[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
AN INSECURE FORECAST FOR CONTINUITY
OF CLIMATE AND WEATHER DATA: THE
NPOESS WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 19, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-109
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43-349 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California JO BONNER, Alabama
LAURA RICHARDSON, California TOM FEENEY, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM MATHESON, Utah DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BARON P. HILL, Indiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
------
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment
HON. NICK LAMPSON, Texas, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
JERRY MCNERNEY, California RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
MARK UDALL, Colorado MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
JEAN FRUCI Democratic Staff Director
JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member
SHIMERE WILLIAMS Democratic Professional Staff Member
TARA ROTHSCHILD Republican Professional Staff Member
STACEY STEEP Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
June 19, 2008
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Nick Lampson, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 8
Written Statement............................................ 9
Statement by Representative Bob Inglis, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 11
Witnesses:
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 11
Written Statement............................................ 13
Biography.................................................... 27
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (U.S. Navy, Ret.), Under
Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; Administrator,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Oral Statement............................................... 28
Written Statement............................................ 31
Biography.................................................... 39
Discussion
Executive Committee Performance................................ 40
Continuity Concerns............................................ 41
The VIIRS Sensor............................................... 44
The Gap Between Satellite Launches............................. 44
More on the Executive Committee's Performance.................. 46
Acquisition Document Approval.................................. 47
Bureaucratic Delays............................................ 50
More on Acquisition Document Approval.......................... 52
Life Cycle Costs............................................... 53
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, Government Accountability Office....................... 58
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (U.S. Navy, Ret.), Under
Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; Administrator,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)......... 61
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force from John J. Young,
Jr., Under Secretary of Defense, dated April 30, 2008.......... 70
Letter to John J. Young, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense, from
Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans
and Atmosphere, NOAA, dated May 16, 2008....................... 72
AN INSECURE FORECAST FOR CONTINUITY OF CLIMATE AND WEATHER DATA: THE
NPOESS WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM
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THURSDAY, JUNE 19, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Nick
Lampson [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
An Insecure Forecast for Continuity
of Climate and Weather Data: The
NPOESS Weather Satellite Program
thursday, june 19, 2008
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
The Subcommittee on Energy and Environment meets on June 19, 2008,
for further oversight on the National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) will testify on the latest report concerning the troubled
weather satellite program and the Administrator of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) will respond. Recent events have
once more raised questions about the stability of the program,
including a new threat to the most critical instrument and decisions
that may create new management risks.
Witnesses
Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues,
Government Accountability Office
Mr. Powner is the head of the GAO team continuously monitoring the
NPOESS program since 2001. He will present the latest in the continuing
series of reports commissioned by the Committee on this satellite
program. He will also respond to changes that have occurred in the
program's status since GAO completed work on its review.
Vice Admiral (Ret.) Conrad Lautenbacher, Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
The NPOESS program is fundamental to NOAA's weather missions, and
Admiral Lautenbacher, as head of NOAA, shares responsibility for
managing the development program. Lautenbacher serves as a member of
the program Executive Committee (EXCOM) with representatives of NASA
and the Air Force, NOAA's partner agencies. Because the GAO report
raises issues requiring action by the EXCOM, Admiral Lautenbacher has
been asked to provide NOAA's testimony.
Issues for Discussion
A. Life Cycle Cost Increases
Just over a year ago, the Subcommittee held its previous hearing on
the NPOESS program. At the time, efforts were underway to implement
decisions imposed on the program after a so-called Nunn-McCurdy review
by the Department of Defense. The NPOESS program is being conducted
using the Air Force procurement system, and at the point that the
program cost estimate rose more than 25 percent beyond the approved
baseline, DOD was required by law to execute a program recertification.
In June 2006, the results of this recertification were announced.
In brief, the estimate for acquisition cost rose to $11.5 billion (with
an additional $1 billion to cover operating costs, making the total
life cycle cost $12.5 billion). Only two satellites were guaranteed to
be built, with the first launch scheduled for 2013. A decision to buy
two more satellites, and to reconsider the program's management
structure, was to be made in 2010. This contrasted with the previously
baselined program, which anticipated purchasing six satellites at an
acquisition cost of $7.4 billion with a first launch in 2008. The
capabilities of the satellites were reduced, in that one of the major
instruments (the Conical Microwave Imaging Sounder) was removed, to be
replaced with a less-capable instrument on the second NPOESS satellite
that would be launched in 2016. Also removed were instruments intended
to extend the data records for monitoring the Earth's climate, and to
track events on the Sun that had the potential to disturb the planet's
geomagnetic environment.
Mr. Powner reported to staff in a briefing June 11 that the life
cycle cost for the program has apparently increased $1.1 billion, to
$13.6 billion. Based on the data reviewed, he estimates that the NPOESS
program expended $300 million in the last year to deal with the broken
frame suffered by the Cross-Track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) during
vibration testing, and to address the changes in the cryoradiator for
the primary NPOESS instrument, the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer
Suite (VIIRS). The problems with VIIRS ultimately resulted in another
delay in delivery of the flight unit for the NPOESS Preparatory Project
(NPP) mission,\1\ which slipped the launch date to June 2010.
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\1\ This precursor satellite, funded by NASA, was originally
intended to allow NPOESS operators to practice with the major
instruments before introducing them into the operational constellation.
It has now taken on the additional function of carrying on climate
monitoring responsibilities after the expected loss of NASA's Aqua
satellite.
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Beyond this, GAO believes that the program life cycle cost will
grow another $800 million to reflect an updated understanding of the
likely operations and support costs. The NPOESS program recently
undertook a review of the operations cost estimate, the first since
2002. The DOD's independent cost estimators were also asked to prepare
an estimate, which appears to be the first time an independent estimate
on operations costs has been conducted. On June 12, NOAA briefed staff
that the two estimates are being reconciled to determine what will be
incorporated into the program baseline. They were reluctant to provide
their own estimate of what that number would be.
GAO's estimate came before NOAA informed staff of yet another
threat to VIIRS that is under investigation. While preparing the unit
for testing, some of the screws used to assemble the instrument were
found to have their heads sheared off. Initial indications are that the
posts into which the screws are inserted were manufactured improperly
and so the screws did not seat properly. There is a possibility that
the entire VIIRS instrument may have to be disassembled to install all
new posts. If this is indeed the case, NPP will once again be delayed
and there will be a further cost impact. The NOAA briefers hoped this
will be avoided. In either case, this is not a technical issue that
results from efforts to push technology. Despite the multiple layers of
oversight that have been applied to the VIIRS instrument for some
years, these surprises continue to occur and the program continues to
be held hostage. It is interesting to note that this backsliding has
occurred in the period following the transfer of the former NPOESS
Program Executive Officer, Air Force Brigadier General Susan Mashiko,
against the warning in GAO's previous report. Despite the fact that she
was replaced by the System Program Director, Dan Stockton, it cannot be
ruled out that these changes allowed slack to creep back into the
program.
B. The EXCOM relationships
GAO once again notes that major management documents have yet to be
finalized and recommends that this be done as quickly as possible. The
agencies received a new incentive to accomplish this goal. On April 30,
2008, the Program Acquisition Executive, Under Secretary for Defense
for Acquisitions, Logistics and Technology John Young, informed the
program that failure to finalize all documents by August 31, 2008 would
result in a cutoff of DOD funds.\2\ (see attached) Loss of DOD funding,
by direction of the Committee on Appropriations, would require the
Department of Commerce to cut an equal amount of funding. That would,
of course, be a crippling blow to the program.
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\2\ Young, John. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force,
Joint Chiefs of Staff/J-* and Program Executive Office, Environmental
Sensing. Subject: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) Acquisition Decision Memorandum. Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. April 30, 2008.
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The NPOESS program is a unique entity, in that it receives its
budget from two co-equal sources and is governed by an Integrated
Program Office (IPO) where NOAA has program management
responsibilities, the Air Force directs acquisition activities and NASA
contributes technical support and manages the NPP mission. The Nunn-
McCurdy recertification of NPOESS in 2006 was driven by the goal of
maintaining existing levels of operational weather capability. The
staff was briefed on June 18 by Josh Hartman, the staff specialist for
space and intelligence matters for Mr. Young, to describe the genesis
of the memorandum. In brief, he described the memorandum as an effort
to instill greater discipline into the NPOESS program. The continuing
failure to complete agreements on the program management documents
resulted in the establishment of the funding cut-off deadline of August
31, 2008. Mr. Hartman agreed with GAO that the process had consumed an
excessive amount of time, and Mr. Young's direction is intended to
focus minds.
Of particular interest was the discussion about the current status
of these documents. In our briefing with NOAA, the message seemed to be
that many documents were awaiting clearance by the Air Force. GAO
seemed to have a similar view. Mr. Hartman, however, provided a chart
he had received from Program Executive Officer Dan Stockton showing
that decisions need to be made by NASA and NOAA as well. GAO's
testimony highlighted issues relating to the new Memorandum of
Agreement that is to define agency roles in the reconstituted program.
There was indication that DOD was asking for changes after the other
agencies had finished. Mr. Hartman agreed that DOD had not communicated
effectively with its partners, but that there were statutory
responsibilities for DOD that required certain language to be included
and that he felt this had not been clear to NOAA and NASA.
Mr. Hartman also discussed the requirements changes for NPOESS
instruments described in Young's letter. These result from a June 2006
agreement with the program user groups to prioritize schedule and cost
over performance when conflicts arose among those three elements. One
of the Nunn-McCurdy decisions was to allow instrument performance to
fall back to a level equal to the performance of instruments on the
existing satellites (DOD's Defense Meteorological Satellite Program or
NOAA's Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites). Again, Mr. Hartman
stated that the discussions underway to convert that decision into the
actual numbers for inclusion in the program baseline had dragged on and
needed resolution. The effect of Mr. Young's memorandum is to direct
the program to continue pursuing the instrument performance levels laid
out in the program specifications. Should it happen that trying to
achieve those program improvements would result in schedule slips or
cost increases, the EXCOM would decide when to authorize reducing the
performance to so-called ``legacy'' level. Admiral Lautenbacher's
response\3\ expresses concern that the guidance is not completely clear
where the performance boundaries lie and requests that this be
clarified. (see attached)
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\3\ Lautenbacher, Conrad C., Jr. Letter to the Honroable John J.
Young, Jr. Office of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. May 16, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO provided the new Decision Memorandum and NOAA's response to
Committee staff on June 11. They came as something of a surprise, and
an effort was made to include Mr. Young as a witness at the hearing. He
declined, due to the late date. The staff's meeting with Mr. Hartman
allowed some insight into Mr. Young's intentions. Mr. Hartman disagreed
that DOD has been seeking to escape from its commitment and stated Mr.
Young hopes that greater discipline will allow the program as we know
it to be completed. Had his memorandum been provided to the Committee
earlier, he might have been able to make those points directly. Admiral
Lautenbacher should be asked why the Committee did not receive the
memorandum from NOAA in May, leaving it to GAO to bring it to our
attention only a week before the hearing.
The staff's meeting with Mr. Hartman also revived the issue of the
effectiveness of the Executive Committee in managing the NPOESS
program. Mr. Hartman has been participating in EXCOM meetings since he
started working in Mr. Young's office last August. The EXCOM, he said,
seemed to spend a great deal of time on status reports, and he often
found that he left meetings wondering what had been accomplished. The
languid pace of completing the management documents and executing the
needed requirements changes in the program baseline reflected the
difficulty the EXCOM had in reaching decisions. In the NOAA briefing,
Mr. Stockton was asked directly if the funding cutoff reflected a
feeling that the program need a ``kick in the pants'' to overcome
procrastination. He said no. Yet this was precisely Mr. Hartman's
explanation for the language in the memorandum.
The Executive Committee is always presented to the Committee as the
final decision point for NPOESS decisions that cannot be made
elsewhere. Yet Mr. Hartman's description seems to show that it has
reverted to the ineffective body that earned Committee criticism during
the Nunn-McCurdy process. At that time, it appeared that EXCOM members
were not even aware of how far the situation had deteriorated. Mr.
Hartman believes that the EXCOM can accomplish its intended function
with appropriate leadership--which Mr. Young appears to be willing to
supply if necessary. There may also be other alternatives the Committee
should consider.
C. Alternative management
The NPOES program was tasked, as part of the Nunn-McCurdy decision,
to evaluate possible alternative management structures in time to
determine if Northrop Grumman should be replaced as system contractor
in 2010. According to GAO's report, the resulting study was completed
last September. Mr. Young asked for a status report on this effort in
May and directed that it be completed by August 31. Admiral
Lautenbacher should be asked to discuss the possible alternatives that
the program has identified, and describe the risks and benefits the
program can expect. A decision to change would be made at the time that
the decision to transition from engineering to production is expected.
This will also entail choosing to purchase the third and fourth NPOESS
satellites. That decision is somewhat foreordained, given that nothing
has been put in place to develop a follow-on system. Whether to then
continue buying NPOESS satellites or inaugurate a new development
program should be explored.
D. Ground system security standards
GAO also highlights in its report that NOAA and the Air Force
disagree on the level of security standards to be applied to the ground
segment of NPOESS. The Department of Defense established the original
security requirements for the ground-side elements. NOAA now believes
that newer Federal Information Processing Standards should be applied.
According to GAO, adopting NOAA's position would have a cost impact in
the ``hundreds of millions'' of dollars. GAO's report indicates that
the rework and retesting to implement new standards could affect the
cost and schedule of what has to date been the lowest-risk part of the
NPOESS program. Admiral Lautenbacher should explain why the benefits of
making this late change--with its attendant risk--are worth the costs.
He should also explain how such costs will be met if the decision is to
go forward.
E. Climate sensor recovery
Dr. John Marburger, Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP), testified at last year's hearing about the
process underway to recover from the loss of the climate sensors. Both
NOAA and NASA had collaborated on an analysis of the threats to climate
monitoring posed by the loss of these sensors aboard NPOESS. The
Subcommittee was concerned that OSTP might be moving too slowly; teams
developing some of the climate sensors were preparing to disband.
Since last year's hearing, decisions have been made to bring
forward and refurbish the last CERES (Clouds and Earth's Radiant Energy
System) sensor from the first NPOESS satellite to fly on NPP. A new
CERES sensor will then be built for the first NPOESS flight. Another
sensor, the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS), was restored to the
first NPOESS satellite. NOAA had requested funds to begin the CERES
changes in the FY08 budget, but this was lost in the final omnibus
appropriation. The agency cobbled together funds to permit steps to be
taken to support an October 1, 2008 start. The agency also intends to
begin the new TSIS sensor program on the same day, with delivery
contemplated for December 2011.
Success at restoring the CERES and TSIS sensors now depends on
NOAA's request for $74 million in its FY09 budget. This is the first
installment of what is intended to be a five-year, $74 million level-
of-effort program. GAO notes in its report that a plan for the long-
term restoration of the Nation's climate-monitoring capability is still
lacking, and that the sensors announced to date only deal with the most
immediate near-term threats of gaps in climate data. NOAA indicated
that the level-of-effort proposal is intended to provide that missing
plan, to develop additional sensors and to place them into operation.
The agency has expressed concern that the contemplated continuing
resolution may upset the progress made so far.
Much still remains to be dealt with in terms of the capabilities
lost from the NPOESS sensors. For example, the Aerosol Polarimetric
Sensor (APS) program has now arrived at much the same spot that TSIS
found itself in last year. APS will fly the prototype sensor on the
upcoming Glory mission for NASA. A new design, it has been difficult to
achieve the targets for precision and accuracy needed to meet the
promised specifications and NASA has been frustrated with Raytheon's
performance.\4\ Recently, however, the instrument has been meeting its
test goals and is on track for delivery. The contract is therefore
running down and the instrument team is likely to break up. NOAA told
staff that the agency intends to evaluate the performance of the sensor
before deciding whether to purchase more. This is consistent with the
recommendations from OSTP's analysis, but means that there will likely
be no option to fly a new sensor for some years after the end of the
Glory mission. This will likely affect efforts to provide a more
accurate understanding of the impacts atmospheric aerosols have on
climate.
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\4\ APS is being built by the same Raytheon division responsible
for the VIIRS instrument.
F. Space weather sensor recovery
The second set of sensors demanifested from NPOESS in 2006 monitor
the so-called ``space weather'' phenomena generated in solar flares and
coronal mass ejections. These events can, under the right
circumstances, affect satellite communications, overwhelm signals from
the Global Positioning System, increase long-term cancer risks for
airline crews and pilots flying in the polar regions or bring down
power grids. The Air Force is particularly concerned because of the
difficulty in discerning between natural interference with satellite
command and control and deliberate efforts to impede communications as
prelude to an attack.
In January, the Office of the Federal Coordinator of Meteorology
(OFCM) submitted its analysis of the impacts to the space weather
program occasioned by the loss of the NPOESS space weather sensors to
OSTP. The report concludes that ``[t]here are no planned missions to
replace the space environmental sensing capabilities removed from
NPOESS. A loss of continuity of critical measurements will occur when
existing on-orbit operational systems complete their missions during
the next decade.'' They judge that anticipated losses range from
``moderate'' (for plasma, which can determine how badly communications
are affected by solar events) to ``extreme'' (in the case of the
Electron Density Profile measurement, without which it is harder to
determine what is happening to satellites). While the sensors would not
be available in time to monitor the approaching peak in the Sun's 11-
year cycle, they would arrive on station to carry through the next.
NOAA states that they are now discussing a follow-on mission with NASA
and the Air Force.
While unrelated to the NPOESS sensors, the OFCM also noted that the
primary early-warning space weather sensor, NASA's Advanced Composition
Explorer (ACE), has passed its tenth anniversary. Originally designed
for a two-and-a-half year mission, it continues in service to allow
NOAA to provide advance warnings of one-half to one hour for solar
events that will affect the Earth's atmosphere and magnetic field. Such
warnings to airlines, power companies and communications firms give
enough time to take steps to reduce disruptions in vital services. ACE
is the latest instance of the lack of long-term planning for developing
improved operational capabilities from research programs. Further, in
May NOAA reported that the X-Ray Sensor on all of the newer
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites had failed. The
agency is currently depending on the last working sensor on the oldest
(GOES-10) satellite to track solar flares and working to obtain
equivalent data from other missions.
