[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE STATUS REPORT ON THE
NPOESS WEATHER SATELLITE
PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 7, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-36
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania TOM FEENEY, Florida
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana VACANCY
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment
HON. NICK LAMPSON, Texas, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
MARK UDALL, Colorado MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
BART GORDON, Tennessee, ex officio RALPH M. HALL, Texas, ex officio
JEAN FRUCI Democratic Staff Director
JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member
SHIMERE WILLIAMS Democratic Professional Staff Member
AMY CARROLL Republican Professional Staff Member
STACEY STEEP Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
June 7, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Nick Lampson, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 10
Written Statement............................................ 12
Statement by Representative Bob Inglis, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Prepared Statement by Representative Mark Udall, Member,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 14
Witnesses:
Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 17
Biography.................................................... 20
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 20
Written Statement............................................ 22
Biography.................................................... 35
Brigadier General Susan K. Mashiko, Program Executive Officer for
Environmental Satellites, United States Air Force
Oral Statement............................................... 35
Written Statement............................................ 37
Biography.................................................... 40
Discussion
Restoring Orphan Sensors....................................... 41
Risk of Cost Overruns.......................................... 43
Avoiding Cost Overruns for Future Programs..................... 44
Data Gap Concerns.............................................. 45
Interagency Collaboration: Drawbacks........................... 46
More on Restoring Orphan Sensors............................... 47
More on Data Gaps.............................................. 49
Impact on the Earth-observation Program........................ 50
Project Management............................................. 52
International Collaboration.................................... 53
QuikSCAT....................................................... 53
General Mashiko's Departure.................................... 55
Program Status................................................. 56
More on General Mashiko's Departure............................ 57
Technology Transfer............................................ 58
More on Data Gap Concerns...................................... 59
Appendix: Additional Material for the Record
Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks
Remain, U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2007...... 64
THE STATUS REPORT ON THE NPOESS WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM
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THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nick
Lampson [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The Status Report on the
NPOESS Weather Satellite
Program
thursday, june 7, 2007
1:00 p.m.-3:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
The Subcommittee on Energy and Environment meets on June 7, 2007,
to continue oversight on the unsettled National Polar-Orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) will release the latest report on this
critical weather monitoring platform requested by the Subcommittee, and
the Program Executive Officer for NPOESS will respond to the findings
and recommendations. Additionally, the Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) will respond to questions about
the status of sensors for tracking climate and so-called ``space
weather'' phenomena that were removed during the recent program
restructuring.
Witnesses
Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues,
Government Accountability Office: Mr. Powner is the head of the GAO
team continuously monitoring the NPOESS program since 2001. He will
present their latest report that discusses the effort to strengthen the
management of the NPOESS program and evaluates the realistic cost
estimate for the revised program. The report also examines the
continuing risks that challenge the execution of the program.
Brigadier General Sue Mashiko, USAF; Program Executive Officer for
Environmental Monitoring: General Mashiko has been in the post of
Program Executive Officer for the NPOESS program since November 2005.
The position was established in the wake of the program's restructuring
to evaluate the performance of the Integrated Program Office (IPO)
handling the system acquisition and to serve as the arbiter for
awarding performance incentives to Northrop Grumman, the program's
contractor. General Mashiko also took on the responsibility for
external relations with the Executive Committee comprising the heads of
the three agencies (NOAA, the Air Force and NASA) contributing to the
program.
Hon. John Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and Technology
Policy: OSTP has been managing reviews by NASA and NOAA of the sensors
removed from NPOESS to identify other ways to fly the instruments and
maintain the data sets. Dr. Marburger will discuss the process involved
in these reviews, the results to date, and how these reviews will
determine the alternative plan for preserving climate and space weather
observations.
Background
A Short History of NPOESS
For decades, the United States has maintained satellites in orbit,
looking down at Earth and gathering information that allows us to track
and forecast weather. These satellites operated in both geostationary
orbit (where they move fast enough to keep pace with Earth's rotation,
thus staying in the same place above the equator and seeing an entire
hemisphere at once) and in polar orbits (allowing them to pass over all
points on Earth as the planet rotated underneath). Both the Air Force
and NOAA were operating polar satellites to satisfy their diverse user
needs. In 1993, the decision was made to combine both programs into a
single system, and thus the National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) was born.
In 2000, the NPOESS program anticipated purchasing six satellites
for $6.5 billion, with a first launch in 2008. Following financial
problems, a new program baseline was issued in 2004, which raised the
expected acquisition cost to $7.4 billion. By November 2005, the
program office determined that it was likely that NPOESS would run over
that estimate by at least 25 percent, which triggered the Nunn-McCurdy
review by the Department of Defense. In order to continue the program,
it was necessary to report to Congress that:
The program is essential to national security;
No alternative program provides the same or improved
military capability at lower cost;
The new cost estimates are reasonable; and
The program's management is adequate to manage and
control costs.
The NPOESS Program was recertified on June 5, 2006, but there were
some significant changes. The estimate for acquisition cost rose to
$11.5 billion (and, as GAO notes in its report, there is an additional
$1 billion to cover operating costs, making the total life cycle cost
$12.5 billion). Only four satellites will be built, with the first
launch now scheduled for 2013. A major sensor, the Conical Microwave
Imaging Sounder (CMIS), was removed because it seemed unlikely that the
technical issues in its design and construction could be overcome. A
new competition is to be conducted for an instrument whose capabilities
will fall much closer to existing technology. The U.S. would fly
satellites in only two, not three, polar orbits; data from the third
orbit would now be the responsibility of European satellites.
The other major decision was to remove several sensors. Some would
focus on the study of Earth's climate. Others monitor phenomena
generated by the Sun that affect the Earth's magnetic field and can
play havoc with power lines, airline flights over the polar regions and
satellites. Scientists studying climate were particularly concerned.
Detecting the small changes in the ocean and atmosphere that signal
climate changes is critically dependent on data collections that cover
decades in time. Without the climate sensors on NPOESS, some of the
most basic climate data would no longer be available. This has been the
focus of articles that appeared in the last day regarding the NPOESS
program and the loss of climate sensors from the satellites.
Central to the persistent problems in the NPOESS programs are the
major sensors and the program's management. The cancellation of CMIS
came about because the weight and size kept growing as the Boeing
instrument team struggled to meet Army requirements for determining
soil moisture. Even worse was the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer
Suite (VIIRS), where sub-component deliveries were behind schedule,
testing of various items was harder and took longer than expected,
ground support equipment was not working properly, and independent
reviews of Raytheon management resulted in removal of the entire
instrument management team. VIIRS is the primary instrument on NPOESS;
it will contribute data to more of the expected products than any other
sensor. The Integrated Program Office, lacking sufficient reserves,
attempted to deal with the problems by redeploying resources from the
other instrument contracts, upsetting their performance. Last year, the
Cross-Track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) suffered a broken frame during its
vibration testing. The program has since been checking the various
pieces of the test instrument to learn if they can still be used.
NPOESS managers believe that the second frame can be substituted for
the first, minimizing disruption to the program.
The Committee's hearing in November 2005 on the NPOESS program
examined the poor performance of NPOESS management levels. This
extended all the way from subcontractors (as noted in the case of
VIIRS) to the Executive Committee (EXCOM), which comprises senior
leaders of the three agencies involved in the program. Members
questioned why the EXCOM failed to meet as the NPOESS program spiraled
further into crisis. Repeated analysis of alternatives often
substituted for decisions. By August 2005, the head of NOAA declared he
had no confidence in the information being reported by the Integrated
Program Office. Part of the program change instituted by the Nunn-
McCurdy process was the redesign of the management structure. General
Mashiko became responsible for seeking direction from the EXCOM and
assuring that those decisions were executed by the IPO. The IPO also
began hiring the technical and managerial talent needed to fill the
many gaps that left it unaware of problems or unable to respond to
them. The EXCOM has been holding quarterly meetings on the program. For
the moment, at least, turmoil in the management suites is not a primary
contributor to risk in the NPOESS program.
Climate Change Science and the White Paper on De-manifested Sensors
NPOESS satellites, as originally designed, were to do more than
support weather forecasting needs for NOAA and the military services.
Sensors were also included to expand the type of climate data being
collected by NASA's Earth Observing System satellites, and to provide
insight into the effects on Earth's environment from solar activity.
These sensors were removed in the Nunn-McCurdy process. The loss of
these sensors was met with dismay among the affected user communities.
The National Research Council, which was completing its first Earth
science decadal survey, recommended immediate efforts to restore some
of the sensors to NPOESS. On June 26, 2006, OSTP met with NASA and NOAA
to discuss a response. NASA agreed to develop an analysis of the
consequences of the removal of climate sensors.
NASA issued its first draft on August 15, 2006. NOAA added its
contributions in drafts that were completed in December 2006. The final
version of the white paper was delivered to OSTP on January 8, 2007.
In the paper, NASA and NOAA conclude that, ``Unfortunately, the
recent loss of climate sensors due to the NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy
Certification places the overall climate program in serious jeopardy.''
In the August 15 draft, NASA devised a set of recommended actions for
the canceled sensors. The main difference between the first draft and
final version was the development of a priority listing.
The white paper lists its first priorities as the Total Solar
Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) and the Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (ERBS).
Together, these sensors track the amount of energy the Sun imparts to
the Earth, and how much of that energy the Earth reflects from its
surface, clouds and what is not absorbed by greenhouse gases. The
difference between the values reported by these two sensors is a
critical starting point for evaluating climate effects. TSIS data
extends back over 28 years, and any loss would disrupt our
understanding of the ``dominant, direct energy input into terrestrial
ecosystems.''
NASA will fly part of the TSIS instrument on its Glory mission,
currently scheduled to launch in December 2008. It will be a three-year
mission, with hopes of two more beyond that. The white paper recommends
three TSIS sensors, with the first to be launched on any available and
suitable vehicle in time to overlap with the Glory mission. For ERBS,
the possibility of a data gap between the end of the current Aqua
mission and the launch of the first NPOESS mission leads to a
recommendation that the last Clouds and Earth's Radiant Energy System
(CERES) sensor be flown on NPP, rather than wait for NPOESS. ERBS would
then be flown aboard the first and third NPOESS missions. The Decadal
Survey agreed that these sensors ``should be restored on NPOESS or
provided by other means to avoid a measurement gap in the timeframe
2008 to 2012.''
Fourth in the white paper priority list was the limb-scattering
component of the Ozone Monitoring and Profiling Suite (OMPS-Limb). The
decision to remove this particular sensor came at a point where the
hardware had been completed and would have required a significant
effort to decouple from the other part of the instrument. Since the
cost of completing the instrument was not that much different from
removing it, the NPOESS program decided that a full OMPS should be
flown on NPP as originally planned. It remains uncertain if the full
OMPS sensor will fly on NPOESS missions.
Of concern as this analytical process unfolds is its tenuous
integration with the NPOESS program and the possibility that it will be
overtaken by events. This first came to the Committee's attention in
March when the instrument contractor indicated that if the OMPS-Limb
sensor was to be flown on NPP, a decision had to be made by the end of
that month to preserve the September 2009 launch date. Senior Members
of the Committee wrote to Dr. Marburger, NASA Administrator Michael
Griffin, and NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher to take advantage
of the opportunity.
Testifying before the Committee a year ago, Admiral Lautenbacher
stated:
We specifically decided that the NPOESS spacecraft will be
built with the capacity to house all of the [de-manifested]
sensors, and includes funding to integrate them on the
spacecraft. The decision was made because the EXCOM agreed that
any additional funding gain through contract renegotiation or
in unutilized management reserve would be considered to procure
these secondary sensors, in addition to other organizations
bringing money for these sensors to the table.
Indeed, the white paper recommends taking advantage of this
capability. Yet the drafters of the analysis indicated in a briefing to
staff on May 17 that they learned the NPOESS program office would not
accept any additions to the sensor complement on the first NPOESS
satellite. Indeed, according to a briefing chart for the March 2, 2007
EXCOM meeting, the ``Lock-Down Dates for integration of De-manifested
Sensors'' on the first satellite was already past. Yet the white paper
was delivered still recommending efforts to fly some sensors on the
2013 launch.
The EXCOM briefing chart states that ``C-1 requires significant
additional development, integration and test time for sensors and
spacecraft,'' and General Mashiko indicates that the NPOESS program
made the decision to freeze the sensor complement to reduce risk of
disruption. Yet these sensors were originally manifested aboard the
satellite, and as Admiral Lautenbacher testified, the program was
directed to maintain space and funding to accommodate them. The
interfaces between sensors and satellite are already included in the
requirements and specifications. While space on the first launch is not
an issue for TSIS, it was an option for ERBS, OMPS-Limb and the
Advanced Polarimetry Sensor. Is it indeed the case that there are no
chances to fill up some of those available slots aboard the first
NPOESS satellite?
In contrast to the decision to restrict further changes to the
first NPOESS satellite, the decision to add CERES to NPP is still open.
Now just two years from launch, making yet another change to the
complement of instruments raises the risk calculations. Arguing in
favor of the change is that it would reduce the threat of data loss,
and that the contractor is willing to offer a fixed-price proposal to
do the job. The government rarely receives such offers unless the
bidder is truly confident that the task is completely understood.
Of more immediate concern for TSIS is the possible loss of the
contractor's staff before the OSTP process reaches a conclusion on the
sensor. With the decision to terminate TSIS, the University of
Colorado's Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (LASP) has been
dealing with the possibility that the employees on the project would
disperse. LASP has proposed a follow-on mission that would update the
technology now flying on the SOlar Radiation and Climate Experiment
(SORCE) spacecraft with TSIS. This would bridge the gap between Glory
and another TSIS that would be placed aboard the second NPOESS
satellite in 2016. This would be consistent with the white paper's
recommendation, but hard to execute if the sensor's builders have gone
on to new jobs.
A similar situation may exist in the sensor for monitoring the
effects from solar flares and coronal mass ejections--so-called ``space
weather'' phenomena. Power companies, airlines and satellite operators
have all discovered in recent decades that the energetic particles and
plasmas can disrupt critical infrastructures or increase their costs.
NOAA's ability to provide early warning of these events, particularly
as the Sun enters the more active phases of its 11-year cycle, has been
improving in tandem with higher-capability sensors.
NPOESS was slated to carry the Space Environment Sensor Suite
(SESS), a combination of five types of instruments that collected data
on different aspects of the particles and fields involved in space
weather. As a result of the Nunn-McCurdy decision, these were replaced
with the Space Environment Monitor (SEM) instrument now aboard existing
satellites. One of these instruments is the Thermal Plasma Sensor
(TPS). It was designed to provide data on the geomagnetic and electric
fields and plasma temperatures and fluctuations during solar events.
With such information, the Air Force could quickly evaluate the loss of
function in their satellites to determine if it was the result of a
natural event or some adversary's action. In times of crisis, this
would be an extremely time-critical analysis. Massive events in October
and November of 2003 and again in December 2006 affected oil drilling
in the Gulf of Mexico as the GPS signals that precisely locate drilling
platforms above the tangle of sea floor pipelines were lost for up to
fifteen minutes.
The United States has only one manufacturer for TPS sensors, a
university group at the University of Texas at Dallas (UTD). The
university anticipates that the group will disband as there is no other
existing requirement for these detectors. Some of the UTD groups are
expected to retire and the lack of interesting projects is likely to
cause the remainder of the team to seek other opportunities. The SEM
package will not meet the requirements assigned to the TPS sensor, and
yet we may lose the capability to obtain such instruments in the next
few months. OSTP only initiated the effort to conduct an analysis of
the Nunn-McCurdy impact on the space environment sensors in February,
and there is nothing similar to the climate sensor white paper yet
available.
In its original white paper draft last August, NASA stated, ``The
budgets and schedules associated with these recommendations will be
incorporated in a subsequent draft of this white paper to be available
in approximately one month.'' Staff was told in the May 17 meeting that
the authors ``were a bit optimistic'' about their ability to provide
such information. A month after the white paper was delivered, OSTP
asked the agencies to begin a second study that would incorporate
budget requirements and alternatives to replacing the sensors on the
NPOESS satellites. The National Research Council was asked to convene
an additional panel to provide assistance. However, the agencies are
not anticipating a final report to OSTP before September, and that may
only include interim information from the Research Council. While
Office of Management and Budget representatives are attending OSTP's
meetings to obtain updates on the analysis, there does not seem to be
any discussion about required budget actions.
Members of the Decadal Survey recommended that ``OSTP. . .should
develop and implement a plan for achieving and sustaining global Earth
observations.'' This experience raises the possibility that OSTP may
not be ready to take on that more ambitious task.
GAO's New Report
The Committee first asked the Government Accountability Office to
evaluate the NPOESS program in 2002, when concerns about NOAA's ability
to handle the data volume expected from the satellites was at issue. In
2004, it reported that costs had jumped by $1 billion and that launch
dates for the various satellites were slipping. In November 2005, Mr.
Powner stated that cost and schedule trends were continuing to
deteriorate and called NPOESS ``a program in crisis.'' In this report,
GAO focuses on the state of the NPOESS program as it starts to carry
out the decisions made by the Nunn-McCurdy process.
GAO notes that the program managers have succeeded in imposing
greater discipline on the program. The program managed to achieve 156
of 166 milestones in the interim program plan for fiscal year 2006, and
has since addressed five of the residual items. Through January of
2007, the program had reached 62 of the 222 milestones planned for
fiscal year 2007--two more than planned. In a briefing to staff, Mr.
Powner stated that the IPO maintains that NPP will meet its 2009 launch
date and that the program cost estimate remains $12.5 billion. He said,
though, that NPP will launch ``as-is'' (with instrument performance at
whatever level can be achieved by launch day) and that there are still
cost pressures that may push the estimate above $12.5 billion.
a. Acquisition planning documents
In April, when it delivered its report, GAO noted that major
documents necessary for the development of program plans and
renegotiation of the contract with lead contractor Northrop Grumman are
still awaiting approval. These included:
the reworked Memorandum of Agreement defining roles
and responsibilities for NOAA, the Air Force and NASA;
the system engineering plan;
the test and evaluation master plan; and
the acquisition strategy.
According to the decision memorandum that resulted from the Nunn-
McCurdy process, the Memorandum of Agreement should have been completed
August 6, 2006 and the other documents by September 1, 2006. These
documents define the relationships between the Integrated Program
Office and the agencies and lay out the predicted levels of resources
in terms of time, money and effort that will be required to complete
the NPOESS program in the wake of the Nunn-McCurdy recertification. The
information in these documents will govern the budget requests for
NPOESS from NOAA, the Air Force and NASA for years to come. That it has
taken a year to complete these items, even though they should be little
more than recording the hard choices already taken in the Nunn-McCurdy
process, indicates that interagency coordination still serves to weigh
down the program.
GAO recommended in the report that the agencies have the approvals
completed by April 30. Yet in meetings with the Committee staff May 23
and 25, both GAO and General Mashiko indicated these documents still
awaited signature. The agency comments included in the report indicate
that the Department of Defense's process for approving the interagency
Memorandum of Agreement appears to be the major roadblock, as NOAA and
NASA could not complete approvals until there was a final consensus on
the text to be approved.
From General Mashiko's perspective, some documents are more
important than others. She emphasized that the program office
prioritized development and completion of the integrated master
schedule and the integrated master plan. These, she said, were the
prime tools for the program office's day-to-day activities and are the
primary tools for the government's control of contractor activities.
