[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUNWAY SAFETY
=======================================================================
(110-99)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
----------
FEBRUARY 13, 2008
----------
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, JOHN L. MICA, Florida
Vice Chair DON YOUNG, Alaska
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
Columbia WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
JERROLD NADLER, New York VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
CORRINE BROWN, Florida STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
BOB FILNER, California FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JERRY MORAN, Kansas
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi GARY G. MILLER, California
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa Carolina
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington SAM GRAVES, Missouri
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York Virginia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois TED POE, Texas
DORIS O. MATSUI, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
NICK LAMPSON, Texas CONNIE MACK, Florida
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii York
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota Louisiana
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOHN J. HALL, New York VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin VACANCY
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
JERRY McNERNEY, California
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California
VACANCY
(ii)
Subcommittee on Aviation
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman
BOB FILNER, California THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JERRY MORAN, Kansas
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa SAM GRAVES, Missouri
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
JOHN J. HALL, New York, Vice Chair SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin Virginia
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TED POE, Texas
Columbia DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
CORRINE BROWN, Florida CONNIE MACK, Florida
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California York
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DORIS O. MATSUI, California VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii JOHN L. MICA, Florida
LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California (Ex Officio)
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
TESTIMONY
Barimo, Basil J., Vice President, Operations and Safety, Air
Transport Association of America............................... 29
Boyer, Phil, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association... 29
Dillingham, Dr. Gerald, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 4
Duval, John K., A.A.E., Airport Safety and Security Coordinator,
Beverly Municipal Airport and Former Deputy Director for
Aviation and Operations, Massachusetts Port Authority and
American Association of Airport Executives..................... 29
Forrey, Patrick, President, National Air Traffic Controllers
Association.................................................... 29
Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic
Organization, Federal Aviation Administration, accompanied by
Jim Ballough, Director, Flight Standards Service, Federal
Aviation Administration........................................ 4
Kallenbach, T.K., Vice President, Marketing and Product
Management, Honeywell Aerospace................................ 29
Prater, Captain John, President, Air Line Pilots Association..... 29
Principato, Greg, President, Airports Council International_North
America........................................................ 29
Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L., Inspector General, U.S. Department
of Transportation.............................................. 4
Sumwalt, Hon. Robert L., Vice Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 4
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri................................. 51
Cohen, Hon. Steve, of Tennessee.................................. 52
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 53
Hall, Hon. John J., of New York.................................. 60
Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona.............................. 61
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 63
Salazar, Hon. John T., of Colorado............................... 67
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Barimo, Basil J.................................................. 69
Boyer, Phil...................................................... 75
Dillingham, Gerald L............................................. 112
Duval, John K.................................................... 227
Forrey, Patrick.................................................. 241
Kallenbach, T.K.................................................. 251
Krakowski, Hank.................................................. 271
Prater, John..................................................... 297
Principato, Greg................................................. 309
Scovel III, Hon. Calvin L........................................ 318
Sumwalt, Robert L................................................ 346
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Dillingham, Dr. Gerald, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Response to question from Rep. Costello........................ 8
Response to question from Rep. Richardson...................... 20
``Aviation Runway and Ramp Safety,'' United States Government
Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters.... 135
Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic
Organization, Federal Aviation Administration:
Responses to questions from Rep. Duncan and Rep. Richardson.... 291
Responses to questions from Rep. Moore via Rep. Petri.......... 294
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HEARING ON RUNWAY SAFETY
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Wednesday, February 13, 2008
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerry
F. Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Costello. The Subcommittee will come to order.
The Chair will ask all Members, staff and everyone to turn
electronic devices off or on vibrate.
The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on
runway safety. I will give a brief opening statement and then
yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his opening
statement or any remarks he may have, and then we will go to
our first panel of witnesses.
I welcome everyone to our hearing today on runway safety.
This hearing highlights the Subcommittee's responsibility to
ensure that the FAA is fulfilling its duties to provide
comprehensive safety oversight in every aspect of the aviation
system including runway safety.
While the United States has the safest air transportation
system in the world, we can't rely on or be satisfied with our
past success. We must continue to strive for greater success
because one accident or near accident is one too many,
especially when the FAA is predicting a tripling of passengers
and cargo by the year 2025.
Late last year, the Government Accountability Office, the
GAO, issued its report on runway and ramp safety which Chairman
Oberstar and I requested. We will hear from Dr. Dillingham and
others concerning the GAO report.
According to the GAO, the rate of runway incursions in
fiscal year 2007 increased to 6.05 incidents per million
operations. This is a 12 percent increase over 2006 and the
highest since 2001 when the rate reached 6.1 incidents per
million operations.
While the number of severe runway incursions dropped from
53 incidents in 2001 to 24 in 2007, in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2008 alone, there have been 10 severe runway
incursions. This is simply unacceptable.
The GAO has stated that the FAA's lack of leadership on
this issue, including a director level vacancy in the Office of
Runway Safety for over two years and an out of date national
runway safety plan has impeded further progress. While the FAA
has finally filled its Runway Safety Office Director position,
this Subcommittee wants to know what the FAA's plan is on a
national level to improve runway safety.
To ensure this issue remains at the forefront of the FAA
safety agenda, I want the FAA to provide a progress report to
this Subcommittee every three months, detailing each Category A
and B runway incursion, how the FAA responded and what progress
is being made to address these incidents and reduce the overall
number of runway incursions.
The GAO also cited controller fatigue as a major factor in
runway safety, and I am interested in hearing more from our
witnesses including Mr. Pat Forrey, the President of the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association, on this issue.
Around the Country, controllers are working longer hours to
handle increasingly congested runways and airspace in part
because of staffing shortages. While the FAA may not admit that
there is a problem, I can assure you, after talking to all of
the users of the system, there is a problem.
In addition to the 10 severe runway incursions in the first
quarter of fiscal year 2008, there was also a near miss at the
Chicago center in December of 2007. This should serve as a
wake-up call to the aviation community that something needs to
be done now to avoid a major disaster in the near future.
Human factors will always be a challenge, but with enough
redundancy worked into the system, using technologies like the
ones we will hear about today, we will be able to mitigate
their effects. I am interested in learning more about near and
long term technologies such as ASDE-X, runway safety lights and
low cost surveillance systems.
In H.R. 2881, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2007 which
passed the House of Representatives on September 20th of 2007
and has yet to be acted on by the Senate, we included
provisions to address runway safety. H.R. 2881 provides $42
million over 4 years for runway incursion reduction programs
and $74 million over 4 years for runway status light
acquisition and installation. Further, it requires the
Administrator to submit a report to Congress, containing a
strategic runway safety plan and a plan for the installation
and deployment of systems to alert controller and flight crews
to potential runway incursions.
Safety must not be compromised in an effort to save money
or because of a lack of resources or attention. The FAA and the
aviation community must do better.
I assure you that this Subcommittee will keep the FAA's
feet to the fire to keep safety efforts on track. The American
traveling public deserves nothing less.
With that, I will recognize our Ranking Member for his
opening statement, but before I do I ask unanimous consent to
allow two weeks for all Members to revise and extend their
remarks and to permit the submission of additional statements
and materials by Members and witnesses. Without objection, so
ordered.
At this time, the Chair recognized the Ranking Member, Mr.
Petri.
Mr. Petri. I thank Chairman Costello, and I would like to
thank our witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee today
to discuss the important aviation safety matter that is before
us, and that is the issue of runway safety.
Though we are currently in the safest period in aviation
history, as long as human beings endeavor to take to the skies,
there will always be the potential for human error and for
accidents, but the Federal Aviation Administration, this
Subcommittee and, in fact, the entire aviation community are
charged with ensuring the safest national airspace system that
is humanly possible.
A recent Government Accountability Office report studied
runway incursions as well as runway and ramp safety and found
that while the rate for most serious categories of runway
incursions is down from last year, 24 events out of 61 million
aircraft operations, there was an anomalous uptick in runway
incursions in the first quarter of this year. Therefore, we
need to remain vigilant in our oversight of this issue.
I am looking forward to hearing about the steps that the
Federal Aviation Administration, airports, airlines, pilots,
avionics manufacturers, general aviation users and controllers
are taking to reduce the risk for these potentially deadly
runway incursions.
I believe that there are many ways to address runway
safety. Clearly, there is no silver bullet to eliminate runway
incursions. I am interested in hearing about the many
technologies currently deployed to reduce runway incursions as
well as those that are under development and may be deployed
before long, technologies such as runway status lights, ASDE-X,
TCAS, low cost surface surveillance, all have the potential to
drastically reduce the incidence of runway incursions.
In addition to technological innovations, I am interested
in hearing about the bricks and mortar type solutions.
Crushable concrete engineered materials arresting systems that
have been installed at 21 airports have proven effective.
Increased painted markings and signage improvements at airports
are also underway. End-around perimeter taxiways have been
installed at Atlanta's airport, reducing runway crossings from
roughly 650 to less than 100 per day.
The Federal Aviation Administration is currently evaluating
these approaches, and I am interested in hearing from our
witnesses what they think about these strategies and from the
Federal Aviation Administration on their plan to deploy these
and other measures.
Beyond the flashing lights, radar, alerting systems and
concrete, it is important that we address human factors issues
that affect runway safety. Pilot alertness and situational
awareness are critical to safe flights. Also, as we seek to get
more information to pilots, it is important that we strike a
balance that does not overload or distract them.
Although the National Transportation Safety Board has not
cited controller fatigue as a factor causing runway incursions
that they have investigated, including last summer's tragic
incident in Lexington, Kentucky, some have cited controller
fatigue as an area of concern, and I am interested in hearing
about these concerns as well.
However, as with all runway safety issues, it is critical
that this discussion be based upon data and science. We must be
cautious when discussing safety to avoid just raising
extraneous issues. Otherwise, we won't achieve the safety
benefits that we are all seeking.
Finally, I am interested in hearing about the FAA's call to
action on runway safety. The agency has clearly taken steps to
address this issue, but it will be important to keep their
programs on scheduled and to continue to maintain the vigilant
oversight that we are seeing now.
The number of enplanements is projected to rise and, of
course, an increase in runway incursions would be absolutely
unacceptable.
So I appreciate the efforts of all of our witnesses to
address this important safety issue, and I look forward to your
testimony.
With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and, at
this time, will introduce our first panel of witnesses. As you
may have noted, we have two panels of witnesses today.
The first panel: Dr. Gerald Dillingham, who is no stranger
to this Subcommittee, he has testified before our Subcommittee
many times, and I have referred to him in our statement
concerning his runway safety report; Mr. Hank Krakowski who is
the Chief Operating Officer of the Air Traffic Organization
over at the FAA, accompanied by Mr. Jim Ballough, who is the
Director of Flight Standards Service for the FAA; the Honorable
Robert Sumwalt, the Vice Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board; and the Honorable Calvin Scovel
who is the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of
Transportation.
Gentlemen on our first panel, we normally adhere to the
five minute rule but because the GAO report will be detailed
for us by Dr. Dillingham, we are going to be liberal with his
time but probably enforce your time. So we will give Dr.
Dillingham more time than our other witnesses.
Dr. Dillingham, thank you for being here--we thank all of
the witnesses for being here--and you are recognized.
TESTIMONY OF DR. GERALD DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE;
HANK KRAKOWSKI, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, AIR TRAFFIC
ORGANIZATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ACCOMPANIED BY
JIM BALLOUGH, DIRECTOR, FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICE, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. SUMWALT, VICE
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; AND THE
HONORABLE CALVIN L. SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Dillingham. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Petri,
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for permitting GAO to
provide the background for this important hearing and to
present the highlights of our testimony in this format.
At the request of this Subcommittee, Chairman Oberstar and
Senator Lautenberg, we undertook a study of runway safety. In
our testimony this afternoon, we will first define and describe
some key types of incursions. Second, we will present the key
findings of the GAO study and, finally, we will offer some
suggestions for actions that we think could be undertaken to
address the problem.
Regarding the nature of incursions, a runway incursion is
generally defined as an incident that occurs on the airfield
when one aircraft comes too close to another aircraft, vehicle
or person. It is not generally considered an aviation accident,
but many aviation safety experts consider incursions as
precursors or early warnings of accidents.
Incursions can occur in several ways. One of the more
typical scenarios is shown here, illustrating the path of two
aircraft that are proceeding towards intersecting runways. A
second very typical scenario is one in which an aircraft
attempts to land as a second aircraft taxis onto an active
runway.
Runway incursions are categorized in terms of severity
based on the distance between aircraft and the possibility of a
collision. Categories A and B are the most serious types as
both of these categories indicate near collisions.
The simulation you are about to see is an actual serious
incursion that occurred July 11th, 2007 at the Ft. Lauderdale-
Hollywood Airport. In this simulation, you will see a Delta 757
nearly touch down on a runway but have to become airborne again
when the pilot sees a United A320 approaching the same runway.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Dillingham. These aircraft missed each other by less
than a hundred feet.
This next simulation illustrates the type of incursion that
occurs when an aircraft attempts a landing on an occupied
runway. This incursion occurred on July 5th, 2007 at the Denver
International Airport. You will see a Frontier Airlines A319
having to conduct a go-around procedure after seeing another
jet on the runway.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Dillingham. These aircraft missed each other by about
50 feet.
Now I would like to turn to the key findings of our report.
In our study, we looked back at incursions for 10 years. We
found that the total number of all categories of incursions
peaked in 2001 at 407.
Between 2002 and 2006, the total number of incursions
declined and was relatively flat. This relatively flat line
still indicates that there was at least one incursion some
place in the U.S. every day.
In 2007, the overall incursion rate peaked again and was
nearly as high as the 2001 peak.
This next graph shows only the serious incursions. This is
Categories A and B. There are two key points that can be taken
from this data.