Chairman Lampson. This hearing will come to order. Good
morning, everyone. We once again meet to keep abreast of the
National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System. When launched, NPOESS will be the primary source of
information the National Weather Service uses to make its long-
range forecasts. Our military services will need NPOESS data to
plan operations around the globe. This Committee has given
sustained attention to this program because it is so very vital
to our daily lives.
NPOESS is having a difficult birth. The Government
Accountability Office once more has to report that instability
continues to beset the program. Last year GAO recommended that
the program managers needed to complete the basic planning and
management documents to assure that everyone understands the
schedule, the objectives, and the resources. It is a year
later, and GAO still has to recommend getting this basic task
done. The Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisitions,
Logistics and Technology, Mr. John Young, has ordered these to
be finished by the end of August or funding will be cut off.
Admiral Lautenbacher will assure us most strenuously that this
time the paperwork will get finished, and I want to discuss
that with him later.
I would like to have had Mr. Young here to talk about his
memorandum and his views on the management of the NPOESS
program. Unfortunately, it wasn't until last week that we knew
it had been issued. I hope Admiral Lautenbacher will explain
why a memo he received in May did not reach us until June, and
then from GAO. This committee, under both Democratic and
Republican leadership, has done its utmost to assist NOAA in
keeping this program on track. The Committee has always
expected to be kept fully and completely informed and I expect
Admiral Lautenbacher to assure us that will always be the case.
Costs for this program are still not under control. Despite
assurances that the program was adhering to its $12.5 billion
life cycle cost estimate, GAO believes that we can expect
another increase of $1.1 billion. Some $300 million represents
the cost of recovery from the problems with the VIIRS\1\ and
CrIS\2\ sensors last year.
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\1\ Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite
\2\ Cross-Track Infrared Sounder
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technical problems are still not resolved. A week ago today
NOAA informed us that some of the screw heads on the VIIRS
instrument were found to be sheared off as it was being
prepared for testing. Early indications are that the posts into
which the screws are driven were improperly made. In the worst
case, the VIIRS unit will have to be completely disassembled to
replace all of these so-called ``jack posts.'' Doing so will
mean yet another delay in launching the NPP precursor mission.
While NOAA hopes that this won't be required, the history of
VIIRS argues that the worst case is only half as bad as what
will finally come to pass.
This is not the situation we hoped to be in at this point
in time. The Executive Committee must expeditiously make
decisions and act to resolve these problems. The risk of a data
gap is growing along with the cost of this program. This
Committee wants to know how these problems are going to be
resolved and when we can expect some good news.
I welcome back our witnesses, Mr. Powner and Admiral
Lautenbacher, for whom this is familiar ground, and recognize
Mr. Inglis for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Lampson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Nick Lampson
Good morning. We once again meet to keep abreast of the National
Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. When
launched, NPOESS will be the primary source of information the National
Weather Service uses to make its long-range forecasts. Our military
services will need NPOESS data to plan operations around the globe.
This committee has given sustained attention to this program because it
is so vital to our daily lives.
NPOESS is having a difficult birth. The Government Accountability
Office once more has to report that instability continues to beset the
program. Last year GAO recommended that the program managers needed to
complete the basic planning and management documents to assure that
everyone understands the schedule, objectives and resources. It's a
year later and GAO still has to recommend getting this basic task done.
The Under Secretary for Defense for Acquisitions, Logistics and
Technology, Mr. John Young, has ordered these to be finished by the end
of August or funding will be cut off. Admiral Lautenbacher will assure
us most strenuously that this time the paperwork will get finished. I
want to discuss that with him later.
I would like to have had Mr. Young here to talk about his
memorandum and his views on the management of the NPOESS program.
Unfortunately, it wasn't until last week that we knew it had been
issued. I hope Admiral Lautenbacher will explain why a memo he received
in May did not reach us until June, and then from GAO. This committee,
under both Democratic and Republican leadership, has done its utmost to
assist NOAA in keeping this program on track. The Committee has always
expected to be kept fully and completely informed and I expect Admiral
Lautenbacher to assure us that will always be the case.
Costs for this program are still not under control. Despite
assurances that the program was adhering to its $12.5 billion life
cycle cost estimate, GAO believes that we can expect another increase
of $1.1 billion. Some $300 million represents the cost of recovery from
the problems with the VIIRS and CrIS sensors last year.
Technical problems are still not resolved. A week ago today NOAA
informed us that some of the screw heads on the VIIRS instrument were
found to be sheared off as it was being prepared for testing. Early
indications are that the posts into which the screws are driven were
improperly made. In the worst case, the VIIRS unit will have to be
completely disassembled to replace all of these so-called ``jack
posts.'' Doing so will mean yet another delay in launching the NPP
precursor mission. While NOAA hopes that this won't be required, the
history of VIIRS argues that the worst case is only half as bad as what
will finally come to pass.
This is not the situation we hoped to be in at this point in time.
I have grave concerns about this program. The Executive Committee must
expeditiously make decisions and act to resolve these problems. The
risk of a data gap is growing along with the cost of this program. This
committee wants to know how these problems are going to be resolved and
when we can expect some good news.
I welcome back our witnesses, Mr. Powner and Admiral Lautenbacher,
for whom this is familiar ground, and recognize Mr. Inglis for his
opening statement.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing about the National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System, NPOESS. This hearing continues
close oversight of this vital weather satellite program,
oversight that started under Republican leadership of this
committee. Last June we met to discuss a GAO report's finding
on the progress of the NPOESS program. Mr. Powner, you were
here to present that report one year ago, and now you are back
again with additional findings. This feels almost like
satellite club reunion, I suppose. But in June of 2007, it
seemed that the program was on track under the new plan.
However, given the significant changes that were being made to
the capability of the system, I and many of my colleagues
stressed that close oversight had to continue or the
repercussions would be costly. And we are here again, and again
we are stressing the importance of oversight and rightly so I
think. Things are less at ease than they were last year. Costly
is a good word to describe the progress of the program over the
past 12 months. $12.5 billion was NPOESS's price tag in June
2007. Today it is $13.6 billion, and there is another increase
looming on the horizon.
The Department of Defense has already announced that if
major management documents are not finalized by September, DOD
will remove funding. If that happens, the Department of
Commerce would be forced to follow suit and remove funding as
well. This loss of funding would mean a significant setback in
the investment and progress of the NPOESS program.
It is said that NPOESS is the most complex environmental
satellite system ever deployed, and given what we have gone
through in this committee alone in the past few years, I
believe it. I also believe that all of us involved--Congress,
NOAA, the Air Force, and NASA--have a vested interest in making
sure that the system succeeds despite the complexities. NPOESS
holds the complexities for advanced climate and weather sensing
which, even in light of the cost, can mean great benefits for
our country and for the world. NPOESS today is a $13.6 billion
program. That is a lot of taxpayer money. We need weather
satellites that are launched on time and to provide data that
informs everything from decisions about our military troop
operations to forecasting the path of hurricanes.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inglis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bob Inglis
Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Lampson, for holding this hearing
about the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
System, NPOESS. This hearing continues close oversight of this vital
weather satellite program, oversight that started under Republican
leadership of this committee.
Last June, we met to discuss a GAO report's findings on the
progress of the NPOESS program. Mr. Powner, you were here to present
that report one year ago, and now you're back again with additional
findings--this feels almost like a Satellite club reunion!
In June 2007, it seemed that the program was on track under the new
plan. However, given that significant changes were being made to the
capability of the system, I, and many of my colleagues, stressed that
close oversight had to continue, or the repercussions would be costly.
And we're here again, and again we're stressing the importance of
oversight. And rightly so, I think. Things are less ``at ease'' then
they were last year. ``Costly'' is a good word to use to describe the
progress of the program over the past 12 months. $12.5 billion was the
NPOESS price tag in June 2007. Today, it's $13.6 billion. And there's
another increase looming on the horizon. The Department of Defense has
recently announced that if major management documents are not finalized
by September, DOD will remove funding. If that happens, the Department
of Commerce would be forced to follow suit and remove funding as well.
This loss of funding would mean a significant setback in the investment
and progress of the NPOESS program.
It is said NPOESS is ``the most complex environmental satellite
system ever developed,'' and given what we've gone through in this
committee alone in the past few years, I believe it. I also believe
that all of us involved, Congress, NOAA, the Air Force, and NASA have a
vested interest in making sure that the system succeeds, despite the
complexities. NPOESS holds the capability for advanced climate and
weather sensing, which, even in light of the cost, can mean great
benefits for our country and the world.
NPOESS today is a $13.6 billion program. That is a lot of taxpayer
money. We need weather satellites that are launched on time and that
provide data that informs everything from decisions about our military
troop operations to forecasting the path of hurricanes.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Inglis. I ask unanimous
consent that all additional opening statements submitted by
Committee Members be included in the record. Without objection,
so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today, as this is
an important opportunity to follow-up on our hearing from last year and
to learn more about the National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS).
I look forward to hearing a status update from Admiral Lautenbacher
and Mr. Powner, as the program is fundamental to the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) weather missions.
As Chairman of the Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation, I am
particularly aware of the contribution that NOAA makes to the safety of
our environment, particularly to aviation travel. Although questions
have been raised about the stability of the NPOESS, it is my hope that
this hearing will help guide the program in the right direction and
answer any lingering administrative questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
Chairman Lampson. It is my pleasure to introduce our
witnesses this morning. Mr. David Powner is the Director for
Information Technology Management Issues at the Government
Accountability Office. Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher is the
Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere and Administrator of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. And I
might add at this point, yesterday I was at the Partnership for
Public Service and witnessed a couple of your folks receiving
some very nice public service awards. One of them happened to
have been a classmate of mine from college, Dr. Eddie Beaumont,
and it was a real pleasure seeing him but more importantly,
knowing what he has accomplished for our country. Very
impressed.
You will each have five minutes for your spoken testimony.
Your written testimony will be included in the record for the
hearing. When you all complete your testimony, we will begin
with questions. Each Member will have five minutes to question
the panel, and Mr. Powner, you may begin.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Powner. Chairman Lampson, Ranking Member Inglis, and
Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to
testify on our latest NPOESS report being released today.
This morning I will briefly address three areas: first, the
status of NPOESS's restructuring which is taking too long to
complete and now raises serious questions about DOD's
commitment to and funding of the program; second, key risk
areas and their potential cost implications which will at least
add $1 billion to NPOESS's life cycle costs; and third, the
need for long-term strategy to restore climate and space
sensors that were removed from the NPOESS program as part of
the June 2006 restructuring.
Before discussing these three points, I would like to
highlight NPOESS's progress in several areas. The program has
redefined deliverables, cost, and schedules and renegotiated
the contract, made significant progress in completing
development and testing activities associated with spacecraft
sensors and ground systems, and it continues to improve its
management of the contractor and program risks.
Last May when we testified before you, Mr. Chairman, we
raised serious concerns about interagency coordination because
key acquisition documents were not signed by their September
2006 due date following the Nunn-McCurdy restructuring. We
highlighted at that time the urgency in signing these documents
to ensure interagency agreements. Although some documents have
been finalized, agency executives have yet to finalize several
key documents needed to effectively manage this tri-agency
program, including the acquisition program baseline and a
critical plan for how the European satellite data will be used
with NPOESS. Now DOD has stated it will not release fiscal year
2009 funds to the program if these documents are not finalized
by the end of August. On the surface, DOD's threat appears to
be a good thing, given that the new August deadline is now
nearly two years later than the original deadline. However, DOD
is equally at fault here since most of the documents in
question are currently at DOD awaiting approval.
Mr. Chairman, such delays, threats, and lack of leadership
and cooperation are unacceptable. It is time for the NPOESS
EXCOM\3\ members to step up, get these documents finalized to
ensure key interagency agreements and to not risk any funding
implications. Regarding key risks and potential cost
implications, key risk areas that concern us the most are the
technical sensor risks, changes to the security approach, and
the uncertainty of operations and support costs. Poor
workmanship and delays caused an eight-month slip in the
delivery of VIIRS which caused a corresponding eight-month slip
in the launch of NPOESS's demonstration satellite, NPP.
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\3\ Executive Committee
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The CrIS sensor has also experienced cost overruns and
scheduling delays, but VIIRS continues to be the program's
largest question mark. It is complex, continues to experience
problems in testing, and is clearly the most concerning aspect
of this acquisition. The program estimates that it will cost at
least an additional $300 million to fix these known technical
sensor issues.
Turning to security, the program is considering raising the
level of security measures associated with NPOESS's ground
stations. The program has been looking at these options but has
yet to finalize, release its findings, or agree to a final
approach. Building in security late in the development cycle
will be costly regarding the operations and support costs.
Following the Nunn-McCurdy decision, the operations and support
costs were estimated to be about a billion dollars. Now, both
the program office and DOD's cost analysis group are refining
the estimate which we expect to be at least $800 million
higher. Therefore, between the technical sensor issues,
increasing security controls, and having a more realistic
operations and support estimate, we expect the $12.5 billion
life cycle cost estimate to increase at least $1 billion but
would not be surprised if the revised life cycle cost estimate
approaches $14 billion.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, some progress has been made in
restoring selected climate and space sensors that were removed
to reduce risk and cost during the Nunn-McCurdy decision.
Specifically, two sensors are being placed on NPP and one will
now go on the first NPOESS satellite known as C-1. These will
both help with short-term needs. In addition, options for
restoring these sensors have been studied. Now decisions need
to be made and plans need to be developed for longer-term
continuity of climate and space sensors. The Office of Science
and Technology Policy has been working with the three agencies,
but there is no firm commitment when such a plan would be
developed. Accordingly, we recommended that a plan be developed
to ensure that there are no gaps in critical space,
environmental, and climate observations.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, the NPOESS program needs to
finalize the acquisition documents, revise its life cycle cost
estimate given the expected increases associated with sensors,
security, and operations and support; and on a broader scale,
our nation is in need of a plan to address long-term continuity
of climate and space observations.
This concludes my statement. Thank you for your leadership
and oversight of this critical program.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
Prepared Statement of David A. Powner
Environmental Satellites
Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on
Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data Continuity
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss our work on the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. NPOESS is
expected to be a state-of-the-art, environment-monitoring satellite
system that will replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental
satellite systems. Polar-orbiting satellites provide data and imagery
that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military
to map and monitor changes in weather, climate, the oceans, and the
environment. The NPOESS program is considered critical to the United
States' ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather
forecasting (including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and
global climate monitoring through the year 2026.
Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS program: the
Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States
Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). To manage the NPOESS program, these agencies established a tri-
agency integrated program office. In recent years, the program has
experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical
difficulties, which led to a June 2006 decision to restructure it. This
decision decreased the complexity of the program by reducing the number
of satellites and sensors, increased the estimated cost of the program
to $12.5 billion, and delayed the launches of the first two satellites
by three and five years, respectively.
As requested, this statement summarizes our report being released
today that (1) evaluates the NPOESS program office's progress in
restructuring the acquisition, (2) assesses the status of key program
components and risks, (3) and assesses NASA's, NOAA's, and DOD's plans
for obtaining the environmental data originally planned to be collected
by NPOESS sensors, but then eliminated by the restructuring.\1\
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\1\ GAO, Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite
Acquisition Faces Delay; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure
Climate Data Continuity, GAO-08-518 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2008).
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In preparing this testimony, we relied on our work supporting the
accompanying report. That report contains a detailed overview of our
scope and methodology. In addition, we updated factual information on
sensors and due dates as warranted. All the work on which this
testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief
The NPOESS program office has completed most of the major
activities associated with restructuring the acquisition, but key
activities remain to be completed. In the past year, the program
redefined the program's deliverables, costs, and schedules, and
renegotiated the NPOESS contract. However, agency executives have not
yet finalized selected acquisition documents, including the tri-agency
memorandum of agreement and the acquisition program baseline. In April
2007, we reported that key acquisition documents were already over six
months late and recommended that agency officials complete them
immediately.\2\ Agency officials subsequently extended the due dates of
the documents. Moreover, although DOD has had a role in delaying their
completion, the Department has stated it would not release fiscal year
2009 funds to the NPOESS program if key acquisition documents are not
completed by August 2008. Without executive approval of the memorandum
of agreement and other key documents, the program lacks the underlying
commitment needed to effectively manage a tri-agency program. In
addition, given DOD's recent instructions, any further delays in
completing these documents could affect the program's funding and
schedule.
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\2\ GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites:
Restructuring is Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain,
GAO-07-498 (Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007).
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In the past year, the NPOESS program has made progress in
completing development and testing activities associated with the
spacecraft, sensors, and ground systems. However, key milestones have
been delayed and multiple risks remain. Specifically, poor workmanship
and testing delays caused an eight-month slip in the delivery of a
complex imaging sensor called the Visible/infrared imager radiometer
suite. This late delivery caused a corresponding eight-month delay in
the expected launch date of the NPOESS Preparatory Project
demonstration satellite, moving it from late September 2009 to early
June 2010. Any delay in this launch date shortens the time available
for identifying lessons learned from the demonstration satellite while
it is in orbit and incorporating these lessons in the development of
the first NPOESS satellite. Such delays could also lead to gaps in
weather and climate data continuity if existing satellites begin to
degrade or fail. Moving forward, risks remain in completing the testing
of key sensors and integrating them on the spacecraft, resolving
interagency disagreements about the appropriate level of system
security, and revising outdated operations and support cost estimates--
which program officials say could increase the life cycle cost by about
$1 billion. The program office is aware of these risks and is working
to mitigate them, but these issues could affect the program's overall
schedule and cost.
When the NPOESS restructuring agreement removed four climate and
space environment sensors from the program and degraded four others, it
led NASA, NOAA, and DOD to reassess their priorities and options for
obtaining climate and space environment data. Since the June 2006
restructuring decision, the three agencies have taken preliminary steps
to restore the capabilities of selected climate and space weather
sensors that were removed from the NPOESS program by prioritizing the
sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and making decisions to
mitigate near-term data continuity needs by restoring two sensors to
the demonstration satellite and one sensor to the first NPOESS
satellite. However, the agencies have not yet developed plans on
whether and how to ensure climate and space weather data on a long-term
basis as no plans have been made for sensors or satellites after the
first satellite of the program. Until such a plan is developed, the
agencies may lose their windows of opportunity for selecting cost-
effective options or they may resort to an ad hoc approach to restoring
these sensors. Almost two years have passed since key sensors were
removed from the NPOESS program; further delays in establishing a plan
could result in gaps in the continuity of climate and space data.