These documents are now developed to a point well beyond what the
government previously had available and, according to Colonel David
Stockton (the NPOESS Program Director), give him greater ability to
measure actual performance by Northrop Grumman and the instrument
manufacturers. These two documents should be in final form before
completion of the contract renegotiation, because changes after that
point will result in contract modifications. Such modifications rarely
result in lower costs to the government.
b. Program Office management and staffing
GAO next moved to a discussion of program leadership and program
office staffing. In July, General Mashiko will be transferred by the
Air Force to the MILSATCOM program. GAO recommends that the Air Force
delay the transfer until July 2008, when all of the instruments
scheduled to fly on the NPP mission have been delivered. Before that
point, GAO considers the increase in risk from management disruption
``unnecessary.'' That recommendation has been rejected by DOD.
General Mashiko stated to staff that change in her position is less
significant to progress in NPOESS than would be the case if the System
Program Director, Colonel Dan Stockton, was to depart. The EXCOM met
May 21 to discuss the transition. According to the comments in the
report, NOAA was expecting to supply the next Program Executive
Officer; apparently the deadline in the position announcement had to be
extended two weeks to attract candidates. General Mashiko indicated
eight are now being considered. The Air Force will supply a deputy. The
intent is to select the replacement quickly to allow as much time as
possible to hand over responsibilities and to allow the new Executive
Officer to participate in decision-making.
GAO argues in its report that management turnover is a contributing
factor to the problems that have disrupted many other Air Force space
system procurements. They believe senior managers should serve until
completion of development or actual delivery of their product, not
simply an arbitrary period of time. The former Chairman and CEO of the
Lockheed Martin Corporation, Norm Augustine, wrote in his book
Augustine's Laws about the problems that come from ``. . .attempting to
develop major new systems with ten-year technology, eight-year
programs, a five-year plan, three-year people, and one-year dollars.''
GAO has lost the argument on this recommendation, but this now becomes
another issue that the Committee will have to watch carefully as the
new leadership takes over.
GAO also recommended that NOAA needed to develop plans for
identifying the staffing needs in the NPOESS program office and to
initiate steps to fill vacant critical slots. The lack of systems
engineering personnel and budget and cost analysts in the Program
Office has been a consistent concern of independent reviewers. As of
April, GAO found that five budget analyst positions and 15 system
engineering or technical manager positions remained unfilled; 16 were
to be provided by NOAA. That these positions remained open a year after
the Nunn-McCurdy decision directive ordered expedited actions to fill
vacant positions led GAO to express concern about the government's
ability to develop an updated cost estimate for renegotiating the
contract with Northrop Grumman or to handle management tasks.
General Mashiko stated in her staff interview that staffing actions
had accelerated with the hiring of a personnel specialist with the
ability to assist division managers in identifying staffing needs. The
Program Office also received assistance from the human resource offices
at the three agencies to find candidates with particular skills and see
them assigned to NPOESS positions. General Mashiko indicated that there
are now only six of NOAA's 16 slots still open, and those were in
various stages of recruitment. Some positions had to be re-advertised
to identify candidates with appropriate skills. That NPOESS is
competing with every other R&D agency in the government for these skill
sets also slowed the process.
c. Continuing concerns
As noted earlier, the sensors for NPOESS remain the major concern
in successfully executing both the early NPP mission and the
operational NPOESS program. The VIIRS instrument was the subject of
extensive discussion at the EXCOM meeting of March 2, 2007. This so-
called ``Gate 8'' decision required the instrument team to demonstrate
that it had addressed design issues and that the instrument would
perform as expected. According to the briefing slides, assuming that
the flight unit performed as well as the current engineering
development unit, the data would meet or exceed what is now provided by
existing satellites. However, there was one issue--``optical
crosstalk''--that remained open. It threatened to reduce ocean color
measurements below the lower limit of the specification. If NOAA
decided to buy a new filter from a different manufacturer, it might
slip the delivery schedule. The EXCOM decided to accept the
recommendation to continue forward with VIIRS development while
continuing to seek a solution to the crosstalk issue. General Mashiko
indicated to the staff that VIIRS delivery for the NPP mission is still
scheduled for late May next year, and there remains three months of
margin in that schedule.
The Failure Review Board for the CrIS flight unit vibration test
mishap believes an incorrect structural analysis of the instrument
frame led to an overestimate of the frame's strength. The subassemblies
are being tested to see if they suffered damage; particularly the
interferometer, which is the primary sensor element. The IPO has
already begun to build a second interferometer to minimize disruption
if the first is unusable. The frame for the second flight unit will be
used in the first instrument (the fixes defined by the failure analysis
``will not be pretty'' but they will work, according to Col. Stockton).
The government technical team independently analyzed and approved the
frame changes. Delivery of this unit slipped from December 2007 to
February 2008; three months of margin still remains.
Loss of the CMIS sensor affected two important data items. CMIS was
the prime contributor to the measurement of soil moisture, critical to
the Army as it determines whether heavy equipment can operate in a
particular region. Requirements for collecting data on ocean winds were
also to be met with CMIS data, which factors into recent concerns about
the possible loss of the QUIKScat scatterometer and the resulting
impact on hurricane forecasting. In the Nunn-McCurdy decision
memorandum, the NPOESS program was directed to initiate a new microwave
imaging sounder that would provide an instrument at least as capable as
current technology in time to fly on the second NPOESS satellite in
2016. General Mashiko stated that the specifications for this new
sensor have been developed, and that the program office is consulting
the user community. The Program Office hopes to have a recommendation
for Mashiko's replacement as Executive Officer in September in order to
obtain EXCOM approval by January 2008.
GAO notes in its report that during 2006 spending for NPOESS space
items exceeded the cost target by $17 million (a four percent overrun
of the planned budget for the year). Further, the contractor could not
complete $14.6 million planned during the year. The problems with the
VIIRS and CrIS instruments were the major factors. These negative
trends are likely to persist as the testing programs on the instruments
progress. GAO states that these issues may affect the life-cycle cost
estimate.
There may also be impacts on the cost estimate from the contract
modification negotiations now underway. Schedule milestones will be the
primary criteria in award fee determinations, and the award fees will
be small. Northrop Grumman delivered its proposals for the contract
modification May 7. General Mashiko intends to have the new contract
signed before she leaves.
GAO concludes that ``restructuring is well under way, and the
program has made progress in establishing an effective management
structure.'' There has not been enough progress to show that the key
technical risks which have bedeviled the program are being reduced,
however. VIIRS flight hardware has yet to be built, and CrIS flight
hardware suffered an unexpected failure in early testing. General
Mashiko will not dispute that assessment but argues that the steps
taken by the new program management give greater confidence that we
have an accurate understanding of the risks and a realistic plan to
deal with them. GAO has already accepted a request from the Committee
to continue its independent evaluation as execution of the restructured
program advances.
Chairman Lampson. This hearing will come to order, and I
want to wish all of you a good afternoon. Welcome to this
hearing on the National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System, NPOESS. These satellites are
the next generation of observational platforms that will allow
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the
Department of Defense to provide weather forecasting services.
It is not too much to say that the United States cannot get
along without them.
And this is not the first hearing the Committee has held on
NPOESS, and I am confident in saying that it won't be the last.
This has been an area of strong bipartisan concern for several
years. When I left Congress in January of '05 (not by choice)
this committee was already concerned about performance trends
in the NPOESS program. The Government Accountability Office had
reported to this subcommittee in September, '04\1\, that a
significant increase in the cost estimate had occurred, there
were technical problems with the instruments, and there was
strong evidence that there would be a half-billion-dollar cost
overrun at the end of the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program
Cost and Schedule Changes, Government Accountability Office Report GAO-
04-1054; September 30, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just over a year later, Mr. Powner has testified in a
hearing here that cost and schedule trends had worsened and
said that the program was in crisis.\2\ Soon after that
testimony, Congress received notification that there was good
cause to believe NPOESS would exceed its acquisition baseline
cost by more than 25 percent--by more than the 25 percent
needed to trigger a re-certification of the program under the
Nunn-McCurdy provisions of federal procurement law.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science. Ongoing
Problems and Future Plans for NOAA's Weather Satellites. Hearing before
the Committee on Science. Serial No. 109-33; November 16, 2005.
\3\ 10 U.S.C. 2433, et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today's hearing marks the first time for the Committee to
get a sense of how the post-Nunn-McCurdy NPOESS program is
faring. Nunn-McCurdy decisions at the Department of Defense
have established a track record of more expensive acquisitions
for fewer satellites. Perhaps most critically, the re-certified
program now lacks most of the climate sensors that were to fly
on NPOESS and were to form the heart of our instrumentation to
provide data for tracking global warming.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy started an
effort to deal with the climate sensors lost for NPOESS almost
immediately after the announcement of the Nunn-McCurdy
decision. Dr. John Marburger is joining us today to explain
that process.
My concern is that the effort headed by OSTP, with
analytical support from NASA and NOAA, is lagging the pace
needed to make effective decisions. The directions to the
agencies are to look at all options for every data need rather
than a direction to identify money that could be used to fund
the planned instruments that had been de-manifested. You can
study that problem and all possible options for as long as you
want, but at some point the manifests for what will fly on the
NPOESS satellites have to be finalized, and so decisions are
not just due. I believe they are overdue.
I think that without decisive action and leadership, we
will lose continuity in the multi-decadal data sets that are
sensitive--that are central to our understanding of global
warming. In fact, some breaches in data collection may be
unavoidable at this point. There was time, just time to add
money into the 2008 budget request if the interagency exercise
had been pushed harder last summer. Now, one year later, the
problem is still under study, and it may be that answers won't
come before the 2009 budget is finalized.
As to money, I think that NASA and NOAA may not be able to
do what needs to be done without direct intervention from the
White House to give them the added resources necessary to fund
those instruments. The President just delivered another major
address on climate change. Perhaps one step he could take
towards showing other nations that this proposal is a serious
one would be to identify funds to find and to fly the climate
sensors.
We will also hear today from David Powner of GAO. Mr.
Powner is a frequent witness before this committee. His
testimony today is less dramatic than at some other times,
prior appearances. At this moment in time the NPOESS program
does not appear to be losing further ground.
According to GAO's report, the ground systems for NPOESS
data handling are now running under their budget, and they have
achieved more than they had planned to accomplish at this
point. Such performances are so rare it may be that particular
project manager deserves the Congressional Gold Medal.
Unfortunately, that performance is overshadowed by the
continuing risks we see with the major instruments destined to
fly on these satellites. Both the VIIRS\4\ and CrIS\5\
instruments still show significant engineering challenges.
There is little doubt that the challenges can be overcome, but
the risk attaches to how much time and money the fixes will
cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ VIIRS: Visible-Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite
\5\ CrIS: Cross-Track Infrared Sounder
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are still a lot of tests for NPOESS to get through,
which means there are many opportunities for unexpected events
to upset the program. So we have asked Mr. Powner to keep up
the good work.
Air Force Brigadier General Susan Mashiko is also with us
today, and in the 20 months that she served as Program
Executive Officer for NPOESS, she has restored a semblance of
order in management structure, to the management structure.
Indeed, the announcement of her imminent rotation to another
posting led GAO to recommend to the Air Force that she not be
spared just yet. I think that the Air Force is going to ignore
that advice, but it may be to the detriment of the program if
solid management is not put into place immediately. NPOESS is
not a program that can be allowed to drift along.
We are a year beyond the Nunn-McCurdy de-manifestation--de-
manifesting of both climate science and space weather
instruments--and yet no decisions have been made on how to
proceed.
We are a year beyond Nunn-McCurdy with the same instruments
causing us the same concerns about risk.
General Mashiko is a month away from her transfer and no
replacement has been named.
I think progress has been made in managing the downsized
NPOESS program that the Department of Defense brought us, but
not enough progress to reduce our concerns about the future for
this satellite program or to satisfy our need to see our
climate science efforts fully supported.
I want to thank all for you for coming, and I will now
recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Inglis, for his opening
remarks.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Lampson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Nick Lampson
Good afternoon, welcome to this hearing on the National Polar-
Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). These
satellites are the next generation of observational platforms that will
allow the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the
Department of Defense to provide weather forecasting services. It is
not too much to say that the United States cannot get along without
them.
This is not the first hearing the Committee has held on NPOESS and
I am confident in saying it will not be the last. This has been an area
of strong bipartisan concern for several years.
When I left Congress in January of 2005--not by choice, of course--
this committee was already concerned about performance trends in the
NPOESS program.
The Government Accountability Office had reported to this
subcommittee in September 2004 that a significant increase in the cost
estimate had occurred, there were technical problems with the
instruments and there was strong evidence that there would be a half-
billion-dollar cost overrun at the end of the program.
Just over a year later, Mr. Powner testified in a hearing here that
cost and schedule trends had worsened and said the program was in
crisis.
Soon after that testimony, Congress received notification that
there was good cause to believe NPOESS would exceed its acquisition
baseline cost by more than the 25 percent needed to trigger a
recertification of the program under the Nunn-McCurdy provisions in
federal procurement law.
Today's hearing marks the first time for the Committee to get a
sense of how the post-Nunn-McCurdy NPOESS program is faring. Nunn-
McCurdy decisions at the Department of Defense have established a track
record of more expensive acquisitions for fewer satellites.
Perhaps most critically, the recertified program now lacks most of
the climate sensors that were to fly on NPOESS and were to form the
heart of our instrumentation to provide data for tracking global
warming.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy started an effort to
deal with the climate sensors lost for NPOESS almost immediately after
the announcement of the Nunn-McCurdy decision. Dr. John Marburger is
joining us today to explain that process.
My concern is that the effort headed by OSTP, with analytical
support from NASA and NOAA, is lagging the pace needed to make
effective decisions.
The directions to the agencies are to look at all options for every
data need rather than a direction to identify money that could be used
to fund the planned instruments that had been de-manifested.
You can study that problem and all possible options for as long as
you want, but at some point, the manifests for what will fly on the
NPOESS satellites have to be finalized, and so decisions are not just
due, I believe they are overdue.
I think that without decisive action and leadership, we will lose
continuity in the multi-decadal data sets that are central to our
understanding of global warming. In fact, some breaches in data
collection may be unavoidable at this point.
There was just time to add money into the 2008 budget request if
the interagency exercise had been pushed harder last summer. Now, one
year later, the problem is still under study and it may be that answers
won't come in before the 2009 budget is finalized.
As to money, I think that NASA and NOAA may not be able to do what
needs to be done without direct intervention from the White House to
give them the added resources necessary to fund those instruments.
The President just delivered another major address on climate
change. Perhaps one step he could take towards showing other nations
that this proposal is a serious one would be to identify funds to fly
the climate sensors.
We will also hear today from David Powner of GAO. Mr. Powner is a
frequent witness before the Committee. His testimony today is less
dramatic than at some prior appearances. At this moment in time, the
NPOESS program does not appear to be losing further ground.
According to GAO's report, the ground systems for NPOESS data
handling are now running under their budget and they have achieved more
than they had planned to accomplish at this point.
Such performances are so rare it may be that particular project
manager deserves the Congressional Gold Medal.
Unfortunately, that performance is overshadowed by the continuing
risks we see with the major instruments destined to fly on these
satellites.
Both the VIIRS and CrIS instruments still show significant
engineering challenges. There is little doubt that the challenges can
be overcome, but the risk attaches to how much time and money the fixes
will cost.
There are still a lot of tests for NPOESS to get through, which
means there are many opportunities for unexpected events to upset the
program. So we have asked Mr. Powner to keep up the good work.
Air Force Brigadier General Susan Mashiko is also with us today. In
the 20 months she has served as Program Executive Officer for NPOESS,
she has restored a semblance of order to the management structure.
Indeed, the announcement of her imminent rotation to another posting
led GAO to recommend to the Air Force that she could not be spared just
yet.
I think the Air Force is going to ignore that advice, but it may be
to the detriment of the program if solid management is not put in place
immediately. NPOESS is not a program that can be allowed to drift
along.
We are a year beyond the Nunn-McCurdy de-manifesting of both
climate science and space weather instruments and yet no decisions have
been made on how to proceed.
We are a year beyond Nunn-McCurdy with the same instruments causing
us some of the same concerns about risk.
General Mashiko is a month away from her transfer and no
replacement has been named.
I think progress has been made in managing the downsized NPOESS
program that the Department of Defense brought us, but not enough
progress to reduce our concerns about the future for this satellite
program or to satisfy our need to see our climate science efforts fully
supported.
Mr. Inglis. Good afternoon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman for
holding this hearing about the National Polar-Orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System, NPOESS. This
hearing continues close oversight of this vital weather
satellite program, oversight that started under the Republican
leadership of this committee.
Under the Republican leadership in the last Congress, this
committee held three high-profile hearings about NPOESS. In
looking over the testimony for today's hearing, it appears to
me that close oversight has paid off. For the most part, the
program is on track under the new plan announced in June of
2006.
Of course, risks remain for a satellite known as ``the most
complex environmental satellite system ever developed,'' but
the government has plans in place to address most of the risks
identified by GAO. Also, the government is actively examining
the options to provide environmental data that we had expected
from NPOESS but under the new plan we will not receive.
But simply because things appear under control right now, I
don't want to imply that Congress, or the Administration for
that matter, can back off from our close oversight of NPOESS.
In fact, I believe just the opposite. Lack of oversight of the
management of NPOESS, the contractor, and the many technical
problems facing NPOESS all led to the June 2006, Nunn-McCurdy
certification in the first place.
Those of us responsible for this program--Congress, NOAA,
the Air Force, and NASA--cannot sit back and relax or we will
risk yet another four-year delay or doubling of costs. NPOESS
today is a $12.5 billion program. That is a lot of taxpayer
money. We expect that investment to provide a series of weather
satellites that are launched on time and provide data to inform
everything from decisions about our military troop operations
to forecasting the path of hurricanes.
Also, I expect that the interagency report on avoiding gaps
in other environmental data be completed as soon as reasonably
possible. The longer we wait to make a final decision on this,
the greater risk we face of having a gap in data important for
understanding global climate change and for seasonal forecasts
of events like El Nino.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and
yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inglis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bob Inglis
Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Lampson, for holding this
hearing about the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System, NPOESS. This hearing continues close oversight of
this vital weather satellite program, oversight that started under
Republican leadership of this committee.
Under Republican leadership in the last Congress, this committee
held three high-profile hearings about NPOESS. In looking over the
testimony for today's hearing, it appears to me that close oversight
has paid off. For the most part, the program is on track under the new
plan announced in June 2006.
Of course, risks remain for a satellite known as ``the most complex
environmental satellite system ever developed.'' But, the government
has plans in place to address most of the risks identified by GAO.
Also, the government is actively examining options to provide
environmental data that we had expected from NPOESS but under the new
plan we will not receive.
But, simply because things appear under control right now, I do not
want to imply that the Congress, or the Administration for that matter,
can back off from our close oversight of NPOESS. In fact, I believe
just the opposite. Lack of oversight of the management of NPOESS, the
contractor, and the many technical problems facing NPOESS all led to
the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy certification in the first place.
