[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S MOST WANTED AVIATION SAFETY
IMPROVEMENTS
=======================================================================
(110-47)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 6, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
35-929 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800
DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon DON YOUNG, Alaska
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
Columbia JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
JERROLD NADLER, New York WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
CORRINE BROWN, Florida VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
BOB FILNER, California STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California GARY G. MILLER, California
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington Carolina
RICK LARSEN, Washington TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
JULIA CARSON, Indiana SAM GRAVES, Missouri
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri Virginia
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DORIS O. MATSUI, California TED POE, Texas
NICK LAMPSON, Texas DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio CONNIE MACK, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa York
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina Louisiana
MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia
JOHN J. HALL, New York MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
JERRY McNERNEY, California
VACANCY
(ii)
Subcommittee on Aviation
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman
BOB FILNER, California THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa SAM GRAVES, Missouri
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
JOHN J. HALL, New York SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin Virginia
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TED POE, Texas
Columbia DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
CORRINE BROWN, Florida CONNIE MACK, Florida
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California York
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DORIS O. MATSUI, California VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii JOHN L. MICA, Florida
VACANCY (Ex Officio)
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
TESTIMONY
Coyne, James K., President, National Air Transportation
Association.................................................... 33
Dunham, Gail, President, National Air Disaster Alliance/
Foundation..................................................... 33
Friend, Patricia, International President, Association of Flight
Attendants..................................................... 33
Gilligan, Margaret, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration, accompanied by John Hickey,
Director of Aircraft Certification Services, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 5
Prater, Captain John, President, Air Line Pilots Association
International.................................................. 33
Rosenker, Hon. Mark V., Chairman, National Transportation Safety
Board, accompanied by Tom Haueter, Director of Aviation Safety,
National Transportation Safety Board........................... 5
Voss, William R., President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation.... 33
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 53
Hirono, Hon. Mazie K., of Hawaii................................. 59
Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 61
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 65
Salazar, Hon. John T., of Colorado............................... 67
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Coyne, James K................................................... 69
Dunham, Gail..................................................... 77
Friend, Patricia A............................................... 88
Gilligan, Margaret............................................... 98
Prater, Captain John............................................. 128
Rosenker, Mark V................................................. 140
Voss, William R.................................................. 160
SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD
Dunham, Gail, President, National Air Disaster Alliance/
Foundation, response to question from the Subcommittee......... 85
Gilligan, Margaret, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration, accompanied by John Hickey,
Director of Aircraft Certification Services, Federal Aviation
Administration:
Response to questions from Rep. Moran.......................... 114
Response to questions from the Subcommittee.................... 116
Rosenker, Hon. Mark V., Chairman, National Transportation Safety
Board, accompanied by Tom Haueter, Director of Aviation Safety,
National Transportation Safety Board, response to questions
from Rep. Chandler............................................. 155
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
HEARING ON THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S MOST WANTED
AVIATION SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS
----------
Wednesday, June 6, 2007
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Aviation
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerry
F. Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Costello. The Subcommittee will come to order.
The Chair will ask all Members, staff and everyone in the
hearing room to turn their electronic devices off or on
vibrate.
The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
National Transportation Safety Board's Most Wanted Aviation
Safety Improvements. I will give an opening statement and then
call on my colleague and the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee
to give his opening statement or brief remarks.
I welcome everyone to today's hearing on the National
Transportation Safety Board's Most Wanted Aviation Safety
Improvements. I have said time and again that although the
United States has the safest air transportation system in the
world, we cannot rely on or be satisfied with our past success.
We must continue to strive for greater success because one
accident or one near accident is one too many.
The National Transportation Safety Board has been
investigating accidents and proposing remedies to avoid them
since it was founded in 1967. With an overall recommendation
acceptance rate of approximately 82 percent by the FAA,
important changes and procedures have been made to improve the
safety of the traveling public.
Since 1990, the NTSB has kept a Most Wanted List
representing the most serious problems facing the
transportation industry. There continues to be significant
challenges in aviation safety. The NTSB's Most Wanted List has
six issue areas for aviation, five of which receive an
unacceptable response. I am disappointed and concerned as many
of these issues have been on the Most Wanted List for five, ten
or even fifteen years.
For example, runway incursions has been on the Most Wanted
List since the list started in 1990. While new technologies
have come on line and are slowly being deployed at our
airports, serious incursions continue to happen. In an incident
as recently as January 5th, 2007, at Denver International
Airport where the NTSB states that two airplanes missed
colliding by almost 50 feet remind us of the importance of
runway safety.
Further, both the General Accounting Office and the
Department of Transportation's Inspector General's Office have
also highlighted runway incursions as a safety concern. Yet,
this issue still remains on the Most Wanted List.
I am interested in hearing both from the NTSB and the FAA
why these six issue areas remain on the Most Wanted List, what,
if any, progress is being made and when we can expect to see
significant improvements in these issue areas.
I am also interested in hearing more about fatigue. Fatigue
is an issue that affects all modes of transportation. Aviation
is a 24 hour, seven day a week business with demanding work
schedules. We must do more to ensure that all aviation safety
professionals are rested and are alert to perform their duties.
Finally, I would like to point out that Gail Dunham,
Executive Director of the National Disaster Alliance/Foundation
is with us today. She represents family members that have lost
loved ones in aviation accidents. Gail and her group know
firsthand the pain that results when our aviation system is not
performing at its highest level of safety possible. She reminds
us all that we must demand the highest standards of aviation
safety.
We must work together to ensure that we continue asking the
tough questions and issue the even tougher and sometimes costly
rules to guarantee the highest level of safety for the
traveling public.
With that, I again want to welcome all of our witnesses and
everyone here today, and I look forward to hearing the
testimony of our witnesses.
Before I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his
opening statement or comments, I would ask unanimous consent to
allow two weeks for all Members to revise and extend their
remarks and to permit the submission of additional statements
and materials by Members and witnesses.
Without objection, so ordered.
At this time, the Chair recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr.
Petri, for his opening statement.
Mr. Petri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our aviation system is the largest and safest in the world.
Commercial aviation is also seeing the highest safety record in
its over 100 years of existence. This remarkable record is the
result of hard work by the safety officials at the FAA in
cooperation with the National Transportation Safety Board and,
of course, of the aviation community.
According to the FAA during 2004 to 2006, the average
passenger death rate has fallen by some 90 percent from the
average rate just 10 years. While no loss is acceptable, this
remarkable improvement in passenger safety should be remarked
upon. Certainly, to remain the leader of aviation safety
worldwide and protect the lives of those who travel by air, we
need to remain ever vigilant in our efforts to mitigate ongoing
and emerging safety hazards.
Each year since 1990, the National Transportation Safety
Board has issued an annual list of its most wanted safety
improvements to draw attention to safety issues that the Board
believes will have the greatest impact on transportation
safety. Through the Most Wanted List, the Board identifies its
most important safety hazards, makes recommendations for FAA
action and tracks progress of the FAA's efforts to mitigate the
identified risks.
It should be noted that the safety issues included on the
Most Wanted List tend to be the most complex, controversial and
indeed costly to address. Additionally, many of the Board's
recommendations require the development of new technologies or
operational solutions to safety issues. That is why some of the
recommendations remain on the list for many years.
Since the Most Wanted List began 17 years ago, the Board
has closed 58 aviation safety recommendations. Of those, 44
recommendations or 75 percent have been closed with an
acceptable rating by the National Transportation Safety Board,
and 7 of those were actually classified as closed, exceeds
recommended action. Some Most Wanted List recommendations are
rated unacceptable and have remained on the list for several
years or more.
While the Board agrees that great progress has been made in
many of these aviation safety hazard areas, it does not believe
that the safety issues have been completely resolved. The best
examples of this are runway incursions and aircraft icing
issues. So I look forward to hearing from the FAA on their
progress on these two important safety issues.
While it is understandable that complex problems take time
to solve, their potential to result in large scale catastrophic
accidents means that they need to be urgently attended to.
I look forward to hearing about the FAA's progress on the
other safety items on the National Transportation Safety
Board's Most Wanted List, and I am also interested in hearing
the views of our witnesses on the second panel regarding the
processes at the FAA and the National Transportation Safety
Board.
I thank the witnesses for appearing today and yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair now
recognizes for an opening statement the former Chairman of this
Subcommittee, Mr. Duncan from Tennessee.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The NTSB has made many good safety recommendations over the
years and the FAA has, I think, done a good job of trying to
balance the costs and the benefits but certainly always coming
down on the side of safety where possible.
One of the NTSB's most wanted recommendations includes
improvement of the audio and data recorders on commercial
aircraft also known as the black boxes. The NTSB's
recommendations include the requirement for the installation of
a second set of recorder systems on the aircraft to achieve
redundancy of what is arguably the most important tool used to
understand the cause of aviation crash.
Several Members of this Committee and the House Homeland
Security Committee and the authorizing committee and the
Appropriations Committees have supported the implementation of
this requirement with the inclusion of a deployable or
ejectable flat data and cockpit voice recorder system as the
backup system to the currently required fixed recorders. This
makes a lot of sense to me.
The deployable system records all required information but
is designed to survive the crash differently than a fixed
recorder. One of the deployable recorder's most significant
benefits is its ability to separate from the aircraft at crash
impact and float indefinitely on water while sending immediate
notification to search and rescue crews of its and the
aircraft's location. This is critically important in the
aviation environment we live in today particularly for aircraft
that are used in extended over-ocean operations.
I could go into this further, but I won't.
You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Gail Dunham who is President o
the National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation. They have
recommended this along with many other groups. I think this is
something that we need to take a very close look at because
this certainly could have helped in the TWA 800 crash and
several other aviation accidents over the years.
So, with that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now
recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Matsui.
Ms. Matsui. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Costello and
Ranking Member Petri, thank you for calling this hearing today.
I appreciate your skilled leadership during this FAA
reauthorization process.
I would also like to thank our distinguished panel of
speakers and witnesses. Your testimony will help inform our
decisions as we address an issue of paramount importance to
millions of American and international travelers.
So far on this Subcommittee, we have dealt with many
important topics related to FAA reauthorization. We have
examined aviation consumer issues and looked at Next Gen. We
have delved into outsourcing and airport improvement financing.
These are all integral parts of our Country's air transit
system. However, none of these is as critical as safety. For
that reason, this hearing today could probably be one of our
most important of the year.
Mr. Chairman, I think most of us have felt the occasional
pang of fear while flying. Whether during takeoff, landing, or
during turbulence, flight can be frightening for many people.
There is very little we can do about the human instinct that
causes us to react this way. Fortunately, we can do a lot to
ensure that this fear is unfounded. We do this by making our
aviation system as safe as possible.
Some say that flying is already one of the safest ways to
travel. This is true. It is more than 20 times safer to fly
than to drive on our Nation's highways. Nonetheless, as we
reauthorize the FAA, we can and should improve on its safety
record.
As Members of Congress, we simply must be sure that
American aviation is the safest, most secure in the world.
Dealing with congestion is one way to do this. Upgrading our
air traffic control infrastructure is another. The Subcommittee
has already demonstrated a strong commitment to these goals.
The best way to protect the flying public, however, is to
follow the recommendations of those who know safety.
Mr. Chairman, the National Transportation Safety Board
knows safety. The accomplished and professional people who work
for the NTSB are experts on this subject. Fortunately, they
have made it simple for the FAA and for us in Congress by
issuing six proposals to increase aviation safety right now.
These six recommendations are our road map to safer and more
secure skies, but recommendations are empty unless they are
followed. The NTSB's six safety proposals are no exception.
I am hopeful the FAA will re-dedicate itself to
strengthening its safety policies. Only then will the American
people fly the safest, most pleasant and most secure skies in
the world.
Thank you again for your leadership, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to listening to today's testimony. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and, at this
time, welcomes our first panel.
Let me introduce our witnesses here today: the Honorable
Mark Rosenker, the Chairman of the NTSB, and he is accompanied
by Mr. Tom Haueter who is the Director of Aviation Safety with
the NTSB; Margaret Gilligan who is the Associate Administrator
for Aviation Safety with the FAA, and she is accompanied by
John Hickey who is the Director of Aircraft Certification
Services for the FAA.
Gentlemen and lady, we welcome you here today and look
forward to your testimony.
The Chair now recognizes Chairman Rosenker.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MARK V. ROSENKER, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD ACCOMPANIED BY TOM HAUETER,
DIRECTOR OF AVIATION SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
BOARD; MARGARET GILLIGAN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION
SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN
HICKEY, DIRECTOR OF AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION SERVICES, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Rosenker. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Petri and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for allowing
me the opportunity to present testimony on behalf of the
National Transportation Safety Board regarding the agency's
Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements.
Our list of Most Wanted Safety Improvements was initiated
in 1990 as an additional way for the Safety Board to focus
attention on a group of safety recommendations selected for
intensive follow-up.
The 2007 list includes six issue areas addressed to the
FAA. The first issue asks the FAA to revise the way aircraft
are designed and approved for flight into icing conditions.
More than 10 years after the Safety Board issued these
recommendations, the FAA has yet to issue any of the
operational design or testing requirement revisions
recommended.
The NPRMs issued in November of 2005 and April of 2007
reflect good progress but full implementation of the regulatory
change may still be several years away. The pace of the FAA's
activities in response to these icing recommendations is
unacceptably slow.
Issue area two asks the FAA to implement design changes to
eliminate the generation of flammable fuel or air vapors in all
transport category aircraft as a result of the in-flight
breakup of TWA Flight 800. The FAA has developed a prototype
inerting system to be retrofitted into existing airplanes at a
fraction of the industry estimated cost. The system has been
flight tested by the FAA, and the results indicate that the
fuel tank inerting is both practical and effective.
An NPRM was published in the Federal Register in November
of 2005 to require the installation of the flammability
reduction system in commercial aircraft. The NPRM closed a year
ago, and the FAA stated that a rule concerning flammability
reduction would be issued this year.
The runway incursion issue has been on the Most Wanted List
since its inception in 1990. The FAA has since informed
controllers of potential runway incursions, improved airport
markings and installed system known as AMASS and ASDE-X that
alert controllers to potential incursions.
These systems are an improvement but are not sufficient to
prevent all runway incursions because the information needs to
be provided directly to the flight crews as expeditiously as
possible. The issue is one of reaction time. Too much time is
lost routing valuable information through air traffic control.
Until there is a system in place to positively control
ground movements of all aircraft with direct warning to pilots,
the potential for this type of disaster will continue to be
high. It has been seven years since this recommendation was
issued, yet it has only been in the past two years that the FAA
has started evaluating technologies that are responsive to our
thoughts.
The fourth issue area addresses the need for multiple
specific improvements to CVRs and FDRs that are essential to
accident investigation data collection and analysis. Although
the FAA published an NPRM in 2005, it has been more than 10
years for some of the recommendations, and we are still only at
the NPRM stage. Although some aspects of the proposed
rulemaking are responsive to the Board's recommendations, the
changes only apply to newly manufactured airplanes, not to both
newly manufactured and existing aircraft as recommended.
In addition, while a recent FAA proposal seeks changes to
the parameters required to be recorded for the Boeing 737, the
proposed changes will not allow investigators to differentiate
crew actions from anomalies in the rudder control system.