In our report, we made recommendations to all three agencies to
establish plans on whether and how to restore the climate and space
sensors removed from the NPOESS program by June 2009, in cases where
the sensors are warranted and justified. In addition, we also
reemphasized a recommendation made in our prior report\3\ that the
appropriate NASA, NOAA, and DOD executives immediately finalize key
acquisition documents. All three agencies concurred with these
recommendations.
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\3\ GAO-07-498
Background
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series--managed by
NOAA--and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)--managed
by the Air Force. These satellites obtain environmental data that are
processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather
products--including both terrestrial and space weather. These satellite
data are also the predominant input to numerical weather prediction
models, which are a primary tool for forecasting weather three or more
days in advance--including forecasting the path and intensity of
hurricanes. The weather products and models are used to predict the
potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency
managers can help prevent and mitigate their effects. Polar satellites
also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such as
ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that are
used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate
monitoring.
NPOESS Overview
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs
would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of
satisfying both civilian and military requirements.\4\ The converged
program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States' ability
to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and
global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To manage this
program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed the tri-agency Integrated Program
Office, located within NOAA.
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\4\ Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.
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Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain
activities: NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the
converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the
acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the
development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged
system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA
funds specific technology projects and studies. The NPOESS program
office is overseen by an Executive Committee, which is made up of the
Administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air
Force.
NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated
to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from
its inception in 1995 through 2018. The program is to provide satellite
development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite
data processing. These deliverables are grouped into four main
categories: (1) the space segment, which includes the satellites and
sensors; (2) the integrated data processing segment, which is the
system for transforming raw data into environmental data records (EDR)
and is to be located at four data processing centers; (3) the command,
control, and communications segment, which includes the equipment and
services needed to support satellite operations; and (4) the launch
segment, which includes launch vehicle services.
When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development
contract was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was adjusted to
$7 billion. Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of
six satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration
of 13 instruments--consisting of 10 environmental sensors and three
subsystems. Together, the sensors were to receive and transmit data on
atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and
solar-geophysical observations. The subsystems were to support non-
environmental search and rescue efforts, sensor survivability, and
environmental data collection activities. The program office considered
four of the sensors to be critical because they provide data for key
weather products; these sensors are in bold in Table 1, which describes
each of the expected NPOESS instruments.
In addition, a demonstration satellite, called the NPOESS
Preparatory Project (NPP), was planned to be launched several years
before the first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk
associated with launching new sensor technologies and to ensure
continuity of climate data with NASA's Earth Observing System
satellites. NPP was to host three of the four critical NPOESS sensors,
as well as one other noncritical sensor and to provide the program
office and the processing centers an early opportunity to work with the
sensors, ground control, and data processing systems.\5\
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\5\ The four sensors are the Visible/infrared imager radiometer
suite, the Cross-track infrared sounder, the Advanced technology
microwave sounder, and the Ozone mapper/profiler suite.
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When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, the schedule for
launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the
satellites be available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites
should anything go wrong during the planned launches of these
satellites. Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May
2006, (2) having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the
final POES satellite launch in March 2008, and (3) having the second
NPOESS satellite available to back up the final DMSP satellite launch
in October 2009. If the NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up
the final predecessor satellites, their anticipated launch dates would
have been April 2009 and June 2011, respectively.
NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical
Problems That Led to Decision to Restructure the
NPOESS Program
Over several years, we reported that NPOESS had experienced
continued cost increases, schedule delays, and serious technical
problems.\6\ By November 2005, we estimated that the cost of the
program had grown from $7 billion to over $10 billion. In addition, the
program was experiencing major technical problems with the VIIRS sensor
and expected to delay the launch date of the first satellite by almost
two years. These issues ultimately required difficult decisions to be
made about the program's direction and capabilities. The Nunn-McCurdy
law requires DOD to take specific actions when a major defense
acquisition program cost growth exceeds certain thresholds.\7\ The law
requires the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when a major
defense acquisition is expected to overrun its current baseline by 15
percent or more and to certify the current program to Congress when it
is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent or more.\8\ In
November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25 percent threshold, and DOD was
required to certify the program. Certifying a program entails providing
a determination that (1) the program is essential to national security,
(2) there are no alternatives to the program that will provide equal or
greater military capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the
program's cost are reasonable, and (4) the management structure for the
program is adequate to manage and control costs. DOD established tri-
agency teams--made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts--to work on each
of the four elements of the certification process.
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\6\ GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold, GAO-06-
573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and
Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO-06-
249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005); GAO, Polar-orbiting
Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and Schedule
Changes, GAO-04-1054 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); GAO, Polar-
orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could Affect Weather
Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-03-987T (Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2003); and GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites:
Status, Plans, and Future Data Management Challenges, GAO-02-684T
(Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002).
\7\ 10 U.S.C. 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy.
\8\ 10 U.S.C. 2433 has recently been amended by Pub. L. No. 109-
163, 802 (Jan. 6, 2006) and Pub. L. No. 109-364, 213(a) (Oct. 17,
2006). The law now also includes cost growth thresholds from the
program's original baseline.
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In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner
agencies) certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost
$12.5 billion through 2026.\9\ This decision approved a cost increase
of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline cost and delayed the
launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly three to five
years. The new program also entailed reducing the number of satellites
to be produced and launched from six to four, and reducing the number
of instruments on the satellites from 13 to nine--consisting of seven
environmental sensors and two subsystems. It also entailed using NPOESS
satellites in the early morning and afternoon orbits and relying on
European satellites for mid-morning orbit data.\10\ Table 2 summarizes
the major program changes made under the Nunn-McCurdy certification
decision.
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\9\ DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified
program would cost $11.5 billion. The acquisition portion includes
satellite development, production, and launch, but not operations and
support costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion
for operations and support after launch, this brings the program life
cycle cost to $12.5 billion.
\10\ The European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites' MetOp program is a series of three polar-
orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp
satellites are planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. The
first of these satellites was launched in 2006 and is currently
operational.
The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones
for the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by
January 2010, launching the first NPOESS satellite by January 2013, and
launching the second NPOESS satellite by January 2016. These revised
milestones deviated from prior plans to have the first NPOESS satellite
available to back up the final POES satellite should anything go wrong
during that launch.
Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite meant that if the
final POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need
to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until
NPP data becomes available--almost two years later. Although NPP was
not intended to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move NPP to a
different orbit so that its data would be available in the event of a
premature failure of the final POES satellite. If the health of the
existing constellation of satellites diminishes--or if NPP data is not
available, timely, and reliable--there could be a gap in environmental
satellite data.
In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy
certification decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13
to nine and reduced the functionality of four sensors. Specifically, of
the 13 original sensors, five sensors remain unchanged (but two are on
a reduced number of satellites), three were replaced with older or less
capable sensors, one was modified to provide less functionality, and
four were canceled. The certification decision also made allowances for
the reintegration of the canceled sensors. Specifically, the program
was directed to build each NPOESS spacecraft with enough room and power
to accommodate the sensors that were removed from the program and to
fund the integration and testing of any sensors that are later
restored. Agency sponsors external to the program would be responsible
for justifying and funding the sensor's development, while the NPOESS
Executive Committee would have the final decision on whether to include
the sensor on a specific satellite. Table 3 identifies the changes to
the NPOESS instruments.
The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of
the resulting weather and environmental products, called environmental
data records (EDR). In selecting sensors for the restructured program
during the Nunn-McCurdy process, decision-makers placed the highest
priority on continuing current operational weather capabilities and a
lower priority on obtaining selected environmental and climate
measuring capabilities. As a result, the revised NPOESS system has
significantly less capability for providing global climate measures
than was originally planned. Specifically, the number of EDRs was
decreased from 55 to 39, of which six are of a reduced quality. The 39
EDRs that remain include cloud base height, land surface temperature,
precipitation type and rate, and sea surface winds. The 16 EDRs that
were removed include cloud particle size and distribution, sea surface
height, net solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere, and products
to depict the electric fields in the space environment. The six EDRs
that are of a reduced quality include ozone profile, soil moisture, and
multiple products depicting energy in the space environment.
Major Restructuring Activities Have Been Completed, but Key Remaining
Activities Could Affect Funding and Schedule
The program office has completed major activities associated with
restructuring NPOESS, but key supporting activities remain--including
obtaining approval of key acquisition documents--and delays in
completing these activities could affect the program's funding and
schedule. Restructuring a major acquisition program like NPOESS is a
process that involves reassessing and redefining the program's
deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiating the contract. The
restructuring process also involves revising important acquisition
documents such as the tri-agency memorandum of agreement, the
acquisition strategy, the system engineering plan, the integrated
master schedule defining what needs to happen by when, and the
acquisition program baseline. In April 2007, we reported that the key
acquisition documents were over six months late from their original
September 2006 due date, and we recommended that the appropriate
executives immediately finalize them.\11\ This recommendation has not
yet been addressed and agency officials subsequently extended the due
dates of the documents to September 2007.
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\11\ GAO-07-498.
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During the past year, the program redefined the program's
deliverables, costs, and schedules, and renegotiated the NPOESS
contract. To do so, the program developed a new program plan and
conducted an integrated baseline review of the entire program, which
validated that the new deliverables, costs, and schedules were
feasible. It also completed key acquisition documents including the
system engineering plan and the integrated master schedule. The program
and the prime contractor signed a modified contract in July 2007.
However, key activities remain to be completed, including obtaining
executive approval of key acquisition documents. Specifically, even
though agency officials were expected to approve key acquisition
documents by September 2007, the appropriate executives have not yet
signed off on documents including the tri-agency memorandum of
agreement or the acquisition strategy report. They have also not signed
off on the acquisition program baseline, the fee management plan, the
test and evaluation master plan, and the two-orbit program plan (a plan
for how to use European satellite data with NPOESS).
Program officials stated that the program has been able to
renegotiate the contract and to proceed in developing sensors and
systems without these documents being signed because the documents have
widespread acceptance within the three agencies. They reported that the
delays are largely due to the complexity of obtaining approval from
three agencies. For example, program officials reported that an
organization within DOD suggested minor changes to the tri-agency
memorandum of agreement after months of coordination and after it had
already been signed by both the Secretary of Commerce and the
Administrator of NASA. Further, after this issue was resolved, a senior
official at DOD requested another change to the document. The program
office has now made the recommended changes and is re-initiating the
coordination process.
More recently, in April 2008, DOD moved the due dates for all of
the acquisition documents other than the memorandum of agreement and
fee management plan from September 2007 to August 31, 2008. (See
Appendix I for the history of the due dates and status of each
document). In addition, even though DOD has had a role in delaying
these documents, the Department has stated it would not release fiscal
year 2009 funds to the program if these acquisition documents are not
completed by the new due date. Without executive approval of key
acquisition documents, the program lacks the underlying commitment
necessary to effectively manage a tri-agency program. In addition,
given DOD's newest instructions, any further delays in completing these
acquisition documents could affect the program's funding and schedule.
Program Has Made Progress, but Key Milestones Have Been Delayed and
Risks Remain
Over the last year, the NPOESS program has made progress by
completing planned development and testing activities on its ground and
space segments, but key milestones for delivering the VIIRS sensor and
launching NPP have been delayed by about eight months. Moving forward,
risks remain in completing the testing of key sensors and integrating
them on the NPP spacecraft, in resolving interagency disagreements on
the appropriate level of system security, and in revising estimated
costs for satellite operations and support. The program office is aware
of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems
could affect the program's overall schedule and cost. Given the tight
time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them on the NPP
spacecraft, and getting the ground-based data processing system
developed, tested, and deployed, it is important for the NPOESS
Integrated Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the
Executive Committee to continue to provide close oversight of
milestones and risks.
Ground Segment--Progress Made but Important Work Remains to Be Done
Development of the ground segment--which includes the interface
data processing system, the ground stations that are to receive
satellite data, and the ground-based command, control, and
communications system--is under way and on track. For example, the
Interface Data Processing System has been installed at one of the two
locations that are to receive NPP data, and the command, control, and
communications system passed acceptance testing for use with NPP.
However, important work in developing the algorithms that translate
satellite data into weather products within the integrated data
processing segment remains to be completed. Table 4 describes each of
the components of the ground segment and identifies the program-
provided risk level and status of each.
Space Segment--Progress Made, but One Sensor Was Delayed and Sensors
Continue to Face Risks
Over the past year, the program made progress on the development of
the space segment, which includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Five
sensors are of critical importance because they are to be launched on
the NPP satellite.\12\ Initiating work on another sensor, the Microwave
Imager Sounder, is also important because this new sensor--which is to
replace the canceled Conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder sensor--
will need to be developed in time for the second NPOESS satellite
launch. Among other activities, the program has successfully completed
vibration testing of the flight unit of the Cross-track infrared
sounder (CrIS), a major pre-environmental testing review for the VIIRS
instrument, integration and risk reduction testing of the flight unit
of the Ozone mapper/profiler suite, and thermal testing of the NPP
spacecraft with three sensors on board.\13\ In addition, the program
made decisions on how to proceed with the Microwave imager sounder and
recently awarded a contract to a government laboratory for its
development.
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\12\ NPP is to include the Visible/infrared imager radiometer
suite, Cross-track infrared sounder, Advanced technology microwave
sounder, Ozone mapper/profiler suite (nadir and limb), and the Clouds
and the Earth's radiant energy system.
\13\ The three sensors included the flight unit for the Advanced
technology microwave sounder and engineering design units for the
Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite and the Cross-track infrared
sounder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the program experienced problems on VIIRS, including poor
workmanship on selected subcomponents and delays in completing key
tests. These issues delayed VIIRS delivery to the NPP contractor by
eight months. This late delivery will in turn delay the satellite's
launch from late September 2009 to early June 2010. This delay shortens
the time available for incorporating lessons learned from NPP while it
is in orbit into future NPOESS missions and could lead to gaps in the
continuity of climate and weather data if predecessor satellites fail
prematurely. Also, the CrIS sensor experienced a cost overrun and
schedule delays as the contractor worked to recover from a structural
failure and is currently several weeks behind its schedule due to
thermal vacuum testing taking longer than planned. The status and risk
level of each of the components of the space segment is described in
Table 5.
Program Risks Remain; Continued Oversight Is Needed to Prevent Further
Cost Increases and Schedule Delays
Moving forward, the program continues to face risks. Over the next
two years, it will need to complete the development of the key sensors,
test them, integrate and test them on the NPP spacecraft, and test
these systems with the ground-based data processing systems. In
addition, the program faces two other issues that could affect its
overall schedule and cost. One is that there continues to be
disagreement between NOAA and DOD on the appropriate level of system
security. To date, NPOESS has been designed and developed to meet DOD's
standards for a mission essential system, but NOAA officials believe
that the system should be built to meet more stringent standards.\14\
Implementing more stringent standards could cause rework and retesting,
and potentially affect the cost and schedule of the system. Another
issue is that program life cycle costs could increase once a better
estimate of the cost of operations and support is known. The $12.5
billion estimated life cycle cost for NPOESS includes a rough estimate
of $1 billion for operations and support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ NOAA officials have stated that they believe the program
should be built to a ``high'' security level per Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 199.
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The NPOESS program office is working closely with the contractor
and subcontractors to resolve these program risks. To address sensor
risks, the program office and officials from NASA's Goddard Space
Flight Center commissioned an independent review team to assess the
thoroughness and adequacy of practices being used in the assembly,
integration, and testing of the VIIRS and CrIS instruments in
preparation for the NPP spacecraft. The team found that the contractors
for both sensors had sound test programs in place, but noted risks with
VIIRS's schedule and with CrIS's reliability and performance. The
program office adjusted the VIIRS testing schedule and is monitoring
the CrIS testing results. In addition, the program office recently
instituted biweekly senior-level management meetings to review progress
on VIIRS's development, and program officials noted that both the prime
contractor and the program executive office will have senior officials
on-site at the contractor's facility to provide extensive, day-to-day
oversight of management activities to assist in resolving issues.
To address the risk posed by changing security requirements late in
the system's development, program officials commissioned a study to
determine the effect of more stringent standards on the system. This
study was completed in March 2008, but has not yet been released. To
address the risk of cost growth due to poor estimates of operations and
support costs, DOD's cost analysis group is currently refining this
estimate. Program officials estimated that the program costs could grow
by about $1 billion, and expect to finalize revised operations and
support costs in July 2008.
The program office is aware of program risks and is working to
mitigate them, but these issues could affect the program's overall
schedule and cost. Given the tight time frames for completing key
sensors, integrating them on the NPP spacecraft, and getting the
ground-based data processing system developed, tested, and deployed, it
is important for the NPOESS program office, the Program Executive
Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to provide close
oversight of milestones and risks.
Agencies Have Undertaken Preliminary Steps to Restore Key Sensors, but
Lack Timely Plans to Ensure Long-Term Data
Continuity
When the NPOESS restructuring agreement removed four climate and
space environment sensors from the program and degraded four others, it
led NASA, NOAA, and DOD to reassess their priorities and options for
obtaining climate and space environment data. Since the June 2006
restructuring decision, the three agencies have taken preliminary steps
to restore the capabilities of selected climate and space weather
sensors that were degraded or removed from the NPOESS program by
prioritizing the sensors, assessing options for restoring them, and
making decisions to restore selected sensors in order to mitigate near-
term data gaps. However, the agencies have not yet developed plans to
mitigate the loss of these sensors on a long-term basis. Best practices
in strategic planning suggest that agencies develop and implement long-
term plans to guide their short-term activities. Until such plans are
developed, the agencies may lose their windows of opportunity for
selecting cost-effective options or they may resort to an ad hoc
approach to restoring these sensors. Lacking plans almost two years
after key sensors were removed from the NPOESS program, the agencies
face increased risk of gaps in the continuity of climate and space
environment data.
While NPOESS was originally envisioned to provide only weather
observations, this mission was later expanded to include long-term
continuity for key climate data. Maintaining the continuity of climate
and space data over decades is important to identify long-term
environmental cycles (such as the 11-year solar cycle and multi-year
ocean cycles including the El Nino effect) and their impacts, and to
detect trends in climate change and global warming. The Nunn-McCurdy
restructuring decision removed four sensors and degraded the
functionality of four other sensors that were to provide these data.