Those of us responsible for this program, Congress, NOAA, the Air
Force, and NASA, cannot sit back and relax or we risk yet another four-
year delay or doubling of costs. NPOESS today is a $12.5 billion
program. That is a lot of taxpayer money. We expect that investment to
provide a series of weather satellites that are launched on time and
provide data to inform everything from decisions about our military
troop operations to forecasting the path of hurricanes.
Also, I expect that the interagency report on avoiding gaps in
other environmental data be completed as soon as reasonably possible.
The longer we wait to make a final decision on this, the greater risk
we face of having a gap in data important for understanding global
climate change and for seasonal forecasts of events like El Nino.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and yield back
the balance of my time.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Inglis. I ask unanimous
consent that all additional opening statements submitted by the
Committee Members be included in the record. Without objection
so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Udall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Mark Udall
Mr. Chairman, I'm very concerned about the status of the entire
NPOESS program, not only because of the critically important climate
data that may be lost if a home is not found for the de-manifested
instruments, but also because the de-manifesting of those instruments
is having a great impact on my district.
On the plus side, I am pleased that NASA and NOAA have worked
together to find the funding needed to bring back the OMPS Limb sensor
for the NPP spacecraft. OMPS Limb, which is being built by Ball
Aerospace in Boulder, will provide measurements of ozone in our
atmosphere.
However, it is clear that other instruments are not faring as well.
I am particularly concerned about the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor
(TSIS) and the Space Environment Sensor Suite (SESS).
TSIS will provide essential data on the impact that the sun has on
our atmosphere and climate--and it is the number one priority
instrument listed in the recent National Research Council's Decadal
Survey on Earth Science. It was being developed by the University of
Colorado's Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics.
However, with the funding pulled for this instrument for NPOESS,
the researchers and engineers working on this instrument may have to
leave LASP to find other careers, jeopardizing our ability to have this
instrument available to fly when needed.
We need one agency to take responsibility for this critical
instrument and its funding. NASA and NOAA would be the logical agencies
and I hope that a decision is made about a lead agency soon. TSIS has
been abandoned for too long and, unless additional funding is found by
the middle of July, we are going to lose critical human capital.
I am also very concerned about the status of the SESS. The
information that it provides is essential for us to better understand
and predict solar flares and their impact on our economy. These flares
have wide reaching impacts on everything from airplane flights over the
poles to telecommunications across the world. The Space Environment
Center in my district has been key to enabling governments and
businesses prepare for increased solar activity. Yet without SESS, we
will not only curb our advances, but we may also lose the capabilities
that we currently have.
I will continue to closely monitor the status of TSIS and SESS,
along with the rest of NPOESS.
Chairman Lampson. We are very pleased to have this
distinguished panel of witnesses here this afternoon. Dr. John
Marburger, a science advisor to the President and Director of
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, OSTP, in the
Executive Office of the President. Prior to his appointment as
Director of OSTP, Dr. Marburger served as Director of the
Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York and as President of
the State University of New York at Stony Brook. Dr. Marburger
has appeared before our committee many times. Today he is here
to discuss OSTP's efforts to provide continuity in our climate
observing system, and I thank you for being here. Good
afternoon.
Mr. David Powner is the Director of IT Management Issues
for the U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO. Mr. Powner
and his team have been diligently tracking satellite
procurement programs for this committee since 2001. He is here
today to discuss their latest report on the current status of
the NPOESS program. Your team's work has been extremely
valuable to the Members of the Committee. We thank you for your
excellent work and for being here to testify this afternoon.
And finally we have Brigadier General Susan Mashiko.
General Mashiko is the Program Executive Officer for
Environmental Satellites. She oversees the Integrated Program
Office, the tri-agency organization that is in charge of the
development of the new polar satellite system, NPOESS. General
Mashiko has held a variety of positions in the Department of
Defense, including Program Manager for the Atlas V Program,
Chief of the Programs Division in the Office of Special
Projects, and Executive Officer to the DOD Space Architect. She
has been overseeing the NPOESS program since November of 2005,
and we are pleased to have you here this afternoon as well,
General.
You will each have five minutes for your spoken testimony.
Your written testimony may be included in the record for the
hearing. And when all three of you have completed your
testimony, we will begin with questions. Each Member will have
five minutes to question the panel, and we will rotate.
Dr. Marburger, would you please begin?
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN H. MARBURGER, III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
Dr. Marburger. Thank you very much, Chairman Lampson, and
Ranking Member Inglis, and Members of the Committee. I am
pleased to appear today to describe the activities of OSTP and
Executive Branch agencies related to the NPOESS program. My
written testimony discusses the ongoing interagency assessment
of the impacts of de-manifesting several Earth-observing and
space environment sensors from the NPOESS spacecraft during the
2006 restructuring of the program. My written testimony also
discusses some other related systems, and I appreciate it being
included in the record.
The background material in your charter for today's hearing
describes the history of the NPOESS program, and I will not
repeat it here. From the point of view of science impacts, it
is important to understand that in the restructuring process
the agencies gave highest priority to preserving continuity and
operational terrestrial weather forecasting capabilities, which
was the original focus of the program. And as you know the
restructuring decision which was announced on June 5, 2006,
reduced the number of operating NPOESS satellites and orbits
and also removed several Earth-observing and space weather-
related sensors from the baseline program budget.
When my office learned of these decisions, we convened an
interagency meeting later that June, including representatives
from NASA, NOAA, and the NPOESS Integrated Program Office. We
wanted first to gain a better understanding of the projected
capabilities of the revised program; second, to explore the
implications of these changes for climate and ocean research
activities; and third, to obtain agency views and information
on ways to retain the capabilities of sensors removed from the
baseline. Based on discussions in this meeting we asked NASA
and NOAA to provide my office, OSTP, with a joint technical
assessment of the expected science implications of the NPOESS
restructuring decision and options for addressing those impacts
in terms of climate research. NASA/NOAA responded with a white
paper in January of this year.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Impacts of NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy Certification on Joint NASA-NOAA
Climate Goals. Earth Science Division, Science Mission Directorate,
Headquarters, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
Climate Observations and Analysis Program, Climate Program Office,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. January 8, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This initial response included a good analysis of the
potential climate science impacts of the restructuring
decision. It also addressed the projected impacts of
eliminating each sensor and prioritized the de-manifested
sensors in terms of the importance of their measurements.
The options it presented for retaining the capabilities of
the eliminated sensors focused mostly on re-manifesting them
back onto NPOESS.
Because that white paper did not include the full range of
options for retaining climate and ocean research capabilities
and did not make cost estimates that are essential for policy-
making, OSTP asked the agencies for more information on these
issues, and NASA and NOAA are in the process of developing that
information.
Interagency discussions and follow-up questions and
analyses will continue throughout the summer and fall and feed
into the fiscal year 2009 budget process. One important
decision has already been made. The sensor known as OMPS-
Limb\7\ has been restored to fly on NASA's NPOESS Preparatory
Project satellite, the NPP, which is scheduled to launch in
2009. NASA and NOAA will split the cost to re-manifest the
OMPS-Limb instrument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ OMPS: Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to thank this committee for its interest in this
project and its support of the program and related sensor
studies. We face more challenges in addressing these topics,
but we are making progress. We are working closely with
interested agencies in devising the way forward.
And I would be pleased to respond to questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marburger follows:]
Prepared Statement of John H. Marburger, III
Chairman Lampson, Ranking Member Inglis, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to describe OSTP
and interagency activities related to the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) weather satellite
program. As you requested, I will discuss the ongoing interagency
assessment of the impacts of removing or ``de-manifesting'' several
Earth-observing and space environment sensors from the NPOESS
spacecraft during the 2006 restructuring of the program. I will also
describe certain other important climate-related activities of
potential interest to the Committee.
First let me briefly outline the NPOESS program and its history.
The NPOESS effort was established through Presidential Decision
Directive in 1994, with the goal of integrating the polar weather
capabilities developed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Department of Commerce (DOC) into one next-generation program that
would support both civil and military weather requirements. The role of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was to improve
the remote sensing capabilities of the operational system through the
insertion of new technologies. The idea was to have one next-generation
program that would support both civil and military weather requirements
and to align overlapping and complementary capabilities to increase
efficiency and data synergy. As planning evolved, a number of other
Earth-observing and space environment sensors and capabilities were
incorporated into the basic program, making NPOESS (as envisioned at
that time) a key component not only for operational weather
forecasting, but also for research on climate, oceans, and space
weather.
Oversight of the NPOESS program is provided jointly by the three
agencies through an Executive Committee, and funding is divided equally
between DOD and DOC. Within this tri-agency framework, DOD is
responsible for major program acquisitions (conducted through the Air
Force), DOC's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is
responsible for satellite operations, and NASA is responsible for
developing new technologies. Development and other activities within
the program are managed by an integrated program office. These
arrangements for NPOESS are unique within the Federal Government, and
many consider it the most complex environmental satellite system ever
developed.
Previous communications to Congress during hearings and in
Executive Branch correspondence have reported numerous technical,
developmental, and management challenges in the NPOESS program since
its inception, resulting in various cost increases and scheduling
delays. In late 2005, the NPOESS integrated program office determined
that projected cost over-runs for NPOESS would exceed the 25 percent
threshold triggering a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy statute, thus
requiring the Secretary of Defense to certify that the program meets
the following criteria: it is essential to the national security, no
alternatives provide equal or greater military capability at less cost,
new estimates of the program acquisition unit cost are reasonable, and
the management structure is adequate to manage and control program
costs. Accordingly, DOD worked with DOC and NASA through the first half
of 2006 to restructure the NPOESS effort in order to address the
significant cost over-run and reduce program risk. In this
certification process, the agencies gave highest priority to preserving
continuity in operational terrestrial weather forecasting
capabilities--the original focus of the program. The ultimate decision
regarding the restructuring of NPOESS was announced on June 5, 2006.
The current restructured NPOESS program includes four NPOESS
satellites operating in two orbits, augmented by data from a European
weather system using several sensors provided by the United States in a
third orbit. (In contrast, the program before restructuring had planned
on flying six NPOESS satellites in three orbits.) To decrease costs and
help maintain continuity in operational weather capabilities, the three
agencies also decided to remove several Earth-observing and space
weather-related sensors from the baseline NPOESS program budget--
effectively removing these sensors from NPOESS--and to de-scope certain
other instruments in terms of performance. It is important to note that
NPOESS, as restructured, still satisfies many climate data
requirements. In addition, the recertified program retains funding
within the NPOESS baseline for the reintegration of the de-manifested
sensors should a way be found to provide them from outside the program.
Nevertheless, the potential impacts to the climate science program
continue to raise concerns.
When my office (OSTP) learned of these decisions, we convened an
interagency meeting in late June 2006, including representatives from
NASA, NOAA and the NPOESS integrated program office, to (1) gain a
better understanding of the projected capabilities of the revised
program, (2) explore the implications of these changes for climate and
ocean research activities, and (3) obtain agency views on ways to
retain the capabilities of sensors removed from the baseline NPOESS
configuration. Based on the discussions in this meeting and our sense
that more work was needed on these topics, we asked NASA and NOAA to
provide OSTP with a joint technical assessment of the expected science
implications of the NPOESS restructuring decision, and options for
addressing those impacts in terms of climate research (implications for
space weather research and activities will be addressed separately). In
response to our request, a joint NASA/NOAA assessment was provided to
OSTP in early January 2007, in the form of a ``white paper.''
The initial NASA/NOAA response to OSTP includes an analysis of the
potential climate science impacts of the 2006 NPOESS restructuring
decision. It also addresses the projected impacts of eliminating each
sensor and provides prioritized rankings of the de-manifested sensors
in terms of the importance of their measurements. In addition, the
white paper presents options for retaining the capabilities of the
eliminated sensors that focus largely on re-manifesting them back onto
NPOESS.
The NASA/NOAA white paper is useful for understanding the
dimensions of the problems created by restructuring, and is a helpful
and important contribution to the process of resolving them. At the
same time, it does not include the full range of options for retaining
the climate and ocean research capabilities, and does not include cost
estimates that are essential for policy-making. Consequently, OSTP
asked the agencies for further analysis of a broader range of options,
including potential solutions such as free-flyers, adding instruments
to other U.S. Government spacecraft, or international cooperative
opportunities. We also requested that NASA and NOAA provide cost
estimates for the full range of options being explored. NASA and NOAA
are in the process of developing information for OSTP and the Office of
Management and Budget regarding various options and preliminary cost
estimates for those options.
Interagency discussions and follow-up questions and analyses
regarding these and other potential mitigation strategies will continue
throughout the summer and fall. Our goal is to complete this phase of
the analysis in time to inform the FY 2009 budget process, where this
information could be considered along with other elements of department
and agency requests. One decision has already been made--the Ozone
Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Limb has been restored to fly on the
NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite, which is scheduled to
launch in 2009. NASA and NOAA will split the cost to re-manifest the
OMPS-Limb instrument.
Regarding instruments other than OMPS-Limb, there have been no
decisions yet on options, program schedules, or identification of
funds. Those issues will need to be addressed as the process unfolds in
coming months. My priorities during this review are to promote
continuity of key climate data needs while ensuring that current
planned missions are not negatively impacted by payload modifications.
While much remains to be completed, I must emphasize that NASA, NOAA
and members of my staff are investing much time and effort on this
difficult problem. Other portions of the scientific community are
providing useful input as well. For example, we are looking forward to
the results of an NRC workshop later this month regarding these and
related Earth-observation issues. The necessary work is getting done,
and OSTP will continue to monitor the process closely as it moves
forward.
In addition to the NPOESS climate-related sensors that are the
focus of the ongoing assessment, a suite of space weather sensors was
also de-manifested from the baseline NPOESS effort during the 2006
restructuring of the program, as noted earlier. These sensors were an
important element of the Nation's planned capabilities for observing
and predicting space weather phenomena such as solar flares, sunspots,
auroras and the solar wind. The loss of such measurements could have a
serious impact on a wide range of U.S. operations and research.
Accordingly, and as with the de-manifested climate sensors, we have
requested that agencies with space weather interests, including DOD,
DOC, and NASA, provide a joint assessment of the impacts of the NPOESS
restructuring decision on national space weather-related capabilities
and goals, followed by an assessment of potential options for
addressing such impacts. This effort is in its early stages and likely
will require several months to complete. Our goal in this effort is to
obtain the necessary information in time to inform the FY 2010 budget
process--a suitable schedule for this analysis according to the
agencies involved.
I would like to mention some other climate-related issues today
that are not directly linked to NPOESS but are part of the broader
context for OSTP's ongoing work on Earth observations. The fourth
assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) shows that great progress has been made in characterizing and
understanding Earth's climate system and how that system is changing,
and U.S. Government-funded Earth observations have been critical in
achieving this progress. Earth observations are important for
characterizing the impacts of climate change to natural and human
systems, and for many other applications such as improved weather
forecasts, predicting and responding to natural disasters, water
resource management, characterizing air quality and assessing ecosystem
health. While current challenges to maintaining and improving U.S.
Earth-observing systems exist, as noted in the recently released
National Research Council (NRC) Decadal Survey on Earth Science, I want
to emphasize that this Administration is committed to supporting these
capabilities.
The NRC report points out that no single mechanism currently exists
for coordinating all national Earth-observing needs across agencies.
Although the Climate Change Science Program has an Observations Working
Group to facilitate interagency understanding and information
exchanges, it has not yet developed a national strategy for climate
observations--nor has any other group. Climate observation plans have
been part of individual agency program plans and budgets, or have been
assembled through mission-specific collaborative processes like the one
that produced NPOESS. This situation exists for most other observation
types as well, not just those for climate. For example, there is an
Interagency Working Group on Ocean Observations that is looking at a
range of ocean-related observations, including but not limited to,
those focusing on climate. Similarly, there is a NASA-NOAA Joint
Working Group on Research-Operations Transition intended to address
issues associated with the transition of observations initiated as
research into operational ones.
Several organizations including the NRC have noted the need for a
plan to achieve and sustain global Earth observations, and this issue
has been taken up by the National Science and Technology Council
Subcommittee on Earth Observations (known as the U.S. Group on Earth
Observations, or USGEO). USGEO, which is co-chaired by OSTP, NASA, and
NOAA, recently reorganized to focus on a national strategy for Earth
observations that would address topics such as organizational roles and
responsibilities, data collection and sharing protocols, and sector-
specific priorities for investment. This process is ongoing, and I
anticipate that at least a year will be required to produce a strategic
plan for this complex issue.
OSTP is also engaged in an emerging national coordination
requirement for medium-resolution land imaging data. I have directed an
interagency working group to address the long-term continuity of
Landsat-type data through an effort known as the Future of Land Imaging
(FLI) Plan. As you know, the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) is
currently in procurement in NASA and is scheduled for launch in 2011.
The Landsat interagency working group is developing the FLI plan for
extending these important systems beyond LDCM and into the future. The
group's report is currently in clearance and will be published within
the next two months.
Thank you for your interest in and support for these issues,
including not only the NPOESS-related sensor studies but also the other
Earth-observing topics that I have mentioned. There certainly are
further challenges ahead in addressing these topics, but we are making
progress and are working closely with interested agencies in devising
the way forward. I would be pleased to respond to questions.
Biography for John H. Marburger, III
John H. Marburger, III, Science Adviser to the President and
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, was born on
Staten Island, N.Y., grew up in Maryland near Washington D.C. and
attended Princeton University (B.A., Physics 1962) and Stanford
University (Ph.D., Applied Physics 1967). Before his appointment in the
Executive Office of the President, he served as Director of Brookhaven
National Laboratory from 1998, and as the third President of the State
University of New York at Stony Brook (1980-1994). He came to Long
Island in 1980 from the University of Southern California where he had
been a Professor of Physics and Electrical Engineering, serving as
Physics Department Chairman and Dean of the College of Letters, Arts
and Sciences in the 1970's. In the fall of 1994 he returned to the
faculty at Stony Brook, teaching and doing research in optical science
as a University Professor. Three years later he became President of
Brookhaven Science Associates, a partnership between the university and
Battelle Memorial Institute that competed for and won the contract to
operate Brookhaven National Laboratory.
While at the University of Southern California, Marburger
contributed to the rapidly growing field of nonlinear optics, a subject
created by the invention of the laser in 1960. He developed theory for
various laser phenomena and was a co-founder of the University of
Southern California's Center for Laser Studies. His teaching activities
included ``Frontiers of Electronics,'' a series of educational programs
on CBS television.
Marburger's presidency at Stony Brook coincided with the opening
and growth of University Hospital and the development of the biological
sciences as a major strength of the university. During the 1980's
federally sponsored scientific research at Stony Brook grew to exceed
that of any other public university in the northeastern United States.
During his presidency, Marburger served on numerous boards and
committees, including chairmanship of the Governor's Commission on the
Shoreham Nuclear Power facility, and chairmanship of the 80 campus
``Universities Research Association'' which operates Fermi National
Accelerator Laboratory near Chicago. He served as a trustee of
Princeton University and many other organizations. He also chaired the
highly successful 1991/92 Long Island United Way campaign.
As a public spirited scientist-administrator, Marburger has served
local, State and Federal governments in a variety of capacities. He is
credited with bringing an open, reasoned approach to contentious issues
where science intersects with the needs and concerns of society. His
strong leadership of Brookhaven National Laboratory following a series
of environmental and management crises is widely acknowledged to have
won back the confidence and support of the community while preserving
the Laboratory's record of outstanding science.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Dr. Marburger.
