[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
KEEPING THE BORDER SECURE:
EXAMINING POTENTIAL THREATS
POSED BY CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 19, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-50
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas, Chairwoman
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Columbia GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York PETER T. KING, New York (Ex
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado Officio)
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Mathew Washington, Director
Erin Daste, Counsel
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Senior Counsel
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 1
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.......... 3
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 25
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Oregon............................................ 19
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 44
The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in congress
From the State of Florida...................................... 22
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. Bill Arrington, General Manager, Highway and Motor Carrier
Division, Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Greg Olsavsky, Director, Cargo Control, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Panel II
Mr. Stephen Russell, Chairman and CEO, Celadon Group, Inc., On
behalf of the American Trucking Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
The Honorable Raul G. Salinas, Mayor, Laredo, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Mr. Gregg M. Ward, Vice President, Detroit-windsor Truck Ferry:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Appendixes
I. C-TPAT Highway Carrier Security Criteria.................. 53
II. May Salinas' Law Enforcement History...................... 59
KEEPING THE BORDER SECURE:
EXAMINING POTENTIAL THREATS
POSED BY CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING
----------
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:38 p.m., in
room 1539, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Sheila Jackson
Lee [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Jackson Lee, DeFazio, Clarke,
Cuellar, Lungren, and Brown-Waite.
Ms. Jackson Lee. [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
what the Department of Homeland Security, specifically TSA and
CBP, is doing to keep and protect our citizens from trucks that
could possibly threaten our nation.
However, before I begin, I would like to ask for unanimous
consent that Mr. Cuellar, a member of the full committee, be
allowed to sit and question the panel during today's hearing.
Mr. Lungren. Is he going to be sitting at the far end?
Ms. Jackson Lee. He will be sitting in a very honored seat.
[Laughter.]
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
Thank you, Mr. Cuellar, and welcome.
I yield myself 5 minutes to provide an opening statement.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of you
for joining us this afternoon, so that we can begin our
exploration of a topic on border security.
I am very grateful that this committee, building on
certainly past leadership, has been enormously active, the full
committee, recognizing our challenges after 9/11. And it is our
commitment to really not leave any stone unturned.
I always am reminded of the fact, with all the respect I
have for so many committees of jurisdiction and with
responsibilities of oversight, if, by chance, there is a tragic
incident of terrorism, they will be looking not to a number of
other committees, but they will be looking to the Homeland
Security Department and the Homeland Security Committee of the
United States House of Representatives and its respective
counterpart in the Senate.
We have the ultimate and bottom-line responsibility of
dealing with security. And that means every nuance, every item
that is conspicuous and all that are not conspicuous.
Some may ask the question, how does border security relate
to transportation security? And that is why we are here today,
because every nuance, every non-obvious aspect of security we
must answer the question.
Well, here are some facts that we all should be aware of,
for example, the annual number of truck crossings remains above
4 million.
The majority of our focus regarding the cross-border
trucking issue has been on the safety implications. Little has
been done to ensure that cross-border trucking is not an easy
conduit for terrorists to enter the United States and use those
vehicles to commit acts of violence against Americans.
It is important to understand that it is a possibility. My
colleague, the ranking member, has recognized that in
legislation that he has put forward regarding trucking.
The security implications of a cross-border trucking
program, from a homeland security perspective, are four-fold.
In order to be secure, we need to know the driver, the truck,
the cargo and the destination. Further, we must be concerned
with the whereabouts of the driver once he is through the
border and driving on our national highways.
The vulnerability created by allowing foreign carriers to
operate freely in the U.S. cannot be overstated. Increasingly,
foreign terrorist organizations are getting a foothold in Latin
America and exploiting our porous border with Canada to gain
entry into the United States.
But speaking about it does not provide solutions. We must
develop friendships: our continued friendship in Canada but
increase friendships in South and Central America.
Mayor Salinas knows about those friendships. That is why I
am gratified that he accepted the invitation of this committee
to come and to share how we can combine the needs of our
southern-border neighbors and our American friends who are on
the American side of the border.
How do we approach security and friendship at the same
time?
It is well-known that once inside a truck, regardless of
what materials he or she may be carrying, a terrorist will have
many tools available to him to harm Americans. We need to
understand what methods TSA and CBP are putting in place to
ensure that, when our borders are finally open to foreign
carriers in a large way, we have a process to find out who they
are, what they are carrying and where they are going.
We want to make sure that we have all of the information so
that we have a productive opportunity for the exchange that we
are used to, as it relates to people and goods. It is important
that we do so. As we do this, we will be able to address the
larger question of the relationships between our borders and
those on our borders.
In addition, we want to make sure that carriers actually
arrive at their destination. This is a two-prong process, and
we hope to see that CBP and TSA are working in lockstep to
check drivers at the border and then track them once they are
on our nation's highways.
We would like to know how effective you have been and what
resources you need to be more effective.
Because the nation's highway transportation system is
robust and interconnected--including 3.8 million miles of
roadways, 582,000 bridges, and 54 tunnels over 500 meters in
length--this work has to be done.
The highway system supports 86 percent of the personal
travel of Americans and moves 80 percent of the freight, based
on value, which is projected to double by 2020. This system is
the backbone of our nation, and all Americans use this system.
An attack on this system could seriously hamper commerce.
We need to make sure that foreign carriers are just as
secure as our domestic carriers, and this process starts at the
border. In the wake of September 11th, we have learned that we
must think outside the box. The committee must continue to
think about the impossible.
This is a security issue that we must make sure is not
exploited for the purposes of carrying out a terrorist attack.
And I believe that if we continue to use Band-Aid approaches or
turn a blind eye, it is only a matter of time before we will
once again regret that we did not act sooner.
As members of Congress and, more specifically, as members
of the Homeland Security Committee, we have a responsibility to
make sure our highways our secure. We are at a crossroads where
we must take action to find out what is the best way to provide
a safe, secure and functional system.
If we do not put effective security measures in place, our
nation may very well be susceptible to another attack, which,
in turn, will cause a major disruption in commerce and could
subject us to grim economic consequences.
We must make sure that we have confidence in cross-border
trucking. And we must demonstrate that we know who is in our
country and what they are carrying, where they are going, and
anything less is unacceptable.
We will look at members' legislative initiatives. We will
also look at a comprehensive response legislatively to trucking
and border security. We will not leave them out. We will
include the thoughts of industry, the thoughts of the
department, and certainly the thoughts of truckers who, every
day, are on the front lines themselves. They are a vital part
of the economic engine of this country, but we must ensure
safety.
Be on the lookout for a comprehensive legislative approach
to many of these concerns.
It is now my pleasure to recognize the ranking member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from California, who I have had
an important discussion on truck safety, as he has offered an
important initiative on that question as well. I yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Jackson Lee. I
want to commend you for holding today's hearing.
Our Homeland Security Committee has addressed many of the
security concerns in the airline industry, the maritime
industry, the chemical industry, and, most recently, the rail
and mass transit industry, which we all hope will soon be
enacted into law.
It is interesting that we are talking today about the
trucking industry. I read an article recently that I found most
fascinating. Following World War I, a young Army officer named
Dwight D. Eisenhower was given the responsibility of taking a
military caravan from one end of this country to the other to
show the difficulty in transportation in this country.
It was out of that experience, after World War I, that
drove him, as president of the United States, to establish the
interstate highway system on the basis of its national security
concerns. Having been in charge for the wartime effort for
moving troops and equipment across Europe, he saw the
inadequacy of our system that remained after World War II.
We have a very different situation today. Today, our
highway system, in many ways, in the envy of the world. It
creates a world that did not exist prior to its existence.
And today, cross-border trucking provides the key
transportation component for almost 70 percent of the value of
freight between the United States and Canada. Between Mexico
and the U.S., trucks carry 83 percent of the freight, or $219
billion worth of goods in 2006.
The volume of trade required over 8 million border truck
crossings between Mexico and the U.S. and, I am informed, 14
million between Canada and the U.S.
Obviously this opportunity carries with it also risk. This
large number of border truck crossings poses a serious and
continuing risk to homeland security.
