[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TRACKING THE STORM AT THE
NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 19, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-47
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania TOM FEENEY, Florida
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BARON P. HILL, Indiana VACANCY
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment
HON. NICK LAMPSON, Texas, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
MARK UDALL, Colorado MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
JEAN FRUCI Democratic Staff Director
SHIMERE WILLIAMS Democratic Professional Staff Member
TARA ROTHSCHILD Republican Professional Staff Member
STACEY STEEP Research Assistant
------
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas Wisconsin
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey TOM FEENEY, Florida
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director
JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member
STACEY STEEP Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
July 19, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Nick Lampson, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 7
Written Statement............................................ 8
Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 9
Written Statement............................................ 11
Statement by Representative Bob Inglis, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 12
Written Statement............................................ 13
Statement by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 14
Written Statement............................................ 16
Prepared Statement by Representative Ron Klein from the State of
Florida, 22nd District......................................... 18
Panel I:
Mr. William Proenza, Director, Tropical Prediction Center
Oral Statement............................................... 24
Biography.................................................... 26
Discussion
NOAA Assessment Team........................................... 27
Media Exposure................................................. 27
Staff Dissatisfaction.......................................... 28
QuikSCAT....................................................... 29
Hurricane Season: 2007......................................... 30
More on QuikSCAT............................................... 30
Integrating Research at the Hurricane Research Center and the
National Hurricane Center.................................... 30
Director Proenza's Tenure at the National Hurricane Center..... 31
More on Media Exposure......................................... 33
More on Director Proenza's Tenure at the National Hurricane
Center....................................................... 35
Legal Obligations.............................................. 37
The Role of Congress........................................... 37
More on QuikSCAT............................................... 38
Director Proenza's Comments on QuikSCAT........................ 39
Future of QuikSCAT............................................. 40
Director Proenza's History..................................... 43
Concept of Operations Plan..................................... 43
Criticisms and Shortcomings of the National Hurricane Center... 44
Hurricane Center Personnel..................................... 46
Hurricane Center Science and QuikSCAT.......................... 46
Panel II:
Dr. Robert M. Atlas, Director, Atlantic Oceanographic and
Meteorological Laboratory, Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric
Research, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce
Oral Statement............................................... 49
Written Statement............................................ 51
Biography.................................................... 54
Mr. Donald L. McKinnon, Director, Jones County Emergency
Management Agency, Laurel, Mississippi
Oral Statement............................................... 55
Written Statement............................................ 57
Biography.................................................... 60
Mr. Robie Robinson, Director, Dallas County Office of Security
and Emergency Management
Oral Statement............................................... 60
Written Statement............................................ 62
Biography.................................................... 65
Discussion
Director Proenza's Tenure in the Southern Region............... 65
Hurricane Research Division and Hurricane Center Collaboration. 66
Hurricane Research............................................. 66
More on the Hurricane Center Personnel......................... 67
Improving Hurricane Forecasting................................ 67
Alternatives to QuikSCAT....................................... 68
More on Hurricane Research..................................... 69
Director Proenza's Relationship With Witnesses................. 69
Returning Dirrector Proenza to His Former Position............. 71
Investigating Personnel Problems............................... 71
Panel III:
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (U.S. Navy, Ret.), Under
Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; Administrator,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Oral Statement............................................... 73
Written Statement............................................ 75
Dr. James Turner, Deputy Director, National Institute of
Standards and Technology
Oral Statement............................................... 112
Discussion
NOAA's Reaction to the Problems With Director Proenza.......... 114
The Proenza Plan............................................... 115
NOAA Documents................................................. 116
The Management Assessment...................................... 116
Course of Action Taken With Director Proenza................... 117
Witness Background............................................. 119
Responsibilities as a Supervisor............................... 119
Admiral Lautenbacher's Actions................................. 120
More on QuikSCAT............................................... 121
Next Generation Forecasting Tools.............................. 123
Additional Witnesses Would Have Been Useful.................... 124
More on State of Hurricane Forecasting......................... 125
Role of the Committee.......................................... 126
TRACKING THE STORM AT THE NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, and
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nick
Lampson [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and
Environment] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
AND
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tracking the Storm at the
National Hurricane Center
thursday, july 19, 2007
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
The Subcommittee on Energy and Environment and the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight will meet on July 19, 2007, to evaluate
recent events at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) Tropical Prediction Center (TPC/NHC).
Upon the orders of NOAA's Administrator, Conrad Lautenbacher, an
assessment team was formed to review the operations of the tropical
prediction center. In response to the Assessment Team's preliminary
reports, the Vice Admiral placed Center Director X. William (Bill)
Proenza on administrative leave. NOAA Administrator Lautenbacher stated
that ``. . .current conditions at the TPC pose an obstacle to the
Team's completion of its work, as well as the Team's concern that, as
expressed by many of you, there currently exists a level of anxiety and
disruption that threatens the TPC's ability to fulfill its mission to
protect the American people. . ..'' This hearing will explore the
process that culminated in Mr. Proenza's removal.
Witnesses
Panel I
1. Mr. X. William Proenza, Director, Tropical Prediction
Center, National Hurricane Center, National Centers for
Environmental Prediction, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, has been invited to discuss his service as
Director of the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane
Center and his experiences during the recent events that led
the NOAA Administrator to place him on leave.
Panel II
2. Dr. Robert Atlas, Director of the Atlantic Oceanographic
and Meteorological Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. Dr. Atlas's laboratory is part of the Hurricane
Research Division, which works with the Tropical Prediction
Center to improve tools and techniques in hurricane
forecasting. He has been asked to focus on the use of QuikSCAT
data in the forecasting process.
3. Mr. Don McKinnon, Director, Jones County (MS) Emergency
Management Agency, will testify regarding services the National
Weather Service (NWS) provides to emergency management offices.
Mr. McKinnon dealt extensively with Mr. Proenza during his
service as Director of the Weather Service Southern Region
Office.
4. Mr. Robie Robinson, Director, Dallas County Office of
Security and Emergency Management, is testifying on behalf of
the Emergency Management Association of Texas regarding the
service provided to the emergency management community in Texas
by the National Weather Service (NWS) through the Southern
Region Office during the period of Mr. Proenza's tenure as its
Director.
Panel III
5. Hon. Conrad Lautenbacher, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and
Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
has been asked to describe how he decided to dispatch an
assessment team to the Tropical Prediction Center and, as a
result of a preliminary report from that team, to place Mr.
Proenza on leave. The team was directed to submit a report on
the situation at the Center on Friday, July 20, 2007.
6. Dr. James Turner, Deputy Director of National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), led the Assessment Team at the
request of Admiral Lautenbacher and will testify on the
assessment and the findings of the Assessment Team's report.
Background
The National Hurricane Center (NHC) is publicly known as the unit
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration responsible for
tracking and forecasting of tropical storms and hurricanes.
Organizationally, the Center is a branch of the Tropical Prediction
Center (TPC) of the National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP)
and Mr. Proenza's actual title is Director of the Tropical Prediction
Center. The Center assists emergency management agencies in the coastal
states by providing information on the development of storms, their
likely track across the ocean and their probable point of landfall on
the U.S. coast. With this information, State and local officials make
decisions about whether to evacuate threatened areas.
Mr. Proenza became Director of the Tropical Prediction Center in
January 2007, succeeding Max Mayfield. In his previous post as Director
of the NWS Southern Regional Office, he managed some 1,000 employees
from New Mexico to the Virgin Islands between 1998 and 2006. An
employee of the Service for 35 years, he began at the National
Hurricane Center as a flight meteorologist aboard the ``hurricane
hunter'' aircraft that support Center operations. Among his awards
during his service was recognition as Manager of the Year from the
National Weather Service Employees' Organization.
On March 16, Mr. Proenza gave an interview to the Associated Press.
That article described him seeking ``hundreds of millions of dollars
for expanded research and predictions.'' It then described his
``immediate concern'' to be the QuikSCAT satellite, specifically the
age of the satellite, the lack of any replacement if it failed, and the
potential cost and time needed to for replacement. He stated that
QuikSCAT's failure would reduce the accuracy of their two-day
predictions by 10 percent and 16 percent for three-day forecasts.
In a telephone interview with Committee staff, Mr. Proenza was
asked how QuikSCAT had come to his attention. He responded that while
he was visiting the Center to discuss transition issues in December
2006, he had been approached by Senior Hurricane Specialist Richard
Knabb and Michael Brennan, who was affiliated with both the Center and
the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research. Both had
participated in a June 2006 Center workshop on requirements for ocean
surface vector winds (which QuikSCAT measures). Mr. Proenza told staff
he had read the report, and noted the statements there by both Mr.
Knabb and Hugh Cobb, lead forecaster in the Center's Tropical Forecast
and Analysis Branch about QuikSCAT's value. Proenza told Committee
staff that he had discussed the workshop report with his managers in
the Weather Service two days after assuming his job. Proenza also said
that, while on the way to the AP interview, he had called Center Deputy
Director (now Acting Director) Dr. Edward Rappaport and received the
figures quoted in the interview.
In his presentation at the National Hurricane Conference in April,
Mr. Proenza again expressed concern over QuikSCAT. His presentation
chart called for ``a next-generation QuikSCAT on an accelerated
timetable (consistent with recommendation by the NRC Decadal Survey).
Estimated cost: $375-400 million.'' He said that issues like this
demonstrated that more funding needed to be devoted to improving
hurricane research and forecasting. An article in the South Florida
Sun-Sentinel quoted Senior Specialist Knabb at the same conference
saying that the satellite had ``. . .helped the National Hurricane
Center [achieve] record accuracy in predicting the path of 10
systems.''
On June 11, NOAA's Assistant Administrator for Program Planning and
Integration, Mary Glackin, became acting Director of the National
Weather Service after D.L. Johnson's retirement. On June 14, she
visited with Mr. Proenza at his office in Miami and delivered a
memorandum entitled ``Operating Procedures/Instructions.'' The
memorandum listed cases when ``you [Mr. Proenza] may have disregarded
the direct instructions of your supervisor. . . or have made decisions
on your own which you had no authority to make.'' The memorandum also
discussed Mr. Proenza's interactions with the news media. He was
instructed to conform to the procedures in the new Department Order on
``Public Communications'' (which had only become effective in May), and
was told that ``your recent statements. . . may have caused some
unnecessary confusion about NOAA's ability to accurately predict
tropical storms,'' and commented about ``unnecessary detrimental
effects on our organization, for example: requiring me to spend a
disproportionate amount of time to correct any confusion; causing undue
concern and misunderstanding among your staff, and; taking valuable
time away from your public role as the NOAA official responsible for
instilling confidence in our tropical storm predictions. . ..''
Staffs of the Science and Technology Committee and the Energy and
Commerce Committee met with Ms. Glackin and with Louis Uccellini,
Director of the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (and Mr.
Proenza's immediate supervisor) on July 12. Ms. Glackin stated that the
memorandum was not intended as a reprimand. She stated it was prepared
after she talked to Mr. Uccellini and came to believe Mr. Proenza was
not following procedures. The items cited in the memorandum were drawn
from incidents recorded by Mr. Uccellini: one case where Mr. Proenza
signed a promotion form for an employee (Mr. Uccelini's responsibility,
a second case was stopped before it completed processing) and a case
where Mr. Proenza approved change-of-station expenses outside the
procedure approved by the NOAA Corporate Board. Mr. Uccellini said that
he had only learned about the incident where Mr. Proenza's change of
name to ``National Hurricane Center'' set off warning alarms after the
fact, and that the change occurred without necessary notification to
Congress and a 60-day waiting period. At this meeting, Mr. Uccellini
also characterized Mr. Proenza--whom he had worked with in the past--as
a dedicated employee, with a reputation for going around channels and
being disruptive. Ms. Glackin described Proenza as receptive and
cooperative, but she notes that the memo was in the press by the next
day and she believes that Mr. Proenza must have leaked his own
``repremand'' memo to the press--though there is no convincing proof of
that.
``A couple of days'' after delivering this memorandum to Mr.
Proenza, Ms. Glackin says she received a call (at another point, she
said she received an e-mail) from Ahsha Tribble, the Executive Officer
(who came to the position just last September after serving as
Technical Chief of Staff to James Mahoney--now retired, but she is seen
also as being close to Admiral Lautenbacher and/or his staff) at the
Center. Ms. Tribble apparently indicated there were a number of
employees who wanted to bring their concerns to the attention of
management. In a call with multiple employees arranged by Ms. Tribble,
Ms. Glackin says the employees expressed discomfort with the work
environment at the Center, felt that their opinions were being
misrepresented, and that the Center would not be ``cohesive'' in a
hurricane situation. Ms. Glackin said she raised these concerns
``vigorously'' with her superiors. It was sometime after this point
that the ``Operational Assessment Team'' was formed at the direction of
Admiral Lautenbacher. The team was headed by the Deputy Director of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, James Turner, and
including John Guenther, an attorney from the Employment and Labor Law
Division of the Department of Commerce Office of General Counsel. The
charge to this group was issued on July 29, 2007--approximately 10 days
after Ms. Glackin had received allegations from NHC staff.
On July 2, Mr. Proenza told Committee staff he received a call from
Admiral Lautenbacher that the Team had been dispatched; they arrived at
his office while the call was still in progress. It seemed apparent to
him that others in the Center were already aware that the Team was
coming. Mr. Proenza met with Turner, and an ``all-hands'' meeting with
the Center staff followed.
On July 4, the Miami Herald reported that Senior Specialists
Richard Knabb and James Franklin--along with a third, Richard Pasch--
believed that Mr. Proenza had damaged public confidence in the Center
and should be removed. Mr. Franklin was quoted as saying ``. . .the
hurricane specialists, by and large, do not agree with much of what he
has done;'' the article also stated that ``shouting matches'' had
occurred between staffers supporting and opposing Mr. Proenza. On July
5, an e-mail was distributed to the Center staff inviting them to a
meeting ``to openly discuss recent events.'' At that meeting, attendees
were invited to go to a second room in a campus building owned by
Florida International University to view and sign the statement that
was released to the media. It is also at this point that concerns are
raised about the possibility that funds supporting aircraft flights
would be reprogrammed to build a replacement QuikSCAT. As far as staff
can determine, that proposal had never been made by any Member and
would be unlikely given the vast difference in the financial scope of
the two programs.
Ms. Glackin told staff that a call was received on July 6
indicating that the Assessment Team felt Mr. Proenza's actions were
inhibiting the ability of the Team to conduct their review. Admiral
Lautenbacher discussed the situation with the Team. On July 7, Admiral
Lautenbacher sent a memorandum to the Center staff indicating Mr.
Proenza was placed on leave and named Mr. Rappaport as acting Director.
Mr. Proenza received the letter informing him he was on leave until
August 9 as he arrived at Miami airport July 9. He was also told that
he should not go to the Center offices without permission from Mr.
Uccellini and that he should not contact members of the Center staff.
A document request was sent to NOAA July 12 from Chairman Gordon,
Chairman Lampson, and Chairman Miller of this committeee, and Chairman
Dingell and Chairman Stupak of the Energy and Commerce Committeee,
asking for records covering Ms. Glackin's June 14 memorandum and
communications between various NOAA officials concerning Mr. Proenza.
At this point, a number of important questions remain:
Why was Proenza chosen to be Director of the highest
profiled Center at NOAA?
Beyond the items listed in the Glackin memorandum--
which NOAA stresses was not a reprimand document and was not
placed in Mr. Proenza's personnel file--are there any other
actions that better justify the action to place Proenza on
leave?
Why was there such a depth of dissatisfaction over
Proenza's focus on a particular satellite?
What is needed to properly equip the Tropical
Prediction Center, and are those resources available at this
time?
Was the Tropical Prediction Center incapable of
carrying out its core task of identifying, tracking and
predicting hurricanes before the evaluation team was dispatched
by Admiral Lautenbacher?
Chairman Lampson. The hearing will come to order. I wish
you all a good morning. Welcome to today's hearing which we
have entitled ``Tracking the Storm at the National Hurricane
Center.''
We are here today to examine the situation that has
developed over the past few weeks at the National Hurricane
Center. Things may be relatively calm over the Atlantic but it
has been somewhat stormy at the Center, and this is a situation
that must be resolved so this organization can do its important
work for the public, forecasting hurricanes and issuing
warnings to the emergency management community and to the
public. They have been an extremely important part of my life
for many, many years that I have lived on the Gulf Coast of
this country where we have had some fairly serious storms, as
you all know.
Today we will hear from Mr. Bill Proenza, who was asked by
Admiral Lautenbacher to become the Director of the Hurricane
Center in December of last year. Mr. Proenza did not apply for
this job or ask to be considered for the opening created by the
retirement of Mr. Max Mayfield. Mr. Proenza was well known to
the Southern Region and by his superiors at the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) headquarters. He
led the Southern Region Office of the National Weather Service
for the past seven years, and due to that position served on
the NOAA corporate board. By all accounts, he has a reputation
for speaking his mind and occasionally ruffling feathers in an
effort to change the way things are done inside the National
Weather Service when he believed that it was in the public
interest to do so. So NOAA leadership selected an experienced
and dedicated NWS--National Weather Service--manager to be the
new Director of the Hurricane Center. Now, before he had been
in the position for even a single hurricane season, NOAA
dispatched an assessment team to the Center. A number of
employees at the Center have become upset enough to call for
Mr. Proenza to step down and Admiral Lautenbacher has placed
Mr. Proenza on temporary leave from the position he asked him
to accept just seven months ago.
In the background, we have some other controversies.
Shortly after his appointment to the Hurricane Center, Mr.
Proenza drew attention to the fact that a satellite, QuikSCAT,
that provides data used in forecasting, was beyond its design
life and if it failed, forecasts could be degraded, and as I
understand it, he wanted NOAA to prepare for this possibility
and have a plan to replace it. His statements to the press
about this issue clearly made NOAA headquarters uncomfortable,
uncomfortable enough that Acting Director of the Weather
Service, Mary Glackin, issued Mr. Proenza a memo on June 14
stating the belief that Mr. Proenza's statements were
undermining confidence in the Center's forecasting abilities.
What is going on? That is all we would like to know. This
is a hurricane season. The only storms the Center should be
dealing with are those that form out in the ocean. I still
don't fully understand why Admiral Lautenbacher believed that
dispatching an assessment team with little experience or
knowledge of the National Weather Service or forecasting to the
Center was the appropriate way to deal with staff complaints
about Mr. Proenza. It seems the arrival of the Assessment Team
exacerbated problems with the staff and has left the National
Hurricane Center without a director. Is this the case of a
disruptive renegade manager that has mistreated and alienated
the staff at the National Hurricane Center and has put its
forecasts and warning mission in jeopardy or has NOAA
leadership helped to foster staff resentment of Mr. Proenza and
used this resentment to justify removing a career employee who
embarrassed NOAA's leadership by pointing out the shortcomings
in the agency budgets and their failure to plan for future
replacement of essential forecasting equipment? I don't know
but we are going to try to figure it out and to figure out what
has happened.
At a minimum, NOAA leadership has made at least two bad
decisions. First, either Mr. Proenza was the wrong choice to
lead the Hurricane Center in December or it was premature to
send in an assessment team and remove him in July. The second
bad decision was the Admiral's failure to inform me and two
other Members of this committee that he met with on June 27 of
the potential problems at the Hurricane Center or his plan to
send an assessment team there on July 2. It is clear from the
documents we received last night that Admiral Lautenbacher not
only was aware of the problems but had already set the plans in
motion to dispatch the Assessment Team to Miami.
We cannot afford any more bad decisions. It is hurricane
season, and if we want to make it personal, I can. I live
there, where we have been displaced multiple times from our
homes, damage to our homes, fright to our children. The people
at the Center need to work together to perform the essential
task this nation needs: providing forecasts and warnings of
hurricanes. The Center needs strong, competent leadership to
serve the public. This is serious business and we need to
straighten this out before we are in the midst of a real storm.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Lampson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Nick Lampson
Good morning. We are here today to examine the situation that has
developed over the past few weeks at the National Hurricane Center.
Things may be relatively calm over the Atlantic, but it has been
stormy at the Center and this is a situation that must be resolved so
this organization can do its important work for the public--forecasting
hurricanes and issuing warnings to the emergency management community
and the public.
Today, we will hear from Mr. Bill Proenza, who was asked by Admiral
Lautenbacher to become the Director of the Hurricane Center in December
of last year. Mr. Proenza did not apply for this job or ask to be
considered for the opening created by the retirement of Mr. Max
Mayfield.
Mr. Proenza was well-known to the Southern Region and by his
superiors at NOAA Headquarters. He led the Southern Region Office of
the National Weather Service (NWS) for the past seven years and, due to
that position, served on the NOAA Corporate Board.
By all accounts he has a reputation for speaking his mind and,
occasionally ruffling feathers in an effort to change the way things
are done inside the NWS when he believed it was in the public interest
to do so.
So, NOAA leadership selected an experienced and dedicated NWS
manager to be the new Director of the Hurricane Center.
Now, before he has been in the position for a single hurricane
season, NOAA has dispatched an assessment team to the Center, a number
of employees at the Center have become upset enough to call for Mr.
Proenza to step down, and Admiral Lautenbacher has placed Mr. Proenza
on temporary leave from the position he asked him to accept just seven
months ago.
In the background, we have some other controversies. Shortly after
his appointment to the hurricane center, Mr. Proenza drew attention to
the fact that a satellite--QuikSCAT--that provides data used in
forecasting was beyond its design-life and, if it failed forecasts
could be degraded.
As I understand it, he wanted NOAA to prepare for this possibility
and have a plan to replace it. His statements to the press about this
issue, clearly made NOAA Headquarters uncomfortable--uncomfortable
enough that Acting Director of the Weather Service, Mary Glackin issued
Mr. Proenza a memo on June 14 stating the belief that Mr. Proenza's
statements were undermining confidence in Center's forecasting
abilities.
What is going on? That's what we'd all like to know. This is
hurricane season. The only storms the Center should be dealing with are
those that form out in the ocean. I still do not fully understand why
Admiral Lautenbacher believed that dispatching an assessment team with
little experience or knowledge of NWS or forecasting to the Center was
the appropriate way to deal with staff complaints about Mr. Proenza. It
seems the arrival of the Assessment Team exacerbated problems with the
staff, and has left the NHC without a Director.
Is this the case of a disruptive, renegade Manager that mistreated
and alienated the staff of the National Hurricane Center and has put
its forecast and warning mission in jeopardy? Or has NOAA leadership
helped to foster staff resentment of Mr. Proenza and used this
resentment to justify removing a career employee who embarrassed NOAA
leadership by pointing out shortcomings in the Agency budgets and their
failure to plan for future replacement of essential forecasting
equipment?
I don't know, but we are going to try to figure out was has
happened. At a minimum, NOAA leadership has made at least two bad
decisions. First, either Mr. Proenza was the wrong choice to lead the
Hurricane Center in December or, it was premature to send in an
assessment team and remove him in July. The second bad decision was the
Admiral's failure to inform me and two other Members of this committee
he met with on June 27 of potential problems at the Hurricane Center or
his plan to send an assessment team there on July 2.
It is clear from the documents we received last night, Admiral
Lautenbacher not only was aware of the problems, but had already set
the plans in motion to dispatch the Assessment Team to Miami.
We cannot afford any more bad decisions. It's hurricane season. The
people at the Center need to work together to perform the essential
task this nation needs--providing forecasts and warnings of hurricanes.
The Center needs strong, competent leadership to serve the public. This
is serious business and we need to straighten this out before we are in
the midst of a real storm.
Chairman Lampson. I will call on the Chairman of our
Oversight Subcommittee, the distinguished Mr. Miller.
Chairman Miller. I thank Chairman Lampson. I also don't
know what is going on here but I would like to know and I think
it merits a closer look by these two subcommittees and by
Congress, and I agree with Mr. Lampson that the work of TPC,
the Tropical Prediction Center, is important to a lot of
Americans, important to Mr. Lampson in his district. It is
important to me in North Carolina. In the last 11 years, North
Carolina has been badly damaged by a number of storms,
particularly Floyd and Fran have done a great deal of damage,
and it is important that we have the best forecasting of those
storms that we possibly can so that we can be prepared to
minimize the damage.
On first impression of what has happened at the Tropical
Prediction Center, the TPC, sounds like office politics,
particularly bad office politics, particularly vicious office
politics, but office politics, something that happens every day
all across America. There are disgruntled employees who are
having trouble adjusting to a new manager, not getting along
with the new manager. There is a new manager or new director
who is trying to adjust to a new set of employees, to a new
chain of command, but on closer look there are certainly parts
of this that don't appear to add up, facts that don't quite add
up, something doesn't seem quite right and it certainly merits
a closer look by Congress to see if it is just particularly
toxic office politics or something that should concern us more
than that.
We know that Mr. Proenza, Bill Proenza, before being named
Director of the Tropical Prediction Center, the TPC, in Miami
had been a strong, well-regarded leader through seven years as
head of the National Weather Service in the Southern Region. By
all reports, Mr. Proenza had a strong relationship with the
Weather Service union. He was seen by line employees as one of
their staunchest advocates, staunchest supporters. The contrast
to the apparently toxic relationship to the employees at TPC
could not be stronger, could not be more striking. We would
assume that if Admiral Lautenbacher was convinced that Mr.
Proenza would be the right replacement for Max Mayfield, he
must have thought that Mr. Proenza was a competent leader and
manager. He would not have called Mr. Proenza to ask him to
take that position if he did not think that. It doesn't make
sense. That is why we are here today trying to understand why
an apparently proven leader with a known track record has come
to find himself in such grave trouble with his own employees
and his own managers.
But once you look past the apparently spontaneous rebellion
by employees at the lab at the TPC and look at what has
happened at the management level above Mr. Proenza in the chain
of command, not below him, there are further questions about
what the real reason is for what has gone wrong. The question
becomes whether Mr. Proenza was pushed out or is being pushed
out because he was a critic within NOAA, not because of his
difficulties in dealing with his employees. Is it because he is
a whistleblower, because he was willing to stand up to the
people who are higher than him in the hierarchy, not because of
his relationship with the people below him in the hierarchy?
Mr. Proenza called attention to the failure of NOAA to take
aggressive steps to find a replacement for QuikSCAT. I don't
claim to know all the technical details of QuikSCAT and that is
something that Mr. Proenza has talked about again and again.
Some have criticized his criticisms, his comments and the
science for the basis for some of his observations, but Mr.
Proenza, like all of us, has had to rely on staff for
information, so if he is wrong about that, there is certainly
blame to go around. It is not all his fault and it certainly is
not his fault for raising those questions, questions that many
within NOAA and the Weather Service are raising. And it is hard
to argue that the degradation of QuikSCAT or one model matters
more than another, well, all that misses the point that
virtually everyone in the meteorological community, all the
people who really do know what they are talking about when it
comes to this agree that they do need QuikSCAT, so the loss of
QuikSCAT is a real problem. The source for Mr. Proenza's
information shows up in NOAA presentations to the National
Research Council in April, in February's interagency strategic
research plan for tropical cyclones produced by the Office of
Federal Coordinator of Meteorology. To argue about the
projected degradation or whether one model matters more than
another just misses the point. He has called attention to the
amount of money that NOAA has spent on celebrating its 200th
anniversary, an amount that appears to be more than $4 million
over fiscal year 2006-2007, this fiscal year, if you include
the cost of employees working on the issue. He is opposed to
Weather Service downsizing, which had been one of the hallmarks
of Mr. Johnson's tenure at the Weather Service, but for that he
has earned the gratitude of Congress and of the employees'
union. Not every manager welcomes a critic within the agency
but Congress certainly does. It is certainly easier for us to
do our job in oversight if we did not face a smooth wall of
unanimity, of one opinion without variation, and Mr. Proenza
has certainly been willing to be a critic and to raise
questions that has helped us do our job.
So Chairman Lampson, I look forward to the questions. I
look forward to finding out more about whether this is simply a
case of office politics or it is the case of an agency not
welcoming criticisms of Mr. Proenza.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Brad Miller
On first impression, what's been unfolding at the Tropical
Prediction Center (TPC), it sounds like office politics, something that
happens every day at workplaces all across America. Certainly, there
are disgruntled employees having difficulty adjusting to a new manager
and a new Director trying to adjust to a new chain of command. But on a
closer look, something just doesn't seem quite right, the facts don't
quite add up.
We know that Bill Proenza, before being named Director of the
Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) in Miami, had demonstrated that he was
a strong, well-regarded leader throughout his seven years as head of
the National Weather service Southern Region. We know that by all
reports, Mr. Proenza had a strong relationship with the Weather Service
union, and was seen by line-employees as one of their staunchest
supporters.
We would assume, that if Admiral Lautenbacher was convinced that
Mr. Proenza would be a superb replacement for the retiring Max
Mayfield, he must have also thought that Mr. Proenza was a competent
leader and manager.
What doesn't make sense is why we are here today, trying to
understand why a proven leader with a known track-record has come to
find himself in grave difficulties with his own employees and managers.
If you look past the apparently spontaneous rebellion by employees
in the lab, and look past what has unfolded at the managerial level of
NOAA, the question arises whether Mr. Proenza was pushed out because he
was a whistle blower, a truth teller.
Mr. Proenza called attention to the failure of NOAA to take
aggressive steps to find a replacement for QuikSCAT. That has come to
be a major talking point for Mr. Proenza in recent months. Some have
criticized his comments and the science underlying his observations. To
these critics I would note that Mr. Proenza had been relying on staff
for this information and so the blame, if there is any, should be
spread widely. In addition, to argue about the projected degradation or
whether one model matters more than another misses the point that
virtually everyone in the meteorological community agrees they need
QuikSCAT. Finally, the source for Mr. Proenza's information shows up in
NOAA presentations to the National Research Council in April and in
February's ``Interagency Strategic Research Plan for Tropical
Cyclones'' produced by the Office of the Federal Coordinator for
Meteorology. To argue about the projected degradation or whether one
model matters more than another misses the point.
He also called attention to the amount of money being spent by NOAA
to celebrate its 200th Anniversary--an amount that appears to exceed $4
million over FY 2006-2007 if one includes the costs of employees
working on the issue.
Finally, Mr. Proenza opposed the weather service ``down-sizing''
efforts that had been the hallmark of Mr. Johnson's tenure at the
National Weather Service. For that he earned the gratitude of many in
Congress and in the Union.
Not every manager would welcome Mr. Proenza's willingness to speak
out. Some would see him as an annoyance. In addition to the possible
motive of silencing an internal critic, the actions of the NOAA
management suggest that something isn't right here, that this isn't
about Mr. Proenza's deficiencies as a manager. The chronology of events
just doesn't fit.