DOD, NASA, and NOAA are now responsible for determining what to
restore, how to restore it, and the means for doing so. This
responsibility includes justifying the additional funding needed to
develop these sensors within their respective agencies' investment
decision processes. Best practices of leading organizations call for
defining a strategic plan to formalize priorities and plans for meeting
mission goals. Such a plan would include the agency's long-term goals
for climate and space weather measurements, the short-term activities
needed to attain these goals, and the milestones and resources needed
to support the planned activities.
NASA, NOAA, and DOD Have Identified Priorities, Assessed Options, and
Made Decisions to Restore Selected Sensors
Since the June 2006 restructuring, NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken
preliminary steps to restore sensor capabilities by determining
priorities for restoring sensor capabilities, assessing options for
obtaining sensor data over time, and making decisions to restore
selected sensors. Specifically, in August 2006, the NPOESS Senior User
Advisory Group--a group representing NASA, NOAA, and DOD system users--
assessed the impact of the canceled or degraded sensors and identified
priorities for restoring them. In January 2007, a NOAA and NASA working
group on climate sensors prioritized which of the sensors were most
important to restore for climate purposes and proposed possible
solutions and mitigation efforts. Two other groups--the National
Research Council and a NOAA-DOD working group--have also issued reports
describing the impact of the loss of climate and space environmental
sensors, respectively.\15\ Table 6 summarizes the results of these
studies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ National Research Council, Options to Ensure the Climate
Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft: A Workshop Report
(Washington, D.C.: 2007), and the Office of the Federal Coordinator for
Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, Impacts of NPOESS
Nunn-McCurdy Certification and Potential Loss of ACE Spacecraft Solar
Wind Data on National Space Environmental Monitoring Capabilities.
(Washington, D.C.: January 2008). The report committee was co-chaired
by the Director of the Space Weather Prediction Center (NOAA) and the
Chief of the Integration, Plans, and Requirements division within the
U.S. Air Force Directorate for Weather. Agency partners in the
Department of Commerce, DOD, NASA, the National Science Foundation, and
the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology concurred with
the report.
In addition to prioritizing the sensors, NASA, NOAA, and DOD
identified a variety of options for obtaining key sensor data over the
next two decades and continue to seek other options. The agencies
identified options including adding sensors back to a later NPOESS
satellite, adding sensors to another planned satellite, and developing
a new satellite to include several of the sensors. Examples of options
for several sensors are provided in Figure 1. In addition, in December
2007, NOAA released a request for information to determine whether
commercial providers could include selected environmental sensors on
their satellites.
In addition to prioritizing sensors and identifying options, over
the last year, NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken steps to restore three
sensors on a near-term basis. Specifically, in April 2007, the NPOESS
Executive Committee decided to restore the limb component of the Ozone
mapper/profiler suite to the NPP satellite; in January 2008, to add the
Clouds and the Earth's radiant energy sensor to NPP; and in May 2008 to
add the Total solar irradiance sensor to the first NPOESS satellite.
These decisions are expected to provide continuity for these sensors
through approximately 2015. Table 7 shows the latest planned
configuration of NPOESS satellites. NASA officials noted that they also
took steps to mitigate a potential gap in total solar irradiance data
by proposing to fund an additional four years of the SORCE mission
(from 2008 to 2012).
Agencies Lack Plans to Ensure Long-Term Data Continuity
While NASA, NOAA, and DOD have taken preliminary steps to address
the climate and space sensors that were removed from the NPOESS program
almost two years ago, they do not yet have plans for restoring climate
and space environment data on a long-term basis. Specifically, there
are as yet no firm plans for obtaining most of this data after 2015.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy, an organization within the
Executive Office of the President, is currently working with NASA,
NOAA, and DOD to sort through the costs and benefits of the various
options and to develop plans. However, this effort has been under way
for almost two years and officials could not estimate when such plans
would be completed.
Delays in developing a comprehensive strategy for ensuring climate
and space data continuity may result in the loss of selected options.
For example, NASA and NOAA estimated that they would need to make a
decision on whether to build another satellite to obtain ocean
altimeter data in 2008. Also, the NPOESS program office estimated that
if any sensors are to be restored to an NPOESS satellite, it would need
a decision about six years in advance of the planned satellite launch.
Specifically, for a sensor to be included on the second NPOESS
satellite, the sponsoring agency would need to commit to do so by
January 2010.
Without a timely decision on a plan for restoring satellite data on
a long-term basis, NASA, NOAA, and DOD risk losing their windows of
opportunity on selected options and restoring sensors in an ad hoc
manner. Ultimately, the agencies risk a break in the continuity of
climate and space environment data. As national and international
concerns about climate change and global warming grow, these data are
more important than ever to try to understand long-term climate trends
and impacts.
GAO Made Recommendations to Ensure That Future Climate Needs Are
Addressed and to Complete Restructuring Activities
Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS
program to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical
weather, environmental, and climate observations, in our accompanying
report\16\ we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and
Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to establish plans on whether
and how to restore the climate and space sensors removed from the
NPOESS program by June 2009, in cases where the sensors are warranted
and justified. In their comments on the report, all three agencies
concurred with our recommendations. In addition, both the Department of
Commerce and NASA reiterated that they are working with their partner
agencies to finalize plans for restoring sensors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ GAO-08-518.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, we also reemphasized a recommendation made in our
prior report that the appropriate NASA, NOAA, and DOD executives
immediately finalize key acquisition documents. All three agencies also
concurred with this recommendation. Further, Commerce noted that DOD
and NASA executives need to weigh in to resolve issues at, or
immediately below, their levels in order to ensure prompt completion of
the key acquisition documents. NASA noted that difficulties in gaining
consensus across all three NPOESS agencies have delayed the signature
of key acquisition documents, and reported that they are committed to
moving these documents through the signature cycle once all of the
issues and concerns are resolved.
In summary, over the past year, program officials have completed
major activities associated with restructuring the NPOESS program and
have made progress in developing and testing sensors, ground systems,
and the NPP spacecraft. However, multiple risks remain. Agency
executives have still not signed off on key acquisition documents that
were originally to be completed in September 2006, and now DOD is
threatening to withhold funding if the documents are not completed by
August 2008--even though DOD has contributed to the delays in
completing these documents. Also, one critical sensor has experienced
technical problems and schedule delays that have led program officials
to delay the NPP launch date by about eight months. Any delay in the
NPP launch date shortens the time available for incorporating lessons
learned from NPP onto future NPOESS missions and could also lead to
gaps in critical climate and weather data. In addition, risks to the
program remain in resolving interagency disagreements on the
appropriate level of system security and in revising estimated costs
for satellite operations and support. The program office is aware of
these risks and is working to mitigate them, but continued problems
could affect the program's overall schedule and cost.
When selected climate and space weather sensors were removed from
the NPOESS program during its restructuring, NASA, NOAA, and DOD became
responsible for determining what environmental data to restore and how
to restore them. This responsibility includes justifying the additional
funding needed to develop these sensors within their respective
agency's investment decision processes. In the two years since the
restructuring, the agencies have identified their priorities and
assessed their options for restoring sensor capabilities. In addition,
the agencies made decisions to restore two sensors to the NPP satellite
and one to the first NPOESS satellite in order to mitigate near-term
data gaps. However, the agencies lack plans for restoring sensor
capabilities on a long-term basis. Without a timely decision on a long-
term plan for restoring satellite data, the agencies risk a break in
the continuity of climate and space environment data. With the
increased concern about climate change and global warming, these data
are more important than ever to try to understand long-term climate
trends and impacts.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions that you or Members of the Committee may have at
this time.
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,
please contact me. Other key contributors to this testimony include
Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director), Kate Agatone, and Kathleen S.
Lovett.
Biography for David A. Powner
Experience
Twenty years' experience in information technology issues in both
public and private sectors.
Education
Business Administration, University of Denver
Senior Executive Fellows Program, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy
School of Government
Director, IT Management Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Dave is currently responsible for a large segment of GAO's
information technology (IT) work, including systems development, IT
investment management, health IT, and cyber critical infrastructure
protection reviews.
In the private sector, Dave has held several executive-level
positions in the telecommunications industry, including overseeing IT
and financial internal audits, and software development associated with
digital subscriber lines (DSL).
At GAO, Dave has led teams reviewing major IT modernization efforts
at Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station, the National Weather Service,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service.
These reviews covered many information technology areas including
software development maturity, information security, and enterprise
architecture.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Powner. Admiral
Lautenbacher, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL CONRAD C. LAUTENBACHER, JR. (U.S.
NAVY, RET.), UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR OCEANS AND
ATMOSPHERE; ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION (NOAA)
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson, Ranking Member Inglis, and distinguished
Members of the Committee, and staff, I appreciate this
opportunity to provide an update on the development of the
NPOESS, the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System program and discuss the latest Government
Accountability Office report. I continue to value and use the
input and insight provided by Mr. Powner and his team at GAO.
NOAA's two environmental satellite programs are the
backbone of the Nation's hurricane and severe weather
forecasting and warning capabilities. Today we are here to talk
about our next generation polar satellite program, NPOESS. As
you know, the original goal of the NPOESS program was to
combine the polar satellite needs and requirements of the Air
Force and NOAA into one program while also providing a
continuation of certain NASA satellite measurements, mostly in
the climate area.
While it has been said before, I must reiterate: satellite
acquisitions are complex and difficult endeavors. This program
also has the additional complexity of being a tri-agency effort
made up of the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense,
and NASA. Now, because of the Executive Committee's key
decisions that were begun prior to the Nunn-McCurdy review in
2006, management and oversight of this program has been vastly
improved, but we still face significant challenges as outlined
by GAO.
It is important for the Committee to understand that, as
mentioned in the GAO testimony, the other four main
instruments, as well as the satellite bus and ground system are
on budget, on schedule, and performing well in testing with no
significant concerns. I continue to remain concerned, however,
about contractor performance and management as it pertains to
the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite known as VIIRS.
VIIRS continues to be our most challenging instrument to
develop. With the government management system now in place, I
believe we are better positioned to identify, contain, and
manage proactively the challenges as they arise. After testing
late last year, for example, showed some technical problems
with cooling systems and circuit boards, a complete review was
held and the delivery of the instrument had to be delayed about
eight months which in turn delayed the NPP NASA launch by eight
months from September of 2009 to June 2010. There was no effect
on the C-1 through C-4 satellite schedule.
In the last two weeks--to indicate our ability to keep this
committee updated--within the last two weeks during integration
testing, as mentioned, the program uncovered some quality and
workmanship issues with certain fasteners which hold the
different pieces of VIIRS together. I am happy to report this
morning that we have received an update last night from our
technical assessment team that the effect of this manufacturing
flaw will likely be very minimal to the program. At this time
we do not anticipate it will delay the delivery of the VIIRS
sensor to NPP. I believe this issue is under control at this
point.
The Cross-track Infrared Sounder, CrIS, is undergoing final
preparation for delivery at the end of July 2008 to begin
integration on the NPP satellite. The Ozone Mapping and
Profiler Suite, called OMPS, the Limb and Nadir instruments
that will fly on NPP have been tested and integrated as a unit.
Specifically, regarding GAO's most recent report on NPOESS, the
first recommendation calls for plans to restore the climate and
space sensors removed from the NPOESS program by June 2009. As
the Committee knows, this has been a high priority for NOAA and
the Administration. The EXCOM has approved restoring the OMPS
Limb and CERES\4\ instruments onto NPP and remanifesting
TSIS\5\ onto the first NPOESS satellite. Meeting the deadlines
to integrate these instruments onto NPP and the first NPOESS
satellite will require fully funding the Administration's $74
million climate sensor request in the fiscal year 2009 budget.
I am pleased to indicate that we have gained support from the
Appropriations Committees for these initiatives and look
forward to successful work on restoring these sensors.
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\4\ Clouds and Earth's Radiant Energy System
\5\ Total Solar Irradiance Sensor
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are actively working on plans for the rest of the
climate sensors de-manifested from NPOESS. In the near-term for
Altimetry, the Jason-2 mission is expected to launch this
month, and we have begun preliminary work on the Jason-3
mission which will allow continuity through the next couple of
decades. With regard to aerosol measurements, they will be
continued through the NASA's upcoming Glory mission, and we
will look at the results from that and work on the follow-on.
Regarding a restoration of the space weather sensors, we
continue to work closely with NASA, the Air Force, and the
space/weather user community to ensure that plans address user
requirements. We have provided the Office of Science and
Technology Policy at the White House with a report earlier this
year to explain what the issues are, and we are awaiting
further direction for the next steps and expect that to happen
shortly.
The second recommendation by GAO re-emphasizes the prior
recommendation that appropriate NASA, NOAA, and DOD executives
immediately finalize key acquisition documents. I
wholeheartedly agree with this recommendation. We have made
significant progress. Sixteen of the 22 documents have been
finalized. My team and I have been working very hard with the
EXCOM and DOD to reach the agreements required to complete the
six outstanding ADM\6\ documents. I am prepared to go through
each one and explain the issues that are involved with them if
you desire, or I can provide that for the record.
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\6\ Acquisition Decision Memorandum
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Let me conclude by addressing some concerns that have
arisen from a recent internal memo by Mr. John Young, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. This memo discussed performance measures for NPOESS
components, new cost estimates for the operations of NPOESS,
alternative management studies, and completion of the ADM
documents. Regarding performance measures for NPOESS, let me
assure the Committee that I and my EXCOM partners are committed
to ensuring NPOESS fulfills its six key performance parameters.
NPOESS will provide roughly 10 times more data at four times
the speed of our current satellites. It is a significant
increase, and it continues to be on track to do that. Mr.
Young's memo was trying to clarify that the whole NPOESS
program shouldn't be put at risk to meet a specific performance
capability. I agree, as the EXCOM does with Mr. Young. I
further clarified in a response letter that the user community
and the EXCOM should be involved in any decisions about changes
to performance given the Nunn-McCurdy review and our charge to
manage the program.
During the Nunn-McCurdy review, the focus--I am on cost
estimates now--the focus of cost estimators was on the
development and the launch of the satellite program, not on the
out-year operational costs which occur far down the line. After
the NPOESS contract had been restructured last fall, the EXCOM
asked the program budget staff to re-examine the original 2002
estimates for NPOESS operational costs used during the Nunn-
McCurdy review. We then asked the DOD independent cost
estimators for its review of the operations cost and ensure we
had the best information available to deal with this program.
Given that the program will now last longer, three to four
years longer, it appears that an additional $1 billion is
potentially required. We are reconciling at this point the
different estimates, and the Executive Committee will make any
final budget decisions on the expected increases. These
additional operations cost would not be effective until
beginning in the 2017 timeframe. They would be normal costs
that are applied to our budget as we apply operation costs
today to run the satellites we have in position and are again
not part of the procurement and development costs.
This timeframe also gives us time to examine alternatives
to ensure the most cost-effective solution for these
requirements. We believe we have alternatives to deal with
those estimates as they exist today. In addition, the program
budget staff and the independent cost estimators have
identified some likely growth in the NPOESS development and
production costs due mostly to the ongoing problems with VIIRS
as mentioned, and that regards the need to retain personnel as
the next VIIRS units are built. Estimates for these additional
costs are still being finalized, and we will reconcile them. It
is part of our deliberate process to ensure that next year's
budget is properly developed to ensure completion of this
system.
The Nunn-McCurdy certification called for the government to
make a decision in 2010 whether to proceed with the third and
fourth NPOESS satellites under the existing contract or develop
an alternative management structure, such as a different prime
contractor or having the government manage the instrument
production, for instance. PEO\7\ has completed and reported to
Mr. Young on the first phase of this study and indicated that
today no immediate management changes were warranted given what
has been put in place. However, the EXCOM has asked for six-
month updates as the PEO and the Independent Review Team
examine all aspects of the program for any possible changes in
preparation for the 2010 decision.
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\7\ Program Executive Officer
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Finally, with regard to Mr. Young's memo, some may suggest
its call for the administrative documents to be completed by
September 2008 or DOD funding would be re-evaluated shows a
lack of commitment to the program. From my experience, the DOD,
the Air Force, the Department of Commerce, and the Nation need
NPOESS to succeed. It is crucial to our ability to forecast
weather, for the war fighter, for our nation's citizens, and
for its impact on the Nation's economy. And since Mr. Young and
his office are a part of the ADM document process, and I have
talked to their office this morning, I have confidence that we
can all work together to finish this job very quickly. I
appreciate the Committee's continued interest in the success of
the NOAA satellite programs. I believe we are doing everything
we can possibly think of and bring into effect to keep this
program on track. We have instituted large-scale management and
oversight reforms. We have government officials at contractor
facilities participating in daily activities and daily
oversight meetings. We measure the daily cost/schedule
performance of the program at innumerable levels at this point.
We are making progress as indicated. But technical and
manufacturing problems can and will continue to arise, I
believe. We will continue to do our best to fix them. I am
happy to expand on any of these points and to answer questions
from the Committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Lautenbacher
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
(U.S. Navy, Ret.)
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Conrad C.
Lautenbacher, Jr., Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere and
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) in the Department of Commerce (DOC). I appreciate having the
opportunity to provide an update of our progress in the development of
the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) Program and discuss the latest Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report on the program. I will provide an update on the
Program since the June 7, 2007, hearing that reviewed the status of the
restructured NPOESS Program.
NOAA's environmental satellite programs are the backbone of the
Nation's hurricane and severe weather forecasting and warning
capabilities. The 30-year record of NOAA's environmental satellites to
the global climate record is also well known. NOAA's two major
satellite programs each play critical roles in providing environmental
information to the Nation. NOAA's Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellite (GOES) series is used for short-term weather
forecasting and severe storm tracking, while NOAA's Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series provides information
that is crucial to long-term weather predictions and climate modeling.
In early 2009, NOAA N-Prime, the last of the current NOAA POES series,
will be launched.