The Safety Board has also asked the FAA to require
redundant CVR and FDR combined recording systems along with the
installation of video recorders, but the FAA has taken no
action.
Issue five asks the FAA to set working hour limits for
flight crews and aviation mechanics based on fatigue research,
circadian rhythms and sleep and rest requirements. The laws,
rules and regulations governing this aspect of transportation
safety date back to 1938 and 1958 respectively. They are not
adequate to address today's problems.
Fatigue continues to be a significant aviation issue today,
yet little or no regulatory action has been taken by the FAA,
and they have not indicated any firm plans to take the
recommended action.
The last issue on the list asks the FAA to require commuter
and on-demand air taxi crews to receive the same level of CRM
training as Part 121 carriers. This recommendation was issued
as a result of the accident that took the life of Senator Paul
Wellstone. To date, the NPRM has not been issued, and the Board
is concerned that the CRM revisions will be delayed as part of
a comprehensive revision to Part 135.
In closing, let me say the issues on our Most Wanted List
tend to be those that are among the most complex and difficult
to implement. While the FAA has made some progress, we are
disappointed that there are so many recommendations on the list
that have not been fully addressed.
I would be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now
recognizes Ms. Gilligan for her testimony.
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Costello,
Congressman Petri and Members of the Subcommittee, we are
pleased to appear today to discuss aviation safety because the
system has never been so safe and there is never a better time
to focus on how we can continue to improve on our safety
record.
Through its recommendations, the NTSB challenges all of us
to consider every possible step we can possibly take to reduce
accidents, but the truth is in the recent past we have suffered
very few major accidents. That is why the FAA and the aviation
industry working through the commercial aviation safety team
have spent the last decade establishing safety requirements for
things like new technology, training and standard operating
procedures.
We have reduced the fatal accident rate significantly. The
results speak for themselves. In the 1940s, we had about 1,300
fatalities for every 100 million passenger and crew who were on
aircraft. By 1995, that number had dropped to about 47
fatalities. The average for the last three years has been about
4 fatalities per 100 million passenger and crew flying on
aircraft.
That accident is not one of fate or luck but an achievement
that is the result of hard work. In fact, like with medicine
which addresses public health and safety, we have virtually
eliminated some major causes of accidents. Just as dedicated
physicians and researchers have eliminated smallpox and polio,
this industry has virtually eliminated midair collisions,
controlled flights into terrain and windshear accidents. I can
assure you that those accident types will never return as the
persistent recurring accident types they have been
historically.
In those cases, we used a layered approach to address the
safety risk. We trained flight crews on how to identify and
manage risk, and we invented and implemented technology. Then
we tested and provided oversight to make sure training and
technology were properly implemented and properly performing.
With this history, I can assure you, the Members of this
Committee, and the Chairman of the NTSB that we face the safety
issues we are here to discuss with the same determination to
find the right solutions.
Our work on fuel tanks is perhaps the poster child for
FAA's persistence when faced with challenges. We have issued
over 100 airworthiness directives requiring redesign and other
corrective actions to eliminate ignition sources, but we knew
we would never eliminate all potential ignition sources. When
experts said we could not reduce the flammability level of fuel
tanks, FAA began the hard work and research and we invented a
method to do just that. We have proposed a rule requiring
reduction of fuel tank flammability and will finalize that
requirement this year.
On icing, you just need to watch your nightly weather
report to know understanding and predicting weather is really
tough, but we have issued 70 airworthiness directives for 50
different aircraft models requiring aircraft design changes and
requiring pilots to exit severe icing conditions. These ADs
address the operational concerns that the NTSB put forward in
its recommendations.
We have developed new rules that will require designers to
demonstrate how airplanes perform in icing conditions and that
will assure that ice protection systems activate automatically
based on moisture in the air and temperature.
And, yes, we are still working on some really complex
icing-related problems, but I can tell you that just as we
addressed controlled flight into terrain and other accident
causes, we will address the risk posed by these phenomena.
Icing is another model of how we approached runway
incursions as well. We have provided pilot training materials
for general aviation and commercial pilots. We have mandated
training for maintenance and airport personnel who operate on
airports. We have begun the Runway Incursion Information
Evaluation Program so we can collect information from those
involved in errors and identify root causes.
We have developed and are implementing technology solutions
that alert controllers to potential conflicts. We are approving
onboard aircraft systems that let pilots see where their
aircraft is in relation to the airport surface, and ultimately
ADSB, a key technology of the system of the future, will
provide pilots enhanced awareness in the airport operating
environment.
Our scientific understanding of fatigue and its effects
tell us fatigue is not easily addressed by prescriptive rules.
Once again, we were faced with developing the solution. We
started by working with NASA to develop fatigue mitigation
measures, and this led to requirements for in-flight rest
facilities for long haul flights as well as instructional
materials for crew members.
And, we cannot overlook the importance of personal
responsibility in the area of fatigue. Everyone involved in
safety must take a personal commitment to report to work,
rested and ready to perform their duties. No regulation can
instill that sense of personal commitment.
We are ready, Mr. Chairman, to address any of the other
particular concerns that the NTSB has on its list. I can tell
you that we are committed as an industry to continue our
improvement of our safety record. The accident rate serves as a
barometer of whether we have made the right safety choices, and
it is pointing in the right direction.
We will not rest on our laurels. We will address the NTSB
recommendations.
I am prepared to answer any questions that the Committee
may have.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady.
Chairman Rosenker, let me ask you just a few questions.
One, I referenced in my opening statement the latest
incident in January at the Denver International Airport. There
seems to be a discrepancy between the NTSB's investigation and
what the FAA reported, and specifically the NTSB indicated that
Frontier Airline Flight A319, a passenger jet, and a Key Lime
Air Fairchild Metroliner came within 50 feet of colliding. Is
that correct?
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Costello. The FAA reported that the distance was 145
feet. Can you explain that discrepancy? I will give Ms.
Gilligan an opportunity to respond as well.
Mr. Rosenker. Let me turn that one to Mr. Haueter. It is
his investigators who do all the technical analysis to be able
to answer that question.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Haueter.
Mr. Haueter. Yes, sir. Looking at the data, both radar data
and flight data recorder information, we plotted it out and the
closest distance between the aircraft was in the 50 foot range,
yes.
Mr. Costello. Ms. Gilligan, you have heard the testimony
from the NTSB. Can you tell the Subcommittee why there is this
discrepancy in reporting 145 feet versus 50 feet?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir. There are some different
technologies that are used to estimate that measure, and
sometimes there are some discrepancies between the two.
I think more importantly both we and the NTSB identified
this as a severe event, and we are focused on it from that
perspective. We would consider the differences in measurements
somewhat less relevant, given the fact that in either case it
was an event that needs to be carefully analyzed and fully
addressed.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Rosenker, you indicate in your testimony
that the AMASS system, the Airport Movement Area Safety System,
is not adequate to prevent serious runway collisions, and you
mention the ASDE-X but you do not describe in your testimony if
you think the ASDE-X is effective.
I wonder if you might comment on both your feeling about
the AMASS system and its inability to adequately avoid or
prevent serious runway collisions, and then I would be
interested in knowing how you feel about the ASDE-X.
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir. Both of these technologies are
clear improvements and have been tremendous assistance in the
process of trying to reduce the number of runway incursions
that occur. The problem, though, is when we have done some
simulations, we have recognized that you can see an eight to
eleven second, I would say gap between the time an air traffic
controller is alerted to a potential runway incursion and the
time that information is analyzed and communicated directly to
the pilot so that he can or she can make a change.
What we believe the appropriate answer for the elimination
of runway incursions would be direct communications in some
way, shape or form. Frankly, I must compliment and applaud the
FAA for the work they have done here in the past two years.
Things like runway status lights, the ferrous lights, these are
direct communications to the cockpit.
We are hoping that, in fact, a decision will be made soon
so that we can begin the process of eliminating these horrible
potential catastrophic accidents.
Mr. Costello. I will have a number of other questions
concerning other issues on the list, but at this time I will
recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for questions.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I really wanted to start with sort of a more general
question on the process involved in this. You compiled this
list, I guess, for about 17 years. Partly, it is a public
relations thing presumably to create a framework and draw
people's attention to it.
But how do you go about using this tool, deciding what
makes your 10 most wanted, I guess six of which are the subject
of this hearing today, and what doesn't make that particular
list?
Mr. Rosenker. Mr. Petri, I thank you for that question.
I just so happened to have brought a copy of our Most
Wanted List. I didn't bring enough for all of our guests and
all of the Members. If I had a little more money in budget, I
am sure I could provide that opportunity.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rosenker. But this has been a very, very effective
device for the NTSB. Our business is not only to investigate
the accident, find out what happened and make recommendations
but to advocate for these recommendations because they do no
good if, in fact, a recommendation is made and it sits on a
piece of paper or on a shelf somewhere. Safety is only improved
if, in fact, the recommendations are addressed by the modal
administrations, and we have got a good record here.
The FAA has a good record. They would be getting what I
would characterize as a B. About in the 40 years that we have
been providing them recommendations, they have adopted about 82
percent of those. Now, of the 12,600 recommendations we have
made, 3,700 have gone to the FAA. They are our largest, if you
will, consumer of our recommendations. So they hear from us
quite frequently. Again, I would like to see if I could get
them to get a B plus, perhaps 85, 90 percent.
But this group of recommendations we put on our list every
year. The Board meets in a Sunshine meeting to decide which of
these critical issues are going to be put on our list. We give
them a color code to be able to understand the status of these
very important recommendations.
Sometimes we take them off because there have been
acceptable responses by our modal administrators or because we
are just not going to be able to get one through because they
have said they are not going to do it. It is rare that they do
it.
We are very pleased with the success rate of our Most
Wanted List, and we will keep plugging on it. I can assure you,
Mr. Petri. Thank you for that question.
Mr. Petri. Is the list basically reflective of your
experience in frequency of accidents or types of accidents or
is it an occasion there is some new technology and you say to
yourself, well, if they would really deploy this, we could
avoid a lot of accidents, so that gets up on the list and there
are other things that, yes, they are a problem, but we can't
imagine what they can actually do to deal with it, so it
doesn't get on?
I am just kind of curious as to how you put this whole
thing together.
Mr. Rosenker. There is a combination of factors that go
into it. Clearly, a high number of accidents would be something
that would really generate significant interest from our staff
and the Board members, but there are other what is genuinely
doable to be able to do something to really impact a particular
mode.
Clearly, one of our top ones, and I realize it is not under
your jurisdiction in this Subcommittee, is positive train
control. That is number one as it relates to our railroad mode,
and we are pounding hard on that, and we are making progress.
As I say, we are very proud of what happens as a result of
the advocacy work that comes from this list. So I know that the
FAA continues to receive publicity about a number of these
issues, and that puts them into perhaps a little more energetic
mode as opposed to some that may not be quite as visible.
Mr. Petri. Is there any one particular recommendation that
you feel probably should be more vigorously addressed than it
is currently being addressed?
Mr. Rosenker. Mr. Petri, these recommendations are like our
children. All of them are very, very important to us.
Mr. Costello. I thank the Ranking Member.
Let me follow up on a question, Mr. Rosenker, to the
Ranking Member's question. While we realize that all of the
recommendations are like your children, how many of those
recommendations have been on the Most Wanted List since it
started in 1990?
We know that the runway incursion issue has been on the
list since the very beginning of the list.
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir. Of the aviation or the entire list?
Mr. Costello. Aviation.
Mr. Rosenker. Okay. That is a good question here. I never
calculated it to that point. Fatigue and runway incursion.
Mr. Costello. While you are looking, it would seem to me
that if, in fact, the NTSB continues to put runway incursions
and any other issue on their Most Wanted List since the
beginning in 1990 that while all are equally important, it
seems to me that if those issues haven't been addressed since
1990, that they continue to be important to the NTSB.
Mr. Rosenker. Clearly, and in some cases as I think Mr.
Petri pointed out, back in 1990 there may not have been the
kinds of technologies that are clearly available today. Again,
I indicated earlier that the FAA is doing an outstanding job of
testing some direct communications to the cockpit. The question
we have is: When will you finally implement that type of
technology?
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Matsui.
Ms. Matsui. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rosenker, which of your six recommendations do you feel
will be most quickly and easily completed?
I would expect that, Ms. Gilligan, you would comment on
that too.
Mr. Rosenker. I believe probably inerting of fuel tanks is
probably the easiest one at this point. There are people that
are doing it right now. The 787 has a system that is being
designed into it which, in fact, would effectively inert the
tank.
There are retrofit systems which, in fact, have been
developed. Some models of the 74 are being delivered with
systems which would, in fact, reduce the flammability. Some
models of the 737 are also being delivered with these same
systems. So I believe that is one which is just about ready.
I can't speak for the FAA, but I know. Frankly, I think I
am sitting one person away from one of the great experts in
that particular area, and I am sure he will be able to share
information.
Another area that I believe we can be doing something
quickly if a decision is made is that in the area of runway
incursions. Again, I think the FAA has done a good job of
experimenting with some very effective systems, and I look
forward to hearing their comments on that.
Clearly, some issues as related to the improvement of the
crew resource management in the 135 operations. They can do a
relatively simple implementation, given they already have a
good template in the 121 operations. So those are the ones that
I believe could be easily accomplished.
I don't want to forget. I don't want to forget some
technological capabilities that we would like to see, and that
would be the video in the cockpits, both in small and large
aircraft. We say small, meaning 121/135 type of operations.
We are also talking about the installation of dual--dual,
that means one in the front, one in the back--combination units
of both CVR and FDR. We believe that is quite feasible and
could be implemented at any time.
So those are just a couple of examples of things that could
pop right away if decisions are made.
Ms. Matsui. Ms. Gilligan, would you comment?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes. Thank you, Congresswoman Matsui,
First, I want to make a clarification. I think it is
important to remember that while some of these topics are on
the Most Wanted List for a period of time, FAA and the industry
have taken many, many steps to address them over that time.
For example, in icing, as I mentioned, we have issued a
number of airworthiness directives that specifically addressed
known risk both in terms of aircraft design and in terms of
actions that pilot crews should take in response to severe
icing. We are following that up then with additional work in
terms of technology and some additional recommendations that
the Board has made.
But, in fact, a number of recommendations in each of these
categories have already been closed acceptable by the Board as
we and the industry work our way through these complex issues.
Having said that, I think that we have a lot of work going
on in all these areas. I agree with the Chairman that we are
pushing hard on fuel tank flammability. As I mentioned in my
opening statement, first we had to invent that technology. Many
of the Board's recommendations begin with the words, develop
and implement. So the Board acknowledges that these are complex
areas where fundamental research work often times needs to be
done before we can actually address the risk in a comprehensive
way.
But I think in all the areas we have activities underway
that are addressing what the Board's intent was, and we
continue to move forward on those.
Ms. Matsui. I yield back.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
Let me follow up since you mentioned, Ms. Gilligan, about
the fuel tank issue. I understand that the FAA has taken a
layered approach, and I wonder if you might explain that for
Members of the Subcommittee.
Ms. Gilligan. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, and I would ask Mr.
Hickey to join in because he has done a lot of this work
himself.