By the spring of 2007, Louis Uccellini, Proenza's
immediate supervisor and head of the NECP, began keeping a file
on Mr. Proenza containing apparently minor administrative
violations by Proenza. It should be noted that while Mr.
Uccellini was Mr. Proenza's superior, he was Mr. Proenza's
junior in the weather service and he and Mr. Proenza had been
essentially of equal rank when Proenza was head of the Southern
Region of NWS.
In April of 2007, senior staff at NOAA met at the
Admiral Lautenbacher's direction to work on something labeled
in an e-mail as the ``Proenza plan.'' This plan was to have
five steps and be run by legal for review. . . It was shared
with D.L. Johnson, then head of the National Weather Service
and Jack Kelly, Deputy Under Secretary at NOAA.
On June 14, three days after being named as Acting
Director of the Weather Service, Ms. Mary Glacken approved a
memo that listed Mr. Proenza's minor administrative violations
that Mr. Uccellini had collected and urged Mr. Proenza to work
through the chain of command and adhere more strenuously to new
NOAA media policy.
On June 21 or 22, TPC senior forecasters--going
against the chain of command--complained to Ms. Glacken about
Bill Proenza's leadership. The call was organized by the
Executive Officer in the Center, Dr. Ahsha Tribble, who was
seen by many at the TPC to be a ``headquarters person.'' Dr.
Tribble had arrived at the Hurricane Center just last September
after working as Technical Chief of Staff to the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere.
By June 26, Admiral Lautenbacher assembled a team to
be dispatched from Commerce to the Center to evaluate its
operations. The team did not include any management or weather
experts. Rather than turn to outside parties with expertise in
the relevant areas--administration (National Association of
Public Administration) or meteorology (National Academy of
Science)--the Admiral selected people from within Commerce who
had no background in weather service forecast office issues and
little expertise in the science. The team's preparation
included meeting with the senior management figures who had
played a role in preparing Mr. Proenza's June memo and in
launching the ``Proenza plan.''
On July 2, the Team arrived on site. Mr. Proenza
learned that this team was being sent by a telephone call from
the Admiral that was designed to be timed with their arrival.
While Mr. Proenza was unaware that a team was being dispatched
to the Center of which he was Director, other people at the
center knew of their pending arrival. Ahsha Tribble, apparently
was assigned to greet the Team and take them to Proenza's
office.
I hope that our witnesses today can explain some of this. I look
forward to hearing Mr. Proenza's side of the story. I look forward to
hearing from Admiral Lautenbacher on his management of NOAA and of the
TPC.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Chairman Miller.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Inglis, Ranking Member of the
Energy and Environment Subcommittee, for an opening statement.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Great nations have governments that ask questions of
themselves so we are here to ask some questions. The loyal
opposition to the Administration, that would be my colleagues
to my left, naturally smell rats from time to time and it could
be that there is a rat. The two Chairmen have just spoken about
how perhaps this is a critic who is being silenced. I think the
evidence may show here today that it is equally plausible that
what we have here is a mismatched manager and a personnel
matter and nothing more. So we have a hearing. Great nations
have governments that ask questions of themselves and we are
here to ask questions, and we have heard some speculation about
some real rats out there. It may be a fairly straightforward
personnel matter. It appears that the Administration put a
highly recommended and well-qualified director into the office
of the hurricane director and thereafter about half of the
staff at that Center signed a letter asking that Mr. Proenza to
be removed. Perhaps they are acting on some personal vendetta,
that may be shown here today, or perhaps they just didn't like
his management style. In any event, the administrator clearly
did the right thing by appointing an independent panel to
investigate the situation. That panel was chaired by Dr. Jim
Turner, who will testify here today.
Chairman Lampson mentioned that this fellow may not have
expertise in hurricane forecasting, and I would ask, if you
think it is a management matter, why would you care if the
fellow had expertise in hurricanes? The question is management
if it is a personnel matter in which case you could hire a
consulting firm to go and ask questions. It happens all the
time. Consultants don't necessarily know how to make a chemical
product in a chemical factory. They don't have to. They are
asking management questions and so if that is what it was, it
is pretty clear that it is appropriate to form a panel and go
ask management-related questions.
We can agree that Mr. Proenza has a distinguished resume
and a history of positive performance reviews. Because of his
success as Southern Regional Director of the National Weather
Service he appeared qualified for the NHC Director position. In
his new role, he became concerned about the potential loss of
the QuikSCAT satellite. Some, as I understand it, would agree
with Mr. Proenza that QuikSCAT helps forecasters better
understand the behavior of tropical storms. Others would assert
that Mr. Proenza exaggerated the impacts of the potential loss
of the QuikSCAT.
Mr. Proenza's management style will be discussed here
today. Surely we need a steady and reliable hand at the wheel
of the National Hurricane Center. With the peak of hurricane
season fast approaching, Admiral Lautenbacher was told that Mr.
Proenza had become so disruptive that forecasters were saying
they could no longer do their jobs. We will hear today that Mr.
Proenza's management style became such an issue that his
immediate supervisors lost confidence, his employees lost
confidence and the independent operational Assessment Team lost
confidence in his ability to manage the Center. We will hear
that Admiral Lautenbacher decided that Mr. Proenza, as
qualified as he had been at the outset, was perhaps miscast as
a director of the Center. I hope my colleagues in the press
will stay around to hear the testimony of Admiral Lautenbacher
and Dr. Turner to hear, as Paul Harvey says, the rest of the
story. Although it seems odd not to accord a senior
Administration official the courtesy of testifying at the
outset of this hearing today, and the Chairman and I have had
discussions about that, I trust that we will all wait to form
conclusions until all the witnesses have testified.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inglis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bob Inglis
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
For my home State of South Carolina and many others in coastal
areas, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) is a critical national
resource. The lives of individuals and families depend on the
information the Center provides. Given the NHC's importance for
protecting our citizens, we should carefully protect the integrity of
the National Hurricane Center.
We may find that we are here today discussing a fairly
straightforward personnel matter. It appears that the Administration
put a highly recommended and well qualified director into the office of
Hurricane Director. Thereafter, about half of the staff at the
Hurricane Center signed a letter asking that Mr. Proenza be removed.
Perhaps they were acting on some personal vendetta. Perhaps they just
didn't like his management style.
In any event, the Administrator did the right thing by appointing
an independent panel to investigate the situation. That panel was
chaired by Dr. Jim Turner, who will testify here today.
We can agree that the Mr. Proenza has a distinguished resume and a
history of positive performance reviews. Because of his success as
Southern Regional Director of the National Weather Service, he appeared
qualified for the NHC Director position. In his new role, he became
concerned about the potential loss of the QuikSCAT satellite. Some
would agree with Mr. Proenza that QuikSCAT helps forecasters better
understand the behavior of tropical storms; others would assert that
Mr. Proenza exaggerated the impacts of a potential loss of QuikSCAT.
Mr. Proenza's management style will be discussed here today. We
need a steady and reliable hand at the wheel at the National Hurricane
Center. With the peak of hurricane season fast approaching, Admiral
Lautenbacher was told that Mr. Proenza had become so disruptive that
forecasters were saying they could no longer do their jobs.
We will hear today that Mr. Proenza's management style became such
an issue that:
his immediate supervisors lost confidence,
his employees lost confidence,
and the independent operational Assessment Team lost
confidence in his ability to manage the Center.
We will hear that Admiral Lautenbacher decided that Mr. Proenza, as
qualified as he had been at the outset, was miscast as the Director of
the Center.
I hope that my colleagues and the press stay around to hear the
testimony of Admiral Lautenbacher and Dr. Turner. Although it seems odd
to not accord a senior Administration official the courtesy of
testifying at the outset of this hearing today, I trust that we will
all wait to form conclusions until all of the witnesses have testified.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Inglis, and the Chair will
now recognize Mr. Sensenbrenner, the Ranking Member on the
Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In December of 2006, Mr. Bill Proenza was announced as the
Director of the Tropical Prediction Center. In July of 2007,
after his superiors, employees and an independent assessment
team questioned his management of the TPC, the administrator of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration placed Mr.
Proenza on temporary leave pending the final recommendation of
an assessment team. The independent Assessment Team
unequivocally found that the TPC could not operate effectively
under Mr. Proenza's leadership. Our country is in the middle of
a hurricane season. After Hurricane Katrina, everyone is aware
of how dangerous this season can be.
The Tropical Prediction Center compiles data about ocean
temperature, wind speed and direction, barometric pressure and
other factors and uses this data to forecast hurricanes. When a
storm is within three days of a potential landfall, the TPC
issues official forecasts and warnings every six hours. As the
storm gets closer to land, the forecasts are updated even more
frequently. Lives depend on the work at the TPC.
Last month in the midst of an investigation of NASA's
Inspector General, I warned that we risk creating a culture of
overzealous oversight. I reiterate that point today. There is a
fine line between good oversight and harmful interference.
Playing politics with hurricane forecasters endangers the lives
of people the TPC works to protect. Admiral Conrad
Lautenbacher, the Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere, replaced Mr. Proenza because he was an ineffective
director. In the spring of this year, Mr. Proenza made several
exaggerated and inaccurate public statements complaining about
a lack of resources and funding at the TPC, the potential
failure of one of the TPC satellites and NOAA's use of funds
for the 200th anniversary celebration of the Coastal Survey. In
an independent assessment of the TPC performed by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, reviewers observed that
Mr. Proenza made statements about the limited lifetime of the
QuikSCAT satellite and the resulting impact on forecasts
``without context or caveat.'' The reviewers further reported
that many staff believe that Mr. Proenza intentionally
misrepresented their views and repeated certain false claims
even after he was corrected. On June 18, Mary Glackin, the
Acting Director of the National Weather Service, received phone
calls from 11 employees of the TPC including seven out of the
nine hurricane forecasters raising concerns about Mr. Proenza's
leadership. The employees complained that Mr. Proenza
interfered with their ability to do their jobs. On June 19, Ms.
Glackin communicated her fears to Admiral Lautenbacher. The
Admiral then sent an independent assessment team to report on
the situation. Meanwhile, staff discontent was increasing.
Three senior forecasters called for Mr. Proenza's removal and
nearly half of the 46 staff members at the TPC signed a
petition demanding his removal because according to the Center
staff, the effective functioning of the Center was at stake
with Mr. Proenza as its director. On July 6, the Assessment
Team requested that Mr. Proenza be placed on leave because he
was jeopardizing the Center's ability to do its job. Three days
later, Admiral Lautenbacher informed Mr. Proenza that he was
being placed on leave.
Upon completion of its report, the independent team's
recommendation was unequivocal: ``The current TPC director
should be reassigned and not allowed to return to his position
at the Center. This should be done due to his failure to
demonstrate leadership within the TPC.'' Such substantial
questions were raised about Mr. Proenza that a failure to
replace him would have been irresponsible. During this
subcommittee's investigation of NASA's Inspector General, the
Majority continuously objected to having an inspector general
in place who did not have the confidence of his staff. In the
present situation, employees have made similar complaints and
raised the same concerns about Mr. Proenza's leadership. I have
no doubt that if Mr. Proenza was still serving as the Director
of the TPC, this subcommittee would be waving the employee
petition in front of Admiral Lautenbacher demanding that he
take action. Mr. Proenza's name would have been added to the
growing list of personnel decisions demanded of the
Administration by Congress.
Instead, the Majority is questioning the veracity of the
employee's complaints. In a July 12 letter to Admiral
Lautenbacher, five Democratic Congressmen wrote that ``It is
alleged that staff was pressured to sign onto what became a
well-publicized letter of complaint against Mr. Proenza.'' I
have no idea who made this allegation. According to the Orlando
Sentinel, staffers at the TPC angrily objected to suggestions
that some were pressured into signing the letter. The Center's
Administrative Officer said ``no one was pressured to sign that
letter but they aren't calling the people who signed it to find
it. Why not? I smell politics at work here.'' Conspicuously,
none of the employees who worked under Mr. Proenza at the TPC
are here to testify today. Instead, the Majority invited two
Emergency Management officials who worked with him when he
served in his former position as Southern Regional Director for
the Weather Service. No one has raised any issues about Mr.
Proenza's effectiveness in that role. The complaints here have
all been about his ability to lead the TPC. It appears that the
Majority has held today's hearing and questioned the
independence of the Center's staff without even talking to the
staff that made the complaints.
Dr. James Turner is here to testify about the findings of
the independent Assessment Team but he is here because he was
invited by the Republicans. The Majority was prepared to hold a
hearing investigating the replacement of Mr. Proenza without
inviting the independent assessors who reported on the
management of the TPC or the TPC employees whose
recommendations and complaint lead to Dr. Proenza's
replacement. No wonder the Center's administrative officers
smelled politics.
None of us are strangers to politics but to disregard our
country's readiness to obtain a political advantage extends
beyond recklessness. I am disappointed that I have to state
what should be the obvious, that unwarranted interference with
the operation of the small hurricane center at its most
critical time can only cause more harm than good. The Tropical
Prediction Center should be allowed to focus on the hurricane
season instead of being forced to weather this Congressional
storm.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
In December, 2006, Mr. Bill Proenza was announced as the Director
of the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC). In July 2007, after his
superiors, employees, and an independent assessment team questioned his
management of the TPC, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) placed Mr. Proenza on temporary leave
pending the final recommendation of the Assessment Team. The
independent Assessment Team unequivocally found that the TPC could not
operate effectively under Mr. Proenza's leadership.
The United States is in the middle of hurricane season. After
Hurricane Katrina, everyone is aware how dangerous this season can be.
The Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) compiles data about ocean
temperature, wind speed and direction, barometric pressure, and other
factors, and uses this data to forecast hurricanes. When a storm is
within three days of potential landfall, the TPC issues official
forecasts and warnings every six hours. As a storm gets closer to land,
the forecasts are updated even more frequently. Lives depend on the
work at the TPC.
Last month, in the midst of an investigation of NASA's Inspector
General, I warned that we risked creating a culture of overzealous
oversight. I reiterate that point today: There is a fine line between
good oversight and harmful interference. Playing politics with
hurricane forecasters endangers the lives of the people the TPC works
to protect.
Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, the Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere, replaced Mr. Proenza because he was an
ineffective director. In the spring of this year, Mr. Proenza made
several exaggerated and inaccurate public statements complaining about
a lack of resources and funding at the TPC, the potential failure of
one of the TPC's satellites, and NOAA's use of funds for the 200th
Anniversary celebration of the coastal survey. In an independent
assessment of the TPC performed by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), reviewers observed that Mr. Proenza made
statements about the limited lifetime of the QuikSCAT satellite and the
resulting impact on forecasts ``without context or caveat.'' The
reviewers further reported that many staff believed that Mr. Proenza
intentionally misrepresented their views and repeated certain false
claims even after he was corrected.
On June 18, Mary Glackin, the Acting Director of the National
Weather Service, received phone calls from 11 employees of the TPC,
including seven out of the nine hurricane forecasters, raising concerns
about Mr. Proenza's leadership. The employees complained that Mr.
Proenza interfered with their ability to do their jobs. On June 19, Ms.
Glackin communicated her fears to Admiral Lautenbacher. Admiral
Lautenbacher then sent the independent Assessment Team from NIST to
report on the situation.
Meanwhile, staff discontent was increasing. Three senior
forecasters called for Mr. Proenza's removal and nearly half of the 46
staff members at the TPC signed a petition demanding his removal
because, according to Center staff, the ``effective functioning'' of
the Center was at stake with Mr. Proenza as its director. On July 6,
the NIST Assessment Team requested that Mr. Proenza be placed on leave
because he was jeopardizing the Center's ability to do its job. Three
days later, Mr. Lautenbacher informed Mr. Proenza that he was being
placed on leave.
Upon completion of its report, the independent team's
recommendation was unequivocal:
The current TPC director should be reassigned and not be
allowed to return to his position at the center. This should be
done due to his failure to demonstrate leadership within the
TPC. . .
Such substantial questions were raised about Mr. Proenza, that a
failure to replace him would have been irresponsible. During this
subcommittee's investigation of NASA's Inspector General, the Majority
continuously objected to leaving an inspector general in place who did
not have the confidence of his staff. In the present situation,
employees have made similar complaints and raised the same concerns
about Mr. Proenza's leadership. I have no doubt that, if Mr. Proenza
were still serving as the Director of the TPC, this subcommittee would
be waiving the employee petition in front of Admiral Lautenbacher
demanding that he take action. Mr. Proenza's name would have been added
to the growing list of personnel decisions demanded of the
Administration by Congress.
Instead, the Majority is questioning the veracity of the employees'
complaints. In a July 12 letter to Admiral Lautenbacher, five
Democratic Congressman wrote that ``it is alleged that staff was
pressured to sign on to what became a well-publicized letter of
complaint'' against Mr. Proenza. I have no idea who made this
allegation. According to the Orlando Sentinel, staffers at the TPC
``angrily objected to suggestions that some were `pressured' into
signing the letter.''
The Center's Administrative Officer said, ``No one was pressured to
sign that letter, but they aren't calling the people who signed it to
find it. Why not? I smell politics at work here.''
Conspicuously, none of the employers who worked under Mr. Proenza
at the TPC are here to testify today. Instead, the Majority invited two
emergency management officials who worked with Mr. Proenza when he
served in his former position as the Southern Region Director for the
National Weather Service. No one has raised any issues with Mr.
Proenza's effectiveness in that role. The complaints have all been
about his ability to lead the TPC. It appears that the Majority has
held today's hearing and questioned the independence of the Center's
staff without even talking to the staff that made those complaints.
Dr. James Turner is here to testify about the findings of the
independent Assessment Team, but he is here because he was invited by
the Minority. The Majority was prepared to hold a hearing
``investigating'' the replacement of Dr. Proenza without inviting the
independent assessors who reported on management of the TPC or the TPC
employees whose recommendations and complaints lead to Dr. Proenza's
replacements. No wonder the Center's Administrative Officer smelled
politics.
None of us are strangers to politics, but to disregard our
country's readiness to obtain a political advantage extends beyond
recklessness. I am disappointed that I have to state what should be
obvious, that unwarranted interference with the operation of a small
hurricane center at its most critical time can only cause more harm
than good. The Tropical Prediction Center should be allowed to focus on
the hurricane season instead of being forced to weather this
Congressional storm.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Sensenbrenner. Just for
the record, staff has talked both to signers and non-signers of
the petition.
If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements for the record, your statements will be added to the
record at this point.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ron Klein
I want to thank my good friend, the distinguished Chairman of this
subcommittee, along with the Ranking Member for holding this hearing
and allowing me to participate. I can think of only a handful of issues
as important as keeping the American public safe from hurricanes and
other deadly storms. It's a fundamental duty of the Federal Government
that I and all Americans take very seriously. That's why I have taken a
high level of interest in the health of our weather satellites, and in
particular, the Quick Scatterometer, otherwise known as QuikSCAT.
On June 5, 2006, NOAA convened a workshop with other federal
agencies to assess, among other things, the impact of satellite surface
wind speed and direction measurements. QuikSCAT, one of two weather
satellites at the heart of the workshop's assessment, received several
eye-catching quotes in support of its usefulness. Rick Knabb, senior
hurricane specialist at the National Hurricane Center, said, ``When
QuikSCAT is gone, it will be like going back seven years in tropical
cyclone analysis.'' He also added, ``Losing QuikSCAT would be like
losing a limb, especially for Tropical Analysis and Forecasting
Branch.''
I've heard similar comments during my many meetings with NOAA
officials, including from General David Johnson, former Director of the
National Weather Service. And during my recent visit to the National
Hurricane Center, several forecasters independently verified to me the
value of QuikSCAT's data when detecting and analyzing hurricanes and
tropical storms. They showed me how the cone used to predict the path
of a storm may be altered when QuikSCAT's data is incorporated, making
the cone narrower and the timing of landfall more precise.
Now, in the midst of the controversy surrounding Mr. Proenza's
dismissal as director of the Center, I'm hearing comments that
essentially retreat from the earlier support of QuikSCAT. There are
accusations that Mr. Proenza misrepresented or overstated the science
when saying two-day and three-day forecasts would be adversely affected
by the loss of QuikSCAT, and one senior forecaster at the Hurricane
Center even compared the loss of QuikSCAT to ``driving a BMW with cloth
rather than leather seats.''
This sudden retreat concerns me. While I recognize that there may
be disputes over Mr. Proenza's management or administrative style, I am
not in a position to evaluate his employment status. However, while I
recognize that disagreements over scientific studies can occur among
reasonable and reputable scientists, my fear is that this retreat may
be born out in part by political motivations.
Such actions may have distracted us from legitimate inquiries into
QuikSCAT along with NOAA's other weather satellites. Fortunately, this
committee has taken its oversight responsibilities seriously and
convened this hearing, inviting me to participate. I'm very grateful
because from the very beginning of my interest in QuikSCAT, I've been
asking two very simple questions to NOAA. How did we get to this point
where a useful weather satellite is on its last legs with no
replacement set to launch, and what are NOAA's short-term and long-term
contingency plans to replace the loss of its data. I should add that we
also now need to inquire whether the QuikSCAT retreat is legitimate and
if this once-praised satellite has value. But if it does, I feel it is
imperative that we find out what are the backup plans, when it fails,
to replace the data and other information it provides in the evaluation
of hurricanes and tropical storms.
I sincerely hope at the end of this hearing that I can leave and
say that we have logical, supportable answers. But if I'm not
satisfied, I intend to keep pressing to ensure that our forecasters
have the best resources and technology available to help them keep the
American public safe from hurricanes and other deadly storms. I look
forward to the outcome and the responses of the distinguished panelists
and Subcommittee Members, and thank the esteemed Chairman and Ranking
Member for their leadership on this issue.
Chairman Lampson. I ask unanimous consent to enter into the
record selected materials that have been provided to the
Subcommittees by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. Is there any objection? So ordered.
[The information follows:]
Chairman Lampson. At this point to mention, and I will talk
with Admiral Lautenbacher in just a few minutes regarding this,
but we did ask two members of the NOAA management chain to be
here this morning. We expected them to be. We were notified at
around 9:00 that they would not be here.
At this point, I would ask unanimous consent to allow
Representative Ron Klein to join us here on the dais and to be
allowed to participate in this committee hearing. Is there
objection?
Mr. Inglis. Reserving the right to objection--hold on a
second.
Chairman Lampson. Without objection, so ordered.
Representative Klein, you are welcome to join us.
At this point I would like to introduce our first panel.
Mr. William Proenza is the Director of the Tropical Prediction
Center, the National Hurricane Center, National Centers for
Environmental Prediction, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. He will discuss his service as director of the
Tropical Prediction Center, the National Hurricane Center, and
his experiences during the recent events that led the NOAA
administrator to place him on leave.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary
inquiry. Is it not the practice of this committee to require
witnesses to file their written testimony 24 hours in advance
so that the Members and the staff of the Committee can review
that testimony and draft appropriate questions?
Chairman Lampson. We did not ask for testimony, which I
understand is common practice. With circumstances like this, we
did ask for his biography and it was submitted.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. A further parliamentary inquiry. Has
written testimony been submitted in a timely manner by all of
the other witnesses on the other two panels?
Chairman Lampson. Yes. Written testimony of everyone has
been submitted.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Further parliamentary inquiry. I am
referring to the Committee rules governing procedure of the
Committee on Science and Technology that says insofar as is
practical, each witness who is to appear before the Committee
shall file no later than 24 hours in advance of his or her
appearance both a statement of the proposed testimony and a CV
in printed copy and electronic form. Why was it not practical
for Mr. Proenza to file his statement pursuant to the rules
when it was practical for all of the other witnesses to do so?
Chairman Lampson. He submitted his bio, which is what we
asked him for.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Further parliamentary inquiry. Then why
did not the Chair ask for the proposed testimony, which is also
required under the rules, since apparently all of the other
witnesses were able to submit proposed testimony?
Chairman Lampson. I think there is a difference between the
two types of information that was coming. I think that it is
traditional when persons who could be considered whistleblowers
are coming before a panel that they not be asked to submit
written testimony.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Well, a further parliamentary inquiry.
It is also traditional that Administration witnesses appear
first on the first panel rather than being forced to wait
around, and that was my practice when I was the Chair of the
Committee and the Clinton Administration was in office. Why was
not Admiral Lautenbacher given the same courtesy that tradition
has allowed Administration witnesses for as long as I have been
on this committee?
Chairman Lampson. I made the determination as the Chairman
to the order that we would have our witnesses come. That is at
the discretion of the Chair and that was the decision that I
made.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. I would then ask unanimous consent
pursuant to the tradition of this committee that Admiral
Lautenbacher be allowed to testify first as an Administration
witness.
Chairman Lampson. I object.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. I would further ask unanimous consent
that Mr. Proenza be excused because he has not filed his
testimony 24 hours in advance as all the other witnesses have.
Chairman Lampson. He is not required to be, and I might add
also that even your own actions for the Committee that you
chaired are different than what you are asking right now,
Ranking Member. And at this point our witnesses should know.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. I would ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Proenza be excused until he files the written testimony as all
of the other witnesses have.
Chairman Lampson. We have heard enough and we will go
forward with this witness, and as you know, the witnesses.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. I object.
Chairman Lampson. And we will go forward with this plan
with our committee as planned.
And as our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is
limited to five minutes each. It is also the practice of the
Subcommittee to take testimony under oath. Do you have
objections to being sworn in? You also have a right to be
represented by counsel. Is anyone represented by counsel? Are
you represented by counsel at this hearing? Please stand and
raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn]
Panel I
STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM PROENZA, DIRECTOR, TROPICAL PREDICTION
CENTER
Mr. Proenza. Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking
Member Inglis, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, Committee Members,
thank you for inviting me here this morning.
Although for the position of National Hurricane Center I
was not a candidate as was mentioned, I was really happy to
accept as a lateral career movement in my senior executive
service that reassignment. I fully felt the weight of this
position and I dedicated myself to its mission, the mission
which boils down to the highest calling in government, the
protection of life. I took over on January 3 as my predecessor
retired on the same day.
A quick background on me. I am a meteorologist. I started
my National Weather Service career in the mid 1990s with two
hurricane seasons at the National Hurricane Center and then
another three seasons flying into the hurricanes with the
Hurricane Hunters. However, a lot of my leadership experience
was gained heading the Weather Services for one of the world's
most severe weather active areas, the Southern Region, since
actually January of 1998, an area that extends from New Mexico,
includes Oklahoma and Texas eastward to include all of the Gulf
states, Georgia, Florida, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and
hydrologic services include South Carolina, North Carolina and
into Virginia as well. This region has nearly 90 percent of the
U.S. landfalling hurricanes. Our nation in an average year has
an active enough hurricane threat in the Atlantic basin, no
question about it, but since 1995 we have been in what we call
a more active, multi-decadal in length, period in which
hurricanes are especially major. During this active cycle, our
nation's average annual losses jump from $4 billion per year to
nearly $19 billion per year. Furthermore, our culture has our
people liking to live near the coast. In fact, our census shows
us that about 53 percent of the Nation's total population lives
within the first 50 miles of the coastline, an important
consideration as we face the challenges of the future for the
Hurricane Center so we can easily see why building the
preparedness of our nation, of our people, building our
partnership with emergency management, local government
officials and Homeland Security, local and State government and
the media is so important to the National Weather Service and a
major activity for me, especially before the normal season
begins in June.
Another major concern during this preseason time for me
that I have spent in this position was assessing our readiness
to maintain our mission delivery to the American public, and
while the National Hurricane Center has never been, has never
been more ready for a season, we still had some potential
problems. But already we have dealt with four tropical storms
and dealt with them without any problem. One was what we
called--one of the problems that we had and one of the
potential problems, what we call the ocean sector surface
vector winds which really is the wind field above the ocean
that is so important for hurricane analysis. It is vital data
that we get from the NASA satellite that was launched in 1999,
QuikSCAT, with an estimated lifespan of three, sometimes people
will say five years, three to five years, but it is now in its
eighth year, and it is on its backup transmitter. Two days
after I entered the National Hurricane Center on January 5, my
staff briefed NOAA Administrator Lautenbacher, NWS Director
Johnson and my then new immediate supervisor, Director
Uccellini, on this problem. A critical satellite on borrowed
time and no plans, no plans to replace it. That presentation
from January 5 stated how important this ocean surface wind
field is from the everyday users of this particular service,
and I have quotes such as, from the senior hurricane
specialists that are on my staff now, ``When QuikSCAT is
gone,'' and I quote exactly, ``It will be like going back seven
years in tropical cyclone analysis.'' ``Losing QuikSCAT will be
like losing a limb, especially for tropical analysis and
forecasting.'' The Navy says QuikSCAT plays a critical role in
our analysis of short-term warnings and forecasts. That is the
Joint Typhoon Warning Center in Pearl Harbor.
NHC has many facts that we look at, many sources of data
but one thing is apparent to us all the time is that over the
ocean we have a tremendous sparsity of data. We have some
buoys, we have some satellites that look over the cloud
features across the ocean, we have some ship reports, but when
it comes to the sparsity of data, no single source of data adds
more information to us for the analysis than QuikSCAT. The fact
that this is a little known recent NOAA publication that came
out officially stated very clearly seven years of QuikSCAT
dependence and we don't have plans in our government to replace
it with a new generation version. It will take five years to
develop and send up a new generation of satellite but it will
have great new benefits. But don't take my word for it. Dr.
Robert Atlas is here this morning, an expert on QuikSCAT from
his days at NASA and now one of our leading NOAA ocean and
atmospheric research scientists. This is not about having a
satellite version that we could call a Chevy or a Cadillac. It
is about having one reliable latest science, what we call ocean
surface vector wind satellite that will help us protect life in
the oceans and on land.
Despite what I thought was a reasonable approach to
QuikSCAT's advocacy, I have asked myself why all this
resistance. The fact is, NOAA is one of the U.S. departments
struggling right now with huge overruns, billions of dollars in
its polar orbiting environmental satellite system and still
nowhere in there, nowhere in their design is there a new
generation listed QuikSCAT replacement until the year 2016. An
oversight? We are all concerned about the protection of life of
our people. Perhaps it was a way to cut costs, whatever. I
dared to call attention to it. I dared to call attention to it,
and by golly, I am going to pay the price for bringing this to
the attention of the American people.
On another matter.
Chairman Lampson. Can you wrap up because your time?