Status of the NPOESS Program
NOAA's satellite acquisitions are complex and difficult development
efforts. I will be the first to acknowledge that the government does
not have a strong track record with regard to recent satellite
acquisition development efforts. Through partnerships with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of
Defense (DOD), and our contracts with industry, we have built and are
reinforcing our team to successfully complete NPOESS satellite
development. We appreciate GAO's long-standing review of the NPOESS
Program and the guidance and oversight we have derived from it. NOAA is
working hard to develop our satellite programs within established cost
and schedule boundaries, and with the performance that the Nation
requires and expects.
The NPOESS program is funded equally (50:50) by DOC/NOAA and DOD/
Air Force annual appropriations. NASA conducts NPOESS Preparatory
Project (NPP) risk reduction and data continuity activities, DOD/Air
Force manages the acquisition contract, and DOC/NOAA provides overall
program management and operation of the system. Through FY 2008, the
NPOESS program will have incurred combined program costs of $4.4
billion. The President's FY 2009 Budget request for the NPOESS Program
is $577 million; of that amount, $288 million is requested for DOC/
NOAA, and $289 million for DOD/Air Force.
Since the NPOESS Program's restructure and the contract
renegotiation, we have completed a number of management changes that
have improved oversight:
Mr. Dan Stockton was selected as the new Program
Executive Officer by NOAA with the concurrence of the NPOESS
Executive Committee (EXCOM).
Colonel Ed Phillips was recently selected as System
Program Director. He currently serves as the acting System
Program Director. Prior to that, he was the NPOESS Deputy
Program Executive Officer.
A restructured NPOESS contract is in place that ties
contractor compensation to more objective measures of cost,
schedule, and performance.
The government has replaced the old award fee
structure with a clearer performance-based structure.
The Chief Executive Officers of Northrop Grumman and
Raytheon now attend the regularly scheduled NPOESS EXCOM
meetings to ensure that the appropriate resources of these
corporations are focused on the development and test issues of
the program.
Several key climate sensors have been remanifested
(or reinstated) on the NPP and NPOESS satellites.
A lower risk alternative to the Conical-scanned
Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS), the Microwave Imager/Sounder
(MIS), is being developed by the Naval Research Laboratory. The
MIS will be flown on the second (C-2) and third (C-3) NPOESS
satellites.
The current suite of instruments listed in Appendix 1
reflects the progress the government has made since 2006 to
continue weather and climate measurements.
As a part of the future planning for the program, the NPOESS
Integrated Program Office (IPO) has begun the Alternative Management
Study which will develop the options and assessments for viable
competing management structures for the NPOESS program. The Alternative
Management Study will support future acquisition strategies for the
EXCOM consideration.
A few of the NPOESS instruments continue to face challenges, but
with the Program Managers and Systems Engineers who are now in place, I
and the NPOESS EXCOM believe that the Program is better positioned to
proactively identify, contain, and manage these challenges as they
arise.
The table below lists the instruments on NPP and the C-1 satellite.
The Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) continues to
be our most challenging instrument to develop, and as such receives a
great deal of management and oversight by the government and NPOESS
contractor team. We have implemented a number of changes based on the
lessons learned during the events that lead to the 2006 restructuring
of the Program and on the issues we have encountered since then. The
tri-agency partners have instituted rigorous management and engineering
reviews to address and resolve problems in an orderly fashion, while at
the same time not posing undue risk to the overall Program. With
respect to the current challenges with the VIIRS instrument, the
Program Executive Officer and System Program Director, with assistance
from NASA, are working with the NPOESS contractors to focus the
appropriate attention and resources to address the VIIRS development
challenges.
As the Committee recently learned, the NPOESS program uncovered
some potentially significant fastener design flaws with VIIRS in the
past few weeks. Although we are cautiously optimistic that technical
assessments will result in minimal impact, the worst case scenario
could cause a several month delay to the delivery of VIIRS to NPP,
which could lead to a further launch delay for NPP.
The Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS) is undergoing extensive
planning and preparation for final sensor checklist items to be
complete in time for delivery for NPP integration at the end of July
2008. The Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS)-Limb and -Nadir
instruments that will fly on NPP have been integrated and a test of the
sensors has been completed.
With respect to the ground system, the IPO continues to make
progress on ``SafetyNet,'' a system of globally distributed ground data
reception stations that will receive data from NPOESS satellites and
immediately relay these data to the four Weather Centrals--NOAA/
National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service; Air
Force Weather Agency; Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography
Center; and Naval Oceanographic Office. The SafetyNet agreements are on
schedule and there are no outstanding obstacles that would prevent
completing the global ground system network.
Development of the Integrated Data Processing Segment (IDPS)
continues on-track. The IDPS will process environmental data products
beginning with the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) and continuing
through the lifetime of the NPOESS system. The IDPS must process a data
volume significantly greater than the current POES and DMSP systems and
within significantly reduced processing times. The IDPS recently
completed factory acceptance test readiness review.
Coordination of Tri-agency Acquisition Decision Memoranda
The IPO continues to coordinate among the tri-agency partners, DOD/
Air Force, NASA, and DOC/NOAA, to conclude and finalize the documents
required by the June 2006 Acquisition Decision Memorandum. Six
documents remain to be completed. While getting these remaining
documents finalized has not hindered our ability to manage and
implement the NPOESS Program thus far, they have been challenging to
coordinate through a tri-agency process. However, the EXCOM remains
committed to completing them. At this time, the six outstanding
documents are the:
Fee Management Plan
Acquisition Program Baseline
Acquisition Strategy Report
Test and Evaluation Master Plan
Two-Orbit Program
NPOESS Tri-Agency Memorandum of Agreement
The program is working to secure final clearance on the documents
by later this year.
Status of Restoring Key Climate Sensors
As discussed earlier, the 2006 decision to restructure the NPOESS
Program removed (or ``demanifested'') several planned sensors that
would have sustained key, long-standing climate measurements. The table
in Appendix 2 lists the current status of those demanifested sensors.
Since this decision, Office of Science Technology Policy (OSTP) and the
Office of Management and Budget have worked closely with NASA and NOAA
and the climate science community to understand the implications of the
loss of these climate sensors for climate and ocean research
activities, and to identify options for retaining key measurement
capabilities from this group of planned sensors.
As a result of these assessments and information provided in the
2007 National Research Council Decadal Survey on Earth Sciences, the
Administration concluded that the highest near-term priorities (listed
in relative priority order) are to sustain the data sets of the
following five key climate measurement capabilities:
Total solar irradiance
Earth radiation budget
RADAR altimetry
Ozone vertical profile
Aerosols
In addition to continuing these critical measurements, the
Administration also recognized the importance of stewardship of the
climate data records that will be derived from these instruments.
The Administration developed a plan to implement this assessment
and requested a $74 million budget initiative in the President's FY
2009 Budget Request. These funds will be used to support the
development of CERES and TSIS in time for their respective launches on
NPP and C-1. Specifically, the FY 2009 funds would be applied to the
development of the sensors in the following manner:
$38 million for development of CERES for NPP and C-1,
which will provide continuity for Earth radiation budget
measurements,
$28 million for development of TSIS for C-1, which
will provide continuity for total solar irradiance
measurements, and
$8.0 million for development of data record
stewardship to provide long-term science support for the data
derived from climate instruments.
This plan complies with the 2006 restructure of the NPOESS Program
that requires sensors be restored only if they are funded separately
from the joint DOC/NOAA-DOD/Air Force annual appropriations for NPOESS.
In this plan, NOAA is responsible for full funding to develop these
instruments with NASA providing technical and acquisition assistance on
a cost reimbursable basis from NOAA.
The plan includes two of the five key measurements detailed in the
priority list above. NOAA and NASA have determined that near-term
continuity of the other three measurements can be fulfilled through
existing plans detailed below:
Continuity of RADAR altimetry measurements can be
fulfilled through the Jason 2 mission scheduled for launch this
month. Plans for a follow-on satellite (Jason 3) are currently
being evaluated.
Aerosol measurements can be fulfilled with the 2009
launch of the Aerosol Polarimeter Sensor on the NASA GLORY
mission.
Ozone vertical profile data requirements can be
addressed by the NPOESS EXCOM's 2007 decision to remanifest
Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite Limb sensor (OMPS-Limb) with
the OMPS-Nadir sensor onto NPP.
While these efforts address the most immediate needs for climate
sensor continuity, it is recognized that a longer-term strategy for
climate sensor continuity must also be addressed. NOAA and NASA are
continuing to work together to identify the longer-term strategy,
taking into account current and future national and international
assets. The results of these efforts will continue to be vetted with
the science community and reflected in outyear budget recommendations.
Status of Demanifested Space Weather Sensors
In addition to the climate sensors discussed above, the Space
Environmental Sensor Suite, which includes five space weather sensors,
was demanifested from the NPOESS program in 2006. In June 2007, OSTP
requested that the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology
convene an interagency group to provide an assessment of the impact of
demanifesting these space weather sensors. NOAA, NASA, and the Air
Force participated in this assessment. The assessment and report
focused on evaluating whether and how to restore these space weather
measurements in a two phase approach:
Phase I: Assess the impacts of the 2006 NPOESS restructure
decisions and the potential loss of NASA's Advanced Composition
Explorer (ACE) mission on U.S. space weather-related
activities.
Phase II: Examine possible options to address these impacts
and to restore the capability lost.
The Phase I report was provided to OSTP earlier this year. The main
findings were that the 2006 restructuring of the NPOESS program:
reduced support of Environmental Data Records from 12
to 5,
may cause monitoring and warning capabilities to
revert to pre-1980 levels, and
put precision Global Positioning System (GPS) users
at risk.
Additionally, the loss of NASA's ACE data was deemed critical as it
would eliminate the ability to predict the onset of geomagnetic storms.
At this time, NASA has instituted a fuel management strategy that may
allow ACE to continue to perform until 2020. However, since there is no
ACE replacement in development, this single source of data remains an
area of concern for NOAA and the space weather community. While OSTP
has not formally initiated Phase II of the assessment, it is expected
to do so later this year.
In addition, the Committee was informed last month that NOAA is
currently working to mitigate the loss of some space weather
observation capabilities on three of four of its on-orbit geostationary
satellites. NOAA is currently relying on GOES-10, the oldest
geostationary satellite on orbit, to monitor solar flares, an
observation important to users of satellite and high frequency
communications and GPS. Plans for future mitigation following the end
of the satellite's service are being planned in partnership with NASA.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Recommendations for Executive
Action
GAO has provided regular reviews of the NPOESS Program and we
appreciate the perspective GAO professionals provide. We have met with
GAO and provided information and feedback on its most recent report and
believe that existing efforts underway will support the closure of
these recommendations.
Recommendation number one: In order to bring closure to efforts that
have been underway for years, we are making recommendations to the
Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to
establish plans on whether and how to restore the climate and space
sensors removed from the NPOESS Program by June 2009, in cases where
the sensors are warranted and justified.
NOAA concurs with the recommendation and continues to work with
OSTP, OMB, NASA, and the climate science community to restore the
climate sensors that were demanifested from the NPOESS Program in 2006.
While the NPOESS Program continues to face challenges, the tri-agency
NPOESS EXCOM, on the advice of the NPOESS Program Executive Officer,
approved remanifesting OMPS-Limb and CERES onto NPP, and remanifesting
TSIS onto the first NPOESS C-1 satellite. Meeting the required
deadlines to integrate these instruments onto NPP and NPOESS C-1
requires full funding of the DOC/NOAA and DOD/Air Force NPOESS Program,
and the NOAA climate sensor and climate data record budget requests. An
FY 2009 continuing resolution that did not provide full funding for the
$74 million for climate sensors would threaten the development of the
TSIS and CERES sensors and potentially put into question whether they
would be ready for integration onto the NPOESS C-1 mission. Restoration
of the other measurements will occur in the later years, as previously
discussed.
Restoration of the space weather sensors is being modeled after the
collaborative interagency process with OSTP and OMB that was used to
assess the demanifested climate sensors. NOAA continues to work closely
with user communities affected by space weather to ensure that its
plans address user requirements. NOAA is also working closely with NASA
to maximize the utility of the ACE satellite. In the interim, NOAA has
requested input from the aerospace industry and several suggested
concepts and proposals are being evaluated as potential commercial
opportunities for data purchases, secondary payload opportunities, and
commercially provided satellites to meet projected NOAA observational
requirements.
Recommendation number two: In addition, we are reemphasizing our prior
recommendation that the appropriate NASA, NOAA, DOD executives
immediately finalize key acquisition documents.
NOAA concurs with this recommendation and has been working with the
tri-agency NPOESS EXCOM to reach the agreements required to complete
the six outstanding Acquisition Decision Memorandum documents.
Recently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics issued an extension until August 2008 to complete the
documents. The NPOESS Program Executive Officer has made completing
this task one of his top priorities and the EXCOM Principals and their
staffs are supporting his efforts.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I appreciate the Committee's continued interest in
the success of NOAA's satellite programs. It is widely acknowledged
that satellites are very complicated and difficult systems to design,
build, and operate. However, their capabilities play a key role in
NOAA's mission to observe and predict the Earth's environment and to
provide critical information used in protecting life and property.
We are making significant strides in developing better processes
for designing and acquiring our satellites. We currently have well
functioning operational satellites with backup systems in place, and we
are working on the next generation that will provide significant
improvements in our ability to forecast the weather and monitor the
climate. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Biography for Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., Navy (Ret.)
A native of Philadelphia, Pa., retired Navy Vice Admiral Conrad C.
Lautenbacher, Ph.D., is serving as the Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere. He was appointed Dec. 19, 2001. Along with this
title comes the added distinction of serving as the eighth
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
He holds an M.S. and Ph.D. from Harvard University in applied
mathematics.
Lautenbacher oversees the day-to-day functions of NOAA, as well as
laying out its strategic and operational future. The agency manages an
annual budget of $4 billion. The agency includes, and is comprised of,
the National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Services;
National Marine Fisheries Service; National Ocean Service; National
Weather Service; Oceanic and Atmospheric Research; Marine and Aviation
Operations; and the NOAA Corps, the Nation's seventh uniformed service.
He directed an extensive review and reorganization of the NOAA
corporate structure to meet the environmental challenges of the 21st
century.
As the NOAA administrator, Lautenbacher spearheaded the first-ever
Earth Observation Summit, which hosted ministerial-level representation
from several dozen of the world's nations in Washington July 2003.
Through subsequent international summits and working groups, he worked
to encourage world scientific and policy leaders to work toward a
common goal of building a sustained Global Earth Observation System of
Systems (GEOSS) that would collect and disseminate data, information
and models to stakeholders and decision-makers for the benefit of all
nations individually and the world community collectively. The effort
culminated in an agreement for a 10-year implementation plan for GEOSS
reached by the 55 member countries of the Group on Earth Observations
at the Third Observation Summit held in Brussels February 2005.
He also has headed numerous delegations at international
governmental summits and conferences around the world, including the
U.S. delegation to 2002 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Ocean
Ministerial Meeting in Korea, and 2002 and 2003 meetings of the World
Meteorological Organization and Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission in Switzerland and France, as well as leading the Commerce
delegation to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in South
Africa.
Before joining NOAA, Lautenbacher formed his own management
consultant business, and worked principally for Technology, Strategies
& Alliances Inc. He was president and CEO of the Consortium for
Oceanographic Research and Education (CORE). This not-for-profit
organization has a membership of 76 institutions of higher learning and
a mission to increase basic knowledge and public support across the
spectrum of ocean sciences.
Lautenbacher is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (Class of
1964), and has won accolades for his performance in a broad range of
operational, command and staff positions both ashore and afloat. He
retired after 40 years of service in the Navy. His military career was
marked by skilled fiscal management and significant improvements in
operations through performance-based evaluations of processes.
During his time in the Navy, he was selected as a Federal Executive
Fellow and served at the Brookings Institution. He served as a guest
lecturer on numerous occasions at the Naval War College, the Army War
College, the Air War College, The Fletcher School of Diplomacy, and the
components of the National Defense University.
His Navy experience includes tours as Commanding Officer of USS
HEWITT (DD-966), Commander Naval Station Norfolk; Commander of Cruiser-
Destroyer Group Five with additional duties as Commander U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command Riyadh during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, where he was in charge of Navy planning and participation
in the air campaign. As Commander U.S. Third Fleet, he introduced joint
training to the Pacific with the initiation of the first West Coast
Joint Task Force Training Exercises (JTFEXs).
A leader in the introduction of cutting-edge information
technology, he pioneered the use of information technology to mount
large-scale operations using sea-based command and control. As
Assistant for Strategy with the Chief of Naval Operations Executive
Panel, and Program Planning Branch Head in the Navy Program Planning
Directorate, he continued to hone his analytic skills resulting in
designation as a specialist both in Operations Analysis and Financial
Management. During his final tour of duty, he served as Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments) in
charge of Navy programs and budget.
Lautenbacher lives in Northern Virginia with his wife Susan who is
a life-long high school and middle school science teacher.
Discussion
Executive Committee Performance
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Admiral Lautenbacher. Let us
start with Mr. Powner and then go to the discussion about the
Executive Committee. This committee has been told that the
Executive Committee represents the group responsible for the
top decisions in the NPOESS program. We have had many concerns
about the EXCOM performance. You have seen the EXCOM in
operation. What, to you, explains the repeated difficulty in
getting decisions made on the NPOESS issues?
Mr. Powner. Mr. Chairman, I think when we look at these key
acquisition documents, the one area where we want to fault the
program is the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee was
put in place to ensure that we work appropriately across
organizational boundaries. We have different cultures, we have
different bureaucratic processes. We are running into that, but
that is still no excuse. The Executive Committee needs to step
up and to ensure that these key acquisition documents get
signed. I think the threat from DOD is not a bad thing given
that we now have this August deadline to get these signed, but
DOD is equally at fault here. I mean, almost every one of the
documents they mention in their memo are waiting approval at
DOD.
Chairman Lampson. At just the one agency, Department of
Defense?
Mr. Powner. No, there is also--we had information as of two
days ago, and there were still some documents in the Department
of Commerce that needed approval also. So we have multiple
organizations that need to agree to these documents and to
ensure that they get signed off so that we can move forward.
And it is key that we have interagency agreement here. And one
of these documents is the approved baseline. You know, there is
a fundamental question about what baseline are we working off
and when are we going to start the clock ticking for perhaps,
you know, measurement for the next Nunn-McCurdy decision. Right
now, we don't have a baseline that we are marching off of right
now.