But as I mentioned, we started first with identifying
potential ignition sources. That was always the original design
intent, that we would eliminate ignition sources, but that work
showed us, proved to us that we may never know all of the
potential ignition sources. Because of that, we had to take
this layered approach to also address fuel tank flammability.
John, if you would give some details on both the ignition
source as well as the tank.
Mr. Hickey. Mr. Chairman, the level of risk that existed
prior to TWA 800 simply has been cut to a phenomenally low
percentage. Through the actions of the airworthiness
directives, over 100 of them, we have virtually eliminated all
known potential ignition sources in the existing fleet today.
Airplanes are being designed today with the knowledge of TWA
800, and all of that is sort of a point in the past.
The flammability reduction is an area that has been the
most difficult, one of the most difficult technology issues we
have had to deal with in any of the safety things, I think, we
have been confronted with. The problem was it is not that a
system can't exist. As many of you know, military and other
sort of industries have those kinds of technologies, but to
take a system like that and put it on a commercial airplane
operating 10, 12, 14 hours a day is a very, very different
scenario.
We chartered two groups of world class experts, not just
FAA, not just industry. We had international experts with very
world-renowned reputations on their own. They recommended to
the FAA back in 2001 that the cost of such a system would be
approximately $20 billion.
At that point, the FAA did not walk away from this issue,
and we began to refute and challenge and demonstrate ourselves
all the individual components that make up a flammability
reduction system. We were successful at that a couple years
later, and we are in the final process of finalizing that.
But I would like to echo my colleague, Mr. Rosenker, that
we are not just waiting for this rule. We are already beginning
to deliver airplanes with these systems. All airplanes coming
out of Washington State from the Boeing Company are all wired
and ready for these systems when the rule goes into place. Of
course, we have had conversations with the other manufacturers,
and I think they are ready when the rule goes final as well.
So I think the safety level today of fuel tanks is
considerably different than it was 10 years ago.
Mr. Costello. Ms. Gilligan, when should we expect the rule
to come forward from the FAA?
Ms. Gilligan. The Administrator has committed that we will
complete this rule by the end of the year, and we are committed
to that schedule.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rosenker, I am going to follow up. I think you
responded either to the Chairman or the Ranking Member about
the direct alerts to the pilot regarding runway incursion
operations which are now under positive control by the air
controllers.
If alerts are put directly into the cockpit, would that not
invite a potential that the pilot may inadvertently turn into
another hazard about which he is not familiar or am I being
overly paranoid?
Mr. Rosenker. Well, sir, I wouldn't call that paranoia. I
think it is a good question.
Clearly, procedures are already in effect on what to do
when you must go around. We saw that successfully occur in the
first Denver accident. We believe that more information in the
cockpit gives the pilots a better opportunity to make the right
decisions.
Runway status lights are a clear--a clear--signal to a
pilot, even though potentially a mistake may have been given to
clear an active runway. All of the technology is telling those
runway status lights that there is an occupied runway or about
to be an occupied runway and that that pilot should stop his
aircraft. You will see a light. It will stop you. It will tell
you to stop.
You then may ask the question again to the air traffic
controller: do you really want me to do this? At that point,
the air traffic controller may say, no, I don't, thank you for
that call.
So I think we will do more in these kinds of signals than
we will have any problems.
That is a good question, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. That does not sound unreasonable to me.
Ms. Gilligan, how does the FAA involve the aviation
community when responding to the NTSB's recommendations?
Ms. Gilligan. Congressman, generally, we outline to the
Board how we intend to address their recommendation. Most
often, that will require rulemaking or other kinds of
agreements to be reached that involve the industry.
After we have outlined our approach, then we work closely
with the industry through a number of either aviation
rulemaking committees or other advisory groups in order to make
sure that we have a common approach to the NTSB
recommendations. We work very, very closely with industry and
with our international partners to make sure we harmonize the
actions that we take across the industry.
Mr. Coble. Now, when I say aviation community, I am
including commercial. I am including private, general aviation.
Is that your read as well?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir. Obviously, depending on what the
recommendation is, sometimes it involves one community more
than others, but we always involve both the general aviation
and commercial industries as we go forward with rulemakings or
policy changes as a result of NTSB recommendations.
Mr. Coble. I thank you for that.
Let me ask you this, Ms. Gilligan. It has been in excess of
a decade now since the TWO Flight 800 accident which crashed as
a result of a fuel tank explosion, you will recall. What has
been the progress of the development of fuel tank inerting
systems and what is the deployment schedule of such systems?
Ms. Gilligan. Congressman, I think we have made outstanding
progress. As Mr. Hickey described, first again, we had to
invent the solution. This was not an off the shelf kind of a
solution when the Board first recommended that we pursue this.
In fact, it was FAA engineers and FAA scientists who developed
the system that we believe can address fuel tank inerting.
We have proposed a rule to require the reduction of
flammability in a fuel tank. You could use the inerting system.
There may other technologies in the future. We wanted to leave
the rule open to that. We will be going final with that rule
this year, so we will mandate that kind of equipage within the
fleet. We are making great progress.
Mr. Coble. Anybody else want to weigh in on that?
Mr. Hickey. Sir, the thing I would add is while that rule
is working its way and there will be an implementation phase, I
would like the Congressman to know that we are also taking
measures in an interim period. We are working with the airlines
to promote use of equipment at the gate area that would allow
the carriers not to run the auxiliary power unit to keep the
airplane cool for the passengers. It is that device which tends
to heat the tanks up which creates the higher and more risky
environment.
We are working with the airlines, and I think we have got
very good success of many of the airlines today using those
ground equipment to, as an interim measure, keep the risk at a
lower level until we can get these systems out.
Mr. Coble. I thank you for that. It is good to have you all
with us.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now
recognizes the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Gilligan, in your testimony you talked about the multi-
pronged approach to icing issues, yet the NTSB classifies the
FAA's response on icing as ``unacceptable because more than 10
years after the Safety Board issued these recommendations, the
FAA has yet to issue any of the operational design or testing
requirement revisions recommended.''
Would you please explain what the multi-pronged approach is
that the NTSB finds unacceptable?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir. We have taken a number of actions
initially through airworthiness directives which, as you know,
are a tool we can use to address a known safety concern. Using
airworthiness directives, we issued design changes as well as
training information to pilots.
Mr. DeFazio. You have issued design changes on aircraft for
icing?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir, through the airworthiness
directives.
Mr. DeFazio. Future design?
Ms. Gilligan. No, sir. Airworthiness directives apply to
the existing fleet, and I can have Mr. Hickey go through some
of the specific airworthiness directives related to icing that
we have issued if that would help.
Mr. DeFazio. That require design changes?
Mr. Hickey. Yes, sir, a number of our airworthiness
directives require the airplanes' operating speeds to be
increased to give protection. We have required in some cases to
have design changes to the stall warning systems. This is a
warning system that tells the pilot he is going too slow. We
have had some design modifications that add additional perhaps
steps on the airplane to give the pilot better visual cue
before he does a takeoff.
We have issued over 70 airworthiness directives that direct
either a change to the airplane configuration whether it is to
the design or the airplane's operating process or even for the
pilot in the way he operates the airplane as if it was an
operating rule.
If I may say, the difference is while we have addresses
these 70 ADs, they are equivalent in my view to the NTSB's
recommendation which would be done in a general rulemaking.
Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Rosenker, would you care to respond to
that? They say they have taken care of the problem here.
Mr. Rosenker. Well, they are taking care of part of the
problem. We would agree with that. But I would like for the
detail of this to my Director of Aviation Safety, Mr. Haueter.
Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Haueter?
Mr. Haueter. Yes, we agree that they have been addressing
the problem one airplane at a time as has been discovered
through accidents and incidents. Our recommendation is more
broader, to look at developing technologies for supercool
liquid droplets, drops going on generically for the whole fleet
for future designs. That is the basic difference.
Mr. DeFazio. You are saying we are back over here in the
Tombstone mentality. When we lose a plane and we find out it
was due to icing, then we deal with that type, that problem,
and we are sort of dealing it with it that way.
But you are saying there may be an undiscovered problem. We
are skating on this, not to make a bad pun, and you are worried
that a more generic rule should be published and more done to
prevent the next incident after which we would put out another
design or operational change.
Mr. Haueter. We would like to see a generic rule that
addresses the whole fleet, both those currently in service and
those in the future.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. I sort of see a pattern here, and it is
a concern I have had for a long time which is what constitutes
a meaningful response by the FAA to NTSB recommendations? We
have changed statute a bit to have the most wanted and that.
Mr. Rosenker, do you think we need to go further and maybe
you should look at this in the FAA reauthorization, that
somehow getting a more meaningful response than one that is
sort of staged? You don't just sort of you make your
recommendations, and then 10 years later you come forward and
tell us what hasn't happened, but you actually have interim
responses or progress reports or something. Could you address
that?
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir. Let me first say again the FAA and
the NTSB are partners in trying to make sure that we make a
safe industry even safer. They are getting about 82 percent of
what we want. I am challenging my colleagues to go from 82 to
85 to 87 to 90 percent.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. What would get us there, I guess is the
question.
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir, exactly.
Mr. DeFazio. We know there is pressure from the industry
saying oh, my God, no. That would cost money. We put in. We
have to do these redundancies. We have to retrofit planes for
recorder systems that don't have a separate bus and an
electrical system for it. So, gee, you will have to wait until
the next generation of planes 25 years from now to do that.
I mean those sorts of things.
Mr. Rosenker. Many of these things are financial in nature.
Others are a political will to do what we would characterize as
the right thing in a timely manner.
But, again, I believe the people of the FAA are good, very
committed people to safety. All I would like to see and my
colleagues would like to see is a more timely response in many
of these recommendations because many times we all get to the
same place which is an ultimate implementation of the
recommendation. Unfortunately, sometimes it is just what we
believe takes too long.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. My time is expired, but I would just
reflect back to the seat spacing requirement for over-wing
exits which I started on and the NTSB started on after the
Manchester incident, and I believe it was about seven years in
the U.S. I took three months in Great Britain. It is my concern
that we somehow be more responsive.
We did strip. After the ValuJet accident, I managed to
strip out most of FAA's charge to promote the industry with the
idea you would be a regulator and not a promoter. I think there
is still some of that element, but I do grant that you are
saying we are making progress.
Ms. Gilligan, you wanted to respond. I am sorry. I am just
about out of time. I thought I saw you reaching for the button
there.
Ms. Gilligan. I was ready in case you were asking me
something.
[Laughter.]
Mr. DeFazio. No, no. What I want to do is I want to help
the FAA to be more responsive and maybe slightly less
responsive to concerns expressed by the industry in terms of:
Gee, yes, it would be valuable to have that flight data
recorder, but hey, we don't lose that many planes. And, gee, we
are going to have to retrofit all these planes, and that will
cost us much money, and maybe there will only be one or two
planes that go down that we won't know why they went down. And
gee, we can just wait for the next generation.
I mean those kinds of things. We want to help you with
those problems.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir, I understand that, and I appreciate
it. I also appreciate the Chairman's kind words about the FAA's
commitment to safety.
Quite honestly, it is to the Board's credit that all major
accidents have had a probable cause determination using the
technologies that were available when those accidents occurred.
So while we do agree there is room for improvement in recorder
technology and we have proposed those improvements and we will
again go final with those rules, the Board has been outstanding
in being able to investigate the accidents with FAA and
industry help so that we do understand what happened and we are
able to correct those errors that we did not understand before.
I just want to reiterate that even while these
recommendations may remain open for a period of time, FAA and
industry are working throughout that time period, and we are
doing things like enhanced training and providing pilots
additional information on how to handle whether it is icing or
other kinds of conditions. I think the Board would acknowledge
it is not that we stand still for 10 years. We work through
that time period and ultimately, if we are able, actually then
invent the technology that takes us to that next step.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Oregon
and recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Westmoreland.
Mr. Westmoreland. I want to turn a little bit maybe to more
of a civil aviation than the commercial aviation that the focus
has been on here.
Ms. Gilligan, are you familiar with the term counterfeit
aircraft?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. As a general rule of thumb, would you
agree that counterfeit aircraft pose a safety risk both to the
occupants of the plane and to people on the ground?
Ms. Gilligan. Sir, if I could, counterfeit aircraft is not
sort of a term of art, as we would call it, that we use in the
industry. I assume you are referring to aircraft which may
contain either unapproved parts or an aircraft where the full
documentation for the aircraft can't be established in order to
assure that all the airworthiness requirements have been met.
Is that?
Mr. Westmoreland. Well, what does counterfeit aircraft mean
to you and what specific guidelines does the FAA have as far as
what makes an airplane counterfeit?
Ms. Gilligan. Again, I don't believe the term, counterfeit,
is a term that we have used.
Mr. Westmoreland. What term do you use?
Ms. Gilligan. But I can certainly look into it.
Mr. Westmoreland. What term do you use?
Ms. Gilligan. Quite honestly, I am not sure what concept
you are trying to pursue.
What we do have are aircraft that must meet certain
standards, and when they do, they get an airworthiness
certificate. If there are elements of the aircraft that are not
appropriate, that are either unapproved or again we can't
document that, in fact, the aircraft is airworthy, then it is
not airworthy. Counterfeit is not really a term that we use in
that context.
Mr. Westmoreland. So if a plane had been issued an
airworthiness certificate and a data plate from the FAA, would
that be a counterfeit airplane?
Ms. Gilligan. Mr. Westmoreland, I think I am familiar with
the particular case that you are referring to. Depending on the
basis on which----
Mr. Westmoreland. Just answer the question. It is very
simple. If the FAA issued an airworthiness certificate and a
data plate to an aircraft, is that aircraft counterfeit?
Ms. Gilligan. If the facts underlying the issuance of those
certificates were accurate, then the aircraft would be
airworthy. If there is some question that arises after the
certificate is issued, then we would pursue that to determine
if all the airworthiness requirements have been met.
Mr. Westmoreland. Are you familiar with the term harvested
aircraft?
Ms. Gilligan. No, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Could you find out if there is any
definition that the FAA may have for the term, harvested
aircraft?
Ms. Gilligan. Sure, certainly.
Mr. Westmoreland. What does imminent hazard to safety mean
to you?
Ms. Gilligan. It is a term that we use to determine whether
or not we need to issue something like an airworthiness
directive in order to address a known safety of flight issue.
Mr. Westmoreland. So if the FAA issues a ferry permit for
an aircraft it deems to be an imminent hazard to safety, then
would you have a problem with that?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, again, I would need to understand the
facts. There are times when we issue ferry permits for aircraft
that do not meet all the airworthiness requirements so that the
aircraft can be taken to a location where proper work can be
done. And so, again, I would need to understand the facts.
Mr. Westmoreland. Where proper work can be done?
Ms. Gilligan. If that is what is necessary.
Mr. Westmoreland. To repair the aircraft?
Ms. Gilligan. Whatever the basis for issuing the ferry
permit.
Mr. Westmoreland. But you would issue a ferry permit and
send out a pilot to fly a plane that had imminent hazard to
safety?
Ms. Gilligan. I don't know if a ferry permit is issued with
that particular phrase. I do know ferry permits can be issued
when the aircraft does not meet all of the airworthiness
standards. It is issued with certain limitations to address
those risks and usually issued for the purpose of getting the
airplane to a place where it could be fixed.