Mr. Powner.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Powner. Chairman Lampson, Ranking Member Inglis, and
Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to
testify on NPOESS, a planned satellite system whose life cycle
costs will now exceed $12 billion.
NPOESS is critical to our nation's ability to monitor
changes in weather and the environment. Over the past several
years NPOESS has experienced significant cost overruns and
delays due to sensor development problems, poor contractor
performance and program management, and inadequate executive
level involvement that led to a June, 2006, decision to
restructure the program.
This decision decreased the complexity of the program by
reducing the number of sensors, increased the estimated cost by
$4 billion, and delayed the launches of satellites by three to
five years. Since then the NPOESS program has made progress and
is currently being managed with much more rigor than we have
previously seen as part of our numerous reviews for this
committee.
However, we remain concerned about its remaining risks; the
interagency management of this tri-agency program, the
premature rotation of the program's key executive, continued
staffing shortages, and whether this program can be executed
within the $12.5 billion life cycle cost estimate.
Before expanding on each of these concerns, General Mashiko
and her team deserve credit for increasing program oversight,
instituting more frequent and rigorous program reviews, and
holding NPOESS's contractors more accountable. In addition,
this committee's oversight role has been instrumental in
driving these management improvements. Despite these efforts,
the NPOESS program is still fraught with risks. Recent program
assessments to NPOESS's Executive Committee rate the cost,
schedule, technical and funding status each as yellow. Our
report being released today\8\ highlights the major technical
risks associated with two critical sensors known as VIIRS and
CrIS. Specifically, VIIRS has experienced problems during
testing with image quality and reliability, and CrIS failed
during vibration testing. Both sensors remain high risk.
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\8\ Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring Is Underway But Technical Challenges and Risks Remain.
Government Accountability Office Report GAO-07-498; April 27, 2007.
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We also remain concerned about the interagency coordination
and commitment required to effectively manage this tri-agency
program. Following last summer's restructuring, the Secretaries
of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA were
required to sign a revised memorandum of agreement by August,
2006, and revise and approve key acquisition documents a month
later. To date this has not occurred, and this executive level
foot-dragging is unacceptable.
This is more than a paper exercise since finalizing these
documents is critical to insuring interagency agreements and
will allow the programs to move forward in completing a new
baseline and contract by next month.
We also remain concerned about having the right people on
board to effectively oversee and manage this program. DOD's
plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer (PEO) next
month increases the program's risk. Establishing the PEO
structure and having a seasoned executive in this role has
streamlined executive decision-making and has resulted in more
aggressive risk management throughout the program. The PEO has
only been in this position for 19 months. Given that the
program is currently still being restructured and that
significant challenges remain, this move adds unnecessary risks
to an already risky program.
In addition, the NPOESS program still lacks key staff
needed to effectively manage this program. These staff include
systems engineers and budget and cost analysts. As a result the
program lacks the staff it needs to oversee the technical
aspects of the program and assess contractor costs and progress
reports.
Finally, we remain skeptical of the program's ability to
execute within the $12.5 billion. Specifically, the costs will
likely increase due to the technical problems associated with
key sensors. In addition, the contractors' preliminary estimate
of the restructured program is higher than current estimates.
The extent of these increases should be known next month when
contractor negotiations are expected to conclude.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, despite some progress, NPOESS is
far from being out of the woods. Moving forward, it is
essential that the program aggressively manage its remaining
developmental risks--especially those associated with high-risk
sensors--approve key documents to assure tri-agency agreement
and commitment is in place, staff key positions to ensure the
right folks are on-board--especially in the engineering and
cost areas--and strongly consider reevaluating the reassignment
of the PEO until next summer when key sensors are to be
delivered for NPOESS's demonstration satellite. Failing to
address any of these concerns will lead to additional cost
increases and scheduled delays.
This concludes my statement. Thank you for your leadership
and oversight of this critical acquisition.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
Prepared Statement of David A. Powner
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss our work on the $12.5 billion dollar National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. NPOESS is
expected to be a state-of-the-art, environment-monitoring satellite
system that will replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental
satellite systems. Polar-orbiting satellites provide data and imagery
that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military
to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the
environment. The NPOESS program is considered critical to the United
States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting (including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and
global climate monitoring through the year 2026.
Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS program: the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States
Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). To manage the NPOESS program, these agencies established a tri-
agency integrated program office. In recent years, the program has
experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical
difficulties, which led to a June 2006 decision to restructure it. This
decision decreased the complexity of the program by reducing the number
of satellites and sensors, increased the estimated cost of the program
to $12.5 billion, and delayed the launches of the first two satellites
by three and five years, respectively.
As requested, this statement summarizes a report being released
today that (1) assesses the NPOESS program office's progress in
restructuring the acquisition, (2) evaluates the program office's
progress in establishing an effective management structure, and (3)
identifies the status and key risks facing the program's major
segments.\1\ The report includes recommendations to NOAA, NASA, and DOD
to facilitate the restructuring of the program and to reduce program
risks. In preparing this testimony, we relied on our work supporting
the accompanying report. That report contains a detailed overview of
our scope and methodology. All the work on which this testimony is
based was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
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\1\ GAO, Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain,
GAO-07-498 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2007).
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Results in Brief
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans
guiding contractors' work activities in 2006 and 2007; however,
important tasks remain to be done. Although the program office
developed key acquisition documents (including a memorandum of
agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the three agencies, a
revised acquisition strategy, and a system engineering plan) the
responsible executives in the three agencies have not yet approved
these documents--even though they were due by September 1, 2006. Delays
in finalizing these documents could hinder plans to complete contract
negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the program from moving
forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline.
The program office has also made progress in establishing an
effective management structure by adopting a new organizational
framework with increased oversight from program executives and by
instituting more frequent and rigorous program management reviews;
however, planned changes in executive management will likely increase
program risk. Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan for
identifying and filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in
key activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. As of
June 2007, key positions remain to be filled.
Development and testing of major program segments--including key
sensors and the ground systems--are under way, but significant risks
remain. For example, work continues on key sensors, but two sensors--
the visible/infrared imager radiometer suite and the crosstrack
infrared sounder--have continued to experience significant
difficulties. Additionally, while significant progress has been made in
reducing delays in the NPOESS data processing system, much work remains
in refining the algorithms needed to translate sensor observations into
usable weather products. Continued sensor problems could cause further
cost increases or schedule delays. Given the tight time frames for
completing key sensors, integrating them with the demonstration
spacecraft (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project or NPP), and
developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based data processing
systems, it will be important for the Integrated Program Office, the
Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to
provide close oversight of milestones and risks.
In our report, we made recommendations to the Secretaries of
Commerce and Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that
the appropriate executives finalize key acquisition documents in order
to allow the restructuring of the program to proceed. We made
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the Air Force to
delay reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive Officer
until key program risks are resolved. We also made recommendations to
the Secretary of Commerce to ensure that NPOESS program authorities
develop and implement a written process for identifying and addressing
human capital needs and that they establish a plan to immediately fill
needed positions. In written comments, all three agencies agreed that
it was important to finalize key acquisition documents in a timely
manner, and DOD proposed extending the due dates for the documents to
July 2, 2007. In addition, the Department of Commerce concurred with
our recommendation to identify and address human capital needs and
immediately fill open positions in the NPOESS program office. Commerce
noted that NOAA was taking actions in both areas.
However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay
reassigning the Program Executive Officer, noting that the Program
Director responsible for the acquisition program would remain in place
for four years. While it is important that the System Program Director
remain in place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this
position does not ensure continuity in the important oversight and
coordination functions provided by the current Program Executive
Officer. We remain concerned that reassigning the Program Executive at
a time when NPOESS is still facing critical cost, schedule, and
technical challenges will place the program at further risk.
Background
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series--managed by
NOAA--and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)--managed
by the Air Force. These satellites obtain environmental data that are
processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather
products. These satellite data are also the predominant input to
numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for
forecasting weather three or more days in advance--including
forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products
and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather
so that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and
mitigate their effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to
monitor environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought
conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a
variety of studies such as climate monitoring.
NPOESS Overview
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs
would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.\2\ The converged
program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States' ability
to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and
global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To manage this
program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated Program
Office, located within NOAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2 (May 5, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain
activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the
converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the
acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the
development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged
system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA
funds specific technology projects and studies. The NPOESS program
office is overseen by an Executive Committee, which is made up of the
Administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air
Force.
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated
to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from
its inception in 1995 through 2018. The program is to provide satellite
development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite
data processing. These deliverables are grouped into four main
categories: (1) the space segment, which includes the satellites and
sensors; (2) the integrated data processing segment, which is the
system for transforming raw data into environmental data records (EDR)
and is to be located at four data processing centers; (3) the command,
control, and communications segment, which includes the equipment and
services needed to support satellite operations; and (4) the launch
segment, which includes launch vehicle services.
When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development
contract was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was adjusted to
$7 billion. Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of
six satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration
of 13 instruments--consisting of 10 environmental sensors and three
subsystems. Together, the sensors were to receive and transmit data on
atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and
solar-geophysical observations. The subsystems were to support non-
environmental search and rescue efforts, sensor survivability, and
environmental data collection activities. The program office considered
four of the sensors to be critical because they provide data for key
weather products; these sensors are in bold in Table 1, which describes
each of the expected NPOESS instruments.
In addition, a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS
Preparatory Project or NPP) was planned to be launched several years
before the first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk
associated with launching new sensor technologies and to ensure
continuity of climate data with NASA's Earth Observing System
satellites. NPP is to host three of the four critical NPOESS sensors
(VIIRS, CrIS, and ATMS), as well as one other noncritical sensor
(OMPS). NPP is to provide the program office and the processing centers
an early opportunity to work with the sensors, ground control, and data
processing systems.
When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, the schedule for
launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the
satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites
should anything go wrong during the planned launches of these
satellites. Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May
2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the
final POES satellite launch in March 2008, and (3) having the second
NPOESS satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite launch
in October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up
the final predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch dates would
have been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.
NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical
Problems Over Several Years
Over the last few years, NPOESS has experienced continued cost
increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be made
about the program's direction and capabilities. In 2003, we reported
that changes in the NPOESS funding stream led the program to develop a
new program cost and schedule baseline.\3\ After this new baseline was
completed in 2004, we reported that the program office increased the
NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 billion to $8.1 billion; delayed key
milestones, including the planned launch of the first NPOESS
satellite--which was delayed by seven months; and extended the life of
the program from 2018 to 2020.\4\ At that time, we also noted that
other factors could further affect the revised cost and schedule
estimates. Specifically, the contractor was not meeting expected cost
and schedule targets on the new baseline because of technical issues in
the development of key sensors, including the critical VIIRS sensor.
Based on its performance through May 2004, we estimated that the
contractor would most likely overrun its contract at completion in
September 2011 by $500 million--thereby increasing the projected life
cycle cost to $8.6 billion. The program office's baseline cost estimate
was subsequently adjusted to $8.4 billion.
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\3\ GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites Project Risks
Could Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-
03-987T (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003).
\4\ GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites Information on
Program Cost and Schedule Changes, GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
30, 2004).
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In mid-November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to
experience problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting in
schedule delays and anticipated cost increases.\5\ At that time, we
projected that the program's cost estimate had grown to about $10
billion based on contractor cost and schedule data. We reported that
the program's issues were due, in part, to problems at multiple levels
of management--including subcontractor, contractor, program office, and
executive leadership. Recognizing that the budget for the program was
no longer executable, the NPOESS Executive Committee planned to make a
decision in December 2005 on the future direction of the program--what
would be delivered, at what cost, and by when. This involved deciding
among options involving increased costs, delayed schedules, and reduced
functionality. We noted that continued oversight, strong leadership,
and timely decision-making were more critical than ever, and we urged
the committee to make a decision quickly so that the program could
proceed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need
for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
16, 2005).
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However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005,
NPOESS cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that
requires DOD to certify the program to Congress.\6\ This placed any
decision about the future direction of the program on hold until the
certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program
office implemented an interim program plan for fiscal year 2006 to
continue work on key sensors and other program elements using fiscal
year 2006 funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GA0, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, GAO-06-
573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nunn-McCurdy Process Led to a Decision to Restructure the NPOESS
Program
The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a
major defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost increase
thresholds.\7\ The law requires the Secretary of Defense to notify
Congress when a major defense acquisition is expected to overrun its
project baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the program to
Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent or
more.\8\ In late November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25 percent
threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program. Certifying a
program entailed providing a determination that (1) the program is
essential to national security, (2) there are no alternatives to the
program that will provide equal or greater military capability at less
cost, (3) the new estimates of the program's cost are reasonable, and
(4) the management structure for the program is adequate to manage and
control costs. DOD established tri-agency teams--made up of DOD, NOAA,
and NASA experts--to work on each of the four elements of the
certification process.
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\7\ 10 U.S.C. 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy.
\8\ 10 U.S.C. 2433 (e)(2) has recently been amended by Pub. L. No.
109-163, 802 (Jan. 6, 2006) and Pub. L. No. 109-364, 213 (a) (Oct.
17, 2006).
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In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner
agencies) certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost
$12.5 billion through 2026.\9\ This decision approved a cost increase
of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and delayed the
launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly three to five
years. The new program also entailed establishing a stronger program
management structure, reducing the number of satellites to be produced
and launched from six to four, and reducing the number of instruments
on the satellites from 13 to nine--consisting of seven environmental
sensors and two subsystems. It also entailed using NPOESS satellites in
the early morning and afternoon orbits and relying on European
satellites for midmorning orbit data.\10\ Table 2 summarizes the major
program changes made under the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision.
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\9\ DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified
program would cost $11.5 billion. The acquisition portion includes
satellite development, production, and launch, but not operations and
support costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion
for operations and support after launch, this brings the program life
cycle cost to $12.5 billion.
\10\ The European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellite's MetOp program is a series of three polar-
orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp
satellites are planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years.
The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones
for the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by
January 2010,\11\ launching the first NPOESS satellite (called C1) by
January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite (called C2) by
January 2016. These revised milestones deviated from prior plans to
have the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES
satellite should anything go wrong during that launch.
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\11\ According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision specifies that NPP is to launch by January 2010,
NASA plans to launch it by September 2009 to reduce the possibility of
a climate data continuity gap.
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Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the
final POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need
to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until
NPP data become available--almost two years later. Although NPP was not
intended to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move NPP to a
different orbit so that its data would be available in the event of a
premature failure of the final POES satellite. However, NPP will not
provide all of the operational capability planned for the NPOESS
spacecraft. If the health of the existing constellation of satellites
diminishes--or if NPP data are not available, timely, and reliable--
then there could be a gap in environmental satellite data. Table 3
summarizes changes in key program milestones over time.
In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13
to nine and reduced the functionality of four sensors. Specifically, of
the 13 original sensors, five sensors remain unchanged, three were
replaced with less capable sensors, one was modified to provide less
functionality, and four were canceled. Table 4 shows the changes to
NPOESS sensors, including the four identified in bold as critical
sensors.
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of
the resulting weather and environmental products, called environmental
data records or EDRs. In selecting sensors for the restructured
program, the agencies placed the highest priority on continuing current
operational weather capabilities and a lower priority on obtaining
selected environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result,
the revised NPOESS system has significantly less capability for
providing global climate measures than was originally planned.
Specifically, the number of EDRs was decreased from 55 to 39, of which
six are of a reduced quality. The 39 EDRs that remain include cloud
base height, land surface temperature, precipitation type and rate, and
sea surface winds. The 16 EDRs that were removed include cloud particle
size and distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the
top of the atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in
the space environment. The six EDRs that are of a reduced quality
include ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting
energy in the space environment.
NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, But Key Steps
Remain to Be Completed
Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and
schedule of the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in
restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks
remain to be done. Restructuring a major acquisition program like
NPOESS is a process that involves identifying time-critical and high-
priority work and keeping this work moving forward, while reassessing
development priorities, inter-dependencies, deliverables, risks, and
costs. It also involves revising important acquisition documents
including the memorandum of agreement on the roles and responsibilities
of the three agencies, the acquisition strategy, the system engineering
plan, the test and evaluation master plan, the integrated master
schedule defining what needs to happen by when, and the acquisition
program baseline. Specifically, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision
required the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator
of NASA to sign a revised memorandum of agreement by August 6, 2006. It
also required that the program office, Program Executive Officer, and
the Executive Committee revise and approve key acquisition documents
including the acquisition strategy and system engineering plan by
September 1, 2006, in order to proceed with the restructuring. Once
these are completed, the program office can proceed to negotiate with
its prime contractor on a new program baseline defining what will be
delivered, by when, and at what cost.
The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the
acquisition. Specifically, the program office has established interim
program plans guiding the contractor's work activities in 2006 and 2007
and has made progress in implementing these plans. The program office
and contractor also developed an integrated master schedule for the
remainder of the program--beyond fiscal year 2007. This integrated
master schedule details the steps leading up to launching NPP by
September 2009, launching the first NPOESS satellite in January 2013,
and launching the second NPOESS satellite in January 2016. Near-term
steps include completing and testing the VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors;
integrating these sensors with the NPP spacecraft and completing
integration testing; completing the data processing system and
integrating it with the command, control, and communications segment;
and performing advanced acceptance testing of the overall system of
systems for NPP.
However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be
completed. Although the program office made progress in revising key
acquisition documents, including the system engineering plan, the test
and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy plan, it has
not yet obtained the approval of the Secretaries of Commerce and
Defense and the Administrator of NASA on the memorandum of agreement
among the three agencies, nor has it obtained the approval of the
NPOESS Executive Committee on the other key acquisition documents. As
of June 2007, these approvals are over nine months past due. Agency
officials noted that the September 1, 2006, due date for the key
acquisition documents was not realistic given the complexity of
coordinating documents among three different agencies.
Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency
agreement and will allow the program office to move forward in
completing other activities related to restructuring the program. These
other activities include completing an integrated baseline review with
the contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and work activities,
and finalizing changes to the NPOESS development and production
contract. Program costs are also likely to be adjusted during upcoming
negotiations on contract changes--an event that the Program Director
expects to occur by July 2007. Completion of these activities will
allow the program office to lock down a new acquisition baseline cost
and schedule. Until key acquisition documents are finalized and
approved, the program faces increased risk that it will not be able to
complete important restructuring activities in time to move forward in
fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline in place. This places the
NPOESS program at risk of continued delays and future cost increases.
Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management
Structure, But Executive Turnover Increases Risks
and Staffing Problems Remain
The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure, but--almost a year after this structure was
endorsed during the Nunn-McCurdy certification process--the Integrated
Program Office still faces staffing problems. Over the past few years,
we and others have raised concerns about management problems at all
levels of the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor
management, program office management, and executive-level
management.\12\ Two independent review teams also noted a shortage of
skilled program staff, including budget analysts and system engineers.
Since that time, the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing
an effective management structure--including establishing a new
organizational framework with increased oversight by program
executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance.
However, DOD's plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer in
the summer of 2007 increase the program's risks. Additionally, the
program lacks a staffing process that clearly identifies staffing
needs, gaps, and plans for filling those gaps. As a result, the program
office has experienced delays in getting core management activities
under way and lacks the staff it needs to execute day-to-day management
activities.