Chairman Lampson. Is it the individuals who sit on the
Committee or is it the culture of the agencies that is
preventing the individuals who are sitting on the Committee
from being able to make these decisions?
Mr. Powner. Both. I think the individuals on the Executive
Committee were put in place to work within their organizations,
but clearly, I am sure the Admiral would agree, there are
individuals above him at both organizations where there has
been a hang-up. But still, that is no excuse for the Executive
Committee not to step up and work upwards to get these key
documents approved.
Chairman Lampson. Admiral, in the period leading up to the
Nunn-McCurdy restructuring of NPOESS, this committee examined a
good bit of the communications that went from the Integrated
Program Office to the EXCOM. We became concerned because it
appeared that at a time when the program needed firm
leadership, the EXCOM regularly postponed decisions, if it met
at all. The Department's Inspector General determined that the
EXCOM did not challenge optimistic statements by the program
manager even as the VIIRS instrument fell further behind
schedule and grew in cost. You testified to the Committee at a
hearing two years ago that there would be quarterly EXCOM
meetings, and you ``insisted that management processes must be
made more transparent and auditable and strengthened at all
levels.'' Has the Executive Committee reverted to their old
habits?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. No, we have not. There has been
significant changes made in the process as a result of the
Nunn-McCurdy review and the steps that we actually took before
the Nunn-McCurdy review began. I am happy to go through--we
have agreed and we have bent schedules and made sure that we
have had quarterly meetings, whether we needed one or not. They
are auditable, they are trackable, and I am happy to provide
the record of all the decisions that were made. There have been
nine EXCOMs since that particular meeting. There have been over
40 decisions made to ensure this program stays on track in a
timely and meaningful manner. There have been dozens of phone
calls and personal interactions to deal with this. This is a
program that in my experience in 40 years of working in the
Navy and seven years, I have never seen this level of detail
and involvement at the agency-head level in the individual
management of a program that is taking place in NPOESS. So this
is providing--we have provided a baseline for continual
dialogue. It still is a difficult program to manage because of
the three agencies. You mentioned the culture before. But I
want to iterate that the issue with this program is not
necessarily the management structure at this point, it is
contractor performance on a particular instrument called VIIRS,
and that is where we are focusing our attention and that is the
issue that needs to be solved to make this program come around
and be on schedule and meet the needs. And we are focused
intently on getting that system in place.
Chairman Lampson. Do you agree with that, Mr. Powner, that
that is the primary or the single----
Mr. Powner. I agree that the performance of VIIRS is the
largest question mark on this program. However, the threat to
withholding funding with these documents not being signed is a
big issue. If in fact funds are withheld for fiscal year 2009,
it has a devastating affect because of the matching that needs
to occur with the NOAA funding portion. So I agree that VIIRS
is the number one problem in contractor performance, but now
that we got this new wrinkle with DOD throwing in the threat to
withhold funding, this is a big deal.
Chairman Lampson. Okay. My time is up in just a few
seconds, so I am going to hold my question for a minute, and I
will now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Inglis for five
minutes.
Continuity Concerns
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of key
questions. I suppose one is cost which you have been
discussing. The other is continuity, and Admiral, you are
confident that we have got continuity in spite of this delay,
is that correct?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, I am confident we have the
continuity. There has been a delay in NPP, but the systems that
are in place today, and the N-Prime satellite which has not
been launched yet, which will be launched after next year, will
last long enough to cover the gap. There has been no effect on
the C-1 launch. So the satellites that we have to launch to
have available for coverage are sufficient to cover the time
until the C-1 instruments are launched in 2013.
Mr. Inglis. At some point we start getting, if we try to
cross this intersection, we get to a yellow light and in
squeezing the orange here at some point we are going to get the
red light. So when is the--we are still safely--it is a green
light, is that right? We are not even in the yellow yet?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. We are still safely in the green
light given the Nunn-McCurdy review that we had. Remember, we
had to delay the program because of the initial manufacturing
problems with the VIIRS instruments. This instrument has
experienced problems across the whole, and let me say that
versus what the EXCOM has been doing, that I have been
personally on this VIIRS issue since I took over this job and
have been beating up on the contractors and the program office
to deal with VIIRS. So it is not an unknown problem to the
EXCOM, and the EXCOM has been involved in working on trying to
resolve problems with VIIRS for a long, long time. So it is not
an issue that there is absentee management from a government
perspective on the issue.
But given that statement, the change in the delay of NPP
will not affect the continuity of our system at this point.
There is sufficient overlap of the satellites that we have in
orbit and stocked up to continue our coverage as we have today.
Mr. Inglis. Mr. Powner, does GAO agree as we approach this
continuity intersection, the light is still green, we are not
running the yellow yet or----
Mr. Powner. Yeah, we would agree with that. I think the key
deadlines of NPP now is a June 2010 date, and then C-1 is
January 2013. If those start to slip, then it is another story
and there is a new ball game here.
The other thing, too, is if NPP would slip--that was a
demonstration satellite that we were to learn and incorporate
that into further builds. So if that would happen to slip, you
lose that opportunity to incorporate those lessons learned.
Mr. Inglis. So this is good news in that we are--it is a
very important project that is going to provide important data
for military and civilian purposes. So we have got continuity
covered, and that is good.
How about--it seems a little bit funny for DOD to--maybe a
good defense is a good offense--no, a good offense is a good
defense I guess is what it is. Maybe what they are trying to do
is just--if they have the documents and they are not working,
not moving them, then what is the deal on that? Anybody got an
observation about why they are being critical even though they
may be holding the documents?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. If I could respond for a minute,
I have been very vocal,k publicly and privately, about the need
to get these documents done. And I expressed to DOD that I
would like some help in getting these things signed because
many of the issues that need to be resolved are at offices that
are above my pay grade. And so this is one of the results of
that; these kinds--I don't want to call it a threat but I am
hoping there is enough attention. I do not believe this is an
EXCOM issue directly, although we are responsible for it and I
am going to work this until the last ``i'' is dotted and ``t''
is crossed on it. But we are not lacking from the EXCOM
perspective in trying to press the system to sign off on these
documents.
And I would tell you that the progress that we have made,
what is left to deal with on these documents is not critical to
making progress on this program. I can go through each one of
these documents and explain that to you if you wish at this
point. But we have created--16 of these documents, are signed,
delivered, and working. We have a full schedule, we have a
contract signed, we have monitors in progress, we have earned
value, we have all of the pieces that we need to make progress
day-to-day on this program and meet schedules. What is left are
important documents. They need to be signed, and I don't
disagree with that; and I am going to work extremely hard to
try to make this deadline, and I am pleased that Mr. Young is
interested in making a deadline, too. I called their office
this morning to make sure they were on-board with this, and
that is the word I got back. So I hope with this incentive
there would be more pressure to move the final wording, and
there are only a few small points that are left from these
documents to deal with.
Mr. Inglis. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. Inglis. And I recognize
Mr. McNerney for five minutes.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, one of the
things that you said that really stuck me was that you have
never seen agency-head involvement at this level of detail.
Now, my experience in industry is when management gets involved
in the details, it has a tendency to make things worse, and I
certainly think there is an opportunity for that here. What is
your opinion on that?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I think that is a good
observation, and I have tried to be careful to do this in a way
to not undercut the expertise and the value of the people put
in place to make the decisions at the right level. I have been
involved in this business for a long time, too. I came to
Washington in 1971, I have been an independent cost estimator,
I have run programs, I have been a budgeteer, I have looked at
management oversight over a wide variety of programs in the
Navy, and I am very sensitive to the comment that you just
made. When I say being involved, what I am talking about is
being briefed and being cognizant of it, making sure that as we
make decisions we know as much in depth as possible in the time
allotted to do it. I have not tried to interfere. I can't speak
for my contemporaries, but I have not tried to interfere in
micro-management that I believe would be counterproductive to
the smooth operation of the program.
Mr. McNerney. Well, you just said you weren't involved in
micro-management, but does the progress with the documents, is
that also taking place at the highest levels----
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. It is.
Mr. McNerney.--of the agency?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. It is. Well, first of all, I
brief the Deputy Secretary of Commerce every week on the full
status of this program, including the documents. I also have,
internal to my organization, the Program Management Council,
with my Chief Operating Officer, that goes through the status
at least monthly. I go through a monthly full up-status with my
staff on what is going on. So I understand what is happening,
and I push people when they need to be pushed and I try to keep
this working. Otherwise, we wouldn't have gotten the 16 of the
22 signed that we have or be as close as we are on the last
six.
The VIIRS Sensor
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. As a scientist, I want to ask a
little bit about the VIIRS sensor, but I am afraid I am going
to run out of time before you could give me a good explanation
of that. You mentioned that you got a call last night that
indicated that that was going to be deliverable on time now.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, sir.
Mr. McNerney. How confident are you of that result, of that
information?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. As with all information that
comes in without sufficient time to sit on it and to look at it
and examine it, I always reserve the right to make sure that it
is correct. We have asked for a full court press obviously in
this particular issue because I view it as a serious one to
look at what needs to be done to ensure that the fasteners are
correctly in place and will maintain the integrity during the
testing phase which is where we are now. A full court press was
put on, day and night, looking--we sent our own people out
there as well as--when I say, government people as well as the
manufacturer's people, to look at it, and this is the report.
We asked them to do it as quickly as possible because we
reported to the Committee and I wanted to have an answer today
for you on where we stand on that, sir.
Mr. McNerney. Mr. Powner, do you share his level of
confidence with regard to the delivery of that sensor?
Mr. Powner. This is new information for us in terms of with
the latest problem. The concern with VIIRS is this: every time
you turn around and look at VIIRS, there is another
manufacturing or technical problem, and there has been a
history of that. So I think we are far from being out of the
woods on VIIRS, and it still is the number one concern on this
program.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Mr. McNerney. Dr. Bartlett,
you are recognized for five minutes.
The Gap Between Satellite Launches
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. A couple of years ago,
Admiral, when we had an oversight Subcommittee hearing on this
issue, there was some major concern that the delays in
launching these satellites were going to result in a lapse of
coverage. What has happened to fill that gap?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Obviously we have come down the
road more than two years now. The satellite launches that we
have scheduled for continuity have worked basically, so we have
two years more of experience that we have satellites in orbit
that are operating and providing us the information. So we have
more confidence because we actually have hardware in the air
that is functioning. So issues that could have caused an
absence of information coming from space have been covered by
the fact that we have been successful in the program that we
predicted we would be able to execute two years ago.
Mr. Bartlett. There are two general reasons for the delays
here. One is the coordination difficulties with this tri-
agency. The other is that we have done here what we so often do
in DOD and that is that we push the envelope, and we never come
to the point that says this is good enough. We have really
pretty good weather data that has been coming in now for a
number of years. Which of these has been the primary reason for
the problems here? Has it been the difficulties coordinating
three very different agencies or has it been that we just were
too optimistic about what could be done with this technology?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I believe it is the latter, sir.
I believe that we have been optimistic about the technology.
The VIIRS instrument, for instance, was supposed to be modeled
after the MODIS\8\ instrument, which was an R&D instrument that
has been working in space as an R&D instrument, not as an
operational instrument. And people felt that, well, if we did
this much with MODIS, we could do this much with VIIRS; and we
already sort of built MODIS, so let us build a bigger VIIRS. It
hasn't been tested, so it is a new instrument and it is having
the same issues that we always have when we try to develop
something new. I have been a proponent of doing more testing
and incremental approaches to our capability to ensure that we
have continuity, and I think that is why we are where we are.
That is one of the prime reasons we are where we are.
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\8\ Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer
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Mr. Bartlett. It is axiomatic, I think, that industry is
going to be perhaps overly optimistic about what they can do
because they are in the mode of selling, and they are going to
win if they promise more. And frequently they promise more than
can be realistically delivered. I worked for five years for an
agency in the Navy that was kind of an honest broker. That was
at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, and that
lab never competes with industry so industries share their
deepest proprietary secrets. But what the lab does is to tell
the Navy, now more broadly the military and NASA, this is
probably going to work, this is probably not going to work.
For programs like this, who do we have to turn to ask them,
is it realistic to expect that industry really can do what they
promised to do?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. We have the ability to go to a
number of the FFRDCs\9\ or independent--we go--John Hopkins is
obviously a place where we can go, and we have used John
Hopkins to help NOAA. I won't speak for the other agencies that
are involved here. And we also use the Aerospace Corporation.
We use Noblis company to deal with some of these issues. NOAA
uses independent advice to look at the feasibility of moving it
into the future. Now, I want to say your question is a very
important one. With one of the issues that the decisions that
were made was to delay what is called the CMIS\10\ or the
MIS\11\ instrument because we believe it was exactly the same
problem we would have with VIIRS. So we delayed that
instrument. What we are doing with that instrument--so we
revised the specs on it. We are engaging--we had competition,
if you want to call it that, with FFRDCs to give us the best
proposal to design something that would work, based on
technology that has already been proven, and the Naval Research
Laboratory--NRL--is now building a prototype for us which will
transfer the technology to an industry partner to build it with
hopefully a lot less risk and more assurity that when that
instrument goes on C-2, it will work and it will be within cost
and schedule. So I think your comments are very pertinent.
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\9\ Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers
\10\ Conical-Scanning Microwave Imager and Sounder
\11\ Microwave Imager/Sounder
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
More on the Executive Committee's Performance
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Dr. Bartlett. The Chair will
recognize himself for the next five minutes.
Admiral, the Committee appreciates receiving the
presentation on the alternative management study which your
staff was kind enough to send us last night at 10:24. I note
that the team convened to evaluate changes said this, ``EXCOM
is too senior to provide the routine immediate assistance often
needed at this stage of a program.'' That seems to say that
EXCOM isn't adding any value to the NPOESS management. Can you
comment on that, please? Would you agree?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Could you read--I am not sure. I
would have to get the context of that. Obviously, there are
many things that we probably--as brought up in the previous
questioning about micro-management and various things. What is
the particular reference there because I think we are--we
should play in the alternative management study in terms of the
strategies that are used for the future. I want to make sure I
understand what you are----
Chairman Lampson. It is in a chart----
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Okay.
Chairman Lampson.--talking about the existing program
structure.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. And it says?
Chairman Lampson. EXCOM is too senior to provide the
routine immediate assistance often needed at this stage of the
program.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. And I would have to look at the
chart. Let me discuss the philosophy and what is involved with
that and what is involved with the EXCOM.
First of all, EXCOM sounds like it is a bad title from an
old science fiction movie. It is not some magic deal, it is
just the agency heads. So it is the agency heads that are
responsible for these programs.
Chairman Lampson. But it is those people who are supposed
to make the management decisions to move this thing forward.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, it is, and at that level.
So there is always an issue of what--and in fact, when we have
had this issue of where the acquisition authority milestone
ought to be in the Department of Commerce, it would be with the
Secretary. Our independent review said, it probably should not
be with the Secretary because he does not have the time or the
ability to be able to deal at the levels needed to add value to
that. So it should be at a lower level, and it came down. It
was at my level that it was put.
So there are always questions as to what levels decisions
should be made. We have tried to balance the decisions with the
information that comes up, and you have to be careful not to
micro-manage areas where you may not have enough information to
be able to do it. So in this particular one, I have to go back
and look at this chart to be sure. I am not sure what this
chart is exactly trying to imply.
Chairman Lampson. Well, I would imagine that something
wouldn't make it to this committee unless the lower level
needed the help of that decision and couldn't go forward----
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Right.
Chairman Lampson.--in the event that it didn't have it. I
would hope that they would be asking those things that they
most critically need of the EXCOM and be able to move forward
from there.
Acquisition Document Approval
You testified that gaining concurrence on the NPOESS
acquisition documents has been challenging to coordinate
through a tri-agency process. What precisely are the areas of
disagreement that have stretched this process out for more than
a year?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. You have to walk a mile in my
moccasins before you can really understand this, and it is hard
to say, ``Well, why isn't this done?''
There are a number of offices in each bureaucracy that deal
with this. So there are at least five big bureaucracies. There
is the Department of Commerce, above my pay grade, the
Department of Defense above the pay grade--above the Air Force.
Then there is the Department of the Air Force. Those are big
departments. They have their own lawyers, they have their own
acquisition program management structures, they have their own
connections with the operating forces--Space Command--that
comes in and kibitzes on each one of these. Their comments come
up and down these various levels, then they come across to us
to see if we agree. We turn around as quickly as we can and get
them back over there. So by the time you work this process----
Chairman Lampson. Let me interrupt. I have got less than a
minute left.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lampson. Talk about some--you said you have the
documents that show some of those differences.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes.
Chairman Lampson. Tell us what----
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Let me tell you where we are.
First of all, as I have said before, these documents that are
not signed with the ``i's'' dotted and ``t's'' crossed yet are
not holding up progress on this program, are not affecting our
ability to manage it and create the progress that we need.
Chairman Lampson. Okay, but give me an example of something
that is.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Okay. I'm sorry, say again?
Chairman Lampson. An example of something that is.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I don't have any examples on
this list that are. The seven--and if you count the alternative
management study, I have already explained that we are doing an
alternative management study and that is a decision to be made
in 2010.
Chairman Lampson. What is the disagreement then in the
Memorandum of Agreement?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Okay. In the Memorandum of
Agreement? In the Memorandum of Agreement, it is about trying
to define the authority of the Acquisition Executive in DOD.
DOD is the acquisition authority. We work under their contract
rules. And this is an internal DOD issue to line up the ``i's''
and ``t's'' to make sure the lawyers--this is being massaged by
lawyers at this point--to ensure that the wording is exactly
correct. Now, I want to point out that the Memorandum of
Agreement--there is a Memorandum of Agreement in place and we
are working under it. We worked under it for the Nunn-McCurdy,
and it is effective. And we follow all the rules, and we are
trying to make a couple of changes to it.
Chairman Lampson. Okay. Does it need to be changed because
of Nunn-McCurdy?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. It does. It does need----
Chairman Lampson. But when will it be?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I have to defer to the
Department of Defense on that. We are under the gun to do this
by the end of August. I am going to do everything I can to have
them get this finished.