Mr. Westmoreland. If an airplane had an airworthiness
certificate, then at some point in time it was airworthy.
Ms. Gilligan. Someone found it to be airworthy. They may
have made a mistake.
Mr. Westmoreland. Since 1988, do you know how many aircraft
have been deemed counterfeit--I will just use that term--by the
FAA and seized by the Government?
Ms. Gilligan. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Westmoreland. Could you find out for me?
Ms. Gilligan. We can try.
Mr. Westmoreland. Also, if you would, while you are looking
for that information, could you also find out for me of those
planes that were seized, how many of those forfeiture cases
have been dismissed and what happened to those aircraft after
the forfeiture cases were dropped?
Ms. Gilligan. Certainly, we will see what we can find out.
Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.
Just in the brief time I have left, Mr. Hickey, you issue
the airworthiness certificates?
Mr. Hickey. My organization does, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Your organization does. Are you familiar
with the term, counterfeit?
Mr. Hickey. Not in the way you are using it, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. So what would you call it?
Mr. Hickey. Again, I look at airplanes through their
airworthiness certificate and whether they have all approved
parts or not. I am not familiar with an official terminology
called counterfeit, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. But an airworthiness certificate should
indicate that the plane is airworthy?
Mr. Hickey. As Ms. Gilligan indicated, it did at one
particular point in time, at the time it was presented to the
FAA and with the facts known at that time, that is correct,
sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. A data plate would be issued from your
office also?
Mr. Hickey. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay, thank you.
No further questions and I yield back.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member and
thanks to all of our witnesses.
Chairman Rosenker, the FAA earlier this week released data
revealing that the level of flight delays during the first four
months of this year have been the worst on record. This is
particularly troubling in New York, home of the top three worst
all-time records of all major U.S. airports.
Stewart Airport in my district is poised to alleviate some
of that congestion when the Port Authority assumes control of
its operations in the near future. With the increased level of
traffic, there will undoubtedly be need to have more bodies in
the control tower to successfully, efficiently and safely take
on the increased number of operations.
Currently, Stewart has a contract tower. Do you think that
the NTSB fatigue recommendations should be implemented at
contract towers in the same way they are implemented in other
towers and do you believe that such an implementation will take
place?
Mr. Rosenker. Clearly, anyone who is involved in the
controlling of aircraft, whether they be contract or whether
they be FAA employees, we believe should have the appropriate
rest, scheduling should be done in a scientific manner, and be
competent and alert to do the work, whether it is contract or
whether it is government employees.
Mr. Hall. Ms. Gilligan, did you want to respond?
Ms. Gilligan. Certainly, sir. The air traffic organization
is looking very closely at the Board's recommendations. The
schedules that FAA has been implementing up until now were
negotiated agreements with the controller union, and we will be
working with the union as well as we review the NTSB
recommendations.
At this point, I have not heard discussion of whether or
not it would be applied to contract towers, but as the Chairman
suggests, certainly as safety professionals, what we look at is
whether or not an issue exists and how to address it throughout
the industries. So I would expect that contract towers would
gain the benefit of whatever changes FAA makes as a result of
the Board's recommendations.
Mr. Hall. That makes sense.
Ms. Gilligan, I want to ask you also, you state in your
testimony that no regulatory scheme can instill the personal
commitment needed to manage fatigue.
In 2005, the Part 135 industry participated in the Aviation
Rulemaking Committee and developed a number of proposed
recommendations including a significant change in the
industry's flight duty and rest rules. What are these
recommendations and when does the FAA expect to initiate the
rulemaking process based on these recommendations?
Ms. Gilligan. Actually, sir, that committee made about 140
recommendations for improvements to the Part 135 regulations.
As Chairman Rosenker has made mention, what we are trying to do
is parse those recommendations so that we don't just have a
huge regulatory project that becomes very cumbersome and
difficult to get through the process.
We are starting actually with the recommendations related
to crew resource management, also a part of the Board's
recommendations, and that will be one of our first rules. The
recommendations on fatigue will follow that rule. I don't
currently have a schedule for when we would take up those
fatigue changes or those changes to the rules on scheduling.
The recommendation is actually quite interesting to us
because the industry recommended sort of three options and that
operators, depending on what the operating environment is, they
might pick one or the other, either prescriptive rules as we
have now or two other options that give a little more
flexibility but that also allow for perhaps the application of
the science of fatigue to be more effective. So we will be
going forward with those proposals, but again I don't have a
schedule for that particular part of the rulemaking right now.
Mr. Hall. Thank you.
Lastly, I would like to ask you if you could explain, Ms.
Gilligan, the flight that is mentioned in your testimony that
was just approved for over 16 hours duration using a fatigue
risk management approach. I am curious what exactly that is.
Could you explain that, please?
Ms. Gilligan. Sure, I am glad to. Actually, we are working
with the International Civil Aviation Organization to look at
fatigue as an area of risk and determine how we can better
manage it and mitigate it.
The schedule that we have approved is for a flight between
Kennedy Airport and Mumbai, India. The operator came in after
having worked with experts in the area of fatigue. They also
had their plan reviewed by an independent expert, and we have
had it reviewed by our experts at the Civil Aeromedical
Institute in Oklahoma City. Their plan actually applies a lot
of what we have learned about how to manage fatigue.
So they have committed to protect a day of rest before the
flight. They will actually get their crews in a location and
protect the day, the rest period before the flight. The
scheduled rest during the flight will occur during the
circadian rhythm low that the crew would experience, and there
is protected rest when they arrive at the other end as well. It
applies not just to the flight crew but also to the cabin crew.
That is the kind of approach that we are looking to develop
with ICAO in terms of managing the risks that can be a part of
these long term operations, long haul operations.
Mr. Hall. Thank you.
I would assume that you are consulting with your unions and
the workforce on the different aspects, be they pilots,
controllers, other crew, ground-based crew, et cetera, about
the same fatigue management.
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, certainly. We have had a number of
rulemaking committees to try to address the issue of fatigue,
and they have always included both the operator and the pilot
community. We will certainly continue to pursue that.
Mr. Hall. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Poe.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you for
being here.
Mr. Haueter, I want to talk to you about the famous black
box that is probably orange. What is the backup system to the
black box?
Mr. Haueter. Well, currently, there is two. There is a
cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder. Those are
the main devices on the aircraft.
We have asked for a combi-recorder which, combi is both a
flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, one
effectively at each end of the aircraft so you would have
redundancy there.
Mr. Poe. What about using some type of satellite system so
that you have immediate knowledge of the information that is on
the black box? We always here, well, we will know something
when we find the black box.
Would it be more immediate? Would it be a better safety
system? What is just your opinion about that?
Mr. Haueter. That has been discussed for some time. The
issue we have is the bandwidth in terms of nowadays an aircraft
with 1,000 parameters, looking at data at eight times per
second for many of those parameters, trying to ensure we don't
lose data in the process.
It has been discussed for a while, and also in terms of
number of aircraft flying. When you have thousands of aircraft
in the air, this is a lot of data now being transmitted. So
far, the people we have talked to, no one has come up with a
solution to all the technical issues.
Mr. Poe. They have or have not?
Mr. Haueter. Not that we have seen.
Mr. Poe. Ms. Gilligan, I want to talk to you and ask you
about the air traffic controllers. In your opinion, do you
think it is the number of air traffic controllers, the number
of flights, the delays that we all know about, do you think it
is at a crisis or not, the number of air traffic controllers?
Because they are all getting grayer. I mean it is the baby
boomers. They are still air traffic controllers.
Ms. Gilligan. I am getting grayer.
Mr. Poe. No offense; I am a baby boomer myself.
Ms. Gilligan. I am afraid we all are.
As you know, the agency has a very aggressive plan for
hiring air traffic controllers in preparation for what may be
increases in retirements over the coming years. As you also
know, the hiring of controllers occurred after the strike of
1980 and 1981, and so there are sort of classes of controllers
who are coming to the ends of their careers. The agency is very
active in trying to plan for that, trying to anticipate what
that level of retirement might be.
At this point, we are making those staffing numbers. In my
organization, we have an oversight responsibility for the air
traffic organization. We are monitoring their plan, and they
are meeting their plan. At this point, we do not see a crisis.
Mr. Poe. So you don't think it is a crisis at all?
Ms. Gilligan. I don't see a crisis now, sir, no.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Costello. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Hawaii, Ms. Hirono.
Ms. Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a follow-up question regarding the management of
fatigue. There is a lot of research being undertaken on how we
can manage operator fatigue in all industries including the
aviation industry. I am sure you are familiar with some of
this.
You indicated that you referred to the science of fatigue.
Now there is technological research being done on coming up
with ways that we can monitor the individual's fatigue factors
right there on the spot. Is the FAA open to this kind of
utilization of this kind of monitoring facilities or
capability?
Ms. Gilligan. I mean we are certainly open to it. Some of
our past research that we funded through NASA included
monitoring performance, both on the flight deck and off duty as
well. We have not considered some kind of monitoring of the
actual operation if that is what you are suggesting.
Ms. Hirono. The actual operator, so real time. I can
envision a situation where a person, a pilot, for example,
flying 15 hours or something, right there on the spot can have
his or her fatigue factors monitored so that in real time you
will be able to ascertain as opposed to either preflight or
that kind of technology or process that you are using now.
Basically, my question is the implementation of
technological advances to manage fatigue, is that something
that FAA is actively interested in and pursuing?
Ms. Gilligan. Again, we have used that kind of technology
to try to understand and evaluate fatigue. We have not
considered requiring crew members to be monitored during the
course of their operation. Quite honestly, it is an interesting
thought, and certainly we can consider that, but we have not up
until now.
Ms. Hirono. Thank you.
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Arkansas, Mr. Boozman.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had a question about the fact that currently large
portions of the commercial and private air routes are blocked
off when we have space launches, things like that. It seems
like with everything that is going on, that the deconfliction
between air and space is going to increase with time. I guess I
had some questions about what we were going to do in the
future, how we are going to manage that as commercial space
flight by Virgin Galactic and all that stuff comes on board.
I guess what I would like to know is what the FAA and DOD,
how they are coordinating the space launches in particular
right now. Also, I know in Huntsville they are working on
software programs to minimize the disruptions space launches
will have on commercial flights. Is FAA coordinating with the
Army in that regard?
Then again as the FAA develops the next generation air
transport system, how is that interfacing? What are we doing to
make sure that that is going to be up and running and
appropriate to handle the deconfliction?
Ms. Gilligan. Congressman, I probably don't have as much
detail as you might be interested in, and we will be glad to
supplement the record to the extent that I am not able to
respond here in the moment.
But as you know, we do have a commercial space organization
within the FAA. We do have responsibility both for setting the
safety standards as well as for promoting the new commercial
uses of space transportation. The Commercial Space Office
coordinates closely with our air traffic organization when
these space launches are scheduled.
Concerned is probably too strong a word. We are aware that
as access to space increases, it will have to be properly
integrated into the national airspace system, and we are
working to accomplish that. The Commercial Space Office
coordinates very closely with all parts of the Department of
Defense in current launching as well as preparing for the
future. So I do think we have the right interfaces there. I
don't know that we have all the answers yet.
Mr. Boozman. In regard to what they are doing in
Huntsville, are we specifically interfacing with the Army?
Ms. Gilligan. My understanding is that that is the case,
but again let me confirm with the Commercial Space Office and
we will confirm that back to you.
Mr. Boozman. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I have got just two or
three other specific questions if we can submit.
Mr. Costello. I would be happy to do that and submit them
for the record, and we will ask that the witnesses answer your
questions.
Mr. Boozman. Thank you, Ms. Gilligan.
I yield back the rest of my time.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes
the distinguished Chairman of the full Committee, Chairman
Oberstar.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing and, Mr. Petri, thank you also for your
participation and splendid efforts that you both invested in
bringing this hearing about. This is one of the most important
things we do in aviation and in all of transportation is attend
to the needs of safety.
In that regard, the FAA is the premier safety agency for
aviation in the world. I said that at a hearing a few weeks
ago. I emphasize it again today. The rest of the flying
community in the world looks to the FAA to set the standard.
ICAO has a role, but FAA is the gold standard.
The role of the NTSB is to make sure the FAA stays at the
gold standard level because the NTSB's role--and I will say it
again--is normative, not measured by benefit-cost analysis
which is the role of regulatory agencies, operating agencies,
but the role of the NTSB is to set the standard and then to
measure agencies, modal agencies by how they adhere to that
standard.
This goes back to the dawn years of aviation, in 1926, when
engines had a bad habit of falling off aircraft in flight,
wings regularly fell off aircraft en route with very bad
consequences.
It was an Assistant Secretary of Commerce who thought this
was terrible for the future of air commerce and advocated
within the department for rules of safety in manufacturing
aircraft and operating aircraft and was rebuffed until he
became Secretary of Commerce. Then in that position, he issued
rules for aviation safety.
His name, Herbert Hoover. We don't associate Herbert Hoover
with a lot of good things in history since he was either the
inheritor of or the progenitor of the Great Depression, but he
saw the need for safety in aviation maybe not for the
individual benefit of pilots. I think he was just at the dawn
of passenger travel in aviation. But he saw the need for
safety, and he insisted that there be a government role to
regulate safety and set standards.
NTSB is the inheritor as is the aviation safety function of
FAA.
Now you have set forth several key points: incursions, fuel
tank flammability, recorders, cockpit resource management
training and fatigue and others, but I want to deal with that.
Incursions, Mr. Rosenker, Chairman, thank you very much for
your vigorous pursuit of the role of NTSB and to all your board
members who have taken their responsibilities with great
seriousness.
You have labeled unacceptable the FAA response on runway
incursion. Runway incursion is one of the most important
aviation safety sectors in the world. Controlled flight of a
terrain outside the United States is the number one cause of
fatalities, but in the U.S. and elsewhere, incursions. There is
a range of technology now available.
Why, Chairman Rosenker, is FAA not responding in an
acceptable manner to the Board's recommendations?
Are they, as in the early days of technology to avoid in-
flight accidents, waiting for the next perfect technology or
what is it?
Mr. Rosenker. Sir, I hate to speak for my colleagues. I am
confident that they will be able to respond for themselves.
But I said earlier and I will say it again. On behalf of my
colleagues at the Board and the staff, we appreciate very much
the work in the past 24 months that has been done to try to
begin the process of eliminating runway incursions.
They have created some technologies that in fact they have
experimented with and appear to be working extremely well, one
of which is located in Dallas, another up on the West Coast
called the ferrous lights. The runway status lights are the
ones in Dallas, and I believe they are getting ready to do
another experiment in San Diego with the runway status lights.
Now, again, these are technologies which are incorporated
into the technologies they are already using, AMASS and ASDE-X,
but what this technology will do is give a direct warning, a
direct communication to the cockpit crew so that they can act.
Eight to eleven seconds of potential gap before information is
passed to the cockpit crew could prove to be catastrophic.
So it is not as if we are disappointed in what has happened
so far. Again, we would have liked to have seen a much more
expeditious implementation of our reg except that at this
moment, in the past 24 months, it seems like we have come to
some sort of stop in the process in that we are looking for a
decision, and we believe that the technologies which they have
shown so far appear to be very, very good and can begin the
elimination of these potential catastrophic consequences.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Ms. Gilligan, Mr. Hickey, what are your responses?