Mr. Proenza. Sure. Another matter, the $200,000 that was
diverted for the Joint Hurricane Test Bed. It was used for one-
to two-year projects translating science into operations. That
was removed this year, and I simply pushed to have it restored
when my deputy, my deputy in January said it would hurt the
success of improving our hurricane monitoring and forecasting.
In addition, I called attention to the fact that it was over $4
million in NOAA resources for celebration of an alleged 200-
year anniversary of NOAA when it was a bit of a stretch, since
NOAA was formed in 1970. Most important, I didn't feel in my
opinion that self-promotion was an acceptable way to use funds,
especially when funds are tight. So I shared all of this early
on with my chain of command, with my partners and later brought
it to the attention of the country and I have been chastised,
threatened, investigated, recommended for reassignment,
discredited after more than 40 years of dedicated service to my
country. The investigation was extraordinarily disruptive that
came in to us that Monday and a surprise from Washington which
triggered a frenzy of concern for mission delivery and employee
careers. I am still the Center's Director. I need to go back to
work. I am ready to repair bruised relationships wherever they
may be with whatever mediators and things that we feel may be
the best way to move forward. That is what we have to do in
this year's hurricane season.
Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for these five minutes. I
am at your Committee's disposal.
Biography for William Proenza
Bill Proenza is the Director of the National Hurricane Center (NHC)
in Miami, part of the National Weather Service (NWS), an agency of the
Department of Commerce bureau, NOAA.
A 1967 meteorology graduate of The Florida State University,
Proenza served two hurricane seasons in '63 & '64 at NHC and then three
hurricane seasons as an assistant flight meteorologist ('65-'67) on the
``hurricane hunter'' aircraft. He continued his career within the
National Weather Service for more than 40 years receiving numerous
performance commendations and awards, including recognition from the
NWS Employees' Organization as the NWS Manager of the Year for 1998 for
his collaborative leadership.
Proenza has held a diverse array of field and leadership positions
and his meteorological experience ranges from leadership in the
modernization of weather services as well as managing weather
forecasting and severe weather warning services as well as climate
services. He rose through the ranks of the NWS and held the position of
Director of the most severe weather-active area of our nation, the
Southern Region, encompassing one-fourth of the Nation from New Mexico,
Texas, Oklahoma eastward all the way to Florida and on across the
Caribbean to include Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands from 1998
through the end of 2006 (acting in '98). Through his experience in the
southern, north-central and eastern portions of the Nation, Bill has
gained a unique familiarity with many types of weather from tropical to
intense winter weather and severe local storms.
Proenza is a long standing member of the American Meteorological
Society, the National Weather Association, the International
Association of Emergency Managers and the National Emergency Management
Association. In 2001, the American Meteorological Society (AMS)
recognized him with its prestigious ``Francis W. Reichelderfer Award''
for outstanding environmental services to the Nation and in 2003, he
was conferred the prestigious status of ``Fellow of the AMS.'' Just
recently in 2006, he was elected by his peers to the leadership board
of the American Meteorological Society as a Counselor.
Proenza is an internationally recognized meteorologist and has
represented the U.S. Government across the Caribbean Basin. In 2006 and
2007, he headed the United States Delegations to United Nations
(UNESCO) meetings on tsunamis and the oceans. Proenza is also the
chairman of the United Nation's World Meteorological Organization's
Hurricane Committee, which supports 26 member nations in the hurricane
threatened nations of the Americas.
Discussion
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Proenza.
It is time now for our first round of questioning, and the
Chair will recognize himself for five minutes.
NOAA Assessment Team
Mr. Proenza, when were you notified that NOAA was sending
an assessment team to the Hurricane Center?
Mr. Proenza. I received a call from Conrad Lautenbacher, an
Administrator at NOAA, at 9:00 that Monday morning, then they
showed up knocking at my door. I did not know before then.
Chairman Lampson. Was anyone else on your staff aware that
the Team was arriving?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir. I talked to my deputy and I asked
him if he knew anything about it. He said yes, he was
instructed from Washington by Louis Uccellini that this team
was coming down to the Hurricane Center but he was told not to
tell me.
Chairman Lampson. Did anyone from NOAA come with the Team
to the Center?
Mr. Proenza. Two people from NOAA came. One was a senior
executive service person from the satellite service of NOAA,
another one was an administrative support person from NOAA, and
then three people from the Department of Commerce.
Media Exposure
Chairman Lampson. We have the review team's report, and I
want to ask you a few things about it that are in it. Page 3 of
the report indicates that you asserted to the review team that
you didn't want anyone going to the media about the assessment.
Is that true?
Mr. Proenza. That is correct. We were in the midst of the
hurricane season. I wanted to have a minimal exposure to what
was going on in the Hurricane Center.
Chairman Lampson. The report goes on to say,
``Nevertheless, the next day he held media interviews on the
forecast operations floor about the assessment while the
hurricane specialists were performing their duties analyzing
tropical activity.'' Is this true?
Mr. Proenza. That is correct again. Essentially those
interviews were set up by NOAA public affairs. A NOAA public
affairs person came down with the Team in addition to our NOAA
public affairs. They coordinated on all of my interviews for
the day and I just simply conducted the interviews I was
instructed to conduct.
Chairman Lampson. And you just answered my next question,
did you arrange those interviews. And who arranged them? Would
you tell me again?
Mr. Proenza. The NOAA public affairs people there. There
were two of them, a Dennis Feltgen, who is normally the NOAA
public affairs person for the Hurricane Center, and the person
that came down with the Team, Greg Romano, who is also a NOAA
public affairs person.
Chairman Lampson. The way the report is written, it implies
that you were being disingenuous with the assessment team, that
although you told them you didn't want media attention on the
assessment, you actually did want media present and that you
arranged for the media to be at the Center. So you didn't want
the media there and you did not arrange those interviews,
correct?
Mr. Proenza. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Lampson. I will turn to another example in the
report. Again on page 3, it states, ``One specialist reported
that the Director disrupted his ability to track tropical
storms. We had Barbara and Barry. He kept bringing the media
over onto the operations floor to show QuikSCAT while I am
trying to put out a forecast. It was hard to get the job
done.'' Do you remember that incident?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, I do.
Chairman Lampson. Do you want to tell me a little more----
Mr. Proenza. Certainly. It was a case where we had Barbara
and we had Barry. I was on duty for both of those storms with
the two hurricane specialists and we had examples where we
could show that the sparsity of data that we were experiencing
over the ocean where these storms were located, and what we
could show was the QuikSCAT coming over and giving us the data
that we needed. It was certainly momentary and it was always
with the full knowledge of knowing what was going on at the
time.
Chairman Lampson. You asked if the media could be brought
over to----
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lampson.--see that and he agreed?
Mr. Proenza. I asked if we could show them what was going
on and how we were using analysis of QuikSCAT.
Chairman Lampson. And----
Mr. Proenza. And they even demonstrated it themselves.
Chairman Lampson. And the response from him was?
Mr. Proenza. ``Yes, and I will demonstrate it,'' and it let
them do the demonstration.
Chairman Lampson. Is it unusual for the media to be present
on the operations floor of the Hurricane Center? I was of the
impression that it is set up for media presence during storms.
Am I wrong?
Mr. Proenza. Off and on for special circumstances, I see it
happening. I don't think it is that unusual but I don't have
enough time there to say.
Staff Dissatisfaction
Chairman Lampson. You were the director for the Southern
Region Office of the National Weather Service for seven years.
During that time, did NOAA ever send an assessment team to the
regional office?
Mr. Proenza. No, sir.
Chairman Lampson. Prior to the arrival of this team, were
you aware that members of the staff were dissatisfied with your
management and leadership of the Center?
Mr. Proenza. No, sir.
Chairman Lampson. Was there any resistance to change and
concern about any public statements?
Mr. Proenza. There was resistance to change as far as what
we were trying to do. One of the objectives that we had as we
entered the season and looked at the fact that we had growing
challenges on the horizon for the Nation's hurricane warning
program, I simply wanted to get the research community more
attuned to the needs of what the operational community needed,
and so we were working together with the NOAA side of the
research group that is there in Miami in the South Florida area
and we had a great cooperation working and they objected to
that.
Chairman Lampson. My time has expired. I will now recognize
Chairman Miller. I am going to relinquish the chair to Mr.
Miller for five minutes.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Proenza, how are you this morning?
Mr. Proenza. Good. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Miller. The last questions from Chairman Lampson
that there was some resistance to change by various employees
of the Center, did you think that there were any problems or
differences between you and the staff that could not be worked
out, that were so serious that they were beyond a solution?
Mr. Proenza. No, not at all. It's just the normal course of
events and how we implement change and we are doing it all the
time in the scientific environment.
QuikSCAT
Chairman Miller. You talked a good deal about QuikSCAT. I
would like to talk about that a little more. Did you ever
advocate for cutting the funding for the hurricane aircraft to
fund QuikSCAT?
Mr. Proenza. Not at all.
Chairman Miller. How are those two projects comparable?
Mr. Proenza. First of all, the QuikSCAT project itself when
it was asked what we wanted to do there, I said that indeed the
NOAA requirements report asked for something to be started
immediately or the replacement with a new generation of
satellite. I said I concurred with that. I said also though I
wanted to make sure that we had support for the aircraft and
for the later model developments we were seeking for the
Doppler radar we wanted for the Air Force, a whole slew of
items that we feel are important for the future our capability
protecting the people. But in addition to that, when they said
well, which one do we have to start on, well, I said we need to
start on the QuikSCAT because that is going to take five to six
years to get it going to the point that we can have a possible
launch and so I said that we needed to start immediately on
that and so I emphasized that.
Chairman Miller. Also, the funding level required for the
hurricane planes versus the QuikSCAT satellite.
Mr. Proenza. For the plane, it is about $50 million. For
the satellite, it is $500 million.
Chairman Miller. Some of the senior forecasters at the
Center apparently believe that your comments about QuikSCAT
were undermining public confidence in the Center's forecast
ability. Why did you continue to talk about QuikSCAT and the
failure to have a satellite ready replacement?
Mr. Proenza. Because I had the scientific community, I had
my own hurricane specialists telling me in their quotes how
important QuikSCAT was to them and I certainly wanted to make
sure that I advocated their positions operationally.
Hurricane Season: 2007
Chairman Miller. How well prepared are we for the current
hurricane season?
Mr. Proenza. We are absolutely as prepared as we have ever
been. We have a new model on board. We are excited about that.
We have had some graphic changes that we put into the web site.
We have an option where the cone of uncertainty has been
redefined by one of the hurricane specialists. We feel that
that would be more accurate and we are also having a toggle
where the user, whoever that may be, can actually take a little
black line that Max used to say don't focus in on. They can
take it off and put it back on. We are doing that and we have
an experimental tropical weather outlook graphic that is going
out that will show the user, the public, a better concept of
where the active areas of disturbed weather are right now.
Chairman Miller. Did you ever think that advocating for
better equipment for future forecasting in any way undermined
the forecasting or the confidence of the forecasts now?
Mr. Proenza. No, absolutely not.
More on QuikSCAT
Chairman Miller. Did anyone superior to you at NOAA, the
Department of Commerce ever tell you to stop talking about
QuikSCAT?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
Chairman Miller. Who were they? And what did they say?
Mr. Proenza. I had a call on Friday, April 13, and it was
from my immediate supervisor, and the statements were, ``You
better stop these QuikSCAT NHC funding associated with the
Joint Hurricane Test Bed complaints. I am warning you. You have
NOAA, DOC, OMB, the White House''--excuse me--``pissed off.''
Chairman Miller. I am sorry. Was that an oral statement or
an e-mail?
Mr. Proenza. That was an oral statement and I just put it
contemporaneously in my calendar.
Chairman Miller. And you said your immediate superior. Was
that Mr. Uccellini?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
Chairman Miller. How about Mary Glackin? Did you ever hear
from her?
Mr. Proenza. Yes. She came on board in June, June 11, I
believe. She came to visit us at the end of that week and she
said in her time that she has been on board as the Acting
Director of the National Weather Service, that she felt she was
spending an inordinate amount of time handling QuikSCAT
questions and wanted me to cease and desist.
Integrating Research at the Hurricane Research Center and the
National Hurricane Center
Chairman Miller. I understand you advocate for more closely
integrated research done at the Hurricane Research Division
with the operational forecasting done at the Center, the
National Hurricane Center. Have those organizations worked
together historically? Why did you want them more closely
linked? And was there any resistance to having a closer
relationship between----
Mr. Proenza. The resistance I was told about and advised
about by my senior staff was that there had been a barrier, so
to speak, between the two operations in the past and I said I
understand but I felt that it was compelling upon all of us
based on the challenges that those barriers were no longer to
exist and we needed to bring together all of the resources that
we had in NOAA into one operation that would challenge the
researchers to meet the needs of the operational forecasters.
Chairman Miller. And my time is also expired, Mr. Proenza.
I think we would now turn to Mr. Inglis for five minutes.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Proenza's Tenure at the National Hurricane Center
Mr. Proenza, this Administration was bitten badly by
Katrina. The theory of the case for you brought forward by the
majority is that you are being punished for being a critic. If
this Administration, having been bitten by Katrina, were
interested in not developing the best technology, it would be
surprising to me. Is it surprising to you that the
Administration, having been bitten by Katrina, would not want
the very best technology and would see it as a crucial priority
of this Administration?
Mr. Proenza. Congressman, even if--if I can point to a
publication from NOAA that looked at our requirements and said
that we needed to do this, I can assure you, at the time that I
brought the need for the QuikSCAT replacement with the new
technology to my superiors, there was no plans to replace this
particular satellite and only later this year did they mention
that they would have something for us possibly by 2016.
Mr. Inglis. The government is very good at reacting. That
is what we do very well and so if this Administration is
reacting to the stimulus, the very unfortunate stimulus of
Katrina, doesn't it stand to reason that they would react and
say whatever it takes, get it quickly?
Mr. Proenza. I totally embrace that any way that I can work
towards getting that a reality.
Mr. Inglis. The thing is, that undermines your whole theory
of this case. It undermines the Majority's theory of the case
because their theory is, you are being punished for being a
critic. You would be the hero for pointing out some better
technology if the Administration had been so bitten, wouldn't
it?
Mr. Proenza. I am trying to point out that we need to work
immediately to begin bringing the latest science and technology
to the forefront and the design of a new instrument that would
be able to replace QuikSCAT whenever it is possible.
Mr. Inglis. Let me ask you this. Can you give me the names
of three people at the Center who I could call who would say
that you are a good leader?
Mr. Proenza. Yes.
Mr. Inglis. Will you give me their names?
Mr. Proenza. Chris Landsea.
Mr. Inglis. Let me get this down. Chris Landsea, L-a-n-c-e-
y?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, L-a-n-d-s-e-a. You know, Congressman,
just a moment. I don't want to put words or expectation in any
employee of mine's mind and I want them to feel free to say
whatever they want to say. I would just suggest that there are
employees there that would feel that way. I just don't want to
invade their privacy and say--and put words in their mouth that
they----
Mr. Inglis. I am just interested in talking with them to
see who you think at the Center would say you are a good
leader?
Mr. Baird. Would the gentleman yield for one moment, if I
may?
Mr. Proenza. Would I----
Mr. Baird. I am not asking the witness. I am asking my
colleague to yield for just a moment.
Mr. Inglis. I don't have enough time, I don't think.
Mr. Baird. Well, I understand that, but there are
procedural legal issues that the gentleman may be treading upon
here.
Mr. Inglis. Am I yielding? I guess I was yielding, but I
consumed some of the time. I suppose I can get the time back,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Proenza, the third one.
Mr. Proenza. I just feel awkward about, there are all sorts
of people, sir, that I don't want to make them, invade their
privacy by bringing their names up, and giving them the
expectation that I feel----
Mr. Inglis. Let me ask you this. Why do you think 23 people
signed a letter saying you should be removed, 23 out of the 46.
That is about half, isn't it?
Mr. Proenza. Sir, I wasn't there when they held the
meeting, and several people stood before the rest of the
employees, and asked them to sign, and the reasons why, I
didn't hear those argument. It would be hard for me to judge--
--
Mr. Inglis. Let me ask you this. If you, even if you were
certain that somebody said before them, I would be really
concerned about signing such a letter, because I would be
afraid that maybe you were going to get me after I signed the
letter, so there is a real resistance to me signing the letter,
right?
So, if I sign the letter, 23 people overcoming that natural
resistance, again, it cuts against the theory of the majority
here. The 23 had to overcome enormous resistance to sign the
letter, to put their name to it. Now, I am asking you for three
people that I can call, and ask who would say that you are a
good leader.
Mr. Proenza. I understand, sir.
Mr. Inglis. And you wouldn't have any trouble coming up
with three more names.
Mr. Proenza. No, it isn't that at all.
Mr. Inglis. And then, you are trying to stop me from
calling them.
Mr. Proenza. No, no. You, sir, you have whatever
authorities you have to do whatever you want to do. I am just
saying upon thinking of your question, with all respect, I just
feel that it would be wrong of me to list names of some of the
people that I supervise, or I am in the chain of command, and
say that they are going to say something about me.
Mr. Inglis. Yes, I understand. You said that before. And
let me ask you this, because my time is running out. You have
spoken here a lot today about QuikSCAT, and you spoke about the
importance of the work of the Center, but I notice you never
spoke about the dedication of the people and their expertise.
Would you describe yourself as a people person?
Mr. Proenza. Sir, I said that the Hurricane Center has
never been more ready than it is this year----
Mr. Inglis. I understand, but you have never mentioned the
people, and it seems to be a manager's crucial question here,
if you take my theory of the case, this may just be a personnel
matter, is that you would mention people if you were an
effective manager, rather than simply technology, and it could
be that you are on a hobbyhorse of a technology, and the people
are being ignored, and perhaps, that is why the assessment team
made the recommendation they made. Is that possible?
Mr. Proenza. They are not being ignored. Absolutely not.
And in fact, the assessment is based on our people, and I am a
people person, and I have a thousand employees, just under a
thousand employees in my previous responsibility. And also in
the Center. I work with professionals, and even though they may
have said what they have said, I have said also that they are
all professionals, and I don't expect any of them to do their
job at any lower performance level than they are capable of
doing now. I really believe in that, and that is why I believe
that the Center is in the best ever condition to deliver the
mission to the American people this year.
Chairman Miller. All right. We are well now past the five
minutes, plus a very generous allowance for that interruption.
Mr. Sensenbrenner for five minutes.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Proenza.
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
More on Media Exposure
Mr. Sensenbrenner. On June 14, your supervisor, Mary
Glackin, gave you a memo outlining procedures and expectations.
Could you please tell us who else on your staff you gave this
memo to?
Mr. Proenza. I shared this memo with, first of all, I had a
meeting with my staff, and I shared what was in the memo with
them. I handed out a few copies of the memo at that time.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Did you release this memo to the press,
or leak the memo to the press in any regard?
Mr. Proenza. No, sir.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Then, fast forward to after the
assessment team paid a visit to the National Hurricane Center.
Did you ask your staff not to discuss the assessment team with
the media, the assessment team and its investigation to the
media?
Mr. Proenza. I remember talking to the investigators,
hoping that this could all be processed in a way that it would
be low key, and not disruptive to the operations at the Center.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Later on, when the media came on one of
their regular calls, did you bring the assessment team's
presence and investigation up to them?
Mr. Proenza. Not that I remember. I remember that all of
the interviews that I had went through the NOAA public affairs
people that were there, and that they, indeed, knew at that
time that the group was there, investigating. I don't know if
they picked it up while they were there, or they knew before
they got there. All I did was I conducted my interview and
answered the questions.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. Now, I have got the assessment
team's report here, and about two-thirds of the way down, on
page 3 of the report, it says: ``Separately, the assessment
team witnessed similar behavior. In the Team's initial meeting
with the Director, he asserted he wanted the assessment to be
least disruptive as possible to our operations, and to be low
key. He told the Team he did not want anyone going to the
media, otherwise, that will engage a lot of explanation on our
part to them. Nevertheless, the next day, he held media
interviews on the forecast operations floor about the
assessment, while the hurricane specialists were performing
their duties, analyzing tropical activity.'' This is a report
of the assessment team. It is at variance with the testimony
that you just gave under oath. Which is correct?
Mr. Proenza. My testimony is correct. When they came in,
and they were interviewing me, that is when those questions
came up. I simply answered those questions. The interviews were
set up where they normally are set up, at the briefing desk,
and I conducted and answered accordingly. I did not set up
those interviews. Those interviews were set up by the NOAA
public affairs people. Is the question, sir----
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The reason the interviews were set up by
the NOAA public affairs people, was that relating to the
activities of the assessment team, or was that relating to the
normal operations of the Hurricane Forecasting Center?
Mr. Proenza. The person that came down with the Team, Greg
Romano, was especially for the purposes of monitoring the
assessment team's impact on the office, and whatever went on
between NOAA public affairs, the two people, it was coordinated
among themselves, and I was strictly just brought out to the
floor to answer them.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. Then, are you saying that Dr.
Turner's report, that I just quoted, is inaccurate, where he
said that you were holding media interviews on the forecast
operations floor about the assessment, while the hurricane
specialists were performing their duties analyzing tropical
activity?
Mr. Proenza. If I was on the forecast floor, it was the
desk that I conduct my briefings from, and should questions
have come up in the media about the assessment team, I would
have answered them at that time, but I did not in any way
invite those questions. They were set up----
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Did it ever occur to you that the word
no comment, words no comment might have been a more appropriate
response?
Mr. Proenza. It did not, because I was answering honestly.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. Well, all I can say is, is that
you know, this is a personnel problem, which in my opinion,
should have been handled internally, rather than being tried in
the newspapers, and ended up being elevated to a Congressional
hearing. I don't think it is our job as Congresspeople to deal
with personnel problems.
Mr. Proenza, you have got a problem down there that half
your employees say they don't have any confidence in you, and
if the NOAA management, and particularly, the NOAA
Administrator, didn't deal with the fact that you had an
employee revolt on your hands, for whatever reason it was, I
think that they could have been justifiably accused of being
negligent, you know, to a ticking time bomb that apparently has
gone off.
Thank you.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Ms. Johnson for five minutes.
Diaz-Balart for five minutes.
More on Director Proenza's Tenure at the National Hurricane
Center
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you,
Mr. Proenza. As many of you know, I represent and live in the
area where the Hurricane Center is located, and I have actually
gone to--I know Mr. Proenza, and frankly, he is a very likable
guy. I have gotten to like him, but I do have some questions
that I think need to be answered.
Mr. Proenza, when you joined the Hurricane Center, and you
said in a lateral position, so it is not like you did it for
the money, I imagine one of the reasons you did it is because,
frankly, as people were saying here, because of the great job
that the people in the Hurricane Center do, and also, the
important responsibility that they have.
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And obviously, you follow a group of very
distinguished professionals. Max Mayfield, you mentioned, Jerry
Jarrell, Bob Sheets, Neil Frank. Some of the people that are in
the Hurricane Center worked with a lot of these people before.
I think we would all agree, everybody here on the dais and
you, that the people that work in the Hurricane Center like
you, have a very distinguished track record. I am a little
worried, however, when you answered a question from the
Chairman, I believe, and he asked you, and I am paraphrasing,
but did you know that the people that worked with you in the
Hurricane Center had a problem, and you, in essence, said I
didn't think there was a problem with the staff. And then,
subsequent to that, half of the staff publicly writes a letter
with some pretty strong statements. If I may quote: ``The
Center needs a new Director, and with the heart of the
hurricane season fast approaching, urges the Department of
Commerce to make this happen as quickly as possible.''
How is it possible to have almost half of the people,
including your secretary, senior hurricane specialists, people
that have an incredible track record, how is it possible that
you would not know that they had a problem, if they got to the
point of, shortly afterwards, going out and writing a letter,
not just saying they have got issues, but asking for you to be
removed? Is that, were you disconnected entirely with your
staff?
Mr. Proenza. Congressman, there is always a few that may
resist some changes.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. This is half of them.
Mr. Proenza. Let me just evolve what I would like to say.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Sure. Sure.
Mr. Proenza. A few that may resist some changes. I know
that there were some that resisted some of the graphic changes,
some of the other changes associated with the research
community, giving the leadership for part of the hurricane
forecast research to the Hurricane Research Division, and so
forth, as part of a total one NOAA type of approach, but
nevertheless, I felt that those were best.
But when the Team came in, what happened with that letter
being signed was after the Team came in. When the Team came in,
that was so extraordinarily disruptive. We had already had four
storms. We have had no problems in dealing with the four
storms, but it was extraordinarily disruptive. There was a
surprise inspection. It was unprecedented. It triggered,
because I heard some of the concerns, it triggered a frenzy of
concern for people's careers and the mission.
And I understand that, and I respect their concerns. They
were popped in with this investigation, and they were
concerned, and of course, at that time, after the investigation
was started, and the meeting that was held, that was called for
by some of the leaders, by some of the leaders of the group
that wanted to do something. That particular time is when they
got the signatures together.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. But Mr. Proenza----
Mr. Proenza. It was after the Team investigation began.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Okay. Now, again, because I have had
contact with these, they were constituents of mine. They have
contacted me as well, and some of them have said that a group
of ten of them initiated the call----
Mr. Proenza. Okay.
Mr. Diaz-Balart.--to your supervisors. They were the ones
who initiated the calls. Now, again, that is what they said. I
don't know if that is factual or not, but here is the question.
You said you did not know there was a problem with the staff. I
don't know, you obviously had a problem, and maybe it was a
problem with one or five or ten, but you had a problem, because
some of them initiated this letter. But you said that you did
not know there was a problem. I mean, it just, it is hard to
believe that you would, did you not know, or did you not think
it was a big enough problem?
Mr. Proenza. Perhaps they should have come to me.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Perhaps, but let me ask you this now,
because you have been a very successful supervisor. If you, in
one of your previous positions, have a group of highly
respected professionals wrote to you, and say our direct boss
has real problems, and it is making our job impossible, would
you think, would you have not done anything?
Mr. Proenza. I would have----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Or would you have tried to, in the best
way possible, tried to figure out what the problem was, and
maybe sent in a group of impartial people to find out if there
was a problem? Or would you have done absolutely nothing?
Because this is my problem. If you have people that you and I
have both said, and everybody here respect, say that the
Director of the Hurricane Center must go, and if NOAA would
have not done anything, if a group of highly regarded
professionals calls their supervisors, as they have said they
did on their own, and said our boss is a major problem, and is
not allowing us to do our job, which may not have been the
case, but that call took place, it seems like. If NOAA would
have not done anything, do you think that would have been
responsible? And in your case, if that would have happened in
your case, would you have done nothing? Would that have been
responsible?
Mr. Proenza. No, I would have called the Supervisor, first
thing. I have had 45 such supervisors under my responsibility,
and the first thing I would have done is called the supervisor,
explain what I have heard is a problem, and explain to them
what can we do to help out. But I would have at least enlisted
them first, to find out what we could do at that level first.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Now, it seems to me that----
Chairman Miller. The gentleman's time has expired. We will
have a second round of questions.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Baird for five minutes.
Legal Obligations
Mr. Baird. I don't particularly have questions. I just
would suggest that as the Committee inquires about this, that
we be cognizant that there are legal matters pertaining to
employment issues. I personally asked the gentleman to yield
previously, because I think to ask a supervisor to identify
personnel in a Congressional forum in the manner that was asked
is really not fair, and is not respectful of his certain legal
obligations, and I think we have to respect.
However, I really don't have a dog in the fight, except
that I think there is politicization. If the gentleman is doing
his best to protect his country from hurricanes, I certainly
worked in organizations, where sometimes, change is resisted.
And I think it is problematic to say to a gentleman, whichever
side you are on on this, would you identify staff members on
one side or the other in this public forum, and I would urge
this committee to refrain from that, out of respect not only
for the gentleman here, but for the employees themselves, and
for legal issues that may pertain to employee hiring and
promotion and other decisions. And that was the point I was
trying to make earlier.
Yield back.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Feeney for five minutes.
The Role of Congress
Mr. Feeney. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think the
gentleman's comments are well taken. I mean, personnel
decisions are always tough. I was Speaker of the House, I had
900 employees, and whether you are managing two people or 900.
The real question for me is why Congress is involved in this
one. The right decision or wrong decision may have recently
been made, but you know, not long ago, I sat in a joint hearing
of the House Science Committee and our corollary on the Senate
side, and we had a supervisor that was accused of being too
popular for his bosses, and so, we had to have a full joint
hearing of the House and Senate.
Now, we have got one who is accused of being too unpopular
with some of his bosses and his employees, and so, we have got
to have a full hearing. We have got admirals and other leaders
waiting in the background. We are going to have a series of
questions. And so, what Congress is going to do is to
micromanage personnel decisions. We have had close to 400
investigations in the first six months, and I guess I should
have expected, coming to work today, that I would be busy,
because I am running from here to the Judiciary Committee,
where we are fighting with the White House over personnel
decisions. And so, as Congress, 535 of us, try to micromanage
decisions that the Administration make, as we are trying to
micromanage, in some cases, the war, it is useful to remember
why we have a chief executive. Somebody has to call the runner
out or safe at home base, and you can't have 15 umpires. You
have got to have one, and the President of the United States
has to make this decision.
And with all due respect, like Congressman Diaz-Balart
said, you may have been the greatest supervisor in the world,
and maybe just bad luck, bad timing, wrong place, wrong time,
personality differences, for whatever reason, we have half your
employees calling for your removal because of lack of
confidence. It may not be your fault. They may have exercised
misjudgment.
Secondly, we have got your supervisor saying that in order
to restore confidence in the TPC, that we need to have your
removal, and finally, we have an independent investigative body
saying the same thing. And it may not be fair at all to you,
sometimes, life isn't fair, but nobody has a right to a job,
especially when it is an appointment by the President of the
United States.
More on QuikSCAT
One of the big things that seems to have generated this
dispute, other than personal issues and interpersonal skills,
and who is mad at whom, is the question over QuikSCAT, and you
have made statements to the press recently that suggest that
without a very rapid replacement of QuikSCAT, essentially, our
ability to track and forecast hurricane paths may be
undermined. That is one of the things that people claim they
are concerned about. As recently as May 22, you were quoted at
a NOAA news conference as saying: ``I am encouraged in those
conversations that we have had, and discussions we have had,
that the Nation will be moving ahead very constructively in
coming up with a design next-generation QuikSCAT to replace the
current, which is still operational QuikSCAT that we have at
this time.''
