[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 110-132]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 12, 2008
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STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
RICK LARSEN, Washington MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
Rudy Barnes, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Zach Steacy, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2008
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 12, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request for the Department of Energy
National Security Programs..................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 12, 2008........................................ 29
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2008
FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking
Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee.......................... 3
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California,
Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee........................ 1
WITNESSES
Podonsky, Glenn S., Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer,
U.S. Department of Energy...................................... 12
Rispoli, Hon. James A., Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, U.S. Department of Energy.......................... 9
Smolen, Gen. Robert L., USAF (Ret.), Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration..... 5
Tobey, Hon. William H., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration..... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Podonsky, Glenn S............................................ 70
Rispoli, Hon. James A........................................ 61
Smolen, Gen. Robert L., joint with Hon. William H. Tobey..... 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Four photographs submitted by Hon. James A. Rispoli,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, U.S.
Department of Energy....................................... 95
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 101
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Tauscher................................................. 105
FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 12, 2008.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Ms. Tauscher. Good morning. This hearing of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee will come to order. Today, we will consider
the Department of Energy's (DOE) Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 budget
request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
Let me begin by welcoming our distinguished witnesses:
General Robert L. Smolen, Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); the
Honorable Will Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration; the
Honorable James Rispoli, Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, Department of Energy; and Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Chief
Health, Safety and Security Officer, the Department of Energy.
Gentlemen, thank you very, very much for being here.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the
subcommittee.
General Smolen, I believe this is your first appearance
before the committee, and we welcome you.
General Smolen. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Tauscher. The fiscal year 2009 budget request for the
Department of Energy is just over $25 billion. The Armed
Services Committee annually authorizes about two-thirds of this
total for Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
For fiscal year 2009, the request of $15.9 billion for
these programs is $770 million more than was appropriated in
fiscal year 2008.
This committee and I are strong supporters of the critical
missions embodied in your respective program areas: maintaining
and ensuring the reliability, safety, and security of our
nuclear deterrent; conducting the scientific research and
production activities necessary to support that deterrent;
keeping our nuclear weapons and weapons complex safe from
physical and other threats; leading the government's
international nuclear nonproliferation efforts; and cleaning up
the environmental legacy of decades of nuclear stockpile work.
We are eager to hear your testimony on the fiscal year 2009
budget request. I am especially interested in your thoughts
about five issues.
First, does the budget include the right investments in the
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)?
While the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) proposal was
slowed in fiscal year 2008, we must continue efforts to
strengthen the stewardship program. That means both the
scientific tools that are coming on line, such as the second
axis at DARHT (the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
facility), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the world-
class scientists and engineers that deploy those tools to
execute the stewardship mission. And we expect a steadfast and
sustained commitment to fulfill the requirements to initiate
the Ignition Campaign in 2010 and provide full funding to do
so.
In that context, what is the current path forward for the
RRW proposal, and when will you deliver to Congress the long-
promised white paper on nuclear weapons policy? How do these
plans affect Complex Transformation?
Second--and I asked this a year ago--does the budget
properly balance various safety and security priorities? Can
the NNSA bring the complex into compliance with the 2005 Design
Basis Threat (DBT) standards while addressing rapidly
escalating cyber security threats?
Third, does the budget support the various commitments the
Federal Government has made within the cleanup program?
Fourth, does the budget adequately support consolidation of
special nuclear materials (SNM)? How do consolidation plans
affect the broad areas of stockpile stewardship, complex
modernization, nonproliferation, safety and security, and
environmental cleanup?
Finally, I would like to know why the Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation budget is cut below the fiscal year 2008
funded level in a number of areas, including verification
research and development (R&D), and nonproliferation and
international security. These programs are some of the best
national security investments this Nation makes, and anything
less than robust funding is difficult to understand.
These are the kinds of concerns we hope you will address in
your statements and during our discussions that will follow the
testimony.
With that, let me turn to my good friend, our Ranking
Member, the distinguished gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Everett,
for any comments he may have.
And before I turn to you, Mr. Everett, I think we have just
come in, and it looks like we may have a series of votes right
in the morning after the 10 a.m. ceremony. So, we will watch
that as closely as we have. But after we do Mr. Everett's
remarks, we will begin the testimony from our witnesses.
I apologize if we have to run back and forth for votes. We
will make you as comfortable as possible. But this is an
enormously important hearing, and we would like to be able to
continue, considering the fact that we do have votes to do in
the middle.
Mr. Everett.
STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA,
RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Everett. Thank you very much, Chairman Tauscher. This
is an important hearing, and thank you for calling this hearing
and getting us to this point.
I am honored to welcome our guests here today.
Congratulations, General Smolen, on your new position. I am
always glad to see an Auburn graduate up here. Although, I tend
toward University of Alabama, as Bart Starr introduced me when
I first ran for Congress. But I want Auburn to win every single
game but one.
Mr. Rispoli, Mr. Tobey, Mr. Podonsky, it is a pleasure for
you to be with us.
And the subcommittee is committed to assuring the United
States maintains a strong strategic deterrent for our national
security, and for the security of our allies and friends. I
believe our nuclear capabilities will continue to play a
principal role in this.
Last summer, we saw what happens when our nuclear focus is
diminished. The B-52 Bent Spear incident highlighted the need
to reinforce the primacy of the nuclear mission and provided an
opportunity to review both Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE
nuclear weapons handling and security procedures. I commend the
chairman for her leadership in this issue and for seeking ways
to improve the inventory control of our nuclear weapons.
I would like to highlight a few areas that I am interested
in hearing about today.
First, the commander of Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
recently testified that we are accepting significant future
risk with our legacy Cold War stockpile. These risks include
reliability, safety, security, and maintenance that were
respectable back then, but not what a modern military commander
would like to have for the future. What is your assessment, and
how are you meeting his needs?
NNSA has done a remarkable job maintaining our nuclear
weapons with the Stockpile Stewardship Program. With these
science and engineering tools, you have provided confidence
that our stockpile, today, works without testing. A very key
challenge I see ahead is how we manage the risk.
I use an analogy that we can relate to: No matter how good
my automobile mechanic and his tools are, my 1960 Chevy is
still a 1960 Chevy. The repair and maintenance costs start to
add up; at some point, there is a risk that my next car problem
may be catastrophic, and at some point, I look at the cost-
benefit of repairing my old car or buying a new car. As we look
at our Reliable Replacement Warhead in inevitable tradeoffs
with Life Extension Programs (LEPs), we face the same sort of
issue.
When might we see a problem in the current stockpile that
could impact our nuclear deterrent? What level of risk is
acceptable to our military commanders and our lab directors?
What is the cost-benefit of the RRW approach versus other
approaches?
Mr. Smolen, this year's budget request for RRW is a mere
$10 million. I cannot imagine that it is significant to compete
with a Phase 2a cost and study design, which is important to
inform the Strategic Commission, Complex Transformation, and
future decisions about the Nation's stockpile size and
confidence.
Second, NNSA's Complex Transformation initiative to achieve
a smaller, safer, less expensive complex makes a lot of sense.
However, this is a large undertaking within a relatively flat
budget.
I am interested in hearing about your implementation plans,
and about any cost analysis you can share.
Mr. Rispoli, the Department has presented its plans for
disposing of surplus plutonium and uranium. This plan proposes
a three-prong approach. Yet, I understand the Department is
considering a two-prong approach using H-Canyon and MOX (the
Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility). Can you tell us where
you are with this decision?
I would like to hear about the Department's project
management efforts. The important Waste Treatment Plant (WTP)
has been hampered by cost growth and schedule delay. What
measures are being taken to ensure that DOE projects don't
experience a similar fate?
Mr. Podonsky, physical security of our nuclear weapons and
material is essential. However, I am concerned that we have not
focused enough energy on cyber security. DOE and NNSA have a
tremendous technical workforce and infrastructure to support
cyber efforts. Your observations are valued as we examine the
National Cyber Initiative.
Mr. Tobey, I have been impressed with the breadth of the
activities of the U.S., working with international partners, in
what has been undertaken to combat nuclear proliferation. I
would, however, like to better understand how you measure the
progress of these programs.
Last, DOE and NNSA have had a key role in shaping the
Nation's future deterrence posture. I hope the Strategic
Commission we have established takes full advantage of the
great depth of experience and expertise of your staffs. It is
world-class men and women in organizations that you represent
that have real capabilities, and we must maintain those
capabilities into the future.
Again, I would like to tell the chairman I agree with her
remarks. This is an extremely important hearing. And we may be
interrupted, but we will get through it somehow.
Thank you for this, chairman.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Everett. Thank you for your
leadership. And I agree with your remarks, too.
Gentlemen, the floor is yours. As we have received your
prepared statements in advance, we will be entering them in the
record. If you could simply summarize, we would be welcoming
that.
And, General Smolen, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF (RET.), DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
General Smolen. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Everett, and
members of the subcommittee, I do thank you for allowing me to
be here today to talk about our 2009 Defense Programs budget.
As you noted, ma'am, this is my first appearance before the
group. And I am the new guy, but I am honored to be here.
I did retire from the Air Force last year after about 33
years of service. My last assignment was as the Commander of
the Air Force District of Washington, but just prior to that I
was serving on the National Security Council (NSC). And that
was during the same time that my colleague, Will Tobey, was
also on the National Security Council, so we have a long
history of working very closely together. We did very similar
kinds of programs there that we help monitor now, and it is a
privilege for me to be here again with Will and work these
issues.
Prior to going over there, I had been in charge of the Air
Force Nuclear and Counterproliferation Offices, so I brought
that more operational customer focus. And now I am seated in
the supplier seat; and so what you see depends on where you
sit, and so I will share with you some of the things that I am
seeing today.
My day-to-day working, though, with Will does reflect a
synergy between the NNSA Defense Programs and Nuclear
Nonproliferation. In 2002, of course, President Bush and Putin
signed the Moscow Treaty and reduced the number of weapons to
1,700 to 2,200 and cut the stockpile. And we have been very
successful in doing that. In fact, it was achieved. The 50
percent reduction was already achieved, and we are working on
an additional reduction.
But this is going to be the smallest stockpile that we have
had in the last 50 years. And the reductions in that increase
our workload in the dismantlement area. And I hope to touch
upon many of the issues that both you and Congressman Everett
mentioned in your opening remarks.
But I do want to assert, certainly, that today's nuclear
weapons stockpile is safe, secure, reliable, and it is not
required any post-deployment nuclear testing to date, nor do we
plan to do any.
However, while the stockpile does remain safe, secure, and
reliable, the weapons laboratories are justifiably concerned
about the future. Our nuclear weapons complex is at a
crossroads, and maintaining the status quo is an option that we
simply cannot afford. Delay and inaction will only increase the
costs and elevate the risks associated with maintaining this
aging stockpile.
Now, regardless of the stockpile transformation plans, we
do have to upgrade our facilities. And the challenge for us
will be to move from that aging nuclear weapons complex that
many of you visited, and move into a 21st century national
security enterprise that is integrated, modern, cost effective,
and eliminates any unnecessary redundancy, but also keeps us at
the forefront of our science and technology.
Our efforts to effect this change were announced last
December, and it was the Complex Transformation. We are going
to simply try to replace some of our aged infrastructure and
transform some of our contracting, procurement, and management
practices to embrace the best in business and human capital
processes that we can find.
We also seek to leverage our core competencies in weapons
design and engineering to advance our leadership in a whole
host of other areas, areas that are very important to us, like
counterterrorism, nonproliferation, physical security, cyber
security, and support to our intelligence community (IC).
The transformation strategy that we have set out on relies
on four pillars. We want to transform the nuclear stockpile in
partnership with the Department of Defense; we want to
transform to a modernized, cost-effective nuclear weapons
complex to support needed capabilities in our physical
infrastructure; we want to create an integrated, independent
enterprise that employs best business practices to maximize
efficiency and minimize our costs; and, finally, we want to
advance the science and technology base that is the cornerstone
of our nuclear deterrents and is essential to our national
security.
As you mentioned, ma'am, the committee authorized $66
million last year for the RRW concept study. Last year's
Omnibus Appropriations Act zeroed out that program funding.
However, the Administration and NNSA continue to believe
strongly that it is necessary to pursue the concepts. And we
have asked for $10 million to continue the study so that the
future Administration will have an opportunity to make an
informed decision on the composition of the stockpile.
We believe the RRW concept is important for a number of
reasons. By design, it would not provide a new role for nuclear
weapons or any nuclear capabilities. As Congressman Everett
mentioned, if you take a 1961 car or a 2008 car, it is still
transportation. So we are providing the same capability; there
is nothing really different in that. But it would help us to
sustain our military capabilities.
Building the RRW would not increase the size of the nuclear
stockpile. In fact, it should further enable reductions. Once a
transformed production complex demonstrates that it can produce
replacement warheads on a time scale responsive to technical
problems in the stockpile or adverse geopolitical changes, then
the reserve that we would necessarily have to maintain could be
eliminated, further reducing the nuclear stockpile and
reinforcing our commitments to the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT).
Because replacement warheads would be designed with more
favorable margins and less sensitive to the incremental aging
effects, introducing them in the stockpile would also reduce
the possibility that the United States would ever be required
to have a nuclear test to diagnose or remedy the stockpile
problems. This supports our overall efforts to dissuade other
nations from conducting tests.
By incorporating the modern security features, RRW would
strengthen the security of the United States' nuclear weapons
against unauthorized use in the event of a nuclear terrorist
attack.
And, finally, a secure, safe, reliable nuclear deterrent
credibly extends to our allies and supports our
nonproliferation efforts because our allies know that our
nuclear deterrents extend a guarantee. This nonproliferation
role of U.S. weapons is often misunderstood.
I look forward to answering any further questions, and I
will now turn the microphone over to my colleague, Will.
[The joint prepared statement of General Smolen and Mr.
Tobey can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]
Ms. Tauscher. We have one vote, my colleagues. So if we
would let Mr. Tobey go, and if you could summarize in about 5
minutes, then we could take the vote and be back in about 15
minutes. If that works for everybody, that is the way we will
proceed.
Mr. Tobey.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. TOBEY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Tobey. Certainly, thank you.
Madam Chair, members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss our fiscal year 2009 budget request for
nuclear nonproliferation.
I am pleased to be here with my colleague Bob Smolen, as
well as my Department of Energy colleagues. Bob and I do have a
good working relationship, and I think that will translate to
improved work at NNSA.
I will be brief, knowing that your time is limited before
the vote and also that members of this committee are well
versed in our work.
The fiscal year 2009 budget request for the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation totals $1.247 billion. This
amount will allow us to continue our mission to detect, secure,
and dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological materials.
Many of our efforts focus on nuclear materials and
facilities security. We recognize that the best way to reduce
the threat of proliferator or terrorist acquisition of nuclear
weapons or devices is by denying them access to necessary
nuclear and radiological materials in the first place.
To that end, our fiscal year 2009 request will allow us to
accelerate our work, including installation of radiation
detection systems at 9 additional ports under our Megaports
Program, for a total of 32 Megaport sites worldwide, helping to
secure 49 border crossings and other high-risk ports of entry
under our Second Line of Defense Program, and expanding export
control and commodity identification activities with more than
50 countries.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2009, we will undertake a new
initiative to strengthen international safeguards to prevent
the diversion of nuclear materials to non-peaceful uses. This
next-generation safeguards initiative will develop the
safeguard technologies and human resources needed to sustain
our nonproliferation efforts, and it will help to strengthen
the Nonproliferation Treaty.
Underpinning all of these efforts is our nonproliferation
research and development work through which we will continue
our leadership as the principal federal sponsor of long-term
proliferation related R&D on nuclear detection and
characterization.
Our fiscal year 2009 budget request will also allow us to
accelerate our efforts under the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI) to convert highly enriched uranium (HEU)
fueled research reactors around the globe and to use less
proliferation-sensitive, low-enriched uranium (LEU). To date,
we have removed enough nuclear material for nearly 70 weapons
and secured enough radiological sources for 8,000 dirty bombs.
In fiscal year 2009, we will convert an additional 8 HEU
reactors to LEU and remove an additional 700 kilograms of HEU,
and secure an additional 125 radiological sites across the
globe.
Last year, I updated you on our progress under the 2005
Bratislava Joint Statement on Nuclear Security in which we
partnered with Russia to secure its nuclear weapons and sites
of highest concern. I am pleased to report that we have
completed 85 percent of these key upgrades to date; work is
underway at the balance of the sites, and we are determined to
finish it by our deadline at the end of this calendar year.
In fiscal year 2009, should Congress grant our request for
resources, our focus will be on completing additional high-
priority security works beyond the Bratislava agreement but
still integral to ensuring optimal control over nuclear
materials, and working cooperatively with Russia to put in
place systems and procedures to sustain these security
upgrades.
Additionally, our fiscal year 2009 budget request also
includes funding to ensure the shutdown of the last remaining
Russian plutonium production reactor in 2010. These material
security efforts enhance our work to strengthen the
nonproliferation regime and the multilateral partnerships
supporting it.
In this regard, we will continue to support the work plan
of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to advance
the objectives of United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540, which mandates effective export controls, criminalizes
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by non-state
actors, and requires states to secure proliferation-sensitive
materials.