Ms. Gilligan. Mr. Chairman, as Chairman Rosenker indicates,
we have been testing lighting systems, a couple different kinds
at a couple different locations, and we have demonstrated what
we believe are two important things. One is that they work, and
second is that they do not have an unintended consequence of
creating additional burden for either the flight crew or the
controllers.
As you know, when we introduce technology, we want to be
sure we are not fixing one problem but introducing some new or
unidentified risk, and we do see that the lights will work and
that they don't add some additional risk.
We are taking those programs through the acquisition
process. There will be a decision made later this year as to
whether or not and at what level to fund those programs. After
that, we will have a program for implementation.
Mr. Oberstar. Are you speaking of the direct pilot warning
system and the ASDE-X and the ferrous?
Ms. Gilligan. Right, the runway safety lighting and
ferrous, those two systems have both been tested, and we will
pursue acquisition of the appropriate, whichever one is
appropriate for whatever circumstance.
As you point out, though, they are related and they rely on
the ASDE-X technology as well. So we will need to link the
lighting systems to those locations where we also will have
AMASS or ASDE-X. So those technologies are coming along.
Mr. Oberstar. Do you anticipate a rulemaking by the end of
the year?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, these would be technologies that FAA
would acquire that would be at airports, and so it is not a
rulemaking.
Mr. Oberstar. The FAA then would not need to issue a rule
but just implement the technologies. Put it in place.
Ms. Gilligan. For these technologies, that is correct.
But I do think something to be mindful is what we are
really looking for here is to make sure pilots have the most
situational awareness they can possibly have. In fact, just in
the spring, the Administrator announced that we have now
refined our approval process for technology in the flight deck
that will allow the pilot to know where their aircraft is on
the airport surface. We have those under review and approval at
this point.
Mr. Oberstar. That is from the aftermath of the Kentucky
accident. Situational awareness on the ground is critical as
well.
Ms. Gilligan. Correct, correct. You are right. There are
applications beyond just runway incursion. The more the pilot
can be familiar with where the aircraft is on the airport
surface, then the more assurance he can have or she can have
that they are in the right location at the right time.
Recent improvements in technology and how quickly some of
these technologies are improving allow us to be able to have
that application for use on the surface. As I said, we have got
an applicant under review, and we do have airlines that have
committed to put that technology in their flight deck once it
is approved. We think that is another key element to addressing
this issue.
Mr. Oberstar. There are least 130, 140 airports where the
on the ground runway/taxiway system is confusing. Has the Board
looked at that situation and have you made recommendations? Is
the FAA preparing to respond to improved training and awareness
for pilots?
Mr. Rosenker. Clearly, we are very interested in that. We
are making recommendations we will be presenting in our
Sunshine Meeting on the 26th of July, the Comair accident that
occurred in Lexington. So that will be 11 months after that
accident occurred. We will have a determination of probable
cause and making recommendations concerning that specific
accident. But many of these recommendations could apply to
other situations as well.
Mr. Oberstar. I want to thank you. I will follow that very
closely.
I want to thank NTSB and FAA for the progress they are
making on fuel tanks flammability although I think that needs
to be wrapped up with a firm rulemaking.
Flight recorders, the video recording systems that were
tested first by Lufthansa in the late 1980s, 1988-1989, is
something that ought to be revisited. I know the pilots union
doesn't like that at all, but we can have video in the flight
deck without allowing it to be used as an enforcement tool, a
penalty tool but as a training device.
Your response?
Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir. As you know, we have tested a
number of video cameras just to see, first of all again, do
they work. Will they really capture in daylight, night time and
those kinds of things? We have done that testing along with the
NTSB.
I think when we consider the commercial fleet, given the
data recording requirements that we already have, we will have
to look closely at whether or not we think we need to include
videos. But as we look at those aircraft that do not have the
robust data recording and voice recording that some of the
commercial fleet has, I think we agree that we need to look
more closely at what is the role for video in some of those
other aircraft.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Chairman Rosenker?
Mr. Rosenker. I would agree. Our first objective in our
recommendation is to get them into aircraft that have nothing.
At this point, aircraft similar to what happened tragically to
Senator Wellstone, if we would have had video in that aircraft,
if it would have been required, some form of either CVR, FDR or
video, clearly we would have been able to make a more timely
determination and make recommendations that may not have
already necessarily been made.
So that is our primary goal is to get them into the smaller
aircraft that have nothing at this point.
Now when you begin to operationally look at those, you will
have, I believe, enough evidence that everyone will be in
agreement that these new technologies are going to be extremely
valuable in the process of accident investigation.
Those again are never, ever, ever used in any way, shape or
form other than for accident investigation. We have proven that
in our FDR, in our CVR categories. Again, they are using FOQUA
in the FDR. Those are never used for punishment. They are used
for operational understanding of what happens.
We believe that this type of protection will be there, and
we would not like to say in any way, shape or form any of these
technologies used for anything other than the furtherance of
safety, not for disciplinary action.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much, and your reference to
Senator Wellstone makes a very personal and heartstrings appeal
and pull for me.
I want to encourage both FAA and NTSB to continue working
to fulfill the one level of safety objective that was set over
a decade ago for Part 121/135, especially the on demand
charter, not only with dual pilot operations but also with
single pilot operations. Don't limit.
Now my final issue and that is fatigue. Help us also since
the objective of safety and the role of the Board and the role
of the safety function of FAA is to preempt the next accident.
We are going to be moving into the new era of aviation with the
pilots flying beyond age 60. It is going to happen one way or
the other, either through legislation which I expect we will do
in this Committee in the reauthorization.
That raises questions about the twice a year medical exam
for the pilot in command. Now I question whether that is
sufficient, twice a year for the pilot in command, twice a year
navigation motor skills, flight check and simulator. Shouldn't
it be extended if we are going to extend the years in service
of pilots?
Shouldn't that be extended to the first officer? That is,
right now, the first officer is not required to have twice a
year medical check, twice a year flight checks, motor skills.
I think we ought to have a more rigorous assessment, and
twice a year would seem to me to be a good standard for
proficiency tests. Putting the first officer in addition to the
pilot in command through low fuel, hydraulics failure and the
ability to process, retain and repeat commands from air traffic
controllers. I think those are very, very critical in-flight
skills that ought to be tested more frequently for the first
officer as well as for the pilot in command.
Ms. Gilligan. If I may, Chairman Oberstar, in the rule that
we are preparing, we are anticipating or we will propose a
requirement for the medical review twice a year.
You are correct. Currently, under U.S. rules, we do allow
commercial pilots rather than ATP pilots to act as a co-pilot.
To be consistent with the ICAO requirement however, we will
propose to have the medical review done twice for any pilot
over age 60.
As to the testing, that will actually remain consistent
with what it is that the airlines currently do. I think as you
know, under our rules, there are certain prescriptive timing
for testing, but we also have some programs like advanced
qualification programs which change those time periods
somewhat, but we would allow the pilots to continue to be
tested under the airline training and testing program. At this
point, we think that will be sufficient.
Mr. Oberstar. Chairman Rosenker, do you have a supplement
to that statement?
Mr. Rosenker. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, that is not an
issue that we have studied at the Board nor do we have a
position at this time.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you.
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. The final question I have is about fatigue.
There is daily fatigue, and there is cumulative fatigue. Over
many years, this Committee has grappled with this issue,
pressed for and enacted legislation eventually on flight and
duty time.
The NTSB has repeatedly said that the FAA should set
working hour limits for flight crews, for aviation mechanics,
based on research on fatigue, circadian rhythms, sleep and rest
requirements. In addition, training and flight checks, ferry
flight, repositioning flights should be included in the crew
total flight time. Those are your recommendations.
Now let me transfer that to another mode: railroad. It is
well known that the operating crew, the locomotive engineer and
the conductor are subjected to limbo time, time when they are
neither on duty nor off duty. The railroads have increased the
amount of limbo time, the number of shifts in which more than
two hours or more of that time in limbo are visited upon the
operating crew.
If it is important enough for aviation, and I realize there
are differences, that aircraft are five or seven miles in the
air, no curb to pull over. You have to have much higher
standards. But the railroad is critical too. You can't stop
that train on a dime any more than you can stop that aircraft
on a dime.
Fourteen hour duty period, ten hours of rest, increase
flight time to ten hours and so on, we need to visit the same
requirements on operating crews of train, and I know the NTSB
has had a number of recommendations on that issue. So I would
like to have your further thoughts about limbo time in
railroading as an addition to or extension of the fatigue to
which operating crews are subjected.
Mr. Rosenker. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
opportunity to talk about another mode while I am here at the
same time. I get a two-for, I think, that way.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes, you do, and we get a two-for.
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir.
I testified for this Committee to talk about issues such as
limbo time and crew rest along with positive train control. I
will get that in one more time wherever I can. That is a
technological advance which in fact when implemented will begin
the process of stopping some of these terrible collisions that
occur on our rails today.
But when we talk about limbo time, if we can eliminate
limbo time, that is one element that we believe will
significantly improve the opportunities for our train crews to
be rested and alert when they finally come back to work. We
would like to see that.
Although we don't call it limbo time in the aviation
community, there is a loophole that enables, for example, a
pilot to fly after his eight hours on 121, to fly a ferry
flight which would go beyond that eight hours and thereby
perhaps put him into a fatigue situation.
Mr. Oberstar. Airlines or charter operations will call that
Part 91.
Mr. Rosenker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. And escape the responsibility of Part 121/
135.
Mr. Rosenker. That is exactly right, Mr. Chairman, and that
is what we believe can be affected, and we have asked for our
colleagues at the FAA to regulate and to improve and to change.
I believe that can be done. We hope it is not just done in the
issue of changes in 135 but a reform that talks about the
entire fatigue issue as it relates to our air crew members.
We have also, of course, made recommendations to those that
deal in the maintenance. We don't want those people in any way,
shape or form to be working on aircraft when they are fatigued.
There are a number of environmental issues which in fact affect
the way they work, and many of these, of course, these
maintenance workers, are doing their work overnight in some of
the most difficult sleep patterns and also in some of the more
challenging environments.
So we would work. We would like to work with our colleagues
at the FAA to get those specific changes implemented and
implemented as quickly as possible.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much.
I won't ask Ms. Gilligan to respond to rail questions.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and, Mr. Petri, I thank you.
Mrs. Moore, thank you very much for your patience.
These are critically important issues, and I spent a good
deal of my service in Congress in them, and I appreciate the
opportunity to explore them in further detail.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from West Virginia,
Mrs. Capito.
Mrs. Capito. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Sorry, Mrs. Capito. I still think of you as
Shelley Moore.
Mrs. Capito. That is good.
I have a quick question. It is not on the most wanted list,
but it is something I have wondered about flying a lot in
smaller aircraft between here and West Virginia, and I think it
is unsettling to the traveling public and more and more people
are on flights. I think the flights are much more crowded than
I have ever seen them.
When you get on a plane, and they start shifting people
around or they ask one person to move because of weight or
balance or get off the plane, it doesn't give you a real good
feeling to think that removing one person is going to be the
difference between flying safely and not flying safely. I know
the accident that occurred in Charlotte was an incident of
overweight, and I believe that was a turbo. Was that a turbo
prop plane? I think yes.
For those of us whom this happens to quite frequently, tell
us what your perspective is on weight and balance and what
direction from a safety standpoint the airlines are going on
this and the FAA.
Ms. Gilligan. Congresswoman, if I could, I would ask Mr.
Hickey who is an aeronautical engineer to perhaps try to
address that issue for you.
Mr. Hickey. Thank you, ma'am. I guess the initial response
I would give is I would be comforted by the fact that a person
was either moved or removed because it shows, I think, proper
diligence by the flight crew that they take weight and balance
seriously. All airplanes have a certain sort of envelope in
which we approve the airplane. We establish that that is its
safe zone. It is probably never more important than on takeoff.
While it might suggest to you it is not like riding a bus
or a train where that typically doesn't happen, in an airplane,
it is a very ordinary proper function to occur. The margins,
though, of one additional person or two additional people being
on an airplane is well, I can assure you, well within the
margins of safety.
I think historically as we have seen accidents associated
with loading, they are egregious, tremendously egregious cases
where they are way out of whack. One or two people really
aren't the make or break in that case.
Mr. Rosenker. If I could make just one clarification.
Mrs. Capito. Yes.
Mr. Rosenker. The Charlotte accident was clearly also an
issue of a filled aircraft that may have had an overweight
situation, but it was primarily caused by the mis-rigging of an
elevator, and that really created the opportunity for the
aircraft not to have been flown properly.
Mrs. Capito. Could you just clarify what misreading of an
elevator?
Mr. Rosenker. That aircraft was in for maintenance earlier
in the month or six weeks. I can't remember the exact amount of
time.
But what had happened is they mis-rigged it and did not do
a maintenance check on it, and therefore they did not know that
you could not get full elevator authority out of it. So when
you could not get the appropriate amount of elevator, when you
combine that with the weight of the aircraft and the number of
people that were on the aircraft, that is what created the
aircraft crashing.
Mrs. Capito. Thank you.
I appreciate, Mr. Hickey, and I do feel good when I know
that people are moving around and there is a lot of attention
paid to it, to the weight and balance. But knowing that it is
important, when you watch the cargo go into the back of the
plane, you start thinking now, how much weight really is on
this plane? I am sure there are large margins.
Mr. Hickey. There is.
Mrs. Capito. But you know there was the whole controversy
on the average size of an air passenger weight being 160 or 170
pounds. There was a little bit of controversy on that. Is that
something that has been readjusted or are you still working on
that?
Ms. Gilligan. No, ma'am. We actually issued new guidance
for operators to use. If they want to use a standard weight,
they use an FAA weight which we did increase both for the
individuals as well as for the baggage. If they want to, they
can actually do a survey of their actual passengers and
establish their own average weights. But they must do one or
the other, and we do over see that.
Mr. Rosenker. We will take a bit of credit for that, and it
was a timely, very, very timely response by our colleagues at
the FAA.
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Capito. On that note, I thank you for your answers.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and thanks
our witnesses on the first panel.
Let me just say that this will not be the last hearing on
the NTSB's most wanted. We intend to follow up and to hold
additional hearings. As you have indicated, Chairman Rosenker,
there has been progress made on some of these issues, but we
want to make certain that we continue to make progress. I just
want to assure our friends at the FAA and the NTSB that we will
continue to monitor these issues, and we will have additional
hearings in the future.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Petri. Mr Chairman, I just would ask unanimous consent
that some questions from our colleague, Jerry Moran of Kansas,
be allowed to be included in the record and submitted to this
panel for written response.
Mr. Costello. Without objection, so ordered.
Again, the Chair thanks the witnesses and would ask the
witnesses for our second panel to come forward, please.
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rosenker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Petri.
Mr. Costello. While the second panel is coming forward, I
would like to make some introductions. One is Gail Dunham who,
as I mentioned earlier in my opening statement, is the
President of the National Air Disaster Alliance/Foundation; Mr.