Chairman Lampson. Okay. You can't force them to do it.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I can't force----
Chairman Lampson. What does it take to make them do it? Do
we have to take action?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I certainly hope not. I
certainly hope that there is enough----
Chairman Lampson. Okay. The award fee plan is awaiting the
Commerce Department decision. What is the problem with that?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. It is the Fee Management Plan.
First of all, award fees are done, taken care of. The Fee
Management Plan--there is one concern left from NASA, and their
concern is to talk about the specific issues on on-orbit
performance, something way down the road. The Fee Management
Plan--we have put in place a much stronger fee management plan.
It has been agreed to in the contract, agreed to by--this was,
remember, a complaint that we got several years ago that you
are not pushing the contractor enough. So remember, that has
totally changed, agreed to, and is in operation today. So that
is not an issue. So the Fee Management Plan on which we are
operating and forcing control by the contractor is in place.
This is about something that is in the future. We expect this
to be done very shortly. In fact, the word I have this morning,
like the technical issue that I mentioned, is that the concerns
are done and this is ready to be signed. It will be signed
today or tomorrow. I was hoping it would be signed before we
got here, but it is just about done.
Chairman Lampson. Okay. Let me pass another round to Mr.
Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Powner, do you
agree with the Admiral that the documents are not likely to--
the lack of the documents being signed is not holding us up at
this point?
Mr. Powner. Well, clearly, I think there are some items in
those documents that are important, but what we know, a lot of
these are minor issues. This is bureaucracy at its worst. I
mean, these are things that need to get signed and especially
now that there is a threat to future funding of the program.
These are items that we need. One other thing with the EXCOM.
If we have a bureaucratic process, the executives are put in
place to work through the bureaucracy and to get things done.
That is what executives do, whether it is below you, above you,
or at your level. And so again, I just want to reiterate that I
think the executives need to step up and ensure that these key
documents get signed.
Mr. Inglis. I am trying to figure out why the DOD would
threaten to withdraw or threaten to not meet the payment
schedule or withdraw funding. They have as much interest in
this as NOAA does, right? And if they are in fact holding the
documents, I am still mystified by that.
Mr. Powner. That circular argument is perplexing, although
I will add if you look back on the history of the NPOESS
program, there are times when some of DOD's actions, and I
mentioned this in my oral statement, where we questioned their
commitment to the program. If you go back historically, they
didn't fund the program fully at one point in time, and I think
this is another action that just raises a red flag about their
commitment to the program.
Mr. Inglis. Why would that be? That is a helpful thing to
know. They are thinking they don't--maybe this isn't their
number one priority or what is your guess on that?
Mr. Powner. Well, weather is clearly important to the
Department of Defense in many areas. Clearly there probably are
other priorities, and right now they have legacy systems that
provide the information they need.
Mr. Inglis. Do they think that the things that we are
adding to this, the complexities, the additional sensor, all
these kind of things, are beyond what their needs are and they
are sort of muscling their way to say, well, we really don't
want that anyway?
Mr. Powner. I think you will get different stories from
DOD. In fact, we talked to many of the user groups who
represent the Department of Defense, and they are clamoring for
some of the information that will come out of the NPOESS
program.
Mr. Inglis. Admiral Lautenbacher, do you have any theories
on that?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, and this is speculation. As
I said, I talked to Mr. Young's assistant this morning, and
there is concurrence that the documents--that they are
interested in signing the documents and they are interested in
helping us sign the documents and they are going to work hard.
We are going to work together to try to make this happen. So
that is why I am hoping the Committee does not have to step in,
that we can finish this ourselves.
I think--there are two things going on. First of all, and
again, having worked in DOD for a number of--in services; I did
work in DOD as well at one point. Mr. Young is relatively new
in his position. He has a portfolio that has significant issues
with it, as Dr. Bartlett mentioned, and he is trying to get
control and hold of this monster that is the DOD establishment
and put some discipline and authority in it. And so he is, you
know, putting some markers on the table that we are going to do
this right. We are going to manage by the book, we are going to
provide the right documentation, and we are going to--and I
couldn't agree with him more. I agree with that. We need to do
it, and I am just as concerned as he is, and I have seen this
before in the Department of Defense because it is hard to
coordinate documents within the Department of Defense, let
alone with DOC and DOD and NASA where people have threatened to
cut off the money because you didn't finish paperwork. And I
don't want to say this is idle paperwork, but you know what I
mean, you didn't finish the job as designed in order to provide
the baseline information for a program. So it is not an unusual
tactic inside the Department of Defense to sort of enforce, you
know, the need to do the job on time and do it well. And I
think we are seeing some of that.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. Dr. Bartlett, you are recognized for five
minutes.
Bureaucratic Delays
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. I think there are
probably three basic reasons for bureaucratic delays, and I
would like each of you to respond to this. One reason is that
they just are incompetent. The second reason is that there is
too much for them to do. They just can't get it done. The third
reason is that there is not enough for them to do which always
results in delays. Dr. Parkinson has noted that work expands to
fill the time available for its completion. As a matter of
fact, it may grow even larger because if you are a bureaucrat
and there is really not enough for you to do, you make sure
that it appears that you have too much to do by letting things
pile up on your desk. I noted that in our local county where
building is way down, and now it takes twice as long to get a
building permit through as it did when we were booming.
Which of these three is the reason for the bureaucratic
delays in this program?
Mr. Powner. I would clearly go with number two and the lack
of this being a priority, too much and how it competes with
other priorities.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I agree with that, but I would
also say that I don't know enough about each one of the many,
many offices that this goes through. I know about ours, and I
would--the ones I know about it, I generally agree it is too
much to do, and I would make the point that most of this
documentation--and I have watched over 40 years--I have watched
the documentation grow and grow and grow and grow because
requirements have been added because somebody made a mistake
somewhere, and you got to make sure they are never going to
make that mistake again. So you put a requirement and a
document or a new document, and it grows and grows and grows.
And we are victims to that process. Now, I am not here to say
that these documents are not necessary, but in fact, work has
expanded and there is an awful lot to do at this point to
ensure that every ``i'' is dotted and ``t'' is crossed.
Mr. Bartlett. Dr. Parkinson also made another very
interesting observation and that was that the larger an
organization gets and with these three agencies, you are
dealing with a lot of people, but the larger an organization
gets, the more energy is spent in internal communications; and
pretty soon at some point all the energy is expended in
internal communications and nothing gets done.
And Admiral, your last comment seemed to indicate that
there is a bit of that going on.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, but we have made a great
deal of progress on these documents after going through a
lengthy review. The human mind is a very ingenious animal and
does things--humans do things that--what happens in this system
is that when you get to the point where you are totally
absorbed in self-communications, we start load shedding
basically; and you find offices that are off to the side that
don't get into the game anymore because most responsible people
who take on tasks know they have to complete the task and they
figure out some way to do it. And if that requires bypassing
the bureaucracy, creating new processes that minimize their
effect on it, it happens. And so I believe there is a continual
cycle here of trying to get ahead of the problem but more
requirements keep getting piled on. And we are in that battle
day by day.
Mr. Bartlett. It is always true, I think, that what is
everybody's business is nobody's business, and I think one of
the problems of this program is that there are too darned many
people responsible for it. Why don't we have just one person
responsible for it who makes the decision? He either lives or
dies on the basis of those decisions? When you have a big
bureaucracy, everybody has tried to protect themselves so that
they can't be faulted for a failure. What can we do to get
around this bureaucracy so that one person makes the decisions?
Committees shouldn't be making decisions, people should be
making decisions so that we can get the job done.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I agree having now had to work
with the system for a number of years, it is cumbersome. It is
the first time we have tried to do a program like this with
three large agencies with three different sets of requirements,
three different sets of acquisition rules, three different sets
of administrative documentation, et cetera. I think that there
are things that we could do to make the structure more
streamlined, and my intention is to try to include that in this
alternative management study that we are talking about because
this is not a good way to do business over the long-term. And
as I said before, human beings are ingenious. We will work out
ways to improve this. So that is my intention at this point
anyway.
More on Acquisition Document Approval
Chairman Lampson. Thank you, Dr. Bartlett. That is
something we may have to keep in mind and make sure we learn a
lesson because something is going to be coming after this. We
may not want to do this again in the manner in which it has
been done.
We were talking about some of the decisions that were
pending, and you had made a comment about NASA, waiting on
NASA, when we talked about the Award Fee Plan and Fee
Management Plan.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes.
Chairman Lampson. The report that we have got indicates
that NASA was completed with its decision on June 4th, that we
were ready with the Commerce Department concurrence. So what
does that leave?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, and we have word that they
have completed it, but that was after it was sitting there for
three or four months. So it is good to say it is out today, but
you have to look at the whole history of this thing. And as I
indicated, I believe that will be signed today or tomorrow. We
have completed the Fee Management Plan.
Chairman Lampson. Money is truly--time is money, and we are
looking at a lot of money. The Acquisition Program Baseline, it
is waiting for DOD, DOC determination, APB budget numbers?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. Yes, and we want to make sure
because this is a document that will be fundamental to the
budget. Remember, we ask due diligence. The Executive Committee
asked that we re-evaluate the operations and support costs
because the operations and support costs was carried forward
from 2002. None of us believe that is accurate. We ask that
that be redone because I don't want to have to come up and
answer to the Committee why we didn't do that so that we have
an independent cost estimate, we have a program estimate now
because we created the ability to be able to do that in our
program so that we can provide the program cost estimates
because we want to lay that into the Acquisition Program
Baseline. Right now we have the people that did those budgets
reconciling them. It is going to come back to the EXCOM to
review and lay it in, and that is the last piece of this deal.
It is basically the operations and support costs that we talked
about and potentially the need for more reserve on VIIRS,
although that is not clear at this point because we have been
able to manage around the issues on VIIRS with the estimate
that we had created from the Nunn-McCurdy. Remember, we have
gone three years now with the budgets and the schedule that we
have laid in because of our intention to make sure there was
enough reserve to be able to handle issues like this that have
come up.
Chairman Lampson. Mr. Powner, would you comment on--give me
your feeling of the relationship between the earned value
management system and the baseline management program, baseline
program?
Mr. Powner. Well, that is one area where we have had
previous recommendations in this area, and I think the Admiral
made some comments about how they get very detailed data. One
of the things that has been very valuable on this program is
when there is a cost increase or a slip in schedule, folks know
about it through the use of earned value techniques; and they
know about it at very high levels. I know the Admiral made a
comment to me at one time that he can hear a pin drop on this
program. Well, that is good because we want to be all over
those costs and schedule issues. Now, we have a number of them
that are coming up here, and we talked about this $1 to $1.5
billion cost increase. We just need to disclose that fully and
move forward with an accurate baseline from this point forward.
Life Cycle Costs
Chairman Lampson. Okay. Let us shift gears. Admiral,
General Mashiko was asked if she was confident that the NPOESS
program would be executed for the estimated $12.5 billion in
life cycle costs for the program that emerged from Nunn-
McCurdy. She said that she couldn't be definite while
negotiations with Northrop Grumman were occurring to implement
the new plan but that she felt that it was the right number.
Given what you know now, what is the life cycle cost?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I think the life cycle cost will
have more operating costs at the end, so it is going to be
larger than $12.5. I think it is likely to be somewhere between
$12.5 and perhaps $13.5, in that region. But we are I think
very close to where we need to be on this at this point in
terms of--I am not going to sit here and guarantee that
everything is going to work perfectly for every nickel that is
scheduled for the next 26 years--is what we are talking about
here--or the next 20 years or so.
Chairman Lampson. Mr. Powner, you have seen data on the
life cycle cost. You briefed our staff that it appears there
will be an increase of $1.1 billion in the estimate. What
accounts for that number?
Mr. Powner. Yeah, I think at least we will see a $1.1
billion increase. That is roughly $300 million to address the
technical issues with the sensors and $800 million associated
with additional operations and support, but I will add to that
that there is a potential for increased security costs; and
that range could also be in the hundreds of millions of
dollars. We are probably more in the camp that the life cycle
cost is going to be closer to $14 billion.
Chairman Lampson. Okay. If I add up the lower-end ranges
that you just gave us, $1.2 billion in cost growth. If I add
the high ends of the ranges you get $1.8. So it is already
higher than last week. Where are you getting those numbers and
how much confidence do you have in them at this point?
Mr. Powner. We got those rough ranges from the program
office. So you know, I think in our official statement we said
at least a billion, but, again, I think we will be probably
closer to $1.5.
One other point, too, with the security issues that have
been raised, we have taken a long time to make a decision on
what our security approach is for the ground stations. The
longer we sit on that, the likelihood that the costs are going
to be going up; and that reason for that is when you build
security in late in the development cycle, it is always more
than if you build it in early. So that is a concern going
forward.
Chairman Lampson. Should any of these additional costs not
be included in the final program baseline? For example, if we
incorporate the cost for VIIRS recovery into the baseline,
doesn't that give future managers a false impression of the
program's cost and schedule performance?
Mr. Powner. Well, I think the VIIRS issues need to be
addressed and we need to build those into the program. And I
think from a security perspective, to the program's credit,
they are looking at options to keep costs down, so that is a
good thing.
Chairman Lampson. Are we ever going to get to a point where
we really won't see any hefty jumps in the program cost
estimates every year, year after year? Both of you.
Mr. Powner. Hopefully, there will be greater stability once
NPP flies and we start looking at the performance with the
operational bird at that point in time. I think that is when
there will be more stability.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. I agree with that. We need to
finish testing on the VIIRS system, and we need to launch NPP.
At that point, I think we will be close to out of the woods on
what the system will really cost.
Chairman Lampson. My time is expired. Let me yield to the
Ranking Member, Mr. Inglis.
Mr. Inglis. For a brief question. I have got a corollary to
the Bartlett theory of bureaucracy. Dr. Bartlett described
one--the reasons for bureaucratic delay could be one,
incompetence; two, too much work; and three, not enough work
and the work expands to the time available. I think that a
fourth possibility is that when you have a complex, difficult
project that encounters a slowdown, it moves to the front
corner of the desk. And that slowdown goes on for a week or
two. It moves to the floor. And when that file hits the floor,
there is an enormous amount of mental energy to bring it back
up onto the desk.
So I wonder if what we are learning here is that one agency
should have owned this, and I guess the idea was to prevent
three from launching satellites. So therefore, let us get some
efficiencies, economies of scale by having just one. But I
wonder if one should have owned it with two others being
customers or tenants on that piece that is owned by the one.
Either of you have thoughts about that?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. That is a model that looks
awfully good right now to me. I have to admit I was not in on
the original discussions in the '90s. I was in the Navy at the
time, and I didn't want the Navy anywhere near this. So we
stayed out of it. But the discussions went on at high levels,
and it was finally decided by the White House how to deal with
setting up this program. So there was a lot of work that went
into trying to think about this model. And I believe in the
fewer complications and the executive authority where you
really have the authority. The programs that I can manage and I
will come and tell you about, we just got an excellent score on
our tsunami warning program which is now a worldwide system
which you supported. It was a program we started. It was graded
by OMB as 93.4. It is only one of 11 percent of programs in the
Federal Government that got the effective rating from our
Office of Management and Budget. It is IOCed.\12\ The buoys are
out around the world now providing 24/7 coverage for tsunami
warning to the United States. That is a program I can control
and put inside. So when you have an agency controlling, you
have a much better chance for success on these things; and any
time you bring in more agencies, you got a problem. I have no
problem really with separation of responsibilities, having
customers that come in with their needs and you make a decision
and move on. As I said, I would like to look in the alternative
management study. I will push that from my end of it to deal
with is there some way to streamline the structure we have
today so we don't get into this problem we have now of trying
to update the MOA to make sure that DOD's executive authority
is exactly prescribed correctly in accordance with what the
lawyers will think it will work across a three-agency boundary.
Thank you, sir.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Initial Operational Capability
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Lampson. Mr. Bartlett, you are recognized for five
minutes.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. This program is typical
of many of our programs in DOD. The costs just keep going up
and up. When I repeat the Lord's Prayer and I come to that part
that says lead us not into temptation, I wonder how we can
enter into some of our contract agreements and still do that
prayer because when you enter into a contract agreement where
the more it costs, the more the contractor makes, we are doing
something similar to what the chaplains at Ft. Leonard Wood
said we were doing when we put young men and women in such
close confines. What we were doing runs contrary to the powers
of nature.
Somehow we have got to get around this, and I think that
pushing the envelope and not knowing definitively what can be
done when you start the program is a major reason for this, but
at the end of the day you say, gee, you really ought to get 15
percent profit. And so the reality is that the worse they do,
that is, the more it costs, the more they make. How do we get
around that?
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher. If you look at the Fee
Management Plan for this program, it has been reduced down to
12 or 13 percent. So they can't get any--we have already
reduced it below that, and there is only two percent of that
which can be, what I would say, judgmental. The rest of it is
tied to meeting requirements on the Nunn-McCurdy revised
schedule and performance. So they are under the gun, and they
are being given their so-called reward based on the ability to
perform. And in many areas, they have not been doing well, and
in other areas, they have been doing well because I mentioned
four of these instruments are on track. So it is a mixed
blessing from the contractors' point of view.
But what you bring to account is the idea of the cost plus
contract which is an issue. And that is kind of a philosophical
discussion. Do we save money on cost plus contracts, even if
they go over, or would it be better to try to go fix price up
front. When you try to do that for a development area where you
really don't know what you are doing in terms of what you can
develop, we have had a lot of trouble with that, too. So that
is another part of the decision. I don't like the cost plus
program, I certainly don't like them for NOAA because NOAA is
an operational agency. I think the research should be done
elsewhere, and when we get an instrument, we should just buy it
and there should be a price and a contractor that produces it
and we will execute it. We are a 24-by-7 operational agency. I
don't like the idea of taking on development risk within the
NOAA framework. We have other agencies that do that and where
their strong point--what I believe is their strong point--and I
have been a strong proponent of planning together across the
agencies, develop space instruments versus the agencies that
use them.
So I think that is a critical need for us to work on as a
government.
Mr. Bartlett. For 16 years now I have been watching
programs in DOD and almost never do we come in on time, on
budget; and it would seem that we ought to learn a little from
history and someone, maybe GAO, needs to take a look at this.