You just told this committee that we are more prepared than
ever to track hurricanes. The dispersal of information
gathering capabilities is much greater than when we started
with QuikSCAT. For example, aircraft reconnaissance, you
started your career. Congressman Diaz-Balart and I recently
crawled into one of the NOAA Hurricane Hunters, so you are very
familiar with the, every year, we are getting better with that
sort of equipment, observations from ocean buoys, ships,
Caribbean islands. We have got a European satellite, and in
fact, NOAA is now investigating ways that we can get the
necessary information.
So, maybe your press skills aren't the best. Lord knows, I
have made my mistakes with the press, but for whatever reason,
there is a great difference of opinion amongst the experts of
how we need to replace the capabilities of QuikSCAT, and some
of your recent comments have generated concern that we have
undermined the ability to protect Americans with the best
information, and if I had to suggest one thing that probably
has led to this whole scenario, it is the fact that you have
made statements, your staff has tried to either correct you or
change those statements, and I will allow you to respond to
that, but I would just tell you, in my view, there is only one
umpire. That decision has been made. I think it has been
verified. It may not be your fault, but you are out.
And with that, I will let you respond to the QuikSCAT
capabilities.
Mr. Proenza. Thank you, Congressman.
First of all, on the QuikSCAT program, the statement I made
on May the 22nd, that I was greatly encouraged, was based on
Conrad Lautenbacher, Administrator of NOAA, saying to the press
that indeed, that particular project was gaining in the
priorities at NOAA, and was rising in its priority level, and I
was encouraged to hear that. And I also know that we were
starting to have a preliminary meeting with the NASA people,
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, on the concept of how a new
instrument would be designed, and again, I was encouraged. When
you mention the aircraft data is valuable to us. It is
essential for us. We use it operationally all the time, when we
have a system.
QuikSCAT is quite different, in that that type of data, we
need QuikSCAT, too. It gives us the wind direction, the wind
speed, at the surface, but it gives us an 1,800 kilometer-wide
swath of information across the ocean, and it covers 90 percent
of the global oceans. It is a key piece of data force.
Thank you, Congressman.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Klein.
Director Proenza's Comments on QuikSCAT
Mr. Klein. Mr. Ehlers and Members of the Committee, if he
wants to go first.
Chairman Miller. Well, actually, I think in the ordinary
rotation of Majority and Minority. Mr. Ehlers, do you care?
Mr. Klein. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. First of all, thank you for being here today, and I
think the public is tired of hearing about the debate. I think
the public is much more interested in making sure that public
safety is number one. Those of us who live in Florida or any
other part of the country where hurricanes are a factor, and we
have lived through some pretty substantial disasters and loss
of life and property, and we know that this Hurricane Center is
very much an important part of how we plan and deal with the
preparation.
So, what was refreshing to me all along was the fact that
you brought something up, and it was a question of let us look
into it. Again, I don't personally feel qualified to determine
whether or not, you know, you should be the manager or not. I
think that if there is a question, that needs to be looked
into. I think this process is fine, and let it play itself out,
and I think none of us support or endorse the idea of
politicization of any kind of job. There is a job to be done,
and this is not any kind of insignificant job. This is a very
important public safety job.
Specifically, my question is this. When I went to the
Hurricane Center, as a matter of fact, I was there one of the
days Congressman Diaz-Balart was down there, I had the chance
to talk to the hurricane forecasters, and to see QuikSCAT and
how it is used. I was told by the forecasters that, they showed
me exactly how the data is presented, that it is one of many
tools. It is not the entire tool. It is one of many tools that
allows them to give a better forecast, allows them to shape the
cone. We all know what that cone looks like, and how we prepare
for it. It allows them to establish, hopefully, a timing
element that is better, and knowing when landfall is met, and I
saw that.
I read, since then, a number of comments that have come
from different people, Rick Knabb at the Hurricane Center,
which said when QuikSCAT, it will be like going back six years
in tropical cyclone analysis. Other people in other positions
have said the same thing, and I guess my question is why is it
that some of these people have retracted or retrenched or
backed off on some of their comments? I look at these people as
professionals. These are scientists. These are career experts,
and just tell me, you know, what your sense of that is. I
understand you stand by your positions, and I just want to make
sure that you still are in that same position, and you still
feel that QuikSCAT is an important part of the data that is
presented to the analysts.
Mr. Proenza. Absolutely. It is an important part of the
data that is presented for the analysis of tropical oceans,
over the tropical oceans, no question about it. It is data that
we vitally look at, and we need to perform our jobs. We have
found a way that we can mitigate, temporarily, while QuikSCAT
is designed, a new generation is designed. But at the same
time, it does not equal the quality of QuikSCAT.
Why people may change their minds, it could be any number
of things. It could be their perspective on an issue might have
changed, evolved. I would rather give them the benefit of the
doubt, and say that they went through an evolution in their
thinking, even if they were in the scientific arena, and it
happened.
Future of QuikSCAT
Mr. Klein. And if QuikSCAT were to, and again, its beyond
its useful life, we all understand what that means, it could
last another few years.
Mr. Proenza. Yes.
Mr. Klein. It could last another week, and since we are in
the middle of the hurricane season, the question I have been
asking and writing and orally all along to you and your
managers is, what is plan B, and I was told that obviously, we
are trying to upgrade the hurricane trackers, which I support.
There is a European satellite that everybody has acknowledged
that that doesn't provide the same level of precise, high
definition data.
Mr. Proenza. Correct.
Mr. Klein. Would you comment, tell me what is the
difference, if QuikSCAT goes down, what is the difference in
the amount, the quantity and quality of data, that we will have
to work with?
Mr. Proenza. For example, in the QuikSCAT data, we are
getting an 1,800 kilometer swath of information. That is down
to a 12.5 to 25 kilometer resolution. That means that often we
will get a point where we get that type of data coming in to
us. On the other hand, the ASCAT, and we will just use that
comparison to the coverage, the ASCAT has got two swaths of
data that are about just over 500 kilometers wide, and then, it
has got a 700 kilometer opening in the middle, where it has no
data. So, the data is quite interrupted, and it is not as
consistent, and not as relevant to what we need.
Mr. Klein. So, for the layperson, understanding what the
technical description you are giving us, what does that mean in
terms of a forecast, for looking at the information presented?
If QuikSCAT is unavailable, and we have the European satellite
and the buoys and other things out there, how does this
translate into the accuracy, the timing, the cone, all those
kinds of things that we are all paying attention to?
Mr. Proenza. The data is not as good, and accordingly, the
analysis that we have will not be as good. A measure of that
difference, the one study that I can remember, and we will have
a QuikSCAT expert coming up here that you may ask that question
of, but the way I understand it, that if we subtract the
QuikSCAT data from the models that were run back in 2003, just
to use some comparison, and see what the model forecast, with
and without the data, that we could see some degradation in the
outcome of the model.
I think it would be best to ask the expert from that
standpoint. I stand on my position that QuikSCAT is a vitally
important tool for the analysis over the tropical oceans and
the rest of the oceans, for forecasting waves and warnings,
winds, and at the same time, in analyzing tropical storm
potential.
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, what I would take from all that is
that I think part of the process of what our committee should
be doing and the Committees of Congress, is considering what
the backup plans are, make sure we are supporting backup plans,
and thinking short-term and long-term in this process.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you very much. Mr. Ehlers, you are
recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I agree
with Mr. Sensenbrenner's earlier comments, that we should not
be involving ourselves in a personnel issue. There are
procedures within the administrative bench to handle this. We
can provide our input, but I think we should shift the emphasis
away from the personnel aspects.
I think what we should, as a Science Committee, concern
ourselves with is the science involved, and particularly, on
the issue of QuikSCAT, but much beyond that, and to the whole
picture of the weather satellite program that we have. I am a
scientist. I can assure you that every scientist I know wants
the maximum amount of data, and wants the data to be as good as
possible. And I understand your desire to that. At the same
time, I have some disagreement with your statement that the
data from QuikSCAT is both important and vital. I would agree
it is important. I do not agree that it is vital. I think there
are other ways of getting--from my limited knowledge, I think
there are other ways of getting the data that are necessary.
And perhaps not as good, but I just don't think the QuikSCAT is
vital, but we should be concentrating our efforts on developing
better alternatives to QuikSCAT, and do that quickly.
And I am also very disappointed, and have been disappointed
for some time, with the difficulty we have had with the NPOESS
satellite program at NOAA, with the huge cost overruns, and we
have spent endless hours trying to straighten that mess out. We
got it back on track, but the price we paid was to give up some
of the sensors on NPOESS, one of which would have provided some
of the data that QuikSCAT provides, and might have done it even
better.
I argued against removing those sensors. I felt we should,
if necessary, slow the project down a year or two, in order to
get the additional money to put the other sensors back on. I
lost that battle, and I think if I had won, we might have had a
better handle on the data sooner than we are going to have now.
Whether or not we need to replace QuikSCAT is another issue. If
we do, I certainly hope that we do not simply run out and have
another QuikSCAT put up there. All the technology has improved.
We can certainly do much better than what we have done in the
past, and even if it takes a few more years to get it done, I
think it is worth doing that.
But I really think, Mr. Chairman, that the responsibility
of this committee has to be a detailed review of the entire
weather satellite program, and establishing good priorities for
us, as to where the money should go. I am also concerned that
we are not putting much money into that, when you consider the
amount of money the Federal Government is putting into military
satellites of various types, is putting into the GPS system, is
putting into the Shuttle Program and so forth, I think we have
given short shrift to NOAA and to the weather satellite
program. When, I just think, if you look at the cost of one
Katrina, that is far greater than the cost of the satellites
that we need to help predict things better, and help to prevent
things.
So, Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my speech. I don't
have any questions for you, Mr. Proenza, but I do think we
should concentrate on the science, not on the personality
aspects, certainly not on the personalities involved. And I
would ask, Mr. Chairman, that we have a complete review of our
weather satellite program. We have not done it justice in the
past, and we have to do a better job.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Ehlers. We will recognize, we will go for our second round of
questioning at this point, and I will recognize----
Mr. Inglis. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, do we really need a
second round? We have got Admiral Lautenbacher waiting, and I
think that we have heard quite a bit. It seems to me that there
is no real value in an additional round here. Couldn't we go
right on to Admiral Lautenbacher?
Chairman Miller. I have some questions I would like to ask.
Mr. Inglis. Will you be around later to hear from Admiral
Lautenbacher?
Chairman Miller. I will.
Mr. Inglis. Okay. Will everybody be around? I hope so,
because we really----
Chairman Miller. I am not sure everybody will.
Mr. Inglis.--need the other side of the story.
Chairman Miller. But I will be, and I have more questions
that I want to ask.
Director Proenza's History
Chairman Lampson. I recognize myself for five minutes.
Mr. Proenza, I have a series of questions.
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lampson. Here in only five minutes, so please,
short. Yes or nos will be fine. We will be able to get through
this hopefully quickly.
Did you apply or seek, in any manner, the position of
Director of the Hurricane Center?
Mr. Proenza. No.
Chairman Lampson. I understand it was D.L. Johnson who
first approached you about the possibility of your taking the
position.
Mr. Proenza. Yes.
Chairman Lampson. Who offered you the position, and when
was that made?
Mr. Proenza. Conrad Lautenbacher, December 1, 2006.
Chairman Lampson. And you began as Director of the Center
when?
Mr. Proenza. I entered on duty on January the 3rd. I was
put on paper as the Hurricane Center Director on the 7th of
January.
Chairman Lampson. I understand that although the position
Hurricane Director is high profile and prestigious, it is
technically a demotion, as compared to your position as head of
the Southern Regional Office. Is that correct?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lampson. I also understand that your position as
Southern Region Director attached to a position on the NOAA
Corporate Board. Is that correct?
Mr. Proenza. Correct.
Chairman Lampson. Accepting your current position means you
are no longer on the Corporate Board. Is that correct?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lampson. Did you ruffle any feathers during your
time on the Board?
Mr. Proenza. I held positions that I thought were important
to the delivery of the mission to the American people.
Chairman Lampson. I am going to take that as a yes. I
understand the NOAA Corporate Board is a venue where NOAA-wide
policies are established, and decisions are made about the
operation of the line offices, budgets, et cetera. Right?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
Concept of Operations Plan
Chairman Lampson. NOAA was considering a change in the way
the local Weather Service offices were structured and worked
together, the so-called concept of operations plan. CONOPS.
Were you a supporter of that plan?
Mr. Proenza. No.
Chairman Lampson. Who were the advocates for the plan on
the Board?
Mr. Proenza. The leadership, the very high leadership on
the Board.
Chairman Lampson. And that would include D.L. Johnson?
Mr. Proenza. That is correct.
Chairman Lampson. Did you believe NOAA leadership supported
the CONOPS plan?
Mr. Proenza. A mixed bag. Some support and not support.
Chairman Lampson. Mostly, more a yes than no.
Mr. Proenza. More yes than no, absolutely.
Chairman Lampson. So, some people might see your departure
from the Corporate Board as, shall we say, a positive step
toward more harmony and tranquility on the Corporate Board?
Yes?
Mr. Proenza. Yes.
Chairman Lampson. This committee, I am pleased to say, was
instrumental in halting the plan. We had a GAO team investigate
and assess the plan for several years, and they produced two
reports. The second one was released last month. They weren't
very impressed with the planning effort, and the Admiral has
told us that the plan has been abandoned. Would you tell me
some about that plan, please?
Mr. Proenza. The concept of operation?
Chairman Lampson. Yes.
Mr. Proenza. Looked at the idea of trying to assign
responsibilities at certain times to adjoining office, and
allowing some of the forecast offices around the country to
shut down, to be less than 24/7 operations.
Chairman Lampson. And they closed it for that reason?
Mr. Proenza. They would close, because the adjoining office
would be able to pick up the responsibility. The concern was
that emergency management would not be served on a 24 hour by
seven basis. In addition to that, there was concern that we
could not open up an office as fast as would be needed to apply
the local expertise of that particular county warning area, to
the issue that might have developed overnight.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Proenza. I will now
recognize Chairman Miller for five minutes.
Criticisms and Shortcomings of the National Hurricane Center
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It certainly is not the role of these two subcommittees to
look at personnel decisions, personnel matters. This appears to
be something that goes beyond, well beyond office politics. The
question that I raised in my opening statement. I found out in
the same way most Americans found out about this controversy,
by watching the news a couple of weeks ago. These subcommittees
had nothing to do with this issue coming up in the national
news. But when there is an explosion like what we saw a couple
weeks ago, it certainly is appropriate for this subcommittee to
find out what has been going on, what on Earth happened.
One unchallenged assumption in a lot of the questioning has
been, and I don't want to ruffle your feathers, or those who
work at the Center, has been that this Center does the best
work. I have talked to research scientists, I don't want to
name names in this setting. Mr. Baird would call me down for
that. But the assumption that the forecasts of the Hurricane
Center are really, really good, are the best, is not what they
say at all. In fact, they say the forecasts are so bad,
particularly forecasts of inland flooding, and the vast
majority of people who die now from hurricanes die from inland
flooding. The forecasts of intensification, whether hurricanes
are going to strengthen or weaken, those are really bad.
Virtually every research university in the country that does
atmospheric research, that does meteorological research,
disregards the Hurricane Center's forecasts. They take the raw
data, they run their own forecasts with their own models, which
are always better, always more accurate.
So, I am not sure that I think it is a bad thing that
someone come into that Center and look at whether that Center
is doing as good a job as it should, and whether it is using
the best science that it should be doing. Mr. Proenza, have you
heard those criticisms that I just repeated?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir.
Chairman Miller. Okay.
Mr. Proenza. And it was my objective to address those. The
growing challenges of the future, as far as the population
centers, and the growing populations along the coastline, was
an absolutely compelling argument why we had to get more
accurate at forecasting intensity changes. I needed to bring
all of the forecast capabilities together with the research
capabilities of our organization and the academic community
together to address that. Absolutely. In fact, intensity
forecasts had shown very little improvement over many years.
Chairman Miller. Okay. Your efforts to try to bring
together, to try to meld research and operations, is that, were
those efforts addressed to get at the failings of the forecasts
of the Hurricane Center?
Mr. Proenza. Yes, sir. We were trying.
Chairman Miller. Well, I think, by comparison to FEMA, yes,
the Hurricane Center is top notch. If we compare it to the kind
of emergency management in Katrina, at least we knew there was
a hurricane coming, but from all that I have heard from people
who know this stuff know, the work of the Hurricane Center is
not as good as it should be. It could be better right now, if
it paid closer attention to the science, the best science that
is out there, and research universities all across the country
are doing better forecasting than the Hurricane Center.
Mr. Proenza. And yes, Congressman, but I have to say we
have to bring the very best science and tools to the Hurricane
Center for them to get better at what they do. They are top
notch group of professionals doing the best job they can with
the information and the tools that they have.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Inglis, would you like to ask a
question or a comment? You are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Inglis. I won't use that, except to respond to Mr.
Miller that as I understand it, the Hurricane Forecasting
Center accurately predicted Katrina's path, and gave warnings
three days in advance of that storm hitting New Orleans. Pretty
impressive work.
Mr. Proenza. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Inglis. By very dedicated people.
Mr. Proenza. Top notch.
Mr. Inglis. That work very hard to accomplish the
objectives of the American people. I have no further questions,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. Mr. Diaz-Balart, you are recognized.
Hurricane Center Personnel
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to
thank Mr. Klein, Congressman Klein, for trying to get us
focused on the one thing that we do do in this committee, which
is science, and not personnel.
Look, it is pretty obvious that despite what I just heard
from Mr. Miller that the Hurricane Center is horrible, and I
beg to differ. And I don't know how many times he has been
there, by the way, maybe many, and maybe he has met the
incredible men and women in the Hurricane Center that Mr.
Proenza says are incredible, and that I know are incredible.
So, I just, despite that, I think everybody here is well-
intentioned. I think Mr. Proenza is a decent, good,
professional guy with a great track record.
Nobody can claim that he doesn't have a great track record,
and I think the people in the Hurricane Center are the same
thing. Unfortunately, and I don't want to, pardon the pun, but
unfortunately, Mr. Proenza has become the lightning rod, from
within the staff in the Hurricane Center and others. And that
is unfortunate, and that has created a problem. I don't think
Mr. Proenza is at fault. I don't think the people at the
Hurricane Center are at fault. Sometimes, these things happen,
and it is unfortunate. Unfortunately, it has created a problem.
Now, we shouldn't be talking about personnel here, because
Congress doesn't do personnel, and even if we decided that Mr.
Proenza is the person to be there, we can't really do anything
about it anyway, so we are kind of just talking for the sake of
talking. So, I do want to get back to, as Mr. Klein said, the
science.
Hurricane Center Science and QuikSCAT
And I do have one piece of good news for Congressman Klein.
A number of us, including Chairman Lampson, Rep. Melancon, and
myself, met with the Admiral, met with the NASA Administrator,
Mr. Griffin. Specifically about this satellite issue, and,
because we were concerned that there was no plan. And I can't
speak for the other two gentlemen, but I can speak for myself.
I am not satisfied that it has taken this long to come up with
a decision as to what has to go up, but I think we are all, at
least I was satisfied, that at least there is a plan to, and I
guess by January, they are supposed to get back us, Mr.
Chairman. They are supposed to get back to NOAA and NASA and
everybody else as to what exactly is the right satellite that
has to go up, in order to make sure that we have not only
QuikSCAT but actually, a much better version of it.
So, and by the way, I think Mr. Proenza has got to be given
a lot of credit for bringing up this issue, whether you agree
with him that it is less important or more important, the
reality, however, is that now, at least, there is a plan, and I
feel good about that. And I think that is what we, frankly,
need to be talking about, because we keep talking about
personnel issues, and the reality is, you know, are we going to
have, then, the 20 plus people that don't like Mr. Proenza for
good reasons or bad, and the 20 plus people that do like Mr.
Proenza for good reason or bad, to come and testify as well?
You know, we are kind of getting a little trivial here.
Those are important issues. I think we need to get into the
science, and when we get into the science, I think there are
much better questions to ask, and I wish we would kind of focus
on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Proenza. Thank you, Congressman.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart. I recognize
Mr. Klein.
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And listen, there is a reason, in my view, for Congress to
have oversight, and make sure there is accountability in our
systems, and sometimes, appointments are good, and sometimes,
they are not. We all don't like, the public doesn't like cover-
ups. The public does like when someone is straightforward and
open and honest, and brings something forward.
You know, what happens from this point on is going to play
itself out, but most importantly, what I appreciate is Mr.
Proenza's bringing this issue forward. And I can't address what
happened inside the office there, but I really believe that
this Congress today, and the meetings that you have had, and
the meetings I have had with the Air Force Reserve and with the
NOAA representatives, and forcing people to come forward, and
say what is plan B, because America wants to know what plan B
is.
If QuikSCAT goes down, and it is even 10 percent of the
information that is provided for hurricane forecasting, that is
real information. And Mr. Ehlers said it correctly, scientists
want to know that they have got everything on the table to
figure that out.
I will tell you also, I participated in the Senate hearing
on QuikSCAT about a couple weeks ago, that Senator Nelson and
others participated in, and another fact that we haven't even
brought up today, is there is no question whatsoever that
QuikSCAT has everything to do with marine forecasting. Nobody
has even questioned that. So, if you have got large vessels,
small vessels, anywhere around the world, the fact that, you
know, the service that gets this information, QuikSCAT, is
providing valuable information to our shipping, our
recreational, all the safety factors that go into commerce and
safety of individuals on the water, QuikSCAT has a big role.
So, even if people are questioning whether it has the same
level of impact on landfall, there is no question that on the
marine side, it does have a big impact.
So, there is a reason to have this conversation. There is
definitely a reason to make sure that our colleagues at NOAA
and the National Hurricane Center have the tools, that they are
doing whatever they can do to make sure that we are properly
protected, and I do give credit for this conversation coming
forward to this point, and that we stay on top of this, as has
been suggested by all the Members of this committee, to make
sure that we understand the total comprehensive picture on our
weather satellites and, of course, QuikSCAT, and anything else
that gives us this data to help best prepare Americans for any
kind of----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Will the gentleman yield for a few
seconds?
Mr. Klein. Yes, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you. I just want to make sure that,
because you have been in the Hurricane Center, like I have, and
I just want to make sure that we don't scare the American
people. I think you would agree with me that they do an
incredible job. Obviously, we need to do everything we can in
our power, so that they have all the technology and the
funding, but I just want to make sure that we don't scare the
American people, because I have heard some things here today on
this dais. Mr. Miller, I think said something which I think was
unfortunate. I think you would agree with me that they do a
heck of a job, and they are really good, dedicated people that
are good at what they do.
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, if I can respond. The answer is,
of course. The personnel are highly qualified scientists. The
question that we are grappling with today is making sure that
they have all the tools necessary to get us even better.
I think Mr. Miller's point is well taken. Can they do
better? Can that cone get narrower? Can the prediction of the
landfall get tighter? You bet, and we have made progress over
time. But we can do more, and we should do more. That doesn't
mean America should be concerned today that we don't have the
necessary good people in place that are doing it, but this
Congress needs to back up the National Weather Service and the
Hurricane Center, and make sure that they have got what they
need to best protect Americans.
Chairman Miller. I think we are going to thank you very
much, Mr. Proenza----
Mr. Proenza. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller.--for coming, and for your comments. The
panel, I mean the Committee, Committees, for their questions
and comments. We will take a short break, and convene our next
panel of witnesses.
Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Panel II
Chairman Lampson. I call this meeting of our two
subcommittees, Energy and Environment and Investigations and
Oversight, back to order. Witnesses have taken their seats. I
will introduce our panel at this time.
Dr. Robert Atlas is the Director of the Atlantic
Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration. Dr. Atlas' laboratory is part
of the Hurricane Research Division, which works with the
Tropical Prediction Center to improve tools and techniques in
hurricane forecasting.
Mr. Don McKinnon is the Director of the Jones County
Emergency Management Agency, Jones County, Mississippi. Mr.
McKinnon addresses the weather services the National Weather
Service provides to emergency management offices, and he also
worked with Mr. Proenza during his service as Director of the
Weather Service Southern Regional Office.
Mr. Robie Robinson, Director, Dallas County Office of
Security and Emergency Management is testifying on behalf of
the Emergency Management Association of Texas, and he will
discuss the service provided to the emergency management
community in Texas by the National Weather Service, by the
Southern Region Office during the period of Mr. Proenza's
tenure as its Director.
As our witnesses, again, should know, spoken testimony is
limited to five minutes. I am going to try to keep you on that,
so if you will pay close attention to it, please, I would
appreciate it.
And after which, the Members of the Committee will each
have five minutes to ask their questions, and it is also the
practice of the Subcommittee to take testimony under oath. Do
you have any objections to being sworn in?
You also have the right to be represented by counsel. Is
anyone represented by counsel at today's hearing?
Then, if you will please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn]
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT M. ATLAS, DIRECTOR, ATLANTIC
OCEANOGRAPHIC AND METEOROLOGICAL LABORATORY, OFFICE OF OCEANIC
AND ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Dr. Atlas. Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, and Members
of the Committee, as mentioned, I am Bob Atlas. I am the
Director of NOAA's Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological
Laboratory in Miami.
At my laboratory, we do open ocean and coastal ocean
research. We do research on climate, and we have as one of our
divisions, within my laboratory, the Hurricane Research
Division of NOAA.
Prior to joining NOAA, I was a NASA scientist for 32 years.
I have helped pioneer many of the satellite systems that are in
use today, and one of them being QuikSCAT, but many others, and
I was a member of the team that developed QuikSCAT, and am
still a member of the team working on the future of such
measurements.
The QuikSCAT, as mentioned, is a NASA satellite. It is the
third in a string of satellites that do ocean surface wind,
direction and speed. The first satellite lasted three months.
The second satellite lasted 10 months, and QuikSCAT has been
there now for over seven years. It is a major success, not only
in its longevity, but in the quality of the data that it
produces under most atmospheric conditions, and also, in the
amount of data that it provides.
Its advantages are that it has higher resolution than any
of the other datasets available. The normal resolution is 12.5
kilometers between observations. This is twice as good as the
European ASCAT and twice as good as any of the preceding
satellites. And it is capable, under research conditions, or
limited operations, to do even double that resolution, 6.5
kilometers. It also has disadvantages. The disadvantage is that
it does not see very well through heavy rain, so in heavy rain
situations, especially where the wind isn't strong, it cannot
predict wind direction accurately, and the data is not as high
quality in heavy rain, high wind situations, such as exist
within hurricanes.
QuikSCAT is used for many applications. It is used in
research of the atmosphere, ocean, and climate. It is now
considered an essential climate monitoring dataset. It is used
for ocean prediction, for driving ocean models, and it is used
in both numerical weather prediction and operational
prediction. I want to say first about operational prediction
and the Ocean Prediction Center of NOAA, the Ocean Prediction
Center of NOAA forecasts for ships at sea and other maritime
interests.
I asked forecasters at the Ocean Prediction Center if they
are using QuikSCAT many years ago, and they said we depend upon
it. I said how would you rate it. They said it was the most
valuable dataset they had. I heard that from three forecasters
of the Ocean Prediction Center, and I also heard from them that
they believe this data is contributing to saving lives, that
ships, some ships are not sinking in bad weather, and some
sailors are not drowning in bad weather, because we have these
kinds of measurements.
For hurricane prediction, it is used directly by the
forecasters at the Tropical Prediction Center and--slash--
National Hurricane Center, and its primary use is for tropical
analysis. It enables them to define what we call the wind
radii, the aerial extent of tropical storm force winds. This is
a very useful application of the data. It also will sometimes
show that a storm, a tropical depression, has formed. It will
show the circulation within the winds, on occasion, before
geostationary satellites show it in the clouds.
So, from those two perspectives, it is an extremely
valuable instrument, but it is only one of the tools that the
Hurricane Center forecasters use. They have heavy reliance upon
the reconnaissance aircraft, and upon ground-based radar,
ships' buoys, and the numerical models. And the numerical
models is the other use of QuikSCAT that affects hurricane
forecasts, and in fact, forecasts everywhere on the globe.
There are three studies defining what the impact of
QuikSCAT is, one by the Joint Center for Satellite Data
Assimilation,\1\ which showed a 10 percent degradation at 48
hours, and a 16 percent degradation at 72 hours, if this data
wasn't there. This study is a rigorous, scientifically correct
study. It is limited in its sample size. There is a Navy study
that has conflicting results, and the authors of that study
have stated that it applies only to the Navy model, and in
fact, the Navy model does not use QuikSCAT as effectively,
because they do something, and they create what is called a
bogus or synthetic hurricane vortex within their analysis. The
QuikSCAT then has to compete with that data, and it is not able
to make as much of an impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ References to the studies can be found on p. 54.
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To sum up, QuikSCAT is an extremely important tool. We need
not another clone of QuikSCAT, but we need a next generation
system that will enable us to make the improvements to
hurricane prediction that the Nation deserves, and NOAA is
working actively to pursue both a follow-on to QuikSCAT and has
an effective mitigation plan now to deal with a possible demise
of QuikSCAT.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Atlas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Atlas
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Dr. Robert Atlas,
Director of the Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory in
the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR). OAR is a line
office of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, within
the Department of Commerce (DOC).
NOAA's Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, Hurricane
Research Division
NOAA's Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory (AOML)
is located in Miami, Florida and specializes in hurricanes and open and
coastal ocean research. Scientists at AOML study the relationship
between the ocean and atmosphere by conducting research in both near-
shore and open ocean environments. This research includes the dynamics
of the ocean, its interaction with the atmosphere, and its role in
climate change. AOML's research improves the understanding and
prediction of hurricane track and intensity change, and the impacts
from wind, storm surge, waves, and rain. Key to this work is the annual
hurricane field program supported by the NOAA Aircraft Operations
Center research/reconnaissance aircraft. AOML scientists cooperate with
other federal, State, and local authorities to maximize research
expertise for use in economically and environmentally important
projects. AOML also provides and interprets oceanographic data
collected via ships, satellites, aircraft, drifting buoys and floats,
and conducts research relevant to annual-to-decadal climate change,
coastal ecosystems and hurricanes.
Within the Hurricane Research Division (HRD) at AOML, scientists
conduct research into hurricanes and related tropical weather
phenomena, using theoretical studies, computer models, and an annual
field program employing NOAA hurricane research aircraft. This research
has resulted in a deeper, scientific understanding and in numerous
practical applications which have improved forecasts. HRD employs
meteorologists, computer scientists, and other professionals, who
collaborate with other governmental and academic scientists worldwide
in this on going effort to advanced scientific knowledge and increase
public safety. HRD coordinates parts of its programs with other NOAA
organizations, e.g., the Aircraft Operations Center and the National
Centers for Environmental Prediction, in particular the Environmental
Modeling Center and the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane
Center (NHC).