Since 9/11, we have struggled to find the right balance
between securing our homeland without undermining our economy.
What security measures can we adopt at our airports, seaports
and landports which improves our national security without
negatively impacting our vital economic and trade activity?
That is the question we have been wrestling with.
Finding the right balance between national and economic
security will be an ongoing struggle as we deal with this new
terror threat. We can never allow our national security to
undermine our economic security, or the terrorists will win.
This is why I join many others on this committee in being
such a strong proponent of risk-based security measures, such
as the automated targeted screening program, ATS, in the fight
against terror. ATS allows the Customs and Border Patrol to
target high-risk cargo crossing the U.S. border. These risk-
based security measures strike the appropriate balance between
national and economic security.
Every time we deal with this and allied issues, it is
important to remind ourselves we do not exist, nor can we
exist, in a risk-free environment. We have to manage risk. We
have to make sure we are smarted than the bad guys. We have to
use our technology, our intelligence, our personnel, and our
perseverance to ensure that the terrorists do not succeed.
If they close down our economy through threat, they are as
successful as if they have an actual physical attack on our
country. And we have to understand that that is why it is
important for us to try and strike that proper balance. And
that is why these hearings are helpful in giving us the kind of
information to make those decisions that strike that balance.
And I thank the gentlelady for the time, and I look forward
to these hearings.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman for his insight.
It is my pleasure now to welcome the witnesses.
And, at this time, I would like to welcome Mr. Bill
Arrington, general manager for highways at the Transportation
Security Administration. In this capacity, he has primary
responsibility for commercial motor vehicle security and
critical infrastructure security for our nation.
I would also like to welcome Mr. Greg Olsavsky, director of
cargo control at U.S. Customs and Border Protection. As
director of cargo control, Mr. Olsavsky has operational program
management responsibility over manifests, cargo conveyance,
clearance, cargo release, automated commercial environment,
truck e-manifests, and multimodal manifest projects.
We look forward to your testimonies.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5
minutes, beginning with you, Mr. Arrington, from the
Transportation Security Administration.
STATEMENT OF BILL ARRINGTON, GENERAL MANAGER, HIGHWAY AND MOTOR
CARRIER DIVISION, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Arrington. Thank you, and good afternoon, Chairwoman
Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and members of the
subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss TSA's activities
to protect highway operators and assets. I would like to
highlight some of the important steps TSA is taking with our
government and industry partners to ensure our highway security
reaches its highest level possible.
First I would like to introduce myself to the subcommittee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you turn on your microphone or put
it closer to you? Thank you.
Mr. Arrington. Thank you.
First I would like to introduce myself to the subcommittee.
As you stated, I am the general manager of TSA's Office of
Highway and Motor Carrier Division, with primary responsibility
in commercial motor vehicle security and critical
infrastructure security for our nation.
When I joined TSA in the latter part of 2002, my first
assignment was area director for the south-central region of
the country, which includes the great state of Texas. Now, with
primary concern in the aviation industry, you are absolutely
right, that is where TSA's primary purpose was at that time for
obvious reasons, was in the aviation community.
Prior to joining TSA, I enjoyed a 30-year career with the
Maryland State Police, retiring 3 days prior to starting to
work for TSA. I retired as a deputy superintendent with the
Maryland State Police. I was chief of the Field Operations
Bureau at that time.
Under the leadership of our administrator, Mr. Kip Hawley,
the culture of TSA has changed for the better.
It is an absolute requirement that all entities within TSA
collaborate and partner with industries at every level and in
an effort to enhance national security.
It is important to keep in mind that a robust security
system is multilayered. Regardless of the mode or facility, TSA
relies on the interconnected system to provide the layers of an
effective security program.
Highway security does not start or stop with the vehicles
themselves. TSA measures rely on everything from intelligence
gathering overseas to border security to awareness and
vigilance of motorists themselves.
TSA does not make distinctions between domestic and foreign
trucking operators. Once a truck or other highway vehicle has
crossed the border and completed all safety and security checks
required by the Department of Transportation and the United
States Customs and Border Protection, it poses and is subject
to the same level of security risk threat assessment as if it
were a domestic vehicle.
As a result, TSA's security programs for the highway modes
are designed to benefit all participants, regardless of their
home base.
The Corporate Security Review initiative is the very
centerpiece in an effort to establish a baseline for homeland
security within the Office of Highway and Motor Carrier. TSA
created a program to evaluate and collect physical and
operational preparedness information and to share that
information with our industry on best practices.
Over the last year, we have trained more than 40 state of
Missouri enforcement officers who, in turn, have conducted more
than 1,300 corporate security reviews within their own state
and created for us a force multiplier.
We also have conducted in-house, with existing staff,
nearly 100 CSRs using our existing staff.
We view law enforcement as our first line of defense. An
example of this is TSA's partnership with the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center, FLETC, and created the Commercial
Vehicle Counterterrorism Training Program for state and local
law enforcement officers.
In an effort to address drivers hauling hazardous material,
we train law enforcement officers to detect fraudulent
documents and to identify suspicious activities. In addition,
we are passing intelligence to them, as evidenced by a recent
alert for the suspicious activities relating to chlorine
shippers.
At the Commercial Vehicle Counterterrorism Training
Program, we initially trained 90 officers, with the intent that
once they were back at their home district they would become,
again, a force multiplier and use what they learned to train
others.
With the information collected through the CSRs, TSA has
developed--
Ms. Clarke. [Presiding.] Mr. Arrington, if you would just
take a moment and sum up.
Mr. Arrington. OK, thank you.
Security and safety is a shared responsibility. It would
take a collaborative effort between government and industry to
stop the next terrorist attack. The future requires a secure
posture that relies upon technology to provide real-time,
detailed pictures in order to respond immediately to threats to
national security.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. I would
be more than willing to answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Arrington follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Arrington
Good afternoon Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and
members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss TSA's highway security programs. As the
General Manager of the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
highway and motor carrier security programs, I am pleased to be here to
discuss TSA's activities to protect highway operators and assets,
regardless of their origin.
The Nation's Highway Transportation System is vast and
interconnected, including 3.8 million miles of roadway; 582,000
bridges; and 54 tunnels of more than 500 meters in length. The highway
system supports 86 percent of all of our citizens' personal travel,
moves 80 percent of the Nation's freight by value, and serves as a key
component in national defense mobility. Nevertheless, despite
widespread redundancies, there are critical junctures with limited
capacity for additional traffic, and freight volume is projected to
double by 2020, stretching the Nation's ability to manage limited
capacity and growing security concerns.
Trucks transport the majority of all of the goods in the United
States. These shipments include agricultural goods, hazardous materials
(HAZMAT), electronics, automotive and other products essential to our
economy. The trucking industry is unique in that it is the only segment
of the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Mode with complete
intermodal supply chain relationships linking the Aviation, Maritime,
Mass Transit, Passenger Rail, Freight Rail, and Pipeline modes. With
widespread access to not only intermodal infrastructure, but also
contact with large numbers of people and goods, it is important that
coordination between trucking operation and other modes includes
effective lines of communication and coordinated security measures to
establish and maintain safe and secure transport of goods and people.
TSA makes no operational distinction between domestic and foreign
trucking operators. Once a truck or other highway vehicle has crossed
the border, completing all necessary safety and security checks
required by the Department of Transportation and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, it poses and is subject to the same level of
security risk and threat assessment as if it were a domestic vehicle.
As a result, TSA's security planning and programs for the highway mode
are designed to benefit all participants, regardless of their home
base.
Security Strategy
Highway infrastructure and motor carrier security is advanced by
implementing layered security measures through transportation systems
operations and management. Toward this end, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Department of Transportation (DOT), State and local
government entities, and private sector security partners continue to
be committed to improving the Highway Transportation System.
The security of the Highway Transportation System is a shared
responsibility among Federal, State, and local governments and private
stakeholders. Measures to secure the assets of the Highway
Transportation System must be implemented in a way that balances cost,
efficiency, and preservation of commerce in this Nation. Federal,
State, local, and tribal government agencies, along with private
stakeholders, will lead the national effort to maintain the capability
to move freely and facilitate interstate commerce under all conditions.