We will, likewise, continue our technical and diplomatic
support of U.S. efforts on the Nonproliferation Treaty within
the nuclear suppliers group and on multilateral initiatives,
such as international fuel assurances and on the disablement of
the North Korean nuclear facilities which are now being funded
through State Department funds. I would add that if we are to
continue this work in North Korea, which I believe to be vital,
we will need relief from the Glenn Amendment, which restricts
funding.
We feel a great sense of urgency to complete our missions.
We appreciate deeply the strong support of this committee, and
we look forward to working with all of you on these vital
issues.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify. If I could take
a moment or two to address the questions that have been given
to me already, I would like to do so, if you have time for
that.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Tobey and General
Smolen can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]
Ms. Tauscher. We have got to go vote. We have got to be
there----
Mr. Tobey. Okay.
Ms. Tauscher [continuing]. In a 15-minute window. So we
will vote. We think that there is only one vote, but it may be
a little longer.
The hearing will be suspended temporarily. Please make
yourselves comfortable. The staff will let you know whether we
are pinned down there for one or more votes. We will be back as
quickly as we can.
[Recess.]
Ms. Tauscher. We want to thank everyone for their patience.
Assistant Secretary Rispoli, thank you for appearing before
us again. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. RISPOLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Secretary Rispoli. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Good morning----
Ms. Tauscher. Good morning.
Secretary Rispoli [continuing]. Madam Chairman, Congressman
Everett, members of the subcommittee.
I am really pleased to be here today with my colleagues and
would like to note that this marks 20 years since the
Environmental Management (EM) Program was first established. A
lot has been accomplished, and I actually have a few photos to
share with you, but a lot more still needs to be done.
When I first appeared before the subcommittee two years
ago, I pledged to you that safety would remain our first
priority. No milestone is ever worth an injury to our
workforce.
Today, I am pleased to report that worker injuries have
been reduced by 50 percent in the past 3 years. And our injury
rate is less than 10 percent of that in comparable commercial
waste disposal and construction industries.
When I was sworn into this position, I set about to refine
all of EM's cost and schedule baselines which guide every
project. During the past 18 months, all EM projects, both our
line-item construction projects and our cleanup projects, have
undergone independent audits to verify their costs and
schedules as valid and reasonable.
Today, our project estimates and assumptions can be viewed,
I believe, by you and by all of our stakeholders with far
greater confidence than ever before. And I stress to you the
entire portfolio of the cleanup program has been independently
audited.
At that time, I also stated that our goal was for the cost
and schedule performance of at least 90 percent of our projects
to be on target or better than on target with respect to cost
and schedule. In July of 2005, 17 of our projects were not on
cost or on schedule, which equated at that time to 51 percent
being on time and on cost.
We have worked very hard at this, and today we have
consistently maintained better than 90 percent of our projects
on time, on cost. I know you cannot see this chart, but this
just shows how we have consistently made progress in improving
the performance of all of the projects in our program.
Turning now to our fiscal year 2009 budget request, our
request for Defense Environmental Cleanup is $5.3 billion, and
it continues to be based on the principal of prioritizing risk
reduction across the entire complex.
Let me address an issue that I know has caused concern, has
been reported in the press as caused concern to several Members
of Congress, and that is that this request has broken with past
understandings related to the Department's cleanup budget
strategy.
I will mention the testimony my predecessor gave to this
subcommittee in 2004. Then Assistant Secretary Jessie Roberson
testified that after a period of accelerated funding peaking in
fiscal year 2005, ``We anticipate funding will then decline
significantly to about $5 billion in 2008.'' Thus, viewed from
this perspective our fiscal year 2009 budget request, for all
accounts, is actually about a half billion dollars more than
what was projected five years ago and reported to Congress five
years ago.
The Administration recognizes that with this budget before
you some of the milestones in our cleanup agreements are in
jeopardy of being missed. It is important, however, to note
that other milestones are in jeopardy due to technical reasons
regardless of funding.
As a result, we have had to make very careful decisions
regarding our priorities. The regulatory agreements that guide
our work have been, and remain, important measures of progress.
The Department's strategies continue to focus on cleanup that
will produce the greatest environmental and safety benefit and
the largest amount of risk reduction.
I would like to highlight some of our accomplishments that
demonstrate our ability to make progress in cleaning up the
environment and reducing risk to public health and the
environment.
The first photo I would like to share with you is the
Savannah River. You have the photo; it is labeled ``Savannah
River M-Area.'' Here, nuclear fuel was fabricated for use in
the Savannah River reactors to produce weapons-usable nuclear
materials.
DOE and its contractors decontaminated and decommissioned 6
aboveground tanks and 22 buildings totaling more than 170,000
square feet, which is equivalent to nearly 4 football fields.
We continue to remediate the groundwater beneath this site.
The second photograph is labeled ``Hanford Site River
Corridor,'' and this area served a similar function as the M-
Area that you just saw at Savannah River. It is located on the
outskirts of the city of Richland, and as you can see in the
photo, it is right alongside the Columbia River. The area
contained 270 radioactive and hazardous facilities.
As you can see from the X's on the photo, we have
decontaminated and demolished many of those structures, 140 to
be exact, and have safely removed 2,000 metric tons (MT) of
excess uranium for disposal or safe storage.
The next photograph I will show you is a photograph of the
gaseous diffusion converters and equipment at East Tennessee
Technology Park. This shows that we have removed nearly 50,000
tons of equipment, which is comparable to the displacement of a
World War II-class battleship from the Oak Ridge K-31 Building,
which is about the size of 40 football fields. Now that this
high-risk material has been removed, the building is available
for industrial re-use.
In your letter inviting me to testify, you asked me to
update you on major project activities in our program. Much of
the information is contained in my written testimony, which has
been submitted for the record. I would, however, like to
highlight just three things.
The Salt Waste Processing Facility at Savannah River: For
that project, we expect design completion by early fall. Site
prep is nearly complete, and we expect to begin construction of
the base mat this June. In the meantime, we have been treating
salt waste through interim processes for onsite disposal at
Saltstone.
For the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant,
the design is approximately 75 percent complete, and the
construction is nearly 40 percent complete. I have given you a
photograph, an aerial, of that project as well, so that you can
see a picture of just how large that is and how much has been
accomplished.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 95.]
I would like to note that last week, Secretary Bodman
informed Congress by letter that he had certified the Waste
Treatment Plant's contractors earned value management system.
This was required by Section 3120 of last year's National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), actually the 2007 National
Defense Authorization Act.
As Chairman Tauscher mentioned, the Department is in the
process of consolidating storage of surplus non-pit, weapons-
usable plutonium. We are moving it from Lawrence Livermore
National Lab (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Lab (LANL), as well
as the Hanford Site to the Savannah River Site (SRS). There,
the plutonium is currently planned to be disposed of using up
to three facilities: the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility,
currently under construction; the existing H-Canyon; and a
proposed small-scale plutonium vitrification capability.
As Congressman Everett noted in his opening, the Department
is indeed currently evaluating an alternative disposition
approach that could eliminate the need for the vitrification
capability and rely on the other two components.
Highly enriched uranium is also being consolidated at the
Savannah River Site using the H-Canyon to blend the material to
a low enrichment to meet the Department's programmatic needs,
and as appropriate for use in commercial reactors. Highly
enriched uranium has already been shipped from the Y-12 Plant
at Oak Ridge, and preparations have been made to receive the
material from both the Lawrence Livermore and the Los Alamos
National Labs.
Two days ago, as you know, Secretary Bodman issued a policy
statement on the management of the Department's excess uranium
inventory, which reaffirms and is consistent with the approach
that we are currently taking.
Madam Chairman, I am proud of the progress our 34,000
contractors and federal employees have made in recent years,
and the wise and secure foundation we have been building for
the future.
This subcommittee has provided the critical guidance that
has enabled us to accomplish the successes we have had to date.
I look forward to working with you in my remaining time at the
Department, and I thank you sincerely for supporting our
efforts to reduce risk to our citizens, our communities, and
our Nation. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rispoli can be found
in the Appendix on page 61.]
Ms. Tauscher. Assistant Secretary Rispoli, thank you very
much for your testimony.
Mr. Podonsky, you have been here quite a few times. Welcome
back to the committee. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY, CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND
SECURITY OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Podonsky. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member
Everett, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate your
inviting me to testify today.
I promise to be brief. But considering the broad missions
of my organization, which affect all of my colleagues here, I
think it is important that I summarize some of our important
efforts that are underway currently.
As the DOE's organization responsible for Health, Safety,
and Security (HSS), we provide the DOE with policy development,
technical assistance, training, independent oversight, and
enforcement. We want to assure the committee that HSS continues
to strengthen the Department's safety and security posture
through initiatives based on the priorities established when
our office was created.
We have institutionalized our infrastructure; we are
recognized by the DOE leadership team, the workforce, other
U.S. agencies and the international community as an
organization that is striving for excellence in health, safety,
and security.
With the creation of HSS, we saw the importance of
identifying programs that would enable workers to have other
access to DOE managers for worker health and safety. During the
past year, we have conducted a series of focus group meetings
with trade unions, professional associations, and DOE program
offices to strengthen those lines of communication and identify
areas of concern or interest. We interface extensively with
other federal organizations to improve the overall safety and
security posture of the Department.
Our Security Technology Deployment Program has partnered
with DOD, the intelligence community, and others for deployment
of new security technologies. Using safety and security
experts, we function as the corporate catalyst for deployment
of effective security technologies across the complex.
We have formed a new relationship with both the Department
of Labor and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health to better facilitate the implementation of the Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act. We
published a status report on the former Worker Medical
Surveillance Program to inform our former and current
workforce, Congress, and the public of the efforts being
undertaken for those individuals who may have been exposed to
harmful conditions while working for DOE.
In the international arena, we renegotiated the agreement
between DOE and Japan to end our 42 years of financial
obligations in fiscal year 2009 for the environmental studies
associated with the accidental release of nuclear materials in
Palomares, Spain. We have also strengthened the DOE's
relationship with the government of Japan and the Marshall
Islands to better manage these health programs.
We are currently in the process of completing a review of
all security requirements, and initiated a review of all safety
requirements to make sure that they are performance-based,
clear and concise without being overly prescriptive or
redundant. We continue to conduct comprehensive, independent
oversight inspections of the DOE performance in security, cyber
security, emergency management, environment safety and health.
Results from these inspections provide the senior leadership
and line managers with information needed for improvements.
For example, our Office of Cyber Security executes one of
the most aggressive, sophisticated cyber security oversight
programs in the Federal Government. The cornerstone of our
cyber-security function is to implement a rigorous penetration
testing program in both announced and unannounced testing.
Everyday threats to our information systems continue to grow,
and while we have many challenges in this area, the Department
is proactively addressing the weaknesses that we continue to
identify in cyber security.
HSS is also promoting improvement in the Department's
safety and security programs through the implementation of
DOE's legislatively mandated enforcement programs. We have
integrated the Worker Health and Safety and Classified
Information Security Enforcement Programs with the Nuclear
Safety Enforcement Program. Our efforts have resulted in the
highly publicized Notice of Violation against Los Alamos
National Laboratory contractors. We are currently conducting
several enforcement investigations, including an inquiry into
the events that led to the release of nuclear material at the
Hanford Site.
Madam Chair, members of the subcommittee, the Secretary of
Energy created HSS to strengthen worker health and safety and
security, and we believe we have demonstrated to many of our
skeptics that we can improve the health and safety and security
of the Department while improving program management and
alignment of the responsibilities and those functions. We are
confident that with the continued support of the DOE
management, our stakeholders in Congress, we can continue to
expand on our accomplishments. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky can be found in the
Appendix on page 70.]
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Podonsky.
We have another vote. It is a 15-minute vote. Perhaps we
can start by just asking one question.
And, General Smolen, the NNSA has identified goals for
staff reduction at each of the labs and sites within the
complex. Do the reductions that have already occurred during
the current fiscal year count toward these goals?
General Smolen. The Complex Transformation goal of 20 to 30
percent would ultimately include those numbers. We still have a
ways to go, and some of that will be dependent on the outcome
of Complex Transformation and what choices are made.
Ms. Tauscher. Okay. Thank you.
Deputy Administrator Tobey, this is a question about
plutonium disposition. In the Fiscal Year 2008 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, funds were reduced for the planned MOX
Fabrication Facility, as we all know, and transferred its
funding out of the NNSA to the Office of Nuclear Security.
However, a February 22, 2008, memo to Secretary Bodman from
DOE General Counsel states that the Secretary is not legally
able to transfer management of the project out of the NNSA. The
memo recommends an Economy Act to formalize continued
management of the MOX project by the NNSA with funding from
Nuclear Energy.
What cost increases and schedule delays will result from
the cuts to the project contained in the Fiscal Year 2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act, both in direct appropriations
and rescinded on obligated balances?
Mr. Tobey. Madam Chair, if I could answer both a question
you raised in your opening statement----
Ms. Tauscher. Sure.
Mr. Tobey [continuing]. And this, because I believe they
are related.
You had asked about whether there are adequate funds in our
budget for materials consolidations.
Ms. Tauscher. Right.
Mr. Tobey. I believe that is the case of the request. But I
would note in that regard that a vital element of consolidation
is our Fissile Materials Disposition Program.
Ms. Tauscher. Right.
Mr. Tobey. Unless that program is successful, we cannot
successfully consolidate materials within the Department. And
with respect to that, the cuts to the program within the 2008
budget that you cited are a serious source of concern.
With respect to what those cuts will result in, in terms of
a longer project or higher costs, we are still working on that
analysis. We will be forced to re-baseline the project,
unfortunately, because of the cuts unless there is some
restoration of those funds, which amount $215 million for the
U.S. project alone. There were additional cuts to the overall
program involving the Russian program.
And so, we should come back to you once that re-baselining
is done. Obviously, we want to be very careful and thorough in
completing that because we want to give absolutely the most
accurate figures that we can.
Ms. Tauscher. As you know, we are going to be moving to our
markup, which will be in the May timeframe--full committee, end
of May--to the floor in June. That is our window of opportunity
for us to do corrective action, if we need to, in this current
bill. So we would like to work very closely with you to get
these numbers, get the timeline adjustments, what the
ramifications are of the shortfall, and how we actually work to
correct it.
I think that there is a linking that we have not clearly
made about, if you want this result, then you have to do these
two things. There is a twinning of them that is a case that we
have not made--I mean ``we'' in the ``big we.'' So we are happy
to help make that case, assuming that we understand what these
ramifications are.
So if we could, you know, chat in the next couple of weeks,
certainly over the break, and then in early April, I think Mr.
Everett and I, and the committee will be very interested in
understanding exactly what these are, and what we can do in the
bill that we are going to be building in the next 8 to 10
weeks.
Mr. Tobey. We would be very pleased to work with you.
Budget cuts to an approved baseline result in project delays
and higher costs. There is no way around it; it is a matter of
physics and math.
Ms. Tauscher. We appreciate that.
We have about eight minutes left. Do you want to ask a
question, Mr. Everett? I would be happy to go to you.
Mr. Everett. Ms. Chairman, I would rather go and come back.
Ms. Tauscher. All right.
We apologize. We have got another vote. We will suspend the
hearing temporarily, and witnesses will be made comfortable.
[Recess.]
Ms. Tauscher. Once again, we thank you for your patience.
We are going to go to Mr. Everett for questions.
Mr. Everett. And thank you, chairman.
General Smolen, let me read from my opening statement:
``This year's budget request for RRW is a mere $10 million. I
cannot imagine that this is significant to complete the Phase
2a cost and design study, which is important to inform the
Strategic Commission, Complex Transformation, and future
decisions about our Nation's stockpile and composition.'' And I
would ask you if--let me go a step further here. As I
understand it, the fiscal year 2009 funds would address the
fundamental sites and certification questions raised by JASON
and continue 2a cost and design studies. Is that really enough
money? Will that really get us where we need to go to get this
information to these folks?
General Smolen. Sir, the $10 million that we have for RRW
was to enable the maturation of the RRW design to address the
questions raised by JASON, as you point out. These design
refinements are necessary if we are going to have to establish
the parameters for potential impacts on certification.
No, sir, it is not what would be required to complete the
study. In order to do that, we would need about $65 million
more.
Mr. Everett. The Commander of STRATCOM recently testified
that we are accepting significant future risk to reliability,
safety, and security and maintainability of our legacy Cold War
stockpile, risks that were perhaps acceptable during the Cold
War, but that would not be acceptable to our future combatant
commanders and security of this country. Would you go into that
a little bit?
General Smolen. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. In fact,
General Chilton and I were contemporaries and served together
on several occasions. And I will be with him on Monday at
Pantex.
General Chilton has taken a very keen personal interest in
understanding the complex and some of the challenges that we
face. I think he is very, very aware of the situation
surrounding the RRW concept. He is also very concerned about
the issues associated with Complex Transformation in order to
be able to support him and his successors in the future.
In very broad terms, I think General Chilton has come to
realize that, much of what you already know, that the aging
weapons, coupled with the aging infrastructure, present us with
potential challenges in the future that we simply have to do
something about. And while we are on a path to begin to stem
some of those issues, there are still a lot of challenges that
we face.
Mr. Everett. Would you go into detail about the possible
risks associated with the LEP program?
General Smolen. Well, sir, the difficulty we really have
basically goes to the aging. As you very appropriately
mentioned, we have a B61 built in the 1960's. We are in the
process of trying to refurbish that. We did some work with the
7, 11 with the physics packages. We still have a lot of non-
nuclear components that are tubes that we are concerned about.