NOAA's Hurricane Forecasting
NOAA strives to improve the reliability, accuracy, and timeliness
of our predictions of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes, to help
society cope with these high impact events. Over the last 15 years,
hurricane track forecast errors have decreased by 50 percent, largely
due to advances in hurricane modeling, an increased understanding of
hurricane dynamics, improvements in computing and technology, and
increased observations in both the region around the hurricane and in
other data sparse regions. Today's five-day forecasts of a hurricane
track are as accurate as three-day predictions were 20 years ago.
Hurricane predictions are better today than they have ever been and
will continue to improve in the future.
To help guide future research efforts and improvements, NOAA
requested that the NOAA Science Advisory Board commission a Hurricane
Intensity Research Working Group to provide recommendations to the
agency on the direction of hurricane intensity research. The Working
Group transmitted its final report to the Advisory Board in October
2006 (http://www.sab.noaa.gov/reports/reports.html). The Federal
Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research
released a report in February 2007, Interagency Strategic Research Plan
for Tropical Cyclones: The Way Ahead, to provide a strategy for
continuing to improve the effectiveness of operational forecasts and
warnings through strategic coordination and increased collaboration
among the major players in the operational and R&D communities (http://
www.ofcm.gov/p36-isrtc/fcm-p36.htm). Both of these reports call for
accelerated research investments and a deliberate focus on moving
research results to operations. In response, NOAA has created a
Hurricane Forecast Improvement Project Team to develop a unified
approach to define and accelerate hurricane forecast improvements over
the next ten years. Objectives will be focused on improved tropical
cyclone forecasting (intensity, track, precipitation, and uncertainty
forecasts), storm surge forecasts, flooding forecasts, and information
and tools to support community and emergency planning.
NOAA Hurricane Observations
Before I talk about the QuikSCAT satellite, I wanted to explain the
systems NOAA uses to monitor hurricanes. Over the open oceans,
continual images from our GOES satellites are the first reliable
indicators of any storms or inclement weather. GOES provides near real-
time critical data to help our forecasters determine a storms location,
size, intensity, and movement. These satellites are so important we
keep a spare in orbit. As tropical systems come closer to land,
information from NOAA and Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft and
ocean buoys provide real time direct measurements of the storm. Within
200 miles of the coast, ground-based radars are used to track the
storm. Computer models used to predict storm track and intensity
require extensive amounts of data, which are mostly provided by NOAA
and various National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), DOD
polar satellites, and where appropriate foreign environmental
satellites. Together these systems provide the forecasters with layers
of information critical to helping them make their forecast.
What is QuikSCAT?
QuikSCAT is a NASA satellite that has demonstrated the ability to
measure ocean wind speed and direction from space with unprecedented
coverage. QuikSCAT data is used for many applications, including
climate monitoring, ocean research and weather prediction. It can be
used to produce improved forecasts of hurricanes in three ways: its
direct use by forecasters, its use as initial conditions for numerical
weather prediction models, and its use as validation data in the
development of advanced ``next generation'' weather prediction models.
According to the forecasters at the National Hurricane Center,
``QuikSCAT has become an important tool, especially for estimating the
track, intensity and size of tropical and other strong marine storms.''
In most cases, however, QuikSCAT has little demonstrated impact on
hurricane intensity forecasts. In hurricanes, winds above 75 miles per
hour typically occur over an area that is smaller than the QuikSCAT
measurement resolution and are usually associated with heavy rain
events. Thus QuikSCAT usually cannot distinguish winds above 75 miles
per hour in a hurricane due to its lower than desired resolution and
signal attenuation in heavy rain. However, QuikSCAT can distinguish
winds above 90 miles per hour in extra-tropical cyclones where strong
winds exist over larger regions of the ocean surface. In addition,
until very recently, most numerical models did not have sufficient
resolution to represent key processes leading to rapid intensity
changes or the ability to assimilate much of the detailed information
contained in the QuikSCAT observations.
QuikSCAT is well past its design life. NASA says QuikSCAT appears
healthy and has fuel to last until 2011. It is not possible to predict
how long QuikSCAT will continue to provide data. It could last several
more years or cease to provide observations very quickly.
There are three studies that address the potential degradation to
computer hurricane forecasts that might result from the loss of
QuikSCAT. Each of these studies has limitations that prevent definitive
conclusions, and additional studies are needed. In my opinion, the
preponderance of evidence from the three studies indicates that
computer model forecasts of landfalling hurricanes, especially in the
2-5-day time range, could be degraded if we do not mitigate the loss
effectively. Forecasters at the NHC are able to improve upon the
computer forecasts, so that the potential degradation can be
diminished. This is especially true as the storms are approaching land
in the shorter time ranges. In addition, NOAA has recently developed an
effective mitigation plan that would make substantial use of other
satellites as well as enhanced aircraft observations.
What are the options to replace QuikSCAT data?
If QuikSCAT were to fail today, the NHC would still receive ocean
wind speed and direction data from space. NOAA is now receiving data
from a new instrument aboard a European satellite, called ASCAT--which
has similar technology to QuikSCAT. ASCAT will not provide the same
quality data as QuikSCAT, especially in terms of coverage and
resolution. NOAA is rapidly developing procedures for inserting the
data into models and using the visual display of these data in
forecasting. We are also examining how to increase the use of our
hurricane hunter aircraft through more flight hours and outfitting the
planes with more advanced technologies. In addition, we are researching
the feasibility of placing scatterometers on Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
In June 2006, NOAA held a workshop at the National Hurricane Center
to discuss the requirements for ocean wind speed and direction.
Hurricane forecasters, researchers, and numerical modelers all prefer a
next generation QuikSCAT, which they hope would be able to meet the new
requirements. Such a satellite would be able to provide observations of
ocean surface wind that would greatly enhance ocean surface wind
measurements for hurricane intensity forecasting, as well as for
weather, ocean and climate applications. In January 2007, Vice Admiral
Lautenbacher, the head of NOAA, was briefed on the conclusions of the
workshop and the need to replace QuikSCAT data. After receiving our
fiscal year 2007 appropriations, NOAA initiated a study with NASA's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, which built the original QuikSCAT, to examine
replacement options. Those studies are due in January 2008 and from
these studies, we will determine the best way to provide ocean surface
wind speed and direction to forecasters.
Details on QuikSCAT
1. We now believe that the quality of ocean surface vector wind
retrievals in storms at sea using any passive sensor (such as WindSat,
or the Microwave Imager/Sounder on the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) ) will never be
comparable to those retrieved using an active sensor such as QuikSCAT.
NPOESS will not provide an acceptable solution for ocean surface vector
winds retrievals, but it will provide many other types of useful data
and imagery.
2. QuikSCAT has provided many benefits but also has significant
limitations. While it provides important additional data for estimating
the intensity and size of tropical storms and other strong marine
storms, it cannot be used for measuring the intensity of most
hurricanes.
3. Data from any non-satellite platform could never replicate the
coverage provided by a satellite. Therefore, no non-satellite option
exists to replace QuikSCAT for wide-area measurements of ocean surface
vector winds. Satellites are complementary to other data sources, such
as aircraft and buoys, which have their own strengths and limitations.
Satellites, aircraft, and surface-based observations are all critical
components of the Nation's weather monitoring and forecasting
enterprise.
4. Data from the European ASCAT satellite instrument are just now
becoming available to National Weather Service (NWS) forecasters. ASCAT
is not a replacement for QuikSCAT, since it provides only about 60
percent of the coverage and only about half the resolution of QuikSCAT.
It will, however, provide partial mitigation against the eventual loss
of QuikSCAT, and it will be fully evaluated for maximum possible use by
NWS operational forecasters and models.
5. Since even QuikSCAT data do not meet NOAA operational requirements
for ocean surface vector winds, serious consideration should be given
to a sustained, more capable, next-generation satellite program for
ocean surface vector winds using already existing technologies. A next-
generation capability is needed to more accurately measure the strength
and size of hurricanes and other intense marine storms, since aircraft
data are not always available and only cover a small portion of the
storm circulation. Such a capability would enhance operational NWS
forecasts of many weather systems for the United States, and it would
benefit research on the intensity of hurricanes and other marine storms
that occur worldwide.
6. NOAA and NASA are working together during the next several months
to examine the costs and benefits of options for what kind of satellite
should replace QuikSCAT: a QuikSCAT copy, or a next-generation sensor.
NOAA and NASA engineers will work directly with NWS operational
forecasters during this study to provide recommendations by early 2008
on next steps for an ocean surface vector winds mission to replace
QuikSCAT.
7. Track forecasts for landfalling storms have the added benefit of
the national and international rawinsonde network (sensors to obtain
detailed atmospheric profiles of wind, temperature, and dewpoint
information), and from aircraft reconnaissance flights into and around
the approaching hurricane. With these data, if QuikSCAT would fail, the
impact on the track forecasts of hurricanes as they approach land would
on average be smaller than for forecasts for storms in the open ocean.
Studies on landfalling storms are insufficient to quantify the impacts.
However, available experiments show that observations far away from the
location of hurricanes can have a significant impact on model track
forecasts. As such, NOAA's mitigation plan will attempt to minimize any
degradation that might otherwise occur.
Current Research Studies of QuikSCAT in Models
Studies have shown either negligible or slightly positive impacts
of QuikSCAT observations on track. The major drawback of these studies
is the small number of cases examined. A more systematic study using
cases from a number of seasons should be performed to clarify the
impact. To date there are no studies of the impact of QuikSCAT data on
tropical cyclone intensity forecasts. The main problem is that until
this season models that forecast tropical cyclone intensity relied only
upon coarse resolution global data assimilation system for their
initial conditions. The impact on intensity must be tested in the
future using very high resolution global and regional models, where
inner core observations can be assimilated.
One study using the NOAA global data assimilation system and global
forecast system tested the impact of QuikSCAT on track forecasts from
two months of Atlantic storms in 2003 (Zapotocny et al., 2007). The
study, conducted at the NOAA/NASA/DOD Joint Center for Satellite Data
Assimilation, examined storms in August-September 2003 and showed that
a degradation in the 48 hour track forecasts of 10 percent and in the
72 hour track forecast of 16 percent when QuikSCAT was removed. A
drawback of this study was the number of cases (only 25 cases at 48
hours and 19 cases at 72 hours). Nevertheless, this study provides the
best available estimate of the degradation of model track forecasts
that might result from a QuikSCAT failure.
A second study used the Navy Operational Global Atmospheric
Prediction System and data assimilation system from two months in the
2004 Atlantic hurricane season (Goerss and Hogan, 2006). This study,
using 8-10 times as many cases as the previous one, found little
significant improvement in the track forecasts due to the inclusion of
QuikSCAT observations of ocean surface vector winds beyond that at 24
hours, which showed a three percent improvement (two percent
improvement at 48 hours, and slight degradation at 72-120 hours. In my
opinion, the impact of QuikSCAT data in this experiment was limited by
the way in which the data was assimilated, and the results should apply
only the Navy model used in the experiment.
A third study by NASA and NOAA (Atlas et al., 2005) using the NCEP
forecast system for two months of forecasts in 1999 showed a meaningful
positive impact of QuikSCAT. In one case (Hurricane Cindy, 1999) the
60-hour forecast intensity and location with QuikSCAT observations of
ocean surface vector winds was more accurate than the 24-hour forecast
without them. This study should be considered in the context of two
decades of numerical experiments with NASA models that have
consistently shown improved predictions of storms over the oceans
(Atlas et al., 2001).
In summary, QuikSCAT provides vital data for a variety of important
applications, including weather prediction for ships at sea, hurricane
forecasting, atmospheric and oceanic research, and climate monitoring.
NOAA has developed an effective mitigation plan that should reduce the
impact of a QuikSCAT failure on hurricane forecasting while working
with NASA to evaluate an advanced replacement for QuikSCAT.
LITERATURE CITED
Atlas, R., R.N. Hoffman, S.M. Leidner, J. Sienkiewicz, T.-W. Yu, S.C.
Bloom, E. Brin, J. Ardizzone, J. Terry, D. Bungato, and J.C.
Jusem, (2001) The effects of marine winds from scatterometer
data on weather analysis and forecasting. Bulletin of the
American Meteorological Society. 82(9):1965-1990.
Atlas, Robert, Arthur Y. Hou and Oreste Reale. (2005) Application of
SeaWinds scatterometer and TMI-SSM/I rain rates to hurricane
analysis and forecasting. ISPRS Journal of Photogrammetry and
Remote Sensing. 59(4):233-243.
Goerss, J. and T. Hogan. (2006) Impact of satellite observations and
forecast model improvements on tropical cyclone track
forecasts. 27th AMS Conference on Hurricanes and Tropical
Meteorology, Paper P5.2, available online from http://
ams.confex.com/ams/27Hurricanes/techprogram/paper107291
Zapotocny, T.H., J.A. Jung, J.F. LeMarshall, and R.E. Treadon. (2007) A
Two Season Impact Study of Four Satellite Data Types and
Rawinsonde Data in the NCEP Global Data Assimilation System.
Submitted for publication in Weather and Forecasting (available
upon request from James Jung, [email protected])
Biography for Robert M. Atlas
Dr. Robert Atlas is the former Chief Meteorologist at NASA's
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), and is currently the Director of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Atlantic
Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory in Miami, Fla. Some of the
areas he focuses his current research on include the prediction,
movement and strengthening of hurricanes. Atlas has worked with both
satellite data and computer models as a means to study these hurricane
behaviors. He is also recognized world-wide as an expert on satellite
surface wind data and performed the original research that demonstrated
the use of these data to improve weather prediction.
Robert Atlas received his Ph.D. in Meteorology and Oceanography in
1976 from New York University. Prior to receiving the doctorate, he was
a weather forecaster in the U.S. Air Force where he maintained greater
than 95 percent forecast accuracy. He was also a summer intern at the
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and an instructor of
physics for the State University of New York (SUNY).
From 1976 to 1978, Dr. Atlas was a National Research Council
Research Associate at NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, New
York, an Assistant Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Science for
SUNY and Chief Consulting Meteorologist for the ABC television network.
In 1978, Dr. Atlas joined NASA as a research scientist. He served
as head of the NASA Data Assimilation Office from 1998-2003, and as
Chief meteorologist at NASA GSFC from 2003-2005. During this time, he
was also an Adjunct Professor of meteorology, teaching weather
prediction to both experienced and inexperienced weather forecasters.
Dr. Atlas has performed research to assess and improve the impact
of satellite temperature sounding and wind data since 1973. He was the
first person to demonstrate the beneficial impact of quantitative
satellite data on weather prediction, for both satellite temperature
soundings and satellite surface winds.
He served as a member of the Satellite Surface Stress Working
Group, the NASA Scatterometer (NSCAT) Science Team, the ERS Science
Team, the SeaWinds Satellite Team and the Working Group for Space-based
Laser Winds. He is also a member of the Scientific Steering Group for
GEWEX (the Global Energy and Water Cycle Experiment), Chairman of the
U.S. World Ocean Circulation Experiment (WOCE) Advisory Group for
model-based air-sea fluxes, and is a past member of the Council of the
American Meteorological Society.
From 1974-1976, he developed a global upper-ocean model and studied
oceanic response to atmospheric wind forcing as well as large-scale
atmospheric response to sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies
(unusual events). In more recent years, his research concentrated on
the role of how the air and sea interacts in the development of
cyclones, the role of soil moisture and unusual SST events in the
initiation, maintenance and decay of prolonged heat waves and drought,
and most recently on the modeling and prediction of hurricane
formation, movement and intensification.
Atlas was one of the principal investigators of a new hurricane
computer model called the ``Finite Volume General Circulation Model''
(fvGCM), being run at NASA's GSFC and Ames Research Center, Moffitt
Field, Calif. The model provides a more realistic representation of
hurricanes and their behaviors, which is enhancing the state of
hurricane forecasting.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Dr. Atlas. Mr. McKinnon,
please proceed for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. DONALD L. MCKINNON, DIRECTOR, JONES COUNTY
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI
Mr. McKinnon. Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking
Member Inglis, and Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the
opportunity to come before you today to provide testimony
regarding the service provided by the National Weather
Service's Southern Region during Mr. Proenza's tenure.
I am Don McKinnon, Director of the Jones County Emergency
Management Agency in Laurel, Mississippi. I am representing the
Mississippi Civil Defense and Emergency Management Association,
which has 300 members across all 82 counties of the State of
Mississippi. I have worked in the Emergency Management Agency
in Jones County for 26 years. I have been the Director since
2001.
Current, accurate, and timely weather information plays a
significant role in all weather events, as well as other
incidents. The accessibility and the willingness of the
National Weather Service to help emergency management are
critical in our incident action plans, as we prepare for and
respond to these incidents.
Over the past six years, I have had the opportunity to work
with the Southern Region Director, Mr. Bill Proenza, on many
occasions. At conferences and other meetings, Mr. Proenza would
always solicit comments from the emergency managers, and took
their concerns to heart. Mr. Proenza convinced me that the
National Weather Service could be more than a reactive weather
source, and could, in fact, be a proactive weather resource in
the emergency management community.
Mr. Proenza encouraged the local weather offices to involve
emergency managers in their outreach activities. He fostered an
environment within the Southern Region that allowed his
personnel to work with and meet the needs of the customers that
they served. Mississippi emergency managers could give you many
examples of how Mr. Proenza made a difference in their ability
to protect their citizens. I have listed a few in my written
statement.
The Warning Coordinating Meteorologist in San Angelo, Texas
came up with the Turn Around, Don't Drown Program. Mr. Proenza
recognized the benefit the program could have on saving lives,
and brought the program to the emergency management community.
Once he sold the emergency managers on the program, he promoted
it across the United States. The National Weather Service
office in Jackson, Mississippi partnered with the Mississippi
Civil Defense and Emergency Management Association to develop
an eight-hour training course geared toward the emergency
management community that included the National Weather Service
offices in Slidell, Louisiana, Memphis, Tennessee, and Mobile,
Alabama. Now, the training is offered annually and available to
emergency management and the media.
Without Mr. Proenza to institute changes and growth in the
Southern Region, we may not have had the Radar Integrated
Display and Geospatial Elements, or RIDGE System, which
provides area-specific warning information in the form of
graphic polygons and text messages. This allows emergency
management to focus on specific areas of the county, and makes
our decision-making process much quicker and more reliable.
Now, we do not have to make broad advisories, but we can focus
on a specified area. Mr. Proenza recognized our need, and
worked with his staff to get us a better tool. The end result
is saving lives and property.
Many counties in the State were plagued by inefficient
coverage by the National Weather Service Doppler radar system.
Simply stated, it did not cover the counties the way it was
designed to, due to elevation and geographical location. Mr.
Proenza was aware of this problem, and worked constantly to
correct it. Thanks to his support and tenacity in getting the
radar moved, we now have a more reliable Doppler radar covering
our counties.
Recently, NOAA was considering the concept of operations,
which would have resulted in lowering National Weather Service
field office staffing and hours of operation of some field
offices. Mr. Proenza defended the much-needed local presence of
full-time service, and stood with local emergency managers to
question this dangerous concept. We are concerned that Mr.
Proenza's defending the interests of the public safety and the
emergency management community may have brought retribution on
him.
Mr. Proenza is a dedicated servant of the American people.
If you are uncomfortable with straight, honest, truthful
answers to the hard questions, then don't ask Mr. Proenza the
question, because that is what you are going to get, the truth.
When I learned that Mr. Proenza had been appointed the
Director of the National Hurricane Center, I was extremely
happy, and at the same time, I was sorry to see him leave
managing the Southern Region. We hoped he would have the
opportunity to bring the same innovative approaches to the
National Hurricane Center that we came to expect when he
managed the Southern Region.
Mr. Proenza is an advocate for the people he serves, and
when he encounters problems, he faces them head-on. If it is
broken, he wants it repaired. If it is working correctly, he
wants it improved. In my dealings with Mr. Proenza, he has
never been one to sit back and watch things happen. He has
always been on the forefront making things happen. Sadly, it
seems that he made the mistake of trying to improve the
National Hurricane Center.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I will
be glad to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKinnon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald L. McKinnon
Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Inglis, Ranking
Member Sensenbrenner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittees, I
thank you for the opportunity to come before you today to provide
testimony regarding the service provided by the National Weather
Service's Southern Regional Office during Mr. Bill Proenza's tenure.
I am Don McKinnon, Director of the Jones County Emergency
Management Agency, Laurel, Mississippi. I am representing the
Mississippi Civil Defense and Emergency Management Association
(MCDEMA), which has 300 members from all 82 counties in Mississippi.
Since 2000 the State of Mississippi has had 11 Presidential Disaster
Declarations, nine Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster
Declarations and 19 Governor State of Emergencies. I have worked in the
emergency management agency in Jones County for approximately 26 years.
I have been the Director since 2001. Emergency Management is a
coordinating agency responsible for maintaining emergency plans,
preparedness, response, disaster exercises, recovery, and mitigation
projects. We work with all public safety agencies, local, State, and
federal, as well as volunteer and non-emergency agencies. One of our
primary missions is to prepare for and respond to weather-related
events. We in Jones County are no strangers to tornadoes, floods and
hurricanes. I am responsible for responding to all of them. We also
have incidents that are not caused by weather that we rely on the
National Weather Service (NWS) to assist us with. For example, chemical
spills, hazardous shipment accidents, bridge collapse, fire, search and
rescue, etc. Current, accurate, and timely weather information plays a
significant role in each of these incidents. The accessibility and the
willingness of the NWS to help emergency management are critical in our
Incident Action Plans as we prepare for and respond to these incidents.
Jones County, Mississippi, is located approximately 100 miles
inland from the Mississippi Gulf Coast. When Hurricane Katrina slammed
into Mississippi on August 29, 2005, we suffered everything the Gulf
Coast suffered except the storm surge. We had 130 + mph sustained winds
with gusts much greater. We had 250 homes destroyed, 650 homes with
major damage and several thousand homes with minor damage. We suffered
seven Hurricane Katrina-related deaths. Remember we are 100 miles
inland from the coast.
Over the past six years in my tenure as the Emergency Management
Director I have had the opportunity to work with the Southeastern
Regional Director of the National Weather Service Mr. Bill Proenza on
many occasions. I first met Mr. Proenza at a Mississippi Civil Defense
Emergency Management Association conference. Mr. Proenza was speaking
to the conference attendees on the importance of the National Weather
Service and the Emergency Management Community working together to
achieve more success in warning our citizens of impending weather
events. Mr. Proenza was passionate about his topic and would later meet
with conference attendees to network individually and continue his
discussion. Mr. Proenza would always solicit comments from the local
emergency managers and took their concerns to heart. Mr. Proenza
convinced me that the NWS could be more than a reactive weather source
and could, in fact, serve as a proactive weather resource working with
the emergency management community.
Not only did Mr. Proenza come to us, he asked us to come to him.
Mr. Proenza encouraged the local weather offices to involve emergency
management in their outreach activities. The National Weather Service
Office in Jackson, Mississippi, partnered with the Mississippi Civil
Defense Emergency Management Association to develop an eight hour
training course geared toward the emergency management community and
the interaction with the NWS. Then the NWS offices from Slidell, LA,
Memphis, TN, and Mobile, AL were invited to attend so the emergency
management customers they serve could interact with them. Some of the
topics included understanding the Doppler Radar, understanding the
products produced and offered by the NWS and tracking specific events
that had occurred. Now the training is offered annually and available
to emergency management and the media. Mr. Proenza recognized that
there are, aside from the general public, two core customers, emergency
management and the media, that needed personal and daily interaction
with the National Weather Service. He fostered an environment within
the Southeastern Regional NWS that allowed his personnel to work with
and meet the needs of the customers they served.
Mr. Proenza was deeply involved in the development of the NWS
Southern Region program ``Turn Around, Don't Drown.'' Flooding is the
number one cause of drowning deaths in the United States. Realizing
that the National Weather Service could do more to educate the public
on what they should and should not do during a flood Mr. Proenza
solicited information from the NWS Offices in his region. The Warning
Coordination Meteorologist in San Angelo, TX came up with the ``Turn
Around, Don't Drown'' theme. Mr. Proenza recognized the benefit the
program could have on saving lives and brought the program to the
emergency management community. Once he sold the EMs on the program he
promoted the program across the United States. The next time you hear
that slogan, remember where it came from. Without Mr. Proenza we would
not have it.
Not one to just continue a practice because ``that is the way we
have always done it,'' Mr. Proenza encouraged the NWS Southern Region
Headquarters Staff to develop a computer program that would give a
graphic display of severe weather information on the NWS Radar sites on
the Internet. Users could already see the weather cells or lines moving
into their areas but when a watch or warning was issued that
information was not visible on the Internet site. Mr. Proenza knew that
emergency management and the public needed more and that's what he gave
them. Now when a flood, storm or tornado watch or warning is issued
they get a graphic box showing the area affected simultaneously with
the weather on the NWS Radar page of the Internet. Not only do you get
visual representation, if you click on a county/parish in the box you
get the text message associated with the watch or warning. You will
know the program as Radar Integrated Display with Geospatial Elements
or RIDGE. Without Mr. Proenza to institute changes and growth in the
NWS Southern Region we may not have the RIDGE System. What we had,
worked. Mr. Proenza knew that it could work better and provide more
useful information to a public who needed it. That's what we have
because Mr. Proenza would accept no less.
Mr. Proenza was contacted in 2004 by a local emergency management
director in a small rural county about a problem with the NOAA weather
radio system in their area. This is a county with a population of
approximately 22,000 people. Mr. Proenza met with the local officials
and listened as they explained their concerns. Mr. Proenza then went to
work for them. In late 2005 the county received equipment to replace
the defunct system. The County now has a working NOAA weather radio
system and the citizens of Carthage, Mississippi, can rest easier
knowing that they will get timely weather information that may save
their lives. I later learned that Mr. Proenza had repeated this process
in several other counties in Mississippi. Not only did he follow
through with the equipment that he promised, he personally followed up
on the resolution of the problems to ensure that the systems were
performing as they should and nothing else was needed. Mr. Proenza was
instrumental in making these systems functional.
Problems are plentiful in the emergency management business. Mr.
Proenza is not afraid to face these problems with us when they concern
the National Weather Service. Jones County as well as many other
counties in the state was plagued by inefficient coverage by the new
(1993) NWS Jackson Doppler Radar system. Simply stated, it did not
cover my county the way it was designed to. In defense of the NWS it
was designed to give full coverage to the NWS Jackson coverage area of
which my county is a part. But when construction was started on the
site, the Federal Aviation Administration notified the NWS Jackson
office that the tower housing the radar would have to be lowered by 10
meters (30 feet) because of the proximity to the Jackson International
Airport. Having no alternative site the construction had to proceed.
From day one the radar coverage was degraded by approximately 50
percent in the eastern part of the state. This was because of a terrain
issue. What did this mean to the radar coverage? It meant that the
forecasters could not accurately monitor rain data and wind data below
six to eight thousand feet. Unless a storm was well above six to eight
thousand feet then the forecasters could possibly miss it, as was the
case in November of 2001 in Jones County. A small tornado touched down
in west Jones County at approximately 7:20 P.M. and destroyed several
homes. The West Jones High School and Middle School received major
damage. NWS officials came to Jones County the next day and explained
that they simply did not see the storm. Mr. Proenza was aware of the
Doppler Radar problem and was working to correct it. He kept me
updated. The emergency management community wrote many letters of
support in this push to get the radar moved to a more suitable
location. Finally the radar was moved in 2002 to a site in Rankin
County, Mississippi, approximately seven miles from the original site.
Coverage has improved tremendously and we have not had any
``surprises'' since the move. Without Mr. Proenza's support and
tenacity we may not have achieved the move. He made it happen and my
citizens are safer because of it.
Mr. Proenza asked for my input on an issue concerning the National
Weather Service name and logo a number of years ago. NOAA wanted to
change the name and the logo of the National Weather Service to the
NOAA Weather Service. This came as a surprise to me and quite honestly
I was baffled by the proposed change. The NWS is a national brand name.
It is trusted and credible with a history going back over 130 years.
The logo represents quality and knowledge in the weather service. To
change the name for no more reason than to just change the name doesn't
make sense to me. I understand that this is still an issue.
More recently Mr. Proenza asked me to represent the emergency
management community in the interview process to replace the retiring
NWS Jackson Warning Coordination Meteorologist (WCM). I had worked with
the outgoing WCM for many years and had grown to trust and respect his
opinion. Finding a suitable replacement was going to be a challenge. We
found a very capable applicant. Before the applicant was approved for
the position Mr. Proenza called me to make sure I was comfortable with
the applicant and that this person would be a good fit in our emergency
management programs. I am happy to report that the new WCM has been
well received by emergency management and has brought with him many new
and useful ideas. Mr. Proenza did not have to include the emergency
management community in this process. However, he recognized the
importance of this position to emergency management and took the step
to include us in selecting the person we would be working so closely
with.
Recently NOAA was considering a ``concept of operations'' which
would have resulted in lowering NWS field office staffing and hours of
operation of some field offices. Mr. Proenza defended the much-needed
local presence of full time service and stood with local emergency
managers to question this dangerous concept. I know my meteorologists
and they know me. They know where Jones County is and what the terrain
is like here. We work together to inform and protect the public. The
meteorologists in NWS Jackson, Mississippi, treat Jones County as more
than a statistical spot on a map. We were grateful that as a result of
questions raised by Congress and particularly this committee that
proposal is on hold. We are concerned that Mr. Proenza's defending the
interests of public safety and the emergency management community may
have brought retribution on him.
Mr. Proenza is a dedicated servant of the American people. If you
are uncomfortable with straight, honest, truthful answers to the hard
questions then don't ask Mr. Proenza the question. Because that's what
you are going to get, the truth. Mr. Proenza has always been accessible
and approachable. He really cares about the public he represents. When
I learned that Mr. Proenza had been appointed the Director of the
National Hurricane Center I was extremely happy and at the same time I
was sorry to see him leave managing the Southern Regional Office of the
NWS. However, The NHC is a vital part of Mississippi's emergency
management program. The information provided to me and the State of
Mississippi from the NHC in times of emergency is critical in the
decision-making process of my Emergency Operations Center.