Vehicles that use the highways are potential targets and weapons
that terrorists or criminals could use to attack critical
infrastructure or other assets. The diversity of highway industries
poses additional challenges to the effective integration of security
into both large, complex operations and smaller owner/operator
businesses. To address these security issues, it is important that the
Federal Government continues to work effectively within established
public-private partnerships, implementing a variety of programs to
enhance the security of domestic highway operations.
Scope of the Mode
The trucking industry is made up of predominantly small private
companies. Approximately 675,000 are interstate and 400,000 are
intrastate companies. In addition to for-hire trucking, private truck
operations are integral to other business operations, such as
construction, agriculture, and the delivery of goods and services.
Nearly 8 million large trucks are registered in the United States.
While approximately 9.3 million truck drivers have commercial driver's
licenses (CDLs), only 3.3 million are regarded as active. Vehicle
configurations include tankers, dump trucks, intermodal containers,
flat-beds, and specialty vehicles.
The motorcoach industry is comprised of approximately 3,600
motorcoach companies, operating 39,000 motorcoaches that carry nearly
630 million passengers annually in the United States and Canada,
traveling approximately 2.44 billion miles per year. The motorcoach
industry, similar to the trucking component, also operates with multi-
modal interconnectivity on a daily basis, providing passenger and
limited freight service on a national level. Again, such open access
requires coordinated safety and security efforts across modes.
The school transportation industry, which is comprised of
approximately 460,000 schoolbuses, is the largest public fleet of
vehicles in the United States. Each day, nearly 23.5 million minor
students travel to approximately 14,000 public educational agencies
nationwide. In the United States, schoolbuses travel 4 billion miles
annually on fixed daily routes, as well as periodically conducting
transportation to public venues.
In accordance with Executive Order 13416, TSA's strategy for
highway security includes four major elements: evaluation of current
security practices and recommendations for improvement; robust
information sharing with government and industry; enhanced cooperation
with stakeholders; and technological research, development, testing and
evaluation.
Evaluation and Recommendation
No overall security strategy can be successful without
investigation of current security practices throughout the mode. As a
result, TSA created the Corporate Security Review (CSR) program. CSRs
are conducted with organizations engaged in transportation by motor
vehicle and those that maintain or operate key physical assets within
the highway transportation community. They serve to evaluate and
collect physical and operational preparedness information and critical
asset and key point-of-contact lists; review emergency procedures and
domain awareness training; and provide an opportunity to share industry
best practices. To date, 96 CSRs have been conducted throughout the
highway mode. Over the past year we have piloted our CSR program to our
state partners. We trained 40 State of Missouri enforcement officers to
conduct CSRs within their state, to date they have conducted over 1500
CSRs. We are now in the process of piloting the CSR program to TSA's
Federal Security Directors (FSD) and plan to begin training with three
airports in August.
Using the information collected through the CSR program, TSA is
developing recommended Security Action Items (SAIs), voluntary
practices designed to improve security for trucks carrying security-
sensitive HAZMAT, motorcoaches and schoolbuses, and highway
infrastructure. SAI development is being coordinated with the
Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA). TSA has worked to tie risk to the application
of the SAIs through the development of lists of High Security Hazardous
Materials and Sensitive Security Hazardous Materials. In this way,
specific SAIs are applied to groupings of hazardous materials. TSA has
been working with chemical manufacturers, shippers, and motor carriers
along with the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier Sector
Coordinating Council (SCC) to obtain industry review and input on the
SAIs prior to issuance. The SCC is a private organization created to
coordinate infrastructure protection efforts with government
stakeholders involved in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
process. SAIs, though voluntary, will allow TSA to communicate and
formally share those security actions identified as key elements within
an effective and layered approach to transportation security. Many of
the applicable stakeholders are currently employing some of these
security actions as evidenced by the results of the CSRs and other
direct outreach to stakeholders. TSA is also working with trucking
insurance underwriters to introduce SAIs and to inquire as to the role
of the insurance industry in enhancing highway security. TSA and PHMSA
have created an Annex to DHS/DOT Memorandum of Understanding to
delineate clear lines of authority, promote communication between the
agencies, and foster cooperation, and prevent duplication of effort in
the area of hazardous material and pipeline transportation security.
Information Sharing
In order to facilitate direct contact with industry and government
stakeholders, TSA has created two avenues to share information
directly, through an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC),
and the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). Using funds
provided through the Trucking Security Grant Program, the American
Trucking Associations (ATA) operates an ISAC for the highway mode in
partnership with national and State trucking associations and
conferences of the ATA Federation, as well as numerous other national
highway transportation organizations in participating the Highway
Watch' Coalition for the benefit of the entire Highway
Transportation System. The Highway ISAC works with both public and
private stakeholders to collect, share, and analyze information that
provides a security benefit for the entire mode. The ISAC disseminates
information bulletins, alerts, and other security-related reports to
stakeholders via e-mail.
In addition to the Highway ISAC, the HSIN provides a secure,
single-source, web-based information-sharing network to assist in the
two-way communication of security-related information. The Highway and
Motor Carrier Infrastructure Protection Government Coordinating
Council, made up of federal and state government entities, has created
a Web portal on HSIN. In addition, the Highway SCC will be creating
their own Web portal on HSIN to allow private sector stakeholders to
engage in two-way communication with the public sector to share,
review, discuss, and disseminate security information in an efficient
and effective format.
Cooperation with Stakeholders
TSA continues to develop and enhance our connections to
stakeholders for collaboration. We continue to administer the program
to provide security threat assessments on drivers seeking to obtain,
renew, or transfer a HAZMAT endorsement on their commercial drivers
license (CDL); work to enhance training opportunities for workers
throughout the sector; and provide the subject matter expertise
necessary to administer the highway mode infrastructure protection
grants.
In cooperation with state motor vehicle administrations, TSA
continues to conduct security threat assessments on all applicants for
hazardous materials endorsements (HME) to CDLs. Section 1012 of the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 requires all commercial drivers seeking to apply
for, renew, or transfer an HME on their State-issued CDL to undergo a
``security threat assessment'' to determine whether or not the
individual poses a security risk. Individuals may be disqualified from
holding an HME based on the assessment, which is comprised of an FBI
fingerprint-based criminal history records check, an intelligence
check, and legal status check. Drivers determined to be a security
threat are prevented from receiving HMEs on their CDLs. To further
enhance security, TSA is evaluating options to perform name-based
screening of all CDL holders against the terrorist watch lists. These
requirements apply to all drivers resident in the United States. For
foreign drivers, as required by section 70105 of the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient, Transportation Equity Act, a Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU) (P.L. 109-59), drivers registered in Canada and Mexico
wishing to transport explosives or other hazardous materials into the
United States must undergo a similar background check to that required
by the USA PATRIOT Act. As a result, TSA requires these drivers to
participate in the Free and Secure Trade Program run by Customs and
Border Protection, which provides the necessary background check. As
suggested by the Committee, we are also continuing to evaluate the
scope of the HME program to make improvements, including reviewing the
materials covered by the HME regulation in cooperation with DOT, to
determine materials that are security sensitive for future program
improvements.
We also continue to work closely with industry stakeholders, and
State, local, and tribal governments to enhance truck and motorcoach
security awareness and training. Existing Federal site visit programs
will be coordinated to enhance security awareness and training, and
provide technical and threat information. This effort will build on
existing complementary DHS and DOT efforts. The Federal Government will
also provide assistance to the bus and motorcoach industries to develop
and implement security plans and security training for employees.
Enhancing programs that support law enforcement agencies, such as DOT's
Trucks 'n Terrorism training and courses offered by the DHS's Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center, will raise awareness of indicators of
suspicious activities involving commercial motor vehicles.