First, the number of serious incursions followed a similar
pattern as overall incursions with a significant drop in 2002
and a relative downward trend to 2006 when there were 31
serious incursions. This graph also shows a 24 percent drop in
the number of serious incursions from 2006 to 2007.
The second key point is that about one-third of these
serious incursions involved at least one commercial aircraft,
each of which represents a potential catastrophic accident.
As this next graphic illustrates, this is a problem that
will require sustained attention. It shows that in the first
quarter of this year there were 10 serious incursions. This is
five times the number of serious incursions from the same time
period from the previous year.
With regard to the cause of incursions, our study found
that over half were attributed to pilot error. Slightly more
than a quarter were caused by controller error, oftentimes
involving some kind of controller miscommunication between the
pilot and the controllers. About 15 percent involved a vehicle
or pedestrian error such as a service truck entering an active
runway.
Turning now to the initiatives to address the incursion
problem. As Mr. Petri said, there are no silver bullets and, as
long as there are humans in the loop, there will probably never
be zero incursions.
We think that a multi-faceted, layered approach has the
best chance of minimizing the problem. Among the initiatives
that we consider that could be done immediately are to continue
the efforts that FAA has underway including the training,
improving airport signage and markings, and individual airport
reviews with stakeholders;
Second, develop and implement the national runway safety
plan;
Third, address human factors issues such as controller
overtime and fatigue issues and adopt international standards
for controller communications; and
Fourth, accelerate the technological remedies such as
runway status light, low cost surface surveillance systems and
the deployment of ASDE-X.
In addition, we think that initiatives such as the
development of a confidential reporting system should be
expedited and, to the extent it is operationally feasible,
runway crossing should be minimized.
Initiatives for the longer term include making
infrastructure changes such as the perimeter taxiway that was
recently opened at Atlanta Hartsfield. Another longer term
initiative is the development of moving maps that will allow
pilots to know where they are located on the airfield as well
as the location of other aircraft and vehicles.
The last initiative which will be demonstrated in the next
two video clips is one that the NTSB has been recommending for
almost 10 years. This is an audible warning to the pilots in
the cockpit. The first video shows the view from the cockpit,
and you will hear the audible warning to the pilot about an
aircraft approaching on a converging runway.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Dillingham. The second clip will also be a view from
the cockpit with the audible warning to the pilot. Take note of
the arrow in the video that locates an aircraft approaching the
runway on which another aircraft is about to land.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Dillingham. In addition to the audible warning, the
advantages of this technology are that it is radar-based and
avoids any delay or miscommunications between the controller
and the pilot.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, with the current
situation and forecasted increases in traffic, runway
incursions are a safety problem that require actions that must
be sustained beyond any temporary reduction in the number of
incursions.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. We thank you, Dr. Dillingham. We will have a
chance to come back and ask questions concerning not only your
PowerPoint but other issues in the report, but let me quickly
ask you a couple of questions before we move on to Mr.
Krakowski.
The Ft. Lauderdale incident where the two aircraft came
within 100 feet of each other, was that pilot error or was that
controller error?
Mr. Dillingham. I don't know the answer to that, but I will
get back to you, sir.
[Information follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 40816.012
Mr. Costello. Okay. The second incident in Denver where the
one plane had to go around, that came within 50 feet, was it
controller or pilot?
Mr. Dillingham. I believe that was pilot error where the
pilot turned onto the wrong runway.
Mr. Costello. Very good. Thank you. As I said, Dr.
Dillingham, we will have other questions for you after we hear
from the other witnesses. We thank you for your testimony and
for the PowerPoint as well.
Mr. Krakowski, you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Krakowski. Good afternoon, Chairman Costello,
Congressman Petri and Members of the Subcommittee.
I am Hank Krakowski. I am the Chief Operating Officer of
FAA's Air Traffic Organization. With me today is Jim Ballough.
Jim is our Director of Flight Standards Service, specifically
working on the pilots' side of this issue.
I am honored to be here today to discuss ways that everyone
can work together to improve runway safety. At FAA, safety is
our top imperative. While 2007 was the safest year yet for
aviation, we remain focused to make the safest system in the
world even safer.
Runway safety starts with preventing runway incursions,
whether these mistakes are made by pilots, controllers or
ground staff. Our most recent efforts have made a difference.
We have reduced serious runway incursions by 55 percent since
2001.
The next chart breaks down last year's runway incursions by
severity. You will note a change in October when the FAA
adopted the new international definition from when we began
counting every single mistake on the runway or taxiway, even if
another aircraft was not present. This was not previously done,
and it appears that incursions are actually rising
dramatically.
Actually, what we are doing is we are counting more
incursions so we can understand the risks better. So, by
getting this additional data of actually treating every single
event as a serious issue to look at, I think we have a better
shot at assessing our safety risk.
The FAA investigates every runway incursion so we can
understand what causes it. As you heard, pilot error accounts
for approximately 60 percent right now, air traffic controller
error around 30 percent, and the remaining 10 to 15 by ground
staff.
The call to action for runway safety which started last
summer resulted in specific runway safety improvements at
hundreds of airports across the Nation. We improved airport
signage and runway markings, and our busiest airports have
received satellite-based runway surveillance technology to help
warn controllers of a possible collision. Chicago O'Hare is
receiving this system a year ahead of schedule.
For pilots, we have installed runway status lights which
were endorsed in the NTSB Most Wanted List. The lights turn red
when there is traffic on or approaching the runway. Runway
status lights are preventing potential accidents today and, in
fact, just last week at Dallas-Ft. Worth, an incursion was
avoided because the pilot saw the red lights and did not enter
the active runway.
Not all measures to improve runway safety will involve
installing new equipment, though. FAA runway safety action
teams have visited 20 of the busiest airports to identify short
term fixes such as new signs, better markings and, more
importantly, training for pilots, controllers and ground staff.
Our teams are headed to even more airports this year as a
result of the success with these first 20.
Another critical component, though, of this program is to
complete our work with NATCA, the controllers' union, to
implement a non-punitive, voluntary reporting system for air
traffic controllers, similar to the Aviation Safety Action
Programs at the airlines.
In my previous role as Chief Safety Officer for United
Airlines, I was responsible for four such programs for pilots,
dispatchers, mechanics and flight attendants. Because of this
experience, I am convinced that the information derived from
this program will be extremely powerful in understanding the
human factors involved in such errors.
The entire aviation community has a role in the solutions,
and I am happy to report that they are stepping up to the
plate.
I welcome the Committee's assistance in these efforts. This
concludes my remarks, and I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you and now recognizes Mr.
Ballough.
Mr. Ballough. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any opening
remarks, but I am here to answer questions regarding pilot
issues.
Mr. Costello. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sumwalt.
Mr. Sumwalt. Thank you and good afternoon, Chairman
Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Chairman Oberstar and Members
of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to present
testimony on behalf of the National Transportation Safety
Board.
As you know, the Safety Board is charged with investigating
accidents and incidents, determining their probable cause and
issuing safety recommendations to prevent their reoccurrence.
The Safety Board is especially concerned about runway
incursions due to their number and potential severity. In fact,
the world's largest aviation disaster was a result of a runway
incursion. In that accident in 1977, 583 lives were lost
because 2 jumbo jets collided on a runway in Tenerife, the
Canary Islands.
Incursions occur because of human error. Pilots make
mistakes. Controllers make mistakes as do those driving ground
vehicles. So there is no single solution.
In 2000, the Safety Board made recommendations to address
the issue in a variety of ways including procedural changes,
educational changes and technological improvements that require
a direct warning to the flight crews. This direct warning is
critical because it would provide pilots with additional time
to react.
Since 2005, the FAA has been conducting the field tests of
the runway status lights at the Dallas-Ft. Worth International
Airport. Initial test results are promising, and the FAA is
planning to conduct tests at other airports.
The FAA has also promoted Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast, or ADS-B, as a method of mitigating the number and
severity of runway incursions. For ADS-B to provide the maximum
safety benefit, the system should support both ADS-B Out and
ADS-B In.
With ADS-B In, surface conflict warnings are provided
directly to the pilots in the cockpit, offering the greatest
opportunity for improved situation awareness. The FAA's NPRM
regarding ADS-B states that aircraft will be required to be
equipped with ADS-B Out but not until the year 2020, and
moreover the FAA does not plan to mandate ADS-B In at all, and
this concerns the Safety Board.
While the Safety Board is encouraged the efforts of the
FAA, their progress has been slow to responding to
recommendations issued seven years ago. Further, national
implementation of these technologies is still years away, and
not all airports with passenger service would be equipped.
The FAA has made progress with lighting and improved
signage at airports, but basic improvements in air traffic
control procedures are needed.
The Safety Board has several outstanding recommendations to
the FAA regarding clearances given to pilots when taxiing
across runways. Although these recommendations mirror those
contained in ICAO guidance used internationally for
implementing runway safety programs, the FAA has not
implemented them. If they had been implemented, the ComAir
accident in Lexington, Kentucky, might not have occurred.
We need the extra protection of additional procedures and
advanced technology to compensate for human errors. We strongly
urge action on these critical safety issues.
I will now briefly turn to the issue of fatigue. Like
runway incursions, fatigue has been on the Safety Board's Most
Wanted List since this list was conceived, the inception of
this list in 1990.
We have issued numerous recommendations regarding aviation
fatigue regarding flight crews, mechanics and air traffic
controllers. However, to date, the FAA has taken little
regulatory action regarding directly related to revising
existing regulations and work scheduling practices.
The FAA is in the process of convening a working group to
develop scheduling practices that minimize controller
impairment due to fatigue. The Safety Board supports these
efforts and continues to believe that further action must be
taken, especially in issuing scientifically-based duty time
regulations and policies that minimize fatigue among flight
crews, mechanics and air traffic controllers. Operating or
controlling an aircraft without adequate rest presents an
unnecessary risk to the traveling public.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my testimony, and I will be
glad to answer questions at the appropriate time. Thank you.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now
recognize General Scovel.
Mr. Scovel. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, Chairman
Oberstar, Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the
opportunity to testify today on runway safety.
Aviation stakeholders are expressing growing concern over
the rise in runway incidents. A significant threat to runway
safety is runway incursions, which are defined as any incident
involving an unauthorized aircraft, vehicle, or person on a
runway. Since 2003, the number of runway incursions has begun
climbing again, reaching a high of 370 in 2007, a 12 percent
increase over the previous year.
While the most serious incidents decreased from a high of
69 in 1999 to a low of 24 in 2007, during the first 3 months of
fiscal year 2008, 10 serious runway incursions occurred. If
that rate were to continue, 40 serious incursions could occur
before the end of this year, which would be the highest level
in 6 years.
Over the last 10 years, our work has shown that a range of
actions is needed to enhance the margin of safety on the
Nation's runways. We see four specific areas where FAA and
other aviation users should focus on runway safety efforts.
First, FAA must implement existing and new systems to
improve runway safety. New technology is considered by many to
be a key factor in the mix of solutions for improving runway
safety. However, our work on three major FAA acquisitions for
improving runway safety has shown significant concerns as to
what can be effectively deployed within the next several years.
For example, ASDE-X, a ground surveillance system that
warns controllers of possible runway conflicts, may not meet
its cost and schedule goals to commission all 35 systems for
$549.8 million by 2011. Questions have arisen as to whether it
will be able to deliver all the planned safety benefits, such
as providing alerts at intersecting runways.
Another promising technology is runway status lights, a
``stoplight'' system that alerts pilots when a runway is
occupied. However, the system is in the very early stages of
development, and a key issue is that it uses ASDE-X data for
its surveillance capabilities. It is therefore dependent on
successful deployment of ASDE-X.
One of the most promising technologies on the horizon is
ADS-B. However, as we testified last October, ADS-B ground
infrastructure will not be in place until 2013, and users will
not be required to equip with some of the needed avionics until
2020.
Second, FAA must make airport-specific infrastructure and
procedural changes. The uncertain timeline and emerging risks
of FAA's runway safety technologies underscore the need to
explore other near-term solutions. Several relatively low-cost,
simple, airport-specific changes_such as better signage,
improved runway markings and lighting, and procedural changes
in daily airport operations_can go a long way to improve the
margin of safety.
However, as we reported in May of last year, other than
networking, NAS users had no official way to share actions that
were successful at reducing runway incursions at their
locations.
We recommended that FAA develop an automated means to share
best practices among all users of the NAS. In response, FAA
implemented a best practices website for runway safety in
December 2007. We will now see how well it is being utilized.
Third, FAA must reinvigorate its national program for
improving runway safety. From 1999 to 2001, runway incursions
increased at alarming rates. To its credit, FAA then took
decisive action that helped to reduce these incidents. It
established regional runway safety offices and initiated
aggressive educational programs for pilots.
However, we found that many of those important national
initiatives waned as the number of incidents declined and FAA
met its overall goals for reducing runway incursions. For
example, FAA established the Runway Safety Office in 2001, but
until August 2007 it had not had a permanent director for
almost 3 years. FAA also stopped preparing its national plan
for runway safety, which defined the Agency's strategy and
prioritized efforts to reduce runway incursions.
In response to our recommendations, FAA has begun
addressing many of these concerns. In addition to hiring a
permanent director for the Runway Safety Office, FAA plans to
reinstate its national plan for runway safety. These are good
steps, and the key now will be maintaining momentum.
Last, FAA must address controller human factors issues
through improved training. As we testified last week,
controller staffing and training will be key watch items over
the next 10 years as FAA begins hiring and training 15,000 new
controllers. Training new controllers on human factors issues
such as fatigue and situational awareness will become
increasingly important as FAA begins addressing the large
influx of trainees.
FAA has successfully implemented an important initiative to
address this type of required training: tower simulators. These
simulators provide controllers with a virtual replica of the
tower environment. The simulators use real-life scenarios such
as day and night operations, varying weather conditions, and
emergency situations. This is important technology to help new
and veteran controllers hone their skills in conditions when
runway incursions are most likely to occur.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy
to answer your questions or questions from other Members of the
Subcommittee.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, General Scovel.