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\12\ GAO-06-249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the
Inspector General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives
Leave NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-
0001/2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In addition, two independent
teams reviewed the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led Independent
Review Team investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact
on NPP, and a DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the
broader NPOESS program. The teams briefed the NPOESS Executive
Committee on their findings in August 2005 and November 2005,
respectively.
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NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective
Management Structure and Increasing Oversight
Activities, But Executive Turnover Will Increase
Program Risks
The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective
management structure and increasing the frequency and intensity of its
oversight activities. Over the past few years, we and others have
raised concerns about management problems at all levels of management
on the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor
management, program office management, and executive-level management.
In response to recommendations made by two different independent review
teams, the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and
early 2006 for revising its management structure.
In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a
Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program
Director, to streamline decision making and to provide oversight to the
program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the
Executive Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer and
the Program Director proposed a revised organizational framework that
realigned division managers within the Integrated Program Office
responsible for overseeing key elements of the acquisition and
increased staffing in key areas. In June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision approved this new management structure and the
Integrated Program Office implemented it. Figure 1 provides an overview
of the relationships among the Integrated Program Office, the Program
Executive Office, and the Executive Committee, as well as key divisions
within the program office.
Operating under this new management structure, the program office
implemented more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, and
program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and
mitigation activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value
management techniques to monitor contractor performance. In addition to
these program office activities, the Program Executive Officer
implemented monthly program reviews and increased the frequency of
contacts with the Executive Committee. The Program Executive Officer
briefs the Executive Committee in monthly letters, apprising committee
members of the program's status, progress, risks, and earned value, and
the Executive Committee now meets on a quarterly basis--whereas in the
recent past, we reported that the Executive Committee had met only five
times in two years.\13\
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\13\ GAO-06-249T.
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Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an
effective management structure, this progress is currently at risk. We
recently reported that DOD space acquisitions are at increased risk due
in part to frequent turnover in leadership positions, and we suggested
that addressing this will require DOD to consider matching officials'
tenure with the development or delivery of a product.\14\ In March
2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD is planning to reassign
the recently appointed Program Executive Officer in the summer 2007 as
part of this executive's natural career progression. As of June 2007,
the Program Executive Officer has held this position for 19 months.
Given that the program is currently still being restructured, and that
there are significant challenges in being able to meet critical
deadlines to ensure satellite data continuity, such a move adds
unnecessary risk to an already risky program.
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\14\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space
Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 6, 2006).
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NPOESS Program Has Filled Key Vacancies but Lacks a Program-wide
Staffing Process
The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies but lacks a
staffing process that identifies program-wide staffing requirements and
plans for filling those needed positions. Sound human capital
management calls for establishing a process or plan for determining
staffing requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning
to fill critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially
important for NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple independent
review teams that staffing shortfalls contributed to past problems.
Specifically, these review teams noted shortages in the number of
system engineers needed to provide adequate oversight of subcontractor
and contractor engineering activities and in the number of budget and
cost analysts needed to assess contractor cost and earned value
reports. To rectify this situation, the June 2006 certification
decision directed the Program Director to take immediate actions to
fill vacant positions at the program office with the approval of the
Program Executive Officer.
Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management structure,
the program office has filled multiple critical positions, including a
budget officer, a chief system engineer, an algorithm division chief,
and a contracts director. In addition, on an ad hoc basis, individual
division managers have assessed their needs and initiated plans to hire
staff for key positions. However, the program office lacks a program-
wide process for identifying and filling all needed positions. As a
result, division managers often wait months for critical positions to
be filled. For example, in February 2006, the NPOESS program estimated
that it needed to hire up to 10 new budget analysts. As of September
2006, none of these positions had been filled. As of April 2007,
program officials estimated that they still needed to fill five budget
analyst positions, five systems engineering positions, and 10 technical
manager positions. The majority of the vacancies--four of the five
budget positions, four of the five systems engineering positions, and
eight of the 10 technical manager positions--are to be provided by
NOAA. NOAA officials noted that each of these positions is in some
stage of being filled--that is, recruitment packages are being
developed or reviewed, vacancies are being advertised, or candidates
are being interviewed, selected, and approved.
The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the
right personnel in place to facilitate this process, and it did not
even begin to develop a staffing process until November 2006. Program
officials noted that the tri-agency nature of the program adds unusual
layers of complexity to the hiring and administrative functions because
each agency has its own hiring and performance management rules. In
November 2006, the program office brought in an administrative officer
who took the lead in pulling together the division managers' individual
assessments of needed staff and has been working with the division
managers to refine this list. This new administrative officer plans to
train division managers in how to assess their needs and to hire needed
staff, and to develop a process by which evolving needs are identified
and positions axe filled. However, there is as yet no date set for
establishing this basic program-wide staffing process. As a result of
the lack of a program-wide staffing process, there has been an extended
delay in determining what staff is needed and in bringing those staff
on board; this has resulted in delays in performing core activities,
such as establishing the program office's cost estimate and bringing in
needed contracting expertise. Additionally, until a program-wide
staffing process is in place, the program office risks not having the
staff it needs to execute day-to-day management activities.
In commenting on a draft of our report, Commerce stated that NOAA
implemented an accelerated hiring model. More recently, the NPOESS
program office reported that several critical positions were filled in
April and May 2007. However, we have not yet evaluated NOAA's
accelerated hiring model and, as of June 2007, over 10 key positions
remain to be filled.
Major Program Segments Are Under Development, But Significant Risks
Remain
Major segments of the NPOESS program--the space segment and ground
systems segment--are under development; however, significant problems
have occurred and risks remain. The program office is aware of these
risks and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems could
affect the program's overall cost and schedule. Given the tight time
frames for completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP
spacecraft, and developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based
data processing systems, it will be important for the NPOESS Integrated
Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the Executive
Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and
risks.
Space Segment--Progress Made, But Key Sensors Continue to Face Major
Risks
The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four
sensors are of critical importance--VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS--
because they are to be launched on the NPP satellite in September 2009.
Initiating work on another sensor, the Microwave imager/sounder, is
also important because this new sensor--replacing the canceled CMIS
sensor--will need to be developed in time for the second NPOESS
satellite launch. Over the past year, the program made progress on each
of the sensors and the spacecraft. However, two sensors, VIIRS and
CrIS, have experienced major problems. The status of each of the
components of the space segment is described in Table 5.
Program officials regularly track risks associated with various
NPOESS components and work to mitigate them. Having identified both
VIIRS and CrIS as high risk, OMPS as moderate risk, and the other
components as low risk, the program office is working closely with the
contractors and subcontractors to resolve sensor problems. Program
officials have identified work-grounds that will allow them to move
forward in testing the VIIRS engineering unit and have approved the
flight unit to proceed to a technical readiness review milestone.
Regarding CrIS, as of March 2007, a failure review board identified
root causes of its structural failure, identified plans for resolving
them, and initiated inspections of sensor modules and subsystems for
damage. An agency official reported that there is sufficient funding in
the fiscal year 2007 program office's and contractor's management
reserve funds to allow for troubleshooting both VIIRS and CrIS
problems. However, until the CrIS failure review board fully determines
the amount of rework that is necessary to fix the problems, it is
unknown if additional funds will be needed or if the time frame for
CrIS's delivery will be delayed. According to agency officials, CrIS is
not on the program schedule's critical path, and there is sufficient
schedule margin to absorb the time it will take to conduct a thorough
failure review process.
Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and
CrIS is of particular importance because these components are to be
demonstrated on the NPP satellite, currently scheduled for launch in
September 2009. Any delay in the NPP launch date could affect the
overall NPOESS program, because the success of the program depends on
the lessons learned in data processing and system integration from the
NPP satellite. Additionally, continued sensor problems could lead to
higher final program costs.
Ground Segment-Progress Has Been Made, But Work Remains
Development of the ground segment--which includes the interface
data processing system, the ground stations that are to receive
satellite data, and the ground-based command, control, and
communications system--is under way and on track. However, important
work pertaining to developing the algorithms that translate satellite
data into weather products within the integrated data processing
segment remains to be completed. Table 6 describes each of the
components of the ground segment and identifies the status of each.
The NPOESS program office plans to continue to address risks facing
IDPS development. Specifically, the IDPS team is working to reduce data
processing delays by seeking to limit the number of data calls, improve
the efficiency of the data management system, increase the efficiency
of the algorithms, and increase the number of processors. The program
office also developed a resource center consisting of a logical
technical library, a data archive, and a set of analytical tools to
coordinate, communicate, and facilitate the work of algorithm subject
matter experts on algorithm development and calibration/validation
preparations. Managing the risks associated with the development of the
IDPS system is of particular importance because this system will be
needed to process NPP data.
Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce Program Risks
Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS
program to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical
weather and environmental observations, in our accompanying report\15\
we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and
to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the responsible executives
within their respective organizations approve key acquisition
documents, including the memorandum of agreement among the three
agencies, the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master
plan, and the acquisition strategy, as quickly as possible but no later
than April 30, 2007. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Air Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed
Program Executive Officer until all sensors have been delivered to the
NPOESS Preparatory Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled to
occur by July 2008. We also made two additional recommendations to the
Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and implement a written process
for identifying and addressing human capital needs and for streamlining
how the program handles the three different agencies' administrative
procedures and (2) establish a plan for immediately filling needed
positions.
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\15\ GAO-07-498.
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In written comments, all three agencies agreed that it was
important to finalize key acquisition documents in a timely manner, and
DOD proposed extending the due dates for the documents to July 2, 2007.
Because the NPOESS program office intends to complete contract
negotiations by July 4, 2007, we remain concerned that any further
delays in approving the documents could delay contract negotiations and
thus increase the risk to the program.
In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our
recommendation to develop and implement a written process for
identifying and addressing human capital needs and to streamline how
the program handles the three different agencies' administrative
procedures. The department also agreed with our recommendation to plan
to immediately fill open positions at the NPOESS program office.
Commerce noted that NOAA identified the skill sets needed for the
program and has implemented an accelerated hiring model and schedule to
fill all NOAA positions in the NPOESS program. Commerce also noted that
NOAA has made NPOESS hiring a high priority and has documented a
strategy--including milestones--to ensure that all NOAA positions are
filled by June 2007.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the
Program Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System Program
Director responsible for executing the acquisition program would remain
in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce also noted that the
Program Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between the Air
Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that a selection would be made
before the departure of the current Program Executive Officer to
provide an overlap period to allow for knowledge transfer and ensure
continuity. However, over the last few years, we and others (including
an independent review team and the Commerce Inspector General) have
reported that ineffective executive-level oversight helped foster the
NPOESS program's cost and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that
reassigning the Program Executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing
critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the
program at further risk.
In addition, while it is important that the System Program Director
remain in place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this
position does not ensure continuity in the functions of the Program
Executive Officer. The current Program Executive Officer is experienced
in providing oversight of the progress, issues, and challenges facing
NPOESS and coordinating with Executive Committee members as well as the
Defense acquisition authorities. Additionally, while the Program
Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between agencies, the
memorandum of agreement documenting this arrangement is still in draft
and should be flexible enough to allow the current Program Executive
Officer to remain until critical risks have been addressed.
Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap between
the selection of a new Program Executive Officer and the departure of
the current one, time is running out. The current Program Executive
Officer is expected to depart in early July 2007, and as of early June
2007, a successor has not yet been named. NPOESS is an extremely
complex acquisition, involving three agencies, multiple contractors,
and advanced technologies. There is not sufficient time to transfer
knowledge and develop the sound professional working relationships that
the new Program Executive Officer will need to succeed in that role.
Thus, we remain convinced that given NPOESS current challenges,
reassigning the current Program Executive Officer at this time would
not be appropriate.
In summary, NPOESS restructuring is well under way, and the program
has made progress in establishing an effective management structure.
However, key steps remain in restructuring the acquisition, including
completing important acquisition documents such as the system
engineering plan, the acquisition program baseline, and the memorandum
of agreement documenting the three agencies' roles and
responsibilities. Until these key documents are finalized, the program
is unable to finalize plans for restructuring the program.
Additionally, the program office continues to have difficulty filling
key positions and lacks a program-wide staffing process. Until the
program establishes an effective and repeatable staffing process, it
will have difficulties in identifying and filling its staffing needs in
a timely manner. Having insufficient staff in key positions impedes the
program office's ability to conduct important management and oversight
activities, including revising cost and schedule estimates, monitoring
progress, and managing technical risks. The program faces even further
challenges if DOD proceeds with plans to reassign the Program Executive
Officer this summer. Such a move would add unnecessary risk to an
already risky program.
In addition, the likelihood exists that there will be further cost
increases and schedule delays because of technical problems on key
sensors and pending contract negotiations. Major program segments--
including the space and ground segments--are making progress in their
development and testing. However, two critical sensors have experienced
problems and are considered high risk, and risks remain in developing
and implementing the ground-based data processing system. Given the
tight time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them, and
getting the ground-based data processing systems developed, tested, and
deployed, continued close oversight of milestones and risks is
essential to minimize potential cost increases and schedule delays.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have at
this time.
Other key contributors to this testimony include Colleen Phillips
(Assistant Director), Carol Cha, and Teresa Smith.
Biography for David A. Powner
Experience
Twenty years' experience in information technology issues in both
public and private sectors.
Education
Business Administration, University of Denver
Senior Executive Fellows Program, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy
School of Government
Dave is Director of IT Management Issues at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. He is currently responsible for a large segment
of GAO's information technology (IT) work, including systems
development, IT investment management, health IT, and cyber critical
infrastructure protection reviews.
In the private sector, Dave has held several executive-level
positions in the telecommunications industry, including overseeing IT
and financial internal audits, and software development associated with
digital subscriber lines (DSL).
At GAO, Dave has led teams reviewing major IT modernization efforts
at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, the National Weather Service,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service.
These reviews covered many information technology areas including
software development maturity, information security, and enterprise
architecture.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Powner, for your testimony
and for being here.
General Mashiko, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL SUSAN K. MASHIKO, PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITES, UNITED STATES
AIR FORCE
Brigadier General Mashiko. Chairman Lampson, Ranking Member
Inglis, and Committee Members, thank you for this opportunity
to address you today.
I am responsible for a portfolio of a program that includes
the orbital operations of the Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program and the development of the NPOESS program. I report to
the Administrator of NASA, the Under Secretary of the Air
Force, and the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you
the status of the NPOESS program and thank you for your
continued interest and support.
In response to the questions that you sent in your letter
of invitation concerning the latest status of the program, the
first question was when will the new program baseline be
finalized, and when will the contractor renegotiations be
completed. A new program baseline is finalized. The integrated
baseline review, our final step, was completed last week, and
the restructure proposal was received from the contractor, and
fact finding is, in fact, complete. Negotiations should
conclude with a contract in July.
Your second question was what is the current status of the
key NPOESS sensors, and when will the flight units be delivered
for incorporation on NPP. The two key sensors as mentioned by
David Powner, are, in fact, the Visible/Infrared Radiometer
Suite, or VIIRS, and the Cross-track Infrared Sounder, or CrIS.
Let me address the VIIRS first.
I commissioned an independent review team to look at the
sufficiency of the VIIRS design. The team came back--when they
reported out--that said the design was basically sound and will
produce operational weather data to the expected levels. The
flight unit has recently completed the test readiness review,
and we will soon initiate acceptance testing leading to its
delivery in the summer of 2008, for NPP.
With respect to the Cross-track Infrared Sounder, or CrIS,
it experienced a structural failure in the final seconds of
vibration testing in October. A Joint Failure Review Board has
determined the root cause of this failure, and a systemic
exoneration of all components is ongoing. This thorough process
has produced confidence in the flight unit, and this unit will
resume testing at the system level upon receipt of a
strengthened frame, supporting delivery in the summer of 2008.
Your third question was what progress has been made on
defining the microwave sensor that replaces the canceled CMIS
instrument. A Request For Information, or RFI, was released to
industry late last year and based upon the data received from
that data call, a detailed specification is being developed
that will meet or exceed the threshold requirements for this
instrument. A new microwave sensor program will be reviewed by
my replacement and the EXCOM\9\ in September and, with the
EXCOM's concurrence, a request for proposal will be released in
FY 2008.
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\9\ EXCOM: Executive Committee Members of the NPOESS Program.
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Your final question was are the program and instrument
contractors currently meeting the milestones set out in the
fiscal year 2007 interim program plan. In short, yes. The
contractors are doing well in meeting their cost and schedule
commitments for the fiscal year 2007 interim program plan.
Northrop Grumman Space Technology (NGST) is currently slightly
ahead of plan, having completed 122 milestones, where only 120
were scheduled.
With respect to the GAO report, it should be noted that the
GAO staff has maintained a close vigilance of the NPOESS
program and attends my monthly program management reviews.
Their understanding of the program was evident in their recent
report, and we completely agree that technical challenges and
risks remain. And we are gratified to see that the GAO notes
that management changes put in place over the last year are
paying dividends. Management changes that we and the NPOESS
prime contractor, NGST, have undertaken are widespread and
affect every aspect of the execution of this complex satellite
development. In fact, it is a complete change of approach as we
move ``back to basics.''
This is as the government assumes a far more active role in
the verification of all data and test results. This required
significant staff additions that have been strongly supported
by all three agencies. They are looking for truly talented and
experienced space people, and they are truly hard to come by.
We currently have a few vacancies in work but all necessary
actions are progressing.
In conclusion, NPOESS is one of the most complex
environmental satellite systems ever developed. The management
changes that the Government and our prime contractor have put
in place are making a difference. But please remember we are
building some truly complex instruments. We have structured a
stringent test program to uncover problems on the ground rather
than in orbit. We are structuring the program to respond
rapidly to any problems with sufficient margin to accommodate
the difficulties that will arise.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.
[The prepared statement of Brigadier General Mashiko
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brigadier General Susan K. Mashiko
Introduction
Chairmen Lampson and Miller, Ranking Members Inglis and
Sensenbrenner, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to provide an update of our progress on the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and to
comment on the recommendations of the recent Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report.
I am Brigadier General Susan K. Mashiko, Program Executive Officer
for Environmental Satellites. I report to the Executive Committee of
the NPOESS Program which is comprised of the Administrator of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Under
Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, and the Under
Secretary of the Air Force. I oversee the day-to-day operations of the
NPOESS Program and interface with other government agencies and
departments and international partners. I am here today to give you an
update on the program status and to address the recent GAO report.
Program Background
First let me review what NPOESS is for the new Committee Members.
In 1994, after a thorough review and serious consideration, President
Clinton directed the merger of the military and civilian operational
polar satellite programs. This new program, NPOESS, is responsible for
developing the next generation of polar satellites and sensors. The
program was designed as a series of six satellites and a total of 10
environmental sensors, five of which represent significant advances
over current operational satellite technology. The new NPOESS sensors
will provide higher quality data than the current operational
meteorological satellites leading to more sophisticated environmental
models for weather, climate and the oceans.
The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) is a joint mission involving
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the NPOESS
Integrated Program Office (IPO). The NPP mission will collect and
distribute remotely-sensed land, ocean, and atmospheric data to the
meteorological and global climate change communities as the
responsibility for these measurements transitions from NASA's existing
Earth-observing missions (e.g., Aqua, Terra and Aura) to the NPOESS.