TSA provides the subject matter expertise necessary to administer
the highway portions of the Infrastructure Protection grant program,
including the Trucking Security Program (TSP) and the Intercity Bus
Security Grant Program (IBSGP). The TSP primarily sustains the Highway
Watch' program to enhance homeland security through
increased vigilance and awareness on our Nation's highways. In FY 2006
TSP awarded $4,801,500 (out of a total appropriation of $5 million)
directly to Highway Watch'. TSP seeks to assist all
professionals and operating entities throughout the Highway
Transportation System in obtaining training on security awareness,
reporting suspicious incidents, and information analysis. The TSP
awarded $11.6 million in FY 2007. The mission of the IBSGP is to,
through the distribution of grant money to eligible stakeholders,
create a sustainable plan for protecting intercity bus systems and the
traveling public from terrorism, especially from explosives and non-
conventional threats that would cause major loss of life and severe
disruption. The FY 2006 IBSGP awarded $9.5 million, and the FY 2007
IBSGP awarded $11.6 million. The President has requested $9 million for
the TSP and $12 million for the IBSGP in FY 2008.
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation
TSA is also sponsoring the evaluation of technology with security
benefits to the highway mode, including the Truck Tracking Security
Pilot. The ability to track trucks, especially those carrying certain
HAZMAT, has potential security benefits. DOT's FMCSA conducted a
tracking pilot and TSA is in the midst of conducting one. FMCSA
conducted a 2-year national field operational study of existing
technologies offering enhanced solutions to the security of motor
carrier shipments of HAZMAT, which was completed in December 2004. The
test evaluated the costs, benefits, and operational processes required
for wireless communications systems, including global positioning
system tracking and other technologies. The tested technologies
performed well under operational conditions and showed promise for
significantly reducing security vulnerabilities.
Building on FMCSA's efforts, TSA is testing near real-time tracking
and identification systems, theft detection and alert systems, motor
vehicle disabling systems, and systems to prevent unauthorized
operation of trucks and unauthorized access to their cargos. As a
result of this pilot, TSA will be able to evaluate such factors as the
costs and benefits of the system; the ability to collect, display, and
store information on shipments of high-risk materials by motor vehicle
and/or trailer throughout the supply chain; and the capability of the
system to resist accidental or unauthorized disabling. The operational
phase of the pilot should conclude shortly, and once the results have
been evaluated, TSA will consider the benefits to security that can be
added by encouraging private industry to adopt widespread use of the
technology.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is important to keep in mind that a robust
security system is multi-layered. Regardless of the mode or facility,
TSA relies on the interconnections and redundancies of the nation's
transportation system to provide the layers necessary for a robust
security system. Highway security does not start and stop with the
vehicles themselves. The program relies on everything from intelligence
gathering overseas, to border security, to the awareness and vigilance
of the truckers themselves. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
here today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Olsavsky, with CBP, to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT GREG OLSAVSKY, DIRECTOR, CARGO CONTROL, U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Olsavsky. Good afternoon, Madam Chairwoman Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member Lungren, Member Cuellar, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee.
I am Greg Olsavsky. I am the director of cargo control for
Customs and Border Protection. And I have program
responsibilities for a lot of the topics that are the subject
of this hearing today.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you today
Customs and Border Protection's efforts to ensure the security
of containerized cargo imported across our nation's land
borders.
As you know, CBP has developed and implemented
unprecedented initiatives to achieve our twin goals of
preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist implements and
facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel.
CBP uses a multilayered approach to ensure the integrity of
its supply chain, from the point of stuffing through arrival at
a U.S. port of entry. This multilayered approach includes the
use of trained CBP officers, technology, automation, advance
electronic information, and partnerships with the trade and
foreign governments.
I understand that many members of the subcommittee have had
the opportunity to view our strategy in action, either in our
seaports, land border ports, or airports.
As you may have noted during any of these visits, CBP's
cargo enforcement strategy is an overarching, multilayered
approach and is applicable to all modes of transportation in
the air, land and sea environment.
My testimony today, however, will focus on our efforts
related to containerized cargo at the land borders.
CBP utilizes advance cargo information, automated targeting
and screening, private and public partnerships, cutting-edge
technology, and a highly skilled, well-trained workforce in
order to gain operational control and protect the Nation at and
between the ports of entry.
I will touch on each of these areas very briefly and would
certainly welcome further discussion.
Advance electronic cargo information: One of the key
components of CBP's layered defense is the receipt of advance
electronic cargo information required by all modes of
transportation by the Trade Act of 2002, including the 1-hour
rule for non-free and secure trade, or FAST, shipments and the
30-minute rule for FAST shipments in the truck environment.
CBP is currently working to obtain additional advance cargo
information and enhance our ability to perform risk-based
targeting. Obtaining data earlier in the process will increase
the transparency of the global supply chain, allowing CBP to
greatly refine its targeting processes.
Automated targeting system: Advance cargo information on
all inbound shipments for all modes of transportation is
effectively evaluated using the automated targeting system, or
ATS, before arrival in the United States.
As a matter of background, ATS provides decision support
functionality for CBP officers working in advanced targeting
units, or ATUs, at our ports of entry and at foreign ports.
National targeting rule sets have been implemented in ATS
to provide threshold targeting for national security risk for
all modes: sea, truck, rail and air.
Public and private partnerships: CBP has developed several
partnerships with industry to enhance security and facilitate
trade. Foremost among these are Free and Secure Trade, or FAST,
and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT.
The FAST program establishes bilateral initiatives between
the United States and NAFTA partners designed to ensure
security and safety while enhancing the economic prosperity of
partner countries.
C-TPAT is a voluntary government business initiative to
build cooperative relationships that strengthen and improve
overall international supply chain and U.S. border security.
Both the FAST and C-TPAT programs recognize that CBP can
provide the highest level of cargo security only through close
cooperation with the ultimate owners of the international
supply chain, such as importers, carriers, consolidators,
licensed customs brokers, and manufacturers.
Use of cutting-edge technology: Given the magnitude of
CBP's responsibility, the development and deployment of
sophisticated detection technology is essential. Technology
deployed to our nation's ports of entry include large-scale X-
ray and gamma imaging systems and a variety of radiation portal
detection devices.
Prior to 9/11, not a single radiation portal monitor, or
RPM, and only 64 large-scale non-intrusive inspection, or NII,
systems were deployed to our nation's ports of entry. CBP
currently has 978 RPMs and 178 large-scale NII systems deployed
nationwide. This is progress.
Additionally, all CBP ports of entry and border patrol
stations have access to the Automated Biometric Identification
System/Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System,
otherwise known as IDENT/IAFIS, which was established to merge
the capabilities of the FBI's criminal master fingerprint file
and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service's
immigration violator database.
The goals of the system were to identify repeat immigration
offenders and identify criminals and previously deported aliens
who should be detained.
CBP border patrol agents are also securing areas between
the ports of entry through the use of a variety of systems that
provide coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to detect
illegal crossings on our northern and southern borders.
Last but not least, CBP employs professional and well-
trained officers, including canines, at ports of entry, whose
training, experience and intuition present a formidable defense
against attempts to circumvent the laws and regulations
enforced by CBP.
The combination of advance cargo screening systems,
inspections and surveillance tools, and a professional and
well-trained workforce help CBP accomplish its mission of
protecting America.
In addition, the CBP is continually searching for new and
improved technologies and applying successful enforcement
strategies to further ensure safety and security against
terrorism.
I have briefly outlined some of CBP's efforts to ensure the
security of containerized cargo imported across our nation's
land borders. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I
would be happy to answer any of your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Olsavsky follows:]
Prepared Statement of Greg Olsavsky
Good morning Madam Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, and Members of the
Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you today
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) efforts to both strengthen
the security of cargo entering our borders and facilitate the flow of
legitimate trade and travel.
CBP has made great strides toward securing America's borders,
facilitating legitimate trade and travel, and ensuring the vitality of
our economy. As America's frontline border agency, our priority mission
is to protect the American public against terrorists and the
instruments of terror while at the same time enforcing the laws of the
United States and fostering the Nation's economic security through
lawful travel and trade. Today, trained CBP Officers, technology,
automation, electronic information, and partnerships with the trade and
foreign governments are concepts that underpin CBP's cargo security and
anti-terrorism initiatives. These concepts extend our zone of security
outward and reinforce the components of our layered defense strategy.