If General Chilton is being asked to establish plans for
targeting, he needs to be certain that those weapons are
capable of yielding what is required. And I think he has seen
some of the challenges associated with that. The W76, as you
know, we are working some issues with that; there are some
challenges there.
So I think he is just expressing a concern that as the
stockpile continues to age, if we are faced with continually
doing Life Extension Programs, and if some of the materials we
need to do that are unavailable and we have to remanufacture
new ones, then we continue to build on the uncertainty which
may some time in the future have the lab directors question
whether or not, in light of all the changes, they would be able
to certify those weapons. And of course if they are not, then
that is an extremely difficult position for General Chilton to
be in.
Mr. Everett. Is there window in which, at some point in
time, we drop off the end of the cliff with this?
General Smolen. I am sure there must be, sir, but we do not
know what that is.
Mr. Everett. That is one of the problems that we have in
trying to decide funding issues and that sort of stuff.
Ms. Chairman, that is my final question. But I would like
to see if we can get some sort of idea of a time frame: when
must we start working toward solving this problem?
Ms. Tauscher. I agree with you, Mr. Everett. I also think
the white paper is going to be informative, because it is a DOD
product, and the client will direct us as to what they think
the requirements will be, so we can match capabilities with
requirements--
General Smolen. Yes, ma'am, I believe the secretaries have
either signed, or are on the verge of signing that paper over
to you.
Ms. Tauscher. Yes, I think we might see that in the next 10
days. So, Mr. Everett, I agree with you.
Why don't we talk subsequently. If you want another hearing
on another issue, I think that some of this will be classified,
and perhaps a hearing that we have talked about on other issues
that have a classification issue that, whether it is MOX or
other things, we will have to do that.
General Smolen. Yes, sir, and the more specific issues that
you were addressing as to some of the problem areas, we would
have to go to a classified setting to discuss that much
further.
Mr. Everett. Chairman, thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Everett, thank you.
Mr. Larsen of Washington.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Secretary Rispoli, welcome back. A few questions for you
regarding Hanford. You can help us out with that.
First question has to do with the Waste Treatment Plant.
And we know it is designed to process 100 percent of high-level
waste, about 50 percent of the low-activity waste at the
Hanford Site, and the DOE has been pursuing a Bulk Vit
Technology to process the remaining low-activity waste.
Critical Decision-2 was expected for Bulk Vit Technology in
January. Yet that milestone, so far as I know, has not yet been
finalized. Further, the budget request includes only $1 million
for Bulk Vitrification while supporting the pursuit of
alternative approaches.
Can you help me out with the true status of the Bulk Vit
Technology development, the expectation when Critical Decision-
2 will be met, and DOE's plans for treatment and disposal of
low-activity waste at Hanford?
Secretary Rispoli. Thank you.
As you correctly stated, the plant as it is designed will
treat in its life 100 percent of the high-level waste, 50
percent of the low-activity waste. That has been the plan ever
since the plant was reconfigured at the end of the Clinton
Administration, and it was upsized, you might say. Originally,
it was only to treat 10 percent by volume, 25 percent by
radioactivity content, of all the waste there.
But it was upgraded, as I say, at the end of the Clinton
Administration to the configuration we have now. So we have
recognized all along that we have to have some sort of
supplemental treatment to deal with the rest of the low-
activity waste.
Right now, we are looking at bulk vit very, very seriously.
And I have testified that in past years as well, as I am sure
you know. We are also looking at other options, they are not
mutually exclusive. What I am about to mention, when I say one
they are not one versus another, these are options that we are
looking at.
One is Bulk Vitrification. One is perhaps adding a third
low-activity waste melter. Another is seeing if we could
increase the throughput of the low-activity waste melters.
Another would be if we want to begin processing waste early,
whether we would want to start processing even earlier than the
completion of the entire plant in 2019.
And because we have these options, and because we want to
focus on the right way to go forward, I have asked that we have
a group of outside people, outside experts, come in and take a
report that was completed last November, I believe it was, of
2007 called--it was a low-activity waste study. It is on both
our DOE website, and it is on at the technology website, as
well as on the Office of River Protection's website. And if you
would like a copy, it is in the public domain. I could print
one off and get it to you.
But in any event, we have asked these people to look at all
of these options--again, they are not mutually exclusive
options--to help guide us to the right business decision, so
that when we make that decision, we know that we have made the
right decision. We don't want to make a decision and then
determine that perhaps it is not optimal.
Clearly, bulk vit has performed through all of its testing,
its surrogate testing, and has performed very well. We are
looking at: Where would it be? How many lines would it have?
How long would the demonstration operate before you build the
final one? Whether you really need the demo one at all, or
could you go into a preliminary version of the final? All of
these options we want to really understand, and I expect that
within just a few months, we should have that nailed down.
Mr. Larsen. So is that the reason, then, that Critical
Decision-2 has not been met, which would be the approval of a
performance baseline?
Do you want to settle on your setup first?
Secretary Rispoli. Well, I think that the two could be
operating in parallel, and I think we were clearly waiting for
the outcome of the tests. I think the latest tests were
completed this winter. We had to wait for some laboratory
results to come back. My understanding is all of those worked
very well. So I don't know that we need to hold up on----
Mr. Larsen. Okay.
Secretary Rispoli [continuing]. The Critical Decision-2.
But at the end of the day, in the final analysis, we really
need the outcome of this group of experts. They are three
eminent people in the Nation that have done this for us before,
and I expect to have that in, like, the June timeframe.
Mr. Larsen. In about June?
Secretary Rispoli. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. With regards to River Corridor, I mean it goes
without saying that inadequate support for Hanford funding, and
much less funding for the other facilities around the country,
over the last few years has made it impossible for DOE, with
regards to Hanford, in our view in Washington state, to meet
its obligations under the Tri-Party Agreement.
In this budget, I am particularly concerned about the cuts
in some programs on River Corridor that could lead to a
degradation of the workforce that we have there. You noted, I
think rightly so, that there has been a lot of cleanup, but
this still leaves a lot left to do as well.
So with these cuts in the programs leading to potential
degradation of the workforce, that could lead to potential
problems in the future. So given that these cuts exist and
River Corridor closure could lead to degradation of the
workforce, to layoffs, how can we plan to ensure that we will
have a trained workforce to do the job in the future to get
this completed? How do we maintain consistency?
Secretary Rispoli. Yes, sir. I think that is a real
challenge, for not only Hanford but for sites everywhere
because there is such a demand for nuclear workers, and we know
that when you shut down an operation, it takes time to bring it
back up.
I would point out that I did share with you all the photo
with the X's through it of all the facilities that have come
down at the River Corridor. And, as you know, we are structured
by contract, and you are correct in talking about workforce.
I would also like to point out that along the River
Corridor primarily, this budget plusses up the groundwater
efforts by $65 million, taking it from about $104 million to
$169 million. And, as you know, the groundwater issue is the
Columbia River; that is really what we are worried about.
And so what we did was we went through a risk--we basically
used a risk prioritization system. Our objective is to address
the highest risks first. And I think that we recognize that
with $2 billion a year going to Hanford, nominally $2 billion,
we believe that the greater risk to the public and the
environment is the groundwater.
We have got some promising new technologies. We have
plussed up, as I say, significantly in the groundwater area,
and that is mostly along the River Corridor as well.
So, we recognize that there will be some perturbations, but
we also recognize we have got to focus on where is the higher
risk. And we clearly think that has to be the Columbia River.
Mr. Larsen. With regards to these technologies you mention,
are they proven technologies, or is this going to be an
opportunity to attempt to mature these technologies, to use a
terminology that I hear around.
Secretary Rispoli. Actually, we have had some great
success. We are using materials that have not been used before.
Some of the results have already been published in scientific
venues. But, yes, we are having success.
Before, we were primarily using pump-and-treat or other
treatments, and we know that some of the contaminants were
still getting to the Columbia River, or at least migrating
toward it. And now we are injecting things into the ground that
actually are interdicting and stopping.
And so we are very pleased with the outcomes. We actually
have a few pamphlets on it, again, that are in the public
domain, and I would be happy to just get those to your office
so you can see what we are doing.
Mr. Larsen. Could you do that?
Secretary Rispoli. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Madam Chair, just an additional question, if I
may, for Mr. Podonsky on medical screenings----
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. Yes, exams. I understand that you
are established not only to improve the program management for
health, safety, and security, but also to actually improve the
health, safety, and security of DOE workers, and that includes
a commitment to providing medical screening exams to former
employees to identify adverse health effects that may have
resulted from working at DOE facilities, and I understand that
more than 600,000 people are eligible in the former worker
program and may need screening.
This element, the occupational health element, was
appropriated about $16.4 million 2008, and the budget request
is for $17.9 million. Just with that sheer number of people who
are eligible to participate, over 600,000, is $17.9 million
even enough? Even though it is an increase, is it even enough
for 2009? And what can you tell us about being sure that folks
who want screening are going to get screening?
Mr. Podonsky. The program itself that you are referring to
was actually started by the Department in 1996, and it is a
consortium of universities and labor unions that are doing
these medical screenings.
And I will tell you, when your HSS was first set up, the
former organization that became part of ours only had budgeted
$12 million, but they were spending about $16 million. And that
was in 2007. In 2008, we put it back up to $16 million again,
finding monies within our own budget. For the 2009 budget--this
is our first budget as HSS and we are not really sure what it
is exactly that we need.
And we have pulled the consortium of grantees together for
the first time. We are meeting again with them in April because
we are challenging them to help us understand how are they
reaching out to get all these former workers. Because if you
look over the history of the program, which is just 12 years,
close to 600,000 former workers, only 50,000 have been
screened. But when you do the math, it is about $2,500 per
screening, and we know the cost is a lot less than that.
So we are trying to get these organizations to get control
of their infrastructure. We want to make sure that we are also
able to reach out to more of the former workers in the
population, identify who they are, because we also think that
this is a great improvement over the way it has been run in the
past.
But more importantly, we want to make sure that the current
workforce understands that this $25 billion corporation is
taking care of its employees, past and present. We also want
to, as I mentioned in my testimony, we want to make sure that
we are married very closely with the Labor Department, with the
Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act
(EEOICPA) program, so that the former worker program can, in
fact, feed into the EEOICPA program as appropriate. So these
are areas that hadn't been done previously, but we plan to do
that.
So to your question, do we know that it is enough? We don't
know for sure, but we feel pretty confident that we are moving
in the right direction. We don't want to just keep on asking
for more money. We want to make sure that we are utilizing it
so we can, in fact, screen as many people as want to be
screened.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, good. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Turner of Ohio.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Secretary Rispoli, when you look at the Department of
Energy 2009 Congressional Budget Request, Environmental
Management section--as you know, we have just recently
discussed--there is a section in that that concerns my
community. And I want to read a few provisions of the
Congressional Budget Request, and then I will offer my
questions to you.
And, first, let me tell you that from the perspective of
the City of Miamisburg, which is referenced in this report, I
believe that the Department of Energy and the City of
Miamisburg's partnership has been a model. The work that has
been done together has been arm-in-arm and, I think,
extraordinary. We are to the final throes of completion of this
project, and certainly that is where everyone gets most
concerned in trying to get the ball over the line so that we
know that everyone has done the right thing.
And in looking at the budget request, it references the
Operable Unit-1 (OU-1) Historic Landfill, and it says a couple
things. One, it says that it meets the requirements under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) and has been accepted by U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Ohio EPA. And it
acknowledges that in 2006, Congress directed exhumation of
Operable Unit-1 within an appropriation not to exceed $30
million, and an additional $44.5 million has been applied to
the remediation at the site.
When you get to the end of the Congressional Budget
Request, it says the closure and turnover of 24 buildings and
306 acres to Miamisburg Mound Community Improvement Corporation
(MMCIC) were expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year
2008. However, a recent correspondence from the Miamisburg
Mound Community Improvement Corporation indicates that they
will not accept the remaining land parcels. When final site
cleanup of Operable Unit-1 is completed and the two remaining
Records of Decision (RODs) are finalized, the complete
operational management of the long-term stewardship mission at
Miamisburg Closure Project will be transferred to DOE's Office
of Legacy Management.
There are a couple of conclusions in here which obviously I
hope are not final conclusions, and I think that the community
and DOE are continuing their conversations. But here are my two
concerns.
One, if the land is unable to be transferred to
Miamisburg's Improvement Corporation and is transferred to the
Office of Legacy Management, obviously there are going to be
ongoing and recurring costs to DOE. And I would ask, one, did
the cost-benefit analysis of DOE retaining that land in the
Office Legacy Management be considered overall in the decision
as to whether or not to execute final cleanup of OU-1? Was DOE
currently advocating not to complete that cleanup?
And the second thing is that the assumption that the
landfill in its present state could be left to meet CERCLA
requirements is based upon our current knowledge of what is
there. And one of the problems with landfills, obviously, is
that you don't necessarily know what, so you can't necessarily
see it as you do tests and do parameters of assumptions. So my
second aspect is that, you know, an understanding that DOE will
provide a continuous review so that, you know, what we know now
might change.
And those really are my two questions about Miamisburg and
the DOE's commitment to look at a cost-benefit analysis of
final cleanup and then transfer to the Miamisburg Community
Improvement Corporation. The second is an ongoing commitment
if, as the information might change, that the cleanup standard
might be impacted.
Secretary Rispoli. Congressman, thank you. I know Mayor
Church, and I know the members on his team very well. I think,
as you state, I think we have a great relationship working with
that community. And we are aware, obviously, of the concern
they have over OU-1.
One of the things we are doing to help with that is that
the current discussions with the community would actually not
transfer ownership of OU-1 to the community. And those
discussions are ongoing now, and we think to a great extent
that will alleviate their concern about OU-1, per se.
When we talk about Legacy Management, I think it is
important to recognize that all over the country when we turn
over properties, whether we keep the property or whether we
turn it over, if there is no other government landlord--like
NNSA in certain cases here at their laboratories--Legacy
Management takes the role of making sure that the records are
maintained, that if there is any groundwater monitoring or
ongoing monitoring to be protected that all of that happens. So
at any site where there will be no other DOE landlord, Legacy
Management will have a role at that site to make sure those
functions are done.
And then lastly, we did, as you know, commission a review
of the cost to do what remains to be done with OU-1. We sent a
report to Congress back in April of 2006 on OU-1 in response to
congressional language, and we specifically mentioned in that
report that we believed that the $30 million that Congress
directed to clean up OU-1 would not be sufficient. And we
proposed an excavation-based remedy with priorities such that--
and that was acceptable to MMCIC at that time--that approach
was acceptable, understanding that we would do it
incrementally, so that if the funds ran out, we would tackle
the worst first.
So out of the eight priority areas that were mutually
agreed, we actually finished, I think it was, five of them, and
we are into the sixth. And that is where we wound up out of
money, despite putting another $4.5 million into it. So, I have
asked for an independent estimate of what it would cost to do
the remainder of those priorities that, all along, we knew
might not ever get done and was documented in this report.
And with that, I would expect we can do exactly as you
suggest, and that is do a cost-benefit of the alternatives. Is
it better to just go and do it for the money that we now
believe it will cost, or will it be more effective----
With all of that said, we want be sure that whatever we
leave there is protective of the community. You know, that has
got to be number one, is to be sure that the remedy is
protective. And right now, we feel that we are on safe ground
because, as you know, both the Ohio regulator and the EPA
believe that what we have done to date is protective. I hope
that answers your----
Mr. Turner. A couple things, and first I want to thank Bob
DeGrasse and Kari Bingen for their help in visiting the site
and their work----
Secretary Rispoli. Sure.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. With you on this. Not transferring
the facility does not eliminate the concern of the community;
the community's concern would remain. And I know that you are
aware that the community had made a concession early on as to
what the standard of cleanup would be. That made a significant
impact on DOE's bottom line for the other portions of the site,
industrial versus residential.
The concern that the community has with respect to
proceeding is, what really is there? And as you are aware,
every time that anything has been opened up, especially since
this was not regulated landfill--these were just random
disposals that were occurring--additional materials have been
found that have been either of a greater concern or an
indication that there is something worse there.
And that is where the community's concern has been placed.
If this is not cleaned up, this will be the only of the
property that is not.
And I appreciate your commitment to doing the cost-benefit
analysis. I appreciate the commitment to continue to work with
the community on looking at what the standards are for cleanup.
And I know as you look to those cost assessments, one of the
things that we are going to be looking at is, what assumptions
do they take into place as to what is there; and how does that
affect Ohio EPA's analysis of when they say that the facility
can be left as it is.
So, I am certain this is going to be an ongoing
conversation. I appreciate your----
Secretary Rispoli. Yes, sir. And I would be happy to work
with you and your office as we go forward, as well as with
Mayor Church. But I think we now have more information to go
forward with that type of a decision.
Mr. Turner. Excellent. And one more question.
Mr. Podonsky, as you know, and as the chairwoman knows,
since Madam Chair has been excellent on the issue of security
for this committee, I wanted to ask you about the Design Basis
Threat, what your current view is of the status of the Design
Basis Threat, what additional reviews or issues or concerns you
might have about the Design Basis Threat.
Mr. Podonsky. Thank you, sir. The Design Basis Threat that
the Department is currently in compliance with was the 2003
Design Basis Threat. The 2005 Design Basis Threat that was
signed out by our former Deputy Secretary, Clay Sell, who just
recently departed, committed the Department to being in
compliance by 2008.