NPP also provides risk reduction by testing several new sensors in
space, ensure the ground control systems work properly, and allow us
time to assimilate the new data into computer weather models before
launch of the first operational NPOESS satellite. NPP will provide
atmospheric and sea surface temperatures, humidity sounding, land and
ocean biological productivity, and cloud and aerosol properties.
NPOESS is being acquired using DOD acquisition authorities and is
managed by an Integrated Program Office (IPO). In 2002, Northrop
Grumman was selected as the NPOESS prime contractor for spacecraft
development, ground systems, sensor integration, and operations.
As many on this committee are aware, in December 2005, the IPO
notified the Air Force that projected cost overruns would exceed the 25
percent threshold triggering a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy statute. In
June 2006, following the Nunn-McCurdy certification and resulting
restructure of the NPOESS program we are moving forward with two fewer
satellites, fewer sensors, less risk, cost increases, but also with
increases in our confidence levels for timely delivery of core weather
forecasting capabilities, accompanied by a significant reduction in its
climate monitoring capabilities.
The GAO report properly notes that the NPOESS program has made
progress since the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy certification and we
completely agree that technical challenges and risk still remain. The
three agencies involved in the NPOESS development, the Department of
Commerce (DOC), the Department of Defense (DOD), and NASA continue to
regularly monitor the development of the NPOESS program. They commit
their best talent and participate in the decision-making process
through the NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM). The significant
management changes and the reduced risk profile resulting from the
Nunn-McCurdy certification and subsequent restructure have had major
positive impacts on the program. NPOESS still remains, however, the
most complex environmental satellite system ever developed.
Over the last eighteen months, the program has taken a disciplined
acquisition approach to the simultaneous execution of the development
program and program restructure. Through the creation of discrete,
measurable, development milestones the NPOESS IPO has fundamentally
revamped their management style to one of aggressive oversight of the
contractor. This ``back-to-basics'' approach facilitated the
reorganization of both government and industry management teams while
permitting risk reduction to move apace. Most metrics for cost and
schedule goals have been achieved for this period. As in all
developmental programs, NPOESS has uncovered and addressed new
challenges.
Program Status
The Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) is intended to provide
improved measurements of the temperature and moisture profiles in the
atmosphere allowing forecasters to improve both global and regional
predictions of weather patterns, storm tracks, and precipitation. In
October, 2006, CrIS experienced a challenge when a structural component
broke in the final moments of its vibration test. The failure was fully
analyzed by a Tri-Agency and industry team and corrective actions are
underway. This instrument has sufficient schedule margin to ensure that
the projected 2009 launch of the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) and
the first NPOESS satellite in 2013 will not, at this time, be affected.
The Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) collects high
resolution atmospheric imagery and generates a variety of applied
products, including visible and infrared imaging of hurricanes and
detection of wildland fires, smoke, and atmospheric aerosols. The VIIRS
instrument, which was one of the principal contributors to the Nunn-
McCurdy breach, has completed extensive reviews by both a government
team from the NPOESS program and an independent team of outside
experts. Corrective actions for all identified VIIRS instrument
problems are underway. One major technical issue, optical cross talk,
remains and we are pursing several potential solutions. The VIIRS
product most at risk at this point is ocean color, but there are also
concerns about the atmospheric aerosol products should the cross talk
problem not be resolved. This key instrument will continue to be the
focus of intense management attention for the foreseeable future.
The NPOESS IPO has issued a request for information for a Microwave
Imager/Sounder (MIS), a smaller, less complex sensor than the original
Conical-scanning Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS). The MIS is still
intended to provide data for a variety of products including sea
surface winds. The MIS is scheduled to first fly on the second NPOESS
spacecraft and then on all subsequent missions. A final acquisition
strategy decision is anticipated by September 2007, at which time cost
and schedule information will be available.
A number of sensors were de-manifested from NPOESS as a result of
the Nunn-McCurdy process, especially those oriented towards climate
measurements. At the initiative of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP), NASA and NOAA are working together to identify what
might be required to provide flight opportunities for the de-manifested
sensors--either on NPOESS platforms or some other method--to assure
continuity of key climate parameters such as Earth radiation budget,
solar irradiance, sea surface topography, ozone vertical profile, and
aerosol optical properties. OSTP will work with the agencies and the
Office of Management and Budget to determine if the required resources
can be identified in the time frame required to protect the climate
data records.
The ground and data processing system continues to make excellent
progress. The NOAA Satellite Operations Facility is up and running and
flying the heritage NOAA and DOD satellites. The command and control
software has been fully tested. Early versions of the operational data
processing system are being tested with real data delivered from
satellites currently in orbit.
The program restructure proposal, which culminates 10 months of
intensive government and industry effort, details all aspects of the
NPOESS program and has been received from Northrop Grumman Space
Technology. This proposal provides detailed planning, scheduling and
resource allocation for the next ten years. The proposal is presently
in the negotiation process and is on track for a late summer 2007
award. Concurrently, the government is conducting an Integrated
Baseline Review (IBR), which will provide the government with
additional confidence in the Northrop Grumman scheduling and resource
allocation process.
The Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Limb instrument will
measure the vertical distribution of stratospheric ozone with high
resolution; and it will complement observations from existing NPOESS
sensors most notably the column and low resolution profile measurements
from the OMPS Nadir instrument. In response to the climate science
community, NOAA and NASA recently announced that the OMPS-Limb will be
re-manifested with the OMPS Nadir onto the NPP in time to meet the
scheduled 2009 launch date. NOAA and NASA have agreed to equally share
the cost of restoring the OMPS-Limb onto the NPP spacecraft. The OMPS-
Limb will measure the vertical distribution of ozone and it will
complement observations from existing NPOESS sensors.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Recommendations
I would like to commend the GAO staff for their collaborative
approach to the NPOESS audits. I appreciate their commitment to
providing recommendations and findings that will assist the NPOESS
partners. While official comments have been provided to GAO, I'd like
to take the opportunity to provide a synopsis of our responses and the
status of addressing the recommendations.
The GAO report emphasizes the need to expeditiously complete the
documentation directed by the Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the
NPOESS program. The staffs of the three parent agencies have been fully
consulted during the development of these documents. These Tri-Agency
documents will be fully executed by late summer. In the interim,
administration of the NPOESS program and the contract is not being
adversely affected.
The GAO report also recommends that the Secretary of Defense delay
the reassignment of the NPOESS PEO. While I cannot speak for the DOD, I
can state that the NPOESS PEO position has long been planned to rotate
between the Air Force and NOAA. As part of this planned rotation, the
next NPOESS PEO will be a NOAA employee. A selection is planned prior
to my departure in summer 2007 and is being timed to provide a
transition period that will facilitate knowledge transfer and ensure
continuity.
The GAO report recommends that NOAA address the human capital needs
for the NPOESS program and that it immediately fill needed positions.
NOAA has implemented an accelerated hiring model and corresponding
schedule to fill all NOAA positions identified in the GAO report and
all positions needed by the NPOESS program. All three agencies are
working in concert and we have identified the positions to be filled,
the hiring strategy, and other program human capital needs. Regular
progress reporting on the status of filling these positions occurs, and
the NPOESS System Program Director reports at monthly meetings with the
PEO. NOAA has established a complementary, documented strategy with
milestones to ensure that all needed positions are filled. We are
working very closely with the NOAA Workforce Management Office to
ensure obstacles to the hiring process are identified and addressed
immediately. The five additional NASA positions were identified as
needed following the Nunn-McCurdy certification have since been filled.
The NPOESS Tri-Agency partners are working very hard to ensure the
actions required to address these recommendations are implemented in a
timely manner to improve our ability to successfully manage the
program.
Summary
In summary, the management changes that were established over the
last year have taken hold and are working at both the government and
contractor program management offices. The test program is identifying
problems and that is just what it is designed to do. We have added one
of the de-manifested instruments onto the NPP; this type of add-back,
if continued onto the NPOESS platforms as envisioned by the Nunn-
McCurdy analysis. The NPOESS program will continue instrument
development to meet the 2009 NPP launch and the 2013 launch of the
first NPOESS satellite.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and I am
prepared to answer your questions.
Biography for Brigadier General Susan K. Mashiko
Brig. Gen. Susan K. Mashiko is Program Executive Officer for
Environmental Satellites, which includes the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System Integrated Program Office in
Silver Spring, Md. The NPOESS IPO is a Presidentially-directed unit
reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, the Under Secretary of Commerce, and the Deputy NASA
Administrator. NPOESS provides a single national capability to provide
global environmental data, meeting military and civil operational needs
of the Department of Defense and Department of Commerce. The NPOESS
program office develops, acquires and operates space and ground systems
valued more than $7 billion. This portfolio also includes the
operations of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, which
provides environmental data to the joint warfighter.
General Mashiko was born in Glendale, Calif., and entered the Air
Force as a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy where she earned a
Bachelor's degree in aeronautical engineering. Her career has spanned a
wide variety of space and acquisition assignments, including Chief of
the Programs Division in the Office of Special Projects, executive
officer to the DOD Space Architect and Program Manager for the Atlas V
Program. She has also served as Director of the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle System Program, Deputy Director of the NPOESS Program
and Vice Commander of Air Armament Center.
EDUCATION
1980--Bachelor of Science degree in aeronautical engineering, U.S. Air
Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
1982--Squadron Officer School, by correspondence
1986--Master of Science degree in electrical engineering, Air Force
Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
1993--Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1998--Master of Science degree in national resource strategy,
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair,
Washington, D.C.
1998--Senior Acquisition Course, National Defense University, Fort
Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
ASSIGNMENTS
1. June 1980-May 1984, Chief, Anti-Satellite Payload Avionics Branch,
Directorate of ASAT Systems, Headquarters Space Division, Los Angeles
Air Force Station, Calif.
2. May 1984-April 1986, graduate student, Air Force Institute of
Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.
3. April 1986-March 1989, Chief, Systems Implementation Branch,
Directorate of Applied Technology, Office of Special Projects, Office
of the Secretary of the Air Force, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.
4. March 1989-August 1992, Chief, Programs Division, Directorate of
Applied Technology, Office of Special Projects, Office of the Secretary
of the Air Force, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.
5. August 1992-June 1993, student, Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell AFB, Ala.
6. June 1993-December 1994, special assistant, Space Policy and
Plans, Directorate of Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C.
7. December 1994-January 1996, executive officer, Directorate of
Space Programs, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, Washington, D.C.
8. January 1996-May 1996, executive officer, Department of Defense
Space Architect, Washington, D.C.
9. May 1996-August 1997, policy and issues analyst, Secretary of the
Air Force Staff Group, Office of the Secretary of the Air
Force, Washington, D.C.
10. August 1997-June 1998, student, Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
11. July 1998-March 2000, Program Manager, Atlas V Program, Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle System Program Office, Space and
Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.
12. March 2000-May 2002, Deputy Director, Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle System Program, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los
Angeles AFB, Calif.
13. May 2002-December 2003, Director, Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle System Program, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los
Angeles AFB, Calif.
14. January 2004-February 2005, Chief, Director's Special Action
Staff, Office of the Director, National Reconnaissance Office,
Washington, D.C.
15. February 2005-August 2005, Deputy Director, National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Systems Program,
Air Force Element, Silver Spring, Md.
16. August 2005-January 2006, Vice Commander, Air Armament Center,
Eglin AFB, Fla.
17. January 2006-present, Program Executive Officer for Environmental
Satellites, Silver Spring, Md.
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Legion of Merit
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal
OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
1998, John J. Welch Award for Excellence in Acquisition Management,
Secretary of the Air Force
1998, Strategic Acquisition Reform Award for Contracting Excellence,
Secretary of the Air Force
1999, David W. Packard Award for Acquisition Excellence, Department of
Defense
2003, Unit of the Year (Director), Air Force Association
EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant--May 28, 1980
First Lieutenant--May 28, 1982
Captain--May 28, 1984
Major--Oct. 1, 1991
Lieutenant Colonel--Nov. 1, 1996
Colonel--March 1, 2001
Brigadier General--Sept. 7, 2006
Discussion
Chairman Lampson. Thank you very much. We will now go into
the questioning, the first round of questions, and I will
recognize myself for five minutes.
Restoring Orphan Sensors
Dr. Marburger, as you note in your testimony we have
restored OMPS-Limb to the Preparatory Project. The Limb sensor
is an important component in monitoring the recovery of the
ozone layer, which may require collecting data out until 2050.
Are we prepared to put the full ozone sensor back aboard the
satellites: according to the information given to the
Committee, removing them from the program had a $57 million
impact or affect?
Dr. Marburger. The short answer to that question,
Congressman, is yes. We are committed. It is rated as an
important sensor, and that is the reason it was put back onto
the NPOESS mission.
Chairman Lampson. Will be on. Okay. Your report recommends
doing so. It recommends flying a full OMPS sensor aboard the
NPOESS satellite in 2013.
General Mashiko, we have been told that the program office
will not accept any new instruments for that satellite. Is that
true?
Brigadier General Mashiko. The manifest for Charley 1 or
the first flight version of NPOESS is locked down. Clearly, I
understand how to take direction, but the reason why we locked
down the configuration of the Charley 1 bird was to reduce the
overall risk to that particular vehicle. If you take a look at
the satellite that flies in the afternoon orbit versus the
satellite that flies in the early morning orbit, that is the
most complex. It actually has eight instruments on it, and as
such it will be the most complex integration. And we are
clearly biting off the most complex integration. In order to
assure operational data continuity, which is my driving
priority, I locked down that configuration. I briefed that, got
EXCOM concurrence, and I also got the Milestone Decision
Authority, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, to concur with that recommendation of
locking down that configuration as soon as possible so that we
could keep the configuration of that particular satellite as
simple as possible.
Chairman Lampson. The United States has obligations under
the 1987 Montreal Protocol on ozone, and the OMPS-Limb helps us
meet those obligations. We were assured that NPOESS was
maintaining the ability to fly these orphan sensors if someone
else built them and delivered them. The lead time for doing so
seemed to be about two years before launch. We are six years
away from NPOESS. Can we or can we not do this?
Dr. Marburger. There may be confusion about which flights
the OMPS sensor is being restored to. My understanding is it
would be restored to the NPOESS Preparatory Project satellite,
the NPP, not the C1. It is a different satellite and which we
do understand is locked down. I just wanted to make sure we are
talking about the same satellite and that there is no conflict
between my testimony and General Mashiko's.
Chairman Lampson. But is there not a desire to fly a full
set of sensors on C1?
Dr. Marburger. The idea is to minimize data disruption and
data gaps. We believe that it is appropriate to fly the OMPS-
Limb sensor on the NPP satellite, which will be launched in
2009. My understanding is that that will address the problem
that we foresaw with the data for that satellite and that the,
that obviates the need to fly it on C1.
If I am mistaken in that, I will be glad to stand
corrected, be corrected.
Chairman Lampson. The idea----
Dr. Marburger. But that is my understanding.
Chairman Lampson.--from my understanding was to fly another
sensor on C1.
Did you want to make a comment, General Mashiko?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Sir, I would like to make a
comment. We do--will, in fact, have the OMPS-Nadir sensor on
Charley 1, which will, in fact, provide the necessary data in
order to meet the Kyoto protocols.
Chairman Lampson. If we want to put OMPS 1 back on, can we
do it?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Physically, it can be done, but
it will be done at added risk to the on-time launch of the
first operational NPOESS satellite, and it is a risk-benefit
equation.
Chairman Lampson. And obviously more cost, more time.
Brigadier General Mashiko. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lampson. The second priority listed in the January
report is the Earth Radiation Budget Sensor for it measures how
much of the sun's radiation gets absorbed by the land. Well,
let me tell you. I am down to my time. Let me--I am going to
stop and ask that question in a minute, because I would like to
get the Ranking Member in with his first round of questions.
So, Mr. Inglis.
Risk of Cost Overruns
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Powner, you said
that there is some concern about whether this can really be
done for $12.5 billion. Will you elaborate on that? What are
the risk factors there?
Mr. Powner. A couple key risk factors. One would be the
technical risks associated with key sensors, in particular
VIIRS.
Mr. Inglis. Uh-huh.
Mr. Powner. That is one reason why we might see increased
costs over time. We have a contract renegotiation coming up
here in July. There is indications that costs could be higher
based on that contract renegotiation, and we say that based on
some preliminary estimates from the contractor that are higher
than original estimates, which when you combine all that, that
pushes you over the $12.5 billion threshold.
Mr. Inglis. Dr. Marburger, General Mashiko, do you have any
comment on that about those risks? What do you think about
that, the chance of overruns from here?
Dr. Marburger. I am certainly not going to argue with GAO
about risks of cost overruns. These are expensive, high-risk
projects, and undoubtedly GAO's assessment needs to be attended
to. Our concern here is that we move ahead with projects that
are essential for the Nation's weather forecasting capabilities
and for the science missions, whether they are performed using
the NPOESS set of satellites or some other satellite approach.
Mr. Inglis. Uh-huh. General Mashiko.
Brigadier General Mashiko. Well, I do agree with the GAO
with respect to the risks. There is something that should give
yourself and the other Members of the Committee some feeling of
confidence. There are some major cardinal changes that were, in
fact, made to the program as part of the restructure, so there
are fewer unknowns in the program--I guess--is the easiest way
to look at it. Colonel Dan Stockton, who is the System Program
Director, and his team laid out a program that took a six-month
rolling wave--traditional way of operating a program, you only
have detailed planning for six months--and laid out detailed
planning from the start of the contract modification all the
way to the conclusion of the contract. So they know in detail
everything that needs to be done on the program between now and
2016. There is no task in that program plan that is longer than
66 days, and they know it with the assurity by having the right
people laying out and reviewing those program plans.
So that should give the Committee some level of confidence
that while there is still risk associated with the program, it
is certainly better understood than it ever has been in the
past.
Avoiding Cost Overruns for Future Programs
Mr. Inglis. You know, I guess we could point out that it is
not unusual for space acquisition programs to experience
significant cost growth. You know, we have had the Space-Based
Infrared Satellite and NASA's Webb telescope are a couple that
were over. Is there something that is systematically wrong or
any explanation, any thoughts about what the Government should
be doing to control these costs, or is this just something
you've got to expect with the first-of-a-kind kind of programs?
Brigadier General Mashiko. They are looking my direction.
It is not something that you should necessarily expect, but
there are certain ground rules that need to be adhered to that
we used to do in the old days of program management, and that
is why we often refer to going back to basics. It is truly
understanding where you stand with respect to technology
maturation. You don't hold your design review too soon. When
you put together your initial budgets for a program, you put
together the initial budgets from the perspective of an
independent cost estimate rather than a purely program office
estimate or an agency estimate. You bring somebody else in to
take a look at what you are doing and give you an independent
assessment as to what you think it is going to cost.
And when you do the traditional things like that, the cost
growths, while they still occur, tend to be smaller, and they
are not quite as large, and you don't end up in a Nunn-McCurdy
certification situation as this program did in late 2005.
Mr. Inglis. All right. Mr. Powner.