William Voss who is the President and CEO of the Flight Safety
Foundation; Captain John Prater who is the President of the Air
Line Pilots Association International; Ms. Patricia Friend, the
International President of the Association of Flight
Attendants; and Mr. James Coyne, the President of the National
Air Transportation Association.
With those introductions and we are changing name tags
around, we will get started as soon as you are seated.
Mr. Costello. Ms. Dunham, I recognize you if you are ready
to present your testimony.
I would ask members of the panel to first note that your
full statement will be submitted for the record, and we would
ask you to summarize your statements under the five minute rule
Ms. Dunham?
TESTIMONY OF GAIL DUNHAM, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR DISASTER
ALLIANCE/FOUNDATION; WILLIAM R. VOSS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, FLIGHT
SAFETY FOUNDATION; CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE
PILOTS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL; PATRICIA FRIEND,
INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS;
JAMES K. COYNE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION
ASSOCIATION
Ms. Dunham. Gail Dunham representing the National Air
Disaster Alliance and Foundation and NADA/F, also NADF. We were
incorporated by air crash family members 12 years ago. We have,
unfortunately, thousands of members worldwide: air crash
survivors, family members, those impacted by aviation
disasters, aviation professionals and those who share our
purpose.
NADA/F is a member organization of the FAA Rulemaking
Advisory Committee, a member of the Executive Committee, also a
member of the TSA Advisory Security Committee. We welcome the
opportunity to work with government and industry to promote the
highest standards of aviation safety and security.
Let us assume the following about aviation today:
Commercial aviation is public transportation. An airline ticket
is a contract for safe transportation. The cost of safety is
nil compared to the cost of a disaster. The lives of airline
passengers are in the hands of the employees who deserve fair
pay and benefits and adequate rest time to do their job.
Aviation technology has greatly improved, and there is also
excellent affordable aviation technology that exists and is not
being used today.
The NTSB Most Wanted List is the cornerstone of our
founding goal: safety, security, survivability and support for
victims' families. We used to receive an annual status report
from the NTSB, and it included references as to why the
recommendations were made and actual progress, sort of
scientific, technical data on the progress that was being made
on the recommendations. Today, the NTSB Most Wanted List has
six recommendations, and it appears that we just don't have the
substance and the progress being made.
Three changes in the process which could be helpful to you:
In 2004, there was a major change. A swat team just deleted
many of the recommendations.
August, 2005, the NTSB and FAA decided to delete perhaps
one of the most important safety recommendations, and that was
for mandatory child restraints seats for children under the age
of two. The FAA completed the studies. The FAA Technical Office
in New Jersey does a terrific job. They already completed all
of the studies to have the specific seats for the type of
aircraft. That was done. The TSO was completed in 2000 in order
to have required child restraint seats, but sadly that TSO has
languished on someone's desk since 2001.
The third change in the process is the FAA MAC, the
Management Advisory Council, which is private meetings of
aviation management with the FAA Administrator and little to no
public records of these meetings. The MAC appears to be less
advisory, and the results imply that it is a council with power
over FAA personnel and dictates to yes or no on much needed
safety recommendations. If the FAA MAC is going to continue to
be this powerful decision-maker, then at least have their
meetings open to the public and the media, or at least most of
their meetings.
Referring to a GAO report about required child restraint
seats, the FAA has been recommending child restraint seats
since 1972--this is the last page in my handout--for 35 years.
We have required child restraint seats in cars for over 25
years, and we should have required child restraint seats for
children on aircraft under the age of two.
There was an FAA study in 1995. I believe it is a flawed
conclusion. They said that if the FAA mandated child restrain
seats, that people would drive rather than fly. I don't think
that is true because people buy seats for their children when
they are over the age of two and the airlines sell the child
seats for half price.
We are asking for Congress to mandate required child
restrain seats. You do rulemaking. We can do rulemaking through
the FAA, through the NTSB, but at times it is necessary for
Congress to get involved in the rulemaking. That usually moves
it forward much faster.
Again, the TSO should just be released, I think, to move it
forward.
I have a couple thoughts about money, on how to pay for
these recommendations. Stop the diversion of transportation
funds. No matter how you fund aviation in the FAA
reauthorization fund, ensure that every single penny is for
aviation safety and security. Stop the diversion now of funds
from the Aviation Trust Fund which is 7.5 percent of the
domestic airline ticket tax.
Again, recognize aviation is public transportation, and
everyone who works for the airlines must give their all.
Congress should mandate that executive airline pensions become
part of the airline pension programs, and this would put all
the employees on an equal footing to put the company first, and
this would create probably half a billion dollars to benefit
aviation and to pay for these recommendations.
We have two pieces of safety recommendations that we are
asking you--to mandate safe flight for children under two,
upgraded recorders, suggestions about where the money might be
located--and I have three things that we are requesting that
have no cost.
We are asking you to mandate public hearings for all
commercial air cargo aviation disasters. Comair/Delta 5191 in
August in Lexington, Kentucky was the worst aviation disaster
in 2006, and there is no public hearing scheduled. A public
hearing provides time for questions, answers and testimony
under oath. At this time, they are planning a three hour
meeting to discuss the worst aviation disaster in 2006, and the
causes of 5191 were the runway incursions under low staffing in
the tower, perhaps fatigue, complex issues.
We are asking that you mandate public hearings for air
crash disasters. Family members are smart. We know the
difference between a meeting. We know the difference between a
lecture and an actual public hearing.
So three recommendations that don't cost money: Mandate
public hearings, whistleblower protection and I have a thought
about how to improve the process of moving these NTSB most
wanted recommendations forward. We need an annual public
meeting with the NTSB, the FAA and the National Air Disaster
Alliance and Foundation and our members together at the table.
Mandate this meeting once a year for public participation to
continue the pursuit, our ongoing pursuit of aviation safety
and security.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Ms. Dunham, and
recognizes Mr. Voss.
Mr. Voss. Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri and Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
aviation safety and the NTSB's Most Wanted List.
The Flight Safety Foundation was founded 60 years ago by
industry leaders to identify and solve safety issues. Those
leaders believed industry needed a neutral ground where
competitors could work together to share information, ideas and
best practices for safety. We have been working around the
world to fulfill that role ever since.
The oldest and most venerable aviation safety tool is
accident investigation. These investigations identify causes
that lead to findings and recommendations, and some of these
recommendations ultimately find their way to the NTSB Most
Wanted List. The NTSB does this better than anyone in the
world.
Objective accident investigations will always be an
essential part of the safety equation, but today they are only
part of a more complex picture. Aviation safety professionals
now have much more to work with. They have adapted a more
proactive safety management approach. They identify risks and
prioritize actions by downloading and analyzing data from
FOQUA. These reporting systems that allow pilots, mechanics and
others to report problems that would normally go unrecognized.
Studies show this type of data can give us hundreds of warnings
before a crash occurs. By protecting this data and acting on it
early, lives are saved.
Within this broader context, I would like to comment on
just several items on the Most Wanted List. The Foundation
supports NTSB efforts in the area of runway incursion but
believes the overall topic of runway safety should also be
addressed.
We break the problem of runway safety into three
components: first, runway incursions such as Tenerife;
secondly, runway excursions such as Southwest Airlines in
Chicago or the recent Garuda crash in Indonesia; and lastly,
runway confusion such as was apparently the case with Comair in
Lexington.
The runway incursions problem deserves every bit of the
considerable attention it has received, but analysis shows
runway excursions present a much larger threat than most had
assumed. From 1995 to 2006, runway excursions accounted for
29.4 percent of major jet and turbo prop accidents. These
accidents typically did not involve mass fatalities and
therefore received little attention. Nonetheless, the data
suggest these accidents deserve a closer look.
The Foundation supports a recommendation regarding human
fatigue. The aviation industry began setting hourly working
limits for light crews some three decades ago. Today, it is
clear such prescriptive rules are sometimes ineffective.
Fatigue risk management systems based on mature science can do
a far better job. Fatigue risk management will allow the
industry to do more with a higher level of safety for the
public and with a higher quality of life for the people doing
the job.
Also, the NTSB Most Wanted List supports the introduction
of CRM training for the air charter industry. We couldn't agree
more. In fact, we are leading industry efforts to go further.
CRM training is a good start, but we know from our work with
the airlines that an extension of this training, known as
Threat and Error Management, can make a good thing even better.
Our corporate advisory committee has embraced Threat and Error
Management and will promote this concept at thousands of
corporate pilots over the next year.
We will not stop there. The next step will be to actively
promote this type of training along with CRM to the air charter
community.
Even though work still needs to be done on the NTSB Most
Wanted List, the aviation industry has done a remarkable job to
reduce the number of accidents because over the last decade the
industry has adopted a more proactive approach that addresses
risks before they become accidents. This proactive approach is
based on a foundation of commitment and trust. Trust is a
difficult thing to maintain.
The industry and the regulator have been through difficult
times, and labor relations are strained. The Foundation takes
no position on political debates, but we do issue one caution.
Such debates must never be allowed to compromise the free flow
of safety information in the system because safety
professionals use this information to save lives.
This is not just theoretical. Today's low accident rate
means there are people walking around today who would have
otherwise died. Unlike the victims of crashes, we can't name
the survivors, but they are as real as those who perished. If
we had the same accident rate today as we did in 1996, there
would have been 30 commercial jet accidents around the world
last year. Instead, there were 11.
Perhaps some of us were on those 19 flights that didn't
crash. We will never know.
Thank you very much for allowing me to testify. I would be
happy to take any questions.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Voss, and
recognizes Captain Prater.
Mr. Prater. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
inviting ALPA to testify before the Subcommittee.
I am John Prater, President of the Air Line Pilots
Association representing more than 60,000 airline pilots at 41
airlines in the United States and Canada. For 76 years, ALPA
has beaten a drum to improve safety in the airline industry.
Some have even called us the conscience of the industry. This
morning, our voice from the flight deck will speak clearly on
issues of safety.
Let me begin by saying that ALPA agrees with the NTSB that
a pressing need exists to provide rational, scientifically-
based working hour limits for pilots engaged in all airline
operations. Simply put, pilots are tired. One reason we are
tired is because we are working under antiquated Federal
regulations developed when airplanes couldn't fly across
multiple time zones. The industry introduced the first
passenger jet airliner in the late fifties. It could cover
about 3,700 miles and required three pilot crew members.
Today, however, aircraft can cover 12 to 14 time zones for
more than 16 hours of continuous flight, easily traveling more
than 9,000 miles, certified to fly with two pilots and
augmented only when the flight is scheduled longer than eight
hours. Commuter airplanes have been replaced by jets carrying
50, 70 to 90 passengers, flying coast to coast. This different
world requires different rules.
Unfortunately, current FAA rules do not adequately apply
known science into pilot fatigue research, circadian rhythms
and realistic sleep and rest requirements. The lack of a
defined duty limit in the regulations illustrates our concerns
perfectly. With an augmented crew, it is legal to fly from the
East Coast of the United States 16 hours to Asia and then
immediately fly another 16 hours back to the United States.
Legal? Yes. Fatiguing? I will allow you to be the judge.
Federal regulations require airline pilots to receive eight
hours off between flights. This does not equal rest. By the
time a pilot finishes up paperwork, catches the airport
shuttles, checks into the hotel, grabs a bite to eat, showers,
dresses and leaves in time to get through security the next day
and conduct another preflight, he or she is lucky to get five
hours of sleep between flights. That leads to a massive sleep
deficit and chronic fatigue.
ALPA strongly urges you to push the FAA to modernize flight
and duty time regulations and rest requirements for the safety
of the traveling public.
Why now? Until the post-9/11 round of bankruptcies, we had
negotiated contractual safety work rules. Those contract safety
rules were gutted under threats of Chapter 11 or in bankruptcy
courts. The Federal aviation regulations that govern maximum
flight and duty times and minimum rest periods for pilots are
now the everyday working standard for many U.S. airlines.
Changing gears, I would like to remind you that the
ultimate safety net in our industry is the front line employee.
That is why ALPA believes the Aviation Safety Action Program or
ASAP should be high on the NTSB's Most Wanted List. It allows
front line employees to report safety concerns firsthand,
enabling the industry to ensure safety while protecting those
same employees.
Recently, ALPA's air safety representatives met with the
senior FAA officials and developed new language that will
improve these programs and encourage additional ASAP programs
at more airlines. We consider ASAP and its partner program
FOQUA, which collects and analyzes data indicating potential
risk, as standard issue. They are must-have items for airline
safety.
As of May 30th of this year, 27 ALPA representative
airlines had ASAP. Six United States ALPA represented airlines
do not have ASAP, and that is six too many. It is time to
implement both of these programs at every airline. These safety
programs which allow employees to identify threats will help us
prevent accidents.
One more issue belongs on the NTSB list. How many of you
have handed your unaccompanied grandchildren to an airline or
watched your spouse and kids board after you have dropped them
off? You have placed an incredible act of trust, handing over
your loved ones to total strangers who will take them in that
narrow aluminum tube called a jet airplane to 30,000 feet,
thousands of miles, trusting they will arrive safe and sound.
When I was hired as a pilot with Continental Airlines,
pilots had to have a minimum of 2,500 hours of flying time,
hands-on experience. The captain beside me probably had at
least 10,000 hours. Military training programs require several
hundred hours of flight time and cost millions of dollars. That
airline pilot supply pipeline is now history.
Today, many pilots get the majority of their training in
simulators. At some regional carriers, pilots need as few as
200 flight hours, the absolute minimum to be a basic commercial
pilot in a single engine airplane, and in just four to six
weeks, they will become your first officer, second in command
on a 50, 70, or 90 seat jet. These pilots will become captain
in less than a year. These pilots are surely talented and
dedicated, but that is no substitute for experience.
Our demand is that airlines hiring pilots with flight
experience less than the minimum of 1,500 flight hours required
to become an airline transport pilot must receive increased new
hire training programs at the regional carriers.
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify. I
will be ready to answer any questions.
Mr. Costello. We thank you, Captain Prater.
Ms. Friend.
Ms. Friend. Thank you, Chairman Costello and Mr. Petri for
giving us the opportunity to testify today.
Flight attendants, as the first responders in the aircraft
cabin and as airline safety professionals, are closely
following a number of the issues raised by the NTSB in their
Most Wanted Aviation Transportation Safety Improvements. The
NTSB has done a good job in identifying many vital and
important issues needing improvement, and we applaud their
efforts.
Today, however, I would like to focus my testimony on the
issue of fatigue. Human fatigue has been a longstanding concern
in aviation accident and incident investigative reports. Based
on these concerns, research has been done on pilot and
maintenance fatigue.
We are here today to tell you that the industry must
acknowledge that flight attendant is also a very real and
serious concern. We believe that the NTSB's most wanted
recommendation setting working hours for flight crews and
aviation mechanics, based on fatigue research, circadian
rhythms and sleep and rest requirements is flawed because it
does not include the need to address flight attendant fatigue.
Multiple studies have shown that reaction time and
performance diminishes with fatigue, an unacceptable situation
for safety and security sensitive employees. Flight attendants
are required to be on board to conduct aircraft emergency
evacuations when they are necessary. In addition, they are in-
flight first responders who are trained to handle in-flight
fires and manage medical emergencies including CPR and the use
of external defibrillators.
Furthermore, since September 11th, the security
responsibilities of flight attendants have greatly increased.