As we work toward securing our ports and borders, we must also
continue to perform our traditional missions, which include stemming
the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband, protecting our
agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases,
protecting American businesses from theft of their intellectual
property, regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting
import duties, and enforcing United States trade laws. In FY 2006, CBP
processed more than 422.8 million pedestrians and passengers, 131
million conveyances, 28.8 million trade entries, scanned and physically
examined 5.6 million sea, rail, and truck containers, intercepted 1.1
million illegal aliens between our ports of entry intercepted more than
2.7 million prohibited plant and animal products, and seized more than
2.2 million pounds of narcotics.
In order to accomplish our mission of securing America's borders
and facilitating trade, CBP has developed a layered enforcement
strategy, part of CBP's philosophy of a smart and extended border
security strategy designed to protect the global supply chain, our
country, our economy--and ultimately, others countries and the global
economy. I will focus my comments today on our efforts at the land
borders. CBP utilizes advance cargo information, automated targeting
and screening, private and public partnerships and cutting edge
technology in order to gain operational control and protect the Nation
at and between ports of entry.
Advance Electronic Cargo Information: As required by
the Trade Act of 2002, advance cargo information must be
provided through the CBP-approved automated data interchange.
For truck cargo, the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is
the approved system and information must be provided 1 hour
prior to the arrival of the truck at the border crossing for
non-Free and Secure Trade (FAST) shipments or 30 minutes prior
to arrival for FAST shipments. ACE has made electronic risk
management far more effective by allowing full security
screening by the Automated Commercial System (ACS) Selectivity
module and the Automated Targeting System (ATS).
Automated Targeting System: CBP uses ATS to identify
cargo that may pose a threat. CBP's Office of Intelligence and
the National Targeting Center (NTC) enhance these initiatives
by synthesizing information to provide tactical targeting.
Using risk management techniques they evaluate people and goods
to identify a suspicious individual or shipment before it can
reach our borders. To broaden the scope of CBP targeting, NTC
works with other DHS components, law enforcement agencies and
governments, expanding its staff to better accommodate the
ever-increasing demands for tactical information and continues
to develop and refine more sophisticated targeting tools.
Public and Private Partnerships: CBP has developed
several partnerships with industry to enhance security and
facilitate trade. Foremost among these are Free and Secure
Trade (FAST) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT). The FAST program, which is operational on
both our northern and southern borders, establishes bilateral
initiatives between the United States and NAFTA partners
designed to ensure security and safety while enhancing the
economic prosperity of partner countries. In developing this
program, Mexico and the United States have agreed to coordinate
to the maximum extent possible, their commercial processes for
clearance of commercial shipments at the border. This promotes
free and secure trade by using common risk-management
principles, supply chain security, industry partnership, and
advanced technology to improve the efficiency of screening and
clearing commercial traffic at our shared border. FAST is a
harmonized clearance process for shipments of known compliant
importers. Thus, any truck using FAST lane processing must be a
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) approved
carrier, carrying qualifying goods from a C-TPAT approved
manufacturer, and importer, and the driver must possess a valid
FAST-Commercial Driver Card. C-TPAT is a voluntary government-
business initiative to build cooperative relationships that
strengthen and improve overall international supply chain and
U.S. border security. C-TPAT recognizes that CBP can provide
the highest level of cargo security only through close
cooperation with the ultimate owners of the international
supply chain such as importers, carriers, consolidators,
licensed customs brokers, and manufacturers.
The C-TPAT program also has undertaken a strong enforcement
posture. The agency suspends or removes members from the program who
have misled CBP as to their security measures, or whose security is so
lax as to allow the supply chain to be breached, as evidenced by a
narcotics or human smuggling incident at the port of entry. Over 100
companies have been suspended or removed in the past year.
Use of Cutting-Edge Technology: Given the magnitude of
CBP's responsibility the development and deployment of
sophisticated detection technology is essential. Deployment of
Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology is increasing and
viewed as ``force multipliers'' that enable CBP officers to
screen or examine a larger portion of the stream of commercial
traffic. CBP is currently utilizing large-scale X-ray and gamma
ray machines and radiation detection devices to screen cargo.
All CBP Ports of Entry and Border Patrol Stations have access to
the Automated Biometric Identification System/Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System otherwise known as IDENT/IAFIS, which
was established to merge the capabilities of the FBI's criminal master
fingerprint file and the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service's immigration violator database. These systems have been
integrated into one system that captures biometric and biographical
information through the use of a ``10 Print'' fingerprint machine and
computer based facial imagery. The goals of the system are to identify
repeat immigration offenders and identify criminals and previously
deported aliens who should be detained.
In addition to NII and IAFIS, CBP Border Patrol agents are better
securing areas between the ports of entry through the use of the
Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS), a system that uses
remotely monitored night-day camera and sensing systems to better
detect, monitor, and respond to illegal crossings; Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) for monitoring remote land border areas where patrols
cannot easily travel and infrastructure is difficult or impossible to
build; Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) that provide coverage
24 hours a day, 7 days a week to detect illegal crossings on our
northern and southern borders; and the Geographic Information System
(GIS) to track illegal migration patterns.
Madam Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Members of the Subcommittee, I have
briefly addressed CBP's initiatives that help CBP protect America
against terrorists and the instruments of terror, while at the same
time enforcing the laws of the United States and fostering the Nation's
economic security through lawful travel and trade. With the continued
support of the President, DHS, and the Congress, CBP will succeed in
meeting the challenges posed by the ongoing terrorist threat and the
need to facilitate ever-increasing numbers of legitimate shipments and
travelers.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I will be happy to
answer any of your questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. [Presiding.] Thank you, gentlemen. I
appreciate your testimony and your presence here today.
Let me acknowledge members of the committee who are here:
Mr. DeFazio of Oregon. We thank him for his presence. Ms.
Clarke of New York, we thank her for her presence. And we thank
Mr. Cuellar of the full committee for his presence as well.
I started out by saying that the large question of
terrorism and the effect of it will always come to those of us
who are entrusted with the responsibility, the major
responsibility.
I would like the both of you to answer this question. Do
you work with each other? Mr. Arrington, do you work with CBP?
And, Mr. Olsavsky, do you work with TSA?
And what are the cooperative pathways that you work? And
how does that impact border security and, in particular, since
this hearing is geared toward trucks? Specifically, what are
the elements of cooperation, which may include programmatic,
personnel, or otherwise?
Mr. Arrington?
Mr. Arrington. Thank you.
Yes, we do work together. CBP, TSA, we have a longstanding
working relationship that we enjoy very much.
The information that CBP gathers in their FAST program is
equivalent to that which we use for drivers that apply and
receive HAZMAT endorsements within the United States. That
information is, in fact, shared routinely from our TTAC office,
our office of credentialing, along with CBP.
So, yes, we do, in fact, work together on those issues of
mutual interest.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you receive their information, their
data that they have collected? Is that--
Mr. Arrington. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you utilize that in whether or not you
give truckers or trucking companies--
Mr. Arrington. Truck drivers.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Truck drivers.
Mr. Arrington. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you use that data as you assess truck
drivers--
Mr. Arrington. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. --and the endorsement that TSA would give,
as it relates to security.
Mr. Arrington. Yes. And it is equivalent to that which we
use for HAZMAT drivers here in the United States in the FAST
program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And does that cover the potential to do
terrorist acts, as well?
Mr. Arrington. Well, it is a criminal history check that we
do on domestic carriers, as well as a check against our
terrorist watchlist, as well as Immigration's check.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Arrington.
Yes?
Mr. Olsavsky. If I could just elaborate further, with
regard to this particular project, it is a very good example of
a close cooperation between CBP and TSA. Because whenever TSA
was given the mandate to come up with a background check
strategy for foreign drivers and a relatively aggressive time
period within which to accomplish it, CBP was able to offer to
them our FAST vetting process and the process we use to vet
drivers as a mechanism by which to provide them with the
opportunity to expedite meeting those requirements.