Mr. Powner. If I can just comment, in terms of NPOESS, what
happened clearly with this, Ranking Member Inglis, is we
greatly underestimated the complexity with NPOESS. We tried to
address three agencies' requirements. That is a difficult thing
to do. Clearly, a lot of the climate requirements have lost
recently. We are trying to restore those, and you know, when
you have three agencies involved, we try to put 13 sensors on a
satellite, that is a lot. The complexity here was huge. I mean,
one of the things we did with Nunn-McCurdy, the decision was to
reduce the complexity, and you know, there are winners and
losers here, and you know, with some of the losers we are
trying to reinstate that now. But clearly underestimating the
complexity and trying to do too much was a major misstep with
this program.
Mr. Inglis. Dr. Marburger, any thoughts about how we can
improve on this?
Dr. Marburger. Well, clearly, many of the climate sensors
that were de-manifested were added during the growth of the
program, and one of the reasons that we have asked for
additional information from NOAA and NASA about alternatives
other than NPOESS--and not immediately rush to put these
instruments back on NPOESS--is that we, too, are concerned
about the complexity that they added to the project and the
likelihood that putting them back would just cause more
trouble. So we are looking at a wider range of possibilities
than simply adding them back into NPOESS. That is why the
analysis takes a certain amount of time.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. I thank the Ranking Member.
We have been called for two votes. We don't know exactly
how much time. It is probably about five or six minutes
remaining for the first one. A second vote will come shortly
thereafter. Probably be 15 to 20 minutes before we get back.
We will recess to go vote and ask your patience with us.
Thank you, and we are in recess.
[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the Subcommittee recessed, to
reconvene at 2:12 p.m., the same day.]
Chairman Lampson. The Subcommittee on Energy and
Environment is reconvened, and we left off in the middle of our
first round of questions.
At this time I would recognize Ms. Biggert for five
minutes.
Data Gap Concerns
Ms. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my first question
is for Dr. Marburger.
I am concerned about the gaps in data that we are currently
collecting, and this data provides us with a historical content
that is very important as we try to understand the current
changes in the weather and the climate. Does the refigured
program lead to any gaps in the data?
Dr. Marburger. Well, the--as I understand it, the
restructuring occurred--Nunn-McCurdy occurred with the data
continuity as one of the high priorities for consideration. And
that has also been the highest priority that we have had in
mind in considering what to do with the sensor capabilities
that were lost in the restructuring.
I think it is important to understand that while the
sensors that are under discussion in this hearing are very
important, they actually represent a small fraction of our
climate science and ocean science research capabilities. There
are many other ways of getting at some of these data. So we
have to consider it in the context of the literally dozens of
other Earth-observing satellites. There are approximately 25
satellites up there that are collecting Earth science data,
nearly all of which are useful for climate science research and
some for ocean research and some for solar research and for
monitoring the space weather.
So I think perhaps our focus on the instruments on NPOESS
has been somewhat misleading to the public who may not be aware
of this vast array of other Earth-observing capabilities.
So it is primarily because of this complex context of
capabilities that we have that we asked NOAA and NASA to
perform these analyses that they gave to us in their white
paper and are continuing to analyze because we do have other
opportunities.
Ms. Biggert. Is it more important, then, to ensure that we
get the sensors into space to avoid the gaps in the weather and
climate data that is currently being collected or the sensors
that collect new weather and climate data, since you say there
are others. Shouldn't we wait until we find another way to test
those new ones?
Dr. Marburger. Well, I think clearly we want to prioritize
these and we want to make sure that the highest priority
sensors for covering any potential data gaps are flying, either
to be re-manifested on subsequent NPOESS missions, the ones
that are not yet shut down, or on free-flying missions of their
own. And we are committed to minimizing these data gaps to the
extent possible, but it has to be done in the context of all of
these other capabilities that we have.
But we undoubtedly will have to fly one of these sensors
that has been de-manifested one way or another, and how we go
about doing that is what is at issue here. We need to study
that.
Interagency Collaboration: Drawbacks
Ms. Biggert. Then, Mr. Powner, when this project was
originally started, it was a weather project, wasn't it? I
mean, did we have the climate included in that?
Mr. Powner. Well, weather was clearly the focus, but there
was climatological information to be provided from NPOESS early
on. Correct.
Ms. Biggert. Okay. Do you think that we might have
proceeded at a faster pace if we had had just one agency that
was in charge of this?
Mr. Powner. Well, I think clearly if you look at the
lessons learned on NPOESS, I mean, you can go back to where
there was, you know, one of three, one of the agencies didn't
fully fund it. It resulted in another agency decreasing
funding. Yeah. Having a single agency program is far less
complex, not only from some of the administrative and executive
level management issues, but in terms of trying to meet
everyone's requirements. That is very difficult. And then when
you start prioritizing, as an example, you know, we had 55
environmental data records associated with NPOESS, and we asked
time and time again what are the priorities, and we were always
told 55, all 55 were needed. But after Nunn-McCurdy we go down
to 39, and you even hear discussions now that there are some
that are more important than others. So there still is a
prioritization, but everyone wants everything when you have
three agencies involved, and it makes it very complex.
Ms. Biggert. Well, doesn't every time they make a change or
decide something, then three agencies having to go back and
each of them to make a decision and then come back and see if
they agreed. It seems that it is such a complex project that it
would take awhile.
And would that increase the costs then, too? I mean, was
that one of the things that made it so much more costly?
Mr. Powner. Well, yeah. Clearly if you look over time with
the increase in costs, this started as a $6 billion program,
and you know, now we are at 12.5, so it is doubled, and that
was a contributing factor.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Ms. Biggert.
Mr. Baird, if you are not ready to ask a question, then I
will give myself five minutes.
More on Restoring Orphan Sensors
Let me go back to what we had talked about toward the end
of my questioning a while ago. OMPS has two pieces; Nadir and
Limb. The Nadir piece is intended to go on NPOESS 1. My
question was: if we wanted Limb to go back as well, and we
would do, and as I understand General Mashiko's answer, we can,
but it increases the risk, and that is correct.
Now, is that just the situation with the first satellite?
If we ask to put Limb on the other satellites, would there be
lower risks or higher risks in doing so?
Brigadier General Mashiko. In a pure sense the risk
equation--clearly any time you add something to a satellite,
you have added risk--but what you have the virtue of in Charley
2, 3, 4, all the subsequent vehicles, you have already built
one. You have already integrated the most complex, greatest
number of sensors onto your satellite. So you know what you are
adding to. So while it increases the risk, it is a smaller
increase in risk when you add it to the subsequent units when
you have already flight-demonstrated your first bird.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you very much.
The second priority listed in the January report is the
Earth Radiation Budget Sensor for it measures how much of the
sun's radiation gets absorbed by the land, by oceans, and by
atmosphere. Continuity in measuring this is considered so
important that the report wanted to take our last existing
sensor and put it on Preparatory Project, put it on the
Preparatory Project mission. Then build ERPS for the NPOESS
satellites. Yet according to a presentation at last year's
Polar Max conference, the team for this sensor is disbanded--
``CERES team at NGST would have to be reconstituted.'' \10\ The
cost impact of canceling ERBS was $73 million. We are going to
need this data I think, Dr. Marburger, if we are to understand
climate change. NASA and NOAA recommend putting it on the first
NPOESS satellite. What do we do?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Stan Schneider, ``Non-Manifested Sensors and Planning for Next
Generation,'' Presentation at the 2006 Polar Max Conference. October
25, 2006; Silver Spring, Maryland. See slide 18. Accessed from http://
www.ipo.noaa.gov/polarmax/2006/day03/4.4schneiderPolar-Max
SchneiderFinal.2006.ppt
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Marburger. What do we do with that instrument is one of
the questions that we have asked NASA and NOAA to give us more
information on so that we can determine whether it makes sense
to put it on one of the subsequent NPOESS satellites or on a
free-flier of its own. Because there are options, obviously, to
get this data from space missions other than NPOESS, and so the
question is one of assessing the impact of possible schedules
stretch--of increasing the risk of NPOESS versus the benefits
associated with putting it on its own separate mission.
Those are the kinds of questions that take the experts to
analyze and the context of all of our other Earth-observing
missions and give us some advice, and we expect that decisions
like that will be made in time to inform the budget process so
that the President can ask Congress for the appropriate funds
to resolve these questions.
Chairman Lampson. Why can we fly it on a free-flier if we
took it off NPOESS because it cost too much? Cost differential?
Same, more, less?
Dr. Marburger. We have already heard that the costs of
NPOESS has escalated. It was multiplied by a factor of two
since it originally was planned, and indeed, if additional cost
increases, or worse, the loss of capability for weather
prediction for the military is a consequence of putting it on,
then we would certainly consider alternatives at--even at
significant costs.
So the cost-benefit equation here has some pretty big
numbers in it, and indeed it does make sense to consider free-
flying missions for some of these other Earth-observing
satellites.
I want to emphasize again the very large number of missions
that we do fly for Earth observation. We have approximately 25
active Earth-observing satellite missions at the present time,
and the NPOESS sensors represent a small portion of our
capability for making these measurements. So the future of our
Earth-observing program that supports climate and ocean
science, it really needs to be considered in a much broader
context than NPOESS.
Chairman Lampson. I understand that, but it just seems to
me that making some of these decisions to, for example, stop
work on one, cancel it, and then come back and put it, whether
it is on a free-flier or back in the same place, adds so much
more money. Why can't we make better decisions the first time
around?
Dr. Marburger. Well, I think we have heard that question
answered before. These are big, high-risk projects, and the
management of them is very difficult, especially when more than
one agency is involved. We are talking about big numbers, and
we are talking about major costs associated with delays and
lack of access to critical operational data. So in my view it
is a part of the expense of doing business in this very high-
tech, high-risk game that we are in.
Chairman Lampson. NPOESS has a history of taking really
long to make those decisions, and, in my opinion, not following
the plan that was put together in the first place, and perhaps
if that plan had been followed on some more of these, perhaps
there may have been some smaller amount of money spent. I will
never, ever forget the project that was canceled at Johnson
Space Center that costs, we made the decision to cancel that
particular project, and it cost $12 million more to mothball it
than it would have cost to complete it. And those are the kinds
of decisions that I think we all ought to be ashamed of and
make an attempt to do a much better job.
My time is up, and I now recognize Mr. Inglis for five
minutes.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
More on Data Gaps
Dr. Marburger, if we could go to that redundancy question I
think you were just answering from the Chairman and also
earlier from Ms. Biggert. As soon as redundancy for weather
observation and for climate change, are there other units up
there that are gathering both types of information?
Dr. Marburger. Well, certainly weather information and
climate information are coupled, and some instruments are dual-
purpose as it were. In fact, even with the loss of the sensors
in the restructured NPOESS program, there is still a
significant climate change and ocean research-related
capability on NPOESS. I would say about half of the climate-
related science capability has been lost in the restructured
programs.
But in addition to the NPOESS instruments, both those that
are retained and restructured programs and those that were
lost, there are literally dozens of other instruments that we
have in space, and some on the ground, that are contributing
data to the overall climate science effort. And that is what I
was referring to, that we have a large number of satellites. We
have the GOES\11\ program, which is also weather, and it gives
climate, but we have a number of other sensors on other
satellite programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GOES: Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And this is part of an integrated Earth-observation system
that the U.S. manages that a number of agencies participate in.
Mr. Inglis. Sir, there is a recent article that said that,
I quote, ``Most of the climate instruments needed to collect
more precise data over long periods of time are being
eliminated.'' \12\ Your response to that?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ John Heilprin, ``U.S. Cuts Back Climate Checks From Space,''
The Associated Press, June 4, 2007; 6:59 P.M. EDT. Accessed at: http://
www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/06/04/ap378087.html (June 6, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Marburger. I would say that that is a misleading
statement. First of all, it is misleading if it is taken to,
applied to all climate sensors that the U.S. has in space. That
is totally incorrect. It is only a small fraction of the
climate science sensors that we fly in our total climate
science program.
With respect to the climate science capabilities of
specifically the NPOESS program, it is probably half right, but
I would say that, as I said in response to an earlier question,
my impression is from the briefings that I have had and from
the reports that I have read that about half of the climate
science capability of NPOESS has been lost in the
restructuring.
Mr. Inglis. Yeah. The Director of Climate Science Watch
said in that same article, was quoted in that same article as
saying that, ``We are going to start being blinded in our
ability to observe the planet.''
Dr. Marburger. That is a grossly misleading statement. We
will by no means be blinded in our ability to observe the
planet by the decisions that were made in the restructuring of
the NPOESS program.
Mr. Inglis. And that is because of all the other sensors.
Dr. Marburger. Right.
Mr. Inglis. Now, what if time goes on, and we don't meet
the timelines from here for the launch of these, the new NPOESS
satellites. Is there enough redundancy with the life expectancy
of the existing satellites to continue to collect data?
Dr. Marburger. It would be, it would represent a serious
problem for NOAA and the Department of Defense if the NPOESS
mission were stretched out indefinitely. I mean, this is, in
fact, a very important satellite program. It provides basic
weather capabilities for operational weather forecasting for
the National Weather Service and for the military. So it is
important for NPOESS to survive, and that is one of the reasons
that such drastic decisions were made to remove these important
science sensors so that the remaining sensors could be launched
on time.
And it is also one of the reasons that we are being so
careful about making decisions to put things back, recommend to
put things back on. You don't want to jeopardize those
fundamental operational missions. We need to have the ability
to track hurricanes and make weather forecasts for a variety of
purposes.
So this is a program that got in trouble. It is very
important. Priorities had to be set, reconfigurations had to be
designed, and we are now facing the questions, the problem of
what do we do next. How do we maintain as much capability as we
can for these important missions and not lose the essential
capabilities that NPOESS was designed for.
It doesn't mean that we are diminishing the science or that
we don't think that the science is important. Indeed, we do,
and we are committed to making our capabilities strong enough
to continue to provide leadership in science, in climate
science, as we have been.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. Mr. Baird, you are recognized for five
minutes.
Impact on the Earth-observation Program
Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am interested in the
interface between the manned missions and the Earth-observatory
missions, and actually the President's call for eventually
trying to get to Mars and how that may have impacted some of
the Earth-observational missions in a variety of possible ways,
which I will put out but then ask for your comment.
You could imagine it impacts it budgetarily, you could
imagine that personnel are drawn from one mission to another,
you can imagine that the perceived priority for advancement
status of people working on one project versus another drops as
some new, more glamorous or politically sexy thing comes in.
What is--any insights into that, how this manned effort may
have possibly adversely, or possibly complimentarily, impacted
this; not just NPOESS but other Earth-observation missions?
Dr. Marburger. Well, there is no question that NASA
operates in a pretty tight budget envelope, and in each request
to Congress for funding for NASA the President, Office of
Management and Budget, my office, and the agencies get
together, we try to figure out what is going to work. And I
must say that it would be easier to do the things that we ask
NASA to do if Congress did, in fact, fund the requests that
were made by, as a result of this planning project. It doesn't
always happen, and it didn't happen this time.
For example, it would be a lot easier for the NASA
Administrator to make these tough decisions if he had--if his
budget were funded according to the plans that were developed
during the budget process, which are embedded in the
President's request to Congress. Congress did not fund NASA by
half a billion dollars within the targets that the President
had requested.
So things like that make it difficult. So we always have to
go back and ask for impact statements and so forth to inform
the next round of budgeting. But I believe that the American
people support both space exploration and space science. They
are exciting. The space science is just as exciting as the
exploration. We have got these, it is not only photographs, but
we have got really remarkable information about our universe
that the American people and people around the world are
excited about. So we are committed to both. This Administration
has mapped out a space exploration vision that from the
beginning was pitched as a step by step, not a----
Mr. Baird. I am going to interrupt you, Dr. Marburger. I
hate to do that because----
Dr. Marburger. Sorry.
Mr. Baird.--I have a lot of respect for you, but if we
recap the Administration's mission to Mars, we will not really
get to the question I asked, and it would be delightful to do
the other more fun, but the question I really asked was how
does the very mission you are talking about impact the Earth-
observational programs that we are, that are before us today.
Mr. Powner, would you care to comment on that or Dr.
Marburger or General Mashiko?
Dr. Marburger. Let me add first of all, the NPOESS mission
was funded through the Department of Defense and the Department
of Commerce, not NASA. It certainly--NASA--some important space
weather and Earth-observing missions are funded through NASA
but----
Mr. Baird. Yeah. When I said NPOESS, I meant----
Dr. Marburger.--I believe----
Mr. Baird.--the broader Earth-observational plan.
Dr. Marburger. Yeah. I believe that this is not primarily a
money problem. I believe the problem associated with NPOESS,
the program we are talking about today, is not primarily a
money problem. I believe it is a management problem.
Mr. Baird. Mr. Powner or General Mashiko, any comments on
that?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Certainly. To provide some
insight at a purely tactical level, NASA has been very
supportive of the program to the extent that while we have ten
dedicated personnel, NASA-badged personnel working in my office
or in Colonel Stockton's integrated program office, I have an
additional 90 people that are supporting the program either
full- or part-time out of NASA Goddard or out of Headquarters,
and those people are provided based on being the subject-matter
experts that we needed to work on either sensors or specific
types of problems. And those were brought to bear by the chief
engineer's office as well as the center director out at
Goddard.
Mr. Baird. Was there any borrowing? In other words, were
people moved from this mission or other related Earth-
observational missions to focus on the manned exploration side
at any point?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Sir, these people--the areas of
expertise were primarily in the types of sensors that are
flying on the polar satellites as well as the GOES satellites.
So it is that type of background that we are exploiting.
Mr. Baird. Mr. Powner, any comments?
Mr. Powner. We clearly did not look in terms of, you know,
where those folks came from to supplement Colonel Mashiko's
staff.
Mr. Baird. I think whether or not the particular issue on
this particular mission lead to a conclusion that the Moon/Mars
exploration has impacted Earth observation in this particular
case may be ambiguous. I don't think it is ambiguous. My read
of the information is it is not ambiguous in a broader case of
Earth observation. Would that be a fair statement? In other
words, that there is fairly--there is a fairly clear potential
adverse impact of the increased focus on the manned mission to
the Moon and Mars, and we may choose to make that decision, but
making that decision has impacts in a finite world with $2
billion a week going to Iraq, a $9 trillion budget deficit, a
$450 billion operating deficit, et cetera, et cetera. Is that a
fair statement that we are making a decision if we pursue these
manned explorations to other planets to possibly give shorter
shrift to our Earth observational?
Dr. Marburger. We always have to have priorities, and if
there is limited funds, then you have to make priorities in
each area, and everybody suffers. I believe that both sides of
the NASA house, the exploration side and the science side, are
operating under pretty severe budget constraints at the present
time.
Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. You are welcome, Mr. Baird.
I will now recognize Ms. Biggert for five minutes.
Project Management
Ms. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me go back.
Dr. Marburger, you suggested that it was not a money
problem but a management problem. Is that because of three
agencies, or is there a different problem?
Dr. Marburger. I believe that the management issues have
been outlined pretty well in the reports that you have
available. The GAO has followed this for a long time, and you
know, the management of big, technically-advanced programs is
always difficult. It is hard to know where the technology will
be by the time you are ready to launch or in the cases I am
more familiar with, building particle accelerators. You really
have to guess where the technology will be when you are ready
to install it. And I think there is a special kind of
management that goes with technically-intensive projects. This
is the kind of management that General Mashiko is an expert in,
and she referred to some of the things that one does in
managing these types of programs.