It has become even more important for flight attendants to be
constantly vigilant of the situation in the aircraft cabin and
aware of their surroundings at all times, and inability to
function due to fatigue jeopardizes the traveling public and
other crew members. An error caused due to flight attendant
fatigue can lead to a tragic loss of life in the event of an
in-flight emergency or during an evacuation.
Flight attendant fatigue has already played a role in some
incidents. For example, in 1995, an ATR-72 experienced the loss
of the rear cabin entry door during the takeoff climb. The
flight crew was able to circle around and land safely. The
aircraft received minor damage, and one flight attendant
received minor injuries.
The probable cause of the incident was the flight attendant
inadvertently opening the door in flight due, in part, to
flight attendant fatigue. The flight attendant estimated that
she had approximately five hours of sleep the night before the
incident flight. Also contributing to the incident was a change
in the design of the door locking mechanism. If we add the
human factors issue of fatigue-impaired judgment and then add
the human factors design issue, the redesign of the door, we
have a perfect human factors interaction error in this
incident.
Fatigue for flight attendants has been growing across the
industry in recent years as our members are required to work
longer duty days, cross multiple time zones and can have work
shifts that are the equivalent of a midnight shift. Flight
attendants do not have a regulatory hard limit on actual flying
hours in any 24 hour period.
Add to that a reduced rest provision that allows a rest
period to be reduced to just eight hours off the aircraft. That
has now become the norm. Our members are reporting that in an
eight hour rest, they are getting only four to five hours of
actual sleep.
Flight attendants are so exhausted that they have informed
us they have, in some cases, forgotten to perform critical
safety functions including the arming of doors and some have
even fallen asleep on their jumpseats.
In 2006, the Civil Aeronautical Medical Institute, CAMI,
issued their report on an initial study of the issue of flight
attendant fatigue. Based on just limited research, the report
concluded that flight attendants are experiencing fatigue and
tiredness and, as such, this is a salient issue warranting
further evaluation.
Potential mishaps could have devastating ramifications.
Fortunately, they have not because of the current overall low
number of accidents. Regulatory agencies as well as the NTSB
must further investigate and recommend changes to address
flight attendant fatigue before a serious incident happens.
To ensure safety of the entire transportation industry as a
whole, we must look at all workers that could have an effect on
the survival rate of passengers, not just the pilot who
operates the aircraft or the maintenance personnel that fix a
broken part. We are, after all, operating the equipment that
fights fires, provides medical first response, and helps with a
speedy evacuation. To say that flight attendant fatigue should
not be a concern or that it is not as important because we are
not the sole factor that could cause an accident or that we
don't operate a moving vehicle is to acknowledge that saving
passenger lives doesn't matter.
Again, thank you, Chairman Costello and the Committee, for
holding this hearing, and I look forward to answering any
questions.
Mr. Costello. We thank you, Ms. Friend, and the Chair now
recognizes Mr. Coyne.
Mr. Coyne. I know I am standing between you and lunch, a
dangerous spot. I will try to go as quickly as I can.
I submit my testimony, but I do want to briefly summarize
it and focus the attention of the Committee on just how glad I
am to be here because in past years, frankly, when this
Committee and Congress more broadly addressed the question of
aviation safety, more typically it was only on the area of
airline safety. As you can see from the recommendations from
the NTSB, all of these recommendations apply to the other
segments of aviation as well as the airlines, and I am very,
very grateful that the Committee has seen fit to have a
representative from the non-airline segment of aviation.
As you know, NATA, the National Air Transportation
Association, represents over 2,000 aviation businesses across
the Country, which employ over 100,000 people who provide
ground service, who provide air charter, who operate FPOs, who
operate aircraft maintenance companies and flight training. All
of these small businesses, if you will, are an incredibly
important part of our air transportation system.
Hopefully without insulting any other members of the panel,
frankly, I like to think of the NATA members as the backbone of
aviation across the Country, and we are very glad to be
included in this safety discussion.
Of course, the five principle issues before the Committee
today, the so-called unacceptable recommendation areas from the
NTSB, are especially important to our industry as well.
Briefly, I would like to summarize to say that of these five
so-called unacceptable response areas of concern, our
organization is generally supportive of the recommendations
that have been made by NTSB in these five areas, but we have
concerns with the application of some of the NTSB proposals
particularly regarding the difficulty of retrofitting existing
aircraft to comply with some of the suggested changes.
Specifically, NATA supports the recommendations made by the
NTSB in regard to the dangers posed by known icing conditions
as well as recommendations to increase requirements for cockpit
voice and data recorders and extend the duration of time
recorded by this equipment. However, any FAA rules requiring
technological improvements should remain what we call forward
fitting and not apply to existing aircraft as such upgrades
will disproportionately affect small general aviation aircraft.
NATA, however, agrees with the recommendations regarding
runway safety and believes that NTSB and FAA are focusing the
correct amount of attention to these top concerns especially
the runways at large commercial airports.
NATA also contends that the best approach to runway safety
must include human factors intervention to complement any
technological improvements. NATA provides such human factors
training to the industry on an ongoing basis through our Safety
First Program.
We are also supportive of the NTSB decision to include
revised pilot work hour regulations and crew resource
management training on the Most Wanted List. The association
has participated in the drafting of a comprehensive proposal
mentioned earlier at the FAA on the Part 135 ARC, and we were
pleased to hear earlier this morning that they are going to be
moving forward with those recommendations in an expedited
manner.
Let me also say, however, that the focus of the Committee
must not continue to be just on flight safety but more broadly
on ground safety. My good friend from the Flight Safety
Foundation pointed out the need for looking at excursions as
well as so-called runway incursions.
But in addition even to excursions, there is a growing
safety hazard at many airports on the ramp and on the taxiways.
You will be surprised to know that so far this year there have
been more fatalities on the ramps of airports in the United
States than there have been in the commercial operation of
those aircraft in the air. The ramps today are an incredibly
crowded spot.
We, of course, at NATA have launched something called the
Safety First Program dealing with ramp and ground safety
broadly for our FPOs and airline service employees. We have
made tremendous strides, and we hope that the Committee and the
NTSB and the FAA will continue to focus on this.
In addition, I want to stress that the air charter segment
is an incredibly important focus of this Committee's attention.
Just yesterday, there was a tragic accident in Lake Michigan,
involving six passengers on a medical flight. Of course,
Senator Wellstone's flight tragedy was a charter flight.
The charter industry has only recently become a priority at
the FAA. Up until a few years ago, they only had one employee
in the entire FAA, looking at charter safety. If I may
compliment them, in the last year they have significantly
broadened this.
We in the industry as well have developed a lot of
proactive, new charter safety recommendations, most especially
our new focus on safety management systems. Just last week, we
created the Air Charter Safety Foundation in cooperation with
the Flight Safety Foundation. So we are very keenly interested
in raising the bar for safety in air charter.
Specifically, of course, the NTSB recommends more
investment in crew resource management in the 135 world. We
worked very hard with the FAA on the ARC to develop these
recommendations, and we support your efforts and NTSB's efforts
to have these crew resource management recommendations put into
law as quickly as possible.
I look forward to your questions. Again, thank you for
letting me be here.
Mr. Costello. We thank you, Mr. Coyne.
Mr. Voss, a couple of questions, one concerning both your
testimony and the reference Mr. Coyne made on not only runway
incursions but excursions as well. I wonder for the record, and
then I will get into issues concerning icing conditions. But I
wonder for the record if you might elaborate, and then I am
going to ask Mr. Coyne to as well for the record to talk about
not only the runway incursions.
I think we discussed it with the first panel but the point
that you made about excursions and please elaborate.
Mr. Voss. Thank you.
Yes, runway excursions are a problem that occurs rather
frequently, but again since it does not have normally severe
consequences, it gets a fairly low amount of emphasis. However,
when we step back and look at the problem, as I said, 29.4
percent of the major damage to turbo jet and turbo prop
aircraft, that is a really significant number, and it has been
that number for quite a long time.
This is related to a number of factors. It has to do with
the fact that we could do a better job getting pilots
information on whether or not they could stop. That involves
airports, air traffic control, runway friction measurements.
Also, we could do a better job mitigating with certain
enhancements to the airport.
There is also issues associated with having stabilized
approaches and whether air traffic control is contributing to
non-stabilized approaches.
All these things appear to be underlying issues that need
to be examined. Given the fact that this has such a high
frequency of occurrence, it is a risk that needs to be treated
because we should be dealing with both those things such as
runway incursions that occur infrequently but have very serious
consequences; as well, we should be looking at things that
occur frequently which have less serious. Both sides of the
risk spectrum deserve to be looked at.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Coyne, if you would like to comment and
elaborate on your statement that more people have been killed
on the ramp, please elaborate for the record.
Mr. Coyne. Of course, just last month in Detroit,
tragically, a young man was killed operating a tug pulling an
airplane and had the misfortunate of colliding with an airplane
and losing his life.
We have seen the ramp accidents, frankly, start to decline
with the implementation of the Safety First Program. You are
familiar, of course, with Midcoast Airport there in Cahokia
where they have fully implemented the Safety First Program and
haven't had a single incident since they have done so.
The importance on excursions cannot be overemphasized
because this couples together the human actors of the cockpit,
the air traffic control system, all coupling together plus the
footprint on the ground.
Take the example at Midway. You are familiar with just a
year and a half ago when Southwest Airlines excursioned off the
end of the runway. That is an example of how an excursion
occurs when a pilot is faced with difficulties in terms of
getting the airplane properly set up for the approach and the
facility, the limitations of the airport itself, the runway,
the length, especially of course in very difficult weather
conditions they had there.
We in the small airplane world are especially concerned
about runway excursions. Frankly, big airplanes like Southwest
tend to survive these excursions more successfully than small
airplanes do. And so, we have situations as in Teterboro a year
and a half ago where a small airplane, relatively small
airplane went off the end of the runway and created loss of
life.
We are very, very concerned about this, and part of the
issue is the size of the airport. There are, frankly, not
enough 5,000 foot long runways in America today. We have too
many airports where for one reason or another--in many cases it
is just the opposition of the local community--we haven't
lengthened the runway sufficiently to deal with the needs of
the newer aircraft.
Mr. Costello. Ms. Friend, I would like to give you an
opportunity to elaborate on the fatigue issue.
Every Member of this Subcommittee and, of course, of
Congress flies frequently. I fly at least twice a week, and I
make it a practice of talking to the flight attendants and
asking them how long they have been working, where the flight
originated, where they go from my destination if it is in St.
Louis or it is DCA. It is not unusual for me to hear from a
flight attendant that they had three or four hours sleep before
their next turnaround and next flight.
I think there is a misconception when they talk about eight
hours rest. It is not eight hours rest. It is eight hours off
the aircraft. I wonder if you might elaborate.
Ms. Friend. That is correct, and I think Captain Prater
referred to that as well. The eight hours incorporates the
transportation time to and from the layover hotel, time to eat,
preparation time for bed, preparation time in the morning, so
all that. Then you have to find some time to sleep in the
middle of that.
Several years ago, working with our fellow unions
representing cabin crew and flight attendants in this Country,
we came to an agreement on some rest and duty times that were
implemented for flight attendants. It was intended to be the
absolute floor because all of us had the experience and the
confidence that we could bargain better duty and rest times at
the bargaining table in our collective bargaining agreements.
As all of you are surely aware, we have just gone through
probably the most difficult economic times in this industry.
What we learned as a result of that and the tough bargaining we
went through, as you can imagine, one of the things that our
employers were looking for was increased productivity, and
increased productivity results from flying more hours for an
individual and reducing the overall head count.
So what we learned is the floor that we worked on all those
years ago is inadequate because that is now what we are living
with, what was intended to be the floor.
We did, Congress did in 2005, in response to our request,
fund and direct the FAA to begin a study on the issue of flight
attendant fatigue. The FAA gave the study to CAMI which is
fine, but they only gave CAMI six months to complete the study.
After restricting CAMI's time to six months, they then took an
entire year to themselves to review the results of the initial
study that CAMI had done.
What CAMI's initial study came back with, and the study was
very limited. It involved really a review of existing
literature worldwide. They recommend a further, more in-depth
study be carried out. We are hoping to get that additional
study funded this year so that we can get a better
understanding on exactly what is needed to alleviate this
increasing fatigue among flight attendants.
Mr. Costello. I thank you, and the Chair now recognizes the
Ranking Member, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much.
I wonder, Mr. Coyne, if you could talk a little bit about
the impact, if any, of the new roll-out of very light jets on
safety and congestion at airports and on the ramps.
Mr. Coyne. Of course, the first two manufacturers of so-
called very light jets or VLJs, Eclipse and Mustang, have now
completed their FAA certification, and those aircraft are in
fact being delivered to customers at a relatively slow rate
right now. My guess is that at the end of the year there may be
as many as 50 of these airplanes in the hands of customers,
perhaps next year another several hundred.
However, I think in the immediate, there has been a bit of
overhype of the impact of this. Small aircraft have been around
for years and years, decades. In fact, small fast aircraft have
been around for decades. The Citation, the first small private
jet, when it first came out, really wasn't much bigger than
these VLJs and essentially operates in the same way in the
airspace with single pilots often and relatively high speeds
over 350 knots. That is what we are expecting to see in the VLJ
market but just a more dramatic and, we think, healthy growth.
The key issue here, as it has been from a safety point of
view, as it has been with small aircraft in the past and
especially owner-flown aircraft, is for training to be
advanced. We think that the industry is as committed to
training these new pilots as they ever have. Of course, most
often the pilots are not literally new pilots. They are pilots
with thousands of hours of experience in other aircraft.
But the training in these new aircraft is paramount. We in
our industry, of course, are working with the charter community
to make sure that programs exist, especially safety management
systems exist in the charter operators of these aircrafts so
that the training of their pilots is equal to or surpasses the
training that airline pilots get.
Mr. Petri. In your testimony, I think you referred to the
concept of a safety management system. I wonder if you could
elaborate on it a bit and how it affects the operation of
participating companies.
Mr. Coyne. We happen to believe that the safety management
system--and thank you for that question--is one of the most
important things that is occurring in the private sector in
aviation.
The concept of safety management system, it is not that
hard to understand. It is essentially within an organization,
creating a mechanism, a management mechanism to ensure that
every single person in the organization, whether it is a huge
airline or a five employee charter business, that every person
in that organization understands that managing safety is their
responsibility. It is not somebody else's responsibility. It is
their responsibility.
They create in that company. It is a company-focused
activity, and in the company, they create a mechanism for
managing safety just like they have a system for managing their
checking account. Of course, it is important to understand,
like a financial management system in a company, it is much
more than just having a checking account and balancing your
checkbook.
So too in safety management, it is much more than just
having a checklist when you are about to take off. It really
invests in the whole organization through a series of audits,
constant training and data collection, trying to look in the
business to collect data that you can use to monitor whether
you are meeting your safety targets.
Frankly, the SMS world got started in the military over 40
years ago. The airlines, of course, moved into it I think
probably 25 years ago or longer. Now it is finally, if you
will, getting into the charter segment of aviation, and this is
really an important development because these companies
historically don't have the resources to invest in safety
personnel that the airlines might have had.
They are developing through the help of computers and
technology and the internet. They are developing the resources.