Dr. Dillingham and Mr. Krakowski, let me ask Mr. Krakowski.
It is clear from reading Dr. Dillingham's report that in fact
he compliments the FAA for taking action in 2001, and then the
report goes on to state that while the agency recognized when
the ground incursions and runway safety issues reached their
peak in 2001, that the FAA took action and they focused on the
problem.
But, however, as the number of incursions started to
decrease, the FAA took their eye off the ball, went on to other
issues and no longer considered it a priority until in 2007
when the number of incursions reached almost its peak of 2001.
I think that is demonstrated very clearly by the fact that
there was a vacancy in the Office of Director of Runway Safety
for over two years and the safety plan at the FAA, the runway
safety plan, clearly was outdated as Dr. Dillingham indicated.
So it is clear to me that when the FAA either recognizes a
problem or someone says we have a problem and you need to
address this, when the FAA acts, then in fact positive results
can happen. It is only when you take your eye off the ball, the
agency takes its eye off the ball, that we go back and we run
into these problems again.
I was struck last night, reading your testimony, Mr.
Krakowski. On page three, it says only 8 out of 24 serious
incursions involved a commercial air flight and none of these
370 incursions resulted in a collision. While most of these
incursions are Category C incidents, which pose little or no
risk to the public, the increase in the incursions and the fact
that the serious incursions are still occurring prompted the
Administrator to issue a call to action on runway safety.
Two points: One is I question the fact that the
Administrator implemented a call to action because of the
number of incidents. I happen to believe it is because this
Subcommittee requested the GAO to do a report on runway safety
because we were concerned, and I think that prompted the agency
then to take action in 2007. Chairman Oberstar and I were
concerned in 2006, and that is why we requested the GAO report.
So I would just say that it is more than a coincidence that
we requested the report in 2006, and in 2007 the Administrator
said we better take a look at this and we better do something.
Having said that, what struck me in your testimony, and I
hope that you didn't mean it to come off this way, only 8 of 24
serious incursions. It is almost like well, we have these
incursions, but really there was not a loss of life or a
serious disaster. So is it really that big of a deal?
I just want you to know that we on this Subcommittee and
others in the aviation world believe that it is.
I happen to believe that it, along with runway incursions,
along with the fatigue factor with pilots and with controllers,
are the two biggest concerns that I have with safety in the
aviation industry today. It is fatigue and runway incursions.
So we hope that you, in fact, are taking action to follow
the GAO's plans, and I am going to get to that in just a few
minutes.
Dr. Dillingham, you state in your testimony that the FAA
indicates that they want to equip 35 airports with ASDE-X.
However, the agency has equipped 11 out of the 35 airports that
they intend to equip, and they have spent almost 60 percent of
the allocated funds for these 35 airports.
Given that fact, are they going to be able to reach their
goal of 35 airports, given the fact that they have already
spent 60 percent of their money on one-third of the airports
that they intend to equip?
Mr. Dillingham. Mr. Chairman, it is a concern of ours not
only in terms of the money spent but the time that it has taken
them to put out the 11 that they have. The expectation is that
the rest of them can be put out in half the time it has taken
to put out the few that have been put out.
So it is unlikely at this point. At least, we don't see how
this can happen on the budget and the schedule that is being
presented to us.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to come
back to the first question and give you some details on the two
simulations that we had. I had to refer to my notes. I am old,
you know.
The Ft. Lauderdale incident, it occurred with visibility of
10 miles. It was daylight. The airport did not have ASDE-X or
AMASS. The probable cause according to the NTSB is that the
flight crew inadvertently entered into an active runway. They
had missed a taxiway as they were on the airfield.
On the Denver incident, it was a combination of things. It
was the fact that the aircraft turned onto the wrong runway,
and the controllers could not identify them on the AMASS. It
was a snowy day as such, but it was a combination of things in
that case.
Mr. Costello. You address the issue of fatigue in your
report and, of course, the NTSB has listed that as a concern
for many years. I guess since the early nineties. General
Scovel has touched on it as well.
What, in your opinion, or what evidence are you seeing that
the FAA is addressing the fatigue issue with air traffic
controllers and others in the system?
Mr. Dillingham. We have had numerous conversations with FAA
with regard to what can be done about this because we think
that this is one of the immediate things that needs to be done
because it is a matter of moving controllers to these busy
places where you have these six-day weeks and ten-hour days
that you can relieve some of that fatigue.
FAA tells us that they are, in fact, studying where they
have these few, relatively few places where the controllers are
doing these six-day, ten-hour work days and intend to address
that issue immediately.
Mr. Costello. I recall in your testimony from last week,
and you correct me if I am wrong, but I think that you cited
the issue of new controllers as opposed to experienced air
traffic controllers.
You, I think, testified, and correct me if I am wrong, that
one facility you looked at where they had a small percentage of
inexperienced air traffic controllers new to the job and
another facility where half--Las Vegas as I recall--where half
of the air traffic controllers were inexperienced and new to
the job. It was either your testimony or General Scovel's, one
of the two.
We have a problem in the system, and we would hope that the
FAA will acknowledge the problem and attempt to address it. Now
I understand that they are now offering bonuses up to $24,000
to retain experienced controllers, but there is a problem in
the system.
Finally, before I turn over to my Ranking Member for his
questions, General Scovel, would you like to comment on the
fatigue issue as well? Do you see any evidence that the FAA is
addressing this issue?
Mr. Scovel. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
Fatigue is a concern, and the NTSB has properly highlighted
it as a concern for many years, specifically when it comes to
air traffic controllers.
By way of tagging fatigue as a direct or contributing
factor to an aircraft incident or accident, it is my
understanding that NTSB has not done so, although it closely
examined that question in connection with the Comair accident
in Lexington, Kentucky, in August 2006. Controller staffing in
the tower at that incident and the degree of rest of the sole
controller on duty at the time of that accident were factors
that NTSB addressed, and I know Mr. Sumwalt can address those
in more detail, should you wish.
One of the key factors that came out of that from NTSB, and
which we would completely agree with, is NTSB's recommendations
to FAA that they undertake these actions: First, that FAA
reduce the potential for controller fatigue by revising
controller work scheduling policies and practices and that they
modify their shift rotations. Second, that FAA develop a
fatigue awareness and countermeasures training program for
controllers.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to us that there is a lot of
bickering between controllers and the agencies regarding
overtime and whether it contributes to fatigue.
It seems, to me at least, a matter within common human
experience that if any individual works long hours at a tough
and demanding job, that individual at some point may likely get
tired. The real question is: What are we going to do about it?
NTSB has offered some very common-sense solutions to this,
put the ball squarely in FAA's court, and we would endorse that
and urge FAA to get on with it.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Krakowski, finally, let me ask you to
respond. What is the agency doing?
You indicate in your testimony that pilot error accounts
for 55 percent of runway incursions, according to your
testimony. What is the FAA doing to work with the pilot
community on training and education?
Mr. Krakowski. Okay. I will have Jim Ballough actually
assist me with this, but I would like to respond initially,
sir.
I take these issues very seriously as I did at my airline
before coming to FAA. The one thing you cannot ever do is let
up on safety. You have to constantly keep pressure on it at all
times which means well-running safety programs, data-driven
data collection programs with involvement by everybody involved
in the system.
That is what we are trying to construct with the ASAP, with
the controllers which we hope to sign soon, integrating and the
data that we are getting from the pilot community and those
programs as well, as well as some of the other reporting
mechanisms through the CAST, Commercial Aviation Safety Team
and ASIAS work which is going to be kind of a center point for
FAA and the user community to look at data and look for leading
indicators. So we are doing some very sophisticated
technological work with MITRE and some others to actually break
some new frontiers in this area.
More immediately, though, on the pilots' side, the call to
action last August was also recently supplemented by the
Administrator, the Acting Administrator calling the CEOs and
Chief Operating Officers of all the airlines to raise their
alertness that the issue is still a concern to us. With the
support of the highest level of those corporations, the
Directors of Safety and the Directors of Flight Operations at
those airlines are working on some programs that I will have
Jim talk about.
Mr. Ballough. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.
As Hank mentioned, this past January, in fact beginning on
the 18th of January, we had an outreach effort with the top
officials from 116 of the major air carriers. We came together,
and myself and my deputy personally did the sessions with the
executives from the airlines, and we identified.
First, we talked about the issues, showed the data to
establish why they were there and to establish the concerns the
FAA has and we all should have as an industry together, to face
the issues regarding runway incursions, but this effort was
focused primarily on the pilot deviation aspect. So these are
errors made by the pilots and, as Hank said, 60 percent of the
incursions involve pilots in some capacity.
So we brought the executive together, and we asked them. We
showed them the data. We went through 11 simulations or
examples of runway incursions, some of which you saw here
today, and we asked them to think about what it is we could do
in the short term immediately to address the issues in the
operational world.
What we learned from the United incident in Ft. Lauderdale
was that potentially when you view the tape, it appears as
though the crew was doing a checklist item with the flight
controls. That was a distraction. So we have asked the carriers
to go back and look at their checklists and revise and identify
any distractions that may occur and then remove those
distractions from the checklist.
We have a number of outreach efforts regarding training. We
have asked them. There are some very good runway incursion
training DVDs that are available. We have partnered with AOPA
to develop some of those as well as ALPA, the Air Line Pilots
Association. So those training materials are out there for the
120, for the air carrier world.
For the general aviation world, we have produced numerous
DVDs as training materials, produced a number of pamphlets,
continued to stress with all of our FAA safety team conferences
that they hold. We have asked them to stress the issue of
runway incursions, and we continue to look for new ways to also
reach the pilots and provide more data to them as well.
Mr. Costello. I thank you.
Mr. Krakowski, I appreciate your commitment to never
letting up. As I said, there has been evidence that the FAA has
moved on to other priorities in the past, and we are pleased to
have you in the position that you are in and committed to not
letting up.
With that, I would recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I wondered. I am going to spend my time and there are a
number of other Members who will be asking broader questions,
but my Senators in Wisconsin and my colleague, Gwen Moore and
Dr. Kagen, who is a Member of this Committee from my State of
Wisconsin, and several other representatives have been sending
letters and raising concerns about changes in control of the
airspace involving the Milwaukee air traffic control unit.
I really want to, if I could, Mr. Chairman, have permission
to submit questions from Representative Moore and myself for a
formal response after this hearing.
Mr. Costello. Without objection.
Mr. Petri. Then also to ask if Mr. Krakowski could respond
or point out to a few areas of concern. What is happened is
they are evidently consolidating or making changes in the air
traffic control space which adds some 8,400 square miles to the
direct so-called enroute aircraft flying through the airspace
controlled by the Milwaukee unit.
I wonder if you could spend a minute describing the
planning process for this airspace absorption and whether the
controllers involved were informed or involved in the planning
process and also what kind of training the controllers have
received or will receive to effect this change.
Also, could you broadly describe what training, staffing
and equipment needs the FAA has provided to ensure that when
the switch takes place, air safety will not be compromised in
any way?
And, if there are any benefits from this change, if you
could address those, we would appreciate it as well.
This is a concern, obviously, in our region. People fly in
and out of that region and, of course, everyone in the aviation
community is aware that a lot of people fly through that area
on their way to and from the largest general aviation festival
in the world at Oshkosh each summer. So that puts extra strain
on this whole part of the system.
I appreciate your addressing that.
Mr. Krakowski. I own a little airplane in Chicago and fly
up in your airspace quite a bit. So I am intimately familiar
with the airspace and the issues up there.
As you know, O'Hare Airport is under some significant
reconstruction and, as a result of that, airspace changes are
needed to accommodate the evolution of the O'Hare airspace. The
determination was made to give Milwaukee more airspace to
control which is the issue.
I am going to commit to you, first of all, that we will do
it safely. We will make sure that we are monitoring the safety
of the transition when it occurs and, again, we are not going
to let up on that.
In terms of training, we have sent people to O'Hare to
actually observe the operation of that airspace that actually
is being controlled by Chicago right now. So quite a few of the
Members from Milwaukee have gone down to O'Hare to actually
observe how to control traffic. There is a one-day classroom
training session. There are nine simulations in the radar
laboratory that we provide to the controllers as part of the
training.
Initially, there will be seven qualified people to man the
new positions when we turn the switch. They, in turn, will get
the other controllers the training and transition that they
need to successfully work the airspace.
So we have a plan. We believe it is a good plan. We believe
it is a safe plan, and we are going to execute on that. I will
be happy to give you the details in a written response.
Mr. Petri. Thank you very much.
Mr. Costello. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.
Several questions, first of all, Mr. Dillingham, was your
PowerPoint presentation included in here, the actual
PowerPoint? I have your written, the other testimony, but is
your PowerPoint?
Mr. Dillingham. Ms. Richardson, if it is not included, we
did bring CDs with that presentation on it. I don't know if it
got included or not.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. If we could, thank you.
My second question is what is the tenure of air traffic
controllers at each major airport?
Mr. Dillingham. I really couldn't answer that at this
point, but we could certainly provide that for the record.
Maybe Mr. Krakowski might be in a better position to answer
that.
Ms. Richardson. I would like it in writing for this
Committee because I think when I listen I see a lot of this
going on here, and to me it is this for those of you who missed
it for the first time.
We either have people who have the tenure, who have the
education, who have the training, who are prepared to work at
the major airports or we don't. To me, I think that that is a
critical piece of this.
[Information follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 40816.013
Ms. Richardson. On page 10 of your report, what was the
reason for the two-year vacancy of the director position?
Mr. Dillingham. FAA just did not fill the position. It is
now filled, but it wasn't filled for almost three years.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, some of these things that we are hearing
today, is there going to be a process of how we will bring
forward, potentially, legislation? If the FAA doesn't feel it
is important enough to do some things, will we have the ability
to talk about what we would like to do from a legislation
perspective?