Mr. Proenza is an advocate for the people he serves and when he
encounters problems he faces them head on. If it is broken, he wants it
repaired. If it is working correctly, he wants it improved. In my
dealings with Mr. Proenza he has never been one to sit back and watch
things happen. He is on the forefront making things happen. Sadly it
seems that he made the mistake of trying to improve the National
Hurricane Center.
It has been an honor and a pleasure to come to our Capitol to meet
with distinguished leaders of our nation's Congress and present this
testimony on behalf of Mr. Proenza's leadership at the NWS Southern
Regional Office. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Biography for Donald L. McKinnon
Donald L. McKinnon currently serves as the Director of the Jones
County Emergency Management Agency and Office of Homeland Security in
Laurel, Jones County, Mississippi. Don has held this position since
2001. Jones County consists of approximately 702 square miles with four
municipalities and a combined population of approximately of 68,000
people. Jones County is located 100 miles inland from the Mississippi
Gulf Coast. Prior to becoming Director Don served in various positions
within the Emergency Management Agency to include: Search and Rescue
Coordinator; Storm Spotter; Administrative Officer; and Operations
Officer.
Don is responsible for the Jones County Emergency Operations
Center; the Office of Homeland Security; the 911 Office; the
Communications Dispatch Center; the 800 Megahertz Trunked Public Safety
Radio System; the Public Safety Paging System; two 911 Tower Sites; and
the Communications Technical Services Staff.
From 1972 until 1978 Don served in the United States Marines Corps.
Don held the rank of Staff Sergeant with a Secret Security clearance
and was assigned communications duties. During his service Don spent
two terms of duty in Okinawa, Japan where he was the Communications
Center Supervisor for the 1st Marine Air Wing. Don was later assigned
to the Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) in
Quantico, VA where he was a communications center shift supervisor.
Don moved to Laurel, Mississippi in 1979 and took a position with
Northern Electric Company as a computer programmer/software analyst.
Don began his service with the Jones County Emergency Management
Agency in 1980. It was during this time that Don volunteered to serve
the emergency management agency as a dive rescue team member. Don
organized and directed the Dive Team from 1980 until 2000. Don also
served as the Jones County Volunteer Fire Coordinator during this time.
He is the past President and founding member of the Mississippi
Chapter of the National Emergency Number Association (911); active
member of the Associated Public Safety Communications Officers
International (APCO); active member of the Mississippi Civil Defense
and Emergency Management Association (MCDEMA); former Board Member of
the MCDEMA; Chairman for Communications and Technology committee of
MCDEMA; and active member of the International Association of Emergency
Managers (IAEM).
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. McKinnon. Mr. Robinson,
you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBIE ROBINSON, DIRECTOR, DALLAS COUNTY OFFICE
OF SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. Robinson. Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking
Member Inglis, Members, thank you very much for inviting me;
again, Robie Robinson, Director of Security and Emergency
Management, Dallas County. Today, I am speaking on behalf of
the Emergency Managers' Association of Texas.
As you know, every state in the Nation is at risk to
disasters, and Texas is no exception. Disaster situations occur
in our state practically every day. From '89 to 2000, floods
and flash floods caused 35 percent of the weather-related
deaths in Texas. They are followed in order by tornadoes,
lightning, winter storms, extreme heat, severe thunderstorms,
and finally, hurricanes and tropical storms.
As I was preparing this testimony, Texas had 61 counties
with declared disasters going on. We also know that a
proactive, robust emergency management program can reduce risk,
property loss, and even death. A critical component of local
emergency management programs is timely, accurate weather data
that we can understand.
Bill Proenza has always been an active supporter of local
emergency managers. During his tenure as the Southern Director,
Bill ensured that the local emergency managers had ready access
to weather information. He ensured that his folks took the time
to understand our weather information needs. He ensured that
they were available during weather events to answer our
questions and provide forecasts. He also ensured that they
worked closely with storm spotters and volunteer weather
monitors to improve forecast models. Bill encouraged his staff
to conduct training classes, teach local emergency managers one
on one, and give presentations at local events and conferences.
Support for local emergency managers was evident in my
first emergency management position in Fisher County, Texas. I
had only been the volunteer EMC for ten days when a tornado
struck the largest town in our community. It was not a large
tornado, but it was not a large town, either, and the warnings
given by the National Weather Service and the follow-up concern
that they displayed were incredible.
It changed the relationship from Service and County to
Robie Robinson and Buddy McIntyre, who worked at the San Angelo
office of the National Weather Service. I went on to learn a
lot more about weather from Buddy, and he hosted the first
disaster exercise that I ever participated in as an emergency
manager. Now, if I had never moved from rural West Texas, I
would have chalked that one up to small town hospitality, but
now, I am in the ninth largest county in the Nation, and the
relationship that I have with the people there, Bill and Gary,
is the same as it was back in West Texas. It is clear to me
that the commitment of the National Weather Service personnel
that I have worked with is a reflection of the leadership that
they had coming down from the regional level.
Thanks to Bill's leadership, we now have a wealth of
weather data available in our emergency operation centers that
we did not have 10 years ago. That data increases the time
available for emergency managers and elected officials to
consider alternative courses of action, and choose the
appropriate action to take.
Now, some people say that weather has changed, but the
weather hasn't changed. It is the same thing it was when I was
Isaac Cline was watching the clouds over Galveston before the
1900 hurricane that is still the deadliest disaster ever to
have struck on U.S. soil, but there are differences in us.
There are different things that we do. We have more citizens in
buildings, more densely populated cities, more people who don't
rely on their own eyes and wives' tales, they rely, instead, on
reliable forecasts, to safeguard their families and their
businesses.
Thanks to Bill's leadership, we have a National Weather
Service office in our area with a staff of professionals who
keep us informed and answer our questions any time, day or
night. Local emergency managers used to only get weather
warnings and watches information by NOAA Weather Radio, phone,
or fax. Now, we get them by Internet, e-mail, and pagers, as
well as those other options. National Weather Service personnel
listened to our needs and met them.
Bill actively pushed for the Warning Coordinating
Meteorologist Program to support local emergency managers. The
National Weather Service has also built, during his tenure,
valuable partnerships. Just a couple of years ago, in
Galveston, the National Weather Service opened a joint office
with the Galveston County Emergency Management Agency. This is
an innovative, forward-thinking partnership. Now, we all claim
that we want to work together in our respective fields, but how
many of us voluntarily go in to share offices on a day to day
regular basis?
Jack Colley is the State Director of Emergency Management
in Texas, and he couldn't be here today, but he asked me to
say: ``We could not operate without the National Weather
Service. They are a key partner in our state, and Bill is an
innovator and an advocate for serving the needs of the locals,
so that we can protect the people who rely on us.''
My county is currently building a new Emergency Operations
Center to help keep our citizens safe. I hope that the National
Weather Service will continue to look toward the future as we
are, and bring new tools and new products to the table. I hope
that they continue the personal contact with emergency managers
surrounding their regional offices. I hope their funding will
be maintained at a level that we won't ever question their
ability to serve the emergency management community and protect
our people. I hope I can see and rely on the same enthusiasm
and commitment from the National Weather Service during the
last half of my career that I have witnessed during the first
half.
In closing, I hope the National Weather Service will
continue the partnerships, energy, and knowledge and innovation
that Bill Proenza fostered. I hope the information sharing will
continue to us at the local level, as we are the conduits
through which their warnings and watches are delivered to the
moms and the dads and the sisters and brothers whose actual
literal lives depend on that information.
Members of the Subcommittees, forecasting the weather
requires courage, because human beings don't control the
weather. But I hope the leadership of NOAA and the National
Weather Service do not move in this new century by squelching
the courage of their people to speak out when they feel it is
important.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robie Robinson
Chairman Lampson, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Inglis, and
Ranking Member Sensenbrenner and Subcommittee Members, thank you for
inviting me to speak to you this morning. My name is Robie Robinson. I
am the Director of Security and Emergency Management for Dallas County,
Texas, and I am here to speak on behalf of the Emergency Managers'
Association of Texas.
As you know, every state across the Nation is at risk to some form
of disaster. Texas is no exception. Our state is vulnerable to multiple
forms of disaster situations--whether they are triggered by an act of
nature, an accident, or man-made. We know from historical data that
disaster situations occur in the state nearly every day, and weather
threats cause the majority of deaths. From 1989-2000, floods and flash
floods caused 35 percent of the weather-related deaths in Texas. These
are followed by tornadoes, lightning, winter storms, extreme heat,
severe thunderstorms, and finally by hurricane/tropical storms. As I
was preparing this testimony, Texas had 61 counties dealing with
declared disasters. We also know that a proactive and robust emergency
management program can reduce risk, property loss, and death. A
critical component of a local emergency management program is timely
and accurate weather data that decision-makers understand.
Bill Proenza has always been an active supporter of local emergency
managers. During his tenure as the southern regional director, Bill
ensured that the local government emergency managers had ready access
to weather information. He ensured his Warning Coordinating
Meteorologists took the time to understand our weather information
needs and to explain the impacts and probabilities of weather events on
our local areas. He ensured the Warning Coordinating Meteorologists
were available during weather events to answer our questions, provide
forecasts, and discuss the various weather products with us. He also
ensured the Warning Coordinating Meteorologists worked closely with the
storm spotters and volunteer weather monitors to improve the forecast
models that applied to our most common hazard, flooding.
The Warning Coordinating Meteorologists and National Weather
Service forecasters provide valuable training for local emergency
managers and weather spotters. Bill supported and encouraged his staff
to conduct training classes, teach local emergency managers one-on-one,
and give presentations at local events and professional conferences.
National Weather Service support for local emergency managers was
evident in my first emergency management position in rural Fisher
County, Texas. I had only been the volunteer EMC for 10 days when a
tornado struck in the middle of the largest town in the county. It
wasn't a large tornado, but it wasn't a large town either. The National
Weather Service assistance began with tornado warnings, but it did not
end there. They stayed in touch as we had crews searching through
debris and cleaning up streets over the next several days. The warnings
given by the National Weather Service and the follow-up concern that
they displayed were incredible. That experience changed the
relationship from Service and County, to Robie Robinson and Buddy
McIntyre, Warning Coordination Meteorologist for the San Angelo office
of the National Weather Service. I went on to learn more about
thunderstorms and weather from Buddy and he hosted the first disaster
exercise that I attended as an emergency manager. If I had never moved,
I would have put it all off to small town hospitality, but I am now in
the ninth largest county in the Nation and the relationship that I have
with Bill and Gary in the Fort Worth office is the same. They interact
with the emergency managers in our area on a regular basis. That is how
they are able to keep an eye on our needs and modify their efforts to
help us. It is clear to me that the commitment of the National Weather
Service personnel with whom I have worked is a reflection of the
leadership they had at the regional level.
Bill's support of local emergency managers also applied to the
River Forecasting Centers. The Fort Worth River Forecast Center worked
closely with local emergency managers as well as the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and Texas River Authorities before, during, and after heavy
rainfall and flooding events. This coordination has been critical in
our abilities to protect critical infrastructures, government
facilities, and the public from flooding events.
The new weather products now available are very useful in our
planning efforts. We have various text products, river data,
hydrographs, various precipitation images, reports and forecasts. We
now have better maps, charts, and tables; weather forecasts,
hydrometeorological data and discussion, climate data, and historical
data. Local emergency managers get the weather information we need in
the format that best meets our needs thanks largely to the programs and
the leadership of Bill Proenza.
The increased variety of weather products, discussions, and graphs,
coupled with probability estimates improved decision-making in our
emergency operations centers before and during extreme weather events.
We now have a wealth of weather data available in our emergency
operations centers that did not exist ten years ago. That data, and our
understanding of it, increases the time available for the local
emergency manager and the elected officials to consider alternative
courses of action and to select the most appropriate one for the
jurisdiction. Bill worked with local emergency managers to ensure we
had the data we needed.
There are those who say that technology has changed our world so
that the weather is different or that our dependence on weather has
lessened over the years. I would say that weather is not any different
today than what it was back when Isaac Cline was watching the clouds in
Galveston, Texas before the 1900 hurricane that is still the deadliest
disaster to have struck in the United States. There are, however,
differences in us and how we live. Our vulnerability is even greater
than ever before. We have more citizens, buildings and vehicles at
risk, and more densely populated cities with people who rely, not on
their own eyes and wives' tales, but instead on reliable scientific
forecasts to safeguard their businesses and their families. Thanks to
Bill's leadership, we have a National Weather Service Office with a
staff of professionals who work to keep us informed and to answer our
questions any time, day or night.
We have all learned to listen to forecasts and we have all heard
when there were watches and warnings in our area. Admittedly, I am
among the ranks of professional emergency managers who are professional
paranoids. It is my job to watch the weather and plan for disasters but
everyone wonders whether it will rain during the game or if today is a
good day to go to the beach or to the lake. We rely on the National
Weather Service for that information.
The National Weather Service distributes weather data based on our
needs. Local emergency managers used to get weather warnings, watches,
and information only by NOAA Weather Radio, phone or fax. Now we get
them from the Internet, by e-mail, and by pagers. The Warning
Coordinating Meteorologists and other National Weather Service
Personnel listened to the local emergency managers needs for weather-
related information and they met them. Bill Proenza actively pushed for
the Warning Coordinating Meteorologist program and for the National
Weather Service support of local emergency managers. The improvements
we experienced over the last ten years would not have occurred without
his leadership in the southern region.
I interact with people all over the state on a regular basis.
People from cities, counties, private industry, health care,
transportation, State employees, and federal personnel. Across the
board, they have nothing but positive comments when asked about the
National Weather Service. Under Mr. Proenza's leadership, the southern
region built this reputation and those in place today are working
diligently to maintain it. However, don't make the mistake of thinking
that they are content to stop there. They are constantly leaning
forward in the saddle looking for new, innovative ways to help us do
our jobs better for the people of the Lone Star State. I have attended
numerous meetings where I have spoken with National Weather Service
representatives who were eager to hear comments from emergency managers
about how we used their products and what we would like to see in the
future.
The National Weather Service has also built valuable partnerships.
Just a couple of years ago, they opened a new office jointly with
Galveston County Emergency Management. This is an innovative, forward
thinking partnership. We all want to claim that we can cooperate with
others in our respective fields but how many of us actually go so far
as to share our offices daily. Emergency managers and the National
Weather Service have a strong tradition of working together but that
isn't enough. It is more important to look toward the future and to
ensure that we are prepared. That is where the southern region was
incredibly effective during Mr. Proenza's tenure. When I was fighting
wildfires across the state for the Texas Forest Service in 2000, I knew
I could and frequently did call the National Weather Service for spot
weather forecasts. This required that meteorologists stop what they
were doing and give me specific information for the very coordinates
where property and lives were hanging in the balance. I needed that
information to keep firefighters safe and to protect the homes and
ranches of many of our citizens. These efforts weren't required; they
were done because the service and the people behind it knew they needed
to be done. I was safer and better able to do my job with the knowledge
that they shared.
In the end, the National Weather Service is not a federal agency
with people who sit in Washington to hand down products, guidelines,
and grant funds. It is an agency of people who provide essential
services to the emergency management community. Jack Colley, the Texas
State Emergency Management Director could not be here today but he
asked me to say, ``We could not operate in Texas without the National
Weather Service. They are a key partner in our state. Bill Proenza is
an innovator and an advocate for serving the needs of the locals so
that we can protect the people who rely on us.''
My county is currently building a new Emergency Operations Center
with County funds, not grant funds, to help keep our citizens safe. I
hope that the National Weather Service will continue to look toward the
future and bring new tools and products to the table. I hope that they
continue the personal contact with professional emergency managers
surrounding their regional offices. I hope their funding will be
maintained at a level such that we won't ever question their value or
their ability to serve the emergency management community and protect
our people. I hope that I see can see and rely on the same enthusiasm
and commitment from the National Weather Service during the last half
of my career that I saw and relied on in the first half. They share in
our common goal and our common role as we work hand-in-hand to protect
people.
In closing, I hope that the NWS will continue the partnerships,
energy, knowledge and innovation that Bill Proenza fostered. I hope
that the information sharing will continue to us at the local level as
we are the conduits from which the warnings and watches are
communicated to the Moms and Dads and sisters and brothers whose very
lives depend on that information.
Members of the Subcommittees, forecasting the weather requires
courage because human beings can not control what is going to happen. I
hope that the leadership of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and the National Weather Service do not move into this
new century by squelching the courage of their people to speak out.
Biography for Robie Robinson
Mr. Robie Robinson is currently the Director of the Dallas County
Office of Security and Emergency Management. Dallas County is the ninth
largest county in the United States and is home to over 2.2 million
people. Under Robinson's direction are Emergency Management, Homeland
Security, Fire Marshal, and Security for all Dallas County buildings,
personnel, and operations.
Robinson was previously an Assistant Professor of Emergency
Administration and Planning at the University of North Texas. Prior to
joining the UNT faculty, Robinson was employed as Regional Fire
Coordinator for the Texas Forest Service where he responded to
disasters across the State of Texas. Robinson has also served as the
elected County Attorney and Emergency Management Coordinator for Fisher
County, Texas.
Robinson completed a B.A. in history from Texas A&M, a Ranch
Management Certificate from Texas Christian University, and a J.D. from
Oklahoma City University. In addition, he has completed the Executive
Leadership Program from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California. Robinson serves on numerous committees at the local, State,
and national level and holds certifications from both the International
Association of Emergency Managers (CEM) and Emergency Managers
Association of Texas (TEM).
Discussion
Chairman Lampson. Thank you very much.
We will move into our first round of questions, and I yield
myself five minutes, as the Chairman.
Director Proenza's Tenure in the Southern Region
You have commented on, both Mr. Robinson and Mr. McKinnon,
have commented on the work that Mr. Proenza did as Director of
the Southern Region. He met the needs of your offices. Did you
have any concerns about the quality of the products that he
would deliver, or his agency would deliver to your agencies,
your offices?
Mr. McKinnon. On the contrary, no problems with the
products at all, and if he had questions, then he would come to
us and ask if we needed to improve what he was offering to us.
Mr. Robinson. Typically, he would ask us if we needed
anything else, and we got what we asked for.
Chairman Lampson. Consider him a people person? Did he have
a hard time getting along with people?
Mr. McKinnon. Very approachable and a very personable
person to me.
Chairman Lampson. Did you have any reason to lack
confidence in the forecasts, warnings, data, or other product
that you had been receiving from the Center?
Mr. Robinson. None at all.
Mr. McKinnon. None, sir.
Hurricane Research Division and Hurricane Center Collaboration
Chairman Lampson. Dr. Atlas, did you ever discuss with Mr.
Proenza greater collaboration between the Hurricane Research
Division and the Hurricane Center, after he became Director in
January?
Dr. Atlas. Yes, I did. When, immediately after Bill became
Director, we were both approached by the NOAA Chief of Staff,
and we were asked to work closely together, to bring research
and operations much closer, and to be able to transition more
of what we do in research into the operations of the Hurricane
Center.
Chairman Lampson. How was that received by people who
worked beneath the two of you?
Dr. Atlas. The people who worked at AOML, at the Hurricane
Research Division, were extremely pleased. We had been wanting
to do this for many years. It had not been as effective as it
could have been in the past. There are many new developments in
research that need to get into operations, and we were working
extremely well together to bring that about.
Hurricane Research
Chairman Lampson. What would a research program look like,
to accomplish the goal of figuring out how to forecast
hurricane intensity, if that is the primary question?
Dr. Atlas. In order to be able to forecast hurricane
intensity well, we need to have numerical models at very high
resolution, that are capable of representing the key processes
that go on within the hurricane, including the hurricane core.
What this means is we need to have better and more
observations, we need to have better ways of using that data.
We need to have a better understanding, and we must have these
new models.
Chairman Lampson. What kind of observational data will be
needed to develop our understanding of hurricane intensity, and
what kinds of sensors does that imply, that we will need in the
future?
Dr. Atlas. Well, we need essentially everything we have
there now, but we need more of it, and we need it at higher
resolution. If we are--the models that are being run now were
based on observations that were at pretty coarse resolution,
and so were the models. Now, as we get down to a few kilometers
in scale in our numerical weather prediction models, we must
have data that is on a comparable scale. We need it for the
development of the models, and we need it to provide initial
conditions to the models.
Chairman Lampson. How would findings from such a research
program be translated into upgrades to models or other tools
and techniques for the staff at the Hurricane Center?
Dr. Atlas. This is, there is a process in NOAA for
transitioning research, and there are new facilities that will
make this go even better. There is something called the
Developmental Test Center, located in Colorado, which enables
researchers to work with the operational models, and enable us
to upgrade them. Ultimately, it goes through the Joint
Hurricane Testbed at the Hurricane Center, and if it passes the
test, it then goes into operations.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you very much. I only have a few
seconds left. I am going to yield that back, and I am going to
turn it over to Mr. Diaz-Balart for five minutes.
More on the Hurricane Center Personnel
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you gentlemen for being here.
Also, I just want to tell the Chairman and others on the
Committee, and my dear friend, Mr. Klein, that one thing that
is worth seeing is the operation that Dr. Atlas has down there
in South Florida, incredible people and led very well by Dr.
Atlas, and I recently had the privilege to visit with them, and
thank you for your hospitality, sir.
I am glad that we are kind of getting away from personnel
issues, and more on science issues, which is what this
committee knows how to do, and we don't know how to deal with
personnel, nor do we have the power to, but since a couple of
things were brought up, I very briefly want to address it.
Mr. Robinson, and I think very well, stated that obviously,
we need to make sure that the courage to do the right thing
continues, and I have no doubt whatsoever that Mr. Proenza has
had that courage. But I just want to, you know, there are some
incredible people at the Hurricane Center, and I don't know if
you all have had, you know, have had a chance to meet with
them, but since I do live and represent that part of town, that
part of the country, you know, you get to kind of know some of
them, and you know, Dr. Avila, James Franklin, so, so many,
Richard Knabb, Dr. Knabb, I should say, Daniel Brown. There are
so many incredible leaders.
Obviously, you are not, and I know you are not, but I just
want to make it very clear for the record, you are not implying
that the people in the Hurricane Center don't have the courage
or the expertise to do their job, correct? I mean, I know you
are not----
Dr. Atlas. That is correct.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. But I just want to make sure that, you
know, right.
Dr. Atlas. That is correct.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I don't want anybody to ever misinterpret
what you are saying, because I thought you were very positive
and very clear.
Improving Hurricane Forecasting
Getting back to the science now. Dr. Atlas, you and I have
had conversations, and you just repeated it now, that one of
the areas that we didn't need to do much better is in
forecasting the strength, the intensity of a storm, and you
have given me some, I think, very easy to understand in
layman's terms, explanations as to where we are, and how we can
do better, and if you could just give me a little bit of your
outlook. Are you optimistic that we can do better, and what do
we need to do in order to do better?
Dr. Atlas. When I left NASA to come to NOAA, I did it
because I had a specific goal in mind, and one of those goals
deals with the improvement of hurricane prediction. I agree
wholeheartedly with every positive statement said about the
National Hurricane Center and its personnel. They do an
excellent job. It represents the state of our science, the
state of the art. However, it is still not good enough for what
the Nation needs. We need to narrow the cone of uncertainty. I
believe that if we develop the kinds of models, and get the
kinds of observations, and increased understanding that I have
mentioned to forecast intensity, we will be able to narrow the
cone of uncertainty as well.
We are at a time in hurricane science where resources put
into computing, into research, into model development, and new
observations can have tremendous payoff.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield
back. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you very much, Mr. Diaz-Balart. I
will recognize Ron Klein for five minutes.
Alternatives to QuikSCAT
Mr. Klein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Dr. Atlas, and gentlemen, for coming today, and being part of
our discussion.
I was focusing, in my questions to Mr. Proenza, on the
difference of QuikSCAT and the role that QuikSCAT plays, and
the difference if QuikSCAT is unavailable or in some diminished
capacity, on marine forecasting, and of course, hurricane
forecasting in general.
Can you give some comment on the quality and quantity of
difference, based on what NOAA said, is here--is our, after
pushing them a little bit, but here is the backup on how we are
going to approach this, between the European satellite, and I
guess there is a new Indian satellite that is coming online, or
a couple of other things, plus the other data and resources we
have available to us.
Dr. Atlas. There is actually another American satellite
that is functioning right now called WINDSAT, and I have done
numerical experiments that show that WINDSAT does provide
useful data, although not nearly as accurate or as much as
QuikSCAT. In general, if we only had WINDSAT to replace
QuikSCAT, we would lose about half of the beneficial effect of
satellite surface wind data.
The European scatterometer, ASCAT, is comparable to their
earlier scatterometer, in how it senses the surface wind, and
does a little better than QuikSCAT in heavy rain situations,
but is much poorer in terms of resolution and coverage, and
does not have the ability to represent an entire storm
circulation within its data coverage.
We believe that we will lose some forecast accuracy.
Certainly, if we do nothing, we will lose forecast accuracy,
but the mitigation plan that NOAA has, to make use of ASCAT, to
augment our reconnaissance aircraft, and to potentially put new
observing systems on unmanned aerial systems, could mitigate
the loss of QuikSCAT very effectively. I think that one of the
very good things NOAA has done is to develop this mitigation
plan, and it is being thought out very carefully.
Mr. Klein. Okay. And just a followup on your comments on
ASCAT, and your previous comment, the fact that QuikSCAT in its
present form has more of a difficult time in heavy rains and
things like that. Are we already currently getting data from
ASCAT? Is that part of our engagement currently, or is that
just as a backup in the event QuikSCAT goes down?
Dr. Atlas. We just started receiving data from ASCAT very
recently. The forecasters are evaluating the quality of the
data, and to what extent they can use it. There are several
difficulties in applying the ASCAT data the way they applied
QuikSCAT, and so, there is a learning curve that we need to get
over.
Mr. Klein. And is there anything else going on in the rest
of the world? I mean, obviously, the Far East has significant
storms and typhoons and a lot of other things, other countries,
other technologies, that are currently in place, that we are
considering, or should be considering, or are we at the top of
the curve here in science, and there is nothing for us to grab
onto in any other part of the world?
Dr. Atlas. Congressman, there are other countries that are
developing scatterometers, but we don't know how good that data
will be, or even whether or not they will make it available to
us. There are other technologies that could also go into space,
or be used on aircraft, that would bring about or contribute to
significant further improvements in weather analysis and
prediction.
More on Hurricane Research
Mr. Klein. Okay. And the last question is, we have heard a
number of times that research, it is not just the satellite or
the buoy, research is a key component of everything from
developing models to, you know, identifying new factors that we
should be considering. Are we currently researching or
supporting the level of research that you believe is necessary
for the future of weather forecasting at this moment, and if
not, what do you recommend?
Dr. Atlas. If I had to answer with a yes or no, I would
have to say no, but that is partially because, as was pointed
out earlier, scientists never believe they have, that we have
enough resources for what we want to do.
I think the level of resources that has existed up to this
point, with where we were in the period of less hurricane
activity, and the state of our science, was appropriate. Now,
in this period of very active hurricanes, and the fact that our
science is now at a stage where we can rapidly capitalize upon
additional resources, certainly more would be warranted.
Mr. Klein. And if you can get back to us on exactly what,
it is easy to throw a number at something, but I think it would
be helpful to this committee to understand what specifics that
we could support, types of research, the amount of support,
resources necessary to get you where you need to be. Thank you.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Klein. Mr. Inglis, five
minutes.
Director Proenza's Relationship With Witnesses
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McKinnon and Mr.
Robinson, testimony from you is very helpful to establish that
Mr. Proenza is a capable fellow, who did excellent work while
he was in a liaison role with the two of you. Is that a good
way to characterize your testimony?
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir. It is mine.
Mr. McKinnon. It is fair enough.
Mr. Inglis. That he was very effective in working with you,
and a capable fellow. And I think that it is important for all
of us to stipulate that that seems to be the case. You are here
saying that, and apparently, the Administration thought that
when they hired him to go the Center, right? Because they
thought he was a very capable fellow.
I just was out in the hallway with some teachers, and had a
little discussion about how, do you think it is possible that
somebody that is a very good match for the superintendent of
schools for a county is maybe not the best match as the
principal of an elementary school? And of course, they
immediately were shaking their heads yes. There is a different
role involved. If you were the leader of a small elementary
school, you are rubbing shoulders every day with the teachers,
you are energizing them, you are being enthusiastic about their
kids and what they are doing. You are working with them in
their individual lives. Whereas if you are at the ed shed, the
district superintendent, you are basically interacting with the
community and principals, and various, at a different level.
Is it fair to say that your interaction with Mr. Proenza
sounds like it might fit more the model of the ed shed guy,
right, the district office person, that was interacting with
you as community members? Is that accurate?
Mr. Robinson. I only interacted with him as a local
representative. I work on the county level.
Mr. Inglis. Yeah, so you worked with him in your capacity
as a county employee, right?
Mr. Robinson. County emergency management. Right.
Mr. Inglis. You never worked for him.
Mr. Robinson. No, I did not.
Mr. Inglis. And Mr. McKinnon, you never worked for him.
Mr. Robinson. No, sir. I never worked for him.
Mr. Inglis. So, in that way, you, while your testimony is
very helpful in seeing that he is a very capable fellow, and
substantiates the decision of the Administration to hire him in
the first place, to go to the Center, you really can't testify
as to what it would be like to work with him in a group of 46
people, sometimes 24 hours a day, sleeping at the Center when a
storm is bearing down. You really don't know what it would be
like to be there with him in that environment.
Mr. McKinnon. And my comment would be, sir, we have worked
very closely over the years, and I found Mr. Proenza to be very
approachable, very personable, and an effective leader.
Mr. Inglis. Yeah.
Mr. McKinnon. I don't believe we have had enough time at
the National Hurricane Center to find out exactly, we haven't
even gone through an entire hurricane season with him at the
helm, to find out exactly how effective he would be at the
Hurricane Center.
Mr. Inglis. Right. And of course, if 23 people of the 46
say that he is not effective, and hurricane season is coming
on, it sort of indicates it is a scary proposition, that 23 say
the elementary school teachers don't have confidence in the
elementary school principal, and think perhaps he or she should
go back to the district office.
And of course, I would ask my colleagues to be thinking
about how we have different relationships with our staff,
perhaps, than we do with our constituents. With our
constituents, we can be very friendly. They are out there. With
our staff, we might have a very different relationship. And so,
it is a different role, right?
Mr. McKinnon. Yes, sir, but I think the word be out if your
staff disliked you for that reason, and I have never heard that
about Mr. Proenza.
Mr. Inglis. You know, I have always been amazed at Members
of Congress getting away with it. But anyway, I have no further
questions. Thank you.