Without getting into classified information, we are taking
another hard look at the expenditures that have been made on
the Design Basis Threat, because it was predicated on
intelligence information that is somewhat dated. And in March
of last year, a year ago, I asked our Director of Intelligence
to give us a site-specific analysis of threats against site by
site as opposed to a generic threat statement that would advise
us on Design Basis Threat. We did not get that from our
Intelligence Office. I then wrote another letter this January,
and copied my colleagues, and the three Under Secretaries, and
the Deputy, getting a little more specific on what we need for
this.
My point is, we do need to reexamine where we are in the
Design Basis Threat in terms of it is very costly and we have
to balance the cost of physical security against the known
threats that we have against our sites. Currently, we believe
that our sites are well protected. The nuclear material and the
other targets are well protected.
But we need to examine whether or not to continue down the
path of being concerned about composite adversaries, concerned
about what the threat is truly. Because it keeps on changing,
and we don't want to chase it with more dollars or more guards,
gates, and guns, as we say.
We do feel, again I want to state, we do feel that the
Department's physical security is really quite adequate in a
number of its sites, so we need to reexamine this. Our bigger
concern lies with cyber security.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. You are welcome, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Franks of Arizona.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
You know, it is kind of ironic, I was going to ask a
question about security, and probably somebody has already
scooped me before I got back.
Ms. Tauscher. No, I think that would be a good area to go
into.
Mr. Franks. Well, let me just start out by saying, General
Smolen, I think that you have had just a heroic effort in
trying to maintain our deterrent given all the challenges that
you have.
And I share the ranking member's concerns about the RRW,
and I am concerned, of course, that if we defer the Reliable
Replacement Warhead too long the Life Extension Programs will
come to a point where you have to make some fairly unpleasant
decisions when you have to testify as to being able to certify
our deterrent. And, you know, you have the unenviable task of
protecting, in a sense, our most critical defense asset, and
that is a challenging thing to deal with. And I just want to go
on record as saying that I think that the ranking member had a
tremendous point.
My question is related to cyber security. I am, first of
all, very encouraged about your emphasis on it because while I
feel like we have taken some pretty strong measures in that
regard, some of the countries that we cooperate with may be at
risk.
And I would like to get, Mr. Tobey, your sense of what that
risk is, and what the vulnerability represented is and what we
should do to address this, especially in terms of, you know,
our nonproliferation concerns from other countries that we are
cooperating with and their risk to cyber security attacks--or
cyber attacks--I guess that is a better way to say it.
Mr. Tobey. I am sorry, sir, I want to make sure I fully
understand the question. Are you referring to other states'
cyber security and whether or not----
Mr. Franks. Yes, I know that we have that challenge, as
well. But it occurs to me that if I were looking at the system,
I would be more afraid of people that we are working directly
with that haven't reached the level of advancement that we have
in protecting themselves against cyber security. They may have
all the good intentions in the world, but if their systems
aren't sufficiently developed, what--or am I just all wet?
Mr. Tobey. No, I think, actually, you have raised a good
and interesting question and one, frankly, that we have not
spent a lot of time on. Our focus with respect to security
improvements in other countries has largely been in other
areas.
But I think you have raised an interesting question and one
that we should probably spend some time on. And, with your
indulgence, is what I would like to do is go back and see what
has been done, what might be done, and come back to you with an
answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 101.]
Mr. Franks. That is great. Thank you.
And thank you, Madam Chairman.
Let me shift gears on you here and talk a little bit
about--you know, I think my greatest concern, just personally--
I know everybody has the same concern, but you know, sometimes
you have an emphasis that you can't get out of your head--is
the whole notion of an Iran, or someone like that, gaining
sufficient capability. Even if they don't have the ability to
hit us with a missile--or even if they do, they know we have
their address, and I think they are going to be reticent to do
that--just gaining that technology that can be translated into,
for lack of a better term I use this term, and I know it is
technically incorrect, but a nuclear improvised explosive
device (IED) that could be brought into this country and
either--and I won't get into some of the thoughts, you know, to
try to catalyze any further consideration on their part. But it
just appears to me that that is a tremendous risk for us, and
that some of your nuclear forensics capabilities might play a
crucial role in helping us not only understand where we are,
but how we can address, you know, where the potential
weaknesses are or leaks are or--I just wonder.
Perhaps I could point that to General Smolen first, and
then Mr. Tobey if you are inclined, as well.
General Smolen. Yes, sir. I think probably the expert that
could help us best answer that question is our Associate
Administrator for Emergency Operations. Retired Admiral Kroll
does those sorts of things for the Department of Energy, and I
think he would have a whole lot more specific information that
he could give you with regard to what we are able to do in
terms of detection and what our capabilities might be in terms
of response.
You may be aware that he and his team have been active in
every major event from the Inauguration, to the Super Bowl, to
assisting our allies and assisting the Chinese in working the
Olympics. So I think we have a somewhat robust capability in
terms of detection and response, but I share your concern. It
is an area of grave concern for all of us, and we probably need
to do better.
Mr. Franks. Madam Chair, with your indulgence, I will just
ask one more question----
Ms. Tauscher. Certainly.
Mr. Franks [continuing]. Related to, you know, without some
of the plutonium production capability that we have had in the
past, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
has expressed some concerns that some of their space missions,
their long-term space missions, they may not be able to power
those missions effectively.
And I know that DOE has talked about restarting the
plutonium production at Idaho National Lab, but it looks like
that has been shelved, at least to some degree. And I am
wondering if DOE intends to resume any plutonium-238
production, and if so, how long would that take to restart, and
are NASA's concerns justified?
General Smolen. Sir, can I take that for the record and get
back to you? I don't know----
Mr. Franks [continuing]. Questions we are getting good
information back some time----
Mr. Tobey. I think, if I understand correctly, and I admit
this is not my area either, but that the Office of Nuclear
Energy works on those issues. But, we can----
General Smolen. We will take that for the record sir, and
get back to you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 101.]
Mr. Franks. Well, the irony is that, you know, I would hate
to see NASA be dependent upon Russia for their plutonium
supply. That would be a real twist. And, anyway, I thank all of
you for what you do. You are that invisible front line of
freedom, and if you succeed, maybe the rest of us will; if you
fail, it is kind of a bad situation. Well, thank you.
And thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Tauscher. You are welcome, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Podonsky, when HSS was established, it was structured
that you were not responsible for any operational elements with
one exception. Nevertheless, within your organization there
appears to be an office responsible for the security of the DOE
headquarters facilities, which would seem to represent a
conflict of interest. That is an office charged with setting
policy and providing oversight. It is also conducting
operations that need to comply with those very policies.
Does the Department have a plan to deal with this conflict?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, ma'am, and you are correct. We do
promulgate policy for the Department, we do the oversight, we
do the enforcement, but we should not actually have an
operational element.
It is not only a perceived conflict, it is a real conflict,
as exemplified by we have an inspection coming up for the
headquarters that my inspection team will be inspecting my
operation, and they both report to me. Now, I have no question
that they will do a good job, but nevertheless, there is a----
Ms. Tauscher. If you do have a question, will you let us
know?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, okay.
The Department, actually, when HSS was created, the
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, we had plans that we worked
out with the three Under Secretaries that the operational
security of the headquarters would actually be transferred to
the Management Administration (MA) Account, as the landlord.
And in December of 2006 when that move was about to take place,
I went to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary and suggested
that it not take place until the MA organization was equipped
to take on those responsibilities; they had just gone through a
number of Senior Executive Service (SES) retirements.
But we do have a plan in place and, I think, with your
question I am sure we should look at executing that sooner than
later.
Ms. Tauscher. Right. I appreciate that.
General Smolen, with the W88 pit production capability now
demonstrated, why any more production? And what are the minimum
pit production requirements for Stockpile Surveillance.
General Smolen. Ma'am, I believe that we have got in the
budget a capacity to do six. I am not sure of the very specific
number to give you. But we do require additional W88 pits in
order to be able to accomplish Stockpile Surveillance over the
next dozen years.
Ms. Tauscher. Okay. Well, I think that question is a nice
segue into the prospect of a future classified hearing. As Mr.
Everett has pointed out, I think we have a number of different
issues, and we will prevail upon you as much as we can to do
that after we come back from the spring break.
Gentlemen, we want to thank you for your time. We
especially want to thank the tens of thousands of people that
you represent--especially the people sitting right behind you--
that we know work very, very hard, are patriotic hardworking
Americans that have worked for a very, very long time to make
sure that we have the safest and most secure and certifiable
stockpile.
It is a big complex. It takes lots of people to make it
work. And obviously we have continuing EM and health and safety
concerns. And we have many challenges with the aging of the
stockpile.
But the committee wants to convey to you all our thanks and
appreciation. And we hope that you will do that, send our
thanks and appreciation to the many people that work for you.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 12, 2008
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Tobey. With respect to the work done by my organization, within
the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, the Material Protection
Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program has worked with Russian nuclear
sites to develop MPC&A systems with effective cyber security. This work
also includes training on information security. These systems are
generally not internet based and therefore, as designed, inherently
more secure. [See page 24.]
General Smolen. The Department of Energy (DOE) supplies
radioisotope power systems (RPS) for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) space science and exploration missions and for
national security applications for more than four decades. These unique
power systems convert heat from the decay of plutonium-238 (Pu-238)
into electric power and provide heat for missions over long periods of
time under remote, harsh conditions. The inventory of domestic Pu-238,
last made at the Savannah River Site in 1988, is nearly exhausted. DOE
has a contract with Russia, the only international supplier of Pu-238,
to purchase the remaining available inventory; like the United States,
Russia ceased production of Pu-238 and would require investment to
reestablish their own production capability.
Relevant agencies are working together to evaluate the current
status of potential Pu-238 production needs, issues, and costs. Based
on NASA's current projected mission requirements, the remaining
available inventory will be exhausted by 2015. The earliest that a
production capability could be established based on proven processes is
approximately seven years after receipt of capital acquisition funds.
DOE continues to produce radioisotope power systems using existing
infrastructure and the remaining Pu-238 fuel. [See page 26.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 12, 2008
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER
Ms. Tauscher. The House-approved FY 2008 defense authorization bill
contains a provision establishing a congressionally-appointed
commission to evaluate U.S. strategic posture for the future, including
the role that nuclear weapons should play in the national security
strategy. What key questions should the commission consider?
General Smolen. The Commission should identify the basic principles
for restoring a national consensus on strategic policy and, in
particular, on the role and mission of U.S. nuclear weapons in the
post-Cold War era. These principles would help to guide the next
administration's review of its nuclear posture. With regard to the
mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Commission
should examine the merits of a broad spectrum of warhead life extension
strategies, including including warhead refurbishment, warhead
component reuse, and warhead replacement, for managing the risks
inherent in assuring a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile for the
foreseeable future without nuclear testing. In addition, the Commission
should offer its views regarding transformation of the large,
inefficient and deteriorating nuclear weapons complex that we inherited
from the Cold War to a modern national security enterprise able to
address a broad range of national security issues beyond its core
nuclear weapons mission.
Ms. Tauscher. Does the NNSA science-based Stockpile Stewardship
Program (SSP) provide all the tools needed by NNSA and the weapons
laboratory directors to annually certify the nation's nuclear weapons
as safe, secure and reliable? What are the gaps, if any?
General Smolen. The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) has
assembled world leading tools to resolve uncertainties in our
predictive models for nuclear weapons performance. Most of the major
experimental scientific facilities are complete or will be complete
very soon, plus the Advanced Strategic Computing Program has developed
significant computational tools. This program in concert with Directed
Stockpile Work has already been successful in; making quantitative
statements on pit aging, closing significant finding investigations,
annually assess the nuclear stockpile, and in enabling life extension
programs. NNSA has a plan to use these tools, both computational and
experimental, to resolve our key uncertainties that did not need to be
understood during testing, and remained after the testing moratorium.
Anticipated future needs include continued increases in our
computational capability and capacity computing and improved physics
models. Unanticipated needs may arise from the planned work on our
major experimental facilities (NIF, Z, Omega, DARHT and LANSCE) over
the next five years. However, as we continue to move further and
further away from the period of full scale nuclear testing and as the
stockpile ages, the level of uncertainty in reliability will grow over
time which may increase the demands on the SSP to develop new and
innovative ways to certify the legacy stockpile.
Ms. Tauscher. Recent testimony by military officials and others has
suggested that continuing to extend the life of our current stockpile
is not sustainable over the long term. Does NNSA currently assess the
SSP as capable of enabling annual assessment and certification?
General Smolen. The present and planned stockpile stewardship
program of record is capable of enabling annual assessments and
certification. These assessments have clearly identified issues with
the stockpile that motivate life extension programs, and other
modifications to systems. Many of these issues are identified through
surveillance or by the application of modern tools. As issues arise
where adequate tools and capabilities do not exist, the research and
development part of the SSP is adjusted to provide those needs in a
timely fashion. To date, the stockpile stewardship program has
successfully extended the lifetime of the stockpile through a number of
Directed Stockpile Work programs, including the closure of surveillance
driven Significant Finding Investigations. The annual assessment
letters by the Laboratory Directors document issues that we are
addressing.
Ms. Tauscher. How do you characterize your confidence in the
nuclear stockpile? Please describe any risks to the stockpile that
might erode that confidence over time.
General Smolen. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Tauscher. Mindful that we are in open session, please give
specific examples of the limits the Stewardship Program will confront
in the coming years. Please indicate the time lines involved with these
limitations (e.g., when they will be manifest).
General Smolen. In the future, we would predict stewardship
challenges similar to those we have already seen--aging components and
materials, unavailable materials; deviations from designs and new
results from experiments/modeling. Additionally, we will anticipate
modifications to keep the stockpile current within Department of
Defense systems, increased requirements for safety and security, and we
have to have a responsive infrastructure to meet any changes in the
geopolitical environment. As yet, we have identified no limits where
stockpile stewardship would fail, however, we are developing increased
understanding of aging and other phenomena to be sure that the
stewardship program can identify issues before they could become a
limiting factor. Significant Life Extension Programs or preferably
weapon modernization in concert with a strong science, technology and
engineering base, is the best course to ensure no limitations are
reached.
Ms. Tauscher. What steps other than RRW can NNSA pursue to enhance
the safety, security and reliability of the current stockpile?
General Smolen. Consistent with the lifetime assessment concerns
presented in the Life Extension Options process and as part of future
life extension program (LEP) concept and feasibility studies outlined
in the Production and Planning Directive, the NNSA will evaluate
opportunities to enhance the safety and security of existing weapons in
the current stockpile. A subset of the technologies that were to be
included in RRW, as well as other advances in surety technology, could
be retrofitted into weapons during the LEP process. Possibilities
include using more modern stronglinks to prevent unauthorized signals
from getting to the fireset, using fiber-optic cables to eliminate
electro-static discharge or lightning concerns, or even replacing pits
which use sensitive conventional high explosive with pits from retired
systems that use safer insensitive high explosives. The benefits of
these enhancements must be weighed against impacts on associated
Department of Defense (DOD) weapon delivery systems (i.e., added
weight, increased volume, or reduced operational performance) as part
of the feasibility studies.
The RRW program baseline included several enhanced, modern safety
and security features. Attempting to incorporate these RRW options into
legacy weapons could compromise the certification basis and potentially
raise concerns about the performance and reliability of the modified
legacy warhead configurations. This approach has risks, and the need
for nuclear testing to validate significant design changes to legacy
nuclear packages and recertify these weapons cannot be ruled out at
this time. The Advanced Certification Campaign is working to reduce
those risks to some degree. This program seeks to understand in a
quantitatively rigorous way, the design ties between a modified or
untested design and the tested design database. Without the added
margin afforded by RRW, added uncertainty in reliability assessments
caused by design changes limits the ability of the Stockpile
Stewardship tools to certify new features added to old weapons.
Ms. Tauscher. Are there limits on the Life Extension Programs in
terms of their scope and ability to meet military requirements? Are
these technical, operational, regulatory, statutory, or a combination?
Please give examples.
General Smolen. A combination of constraints imposes limits on what
can be accomplished through Life Extension Programs (LEPs). The current
approach to legacy stockpile sustainment through LEPs is focused on
minimum technical excursions from the original design. A fundamental
objective of the LEP approach is to meet the original military
characteristics (requirements) that were established with the DOD. Most
of the legacy warheads were highly optimized systems, trading margin
for more yield and reduced weight, and were all validated by nuclear
testing.
LEPs are becoming increasingly more difficult and costly in order
to replicate materials and outdated or non-operational processes and
technologies that were used to meet original warhead specifications. In
some instances, materials or processes have become obsolete because of
their hazardous nature and are no longer available in industry due to
increased regulatory constraints and cost. Each refurbishment
introduces changes that take the designs further from the tested
configurations, increasing uncertainty in weapon reliability. As these
designs continue to change, NNSA's ability to ensure confidence in the
legacy stockpile's safety and reliability over the long-term, without
underground nuclear testing, will become difficult.
Ms. Tauscher. What is the status of the study NNSA has been
conducting for the Air Force on the B61 warhead life extension?