Mr. Costello. I think one of the reasons why we are getting
some action is I had mentioned earlier concerning the GAO
report and the attention of the Administrator on this issue is
because the Subcommittee is beginning to provide aggressive
oversight on these issues. That is the best function that we
can perform here, and that is to make sure that the FAA and
everyone in the aviation industry, that they are doing their
job, in particular the FAA.
As I indicated, I think that is an indication that we are
not here to beat up on Mr. Krakowski. He has not been with the
agency that long.
But if this runway safety was a priority for the FAA, they
would not have left that position open for two years and they
would not have an outdated runway safety plan. So one of the
reasons why they, I think, have kicked it into gear is because
we are providing the oversight that needs to be provided.
Mr. Dillingham. Ms. Richardson?
Ms. Richardson. Yes.
Mr. Dillingham. I can convey to you the response that we
obtained when we asked FAA why the position was vacant for so
long. Basically, FAA told us that they had devolved runway
safety down to the various lines of business and down further
from headquarters.
Our response to that was that may be okay, but if there is
no national strategy or national plan, you have a situation
where different parts of the agency or different regions may be
doing things differently. More importantly than that, the
lessons that could be learned from good practices were not
being shared on a national basis.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you. I am glad that you are involved.
My other question had to do with the deployment of the
software systems. When I look at, for example, Chicago Midway,
they are not expected to have scheduled deployment until June
of 2010. Some of these others on here, when you look at the
most runway incursions, it seems like some of the biggest
airports that are having the problems are still waiting to get
this information.
Mr. Krakowski. What I would like to do is respond.
It is less important to look at necessarily the history of
runway incursions that have happened. We actually look at the
risk, the complexity of the operation, the operational tempo at
that airport, how many runways and taxiways intersect because
we believe that you prioritize in terms of safety risk, not
kind of a historical incident. That is an important component,
but it is not the only component.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. I will hold the rest of my questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and now
recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to have you all with us today.
When someone mentioned, Mr. Sumwalt, the Lexington,
Kentucky accident, was there evidence that the air traffic
controller mentioned was a victim of fatigue at that time?
Mr. Sumwalt. Congressman Coble, it is a two-part answer.
The controller likely was fatigued. We found that he had slept
approximately 2 hours in the 24 hours prior to the accident.
However, in the NTSB's analysis of that accident, we
determined that there was no causal relationship between the
controller's fatigue and the accident's occurrence.
Mr. Coble. I got you. I thank you for that.
I would like for you all to elaborate on the behavioral or
the fatigue issue, what contributing factors may be involved.
Mr. Scovel, you mentioned common sense recommendations or
suggestions. They were submitted by whom?
Mr. Scovel. By the NTSB, sir.
Mr. Coble. What were some of the common sense
recommendations?
Mr. Scovel. First_and these arose out of the Lexington
accident_that FAA revise its controller work scheduling
policies and practices in order to provide rest periods that
are long enough to obtain sufficient restorative sleep.
Next, that FAA modify shift rotations for controllers so as
to minimize disrupted sleep patterns and accumulation of sleep
debt and increase cognitive performance.
Lastly, it recommended for the benefit of controllers
themselves, since controllers have a responsibility to take
themselves off the scope when they feel that they are too
fatigued to perform effectively, NTSB recommended that FAA
develop for controllers a fatigue awareness and countermeasures
training program.
Mr. Coble. Now, have those recommendations been embraced or
in practice?
Mr. Scovel. I will defer to FAA on that, sir. It is my
understanding that they are in the process of being
implemented.
Mr. Coble. All right, sir.
Mr. Scovel, would you elaborate on in your testimony on the
FAA's use of tower simulators for training? Is it your opinion
that this is an effective way to train controllers and what is
the FAA's deployment plan?
Mr. Scovel. I can answer at least part of your question,
sir, and if you would like I can take the rest for the record,
or FAA may be able to respond here.
We consider tower simulator training to be a very effective
tool, and we would encourage FAA to move out on that as quickly
as it is able.
Our estimates are that simulators cost about $500,000 per
facility plus approximately another $100,000 for individual
software packages that may need to be configured for
surrounding airports where controllers can also receive
training on the tower simulator.
The benefits are that simulators allow evaluation of new
operations. They can study alternatives for improving safety,
and they are of great benefit for both new and seasoned
controllers.
They have been proven in a couple of instances. At Boston
Logan Airport, sir, a tower simulator was used to aid in
establishing safety procedures to be implemented with a newly
constructed runway. NASA used a tower simulator at Los Angeles
Airport to study alternatives for improving runway safety as
they looked at options for reconfiguring the layout of runways
and taxiways at that airport.
Mr. Coble. I thank you for that, sir.
Any FAA deployment? Can anybody respond to that?
Mr. Krakowski. Yes, Congressman. We have bought 24 of the
systems. We will deploy 12 this year and 12 next year. I would
be happy to submit the list of facilities to you formally.
I just finished a 33-year career as a commercial airline
pilot, and that is how we trained. We trained in simulators.
You have a big fan sitting here of this technology for a lot of
reasons. So I am looking forward to putting this out to the
workforce.
Mr. Coble. Well, thank you for that.
Finally, Dr. Dillingham, in your view of the controller
fatigue matters, did you find any evidence to support a causal
link between runway incursions that you studied and controller
fatigue?
Mr. Dillingham. Mr. Coble, we did not find a causal link.
We relied in large measure on the NTSB finding that basically
said it was possible that it was a contributing factor, but no,
we did not find a causal link. The NTSB was in reference to
only four incidents, as I recall.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, sir. Thank you all again.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the other gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope people don't
think North Carolina is getting an unfair advantage here.
I will have to admit at the beginning that this is an
important safety issue, but for others of you in the audience
there are other far more compelling safety issues. I hope we
don't lose sight of them as we focus on this one.
Mr. Krakowski, what is the maximum allowable overtime for
an air traffic controller? How many hours?
Mr. Krakowski. Ten hours, sir. Ten hours.
Mr. Hayes. Ten hours a day. How many hours a week?
Mr. Krakowski. Well, it would be 50 hours then. One day of
overtime, I believe.
Mr. Hayes. So 10 hours in any one day.
Mr. Krakowski. A six-day week.
Mr. Hayes. Okay. So that would be 60.
Mr. Krakowski. Right. You could. Yes, you could.
Mr. Hayes. How many hours of overtime are being voluntarily
worked by controllers?
Mr. Krakowski. About 80 percent of the current overtime,
which is about 2 percent system-wide, is voluntary where
controllers sign up to do it.
I have some facilities with virtually no overtime, some as
high as 9 percent in some areas. Nine percent is too high, and
we are working to get some staffing in those facilities, sir.
Mr. Hayes. Being an airline guy, you know it is important.
The fatigue factor for controllers is important, but it is just
as important for the crews in the aircraft, and we haven't
mentioned that today.
Mr. Krakowski. Yes, and I would like to hand that over to
Jim Ballough because he is working that issue not just for
controllers but for the pilot community as well.
Mr. Ballough. Yes, Mr. Hayes, we are working currently in
the FAA. The Acting Administrator has asked us to look at this
fatigue issue not just for controllers or pilots but across the
board for mechanics, flight attendants as well.
We are in the final stages of planning a symposium that
should be conducted somewhere in the June time frame to where
we will bring all of the academia together, industry
stakeholders together, labor and really tee up the issue of
fatigue and how we can manage it now.
We know that we think there are science that is out there
today that makes it doable, and so it is time to bring those
parties together and to plan a strategy for how we use the
fatigue science and apply it. We know that prescriptive flight
and duty rules don't work. We know that they have served us
well over the years, but we know now that we can make further
progress to address this issue with fatigue.
So we look forward to working this issue later this year
and hope to have some very positive results and use that
conference as a springboard to move forward to address fatigue
issues.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you for that.
I would like to emphasize, as I have many times before,
there are glide slopes out of service. There are localizers out
of service. There are AWAS and ADIs and other important day to
day, hour to hour safety devices and procedures that the FAA is
not keeping up with. That is troubling me far more than what we
are talking about today, as important as it is.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the next panel because I
want to hear. You all don't care what I think as a pilot as
much as I want to hear the professionals speak to us from their
perspective about what a pilot does, can and should do to be
the number one runway incursion preventer in the whole process
because very few examples. Tenerife is one example where there
was no visibility and you could not see and be seen, but for
the large majority, 95 plus percent, clear right and clear left
is the number one preventive for runway incursions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes
the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Because I didn't get here in time to hear the testimony of the
witnesses, I didn't think I was going to ask any questions, but
I have a couple of things that I am curious about.
One is we have all been given a chart, and it says it is
from the FAA, from the Air Traffic Control Organization, that
runway incursions are less than half of what they were in 2001.
But then, at the same time, we were given a briefing memo
that says GAO reports that the rate of runway incursions in
2007 has increased to 6.05 incidents per million operations.
This is a 12 percent increase over 2006 and the highest number
since 2001.
I am a little confused as to which it is. Are the incidents
cut in half as this chart shows, in other words, meaning that
it has gone way down, or have they gone way up?
Mr. Krakowski. Congressman, relative to the rate, you have
to remember operations go up too, so rate is reflected against
the number of operations in the NAS as well. But I think what
is important to note on the last bar, the actual number of
incidents, total incidents is up.
Mr. Duncan. The problem, though, what has confused me is
both of these things say they are per million operations, both
the memo and the chart. I don't know. Anyway, go ahead.
Mr. Krakowski. Okay. Well, I am not quite sure how GAO
determined theirs.
Gerald?
Mr. Dillingham. Well, we used the FAA data.
Mr. Krakowski. Right, okay.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Duncan. It is quite a difference.
Mr. Krakowski. Yes, but these are the serious. These are
the As and Bs here. These are the most serious runway risks.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Well, maybe you could get an
explanation or figure that out. It might be interesting for us
to know which it is, whether they have gone way up or way down.
Then you got my curiosity when, Mr. Sumwalt, I believe it
was you that said that the controller is Lexington had only
slept 2 hours in the last 24 hours. Was that due to his own
personal, private behavior or did the FAA have something to do
with that in the scheduling they had done?
If the FAA is responsible for that, then that is something
that I hope we have eliminated. That shouldn't happen any
place.
But if it is something that was just a matter on his own
private time he stayed up, then there is not much we can do
about that. I just was curious as to which it was. What would
have caused him to sleep only 2 hours out of the last 24 before
that happened, that accident happened?
Mr. Sumwalt. Congressman Duncan, it was a combination of
both things that you mentioned.
The scheduling factors, he had worked a shift that had
gotten off duty earlier in the day, 1:30 or 2:00 in the
afternoon. Then he was off for his, I guess, eight hours, but
then he did personal things during that time off, including
going out and running and apparently only slept about two
hours. Then he showed up to work again to work the shift in
which the accident occurred, which I think that shift started
around 11:00 at night.
So it was a combination of the schedule that he maintained
and the inability to manage his own personal schedule such that
he could maximize opportunities for rest.
Mr. Duncan. How common is something like that, Mr.
Krakowski? Is this an aberration or how common is it that
controllers get off and then only have eight hours between when
they are due at work again?
Mr. Krakowski. Let me answer this in a couple ways. If you
are really going to study fatigue as we were just starting to
do that at United Airlines before I retired, there is new
science that we have now that really knows how to look at this
in ways that 10 years ago we didn't have. It is applicable to
controllers, pilots and everybody.
If you are really going to study fatigue, it is everything.
It is scheduling practices. It is what people do with their
time off. It is how patterns of schedules are put together.
That is what this conference that Mr. Ballough will be
sponsoring later this spring is going to address to really take
a scientific look at this.
The other issue about fatigue that is a bit concerning is
there is a lot of anecdotal stories about it, but the data are
important.
Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you this. What the staff is telling
me is they are telling me this comes from a 221 air traffic
control scheduling practice that the controllers themselves
have asked for or want or is popular with them. Is that right?
Is this happening because this is what the controllers
want?
Mr. Krakowski. We understand it is a popular scheduling
practice, yes, but I think again if we can get into this spring
to understand. You know popular scheduling practices, if you
know how to rest and you know how to use your time off during
those periods, it may or may not be a risk at all. So that is
what we have to get into.
The other part of this, as I mentioned earlier, the
Aviation Safety Action Program that we want to start with the
controllers is the kind of mechanism that allow us to take a
look at just these sorts of issues. So I really hope we get
that signed soon.
Mr. Duncan. It seems to me there ought to be more time in
between shifts than eight hours unless these controllers are
sleeping there at the facility because by the time somebody
leaves and drives home and does all the things that people
ordinarily do, you could run into some problems there.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. I thank the gentleman.
To clarify a point just so we understand, I know, Mr.
Krakowski, you are saying that if the person knows how to rest.
But if you are working 16 out of 24 hours, during that 8-hour
period that you are off I am sure there are other personal
things, family things that you have to attend to, that you just
don't go home and get 8 hours sleep.
So, regardless if it is the agency forcing the controller
to work 16 hours in a 24-hour period or if it is on the part of
the controller wanting to work that schedule, it seems to me
that it is an issue that needs to be addressed.
The other point that I would make to Mr. Duncan's question
about is this increased or decreased between 2001 and 2006,
regardless of how you look at the numbers, we do know for a
fact that in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 we have had
10 severe runway incursions, just in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2008. So it is an issue and is a problem, and again
we are pleased that you are moving forward to make some
progress.
The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Graves?
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes, would like to
be recognized for a comment.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We talked about the situation in Lexington, and I think it
is important to understand there is an issue about the
controller, but we haven't talked about what happened with the
airplane.