Returning Dirrector Proenza to His Former Position
Chairman Lampson. Just one thing, as we wrap this up. How
would either of you, Mr. McKinnon and Mr. Robinson, react to a
decision that would return Mr. Proenza to his former position
as Director of the Southern Regional Office?
Mr. Robinson. I would be very happy to hear that.
Mr. McKinnon. Let me think about the question a moment,
sir. That is a very good question. I think Mr. Proenza has a
lot of potential. I think he has a lot to offer the American
public, to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
and to the National Weather Service. I think he would do the
National Hurricane Center and the American public very proud,
and I think he would make it, again, not to say that it has
lost its reputation, but I think he would elevate its
reputation back to the premiere hurricane center in the world,
given the opportunity to advance the ideas that he has.
Chairman Lampson. Gentleman, thank you. Does anyone else
have any? Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Investigating Personnel Problems
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
your indulgence. And again, sort of speaking hypothetically,
but--and again, as someone who really likes Mr. Proenza, I
think he is a really good, decent man. And I think, not only
that, that he is really trying to do the best job he can. And I
don't think, see, I don't think there are any evil people here.
This is not a conspiracy thing. I don't buy that. I think it is
what it is.
But let me just ask you this, then, kind of theoretically,
as well. If you all have a number of, you supervise an
individual, and that individual has a number of people that he
or she supervises, and if you get notified by those employees,
half of them, the very people that you really respect, that
their supervisor, the person that works under you, they cannot
work with, that they are having major problems with, and you
know that it is a very important job, would you ignore that
request? Will you just say I don't care what you say, I am not
going to do anything about it? Would you, in one way or
another, and there are different ways of doing that? Or would
you try to see what is actually going on, to make sure that
things are running smoothly?
Mr. McKinnon. Are you directing the question to me, sir?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Whoever, you know, whoever wants to.
Mr. McKinnon. I believe there is two sides to every story,
as you have said.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Absolutely.
Mr. McKinnon. And for a matter of record, I do not want to
cast any doubt on the credibility or the professionalism of
anyone at the National Hurricane Center.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Which is what I hope we don't do.
Mr. McKinnon. Exactly. Thank you. Certainly not. Certainly
not.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Right.
Mr. McKinnon. I do believe, in this case, opposites do not
attract, and we may have some friction there. As with any case,
and to answer your question, I do have people that report to
me, and I do have supervisors that report to me. If there is a
problem that the supervisor cannot resolve, then I do, if the
information if brought to me, I do question the supervisor, and
I question the person who has made the allegations, and we try
to come to a suitable conclusion for all the parties that
matter.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I think, again, in a more hypothetical
way, I think that would be the only responsible, what I do now,
we can argue as to what procedure you should take, in order to
do that, but I think it would be, frankly, not reasonable to
expect, if you have people that are well respected, who
complain, and maybe they don't have good reason to, I think it
would be totally irresponsible to not try to find out whether
there is something to those complaints. And the reason I
mention that is because again, I don't think there are, I agree
with you, I don't think there are evil people here. The people
at the Hurricane Center, by the way, who have not lost their
reputation, who are incredible and who are very good, despite
what, again, you know, we all say some things that we shouldn't
say, I am sure we regret up here, but I am talking about
Members of Congress, not you.
But when you have professionals at the Hurricane Center,
with good or not so good reasons, whether an individual there
is making the job impossible to do, I think it would be
irresponsible to not take measures, whether the right ones are
taken or not, to try to address. So, therefore, I don't see how
NOAA acted wrong. I don't see how Mr. Proenza acted wrong. I
don't see how the people in the Hurricane Center acted wrong. I
think what you have here is, frankly, people that just can't
work together very well. It doesn't mean they are evil. It
doesn't mean they are not qualified, because clearly, Mr.
Proenza is qualified, and clearly, the people in the Hurricane
Center are qualified. And clearly, NOAA has tried to address
it.
Would you disagree with that kind of general assessment?
Mr. Robinson. No, I think that is a reasonable statement.
But I don't have all the inside knowledge.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Correct.
Mr. Robinson. And neither do you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Correct.
Mr. Robinson. I mean, you have said that, and I think that,
given that, all we can do is look at it from the outside and
evaluate it. I have given my perspective, and you all will have
to work from your perspective.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And Mr. Chairman, we obviously appreciate
the perspective. Thank you, sir. Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart. Gentlemen,
thank you very, very much for your time, your insight, your
answers. May you all have a good day. I hope you make your
flight, and it is a nice one, and we will call you again.
At this point, well, shall we take--stand up, and take a
deep breath as he comes in. Admiral Lautenbacher will be--Vice
Admiral Lautenbacher is the next witness.
[Recess.]
Panel III
Chairman Lampson. After a very brief recess, we welcome the
next panel, and that includes Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher,
who is the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere, and the Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.
And also, Dr. James Turner, Deputy Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology. Dr. Turner led the
assessment team, at the request of Admiral Lautenbacher, and
will testify on the assessment and the findings of the
assessment team's report.
Again, as our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is
limited to five minutes, after which, we will ask, as Members
of the Committee, five minutes, and it is also the common
practice of the Subcommittee to take testimony under oath. Do
you have any objections to being sworn in?
You also have the right to be represented by counsel. Is
anyone represented by counsel today?
So, if you will, please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn]
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, gentlemen. If you will have
your seats, and Dr. Lautenbacher, would you please begin?
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CONRAD C. LAUTENBACHER, JR. (U.S.
NAVY, RET.), UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR OCEANS AND
ATMOSPHERE; ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION (NOAA)
Admiral Lautenbacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Inglis, and distinguished Members of the Committee, and
staff. I am here at your request today to address issues
concerning the Tropical Prediction Center's National Hurricane
Center, and the decision to place its Director, William
Proenza, on leave.
Before I begin, however, I want to make clear to the
Committee and all residents of coastal states in no uncertain
terms that NOAA, the National Weather Service, and the TPC are
fully prepared for this hurricane season. Our forecasting
ability continues to improve, and the American people can
expect nothing less than the full capabilities of the National
Hurricane Center.
The scientists and forecasters at the TPC answer to one of
the highest callings in public service, the protection of life
and property. They have dedicated their careers to preparing
their fellow citizens for the dangers brought on by tropical
weather. When a storm is bearing down, they continue to calmly
provide accurate and timely forecasts.
It is for these reasons that we want to provide them with
all the support they need to do their jobs.
In recent weeks, some concerns about operations at the TPC
have come to my attention. When Mary Glackin, a career NOAA
employee with 22 years of experience in the National Weather
Service and 30 in NOAA, became Acting Director of the Service
on June 11, 2007, she was aware of a need to improve managerial
rigor throughout National Weather Service operations. She
promptly communicated to all senior staff the need for
adherence to organizational policies, procedures, and the chain
of command.
In response to information the TPC Director, William
Proenza, may have disregarded direct instructions from his
supervisor, Ms. Glackin specifically counseled Mr. Proenza
about these matters on June 14, 2007. On June 19, Ms. Glackin,
responding to a request of a TPC employee, participated in a
conference call with 11 employees at the Hurricane Center,
including seven of the nine hurricane specialists.
Despite expressing fear of retaliation for expressing their
views, the participants on the call said that they felt muzzled
by Mr. Proenza, that he lacked the knowledge of the hurricane
program necessary to make informed decisions about the future
of the program and hurricane forecasts, and that his actions
were generating turmoil, fear, and a loss of cohesiveness at
the Center.
When I was briefed about this call, I felt it was essential
to look into what appeared to be significant employee
complaints, questioning whether they could do their job under
Mr. Proenza's leadership. In fact, I felt it would be
irresponsible for a senior manager not to get to the bottom of
the issue. Concerned about the ramifications of this discontent
during the middle of the hurricane season, I decided we needed
an immediate, fair, and impartial assessment of these
allegations, independent of the National Weather Service. With
lives potentially at stake, inaction was not an option.
Dr. Jim Turner, Deputy Director of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, agreed to lead a team to assess
operations at the TPC. The team was given a broad mandate to
address management, organizational structure, and operations.
On Friday, July 6, Dr. Turner provided preliminary findings.
Specifically, the Team advised that, based on their firsthand
observations, ``the continued presence of Director Proenza at
the TPC will interfere with the ability of the assessment team
to complete its work.'' Moreover, it was the ``unanimous
opinion of the assessment team that Mr. Proenza's actions
during the assessment have not only failed to calm his staff,
but have actually resulted in a level of anxiety and disruption
that threatens the TPC's ability to fulfill its mission to
protect the American people.''
The Team cited incidents where Mr. Proenza questioned a
senior forecaster at his workstation about his interview,
approached other staff to ask for their support before they
spoke with the Team, and conducted media interviews on the
operations floor while hurricane specialists were attempting to
perform their regular duties.
After hearing from the Team, I advised Mr. Proenza on July
9 that he was being placed on leave, based on the Team's
determination that his presence threatened the Center's
``ability to fulfill its mission to protect the American
people.'' On Friday, July 13, the assessment team presented its
final report. It found that ``the short-term ability of the TPC
to provide accurate and timely information was put at risk due
to the TPC director's disruptive conduct and the lack of trust
between many staff and the director.'' More pointedly, the Team
determined that ``the TPC's ability to achieve its mission was
seriously threatened because of the environment which had been
created by the director's statements and actions.''
Citing actions by Mr. Proenza that intimidated and
alienated staff, damaged teamwork, and produced fears of
retaliation, the Team concluded that ``the negative work
environment, exacerbated by the director, has had--and is
likely to continue to have--a major deleterious impact on the
center's ability to fulfill its mission, if he is allowed to
return to his position.''
The team recommended: ``The current TPC Director should be
reassigned and not be allowed to return to his position at the
Center. This should be done due to his failure to demonstrate
leadership within the TPC rather than due to his public
statements.'' The assessment team also included a number of
other recommendations for improving operations at the TPC, the
National Weather Service, and NOAA. I have asked my Deputy
Under Secretary to provide a written review and response to
these recommendations within two weeks time.
Let me say at this point that William Proenza has a long
and distinguished career with the National Weather Services.
Any decisions I may make with regard to these recommendations
will be made on the merits of the Team's assessment of
operations at the National Hurricane Center, and not on any
other issues or public comments Mr. Proenza may have made.
A copy of the Team's report, along with other relevant
documents, has been included with the written testimony I have
submitted for the record.
And finally, I would like to note that the official
forecasts of the Tropical Prediction Center do not come out of
a computer. They do not come out of a single satellite.
Hurricane forecasting, at its core, still comes down to a team
of specialists coming together to analyze all available data,
and using their best expertise and wisdom to make a forecast.
The American people need to know that when a storm is bearing
down, those forecasters are focused on only one thing, that
they feel free to offer their views, and that they are
supported at the very highest levels.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Lautenbacher
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
I am here in response to your request for testimony on issues
concerning the Tropical Prediction Center's National Hurricane Center.
The Committee has asked me to provide an account of events relating to
the hiring of and recent decision to place on leave the Director of the
Tropical Prediction Center (``TPC''), Mr. William Proenza.
Before I begin, however, I want to make clear to the Committee and
all the residents of coastal states in no uncertain terms that NOAA,
the National Weather Service and the TPC are fully prepared for this
hurricane season. Our forecasting ability continues to improve and the
American people can expect nothing less than the full capabilities of
the National Hurricane Center.
The scientists and forecasters at the TPC answer to one of the
highest callings in public service--the protection of life and
property. They have dedicated their careers to preparing their fellow
citizens for the dangers brought on by tropical weather. When a storm
is bearing down, they continue to calmly provide accurate and timely
forecasts.
It is for these reasons that we want to provide them with all the
support they need to do their jobs.
In summer 2006, the then-Director of the TPC, Max Mayfield,
informed me of his decision to retire, and D.L. Johnson, the then-
Director of the National Weather Service, initiated a search for a
replacement. In November, General Johnson, with the concurrence of the
Deputy Under Secretary, General (Ret.) Jack Kelly, recommended to me
that William Proenza be appointed as Director of the TPC.
Mr. Proenza began employment at the TPC on January 6, 2007. During
January to May 2007, Mr. Proenza made a series of statements to the
media regarding the TPC's budget and the potential loss of NASA's
QuikSCAT research satellite. The statements about the budget were not
factually accurate and the statements about the satellite were
misleading and potentially detrimental in terms of public confidence in
the Center's forecasts. I felt that some of these statements could have
been the result of Mr. Proenza's being new to the TPC and not yet up to
speed in terms of his new role. To address these concerns, I instructed
senior management to work with him throughout the spring and to provide
him with the necessary information and training to succeed as TPC
Director, including detailed budget information relating to TPC
operations.
On June 11, 2007, Mary Glackin, a 30-year career NOAA employee with
22 years of experience in the National Weather Service, became the
Acting Director of the National Weather Service. In assuming her
duties, Ms. Glackin was made aware of the need to improve managerial
rigor throughout National Weather Service operations. Accordingly, at
the outset of her tenure, Ms. Glackin communicated to senior staff the
need for adherence to organizational policies, procedures, and the
chain of command.
With respect to Mr. Proenza, Ms. Glackin was advised that since
January, ``there [had] been times when [Mr. Proenza] may have
disregarded the direct instructions of [his] supervisor, the Director,
National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP), or [had] made
decisions on [his] own which [he] had no authority to make.'' For
example, Ms. Glackin had learned that Mr. Proenza instructed
forecasters to replace the TPC heading with the ``National Hurricane
Center'' label on the March 4 High Seas forecast. Because this action
embedded the word ``hurricane'' in the forecast, it set off a ``pan
pan'' alarm--a non-life threatening distress call--on every ship in the
Pacific Ocean. To make sure there was no misunderstanding and to
clarify management expectations, Ms. Glackin issued a memorandum on
``Operating Procedures/Instructions,'' dated Thursday June 14,
(attached) and met with Mr. Proenza in person in Florida the next day,
to discuss its contents.
Ms. Glackin's memo was not a reprimand. After identifying the ``pan
pan'' alarm and other instances over the past five months that had
prompted her to prepare the memo, it acknowledged that ``[s]ome of
this. . .might have resulted from some confusion as to the various
roles and responsibilities in the [National Weather Service].'' Ms.
Glackin, however, wanted to reiterate to him her instructions about
adhering to organizational policies, procedures and the chain of
command, and that going forward she ``expect[ed] that [Mr. Proenza] and
[his] staff will follow the directions and the policies and procedures
developed by NCEP.''
In particular, Ms. Glackin asked Mr. Proenza to consult on a
regular basis with his direct supervisor on issues concerning ``budget,
science, research, and operational or administrative issues'' that had
``NOAA- or [National Weather Service]-wide implications or public
safety consequences.'' Ms. Glackin expressly stated that she was
``available to resolve any disagreements,'' once the two had discussed
the matter fully, and expressed the intention to ``work together to
ensure accurate predictions and to support the work of [the NCEP], [the
National Weather Service], and NOAA.''
On the evening of June 18, Ms. Glackin received a request from an
employee at the TPC for a conference call. The call took place on
Tuesday, June 19, with eleven TPC employees participating. These
included seven of the nine TPC Hurricane Specialists; the TPC Union
Steward agreed this meeting was requested by the TPC group and did not
constitute a formal meeting requiring official notification to the
union.
During that call, Center employees raised several serious concerns
about Mr. Proenza's actions, and whether they could do their job under
Mr. Proenza's leadership. These concerns are reflected in a memorandum
for the record (attached) including:
They feared Mr. Proenza would take retaliatory action
against them if he learned they were voicing their views, some
stating they ``were scared'' of Mr. Proenza and others that
they were ``deep[ly] concern[ed] that their future was at stake
if this meeting got out,''
They felt ``muzzled'' by Mr. Proenza, citing as an
example the development of priorities for improving hurricane
forecasting agreed to by the hurricane specialists, ``but not
approved by [Mr. Proenza],'' and therefore not permitted to go
forward to NCEP/NWS,
They lacked confidence in Mr. Proenza's knowledge of
the hurricane program and were concerned that Mr. Proenza would
make decisions about its future without the required knowledge
or willingness to listen to staff,
They believed the QuikSCAT issue had been
``overblown'' and its representation in the media ``is not
accurate,''
They questioned his ``integrity'' and were
``outraged'' at his misrepresenting the actions and views of
his staff in the office and media, and
They felt Mr. Proenza's actions were generating
``turmoil,'' ``anxiety,'' ``fear,'' and a loss of
``cohesiveness'' at the Center.
Ms. Glackin and Dr. Uccellini were gravely concerned by what they
had heard, and communicated to me their conclusion that immediate
action was necessary. Given the fact that seven of the nine TPC
Hurricane Center forecasters were expressing these concerns, it was
their assessment that if the current situation persisted, the Center
would have difficulty fulfilling its life-saving mission. Because of
the serious nature of the situation, I consulted with my chain of
command and we determined we had no other choice but to take action.
Had we failed to act, we would have been derelict in our duties as
public servants charged with protecting people's lives.
However, in our judgment, the need for prompt action had to be
balanced with making sure we had a clear understanding of the situation
and were fair to all concerned. We therefore decided that the right
approach was to convene an independent assessment of the Center's
management and operations and its ability to meet its mission, and to
set a fairly short deadline for completion of this assessment.
Accordingly, on June 26, I requested that Dr. James Turner, NIST's
Deputy Director, lead a team to undertake this charge. A copy of my
memo to Dr. Turner is attached. On July 2, a memo was distributed to
all employees of the Tropical Prediction Center advising them that I
had asked for this independent operational assessment (attached). I
further stressed that the ``candid views and opinions of the entire TPC
team are extremely important to this assessment'' and encouraged
``everyone's engagement, participation, and support of this endeavor
without fear of retaliation or criticism.'' I also advised staff that
the Team would be touring the Center and would be available to conduct
individual and group interviews.
On Friday, July 6, Dr. Turner and his team provided me with a
preliminary assessment and recommendation regarding management of the
Center (attached). Specifically, the Team advised me that, based on
their first-hand observations, ``the continued presence of Director
Proenza at the TPC will interfere with the ability of the assessment
team to complete its work.'' Moreover, it was the ``unanimous opinion
of the assessment team that Mr. Proenza's actions during the assessment
have not only failed to calm his staff but have actually resulted in a
level of anxiety and disruption that threatens the TPC's ability to
fulfill its mission to protect the American people.'' In a series of
documented incidents, Mr. Proenza had questioned a senior forecaster at
his work station about his interview, which made the forecaster
uncomfortable and upset; he approached other staff and asked for their
support before they spoke with the Team; and he held media interviews
on the operations floor about the assessment while the hurricane
specialists were performing their duties analyzing tropical activity.
The team thus recommended that Mr. Proenza be ``temporarily removed
from active direction of the Center until such time as the assessment
is complete and has been reviewed by NOAA management.''
On Saturday, July 7, 2007, Ms. Glackin sent me a memo, agreeing
with the recommendation of the assessment team, and recommending that
Mr. Proenza be placed on leave (attached).
The following Monday morning, July 9, Mr. Proenza was advised that
he was being placed on leave, and that the reason for doing so was
based on the preliminary determination of the independent assessment
team that his presence was interfering with the Team's completing its
work, and resulting in a ``level of anxiety and disruption that
threatens the [Center's] ability to fulfill its mission to protect the
American people.'' A copy of the memo issued to Mr. Proenza is attached
to my testimony. A memo was then distributed to Center employees
advising them that Mr. Proenza would be on leave until further notice,
and that Deputy Director Ed Rappaport would serve as acting Director of
the Center during this period (attached).
On July 13, Dr. Turner and the assessment team completed the
report. A copy of the report is attached to my testimony. The team
found that the TPC is technically equipped to continue to provide
accurate and timely information regarding hurricane-related activities.
Specifically, the TPC's readiness has been strengthened by the addition
of four new hurricane specialists in late 2006 (a two-thirds increase
over prior years), the addition of a new hurricane forecast model this
year, additional buoys, and a new instrument on the hurricane
reconnaissance planes that will provide surface wind data.
At the same time, the Team found that ``the short-term ability of
the TPC to provide accurate and timely information was put at risk due
to the TPC director's disruptive conduct and the lack of trust between
many staff and the director.'' Even more pointedly. ``the Team
concluded that the TPC's ability to achieve its mission was seriously
threatened because of the environment which had been created by the
director's statements and actions.'' The team cited actions by Mr.
Proenza that intimidated some staff, alienated others, damaged
teamwork, and produced fears of retaliation. In short, the Team found
that ``[t]he negative work environment, exacerbated by the director,
has had--and is likely to continue to have--a major deleterious impact
on the Center's ability to fulfill its mission, if he is allowed to
return to his position.'' Drawing on these findings, the Team
recommended immediate action with respect to Mr. Proenza, due to his
failure of leadership:
The current TPC Director should be reassigned and not be
allowed to return to his position at the Center. This should be
done due to his failure to demonstrate leadership within the
TPC rather than due to his public statements about [the]
QuikSCAT satellite or NOAA leadership. A replacement should be
recruited as soon as possible through a nationwide, full and
open competition.
I want to note that the report also includes a number of other
recommendations for improvement of the TPC, NCEP, NWS and NOAA. These
include better management approaches (e.g., establishing ``clear,
written statements of authority for decision-making throughout the
management chain at TPC''), enhanced employee training and leadership
development programs (e.g., ``[i]nstitut[ing] formal succession
planning and leadership programs for developing staff from within''),
additional support for identifying and addressing technical needs,
tighter linkages with the research and user communities (e.g.,
establishing a ``user group to provide regular input'' to the Center),
clearer visioning, improved organizational structure in certain areas,
stronger integration of the TPC into its parent organization, and
constantly improving public education and outreach. I have directed the
Deputy Under Secretary, Jack Kelly, to lead a review of the report and
provide a response to the Team's recommendations within two weeks' time
(attached). Following the same procedures we have used in responding to
GAO reports, General Kelly will comment on the report's findings and
recommendations and detail the steps to be taken to address the
identified concerns.
Let me say at this point that William Proenza has a long and
distinguished career with the National Weather Service. Any decisions I
may make with regard to these recommendations will be made on the
merits of the Team's assessment of operations at the National Hurricane
Center and not on any other issues or public comments Mr. Proenza may
have made.
And finally, I'd like to note that the official forecasts of the
Tropical Prediction Center do not come out of a computer. They do not
come from a single satellite. Hurricane forecasting, at its core, still
comes down to a team of specialists coming together to analyze all
available data and using their best expertise and wisdom to make a
forecast. The American people need to know that when a storm is bearing
down, those forecasters are focused on only one thing, that they feel
free to offer their views and that they are supported at the very
highest levels. Again, the scientists and forecasters at the TPC--
indeed, employees throughout the National Weather Service and NOAA,
including myself--answer to one of the highest callings in public
service--the protection of life and property, and we are fully prepared
for this hurricane season.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Admiral. Dr. Turner, you are
recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES TURNER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Turner. Thank you, sir. Chairman, Members of the
Subcommittees, I am providing information to you today pursuant
to the formal request I received in writing from the Chairman.
I am happy to provide a brief summary statement about the
work at the Tropical Prediction Center of the independent
assessment team. Our team was composed of Matthew Heyman,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, John Gunther,
Department of Commerce, Kathy Kelly and Alexis Gutierrez, both
of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.
We were charged to do the assessment. When we were charged
to do the assessment, we asked for a written scope. We were
asked to assess: One, the ability of the Tropical Prediction
Center to continue to provide accurate and timely information;
two, whether the management and organization structure
facilitates TPC achieving its mission; and three, the extent to
which lessons learned from recent hurricanes, including whether
the 2005 Gulf Coast events have been incorporated.
Please note that these are management issues. The
assessment was not intended to be a technical referendum on the
efficacy of the QuikSCAT satellite. Discussion of QuikSCAT was
only pertinent to us, insofar as it impacted the three areas
the Team was asked to assess. So that we would be clear on what
our mission was, we also asked that our work be considered
independent. We zealously guarded that independence, and that
independence was scrupulously respected by NOAA management.
Our process involved visiting the Center twice, touring the
facilities, and being available to all employees, including the
Director, who wanted to speak with us. We made ourselves
available to the employees at times that would not interfere
with their work schedule. In all, 31 of the 46 Center employees
voluntarily came forward to answer the prepared questions we
had. Each employee was also offered the opportunity to comment
on any areas they felt pertinent to our scope, which were not
addressed in our questions.
Every employee we interviewed was provided with a written
draft summary of what we thought we heard as their responses.
The employees were free to correct the draft if errors were
detected. Using the interviews, as well as our personal
observations and firsthand experience at the Center, we
developed a set of findings to address our charge. Where we
thought pertinent, we provided recommendations.
The report was delivered to Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher on
July 13, 2007. At this point, sir, would you like for me to
provide a brief summary of the findings and recommendations?
Chairman Lampson. Yes, sir. Please.
Dr. Turner. First, we divided the findings up according to
the three areas we were charged to address. First, the ability
of the TPC to continue to provide accurate and timely
information regarding hurricane-related activities. Across the
board, staff members of the TPC are highly dedicated to
achieving the mission of saving lives and protecting property.
We also looked at the technical capability, as well as the
work environment. And from a strictly technical standpoint, the
TPC is equipped to continue to provide accurate and timely
information. However, the short-term ability of the TPC to
provide accurate and timely information was put at risk due to
the Director's disruptive conduct, and the lack of trust
between many staff and the Director. The negative work
environment, exacerbated by the Director, has had and is likely
to continue to have a major deleterious impact on the Center's
ability to fulfill its mission, if he is allowed to return to
this position.
By the same token, simply replacing the Director will not
resolve the Center's workplace issues. If staff morale and
longstanding organizational issues are not addressed, they will
hinder the Center's ability to accomplish its mission. In the
longer-term, the TPC faces some potential degradation of its
capabilities, if current data about wind speed and direction,
wind vectors over the oceans, are no longer available due to
the loss of QuikSCAT, before similar or better data are
available, through a yet to be designed alternative instrument.
The second charge, whether the management and
organizational structure facilitates their achieving their
mission. The lack of effective supervisory oversight from NOAA,
the National Weather Service, NCEP, and TPC management, has
contributed significantly to longstanding problems at the
Center, as well as the disruption over the last six months.
And finally, to whether lessons learned were incorporated,
we used as our source document the Service Assessment from
Katrina. We found that the lessons learned were, in fact,
incorporated, that there were several best practices
identified, and that there were research challenges remaining,
the primary one of which was the forecast of intensity.
Among our recommendations, the current TPC Director should
be reassigned, and not be allowed to return to his position at
the Center. This should be done due to his failure to
demonstrate leadership within the TPC, rather than due to his
public statements about the QuikSCAT satellite, or NOAA
leadership. A replacement should be recruited as soon as
possible, through a nationwide full and open competition.
Morale problems and division among staff must be addressed as a
high priority, for the good of the Center, and to ensure that
the organization can perform its mission.
NCEP, the National Weather Service, and NOAA should
increase their focus on the critical technical needs in
hurricane forecasting, including improved Earth ocean surface
vector wind data, intensity, understanding and forecasting, and
modeling. NOAA leadership at all levels must require the
highest level of conduct and performance from its employees and
its managers. Supervisors must know that they will be supported
in the management of their operations, and held accountable for
failure to manage effectively.
NOAA must communicate aggressively, in plain language, key
facts, and rebut erroneous information about its hurricane to
stakeholders, the public, and then, we have a number of things
after that.
Discussion
NOAA's Reaction to the Problems With Director Proenza
Chairman Lampson. That is fine. We may get to some of those
during our questioning, and I appreciate your testimony. We, at
this time, will go into our rounds of questioning, and I will
yield myself five minutes.
Admiral Lautenbacher, when did you learn of the complaints
from the Center?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I learned about the complaints on
June the 19th, in a phone call from Mary Glackin, who is the
Acting Director of the Weather Service.
Chairman Lampson. Was it the day before you came to visit
me? Well, actually, the day before you came to visit me, Mr.
Proenza and the Center must have been pretty much on your mind,
for on June 26, you sent a note over to the head of NIST,
asking that Dr. Turner be loaned to NOAA to head up a review
team.
Admiral Lautenbacher. When I came to see you, we were very
concerned about the personnel issue at the Hurricane Center,
and were working on ways to deal with it.
Chairman Lampson. Was the communication that you sent on
that day the first communication between NOAA and NIST
regarding who might be detailed to such a team?
Admiral Lautenbacher. The first communication, I think was,
I signed on June 26, and that is the first one that I am aware
of at this point, that we, in order to set in motion the kinds
of procedures and process that was necessary, we needed to
ensure that we had the right documents, the right charge, that
the Team agreed with it, people were involved, so that was the
beginning of the process.
Chairman Lampson. On that same day, you produced a brief
outline of what you wanted the Team to review. When was the
first draft of that produced, and by whom?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I don't recall. I can try to take
that for the record. It was certainly one of my staff.
Chairman Lampson. On June 26 also, you received legal
authority to take managerial actions against Mr. Proenza. Do
you remember receiving that authority?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, I do. The background on that is
that the Secretary of Commerce holds the authority to reassign
and transfer members of the level of employment at which Mr.
Proenza is at. I can't overemphasize the extraordinary concerns
that I felt from what Mary Glackin had relayed to me, and when
I expressed that to the Department, they felt that we needed to
have a way to ensure that if there were some immediate
problems, that we would have some way to deal with them. It was
clearly a backup mechanism to ensure that we would not
undermine the ability of that team to function to forecast
hurricanes.
Chairman Lampson. And so, while you were working to put
together the team that will get to the bottom of the situation
at the Center, you were also securing the authority to get rid
of or reassign Proenza. And yesterday, the staff were told by
the head of the review team, that they were going into their
review of the Hurricane Center with no preconceived notions.
That doesn't seem that you shared that attitude. When did you
first meet with the review team?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I have always been interested in a
fair and impartial review of what was going on at the Hurricane
Center, and I would ask you, you can ask Dr. Turner about his
feeling of independence or not, but that was where I was going.
I have never been, I have never publicly stated or been
involved in any issues other than trying to make the situation
such that Mr. Proenza could succeed in his task as the head of
the Hurricane Center. As I said, it was purely a backup to
ensure that if there were some situation that came up, that we
could move quickly, and not undermine the capability of the
Center.
Chairman Lampson. Did you tell them that you had sought the
authority to transfer or reassign Mr. Proenza?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I don't recall whether I told them
that or not.
Chairman Lampson. What did you tell them about him? What
was your charge to them?