And the FAST process includes a very detailed application
process, criminal history checks through all of the available
criminal history databases, personal interview between a
uniformed officer and the applicant to determine whether or not
there are any issues with the applicant, and then of course a
full biometric profile and 10-point fingerprint scan to verify
whether or not there are any derogatory information in any of
the other databases that are out there.
So that collaboration is a very good example of the close
cooperation between TSA and CBP.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And do you gather your information from
national intelligence lists or intelligence information? Are
you coordinating with our intelligence representatives in
gathering your information?
Mr. Olsavsky. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you have an internal intelligence
component in the CBP?
Mr. Olsavsky. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And do they collaborate on information
from a number of sources?
Mr. Olsavsky. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And how accurate do you think your
information is? Do you have the resources to make sure it is
accurate?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, it is as accurate as the information in
the database that is provided to us. Our connections and our
research goes through a number of law enforcement databases. So
we rely on the credibility and the accuracy of those databases.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask, are there any mechanisms in
place to monitor the activities of vehicles and drivers that
temporarily enter the United States from Canada and Mexico for
business purposes? And what prevents the driver and/or vehicle
from remaining in the United States without boundaries?
In essence, what is our tracking mechanism? And the key
questions that we asked--what are they carrying, who is
carrying it, and where are they going--is a key element to
security.
Mr. Arrington?
Mr. Arrington. It is a great question and one, certainly,
that I am not able to answer. I will have to defer to my
colleague from CBP, as far as the tracking of those vehicles
once they cross the border.
I might add that we do have a tracking system, a truck
tracking pilot that we are running in the United States that
will run through the end of this year, where we are now
tracking, real-time, hazardous material as it moves along our
nation's highways.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Meaning how long they are on the nation's
highways from point A to point B?
Mr. Arrington. Yes. We are able to track full-time. There
is some tested technology out there that we will be able to
take a look at, real-time, from our Transportation Security
Operations Center. We have a truck tracking center set right
now in the state of New York that is testing the different
modes of truck tracking that we are able to share with the
industry.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Olsavsky, will you comment on the
tracking issue?
Mr. Olsavsky. First, I would just like to point out that
CBP's principal role is to ensure that any person or conveyance
that is crossing the border is eligible to enter the country.
We are, in fact, the principal border search and border
inspection agency, and that is our primary role.
But beyond that, any person who approaches the border has
to prove that they are eligible to cross the border. And along
the southern border, for example, they have to present either a
border crossing card, a DSP-150 ``laser'' visa, or some other
document that indicates that they are eligible to enter the
country.
Once we prove they are eligible to enter the country and
they go beyond the border, the responsibility for tracking them
is outside of CBP's area of responsibility.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Who do you pass it on to?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, depending on the nature of the
transaction, whether it is an individual or a commercial
conveyance.
If anyone intends to be in the country more than 72 hours,
they are issued an I-94 entry document. That document provides
for tracking when they enter the country, and there is a
portion of the document that they are supposed to return to us
upon a departure. So we do use those documents.
If someone is issued a visa for business, for example, a B-
1 visa for business, for example, they have a limited time
period within which that visa is valid. And if they do not
depart during that time period, they become a visa overstay,
and then it becomes the responsibility of ICE to research and
try to investigate the location of those individuals.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And you use that same format for someone
who is driving a truck?
Mr. Olsavsky. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the witnesses.
I have an additional question, but I am going to yield to
the distinguished gentleman, as I yielded to myself, 5 minutes.
I yield to the distinguished gentleman. The ranking member is
now recognized.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
My goodness, this is 2007. NAFTA was ratified by Congress
in 1993. It was supposed to be a 1-year pilot project at that
time, in terms of trucks coming across the border; see how far
they could come. In 1995 it was put on hold.
The NAFTA dispute resolution panel determined that we were
in violation of NAFTA for putting restrictions on more trucks,
so the Congress then followed through on that to set up a pilot
project.
The Ninth Circuit, a court that I am very familiar with,
the most overruled court in the United States, for which they
take great pride and which was my frustration when I was
attorney general of California, ruled that the Department of
Transportation couldn't go forward with the program because
they hadn't done something that the Ninth Circuit found that
they should do.
The U.S. Supreme Court then, as it does often, unanimously
overturned the Ninth Circuit. And now it comes before the
Congress. And there is a lot of concern about safety of the
trucks still, lot of concern about security.
And now, with the backdrop of 9/11 staring us in the face,
members of Congress want to know what the present circumstance
is with respect to a Mexican truck operator, coming from Mexico
into the United States: What are the safety and security
concerns there that you folks are responsible for, in your two
cases, security; and then how you would provide that level of
security that we expect, if we have either the expanded pilot
program or go beyond that?
So, if both of you could just walk us through what exists
now and what the differences would be. Because there is a lot
of information, or misinformation, out there, and I have never
seen anybody take it simply, ``Here is what happens now. Here
is what would happen under a new regime.''
Mr. Olsavsky, I guess if you would start first with that?
Mr. Olsavsky. Sure. They are very good questions, sir.
First, let me just explain in a little more detail our
layered enforcement strategy that we employ at all ports of
entry. And it doesn't matter whether it is a land border port
of entry or another port of entry.
But specific to the land border, we receive advance
information, as I explained in my opening remarks. And that
advance information allows us to pre-screen cargo and trucks
before they arrive at the border, allows us to assign a risk
assessment to them and a risk profile--
Mr. Lungren. And what time frame do you have for that? The
information, how soon--
Mr. Olsavsky. The information is presented to us an hour
before the arrival for a non-FAST and 30 minutes prior to
arrival for a FAST.
Now, I will say that with FAST, of course, the requirements
to participate in that program are stringent, and those folks
have already been designated as low-risk.
Mr. Lungren. OK. Now, we just had a situation with a guy
with TB trying to come in the United States. You had a CBP guy
look at it, it came up on the screen, he didn't act
appropriately. That was within 2 minutes or whatever it was.
Mr. Olsavsky. Right.
Mr. Lungren. What, actually, time does somebody working for
you folks have to check this out, to check a truck, and make a
decision?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, by the time that truck arrives at the
border, the screening of the information that was presented via
the manifest has already been done. So when the truck
approaches our primary inspection booths and the officers
identify that shipment, either by way of a license-plate reader
or by punching in the driver's information, they will get a
message almost immediately that tells them whether or not this
is high-risk shipment. And it is literally within a few seconds
that the system will respond with that information.
So all of the screening and the targeting is done even
before the truck arrives at the border. And when the officers
identify that shipment in the system, they get an immediate
response from the system that tells them whether this is a
high-risk shipment.
Mr. Lungren. So I am a Mexican truck driver. I am bringing
my stuff up. I have come to the border. You folks now know
whether you should take a look at me or not take a look at me.
You take a look at me. How far do I go in? How far do you
follow it? What do you do? Or do you just leave it, at that
point?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, the only difference between our current
processes and the process that will be employed for the DOT
trucking pilot is the fact that, because these drivers and any
crew or passengers with them will be proceeding beyond the
commercial zones, they will have to prove that they are
eligible as a visitor for business. And so--
Mr. Lungren. And for how long a period of time will that
have it?
Mr. Olsavsky. Generally, the B-1 visas are either single-
use or multi-use visas, and they can be valid for up to 6
months.
Mr. Lungren. So the fellow, he can stay up to 6 months. You
have no control over how long he is there within that 6 months.
And do you know when he leaves?
Mr. Olsavsky. Yes, because they have to report their
departure, according to the visa. Now--
Mr. Lungren. They have to report. How do they report that?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, they have to present themselves to a
Customs officer whenever they depart.
Mr. Lungren. And then he checks up against the manifest
that he would find or the information that he would find on his
computer as he goes through?
Mr. Olsavsky. Right, the arrival information and--
Mr. Lungren. So it is no real difference from what you
would do now, except that they would now have this extended
period of time.
Mr. Olsavsky. Correct.
Mr. Lungren. And I know my time is up. Could I just ask Mr.
Arrington to respond?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Lungren. What is your administration's responsibilities
now, and how would it change, if at all, under the pilot
project that is projected?