Mr. Krakowski, refer back to the time when you were flying
in the line so that members of the panel and the audience can
understand. When that aircraft pushed back, the first officer
and the captain, how would they brief each other?
I mean I know, but I think it is important for the record.
This is not just about controllers. What did the pilots do that
led them to take off on an unlighted short runway?
Here is Lexington. Long runway, short runway. Lighted,
unlit. What happened when they pushed back? What did they say
to each other? Where did this go wrong?
Mr. Krakowski. So I would say that based on what I know of,
and I think Mr. Sumwalt actually would be able to give you the
detail on this. So I will defer to him. But I think the cockpit
did have some distraction going on.
Robert?
Mr. Hayes. Well, before you answer, let me ask the question
a different way. When done right, what would the brief between
the captain and the first officer have sounded like to get to
the correct runway and to make the right decision? Obviously,
that came apart.
Mr. Krakowski. A crew has to work together. The captain is
in command of the aircraft. The captain sets the atmosphere in
the cockpit for running your checklist, doing your briefings
efficiently and making sure you are going in the right
direction.
At least at my company, you had the taxi chart in front of
you. You briefed these routes. You validated that the heading
of the aircraft was on the assigned runway before you actually
took off.
So that is how you do it right. You have really good
cockpit procedures reinforced by training and reinforced by
good training and good checking standards.
Mr. Hayes. But that obviously broke down.
Do you want to comment, Mr. Sumwalt?
Mr. Sumwalt. I would, Congressman, because I am just a
neophyte compared to Captain Krakowski. He had 33 years with
the airline. I only had 24, most of which were based in
Charlotte Douglas International Airport.
So the NTSB did determine the probable cause of the Comair
accident was to be the failure of the flight crew to use
available cues and aids to identify the airplane's location on
the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross
check and verify the airplane was on the correct runway.
Contributing to the accident was, in fact, distractions
that the crew enabled themselves to get into due to violations
of the sterile cockpit rule. We also did take an opportunity to
point out that if the FAA had required that all runway
crossings be authorized by specific air traffic control
clearances. We listed that as a contributing factor as well.
Mr. Hayes. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is just important to know what that part of it
is. If there are two pilots, they are going to say: Where is
the runway? How are we going to get there. That is just common
language, and that is where we had a major breakdown.
The controller issue is a part of it, but again that is
critically important.
Once you get where you think you are supposed to go, the
number on the end of the runway should correspond with your
magnetic compass which, oh, by the way, you are going to check
with your directional gyro which should be the same number. If
any of the three don't agree, something is wrong here.
Mr. Costello. The final comment or question is the other
gentleman from North Carolina. North Carolina is getting a lot
of time today.
Mr. Coble. You are very generous to us, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that.
I want to be very brief. I want to extend the gentleman
from Tennessee's questioning regarding facilities for berthing.
I complete my tour, and I get eight hours off. My house is
2 miles away. Do I have facilities on board to sleep before I
stand my next watch?
Mr. Krakowski. Typically, no, sir.
Mr. Coble. Typically, no?
Mr. Krakowski. At the facilities.
Mr. Coble. Thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks the gentleman and thanks all
of the witnesses on our first panel.
Mr. Sumwalt, you had a final comment?
Mr. Sumwalt. I would, sir, and thank you for the extra
time.
The question has come up, has the NTSB established a causal
link between certain runway incursions and fatigue?
In fact, in our April 10th safety recommendation letter
that we issued the recommendations that General Scovel
mentioned, we did point out four runway incursions, four runway
incidents that provided clear and compelling evidence that
controllers are sometimes operating in a state of fatigue
because of their work schedules and because of their poorly
managed utilization of rest periods between shifts.
So we have found runway incursions that we have attributed
to controller fatigue.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you and thanks all of you on
our first panel for being here and testifying, for your
testimony today. Thank you.
The Chair will now ask the members of the second panel to
come forward in just a few minutes. I will do the introductions
right now.
We are expecting in about 15 minutes a vote on the Floor of
the House. I don't know how many votes. So we will try and get
our second panel at the witness table. I will do introductions
now as we are making the transition.
The first witness that I will introduce is Captain John
Prater, the President of the Air Line Pilots Association; Mr.
Patrick Forrey, the President of the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association; Mr. Basil Barimo who is the Vice
President of Operations and Safety at the Air Transport
Association of America; Mr. Greg Principato, the President of
the Airports Council International-North America; Mr. John
Duval, who is the Airport Safety and Security Coordinator for
Beverly Municipal Airport; Mr. Phil Boyer, President of AOPA;
and Mr. T.K. Kallenbach, who is the Vice President at Honeywell
Aerospace.
Mr. Prater, your time is up. No. I am just kidding.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Costello. Mr. Prater, you are recognized under the
five-minute rule. Please begin your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS
ASSOCIATION; PATRICK FORREY, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION; BASIL J. BARIMO, VICE PRESIDENT,
OPERATIONS AND SAFETY, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA;
GREG PRINCIPATO, PRESIDENT, AIRPORTS COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL_
NORTH AMERICA; JOHN K. DUVAL, A.A.E., AIRPORT SAFETY AND
SECURITY COORDINATOR, BEVERLY MUNICIPAL AIRPORT AND FORMER
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR AVIATION AND OPERATIONS, MASSACHUSETTS PORT
AUTHORITY AND AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES; PHIL
BOYER, PRESIDENT, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION; T.K.
KALLENBACH, VICE PRESIDENT, MARKETING AND PRODUCT MANAGEMENT,
HONEYWELL AEROSPACE
Mr. Prater. Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Mr. Petri, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to provide the pilots' perspective on
runway safety.
As you know, our pilots operate in complex airport
environments every day. They fly in all types of adverse
weather and with limited visibility conditions. They complete
the demanding task of a safe landing over and over, often after
being on duty for more than 16 hours and being awake for more
than 20 hours.
All of these tasks demand vigilance and high situational
awareness. These are the challenges we face every day in
delivering our passengers safely to their gate.
But the risk for a runway incursion in this environment is
constantly increasing. It is an issue that must become a
national aviation safety priority and ALPA thanks the Chairman
for putting it onto the Subcommittee's agenda.
According to the FAA's statistics, during the last three
months of last year, there was an average of 2.5 runway
incursions every day in the United States, providing the
potential for a catastrophe. The FAA categorizes this risk as
unacceptable.
We agree, but I am taking it a step further. This rate of
occurrence is inexcusable.
The FAA categorizes runway incursions as either a pilot
deviation or an operational error, but those classifications
don't tell the whole story. While it may be convenient to
assign blame due to the pilot or the controller, it doesn't
address the root of the problem. We must understand why these
runway incursions take place and then put mitigations into the
system so that we can help pilots and controllers avoid these
errors.
Dozens of experts in several countries have studied the
runway incursion risk over the years and devised mitigations
that can greatly lessen the risk in ground operations today. In
fact, according to the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, the
problem can be reduced by as much as 95 percent with the
implementation of new technologies, new training and
operational techniques that increase both pilots' and
controllers' situational awareness.
Technological solutions include cockpit moving map displays
similar to the GPS device that many people have in their cars
today, the integration of ADS-B to enable pilots and
controllers to track all aircraft and vehicles on the surface
and up to 1,000 feet above ground level, automatic runway
occupancy alerting and digital datalink clearances that are
then displayed on the cockpit moving map.
Most airline pilots, however, are still flying aging
airlines with none of this technology available to them.
Other ALPA-recommended improvements include the
installation of red runway status and hold lights. These simple
and inexpensive lights automatically provide direct indication
of runway status and warn pilots of landing and departing
aircraft. With ALPA's help, the MIT Lincoln Laboratory tested
this system at the Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport and,
since its implementation in 2005, runway incursions there have
decreased by 70 percent.
Not all runway safety solutions involve high tech gadgets.
Some low tech solutions involve something as simple and cheap
as a can of paint which can be used to improve our runway and
taxiway markings.
The FAA issued an advisory circular in 2005, requiring that
the 75 busiest airports enhance their taxiway centerline
markings near runway intersections by June of this year. All
but four of these airports have completed that requirement.
But our pilots and our passengers fly to hundreds of
airports, and ALPA strongly recommends that these airport
surface markings become standard for all Part 139 airports.
That is a total of 566 airports.
Sixty-two of these airports have voluntarily made these
improvements, unfortunately, some spurred by fatal accidents.
That still leaves roughly two-thirds of America's airports that
need better ground markings for pilots.
Some airports have found that installing perimeter taxiways
also reduces runway incursion risk. Atlanta Hartsfield is a
good example of that. They have eliminated 600 runway crossings
a day and reduced delays by 60 percent.
Our union is doing its part for runway safety. ALPA is
reaching out to our 60,000 pilots in both the United States and
Canada through a new communications initiative that we call for
Hold Short for Runway Safety. It is designed to educate pilots
on what we can do now to prevent runway incursions.
Our initiative includes a web site, educational material, a
series of newsletters going out, starting this Friday, and we
will keep them sending them out to try to keep the focus on
runway safety.
In coordination with the FAA, ALPA and United Airlines
produced a video for a training video to highlight the problems
and how we can reduce operational errors.
But in order to adequately prepare for the increase in
airport operations and the increased runway incursion risk,
ALPA urges the government to commit proper funding to improve
our National airspace System. Every stakeholder and every
passenger deserves it. They deserve it now.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Captain Prater.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Forrey under the five-minute
rule.
Mr. Forrey. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri and the
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, let me begin by
first thanking the leadership of the Transportation Committee
in passing a comprehensive FAA reauthorization bill and package
in a timely fashion, moving it through the House last September
and the bipartisan support of 267 Members of this House.
I further applaud your efforts earlier this week in passing
a short term extension rather than putting this important
legislation off until next year.
It is NATCA's hope that the Senate will yield to the House
and forego efforts to move an extension that goes beyond June
30th. Our fear is that doing so would undermine the hard work
this Committee as well as of the Senate Finance and Commerce
Committees and fail to address the immediate and future needs
of the National Airspace System.
Aviation is vital to this Nation's economy, and H.R. 2881
maintains important provisions to keep our system the safest
and most efficient in the world.
NATCA urges the Senate to take FAA reauthorization out of a
holding pattern and act swiftly on passing a comprehensive long
term bill.
Turning to the topic of today's hearing, NATCA's mission is
to preserve, promote and improve the safety of air travel
within the United States and to serve as an advocate for air
traffic controllers and other aviation safety professionals.
Air traffic controllers and pilots, more than anyone else
here today, are responsible for the safety of the runways at
America's airports.
NATCA has been trying to direct attention to the decreasing
safety margins in our skies and on our runways for years. We
are no longer alone. In the past few months, a host of
independent Federal watchdogs have joined the chorus of rising
concerns about aviation safety.
In November, the GAO issued a report that warned of a high
risk of a catastrophic runway collision occurring in the U.S.
In December, the Transportation Department Inspector General
launched an investigation on the role that workplace conditions
played in several close calls at the FAA facilities in
Illinois. And, the NTSB recently added runway incursions and
incidents caused by air traffic controllers fatigue to their
2008 list of most wanted aviation safety improvements.
In addition, last April, NTSB Chairman Rosenker called on
both NATCA and the FAA to work together to combat controller
fatigue. NATCA's response was to welcome that recommendation
and to work with the agency and offered our assistance to help
the FAA to make our runways safer. The agency's response,
however, was to not follow the NTSB's Chairman's recommendation
to work with the controllers but rather to create a working
group that didn't include NATCA.
Despite the FAA's sound rejection of our input, NATCA
offers its recommendations for improving runway safety today to
the Aviation Committee:
First, because each airport represents unique challenges
which negate the usefulness of broad, universal solutions,
NATCA recommends the creation of a runway incursion prevention
committee for each airport. These groups would be comprised of
the local stakeholders including pilots, air traffic
controllers, airport management, vehicle driver operators and
the FAA.
Second, NATCA recommends that controller staffing at our
Nation's FAA facilities be adequately addressed. Today, there
are 1,500 fewer fully certified controllers than there were on
9/11, leaving fewer eyes to watch more planes, and the result
is increased controller fatigue.
If the FAA would return to the bargaining table where the
parties left off and negotiate in good faith with NATCA, the
effort would make staying in the FAA more attractive to both
newly hired controllers and those eligible for retirement.
Unfortunately, the current rate of controller attrition is 6.2
a day, and the system can't sustain that rate much longer.
Third, NATCA's recommendation that the FAA work in
cooperation with the union in the development of deployment of
new technology. Under the liaison program, the FAA and NATCA
work side by side in creation of new technologies. ASDE-X, an
effective surface surveillance system is a product of that
collaboration.
NATCA recommends the deployment of this technology in all
airports throughout the Country with mid to high traffic
density. NATCA further recommends that the liaison program
dismantled by the FAA in 2005 be reinstituted.
Fourth, because runway incursions often occur when the
layout of a taxiway forces aircraft to cross runways on route
to a second runway or gate, NATCA recommends that end-around
taxiways be constructed and utilized at all airports where such
construction is possible.
Mr. Chairman, NATCA is not alone in sounding the alarm on
passenger safety. The NTSB and the GAO have determined that the
threat of controller fatigue is real.
The increase in runway incursions is real too. There have
been 12 serious A and B runway incursions in the first 4 months
of fiscal year 2008 compared to 3 during the same time last
year.
The warnings of the GAO, the IG and the NTSB should not go
unheeded. NATCA stand ready, willing and able to offer real
solution. We can only hope that the FAA is really listening.
I, once again, thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity
to testify here today. I look forward to answering whatever
questions you might have.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Forrey.
Mr. Barimo, do you think you can get your testimony in, in
five minutes?
Mr. Barimo. Yes, sir.
Mr. Costello. Very good. You are recognized.
Mr. Barimo. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Basil Barimo, and I am the Vice
President of Operations and Safety at the Air Transport
Association of America. Thank you for the opportunity to join
you today and discuss runway safety issues.