General Smolen. On March 25, 2008, the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC) approved a joint Air Force/National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) study, to be completed within 90 days, on whether
to proceed with a comprehensive nuclear and non-nuclear Life Extension
Program (LEP) of the B61 warhead. Prior to the NWC decision, the NNSA
program-of-record was for a limited non-nuclear refurbishment of the
B61 warhead. The NWC also requested the Air Force and NNSA to begin
planning for entry into the Phase 6.2/6.2A study no later than
September 30, 2008. Consistent with the requested joint study and in
close cooperation with the Air Force, NNSA efforts are currently
focused on determining the Phase 6.2/6.2A study scope, updating user
requirements, and estimating the complete study cost. Complementing the
joint B61 LEP study, NNSA has begun a 60 day technical risk assessment
study to investigate the potential reuse of an alternate pit (this
candidate was in the stockpile as of December 2, 2002). The pit reuse
assessment study will be completed with Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory in order to maximize design flexibility, with an emphasis on
additional safety, security and use control features.
Ms. Tauscher. What is the current NNSA plan for maintaining the
capability offered by the B61?
General Smolen. NNSA has been addressing B61 performance, aging,
and reliability concerns as they arise through approved bomb
alterations (Alts). Currently, NNSA is in Phase 6.6 Full-Scale
Production for a series of alterations, including a canned subassembly
Life Extension Program (LEP) on the B61-7/11 (Alt 357) and a spin
rocket motor refurbishment on the B61-7/11 (Alts 358/359) and B61-3/4/
10 (Alt 356).
NNSA planned to continue this approach with an arming and fuzing
alteration to address radar performance and neutron generator end of
life concerns which was included in the Fiscal Year 2009 President's
Budget. Recently, the NNSA, in partnership with the Air Force, has
reconsidered this approach to B61 sustainment because of the associated
life cycle costs and timeliness of fielding multiple alterations over
the next decade. The new approach is to perform a comprehensive LEP
addressing both non-nuclear and nuclear refurbishment. The life
extension program would also include improvements in safety and use
control, as well as possible consolidation of the B61 bomb family to
reduce future sustainment costs. The Nuclear Weapon Council approved
this approach on March 25, 2008 with the direction to begin a B61 LEP
Feasibility/Design Definition/Cost Study (Phase 6.2/6.2A) study no
later than September 30, 2008. NNSA is also performing an alternate pit
reuse study to evaluate the technical feasibility of reusing another
pit in the B61 LEP. NWC tasking allows the scope of the Phase 6.2/6.2A
study to include analysis of an alternate pit if Congressional support
allows.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
directed NNSA to examine the feasibility, advantages and disadvantages
of reusing existing pits in the RRW program. What is the status of this
assessment? Will the NNSA have the report to Congress by this summer,
as required by the NDAA?
General Smolen. A draft of a report detailing the results of this
assessment is in coordination with the appropriate Department of Energy
(DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. The Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC) consultation process has been initiated for this report
in accordance with established procedures and timelines. NNSA expects
to deliver this coordinated report to Congress by July 28, 2008.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2009 budget request includes $10 million for
RRW, which the budget justification materials describe as funding
``maturation of RRW design concepts to address questions raised by the
JASONs review of RRW feasibility.''
What progress toward conclusion of the ``Phase 2a'' (design and
cost) study proposed in the FY 2008 request will the NNSA be able to
achieve with the FY 2009 request?
General Smolen. The FY 2009 budget request of $10 million will
permit maturation of some specific design features to address specific
design certification issues raised by the JASON review. Specific design
work would include maturation of safety and security features, some
fabrication processes and material selection, including contingency
design using more traditional fabrication processes. Additionally, some
peer review of the proposed design may occur. No work on the
development of the joint schedule or cost estimate would be done.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2009 budget request includes $10 million for
RRW, which the budget justification materials describe as funding
``maturation of RRW design concepts to address questions raised by the
JASONs review of RRW feasibility.''
What resources would be necessary to complete the RRW Phase 2a cost
and design study?
General Smolen. The purpose of the joint Department of Defense and
National Nuclear Security Administration Reliable Replacement Warhead
Phase 2A Design Definition and Cost Study is to develop the detailed
cost, scope and schedule baseline. Both organizations require funding
in order to complete the joint study. NNSA requires $65 million to
complete its portion of the activities of the joint study.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2009 budget request includes $10 million for
RRW, which the budget justification materials describe as funding
``maturation of RRW design concepts to address questions raised by the
JASONs review of RRW feasibility.''
Describe the new Advanced Certification program and how it is
different from other Science and Engineering Campaign activities
intended to develop the scientific and engineering capabilities to
support certification without testing?
General Smolen. The Science and Engineering Campaign activities
provide better tools, models and technologies which are the enablers of
our assessment and certification processes that are conducted under
Directed Stockpile Work (DSW). The Advanced Certification sub-program
is developing the methodologies needed to support scientifically
rigorous assessment and certification process, and is obviously linked
in its goals, but different in its approach. As constructed, the
advanced certification sub-program contains the following examples of
activities that were not previously included in the campaigns:
(i) Generation of a strategic plan for certification and
assessments based on the planned improvements in our Stockpile
Stewardship Program tools, models and technologies;
(ii) Development of rigorous definitions of underground test
near neighbors; and
(iii) Experiments and calculations to determine and resolve
certification issues of surety features prior to their
inclusion in DSW activities.
A thorough description of the work in the advanced certification
campaign is contained in the report submitted to Congress in May 2008.
Ms. Tauscher. The NNSA identified its Preferred Alternative for
Complex Transformation in a Supplemental Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (SPEIS) released last month. The Preferred Alternative
identified in the SPEIS refines the Complex 2030 report NNSA submitted
to Congress a little more than a year ago, which like the SPEIS noted
that NNSA expects to maintain a level Directed Stockpile Work budget.
NNSA has said it will rely on initiatives such as facility and staffing
reductions and new business practices to pay for transformation. NNSA
has stated Transformation must take place with or without RRW, but has
stated that RRW would enhance the responsiveness of the complex. NNSA
has stated that the cost of RRW could be offset by fewer planned Life
Extension Programs (LEPs) and deeper reductions in the size of the
stockpile.
What legacy weapons arc candidates for near term reduction or
elimination?
General Smolen. The DOD, in conjunction with the NNSA, must sustain
the nuclear weapons stockpile as directed in the President's annual
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP). In this regard, the DOD is the
lead agency for definition of the nuclear weapon stockpile size and mix
of weapon types necessary to meet war planning, logistics, and
maintenance requirements to meet the NWSP. Therefore, the DOD would be
the appropriate agency to identify any legacy warheads that can be
reduced or eliminated in the near term.
Ms. Tauscher. The NNSA identified its Preferred Alternative for
Complex Transformation in a Supplemental Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (SPEIS) released last month. The Preferred Alternative
identified in the SPEIS refines the Complex 2030 report NNSA submitted
to Congress a little more than a year ago, which like the SPEIS noted
that NNSA expects to maintain a level Directed Stockpile Work budget.
NNSA has said it will rely on initiatives such as facility and staffing
reductions and new business practices to pay for transformation. NNSA
has stated Transformation must take place with or without RRW, but has
stated that RRW would enhance the responsiveness of the complex. NNSA
has stated that the cost of RRW could be offset by fewer planned Life
Extension Programs (LEPs) and deeper reductions in the size of the
stockpile.
What confidence do you have that cost savings from facility and
staffing reductions, business process improvements, and materials
consolidation will adequately pay for Transformation? If such
reductions will pay only in part for transformation, from where will
NNSA draw the remainder of the required funds?
General Smolen. The preferred alternative for Complex
Transformation will offer the lowest overall cost and risk in the
longer term. We propose to implement transformation within our existing
budget projections, assuming we maintain a weapons budget adjusted for
inflation and that we are allowed to re-invest the savings we achieve,
rather than applying them to other budget shortfalls.
We propose to pay for transformation through a combination of the
following:
Infrastructure savings through footprint reductions,
replacement of buildings that have been retained long past
their economic lifetime, and updated cost sharing models;
Reduced overhead costs through contract reforms,
improved risk management strategies, greater business practice
uniformity, improvements in product assurance processes, and
commodity purchase savings through a supply chain management
center;
Reductions in security costs enabled by Special
Nuclear Materials (SNM) consolidation and use of modern,
hardened facilities;
Savings from mission consolidations and elimination
of redundant experimental facilities;
Collaborating with DOD on alternative stockpile
augmentation strategies;
Reduced overall staffing supporting weapons
activities through natural attrition and transition to other
national security missions; and
Optimization of a reduced federal staff enabled by
contract reform and improved line oversight of contractor
assurance systems.
In short, Complex Transformation forces us to reform our current
business practices and consolidate the nuclear weapons enterprise. Our
objective is to retain mission work (e.g., Directed Stockpile Work and
Campaigns) at as high a level as possible while we cut overhead costs.
If these cost savings are not available to pay for transformation, we
will need to re-align all existing work to pay for essential
transformation actions. The Department of Defense Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (DOD/CAIG) completed a recent analysis of our
modernization plans and estimated that it could be completed with a 5%
adjustment to our existing funding plan.
Ms. Tauscher. The NNSA identified its Preferred Alternative for
Complex Transformation in a Supplemental Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (SPEIS) released last month. The Preferred Alternative
identified in the SPEIS refines the Complex 2030 report NNSA submitted
to Congress a little more than a year ago, which like the SPEIS noted
that NNSA expects to maintain a level Directed Stockpile Work budget.
NNSA has said it will rely on initiatives such as facility and staffing
reductions and new business practices to pay for transformation. NNSA
has stated Transformation must take place with or without RRW, but has
stated that RRW would enhance the responsiveness of the complex. NNSA
has stated that the cost of RRW could be offset by fewer planned Life
Extension Programs (LEPs) and deeper reductions in the size of the
stockpile.
The SPEIS makes plain that much complex transformation is necessary
regardless of what happens with RRW. What elements of complex
transformation are tied to RRW?
General Smolen. Complex Transformation must take place with or
without RRW. While we are meeting safety, security, and basic DOD
requirements today, the present Complex is unsustainable. Special
nuclear materials (SNM) are present at more sites than necessary. In a
post 9/11 world, security has been enhanced and SNM is becoming more
and more expensive to secure. Many old facilities support a large Cold
War-era stockpile no longer necessary or affordable. Without
transformation, increasing funds will be required to secure a greater
perimeter than needed, maintain more square footage than is efficient,
and sustain out-dated facilities well-past their economic lifetime.
If the RRW strategy is approved by a future administration and
Congress, the RRW design concepts would affect complex transformation
in several ways. First of all, the RRW concepts employ fewer exotic and
hazardous materials than the legacy stockpile. If the LEP strategy is
pursued, processes involving such hazardous materials as beryllium and
conventional high explosives, among others, would have to be continued
or re-established as the components in the legacy weapons require
remanufacture. Secondly, introduction of improved surety features,
including insensitive high explosives and fire-resistant pits, will
lead to improvements in the efficiency and responsiveness of the
production plants compared to an LEP-only approach.
This does not mean that we need fewer production facilities or that
they would be significantly smaller in square footage because of RRW.
However, we will be more efficient, responsive, and environmentally-
sensitive using an RRW strategy.
In addition, RRW would likely enable a significantly reduced
stockpile by reducing the need for ``hedge'' warheads.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2009 budget request includes $77.4 million for
Transformation Disposition. How does NNSA plan to coordinate efforts
under the new Transformation Disposition program with the Office of
Environmental Management? Do NNSA and EM have a plan for coordination
of D&D and cleanup activities at NNSA sites?
General Smolen. Transformation Disposition (TD) is the principal
funding source to achieve footprint reduction within the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The TD program has committed to
eliminating 5,000,000 gross square feet through transfer, sale, or
demolition by FY2017 and it is anticipated that a portion of the TD
funding viill be used to deactivate and prepare process-contaminated
facilities for transfer to the Office of Environmental Management (EM)
and final disposition. DOE currently uses the transfer process in DOE
Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, which outlines the
acceptance criteria for transferring facilities from one DOE program to
another. The NNSA and EM are in the coordination phase on what process
contaminated excess facilities meet acceptance criteria for transfer.
Ms. Tauscher. Are the design specifications for the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility or the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) facility dependent on decisions relating to
the long-term stewardship of specific stockpile weapons? To the extent
they are, how does the NNSA intend to account for these dependencies
while moving forward with design of both the CMRR and the UPF?
Specifically, would the design of UPF change substantially if the
secondary components of legacy weapons could be reused, at least in
part?
General Smolen. Complex Transformation must take place regardless
of the size or composition of the future stockpile. For the range of
future stockpiles that NNSA and DOD contemplate, maintaining required
capabilities has a greater impact on the minimum size of our facilities
than throughput capacity. The following discussion relates to the
Preferred Alternative in our ongoing National Environmental Policy Act
actions.
UPF: The design considerations that drive the configuration of the
UPF relate primarily to its capability requirements, recognizing that
UPF capabilities support weapons production fabrication efforts and
other programs, including dismantlements, surveillance, certification,
uranium blend-down for non-proliferation reasons, and the supply of
highly enriched uranium for naval and research reactors. The
prospective footprints for a UPF that would support the current
stockpile versus the size for a UPF that fabricated only one weapon per
year differ by only a few percent. As for the composition of the
stockpile, the design of UPF would not be significantly affected by the
selection of legacy systems, new weapons designs, a combination of the
two, or most contemplated secondary reuse scenarios. The reuse
scenarios that would result in significant size reductions in UPF would
require that the hypothetical future stockpile be composed entirely of
reused secondaries; however, these scenarios are not considered viable
national security alternatives because no future production capability
would be available.
CMRR: CMRR would be part of an integrated set of facilities at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to assure continuity of a plutonium
capability for the nation, which includes pit fabrication, pit
surveillance, and pit certification as well as non-defense programs
actinide research, development and production. These facilities at LANL
would be able to support the current pit production mission need, which
is continuity of capability, and the longer-term need for a modest pit
production rate, where the pits could be legacy designs, new designs,
or a mixture of the two.
Based on the facts above, NNSA is confident that many aspects of
Complex Transformation can proceed while stockpile requirements
continue to be refined. Proceeding apace with the two projects' designs
avoids delays, whose collective delay costs and lost opportunity
savings run in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year.
Aside from Complex Transformation, design specifications for both
CMRR and UPF are also intended to improve nuclear safety beyond what is
possible in the current facilities. The need for such safety
improvements has been repeatedly advised by the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board as noted in their Eighteenth Annual Report to
Congress (February 2008).
Ms. Tauscher. Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) continued to
experience security breaches over the past year, despite a new
contracting team. What steps has NNSA taken to address security at
LANL? What steps have you taken with the management and operations
(M&O) contractor to improve security? What steps has the contractor
taken?
General Smolen. While we continue to be concerned with the
frequency of security incidents involving classified materials, we
believe that Los Alamos National Security LLC (LANS), the new
contractor for the laboratory, is making significant security
improvements at Los Alamos. In the year since the Secretary issued his
Compliance Order (CO) regarding classified material protection to LANS
pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 824, LANS has made substantial progress
towards completing all 14 actions required by the Compliance Order. All
14 requirements are enforceable under 10 C.F.R. 824 with the potential
for fines of up to $100,000 per day per requirement.
As part of its effort to satisfy the Compliance Order, LANS
developed an additional comprehensive corrective plan, ``Security
Compliance Integrated Corrective Action Plan'' (SCICAP). The SCICAP
contains 27 activities to improve security plans and procedures,
security cultural and training, and the self-assessment program for
classified material protection. LANS has reached back to the four
entities that are its members to obtain security and management
expertise in order to develop a high quality plan. While these
improvements cannot guarantee that LANS will not have additional
incidents, they indicate that LANS is improving its security
procedures. In addition, under the new performance fee structure for
LANS' contract it is evaluated on its security performance and award
fees can be used to hold LANS accountable for its performance in this
critical area.
Preventing additional security violations at LANL rests on LANS'
ability to sustain the improvements it has made on strong federal
oversight of the LANS' security program. NNSA has recently selected a
new federal security manager for LANL and it will be providing
additional resources to the new manager to ensure he has the staff and
technical assistance necessary to provide effective oversight. The
Department's Office of Independent Oversight will conduct a
comprehensive inspection of both the Federal office and the LANS
starting in August 2008. NNSA will be paying close attention to this
inspection and will provide additional assistance to address any issues
or concerns identified by the inspection team.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
requires the GAO and then the NNSA to examine alternatives for managing
protective forces at all NNSA and Department sites with special nuclear
material. Has the GAO contacted the Department about this review? Is
NNSA Defense Nuclear Security working with the Department to conduct a
review?
General Smolen. Mr. Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director, Government
Accountability Office (GAO) conducted an entrance briefing concerning
the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (DOE Protective Force
Options: GAO Engagement 360953) on June 10, 2008. In August 2007, the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense
Nuclear Security was tasked by the NNSA Administrator to conduct an
analysis and comparative survey examining several options for
performing Protective Force duties at NNSA sites, including the use of
an enterprise-wide contractor, Federalization of existing security
employees, or a combination of the two. The ``Comparative Analysis of
Contractor and Federal Protective Forces at Fixed Sites'' also
identified benefits of standardization across the NNSA Complex,
including reduction of preparation time required for response to
potential work stoppages resulting from strikes. DOE is awaiting
completion of the GAO study (approximately March 2009) in accordance
with the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act prior to submitting
a report within the allotted 90 days to the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2008 NDAA also directs NNSA to conduct an
assessment of the physical and cyber security risks posed to the
nuclear weapons complex and the security technologies employed against
those threats, and prepare a report identifying the manner in which it
prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security of the weapons
complex. The report would be included in the annual Future Years
Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP). Is the NNSA working on this assessment
and report?
