[House Hearing, 110 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S RESPONSE TO AIR QUALITY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: WERE THERE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS? ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ JUNE 25, 2007 __________ Serial No. 110-54 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 36-342 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007 --------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800 DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MAXINE WATERS, California DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts RIC KELLER, Florida ROBERT WEXLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia HANK JOHNSON, Georgia STEVE KING, Iowa LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM FEENEY, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California TRENT FRANKS, Arizona TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director and Chief Counsel Joseph Gibson, Minority Chief Counsel ------ Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chairman ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida MIKE PENCE, Indiana KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota DARRELL ISSA, California JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan STEVE KING, Iowa ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia JIM JORDAN, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina STEVE COHEN, Tennessee David Lachmann, Chief of Staff Paul B. Taylor, Minority Counsel C O N T E N T S ---------- JUNE 25, 2007 Page OPENING STATEMENT The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties................ 1 The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, and Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties.................................... 9 The Honorable Anthony D. Weiner, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary...................................................... 11 The Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress from the State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties................ 28 WITNESSES The Honorable Christine Todd Whitman, Whitman Strategy Group Oral Testimony................................................. 13 Mr. John L. Henshaw, Henshaw & Associates, Inc. Oral Testimony................................................. 15 Prepared Statement............................................. 18 Mr. Samuel Thernstrom, American Enterprise Institute Oral Testimony................................................. 64 Prepared Statement............................................. 66 Ms. Tina Kreisher, Communications Director, U.S. Department of the Interior Oral Testimony................................................. 85 Prepared Statement............................................. 86 Mr. David M. Newman, New York Committee of Occupational Safety and Health Oral Testimony................................................. 88 Prepared Statement............................................. 90 Ms. Eileen McGinnis, Senior Vice President, Whitman Strategy Group Oral Testimony................................................. 114 Ms. Marianne L. Horinko, Executive Vice President, Global Environment & Technology Foundation Oral Testimony................................................. 115 Ms. Suzanne Y. Mattei Oral Testimony................................................. 116 Prepared Statement............................................. 118 LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties................................................ 6 Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, and Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties......... 10 APPENDIX Material Submitted for the Printed Hearing Record Material submitted by the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties................................................ 150 Supplemental Submission from the Honorable Christine Todd Whitman, Whitman Strategy Group................................ 153 Response to Post-Hearing Questions from the Honorable Christine Todd Whitman, Whitman Strategy Group........................... 158 Response to Post-Hearing Questions from John L. Henshaw, Henshaw & Associates, Inc.............................................. 167 Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Samuel Thernstrom, American Enterprise Institute.................................. 171 Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Tina Kreisher, Communications Director, U.S. Department of the Interior....... 174 Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Eileen McGinnis, Senior Vice President, Whitman Strategy Group......................... 175 Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Marianne L. Horinko, Executive Vice President, Global Environment & Technology Foundation..................................................... 177 Substantive Due Process Violations Arising from the EPA's Handling of Air Quality Issues Following September 11, 2001, June 25, 2007.................................................. 181 OFFICIAL HEARING RECORD Material Submitted but not Printed The information that follows is material that was submitted for the official hearing record. The material is not printed in this printed hearing record but is on file with the Subcommittee and is also available at the specified links. EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement, by the Office of the EPA Inspector General at: http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2003/WTC_report_20030821.pdf. This August 21, 2003 report by EPA's Office of the Inspector General surveys EPA's response to the attacks on 9/11 and the Agency's failure to comply with its established regulations and responsibilities, particularly with regard to indoor air. Pollution and Deception at Ground Zero, by Suzanne Mattei at: http://web.archive.org/web/20041106175554/www.sierraclub.org/ groundzero/report.pdf. This report, by the former New York City Executive of the Sierra Club, analyzes the response of Federal and local authorities in the wake of 9/11. It provides important insight into falsely reassuring statements that EPA made to the public. EPA Ombudsman Hearings Transcripts at: http://www.nyenvirolaw.org/PDF/Transcript-EPA-OmbudsmanHearing-2- 23-2002.pdf, and http://www.nyenvirolaw.org/PDF/Transcript-EPA-OmbudsmanHearing-3- 11-2002.pdf. The EPA Ombudsman held two investigative hearings in 2002 at the request of Congressman Nadler to explore the accounts of people who were directly affected by the environmental consequences of 9/11. Transcripts of both hearings are provided. The Honorable Jerrold Nadler's Actions Regarding World Trade Center Air Quality on Testing and Clean-up of WTC Contamination at: http://www.house.gov/nadler/wtc/cleanup.shtml. This site provides information on Congressman Jerrold Nadler's actions on testing and clean-up of contamination that resulted from the collapse of the World Trade Center. It provides a link to Congressman Nadler's April 12, 2002 report on Lower Manhattan air quality, which documents significant evidence that EPA misled the public about the safety of air quality and made virtually no effort to ensure that City agencies complied with Federal laws designed to protect the public from hazardous materials. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S RESPONSE TO AIR QUALITY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: WERE THERE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS? ---------- MONDAY, JUNE 25, 2007 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:02 p.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerrold Nadler (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Nadler, Wasserman Schultz, Ellison, Conyers, Scott, Cohen, Franks and King. Also present: Representatives Pascrell and Weiner. Staff Present: David Lachman, Subcommittee Staff Director; Kanya Bennett, Majority Counsel; Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director and Chief Counsel; Ted Kalo, General Counsel/Deputy Staff Director; Paul Taylor, Minority Counsel; Crystal Jezierski, Minority Counsel; and Susana Gutierrez, Professional Staff Member. Mr. Nadler. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties will come to order. Today's hearing will examine the question of possible substantive due process violations arising from the EPA's handling of air quality issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Before we begin, and mindful of the very strong emotions necessarily associated with the issues we will be looking at today, I would remind all those in attendance that the Rules of the House of Representatives do not permit demonstrations of any kind by the spectators. That includes holding up posters of any kind. The work we are doing today is very important. We have the opportunity to get answers to questions many people have been asking for nearly 6 years. The Chair is determined to see that the work of the Committee will go forward and not be disrupted. I know that those of you have traveled so far to be here will agree with that goal. Before we begin, I'd like to extend a special welcome to a number of people who are here: to first responders John Sferazo, Marvin Bethea, Richard Volpe, Jim McGowan, Deputy Chief Jim Riches, and Michael Arcari; to family members, the family of Felicia Dunn-Jones, Rebecca Jones, Joseph Jones, Sharon Alvarez, Rose Foti and Diane Horning; and to people who have been very active in the community surrounding the World Trade Center in the last 5\1/2\ years, Kimberly Flynn, Jo Polett, Catherine McVay Hughes, Jonathan Bennett, Rob Spencer, Rachel Lidov, Sally Regenhard, Robert Gulack, Nina Lavin; member of the State Assembly from New York Linda Rosenthal; and Professor Glen Corbett. The Chair recognizes himself for an opening statement. Today the Subcommittee begins--let me say since the Ranking Minority Member is not here yet, he will be here in about 20 minutes, we will give him an opportunity to make his opening statement after he arrives between rounds of questioning. Before my opening statement, I want to ask unanimous consent, we are joined today by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner, who is a Member of the full Committee but not a Member of the Subcommittee. Without objection, the gentleman will be permitted to sit on the Subcommittee and recognized to ask questions of our witnesses after the Members of the Subcommittee have had the opportunity do so. Without objection. In addition to that, we are joined today by the gentleman from New Jersey Mr. Pascrell. Without objection, the gentleman will be permitted to sit on the Subcommittee and will be recognized for 5 minutes to ask questions of our witnesses after the Members of the Subcommittee have had the opportunity to do so. Without objection. Today the Subcommittee begins its investigation of the possible substantive due process violations arising from the Environment Protection Agency's handling of air quality issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. I want to welcome our witnesses and thank them for their willingness to participate. This hearing continues the work begun in the hearing chaired last week by New York's junior Senator, Hillary Clinton, which also looked at the Federal Government's failures in responding to the environmental crisis that resulted from the World Trade Center attacks. The hearing will examine whether the Federal Government by its actions violated the substantive due process rights of first responders, local residents, students and workers. Specifically, did the Federal Government itself, by responding inadequately or improperly to the environmental impact, knowingly do bodily harm to its citizens and thereby violate their constitutional rights, and if so, which government actors were responsible? We will look into what is known about the quality of the air versus what was communicated to the public and whether Federal Government ``risk communications'' properly communicated necessary and legal precautions. So why are we asking these questions about events that happened nearly 6 years ago? These hearings represent the first comprehensive congressional oversight investigations into these matters since the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Indeed, Congress and the American people have heard very little on the record from the key players in this controversy. Today marks the first time that former EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman has testified at a congressional hearing dedicated solely to the Federal Government's response to the environmental and health dangers caused by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. The heroes and victims of 9/11, and the families and workers who continue to live with the consequences of that environmental disaster, deserve to know the truth, to hear from the officials who provided the assurances on quality, and to learn why, and on what basis those assurances were made. Finally we must address the future. What can we learn from the government's response? How will our government respond to future environmental disasters? The Administration seems to be headed in the wrong direction already. For example, the Administration has now mandated that public health communications during a terrorist attack be ``coordinated'' through the Department of Homeland Security, and it is developing standards for toxic clean-ups and national emergencies that may be weaker than current Federal standards. I represent the site of the World Trade Center and the surrounding communities. The World Trade Center collapse propelled hundreds of tons of asbestos, nearly half a million pounds of lead, and untold amounts of glass fibers, steel and concrete into a massive cloud of toxic, caustic dust and smoke which blanketed parts of New York City and New Jersey, and was blown and dispersed into surrounding office buildings, schools and residences. In addition, fires that burned for many months emitted particulate matter, various heavy metals, PCBs, VOCs, dioxin, benzene and other deadly substances. Tens of thousands of my constituents and others from around the country who responded to the call have already begun to suffer severe illnesses. I have unfortunately had to spend the better part of the last 5-plus years attempting to cajole the Federal Government into telling the truth about 9/11 air quality, insisting that there must be a full and proper clean- up of the environmental toxins remaining in apartments, workplaces, and schools that to this day, I believe, are poisoning people, and demanding that the government provide long-term, comprehensive health care to those already sick, be they first responders or area residents, workers or schoolchildren. In the 6 years since the attacks, we have accumulated a mountain of evidence that tens of thousands of those exposed, including 10,000 firefighters, are suffering from chronic respiratory diseases and a variety of rare cancers. And the deaths of at least two individuals, James Zadroga and Felicia Dunn-Jones, whose families join us today, have been linked unquestionably by government medical examiners to World Trade Center dust. Nonetheless, the Federal Government still refuses to respond appropriately. The Administration continues to conceal and obfuscate its misstatements, its failure to follow applicable laws, and its failure to take standard protective actions in the days and weeks following the attacks. Even worse, the Administration still fails to protect the health of the community and our first responders. Whatever may have been noted at the time the evidence available today mandates action. The Administration's continuing lack of response stems directly, I believe, from a desire to cover up its misstatements and misdeeds in the early days after the attacks. The Administration has continued to make false, misleading and inaccurate statements, and refused to take remedial actions, even in the face of overwhelming evidence, so that it would not have to admit it failed to follow applicable laws and to utilize basic precautionary principles in the first place. It continues to this day, to endanger the lives of American citizens, so it can deny that other White House concerns trumped its legal mandate to protect public health. That is why this hearing seeks to reexamine what happened back in the early days of September and October 2001. Following the attacks Administrator Christine Todd Whitman repeatedly assured New Yorkers that the air was ``safe to breathe.'' On September 14, 2001, the New York Times concluded from Administrator Whitman's assurances that ``tests of air and the dust coating parts of Lower Manhattan appeared to support the official view expressed by Federal health and environmental officials that health problems from pollution would not be one of the legacies of the attacks.'' The EPA Inspector General found these statements were falsely reassuring, lacked a scientific basis, and were politically motivated. The IG said, ``When EPA made a[n] announcement that the air was ``safe'' to breathe, it did not have sufficient data and analyses to make such a blanket statement.'' The IG called the EPA assurance, quote, ``incomplete in that it lacked necessary qualifications and thus was not supported by the data available at the time.'' She concluded that ``EPA's basic overriding message was that the public did not need to be concerned about airborne contaminants caused by the World Trade Center collapse. This reassurance appeared to apply to both indoor and outdoor air.'' I believe the Inspector General was quite generous here. In a March 2002 White Paper, I detailed how EPA's statements not only lacked sufficient data and qualification, but how they also mischaracterized what data they did have, withheld critical information from the public, and ignored a wealth of information available at the time that directly contradicted their assurances. The IG's report described the process by which the White House, through the Council on Environmental Quality and the National Security Council, ``. . . influenced . . . the information that EPA communicated to the public . . . when it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones.'' It concluded that, quote, ``competing considerations, such as . . . the desire to open Wall Street, also played a role in EPA's air quality statements,'' close quote. Other observers have surmised that the cost of a proper government-financed clean-up of indoor spaces, given the scope of potential contamination, and concern about Manhattan real estate value may have been other ``competing considerations.'' These EPA statements and a series of subsequent EPA misdeeds lulled Americans affected by 9/11 to a false sense of safety, and gave other government decision-makers, businesses and employers the cover to take extremely perilous shortcuts, which did further harm. After making those initial safety claims, EPA continued to make materially misleading statements about air quality, long-term health effects and EPA's alleged lack of jurisdiction for remediating indoor contamination. EPA illegally delegated its responsibility to clean indoor environments to New York City, which in turn dumped that responsibility onto individual homeowners, tenants and employers who were completely unequipped to discharge that responsibility. EPA conducted indoor clean-ups in 2002 and later that the IG, EPA's own Scientific Advisory Panel, and now the Government Accountability Office have all found lacked a paper scientific basis and failed to ensure the proper decontamination of tens of thousands of residences and work places. The response of other Federal agencies was similarly inadequate. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for example, failed to enforce workplace safety regulations on the ``pile,'' the same regulations that were enforced at the Pentagon where every worker was required to wear respirators, and nobody has become sick. OSHA allowed indoor workers to reoccupy workplaces that had not been properly tested and cleaned. FEMA refused to pay for testing and clean-up of indoor spaces, a cost that was much too prohibitive for most residents and small businesses. FEMA also denied payments to residents to stay elsewhere even when their homes were full of World Trade Center dust. New York City and State government officials followed suit by allowing reoccupation of buildings, including schools, that had not properly been tested and decontaminated; advising people to clean asbestos-containing dust in their homes and workplaces with a ``wet mop and wet rag,'' illegal and unsafe advice endorsed by EPA and posted on its Website; and failing to enforce local environmental codes for worker protection. Based on EPA assurances, insurance companies refused to cover individual claims for proper indoor clean-ups, and building owners and employers citing the Federal safety standards did not properly test and clean the spaces for which they were ostensibly responsible. Hundreds of thousands of people, not wanting to imagine that their government could act with such reckless disregard for their safety, believed the false assurances and continued to work on the pile with inadequate protective equipment and returned to their homes, schools and workplaces that had not been properly tested and cleaned and have still have not been. Six years later we are just beginning to see the enormous consequences of these actions. Our government knowingly exposed thousands of American citizens unnecessarily to deadly, hazardous materials, and because it has never admitted the truth, Americans remain at grave risk to this day. Thousands of first responders, residents, area workers and students are sick, and some dead. And that toll will continue to grow until we get the truth and take appropriate action. Those false statements continue to the present. Administrator Whitman has said, ``There has never been a subsequent study that disproved what agency scientists told us all along.'' She omits to note that what Agency scientists and others told her was very, very different from what the EPA communicated to the public. A September 2003 statement of 19 EPA union local heads read: ``Little did the Civil Service expect their professional work would be subverted by political pressure applied by the White House. . . . These workers reported to senior EPA officials their best estimate of the risks, and they expected those estimates and the accompanying recommendations for protective measures to be released in a timely manner to those who need the information. The public was not informed of all the health risks. . . . This information was withheld . . . under orders of the White House. The Bush White House had information released, drafted by political appointees, that it knew to contradict the scientific facts. It misinformed. And many rescue workers and citizens suffered. Some citizens now face the long-term risk of asbestos-related lung cancer as well as other debilitating respiratory ailments as a result.'' I want to conclude with a pronouncement made by then Administrator Whitman in 2001. She declared then, ``The President said, 'Spare no expense, do everything you need to do to make sure the people of this city . . . are safe as far as the environment is concerned.'' It is my fervent hope that after some of the truth begins to come to light through these hearings, we will see that this promise made to the victims and heroes of 9/11 is finally kept. [The prepared statement of Mr. Nadler follows:] Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Today, the Subcommittee begins its investigation into possible substantive due process violations arising from the Environmental Protection Agency's handling of air quality issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. I want to welcome our witnesses and thank them for their willingness to participate. This hearing continues the work begun in a hearing chaired last week by New York's Junior Senator, Hillary Clinton, which also looked at the federal government's failures in responding to the environmental crisis that resulted from the World Trade Center attacks. This hearing will examine whether the federal government, by its actions, violated the ``substantive due process'' rights of first responders, local residents, students and workers. Specifically ``[d]id the federal government itself, by responding inadequately or improperly to the environmental impacts--knowingly do bodily harm to its citizens, and thereby violate their constitutional rights? And, if so, which government actors were responsible?'' We will look into what was known about the quality of the air versus what was communicated to the public, and whether federal government ``risk communications'' properly communicated necessary and legal precautions. So, why are we asking these questions about events that happened nearly 6 years ago? These hearings represent the first comprehensive Congressional oversight investigations into these matters since the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Indeed, Congress and the American people have heard very little on the record from the key players in this controversy. Today marks the first time that former EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman has testified at a Congressional hearing dedicated solely to the federal government's response to the environmental and health dangers caused by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. The heroes and victims of 9/11, and the families and workers who continue to live with the consequences of that environmental disaster, deserve to know the truth; to hear from the officials who provided the assurances on air quality, and to learn why, and on what basis those assurances were made. Finally, we must address the future. What can we learn from the government's response? How will our government respond to future environmental disasters like this? The Administration seems to be headed in the wrong direction already. For example, they have now mandated that public health communications during a terrorist attack be ``coordinated'' through the Department of Homeland Security and they are developing standards for toxic cleanups in national emergencies that may be weaker than current federal standards. I represent the site of the World Trade Center and the surrounding communities. The World Trade Center collapse propelled hundreds of tons of asbestos, nearly half a million pounds of lead, and untold amounts of glass fibers, steel and concrete into a massive cloud of toxic, caustic dust and smoke which blanketed parts of New York City and New Jersey, and was blown or dispersed into surrounding office buildings, schools, and residences. In addition, fires that burned for many months emitted particulate matter, various heavy metals, PCBs, VOCs, dioxin, benzene and other deadly substances. Tens of thousands of my constituents and others from around the country who responded to the call have already begun to suffer severe illnesses as a result of this environmental disaster. I have, unfortunately, had to spend the better part of the last five plus years attempting to cajole the federal government into telling the truth about 9/11 air quality, insisting that there must be a full and proper cleanup of the environmental toxins remaining in apartments, workplaces, and schools that, to this day, are poisoning people, and demanding that the government provide long term, comprehensive health care to those already sick--be they first responders or area residents, workers or school children. In the six years since the attacks, we have accumulated a mountain of evidence that tens of thousands of those exposed are suffering from chronic respiratory disease, and, increasingly, a variety of rare cancers. The sick includes 10,000 firefighters. And, the deaths of at least two individuals--James Zadroga and Felicia Dunn-Jones (whose family joins us today) have been linked unquestionably by government medical examiners to World Trade Center dust. Nonetheless, the federal government still refuses to respond appropriately. The Administration continues to conceal and obfuscate its misstatements, its failure to follow applicable laws, and its failure to take standard protective actions in the days and weeks following the attacks. Even worse, the Administration still fails to act to protect the health of the community and our first responders. Whatever may have been known at the time, the evidence available today mandates action. The Administration's continuing lack of responsiveness stems directly, I believe, from a desire to cover up its misstatements and misdeeds in the early days after the attacks. The Administration has continued to provide false, misleading and inaccurate statements, and refused to take remedial actions, even in the face of overwhelming evidence, so that it would not have to admit that it failed to follow applicable laws and to utilize basic precautionary principles in the first place. It continues, to this day, to endanger the lives of American citizens, so it can deny that other White House concerns trumped its legal mandate to protect public health. That is why this hearing seeks to re-examine what happened back in those early days of September and October of 2001. Following the attacks, Administrator Christine Todd Whitman repeatedly assured New Yorkers that the air was ``safe to breathe.'' On September 14, 2001, the New York Times concluded from Administrator Whitman's assurances that, ``tests of air and the dust coating parts of Lower Manhattan appeared to support the official view expressed by . . . federal health and environmental officials: that health problems from pollution would not be one of the legacies of the attacks.'' EPA's Inspector General found that these statements were falsely reassuring, lacked a scientific basis, and were politically motivated. The IG said, ``When the EPA made a[n] announcement that the air was `safe' to breathe, it did not have sufficient data and analyses to make such a blanket statement.'' She called this EPA assurance, ``incomplete in that it lacked necessary qualifications and thus was not supported by the data available at the time.'' She concluded that ``EPA's basic overriding message was that the public did not need to be concerned about airborne contaminants caused by the WTC collapse. This reassurance appeared to apply to both indoor and outdoor air.'' I believe that the IG was quite generous here. In a March, 2002 ``White Paper,'' I detailed how Administrator Whitman's statements not only ``lacked sufficient data'' and ``qualification,'' but how she also mischaracterized what data she did have, withheld critical data from the public, and ignored a wealth of information available at the time that directly contradicted those assurances. The IG's report described a process by which the White House, through the Council on Environmental Quality and the National Security Council, ``. . . influenced . . . the information that EPA communicated to the public . . . when it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones.'' It concluded that, ``competing considerations, such as . . . the desire to open Wall Street, also played a role in EPA's air quality statements.'' Other observers have surmised that the cost of a proper government- financed cleanup of indoor spaces, given the scope of the potential contamination, and concerns about Manhattan real estate values, were other ``competing considerations.'' These EPA statements, and a series of subsequent EPA misdeeds, lulled Americans affected by 9/11 into a dangerously false sense of safety, and gave other government decision-makers, businesses and employers the cover to take extremely perilous short cuts which did further harm. After making those initial safety claims:EPA continued to make materially misleading statements about air quality, long-term health effects, and EPA's alleged lack of jurisdiction for remediating indoor contamination; EPA illegally delegated its responsibility to clean indoor environments to New York City, which, in turn, dumped that responsibility onto individual home owners, tenants, and employers; and EPA conducted two so-called ``indoor cleanups'' that the IG, EPA's own scientific advisory panel, and, now, the Government Accountability Office, all found lacked a proper scientific basis and failed to ensure the proper de- contamination of tens of thousands of residences and workplaces. The response of other federal agencies was similarly inadequate. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for example, failed to enforce workplace safety regulations on the ``pile'' that it enforced at the Pentagon (where every worker was required to wear respirators and nobody has become sick). OSHA also allowed indoor workers to re-occupy workplaces that had not been properly tested and cleaned. FEMA refused to pay for testing and cleanup of indoor spaces, a cost that was much too prohibitive for most residents and small businesses. FEMA also denied payments to residents to stay elsewhere even when their homes were full of World Trade Center dust. New York City and State government officials followed suit by allowing re-occupation of buildings (including schools) that not been properly tested and decontaminated, advising people to clean asbestos- containing dust in their homes and workplaces with a ``wet mop and a wet rag''--illegal and unsafe advice endorsed by EPA and posted on its website--and failing to enforce local environmental codes for worker protection. Based on EPA assurances, insurance companies refused to cover individual claims for proper indoor cleanups. And building owners and employers, citing the federal safety statements, did not properly test and clean the spaces for which they were ostensibly responsible. Finally, hundreds of thousand of people, not wanting to imagine that their government could act with such reckless disregard for their welfare, believed the false assurances, and continued to work on the pile with inadequate Personal Protective Equipment and returned to their homes, schools and workplaces that had not been properly tested and cleaned--and have still not been. Six years later, we are just beginning to see the enormous consequences of these actions. Our government has knowingly exposed thousands of American citizens unnecessarily to deadly hazardous materials. And because it has never admitted the truth, Americans remain at grave risk to this day. Thousands of first-responders, residents, area workers and students are sick, and some are dead, and that toll will continue to grow until we get the truth and take appropriate action. Those false statements continue to the present. Ms. Whitman herself has rationalized the White House's soft-peddling of risk in EPA statements, proclaiming to Newsweek in 2003 that she did not object to the White House changing her press releases and that, ``the public wasn't harmed by the White House's decision to adopt the more reassuring analysis.'' Even now, they try to rewrite history, arguing, for example, that their reassuring statements were ``only talking about air on the `pile,' not in the surrounding neighborhoods'' or that they were ``only talking about outdoor, not indoor air'' or that they had ``always told residents to get their homes professionally cleaned.'' The IG reached a different conclusion, and the statements speak for themselves. Governor Whitman has even gone so far as to blame the victims themselves for their illnesses. Administrator Whitman has said, ``There has never been a subsequent study that disproved what agency scientists told us all along.'' She omits to note that what agency scientists and others told her, was very, very different from what she communicated to the public. A September, 2003 statement of 19 EPA union local heads reads: Little did the Civil Service expect that their professional work would be subverted by political pressure applied by the White House. . . . These workers reported to senior EPA officials their best estimate of the risks, and they expected those estimates and the accompanying recommendations for protective measures to be released in a timely manner to those who need the information. The public was not informed of all the health risks. . . . This information was withheld . . . under orders of the White House. The Bush White House had information released, drafted by political appointees, that it knew to contradict the scientific facts. It misinformed. And many rescue workers and citizens suffered. Some citizens now face the long-term risk of asbestos-related lung cancer as well as other debilitating respiratory ailments as a result. I want to conclude with a pronouncement made by then-Administrator Whitman in September 2001. She declared then, ``The President has said, `Spare no expense, do everything you need to do to make sure the people of this City . . . are safe as far as the environment is concerned.'' It is my fervent hope that after some of the truth begins to come to light through these hearings; we will see that this promise, made to the victims and heroes of 9/11, is finally kept. Thank you. Mr. Nadler. Please, no demonstrations, including applause. Since the Ranking Member is not here, as I stated before, we will postpone his opening statement. Normally in the interest of proceeding to our witnesses--we will have apparently two opening statements right now, first from the Chairman of the full Committee, the distinguished gentleman from Michigan Mr. Conyers. Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Chairman Nadler. I come here in full recognition of the importance and gravity of this hearing, and I begin by welcoming the witnesses of which there are quite a few. But to begin with, it is important that we extend a welcome, as the Chairman Nadler will, to Governor Christine Todd Whitman, the former Administrator of EPA. We thank you very much for your appearance here today and the discussion that we are going to have. This isn't a courtroom, although most of the people might be lawyers. We want to try to get at the bottom of a very important historical question, obviously. And the reason I start off by welcoming you is that it would not be inappropriate to notice that you, at times when you felt it necessary, have been an independent voice in discharging your responsibilities not only as the Governor, but as the director or Administrator of EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency. And so we thank you for coming. This will probably be the most important hearing that we will hear, and it is appropriate that you know that there--with Chairman Nadler, he has a very direct and vital connection to this terrible tragedy. His constituents were involved. He's represented the City of New York and the State of New York across a great number of years, and so we think that that is extremely important. I would also like to thank the former Administrator of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA, Mr. John Henshaw, who is sitting at the witness table as well. I want to thank you, sir, personally for the cooperation you have extended the Committee, which leads us to the best way that we can get at what happened. Now, September 11, 2001, indelibly imprinted in the history of this country by reason of the fact that terrorists flew two hijacked commercial jets into the World Trade Center Towers in New York. Almost 3,000 people were killed by the terrorists in the collapse of the towers, including hundreds of first responders, police officers and firefighters. Beyond the devastating loss of life, when the towers collapsed, numerous hazardous substances were released into the environment. It also is appropriate to say that our attitude as a Nation toward the enemies of this country were automatically changed at the same time in a hugely dramatic way. And so we're here to reexamine it, and I have to comment on some of the theories that have been advanced to me across the years about this, which we need not recount now, but this has moved into the psyche of almost all of the citizens of this country. And so evidence accumulated since the collapse of the World Trade Center under this attack indicates that the air exposure to these hazards have caused serious physical injury and death. That's probably the first thing we want to examine. Those who relied on statements that the air was safe and the instructions for insufficient clean-up of the indoor spaces have created serious results following that. There's been a lot of injuries and deaths and suffering and family misery that has been caused as a result of the actual dastardly attack on this country. This oversight hearing of the Constitution Subcommittee gives us and the American people the first opportunity to try to establish what really happened, and we are looking for an honest revelation of the circumstances and the relationships between EPA and the White House, through the Council on Environmental Quality and the National Security Council, and other activities between them that will be inquired into. It's very important to me that all of our witnesses' testimony be as candid as it possibly can be under the circumstances. We're here to learn, we're here to find out what happened, we're here to put to rest some of the misunderstandings that have occurred. And we are counting on our witnesses, beginning with Governor Whitman and Mr. Henshaw and those others--I think there are six more on panel two--to help us make history right by us proceeding with an inquiry that is long overdue. But I commend the Chairman and even the Ranking Member in his absence, and I am hoping he will appear shortly, for the way they have constructed today's activity, and I thank the Chairman and congratulate him for his hard work. [The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:] Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, and Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 Americans lost their lives in a series of terrorist attacks, one of which caused the collapse of the World Trade Center. As a Nation, we collectively shared the pain and suffering of the victims and the survivors of these horrific attacks. Sadly, there continues to be further casualties of this national tragedy. The collapse of the World Trade Center spewed numerous toxic chemicals into the air, which was then inhaled by the brave rescuers and clean-up personnel as well as the men, women and children living in the surrounding area. Already, many of these individuals have developed life-threatening illnesses as a result of their exposure to these chemicals. Our Nation's air quality watchdog, the Environmental Protection Agency, however, may not have accurately assessed the extent of the hazard these airborne toxins presented to the public. Indeed, the allegations go beyond that the EPA acted negligently. While the EPA assured members of the public that the air was safe and that they could return to their homes, jobs, and schools, there is accumulating evidence that the available science did not support those statements and may have actually contradicted them. The EPA's Inspector General found that the Agency's press releases and reports were altered to downplay or conceal the breadth of the environmental hazard and health consequences. In addition, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that the EPA's actions violated the public's due process rights. Noting that the EPA's actions were ``conscience-shocking,'' the court found that the Agency ``affirmatively took actions that increased or created dangers'' to the public. Although the terrorists bear the ultimate responsibility for the September 11th attacks, it is the duty of our government to protect the public and to assist those whose lives have been affected by a catastrophe. Unfortunately, the government's failures here have compounded, rather than lessened the impact of the September 11th attacks. Today, we have the opportunity to assess the EPA's response to the lingering health hazards presented by these attacks. It is my hope that the witnesses will shed light on the facts and circumstances of the Agency's actions and respond to these very serious allegations. Understandably, there has been much speculation as to why the EPA acted as it did, but the American public, particularly those who work and live in New York City deserve the truth. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. I am told that Mr. Weiner wanted to have an opening statement. Without objection--do any of the other Members of the Subcommittee want an opening statement first? Fine. Without objection, Mr. Weiner will be recognized for an opening statement. Mr. Weiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take much time. I first want to begin by offering my thanks and the thanks of our whole city to you, Mr. Chairman. Shortly after the events of September 11, there began to be many people who sought to gloss over the challenges our city in Lower Manhattan faced. You were not one of them. You confronted the danger that was quite literally in the air and have not given up your quest to get to the bottom of it. Today I also want to welcome Governor Whitman, the EPA Administrator, here today. We will get to hear two voices, and maybe even more, from the EPA Administrator. We heard the public assurances in the days after September 11; the assurances, for example, on September 13, in the EPA press release that the air quality is ``unlikely to cause significant health effects, and the EPA is greatly relieved to have learned there appears to be no significant levels of asbestos dust in the air in New York City.'' We heard the EPA say on the 16th, air asbestos levels ``cause us no concern.'' September 18: ``I, the EPA administer, am glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, D.C., that the air is safe to breathe.'' Those quotes were unambiguous, they were reassuring, and they were dead wrong. They were literally dead wrong. We know they were deadly because many of my constituents and some people in this audience are dying because they believed those assurances. We also know they were wrong because the IG has said they were wrong. A Federal district court went so far as to say Whitman's deliberate and misleading statements made to the press where she reassured the public that the air was safe to breathe around Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn and that there would be no health risk presented to those returning to the areas shocked the conscience. We also know they were wrong because the EPA knew they were wrong at the time you, Madam Governor, stated them. At the point that those decisions were made, those statements were made, 25 percent of all the dust samples taken by the EPA had already shown to have unsafe levels of asbestos. But now there is a second voice emerging from the former Administrator, after shouting from rooftops in the days after September 11 that the air was safe, now there are statements that, well, in fact, I, the EPA Administrator, was quietly whispering into the ear of city officials, saying, don't believe what I say publicly, only believe that it is unsafe; go out and make sure your workers protect themselves. It looks very honestly like what it is, an unseemly attempt to rewrite the public record, to rewrite it in a way that effectively covers one person's responsibility and moves it to someone else. Make no mistake, this is a national responsibility. This was an attack on us, the United States, not one neighborhood, not two buildings. It was an attack on the United States. It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to act now, and it is not too late. It is too late for some that stood on that pile and believed what they heard their highest government officials say, but it is not too late for the Federal Government to finally step up and say, we did wrong then, there were pressures on us that were unimaginable, but now is the time for us to start taking care of the health of the people who believed what we said. There was an environment in the period after September 11 where many things that were told to us by our government turned out to be wrong. Slowly but surely, like an onion peeling away, we are learning more and more of them. Perhaps none were so damaging to the health and lives of the people in New York City than the ones made by our witness here today. We cannot continue this effort to say I said, he said, she said. Now is the time to accept responsibility, so finally the people who are harmed by those statements, harmed by those misjudgments, harmed by that mismanagement can finally reach some closure on the facts and get some opening on true health care for their families. And I yield back. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit opening statements for inclusion in the record. Without objection, the Chair will be authorized to declare a recess of the hearing if necessary at any time. We will now turn to our first panel of witnesses. As we ask questions of our witnesses, the Chair will recognize Members in the order of their seniority on the Subcommittee, alternating between Majority and Minority, provided that the Member is present when his or her turn arrives. Members who are not present when their turn begins will be recognized after the other Members have had the opportunity to ask their questions. The Chair reserves the right to accommodate a Member who is unavoidably late or is only able to be with us for a short time. Our first witness is the Honorable Christine Todd Whitman. Christine Todd Whitman served as Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2003. Before that she served for 7 years as Governor of New Jersey. Governor Whitman is now the president of the William--I'm sorry, Whitman Strategy Group, a consulting firm that specializes in government relations and environmental and energy issues. Our next witness is John Henshaw. Mr. Henshaw was nominated by President Bush and was confirmed by the Senate in 2001 to head the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Prior to becoming the OSHA Administrator, he served as director, environment safety and health for Astaris, LLC. He was also the director of environment safety and health for Solutia, Inc.; corporate director, quality and compliance assurance, from Monsanto Company. He is now president of Henshaw & Associates, Inc., a safety and health professional services firm of Florida. Your written statements will be made part of the record in its entirety. I would ask that you now summarize your testimony in 5 minutes, if you can. To help you stay within that time there is a timing light at your table. When 1 minute remains, the light will switch from green to yellow, and red when the 5 minutes are up. I will be a little lenient on the timing. It is our custom in this Committee to swear the witness, so will the two witnesses please stand? I ask you to raise your right hand to take the oath. [witnesses sworn.] Mr. Nadler. Let the record reflect the witnesses responded in the affirmative. You may be seated. Governor, you may proceed. TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, WHITMAN STRATEGY GROUP Ms. Whitman. I appreciate this opportunity to respond, to discuss the Environmental Protection Agency's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It's been nearly 6 years since two planes flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, yet not a day goes by that I don't think of friends that we all lost and the grief, despair and helplessness we felt as a Nation. It is important to remember that many of the EPA personnel saw the planes hit knowing they had friends and relatives in those buildings. Yet within hours of those attacks, EPA officials were on the site collecting test data on potential environmental contaminants in order to assist New York City and the public. In the early days EPA officials were monitoring for contaminants around Ground Zero without the benefits of electricity, surrounded by firefighting crews in the midst of desperate rescue operations. They deserve our respect and our appreciation. On September 11, the President issued the declaration of emergency triggering the Federal response plan, which assigned lead Federal authority to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA then charged EPA with the responsibility of supporting the city's response to any discharge of hazardous materials as a result of the attacks. EPA immediately began collecting air, water and bulk dust samples for testing. By 2003, EPA had taken over 25,000 test samples, consisting of nearly 227,000 individual measurements of almost 700 contaminants. The EPA also performed other emergency response functions, such as the removal of hazardous waste, monitoring environmental conditions at landfills receiving debris from the World Trade Center, assisting the FBI in the recovery of evidence and remains, as well as constructing and operating wash stations near Ground Zero for both vehicles and personnel. Within days of the attack, EPA took the initiative to secure critical protective gear for rescue and recovery personnel and in all provided them with 22,000 respirators, 13,000 safety glasses, 1,000 hard hats. After I left the Agency in 2003, the Inspector General confirmed that the EPA fulfilled its mandate to support New York City. While understandably finding areas for improvement, she publicly stated, and I quote, ``EPA did a really good job.'' Mr. Chairman, I fully appreciate that the events of 9/11 touch raw emotions, but I am disappointed in the misinformation, innuendo and outright falsehoods that have characterized public discussion about EPA in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. EPA's extreme critics have alleged that I knowingly misled New Yorkers and the workers of Ground Zero about the safety risks associated with environmental contamination. This destructive and incendiary charge was investigated by EPA's Inspector General, who confirmed in her 2003 report that we did not conceal any of our test data from the public. In fact, within days of the 9/11 report, I authorized EPA to post all the test data, all of it, on a public Website. I did so precisely because I wanted to be as transparent to the public as possible. Statements that EPA officials made after 9/ 11 were based on the judgment of experienced environmental and health professionals at EPA, OSHA and the CDC who had analyzed the test data that 13 different organizations and agencies were collecting in Lower Manhattan. I do not recall any EPA scientist or experts responsible for reviewing this data ever advising me that the test data from Lower Manhattan showed that the air or water posed long- term health risks for the general public. With respect to the immediate area where the towers fell, however, the data revealed, and we publicly reported, that the air was different than in the rest of Manhattan. As these charts over here show, in the weeks following the attacks, EPA officials repeatedly warned of the risk to workers at Ground Zero and noticed the difference between air quality at the site and the air in the rest of New York. I and other EPA officials publicly urged rescue and recovery workers to wear protective gear that EPA had secured for their use at Ground Zero. The EPA also advised workers at Ground Zero of the proper washing procedures for their clothes and equipment. In fact, on September 11, only hours after the attack, EPA officials prepared this flier that I would direct your attention to for distribution by FEMA to rescue and recovery workers at the site. As you can see, Mr. Chairman, the flier informed workers of the risk of asbestos exposure caused by the collapse and cautioned workers to use protective equipment, including appropriate eyeglasses, respirators and protective clothing. It also urged proper cleaning procedures for clothing and equipment. It is utterly false, then, for EPA critics to assert that I or others in the agency set about to mislead New Yorkers or the rescue workers. Mr. Chairman, the grief of 9/11 remains with us. Like many others, I lost personal friends that day. I suspect there will be a lot of talk in this hearing about blame and responsibility for what happened on September 11 and its aftermath. Let's be clear: There are people to blame. They are the terrorists who attacked the United States, not the men and women at all levels of government who worked heroically to protect this country. Of course, there are lessons to be learned from the extraordinary challenges of 9/11. I welcome a constructive dialogue on those lessons that is undertaken in good faith. I came here today in that spirit, Mr. Chairman, and I trust the Subcommittee has as well. I thank you and will be pleased to answer any questions that you might have. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Henshaw for an opening statement for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF JOHN L. HENSHAW, HENSHAW & ASSOCIATES, INC. Mr. Henshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You stated earlier I am an occupational safety and health professional and a certified industrial hygienist providing safety and health consultation services to clients around the world. In June 2001, I was nominated by President Bush and then later confirmed by the U.S. Senate in August of 2001 as Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or OSHA. I wish to take this opportunity today to discuss OSHA's role in protecting workers after the tragic events of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. My testimony represents my views and reflects my experiences as the OSHA Administrator. OSHA's mission is to ensure to the extent possible safe and healthful working conditions for employees around this Nation. Under the OSH Act of 1970, OSHA has jurisdiction over private- sector employees and does not have jurisdiction over the public-sector employees such as the local fire and local police. In addition, and under the Federal Response and National Contingency Plans established to deal with emergencies, OSHA operates under the incident command system which is invoked during significant emergency situations. Our first action after the attack was to evacuate all 21 members of our Manhattan area office from building number 6 of the World Trade Center, which was destroyed with the collapse of the North Tower. It is because of their training and commitment to protecting workers, all of our employees, including an employee confined to a wheelchair, got out safely. They, too, were traumatized and exposed to all the same conditions as others who were in Lower Manhattan that tragic day. After all were accounted for, our staff joined the Federal, State and local agencies, as well as safety and health professionals from contractors, trade unions on site, all in an effort to protect the workers involved in the rescue, recovery, demolition and clean-up operations. In line with OSHA's internal directive, we determined we could be most protective in protecting worker safety and health by providing immediate assistance, oversight and consultation in an effort to ensure OSHA's standards and good safety and health practices were followed at a minimum. It was apparent the site was not a typical construction or demolition project. Workers needed immediate protection from hazards whose scope and severity could be assessed only as the work progressed. In an effort to achieve quick and maximum effectiveness in saving lives and assuring worker protections, OSHA embarked on five specific activities: Number one, conducted personnel and area monitoring to characterize potential workplace exposures and the resulting hazards; number two, recommended appropriate personal protective equipment, including respiratory protection; number three, distributed and fit respirators, along with distributing other kinds of personal protective equipment; number four, conducted safety and health inspections 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in an effort to ensure standards were followed and workers were properly protected; and number five, provided site leadership and coordination of workplace safety and health. OSHA committed nearly 1,100 staff, many times as many as 75 personnel on the site on any day. OSHA's staff worked on the site 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for the entire 10-month period. OSHA collected more than 6,500 air and bulk samples and performed over 24,000 analyses, looking at 81 different potentially hazardous materials such as asbestos, lead, silica and many other organic and inorganic compounds. Personal air samples were collected around the clock each day, and we coordinated our efforts in monitoring with our safety and health compatriots, our professionals, and unions, and contractors and other agencies. OSHA's sampling effort focused on workers on and near the pile, as well as workplaces that were impacted by the attack, which is like the financial district. OSHA's breathing zone samples showed well below the Agency's permissible exposure levels for the majority of compounds and substances. The few that were above were on the pile. OSHA distributed sampling summaries to trade unions, site contractors and agencies during our daily safety and health meetings and posted them on our Web. OSHA consistently instructed employers on the site to wear appropriate respiratory protection. Due primarily to the unpredictable nature of the hazards on the pile, a high level of protection was selected jointly with all safety and health professionals. These requirements were communicated through orders and notices posted throughout the sites, as well as during inspections, daily meetings and other communications. During the first 3 weeks following the attack, OSHA gave out respirators at a rate of 4,000 a day. Over the 10-month period OSHA distributed more than 131,000 respirators to personnel working at the World Trade Center. Initially handing out respirators on foot, OSHA quickly opened multiple distribution locations throughout the 16-acre site, including the ones at the Queens Marina, which was the Fire Department of New York's staging area. Over 7,500 quantitative fit tests were conducted for negative pressure respirators, including nearly 3,000 fit tests specifically for the firefighters. In addition, 45,000 pieces of other kinds of protective equipment were distributed, including hard hats, safety glasses, gloves. Mr. Chairman, I am very proud of how OSHA responded after the attack of September 11, 2001. Despite the highly intense, highly emotional and highly dangerous rescue, recovery and clean-up mission, this Nation did not lose another life at that site during that 10-month period. In fact, the lost day injury rate during that 10-month period was significantly less than what you would expect on a typical construction project. Mr. Chairman, this was not a typical construction project. The absolute key to this success was working in partnership with unions, contractors, city employees, management, all in an effort to achieve compliance with OSHA's standards and our recommendations. The normal enforcement strategy was unacceptable to me, unacceptable approach, to enforce within the green line the pile, given the fact that enforcement may take days or weeks to develop the necessary evidence to support citations as this Committee knows. As you know, if citations are contested, it could take years before the administrative law judge's review and corrective action is required. Mr. Chairman, if our purpose is to save lives and reduce injuries and illnesses, we did not have years, we did not have months, we did not have weeks, we did not have hours to wait for corrective action. We had to deploy a strategy to achieve compliance as soon as the hazard was recognized. The number of near misses that were reported indicated to me that the strategy that achieved immediate corrective action was the absolute right choice. OSHA did, however, execute normal enforcement strategy outside the pile, outside of Ground Zero, and we issued many citations as a result. Mr. Chairman, I, like many people in OSHA, can say with confidence and a high degree of pride that OSHA's staff did everything they believed humanly possible to assure worker protection during those 10 months after the attack. OSHA did, however, learn a great deal at the World Trade Center site, lessons that can help the Agency and the Nation improve emergency preparedness and emergency response. Following the World Trade Center experience, OSHA is pursuing a leadership role in coordinating worker health and safety during significant emergencies and is getting more involved in emergency preparedness. We now train with firefighters, law enforcement agencies and others responders across the Nation as a valued member of the response team. Our Nation's responders deserve the very best protection, and the best way to assure that is for OSHA, supported by NIOSH, to be an integral part of our Nation's emergency planning, training and response efforts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad to take any questions. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Henshaw follows:] Prepared Statement of John L. Henshaw [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Nadler. The Chair will recognize himself for the first questions. A September 12, 2001, e-mail circulated to top EPA officials stated, quote, ``All statements to the media should be cleared through the National Security Council before they were released,'' close quote. So as early as September 12, the National Security Council and the White House were approving public statements. Let's take a look at some of those statements. There will be a video for about 30 seconds. [Videotape played.] Mr. Nadler. Ms. Whitman, an EPA press release from September 18th also quotes you as saying, ``I am glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, D.C., that their air is safe to breathe.'' Mr. Henshaw, in a September 16th press release, you were quoted as saying, ``Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to work in New York's financial district.'' In a series of EPA press releases beginning on September 13, the following words were used to describe the air conditions: Good news, causes no concern, not detectable, no significant health risk and safe to breathe. Ms. Whitman, do these words and phrases convey a sense of danger or even of caution, or do they, in fact, convey a sense of safety and security? Ms. Whitman. Mr. Chairman, those words, to the best of my recollection and every effort that I made at the time, were also added with the phrase, ``However, on the pile it is different.'' Mr. Nadler. Well, we will get to that. Ms. Whitman. There is a significant difference, the readings we were getting at the time. Mr. Nadler. At the time--would you answer my question--do they convey a sense of safety and security or a sense of caution? Ms. Whitman. They convey exactly what they were meant to convey. Those were the readings we were getting from the scientists. Mr. Nadler. Do you regret your repeating the sentence that the air was safe to breathe? Ms. Whitman. I do not regret repeating what the scientists said was appropriate. Mr. Nadler. Mr. Henshaw, do these words and phrases convey a sense of danger or even of caution? Or do they convey a sense of safety and security in your opinion? Mr. Henshaw. Again, not counting the pile, the pile was a separate issue. Mr. Nadler. We will get to the pile. Mr. Henshaw. All right. We took 240 samples------ Mr. Nadler. Please answer the question. Mr. Henshaw. All of our samples were below our-- significantly below our significant exposure limits. Mr. Nadler. You said that already. It is on the record. I just asked you to convey the sense of------ Mr. Henshaw. That conveys that the environment is safe. Mr. Nadler. Okay. Thank you. Do you now regret saying it was safe for New Yorkers to go back to work 6 days after the terrorist attack? Was that a mistake? Mr. Henshaw. Not within the Financial District. On the pile was a different circumstance. Sir, I do not regret it. Mr. Nadler. The area around it was okay? Mr. Henshaw. All of our data indicated it was okay. Mr. Nadler. Ms. Whitman, during 2001 did any government official or outside scientist tell you that EPA statements were not adequately communicating health risk warnings based on the data available at the time? Ms. Whitman. Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge, not one of the scientists who were responsible for analyzing the data on the pile ever indicated------ Mr. Nadler. Did any scientist? Ms. Whitman. Not that I can recall. Mr. Nadler. Okay. Now, Ms. Whitman, I would like to talk about the information you had or did not have at the time and compare it to what EPA said publicly. Much of this organization is--I am sorry--much of this information is contained on that chart to your left, although not all of it. It is Document 16 in the binder that was supplied to you. Since I know it's a little difficult to read that, because I can't read it from here, that chart summarizes overwhelming evidence that when the EPA was assuring everyone was--that the air was safe, in fact, it either didn't have supporting data or it had data showing the opposite. Ms. Whitman, on September 13 you said in an interview, everything we are getting back from the sampling that we are doing is below background levels. There's not a reason for the general public to be concerned, closed quote. And yet on September 12, the day before that statement, in response to an urgent White House inquiry, Dr. Ed Kilbourne of the Centers for Disease Control warned that EPA sampling data was, quote, scanty, unquote, that he was, quote, aware of other toxic hazards in the area about which EPA hasn't asked, and that of the first five EPA bulk samples from the World Trade Center site, one contained a, quote, substantial concentration of asbestos, closed quote. That is 20 percent of the available samples. Doesn't this information make your September 13 statement a flat out falsehood? Ms. Whitman. No, it does not, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nadler. Why doesn't it? Ms. Whitman. The fact that dust contained high levels of lead and asbestos, or asbestos I should say, is absolutely accurate and true. But that was different from what we were finding in the air. In fact, that was why we were working with the city to put HEPA trucks on the street that could get in and suck up the dust and to wash down the outsides of the buildings. Mr. Nadler. Were you aware that Dr. Kilbourne had warned that EPA wasn't asking about lots of toxic hazards and that he said that the EPA sampling data was scanty and should not be relied upon for safety at that------ Ms. Whitman. I was not aware of any scientist--what happened--let me describe for you the process. Perhaps it will help things. The first week, or 2 weeks actually, we had three phone calls a day, gradually went down to two and then one, that involved every regional administrator from around the country, Region 2 scientists at Region 2, on-scene coordinators as well as headquarters staff, who was involved with emergency response and in communications. We would go over what the dust--what the samples they were getting in those days. And we were constantly adding to the samples. There's no doubt about that. We were getting results on a lot of those samples. We would go over. I would ask what was accurate to say to the public, what they could hear, what I could say accurately. And I was told we were--went over that, we decided what it was and we went out and conveyed that to the public. Mr. Nadler. Well, EPA did not begin regular outdoor air monitoring in Lower Manhattan until September 14. The only air monitoring results, we are told, that you had for September 12 and 13 were from the New York City Department of Environmental Protection. Those air samples, of the 10 air samples the city took during those days, seven showed asbestos levels above the EPA's 1 percent trigger mark, including one from as far away as six blocks away in front of the Municipal Building. Yet the September 13 press release states that EPA, quote, found either no asbestos or very low levels of asbestos and further states that monitoring the sampling has been very reassuring about potential exposure. The general public should be very reassured. This despite the New York City findings of 70 percent of its samples showing asbestos levels above the EPA's 1 percent trigger level. Isn't this a little contradictory. Ms. Whitman. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to try to go back almost 6 years now to second-guess the scientists at the time. Mr. Nadler. Excuse me. It's not second guessing the scientists at this time. Ms. Whitman. It would be second guessing the scientists. Mr. Nadler. No. My question has nothing to do with the scientists. My question is to do with the fact that you are putting out very reassuring statements saying nobody's finding any asbestos levels above--any high asbestos levels when in fact the only test they had at that time, the New York City test, showed high asbestos levels above the 1 percent mark in 70 percent of the tests. Ms. Whitman. Two things here, Mr. Chairman, and I cannot determine based on the question what is in play either, whether all of the samples that you are talking about from New York City were relative--related to the dust or related to the air. Those are two different things. Mr. Nadler. Excuse me. Those were air samples. Ms. Whitman. All right. Fine. Thank you. I will also tell you that it was my understanding--we had people back on the site. We did use New York City samples. We used New York State samples. We used samples, as I had mentioned, from over 17 different organizations and we were taking our own samples, which we were taking at which time? I can't tell you. I can't go back and tell you. Mr. Nadler. Let's go into your own samples. The EPA dust samples, dust samples of September 14 show asbestos levels of 2.1 to 3.3 percent, which is 210 percent and 330 percent above the EPA's 1 percent trigger level. Yet the EPA September 16 press release describes this as slightly above the 1 percent trigger. Don't you believe that characterizing dust samples that are 210 to 330 percent above your own standard as only slightly above the trigger is falsely reassuring and misleading? Ms. Whitman. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect I can't imagine that we would have released a statement 3 days later that wasn't based on new testing data and results because we were getting new information every single day. When I was on the phone------ Mr. Nadler. The fact is, is that you did release that statement, and these were the test results that were there at the time. Ms. Whitman. Well, if we are talking about dust or air, again there was a difference with dust and air. Mr. Nadler. These were dust samples. Ms. Whitman. You are saying that the second statement related to dust samples, too, or air samples? Mr. Nadler. The second statement simply said that um--yes, they referred to these specific tests, and they characterized the results of these specific tests of 2.1 and 3.3 as slightly above the 1 percent trigger. So we are referring to these specific tests. Mr. Whitman. I will have to take your word for that. I haven't seen that. Recently I haven't had a chance to go back over all that. But I will tell you again that every statement that we made, that I made, was based on what the experts who had a great deal of experience in this kind of response were conveying to me. Mr. Nadler. Thank you very much. I will now recognize the distinguished--I will come to Mr. Henshaw in the next round. I will now recognize the distinguished Chairman of the full Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for their testimony. Mr. Henshaw, the September 16 EPA press release quotes you in the following way: Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to work in New York's Financial District. Now this release implied that you said this on the basis of the fact that some indoor tests in the Financial District buildings were, according to the EPA, negative for asbestos. But again, outdoor test results showed the 2.1 to 3.3 levels. Do you believe it is practical in a dust-saturated environment for workers to walk through debris with unsafe levels of asbestos without somehow breathing it in or getting it on their clothes or tracking it into the buildings? Mr. Henshaw. Mr. Congressman, tracking materials, you will see in that press release we talk about and caution about tracking it back into the buildings. That was a big concern of ours, and that's why the HEPA vacuum, as the Governor mentioned, and the cleaning of the streets of the Wall Street area was a significant event, to make sure that we maintain safe work environments. Now, our results--the results you are talking about are referring to percent in a bulk sample. And true, we found as high as 1.9 percent in bulk. This was a chunk on top of a patrol car. That was the highest percentage we found of asbestos. What we found in the workplace in the air, which is the critical piece, if it's in a bulk, it's not going to be hazardous unless it gets in the air and people breathe it. We spent--starting on the 13th, our data began to measure and monitor exposures throughout the entire Wall Street area; in fact, from Canal Street down, and collected over the period of time 204 samples. All of those samples showed we were well below--we barely detected any asbestos or any fibers in the air. And let me clarify this, we did find fibers in the air using our base contrast microscopy. When we used TEM, we found out those were not asbestos. Keep in mind, there's two towers loaded with carbon material, with fabric from wall covers, from the cubicles, from the ceiling tiles to the curtains. There were a lot of fibers. And when you see results as you saw in the NYCOSH data that talks about fibers, not speciating as to whether it is asbestos or not. And that's the confusion, Mr. Chairman. And that's why somebody needs to coordinate this whole effort, to make sure that we have a constant message. Because showing samples that is using the PCM method that we have a lot of fibers doesn't mean it's asbestos. And so, Congressman, the answer to your question directly, we did find some fibers in tests but they were not asbestos. And therefore, we believed it was appropriate to open up Wall Street, as long as we put in the right precautions, that we do what we can to minimize the tracking and reentrainment when you kick on ventilation systems, reentrainment of whatever dust may be in those systems. It was safe for people to go back to work. Chairman Conyers. Well, it was safe to go back to work if you could get through the pollution to get to work. I mean, what we are talking about here, sir, are the outdoor tests as compared to the safety that you claim was on the inside. The outdoor tests showed there was great danger of very potent---- -- Mr. Henshaw. And while our issues are workplace environments, we knew workers were going to walk to and from their workplace. We monitored, and we had OSHA inspectors walking the streets of New York City on the 14th, 15th and 16th, and we did that following the 17th when we opened up Wall Street, to see what exposures the people who are walking to and from work might be exposed to. And sir, we did not find them being exposed above any kind of acceptable standard, or unacceptable standard in respect to workplace standards. Mr. Conyers. You didn't find--you didn't know that the outdoor test results showed that there were 2.1 to 3.3 levels existing in the outside atmosphere? Mr. Henshaw. When you say levels, I am not sure what you are talking about. But I did not know of any result. We did not find any result of fibrous per cc of air, is the units we use, to estimate or judge whether in fact a workplace is an issue. We did not find those concentrations. If you are talking about a bulk sample, which represents the percent of asbestos in that by weight of that substance or that chunk, that's a different story, and we did find percentages. At the highest we had was 1.9 percent. But again, Congressman, if I may interrupt, the key really is what's in the air. That's------ Mr. Conyers. That's what I am saying. What is in the air. In the air, let me just read------ Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. You can ask just this question. Mr. Conyers. All right. Let me just follow this out. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Here is EPA, Environmental Protection Agency response to September 11. And this is dated September 16. In the fifth paragraph, air samples taken on September 13 inside buildings in New York's Financial District were negative for asbestos. Debris samples collected outside buildings on cars and other surfaces contained small percentages of asbestos, ranging from 2.1 to 3.3. That's where I get that-- that's where I get it. Mr. Henshaw. That, sir, is------ Mr. Conyers. That is what was outside. So all I am raising is that to get inside where you claim it was safe, you had to work--you had to walk through an environment that was highly, highly infested with the kinds of materials that are harmful to human beings, right? Mr. Henshaw. Not--no, sir. Mr. Conyers. I am not right. Well, is this statement incorrect in the EPA release of September 16, 2001? Would you like to take a look at it? Mr. Henshaw. You are saying the EPA release? Mr. Conyers. Yes, sir. Mr. Henshaw. Well, I will be glad--but all I can--you are referring to bulk samples, which is sediment, dust on a surface, and one of the reasons why we recommended on Friday that we clean Wall Street, and that's with the HEPA vacuums and that's with the washing down of the streets where a lot of that debris was removed. Mr. Conyers. So you are suggesting we shouldn't pay any attention to this asbestos ranging from 2.1 to 3.3 in the release, that wasn't relative to any------ Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The witness may answer the question. Mr. Henshaw. Certainly bulk concentrations of an asbestos above 1 percent is something that we need to pay attention to. No doubt about it. And what's important is, we want to make sure that doesn't get reentrained in the air where people are exposed to it. And so that's why we continue to monitor. We monitored before Wall Street was open, and we monitored after to make sure that nothing was getting in the air. And Congressman, we didn't find anything getting in the air. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Thank you. We've now been joined by the Ranking Republican Member of the Committee, of the Subcommittee rather, Mr. Franks, and I will now recognize him for an opening statement because I promised I would before. Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank Governor Whitman and Mr. Henshaw for being here. I apologize, and no one tried to get here sooner. With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, this oversight hearing is ostensibly to explore the legal issues that are currently being examined in ongoing litigation specific to the case of Lombardi v. Whitman. Initially this case was unanimously decided by a three-judge appellate panel, including Robert D. Sack, a Clinton appointee, but the decision by that panel is not the final step in the litigation process, as there will be appeals to the full Second Circuit for an en banc decision by all of its judges and a possible appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court after that. And while I look forward to an exploration of some of the legal issues raised in this case, I am concerned that our hearing today will be seen as a constitutionally questionable or inappropriate congressional attempt to second-guess the judiciary decision before the appeals process has made the final determination on the merits. The claims involve whether the EPA's public statements regarding the quality of the air at the World Trade Center cleanup site were entirely accurate with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. The court determined that the EPA took substantial measures to warn the public of environmental dangers. The court resolved the claims as follows, stating: Government action resulting in bodily harm is not a substantive due process violation unless the government action was so egregious, so outrageous that it may be fairly said to shock the contemporary conscience. In order to shock the conscience and trigger a violation of substantive due process, official conduct must be outrageous and egregious under the circumstances. It must be, quote, truly brutal and offensive to human dignity, closed quote. The OIG report shows that the defendants were required to make decisions using rapidly changing information about the ramifications of unprecedented events in coordination with multiple Federal agencies and local agencies and governments. If anything, the importance of the EPA's mission counsels against broad constitutional liability in this situation. The risk of such liability will tend to inhibit EPA officials in making difficult decisions about how to disseminate information to the public in an environmental emergency. Knowing that lawsuits alleging intentional misconduct could result from the disclosure of incomplete, confusingly comprehensive or mistakenly inaccurate information, officials might default in silence or default to silence in the face of the public's urgent need for information. In essence, the Second Circuit held that it would not be lawful to hold the Federal Government responsible for harm suffered by rescue workers who may have relied upon information issued by the Federal Government in circumstances in which the Federal Government was, quote, required to make decisions using rapidly changing information about the ramifications of, once again, unprecedented events in coordination with multiple Federal agencies and local agencies and governments, closed quote. As the OIG report stated, responding to this crisis required organizations from all levels of government to coordinate their response efforts and to make critical public health and safety decisions quickly and without all of the data that the decision makers themselves would normally desire. To impose liability in such circumstances would actually risk even greater harm in the future because fear of liability might deter the government from saying anything about an emergency situation. And I hope we can all agree that nothing should be done to force the Federal Government to remain silent in the midst of a crisis. I understand that Chairman Nadler held a press conference to criticize State and local official efforts to provide for injured 911 rescue workers in which he said, quote, the villains are no longer the terrorists. The villains live in the White House and in the Gracie mansion and in the Governor's office, closed quote. Let us be clear, Mr. Chairman, the villains are the terrorists, the villains remain the terrorists. The terrorists caused the harm on 9/11. We must be very careful not to equate even unintentionally the good-faith efforts of government officials to dutifully respond to an emergency in strange circumstances with the vicious premeditated violence perpetrated by blood thirsty murderers who express desire to kill as many innocent people as possible. Mr. Conyers. Would the distinguished------ Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the witness. Mr. Conyers. Would the distinguished gentleman yield to me? Mr. Franks. Certainly. Mr. Conyers. I thank you, Mr. Franks. As the Ranking Member, we appreciate your presence very much. What I wanted to just make sure that we all agree on, that we're in no way attempting to intervene with the court procedures or what's going on in the court, and that we're not trying to obfuscate or in any way discredit anything that is going on at this present time in the Federal courts under the legal procedure. I think we're all in agreement that that is not our goal here, to interfere or even to instruct the courts. We're holding the hearing pursuant to our responsibilities as Members of the one Committee in the Congress that can inquire into these matters, and I just wanted to seek your assurance that that's why we're all here. Mr. Franks. Well, I understand, Mr. Chairman. And I accept that at face value. I guess I would just suggest that given the sensibilities of the issue here that it might be better for the courts to come to their conclusion before we begin to second- guess them. And with that, I will yield back. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Let me just say that I don't think that the Congress in the exercise of its legislative responsibilities can or should wait for courts to decide limit questions that are before the courts. Mr. Conyers. Yes. Mr. Nadler. There are at least three cases before the courts. Our purpose today is not to influence those cases in any way, but neither should we wait for them because we have responsibilities to undertake, and I must comment I did say what I was quoted as saying. And I think the terrorists--with the terrorists, they were the villains who did what they did. But insofar, insofar as government, as government officials in bad faith, if they were in bad faith, acted in such a way as to inflict bodily harm or to subject people to bodily harm in the United States, then they also are guilty if that is the case that happened. I'm not saying that now. That happens to be my personal opinion. But that's not before the Committee now. But that was the--what I was saying there, I was not equating them with the terrorists. The terrorists did what they did, which was obviously heinous. But that doesn't eliminate the logical possibility that other people compounded the damage, which I believed to be the case. And that--and that it may be incumbent on us as Congress to take remedial action, which is what we have to examine. Mr. Conyers. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. Nadler. Yes. Mr. Conyers. I just wanted to get the assurances and the continued cooperation of the distinguished Ranking Member of this Committee that I hope that he has no objection to us moving forward with the inquiry. No one has mentioned the courts until now. And we don't intend to invade their jurisdiction, nor do we intend to describe or limit or instruct them as to how they should proceed. And so we would like to continue the comity that we've enjoyed in this Committee so far and get your assent to the continuation of these hearings as we're proceeding. We've got distinguished witnesses here, and we would like this to be a bipartisan inquiry. Does that meet with the objections of the gentleman. Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, I would just say I look forward to the hearing and what the witnesses have to say and do so with an open heart. Mr. Conyers. Wonderful. Now one point though. Could you call for me our distinguished friends, Mr. Pence and Mr. Issa and Steve King and Jim Jordan, to invite them if they are here, to please join these proceedings because this isn't a party, a partisan inquiry. And I don't want anybody to think that it is. It's a bipartisan point of view in which they are entitled to express any opinions that they hold about this proceeding. And I don't think that the Committee serves its fullest purpose without all of our colleagues here. Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond to that just extremely briefly. Mr. Nadler. Briefly, yes. Mr. Franks. The meeting being held--in all due deference to the Chairman--at 1 on a Monday has been difficult for some of our Members. As you know, I had to make great effort to be here personally and I know all of you are here, so that leaves us without excuse. But I do suggest to you that the particular timing of the hearing made it------ Mr. Conyers. And I'm sorry that you were inconvenienced, your Members, not you, but those that may not have been able to be here. Mr. Nadler. Let me just say, the meeting was scheduled for 1 on a Monday because that was the only time that some of the witnesses could make it. With that, I will yield for 5 minutes of questioning to the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison. Mr. Ellison. Ms. Whitman, on September 14, the EPA had its own workplace tested in Manhattan and found asbestos. Without even waiting for the results, the EPA had its building professionally cleaned. How could you say that there were, quote, no significant levels of asbestos, unquote, in your September 16 press release when significant amounts of taxpayer dollars were spent to clean your own building at 290 Broadway? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, we advised everyone who was going to reoccupy buildings that they should be appropriately cleaned. There was no extraordinary cleaning undertaken at our buildings, but clearly every building in that area where people were going to be occupying should have been cleaned. And what we said at the time was, while we recommended professional cleaners, if individuals couldn't afford that or didn't have access to them, that HEPA vacs and wet wipes were the procedures that they should undertake. But we absolutely recommended that everybody clean the buildings. And I would repeat that nothing extraordinary occurred with our building, but surely it was important to get the men and women back within who were responding in a very direct way and were responsible for a lot of the analysis of the information and the data on which the public so depended back into their building, which was literally four blocks away. Mr. Ellison. Governor Whitman, did the EPA issue a press release and also state on its Website that residents should clean their residences and workplace with a wet rag or a wet mop? Ms. Whitman. I don't recall EPA ever saying wet rag or wet mop. EPA said professional cleaners if possible and HEPA vac and wet wipes together. Vacuum cleaner with a special HEPA filter and wet wipes. It is my understanding that in subsequent retesting that those who followed those procedures, they were found to have very low, if any, incident of remaining asbestos. We also recommended that if people had shag carpets------ Mr. Ellison. I'm sorry, Ms. Whitman. I have limited time. Thank you, Governor Whitman. On September 16 the EPA told New York Newsday that its highest recorded asbestos rating for contamination was about 4.5 percent. New York Newsday quoted you, Ms. Whitman, as saying, quote, there is no reason for concern. Why did say there's no reason for concern when EPA's official own position since 1986 has been that there's no safe level of asbestos? Ms. Whitman. Well, as Mr. Henshaw indicated, the concern that we had for the general public was in asbestos getting into the air into their lungs. What we found in dust--in bulk samples was different. Nobody wants asbestos anywhere. There's no------ Mr. Ellison. Excuse me. Could I just say that you'd agree with me that in the aftermath, the immediate aftermath of this tragedy, people were scared? Ms. Whitman. Of course people were scared. Mr. Ellison. People were panicked, right? Ms. Whitman. Of course. Mr. Ellison. People wanted to know what should they do and they wanted to know from you, that is right? Ms. Whitman. That is correct. Mr. Ellison. You gave them reassurances about the quality of the water and the quality of the air being okay. Today you come and say okay, we're talking about bulk or this or that. But the fact is that on the September 18 press release, you said that we're very encouraged by the results of the------ Ms. Whitman. We were. Mr. Ellison. You gave the assurances to people. Let me ask you this, do you agree that after those planes collided with the towers that it caused immediately dangerous toxic levels for people of air quality, dust and water? Ms. Whitman. We were enormously concerned when those towers came down. Mr. Ellison. Right. And do you also agree today even looking back in hindsight that the language that you used gave people a false sense of safety? Ms. Whitman. No, I do not agree it gave them a false sense of safety. We were talking about air quality, the general ambient air quality in Lower Manhattan and the impact on long- term health. And I'm sorry if that was not what people now looking back on see, but that was what the scientists------ Mr. Ellison. I'm sorry, Governor. I only have 5 minutes. I would never interrupt you under normal circumstances, but I only have 5 minutes. This is a quote from the September 18 EPA response: Given the scope of tragedy from last week I am glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, D.C. that their air is safe to breathe and the water's safe to drink. Now that is a fairly sweeping statement about reassurance. Do you now feel that you spoke a little bit too broadly and a little bit too soon about the actual quality of the air and the water? Ms. Whitman. Every test that we have------ Mr. Ellison. Excuse me, Governor. Ms. Whitman. Congressman, you know, it's fine to go through the yes and noes. But I think it's important for people to understand that these were not whims, these were not decisions by a politician. Everything I said was based on what I was hearing from professionals. My son was in Building 7 on that day, Congressman. And I almost lost him. This is as personal to me as it is to anyone. Mr. Ellison. Governor, excuse me. I'm not going to allow you to turn this into a personal thing. It's personal for the people out here too, Governor. Ms. Whitman. It's personal to everyone. Mr. Ellison. I'm not going to stand here and allow you to try to obfuscate the questions that I am asking. Ms. Whitman. I'm not obfuscating, Congressman. I am asking. I have been called a liar. I have been called a liar even in this room today. My actions were not criminal. With all due respect, you are sitting on a panel with people------ Mr. Nadler. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Ellison. With permission Mr. Nadler. Without objection, the gentleman has 1 minute. Mr. Ellison. On September 27, the USDA gave the EPA test results that found WTC dust to be highly toxic. The WSGS-- excuse me, the USGS concluded that the ph level of the WTC dust was as toxic as drain cleaner. Why didn't the EPA issue a single press release about the USGS findings? Ms. Whitman. The reference in, as I understand it again, looking--to the best of my recollection looking back 6 years, that statement was relative to the dust, the contaminants found on the pile of Ground Zero, and that is where EPA was constantly reminding all those involved that Ground Zero, the air quality on Ground Zero on the pile was different than in Lower Manhattan, and that those responders should wear respirators, should wear HAZMAT suits, should take--wear eye protective and that's--eye protection and that's why we even set up wash stations. Mr. Ellison. My time has expired. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks. Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you again, Mr. Henshaw and Governor Whitman, for being here. Governor Whitman, I read in the IG report that the IG, quote, found no evidence that EPA attempted to conceal data results from the public, closed quote. That's pretty straightforward. Is that your understanding? How do you answer critics who claim that the EPA misled the public about the data results? Ms. Whitman. Well, again in that instance I would absolutely agree with the IG's finding there because we were providing--we had a Website up within 10 days. We had data that was being collected by 13 different entities to synthesize. We tried to ensure that those in the public who--and the scientists and the public and in other parts of government at all levels had the opportunity to look at the data that we were looking at to be able to compare apples to apples and make their own decisions, were we telling them the truth, was it safe or not. So they could see what was happening in that area. Mr. Franks. Governor, you know that the same report states again, quote, that EPA provided public access to its monitoring data through its public Website. I am assuming this is the one you just mentioned. Ms. Whitman. Yes, sir. Mr. Franks. Which included interactive maps that could be used to identify monitoring results. Am I reading this correctly, that the EPA provided public access to all of its data? Ms. Whitman. We put everything up on the Website as fast as we could get that. Mr. Franks. Why did you do that? Ms. Whitman. Because I thought transparency was of the utmost importance. People needed to see what we were seeing, how we were coming to the conclusions that we were, to make the statements that we were. It was important because in science you are always going to get second-guessed and we need people to be able to see all the data. Mr. Franks. Sometimes you get 10 scientists in the room and you get 20 opinions. Up here you get 10 of us and you get 150 opinions. These scientists could have come to a different conclusion looking at the same data about whether the air was safe in your mind? Ms. Whitman. Scientists certainly could. It's a little bit like climate change. There are a number of scientists who don't feel that that is occurring, yet the bulk of the scientists believe that it is. It is sort of the same kind of situation. Mr. Franks. I'm confused, as some of us, that Mars is also increasing there, and we wonder how that's greenhouse gases. Governor, I keep reporting, keep referencing this IG report. But let me just reference one more. The conclusions from the EPA draft risk evaluation completed over a year after the 9/11 attacks have tended to support EPA's statement about long-term health effects when all the necessary qualifications are considered. Do you think this means that the EPA has found no evidence of a long-term health effect from the air in New York beyond the Ground Zero sites? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, there are ongoing studies on which EPA is--in which EPA is participating to monitor the health of the responders and those who live at Ground Zero. And I would have to respect whatever those--those studies find. But as yet, I have not seen any final peer review scientific conclusion from any of those studies, those long-term studies. But the agency I gather is part of those. I know they are continuing to go along with those and I would bow to whatever those studies ultimately conclude. Mr. Franks. Well, the IG report also noted that the IG consulted with environmental and medical expert--or medical external experts who confirmed that such exposure to the general public was not likely to present a risk of long-term health risks. Were you aware of the external experts that they had reached these kind of conclusions? Ms. Whitman. I was aware of what I was getting every day on the calls, sometimes three times a day early on, from the scientists who were analyzing the data. And sometimes it may not seem intuitive to those of us standing around that what they were finding was real. But I will believe the scientists. When they tell me that they examined the data and what is safe for humans to breathe, I will believe them. And in this instance, I did. And I think they have been proven to be correct in large measure, to the best of my knowledge. Mr. Franks. Well, we've heard a lot about the White House and its involvement in this hearing. Why was the White House involved in crafting the press release? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, my experience as a Governor, I always found that in the time of a crisis you need to speak with one voice. You need to have someone who is collating the information and is communicating it in a reasoned way that the public can understand, especially when you have a number of different agencies under your purview that have responsibility for that kind of response. In this instance, obviously you had EPA, you had OSHA, you had CDC, you had the FBI, you had CIA. ATSDR, you had a number of different organizations looking at a variety of data. And it was important that that be synthesized and communicated in a way that was coherent and that the public could use, and I thought it was entirely appropriate to have the White House perform that function. Mr. Franks. If I can get under the line here, I would like to ask, there's a letter from Mr. Bruce Sprigg, which is EPA's chief of Response and Prevention Branch, to Mr. Kelly R. McKinney. And that's Associate Commissioner of the Bureau of Regulatory and Environmental Health Services of the City of New York. It's dated October 5, 2001, which states, quote, the EPA has recommended and continues to recommend that workers at the site wear respiratory protection, closed quote. Were you aware that the EPA made these recommendations to New York City shortly after the 9/11 attacks? Ms. Whitman. Yes, I was. Mr. Franks. Well, my time has expired, but thank you, Governor. Mr. Henshaw, I'm sorry I left you out. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I now recognize for the purpose of asking questions for 5 minutes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our witnesses for being with us today. Mr. Henshaw, you mentioned the fact that asbestos was detected and was over a certain level. Are there safe levels of asbestos? Mr. Henshaw. Yes, sir, there are safe levels of asbestos. We have an Occupational Safety and Health--what we call permissible exposure limit, which is 0.5 fibers per cc for an 8-hour average. That is our current standard with respect to asbestos. Mr. Scott. And you consider that safe? Mr. Henshaw. Yes, sir, I do. Mr. Scott. I understand that the EPA office was professionally cleaned. Was there a recommendation that people cleaning their own apartments use professional cleaning? Ms. Whitman. Yes, there was. Mr. Scott. There was? Ms. Whitman. Yes, there was, sir. Mr. Scott. Was that in your press release? Ms. Whitman. It was in a number of our press releases, in statements, and I believe that the City of New York had assumed the responsibility for indoor air cleaning. They had asked us not to participate in that but we worked together collegially to help them with it, but they were doing it. And we referred them, anyone who had questions, to New York City, as well to their health office and they had a series of recommendations. I also believe I included the recommendation to use professional cleaners wherever they could. Mr. Scott. Okay. And there was one press release that was a legal exchange. One of the reports we have, it's Document 15, paragraph 35. It says that the OIG representative read a statement that the Wall Street Journal attributed to EPA's Region 2 administrator. We have said from the very beginning, the departments need to be professionally cleaned. The OIG representative asked, did your office consider advising the public through a press release that they need to obtain professional cleaning for their indoor spaces? Ms. Kreisher replied that, quote, it was in a press release. It was removed by Sam. Ms. Whitman. That was one press release, and that's absolutely correct. It was the only time in fact when the press releases--that I was ever made aware of a substantive difference between the White House and EPA on what should be communicated to the public. We had been saying prior to that time professional cleaners. We said after that time professional cleaners. When it was brought to my attention that, in fact, it was recommended that this sentence be removed, the phrase be removed, at that point in time there had been apparently quite a bit of discussion back and forth on the use of this sentence. It was in the afternoon, and I don't remember, Congressman, what else was in that press release, but I do remember thinking--there was information there that needed to be communicated to the public. So I made the determination rather than continue the fight, battle over that particular phrase, to let the press release go out as it was because I knew I was going to be appearing on, I believe it was CNBC, but again going back in time, I don't remember which particular media outlet I was going to be on. And I said I will use that phrase. It appeared in every subsequent press release. But in that one press release, that was the only time that I remember anything of substance being taken out. The information may not have been the exact order wording that the EPA sent over, but it conveyed all the relevant information that the public needed. Mr. Scott. Do you believe there are safe levels of asbestos exposure? Ms. Whitman. Well, in general the EPA doesn't like to see asbestos anywhere. But yes, there are standards that represent safe levels of exposure. Mr. Scott. And do you know what that safe level is? Ms. Whitman. I bow to Mr. Henshaw's analysis of that. He's the expert. Mr. Scott. Now you mentioned Ground Zero and people were going back--Mr. Henshaw, Ground Zero people were going back to Ground Zero. Were they wearing the appropriate respirators? Mr. Henshaw. Were all the folks wearing appropriate respirators? Obviously, sir, no. That was our dilemma. How do you get people to wear proper personal------ Mr. Scott. Do you communicate to them in such a way that they were risking their lives by not using the respirators? Mr. Henshaw. Constantly. That's why that is why we did 24/7 inspections. Mr. Scott. Do you have any enforcement powers when people are violating OSHA regulations? Mr. Henshaw. As you know, we do not have jurisdiction over the firefighters and police. So we couldn't tell them that they should do that. Mr. Scott. But you were aware that they were endangering their lives. Mr. Henshaw. That's precisely, sir, why we put together on October 15 the partnership, which included the firefighters and police, we put down in writing, they will follow our OSHA standards. I can't guarantee they follow them always. This was something that we had not done before. And we did it because these circumstances required extraordinary efforts. Mr. Conyers. And do you have any evidence to contradict what I've heard that 70 percent of the first responders are already having symptoms of asbestos and other problems? Mr. Henshaw. Sir, as the Governor had mentioned earlier, clearly the exposures right after the collapse of the tower were immense. No doubt about it. Unfortunately we did not measure, but that was, in my mind, an extraordinary amount of exposure. When it clouded out the sky, when you couldn't see the sun, that was--I've been an industrial hygienist almost all my life. I keep saying, I'm not done yet. But that was an immense concentration. And clearly those folks were exposed to all sorts of things, even the caustic environment that was mentioned earlier. And clearly--we just don't--we can't quantify what that was but that clearly was an extreme exposure. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time------ Mr. Henshaw. That was the effect of the terrorist attacks, not because of the response. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen. Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Governor Whitman, according to the Inspector General, your Chief of Staff, Ms. McGinnis, I understood that Sam Thernstrom provided press releases to other government officials but she didn't know who those officials were. Do you know who in the White House these other government officials were that the crafted press releases were given to? Ms. Whitman. No, sir, I don't. Mr. Cohen. You don't know who the ultimate White House decision-maker was on press releases? Ms. Whitman. I assumed it was the Council on Environmental Quality. Mr. Cohen. The Council on Environmental Quality changed quite a few of the releases from what your office had suggested. And I think it's summarizing them, your office acted as a scientist health-based group, I guess, and had precautionary press releases. The changes were uniformly made by the White House or the environmental quality group to less precautionary and more reassuring. More political, so to speak. Was that appropriate, do you believe from your perspective? I know as a Governor you see a common--it should be a common voice. We saw in Jaws that the sheriff told everybody it's safe to go back in the sea, you know, we know it wasn't. Was that appropriate for the White House to take that pro-environment, economic, everybody come and have a nice time at the beach and don't worry about the sharks approach? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, with all due respect I don't think that was ever even implied in any of the press releases. No kind of levity, no kind of------ Mr. Cohen. I know they weren't. Ms. Whitman. Dismissive of the threats and the concerns that everybody had. To the best of my knowledge, as I indicated in a previous response, the only time that there was anything substantive that I felt was important that the public know was in the one press release where the phrase ``use professional cleaners when possible'' was omitted. Beyond that, as I indicated earlier, press--what happened--we'd sit down, we'd talk to those on-scene, we had talked to those who were analyzing the data, we being a group at headquarters, myself, the deputy chief of staff, the head of emergency response, the head of the press office, we would determine what was the appropriate message. After that, it was left to--it became a process that was coordinated by the White House to bring some kind of agreement of all the various agencies responding so that how it was--how the ultimate--my concern was that the information get out. Mr. Cohen. Let me ask you this, Governor, the White House's first concern was to see that the markets were open the next day. Their first concern was that everybody could go shopping. Don't you think that you as the EPA Administrator should have taken a higher--you were held to a higher duty and a higher standard and should have implored somebody in the White House that having the market open, having MSNBC active, having everybody feel reassured was not as important as a precautionary note, which we now know that the precautionary note was correct? Don't you think you had a higher responsibility than commerce? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, I couldn't disagree with you more with what you just said about what the White House wanted. Yeah, did I get a call? I reported it before. I got a call from the White House a day after from the Office of the Economic Advisers, which is not surprising, they're concerned about the economy of the country saying, reminding me of the importance of Wall Street, of opening the stock market. I indicated that until that building was cleaned, until it was safe it would be inappropriate, and that's the last I heard of that. It was cleaned, it was safe, as you have heard from Mr. Henshaw, for them to go back in, and they were allowed back in. Was it wrong to try to get the city back on its feet as quickly as possible in the safest way possible? Absolutely not. Safety was first and foremost, but we wouldn't let the terrorists win. Mr. Cohen. Please. I'll take care of that. I appreciate your help. I mean, the terrorists, you talk about a uniform voice. I have heard the terrorists twice. We have got a uniform voice here. The original EPA language stated that dust samples showed levels of asbestos ranging from 2.1 percent to 3.3 percent. EPA views 1 percent of asbestos as containing material to be dangerous. This language was deleted and the White House added, our tests show it's safe for New Yorkers to go back to work in New York's Financial District. Isn't that a big change from 200 to 300 percent higher than what EPA recommends to ``it's safe to go back to work''? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, I can't tell you, again, I'm not looking at the press release, I don't know what it said. I know that when contacted by the White House and asked if it wouldn't be safe for reoccupation of the building by the Friday after the Tuesday after the attacks, we indicated that until the buildings were safe and had been cleaned and were safe that it wouldn't be appropriate, and as Mr. Henshaw has indicated, cleaning took place, testing was done, and it was safe. It would have been inappropriate to say you can't go back if it is in fact safe. Safety is first and foremost. Mr. Cohen. Are you submitting, with all you know today, that it was safe to be back in that area other than on the pile? Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The witness may answer the question. Ms. Whitman. I said yes. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. Governor, there's no one in this room that believes--I don't believe--knowing what I know about you, that you feel any less or are any less sensitive to the workers and the folks that came from New Jersey, many of them, and the first responders. That's not the issue. The issue is this, that you said there was no conspiracy, you said there was no White House interference. Yet let me simply repeat what your own IG stated, your own. Quote, the White House Council on Environmental Quality influenced the information that EPA communicated to the public through its early press releases when it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones. Tables II-4 and tables II-5 in the IG's report is very clear about that. And a letter that we sent in 2003, and another letter we sent in 2006 to the Attorney General, we never got really a response on. I don't remember a response. Do you? Mr. Nadler. None. Mr. Pascrell. The Associate Administrator Kreisher, K-R-E- I-S-H-E-R, told the IG there was a conscious effort, quote, to reassure people, and that came from the Administrator and the White House, unquote. She told the IG that, quote, felt extreme pressure from the White House. You are stating today again that there was no extreme pressure from the White House, Governor Whitman. Is that correct? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, I'm saying that I felt no extreme pressure from the White House. And I think if you'll go further------ Mr. Pascrell. Why does the Associate Administrator feel that way? Why does Kreisher feel differently than you? Ms. Whitman. You will have an opportunity to ask her that in a minute. She is on the next panel. Mr. Pascrell. I certainly will. We're talking here about credibility and accountability. Let me ask you this question, do you think the City of New York acted responsibly? Ms. Whitman. I think the City of New York did absolutely everything in its power to do what was right by the citizens of New York. Mr. Pascrell. So now we're in a different stage since------ Mr. Nadler. I would remind people. The gentleman will suspend. I would remind people again no demonstrations. Continue. Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, I don't lose time, do I? Mr. Nadler. No, no, no. Mr. Pascrell. I had the honor to serve on the Homeland Security Committee for 4 years. We went into this certainly not in the depth that this Committee's going to go into it. And Chairman at that time it was Peter King. It just didn't seem right, what was going on and what we were hearing. If you've read the reports from Mount Sinai, two, a couple of reports--by the way, did you read the reports from Mount Sinai about those people who worked------ Ms. Whitman. I have not read the reports. Mr. Pascrell. Let me recommend them to you. I say that in all sincerity. Because I conclude after reading the two reports that I read, it might have been more, that the people are not making these stories up. The people are not claiming that their illnesses or sicknesses are coming from something other than they felt their work in the area. That's very dangerous, and I think you'd agree with that, very serious, and we have a responsibility in the government to protect and to prevent things from happening. If these people are correct that they suffered these things, then I don't care what reports you tell us about. I don't care what evidence you present. The evidence is that people I'm convinced are not lying, that they are sick, that they have had very difficult situations in breathing, pulmonary problems. I've talked to these people myself, Governor. They're not making this stuff up. Ms. Whitman. Congressman, I would never say they were making it up. And I have talked to them as well. Mr. Pascrell. Well, good. Now that we agree------ Ms. Whitman. That's one of the reasons why we continue to say that those working on the pile should wear respirators. Mr. Pascrell. But they all didn't. And the judge who handled the case--and in conclusion, I want to make this point very clear. The judge who handled the case that was brought against you and against the EPA was very clear. He said this: ``Whitman's deliberate and misleading statements made to the press, where she reassured the public that the air was safe to breathe around Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn, that there would be no health risk presented to those returning to those areas shocked the conscience.'' That's what he said. I didn't say that. Nadler didn't say that. King didn't say that. That's what he said. He also said, ``no reasonable person would have thought that telling thousands of people that it was safe to return to Lower Manhattan while knowing such return could pose long-term risks and other dire consequences was conduct sanctioned by our laws.'' And let me tell you, something, Governor, very clearly. There is a reason, there is a reason for this happening. And there's a reason for why this judge said what he did. And let me tell you also, you know that this Administration that you worked for has very little credibility and accountability. So you wonder, you don't wonder why we ask questions about what they were--what was coming out. We wanted one voice. Give me a break. We're talking about people here. We're talking about families. We're talking about human faces. And you know that just as well as I do. I ask you, come clear, clear the air so that we can all go forward. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The witness may answer the question. Ms. Whitman. Thank you. First of all, I would just like to correct, it was a she, that particular judge, and there was another judge in the Southern District Court on the same day-- ---- Mr. Pascrell. I apologize for that, Governor. Ms. Whitman. Congressman, there was a judge in the Southern District Court on the same day looking at the basic same fact pattern came to a very different conclusion. She did not look at fact. I think you are a lawyer, Congressman? Mr. Pascrell. No, I'm not. No, I'm not. Ms. Whitman. I'm not either. That's one of the few things we share, Congressman. Neither one of us are. Mr. Pascrell. I have two sons who are lawyers. I don't hold it against them. Ms. Whitman. One of the things that a judge must take as fact in that kind of the proceeding are the allegations by the plaintiffs. They don't look at fact. They don't hear testimony on it. They have to take that as fact and she was adjudicating whether or not------ Mr. Pascrell. Well, I'm glad someone from the Administration, past and present, believes that we should rely on science. That's what we will do. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentlelady from Florida's recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Henshaw and Governor Whitman, I in my other role serve as the Chair of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittee and I say that because we have just been through a process by which we are having to make sure that we can now take care of tunnel workers who were exposed to very high levels of asbestos in our tunnels while working on the Capitol Visitor Center site as well as the site leading to the Capitol power plant. And for years we battled the Architect of the Capitol, who refused to do anything about it or acknowledge that there's a problem, and now we know that we have tunnel workers who were exposed. And we're going to have to deal with that to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars, both to clean up the site and make sure we can take care of those workers. So I have spent a little bit of time on this and I wanted to lay that out in that context. Mr. Henshaw, at the Pentagon my understanding is that OSHA enforced regulations requiring the use of respirators and then no one became sick. But at the World Trade Center site OSHA regulations were not enforced and 70 percent of the first responders are now sick. So why did OSHA not enforce the law in New York with respect to the non-city or State employees on the site despite repeated requests from, what I understand from the city to do so? And given the fact that thousands of people are now sick, do you now believe that OSHA's nonenforcement of the respiratory protection standard at Ground Zero was the correct course of action? Mr. Henshaw. Congresswoman, you probably missed my opening statement. But Virginia has a State program, and the State program also has authority to enforce with firefighters and police. We in the Federal system do not have the authority to enforce with firefighters and police. The municipal employees, public sector are now covered under the OSHA Act, as you know. Number two------ Ms. Wasserman Schultz. The EPA did have the ability to take over the site at the point that they felt that--and that is under Presidential Decision Directive 62, Emergency Support Function 10, and the National Contingency Plan under CERCLA, EPA could have taken over control of the site from the city as the lead agency if they felt that the city was not properly protecting their workers. So they certainly had the ability to do it, and you chose not to. So if you are saying that the law wasn't structured in New York to allow you to do that, then why didn't EPA step in and take over? Mr. Henshaw. First, I can't speak to why EPA didn't step in. And if you want------ Ms. Wasserman Schultz. I will have Governor Whitman answer then. Mr. Henshaw. If I can complete the other part of your question, previous question, in respect to enforcing, even with the nongovernment employees or nonpublic sector employees, which were the contractors, the four primary contractors, that were at the site. We met with them the day after. They produced safety and health plans. We coordinated those safety and health plans. We got an agreement up front that we were going to follow one safety and health plan which has required the use of respiratory protection. That plan was put in place and signed by all parties eventually on October 15. Yes, Congressman, it was signed by the 15th. That plan, the contractors were the ones that were putting that together. We did not enforce--and that's why we had 70 people on the ground for 24/7 for that 10-month period when we saw--when we did inspection and found they weren't wearing respiratory protection, we told them to put it on and we also got a few of them removed from the site because they weren't wearing respiratory protection. Again this was the contractors. We had an agreement up front. Now, sir, I'm not a lawyer either and I don't want to employ any more lawyers. And as you know if we go through enforcement, we have to develop the evidence, we have to present it, issue the citations, they have 15 days to contest the citations. And then it goes through the administrative law judge and ultimately possibly to the review commission. That could take years. And we did not have seconds. I was there, and I agree 150 percent, this was the best approach to make sure we had immediate compliance. And that's why we put 1,100 people on the ground to make sure that they were complying. Now, in the earlier days it was very, very difficult because there were a lot of issues. Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Mr. Henshaw, when you are talking about exposure to that type of environment, you don't have the luxury of letting that type of time pass. The more time passes, the more people are exposed, and the more likely they are to get sick down the road. So even a lapse of a few weeks made a significant difference in people's health. And Governor, I would like to ask you, because I don't think it has been covered before I got here, why is it that EPA didn't take in and step over and use your legal authority to make sure these things were taken care of? Because that is a great concern to me. Ms. Whitman. Congresswoman, under--as you know, the EPA would have under certain circumstances had the authority to take over the site. What had to be proven in order to invoke the CERCLA, the Superfund Act, substantive--substantial and imminent danger, and the readings that we were getting relative--and this was relative to the overall air, I'm talking more about outside of the pile, were not indicating that. And we were working in a collegial fashion with the City of New York. Again, as far as the workers on the pile, what our--we were tasked by OSHA to do the--I mean, excuse me, by FEMA to do the health and safety monitoring, to monitor the air. And we did that, and then we provided respirators. Ms. Wasserman Schultz. When it comes to imminent-- substantial and imminent danger, are you talking about immediate death, horrible sickness within weeks? Because mesothelioma, the cancer that is the result of exposure to asbestos, does not manifest itself substantially or immediately. It could be years, but it's almost certain. So how is it that you didn't step in and exercise your authority given that knowledge, which has been known for years? Mr. Nadler. The gentlelady's time has expired. The witness may answer the question. Ms. Whitman. Congresswoman, that was based on what the interpretation of what our legal ability was to act by--in consultation with counsel at the time. We did have conversations about invoking Superfund and determined that frankly, the other part of it was, even if we had it, given the fact that we were trying to work in a collegial way with New York, I'm not sure the public would have stood with my taking New York to court to take Federal control of the site. But I can't speak to that because that would be supposition on my part. We did look at it and didn't feel the legal basis for exerting that existed. That's what I was told. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Thank you. We will start the second round of questions and I yield myself--well, we won't start the second round of questions. I recognize the distinguished gentleman from Iowa. Mr. King. I thank the Chairman, the distinguished gentleman from New York. I want to make my short confession here in that and I just arrived on the scene and there are many pieces, details, of this that I haven't had an opportunity to accumulate and sort in as rational an approach that I would like to. I didn't want to pass up this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. What I'd like to do is, if I could just direct a question to Governor Whitman. The narrowness of the questions that have been asked at this point: Is there something you would like to address that you haven't had an opportunity to speak to? Ms. Whitman. What has always been frustrating is that I believe that the men and women of the Environmental Protection Agency were heroes as much as everyone in the way they acted after that and the kind of work they did, going down. They were on the pile, as far as I can recollect, on an almost daily basis. We had people on the site wearing monitors, trying to convey the best information. We tend to forget, looking back almost 6 years, the chaotic and emotional nature of this event. It was unprecedented. We were doing the very best we could, putting out information as fast as we could get it to the public, with the best interpretation of scientists who were not neophytes at this. While we had never faced something of the magnitude of the Twin Towers coming down, the professional men and women of the Environmental Protection Agency have responded to crises all around the world, and they were in Oklahoma City when the buildings came down. They know the kinds of things to look for, they make appropriate scientific-based assumptions based on what they know and the readings they are getting. To me, it is really sad that their reputation is being so undermined and so questioned when I believe they did an extraordinary job. Mr. King. Governor, I thank you for those comments and I reflect upon a number of other incidents across the country where in the aftermath firemen charged the fire. And we know how many of them lost their lives because of their selfless dedication to their duty, without question about measuring the risk. I've seen it happen on a smaller scale in the district that I represent and this is the aftermath I understand, but also there have been many Monday mornings since then that have passed to get to this point. It is my view that we should measure the circumstances in the time that it took place and also measure the dedication of the people who made those decisions and question what they had to work with at the time and the political climate that we were in, well as the emergency situation that was there. How could anyone--I pose this question to you, Governor: How could anyone argue that we shouldn't have engaged in the recovery operations until we had a definitive response, definitive understanding of all of the implications that might have unfolded? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, I don't think anybody would. Obviously nobody did. The men and women who went in to respond to that--and many of them were people who were there because they worked for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and I have had the opportunity to work with them and they didn't come back out of those buildings. They were true heroes and we owe them a debt of gratitude. And for those who did come out, but spent then months on that pile, this was a response where I believe every level of government did their very best. To say that anyone is perfect, that's not within the purview of mankind. But to then say that because there might not--to say that no one, not everyone is perfect in every instance, although I think we did an outstanding job, to say therefore it was malicious and with forethought and intent to mislead is an extreme--well, I think it is dangerous and it is going to be hard for people, if we should ever suffer another attack, for people to trust their government. Mr. King. I leave with you that conclusion, Governor. I appreciate your testimony; yours also, Mr. Henshaw, and I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. I'll now begin the second round of questioning. I yield myself 5 minutes. First of all, let me make a couple of comments on what was said before I get into my questions. Mr. Henshaw, you talked about 70 percent of the victims and you talked about people caught in the plume and it was the terrorists' fault. But the 70 percent was not of people caught in the plume, the 70 percent of people who are sick are 70 percent of the first responders who were not caught in the plume. They are sick because they worked in the pile for 40 and 50 days without proper protection, so that is not the same thing. The people who were caught in the plume lots of them are sick, but the 70 percent of the first responders who were not caught in the plume, who did not inhale anything toxic on 9/11, but who worked there 40 and 50 days later, they are now sick because they worked without proper protection from OSHA or EPA or other agencies of government. Second of all, I must comment on Ms. Whitman's claims that EPA constantly told people to get a professional cleaning of their homes. There were no such recommendations in any EPA press release or on the 24-hour hot line or in any statements that we could identify before November 26th of '01. EPA region II Acting Administrator Kathleen Callahan testified at a New York City council hearing on November 1, '01, only about the New York City instructions to clean up, that people should clean up their apartments and their places of business with a wet rag and a wet mop, and made no distinctions in her testimony about levels of dust. In response to January 2002 Freedom of Information Act request, EPA could not produce any publicly disseminated document that either assumed the dust to contain asbestos or told people that they should use professional contractors if there is more than minimal dust. So unless you can provide to this Committee something dating before November 26th, 2001, I would hope you would not repeat the untruth that EPA was constantly telling people to get professional help. They were certainly not doing so in anything that we have been able to identify before November 26th. Ms. Whitman. Congressman, I will attempt to get you the tape of October 26, an MSNBC interview that I gave that talks about that. I'll get it to you. Mr. Nadler. And October 26, if you said that on October 26, that's a month and a half after you'd given the wrong information. Now, EPA press releases at its Website referred residents and employers returning to their homes and workplaces to New York City Department of Health guidelines that advised people to remove dust from their homes and workplaces using a wet mop or a wet rag. Now, Mr. Henshaw, on January 31, 2002 you wrote a letter to President Peterson of Local 78 of the Asbestos Workers Union and you said the following: In that the materials' referral to dust--he had asked whether dust found in people's homes should be considered asbestos containing material. You wrote the following: In that the materials containing asbestos were used in the construction of the Twin Towers, the settled dust from their collapse must be presumed to contain asbestos. Therefore, you concluded, the dust contained asbestos must be removed by a competent person and be disposed of properly. Now, Mrs. Whitman, the IG report, as was noted before, said that a recommendation to obtain professional cleaning was deleted from an EPA press release by a White House official. We will get into that in Panel II. The EPA Website was constantly referring people to the New York City Department of Health recommendation to clean up their apartments with a wet mop and wet rag. Now, Mrs. Whitman, isn't it a fact that EPA prosecutes people all the time for illegal removal and disposal of asbestos? Ms. Whitman. Yes, yes. Mr. Nadler. If the EPA saw removal crews dumping asbestos- containing material in the trash, wouldn't the EPA prosecute them? Ms. Whitman. I would presume they would. Mr. Nadler. Then given that Mr. Henshaw's letter properly stated that all World Trade Center dust must be presumed to be asbestos-containing material, and that therefore all asbestos regulations apply, and since EPA's own 1986 regulations state that there is no safe levels of asbestos, how could EPA urge people, how could they permit the City Department of Health to urge people to illegally dump asbestos-containing material in the trash and to illegally clean it up without being licensed to do so or without being properly protected? Isn't that illegal advice for which you would prosecute people in the normal course of events? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, no, I am not a lawyer so I can't tell you whether counsel would have advised under those circumstances to bring charges against anyone who was trying to dispose of the dust. Mr. Nadler. Let's rephrase the question. Isn't it clearly illegal for people who are not licensed to do so, and are not properly protected, to remove asbestos-containing material and throw it in the garbage? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, I actually cannot answer that question. I am not a lawyer. Mr. Nadler. Mr. Henshaw, can you answer that question? Mr. Henshaw. I don't know if I can answer that exact question, except that letter was in response to invoking what the standards are required for hazardous waste. And that wasn't the case under these circumstances. Mr. Nadler. What wasn't the case? Mr. Henshaw. That this was a hazardous waste site. Mr. Nadler. It certainly was. Mr. Henshaw. It was hazardous, but it wasn't declared to be a hazardous waste site. Mr. Nadler. It wasn't declared to be hazardous site, but nonetheless your letter stated that since there was asbestos in the World Trade Center, you must presume that the dust from it contained asbestos. And the law would simply operate to say if it is asbestos-containing material, you must dispose of it according to the law. We will get to that in Panel II, though. But my conclusion is this: That was illegal advice, not to mention unsafe. My time is expired, but I permit you to answer the question. Mr. Henshaw. Thank you very much. We were operating under 1926, which is construction standard for asbestos, those are-- that's the standard which we were operating under during the World Trade Center events. I would also like------ Mr. Nadler. And, therefore, what------ Mr. Henshaw. And that required based on the assessment, based on exposure assessment, and our assessment was we did not find asbestos concentrations in those workplaces. And therefore the appropriate--we had in the cleanup operation scope A and scope B. If you read further in the discussions, you will hear scope A and scope B. If there was scope A, what was visible dust, then we would recommend respiratory protection. If it was scope B, which is nonvisible dust, then we didn't require it. I'd like to go back------ Mr. Nadler. My time is expired. Mr. Henshaw. But during your time you raised the issue about 70 percent. Mr. Nadler. I'll have to get to that later. My time is well over-expired. Mr. Franks? Mr. Franks is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just start the second round here by saying that I know that anyone who's gotten sick as a result of this tragedy is an ancillary part of it. I don't want it ever to be thought or assumed that there's not a great concern on my part and, I am convinced, as well as those members of the panel here today. But I think what is disturbing me is that somehow, Governor, as you put it earlier, that there is being attached to this tragedy some malicious part, malicious motivation on the part of the EPA to somehow either not care or just deliberately do things that would harm people in the aftermath of this tragedy. I've heard things as outrageously ridiculous as that 9/11 was orchestrated by the American Federal Government. You hear things that are stupid beyond degree, and yet it seems that there are those in certain quarters willing to say them with great conviction. So I just--I want to register my disgust with people that would deliberately attach a malicious attitude on the part of government officials that were trying, trying to respond to a tragedy that beggars the description of all of us. With that said, I am particularly concerned about some of the things related to the White House involvement and press releases. The 9/11 Commission Report at note 13 on page 555 already examined this issue and they concluded as follows: All the White House-reviewed process resulted in some editorial changes to the press releases. These changes were consistent with what the EPA had already been saying about the White House clearance. There were disputes between EPA's communication person and the White House coordinator regarding those press releases. But the White House coordinator, however, told us-- this is the 9/11 Commission--that these disputes were solely concerned with process, not the actual substance of the press releases. Former EPA Administrator, Christine Whitman, agreed that the White House coordinator--agreed with the White House coordinator, the document supports this claim. We found no evidence of pressure on the EPA to say the air was safe in order to permit the markets to reopen. So I guess, Governor Whitman, I would ask you, hasn't the 9/11 Commission already looked into this and concluded that there was no wrongdoing? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, the 9/11 Commission did a very thorough investigation of the entire tragedy. I have read that word for word, been through the entire 9/11 report, and I think they were very accurate in their portrayal of the response of the Environmental Protection Agency and the other levels of government to this unprecedented attack and tragedy. Mr. Franks. Did anyone within the EPA ever complain to you that they believed that EPA's public statements about the test data were false and misleading. Ms. Whitman. To the best of my recollection, I don't remember anyone ever coming to me within the Agency and saying that. To the best of my recollection. Mr. Franks. Related to the lawsuits, isn't it true that two of the lawsuits filed against the EPA and you personally, one of them has been thrown out of court and the other one is on appeal with the same court that threw out the first one? Ms. Whitman. Yes, it is. Mr. Franks. Let me just conclude here with a quote from the IG's statement and New York Times: ``We looked at a lot of things and we only came up with those very few things that we talked about, and what that says is that the EPA did a really good job. I don't think you can read five pages in that report without us talking about the fact that it was an unprecedented thing. Also an official from the New York City Department of Design and Construction said about the EPA's response to 9/11 that it was ``phenomenal'' and that the EPA's response crews were on top of every issue under EPA's mandate. And you, Governor, led this agency through those tough times and, for whatever it is worth to you, I would like to try to applaud your conduct. Ms. Whitman. Thank you, Congressman. Could I do one follow- up response to the Chairman? Mr. Franks. Certainly. Ms. Whitman. When you indicated that we were misleading and not providing the information to the public on the cleanup, I would refer you to a 9/16/01 statement where we did refer people to the New York City Department of Health, they were the ones who were leading for New York City, where they specifically called for a professional cleaning of the buildings. New York City did do that. They had that on their Website. We were deferring to them. I just want to make sure that you understood the full picture there, that New York City was doing this as early as 9/16. Mr. Nadler. Time for the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, Chairman of the full Committee is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are trying as best we can as a congressional Committee, to recreate as accurately as we can recall, the circumstances-- and in some ways they are complicated--about what happened following this disastrous tragic attack upon our country in New York. Governor Whitman, you said that New York City was not properly protecting its workers; is that accurate? Ms. Whitman. I don't recall ever making a quote to that effect, no. Not using those words. New York was the primary responder; I did say that, yes, because that was how the emergency response works out, that's how it happens, that they are the primary responder. But I don't think I ever blamed--and Congressman, I can understand how you might be misinformed on that, because the press is dying for a fight here. Mr. Conyers. Well, I am dying to get Katie Couric and your conversation on 60 Minutes------ Ms. Whitman. Certainly. Mr. Conyers.--on September 2006 accurately interpreted. Let me review that with you. Couric: The Environmental Protection Agency is to protect people from the environment. Ms. Whitman: Right. Couric: Did you really do it? Ms. Whitman: We did everything we could to protect people from that environment and we did it in the best way that we could, which was to communicate with those people who had the responsibility for enforcing what we were telling, saying should be done. We didn't have the authority to do that enforcement, but we communicated that to the people who did. Couric: But who had the ultimate authority over the site? Ms. Whitman: Really it was the city; it was the primary responder. Do you recall that? Ms. Whitman. Yes, I do. Mr. Conyers. Okay. Couric: Did your people do enough to call the people who were overseeing the site, i.e. Mayor Guliani and city officials, and say, damn it, we have got to protect these people? Ms. Whitman: Oh, EPA was very firm in what it communicated, and it did communicate up and down the line. Couric: In no uncertain terms? Ms. Whitman, no uncertain terms. So if this were the case, does it not appear that it was the city that was not properly protecting its workers? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, my response is, those are all accurate, to the best of my knowledge; that the city was the primary responder, and as I indicated, that's--we conveyed the information about the importance of wearing protective gear on a regular basis to those who had the most direct oversight of the responders on the pile. There were mornings it's my understanding up in Region II with everyone. Again, this was a highly emotional time and I fully appreciate your sentiment of wanting to see how we do better, and I hope that one of the things that will come out of a Committee like this is whether they want to call it a line item or whatever, but a real focus on how do we make respirators that don't clog, that aren't cumbersome, so responders will wear them without worrying about it. These were people who were trying to save their brothers and sisters. These respirators inhibited communications. They did clog. They were hot. Those were warm days in the September, early October days. There were reasons. Nobody--again, we all seem to want to always find blame, somebody to blame--that's the terrorists over and over again-- but there are some very good things we can do: Get HAZMAT suits that are not cumbersome, that allow them to do their job and that are safe. Those are the kinds of things that we ought to be looking at. Mr. Conyers. Well, did you------ Mr. Nadler. The time for the gentleman is expired. Mr. Conyers. Could I get an additional minute? Mr. Nadler. By unanimous consent, without objection, the gentleman is yielded 1 additional minute. Mr. Conyers. I have got a number of minutes, but here is what Mayor Guliani said on September 12, 2006. And I am not trying to be provocative, but if we don't straighten it out with you, I don't know who to go to except for Katie Couric herself. But Guliani also lashed out at the former Environmental Protection Agency Administrator for trying to blame him. That's what he said. ``What I remember from Cristine Whitman is her saying that the air was fine,'' he said, ``and her saying that quite prominently over and over again, and insisting on it.'' Now, that's why I raised the question in the way that I did. I wasn't trying to put words in your mouth. Can you help me with that response before--the Chairman is raising his gavel again. Ms. Whitman. I would be happy to. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired, but the witness may answer the question. Ms. Whitman. I would be happy to, Congressman, once again. There are two different things we are talking about, the pile and ambient air quality in Manhattan in general. One of the things that I learned, as I am sure you have, is not to respond to purported allegations given to me by reporters and the press, because usually we find that those are taken somewhat out of context, and we find that people weren't really blaming other people in the way that is implicated or implied by the way the question might be asked. So I don't think the mayor is blaming me. I am certainly not blaming the mayor. I don't think that that is a fruitful thing in which to engage. Mr. Conyers. In other words, you don't think he said it. Ms. Whitman. I don't think he said it relative to the pile, certainly relative to the ambient air quality in Lower Manhattan in general, because that's what I said. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. The gentleman from Iowa is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think most of us on this Committee have looked upon that tragic smoking pile of rubble and, later, into that smoking hole of rubble. I can't imagine anyone not thinking it was a war zone, that it was a war zone. I can't imagine anyone not thinking that did not put us at war right then, at that moment of impact, on that day. As I look down into that smoking hole, I think back across our history and what did it mean? The first word when I found out about the first plane--actually the second plane that hit the Twin Towers, the first one was, ``oh my God, what's happened to a passenger plane?'' The second one was my passenger who was with me said ``Pearl Harbor.'' The scope of the whole thing rolled into his head instantaneously. I spent my Father's Day weekend down to the Civil War battlefields at Manassas. And the first Battle of Manassas as it is known up on the south side of the Mason-Dixon line and, as I learned, the Battle of Bull Run, there was a momentous time in history and a lot of people think that the Civil War might have been over within months instead of years, at the cost of thousands of lives rather than hundreds of thousands of lives, if the battery that protected the right flank of the Union had simply received the order to fire on the charging regimen of, I believe, the 32nd Virginia. That order was apparently never issued, but no one really knows because every one who defended that battery was killed within a 10-minute period of time. The Union line was overrun and the first Battle of Bull Run was won by the Confederates and we launched ourselves on a tragic path of American history. What's interesting about that is Congress held hearings on that battle and they held hearings on why the order wasn't given. If it was given for that battery of cannon-to-fire-rate- shot, how it might have turned history if it had just done something different. I read that history down there, and I think how could Congress go back and be a Monday morning quarterback and even put themselves into the circumstances of the troops who lost their lives that day or those who survived the battle. And it is different when you are at war, it is different when decisions have to be made on the spot, and it is different in the aftermath. And this Nation had needs. And I am trying to imagine what it would be like, with a city that covered with ash, to file charges against someone for not doing a proper EPA cleanup when they maybe lost their wife or husband in the Twin Towers? How could you bring that kind of enforcement from the EPA? And I guess that's really where my question is. I ask you that question, Governor Whitman, because I'd ask you again: Can you set the scene, how would that have been, if you would have followed the path that seems to be recommended here by some of the members of the panel, what do you think would have been the reaction of the public, of the President, of the Congress? Do you think you would have been called before hearings before this Congress if you had punished people who maybe didn't follow all of the letters of the regulations of the EPA and the cleanup in the aftermath, especially in the first couple of months afterwards? Ms. Whitman. Again, Congressman, it is so hard to speculate about what might have happened or might not have happened. But given today's atmosphere I would have to say, yes, I would have been probably brought to Congress long before this. Mr. King. Governor, that's my speculation too. It strikes me that the circumstances that you found yourself in, that history called you to, were a no-win situation. Whichever side of the argument that might have come down, there were going to be a lot of questions, a lot of recriminations. And what is different about this era than the Civil War era, is we're a litigious society. Nobody was going to file a lawsuit at the beginning of the Civil War or in the aftermath, but today we have a lot of litigation that goes on. We have people that are looking for these kind of opportunities, people that advertise for these kind of opportunities. And the financial incentive that's there is part of the equation. And I am not impugning anyone's integrity here, we know, it is part of the equation. We deal with that debate in this Committee. We have every year since I have been here. So I think we need to put this in a proper perspective, being that we were at war, we still are at war, and decisions had to be made on the spot. And to go back and, by the way, engage ourselves in a hearing here that may well affect the results of litigation, I think is something that we have refrained from in this Committee, but it is happening here today. I would ask Mr. Henshaw if he'd comment on that. Mr. Henshaw. Congressman, I agree 100 percent. I came to New York on Thursday after driving all night from Wisconsin, and I had a really deep appreciation of what some of those folks were going through. Incidentally, Congressman, Mr. Chairman, your people in New York were outstanding individuals. I went to some of the candlelight vigils. I have the utmost respect from New Yorkers. I grew up in Delaware and on the east cost, but I have the utmost respect for New Yorkers. When I arrived, we're trying to get a sense of how we can add value and save lives and reduce injuries and illnesses. Quite frankly, one of the purposes behind this ought to be how can we move forward. We had firefighters tell us, we don't need civilians to tell us how to do our job. And it's not because--I went through fire school------ Mr. Nadler. Could the witness please------ Mr. Henshaw. I am wrapping up. My point is I have the utmost respect for those individuals. We did not train them on wearing negative pressure respirators, and during an emergency you are not going to add a new element to their training. You just don't do that. And so the fallacy here is we did not prepare them adequately to deal with those kinds of conditions. And so the future ought to be how can we train them to put on the negative pressure respirators because we did not train them prior to that, and that's where we need to focus on. I yield back. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman, I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Governor Whitman, you indicated that the 9/11 Commission had exonerated the EPA. Ms. Whitman. No, I don't believe I used the word ``exonerated,'' Congressman. I think I said they had done a very thorough report on what happened. Mr. Scott. Okay. There is one statement in a footnote that said we did not have the expertise to examine the scientific accuracy of the EPA pronouncements in the press releases. Is that in their report? Ms. Whitman. Yes, that's in the footnotes as you allude to, as I recall. I don't recall every footnote. Mr. Scott. Mr. Henshaw, just to get a couple of things on the record for clarification. I understand you say that you knew when the workers were at Ground Zero, working without respirators, that you were aware that they were in eminent danger for health problems; is that right? Mr. Henshaw. No, sir, I did not say that. In fact, what our requirements were to wear respiratory protection. And to answer the question of the Congresswoman about citation, we did not find many samples above our standard able to cite. Mr. Scott. You knew they were working at Ground Zero without respirators. Mr. Henshaw. Our requirement was to wear respirators and when we saw one not wearing it, we in fact told them put it on, and they did. And we also had a few people dismissed because they weren't. Mr. Scott. So you were not aware of anyone working without a respirator that you didn't take immediate action to correct? Mr. Henshaw. I am not aware of any that we did not take immediate action to correct. Mr. Scott. And in response to the gentleman from New York, the Chairman's comment, you indicated that one of the problems with exposure was exposure was immediate, and so a lot of the illness could not have possibly been prevented because the exposure was right there at the explosion. Is it your testimony that people were not exposed after the initial 9/11 and subjected to significant health problems? Mr. Henshaw. Congressman, certainly during the collapse of the building there was an immense exposure, no doubt about it. There is a picture right here to see the kind of environment that individuals were in. During the cleanup and recovery and as soon as we began to take samples, we began to characterize what those exposures were. And we found very few above our permissible exposure levels. But regardless, the requirement was to wear respiratory protection when you are on the pile. Mr. Scott. While you are talking about acceptable levels, can you remind me what you said the acceptable level for asbestos exposure was? Mr. Henshaw. On an 8-hour time-weighted average, it is 0.15 fibers per cc. Mr. Scott. There are some that think that any exposure to asbestos is hazardous; you would disagree with them? Mr. Henshaw. I disagree with them. Mr. Scott. Okay. Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a second? Mr. Scott. I yield. Mr. Nadler. I would point out that the Federal Register of April 25th, 1986, the official EPA regulations state available evidence support the conclusion there is no safe level of exposure to asbestos. I yield back to the gentleman. Mr. Scott. Reclaiming my time. I am aware of that, I just wanted to make sure I didn't misunderstand the gentleman's testimony. Mr. Henshaw. That's based on a 1980's risk assessment that was based on some old information. We have new information today. Mr. Scott. Governor Whitman, you indicated in response to the Chairman's inquiries on the question of whether the places ought to be professionally cleaned, you have knowledge that the White House changed the press release, that was a substantive change, but that was the only time that you failed to mention the places ought to be professionally cleaned? Ms. Whitman. To the best of my--no, what I said, to the best of my knowledge, that was the only time that something substantive had been changed in a press release, that did not convey all of the information that we felt should be conveyed. Again, I am surprised to hear the Congressman say there weren't other press releases that indicated the need for professional cleaning. I know that I have said it on numerous occasions, and I am surely happy to go back and find tapes, although we------ Mr. Scott. We know now that evidence was there that we should have known better than to send people back into some of those situations. If we don't know whether it is safe or not, should we say that it's safe or should we say that it's not safe if we don't have firm evidence one way or the other? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, we were basing everything--there were tests that were done on air quality. Again, it is not the usual prerogative or responsibility of the Agency to do indoor air. However, this was clearly a need, and we were working with the city of New York that took the lead on indoor air, and we were following their lead. They were the primary responders---- -- Mr. Scott. We know now that it was not safe, so obviously we didn't------ Ms. Whitman. No, it was a question of the readings as to whether they were high enough where they exceeded levels, and to the best of my knowledge in going back and talking to people about 5-1/2 years ago and what we were finding, that they were not finding levels in the air that were--when they did go into apartments--that were problematic. But that's my recollection looking back. That was run out of Region II and again it was New York City who was the primary responder. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen. I'm sorry, did I skip Mr. Ellison? I am sorry. The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison. Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Governor, I just want to tell you I appreciate you being here. I know we had an exchange last time. Nothing here is intended to be personally offensive to you. I'm just trying to get some information. Do you agree that people were made sick because of the exposure to toxins that were in the environment in the aftermath of 9/11? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, I can't make that kind of finding. That has to be based on the scientific data and the studies. Mr. Ellison. Okay. Based on the scientific data and the studies, do you believe people were made sick by toxins that were in the environment after 9/11? Ms. Whitman. If they come to those conclusions I would have to agree. But waiting for those conclusions------ Mr. Ellison. But, Governor------ Ms. Whitman. No. Clearly we were concerned, Congressman. Obviously we were concerned or we wouldn't have recommended time and again that those working on the pile wear appropriate safety protections. Mr. Ellison. So can we safely say that you do agree that the illnesses that people have suffered as a result of their work of recovery, post 9/11, are related to their illnesses? You------ Ms. Whitman. That's something that will be proven by all those studies, including the Mount Sinai one. Mr. Ellison. So are you saying yes, no, or you just don't know? Ms. Whitman. I don't know. I am not a scientist. I am not a doctor. Mr. Ellison. I know, I've read your bio. What does your common sense tell you? Ms. Whitman. Excuse me? Mr. Ellison. What does your common sense tell you? Ms. Whitman. My common sense tells me that we were concerned about possible health ramifications from workers who were not adequately protected; otherwise we would not have repeated over and over again that they should wear protection. Mr. Ellison. So you have testified already today about how the toxins that you tested for were within limits in terms of the studies that you relied on. If you--do you doubt the testing--do you doubt any of those tests that you found that were within the acceptable limits for exposure for people? Ms. Whitman. Do I doubt the quality of the tests? Mr. Ellison. Yeah. Ms. Whitman. I have no reason to doubt the quality of the tests. Again, the men and women at the Environmental Protection Agency, the scientists--and they weren't just the Environmental Protection Agency scientists who were looking at this data, it was OSHA, CDC, ATSDR, a number--as well as hospitals, the city and the State. There was a lot of instantaneous peer review, if you will, going on. So it as not just EPA. Mr. Ellison. Well, here's the thing, Governor. We have a lot of people who are sick, many of them are here today. And yet we have you saying, hey, we tested it and it was within acceptable; levels, that's why we told the public that--we reassured the public that it was safe. How do you account for what looks to me like a discrepancy? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, again, I think we are talking about two different things. On the pile there were concerns, and clearly, as Mr. Henshaw has indicated, when those towers came down, anybody that was engulfed in that dust you have to believe there was enormous amount of contamination that took place then, but that as it was happening nobody was out there taking readings; everybody was trying to figure out what to do. Our offices in fact were very near that site and had to be evacuated and people had to go immediately to the Emergency Response Center. But in the ambient air quality in Lower Manhattan in general, after setting aside the moment when those buildings came down, after that, when we started taking tests and data--the scientists were telling me that they didn't see anything that indicated long-term health problems for the general public. And, of course, remember that Lower Manhattan was closed to the general public, to most of the general public for quite some time afterwards as well. It wasn't a complete kind of a closeout, but there were pretty strict police patrols. But that's aside--we were just dealing with what we were hearing from the scientists, to the best of my knowledge. Mr. Ellison. Well, let me--are you saying that the people who have contracted illnesses--well, who I believe contracted illnesses as a result of the exposure were people who were only--who were exposed later and not as a result of the on-the- scene--at the time of the attack that were engulfed in that big pile? You are saying that the illnesses are folks who--the people who are sick are people who got exposed outside of the initial attack? Ms. Whitman. I couldn't even begin to speculate on that, which is why the Environmental Protection Agency is part of the ongoing health registry and examinations that are being conducted to follow people to find out exactly what kind of exposure, whether these are--whether they can make that kind of correlation. I couldn't speculate on that, sir. Mr. Ellison. One last question, Mr. Chair. Earlier on, a member of our panel sort of raised a question about why would we go through an exercise of asking questions post hoc about what happened here. My question--my point would be because we want to do better next time. My question to you is in that light, going forward, do you think that you would give reassurances about safety of the air and the water and the toxic exposure after a catastrophe the way you did this time, if we were to, heaven forbid, to have another kind of catastrophe like this? Ms. Whitman. Going forward, I think it is the absolute responsibility of the Agency to communicate to the public the information and conclusions being drawn by the scientists who are looking at the data and making that analysis, not to inject any kind of a personal presumption into it, but to communicate what they are getting, based on what the scientists and professionals who are trained in this are finding. Mr. Nadler. Gentleman's time is expired. The gentleman--now we'll get to the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen. Mr. Cohen. Governor Whitman, were the scientists involved in the issuing of the--given the information that were used in the press releases at the EPA issued? Ms. Whitman. Were there scientists involved? As I explained at the beginning, Congressman, when we would have the meetings in the morning, our scientists, the head scientist was generally present at headquarters, but also on the other end at Region II, their Acting Administrator who was overseeing things was there, he had scientists there. Scientists were very much a part of the discussions; yes, sir. Mr. Cohen. And when the press releases were changed, were the folks in the White House--do you know if scientists were involved in that office? Ms. Whitman. I don't know that, sir. Mr. Cohen. Well, being that you don't know if there were scientists involved on that end and there were on your end, and you state, which is accurate and correct, that the scientists are the people who should be making these decisions, why did you never object once, with the changing of the press releases to an ``all is safe and clear'' from a precautionary note? The scientists were precautionary, the politicians weren't. Why did you never once be precautionary? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, as I indicated earlier, the thing of concern was to ensure that all of the information that the public needed to make intelligent choices was it contained in these press releases and there was--as far as the actual wordsmithing went, I left that to people who were trying to get consensus from the various agencies. And I have to presume that scientists were involved from other agencies as well. Mr. Cohen. You presume, but you don't know. Ms. Whitman. No, I don't know. Mr. Cohen. And you never questioned one time, you didn't think your position was to speak truth to power, even if they refused and overruled you, that at least you would have rested--your conscience would have felt good about raising an issue. Ms. Whitman. All the relevant data was communicated in those press releases to the best of my remembrance and looking at them. I know, I feel assured, because in one instance where we felt that all the data wasn't getting out, it was brought to my attention. So again we talked in the morning about what information we knew, what the scientists and professionals felt was acceptable to communicate to the public. That was communicated to the communications office that went through this process------ Mr. Cohen. But you looked at the differences. The differences are very dramatic from, you know--there's a problem, and asbestos is never a safe substance and it is 200 to 300 percent higher to------ Ms. Whitman. Well, I would disagree with your characterization of the changes and I think you could go through and argue back and forth. But also remember, Congressman, that press releases were not the only way we were communicating information and data. In fact, I find that they were probably the least effective way because most of the people that needed the information, particularly those on the pile, didn't have time to sit and read press releases, which is why we communicated, too, verbally and a whole lot of different levels as well. Mr. Cohen. How do you define ``the pile?'' What's the dimensions of the pile, the parameters? Ms. Whitman. I can get it for you, I don't have it here, but there was actually a blue line drawn around it--or green line I guess it was--a green line that indicated the parameters of the highest exposure where people were working on. It was basically those areas where the buildings collapsed. Mr. Cohen. And so was it out to the fence? Ms. Whitman. Which fence? Mr. Cohen. When I was there, this is what I was given about 3 weeks afterwards. I was out around the fence. Was that the pile? Or was the pile--did the pile stop? Ms. Whitman. Actually our area, you'd probably get a better answer with the next panel, Congressman. Off the top of my head, I can't tell you what the parameters were, but again, that's a matter of record. Mr. Cohen. There were differences in how the folks who worked at the Pentagon were allowed to work and the ones at the Twin Towers. You waived some standards, did you not, at the Twin Towers that weren't waived as far as using respirators or conditions? Ms. Whitman. Are you addressing me or Mr. Henshaw? Mr. Cohen. Either one that can give me a proper answer. Mr. Henshaw. No standards were waived. Mr. Cohen. But everybody at the Pentagon wore the respirators, did they not? Mr. Henshaw. I don't know that for sure. Mr. Cohen. The information I have says they were and that there were different standards. You don't know anything about that. Mr. Henshaw. They were not different standards. We enforced the same standard, but just in a different way. Mr. Cohen. In a different way. Mr. Henshaw. Well, I know there was a snicker behind me. This is as serious to me as it is to them. We applied a different enforcement policy or strategy on the pile because we did not have enforcement authority. And circumstances require a little different standard in respect to enforcement, as I said earlier, than happened at the Pentagon. Under the circumstances, we had to deploy a partnership requiring people to follow those standards because we did not have authority for the firefighters and the police. Now, was every one of them wearing a respirator? Obviously, I see photographs of people not wearing respirators, or they are hanging around their chin. I'm an industrial hygienist, and I know the only way it is going to work is if it is on your face properly and you are fitted properly. So you are asking me, did everybody wear it the same way? No. You're asking me, did people wear it always at the Pentagon? I don't know for sure. In workplaces all around this country people are supposed to wear it, and sometimes they are not, so I don't know. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. The time of the gentleman is expired. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Pascrell. No one is suggesting that the EPA or OSHA doesn't care about human life. The bottom line is we have to find out whether you did your job or not, and we are going to do that, believe me. Governor Whitman, I have a question for you. I want to know who was the highest-ranking White House official you ever spoke to about air quality at the site we are discussing today? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, they were regular Cabinet meetings that we have, and in the course of those Cabinet meetings, I reported to the President. Mr. Pascrell. So you spoke to the President about the air quality at the site. Ms. Whitman. At least one Cabinet meeting it was mentioned what was happening. Mr. Pascrell. Was any official at the White House involved in the decision not to use your authority to take over the site cleanup to protect workers? Ms. Whitman. No. Mr. Pascrell. You don't remember anything like that? Ms. Whitman. Never had a conversation with anyone at the White House on that issue. Mr. Pascrell. What about your authority at the site? Ms. Whitman. No, we were operating within the authority as invoked when the President issued the emergency declaration required under the law. Mr. Pascrell. I can only conclude from what you are saying, Governor, that you wouldn't have changed one darn thing if, God forbid, this heinous act happened again. I listened very carefully to your answers from both sides of the aisle, and I don't think you would have responded much differently. That disturbs me because a lot of people are hurting. I know you don't want to hurt people--but the results of your actions. I have another question to ask you. Ms. Whitman. Could I respond to that? I would refer you to the lessons learned plan here. The Environmental Protection Agency was the first Agency of the Federal Government to take a look at what happened after 9/11 and to come up with a number of ways that we could have improved our performance, and those things I endorse. Mr. Pascrell. Governor Whitman, you have a habit of quoting what you want from the documents. If you go back to 9/11, since you brought it up, the quoting from 9/11 that totally exonerates you--do you want me to read what else they said in this report? Ms. Whitman. Excuse me, but I don't believe I ever said it totally exonerates. Mr. Pascrell. Then we should open up and clear the air. I have a question to ask you, because if I repeat on the record for the first time what else the 9/11 report said, it isn't as clear as you pretend it to be. And you know what I am talking about. Ms. Whitman. No, Congressman, I honestly don't. Mr. Pascrell. If you want me to read it to you? Ms. Whitman. If you want to read, Congressman, I have learned in dealing with you in the past, if you want to read it, you will read it. That's up to you. Mr. Pascrell. Before I read it, I want to ask you a question. Why did you shut down the EPA Ombudsman Office when they were------ Ms. Whitman. The EPA--certainly. Mr. Pascrell. I didn't finish the question. --when they were investigating two major areas, plus how 9/ 11. What did the 9/11 response encounter? Why did you shut the office down? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, the office wasn't shut down. The functions of the office were moved to the Inspector General's offices, a more appropriate place to place it, frankly, because we were concerned. There had been numerous times where the ombudsman office had conducted hearings at Superfund sites, raised very serious questions about EPA's response in those Superfund sites, and yet not issued a report on them. In order for EPA to change its behavior and to make a difference we needed to have those reports. It started under Carol Browner. Mr. Nadler. Would you yield for a moment? Mr. Pascrell. Sure. Mr. Nadler. I would like to ask Governor Whitman, in February and March of '02 the EPA Ombudsman's Office held hearings in New York on this whole question. And you refused to attend those hearings. You sent a memo saying to other government agencies, saying they should refuse to attend those hearings, and you put out a press release in advance of the hearings saying it would be a Broadway production and a farce and that no one should attend the hearings. My information is that you had never done this for any previous ombudsman hearings. Why did you do that? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, I have to tell you, I have no recollection of doing that. Mr. Nadler. I was cochairing those hearings. I remember you doing it. Ms. Whitman. Well, okay. Well, fine. Mr. Nadler. There will be no comment from the audience, please. Governor? Ms. Whitman. Congressman, obviously I am taking your word for it. I am just saying I have no recollection of that. Mr. Nadler. Thank you, I yield back. Ms. Whitman. Okay. Mr. Pascrell. It says in the 9/11 report a lot of things, ``Former EPA administrator, Cristie Whitman, Christine Whitman, agreed with the White House coordinator. Christine Whitman interviewed June 28th, 2004. The documentary evidence supports this claim, although Whitman told us she spoke with White House senior economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay regarding the need to get the financial markets open quickly. She denied you pressured her to declare the air was safe due to economic expediency. We found no evidence of pressure on the EPA to say the air was safe in order to permit the markets to reopen. The most controversial release that specifically declared the air safe to breathe was released after the markets had already reopened. The EPA did not have the health-based benchmarks needed to assess the extraordinary air-quality conditions in Lower Manhattan after 9/11. The EPA and the White House therefore improvised and applied standards developed for other circumstances in order to make pronouncements regarding air safety, advising workers at Ground Zero to use protective gear and advising the general population that the air was safe. The first questions that I asked you my first time around: Those standards--different standards when you respond to first responders at the site and compared to different standards when you talk about school kids and other workers in the area. Let's not confuse those two, because there were two judges involved here. One was a male and one was a female. I just want to make that clear. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. The witness may answer the question. Ms. Whitman. Congressman, there were no new standards applied. Frankly, I thought it would be a huge mistake to suddenly start imposing new standards in the middle of a crisis. We went by the standards that EPA has traditionally used when it has responded to emergencies. We did not change any of the criteria on the testing data, we didn't change any of the markers, we stayed with what EPA has used in the past. And I will go back again to say it is an extraordinarily professional Agency, with very smart scientists, who are a lot smarter than I am. Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, if I may conclude with this one point. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman is granted an additional 30 seconds. Mr. Pascrell. I'm reading in the 9/11 report that everybody seems anxious to quote from. ``The White House efforts during the crisis were coordinated by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets.'' Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. That concludes the first panel of witnesses. The witnesses are excused, with our thanks. And we will go on to the second panel of witnesses. We will give a moment or two to change over. [Recess.] Mr. Nadler. The hearing will resume. I hope everyone can take their seats. Let me remind everybody of what I said prior to the first panel, that the rules of the House of Representatives do not permit demonstrations of any kind by the spectators. Given the emotions, I think everybody's pretty good about that, but please continue. We have the opportunity to get answers to questions, that many of us have been asking for 6 years, today and we must proceed in an orderly manner. I know that those of you who have traveled so far to be here today agree with that. I would now like to introduce our second panel of witnesses. Our first witness, who I don't see there but who I saw earlier--our first witness is Samuel Thernstrom. He is managing editor of the AEI Press, which is a publisher of the American Enterprise Institute, and director of the AEI's W.H. Grady Program on Culture and Freedom. He was the associate director for communications for the White House Council for Environmental Equality from 2001 to 2003. He was also chief speechwriter for the U.S. Department of Labor, speechwriter for former Governor George Pataki of New York, and spokesman for the New York Department of Environmental Conservation. Previously he was an environmental studies fellow at the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, a research assistant to Aaron Rudofsky at the University of California at Berkeley, and a research fellow of the Political Economy Research Center. Our second witness is Tina Kreisher. Ms. Kreisher became director of communications of the U.S. Department of the Interior in 2004 where she had been a speechwriter and acting deputy communications director since 2002. She was associate administrator, Office of Communications, Education and Media Relations for the Environmental Protection Agency from 2001 to 2002. Previously she was communications director for the U.S. Senate, Energy and Natural Resources Committee; deputy director of Governor Christine Todd Whitman's Washington Office, and special assistant to the Public Liaison Director for the Information Agency. Next, Witness David Newman who has served as a nongovernmental expert on the EPA World Trade Center Expert Technical Review Panel. He is an industrial hygienist with the New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health and coordinates its World Trade Center Health and Safety Project. Mr. Newman serves on the Community Advisory Committee of the World Trade Center Environmental Health Center at Bellevue Hospital and on the Labor Advisory Committee of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene World Trade Center Registry. He served on the advisory board of Columbia University Mailman's School of Public Health World Trade Center Evacuation Study and on the Exposure Assessment Working Group of the World Trade Center Worker and volunteer medical screening program. Mr. Newman is a member of the American Industrial Hygiene Association, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, and the American Public Health Association. Our next witness is Ms. Eileen McGinnis. Ms. McGinnis served as chief of staff to the Administrator of the U.S. EPA. Ms. McGinnis also served in Governor Whitman's cabinet as chief of policy, where she was responsible for the government operations of 16 State departments. She also served in the administration of Governor Thomas Caine as director of the Office of Policy in the Department of Human Services. The next witness is Marianne Horinko who was named Acting Administrator of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency by President Bush on July 10th, 2003. She served in this position from July 14th, 2003 until November 5th, 2003. She then returned to her position as system administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Ms. Horinko has served as a system administrator since being confirmed by the Senate on October 1, 2001. Following the events of September 11, Ms. Horinko spent her first few months at EPA involved in environmental cleanup activities in Lower Manhattan, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. And the U.S. Capitol during the crisis over anthrax contamination. During the first Bush administration, Ms. Horinko was attorney advisor to Don Clay, EPA's Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response. In that capacity she was responsible for RCRA regulatory issues and Superfund reauthorization. Our final witness is Suzanne Mattei. Suzanne Mattei has worked in environmental policy analysis and advocacy for 25 years. After graduating from Yale Law School in 1981, she became staff attorney and then director for the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, and environmental advisor to the New York City Comptroller from 1990 to 1993. In 1994, she became assistant deputy advocate to the Public Advocate. She then served as public policy director for the Access to Justice Campaign for the New York State Trial Lawyers. From 2003 to early 2007, she served as New York City executive for the National Sierra Club where she produced three in-depth reports on the health impacts of human exposure to pollution from the September 11 attacks and response at the World Trade Center, and failed environmental response at the World Trade Center and the Katrina Hurricane. She now serves as regional director for the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Region II. She is testifying not in her State capacity, but in her capacity as the former New York City Executive for the Sierra Club and author of its ``Pollution and Deception at Ground Zero'' series of reports. Her comments are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. I am pleased to welcome all of you. As a reminder, each of your written statements will be made part of the record in its entirety. I would ask that you now summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you stay within that time, there's a timing light at your table. When 1 minute remains, the light will switch from green to yellow and then red when the 5 minutes are up. As is customary, I ask the witnesses now to please stand and raise your right hand to take the oath. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr Nadler. Let the record reflect all of the witnesses responded in the affirmative. You may be seated. Mr Nadler. The first witness we'll invite to testify is Mr. Thernstrom. Mr. Thernstrom, you are recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL THERNSTROM, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Mr. Thernstrom. Good afternoon. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to testify. This is an important opportunity to correct some widespread misconceptions about the environmental issues related to September 11. Prior investigations, including the bipartisan September 11 Commission investigation, debunked those misconceptions and I hope the Committee will do so as well. As you know, the EPA Inspector General's report made a number of inflammatory claims regarding CEQ's interactions with EPA. As a White House employee, I was not at liberty to respond to the IG's questions, although I would have liked to. As a result, the IG's report was based on an incomplete and faulty assessment of the facts. Let me be clear. The White House had a legitimate role to play in reviewing EPA's public statement at this time of grave national emergency, and I am proud of my work. My goal was to ensure that EPA's statements were as clear and accurate as possible, providing the public with both the environmental testing data and EPA's best assessment of its significance. Every EPA staffer working on this issue shared that goal, and we worked together to achieve it. There was no disagreement between the White House and EPA about the degree of danger to the public. On that question, I deferred to the experts at EPA and OSHA, who had assessed the data, and I relied upon my counterparts at those agencies to consult with their colleagues to ensure that the press releases that they issued were accurate. This was a collaborative process involving dozens of agency staffers, and the actions we took reflected the broad consensus within the agencies about the data. It is true that I made many suggestions to EPA about ways to improve their press releases, and when EPA agreed with those suggestions, they accepted them. In instances where we revised EPA's drafts in ways that made them more reassuring, it was my belief that those changes accurately reflected EPA's assessment of those risks as repeatedly articulated in daily conference calls with and prior public statements by EPA officials. There was no meaningful dispute between EPA and the White House about how to characterize those risks. The IG's claim that the White House improperly influenced the substance of these press releases is simply false, as the documentary evidence clearly shows. Fortunately, a far more thorough and objective investigation of these claims was conducted by the bipartisan September 11 Commission. The Commission's findings were unambiguous. There was no improper White House influence. EPA's statements accurately reflected its assessment of the risks. The Commission was appropriately agnostic as to whether EPA's risk analysis was infallible, as indeed am I; but they were quite clear that my role in this process was not improper and indeed did not influence Administrator Whitman's decision to declare that the air in lower Manhattan was safe. As the Commission noted in its report, quote, ``We did examine whether the White House improperly influenced the content of the press releases so that they would intentionally mislead the public. The EPA press releases were coordinated with Samuel Thernstrom, Associate Director for Communications at the White House Council on Environmental Quality. Oral reports, interviews with EPA officials and materials on EPA's Website were not coordinated through the White House. Although the White House review process resulted in some editorial changes to the press releases, these changes were consistent with what the EPA had already been saying without White House clearance,'' closed quote. The Commission report then cites several examples of news stories published on September 14 and 16 in which Administrator Whitman reassured the public that there was no reason to be concerned about air quality in New York. The Commission report continues, quote, ``There were disputes between the EPA's communications person and the White House coordinator regarding the press releases. The White House coordinator, however, told us that these disputes were solely concerned with process, not the actual substance of the releases. Former EPA Administrator Christine Whitman agreed with the White House coordinator. The documentary evidence supports this claim. We found no evidence of pressure on EPA to say the air was safe in order to permit the financial markets to reopen. Moreover, the most controversial release that specifically declared the air safe to breathe was released after the markets had already reopened,'' closed quote. The Commission's findings are very clear, and I hope this Committee will give them proper consideration. In closing, I want to simply make clear that my statements here today have been and will be accurate to the best of my recollection. But almost 6 years have elapsed since September 11, and I have not had access to my White House records while preparing for this testimony. A lot has happened in the intervening years, but I will do my best to answer your questions as completely and accurately as I can. Given the time limitations on my oral testimony, I will have to stop here. But my written testimony adds considerable additional detail to these points, and I encourage all of you to read it. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Thernstron follows:] Prepared Statement of Samuel Thernstrom [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ATTACHMENT [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr Nadler. I will now recognize Ms. Kreisher for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF TINA KREISHER, COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Ms. Kreisher. Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Franks and Members, my name is Tina Kreisher. I serve as Director of Communications at the Department of the Interior. I've been at Interior since February 2002 and have served two secretaries, Gale Norton and now Dirk Kempthorne. In September it will be a full 6 years since the events of 9/11 and the time I worked at the Environmental Protection Agency. More than 3 months after that catastrophic event, I left EPA for extensive foot surgery and then moved to a new position at Interior. I left behind all of my files and have had only the August 2000 report--2003, excuse me--report by the EPA's Inspector General to refresh my memory. Excuse me. Much has been said about the adequacy of the processes being used by EPA to test for air quality after the monumental destruction of the terrorist attack. Yet the tests are the same as those used by the Clinton administration and for a few months by the Bush administration to test for daily air quality in the City of New York and elsewhere. It was the standard being used by EPA. As a political appointee, I was not and others were not scientists. We relied on the professionals to guide us through the testing procedures and processes. When we were told the test showed air quality within normal range, we accepted those findings. My memories are of our New York office located just blocks from Ground Zero and the stories of our staff members literally scooping up dust samples as they ran away from the maelstrom on that day, and of their returning to work there just a few short weeks after the attack. There seems to be a perception by some that we accepted these test results because we had a disregard for the people living in the city. There is no basis to that perception. I remember being in the office as Administrator Christine Todd Whitman heard from her son, who was in one of the buildings at the World Trade Center. He called, and she told him to get out of the building, which he did; but then it was agonizing hours before he called to tell her he was safe. My oldest daughter was an attorney in New York at the Cravath law firm, and she lived near the theater district. She was there on 9/11 and breathed the air for 2 years before she moved from the city. There was no disregard for the people who had suffered and were suffering either on a personal or on a professional level. Administrator Whitman wanted complete transparency for the test monitoring, and it was at her suggestion that we put the testing results online for the press and the public and other scientists to see and evaluate. She also wanted more press releases, which brings me to the section of the IG report that is critical of the press releases. I've been writing press releases in this town for more than 18 years, and it has always been a cumbersome process. In my experience, when the release has a Congressman's or Senator's name at the top, usually he or she has edited it. At Interior, we have an approval process that can sometimes take minutes if I can get to the Secretary, or hours and days for a detailed review process involving many people. The press release approval process that was set up after 9/ 11 was taking days and sometimes a week. There were many considerations and many questions being asked, and debates swirled on conference calls set up, at least in part, by the Council on Environmental Quality under the auspices of the National Security Council. Questions were: Could EPA speak to health risks? Who was the lead for getting the information out? What was our statutory obligation? The IG's report, in fact, said, and I quote, ``These statutes and regulations do not obligate EPA to respond to a given emergency, allowing for local agencies to lead a response; and New York City, in fact, exercised a lead role regarding indoor air,'' unquote. We were told on conference calls that EPA should continue testing and let the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, the City and State of New York, the Department of Health and Human Services discuss human health. I understand that OSHA did provide guidance at Ground Zero. The point has been made many times that there are more effective ways to get information to the press than by press release. In fact, I rarely see the content of press releases in actual press reports. Reporters prefer to do their own reporting and not copy what is being given to everyone. Because of the cumbersome approval process, I opted to do fewer releases and, instead, spoke personally to almost every reporter who called during those days. This meant 20 to 30 interviews a day just for information from me and then a number of requests for live interviews with Administrator Whitman. I think reporters would confirm that we were forthcoming with information during that period if we had the information to give them. I will add one other thing. In all of the years I've been writing press releases, I've never knowingly put false information into a release. While editing changes were made, based on recommendations by the Council on Environmental Quality, I believe those changes to be upsetting in some cases but not false. I still believe that to be true. The IG's report, in fact, had this to say, and I quote, ``We spoke to a number of experts in the field of environmental monitoring, including physicians, industrial hygienists and researchers. These experts generally agreed that the levels of airborne asbestos detected in the air outside the perimeter of Ground Zero in Lower Manhattan did not present a significant increase in the long-term health risks imposed on the public,'' end quote. I will be happy to take your questions. Mr. Nadler. I thank the witness. [The prepared statement of Ms. Kreisher follows:] Prepared Statement of Tina Kreisher Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Franks, members of the subcommittee, my name is Tina Kreisher and I serve as Director of Communications at the Department of the Interior. I have been at Interior since February, 2002 and have served two Secretaries, Gale Norton and now Dirk Kempthorne. In September, it will be a full six years since the events of 9/11 and the time I worked at the Environmental Protection Agency. More than three months after the catastrophic event, I left EPA for extensive foot surgery and then moved to a new position at Interior. I left behind all of my files and have had only the August 2003 report by the EPA's inspector general to refresh my memory. Much has been said about the adequacy of the processes being used by EPA to test for air quality after the monumental destruction of the terrorist attack. Yet the tests are the same as those used by the Clinton administration and for a few months by the Bush administration to test for air quality in the city of New York and elsewhere. It was the standard being used by EPA. As a political appointee, I was not, and others were not, scientists. We relied on the professionals to guide us through the testing procedures and processes. When we were told the tests showed air quality within normal range, we accepted those findings. My memory is of our New York office, located just blocks from ground zero and the stories of staff members scooping up dust samples as they ran from the maelstrom on that day. And of their returning to work there just a few short weeks after the attack. There seems to be a perception by some that we accepted these test results because we had a disregard for the people living in the city. There is no basis to that perception. I remember being in the office as Administrator Christie Todd Whitman heard from her son, who was in one of the buildings at the World Trade Center. He called and she told him to get out of the building, which he did. But then it was agonizing hours before he called to tell her he was safe. My oldest daughter was an attorney in New York at the Cravath law firm and she lived near the theater district. She was there on 9/11 and breathed the air for two years before she moved from the city. There was no disregard for the people who had suffered and were suffering either on a personal or professional level. Administrator Whitman wanted complete transparency for the test monitoring, and it was at her suggestion that we put the testing results on line for the press and the public and other scientists to see and evaluate. She also wanted more press releases. That brings me to a section of the IG report that is critical of the press releases. I have been writing press releases in this town for more than 18 years and it has always been a cumbersome process. In my experience, when the release has a Congressman's or Senator's name at the top, usually he or she has edited it. At Interior, we have an approval process that sometimes takes minutes from the Secretary or hours from a detailed review process involving many people. The press release approval process that was set up after 9/11 was taking days and sometimes a week. There were many considerations and many questions being asked, and debate swirled on conference calls set up, at least in part, by the Council on Environmental Quality under the auspices of the National Security Council. Could EPA speak to health risks? Who was the lead for getting information out? What was our statutory obligation? The IG's report, in fact, said, ``These statutes and regulations do not obligate EPA to respond to a given emergency, allowing for local agencies to lead a response, and New York City in fact exercised a lead role regarding indoor air.'' We were told on conference calls that EPA should continue testing and let the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, the city and state of New York, and the Department of Health and Human Services discuss human health. I understand that OSHA did provide guidance at ground zero. The point has been made many times that there are more effective ways to get information to the press than by press release. In fact, I rarely see the content of press releases in actual press reports. Reporters prefer to do their own reporting and not copy what is being given to everyone. Because of the cumbersome approval process, I opted to do fewer releases and instead spoke personally to almost every reporter who called. This meant 20 to 30 interviews a day for just information from me and then a number of requests for live interviews with Administrator Whitman. I think reporters would confirm that we were forthcoming with information during the period--if we had the information to give them. I will add one other thing. In all the years I have been writing press releases, I have never knowingly put false information into a release. While editing changes were made based on recommendations by the Council on Environmental Quality, I believed those changes to be upsetting in some cases, but not false. I still believe that to be true. The IG's report, in fact, had this to say: ``We spoke to a number of experts in the field of environmental monitoring, including physicians, industrial hygienists, and researchers. These experts generally agreed that the levels of airborne asbestos detected in the air outside the perimeter of Ground Zero in Lower Manhattan did not present a significant increase in long-term health risk to the public.'' I will be happy to take your questions. Mr Nadler. We'll now recognize Mr. Newman for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF DAVID M. NEWMAN, NEW YORK COMMITTEE OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH Mr. Newman. Good afternoon, Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Franks and other Subcommittee Members. The attacks of September 11, 2001, produced not only an initial catastrophic loss of life, but also a lingering environmental disaster with adverse health consequences for responders as well as for area workers and residents. Toxic contaminants were dispersed at Ground Zero, throughout Manhattan, parts of Brooklyn and possibly beyond. Prior to and on 9/11 EPA and OSHA had credible data that indicated the presence at the World Trade Center site of an extensive list of toxic materials which, if released, could pose a risk to human health. Government databases documented reportable quantities of stored hazardous materials at the WTC site, including barium, lead, chloroform, chlordane, carbon tetrachloride, cadmium, chromium, mercury, hydrogen sulfide, arsenic, tetrachloroethylene, PCBs and ethane. The agencies were most assuredly also aware of the danger posed by the presence of several hundred thousand pounds of asbestos in World Trade Center fireproofing. EPA's and OSHA's public statements mischaracterized the available data. Sampling results obtained by EPA and OSHA after 9/11 indicated the presence of toxic substances at levels of concern at Ground Zero and at other locations in Lower Manhattan, both outdoors and indoors. Asbestos was detected by EPA in 76 percent of 143 bulk samples collected outside the 16-acre collapsed site; 26 percent of these samples contained 1.1 to 4.49 percent asbestos, that is, levels 110 to 449 percent of the level at which legal requirements for asbestos are triggered. At least 25 12-hour air samples obtained at 10 separate locations exceeded the clearance standard of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, the benchmark EPA was using. Fifty-seven percent of personal air samples obtained in September 2001 by the U.S. Public Health Service exceeded the OSHA permissible exposure limit for asbestos. Sixty percent of asbestos air samples collected at Ground Zero by the operating engineers exceeded the EPA clearance standard. Twenty-seven percent of 177 bulk samples initially collected by EPA and OSHA at Ground Zero were greater than 1 percent asbestos. Independent air monitoring in two Lower Manhattan apartments found significantly elevated levels of asbestos, including results up to 151 times the EPA clearance level. The U.S. Geological Survey reported as early as September 18 that asbestos could be present in concentrations of 20 percent or more at distances greater than one-half mile from Ground Zero. EPA detected benzene at Ground Zero in 57 of 96 air samples at levels from 5 to 86 times the OSHA PEL. Benzene results as late as January were five times the PEL. EPA test results through November for dioxin several blocks from Ground Zero indicated that workers and residents who returned to areas reopened as safe were potentially exposed to concentrations of dioxin nearly six times the highest dioxin level ever recorded. Workers at Ground Zero were potentially exposed to dioxin levels 100 to 1,500 times higher than is typical in urban air. EPA did not release this information for more than a year. EPA's unsupported reassurances of lack of risk had the unfortunate effect of giving a green light to employers and workers not to use respiratory protection, and to landlords, employers and government agencies that cleanup was not necessary. Because EPA contended for 8 months that it had no legal responsibility for addressing indoor contaminants, sampling and remediation efforts occurred only on a limited, haphazard and ineffectual basis. EPA's indoor cleanup efforts, to date, exclude all 1,500 commercial and government buildings in Lower Manhattan and are of questionable scientific merit and technical effectiveness. Within days of the attacks, EPA declared Lower Manhattan's air safe to breathe. OSHA announced that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to work. EPA maintained until fairly recently that, quote, ``There is little concern about any long- term health effects,'' unquote. Unfortunately, there's considerable evidence to the contrary. It is now well established that a large and increasing number of people who were exposed to 9/11 contaminants, primarily rescue and recovery workers, but also area workers and area residents, are suffering serious and persistent adverse health outcomes. We now know that those caught in the dust cloud and/or those responding at the WTC site in the first hours and days have higher incidences and greater severities of health impacts. Presumably, the intensity and duration of exposure and the lack of respiratory protection were significant factors. These early exposures were unavoidable; however, the failure of OSHA to ensure the use of respiratory protection and the failure of OSHA to enforce legal standards subjected workers to unnecessary and avoidable exposures with the result that many are now experiencing persistent disabling respiratory illnesses, and some are dying. Similarly, the failure of EPA to provide, require or even encourage indoor environmental assessments and cleanup, where warranted in commercial and government buildings, coupled with EPA's inadequate sampling and cleanup in residences is likely to have subjected area workers and residents to additional unnecessary and avoidable exposures. Thank you very much for your concern on these issues. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Newman follows:] Prepared Statement of David M. Newman [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr Nadler. Ms. McGinnis is now recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF EILEEN McGINNIS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, WHITMAN STRATEGY GROUP Ms. McGinnis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon to share my thoughts and perspectives on the response of the USEPA to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. By way of introduction, I served as Chief of Staff to EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman from January 2001 to June of 2002. Prior to that, I served as Chief of the Governor's Office of Policy and Planning for 6 years. I have served most of my career in government service. Hours after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, I received a phone call from EPA's Regional Administrator in New York City, informing me that EPA employees were out in the field installing air monitors. I was proud, although they had just witnessed the horrors of the attacks a few blocks from their office, these very brave and courageous employees quickly put aside their personal and emotional reactions to the tragedy and were already on the job in pursuit of the Agency's mission to protect the environment and human health. On September 11, a dedicated team of EPA employees collected air samples for the presence of lead, asbestos and VOCs which were the contaminants of initial concern. Samples for other contaminants were added in the days and the weeks after the attack. In truly EPA fashion, experts from all over the country came together to help form a monitor network to assess the ambient air conditions in Lower Manhattan. EPA employees worked around the clock in makeshift offices since their offices in Lower Manhattan were closed as a result of the tragedy. The emphasis in those early days after the attack was to provide as much information as possible to the public and to make sure that information was as transparent as possible. Data from the air and water monitoring was put up on the EPA's Website for everyone to see and track. It is important to note today that the Inspector General's report being discussed at today's hearing verified the accuracy of the information posted and found no evidence the EPA attempted to conceal data from the public. In all, EPA took nearly 25,000 samples and conducted a quarter of a million measurements. Mr. Chairman, your press advisory about today's hearing states, quote, ``Now is the time for the truth,'' end quote. I believe the ultimate truth is that the leadership and staff of the EPA did the very best they could under very difficult circumstances to meet the Agency's obligation to help protect the lives and health of all those affected by the attacks. EPA, along with other agencies with whom we worked, acted to provide the best possible information based on available data and using our collective professional judgment under extraordinary circumstances. Looking back, one can always find things that could have been done better. That's why, within weeks of the terrorist attacks, we launched a comprehensive review of the actions we took in response. As a result, we developed clear recommendations as to how the agencies could better respond to any future attacks, should they occur. On the whole, however, I remain confident that we've discharged our duties with integrity, professionalism and commitment to our mission; and those EPA employees who were in the field in the hours, days and weeks following the tragedy, with courage and bravery. Thank you, and I would be glad to answer any questions. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentlelady. Ms. Horinko is recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF MARIANNE L. HORINKO, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT & TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION Ms. Horinko. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate your invitation to be here this afternoon, because I am convinced the more the public understands about EPA's actions after September 11, 2001, the more everyone will understand what I know, that the women and men of EPA were then and are now an amazing group of professionals dedicated to protecting the health of every person in this country. In New York, in the weeks following September 11, it was not business as usual. EPA employees from all over the country rushed to New York to provide their assistance in cleaning up the aftermath of the terrorist attack and to gather and analyze the data required to answer questions that everyone who lived and worked in Manhattan were asking. We had to find creative ways to place monitors and to gather the data, since there was little monitoring infrastructure and, for quite some time, no electricity. EPA employees had difficulty getting permission to get near Ground Zero in the areas where monitoring was most critical. But somehow the monitors went up. Once we started gathering data and consistent with our overall mission as an agency, we were determined to share information with the public as quickly as we could and in a manner that was easily accessible. Public officials and citizens were clamoring for information. We felt we owed them a duty to get the data out as fast as we could. We posted the data from our monitors on the Internet, accessible to anyone. Anyone who wanted to look at the same data we were reviewing could. We gathered the experts of the Agency and in other agencies to review this data to help determine potential impacts to residents and workers in New York. We provided our best information as frequently as we could to the public. We also worried a lot about the first responders and all the people who worked at Ground Zero. We told the workers in every way we could imagine to do it that they needed to protect themselves even while they were trying to save others. We gave them equipment and taught them how to use it. We even set up tents with food to encourage the workers to come in and decontaminate their clothing and ensure that their protective equipment was functioning properly. Did we learn some lessons from this experience? Of course we did. Within a matter of weeks, we worked to memorialize those lessons so that our next response to any significant disaster would be better. I find it very affirming to know that the Inspector General, looking dispassionately at our actions with the benefit of hindsight, concluded that we acted responsibly and that our statements to the public reflected the facts as we knew them then and as we still know them today. To suggest that anyone at EPA was ever motivated by anything less than a complete focus on protecting the public does those individuals a terrible disservice. Governor Whitman, whom I admire greatly, sought out the opinions of experts and listened to what they had to say. She kept the Agency on course when it would have been easy to lose direction. EPA has an important mission in responding to any disaster like the collapse of the World Trade Center. But EPA was never intended to do everything for everyone. In this case, we worked effectively with all the other agencies that also had expertise and an important role to play, including OSHA, the Centers for Disease Control, ATSDR and the City of New York. That is the way the system is designed, and I feel comfortable that it worked as planned. As I said at the beginning, I thank you for inviting me here and I will be happy to answer any questions. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentlelady. Ms. Mattei is recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF SUZANNE Y. MATTEI Ms. Mattei. Good afternoon. My name is Suzanne Mattei. I am the former Sierra Club, New York City, executive and author of its Pollution and Deception at Ground Zero report on our Federal Government's failure to provide a proper response to the 9/11 pollution. The report also warns that our Federal Government's new disaster policies perpetuate its failures at Ground Zero. Most Americans know more about Paris Hilton than about what happened in New York City after September 11. They don't realize that the community district that included the Towers was home to over 2,700 children under age 10 at the time of the attack. Most Americans also don't realize how long Ground Zero burned. The fires were not declared out until 3 months after the attack, and even after that as debris removal opened up new areas the site emitted smoke for at least 6 months after the attack. The exposures were much more extensive and prolonged than most Americans know. In the aftermath of the attack, our government should have warned people against exposure and reduced exposure through proper cleanup. Instead, it did the opposite. It encouraged people to ignore their own common sense. The air looked bad and smelled bad. Many people would have guessed that the air was unsafe for themselves and their children, but EPA's broad, unsupported assurances of safety interfered with that commonsense reaction. I recall people saying, It smells awful, but EPA says it's not really that bad. The sad irony is that if EPA had said nothing at all, the public probably would have been better off because more people probably would have used their own common sense. While the September 11 attack was unprecedented, there was no excuse for failure to warn about known hazards. The event's physical effects on the environment were not completely without precedent. Planes have crashed and burned before. Buildings have caught fire before. Buildings have even collapsed before. We actually know quite a bit about what happens when uncontrolled fires burn mixed materials and when buildings collapse. EPA's been studying the products of uncontrolled incineration for decades, and is knowledgeable about demolition as well. It did not have to take a single test to know that the 9/11 cloud of dust was harmful. It should have issued a health warning right away. Even if dust contains no toxic chemicals, it's a respiratory hazard. EPA had the expertise to know that people with asthma and respiratory conditions needed to avoid exposure. EPA knew the Towers contained not only asbestos but also thousands of computers, plastics and electrical equipment, all of which would emit toxic chemicals when burned. Think of your own computer on your desk. If that caught fire, would you want to breathe in those fumes? Our Federal experts knew all these things before taking a single test. There can be no excuse for issuing broad assurances of safety when two 110-story office towers burn and collapse. So the concern is not just the EPA lacked the test results to justify its early assurances of safety, it's worse. Our government issued those safety assurances even though EPA's own vast body of knowledge built up over three decades of research indicated that the pollution would be harmful. EPA also should have changed its assurances when new information on health risk emerged. It didn't do so when tests showed the presence of toxic hazards. It didn't do so when it became apparent that people were getting sick. The Federal administration failed to issue a press release, for example, when the U.S. Geological Survey shared with other agencies on September 27 its proof that the 9/11 dust was highly caustic. The public didn't hear about this until over 4 months later from a St. Louis Post Dispatch article. That's not how we should find things out. Among those expressing surprise were some of the leading doctors treating the already ailing Ground Zero workers. EPA's responses to the disclosure of hazards tended to be defensive, not corrective. When environmental attorney Joel Kupferman's research published by Daily News journalist Juan Gonzalez revealed that an air sample at the pile surface showed a high level of benzene, a cancer-causing chemical, EPA argued there were lower levels in what it called the breathing zone, 5 to 7 feet above the debris pile. The Ground Zero workers were reaching in and pulling out debris and human remains by hand. Their breathing zone was not 5 or 7 feet above the pile. Our Federal Government's stonewalling continued as study after study documented health impacts not only among workers from the pit but also area cleanup workers, building cleanup workers and residents. I want to recognize Alex Sanchez and Manuel Checo, who are here today, building cleanup workers suffering severe health effects from their exposures. Six years later, denial is still the order of the day. The assurances of safety have never been retracted, and this has had consequences. Consider the government's weak response to 9/11 health impacts which Jonathan Sferazo, a Ground Zero iron worker and founder of the Unsung Heroes Helping Heroes, calls an ``epidemic.'' The Government Accountability Office's report on the government's slipshod work to assess those impacts reveals that the Federal Government didn't really bother to find out how many people were sick. They don't know, perhaps because these people are not supposed to exist. They do exist. Five years later, only limited Federal money for treatment; it's inadequate, it doesn't begin to touch the devastating economic impacts that many of these hard-working people and their families now face. This hearing is a historic step to investigate what happened after the attack. We need action to right at least some of the wrongs that occurred and to ensure that these missed steps don't ever happen again. Unfortunately, our Federal Government hasn't learned from this debacle. Under its national response plan, OSHA will not enforce worker health and safety standards in national disasters. The plan centralizes press statements, as occurred after 9/11, without a strong precautionary policy to err on the side of protecting human health when full data is missing. Finally, the Department of Homeland Security's new guidance document on cleanup after a dirty bomb or other terrorist nuclear attack encourages consideration of economic factors, even impacts on tourism in managing the public health risks. Some people may be suffering from media fatigue, tired of hearing about Ground Zero. They may wonder why New York City residents don't just get closure and move on. The answer is, we can't. We still live with the toxic aftermath of the attack. We still haven't had a proper cleanup. Until our government does the right thing, we will never be able to have closure. And until our government takes action to make sure that the failed response at Ground Zero never happens again in any future disaster, no American can truly have closure. [The prepared statement of Ms. Mattei follows:] Prepared Statement of Suzanne Y. Mattei Good afternoon. My name is Suzanne Mattei. I am the former Sierra Club New York City Executive and author of its Pollution and Deception at Ground Zero series of reports on the harmful impacts of the 9/11 pollution and our federal government's failure to warn the public and provide a proper response. The reports also urge that our federal government's new disaster response policies perpetuate its failures at Ground Zero. Most Americans know more about Paris Hilton than about what happened in New York City after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. They do not understand that it happened in a residential area. Lower Manhattan looks like a commercial zone, but people live there. The community district that includes the World Trade Center was home to over 2,700 children under age 10 at the time of the attack. Most Americans also do not understand how long Ground Zero burned. The fires were not officially declared out until three months after the attack. And even after that, as debris removal opened up new areas, the site emitted smoke. One resident living nearby recalls the weekend of St. Patrick's Day, in 2002, when she looked out the window and saw smoke from the pit--half a year after the attack. So the exposures were much more extensive and prolonged than most Americans realize. The deaths on September 11th were devastating, but our government could have and should have done much more to control the lingering harm. It should have warned people against exposure and reduced the duration of exposure through proper cleanup. Instead, it did the opposite. It encouraged people to ignore their own common sense. The air looked bad and smelled bad. Using common sense, many people would have guessed that the air was unsafe for themselves and their children. But EPA's broad, unsupported assurances of safety interfered with that common sense reaction. I recall people saying, ``It smells awful, but EPA says it's not really that bad.'' The sad irony is that if EPA had said nothing at all, the public probably would have been better off, because more people probably would have heeded their own common sense. Calling the September 11th attack ``unprecedented'' can be misleading. There was no excuse for failure to warn about known hazards. Yes, the terrorist attack itself, causing widespread destruction on American soil, was unprecedented. But the event's physical results on the environment were not truly without precedent. Planes have crashed and burned before. Buildings have caught fire before. Buildings have even collapsed before. We actually know quite a bit about what happens when uncontrolled fires burn mixed materials, and when buildings collapse. EPA has been studying the products of uncontrolled incineration for decades and is very knowledgeable about demolition as well. It did not have to take a single test to know that the massive amount of dust released by the towers was harmful. It should have issued a health warning right away. Even if dust contains no toxic chemicals at all, it irritates the human respiratory system. EPA should have immediately warned the public--especially people with asthma and respiratory conditions--to avoid exposure, before any test results for toxic chemicals came back. EPA knew that the towers contained asbestos--this had become widely known after the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. EPA knew that the towers contained thousands of computers, plastics and electrical equipment, all of which would emit toxic chemicals when burned. It did not have to consult any existing database on storage hazardous materials at the site to take cognizance of this. Our federal experts knew all these things before taking a single test. There can be no excuse for issuing broad assurances of safety when two massive office towers burn and collapse. So the concern is not just that EPA lacked the test results to justify its early assurances of safety--as noted in the Inspector General's 2003 report. It is worse than that. Our government issued those safety assurances even though EPA's own vast body of knowledge, built up over three decades of research, indicated that the pollution would be harmful. Also, EPA should have changed its safety assurances when new information on health risks emerged. It did not do so. It did not do so when tests showed the presence of toxic hazards, and it did not do so even when it became apparent that people were getting sick. The first Pollution and Deception at Ground Zero report contains a table entitled, ``What Was Known, What Was Said.'' The table documents at least a dozen instances in which EPA had information indicating health risks yet failed to correct its assurances of safety. Despite early dust tests indicating the presence of asbestos, for example, a sentence stating concern for workers who might be returning to their offices on or near an area with asbestos-containing dust was deleted from EPA's September 14 draft press release. Also, the federal administration failed to issue a press release when the U.S. Geological Survey sent test results to its sister agencies on September 27, 2001, documenting that the 9/11 dust was highly caustic. The public did not hear anything about this until over four months later, when the St. Louis Post Dispatch released an article about the data. Among those expressing surprise at the time was one of the leading medical doctors who had been screening the already ailing Ground Zero workers. EPA's responses to the revelation of hazards tended to be defensive rather than corrective. Perhaps the worst example is its response to a disclosure of benzene pollution on the pile. Research by environmental attorney Joel Kupferman, published in the Daily News by journalist Juan Gonzalez, revealed tests showing elevated levels of certain pollutants from Ground Zero. One of them was benzene, a known human carcinogen that can cause leukemia. EPA argued that while a benzene sample at the surface of the pile had a high reading, EPA had found lower levels in what it called the ``breathing zone,'' five to seven feet above the debris pile. The rescue and recovery workers were reaching in and pulling out debris and human remains by hand. Their breathing zone was not between five and seven feet above the debris pile. Our federal government's inaction in the face of new information continued as study after study documented health impacts not only among workers from the pile but also area clean-up workers and even residents. Today, over five and a half years later, denial is still the order of the day. The assurances of safety have never been retracted, and this has had consequences. Consider the federal government's weak response to the health impacts from 9/11 pollution, which Jonathan Sferazo, a Ground Zero ironworker and President of the Unsung Heroes Helping Heroes, calls an ``epidemic.'' The General Accounting Office issued a report on the government's slipshod approach to assessing those health impacts. In plain language, the conclusion is this: The federal government has not even bothered to find out how many people are sick. Why? Perhaps because these people are not supposed to exist. But they do exist, and they are suffering. Only now, five years later, are we beginning to see some federal money for medical treatment, but it is terribly inadequate and does not begin to touch the demoralizing economic impacts that many of these hard-working people and their families now face. This hearing is a historic step to investigate what really happened after the September 11th attack. We cannot control everything, but our federal government certainly could have controlled this attack's toxic consequences far better than it did. We need action, to right at least some of the wrongs that have occurred. Also, we must prevent such harms from happening in future disasters. Unfortunately, our federal government has not learned from its Ground Zero debacle. Under its National Response Plan, worker health and safety standards will not be enforced in national disasters. Also, the Plan centralizes and controls the release of information, which can facilitate politicization of health warnings, as occurred after 9/11, without a strong precautionary policy to err on the side of protecting human health in the absence of full information. Finally, the Department of Homeland Security's new guidance document on radiological cleanup would encourage consideration of economic factors, even impacts on tourism, in determining public health risks from a dirty bomb or other terrorist-wielded nuclear device. Some people may be suffering from media fatigue. They may be tired of hearing about Ground Zero. They may wonder why New York City residents don't just ``get closure'' and ``move on.'' The answer is, we cannot. We are still living with the toxic aftermath of the attack. Until our government does the right