Admiral Lautenbacher. My charge to them is in the document
that we provided, which indicates the three tasks that we asked
them, and my personal conversations, as far as I can recall,
were in line with the written document that we had provided,
and the charge that we gave to the Team.
Chairman Lampson. I am going to yield back my time, and
yield time now to Chairman Miller.
The Proenza Plan
Chairman Miller. Good afternoon. Admiral Lautenbacher, you
said that you first heard of any problems at the Center on June
19.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, sir.
Chairman Miller. Okay. There was an April 21 mail\2\ that
spoke of a five-step Proenza plan, and it said that you had
asked for that. What is the Proenza plan, what were the five
steps? What was the purpose of it? What was that all about?
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\2\ Inserted in the record on pp. 19-22.
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Admiral Lautenbacher. That is a euphemism for us trying to
help Bill to accommodate to his new position. We had asked and
talked about, and I can't expressly remember who had what idea,
but we felt the following, that first of all, he is in a new
position, and for any employee, and certainly at the SES level,
there is a requirement that you have a performance plan, so
that their progress and their expectations of the management
can be outlined and agreed to by the employee.
I wanted to make sure, first of all, confirmation from the
chain of command that that was in place, because he had just
come into a new position from an older position, and that
needed to be done. The next step was that it was time for a
mid-year review. You are required to consult with your
employees, and to have a face to face meeting, in terms of
telling them how they have done, where they are going, and you
know, advocating what needs to be done with them. Those were
two.
Three was, given some of the misleading statements that had
been in the press, that we asked him to, I wanted the chain of
command to provide some ethics training. And four was to, and
these are not, there is no five step program. This was designed
to give him the material and tools in order to make him a more
effective Director. Fourth was the information and direct
connection with our budget activities, so that he would have
full and free access, and the information on how much was being
spent on various issues, and particularly, his part of the
world. And then, five was media training. He is responsible for
his statements in public, and is, quite frankly, the most
visible spokesman of NOAA, and it is very important that he do
that job well.
So, those were the five kinds of steps. They were designed
to provide for him the tools to make him successful in the job.
Chairman Miller. Why did you ask legal to look at it? The
email says Eddie said he wanted to get legal to look it over.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Because I asked the HR folks, I
wanted to make sure, I am very deferential to protecting the
rights, as a career person myself, I am very deferential to
protecting the rights of career employees, making sure that we
do not, management does not overstep the bounds of what is
proper, right and proper, in order to supervise and maintain
adequate control and management of all employees, so it was a
check to make sure that we were not overstepping any potential
bounds.
NOAA Documents
Chairman Miller. There have been no subpoena issues by this
committee. We have described to NOAA what kinds of documents we
want provided. We got 700 pages of documents last night. Excuse
me, 284. You have mentioned legal here. Of course, none of this
is subject to a subpoena, but has NOAA provided all the
documents that meet the description that we provided you, of
the documents that we want? Have any been withheld on any claim
of lawyer-client privilege or executive privilege, or
decisional process privilege, or Privacy Act privilege, or any
other basis?
Admiral Lautenbacher. None of that for the documents we
provided, and I am certainly going to state, and that your
staff knows, we have not provided, we have not completed the
document search. We are working as quickly as we can to provide
all of the information you need. We want to cooperate with your
need to review everything, and we are continuing to work on
that as fast as we can.
Chairman Miller. Okay. And we will continue to get
documents from you, then.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, sir. You will continue to get
documents from us.
The Management Assessment
Chairman Miller. Fine. The way that this management
assessment was described, or as Mr. Proenza learned of it, was
that he got a call, as they were arriving, from you. So, that
was the first he learned of it, that other employees at that
Center knew about it, knew the Team was coming, but for him,
they showed up at his door, and that seems to be, apparently
was intentional, a plan.
It sounds more like law enforcement serving a search
warrant than a management assessment. Why was it done in that
way?
Admiral Lautenbacher. That was not the intention at all.
The issue was to try to protect the rights of both Mr. Proenza
and the employees. I am not aware of who knew or didn't know
before whatever, but I know that arrangements were made
logistically to ensure that someone knew that there would be
some people coming, so that there would be someone to----
Chairman Miller. But was there a decision, a conscious
decision that Mr. Proenza would not know that there was a
management assessment team on the way?
Admiral Lautenbacher. There was a conscious decision to try
to make this as, let us see, what is the right term here, we
wanted to assess the situation as it was. We were very
concerned, I was concerned, based on what I heard from Mary
Glackin about reprisals, and the employees' concerns, so the
issue was to try to, to the best that we could, and this isn't
some big secret operation, this is just to try to do it as a
snapshot of the way this, the way the operation functions, and
to do it in a way that didn't alarm either Mr. Proenza or the
employees. That was the intent.
Chairman Miller. Have you sent in management teams in
similar circumstances, and not told the head of the office that
they were arriving until they were at his doorstep?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I have not done that, have not had
the need to do that in my term as the head of NOAA. I have done
it a number of times in my Navy career, and it is a normal
process to have reviews that are done as daily business is
occurring, in order to not to disrupt the command, which is
another issue. We didn't want them to spend a lot of time
trying to prepare, and create a great deal of, perhaps,
consternation, and as I said, concern about the reaction the
employees would have if Mr. Proenza and they were trying to
prepare for some, and again, it was an assessment, a snapshot
assessment. It was not designed in any other way, except to
uncover the facts.
Chairman Miller. Okay. I have more questions, but there
will be an additional round. Mr. Inglis for five minutes.
Course of Action Taken With Director Proenza
Mr. Inglis. Admiral, Chairman Lampson was concerned in his
questions about why it was that you didn't mention it, the
pending action involving the Team going in to see Mr. Proenza,
at the time that you met with him, Chairman Lampson. Is that,
in retrospect, a good decision on your part, or----
Admiral Lautenbacher. I believe so, because at the time, we
had not completed the full discussion and deliberation process
to make a final decision on exactly how it would be conducted,
try to ensure protections if we were to do it, and exactly when
we would do it, and what the results, the plan had not been
formulated at that point, when I saw the Chairman.
Mr. Inglis. Now, suppose, my take on that if it is a
personnel matter, it is really not ripe for discussion. Is that
right? I mean, in other words, we don't exactly discuss, you
wouldn't naturally, you wouldn't take it upon yourself to
discuss personnel matters that aren't yet decided.
Admiral Lautenbacher. I would not do that as a normal
course of action. I did advise the Committee, and called,
personally called a number of people on Monday to tell them of
what the issue was, and how we were going to try to deal with
it, because I am very respectful that this committee needs to
understand what is going on at an area as sensitive as the
Hurricane Center.
Mr. Inglis. And you could have simply terminated Mr.
Proenza. Is that correct?
Admiral Lautenbacher. There is a misunderstanding here
about the authority. I don't have any authority that is not
granted in the normal personnel regulations, that comes from
the laws that Congress provides, and as are distributed to us
from the Office of Personnel Management. There is a very clear
procedure that one must go through, and I would never, in my
wildest imagination, think of violating any due process and
procedures in providing all the rights that accompany that. So,
I was not interested in anything to do with dismissal or
removal at that point.
Mr. Inglis. But sending in a team, was that required? Were
you required to send in an assessment team, or could you have
taken more direct action if you wanted to, against Mr. Proenza?
Admiral Lautenbacher. If I had wanted to, I could have
taken more direct action. I did not feel it was appropriate to
take more direct action, or I could have instituted more direct
action, and more respectfully. And remember that Mary actually
recommended that more direct action be taken. I wanted to
ensure that everybody's rights were protected, Mr. Proenza's,
as well as the employees that work for him.
Mr. Inglis. And Dr. Turner, in retrospect, would you think
it is the right decision to go without notice? Chairman Miller
mentioned that concern, that it was without notice to Mr.
Proenza that you all showed up. Is that, in retrospect, the
right thing to do, you think, or----
Dr. Turner. I just find it very difficult to answer,
because it is a hypothetical, and I have not thought about
that, and I don't know. There may have been some other
situations and circumstances that I was not aware of, and so, I
would certainly not, you know, based on what I knew, I would
certainly not be in a position to second guess decisions made
by the Admiral or anyone else.
Mr. Inglis. Yeah. Well, it seemed to me that actually, you
would want to go in quickly and without notice. And I know that
Chairman Miller seems to think that is untoward, or appears to
think it is untoward. I would think that is exactly what is
indicated in the circumstances, because otherwise, you put
everybody on notice, they are going to go around getting their
stories together. They are going to spend time of the agency
developing arguments, rather than keeping on doing their work,
and let us just come in here and check and see what is
happening here. So, it seems to me a rather reasonable
decision.
Also, I am almost out of time, but it appears to me,
Admiral, you have had a lot of experience in the Navy, and I
would assume that the teacher analogy you may have heard, that
I used out in the hallway with some teachers, that the great,
that the person that is best at being the elementary school
principal may not be the same person that performs well at the
district office, and vice versa.
I suppose that has been your experience, and I hope that
somehow, we leave here having delved, unfortunately, rather
publicly, into a personnel matter that may damage the
reputation of Mr. Proenza in the end, but he could be restored
as somebody that can perform well in a number of circumstances,
and maybe just didn't fit in this. Is that how you think this
might, this footnote in history be written?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Obviously, I can't describe what
actions I am going to take, because I haven't gotten the
recommendations that I have asked for from my deputy. But my
track record, and you can ask many people, has been always to
try to ensure that people are in the right billets, that they
are given the opportunities to perform at their highest level.
I believe in the inherent dignity and rights of every
individual, and I have always worked to try to put people in
the right jobs, and to ensure their success, and I will
continue to do that.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Miller. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, how are
you, sir?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I am fine. Thank you, sir.
Witness Background
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Admiral, just for my information, you
know, we call you Admiral, but, because you were an Admiral,
and obviously, you still have the title. How long were you in
the Navy?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I was in the Navy for 40 years.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Forty years. That is kind of a small mom
and pop operation, right? The Navy, you didn't have to
supervise a lot of people then, did you?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I have had experience at all levels
in supervising, small groups to very large groups.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you for your service to the country,
that you continue to do. Mr. Turner, Dr. Turner, I was also, by
the way, it is just when I was looking at your resume, sir, it
is pretty impressive. I just think it is good for us to hear
this. I might embarrass you, because I know you are, but I
just, you know, when you have got people of this caliber in
front of you, I think it is important to say this is a man who
has received the U.S. Government Presidential Rank Award for
Meritorious Service, three times received the U.S. Department
of Energy Exceptional Service Award, earned the Secretary of
Energy Gold Award, and the National Nuclear Security
Administration's Gold Medal.
It is a privilege to be in your presence, sir, and to both
of your presence.
Dr. Turner. Thank you very much, sir.
Responsibilities as a Supervisor
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You know, we have something here that is
kind of almost, I guess, without precedent. I don't know how
many times, I have never, I have only been in Congress for a
few years. It is only my third term, but I don't--Dr. Turner or
Admiral, have you all ever been in a position where half of the
staff publicly manifests itself against a supervisor, publicly,
and even with the press? Is that something normal? Again, as a
rookie, I am, you know, I just, is that something that happens
a lot in the Federal Government?
Dr. Turner. I have had about 30 years in the Federal
Government, and I have not run into that type of situation,
where there has been a public outcry such as that.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Dr. Turner, in your years of being a
supervisor, if however something like that would have happened,
would you have thought it would have been responsible to not
act and try to find out what is going on, and kind of ignore
the situation, and not try to come up with a way to try to
figure out what is wrong, or you know, what is going on?
Dr. Turner. Yes, sir. I think it is part of the
responsibility of a supervisor, and also, I think in some cases
similar to this, the difficulty is getting employees to speak
on the record. That often is difficult, because one cannot act
unless they go on record, because it is not fair to the person
being accused, and it is also not fair to the person who
ultimately has to make a decision. And it is not fair to the
employees expecting something to happen, but they need to go on
record, and I think these people went on record, and I think,
again----
Admiral Lautenbacher's Actions
Mr. Diaz-Balart. That is pretty clear. Admiral, let me--if
I sound critical, I just learned now that you could have, once
you got the information from Acting Secretary Glackin, you
could have, on your own, acted to, you know, move Mr. Proenza.
And yet, what you did instead is you created this, you asked
people to go in and look at what is going on. Would it not be,
frankly, a fair criticism saying that, knowing of the
importance of the Hurricane Center, that we are now in the
middle of a hurricane season, that you frankly were not
aggressive enough, and didn't act quick enough, because of what
is at stake here? I mean, isn't that a fair criticism, to say
that maybe you were not aggressive and quick enough?
Admiral Lautenbacher. That is a fair criticism, and I have
thought long and hard about that, too, and tried to find the
right compromise to ensure rights were protected, and that we
were doing the right thing for the American people. It is a
very difficult decision.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And within that decision, Admiral, so you
were aware of the importance of the Hurricane Center, and the
fact that we are in a hurricane season, and yet, you still
thought that you would be a little bit slower, and I guess a
little bit more deliberative, and you actually got this group
of individuals, I already mentioned some of the awards that Dr.
Turner has earned. So, you obviously found a pretty qualified
group of individuals, and you did not just act, you actually,
what, you wanted to make sure that Mr. Proenza and the
individuals, the highly qualified scientists and others at the
Hurricane Center, had the ability to really, what, air it out
without fear of retribution? Is that what you did, even though,
knowing that you would have had to slow down in order to do
that? Even though we are in the middle of a hurricane season?
Admiral Lautenbacher. I did, and I felt that if there were
any indications, first of all, I watched the weather situation
very closely, because I was not going to do this in a period
when we had serious tropical activity, and needed to have full
efforts placed on the hurricane forecasting, so that was part
of the decision as well.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Admiral. So again, and I am,
you know, I am not being critical, but I just want to make sure
that it is very clear that you could have done it quicker. You
could have done it without Dr. Turner and other career service,
frankly, heroes to our nation, looking at this, but you didn't,
even though we are in the hurricane season, and I guess what,
and I just want to make sure I understand this, because you
just wanted to make sure that it was done right, not
necessarily done as quickly as possible, but done right, and
even knowing that that, in itself, you could have been accused,
you could be accused, I mean, I guess someone might say that I
am, of not doing it as quick as you could have done, knowing
the fact that it is not usual for people in the Federal
Government, half the employees, to publicly say we want this
individual to go?
Admiral Lautenbacher. That is correct.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Klein for five minutes.
More on QuikSCAT
Mr. Klein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Admiral, and thank you, Dr. Turner for your service. We
appreciate it.
I am not going to spend my time on the personnel issues,
other than just to say that the reason probably that this is
going on right now is because there are probably some
statements made, when Mr. Proenza brought forth his comments on
QuikSCAT from NOAA. There is probably some personnel management
issues within, that certainly have left some smoking guns out
there for people to make these situations.
I have heard what you all said today. I appreciate the
process you went through. It probably stirred some things up
down there, and maybe that was the right thing to do, to get to
the bottom of it. I agree this is the middle of the hurricane
season. Those of us who live in Florida and other places around
the country, we are as concerned, and I appreciate your closing
statement there, about the responsibilities that NOAA and the
Hurricane Center and the personnel take extremely seriously,
and I appreciate that, because I don't question any of that.
I am going to go back to QuikSCAT, and go back to the
equipment and the tools and those kinds of things. I am fairly
convinced that there is some relevance to QuikSCAT, based on
what I have heard up to this point, whether it is marine
activities, or whether it is some level of evaluation tool that
is used by the forecasters. When I went down to the Hurricane
Center, they specifically told me that it has some relevance.
Whether it is 15 percent, or some contribution, I think we all
agree that the more tools, and the more information on the
table, the better the analysis can be.
And the question that I asked, you know, your organization
early on, when I started raising some issues about this, is
what is the backup, which I now believe is, you know, being
thoroughly evaluated. I was concerned it wasn't for as long as
it should have been, and I hope that we have all learned that
process since then, that we should be in a better position, and
continue to move along, and I want to encourage that, so that
we, if this thing does fail, whenever it fails, that we really
have all the tools in place.
We have had some other testimony today about this, and just
give me your sense of, your professional sense of if it does
fail, you know, how far off are we, in terms of you are
recognizing yes, we have most of what we need, but how far off
are we, and are you satisfied that between the various tracking
tools we have, that we are going to be in a sufficient
position?
Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, thank you, and I appreciate your
comments. First of all, let me caveat. I am trained as a
scientist, and I consider myself a scientist, but in this role,
I am a manager, so I take the advice of my practicing
scientists, and so, that is what you are hearing, that
temporized through my interpretation as a scientist.
But I view the QuikSCAT as a very important instrument,
because it brings the surface vector wind field. I won't say it
is the Holy Grail of forecasting, but it is a really nice thing
to have. As a fluid dynamicist, I would like to have, that is
an important variable.
We had planned, obviously, for many years before QuikSCAT
was determined to be so effective, which happened in the last
year or two, that we got into that, to use conical microwave
imaging and sounding to provide those variables, those fields.
So, we are at the cutting edge, kind of, of instrumentation to
provide this surface vector wind field. We have been using the
QuikSCAT information, that is an experimental satellite, that
had been built by NASA. It has been working fine, and we expect
it to keep working. I will keep my fingers crossed, but--and
so, I view that, for this season, we are in good shape.
We have put on, in our partnership with Europe, we have
EUMETSAT, a polar orbiting satellite that has something called
ASCAT on it, which is a scatterometer, an active instrument. It
is, on specs, not quite as good as the QuikSCAT scatterometer,
but that now is operating, and is in place, and it will be here
until 2020 continuously. I have directed, and I am sure you are
aware of that, that that be taken into account and looked at,
and put into the models, to see how much of a difference that
would make in a model, and remember, we are talking about a
model, not necessarily, remember, forecasts are made by
forecasters, not by computers. It is still an art, in a sense.
And so, that system is in place, but in addition to that,
we continue to put in place one improvement after another. This
year, we are putting seven new hurricane buoys in place. It
will be a ground truth on the surface of the ocean. Never had
that before. We have more accurate wind measurement instruments
going on our Hurricane Hunter aircraft, which are very
important for landfalling hurricanes, which is very important.
In fact, remember, the scatterometer is most useful for
hurricanes that are away from land, and for tropical storms,
basically, not landfalling hurricanes, because of the speed
limitation on QuikSCAT.
So, there is a number of issues. I can keep going on, but I
am afraid that I am going----
Mr. Klein. That is okay, and I am aware of where I am going
with this.
Admiral Lautenbacher. It is not part of what this hearing
is.
Next Generation Forecasting Tools
Mr. Klein. Where I am going with this, and this is part of
where I am interested in, and I think Members of Congress are,
is whether we have the adequate tools in place, and you know,
there is a history that, I am a new Member of Congress, but
there is a history, apparently, the last number of years, of a
lot of money that was put down the drain, in a technology that
has not gotten us where we wanted to be, and that was sort of
going to be the next generation of where we are going with some
of the, you know, equipment.
So, I want to be supportive. I know Members want to be
supportive of giving you the tools, including research, so I am
interested in knowing, on the research side, you know, what
connects we need, where do we need to be helpful, but at the
same time, there has got to be a good, frank, honest, and open
relationship with the Congress and the American people, to make
sure that, you know, we have the backing of the taxpayers, to
know we are doing the right thing.
But we have to have this, and it is very important that
whether it is QuikSCAT or anything else, I don't want to hear a
month ago oh well, it is very important, very important, and
all of a sudden, with Mr. Proenza's situation in the middle of
this, it is not important, it is not important, it is not
important. And then, I hear some backtracking from some folks.
That is the credibility gap that has developed out of this
whole dynamic, which I think needs to be flushed out and gotten
off the table, and we need to move on.
Admiral Lautenbacher. Can I make just two comments, and I
know Dr. Turner is interested? First of all, I know it was just
a euphemism, but I do not believe money has been poured down a
rat hole on the satellite programs. What we have is a problem
where the technical difficulties involved in creating the next
generation of instruments took more time and more money than
anybody ever anticipated to deliver, so we have had to reduce
some of the risk on that, so that we have the schedule, and
they can be delivered. That has been. That is back on track.
So, that is good.
Now, QuikSCAT is a potential filler of this surface vector
wind field, we have pushed money in the direction. We have a
study going. We are trying to look at a replacement for
QuikSCAT based on the renewed, or I would say, probably new
interest that it is the only, or it is the best replacement for
that field, as a matter of priority. And we are working on that
with a study, and we will make decisions as quickly as we can
make them responsibly, and come to you as the Oversight
Committee, and say this is the right place to invest money.
Mr. Klein. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Turner, you can respond to that. We
are getting close to the end, but go ahead, Dr. Turner.
Dr. Turner. Yes, sir. I think the discussion about QuikSCAT
has two dimensions, and certainly, one dimension that has been
discussed quite a bit here, and that is the scientific
dimension, and certainly, dialogue and discussion about the
science and so forth of QuikSCAT and its replacement, are
certainly ripe fields for people to talk about.
I think what concerned us in our assessment was the
misrepresentation that Mr. Proenza made about the, about what
his staff was telling him about QuikSCAT and its importance to
them and their forecasting. We were told on several occasions
that his staff corrected his statements, told him why they
thought that they were being taken out of context, and he
continued to misrepresent their views, and I think that is the
part that made them lose confidence in his integrity.
Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman. Just for the record, and I know my
time is up, for the record, I did go down to the National
Hurricane Center, as I said before. I asked two specific
forecasters, veteran forecasters, specifically about the
statements that Mr. Proenza was making, and they validated them
independently. It was just a private conversation, but I was
interested, and just they showed me, and they said yeah, this
is true, and this is what the value is. So, I don't know what
has been said since then, but it was a firsthand expression to
me, and I know that was there. Now, what has happened since
then, and different people can have different opinions, but I
want to put that on the record.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Turner, you can complete your
statement.
Dr. Turner. It is fine.
Chairman Miller. Okay. All right. I know that there are
further questions that I have, but we have spent the better
part of the day in this hearing. We have more documents to
receive. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Additional Witnesses Would Have Been Useful
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And thank you, and Mr. Chairman, you have
been very generous, and also, I will be quick, but I do think
it is one of the things that I wish in hindsight, well, even
though we asked for it, it would have been helpful, in order to
clarify some of these questions, to get others to testify. None
of those people that Congressman Klein and I spoke to on all
sides of these issues were frankly invited to be up here, and I
think that is frankly a little bit of a disservice, but again,
I am not here to point a finger. I just want to make that
point, that I think it would have been a more helpful, since we
are, unfortunately, I guess, going to continue to try again to
push personnel issues as Members of Congress. If we are going
to do that, at least it would have been nice to have all of the
people involved, and not just some.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller. Well, under our rules, the Minority is
allowed to bring witnesses, and have. I think Dr. Turner is a
witness of the Minority.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We brought him. We,
again----
Chairman Miller. We will continue to----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. He would have been good to have----
Chairman Miller. It is almost certain that we will have
another hearing on this topic, since we still do not have all
of the documents. And that is, let me take back the implication
that that was a criticism. I know we have asked, with a very
short time, for documents. We do need the documents. We do need
to look at this. Now, the Minority has said that for us to look
at this is simply a personnel issue, but for you to look at was
the Lord's own work, that you had to look at it, you had to
make sure that the National Hurricane Center, the Hurricane
Center was doing its work.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. That is their job.
Chairman Miller. Well, agreed. It is also our job in
exercising oversight to know what goes on. And they are, I
began this hearing, and I know that Mr. Lampson wishes to make
a final remark as well. I began this hearing saying I did not
know what had happened at that hearing. Mr. Inglis has used the
phrase, the Majority's theory of the case. This isn't a case, I
don't have a theory. I want to know what has happened.
This exploded into national attention a couple weeks ago. I
think we all found out about it at the same time. I think we
all see this as important. It is important. It is important to
our role as Members of the Committee that has oversight
jurisdiction of NOAA, of the Hurricane Center, to find out what
is going on. And there is a lot more that I want to know.
There will be other witnesses. As I pointed out earlier
this week, in a hearing of these two subcommittees, I don't
want to hear complaints at the hearing about the procedures
that we are using when there has been ample opportunity,
leading up to the hearing, to talk about it. If there are
witnesses that the Minority wishes to call, let us know about
it. Our staffs are in constant contact. The Members know how to
talk to each other as well.
Members can get the cell phone numbers of other Members. My
home telephone number in Raleigh is in the phonebook. I am
visible on the floor, we can find each other, and to hear
about, hear complaints of the procedures of the Committee,
about who we have called or not called at the hearing, does
make me wonder if the purpose of the complaints is simply to
distract attention from the subject of the hearing.
There are still questions that I have. The Minority has
drawn out, in its questioning, the question about whether Mr.
Proenza would retaliate against anyone, and that is why this
management team needed to show up unannounced, which I am sure
felt, to all the employees there, like law enforcement serving
a search warrant. I do not think that is an ordinary procedure.
The ordinary way that a management team comes in to look at how
an office, a center is being run.
More on State of Hurricane Forecasting
There has been disputed question here about how well we are
integrating the best science into our forecasting. I have
heard, like Mr. Klein, not in anticipation of this hearing, not
with somebody, from someone with any axe to grind, but someone
with expertise in atmospheric research, in meteorological
research, who has told me that the forecasting by the Hurricane
Center is not what it should be. It is not what we should
expect with where science is today, and particularly, as others
have pointed out since I raised the issue, intensification,
intensity of hurricanes, forecasting intensity is not what it
should be.
I have also heard inland flooding, forecasts of inland
flooding is far short of what it should be. Virtually all the
lives lost in my state from hurricanes in the last few years
have been from inland flooding. If we can be much better at
that, as I have been told we can be, we should be, and I want
to make sure yes, there are some parallels here to the case of
Moose Cobb, the Inspector General at NASA.
When an important agency of government appears to melt
down, it is appropriate for us to look at what has happened.
Was it the case that there was resistance at the Center to
changes that needed to happen to improve the science, to do a
better job of forecasting? Is that what happened?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Would the gentleman yield?
Chairman Miller. Well, in a moment, I will.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Miller. In a moment.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. We welcome, we depend upon critics within
government to tell us what is going on. Our job of oversight
depends upon people within the government, employees speaking
freely to us, to tell us what questions to raise. There is no
question that Mr. Proenza was a critic, was willing to speak
his mind, was willing to stand up to superiors in this
department, in NOAA, in the Weather Service.
We certainly--it is certainly appropriate to look at
whether that is part of what happened here. Was this genuinely
a revolt by those below him, or was this something provoked by
those above him in the hierarchy? Those are all the questions
that I still have, that this hearing has not answered, and we
still have a good many more documents to be provided.
I know Mr. Lampson wishes to be recognized, so let me
recognize Mr. Diaz-Balart first, and then, Mr. Lampson.
Role of the Committee
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again.
You are very kind to recognize me.
You know, I don't disagree with a lot of your questions,
and I think the issue, as to whether we are getting the best
forecasting available is something that this committee needs to
look at, and needs to continue to look at. Obviously, I
question whether we should be dealing in the personnel issue,
but if we are going to, and that is okay, because you are Chair
of the Subcommittee, so you can do what you would like.
It would just seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that there are some
things that shouldn't be partisan. For example, if we are going
to be looking at what happened in this particular case, it
would seem to me that the Majority would want to get as many
witnesses on all sides.
Chairman Miller. Would the gentleman yield on that?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Of course, sir.
Chairman Miller. Will you have any objection to our
bringing employees of the National Hurricane Center here?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Absolutely not. I don't think----
Chairman Miller. Or taking our committee there to, or to
take our committee there to have a field hearing?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. If I may, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller. It is your time.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you. You know, I am not one to
object to what the Majority wants to do. My statement.
Chairman Miller. Then we will assume that there won't be an
objection.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, my statement would be, though,
however, twofold, that we should clearly not do anything that
is going to jeopardize the ability of the forecasters in the
heart of a hurricane season to do their job. I think we are
already doing that as it is, and I think it would be highly
irresponsible, borderline negligence for us to continue to ask,
not NOAA, continue to ask the Hurricane Center people to, you
know, spend their time doing things that are not just looking
for hurricanes, number one. After the hurricane season is over,
I think we should spend as much time, that would be a privilege
and an honor to have you all in Miami, and I think you would be
highly impressed.
I just do want to mention, though, that, and again, you
know, I am not crying over spilled milk, but we brought this
up, but this was brought up, that we only had, I understand how
the rules work, we had one, to have one witness. It would seem
to me that this should not be partisan, that if the Majority
wants to learn the facts, it shouldn't have to be a Minority
witness. It should be the witnesses that are available, to find
out what the facts are, and it is just, frankly, a little
disheartening that such, and I, look, it may be a little
personal, and please bear with me.
The men and women in the Hurricane Center are incredible
professionals, incredible professionals. You don't know them
personally like I do. And when those people speak out, and
then, this committee has a hearing to find out why they spoke
out, and what happened, and they are not invited, it is frankly
sad. It really is sad, and again, we had one witness, we got
it. It would have been nice for the Majority to at least have
the intention of, if you were trying to find out what is
happening, you had Mr. Proenza. He is a great guy. I am glad he
was here. How is it possible to not call, I am confused, how is
it possible to not call some of those 20 plus people to have
them up here?
Chairman Miller. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, sir. Of course.
Chairman Miller. Do you know that we did call the staff,
and that we did speak?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, actually not at the Hurricane Center.
Chairman Miller. And called them as----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Not at the Hurricane Center. And we----
Chairman Lampson. Well, it is, as Mr. Diaz-Balart, as you
have pointed out, it is the middle of the hurricane season now.
Chairman Miller. Generally, the Chair welcomes Mr. Diaz-
Balart's suggestion that this committee have a field hearing in
Miami, and say December or January.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, you are a wise man.
Chairman Miller. The Chair welcomes bipartisan
contributions such as that. And Mr. Lampson.
Chairman Lampson. I think that I got my question answered
about support for the hearing, and your support for having the
right people come up here. That is there or here. Doesn't
matter, but the point is we----
Mr. Diaz-Balart. After the hurricane season, right, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Lampson. We need to have those things. I would
like to just mention, in my part of closing, that we did ask
for some specific staff, high ranking assistants to Admiral
Lautenbacher, to attend today. And granted, it was not done by
letter. There was an understanding when staff asked, I think
that is an inappropriate request. In the future, we would like
for that certainly to be honored. We don't, again, don't think
that it is inappropriate to do so, in matter.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time, and I
thank the panel for being here.
Chairman Miller. I also thank the panel for being here, and
I appreciate what I expect to be continued cooperation with the
Committee on this issue. I thank everyone for being here, and
with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:06 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]