Airlines have been focused on reducing runway incursions
since well before it was in vogue and appreciate the
Subcommittee's interest in this matter. Runway incursions are a
serious threat to civil aviation safety both to airlines and to
general aviation, but we are making progress.
I would like to concentrate my remarks today on three
areas: first, on the data as it pertains to serious commercial
incursions, you heard the definitions earlier; second, on our
strategy for achieving these improvements; and third, actions
that are underway to reduce the risk of incursions.
Before proceeding further, though, I would like to mention
that we have only yesterday reemphasized our commitment to
improve safety in the airport operating environment. On
Tuesday, ATA member airlines, ALPA, FAA and other interested
members of the aviation community held a Runway Safety
Awareness Day. Roughly 70,000 pilots represented by 50 airlines
received a letter from senior management, reinforcing the
industry's collective commitment to improving runway safety.
As a starting point in this discussion, what do the FAA
data tell us? According to the FAA, the frequency of serious
runway incursions, A or B, have decreased steadily since 2001
with commercial operations accounting for approximately a third
of the total. The chart on page two of my written statement
depicts this data.
But narrowing the focus further, the number of serious
incursions involving commercial operations that were
attributable to pilot deviation has also declined.
How did we achieve these improvements? In this, as with so
many other safety-based endeavors, the aviation community looks
to data to identify what aspects of a problem it needs to
concentrate on. We can call upon multiple sources of safety-
related information like ASAP and FOQA and CAST and ASIAS to
better understand the nature and the extent of the risks that
confront us.
Our analytical abilities have advanced to the point where
we can assess future vulnerabilities and therefore don't have
to rely exclusively on what has happened in the past. This
means that in the context of airport surface operations, we
cannot only spot overall trends but can pinpoint specific
locations that are prone to incursions.
The decline in serious runway incursions is a result of
well thought out collaboration among stakeholders. Recognizing
this achievement, of course, does not mean that we should be
satisfied with it. We most emphatically are not. But it does
give us the confidence to work toward greater improvements.
That is the task before us.
What actions are underway to reduce the risk of incursions?
Because of the data evaluation efforts, we understand far
better the airport surface operating environment than we ever
have.
The more informed perspective has resulted in an array of
initiatives designed to decrease runway incursion risk,
including elevating the awareness of risks, reducing flight-
crew distractions during the taxi phase of flight, emphasizing
the use of standardized ATC verbiage and clearances, enhancing
pilot training, leveraging the work of the existing Runway
Safety Action Teams, enhancing signage, lighting and markings,
reconfiguring taxiways to eliminate confusing intersection and
runway crossings.
In addition to these initiatives, several emerging
technologies will improve the operating environment, things
like ASDE-X, cockpit moving map and head-up displays, automated
lighting systems and, finally, we all look to ADS-B to provide
greater airport surface safety improvements. Each of the
foregoing is an important initiative that will contribute to
improving safety.
However, we believe that three items are worthy of special
attention as short-term, high priority initiatives, and they
are:
Continuing to eliminate cockpit distractions for crews
during the taxi-out and taxi-in phase;
Continuing to eliminate confusing taxiway and runway
intersections, adding signage and lighting, and introducing
technologies that link ASDE-X to TCAS and put the warning
directly into the flight deck; and
Finally, tapping into critical safety information by
implementing an ASAP program for air traffic controllers,
similar to those used so effectively within the airline
community.
These three initiatives can be accomplished in the short
run and promise to improve the safety of the airport and
operating environment. They shouldn't be regarded as
supplanting the other initiatives that I have mentioned but are
worthy of further immediate emphasis.
The Subcommittee's interest in the issue of runway
incursions is always welcome and always timely. The threat is
real. The need for continued action is indisputable. The
aviation community remains ready and committed to reducing the
risk of runway incursions.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Barimo.
We have four to five votes on the Floor right now, which
means that the Subcommittee will stand in recess until we would
ask you to be back by 4:20, 20 minutes after 4:00.
So if you want to get a cup of coffee, we will be back here
at approximately 4:20. We would ask you to be here. We would
ask our witnesses to stay, to those of you who have already
given your testimony, so that Members have the ability to ask
questions.
The Subcommittee will stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Costello. The Subcommittee will come to order.
First, let me say we thought we would be back by 4:20, but
strange things happen when you are having fun. We had a couple
of extra votes that we didn't count on.
The Chair now recognizes, under the five-minute rule, Mr.
Principato.
Mr. Principato. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri,
thank you for allowing ACI-North America the opportunity to
participate in this important hearing on runway safety.
As you know, I am Greg Principato, and I am the President
of Airports Council International-North America. Our 360 member
airports enplane more than 95 percent of the domestic and
virtually all of the international passenger and cargo traffic
in North American, and nearly 400 aviation-related businesses
are also members of ACI.
We applaud the Committee for its tireless work on H.R.
2881. The resources the bill provides will fund many critical
projects to bring important safety benefits. We thank you for
your leadership and commitment to both airports and the
aviation industry, and we commend both you and the House of
Representatives for passing this bill.
In fiscal year 2007, the FAA reported 24 serious runway
incursions out of more 61 million operations. Although the
Nation's airport runways remain safe, reducing the risk of
runway incursions is a top priority. Airports have taken a
particularly aggressive stance in addressing this safety
concern.
Last August, more than 40 aviation leaders including ACI-
North America, participated in the call to action. The purpose
of the call to action was to reach consensus on a number of
short, medium and long term initiatives that could be
undertaken to further improve the safety of operations at
America's airports.
By June 30th, 2008, the FAA was requiring 75 large and
medium airports to paint red markings on the taxiway hold line
to identify the approach of a specifically marked runway. FAA
is also requiring these airports to improve centerline painting
and markings on all airport taxiways to give differential color
distinctions to ensure taxiways are easily seen by taxiing
pilots at night or under poor weather conditions.
To date, actually, the number is 72 out of 75. Another has
complied. Airports have completed this, and three airports will
be finished by May, ahead of the deadline.
Now the FAA is not requiring new taxiway painting and
markings for smaller airports certificated under Part 139.
However, the call to action plan calls on those smaller
airports to voluntarily do so, and I am pleased to say that by
the end of this year 251 will have done so.
Midterm runway safety actions specific to airports include
the accelerated installation of runway status lights, which use
runway and taxiway centerline illuminated lights to warn pilots
of potential runway conflicts and prompt them to notify the
tower before proceeding if a contradicting clearance has been
issued.
The FAA has tested runway status lights at Dallas, and a
DOT Inspector General report or audit showed that runway
incursions on that test runway at DFW decreased by 70 percent
after runway status lights were installed. Due to this success,
in early December, DFW began construction of runway status
lights on two additional runways.
Additional midterm action includes final approach runway
occupancy status lights. FAROS is a test concept that flashes
the existing lights to give direct notification to the pilots
that the runway is occupied and unsafe for landing. Test
airports include Dallas and Long Beach.
Longer term actions include full deployment of ASDE-X by
2010, moving map displays in cockpits, ADS-B In and Out as well
as cockpit display of traffic information, things you have
heard about already today.
Independent of the FAA requirements and technological
evaluations, airports are taking independent action to enhance
runway safety. Last year, Atlanta completed its end-around
perimeter taxiway, essentially eliminating 650 daily runway
crossing, 650. Minneapolis, Grand Rapids and Pittsburgh have
constructed tunnels under their respective runways to eliminate
the need for vehicles to cross runways on the surface.
Airports also continue to provide recurrent training for
all airport employees who operate vehicles on the movement area
of the airfield.
In addition to airport-specific actions, we recently joined
the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, or CAST, which was
discussed earlier, a cooperative voluntary partnership
consisting of all commercial aviation stakeholders with a
mission to increase safety, using an integrated, data-driven
approach based on analyzing accident causes, identifying ways
to make positive changes and implementing improvements to help
address runway safety and incursion issues.
Before wrapping up, let me also say we have heard a lot
about various systems that I have just mentioned and earlier
people have mentioned. I think it is important that down the
road we look for consistent applications and uniform deployment
of those systems.
Pilots work in a lot of different airports. They don't just
work in one airport. They go from airport to airport. It is
particularly important that when they come to an airport, what
they see is consistent from airport to airport eventually,
especially a lot of focus on the larger airports. But a lot of
regional pilots will fly back and forth between a large hub and
a smaller non-hub, six or seven or eight times a day, and
having that consistency is important.
So I conclude by thanking you for holding this hearing and
allowing us to participate.
Mr. Costello. We thank you for being here and giving us
your testimony today.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duval.
Mr. Duval. Thank you, Chairman Costello, Ranking Member
Petri and Members of the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation. Thank you for inviting
me to participate in this hearing on runway safety.
I am John Duval, the Airport Safety and Security
Coordinator at Beverly Municipal Airport, a GA airport and a
reliever airport located approximately 22 miles north of
Boston. I am testifying today on behalf of Beverly Airport and
the American Association of Airport Executives.
Mr. Chairman, before I proceed, I would like to thank you
and the other Members of this Committee for your leadership on
H.R. 2881, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2007. Airports are
particularly grateful that the bill would raise the PFC cap to
$7 and increase AIP funding by $100 million a year. These two
funding provisions will help airports improve safety, prevent
runway incursions and accommodate increasing demand.
Since the Senate has yet to complete its action on a multi-
year FAA reauthorization bill, I would also like to thank you
for helping to pass a short term extension bill yesterday.
As Members of this Subcommittee well know, AIP contract
authority has already expired and the aviation excise taxes are
slated to expire at the end of this month. I hope the Senate
will follow your lead and approve H.R. 5270, so airports can
begin to receive the funds that they need for critical safety
projects.
Today, we are here to focus on runway safety. As passenger
numbers continue to rise and takeoffs and landings increase, it
is imperative that we redouble our efforts to improve runway
safety. I would like to describe just a few of the steps that
airports are now taking to improve runway safety and some of
the technology that could help prevent further runway
incursions.
Airports around the Country are using the enhanced taxiway
centerline markings and surface hold position signs to prevent
runway incursions. Commercial airports with more than 1.5
million enplanements per year are required to have these
markings installed by June 30th.
Standardization, as you have already heard, as long been a
crucial tenet at all of our commercial airports, and I commend
the FAA for recently issuing a draft advisory circular that
would extend these enhanced surface markings to all Part 139
airports.
Airports are also beginning to add perimeter taxiways to
reduce runway crossings and the potential for runway
incursions. The Atlanta Airport installed an end-around taxiway
earlier this year, and according to the FAA the new taxiway is
expected to eliminate nearly 700 runway crossings per day.
DFW is also engaged in a perimeter taxiway project that
will include perimeter taxiways in all four quadrants of the
airport. The first one is expected in the southeast quadrant to
be completed by the end of this year. When all four are
completed, this will eliminate as many as 1,700 runway
crossings per day at DFW.
Both taxiway projects will help to prevent runway
incursions at two of the busiest airports in the United States.
The FAA points out that training is one of the keys to
reducing the severity and frequency of runway incursions. I
agree, and I am very proud of the computer-based interactive
employee training system that AAAE has developed to better
train airport and airline employees and other airport tenants.
AAAE has delivered nearly 1 million training sessions at 55
airports around the Country.
IET training programs are highly effective in training
because employees receive a video component that features the
actual work environment at their airport. Some of the topics
include movement and non-movement driver training area as well
as airfield safety and incursion prevention.
One of the most promising technology improvements to
prevent runway incursions is the runway status light system.
The system uses radar to anticipate the use of a runway by an
arriving or departing aircraft and then controls a series of
lights to provide information to pilots and vehicle drivers
regarding the runway status.
The FAA has been testing this at DFW and San Diego. Runway
incursions, as you have heard, in the test case has decreased
by 70 percent on the test runway at DFW. I hope that FAA will
continue to work with airports and other aviation stakeholders
in an effort to expedite the deployment of this system.
We should also use new technology to improve runway safety
at smaller airports. Toward that goal, the FAA is testing two
low cost ground surveillance systems at Spokane Airport that
could improve runway safety at small to medium size airports.
One uses millimeter wave sensors. The other uses X-band radar
to detect motion on the airports runways and taxiways.
I am encouraged by reports that these systems are
effective, relatively inexpensive and easy to install. I hope
the additional evaluations will yield positive results and that
the FAA will be able to expedite the deployment of this system
as well.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Aviation Subcommittee,
thank you again for inviting me to attend today's hearing on
runway safety, and I look forward to answering any of your
questions.
Mr. Costello. We thank you, and the Chair now recognizes
Mr. Boyer under the five-minute rule.
Mr. Boyer. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the witness rest period. I must admit that I did not sleep or
use it for personal time, but if I am a little incoherent, that
is probably the reason.
I am here today, unlike usually, to represent not only
AOPA, of which I am the President, but the AOPA Air Safety
Foundation. I can think of no single organization outside of
government, perhaps in government when I am through here, that
has spent more time, energy and materials and dollars on runway
safety.
First of all, we haven't talked at all about GA statistics.
So I am not going to spend a lot of time. It is in our
testimony. I just want to put up one graph.
With all due respect to the end of the table, this isn't a
competition, but just to put it in perspective. You have been
hearing a lot about air carrier airports and airline pilots.
There are about 79,000 airline pilots, 273 pilot deviations
during the three-year period covered by the FAA numbers.
There are almost a half a million GA pilots and, yes, there
are more deviations, about 580. But if you look at the ratio of
GA pilots, it is a group that has a lower propensity to this
kind of an accident and many times due particularly to the
types of airports they use.
One runway incursion, whether it be by an airliner, a GA
airplane or a combination or a ground vehicle, I have to say,
800 Independence Avenue, we, and I put in that everyone at the
table--airports, ground operators, airline pilots, airlines
themselves--we do have a problem because the statistics should
be at zero if they could be, and that is what we all strive to
do.