thing, we will never be able to have ``closure.'' And until our government takes the proper steps to make sure that the failed response at Ground Zero never happens again, in any future national disaster, no American can truly have ``closure.'' Mr. Nadler. I thank the witnesses. I will begin the-- please, we're not supposed to have any demonstrations. It's against the rules of the House, even approval. It may not seem political, but that's the rules of the House. I will begin the question period--oh, I should say. I will begin the questioning by yielding myself 5 minutes. Mr. Thernstrom, who designated you to be the conduit or communications liaison between the EPA and NSC? Mr. Thernstrom. Honestly, I believe that system was set up by Deputy Chief of Staff Josh Bolten, but I couldn't say for sure. I was told to assume that responsibility by my boss, Chairman------ Mr. Nadler. Who at the NSC did you report to on EPA communications clearance activities? Mr. Thernstrom. I don't frankly remember the NSC press person who------ Mr. Nadler. You don't remember who you reported to? Mr. Thernstrom. I reported to Chairman Connaughton. I sent the press releases over to the NSC and received approval for them. But, no, I don't actually remember the name of the person I was dealing with there. Mr. Nadler. Who at the NSC did you send those papers to? Mr. Thernstrom. I sent them to a fax number that was assigned. I don't know who was reviewing them at the NSC. It was 6 years ago. Mr. Nadler. I understand that. Who made the decision to have the NSC approve all the EPA statements? Do you know that? Mr. Thernstrom. I don't know. Mr. Nadler. Who at the White House did you speak to about EPA's public statements? Mr. Thernstrom. Chairman Connaughton in my office was my primary contact. I also consulted occasionally with perhaps another staffer on the CEQ staff. Mr. Nadler. No one above Chairman Connaughton in the organization? Mr. Thernstrom. No, sir. Mr. Nadler. Did you ever speak with Ms. Whitman about EPA's public statements? Mr. Thernstrom. I don't believe that I had any direct personal conversation with Ms. Whitman. I participated in daily conference calls with Ms. Whitman. But I don't think we had any one-on-one conversations about these things. Mr. Nadler. Now, Ms. Kreisher told the Inspector General that you worked directly with the NSC Press Secretary on clearance for EPA communications. That is Condoleezza Rice's Press Secretary. She was head of NSC at the time; is that correct? Mr. Thernstrom. Like I said, I sent them to the NSC and I assumed that, yes, it was the Press Secretary. I don't actually recall. Mr. Nadler. You didn't work with that person? Mr. Thernstrom. I do remember speaking to that person at one point. Like I said, I don't even recall her name. This was a------ Mr. Nadler. Now, EPA Chief of Staff McGinnis, who is sitting here, was asked by the EPA IG whether she could claim ownership of EPA's early WTC, World Trade Center, press releases. She replied that she was not able to do so, quote, ``because the ownership was joint between the EPA and the White House,'' unquote, and that, quote, ``final approval came from the White House,'' unquote. She also told the IG, quote, ``If Sam''--that is you, sir-- ``If Sam okayed it, then it was issued.'' The IG also noted that Ms. McGinnis, quote, ``understood that Sam Thernstrom provided draft press releases to other government officials, but she does not know who these other government officials were.'' Were you, sir, the final decision maker for the public statements? Mr. Thernstrom. No. I wouldn't put it that way. Mr. Nadler. If not, who had the final approval in the NSC for EPA public statements? Mr. Thernstrom. Like I said, I sent them to the NSC and I received approval from the NSC. Mr. Nadler. Someone you were dealing with in the NSC had final approval, but you don't know who it was? Mr. Thernstrom. Six years after the fact, I honestly do not remember the name of the person I dealt with. Mr. Nadler. Okay. Ms. McGinnis, Ms. Kreisher told the IG that all press releases pertaining to the World Trade Center disaster were always approved by the Administrator's Chief of Staff, Eileen McGinnis. Now you have said that you never approved the press releases either verbally or in writing. Did you have the final okay on EPA 9/11-related communications within EPA? Ms. McGinnis. Tina would keep me informed throughout the day on the interagency process that was going on and the types of discussions that were going on. But as I said in my testimony, the CEQ, as our conduit to NSC, had the final sign- off on------ Mr. Nadler. They had the final sign-off. But within EPA you were the final sign-off? Ms. McGinnis. Yes. Mr. Nadler. Okay. Thank you. Now, you received an e-mail on 9/12, that is, on September 12, from EPA Deputy Administrator's Chief of Staff Claudia McMurray, stating that all statements to the media should be cleared through the NSC before they were released. You stated you cleared all statements through the NSC. Ms. McGinnis. I did not, sir. CEQ was our conduit to the NSC. I had no contact------ Mr. Nadler. They were all sent to the CEQ and then the NSC? Ms. McGinnis. Correct. Mr. Nadler. Okay. Did you tell Ms. Whitman to clear all statements with the NSC. Ms. McGinnis. I recall a memo coming over to all agency heads. Mr. Nadler. That would have been the Claudia McMurray memo? Ms. McGinnis. No. I think it was from Andy Card. Mr. Nadler. From whom? Andrew Card? Ms. McGinnis. Andrew Card. I recall them saying that all communication needed to be reviewed by NSC, and then that was followed by the e-mail that was in the IG's report by the Deputy Administrator. Mr. Nadler. Okay. What expertise does the National Security Council have that the EPA doesn't have with respect to the risks from environmental contamination on public health? Ms. McGinnis. I can't answer that question about what excuse they have. I have never been in contact with NSC. I stated in my testimony to the IG that I thought the White House played an appropriate coordinating role, given the national emergency. Mr. Nadler. And do you know who made the decision to have the NSC approve all EPA statements? Ms. McGinnis. I do not. Mr. Nadler. Do you know who would know that? Ms. McGinnis. I do not. Mr. Nadler. Okay. Well, final question, when you were asked by the EPA IG whether you could claim ownership of EPA's early World Trade Center press releases, you replied you couldn't do so ``because the ownership was joint between EPA and the White House'' and then ``final approval came from the White House.'' You also told the IG, ``If Sam okayed it, it was issued.'' The IG also noted that you understand that Sam Thernstrom provided draft press releases to other government officials, but she doesn't know who those other government officials were, as you just said. Was it your understanding that Mr. Thernstrom was the final decision maker for EPA public statements within the White House? Ms. McGinnis. I really did not know what happened--who Sam communicated with at the White House. Mr. Nadler. So you don't know who the final decision-making authority------ Ms. McGinnis. I do not. Mr. Nadler. Okay. Thank you very much. My time has expired, and I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona. Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the main question that is being asked here today is if, indeed, there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the EPA to conspire with the White House to send people, to convince people to go into an unsafe environment. And, you know, the motivations to that end elude me completely. But, Ms. McGinnis, I would like to ask you, do you think that there was a deliberate conspiracy within the White House and the EPA to convince people to go into an unsafe environment? Ms. McGinnis. I do not, sir. Mr. Franks. What was the main--the Agency's goal as far as the press releases that you sent? What was your main goal? What was your desire? Ms. McGinnis. The public was very hungry for information, and our desire was to produce information as soon as possible with--emphasizing quality and timeliness. Mr. Franks. Was it appropriate in your mind for the NSC and CEQ to have the final sign-off on these press releases? Ms. McGinnis. Yes, given the national emergency that had just occurred. Mr. Franks. Were press releases your only form of communication? Was it your main form of communication? What---- -- Ms. McGinnis. As Governor Whitman and Ms. Kreisher have testified, I have supervised over the years many press offices, both on the State and in the Federal level. Press releases, I think, have become increasingly less important, and other forms of communication have become more important. Mr. Franks. All right. Thank you, Ms. McGinnis. Mr. Thernstrom, the Office of the Inspector General report stated, quote, ``Responding to this crisis required organizations from all levels of government to coordinate their responses and their efforts, and to make critical public health and safety decision quickly and without all the data the decision makers would normally desire,'' unquote. Do you agree that in this case the EPA had to make statements regarding its judgment in emergency circumstances in which it could not possibly have had perfect information? Mr. Thernstrom. Absolutely, Congressman. In fact, I was quite struck by the fact that when the EPA Inspector General was interviewed by, I believe it was MSNBC, after her report was issued and she was asked whether she believed that the air after 9/11 was safe, she said that even 2 years after the fact, she wasn't certain what the answer to that was. Now, I don't think it's the appropriate response for the Federal Government to tell the people of New York, Gee, we're taking all the tests, but we don't really know. Hold your breath and just--you know, we'll get back to you in a couple of years if we have an answer then. I think the best response of the Federal Government, who employs the Nation's best experts on these questions, was to assess the data as best it could, make its best judgment about the significance of that data and speak to the public in this time of terrible national emergency. And I think EPA did that very responsibly. Mr. Franks. You don't think there was any hint of conspiracy between EPA and the White House to convince people to go into an unsafe area? Mr. Thernstrom. I think nothing could be further from the truth, Congressman. We were very concerned about the potential environmental hazards related to September 11, and we were very reassured by the information that we saw. And as Governor Whitman said, we spoke--we had a thrice daily conference call originally, later twice daily, speaking with all of the staffers who were working on this issue. They were looking at the data. The things that Governor Whitman said, the things that Ms. Kreisher and I put in the press releases that were issued were based strictly upon what we were told by all of the scientists, who reviewed the data, was the correct way to characterize those risks. I can't say that their assessment was infallible, but I am quite confident they were doing the best job they could under the circumstances, and we were listening to them very carefully. Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, I guess I can only add that, you know, there is no way to overstate the tragedy that this 9/11 incident caused America and so many people both on that day and in subsequent days and some of the ancillary areas that have occurred since. And I don't know that anyone in this room would ever want to minimize that tragedy, anyone. And I guess I just would suggest that this Committee's energies might be better spent trying to make things better for those victims that were in 9/11, and doing what we can to have policies that would prevent such a tragedy from occurring again. And deliberately trying to somehow insinuate that there was a conspiracy between the EPA and the White House to convince people to go into unsafe areas, that's a preposterous notion; and I think the Committee's energy is ill spent in this regard, and I think we have to work toward making this never happen again. I thank the panel members. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott------ Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nadler.--is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, we're inquiring whether or not there are any failures in government processes that might have unnecessarily exposed people to health risks. Just because we're doing that, that doesn't suggest necessarily that we are trying to find a conspiracy to intentionally endanger people. We're trying to see if government worked or it didn't work. And I think there's plenty of evidence here that people have been exposed to toxic materials unnecessarily. Now, let me ask a couple of questions. Mr. Thernstrom, you were doing press releases? You were doing press releases in the White House at the time? Mr. Thernstrom. I was the Associate Director of Communications for the CEQ, yes, and I worked closely with Ms. Kreisher and other EPA staffers on these press issues. Mr. Scott. Did you make any changes in these press releases that were presented to you that made a substantive difference in the science? One that was suggested is, you took professional cleaning--it's been suggested that you took quote, ``professional cleaning,'' as a recommendation out. Is that true? Mr. Thernstrom. That is correct, Congressman. That was not based upon a difference in the science, though--however. That was a jurisdictional question involving which agency had responsibility for providing New Yorkers with guidance on that issue. That was not based upon my reading of the science so-- whatsoever. Mr. Scott. Well, the EPA Director suggested that that was a substantive difference. Were there any other changes that were made that constituted a substantive difference? Mr. Thernstrom. I can say--you know, ``substantive difference'' is in the eye of the beholder, Congressman. But I can say every change I made was a matter of consensus between me and the EPA staffers who I worked with. There was no disagreement about the substance of them and that, in fact, the changes I made were based upon my daily conversations with all of the EPA staffers. So we all worked together in this very fast-moving, very chaotic, dynamic environment to try to understand all of the information that was coming in, to listen to the staff that we were talking to and to correctly reflect what they were telling us. Mr. Scott. Thank you. Ms. Kreisher, did you feel any political pressure in the way press releases should be written? Ms. Kreisher. I didn't feel political pressure. Mr. Thernstrom and I sometimes disagreed, and that's reflected in some of the edits we see in the press releases. I would agree with Governor Whitman that the only substantive change had to do with the cleaning. And as Sam just said, that press release referred you to the City of New York. Mr. Scott. The question was, did you feel any political question to write press releases in a certain way? Ms. Kreisher. No. Mr. Scott. Mr. Newman, I've got two versions of an answer to a question I asked Mr. Henshaw, about what was going on at Ground Zero. The first go-around was that people were there not wearing respiratory equipment and there was nothing he could do about it because it was New York City's problem. The second time he answered the same question, he said that any time they notice someone not wearing the equipment, they were down there on the spot and corrected it right then and there. Can you tell me what you thought was going on in terms of OSHA enforcement? People are obviously in a dangerous situation involving the equipment they should be wearing. Mr. Newman. Thank you for that question. There was no OSHA enforcement at Ground Zero. That was a deliberate, conscious policy. That policy was done on--was implemented at that point in time on a discretionary basis. It has since then been incorporated into OSHA policy officially, and OSHA's official policy as of 2003, going forward, is automatic nonenforcement in disaster response situations, which of course I disagree with that policy. I think it's an incorrect policy. The contention that OSHA had no authority to enforce, I think is also fallacious. There is absolutely nothing, at least insofar as I'm aware, in either the National Contingency Plan or Presidential Decision Directive 62 which addresses the issue of OSHA enforcement; and OSHA not only is free to enforce, but is obligated to enforce in my opinion. Mr. Scott. What was going on at Ground Zero? Were the people wearing the equipment or not? Mr. Newman. Well, the answer to that is ``no.'' There was no enforcement, and people were not wearing their equipment. Whatever policy OSHA adopted, whether it was enforcement or nonenforcement, that policy was ineffectual. Mr. Scott. Was there any question that the people not wearing the appropriate equipment were in danger? Mr. Newman. Well, I don't think there was any question among the regulatory agencies or among the people in the industrial hygiene or public health communities. There was certainly some question among responders themselves, given the lack of clarity and reassurances from EPA and OSHA that the air was safe to breathe. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nadler. I thank you. I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the 9/11 report, since, Mr. Thernstrom, you are such an expert on 9/11, there's a statement by the Committee that says, we do not have the expertise to examine the scientific accuracy of the pronouncements in the press releases. The issue is the subject of pending civil litigation. How do you interpret that? Mr. Thernstrom. I'm not quite sure how to answer the question, Congressman. It seems it's a self-evident statement-- ---- Mr. Pascrell. What does it mean to you? Mr. Thernstrom.--in its entirety. Mr. Pascrell. What does it mean to you, Mr. Thernstrom? What does it mean to you? Mr. Thernstrom. Simply that there are complex scientific questions involved which are hotly disputed and that that was not an issue that the 9/11 Commission had the expertise to examine, nor was it an issue that I feel I have any expertise to comment upon. Mr. Pascrell. So, therefore, we can't make a conclusion or a judgment that the 9/11 Commission cleared anybody, because they didn't have the scientific evidence, because they weren't tuned to that. Is that an accurate statement? Mr. Thernstrom. Congressman, the 9/11 Commission looked at one question specifically, which was whether or not------ Mr. Pascrell. It is only a short period within that report; is that correct? It is about 12 footnotes. Mr. Thernstrom. The question the 9/11 Commission was looking at was whether or not the White House influence upon EPA's press releases was improper. And on that question, their answer was unambiguous; its answer was ``no.'' Mr. Pascrell. It's not a conclusion. It's not a conclusion if you read this report. But I want to ask another question. Mr. Thernstrom. But I don't understand that. Mr. Pascrell. I would like to ask another question. Mr. Thernstrom. Sure. Mr. Pascrell. What you call ``preposterous,'' you said that would be so preposterous in your answer to the question. Why would it be so preposterous? This is an Administration that paid journalists to clear the air. They also had the chief procurement officer out of the White House so he couldn't be arrested in there, first time an employee--why would it be so preposterous to change--excuse me, sir. I'm not finished. Why would it be so preposterous to change the words within a press release so that people's fears could be assuaged? Mr. Thernstrom. Congressman, I don't believe I used the word ``preposterous.'' Mr. Pascrell. You used the word ``preposterous.'' Mr. Thernstrom. I believe Congressman Franks------ Mr. Franks. Actually I, did, sir. Mr. Pascrell. Well, you used it then. There's no difference. There's no difference because this is--you know, how did Andy Card show up in the middle of this thing? How did Andy Card show up in the middle of this thing? Ms. Mattei, I want to ask you a question. Ms. Mattei. Yes. Mr. Pascrell. What are the shortcomings of the various indoor cleanup plans that the EPA has conducted so far? What should they have done? What should be done now? And my final question to you is this: Has the EPA ever called for an examination, a physical examination, of those people who were in the zone long beyond which they shouldn't have been in that zone? Had they ever asked you or anybody else, first responders, to definitely get a physical examination to see what might affect you and you personally? Have they ever done that? Ms. Mattei. I certainly did not experience that. And I'm not aware of them ever having done that. I didn't see anybody monitoring the air on the street where I worked. And I can tell you that I smelled Ground Zero for months, and I was about seven blocks away. This ``on-the-pile'' versus ``off-the-pile'' thing is a little bit of nonsense. There was no glass bubble over Ground Zero. The air blew that stuff into the------ Mr. Pascrell. All over the place. Ms. Mattei.--into the surrounding community. It definitely did. And while there may have been some dissolution, there were a lot of toxic chemicals for which there is no safe level of exposure. Mr. Pascrell. Speak the truth. Ms. Mattei. And the nonsense about--well, the high levels were in the dust, not in the air, that's just out of touch with reality. People coming back to their homes, people coming back to their work sites, there was dust. And what did people do? They cleaned up the dust. Small business people cleaned up their own businesses. People cleaned up their own offices. Have you ever dusted a book shelf? Mr. Pascrell. That's a good idea. Ms. Mattei. Where was your nose? Where was your nose when you dusted that book shelf? Thank you. Mr. Pascrell. I just have one more question. I want to ask that question to Ms. Kreisher. Ms. Kreisher, you told the Inspector General that you felt extreme pressure when the White House was changing your drafts of the EPA press releases. And you said in your testimony today that those changes were upsetting in some cases. Who upset you? Ms. Kreisher. As I said, Sam and I didn't always agree. The pressure was from Sam. A lot of times tempers flew. Mr. Pascrell. Was he applying pressure to you? Ms. Kreisher. I wouldn't call it ``pressure.'' Any point, Sam would always say, this is your press release. Mr. Pascrell. So your statement to the Inspector General wasn't really what you felt? Ms. Kreisher. Well------ Mr. Pascrell. You used the term--correct me if I'm wrong-- ``extreme pressure.'' Ms. Kreisher. I was referring words--to the wordsmithing, not some big policy somewhere. You've got to put this back in context. The IG inspector came to see me. I was at Interior. I was being asked about what my press releases looked like and whether the words in the press release were all mine. Mr. Pascrell. So the pressure--the pressure was basically whether we should use a comma or colon--I'm exaggerating right now; I'm using hyperbole right now--and not really whether or not we were communicating to the folks out there what was really going on? That wasn't ever a question in your mind, right? Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. Ms. Kreisher. Of course it was a question. Mr. Pascrell. It was a question in your mind? Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The witness may answer the question. Ms. Kreisher. We always cared what the content was. And as I said, we had a lot of conference calls. We had a lot of discussion before these press releases were ever issued. And we usually came to consensus before that happened. Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nadler. Yes, sir. Mr. Scott. I don't mean any harm, but I thought I asked the same witness if she was receiving any political pressure, and she told me ``no.'' Mr. Nadler. I will yield the gentleman, with unanimous consent, 1 minute; and the witness may answer the question. Ms. Kreisher. Okay. To me, political pressure is, here is the message. You will make sure that this is the message that goes out, crafted accordingly. It was not done like that. The scientists gave us the message. We always listened to the scientists. Mr. Nadler. If the gentleman would yield, so what pressure were you referring to? Ms. Kreisher. Sam and I didn't always agree. And there was pressure between us on, you know, was this the right wording? Was this the right wording? I got a lot of pressure from------ Mr. Nadler. So it was interpersonal pressure, not political pressure? Ms. Kreisher. Yes. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. The gentleman from Tennessee is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, I was with some folks in the back, and I hate to go over------ First thing, all politics is personal. My protection on October-something in 2001. The EPA document labeled Attachment 4 and produced by Ms. Whitman says that paper filament masks would provide sufficient protection under minimal exposure conditions. Mr. Newman, this mask--is this a paper filament mask? Mr. Newman. I'm sorry. I can't see it from here. Does it say NIOSH on the front? Mr. Cohen. It sure does. Mr. Newman. Does it say N95? Mr. Cohen. It says N95. Mr. Newman. Well, that's not the paper mask that is being referred to in this case. Mr. Cohen. What would this one be? Is this better or worse? Mr. Newman. That is not--despite the fact that that's not the paper dust mask to which you were referring, that mask is not acceptable under OSHA legal standards for exposure to asbestos. Mr. Cohen. This one isn't. Mr. Newman. You need a halfface air purifying respirator with screw-in HEPA particulate filters, which that is not. Mr. Cohen. So when I was on that location, right down there somewhere around this fence, or right down inside the--just outside the pile, this was show business? Mr. Newman. That would be a fashion accessory, yes. Mr. Cohen. You do know I was wearing--how about the paper filament masks; they were not sufficient either? Mr. Newman. Paper dust masks provide zero protection under any circumstances, zero health protection, that is. Mr. Cohen. Was there any reason why the people at the Twin Towers should have been allowed to--should the EPA have enforced their regulations that those folks use their respirators, as apparently they did at the Department of Defense? Mr. Newman. That's directed to me? Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. Mr. Newman. Neither EPA or OSHA enforced their regulations, as we know, at Ground Zero. I think that was absolutely inappropriate and possibly criminal. I'm shocked to hear here that we're talking about an extraordinary--we're talking about extraordinary circumstances as though EPA did not have, frankly, quite a stellar--in general, stellar track record, the expertise, the staffing, the funding and the track record to respond to incidents like this. Yes, the scope of this was somewhat unusual. However, there was nothing unusual here. I mean, what's unusual is the lack of enforcement of applicable standards. That's the most unusual thing in this case. What's unusual is not the hazards to which people were potentially exposed. The issue was that we didn't protect people against those hazards. That was the unusual part here. Mr. Cohen. Is there anybody on the panel that would like to respond to that? Nobody wants to respond to that? Do you all agree with that? Everybody agrees? Ah, a volunteer. Ms. Horinko. I will, because I feel that the agencies, working collectively, used their best judgment to get the responders to wear their gear as quickly as we could. There was discussion with the city and OSHA of how, daily, to get the responders to wear their gear. EPA, the first weekend, at OSHA and FEMA's behest, provided, I believe, thousands of respirators and cartridges and set up washing stations, and eventually set up the food stations to get the--a condition of which was to decontaminate and make sure your gear was working properly. There was discussion about whether the city or OSHA should step in and start fining the responders and take them to court. It seemed inconceivable that we would do so while they were trying to still save fallen comrades. So given the situation at the time------ Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield for a moment on that point? Mr. Cohen. Yes. Mr. Nadler. Everybody who was going to be saved was saved by the third day. After that it was simply a recovery operation. So why was it inconceivable in the next 50 or 60 days? Ms. Horinko. In the next 50 or 60 days we didn't have to because by then people were wearing their gear. Mr. Nadler. It's your testimony everybody, almost everybody, wore their protective gear after the first 3 three or 4 days? Ms. Horinko. Not after the first 4 or 4 days but certainly 50 or 60 days. Mr. Nadler. I yield back. Mr. Cohen. Ms. Kreisher, if you have answered this, let me know, but Mr. Thernstrom said your work quality wasn't good, or something to that effect. Ms. Kreisher. I don't recall him saying that. We had our differences but we did respect one another. Mr. Cohen. In Mr. Thernstrom's written testimony he stated that his job was to make it clear and to the point, and stated because--in his words--the complete conflict between you and he was only about your work quality. Ms. Kreisher. Well, the wordsmithing that went on, we disagreed on some of the------ Mr. Cohen. Work quality is wordsmithing? Ms. Kreisher. In a press release, sir. Mr. Cohen. I guess it is. Mr. Thernstrom. Since you're characterizing my words here, I did not say the conflict with Ms. Kreisher was about our work quality, I did say that we sometimes--I worked to try to improve the press releases because I had concerns about the quality of them. I thought they were sometimes vague and incomplete. Where I said that they conflict with Ms. Kreisher was in fact about process questions involving the clearance procedures with the NFC. I thought it was important that the NFC have an opportunity to sign off on everything that went out the door before it went out the door, and Ms. Kreisher understandably was frustrated with the clearance process. It wasn't something she was accustomed to. That, to the best of my recollection, was the source of conflict between us. Mr. Cohen. Thank you. Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, can I have 1 minute? Mr. Nadler. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 1 minute. Mr. Pascrell. Let's look at exactly what was changed in the September 14th draft release. The original statement was this. This is the sentence before it gets to our friends. ``the concern raised by these samples would be for the workers at the cleanup site and for those workers who might be returning to their offices on or near Water Street on Monday, September 17th 2001.'' The samples that were taken they are talking about here. That sentence was deleted. It goes away. Instead the release quotes OSHA saying this: Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to work in New York's financial district. Let me tell you something, Ms. Kreisher, I don't see a technical change in the sentences, I see--I can only tell you what I see and you tell me what you see, although you change your mind but that's okay, you can change your mind around here--you trying to convince me and the panel that the sentence that was replacing the original sentence, the former sentence that I read, there is some technical changes? That is night and day. Ms. Kreisher. Congressman, Sam has gotten kind of a heavy rap here as being the only editor of these press releases. As we explained we were on conference calls with OSHA, CEQ, with sometimes the State of New York, with a lot of different people who had input into this. The thought was that OSHA had better and more complete data at that point than the------ Mr. Pascrell. So you let it go through your hands that the air is really clear and forget about the original statement that would have gone in there. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Pascrell. Give us a break. Mr. Nadler. We will now begin the second round of questions. I will pick up where Mr. Pascrell was leaving off. Mr. Thernstrom, you have stated in your testimony that your basic job is to make--or one of your jobs is to make EPA's written statements clear and to the point. Now the IG details in its report, tables 2.4 and 2.5 over there, changes you made to several press releases. On September 13 you took out the statement: ``even at low levels EPA considers asbestos hazardous.'' You substituted for that warning a quote from Mrs. Whitman: ``EPA is greatly relieved to have learned that there appears to be no significant levels of asbestos dust in the air in New York City.'' Do you consider that simply making something clear and to the point or isn't that clearly changing the meaning from a warning to a reassurance? Mr. Thernstrom. Congressman, as Ms. Kreisher just explained, we had------ Mr. Nadler. Is this changing only stylistic or changing a warning to reassurance? Mr. Thernstrom. Congressman, that change reflected our conversations. Mr. Nadler. I'm not asking that. Mr. Thernstrom. It accurately reflected it. Mr. Nadler. It accurately reflected what you thought, but does it change EPA'S original suggestion of a warning to a reassurance; yes or no? Mr. Thernstrom. I don't believe that EPA was originally trying to warn the public. Mr. Nadler. Even at low levels EPA considers asbestos hazardous is not a warning? Mr. Thernstrom. You opened this hearing by showing a video clip on the monitors of Governor Whitman telling the people of New York that she believed the air was safe. I think that the revisions that we made to the press releases were in light of that, Governor Whitman's assessment. Mr. Nadler. Going to the next one, you change the original EPA language stating dust samples showed levels of asbestos ranging from 2.1 to 3.3 percent. EPA views 1 percent levels of asbestos as a definition of asbestos- containing material, to final language deleting reference to 1 percent level being dangerous and characterizing sample results 200 to 300 percent over the 1 percent level as, quote, ``slightly above the 1 percent level.'' I have the same question. Don't you think that is slightly misleading, to characterize something 200 to 300 percent above a level as slightly above? Mr. Thernstrom. Congressman, all I can tell you, the language in those press releases was considered accurate by the scientists who reviewed them. Mr. Nadler. Ms. Kreisher told the IG that there was a conscious effort to reassure the public and that it came from the White House and the Administration; do you agree? Mr. Thernstrom. We all, including EPA and at the White House, found that the data we were looking at was reassuring; and so we felt it was appropriate to reassure the public. That was what the scientists who reviewed the data told us and we were greatly relieved to hear that. Mr. Nadler. Finally, Mr. Thernstrom--Ms. Kreisher, rather-- Mr. Thernstrom e-mailed you on the 25th of September '01 about your desire to put raw monitoring results on the EPA Website. He wrote that raw, quote, ``raw data alone is easily misunderstood and mischaracterized by political candidates in a city who have an ax to grind. I think you will leave yourself more open to their attacks by giving them more ammunition,'' close quote. Do you agree that denying the public the right to see raw testing data is an appropriate approach to communicating risk, Ms. Kreisher? Ms. Kreisher. I agreed with Governor Whitman that that data needed to be out there as quickly as possible. The discussion came in, if you have no context for the data, does it make sense to the public, and at that point the raw data was just that, raw data. Mr. Nadler. Mr. Newman, was there--did this seem to be a pattern of EPA not posting relevant data on its Website for months at a time? Mr. Newman. There was certainly delays and omissions in what we saw posted on the EPA Website. Additionally, there was information of the sort that I believe Ms. Kreisher is referring to, that is characterization of the data as distinguished from the raw data, and it is my opinion that the characterization of the data was used at times to obfuscate or to hide the raw data. Specifically, as an example, are the dioxin data. Mr. Nadler. Ms. McGinnis, earlier in your testimony you mentioned Andrew Card's name. I think you mentioned Andrew Card, Josh Bolton. Ms. McGinnis. Andrew Card. Mr. Nadler. Is there anyone else at this level, and did you say that he was involved in issuing or approving statements about the World Trade Center? Ms. McGinnis. I didn't say that. I raised his name in the context of I believe on September 12 a memo came over from Andy Card to all agency heads, the whole Cabinet, mentioning the need to coordinate communications. I think it was like a two- or three-sentence memo. Mr. Nadler. Okay. Mr. Thernstrom, did you ever speak to Andy Card about any of these statements? Mr. Thernstrom. No, sir. Mr. Nadler. Or anybody in his office? Mr. Thernstrom. No, sir. Not to the best of my recollection. Mr. Nadler. Very good. Okay. The time of the Chairman has expired. I now recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Franks for 5 minutes. Mr. Franks. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you again for being here. Ms. Horinko, I know that many times we are asking questions on subjective statements here today. When you say ``safe,'' I'm not sure this hearing room is entirely safe. There's a lot of subjective statements. But let me just ask you, has there been any scientific showing that any long-term health risks have been presented by contamination to the residents of lower Manhattan? Ms. Horinko. No, Congressman, I'm not aware of any peer- reviewed studies where scientific experts have found any long- term risks to the public. Mr. Franks. So essentially we're dealing with kind of the individual reports and things of that nature and not able--when we talk about science here, that has been mentioned several times--we don't really at this point have any science that indicates even specifically, much less incontrovertibly; correct? Ms. Horinko. Not that I am aware of, Congressman. Mr. Franks. There has also been some criticism regarding uneven enforcements of procedures used in the debris removal. Didn't the IG report find it was New York City that was responsible for the debris removal as well as the demolition of that debris? Ms. Horinko. That I am not specifically aware of, Congressman. Mr. Franks. Do you know if the IG found that FEMA agreed to fund indoor cleanup programs, something that FEMA normally does not do, because the EPA provided FEMA with justification for such a program, and could you elaborate if you know anything about that? Ms. Horinko. Yes, indeed, Congressman, I know a bit, although I was not involved a whole lot. But I do recall the region II folks coming to me saying that they needed some help with FEMA Headquarters securing funding. In fact, I believe they went over to the White House and met with some staff who were very helpful with FEMA. Mr. Franks. Isn't it also true that the IG has found contemporaneous documents showing that New York City told EPA it did not want EPA's assistance with the indoor cleanup program? Ms. Horinko. I believe that was the case in the beginning, but they came to agree that that would be a good way. Mr. Franks. So why didn't EPA simply push New York City aside and take charge of the indoor cleanup program themselves? Ms. Horinko. We enjoyed a very collaborative relationship with the city. Within the national response plan EPA works under FEMA's direction, under the city's leadership, and so we wanted to make sure that we followed the established procedures in any disaster. Mr. Franks. So I might ask you, Ms. Horinko, before my time is up here, a question that I have asked a couple of other panel members. Do you know or believe that there was ever any conspiracy between EPA and the White House to deliberately convince people to go into unsafe areas? Ms. Horinko. No. Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, I guess I'll yield back what time I have. Mr. Nadler. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Scott. Thank you. Ms. Mattei, if you had gotten better information, what could the public have done different? Ms. Mattei. I think people could have done a lot to avoid exposure, people could have had professional cleanings of their home, they might not have had to fight with their insurance companies over that. I work in my office, but if I had to work at home for a while, I could. We're living in the 21st century and there are many alternative ways to get things done. So people could have protected themselves quite a bit. If I could just take a moment, I'd also like to point out that there have been peer-reviewed scientific studies on health impacts from the Ground Zero contamination, both a survey that was published in the American Journal of Epidemiology about residents, 43.7 percent of 2,362 surveyed residents had new onset upper respiratory systems that persisted a year after the attack. There have been studies on newborns of women who were exposed to the dust cloud, smaller birth weight than normal. And also a very disturbing study about genetic mutations, procarcinogenic DNA level at a higher level in women who were exposed to the dust cloud and also in their newborns. So I think there is some peer-reviewed information out there now about health risks from the 9/11 contamination to the residents in the area. Mr. Scott. Do any of those studies speak to the allowable exposure risk of asbestos? Ms. Mattei. I have been hearing today that there are safe levels of exposure to asbestos. I have to say that's kind of news to me. If you float around on EPA's Website you'll find statements that there's no safe level of exposure to asbestos, and there is new information that's come out that asbestos not only causes cancer but also can wreak havoc to the immune system. So I'm finding those statements very questionable today. Mr. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Newman, you served on the EPA World Trade Center Expert Technical Review Panel. Can you give us information about what you did on that panel and what the conclusions were? Mr. Newman. The panel was charged with assessing the extent, if any, of residual indoor contamination from 9/11, with identifying and proposing methods for addressing unmet public health needs stemming from 9/11. We engaged in extensive discussion on some of these issues, particularly an attempt to devise a sampling and cleanup plan for Lower Manhattan residences and workplaces over the course of a year and a half or so. Ultimately with regard to that issue, EPA chose to ignore or reject all of the panel's proposals, recommendations, and concerns and disbanded the panel. In regard to our attempt to address issues of broader-- issues of public health, as we were mandated to do at the implementation of the panel, those attempts to engage in those broader discussions were largely thwarted by EPA. Mr. Scott. Who were the members of the panel and how did they get appointed? Mr. Newman. It was a rather unique construction for the panel. At least initially there was equal representation from government agencies such as OSHA, EPA, FEMA and New York City Department of Health, New York City Department of Environmental Protection, Coast Guard Strike Force, et cetera, along with academics and technical experts, including nongovernment technical experts, including myself. Mr. Scott. Were the conclusions a consensus? I mean were there differences of opinion? Mr. Newman. There were continual differences of opinion. There was no mechanism in the panel process for votes or consensus reaching. Nevertheless, there was on certain issues and at certain times fairly robust discussions, at which points of agreement were readily apparent and those points of agreement ultimately were ignored in the sampling plan that EPA------ Mr. Scott. Did you issue a report with this consensus? Mr. Newman. There was no mechanism in the panel process for the panel or panel members to issue reports. There were a large------ Mr. Scott. How did you communicate a consensus? Mr. Newman. Through discussion at panel meetings. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. I will now yield myself 5 minutes. Ms. McGinnis, you were asked--before I get to that, the Inspector General reported that the so-called EPA cleanup of 2002 to which I think you referred to a few minutes ago, was against scientific standards, totally inadequate, and essentially useless. The Inspector General reported that the site, namely the whole downtown Manhattan, Brooklyn, maybe Jersey City, had not been properly characterized as normal procedures say it should be, and that what should be done in order to assess indoor contamination is that you should take several hundred inspections of indoor spaces and concentric circles out from the World Trade Center, find out where in fact the contamination indoor is, maybe three blocks in one direction, maybe three miles in another direction and wherever that was found, whatever geographic area, every building in that area must be cleaned. That was the IG's recommendation. I think most scientists who have looked at that have concurred with that. Nothing like this was done, obviously. Given that fact, Ms. Horinko, can you say with assurance that thousands of indoor spaces today are not contaminated? Ms. Horinko. Obviously, I don't have data on every house or every apartment. Mr. Nadler. I didn't ask about every--talking about large numbers. Ms. Horinko. I believe that large numbers of the homes in lower Manhattan are safe. Mr. Nadler. On what basis do you say that? Ms. Horinko. I relied upon the experts in EPA region II who designed the program. Mr. Nadler. But everyone, the IG, et cetera, says that program was nonsense, it wasn't based on scientific standards. Ms. Horinko. I can tell you the program was design------ Mr. Nadler. Do you believe there was a 30,000-high-foot wall at Canal Street and therefore they didn't have to look north of Canal Street all along the East River; therefore they didn't have to look at Brooklyn? Ms. Horinko. I relied on the professionals' expertise. Mr. Nadler. Well, using common sense, could any professional in his right mind say that you have to inspect below Canal Street but not above Canal Street? Ms. Horinko. All I can say, Congressman, is you have to draw a line somewhere. Mr. Nadler. Mr. Newman, would you comment on that, please? Mr. Newman. In our discussions at the EPA World Trade Center Technical Review Panel, EPA presented as a basis for its determination of geographic boundaries for the sampling plan aerial photographs from the EPA EPIC study. Those aerial photographs showed deposition of visible dust and debris in areas of Lower Manhattan and some areas in Brooklyn. However, I believe and the panel believed strongly that geographic boundaries needed to be expanded beyond what EPA proposed, and we believed there is no scientific basis for utilizing visible dust and debris as the basis for the extent of the geographic dispersion of particulates, in particular, because the particulates of most concern to health are not visible, they are invisible. Those asbestos fibers and other particulates will not show up on those photographs. Mr. Nadler. Are you aware of any respected scientific authority who will be willing to testify that the EPA so-called cleanup plan in 2002 was scientifically valid? Mr. Newman. EPA certainly has some. Mr. Nadler. Outside EPA? Mr. Newman. No, I'm not. Mr. Nadler. You're not. Okay. Ms. McGinnis, you were asked by the IG whether the EPA had considered putting qualifications in the press releases and whether there was resistance to putting in such qualifications. You replied that you would not call it resistance but would call it competing priorities. You stated that opening Wall Street was one of the major competing priorities. Is it your testimony today that considerations than public health were considered when preparing EPA's early press releases? Ms. McGinnis. Economic security, national security, were certainly considerations but health concerns were never sacrificed because of those considerations. Mr. Nadler. Do you believe that economic factors ought to be considered in a health-based determination? Ms. McGinnis. No, sir. Mr. Nadler. Who discussed these competing priorities with you? Ms. McGinnis. I don't recall any specific conversations about it. I do recall general conversations about whether the Wall Street area was cleaned sufficiently for its reopening. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. Ms. Horinko. Two more questions, one for Ms. Horinko. Ms. Horinko, were White House officials involved in the decisions on funding or cleaning up indoor spaces? Ms. Horinko. I have no direct knowledge. Mr. Nadler. You have no direct knowledge. Thank you. I see my time has expired. I will recognize the gentleman from Virginia--I am sorry, the gentleman from Arizona. Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Kreisher, thank you very much, again, for being here. I wanted to ask you, the indications were that maybe somehow the pressure that people speak of, that you had complained to Ms. Whitman that--about the changes that the White House requested. Is that true that you ever complained to her about specific changes that the White House had requested? Ms. Kreisher. I don't believe I ever went directly to the Governor with anything like that. Eileen and I had discussions. Again, you get your ego and all kinds of things involved when you are having a dispute with someone, and I would go in and say, Eileen, you have got to change this or call them or something, and those things happened; but, no, I never went directly to Governor Whitman. Mr. Franks. I think every Member of Congress identifies so much with that when we have discussions with our press secretaries and there is always--of course, Members of Congress are superior in every way in terms of what words to use. But it's an ongoing situation. I have hit on a central theme here throughout this entire Committee and that is simply: Was there any conspiracy between the White House and the EPA to deliberately convince people to go into unsafe areas? Was there any effort like that, Ms. Kreisher? Ms. Kreisher. No. In fact, this is very interesting to me from my existing job at Interior, because we are being often criticized that we did not listen to the scientists; that in some way policymakers are changing what the scientists are telling us--and that is the subject of other congressional hearings--yet I seem to be getting overtones here that we shouldn't have been listening to our scientists and should have come up with another policy. It's just an observation that I'll make. Mr. Franks. Let me just ask the question a little broader. Do you know of any instance in which the leadership of the EPA or the White House deliberately acted in a way to subordinate people's health to political considerations? Ms. Kreisher. No, sir. Mr. Franks. Even carelessly? Mr. Kreisher. Not that I'm aware of. Mr. Franks. Thank you, Ms. Kreisher. Mr. Thernstrom, let me just ask you a kind of open-ended question. Is there anything here that you think hasn't been covered that you think that you would like to specifically bring out? Again, along the lines that I talked about with Ms. Kreisher, do you think there is any conspiracy here or any deliberate effort or even any just blatantly careless effort on the part of the White House or the EPA to subordinate the lives and health of people for political reasons? Mr. Thernstrom. No, sir; to the contrary. I think we made great efforts under very difficult circumstances, as I mentioned, constantly changing information, many different Federal agencies working together. We made great efforts to try to make sense of that information, to listen to the scientists and to most accurately characterize the information that was being given to us. So I don't think anything of the sort was going on. If you don't mind, I wouldn't mind taking this opportunity just very briefly--I'm sorry that Congressman Pascrell from New Jersey has left. He was quite exorcised about one particular point in the September 14th press release, and if you don't mind------ Mr. Franks. He was also exorcised about me calling some of his ideas preposterous. Mr. Thernstrom. I would like to correct this point for the record. He said that in the draft press release from September 14th, that I struck the sentence that said the concern raised by these samples would be for workers at the cleanup site and for those workers who might be returning to their offices on or near Water Street on Monday, September 17th. And he's correct that I did strike that sentence. But I think everyone in this room should listen to the sentence that immediately followed that in the original draft press release which was: OSHA Director John Henshaw emphasized that the level found, even if resuspended in the air, does not violate OSHA standards. And so the context in the original press release that is very clear, is that the press release spoke of a concern and then it spoke of the fact that that was not a concern. And so the appropriate editorial process was to clarify that, in fact, the overall message from this press release was that there was not a concern. The original language was confusing and the language was revised in a way that more clearly communicated the correct language. That's exactly the sort of type of thinking through these draft press releases when we're working very quickly under a great deal of pressure. That is the editing process we went through collaboratively to try to best express to the people of New York the information that they needed to know. And I have, in all of the time that has elapsed, I have never heard that any EPA scientist object to anything that we said to any way of characterizing their reports to us. We had daily conversations with them and to the best of my knowledge we accurately characterized what they told us. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Virginia. Mr. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Nadler. Is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Thernstrom, in your testimony you stated that you were not at liberty to talk to the Inspector General when you were at the White House. Mr. Thernstrom. Correct. Mr. Scott. Who told you not to talk to the Inspector General? Mr. Thernstrom. White House counsel's office. I asked them to try to make arrangements to have that interview happen and those arrangements were not made, ultimately. I was never given the go-ahead. Mr. Scott. The White House counsel's office. Mr. Thernstrom. Correct. Mr. Scott. Who was the White House counsel at the time? Mr. Thernstrom. That would be Mr. Gonzales. Mr. Scott. Mr. Newman, we've heard suggestions that we needed to listen to the scientists. What were the scientists saying this time about the health concerns that people should be aware of right after--on 9/11 and right after 9/11, while the EPA was suggesting--as the public statements were being made that things were safe. Mr. Newman. I think as a number of witnesses have already pointed out, scientists look to the data for their answers. And so the question is the quality of the data and what data are available. I think what many folks were confronted with were the fact that--many scientists were confronted with was the fact that, number one, we had inconsistent data. We had a large body of data that indicated low or no exceedances. We had a much smaller body that indicated fairly high exceedances under certain conditions and certain circumstances. The question then becomes which--and that's not unexpected. In a circumstance like this where conditions change daily or hourly in terms of fires and in terms of emissions, we would expect to find inconsistent data. The question then becomes politically and from a public health perspective how do you interpret that data. One approach would be to take the most reassuring data and emphasize that. And another approach would be to take the worst-case scenario and emphasize precautionary measures until such time as we're comfortable and confident that hazards don't exist. Mr. Scott. With the dangers, with the potential dangers, if you're not sure what to do, which way should you lean? Mr. Newman. That also goes to the issue of enforcement. We had applicable standards such as the OSHA hazardous waste operations and emergency response standard, which basically is the most effective, proactive, and protective--or standard for workers engaged in hazardous waste operations, and we had OSHA's decision not to enforce that standard or any other standard. Those standards essentially call for precautionary approaches; that is, assume the worst and as the data become available and become more credible, if appropriate, we can scale down our levels of respiratory protection, our levels of safe work practices, our levels of personal protective equipment. But start off with the worst data, assume workers are going to be exposed at that level, and assess the situation in an ongoing fashion. Instead, we had the opposite. We assumed the best and not the worst and the consequences--the bottom line here is not the data either way; the bottom line is that people are ill, regardless of what the data show or don't show and regardless of what our interpretation of the data is. I have to strongly disagree with my esteemed colleagues from EPA. There is a considerable body of data in the peer-reviewed literature, in fact. It's unambiguous and noncontroversial and I'm amazed people haven't read it. There is a considerable body of evidence that indicates both Ground Zero responders as well as area workers and residents are ill at alarming rates with clinically diagnosed persistent respiratory illness and other medical conditions, and the bottom line is if the data don't show that, there's something wrong with either how we're interpreting the data or with how we obtained the data--because the bottom line is that if people are sick, we have a problem. Mr. Scott. Ms. Mattei, if people are sick, as they are, how can that possibly be consistent with the message that was being given out? Ms. Mattei. Well, it certainly was not. And that's why I wrote the reports that I did, because you can't have it both ways. You can't have it's safe, and thousands of people are sick. We're talking about thousands of people, not 50 or 100. Thousands of people are sick. Children of people exposed are at risk. That's what procarcinogenic damage is. It makes a person more vulnerable to cancer. That's what's happened to some of these newborns. So it's a really serious situation. I would also point out that, repeatedly, when private tests were conducted, when elected officials paid for private tests, when other people conducted private tests, they were finding much higher levels of asbestos than EPA was. And I also want to point out that the constant emphasis on asbestos was very disingenuous. I never heard EPA talking about the polycyclic aeromatic hydrocarbons carbons. Thousands and thousands of pounds of that went into the air. It was discovered on window films within a kilometer of the site at high levels. Polycyclic aeromatic hydrocarbons are a very toxic group of chemicals. And they never talked about it, they never talked about a number of the other pollutants from Ground Zero that we should have been concerned about and watching for. It was easier to just focus on one chemical, and that's what they did. But that was wrong. It was definitely a wrong thing to do. Mr. Scott. If you could just respond------ Mr. Nadler. The gentleman is granted an additional 30 seconds, without objection. Mr. Scott. Was that message coming from the scientific community? Ms. Mattei. David, do you want to respond to that, because I'm trying to remember who said what, when. I knew there was a fairly significant amount of research from data sources other than EPA or other government resources that indicated the possibility, the likelihood, and in some cases the reality of a variety of a robust range of contaminants. However, that data was not large in quantity, so there were a number of scientists who have expressed concern through their research as the possibility of the presence or exposure to other contaminants. However, the data upon which most scientists relied, either because they were in the Agency, such as EPA, or because they were--or the only data they had available to them if they were outside EPA, was the EPA and OSHA data that was publicly shared. That data, by and large, at least the data that was publicly shared was, as EPA correctly said, reassuring. The data that was not necessarily shared was less reassuring. Ms. Mattei. I just want to add to that, that we're not just talking about what science would indicate but the regulations on dealing with hazardous releases calls for that kind of a comprehensive assessment. You're not just supposed to look at one chemical when you have a release, a hazardous release; you're supposed to find out what's in it, where did it go and who was exposed? That didn't happen here. Mr. Nadler. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired and I'll grant myself 5 minutes. I recognize myself, I should say, for 5 minutes. First of all, let me ask Mr. Thernstrom, an EPA press release from September 13 says that the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings is unlikely to cause significant health effects. From September 2002 to September 2003, the CDC, Centers for Disease Control, New England Journal of Medicine, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, all issued reports demonstrating that rescuers, cleanup workers and office workers, were sick as a result of their exposure to WTC dust. And yet the White House Council of Environmental Quality asserted in October of 2003 that quote, ``We continue to stand by the information distributed in press releases regarding the potential long-term health risks,'' close quote. There have been a myriad of subsequent peer-reviewed studies documenting chronic health effects, as has been mentioned. Do you still stand by the information distributed in the press releases regarding lack of potential long-term health risks in spite of all what we know today? Mr. Thernstrom. Congressman, I don't actually recognize the October quote that you are reading to me. That certainly was not something I wrote. I'm sorry if------ Mr. Nadler. First of all, it's a September quote. But forget that quote. There are a whole bunch of quotes we've been talking about all afternoon here saying in effect that things are safe, things are good, things are reassuring, we're not going to have health problems from the World Trade Center. We now know that that wasn't--I think we know from all the studies and from the reality, that that wasn't correct; and yet the White House in its latest pronouncement, which was 3 years ago, said they stood by it. Do you still think they ought to stand by those? Mr. Thernstrom. I wasn't working for the White House 3 years ago so I can't speak to what they said then. Honestly, I really don't feel like I have the expertise to speak to the health effects of the World Trade Center. Mr. Nadler. You're still not willing to say that all these people who are sick, a lot of them are sick because of the World Trade Center. Mr. Thernstrom. Congressman, I simply don't have an expertise on that subject. All I can say, what we------ Mr. Nadler. Let me ask Ms. Mattei and Mr. Newman. You mentioned, Ms. Mattei, I think, that there was--I think you said a paucity of data with respect to asbestos and so forth. There is one thing I wanted to get in the record here. The EPA was using PLM test methodology all over New York City except in its own building. Now, in 1994 the EPA said the PLM test methodology was old-fashioned, not accurate, not up to date, and they ought to use the TEM methods. We know that the TEM methods will detect small asbestos fibers that are produced by the pulverization such as occurred at the World Trade Center, that the PLM method will not. Do you think that most of the, or many--much of the EPA asbestos readings taken with PLM methodology was simply not reliable for that reason? Ms. Mattei. Certainly the TEM tests revealed higher levels. Joel Cutherman worked with both BEP and EPA staff at one point to test a split sample and found that there were much higher readings of asbestos fibers using the TEM method than the PLM. It is not only better at identifying short fibers, but also the very thin fibers because it tends to produce thin fibers. I would point out it wasn't EPA that tested. It was actually the General Services Administration. Pretty much everybody else was using--everybody was using TEM except the EPA. Kind of baffling. Mr. Nadler. Why was that not done? Ms. Horinko. We relied upon the folks from region II and thought we should use------ Mr. Nadler. Ms. McGinnis, your September 13 press release said--well, and also Governor Whitman earlier today kept talking about the distinction between the quality air on the pile and off the pile; on the pile you kept saying it was bad and all the assurances that we were hearing that everything was fine didn't relate to the pile, it related to off-the-pile. That's the testimony we heard earlier today. Now, September 13 EPA put out a press release that said quote: Sampling of ambient air quality found no asbestos or very low levels; tests have been reassuring of rescue crews and the public to environmental contaminants. Obviously if it's talking about rescue crews, you're talking about on the pile, not off the pile. So it is not true that at least some of the very reassuring statements were dealing with off-the-pile only, and in fact you're talking here giving reassuring statements about on the pile. Is there any other way of reading this? Ms. McGinnis. Could you say that again? I didn't follow. Mr. Nadler. I will give myself another minute to repeat that. Ms. McGinnis. I understood everything except the sentence itself. Mr. Nadler. The question is: Is there any way of reading that press release, or the part of it that says the tests have been very reassuring about potential exposure of rescue crews and the public, as meaning anything other than that that press release refers to the wonderful air quality on the pile, not just off the pile, and that everything we've heard today about the reassurances not referring to conditions on the pile are not quite true, or at least not completely true? Ms. McGinnis. I'm reluctant to say yes or no on that without looking at the context, and I don't have--haven't looked------ Mr. Nadler. You will agree you have to be talking about rescue crews, you have to be talking about on the pile. Ms. McGinnis. I have no recollection. Mr. Nadler. It's in tab 3 of your binder is the entire quote. Ms. McGinnis. What paragraph are you referring to? Mr. Nadler. The sentence: Sampling of ambient air quality found asbestos. Tests have been very reassuring about potential exposure of rescue crews and the public to environmental contaminants. This would imply rescue crews should not even be concerned about air quality. Do you want to comment, Ms. Kreisher? Ms. Kreisher. I think it would be an error that I probably made. At the time we were only 2 days out from the blast, and I could have added that without thinking in terms of the distinction between the------ Mr. Nadler. You're saying that all the reassurances were not still on the pile, and that including that reference was probably a mistake. Ms. Kreisher. The same day, September 13, I can quote from ABC News.com quoting me saying, ``It's one of those cases of don't be stupid. If there's a chance, why not put on the mask?'' We're talking to rescue workers at that point. Governor Whitman was much more strident than I was about making sure that there was a distinction. Mr. Nadler. My time has expired. The gentleman from Arizona. Mr. Franks. Thank you. Ms. Horinko, did you have anything that you wanted to add as far as being able to answer any of the questions prior? Ms. Horinko. I just wanted to add that I think all the agencies involved worked as hard as they could to get the information out in the hands of people who needed it, to make sure that responders were able to develop standards under an unprecedented situation, using their best professional judgment. We will continue to monitor the studies that are taking place in New York. People that are becoming ill, if the study shows that it is the fault of the World Trade Center exposures that they received, I think should get the best possible access to health care and treatment they possibly should. But at the end of the day, I think everyone involved did their very best to get the information out as quickly as we could. Mr. Franks. Thank you. Mr. Thernstrom, you have testified that you tried the best you could to disseminate information based on what you thought the science showed and that was reported to you, and that's still your testimony essentially. Mr. Thernstrom. Absolutely, sir. Mr. Franks. I think the reason I mention that is the Bush administration has been criticized sometimes for their, quote, ``lack of using scientific bases,'' and yet when they do so then they are criticized for that as well. I happen to be the grandson of a man who died of black lung from exposure to a toxic substance and I know that that's a heartbreak for families that begs my ability to describe or articulate today. So I want to make sure that any people in this room or under the sound of my voice know that I identify and care very much about any illness that they have faced. But the reality remains that when we talk about safe levels of asbestos, there is asbestos in this room; it might be measured in parts per quadrillion instead of parts per million, and yet 6 years from now there may be people in this room will come down with some type of sickness that would be impossible to relate to that. I don't know what the ultimate effect--cause and effect has been in these illnesses, I really don't know. But my point is this: The overwhelming testimony that I have heard today indicates to me that there was no deliberate effort on the part of the EPA or the Administration to do anything but the best they could to try to serve the country in a horrifying tragedy, and I believe that they tried to serve both the future and the people that were being--not only the ones that were victims at the moment, but potentially victims in the future. It again seems astonishing to me that we spend the time of this Committee trying to punish those who are doing the best they could. Mr. Nadler. If the gentleman will suspend, please, we have come almost to the end with proper decorum. Let's continue that. Mr. Franks. Just for the record, I understand the comment. But for the record, I believe with all my heart that you were trying to protect the American people, from what I have heard today. So for that I commend you and hope that somehow we can all work together to make sure this never happens again, and we can help the people who are sick try to get better and prevent this tragic situation. But we need to remember--my last word--that it was not you, the EPA or the Administration, that did this to the American people; it was jihadist terrorists that continue to plot against America. Mr. Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I hope we wouldn't set as our standard that there is nothing at all if you can't find a potential conspiracy between the EPA and the White House to intentionally victimize people. I mean the evidence is clear that people are sick. There is something we could have done to have prevented it. You don't have to find a potential conspiracy to improve things so that it doesn't happen again. I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. They have been here a long time, and I appreciate their patience, and just ask any of them if they have any final comments, particularly on indoor cleanup. If anyone wants to make a final comment. Ms. Mattei. Well, I was--just on the issue of the kind of information that has been put out about indoor pollution. There was something that I think was significantly misleading, and that was a letter from the White House Council on Environmental Quality to Senators Hillary Clinton and Joseph Lieberman, stating that of the 4,100 residential units examined as part of EPA's indoor program, only about 1 percent were found to have asbestos at levels exceeding the health-based standard. What that letter didn't say was that they didn't test most of those apartments before cleaning them. They tested most of them after cleaning them. So the data was significantly misused. And it is hard for me to understand how anybody could have misused the data in that way, because it was obvious what the data was. And the way that it was presented in the letter was so obviously misleading. So that is of great concern. I am concerned about Ground Zero dust remaining in buildings in Lower Manhattan. And until we have a proper testing and cleanup program in Lower Manhattan, I consider the Lower Manhattan residents--and I am also concerned about Brooklyn, as is Jenna Orkin, who is here today, I consider people to be at risk. And in particular toddlers who roll around on carpets and bounce on soft furniture, where the dust is likely to be trapped and can't get picked up by an ordinary vacuum cleaner. That is my primary health concern for Lower Manhattan and the parts of Brooklyn affected by the dust cloud. It is not over for us. Mr. Newman. Let's be very clear here that when we talk about indoor cleanup, there fundamentally has been none. The single EPA program from 2002 to 2003 was limited in scope. Anything that was not a residence was excluded, or businesses, workplaces, schools, firehouses, City Hall, hospitals, were excluded and are excluded again in the current program. The participation rate in 2002-2003 was only approximately 4,000 apartments. The efficacy of environmental cleanup in those apartments was inadequate. Fundamentally, the same methodology will be used in the current program, only I believe the number is 295 apartments are enrolled in the current program. So what we have, approaching the sixth anniversary of the events of 9/11, is virtually zero testing and cleanup of indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank all of our witnesses for their patience. This has been a long hearing. Mr. Nadler. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. Scott. I yield the balance of my time to the Chairman. Mr. Nadler. I thank the gentleman. Let me simply say, before I go through the rigamarole for closing the hearing, and before I thank the witnesses, let me just say that I hope that we have learned something at this hearing. I think we have learned some things. But I think it is very clear that much of the discussion that we were having about those press releases, et cetera, was what was known then, and whether people should have put out those reassurances then. Looking backward--and my opinion is obvious. Looking backwards now, it is very clear that whatever their intentions, whatever their reliances, they were wrong; 70,000 first responders are sick--10,000 first responders; 70,000 people are getting sick. Of the 10,000 first responders tested, 70 percent. So 70 percent of the first responders are sick, probably more of the people in the plume, and others. That didn't happen because everything was safe and because the air was safe. And Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn, and maybe Jersey City, hasn't been cleaned up, as Ms. Mattei said. And I hope that this hearing, which may be followed by others, will begin the process of getting more of this out into public view so that we can set the case for changing our policies, which are still based on the same policies that got us into this mess. And by the way, the terrorists caused a terrible mess, but an additional mess--I don't want to confuse that--an unnecessary mess, with people unnecessarily sick, that we are in. With that I yield back my time. And I want to thank the witnesses. I want to--with unanimous consent, I ask unanimous consent to place the EPA Inspector General's report in the record.\1\ Without objection. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ See report entitled EPA's Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement, by the Office of the EPA Inspector General at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/ 2003/WTC_report_20030821.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I want to thank all of our witnesses. I want to also thank the many people who came here today from New York. I want to thank the Members for their participation. Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit to the Chair additional questions for the witnesses, which we will forward and ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as you can so that your answers may be made part of the record. Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit any additional materials for inclusion in the record. With that, this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X ---------- Material Submitted for the Printed Hearing Record Material submitted by the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Supplemental Submission from the Honorable Christine Todd Whitman, Whitman Strategy Group [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Response to Post-Hearing Questions from the Honorable Christine Todd Whitman, Whitman Strategy Group [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ATTACHMENT [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Response to Post-Hearing Questions from John L. Henshaw, Henshaw & Associates, Inc. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Samuel Thernstrom, American Enterprise Institute [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Tina Kreisher, Communications Director, U.S. Department of the Interior [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Eileen McGinnis, Senior Vice President, Whitman Strategy Group [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Marianne L. Horinko, Executive Vice President, Global Environment & Technology Foundation [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Substantive Due Process Violations Arising from the EPA's Handling of Air Quality Issues Following September 11, 2001 June 25, 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]