So it isn't just a question of paying attention and keeping
the books correctly. It is also a question of doing project
management, to take into account the technical risks that you
know are going to be there, and to have large contingencies and
so forth that will prevent surprises.
Ms. Biggert. Well, as you know, as this progresses, do you
think then that there should be just one agency involved? And
if so, which one?
Dr. Marburger. Now we are getting into a matter of opinion
here about the management. When it comes to space projects,
there are two parts. One is the infrastructure associated with
launching and operating in space, and there is quite a
substantial infrastructure that is somewhat independent of the
instruments. The other is the instrumental and scientific
context. So very frequently you will have an agency like the
National Science Foundation or the Department of Energy that
has a project that needs to be launched in space. They almost
have to work with NASA in order to couple the space expertise
with the instrumental and science expertise.
So I believe that we will continue to see projects that are
managed--that require multi-agency coordination, and we just
have to learn lessons about how to do that from NPOESS and from
the other projects, some of which have gone sour, too. We have
to learn how to do that, because we are going to be doing more
and more of it as time goes on.
International Collaboration
Ms. Biggert. How would you then characterize the
international community's interest in remote sensoring, and
should we be looking at opportunities to engage them with us
and, again, this would be costs?
Dr. Marburger. We certainly should be, and one of the
features of the restructured NPOESS program is to take
advantage of European weather satellites in two of the orbits
that were de-manifested. So prior to restructuring, there were
six satellites in three different orbits associated with this
program. After restructuring, there were four satellites in two
orbits, and the third orbit would be provided by the Europeans,
so that we are already taking into account the possibility that
other countries will have capabilities that we can use. And we
absolutely must be building those into our plans, those
capabilities into our plans.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Ms. Biggert.
Mr. Diaz-Balart, five minutes.
QuikSCAT
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to talk a little bit about the QuikSCAT satellite. I was in the
Hurricane Center just last week for obvious reasons, and I was
able to see firsthand--and which I had seen before, the actual
passes of the QuikSCAT satellite that provides some information
that frankly, is extremely valuable to, you know, to figure out
where the centers of the storms are, et cetera. And we all know
that it was supposed to have a five-year lifespan. It is on its
eighth year. It may be on its way out. We don't know. And what
was supposed to replace that was taken out of the ones that are
supposed to come up shortly, and now the replacement doesn't go
up to 2016.
Frankly, that is a little worrisome. Yes, they are looking
at ways to tap into other satellites, European satellites, but
what I have heard is that what that satellite provides is
frankly something that is not totally replaceable with what is
out there right now.
And the question is why 2016, if we know that we have a
satellite that is, you know, on its eighth year of what is
supposed to be a five-year lifespan. And after knowing that,
you know, we are in an elevated cycle of storms that about a
30-year cycle history will show us, and we know the cost of
those storms, I don't quite understand why that is not a higher
priority.
Dr. Marburger. Mr. Congressman, the QuikSCAT information is
clearly important for tracking hurricanes. We understand the
importance of that program and are watching it.
The problems that have been publicized associated with
QuikSCAT have not appeared in any priority documentation that
has reached me or my office. My understanding is that the
satellite continues to be very functional, all of its
instruments are functioning, it has switched over to a back-up
telemetry system, which is functioning very well. I presume it
is at least as robust as the original telemetry system with
which there was a problem, but it is not, it has not been rated
as requiring urgent attention at this time. And as soon as an
agency that has responsibility for this, these types of
measurements notifies us that it is an urgent priority, we will
certainly pay attention to it. But it simply hasn't risen to
that level of priority that we have seen fit to intervene on.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. If I may, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. Yes.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I bring this up
because obviously if we were to lose that satellite, that
capability, it is about a 16 percent reduction in the actual
forecasting, you know, coverage.
Chairman Lampson. Right.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Or efficiency or whatever you want to call
it.
Chairman Lampson. An important piece. Right.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Right. Right. Now, if you would be so
kind, sir, if you would have somebody look into that, because I
do know, I'm not the smartest guy in the world, but it seems to
me that if it is a five-year lifespan, and you are on the
eighth year, and now we are looking at until 2016, I don't know
how many years you can milk out of something like this. But I
would like somebody to get back to me and tell me they have
looked at that. If, in fact, there is absolute confidence that
it is going to be there, working well until then, and if not,
what are the alternatives. Because I just, I am a little
concerned as you can well know, you can imagine, the hurricane
season comes, and I represent South Florida and the only
hurricanes we like are the football team from the University of
Miami.
Dr. Marburger. Well, despite the fact that this hasn't come
up in our discussions and briefings, when we heard about the
concerns we began to look at them. We will get back to you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Great.
Dr. Marburger.With whatever we find.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Great. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart.
I yield myself five minutes.
General Mashiko's Departure
Dr. Marburger, your testimony about management just a
minute ago obviously referred to also what General Mashiko said
earlier about it is hard to find talented space people. But is
that not exactly the reason why she ought to be considered to
be kept as the director, or as the person over this program,
rather than changing horses at this time?
Dr. Marburger. That is not my decision to make. That is the
Department of Defense's decision. They have the responsibility
for managing this program, and they are one of the principle
beneficiaries of the results from NPOESS, and I believe that--
--
Chairman Lampson. Would you agree with me that is something
that they certainly ought to consider?
Dr. Marburger. I have the highest respect for General
Mashiko's talents, and I wish she were working for me.
Chairman Lampson. All right. Mr. Powner, would you comment,
and so would you, General Mashiko, would you, I don't want to
put you on the spot, both of you. Start with Mr. Powner.
Mr. Powner. Well, clearly that was one of the
recommendations in our report. You are at a point in this
program where there is still a lot of risks involved, VIIRS in
particular. They need to be aggressively managed. She does a
very good job holding contractors accountable, picking up the
phone, talking to executives, with the various contractors and
subcontractors, getting them to the table. We don't believe now
is the time to rotate someone like General Mashiko. She does a
very good job, and an important part of this program is
continuity of executive leadership. That has been a problem
leading up to the Nunn-McCurdy issue, and now you have a key
executive, and you are about to rotate her off. We don't think
that is wise.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you. Now I will put you on the
spot.
Brigadier General Mashiko. Let me address it a couple ways,
sir. The upcoming period--because we are going to have the
program restructured and in place in the beginning of July, is
going to be primarily execution. Now that there is a--there
will be a contract in place, so it is going to be primarily
execution; where you are going to need the critical continuity
is, in fact, at the program director level. The way you
separate the area of responsibility, if you will, the program
director is the one that truly makes the contactor execute on a
day-to-day fashion. The program executive deals up and out, and
with respect to my job, which is up and out, clearly sitting
here and dealing with various other agencies, the Department of
Commerce has the responsibility to replace me. They have been
using the standard OPM process in order to do that. They got a
reasonable number of candidates. They were screened. The
candidates have, in fact, been interviewed, and as soon as we
get the EXCOM, all three members on the telephone to do the
actual ratification of the selection, the name will go forward
to OPM for approval.
And I have been informed that we do have a viable candidate
for my replacement, and so once that happens we will be more
than happy to let the Committee know who that is, in fact,
going to be.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you very much.
Program Status
Is the NPOESS program as currently constituted on track to
deliver four satellites in orbit to operate between the years
2013 and 2036--2026, excuse me--for an acquisition cost of
$11.5 billion, and an additional $1 billion in operating costs?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Sir, until the contract is
negotiated, all I can tell you is that is what the plans are.
At the present time we believe that the program will, in fact,
meet the total acquisition cost of $11.5 billion with the
additional billion dollars for operations and support.
To give you additional confidence and to give myself
additional confidence, I asked the OSD\13\ cost group who did
the original independent cost estimate that the Nunn-McCurdy
was based on, I asked them to do an independent cost estimate
as to what operations and support will be in the future, and
the allocation of those dollars and which year should they be
so that we can do the necessary flow of money to get everything
correctly lined up.
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\13\ OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense.
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So that is in work. That, in parallel with the negotiation
of the actual modification, will solidify what the final cost
of the program should be, and then we can then make any
adjustments to the budget. But any adjustments to the budget
will be in the out years, not the years of execution.
Chairman Lampson. Okay. You believe right now it is on
track?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lampson. I hesitate to ask this. My time is----
Mr. Powner. Mr. Chairman, can I just add something to that?
Chairman Lampson. Please.
Mr. Powner. You know, that is fine that we are making that
statement, but I just want to be clear that GAO's opinion on
this, there are still a lot of risks, and until that contract's
inked, you know, I think we need to remain very cautious with
that estimate until that contract is solidified. And that is to
be next month.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you. I know my time is up. Bear
with me for just a second, please, because this is a short
question, and maybe rhetorical.
The report from NASA and NOAA did not include financial
data that was necessary--that deal with a lot of this. Along
the way has anyone been fired or censored because of actions
that they have taken, or has any contract been terminated?
Anybody, please.
Brigadier General Mashiko. Sir, let me ask you what
timeframe do you mean, and then I will----
Chairman Lampson. At any time.
Brigadier General Mashiko. Okay. Let me back all the way up
to August of 2005. At that point the system program director
resigned. That was the government system program director. At
the contractor, the contractor program director was removed.
Most of his management staff was, in fact, changed at the
contractor at the Northrop Grumman level. If you go to
Raytheon, Santa Barbara, which was responsible for the VIIRS
contract, we have done, over time, almost two full management
shifts and change-outs in order to find the right management
team to actually execute the program. As a result we have a
vice-president out at Raytheon literally running the VIIRS
program. He is a Navy nuke guy, so he comes from a zero-defect
kind of background, and that is the type of management rigor
that has been put in place out at Santa Barbara. The management
team at Northrop Grumman--what we have done there, in addition
to doing the change of the program manager--originally that
program manager was a direct report to the sector president,
totally bypassing the functionals, if you will, within the
Northrop Grumman campus. We have changed that such that NPOESS
is not treated as a normal program, and the functional vice
presidents at Northrop Grumman are now fully engaged in the
program, bringing that level of expertise and experience to the
program as well.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you very much. Were you responsible
for most of that?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Sir, myself and my team.
Chairman Lampson. I hate to see you go. Thank you for your
good service.
I yield five minutes to Mr. Inglis, the Ranking Member.
More on General Mashiko's Departure
Mr. Inglis. General Mashiko, based on your departure coming
up in a month, I think it is, is there going to be enough time
for you to bring the replacement up to speed, or is that a
concern that you have?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Sir, in all honesty it is going
to depend on who the individual actually selected is. And we
will make the necessary adjustments. The Air Force is prepared
to allow me to split my time in order to do a correct
transition if it is somebody who is being brought in from the
outside.
Mr. Inglis. Right. Because it does sound like, particularly
based on your last entry, the last question, that there is an
awful lot of information that you will be taking with you that
needs to be imparted to your replacement. So I hope there is
some flexibility on how it is that you will be able to bring
them up to speed.
Brigadier General Mashiko. Yes, sir. There is a great deal
of flexibility with my new boss, and the other thing is, is the
new job that I am going to I will be spending considerable time
in the Washington, D.C. area, so that will also facilitate any
additional overlap that is required after my departure.
Mr. Inglis. Nice to be so indispensable, isn't it? That is
a good thing, you know.
Brigadier General Mashiko. Yes, sir. Job security is a
wonderful thing.
Mr. Inglis. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. Mr. Baird. Five minutes.
Technology Transfer
Mr. Baird. The gentleman from Florida raised an interesting
issue that highlights a broader question which has to do with
the research operations process. So you set up, buy something
for research purposes, you come back with some interesting
data. How then do you translate that instrumentation or the
analogs that develop out of that or whatever data you get into
actual usage, sustainable information feedback? And this
research to operations gap. Could anybody comment on that and
what is being done to address that? So we don't just go out,
find something interesting, and then not actually apply it down
the road. And sometimes you find something that is not
applicable, but if you find something useful, what are we doing
to follow up on that?
Dr. Marburger. On the science side most of the data
analyses that lead to discoveries are published in the open
literature, and that is the medium of communication at the
basic level that the science community relies on to get these
ideas out and have them discussed in conferences. And there are
usually teams of people sometimes from multiple federal
laboratories and universities that manage these so that they
appear at conferences.
Mr. Baird. I have read many of the special issues of
Science from these very things.
Dr. Marburger. You know how that works.
Mr. Baird. I am a long member of AAAS\15\ and subscribed--
--
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\15\ AAAS: American Association for the Advancement of Science.
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Dr. Marburger. So the next steps are usually rather
complicated and not terribly well defined. Most institutions,
both federal labs and universities have technology transfer
offices that are alert for ideas that their scientists have
that might be turned into commercially-significant
applications, and they work with the faculty and or with the
scientists who protect the intellectual property.
Mr. Baird. Now, what about NASA and NOAA, that interface?
You know, you send up a research flight, find something
interesting. Do you then incorporate that in terms of a long-
term observational system or something stable that becomes part
of your regular routine?
Dr. Marburger. When it comes to the instrumentation,
absolutely. The discoveries that are made, for example, by a
contractor developing an advanced sensor are typically made
available to other projects. And I would say that some of the
technology that we find on our cell phones and our digital
cameras came from early work and early experience with NASA
imaging requirements. And particularly from military imagining
requirements. So we have----
Mr. Baird. I appreciate, I know there are spin offs in the
general. I am told that this is a recurring problem or
perceives to be a recurring problem, that we sort of do one
slight thing but they don't necessarily translate into long
term in the NASA-NOAA interface.
Dr. Marburger. Well, I don't think the NASA-NOAA interface
is unique. I believe that this problem exists with almost every
scientific application, but the, you know, what makes the
communications work is that the scientists and the engineers
talk to each other about whether there are stovepipes in
agencies or not. The good ideas do tend to get translated.
So my view is it is a complex press. There may be cases
where interagency communications aren't ideal, but in this
scientific community and the technical community, there is a
great deal of interchange of ideas.
I would be glad to respond to it to more specific or
detailed questions about this because it is an important issue
that my office watches. And we specifically are charged by
Congress to do interagency coordination and sometimes it is not
easy. So if problems arise that you are aware of that you would
like to have more feedback on or just----
Mr. Baird. I guess one example I could imagine, you know,
you build these things and so it is an interactive process. So
you send up a flight, gather some data. For sure then somebody
else wants to send their flight up, and they want to gather
their data.
Dr. Marburger. Right.
Mr. Baird. But the question for me is to what extent do
you--is there a prioritization that says, ``Okay, we sent this
up. We learned this from this.'' Now, maybe our next test
flight is not--whoever happens to be next in the queue of
putting something from the first one we learned permanently
because, lo and behold, it was actually useful instead of
having--okay. Shelve that. Publish your special issue of
Science magazine. We all read it, and--or most people don't,
but then we go to the next, publish a special issue of Science,
and somewhere along the line that cumulative benefit gets lost.
Dr. Marburger. In general that kind of intelligence that is
brought to the sequence of scientific explorations is provided
by the scientific community through the National Academies of
Science, and the decadal surveys and the special reports that
are commissioned both by NOAA and by NASA are taken very
seriously by those agencies as they plan their projects and
programs. And we watch that process at OSTP. We force the
agencies to come together and make strategic plans together
that provide guidance for all the agencies that might
participate in these. And we frequently ask the agencies to go
to the National Academy or to their own external advisory
panels of scientists to get advice on what to do next and how
to take advantage of that data that already exists.
Mr. Baird. Anyone else care to comment on that?
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Baird.
More on Data Gap Concerns
General Mashiko, GAO states that the cost analysts are
about 90 percent confident that there will be--that they are 90
percent confident that there will be no weather coverage gap.
What is the basis for that confidence?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Sir, when we went through the
Nunn-McCurdy process, that was the driving priority, and it was
the operational data continuity. What we did was in order to
assure approximately a 90 percent operational data continuity,
which the GAO refers to, we had to pull risks out of the first
NPOESS bird in order to increase the likelihood of it being
able to be launched on the date specified, which is why the
CMIS\16\ sensor was canceled and taken off of the first Charley
bird and put on the second Charley bird. Because that was going
to be the critical path for that, the first operational NPOESS,
and we needed to get the risk equation down such that we
increased the likelihood that that satellite would, in fact, be
able to be delivered and launched when it was going to be
needed in the afternoon orbit. Because if you take a look at
the heritage satellites, which are DMSP\17\ in the early
morning and mid-morning in orbit and then POES\18\ in the
afternoon orbit, they actually run out of POES in the afternoon
orbit, and there would be an operational data gap such that we
wouldn't be able to do standard weather forecasting that we
have all gotten used to on the Weather Channel, unless we were
able to get the NPOESS bird up there in the timeframe.
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\16\ CMIS: Conical Microwave Imaging Sounder.
\17\ DMSP: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program.
\18\ POES: Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite.
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And that is what is generally referred to as the 90 percent
schedule.
Chairman Lampson. Mr. Powner, could you comment also?
Mr. Powner. Well, I think what this, what came out of Nunn-
McCurdy really highlights the importance of staying on schedule
now. I mean, we have pushed a lot of these birds, extending
their useful lives. I mean, fortunately, we have been able to
push off some of the launches of POES and DMSP, but it is
important from this point forward that we really do stick to
the schedule going forward so that we may maintain that
continuity.
And I think the General brings up a very important
balancing act here in terms of, you know, what we add to C1 and
when we lock that down to keep it simple so that we can hit
that date.
Chairman Lampson. Okay. The GAO also paraphrases the cost
analyst as saying that they are highly confident acquisition
costs will not exceed $11.5 billion, but a lower level of
confidence that the sensor configuration will remain unchanged.
The lower level of configuration and the sensor configuration
suggests to me that the program is prepared to accept further
changes that will decrease the observational capabilities of
this satellite system to maintain this budget. Is that the
case, first, General Mashiko? And then Mr. Powner, would you
comment?
Brigadier General Mashiko. Sir, I believe what the cost
analysts are referring to--to put it very simply, normally I
always have a program schedule where I have a triangle on it
that I don't generally publish, and that is the day I shoot the
engineers, because literally you need to stop doing the
changes, you button up what you have got, and you go with it.
Because you are better off getting what you have on orbit and
getting the utility of out it and then making step wise changes
or improvements on the next serial number.
And that is I believe what the cost analysts were referring
to. It is not a matter of taking sensors off. It is being able
to make the decision of go with what you have got, get it on
orbit, and get the end-to-end data chain up and operational.
And then make step-wise improvements if necessary to subsequent
serial numbers.
Chairman Lampson. Mr. Powner.
Mr. Powner. That is a fine approach to mitigate risks. I
think the key question, though, going forward, and one example
is NPP with the preparatory satellites that is currently in
place. You know, it will fly. The game plan now is to fly it on
schedule, but it is going to fly in a degraded mode where there
are certain environmental data records that will not be
available.
In particular, the way we measure ocean color and aerosol
measurement, and what does that mean to users so we can button
down and hit schedule and that type of thing, but there is an
impact on users, and that needs to be clearly articulated.
Chairman Lampson. Well, thank you. Thank all of you very,
very much. We appreciate your being here and for your testimony
before the Committee today and at other times.
The record will remain open for additional statements from
the Members and for answers to any follow-up questions the
Committee may ask of the witnesses.
The witnesses are excused, and the hearing is now
adjourned. Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Additional Material for the Record