I want to concentrate on just one area, and that is FAA
leadership. It came out in the IG. It came out in the GAO
testimony you heard.
I am going to go off this slide just a little bit and talk
about 1997 when then-FAA Administrator Jane Garvey called me
when she realized this was one of the five top issues she had
to deal with during her administration and said, ``Phil, can
you do something? AOPA can work so much faster than the FAA.''
We stepped in at that time, and we did a lot of things. I
provided a packet for the Committee of all those things we have
done.
I have to tell you, the Administrator at that time, the
late nineties, she formed a taskforce. I was on it. The head of
ALPA was on it. Others were on it.
She met with us personally almost every single month. We
looked at the metrics together.
She said, what are you doing? I don't want to hear the BS.
I want to know what you are actually doing.
The FAA embarked on what I would say in my 18 years was the
biggest effort on safety that I have seen them undertake. The
program was well funded. Other divisions of FAA, and they will
tell you this today, were jealous of the kind of money this
project was given.
Regional meetings were held around the Country with the
airports that my two friends here to the right represent, with
the airlines, pilots that went to those airports--I remember
Los Angeles which had a language problem, et cetera--and with
the GA community.
But it all boils down to just what you and Chairman
Oberstar said in your rebuttal to the USA editorial today. It
is not about aviation infrastructure having a lack of money.
You were talking about and the words were FAA leadership.
I can even remember the name of the person who headed the
program back in 1997.
But then it sort of dropped off the radar map. Frankly, as
a group that has done a lot with aviation and runway safety,
when you are not being prodded, when you are not being asked
for more like we were for those five years, it went off the
table.
So what have we done? Well, we have educated our pilot
members on, hey, the House bill is a good bill for the FAA
financing. The Senate bill has a few problems. We have been
spending our time at things like that.
Well, you refocused them with the GAO study. The FAA got
your attention again, but frankly let's call a spade, a spade.
We haven't had the FAA's leadership on this issue and, believe
me, industry is ready to go. We have been ready to do all kinds
of things.
I want you to look, as you look at the solution list, at
the low tech things. You have heard a lot of high tech things
that will take years to happen. There are a lot of low tech
things too.
We need those AIP funds that you have put in your bill.
This is just a shot of taxiway. If you look below there in the
lower right, no one with a propeller or a turbine aircraft
wants to go across fog like that, and they are waiting for AIP
funding to become available. Hopefully, the Senate matches what
you did. We can get some of that started.
In the end, I just want to say we are here. We are ready to
help. We are ready to take all the things we have done, like
our magazine where we bound in 400 runway safety brochures in
the past.
We certainly are getting the message now from your
Committee, and we certainly see now that the FAA in the earlier
panel will respond.
Thank you.
Mr. Costello. The Chair thanks you and recognizes Mr. T.K.
Kallenbach.
Mr. Kallenbach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr Boyer, I think you got plenty of rest. You didn't appear
fatigued to me.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, Members of
the Subcommittee. Good evening.
My name is T.K. Kallenbach. I am the Vice President of
Marketing and Product Management for Honeywell Aerospace, and
my responsibilities include development and deployment of
safety technologies for Honeywell.
Runway safety is not a new concern, but as our Nation's
skies and runways become more crowded, one that absolutely
requires new solutions. We can build on existing technologies
to implement these solutions both in the short and long terms.
This will require active and vigorous support from the FAA,
aircraft operators, airports and manufacturers, and perhaps
most critical will be your continued oversight and vigilance to
hold everyone's feet to the fire to get this done in a timely
fashion.
Mr. Chairman, I come before you representing Honeywell's
history of addressing NTSB safety recommendations, and we are
proud of those accomplishments, proven solutions that have
saved lives.
From the 1970s through the 1990s, the leading cause of
aviation accidents was controlled flight into terrain or CFIT.
Since the introduction of our Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning
System, or EGPWS, CFIT accidents have dropped over 500 percent
and, most importantly, not one aircraft operating with our
system has been involved in a CFIT accident.
Today, I want to show you that similar solutions are
available to address runway safety issues and endorse some of
the technology comments from NTSB, GAO and FAA. There are a
couple of solutions available now that assist pilots in
tracking their position on the airport surface.
One solution is Honeywell's Runway Awareness and Advisory
System, or RAAS. RAAS provides verbal announcements over the
cockpit's audio system, indicating the aircraft's position
relative to the runways, allowing pilots to remain heads up and
visually alert to immediate surroundings. RAAS is a software
upgrade to the EGPWS computers that are installed in over 95
percent of the commercial aircraft.
RAAS is FAA-certified and has been incorporated in over
2,000 aircraft that have already been upgraded. You heard RAAS
announcements on the GAO video that was used earlier.
Another short term solution is moving map displays. They
provide pictures of the airport's runways and taxiways with a
symbol indicating where the airplane is located. Like RAAS,
airport moving maps improve pilots' situational awareness and
the systems are complementary with RAAS providing verbal cues
and the moving map matching them up with a picture of their
position.
Short term solutions help pilots avoid placing their
airplane in runway incursion situations. The longer term
objective is to provide pilots with better information about
what other aircraft are doing and warn pilots and controllers
simultaneously when a collision is imminent. We call this
breaking the chain of events that could ultimately lead to an
accident.
Today's surface detection systems generate alerts only for
air traffic controllers. With the aircraft traveling at high
rates of speed, the seconds needed for the verbal relay between
controller and pilot can be the difference between a
catastrophic collision and safe resolution. Consider that an
aircraft on approach covers a quarter mile in six seconds.
Honeywell and Sensis Corporation, the FAA's supplier for
ASDE-X, have worked in partnership to develop an integrated
alerting solution. In our prototype system, as you saw in the
testimony from Dr. Dillingham from GAO, alerts are provided
directly and automatically to pilots, maximizing the time
available to resolve the incursion before an accident. This
technology was successfully demonstrated to senior FAA and NTSB
officials in the summer of 2007 in Syracuse, New York.
Another longer term solution involves the deployment of
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, or ADS-B. As more
aircraft are modified to broadcast and receive this
information, the ability to identify potential conflicts
becomes viable.
While the FAA's currently proposed rule doesn't require
aircraft to broadcast their ADS-B information until 2020, FAA's
traffic information service can accelerate the practical use of
aircraft-based incursion detection alerting.
Mr. Chairman, I described a series of short and long term
solutions for improving runway safety. The key question is:
When?
Accelerating the deployment requires a cooperative effort
among a number of stakeholders, and Honeywell recommends this
Committee aggressively pursue the following three actions:
One, strongly encourage the adoption of better pilot
situational awareness capabilities including the preparation of
certification criteria and financial incentives for equipping.
Two, accelerate the implementation of traffic information
service at airports throughout the National Airspace.
Three, require regulatory and procedural changes that will
allow ASDE-X to broadcast alerting signals for use in the
cockpit.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you again
for the opportunity to present our recommendations to address
aviation safety.
Mr. Costello. We thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Prater, I have a few questions. Then I will turn it
over to Mr. Petri.
In your testimony, you talk about a mitigation strategy in
order to avert runway incursions. You talk about moving maps as
an important part of that strategy. I wonder if you might
elaborate a little bit on that.
Mr. Prater. Well, I would compare it most to the GPS in
your car that would show intersections. You could easily place
the crossings, the runway crossings, the potential caution
areas so that they are more easily seen and recognized from
inside the cockpit instead of depending just upon the exterior
cues, the limited markings that many places have, especially in
low visibility conditions.
It would certainly increase the situational awareness. A
problem, of course, is driving the airplane, taxiing along at
20, 25 knots while observing it.
So one of the basic mitigations that we spoke about earlier
is much simpler. It is to slow down. It is to slow down. It is
do the same thing we teach our kids at the railroad crossings.
Stop, look, and listen.
We need to slow it down once in a while when these airports
get too crowded, when too many operations are taking place.
That will help just as much as the high tech solutions.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
Mr. Boyer, you are exactly on point, and I am in total
agreement with you. I gather that you picked that up earlier in
my comments about a lack of leadership at the FAA.
Up until 2001, they had their eye on the ball. They engaged
with the users of the system and made them participants to try
and come up with a system to reduce runway incursions. When the
numbers started coming down, the FAA went off and concentrated
on other things.
It is unfortunate, but we know that when you leave the
director's position open for over two years and you have a
runway safety plan that has not been updated since 2002, we
know that it is not a priority for the agency.
I hope that Mr. Krakowski, his testimony here today. He is
committed. He has over 30 years experience in the cockpit. We
hope that that will change.
Let me ask you. You mentioned what you had done with your
membership, with the foundation in developing educational
materials for general aviation pilots. How closely have you and
the foundation worked with the FAA concerning the Runway Office
and development in order to get this information out to the
pilots?
Is it strictly AOPA doing this or are you coordinating this
with the FAA?
Mr. Boyer. That is a very good question. I guess the first
five years, it was in total cooperation. The brochures that we
submitted, I think, to the Committee have the FAA and AOPA Air
Safety Foundation logos on them. Then, it has been pretty much
unilateral.
Actually, after the Lexington accident that you have
already talked about today, which was an air carrier problem,
but you know could happen to any general aviation pilot.
Actually, it did happen last week in St. Augustine. They only
had a 300 foot runway, so the situation was even exacerbated
which was left.
But we put out 200,000 CDs of our course on runway safety
after that accident at our expense and mailed them to members
to call attention to runway safety.
I think now, boy, this week a lot has gone on. We have been
getting calls. Yet, still, there are people in the Runway
Safety Office today that yesterday called our office and said,
we didn't know you folks did a CD with the airlines on runway
safety, and it was funded by the very office that was calling.
So, no coordination
Mr. Costello. It is a consistent pattern here that concerns
me, and I am not here to beat up on the FAA. I am just here to
look at the facts and try and make certain that the system gets
better.
We have found a lack of communication, coordination and
reaching out to the users of the system, and that takes me to
the question of the air traffic controllers. I want to ask Mr.
Forrey.
We understand that we don't want to renegotiate the
contract here today, and we understand that there is a large
divide between where NATCA is and where the FAA is, but earlier
we heard the NTSB testify that after the accident occurred in
Lexington the FAA said that they recognized. I don't know if
they said they recognized it, that there is a fatigue issue and
that they were working with NATCA concerning controller
fatigue.
I just wonder what action has the FAA taken to reach out to
your controllers to address the issue of fatigue.
Mr. Forrey. Mr. Chairman, the NTSB made two recommendations
to the FAA and to us to look at the fatigue issue and
controller scheduling and things of that nature. We wrote a
letter to the Administrator, Blakey at the time, and said we
would be more than happy to do that. That was probably in 2007,
May of 2007, somewhere in that time frame.
We did not hear back from the Administrator until September
where she said she would like to do that at some point in time
and they would let us know what kind of requirements or subject
matter experts they would like from us to participate.
In the meantime, they had sent a letter to the Chairman of
the NTSB, stating that we were working together, sometime in
August.
The agency has created their own work group. They are
already doing investigations on, I would imagine, scheduling or
controller scheduling. They have not included us all in those
subjects or those discussions.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Hayes and I had talked about NextGen many
times. You have heard, many of you, in testimony in hearings
that we have had here in this room last year of the need, both
Mr. Dillingham and the Inspector General encouraging the FAA to
work with user groups to get their input.
Obviously, they have dropped the ball regarding what you
are doing at AOPA with your foundation, that they are not
working as closely as they have in the past. Obviously, if they
say they are working with NATCA to try and address these issues
and they have not, it is an issue.
It brings up not only runway incursion and safety issues
but also NextGen, where we are going with NextGen.
As I said today in the USA op-ed is that my concern is
about a leadership. It is not about money. I mean we provide
more money in the FAA Reauthorization Bill than the
Administration calls for in its own proposal.
My concern is not what we are getting in the end but how we
get there so that we don't spend a lot of money and go back and
say, oh, we have to retrofit this now and go back and
backtrack.
My concern about that is the users of the system are not
being consulted and ample input is not being given through JPDO
and the FAA.
A final question and then I will let you, Mr. Forrey, since
there was talk about the fatigue issue not only on the part of
the controllers but also the pilots. So I will ask you to
quickly summarize, Mr. Forrey, and you, Mr. Prater.
Mr. Forrey, on the issue of staffing, understaffing and the
additional hours that controllers are being forced to work,
some would have us believe that these hours are forced on them.
Others would have us believe that this is of their choosing,
that they choose to work the overtime. I want to know your
response.
Mr. Forrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the
opportunity to answer that question.
The facility manager calls in overtime because they require
overtime to work the shift. It is not because a controller
wakes up in the morning and says, you know what, I feel like
working overtime today. I will tell the manager I will be in to
work.
That is not how it works.
That is just a way of controllers deciding how they are
going to work overtime. If they volunteer for it, they will
call them first. If they don't, they assign it.
There are many facilities in this Country where they are
signing that overtime. Southern California TRACON, Atlanta
Tower and TRACON, Miami Center, just to name a few. Those
people are forced to work.
What that does is because they are working short shifts,
controllers are working positions, combined positions that
would normally take two or three people to work. That means
they are working more traffic. They are working more frequency.
They are working more airplanes. There has to be a greater
situational awareness.
That kind of wears you out, especially if you are working
six days a week or you are working ten hours in a day. That is
the impact of working overtime and the fatigue that it creates.
Now the agency likes to plump in these numbers, that it is
only 2 percent of the entire Country. They like to generalize
in that respect.
But the fact of the matter is at some of our busiest
airports and some of our busiest facilities in the Country,
there is a lot of overtime being worked and there is a lot of
tired controllers. That is the opportunity to make mistakes.
As Captain Prater stated, you have inexperienced pilots now
infiltrating the system and they are working 16 to 20-hour
days. Even though they are not flying it, they are still busy
doing something for that period of time.