No matter how big or small their company is, they are
developing the resource to create the same kind of professional
safety management structure that has helped contribute to the
safety record in the airline industry for the past 20 or 30
years.
We are very excited about it. We have the help of the FAA
to help launch many of these SMS training programs, and we hope
over the next year, especially with the launch of our new Air
Charter Safety Foundation, that SMS will become a requirement
literally in the United States for Part 135 as it is already in
Canada.
Finally, I should quickly say that SMS is also being used
by ground companies, FPOs and others on the ground, who are
concerned about safety on the ramp, and we have been
implementing that through our Safety First Program for over
five years now.
Mr. Petri. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the distinguished Chairman of
the full Committee, Chairman Oberstar.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank this entire panel and welcome you to the
Committee. Along with the Chairman and Ranking Member, we
greatly appreciate your contribution to safety. To those such
as Ms. Dunham who is an advocate for safety and with personal
experience, you understand the stakes that await us and are
before us in every issuance of rulemaking and every action
taken by the regulatory agencies as well as the operating
companies, the airlines themselves.
Ms. Friend, it took 14 years of wheedling, cajoling,
pressuring, asking, hearings conducted in this committee room
to press the FAA to begin a rulemaking, and then it took an act
of Congress to get it enacted and finally promulgated, even
after the act of Congress, took us a couple of years of your
work--you, the flight attendants organization, and Members of
this Committee on both sides of the aisle--to publish a rule in
1996.
Now that law, it is two pages of printed documentation,
says:
No certificate holder may assign a flight attendant to a
scheduled duty period of more than 14 hours--and then a number
of other limitations--14 hours but no more than 16 hours if the
certificate holder has assigned to the flight or flights in
that duty period at least one flight attendant in addition to
the minimum flight attendant complement.
Are they doing that?
Ms. Friend. Yes, they are.
Mr. Oberstar. Certificate holder may assign a flight
attendant to a period of more than 16 hours but no more than 18
hours if the certificate holder has assigned to the flight or
flights at least two flight attendants in addition to the
minimum flight attendant.
Are they doing that?
Ms. Friend. Yes.
Mr. Oberstar. Are they in compliance?
Ms. Friend. Yes, they are in compliance.
Mr. Oberstar. My guess is they wouldn't be if we hadn't
written it into law.
Are they complying with the scheduled duty period of more
than 18 but no more than 20 hours if the duty period includes
one more flights that land or take off outside the 48
contiguous states and the District of Columbia and so on? Are
they in compliance with that?
Ms. Friend. Yes.
Mr. Oberstar. The problem is that the economic pressure on
the marketplace, fewer aircraft, one-fifth fewer aircraft than
the fleet we had prior to September 11th, the pressure on the
airlines in the marketplace to operate those aircraft more
continuously, keep them more in service puts pressure on flight
deck crew, Captain Prater, and on the cabin crew, resulting in
the situations that you have described for us: inability to
function due to fatigue, impaired judgment.
The eight hours rest doesn't really mean eight hours of
sleep. Often times it buys you only four or five hours of
sleep.
There is flight time and there is duty time. Flight time,
we finally caused, through this Committee's work, the FAA to
write a definition into law of when flight time begins and when
it ends, when the brake is released and when the brake is
applied at the end of the flight. But then surrounding that,
encapsulating that is duty time, and that is both for the
flight deck crew and the cabin crew.
Under what circumstances does that time come to be
expanded?
Ms. Friend. Sir, we both have comments.
Mr. Oberstar. You both speak for the same time.
Ms. Friend. It comes to be expanded in what we fondly refer
to as irregular operations where the schedule may be built
within the correct parameters and circumstances arguably beyond
the control of the operator prevent the aircraft from being put
on the ground in the proper place within those time frames.
Our bigger problem is with the rest provisions that were
part of that laborious and painful process that you described
in that there is a provision in the rest to reduce the rest
time down to eight hours. But it was intended to be on an
exception basis to accommodate irregular operations whether it
be weather or air traffic control delays, things that we really
can't control which is now being used not as an exception to
the rule but as regular scheduling practices. That is really
the problem that we are having.
Mr. Prater. You start to find that time is defined
differently in the airline industry. Some of the practices are
to flight plan, schedule a flight just below eight hours even
though that flight couldn't, on its best day, be flown under
eight hours as a way of not exceeding the need for two pilots.
New York to Frankfort, that flight will go over eight hours day
in and day out, but it is always scheduled for 7 hours and 55
minutes.
We see a few other practices like that that come to our
attention. One of the most egregious is the scheduling of
reserve crew members. We heard this morning from the FAA that
personal responsibility for mitigating fatigue should be
considered.
Well, let me tell you a practice of telling a pilot that he
is going to go on duty at 4:00 a.m. in the morning. So he or
she goes to sleep maybe at 8:00 the night before. At 4:00 a.m.,
they receive a call saying, oh, all of the morning flights are
covered. You are now released to your nine hours of rest. Be
ready to go back to work at 3:00 this afternoon and oh, by the
way, we are going to schedule you for an 8:00 flight to London
and you will be on duty for 15 hours.
This double use of crew members, you cannot prepare for
those types of situations. That is why we need more regulatory
efforts to control those types of situations.
Thank you.
Mr. Oberstar. Is that situation extant because there are
not enough flight crews to call upon to manage the aircraft,
that is, you don't have enough pilots?
Mr. Prater. The pilot staffing has been cut to the bone
just like many other employees, whether it is service, whether
it is flight attendants, whether it is mechanics. We have seen
that reduction of the force. While we have seen maybe fewer
airplanes in the fleet, we see a lot fewer employees to service
even more passengers.
So, yes, we are seeing trying to fly a full schedule with
less pilots. That is forcing longer days, more hours in the
work month, more hours in the year, and that is the effects of
the last five years for what we are seeing.
The FARs do not adequately protect the traveling public
from having a tired pilot, a tired flight attendant, a tired
mechanic.
Mr. Oberstar. Ms. Friend, I think the same situation
pertains in the flight attendant crewing of aircraft.
Ms. Friend. That is correct. It is a question of the
employers' efforts to increase productivity, getting more work
out of a fewer number of employees, and that was in response to
their economic crisis.
Mr. Oberstar. Captain Prater, also as you said in your
testimony, there is no limit on the number of times a month
that lengthy duty days may be assigned. Do you think that we
ought to amend the existing laws and impose limits?
Mr. Prater. When we went through the exercise back in 1995
and 1996 and some of the proposals are still sitting, gathering
dust on one of the FAA shelves, it was because the industry and
the unions and the FAA couldn't agree.
Mr. Oberstar. That was before September 11th.
Mr. Prater. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes, yes.
Mr. Prater. We have asked and we have told the FAA that we
were coming back because of our experience, the reports of
those 60,000 pilots telling us. I am not telling them. They
have been telling me: We have got to do something. We have lost
the contractual rights. Therefore, if we can't move it through
the FAA, we have to come to Congress and ask for assistance.
Mr. Oberstar. Your point, I think, is well stated. The
issue is not whether to change the rules but how much to reduce
the maximum flight and duty times. If that means that airlines
have to hire more crew, then they ought to be doing it in the
interest of safety or the time will come when people say it
isn't safe to fly.
Mr. Prater. We will do everything in our power to make sure
that day doesn't come.
Mr. Oberstar. We heard from NTSB and also from FAA about
technology, the runway status lights system. This FAA is so
full of acronyms. I just hate to use them. I spell them out for
my own benefit as well as for others I am talking to.
ASDE-X and a final runway approach signal, what is your
reaction to the effectiveness of that technology giving pilots
information in the flight deck about the situation on the
ground?
Mr. Prater. We are certainly not averse to new
technological approaches to solving problems, but we think
sometimes the concentration ought to be on the more basic, back
to the basics approach, whether it is better lighting systems
on the ground, stop signals to prevent a runway from being
crossed while it is being used by an approach.
Yes, technology can help. The systems that have evolved
over the years have provided us with much better separation
from midair collisions, and it can be done with the ground
control.
But we see some of the most basic things like making sure
there is enough controllers in the cab to make sure a runway is
clear before crossing us, to make sure that someone is
responsible for one runway approach instead of two, three or
four crossings downfield. In low visibility situations, the
technology helps greatly.
One of the best things we can all do sometimes, even though
aviation is supposed to be fast, is to slow down, is to not
push the airplanes right to their limits, not to push the
maximums. Hitting, if you will, the final approach marker four
or five miles from touchdown at speeds where you have to do
everything you can to slow down to make that landing. Those are
all techniques used by the industry, by the FAA to try to
mandate, to get as much capacity into the system.
We believe a few more controllers in the tower would be a
good thing especially if they are rested controllers.
Mr. Oberstar. I couldn't agree with you more on that score
because as we all have learned over the years, on final, it is
not how much runway is behind you but how much runway is left
ahead of you.
Mr. Chairman, you, I am sure, have questions and Mr. Petri
as well. I will withhold at this point.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Petri, do you have further questions?
Mr. Petri. I would like to thank the panel.
Mr. Costello. Actually, Mr. Chairman, I think that we have
covered a lot of the issues.
I do have some comments that I want to make. But before I
do, let me say that our colleague from Kentucky, Ben Chandler,
submitted written questions not only for the first panel but
for you as well, and we will be getting those to you for a
written response to Mr. Chandler.
I said to the first panel and will say to you that this
will not be the last hearing that we will hold concerning not
only the NTSB's Most Wanted List but other safety issues. I
believe it is our responsibility, this Subcommittee's
responsibility to make certain that we hold the FAA and other
agencies that we have jurisdiction over accountable.
I believe that while we have made some progress in certain
areas, it has taken far too long as I think Ms. Dunham has
pointed out in her written testimony.
Ms. Dunham. May I say something?
Mr. Costello. She looks like she wants to jump in right
now, so I am going to recognize you in just one second.
But it has taken far too long. It is our responsibility to
make certain that the FAA takes action, and when they do not,
we need to hold them accountable. I want to assure you, as I
did the FAA, that if they think is going to be the last hearing
and they can get by today and go back to business as usual,
that is not going to happen.
Ms. Dunham?
Ms. Dunham. I am glad to hear that.
I think the purpose of the hearing was to discuss these six
NTSB recommendations. Collectively, these have been studied for
about 150 years. I totaled it up. We are concerned about moving
action forward, and we are asking Congress for your help. When
the technology is there, when the money is there, the safety
initiatives should move forward.
One good example right back where we started, the most
important tool in an air crash investigation is the black box.
We are recommending upgraded recorders. The FAA has delayed
upgraded black boxes for decades.
We are requesting that Congress respond with legislation
that would mandate dual flight data recorders for the front and
the rear and a deployable recorder in the rear to ensure that
the black box survives and have a rapid response for the cause
of the disaster. The military has had deployable recorders for
years. This would benefit everyone with the state of the art
technology.
You don't know the cause of the next aviation disaster.
There will be suspect about terrorism. It is most important
that we get this basic technology forward, and we are asking
you for help.
Flying is safe. Millions of people get where they are going
every day, but we still average over one fatal crash a day in
the United States. We shouldn't have aviation disasters as the
only way to get people's attention.
Thank you so much for saying that this isn't the last
hearing.
Mr. Costello. Well, thank you for your participation and
all that you have done with the families that have been
involved in your organization.
Let me ask the other members of the panel if they have some
final thoughts or comments before we go to a final round of
questions and close the hearing.
Mr. Voss?
Mr. Voss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think my only comment would be that it is important for
us not just to pay attention to the accidents because there are
very few accidents now.
We are doing a great job looking forward. Safety management
systems were mentioned repeatedly, FOQUA and ASAP systems also.
Recording systems were mentioned repeatedly. I think that we
are at a new age now where we need to be focusing on those
proactive measures. I think there has been a strong consensus
on the panel that they are all very important, and I would like
to see more emphasis on that in the future.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Captain Prater?
Mr. Prater. Yes, sir, I would like to roll right in on the
SMS. We have seen safety management systems evolve through the
government in Canada. We have done everything we can to protect
the ASAP and FOQUA systems and develop those so that it can be
a confidential way to report on yourself, to report what you
see, even from the ramp driver, tug driver that might
accidently hit an airplane. If he or she recognizes that and
turns himself in, we might prevent an incident or even an
accident.
We have to develop those systems in the United States from
the top down, from the CEOs right down to whatever employee is
near an airplane. If they will do that, we are ready to move on
those. But, again, I fear it will take a push by Congress to
get the airline industry to fully adopt the SMS systems.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Ms. Friend?
Ms. Friend. I would just thank you again, Chairman
Costello, for your interest in our industry. We can use all the
help we can get.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Coyne?
Mr. Coyne. I would like to thank you all. Mr. Chairman, I
have appreciated your help and friendship, all the Members of
the Committee over many years, and I am very happy to be here.
I would like to just second one of the things that Mr. Voss
said earlier, though, which is really important. The number of
accidents is going down. The era, the 20th Century was a time
when we could promote safety perhaps by just investigating the
accidents.
We really need a much more diagnostic environment now where
we look at problems long before they are accidents, and that is
why I think the safety management system process is so
important because that is the only way for us to get the data
we need. Of course, once we have the data, we can figure out
what we need to do. The worst way to get data to create
aviation safety is to get the data from an accident.
Hopefully, with your help and others, we can get to a world
where we never again have to wait for that accident to get the
data we need.
Mr. Costello. Chairman Oberstar?
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the panel for their comments.
In the spirit of safety which is aimed at preempting the
next accident, Mr. Voss, I would like to ask you and Captain
Prater whether you are noticing an increase in the number of
minimum equipment list incidents aboard aircraft in this era of
fewer aircraft, more pressure on existing aircraft to be flying
more hours of the day and more outsourcing of maintenance.
Are there more MELs?
Mr. Voss. Thank you, but I think I would have to defer to
Captain Prater on that one, and I am certainly interested in
hearing the response to that question.
Mr. Prater. Well, I hate to pass the buck, but what I will
tell you is that I think it is a question that needs to be
investigated.
I can say that at the first rate operators, no, there has
not been. They have been keeping the airplanes in the sky, and
they have been keeping the maintenance going when the airplanes
are on the ground. However, we have seen a tremendous economic
pressure on some operators, and there is always at that point a
concern about whether something gets fixed when it is noticed
or is it put off for 24 or 72 hours.
What I can commit is that we will survey all of our
operators, all of our pilots to see if there is an increase. I
believe that most of our operators are doing a good job in
keeping the airplanes maintained.
Mr. Oberstar. Ms. Friend, do you have a comment on that?
No.
Just for the record, a minimum equipment list is that
equipment that is inoperative or non-functioning which is not
essential to safety of flight. It means you can operate the
aircraft, but you need to have a public announcement system and
you can't fly it more than 24 hours without.
What I have learned over the years is that there is a
progression from MELs to major failures. I am very concerned
about this, and I have asked the FAA to do a search of records
and provide me with a report that I will share with Mr.
Costello and Mr. Petri when we get that information on whether
there is a progression of MELs.
I just, in random flying, notice an increase. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. I thank the Chairman.
We thank all of you for your thoughtful testimony. We look
forward to continuing to work with you on these important
issues. Thank you.
The Subcommittee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]