientation toward that approach.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Right.

Did you want to say anything, Mr. Healy?

Mr. HEALY. The only thing I would add is in trying to make a determination on an individual who is coming in as a freshman and their criminal background, most of those records would be sealed, and we wouldn't have access to them anyway. So I agree that this is obviously a touchy issue, a very slippery slope. That doesn't mean we shouldn't be thinking about how we evaluate our students before we allow them into our institutions. Clearly we should learn some lessons from this very tragic incident at Virginia Tech.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman MILLER. I have six people remaining to ask questions, and we are going to be out of here no later than 10 after. So the extent to which you can restrict yourself so your colleagues can have a question.

Mr. Bishop.

Mr. BISHOP OF NEW YORK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be quick.

Dr. Walbert, I used to be a NASPA member, so I thank you for your leadership.

Ms. WALBERT. Excellent.

Mr. BISHOP OF NEW YORK. One of the things we focus on in this committee is student cost, rapidly increasing rates of tuition, and we have had testimony before this committee that ties increase in student cost to a proliferation of nonteaching staff on college campuses.

I note in your testimony that you talk about the key roles the student affairs professionals play, how they facilitate student learning, how they help maintain a healthy environment on the campus. Could you talk about how colleges need to make those kinds of judgments when they are constructing their budgets and where they put their staffing resources? Could you talk more about the role that student affairs professionals play?

Ms. WALBERT. It is essential to think about what the expectations are of the students and the parents of the students coming to a given institution and determine whether or not the services, the programs, the activities are consistent with those expectations. If you have a more mature population, they may not expect campus environment activities and so forth.

The issue of counseling, however, is one of those things where it is very important to define what it is that you are going to provide. I could have dozens of psychiatrists on staff and probably address many issues with students, but thinking about the best utilization of the resources I have every year every time I have resources at hand to think about is critical for me as an administrator. I need to think about whether or not I can utilize a full-time counselor more effectively than I can utilize some other resource, and that stone doesn't get upturned any given year. We deal with it constantly to make the most of those resources.

Mr. BISHOP OF NEW YORK. I take it you would agree cutting nonteaching staff is not the way to hold down tuition costs.

Ms. WALBERT. I certainly wouldn't support that.

Mr. BISHOP OF NEW YORK. I will just ask one more question.

Dr. Cornell, you make several references to the Safe and Drug-Free Schools. I am going to assume you are aware that the President's budget recommended the total elimination of that program for fiscal 2008. I take it that is a recommendation that you would urge this Congress to overrule.

Mr. CORNELL. I think it would be a disaster for our schools.

Mr. BISHOP OF NEW YORK. Thank you very much.

I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. I have just a quick question also, which is in terms of threat assessment, I mean contact with the court system certainly would seem like a red flag for a current student; again, I am not talking about precollege.

Maybe this question is for you, Mr. Healy, in terms of just whether or not—particularly when you have got students who don't live in the jurisdiction where the campus is, and if there is trouble back home or a probate court finding like there was with this

shooter at Virginia Tech of some mental issues, I mean, that does seem like a role that the Federal Government—and we have the NCIC system for crime information where there could be ways of making sure that actual dispositions of conduct either that broke criminal laws or resulted in some type of civil findings are transmitted to people who need to assess threats, and whether or not that system really works now, or whether or not that is something that Congress should be looking at.

Mr. HEALY. Sir, I think NCIC obviously works very well, but the problem is that when you have students who are engaged in activities around your campus, generally you will find out through your relationships with your local agencies. If an individual who is a student at your university is engaged or involved in a situation in another State, it is a low probability, because normally when students are getting in trouble, they don't identify themselves as, I am a student of Princeton University. So it is very rare we would find out those situations.

So I think it is willing to discuss—it is good to have the conversation about how we monitor that. Again, I think it is a slippery slope. We understand that our students are citizens of the world, and obviously they engage in activities sometimes that aren't the best. That doesn't necessarily mean that they shouldn't belong in the campus community.

Mr. COURTNEY. Again, I am not suggesting if someone gets in trouble back home, that that somehow endangers their status, but certainly it would seem like something the campus would want to know about, again, some of the indicators that would suggest someone is falling into trouble in terms of mental health issues or behavior issues.