Someone is going to make a mistake. We rely on each other,
pilots and controllers, to catch each other when we make
mistakes. In most cases, it works. Like in Ft. Lauderdale, the
pilot made a mistake, and the controller caught it. In
LaGuardia, the controller made a mistake. The pilot caught it,
and they avoided near disaster.
That is the kind of system we have in place, but when you
start reducing that or you start lowering the experience levels
of the people working it, like the agency is doing right now,
it is a recipe for disaster.
Mr. Costello. Captain Prater, would you like to comment on
pilot fatigue?
Mr. Prater. Very briefly, even though I would like to talk
for about 16 hours which is what the FAA says a standard duty
day can be for an airline pilot, I will try to keep it a little
shorter than that.
But the fact is we can do 16 hours followed by 8 hours away
from the airplane. Go through the airport. Find a hotel. Get a
couple hours rest and come back 8 hours later. Go through
security. All of you travel well, so you know it is going to be
20 or 30 minutes. Walk through the airport. Then start another
16-hour duty day.
At the end of several of those, you are making the most
important decision of your life every day. You are landing an
airplane full of passengers, full of cargo, in the weather, and
the fatigue catches up with you.
What we have seen more since 2001 is that we are seeing
many pilots flying longer days, being pushed to those maximums.
Some of it is economics. Some of it is shortage of pilots. Some
of it is because there is not enough pilots staffed to fly that
full schedule.
We are seeing the cumulative effects, and I can say easily
in my 35, 36 years flying, I have made a few mistakes. Other
people have caught them: the first officer, a controller. We do
depend upon each other, but we also depend upon trying to be as
rested as possible.
Congressman Hayes, I think talked about it earlier. A well
rested, well experienced, well trained pilot is how we prevent
incidents from happening.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri.
Mr. Petri. Thank you.
I have a couple areas to explore. I happened to have the
opportunity to get a briefing from something I guess is
referred to as the NextGen Institute that is a kind of
industry-community consortium to help plan and think through.
It has a series of working groups for doing NextGen as
effectively as possible.
One of the, I think, nine working groups they have is a
safety working group. I am just curious to know if any of the
organizations that you are involved with are involved with that
or if you could discuss that, if you are being consulted, if
there are problems with it or if it can be improved or how that
all stands.
If any of you would care to address that, I would be happy.
Mr. Forrey. I just started getting involved about a year
ago with NextGen.
The problem with the IMC, the Institute Management Council,
is that industry are the people that make up these subgroups.
So they have to take people from their companies to try and
work and volunteer while they pay them while they do that to
work on certain projects.
I can't pull people out of the FAA facility to go do that,
so I am kind of limited on what we can do based on what staff I
have available nationally. It is a good concept. Just, we don't
get that much participation other than the main group.
Mr. Prater. From the airports' side, we have been very
involved from the beginning. Phil is actually the co-chair of
the IMC, so maybe I should let him talk in greater detail.
But from the airports' side we have been very involved.
Like Pat said, you have to go out and get some folks from
airports and so forth to participate in some of the groups.
I have to say it got off to a slow start, but over the last
year or so, it has gotten a lot better. I think Charlie Leader
has done a good job of moving it along. So we have been
involved in it from the beginning.
Mr. Boyer. I would like to talk as a co-chair, and my other
co-chair is a strange bedfellow, the head of the airlines
association, but we do take this pretty seriously.
Greg is right. We were off to a slow start. I think it is
still fairly slow. I mean for you in Congress to be able to
articulate what it is going to cost, what it is going to be,
what it is going to do in capacity, you could hold hearings
after hearings right now and you wouldn't get there.
The thing that I have sort of adopted and actually the
airlines have jumped on this. So, once again, we are together
on this too. We need a little NowGen, and that is what we were
talking about here. Not NextGen, not 2025, 2020 for ADS-B or
some of the other things. We need to take some practical
solutions as are happening now with runway safety because of
your interest in the subject.
We need to also look at what we can do for your
constituents in your districts who travel on the airlines,
travel in general aviation, that we can do now at low cost, no
cost, and there are plenty of things. I think that is what the
industry--and that are safe--will be working on also.
You are going to hear that term emerge in the coming weeks,
not only NextGen but NowGen.
Mr. Petri. Just one other area, maybe two, that I was kind
of curious about. You would expect--but it may not be right--
that with a global aviation environment, people flying to a lot
of airports, say into Milwaukee International Airport or
whatever, to Toronto and so on, that there could be problems in
communication or safety and runway collisions that occur
because of people being relatively less familiar with how
people interact and all that.
Is there any variation on international flights to the
United States or is it as safe? Is that really not a factor? Is
it so obvious that people have dealt with it successfully?
Secondly, how do we compare, if anyone has any information,
on airport runway safety here in the United States, the
dominant market for aviation, compare with other countries
around the world in safety?
Our pilots fly all over the world. It is something that is
of concern to us for them and so do our citizens. How are they
doing when they land in London or in Ankara or somewhere?
Mr. Prater. Congressman, I know Pat will want to weigh in
on this because communications are key to safety.
There are requirements for improved or enhanced English
language. There is also an ICAO standard that we have not yet
adopted fully in this Country, and it may have prevented one of
the most recent accidents just to use it as a point. It is the
use of standard language, standard phraseology.
In the case of ICAO, which we are used to operating under
in most foreign countries, specific ATC clearances would be
required to cross a runway. So we would never be given
clearance to cross, to taxi out, cross one or two runways and
take off on another runway.
It might have prevented Lexington because that crew would
have been cleared to the first runway and held short and would
not have been able to misidentify it for the active runway, the
lighted runway. But that is not used here.
Overseas, we fly to many airports, and it can be a
challenge. There are many times going into an airport like de
Gaulle or Gatwick or Rome. If we have problems, what do we do?
What did he say?
Query the co-pilot. What did he say? Wait a minute, let's
just stop until we find out what the instructions are.
Sometimes the controller there will slow down and make sure
that we are able to understand the direction.
So I think the key to it is taking the time, standard
phraseology, the ICAO standards. I think we would see an
increased runway safety environment back here in the States if
we did it.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Principato. You had asked, Congressman, about airports.
We are part of a global organization, Airports Council
International, and they did a global survey of this kind of
thing. I think we provided the information to the staff, but it
showed that this region has the best rate or the lowest rate of
these incidents of any of the ACI regions.
Just one other thing that might be worth thinking about if
you are looking at the global industry is in other parts of the
world. The U.S. airlines typically do their ground handling.
Here, the airlines do the ground handling. In other parts of
the world, airports typically do it, and so there is a
difference. If you look at apron safety and so forth, you might
find some things overseas that don't stack up quite as well
either.
I think we do a pretty good job here.
But we did provide the international information to the
staff, and we would be happy to elaborate on it if you like.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. Back again.
Captain Prater, President Forrey, is there any formal or
informal along the lines of runway incursion prevention talk
between controllers and pilots?
They have the best perspective of anybody. Are there any
talks going on or any plan there?
I am lucky. I have you all come and see me all the time, so
I can talk about it. But is there something happening there?
Mr. Prater. Well, there is, but again it is between our two
unions. NATCA conducts a Communications for Safety seminar ever
year that we are proud to participate in. Some of the regionals
are starting to have more air traffic control-pilot
interaction.
We used to get to see our controllers a lot more because
they had the right to ride our jumpseat, and that is a real
serious safety tool that we no longer enjoy.
Controllers, probably, and pilots have the same type of
relationship maybe as doctors and nurses at times. There might
be a little bickering, but they straighten us out and we listen
to them.
When they can ride our jumpseat and see the view from the
cockpit window and we can talk about problems, it used to be a
pretty good safety tool. FAA took it away from us. We need that
back, sir.
Mr. Forrey. Mr. Hayes, I would say that what we have
started doing, because the agency doesn't want to include us,
is we have reached out to industry and, of course, our fellow
union brothers and sisters in the pilots association.
We have started meeting in major hubs now. We just started
this year with our safety committee and their safety committee,
and we are trying to explain the airspace to these guys and
gals, understand what they are going through and what they can
expect, and we are just starting to build those relationships.
It is quite impressive what these people are doing.
So we are creating that dialogue ourselves. We are reaching
out and doing that. It is important, and it is something we
should have been doing a long time ago.
Mr. Hayes. I think it would be very important to Phil and
everybody else at the table if you would come back to the
Committee with some practical things. We sometimes get
paralysis by analysis around here, but to me that would be
very, very helpful. Watch out for Congressional fatigue as we
deal with some of these issues. That is also an issue.
Let me switch over to Mr. Kallenbach.
You have a multi-tasking guy sitting beside you. He can go
steam gauge or he can go technology. Honeywell is obviously an
innovator as are many with gadgets. Sam understands, and it is
second nature to him but a little bit foreign to me.
Once you go into the development stage, we are going to
switch over to ADS-B in a minute, how do you take information
from the field and translate that into technology to solve
problems and make things safer? Kind of give us your
perspective on how that works.
Mr. Kallenbach. Okay.
Mr. Hayes. Lessons learned, if you will.
Mr. Kallenbach. Sure, I would be happy to.
Maybe one of the best examples is a recent product we have
come out with called Synthetic Vision which by taking
information that we have in our terrain database, our EGPWS
database. We take that information and we fuse that graphically
and portray that on your primary flight display, still the same
primary flight display information that has always been in the
cockpit. By doing this, what we have been able to do is give
the pilot better situational awareness inside the cockpit.
The methodology is that we basically sit with pilots, crew,
controllers, members of NTSB, for instance, to try and
understand what is the problem we are trying to solve in the
case of pilot awareness. Through a series of interviews, we
develop a voice of the customer and kind of an assessment of
what really would help them solve their problem. So you don't
want to give them too much information. You want to just give
them the exact relevant information they need at the time.
Then we develop a prototype. That prototype then becomes
something we can test with similar or same groups. Take it
flying. Take it into a pre-production phase and ultimately,
working with the FAA and the certification authorities,
globally come up with a certified system.
In general, that process can take anywhere from three to
five years.
Mr. Hayes. Good point. There are so many things that are
available now that enhance safety and make flying easier. The
more communications we have within interested groups, the
better off we are going to be.
Taking all that and putting it in a nice round package,
what do the industry and all the groups at the table and the
FAA going to do to bring the advantages at a reasonable price
to the flying public, be it airlines or general aviation, with
ADS-B?
I mean that is just sitting there, waiting to happen. If we
would get all the folks to really give it their best effort,
that could be implemented and technologically a lot of our
issues would be dealt with. Any thoughts on that, Phil or Mr.
Kallenbach or anybody?
Mr. Boyer. I think, first of all, I want to go on the
record in answering the question you asked earlier with Prater
and Forrey.
Pat was very instrumental. Actually, I think he attended
and worked with a couple of them. A seminar series our Air
Safety Foundation did around the Country and still is doing,
called ATC and You, and it was done in conjunction with NATCA.
Pat had some of his controllers each evening.
This was put on around the Country, and this was probably
the biggest audience-drawing set of seminars we have ever done
because of the interest of the pilots in hearing and being able
to talk directly with Pat's membership.
But in answer to your question, I think we have to get into
what needs to be certified by the agency and what is
supplemental to flying the airplane.
We sit today in most of our GA planes that are new with the
plot of the runway environment and the taxiways in the airplane
on them, so that we can taxi at busy airports. Prater would be
jealous of this today, but it is the certification level. In a
Part 91 operation, it is supplemental.
So what needs to go through years and years of study to say
isn't the GPS in the car good enough to know we are coming on
this street, we are coming up on this taxiway or this runway.
So a lot of the slowdown is trying to channel the FAA into
saying everything that is in the cockpit that is for the safety
of flight, the basic safety of flight, yes, needs to be
certified.
But supplemental information like datalink radar, like the
moving map displays, don't really need to go through that same
level of certification if you still have a paper chart. You
still have a co-pilot. You are still looking out the window.
This is just that extra information like it is on your car GPS.
Mr. Hayes. Great point.
I have used up all my time, Mr. Chairman.
But, again, thank you. You all hit on some really good
things. I know Captain Prater would love to have NEXRAD.
Anyway, take your controller out to lunch. That works.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Costello. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Missouri, Mr. Graves.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to have to
bolt real quick. I have to handle a bill panel over on the
Floor, but just a comment.
I would love to explore some things in this, and I do want
to applaud, obviously, Honeywell for the technology you are
working on. I don't know if it can be afforded by GA pilots. It
probably can't, unfortunately.
But it goes back to and it kind of dovetails on what Mr.
Prater said and Mr. Boyer just said, and we all learned it in
basic flight training. You have to look out the window. That is
the bottom line. You have to look out the window. All the
technology in the world isn't going to replace that simple
thing.
When we took advanced flight training and when I have taken
advanced flight training, you learned to bury your head in the
panel, but it is that basic flight training stuff when you are
on the ground. Slow down, but you have to look out the window
and see what is coming and what is out there.
Too many times we do just exactly what I said. We bury our
heads in the panel and aren't paying attention. It goes for the
controllers too. That is the reason the tower is so tall, so
you can look out the window and see what is going on.
I know I am oversimplifying this to a great deal, but the
fact of the matter remains that is simple technology. Enhanced
runway markings work. The stop lights work. But look out the
window.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Costello. Thank you.
That concludes the testimony of our witnesses.
The hearing went on a little bit longer than we anticipated
because of votes on the Floor, but we appreciate all of our
witnesses staying here to answer questions from members of the
panel.
I can assure not only our friends at the FAA but all of you
and everyone in the industry that we are going to continue to
provide aggressive oversight to make certain that the FAA is
moving forward and doing everything they possibly can do,
working with all of the stakeholders so that we can improve the
runway incursions that we have recently seen and have
experienced.
That concludes this hearing. Again, we thank you very much.
The Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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