General Smolen. NNSA is in the process of conducting a
comprehensive assessment aligned with Congressional direction contained
in the 2008 NDAA. The assessments and resulting report, covering both
physical and cyber security, will be fully coordinated with the
Department, to include the Health, Safety, and Security (HSS)
organization. To address the physical security threats, NA-70 has
tasked Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to conduct a rigorous
assessment of the threats facing the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) and
how NNSA utilizes both existing and emerging technologies to meet our
physical security challenges. The SNL report, due for completion at the
end of CY 2008, will include the following major elements:
Provide a description of technologies deployed at
each site that address physical security threats.
Identify the methods used by NNSA to establish
investment priorities.
Provide a detailed description of how the funds
identified in each program element for each fiscal year of the
5 year plan will help carry out the plan.
Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current
NNSA process and provided recommendations for improving this
process.
To address the cyber security threats, the NNSA Office of the Chief
Information Officer (OCIO) has tasked our internal red team to conduct
a rigorous assessment of the cyber threats facing the Nuclear Weapons
Complex. The assessment will focus on how NNSA can implement existing
and emerging cyber security technologies to protect and defend the
technology infrastructure. The team report will be due to the OCIO at
the end of CY 2008. The report will include the following major
elements:
Cyber Security Policy Implementation
Technical and Management Controls Implementation
Network Operations
Web Services
Desktop Configuration and Boundary Protection
Wireless Services
Ms. Tauscher. NNSA plans for fissile materials disposition have
slowed in recent years, first as a liability dispute between the U.S.
and Russia delayed work, and more recently as Congress expressed
reservations about proceeding with construction of the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Most recently,
the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act reduced funding for the MOX
facility and transferred funding for the facility to the Office of
Nuclear Energy. However, a February 22, 2008 memo to Secretary Bodman
from the DOE General Counsel states that the Secretary is not legally
able to transfer management of the project out of the NNSA. That memo
recommends an ``Economy Act'' to formalize continued management of the
MOX project by NNSA, with funding from Nuclear Energy.
Has NNSA worked out a formal arrangement with the Office of Nuclear
Energy?
Mr. Tobey. Yes, the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy and the NNSA
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement under the Economy Act whereby the NNSA Office of Fissile
Materials Disposition manages the project on behalf of the Office of
Nuclear Energy while the Office of the General Counsel analyzes whether
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, effectuated a transfer of
program responsibility for this project.
Ms. Tauscher. NNSA plans for fissile materials disposition have
slowed in recent years, first as a liability dispute between the U.S.
and Russia delayed work, and more recently as Congress expressed
reservations about proceeding with construction of the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Most recently,
the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act reduced funding for the MOX
facility and transferred funding for the facility to the Office of
Nuclear Energy. However, a February 22, 2008 memo to Secretary Bodman
from the DOE General Counsel states that the Secretary is not legally
able to transfer management of the project out of the NNSA. That memo
recommends an ``Economy Act'' to formalize continued management of the
MOX project by NNSA, with funding from Nuclear Energy.
What cost increases and schedule delays will result from the cuts
to the project contained in the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations
Act--both in direct appropriations and rescinded unobligated balances?
Mr. Tobey. DOE is currently analyzing the MOX cost and schedule
impacts that will result from the $217 million funding reduction to the
MOX project (this reduction includes $100 million cut from the budget
request, the rescission of $115 million and a $2 million reduction in
Other Project Costs) in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008.
Ms. Tauscher. NNSA plans for fissile materials disposition have
slowed in recent years, first as a liability dispute between the U.S.
and Russia delayed work, and more recently as Congress expressed
reservations about proceeding with construction of the MOX Fuel
Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Most recently,
the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act reduced funding for the MOX
facility and transferred funding for the facility to the Office of
Nuclear Energy. However, a February 22, 2008 memo to Secretary Bodman
from the DOE General Counsel states that the Secretary is not legally
able to transfer management of the project out of the NNSA. That memo
recommends an ``Economy Act'' to formalize continued management of the
MOX project by NNSA, with funding from Nuclear Energy.
What is the current status of construction of the MOX facility?
Mr. Tobey. Currently, the construction of the MOX facility
continues to proceed on schedule and within budget. The building
foundation of the MOX facility is 70% complete and construction of
several ancillary support buildings has been completed. In mid-May, the
MOX facility project achieved 500,000 work hours without a lost time
accident.
Ms. Tauscher. How much more does NNSA need to do to secure and
reduce all known and unsecured weapons-grade nuclear and radiological
material around the world, and what is the cost of the remaining effort
in this area? Please also submit something for the record on this, in
classified form if necessary. What can NNSA do to expand and strengthen
the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the International
Nuclear Materials Protection & Cooperation (MPC&A) programs?
Mr. Tobey. Within the Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI)
mission area, there is an estimated five (5) metric tons of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium within civilian programs
worldwide, of which 43%, or about 2.1 metric tons, has already been
removed, leaving approximately 2.9 metric tons of material to be
removed in the future. There are also approximately 3,300 high risk
radioactive sources in other-than-high income countries that we believe
need to be recovered or adequately secured in order to reduce the risk
of theft or sabotage for malevolent acts; of these, 730 (22%) will have
been secured by the end of FY 2008, leaving approximately 2,570
vulnerable sites to be secured in the future. Within our current
approved budget projections through FY2013, we anticipate spending
another $160 million to address removal of nuclear material and another
$150 million to address the recovery and security of radiological
sources.
The out-year budget profile contained in the President's FY 2009
budget request adequately supports securing vulnerable nuclear
materials where the NNSA is currently able to work. Future priorities
for GTRI include addressing security concerns at an additional 130
civilian sites possessing vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive
materials that pose security concerns in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, India, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, the
Dominican Republic, Uganda, and the United States.
Within the MPC&A Program mission area, over 85% of sites containing
nuclear warheads and material in Russia and nuclear material sites
other former Soviet states have been secured, and a majority of the
remaining upgrades are on track to be completed by the end of FY 2008.
The MPC&A Program is also adding more detection layers at some
facilities by working at outer perimeter checkpoints to increase the
probability of detection, and making any necessary final adjustments in
response to changing conditions and emerging threats. The MPC&A Program
does not anticipate expanding work in the former Soviet Union, but will
remain engaged in order to maintain mutually beneficial exchanges
between security experts.
To address concerns about the security of weapons-grade nuclear
material in other states, where relatively strong economies allow these
countries to finance their own security systems, the MPC&A Program is
engaging on nuclear security best practices. The MPC&A Program is
cooperating with China to promote the adoption of modern security
technologies at civilian nuclear facilities to provide a first line of
defense against nuclear material theft, diversion and sabotage, and is
interested in similar MPC&A cooperation in India. (Efforts to begin
discussions with India have been hampered as a result of delays in
concluding an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation under section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.)
The MPC&A Program is also engaging internationally to strengthen
MPC&A and safeguards practices globally as a long-term investment in
the sustainability and viability of nuclear security in partner
countries (Russia and other former Soviet states in particular) after
bilateral cooperation ends. With our current approved budget
projections through FY2013, we expect to spend approximately $850
million on these activities, comprising the areas where NNSA is
currently able to work. However, as other opportunities arise in the
future, such as further expanding radiation detection layers around
Russian nuclear sites or expanding training and sustainability
activities with the Russian Ministry of Defense, additional resources
could be required.
Ms. Tauscher. Please discuss NNSA's ability to accelerate work
within NNSA defense nuclear nonproliferation and possible limitations
to accelerating work, if any. Please also discuss any other areas where
you could do more to accelerate and strengthen programs if you had more
funding.
Mr. Tobey. NNSA's defense nuclear nonproliferation efforts are
dynamic programs designed to address today's evolving proliferation and
nuclear terrorism threats. Recognizing the urgency of this mission, we
are working to the best of our ability to accelerate defense nuclear
nonproliferation efforts across the globe. We are working to meet the
accelerated timeline of existing efforts, such as those under the
Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative. Under the Bratislava
initiative, we accelerated our nuclear security upgrade work in Russia
by two full years. Separately, we have accelerated the completion date
for installing radiation detection devices at all Russian border
crossings by a full six years; shut down two plutonium producing
reactors in Seversk, Russia six and eight months early (with efforts
underway to shut down Russia's last such reactor as much as a year
early); and accelerated our research reactor conversions from the
historical rate of 1.5 per year to 5 conversions in FY2006 and 6
conversions in FY2007, and we are on track for 8 in FY2008. We are also
increasing our focus on work to secure civilian nuclear materials
globally and working on efforts such as the Next Generation Safeguards
Initiative to revitalize the technology base for international
safeguards, in order to detect and deter proliferation activities
worldwide.
Additionally, we are increasingly emphasizing the so-called
``second line of defense'' activities that complement nuclear security
upgrades by providing a layered defense against nuclear proliferation
should first line of defense efforts be compromised. In this regard, we
are expanding and strengthening efforts such as the Megaports programs,
our nuclear materials detection R&D work, and our International
Nonproliferation Export Control and Commodity Identification Training,
all of which help detect, deter, and interdict WMD-related materials
trafficking.
There are non-resource obstacles that can delay or prevent the
acceleration of these efforts in certain cases, such as bureaucratic
delays and political considerations in partner countries; and technical
issues and technology gaps. However, NNSA will continue to mitigate and
address such limitations to execute our defense nuclear
nonproliferation mission efficiently.
Ms. Tauscher. Can you describe NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation
priorities? What are the primary areas of progress, and the main
challenges facing NNSA nonproliferation efforts?
Mr. Tobey. Our primary nuclear nonproliferation mission is
detecting, securing and disposing of dangerous nuclear material
worldwide. Further, our priorities are: 1) completing the Bratislava
nuclear security upgrades by the end of 2008; 2) effective project
management to ensure continued success of plutonium production
prevention and disposition programs; and, 3) ensuring that our strategy
meets the evolving threat we face. The third priority is resulting in a
shift of emphasis from nuclear weapons material security work (which we
are completing) to second line of defense efforts to detect and deter
illicit transfers and to secure civil nuclear and radiological
material.
We have made remarkable strides in achieving that mission,
including: repatriating over 600 kg of Russian-origin highly enriched
uranium (HEU) and 1,145 kg of U.S.-origin HEU; securing over 635
vulnerable radiological sites overseas and recovering over 17,525
radiological sourced domestically; securing 85% of Russian nuclear
weapons and material sites of concern; completing 12 operational
``Megaports'' to help detect and interdict nuclear material at key
seaports overseas with work underway at an additional 19 ports;
monitoring the downblending of over 330 metric tons of Russian weapons-
origin HEU into LEU fuel; downblending over 94 metric tons of U.S. HEU
into LEU fuel for commercial domestic reactors; and ending 43 years of
plutonium production in Seversk, Russia by shutting down the city's two
plutonium-producing reactors.
We are also continuing our priority mission to strengthen the
nonproliferation regime, including our work to help states implement
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 by bolstering the
implementation of physical protection, export control, and safeguards
practices in over 50 countries worldwide. We also launched the Next
Generation Safeguards Initiative to strengthen international
safeguards, supporting the objectives of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and its safeguards obligations.
We will continue and, where possible, accelerate these urgent
nonproliferation efforts while focusing on our near-term priorities to:
1) complete all Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative upgrades in
Russia by 2008, 2) shutdown Russia's only remaining plutonium
production reactor in Zheleznogorsk no later than 2010; and 3) ensure
the sustainability of completed nuclear security upgrades in Russia
beyond the Congressionally-mandated USG funding cutoff of 2012. With
respect to these near-term priorities, the challenge lies in obtaining
high-level Russian governmental support--and Russian resources--to
complete this work on time and transition responsibility to Russia.
Ms. Tauscher. NNSA's Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program
is the sole remaining U.S. government capability for long-term nuclear
nonproliferation research and development and other critical work that
help keeps the U.S. on the cutting edge of technology. The program is
also thinly staffed and supports many U.S. government entities outside
of NNSA.
What more can NNSA do to expand and strengthen this program, with a
particular focus on significantly increasing the qualified scientific
workforce in this area and developing the capacity to detect nuclear
material origin and uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing?
Mr. Tobey. NNSA strongly supports the nonproliferation research and
development program. Integral to this work is a vigorous emphasis on
long-term basic and applied research toward detection of foreign
production of enriched uranium and plutonium, as well as radiation
detection. NNSA actively works to integrate all phases of its R&D in
these areas with other U.S. government R&D organizations to ensure that
the maximum benefit is obtained for every research dollar, thereby
providing cutting edge technology for NNSA needs, as well as that of
the broader U.S. government. An area that has gained particular
emphasis in the past two years is basic research in the academic
community that not only directly supports NNSA nonproliferation
missions, but also provides critical support to academic programs that
are training the next generation of nonproliferation researchers.
Ms. Tauscher. The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS)
program offers opportunities for robust activity on major current WMD
proliferation concerns, including: activities to address proliferation
concerns in North Korea and Iran; engagement on nonproliferation with
Russia, China, India and other states; inter-agency participation in
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); assistance to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); cooperation on international
safeguards and export controls in South Asia and the Middle East;
efforts to strengthen U.S. commitments to international agreements and
regimes; and the establishment of a contingency fund for opportunities
to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism that may arise.
Why was the FY 2009 request for NIS below the FY 2008 funded level?
Mr. Tobey. The FY 2008 Omnibus Budget Report included a one-time
increase for NIS of $26.5 million above the President's request. These
added funds were used to support U.S. monitoring of denuclearization
activities in North Korea and a new effort--the Next Generation
Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)--designed to strengthen international
safeguards and revitalize the U.S. technical base that supports them.
Ms. Tauscher. The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS)
program offers opportunities for robust activity on major current WMD
proliferation concerns, including: activities to address proliferation
concerns in North Korea and Iran; engagement on nonproliferation with
Russia, China, India and other states; inter-agency participation in
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); assistance to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); cooperation on international
safeguards and export controls in South Asia and the Middle East;
efforts to strengthen U.S. commitments to international agreements and
regimes; and the establishment of a contingency fund for opportunities
to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism that may arise.
What more can NNSA do to expand and strengthen this critical
program [NIS]?
Mr. Tobey. NIS represents NNSA's most diverse nonproliferation
program, ranging from implementation of laws and treaties that form the
backbone of the international nonproliferation regime to the hands-on
work of applying technology and partnering with foreign governments to
build national capabilities to prevent nuclear proliferation. A key
NNSA/NIS program looking forward is the Next Generation Safeguards
Initiative (NGSI), through which the United States aims to fortify
international safeguards and ease strains on the IAEA that are likely
to worsen with the emerging growth in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
NGSI will take advantage of U.S. technical leadership in the Department
and the National Laboratories and work in concert with others to ensure
that the IAEA has the tools needed to carry out effective safeguards.
Ms. Tauscher. The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS)
program offers opportunities for robust activity on major current WMD
proliferation concerns, including: activities to address proliferation
concerns in North Korea and Iran; engagement on nonproliferation with
Russia, China, India and other states; inter-agency participation in
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); assistance to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); cooperation on international
safeguards and export controls in South Asia and the Middle East;
efforts to strengthen U.S. commitments to international agreements and
regimes; and the establishment of a contingency fund for opportunities
to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism that may arise.
What is NNSA doing to ensure that as it expands the scope of its
nonproliferation programs globally, existing nonproliferation programs
with Russia remain a cooperative endeavor and the U.S. Russia
nonproliferation partnership continues to address remaining work in
Russia and other possible opportunities for nonproliferation
cooperation?
Mr. Tobey. NNSA is working to transition our nonproliferation
relationship with Russia from a donor-recipient relationship to a
cooperative partnership, commensurate with changes in Russia's economic
and political status and its willingness to work diligently on
nonproliferation efforts since the inception of our work in Russia. The
implementation strategy for this transition is three-fold: 1)
transitioning responsibility for and sustainability of U.S. assistance
provided to date; 2) accelerating the remaining nuclear security and
nonproliferation work within Russia; and 3) expanding our partnership
with Russia to promote global nuclear security objectives and provide
assistance abroad.
An excellent example of this strategy can be found in our
partnership with Russia under the Bratislava Nuclear Security
Initiative, which incorporates all three elements noted above,
including an accelerated schedule of completion for remaining Russian
nuclear security upgrades and cooperation to convert research reactors
in third countries from HEU to LEU fuel and to repatriate the HEU fuel.
Both the United States and Russia share a unique responsibility as
advanced nuclear technology holders, as well as shared nonproliferation
and counterterrorism interests. The U.S.- and Russian-led Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, now boasting over 70 partner
countries, is an example of the benefits of cooperative leadership
internationally. Together with NNSA's continued efforts on
sustainability and cost-sharing, we look forward to building upon these
and future opportunities for cooperation in these priority areas.
Ms. Tauscher. Some NNSA nonproliferation programs have carried
relatively large uncosted and/or unobligated balances over recent
years.
Do you expect any NNSA nonproliferation programs to have any
uncosted unobligated balances in FY 2008? If so, are such balances
reflected in the FY 2009 request for these programs? Please describe
any progress by NNSA to limit uncosted and unobligated balances for
NNSA nonproliferation programs, and the rationale, if any, for
maintaining a certain level of such balances for these programs.