And this is a long history. It precedes by many years, my short
16 years of watching this process. How come we never get it
right? This program is just typical of many of our programs,
and you are not unique in the problems that you have.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lampson. You are welcome, and we are running a
little bit out of time, close on our votes that we have, so I
am going to be very quick. I have wanted to make a corrected
statement that I made at the very, very beginning when I talked
about the gentleman who received an award the other day with
whom I had gone to college, and then you began talking about
the tsunami program. Dr. Eddie Bernard--and I said Dr. Eddie
Beaumont--I meant Dr. Eddie Bernard from Beaumont, Texas--
pardon my--getting ahead. My tongue got faster than my brain
was working apparently, but Dr. Bernard is the Director of the
Pacific Marine Environment Laboratory and has done significant
work. And obviously, the role that he played in creating that
tsunami warning system is something that we are all very, very
proud of, proud to have known that I sat in some of the same
classes with him. I just wish I had learned more along the way.
Thank you all, both, for being here and the panel members
for raising the questions that we have done today, and
hopefully we will move this program forward because we know how
critically important it is to our whole country and this Earth.
So thank you for appearing before the Committee this
morning, and under the rules of the Committee, the record will
be held open for two weeks for Members to submit additional
statements and any additional questions that they might have
for the witnesses. This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology
Management Issues, Government Accountability Office
Questions submitted by Representative Bob Inglis
Q1. The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision reduced the number of
instruments on the NPOESS satellite from thirteen to nine and reduced
the functionality of four of the nine remaining sensors. The decision
stated that these instruments could be remanifested if other parties
funded them. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
has announced that two of the sensors have since been added back to the
configuration of the satellite and has expanded the capability of
another instrument.
Q1a. What was the point of going through the Nunn-McCurdy process,
particularly with respect to reducing the number of instruments in
order to lessen the risk of the mission, if the NOAA was going to put
all these instruments back on?
A1a. According to the June 2006 decision, the program restructuring was
intended to reduce the acquisition's complexity and risks while
ensuring the continuity of existing satellite programs and data. The
decision also allowed the program the flexibility to remanifest key
instruments if they were funded outside the program and approved by the
tri-agency Executive Committee guiding the NPOESS program.
In January 2007, NOAA and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) prioritized the capabilities of the instruments
that were degraded or removed from the NPOESS program. The highest
priorities included Earth radiation budget, solar irradiance, and
improved ozone measurements. These measurements were expected to be
provided by the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System (CERES)
sensor, the Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) sensor, and the limb
component of the Ozone Mapper/Profiler Suite (OMPS), respectively.
Given these priorities, the NPOESS Executive Committee decided to
make two modifications to the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)
demonstration satellite--by adding a CERES sensor and restoring the
full functionality of the OMPS sensor. In addition, the Executive
Committee decided to add one sensor, TSIS, to the first NPOESS
satellite. No changes were made to the three other satellites in the
NPOESS program. NOAA officials reported that these modifications are
being funded outside of the program and that TSIS will not be permitted
to delay the NPOESS schedule. Specifically, the program office reported
that TSIS will not be included on the satellite if it falls behind
schedule.
While restoring selected sensors and functionality to NPP and the
first NPOESS satellite involves added risk, the program has attempted
to mitigate these risks by selecting sensors and technologies that are
well understood and maintaining the option to not include TSIS if it
falls behind schedule. Further, program officials have decided not to
reintroduce other sensors that were removed (including the Advanced
Polarimetry Sensor or the Radar Altimeter) or to restore the functions
of other sensors that were degraded (including the Conical-Scanned
Microwave Imager/Sounder and Space Environment Sensor Suite) at this
time.
Q1b. Was there any other way to maintain the climate and environmental
data short of restoring these instruments?
A1b. In our May 2008 report, we highlighted several short-term options
for restoring selected climate sensors, including adding sensors back
to a later NPOESS satellite, adding sensors to another planned
satellite (such as Landsat--a joint NASA/U.S. Geological Survey
mission), and developing a new satellite to include several of the
sensors.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite
Acquisition Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure
Climate Data Continuity, GAO-08-518, (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to short-term options, the Federal Government needs to
consider long-term options. We reported that NASA, NOAA, and the
Department of Defense (DOD) lacked plans for restoring sensor
capabilities on a long-term basis. We recommended that the three
agencies establish plans on whether and how to restore the climate and
space sensors removed from the NPOESS program, in cases where the
sensors are warranted and justified. This would include justifying the
additional funding needed to develop these sensors within their
respective agency's investment decision processes. The result of this
planning will help determine the best and most cost effective way of
maintaining relevant climate and space environment data records.
Q2. In your testimony, you mentioned that there was a newly identified
risk of changing security requirements.
Q2a. Can you please explain the basis for the concern about these
requirements?
A2a. As we noted in our testimony and in the accompanying report,
changing security requirements late in a system's development can add
cost and risk to the program.\2\ To date, NPOESS has been designed and
developed to meet DOD's standards for a mission essential system.
However, NOAA officials believe that the system should be built to meet
more stringent standards--specifically to a high security level per
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199. Implementing
more stringent standards could cause rework and retesting, and
potentially affect the cost and schedule of the system. Program
officials are assessing options and expect to decide on security
requirements by September 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO-08-899T and GAO-08-518.
Q2b. You also mentioned there was a March 2008 study of the impacts
and costs of adding additional security to NPOESS. Has GAO received a
copy of this study? If not, when do you expect to see a copy and what
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
were the reasons you were given for not releasing it to the GAO?
A2b. We received a summary of the March study in June 2008. This study
identified the new requirements and contained rough estimates for
implementing the various upgrades depending on when and how the various
changes were made. The Chief Information Officer of the NOAA
subcomponent the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and
Information Service noted that the office is currently working with the
NPOESS program office to outline the specific engineering solution for
the requirements and anticipates a better cost estimate after that
effort is completed--which is anticipated to be later this summer.
Q3. There seems to be continuing problems with some of the sensors, in
particular the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)
instrument. In previous reports, GAO has characterized the risk as, in
part, due to problems with contractor and oversight issues on the part
of the NPOESS program management. Since we are still seeing problems
with the sensors, even with the increased oversight by the government,
what can be done to improve the performance of the contractor?
A3. In our May 2008 report, we noted that the program office had
recently instituted biweekly senior-level management meetings to review
progress on the status of the VIIRS instrument's development, and that
program officials had stated that both the prime contractor and the
program executive office will have senior officials on-site at the
contractor's facility to provide extensive, day-to-day oversight of the
prime contractor and subcontractor management activities to assist in
resolving issues. This is in line with an independent study (called the
Alternate Management Study) that recommended in June 2007 that the
program office provide more systems engineering leadership for the
program and intensify management and technical oversight over the prime
contractor. More recently, the Defense Contract Management Agency and
the prime contractor conducted reviews of the subcontractor responsible
for VIIRS and recommended further management changes. Program officials
reported that the subcontractor is working to implement these changes
while the program office is overseeing these efforts. In our report, we
stated that it is important for the program office, the Program
Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to provide
close oversight of milestones and risks.
Q4. One of the most significant problems I believe you raise in this
report is the concern about the loss of sensor capability on satellites
past the NPP and first NPOESS satellites due to a lack of planning. You
state in your testimony that the agencies may lose ``windows of
opportunity'' for selecting the most cost-effective options with
regards to sensor acquisition.
Q4a. Considering the ballooning cost of this program as it is, what
was the agencies' response to this concern when you presented them with
the draft report?
A4a. In written responses to our May report's recommendation, all three
agencies agreed with the recommendation to develop long-term plans for
whether and how to restore the climate and space environment sensors
removed from the satellites. In addition, both the Department of
Commerce and NASA reiterated that they are working with their partner
agencies to finalize plans for restoring sensors to address the
Nation's long-term needs for continuity of climate measurements.
Q4b. How soon should such a plan be developed before the costs become
prohibitive?
A4b. There are many options available for obtaining climate and space
data continuity, such as including selected sensors on other NASA,
European, or NPOESS satellites. However, as time goes by, selected
options will no longer be viable because the window of opportunity for
adding sensors to those satellites will close.
While other satellite programs may have different requirements,
NPOESS program officials stated that they need at least six years'
notice in order to add sensors to their satellites. This means that
agencies would need to identify their plans to add sensors to the
second NPOESS satellite by January 2010.
In responding to these questions, we relied on information we
previously reported on NPOESS.\3\
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\3\ GAO-08-899T; GAO-08-518; GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way, but Technical
Challenges and Risks Remain, GAO-07-498 (Washington, D.C.: April 27,
2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. (U.S. Navy,
Ret.), Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere;
Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA)
Questions submitted by Representative Bob Inglis
Q1. You mention in your testimony that the NPOESS program uncovered
some design flaws with the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite, or
VIIRS, specifically relating to fasteners and screws. This is not a
highly technical part of this critical instrument.
Q1a. How could an oversight of this kind occur?
A1a. There were two fastener related issues on the Visible/Infrared
Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS): titanium bolt breakage and jackpost
breakage. Titanium bolts have properties that require slow tightening
during installation to prevent weakening of the part. Consequently, we
are looking very closely at the processes undertaken by the VIIRS
contractors, particularly those associated with installation and
quality control. The bolt was taken from a new batch and that lot was
sampled, inspected and tested without any issues noted. No other parts
in the original batch displayed failure.
The fasteners, called jackposts, are custom designed parts. The
root cause of the jackpost failure is that the parts did not meet
specifications as defined by the government. The part supplier was a
trusted vendor to Raytheon and the parts were not subjected to the
appropriate level of inspection by Raytheon upon delivery. The
acceptance process for parts has been reviewed to ensure that a similar
lapse will not occur again. Subsequent investigations by the NPOESS
Program and contractors have revealed that the remaining jackposts on
VIIRS are flight worthy and we only need to replace the 18 jackposts
that broke.
The NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO) and contractors are
reviewing internal control processes to ensure that similar incidents
do not happen again. The government is continuing its investigation of
the processes and actions of the VIIRS contractors. The government is
putting in place design and quality process changes to use standard
parts as much as possible, and are instituting mandatory parts
screening and inspection for all vendors.
Q1b. Is there a process in place to prevent such oversights from
occurring in the future so that minor parts of the instruments do not
lead to major problems later on? What assurances do we have that these
types of problems are not pervasive throughout the rest of the
instruments?
A1b. We have put in place both design and quality process changes which
include:
1) Using standard parts instead of custom parts wherever
possible during design; and
2) Mandatory screening and inspection on all incoming parts
regardless of vendor past performance.
Specifically for VIIRS, the team is reviewing all custom parts and
the associated spares to ensure no issues exist with other components
on the sensor. To assure ourselves that the VIIRS issues are not
systemic to this program, the NPOESS IPO tasked Northrop Grumman, the
NPOESS prime contractor, to perform Mission Assurance audits of each of
their subcontractors.
The IPO continues to provide oversight of the NPOESS contractors to
improve their adherence to program specifications and quality control
of the manufacturing processes. The IPO, NOAA and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continue to work closely to
ensure that there are clear lines of communication between the
government and the contractors.
Q2. The President's FY09 budget request includes $74 million for the
development of the CERES (Clouds and Earth's Radiant Energy System) and
TSIS (Total Solar Irradiance Sensor) instruments. These are two sensors
that had been demanifested by the Nunn-McCurdy certification process
and the money for their development can not come from the NPOESS
program baseline.
Q2a. Is this just an additional $74 million that NOAA and NASA are
asking for? Or does this ask reduce available funds in other NOAA
programs?
A2a. The $74 million for the Climate Sensors/Climate Data Records is an
additional increase in funding for NOAA's satellite budget request. No
other NOAA program funding was reduced to support this new initiative.
Q2b. Has NOAA explored the possibility of putting these sensors on
separate vehicles to maintain the integrity of the current launch
schedule?
A2b. NOAA and NASA, in collaboration with the Office of Management and
Budget and the Office of Science Technology Policy, assessed the
processes and capabilities required to build these instruments and
place them onto the appropriate and most cost-effective satellite.
Careful consideration was given to cost, schedule, and technological
maturity of the sensors, as well as the capability of the Federal
Government and its contractors to successfully deliver the instruments.
The assessment also included a review of available launches, the cost
and feasibility of single mission satellite launches and the time
required to launch these sensors to ensure uninterrupted continuity of
the climate measurements.
Based on the planned timing of the launches of the NPOESS
Preparatory Project (NPP) and the first NPOESS satellite (C1), and the
dates when the sensors are needed on orbit to ensure continuity of the
climate record, the decision was made to place the Clouds and the
Earth's Radiant Energy System (CERES) Flight Model (FM) #5 on NPP, and
Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS) and CERES FM #6 instruments on C1.
Full funding of the NPOESS-related budget requests in the
appropriations bills for NOAA, the NASA, and the Air Force
appropriations bills is required to ensure the climate sensors can be
integrated and launched on the respective NPP and NPOESS satellites.
Q2c. In the event that Congress does not pass an Appropriations bill
for FY09, what will be the affect of a continuing resolution on the
development of these sensors? How does that affect our ability to
collect relevant climate data?
A2c. NOAA will be operating under a continuing resolution in FY2009
until at least March 6, 2009, which will impact current acquisition and
development activities. While the mitigations of the continuing
resolution impacts are still being evaluated, the funding shortfall
will slow initiation of GOES-R flight and ground efforts which could
result in a launch delay and/or increased life cycle costs. The funding
shortfall will also place the schedules for CERES and TSIS at high risk
for meeting the January 2013 NPOESS C1 launch. Additional costs to
CERES and TSIS could also be possible to accelerate deliveries or
accommodate late deliveries if feasible.
If the CERES FM6 and TSIS instruments are not available in time to
be integrated onto NPOESS C1, the Nation's scientific community would
be at high risk of a data gap for these critical global environmental
measurements. Such a break in the climate record would introduce
uncertainty and compromise climate information for decision-makers. In
addition, the loss of these data would require many years of
calibration to recover.
Q3. The Nunn-McCurdy certification included $1 billion placeholder in
the estimated life cycle cost for operations and support--essentially
what is needed once the satellite is actually launched. This
placeholder was originated in the 2002 Acquisition Program Baseline.
GAO has informed us that as the launch date gets closer, this figure
will go up by another $800 million, in part because it hadn't been
updated since 2002.
Q3a. Why is the additional $800 million needed if now there are only
four satellites, whereas in 2002 there were six satellites to support
and the program estimated only $1 billion for operations and support
purposes?
A3a. The Nunn-McCurdy certification process of the NPOESS program only
examined development and production costs, not operations and
sustainment (O&S) costs. In fall 2007, following the completion of the
program restructure after Nunn-McCurdy that scaled back the program
from six to four satellites, the NPOESS program was directed to execute
a complete program estimate including O&S costs given NOAA's concern
that the program did not have a realistic estimate of those costs.
Following the Program Office Estimate completed in December 2007, the
EXCOM requested the Department of Defense's Cost Analysis Improvement
Group (CAIG) complete an independent review of the total program costs
to further validate the estimate of operations costs as well as the
development and production costs estimated during the Nunn-McCurdy
certification process. The EXCOM received those results in July 2008.
The 2002 O&S estimate only included costs from the time of launch
through the initial ten years of on-orbit life, while today we expect
operations to last 17 years following initial launch. The recently
completed estimate took into consideration some NPOESS Preparatory
Project (NPP) costs that were not captured in the 2002 estimate. The
recent estimate was also completed with far more knowledge of the
system than the earlier estimate and consequently added more detail and
accuracy to the overall life cycle cost estimate.
Overall, the cost for operations and sustainment is not directly
linked to the number of satellites, but the length of time the
satellites will be on orbit and the corresponding costs to maintain the
processing software, and the need for periodic updates of the ground
processors. The recent estimate of operations costs better estimated
the needs for software and processor updates and indicated that an
additional $800 million is required to support the operations of the
NPOESS program.
Q3b. If the $1 billion is incorrect now in 2008 by $800 million, it
must have been incorrect in 2006 when the program was being subjected
to the Nunn-McCurdy certification process. Why was the figure not
updated then, or even before?
A3b. As noted above, the Nunn-McCurdy process as defined by DOD for the
NPOESS program only examined development and production costs, not
operations and sustainment costs. This is why NOAA requested the NPOESS
program provide a complete cost estimate following the restructure in
Fall 2007. In March 2008, the EXCOM requested an independent cost
estimate be completed by the CAIG and the final results were reported
to the EXCOM in July 2008.
Q4. If there are problems that still exist in the program that cannot
be agreed to at the staff level, why are they not resolved at the
periodic EXCOM (Executive Committee) meetings?
A4. Problems that cannot be resolved at the staff level are addressed
at the EXCOM meetings. However, given the unique tri-agency structure
of this program, the NPOESS program has found it challenging to
navigate the bureaucracies of the three separate agencies to get final
documents representing complex agreements signed in a timely manner
even when agreed to in principle at EXCOM meetings. Progress has been
made to improve the process within the tri-agency program during the
last few months.
Q4a. Please provide a detailed agenda of each EXCOM meeting since it
was formed in 2006 and please detail what decisions were made in each
meeting.
A4a. The following table provides the date of the nine EXCOM meetings
conducted since it was formed in 2006, and a detailed list of decisions
made at each meeting.
Q4b. If an item on the agenda is not resolved at an EXCOM meeting,
does it appear on the agenda for the next meeting?
A4b. Most decisions made by the EXCOM have been resolved at the meeting
in which the issue was scheduled to be discussed. However, there have
been a few complex issues in the program since the Nunn-McCurdy
certification, which have been more difficult to resolve. Those issues
were included on multiple agendas during the past few years and have
also been addressed and brought to final decision through multiple
principal level teleconferences and other meetings between formal EXCOM
meetings.
Q4c. Please detail the items on each agenda that were not resolved at
the EXCOM meeting for which it was brought up and explain why no
decision was agreed to.
A4c. As noted above, the EXCOM has been largely successful in resolving
issues in the agenda at the time of the EXCOM. However, since the Nunn-
McCurdy Recertification, the issues of budget reconciliation and cost
estimates, as well as Acquisition Decision Memorandum document
resolution have been ongoing issues that took multiple meetings and
other interactions to resolve as these issues were processed formally
through each agency. As noted above, this unique tri-agency program has
made progress in merging the disparate processes in each agency to get
final decisions documented.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material Submitted for the Hearing Record