Ms. WALBERT. If I could address that just a moment. It may not be on a specific matter, but we meet with our local judicial officers. We meet with the judge in our township. He knows what our expectations are on our campus and how we support the things that he does. So while we may not be talking about an individual student, when he is dealing with an individual, he knows how the institution expects it to be addressed as well. I think that is a great collaboration with off-campus resources as well.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

In a somewhat different light I heard Dr. Kennedy mention about the natural disaster that occurred. Fortunately, it was when no students were at the school. I am a graduate of Seton Hall University in New Jersey, and it is also in my congressional district. Although it is on a little different subject, as you know, there was the fire at Seton Hall where several students died. The cause was certainly suspicious. It was finally determined that it was started by several young men.

And I am wondering whether in your overall assessment of safety for children, for the students rather, have you and all of you that are associated with schools—very quickly, had that been addressed? I know we passed some Federal legislation and all that, but what is—since we are talking about safety in general, most of it is about the Virginia Tech, but how are you all coping with that

situation of the potential of fires and fires being started and sometimes maybe even a mental instability from a student?

Ms. WALBERT. I would just say that any of the aspects of behavior that students exhibit that is inappropriate or in violation of a code of conduct is an opportunity for us to send a loud message. On our campus any tinkering with any kind of fire safety feature is a very severe violation of our code of conduct, and students get that message loud and clear. We have an opportunity to do that. There are other issues such as alcohol and drugs as well. But fire safety is one of those things that we can explain very clearly to students, and utilizing the existing code of conduct is one mechanism to do that.

Ms. KENNEDY. I would just concur with Dr. Walbert on that. I think that the CSU operates a similar system. We do say in California that we have four seasons, fire, flood, earthquake and summer. And so we are conscious of various kinds of acts of natural disaster.

Mr. HEALY. Again, I would just add that the approach that IACLEA recommends for responding to catastrophes and critical incidents is an all-hazards approach, so I think in every emergency management plan you will see particular pieces that address fire emergencies.

As you know, we are from the same State, and New Jersey has very stringent requirements for colleges and universities.

Mr. PAYNE. Right. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Holt.

Mr. HOLT. Thank you. I will be very brief because we have little time, and also because I have been in and out of this hearing, and I don't know what I have missed. You have probably answered most of the questions. I just want to at this late time in the hearing welcome Mr. Healy and say how proud Princeton is of his work.

The one specific—by the way, how proud we are that we have the president of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement. The one specific question I have that I believe hasn't been answered, but you can correct me if it has, is just how much, Mr. Healy, do you think we can learn from looking at the work over the last half dozen years of secondary schools, because you have recommended learning those lessons and transferring them to the colleges and universities.

Mr. HEALY. Sir, I believe that we can learn a lot from the K-through-12 studies that have been conducted, and I think primarily it is the behavioral threat assessment model. Again, I think we need to take a deliberate look to ensure that the model as currently written is completely transferable.

I am not so sure, and in my meetings with the FBI and the Secret Service, they are obviously concerned that we just don't take one model and just plop it over and expect that it will operate the same way. But clearly the behavioral threat assessment model is a good model that we need to consider studying.

Mr. HOLT. Thank you very much. I look forward to learning more from Dr. Cornell. I was impressed with your different view, I think, of what we need to do, and I thank the witnesses very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Hare.

Mr. HARE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have two questions—one for you, Dr. Cornell, and one for Dr. Walbert.

Dr. Cornell, not all of the threats, as you know, are the same, and you emphasize that school officials should not look at them as such, and just a two-part question.

What are some of the elements used to assess the severity of a threat, and how are the students' privacies protected while you are doing this assessment?

Mr. CORNELL. Okay. Those are both good questions.

We have a detailed decision tree in which we classify threats as transient, serious substantive, or very serious substantive. And there are a number of factors. You mostly have to consider the context in which the threat is made, and we have an interview protocol in which students are interviewed about what did you say, what did you mean by that, how do you think the other person took it? And then we have a similar interview that we do for witnesses to the threat and for the recipient of the threat.

So there is a process involved to sort of understand what they meant by that, and then the more serious we think it is, the more we involve law enforcement and mental health persons. So there is a level at which every child then would get a mental health assessment which would look at their history of violence and their proclivity for violence, and then there would be a law enforcement investigation in which we might search the child's locker, the backpack, maybe get a search warrant and go to the child's home. And as you know, there have been many cases where a kind of threat assessment has been done where they have gone into children's homes and have found weapons in their bedrooms, for example. So there is a progressive series of steps that we take.

Now, in terms of privacy, FERPA allows, in a health and safety emergency, to share information, and that is very important that they understand that FERPA, even as currently written, allows in a health and safety emergency to share information. And we include that in our training so that they understand, in a case where it rises to a level of a very serious, substantive threat, that information is not confidential, and so we do not promise confidentiality when we interview a student and we contact parents.