Mr. Tobey. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation plans to
have minimal unobligated balances, and the target level for uncommitted
uncosted balances for operations and maintenance activities is around
13% for FY2008. These levels are consistent with the DOE and GAO
guidance on appropriate threshold levels of carryover balances that are
required for prudent operations at the beginning of the new fiscal
year, and as such, no NN balances are deemed ``excess'' or available to
offset the need for new FY 2009 appropriations.
NNSA supports operating within the threshold targets for uncosted
balances for all of its operating and maintenance programs. There are
no thresholds for construction activities, due to the nature of
contracting for this work. As such, the Elimination of Weapons Grade
Plutonium Production (EWGPP) Program expects to have a total uncosted
balance of about $120M at the end of FY 2008. These uncosted balances
accrued due to Russian and 3rd party delays on a construction contract.
Nuclear Nonproliferation programs have been on a good trend in
executing their programs to reduce the amount of uncosted uncommitted
balances at year end, despite rapid and substantial program growth in
some areas. For example, the uncosted balances that have been carried
by the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program
have been halved over the last five years, with less than $20 million
expected to be uncosted but obligated at the end of this fiscal year.
Uncosted balances for DNN programs accrue largely because of the
significant amount of DNN work conducted in foreign countries,
including the Russian Federation and the Newly Independent States.
Business transactions with these countries, including contract
negotiations and contractual agreements, and the subsequent accounting
of these transactions do not follow the normal obligation and costing
patterns. Contract negotiations with a foreign entity may take from two
to eighteen months to complete, with the actual work scope taking
another three to six months to implement. This unique situation results
in higher uncosted balances than many of the other NNSA programs whose
business is conducted primarily within the United States. DNN programs
have taken several steps to reduce the level of uncommitted uncosted
balances, including: monthly financial reviews to determine whether
funds need to be reallocated from areas where contract negotiations
have slowed; progress reviews at sites to identify and resolve problems
early where schedules slippages may be occurring; and efforts to ensure
that all direct federal contracts and task orders are awarded in a
timely manner. We will continue to identify and implement solutions to
limit uncosted and unobligated balances.
Ms. Tauscher. The risk of terrorism involving WMD is certainly not
limited to the United States, and the success of U.S. efforts is
dependent in large part on whether our international partners share a
common recognition of the threat and a willingness to combat it.
How is NNSA working with U.S. international partners to address
these risks? What are international partners doing to contribute
resources and funding to achieve our shared nonproliferation goals?
Mr. Tobey. A key component of addressing the threat of terrorist
acts involving WMD lies in reventing terrorist acquisition of WMD and
related materials, equipment, and technology in the first place. To
that end, the NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation supports
broader USG and NNSA counter WMD terrorism objectives through its
mission to detect, secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear material
worldwide, cooperating with over 100 countries.
In addition to efforts to secure materials in place and provide
defense in depth through second line of defense activities, NNSA also
helps strengthen the nonproliferation regime at its core. Such
activities include strengthening multilateral regimes and supporting
efforts such as the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and its new provisions against the
sabotage of nuclear facilities, and the recently extended United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Commission, as well as
actively participating in multilateral efforts such as the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI).
International partners are also contributing resources, expertise,
and leadership to support these key multilateral initiatives. To date,
more than 70 countries have signed on to the Global Initiative, and
more than 90 countries support PSI. Additional vehicles for cooperation
such as the G-8 Global Partnership and NNSA's own ``Securing the Future
Through an Integrated Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategy'' provide
avenues for cooperation. To date, some seven countries (Canada,
Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom) have contributed nearly $45 million in contributions
and pledges to NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs alone.
Just as the threat of WMD proliferation and terrorism is global in
nature, so too must be our responses to address it. We look forward to
continued cooperation internationally on this shared international
security imperative.
Ms. Tauscher. The risk of terrorism involving WMD is certainly not
limited to the United States, and the success of U.S. efforts is
dependent in large part on whether our international partners share a
common recognition of the threat and a willingness to combat it.
Can you give us any examples of ``cost sharing'' models for
nonproliferation programs that could be leveraged?
Mr. Tobey. One such example is the October 22-23, 2007, workshop
held in conjunction with the Swiss Government, on ``Securing the Future
Through an Integrated Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategy'' to promote
new partnerships in addressing urgent nonproliferation and
international security issues. This meeting included 45 attendees from
15 countries and the IAEA and International Science and Technology
Center (ISTC), with a view toward providing new partnership vehicles,
identifying common objectives and shared opportunities and pooling
limited resources--while doubling international contributions to NNSA's
defense nuclear nonproliferation programs by 2010. To date, through
this mechanism and others, NNSA has received nearly $45 million in
international contributions.
Additionally, specific programs have cost-sharing plans. For
example, in Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) source recovery
projects in a ``high-income'' country, GTRI pays for packaging labor,
while the host country pays all remaining costs. The Megaports
Initiative cost-shares, where feasible, with host governments and/or
the port authority or terminal operator(s) at the port. Under the most
typical cost-sharing approach employed by Megaports, the host nation
pays for the design, engineering, construction and installation of the
equipment, and in some cases limited maintenance, while DOE/NNSA pays
for the radiation detection equipment (including radiation portal
monitors and handheld detection equipment), the related communications
system (including fixed cameras, optical character recognition or
license plate reader systems, communications hardware, and software
development), training, and limited maintenance and technical support.
For example, Megaports worked with Dutch Customs in 2004 on a pilot
project at one terminal in Rotterdam, where the Dutch Government fully
funded the design, procurement, and installation of radiation detection
equipment to scan container traffic at all of the terminals in
Rotterdam. This model will also be duplicated in Spain, where the
Spanish Government has decided that it will procure and install
radiation detection equipment at all remaining Spanish ports, in
consultation with DOE/NNSA. Numerous NNSA programs employ such specific
strategies, including caps on USG funding, and NNSA will increasingly
pursue cost-sharing.
Ms. Tauscher. The risk of terrorism involving WMD is certainly not
limited to the United States, and the success of U.S. efforts is
dependent in large part on whether our international partners share a
common recognition of the threat and a willingness to combat it.
With Russia's economic growth and cash influx, has it taken on more
responsibility in funding nonproliferation programs within its borders?
Does Russia maintain any nonproliferation programs on its own? How is
NNSA working with our Russian partners to move them towards``cost
sharing'' models?
Mr. Tobey. Russia has taken a more active role in the selection of
nonproliferation and cooperative projects in which it undertakes with
the United States. As truly cooperative projects or programs move
forward with Russia that are clearly a Russian priority or of interest
to them, it has become possible to move Russian partners towards ``cost
sharing'' models.
The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has been working in
close cooperation with the Russian Federation to address cost sharing
by Russia for our nonproliferation activities. Specifically, Russia is
funding the long haul shipping costs for radioisotopic thermoelectric
generator (RTG) recoveries, has funded the recovery of 12 RTGs, and has
identified $19 million USD to be used for RTG recoveries in 2008-2015.
In addition, Russia has committed to fund all storage costs for RTGs in
the Far East, starting in 2010. Russia has also begun to address the
recovery of both high and low level orphaned and/or abandoned
radioactive sources, contributed to orphan source recovery activities
at former Soviet sites in Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and
completed physical protection upgrades at some radiological
repositories throughout Russia and it is understood the these efforts
will continue to address all repositories. Lastly, Russia is funding
the development and manufacturing of a special uranium-molybdenum fuel
to be used in potential future Russian research reactor conversions.
The Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP)
program implemented cost sharing with the Russian Federation at both
projects in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, Russia. U.S. funding caps were
negotiated and established early in the implementation of both
projects, which effectively transferred the cost risk of the projects
to the Russian Federation.
NNSA and Rosatom's Institute for Physics and Power Engineering
(IPPE) split the costs on the creation of an export control training
center, which is expected to be ready for use in the fall of 2008.
Building on this initial success, INECP will continue to pursue cost
sharing models in Russia. Additionally, the Global Initiative for
Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) has initiated cost sharing discussions
with Russian counterparts and anticipates several cost share projects
in FY09.
Russia is increasingly sharing the costs for implementing the MPC&A
and Second Line of Defense Programs in its country. As part of the
transition to full Russian responsibility for sustaining nuclear
security upgrades, NNSA is currently negotiating with Rosatom how it
will take on a larger share of sustainability costs. In 2007, DOE and
Rosatom signed a Joint Statement on sustainability principles that
outlines the budgetary, human resource, management and operational
requirements for effective long-term Russian sustainability. A detailed
MPC&A Joint Action Plan for 2007-2012 provides plans for transitioning
specific activities and efforts.
With regard to the Russian plutonium disposition program, the
United States and Russia have recently agreed upon a financially and
technically credible program to dispose of surplus Russian weapons-
grade plutonium based on irradiating it as MOX fuel in fast reactors.
As this program is consistent with Russia's national energy strategy,
the United States will cap its contribution to Russian plutonium
disposition at $400 million and Russia will be responsible for the
balance of costs for its multi-billion dollar program.
Ms. Tauscher. With a relatively modest investment, the Global
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program has employed
thousands of former weapons scientists in Russia and nations of the
former Soviet Union. Yet the program has been criticized this year by
the General Accounting Office and the leadership of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee as having supported scientists who contributed
to Iran's nuclear program.
Have GIPP funds been diverted to activities supporting the Iranian
nuclear program?
Mr. Tobey. There is no evidence that GIPP funds have been diverted
to activities supporting the Iranian nuclear program. As reported to
the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the Department's National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a thorough
analysis of all GIPP projects and payments. That analysis concludes
that no payments were made to Russian scientists funded by GIPP who are
known to be supporting Iran's nuclear programs; nor were GIPP payments
made to individuals at Russian institutes subject to U.S. sanctions.
Further, GIPP program guidance requires that all project proposals
be vetted through an interagency process to determine whether there are
any proliferation concerns associated with projects, entities, or
individuals proposed to carry out project work. GIPP projects that
require a U.S. export license or authorization are subject to review by
the appropriate U.S. interagency export control committees.
To further strengthen the current review process, the Departments
of Energy and State, in coordination with other U.S. agencies, recently
updated project review procedures and criteria to ensure consistency
across U.S. scientist engagement programs.
Ms. Tauscher. With a relatively modest investment, the Global
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program has employed
thousands of former weapons scientists in Russia and nations of the
former Soviet Union. Yet the program has been criticized this year by
the General Accounting Office and the leadership of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee as having supported scientists who contributed
to Iran's nuclear program.
How many scientists that might otherwise have been recruited by
rogue states or terrorist groups have been employed via the GIPP
program over the past three years? What has been the total investment
in GIPP over that period?
Mr. Tobey. In Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU), the GIPP
program has engaged thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians
with a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) background in the last three
years, taking into account that project participants are often engaged
over multi-year projects (FY08: 3,100; FY07: 3,760; FY06: 4,690). GIPP
engages individuals who, due to their specializations in technologies
for design, testing and manufacturing of WMD, are logical candidates
for recruitment by rogue states or terrorist groups. In broad terms,
their involvement in GIPP projects diverts resources and expertise that
might otherwise be available to support proliferation programs in
countries of concern, and provides former weapons scientists and
technical personnel with opportunities to pursue non-WMD work. Benefits
also accrue by virtue of the relationships and trust established
through collaborative commercial and civilian research projects, which
in turn help foster communities of experts who cooperate with the
United States to prevent proliferation.
The total investment in GIPP over this time period totals
$85,540,000. This sum also supports non-WMD personnel with marketing
and other expertise necessary to commercialize sustainable project
results, DOE laboratory participation and fixed administrative costs in
the United States, as well as important redirection programs in Libya
and Iraq. Budget constraints and priorities outside the FSU reduced the
annual number engaged. The substantial plus-up that the program
received in FY08 will increase the numbers again, taking into account
an approximate one year delay between project approval and actual
implementation due to the complex contracting process with Russian and
FSU institutes.
Ms. Tauscher. The Environmental Management (EM) budget has
decreased in recent years, but the Department of Energy remains
responsible for meeting thousands of site-specific regulatory
milestones. Many of these milestones are enforceable via court
sanctioned agreements, such as the Tri-Party Agreement in Washington.
For FY 2009, the Department has identified 32 milestones at-risk of
being missed, double the number at-risk in 2008. Of those 32
milestones, 23 are at-risk due to budget constraints.
How much investment would it take for DOE to achieve compliance for
those 23 milestones at risk of being missed due to budget constraints?
Secretary Rispoli. It is important to recognize that some
milestones and obligations would have been missed regardless of the
budgetary approach and the level of funding that was chosen. This is
primarily the result of the relevant agreements having been negotiated
years ago with incomplete knowledge by any of the parties of the
technical complexity and magnitude of costs that would be involved in
attempting to meet the requirements. Moreover, the cleanup program
continues to be impacted by various safety, contract administration,
project management, regulatory, legal, technical, economic, and other
significant challenges. Consequently, isolating funding as the only
issue placing some of the Department's cleanup milestones in jeopardy
given the other confounding factors would be inaccurate and misleading.
Ms. Tauscher. The Environmental Management (EM) budget has
decreased in recent years, but the Department of Energy remains
responsible for meeting thousands of site-specific regulatory
milestones. Many of these milestones are enforceable via court
sanctioned agreements, such as the Tri-Party Agreement in Washington.
For FY 2009, the Department has identified 32 milestones at-risk of
being missed, double the number at-risk in 2008. Of those 32
milestones, 23 are at-risk due to budget constraints.
What financial and other penalties might the Department face for
failing to meet these 23 compliance milestones at-risk due to lack of
adequate resources?
Secretary Rispoli. Many of our regulatory agreements contain a
provision that addresses noncompliance with enforceable milestones
under which the parties may agree to renegotiate the due date for at-
risk milestones. When fines and penalties are issued, the governing
statute or regulatory agreement usually establishes the maximum fine or
penalty that can be imposed--for instance, $5,000 for the first week of
non-compliance and $10,000 for each week thereafter. However, our
regulators retain the discretion to impose no fines or lesser fines
than the maximum allowable, so it is impossible to predict what actual
fines will be until they are imposed, and even then they may be
negotiated downward before they are paid.
Ms. Tauscher. The Environmental Management (EM) budget has
decreased in recent years, but the Department of Energy remains
responsible for meeting thousands of site-specific regulatory
milestones. Many of these milestones are enforceable via court
sanctioned agreements, such as the Tri-Party Agreement in Washington.
For FY 2009, the Department has identified 32 milestones at-risk of
being missed, double the number at-risk in 2008. Of those 32
milestones, 23 are at-risk due to budget constraints.
What efforts is the Department making to mitigate the risks of
meeting milestones?
Secretary Rispoli. In planning its environmental cleanup efforts
and developing the budget for those activities, the Department seeks to
focus on work that will produce the greatest environmental benefit and
the largest amount of risk reduction. The Department strongly believes
that setting priorities and establishing work plans in this way is the
most effective use of taxpayer funds and will have the greatest
benefit, at the earliest possible time, to the largest number of
people. In determining these priorities, the Department works closely
with federal and state regulators, and will seek the cooperation of
those entities in helping evaluate needs and focus work on the highest
environmental priorities based on current knowledge, particularly where
doing so necessitates modification of cleanup milestones embodied in
prior agreements with DOE.
Ms. Tauscher. The Environmental Management (EM) budget has
decreased in recent years, but the Department of Energy remains
responsible for meeting thousands of site-specific regulatory
milestones. Many of these milestones are enforceable via court
sanctioned agreements, such as the Tri-Party Agreement in Washington.
For FY 2009, the Department has identified 32 milestones at-risk of
being missed, double the number at-risk in 2008. Of those 32
milestones, 23 are at-risk due to budget constraints.
Does the Department intend to open new negotiations with states
where court-sanctioned agreements are in place and milestones will be
missed?
Secretary Rispoli. The Department works closely with federal and
state regulators, and will seek the cooperation of those entities in
helping evaluate needs and focus work on the highest environmental
priorities based on current knowledge, particularly where doing so
necessitates modification of cleanup milestones embodied in prior
agreements with DOE.
Ms. Tauscher. Consolidation and disposition of special nuclear
materials is a collaborative effort between EM and NNSA. To date, this
collaboration has happened through the Nuclear Materials Disposition
and Consolidation Coordinating Committee (NMDCCC), and organization
whose charter will end upon completion of the implementation plans at
the end of fiscal year 2008. DOE is currently shipping surplus non-pit
weapons-grade plutonium to the Savannah River Site (SRS) from the
Hanford Site, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. The current plan for materials disposition is a
three-pronged approach including the MOX facility, H Canyon (also at
SRS), and construction of a vitrification capability at SRS. But last
year, the Department informed Congress it was examining whether the
vitrification capability was needed.
In your view, what is the appropriate organizational framework to
serve as follow-on to the NMDCCC? Should any particular office assume a
strategic lead for any remaining planning?
Secretary Rispoli. The Department has established an Office of
Nuclear Materials Integration within the National Nuclear Security
Administration. This Office has the responsibility for establishing
nuclear material management policy for the Department, integrating
nuclear materials disposition plans and tracking status against those
plans. Program offices, such as the Office of Environmental Management,
retain full programmatic responsibilities for the materials under their
purview. The new office, working closely with the program offices, has
the lead for developing strategic plans for the disposition and
consolidation of the Department's nuclear materials.