Mr. Arrington. Well, as far as cross-border security, TSA
has no responsibility in that area for those foreign carriers.
Our primary focus is on domestic carriers. However, we do, as I
said early on, we do collaborate with CBP, other government
partners, as well as private industry, with regard to the
movement of vehicles.
We do have our truck tracking pilot that is going on in the
United States. But, again, we are tracking domestic carriers
only hauling hazardous material.
Mr. Lungren. So your answer is there would actually be no
difference between what you do already and with the no problem,
because you would treat them the same as domestic trucks?
Mr. Arrington. That is correct.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair will now recognize other members for questions
they may wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our
committee rules and practice, I will recognize members who were
present at the start of the hearing, based on seniority on the
subcommittee, alternating between majority and minority. And
those members coming in later will be recognized in the order
of their arrival.
I do want to acknowledge the presence of Congressman Brown-
Waite of Florida. We thank her for being here.
Mr. DeFazio for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Olsavsky, could you tell me, on the C-TPAT program, how
many site visits have been conducted? What percent of the C-
TPAT certified carriers or brokers have been physically visited
by U.S. agents in Mexico or Canada?
Mr. Olsavsky. I am sorry, sir. I don't have that actual
number with me, but we would be happy to--
Mr. DeFazio. OK. It is not 100 percent. We know that,
right?
Mr. Olsavsky. That is correct.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. And there is sometimes up to a 2-year
lapse after someone files for C-TPAT, as I understand it,
before they are actually visited? It could be 2 years?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, the time period has been shortened
dramatically because of the hiring of a lot of--
Mr. DeFazio. OK, so what are we down to now? A year?
Mr. Olsavsky. I believe it is a year or less, sir, yes.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. So I file the paperwork online; for a
year, I am in sort of this privileged lane here and considered
to be a lower risk. The committee has previously expressed
concerns about that, and I would express that concern again.
The advance information, how accurate is it? I don't know
about land crossings, but I do know that sea-borne container
cargo is allowed to modify their manifest up to 6 months after
it arrives. So, admitting that they are totally inaccurate and
worthless.
What about the manifests for trucks coming across the
border? Do they have to be accurate? Are they verified? Or are
they allowed to, you know, file and amend them after the truck
has already delivered its cargo somewhere in the U.S.?
Mr. Olsavsky. They do have to be accurate, sir. And
generally, because of the short time period within which to
clear the cargo, the manifest as well as the entry for
consumption are filed almost simultaneously. So often you will
have both processes already have occurred by the time the truck
arrives.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. So, if you found discrepancies between a
manifest and the cargo, what would you do with that truck?
Mr. Olsavsky. The truck would be referred for a secondary
inspection to verify the contents of the truck and to iron out
or ascertain the depth of those discrepancies.
Mr. DeFazio. But if there were significant discrepancies,
would the truck be fined, impounded, or are they just allowed
to amend at that point after they are searched?
Mr. Olsavsky. Depending on the nature of the discrepancy,
whether it is simply a trade violation versus contraband in the
form of narcotics, there could be a simple fine, there could be
a seizure effected, depending on the nature, if there was some
criminal conspiracy associated with the discrepancy or if there
was evidence of intent at the time the discrepancy was
discovered based on the packaging of the material, evidence of
a deliberate attempt to conceal the nature of what was in the
truck.
But generally, there would be either a fine or some harsher
punishment, depending on the totality of the facts.
Mr. DeFazio. In answer to an earlier question, I believe
from the chairwoman, you were saying that, in terms of the
persons entering the U.S. as truck drivers, that our checks on
them are as accurate as the databases which we are using allow,
and as much as they are credible and reliable.
In the case of, in particular, this pilot program,
beginning with Mexico, the commercial driver's licenses issued
down there, the GAO has said that there are substantial
questions about the credibility and inclusiveness of that
database.
Are you aware of that?
Mr. Olsavsky. No, I am not, sir. But that is really an
issue that would be best discussed with the Department of
Transportation.
Mr. DeFazio. Right, except that when they come to the
border and they are presenting a Mexican commercial driver's
license and you are checking the database to make certain that
they are--I mean, isn't that what you use to check? What do you
check at the border?
When one of these pilot program Mexican trucks crosses the
border and they present their Mexican driver's license, what
would you use to verify that?
Mr. Olsavsky. We generally use existing databases of
information that are U.S. databases.
Mr. DeFazio. So that person would not be in the database.
So how, then, do we know who they are? Somehow the Department
of Transportation is going to know but you won't?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, they have to present documentation that
entitles them to enter, regardless of the driver's license
information. They still have to prove that they are eligible to
enter the country.
Mr. DeFazio. And that would be?
Mr. Olsavsky. That would be a passport or a border crossing
card.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. But if they have a passport and a driver's
license, whether or not it is accurate, then they would just be
issued one of these--the document you referred to, where they
could stay up to 6 months potentially on a single-use entry or
something like that?
Mr. Olsavsky. Under the current process, the trucks are
only allowed to proceed through the commercial zones, and they
are not--
Mr. DeFazio. Correct. I know that. But in the pilot
program, I mean, I was a little concerned to hear that they may
get up to 6 months. I mean, among all the many concerns we have
about this pilot program, one is what is called cabotage, i.e.,
once that truck penetrates the border, what is to stop them
from going point to point in the U.S. and providing, you know,
a much cheaper service in violation of U.S. law?
And if they have a valid 6-month--you know, why would we
issue them something up to 6 months? I mean, shouldn't they
estimate the time that they are in--they are only supposed to
come in and go back out. I mean, don't you think we would have
a new program that says, ``Well, the estimated time for your
trip to New York and back is 8 days; you have 8 days''?
I mean, if you give them 6 months, that truck is in the
U.S.; there are 8 million trucks. How long is it going to be
before someone notices it has been going back and forth between
Chicago and Los Angeles for the last 4 months?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, I have two answers for you, sir.
Number one, we do have the ability to issue them for a one-
time, one-purpose visit.
On the other question, of the cabotage question, it is a
matter of the driver is playing with fire in those situations.
Because if we discover, at any point in time, that they have
committed a violation of either the customs laws or immigration
laws related to cabotage, that effectively makes them
ineligible to function as a cross-border trucker. They would
lose that opportunity and the ability to actually ply their
trade and to earn a living.
So they really would be playing with fire if they were to
take that chance and to engage in cabotage, because they would
effectively, if it is discovered, lose the opportunity to
perform that function.
Mr. DeFazio. OK, thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The gentleman's time has expired.
I recognize Ms. Brown-Waite for 5 minutes.
Ms. Brown-Waite. I thank the gentlelady.
I believe that this question is for Mr. Olsavsky.
And if I have mispronounced your name, please accept my
apology.
I am a little concerned about the fact that, if I
understood you correctly, you collect part of a form when the
truck driver leaves the United States. Is that correct?
Mr. Olsavsky. The I-94 forms, yes, we would collect that.
Ms. Brown-Waite. OK. Can you tell me how many truck drivers
never went back over, let's say, the last year?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, generally those truckers who are
involved in a cross-border trade within the commercial zones
and who are doing drayage just back and forth on a daily basis,
they are not issued I-94s because they have no intention of
staying in the country for more than 72 hours.
So we are relying on the crossing information that is
presented to us via their entry, whenever they come in to the
country.
Ms. Brown-Waite. Well, then, the ones that you said could
stay up to 6 months, of those, how many overstay? How many
never turned in the other part of the form?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, at the present time, they are not
authorized to travel beyond the commercial zones to operate a--
Ms. Brown-Waite. OK, so it is in the--
Mr. Olsavsky. The pilot hasn't begun, so they are not doing
that. When the pilot does begin, they will be issued I-94s.
Ms. Brown-Waite. And the penalty for not going back after
the 6-month period, that is up to Immigration? Is that correct?
Did I understand that correctly?
Mr. Olsavsky. Well, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
would investigate visa overstays--
Ms. Brown-Waite. Right, OK.
Mr. Olsavsky. --and try to intercept folks and interdict
them.