On the college domain, obviously, there are some additional hurdles there to be dealt with—that is one of the adaptations that you need to make—but that, I think, can be worked out.

Mr. HARE. Thank you.

Dr. Walbert, just one last question here.

You mentioned that the resident assistants are typically trained to recognize and address interpersonal conflicts and signs of mental health. What specific training are they given to prepare them for dealing with troubled students, and would you recommend that anything be added to that training, given what we have seen?

Ms. WALBERT. The training for resident assistants varies from campus to campus, but in most cases it is quite extensive; it is done over a series of times. Often, right before the academic year

begins, there is an intensive span of maybe 2 weeks of educational programs and so forth, and then there is ongoing training, very typically.

The types of things that might be specific to this are emergency protocols, understanding how to deal with certain types of emergencies and so forth, but a great deal of time is spent on helping the individual student think about how they are going to interact with their peers, build the relationships, form the team, the community that they live in so that they will get the kinds of information when there is a concern about a student.

The reality is that students are more apt to say something to another student than they are to a senior administrator of some sort, and we need to have the systems in place, which most campuses do, to use that liaison very effectively.

So, in tooling them, we do things like, behind closed doors, we practice; we role-play; we give them a number of different kinds of experiences so that the students who are working for us are very much a part of the community that the other students are in.

Mr. HALE. I yield back.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Altmire.

Mr. ALTMIRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Walbert, again, I wanted to actually follow-up on what Mr. Hare was talking about.

What does a resident assistant do when they see or they hear through another student—or, you know, a living companion or whatever the case may be—that there may be an issue with a student? What is the next step that takes place after that?

Ms. WALBERT. There may be a number of decisions that that individual has to make. They may consult with a professional staff member; they may reach out to the student to find out what is going on. Any number of times during the course of any given week or month, I may leave a message for a resident assistant and say, “How is ‘so-and-so’ doing?” because I have gotten something from a parent or from someone else who is concerned about that individual. So we team together, and I do not supervise the R.A.s directly. I am a vice president at the same time. I might have that conversation with a professional staff member who lives in a residence hall or with an undergraduate student who serves as resident assistant.

There are different options. It could be personal/private where you walk into a room and ask them how they are doing. It could be escorting them right down to the counseling center themselves, because the student trusts them.

Mr. ALTMIRE. What is the level of interaction that the R.A. would have once a decision is made at some point that there really is, maybe, an above-average situation that is taking place here, something out of the norm?

Ms. WALBERT. It would vary depending on the specific circumstances and where the trust levels existed with the resident assistants and the professional staff at that point. It might also vary given the time of day. We had a situation that occurred at noon, and the resident assistant was off at class, and it was all the professional staff who dealt with that particular situation. And we

later got back to the resident assistant about what had transpired and what they could do to help build the community on their floor.

Mr. ALTMIRE. Thank you all for your time.

Lastly, given what happened at Virginia Tech recently, has there been any thought to modifying the training that R.A.'s receive based on that one case, or do you feel like we are moving still in the right direction?

Ms. WALBERT. I do not have the specifics of that particular situation, the response at that moment in time, but I think all of us are very well aware of the focus that those residential students play in our system. They are so valuable to us. We talk to them at the beginning of any given year, we interact with them in a variety of ways, and we recognize them at the end of each year. At the same time, every bit of training that we can give them might make a difference in a critical moment.

Mr. ALTMIRE. Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you very much.

Thank you to the members and to the members of the panel for your very thoughtful discussion this morning.

I know, on behalf of Mr. McKeon and myself, our goal in this hearing is to see how we can be helpful, and I think that many of your comments today were very, very constructive. The one thing I might ask is, now that you have been through this experience and you have made a number of recommendations, I think also the question would be what it is we might do to make campuses safe. I know some of you have worked through Homeland Security; you have worked through the Justice Department; you have worked through the Department of Education.

How is it that we might make that process a little bit simpler for access to those resources and whether or not they are there in a fashion to be—I mean, you have painted a pretty comprehensive picture here of the kinds of resources that you have to assemble on a campus to really deal with this problem, whether it is an earthquake or it is a shooter incident or everything in between, and sometimes we do not necessarily align resources with that comprehensive responsibility that campuses have, even of K through 12.

We obviously look forward to Governor Kaine's report from the commission there, and we will be pulling this together to see how it is that we might be helpful. But if you have some suggestions along those lines, I think that would be helpful, because you work with these programs from the other end. We know they are a great idea when they leave this committee. Now, sometimes they get screwed up out there. So that would be helpful if you could call upon that experience and relay that to the committee. I would appreciate it. Thank you very much.

With that, the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