Ms. Tauscher. Consolidation and disposition of special nuclear
materials is a collaborative effort between EM and NNSA. To date, this
collaboration has happened through the Nuclear Materials Disposition
and Consolidation Coordinating Committee (NMDCCC), and organization
whose charter will end upon completion of the implementation plans at
the end of fiscal year 2008. DOE is currently shipping surplus non-pit
weapons-grade plutonium to the Savannah River Site (SRS) from the
Hanford Site, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. The current plan for materials disposition is a
three-pronged approach including the MOX facility, H Canyon (also at
SRS), and construction of a vitrification capability at SRS. But last
year, the Department informed Congress it was examining whether the
vitrification capability was needed.
When will a final decision be made on whether to proceed with a
Plutonium Vitrification Facility?
Secretary Rispoli. By memorandum dated June 27, 2008, the Under
Secretary of Energy approved use of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) and H-Canyon
facilities as the revised preferred alternative for disposing of
surplus non-pit plutonium, thereby eliminating the need to proceed with
also establishing a plutonium vitrification capability. The Department
is also preparing a Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and plans to issue the final
Supplemental EIS and a Record of Decision on its surplus plutonium
disposition strategy in early 2009.
Ms. Tauscher. Consolidation and disposition of special nuclear
materials is a collaborative effort between EM and NNSA. To date, this
collaboration has happened through the Nuclear Materials Disposition
and Consolidation Coordinating Committee (NMDCCC), and organization
whose charter will end upon completion of the implementation plans at
the end of fiscal year 2008. DOE is currently shipping surplus non-pit
weapons-grade plutonium to the Savannah River Site (SRS) from the
Hanford Site, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory. The current plan for materials disposition is a
three-pronged approach including the MOX facility, H Canyon (also at
SRS), and construction of a vitrification capability at SRS. But last
year, the Department informed Congress it was examining whether the
vitrification capability was needed.
If the MOX facility is not built, could a vitrification facility be
built that could dispose of all the plutonium slated for the MOX
facility? What would such a facility cost?
Secretary Rispoli. If the MOX facility were not built, the
Department would have to reevaluate viable alternatives for the
disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The Department has
previously considered immobilization and may reconsider it as a
disposition path for the surplus weapon-grade plutonium currently
planned for the MOX facility. Cost estimates for immobilization are
highly uncertain since the technology supporting the immobilization of
plutonium would require additional R&D and the immobilized waste form
has yet to be qualified for acceptance in the planned geologic
repository at Yucca Mountain. Research and development of a ceramic
immobilization process was halted seven years ago and restarting such a
program now would require at least 10-12 years to complete the
necessary R&D, design and construction before such a facility were able
to become operational in the 2018-2020 timeframe. The amount of time
necessary to immobilize this large quantity of weapon-grade plutonium
would extend beyond the planned operating life of the Defense Waste
Processing Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River Site, moreover there
is an insufficient quantity of high-activity waste at DWPF to
immobilize this quantity of surplus plutonium.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2009 NNSA budget request includes $77.4
million for a new program called Transformation Disposition. Does EM
have an eventual role in the NNSA's Transformation Disposition? Will EM
coordinate with NNSA on these efforts?
Secretary Rispoli. The National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) is using their new Transformation Disposition (TD) as the
principal funding source to achieve footprint reduction through the
sale, transfer, or demolition in support of Complex Transformation. A
portion of the TD program resources will be used to support transfer of
NNSA's process-contaminated excess facilities to EM. DOE currently uses
the transfer process in DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset
Management, which outlines the acceptance criteria for transferring
facilities from one DOE program to another. The NNSA and EM are in the
coordinating phase on what process-contaminated excess facilities meet
acceptance criteria for transfer.
Ms. Tauscher. Do NNSA and EM have a plan for coordination of D&D
and cleanup activities at NNSA sites?
Secretary Rispoli. Legacy environmental cleanup, including D&D
activities at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sites
are funded by the Office of Environmental Management (EM) and
coordinated with the NNSA. These activities have been established as
formal projects within the Department of Energy (DOE) following the
procedures established by EM and the requirements of DOE Order 413.3A
Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets.
The terms of oversight and direction for these projects at the NNSA
sites have been formalized by joint memorandum Authority for
Environmental Work at National Nuclear Security Administration Sites
signed by the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management and the
Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Environment, National
Nuclear Security Administration dated October 27, 2005. The NNSA is
coordinating with EM on the potential transfer of excess facilities
that are process contaminated. DOE uses the transfer process in DOE
Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, which outlines the
acceptance criteria for transferring facilities.
Ms. Tauscher. According to GAO, not all DOE sites will fully
implement the Design Basis Threat (DBT) by the end of FY 2008, as
required by DOE's 2005 DBT. What have been the challenges in meeting
the requirements of the 2005 DBT?
Secretary Rispoli. DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) facilities were originally required to meet the 2005 DBT by the
end of 2008. The initial deadline was changed to allow the DOE/NNSA's
program offices to determine the ``How'' and ``When'' of the 2005 DBT
implementation. The deadline was changed in recognition of the
Departmental direction to minimize the number of high-equity facilities
through material consolidation, and the actual time required to fully
analyze the 2005 DBT and develop and implement appropriate and cost-
effective enhancement proposals.
Y-12: Will be complete in FY 2011.
LANL: Will be complete in FY 2011.
SNL: The de-inventory of Category I
special nuclear material has
been completed.
Pantex: Will be completed during FY
2008.
LLNL: The de-inventory of Category
I special nuclear materials will
be completed in FY 2012.
Kansas City: Has no special nuclear
material.
Nevada: Will be completed in FY
2009.
OST: Will be completed in FY 2008.
INL: INL has completed several physical
security upgrades to comply with
the 05 DBT. In November 2007, the
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear
Energy approved a revision to the
NE Implementation Plan for the
2005 DBT that identifies the
actions required for NE to become
fully compliant with the 2005 DBT
by the end of FY 2013.
SRS: The Savannah River Site (SRS) will
complete implementation of the
2005 DBT by September 30, 2008.
The major facility impacted by the
2005 DBT is the K-Area Complex, a
key site in the Department's
plutonium consolidation
initiative.
RL/Hanford: In April 2006, the Deputy Secretary
of Energy approved an exemption
for the Richland/Hanford Site's
Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) to
implement the 2005 DBT, based on
plans to de-inventory PFP's
surplus plutonium inventory by the
end of 2009. In September 2007,
DOE decided to continue surplus
plutonium consolidation to the
SRS. These shipments from PFP to
SRS are well underway and it is
anticipated they will be completed
by September 2009. However, some
residual spent nuclear fuel will
be relocated to the Canister
Storage Building complex which
will be 2005 DBT compliant by
December 2009.
ORNL: Building 3019 is a non-enduring
facility and therefore not
required to implement the 2005
DBT. Additionally, there are no
other Office of Science sites with
Special Nuclear Materials
quantities requiring
implementation.
Ms. Tauscher. The Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) is designed to treat
100 percent of the High Level Waste and 50 percent of the Low Activity
waste currently stored in tanks at Hanford. DOE has funded an effort to
develop a Bulk Vitrification system to process 50 percent of the low
activity tank waste, but costs for this system have doubled over the
past four years, and progress has been slow. When the contract was
awarded in 2004, the objective was for a technology demonstration in
2006; but in a June 2007 report, GAO noted that the estimate for such a
demonstration is 2012 or later. The FY 2009 budget request reports that
engineering-scale bulk vitrification tests were successful and Critical
Decision-2 (Approve Performance Baseline) may occur in January 2008,
but this milestone has not been met. The FY 2009 request also cuts
funding for Bulk Vitrification to $1 million and proposes two
alternative paths for processing low activity waste (increasing the
capacity of the Low-Activity Waste Facility of the WTP and early
startup of the Low-Activity Waste Facility).
Please provide an update on EM's disposition plan for low activity
waste at Hanford.
Secretary Rispoli. The Department is developing a strategy to
accomplish the tank cleanup mission. It is expected that this strategy
will be completed in the comings weeks. The Waste Treatment Plant has
the capacity to immobilize 100 percent of the high level waste and 50
percent of the low activity waste. To address the remaining 50 percent
of low activity waste, we are conducting studies to determine options
for low activity waste treatment. These activities have included:
commissioning a technical consultant review team to evaluate the
current disposition plans, developing pre-conceptual studies of an
interim pretreatment capability, evaluating the feasibility of
installing a third melter in the Low Activity Waste Facility,
evaluating the feasibility of installing enhanced capacity melters in
the Low Activity Waste Facility; and determining the viability of an
early startup of the Low Activity Waste Facility.
Ms. Tauscher. In a January 2007 report to this committee, GAO found
that among other security challenges at LANL, the Los Alamos Site
Office lacked the security staff required to conduct oversight of the
LANL contractor, and often such officials lack proper training. From
your perspective as Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer for all
of DOE, does the Los Alamos Site Office have an adequate number of
properly trained security officers?
Mr. Podonsky. As a point of clarification to the question, the Los
Alamos Site Office (LASO) has a staff of career federal security
professionals; they do not have security officers (armed or unarmed
guards). To evaluate the LASO's oversight of the contractor, the Office
of Independent Oversight performed a comprehensive inspection of the
LASO and the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) during the fall of
2006 and found that staffing within LASO was insufficient to fully
oversee the laboratory's safeguards and security program. While LASO
had integrated the Department's technical qualification program for
safeguards and security into training program and staff generally met
established qualification requirements, skill mix issues were evident.
The recent departure of the LASO Assistant Manager for Safeguards and
Security and vacant security positions continue to challenge the site
office's ability to perform effective oversight of the LANL.
The Office of Independent Oversight has scheduled another
comprehensive inspection at LANL during August-September 2008 and will
evaluate LASO progress in improving its safeguards and security
oversight capabilities.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
requires the GAO and then the NNSA to examine alternatives for managing
protective forces at all NNSA and Department sites with special nuclear
material. Has the GAO contacted the Department about this review? Is
NNSA Defense Nuclear Security working with the Department conduct a
review?
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director, Government
Accountability Office (GAO) conducted an entrance briefing with NNSA
concerning the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (DOE
Protective Force Options: GAO Engagement 360953) on June 10, 2008. In
August 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),
Office of Defense Nuclear Security was tasked by the NNSA Administrator
to conduct an analysis and comparative survey examining several options
for performing Protective Force duties at NNSA sites, including the use
of an enterprise-wide contractor, federalization of existing security
employees, or a combination of the two. The ``Comparative Analysis of
Contractor and Federal Protective Forces at Fixed Sites'' also
identified benefits of standardization across the NNSA Complex,
including reduction of preparation time required for response to
potential work stoppages resulting from strikes. DOE is awaiting
completion of the GAO study (approximately March 2009) in accordance
with the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act prior to submitting
a report within 90 days to the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.
Ms. Tauscher. Should the Department revise or update the 2005 DBT?
Mr. Podonsky. The Department of Energy is currently in the process
of assessing the technical basis and applicability of the 2005 Design
Basis Threat (DBT). The DBT and the basis for the DBT are reviewed
annually to ascertain if the current performance metric and adversary
capabilities are adequate. A 2008 revision to the DBT is under review.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2008 NDAA directs NNSA--in consultation with
your office--to conduct an assessment of the physical and cyber
security risks posed to the nuclear weapons complex and the security
technologies employed against those threats, and prepare a report
identifying the manner in which it prioritizes investments in physical
and cyber security of the weapons complex. The report would be included
in the annual Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP).
Is the NNSA working with your office in conducting this assessment
and report?
Mr. Podonsky. The NNSA has assigned this work to Sandia National
Laboratories. Sandia has not yet contacted the Office of Health, Safety
and Security (HSS) to provide input, support or review, but NNSA has
assured us that the scope of work provided to Sandia includes
consultation and coordination with HSS.
Ms. Tauscher. The FY 2008 NDAA directs NNSA--in consultation with
your office--to conduct an assessment of the physical and cyber
security risks posed to the nuclear weapons complex and the security
technologies employed against those threats, and prepare a report
identifying the manner in which it prioritizes investments in physical
and cyber security of the weapons complex. The report would be included
in the annual Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP).
How does the Department prioritize investments among physical and
cyber security?
Mr. Podonsky. Departmental program elements prioritize funding for
physical and cyber security based upon policy requirements and
recommendations and findings from oversight organizations. The
Department's Office of Chief Information Officer (OCIO) has program
responsibility for cyber security that includes development of policy.
The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) has the responsibility
for policy development, for physical security, and independent
oversight for both physical and cyber security. HSS and OCIO coordinate
policy and response to oversight findings when both cyber and physical
security are involved.
Ms. Tauscher. Your office is the central DOE organization
responsible for health, safety and security policy development,
assistance, oversight and enforcement.
What is the extent of your office's authority in establishing DOE
security policies?
Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) is
the corporate policy office within the Department of Energy (including
NNSA) for the development, maintenance, interpretation and revision of
various Departmental security policies, less cyber security. These
include: Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management,
Protective Force, Physical Protection Security, Information Security
for Classified Material, Personnel Security (including the Human
Reliability Program), Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability and
the Design Basis Threat. HSS also provides Government-wide and
Department-wide policies, procedures and guidance for information
classified or controlled under statute or executive order to protect
the national security (especially Restricted Data), and controlled
unclassified information. HSS-proposed policies are subject to review
and comment by other Departmental elements through the formal
Departmental Directives Program. When comments from this process are
reconciled, the policy receives final approval from the Deputy
Secretary of Energy.
Ms. Tauscher. Your office is the central DOE organization
responsible for health, safety and security policy development,
assistance, oversight and enforcement.
Does your office have the necessary authorities to execute its
oversight authorities?
Mr. Podonsky. While not established by legislation, the Office of
Independent Oversight, within the Office of Health, Safety and
Security, has clearly defined authorities that facilitate effective
implementation of the Office's independent oversight responsibilities.
The Office's defined authorities have been longstanding and are
embodied primarily in DOE Order 470.2B, Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance Program. The establishment of this order by the
Secretary of Energy provides clearly defined authorities for scheduling
and conducting inspections to evaluate the effectiveness of DOE line
management performance in the areas of safeguards and security; cyber
security; emergency management; and environment, safety and health.
Further, the order obligates DOE line management organizations and
their contractors to support, participate in, and respond to
Independent Oversight inspections. The formation of HSS has further
supported the Independent Oversight mission by creating enhanced
organizational interfaces with offices that are responsible for
establishing policy, providing assistance to line management, and
conducting enforcement actions.
Ms. Tauscher. When HSS was established, it was structured to ensure
you were not responsible for any operational elements, with one
exception. Nevertheless, within your organization there appears to be
an office responsible for the security of the DOE Headquarters
facilities, which would seem to represent a conflict of interest. That
is, an office with setting policy and providing oversight is also
conducting operations that need to comply with those very policies.
Does the Department have a plan to address this conflict?
Mr. Podonsky. The Department acknowledges that the presence of the
Office of Security Operations within HSS does present a potential
conflict of interest, in that the Office of Security Operations is
responsible for implementing security for DOE Headquarters facilities.
Other elements of HSS establish security requirements which they must
comply with, and the HSS Office of Independent Oversight is charged
with undertaking periodic review as to the effectiveness of
implementation. That potential conflict has been at least partially
mitigated through the strength of internal controls within the HSS
organization. Security policy and oversight functions report to the HSS
Deputy Chief for Operations, whereas the Office of Security Operations
reports directly to the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer. The
independence and objectivity of Independent Oversight results are
insulated through the use of a senior Quality Review Board that ensures
that the results presented to the implementer (Office of Security
Operations), and to the Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer, are
complete and fully supported. The Department recognizes that most of
the ``landlord'' functions (including safety and health) for the
Headquarters facilities have been assigned to Office of Management
(MA), and is considering transferring most functions of the Office of
Security Operations to MA.
Ms. Tauscher. HSS was established not only to improve program
management for the health, safety and security functions within DOE,
but also to improve the health, safety, and security for DOE workers.
These responsibilities include a commitment to provide medical
screening examinations for former employees to identify adverse health
effects that may have resulted from working at DOE facilities. The
committee understands that more than 600,00 people are eligible to
participate in the former worker program and may need screening. This
element (Occupational Health) of the HHS budget was appropriated $16.4
million in FY 2008, and the budget request for FY 2009 is $17.9
million.
Please explain how this program can adequately provide for all the
former workers who seek medical screening examinations with its modest
funding.
Mr. Podonsky. As of November 2007, over 51,000 comprehensive
medical screening examinations have been provided to those who
volunteered to participate in the program. In addition, follow-up re-
screening exams have been provided to over 5,700 former workers. For FY
2009, HSS has requested an additional $1,539,000 to ensure that the
Former Worker Medical Surveillance Program can provide additional
medical screenings. This additional funding is required to continue the
goal of serving all interested former workers from all DOE sites. These
additional funds are especially necessary in order to work through the
backlog of individuals waiting to be screened through the National
Supplemental Screening Program, a Former Worker Program project that
provides medical examinations for former workers who no longer reside
in close proximity to the regional screening clinics. Based on the
historical level of medical screenings that have been conducted and the
utilization rate in FY 2008, HSS believes this increase in funding and
the resultant increase in medical screenings are sufficient to meet the
needs of the program and will eliminate the backlog of former workers
who have volunteered to participate in the program.