Ms. Brown-Waite. The other question that I have is on the
Canadian and Mexican drivers hauling hazardous materials. How
do you make sure that they have a comparable background check
to that required of U.S. drivers?
And also, one of the concerns originally about the Mexican
trucks involved the environmental laws and are the trucks still
up to the same standards. So, can you just run by exactly what
you do, if anything, to make sure that those trucks are
complying with U.S. standards?
Mr. Olsavsky. Sure. In general, I will say that the safety
of the trucks is really the responsibility of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, and they are deployed at ports
of entry and they do inspect trucks as they come into the
country.
With regard to the environmental protection aspects and the
emissions, that is really EPA's bailiwick. But I can tell you
that whenever trucks and cargo enter the country, we do attempt
to determine whether or not they are eligible or whether or not
they comply with all applicable Federal regulations relative to
their entry to the country.
Ms. Brown-Waite. I appreciate it.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentlelady.
I recognize the flight time of some of our witnesses.
Mr. Ranking Member, I ask unanimous consent to yield myself
2 minutes, 2 1/2 minutes. I have a final question that I wish
to get in--
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Cuellar?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, I am going to ask him in just a
second, but I was just asking for unanimous consent for that
after Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar, do you desire to ask any questions at this
time?
Mr. Cuellar. Not at this time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. No? Thank you.
I was going to yield to him.
The reason that we have two panels is that we want to be
balanced. And I look forward to the witnesses who will discuss
some of the issues dealing with truckers, the industry, and
certainly our favorite cities on the border, which we have
great concern about.
But let me just raise at least my concern. And I think we
are going to have to fix it. I think there are a lot of answers
given here that leads to a lot of frustration.
I don't see the coordination, collaboration. I am not sure,
in response to the question on sharing information, whether in
fact CBP provides any information to ICE. And my understanding
is that ICE is focused on illegal aliens and criminal
activities and other issues. I am not sure whether they are
even aware of the mountains of truckers who are coming in.
We don't have the TWIC card in place. No one has indicated
that they could use that document, prospectively, if we could
get it to work.
And I would say that I am unhappy about the answer about
sharing information, ``We just use what data is given to us.''
And the border is key, and it is one of the key issues that we
must confront in comprehensive immigration reform, both the
northern and southern border.
Let me just try to raise a question. There is a Highway
Information Sharing and Analysis Center. There is a Homeland
Security Information Network. I guess both are informational.
And they have ways of sharing information with the highway
industries.
Does TSA and CBP work with these networks, ISAC and HSIN?
Do you find them useful? What time of information is included
in them? How does it impact you in the support of your cross-
border opportunities or responsibilities? And does the industry
post information on these programs? Does the industry have
access to these programs? And how do you confirm that industry
is appropriately and effectively sharing this information that
they may get?
And that is one component. It is a long list of questions.
Those that you can remember, if you can answer them to the best
of your ability.
But you need to come back again with sort of a more
definitive response, which is either ``I don't know'' or ``We
are working on it'' or maybe a more effective answer that says
what happens to trucks once they go across, even if someone
represents that they are here temporarily. We all represent
matters that may not be factual. That means we have no follow-
up to the vast numbers of truckers who are coming across any of
our borders, northern or southern.
Mr. Arrington?
Mr. Arrington. Thank you.
Yes, we do work very closely with the Highway ISAC. In
fact, the Highway ISAC, they are housed out at the
transportation security operations center out in Herndon.
The information received by the Highway ISAC is, in fact,
shared with other components of TSA on a daily basis. It is a
24/7 operation. The information that is coming in is a result
of a very robust domain awareness program that we have in
partnership or under cooperative agreement with ATA.
Once the individuals are trained, and should they discover
or see something suspicious in nature, it goes into a call
center. It is treated as a trusted agent, if you will, as
opposed to just routine information from a caller. That then
goes into that intelligence center out at the TSOC, where that
information is compared, it is analyzed, and it is pushed back
out to those authorities that have jurisdiction and can, in
fact, take action in that particular area.
Additionally, we use that information and certainly that
system, if you will, to communicate or collaborate back and
forth with those truckers--the eyes and ears of our nation out
on the highways.
So it is a worthwhile program. It is working, and working
well. And it is a collaborative effort between TSA and ATA.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is the data intelligence real-time? Do you
turn it around quickly?
Mr. Arrington. We turn it around very quickly, especially
if there is an incident where we have--or an example, an
incident involving a particular truck in the state of Texas.
Then we found that that same truck was involved in an incident
in the state of California. That information is then paired up
and it is pushed back out to the proper authorities, where they
can, in fact, take appropriate action.
So it is, in fact, viewed as good, real intelligence, and
it is, in fact, used and turned around in real-time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Olsavsky?
Mr. Olsavsky. Madam Chairwoman, I will have to defer to our
intelligence folks, and we will try to get you an answer to
that question at a future date.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the witnesses at this time
for their valuable testimony.
Let me thank the members for your questions.
Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions,
and we will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to
those questions. In particular, for the Customs and Border
Protection, we would like an extensive response to the question
that I posed. I posed a number of sub-questions that I won't
ask for a response at this time in detail. But it is extremely
important, and I look forward to hearing back from you.
At this time, the committee will move to the next panel.
Gentlemen, thank you so very much for your presence here
today and your testimony. Thank you again. And thank you for
your service.
Mr. Arrington. Thank you.
Mr. Olsavsky. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Welcome. Thank you.
At this time, I would like to welcome the second panel of
witnesses.
Our first witness will be Mr. Raul Salinas, mayor of
Laredo, Texas. Mayor Salinas has 35 years of solid public
service and, as the mayor of Laredo, understands the importance
of our neighbor and friend to the south all while maintaining
the safety and security of the U.S.-Mexico border.
I will be yielding to my good friend and colleague from
your great region, who has worked very hard on these border
security issues. However, I would like to personally say that
this introduction does not do you well in terms of the years of
knowledge that you bring to being mayor as well as to this
committee hearing today. Having had law enforcement experience,
I have heard your testimony not only here in Washington but on
the border. And it is important to note that you do not mince
your words in your new responsibility of encouraging trade and
commerce but also recognizing security.
With that, Mr. Ranking Member, if you would allow me to
yield to my good friend from Laredo, Texas, Congressman Henry
Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the
committee. I just wanted to make a presentation on behalf of
the mayor.
The mayor, as you know, actually started off here at the
Capitol Police, so he served, working here, with us. He worked
also as an aide to Congressman Kika de la Garza also. He was at
the FBI for 27 years. Recently he served as legal attache there
at the American embassy in Mexico City.
Of course he is now the mayor of the city of Laredo,
largest inland port that we have at the southern border, where
he is trying to make sure that we find the right balance
between security but at the same time not impede in trade and
tourism.
So, Madam Chair, thank you for inviting my hometown mayor.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Our pleasure. And thank you, Congressman
Cuellar, for those very instructive remarks for our committee.
Our second witness is Mr. Gregg Ward, vice president of
Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry. Mr. Ward has been closely involved
with border issues since 1988, when he and his father
conceptualized and initiated the Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry
service. In addition, while operating the truck ferry, he has
also been involved in several transportation and business
development projects in North America, Europe and Asia.
And it is our charge and challenge in this committee to
recognize that there are two borders, probably more--there is a
third border in the Caribbean--but certainly there are two
borders: the southern border and the northern border.
We thank you for your presence here today.
The final witness of this panel is Mr. Stephen Russell,
chairman and CEO of the Celadon Group. Mr. Russell is a member
of the Executive Committee and a director of the American
Trucking Association, as well as chairman of the Homeland
Security Committee of the American Trucking Association.
And we are very grateful that we have that voice here, as
we try to construct the right kind of approach, both practical
and legislative, to answer the concerns that we are raising
today.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5
minutes, beginning with Mayor Salinas.
And we welcome you to our committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAUL SALINAS, MAYOR, LAREDO, TEXAS
Mr. Salinas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and Ranking
Member and members of the committee. It is nice to be back
home. It kind of makes me a little bit emotional. I used to
patrol these floors. So it is really nice to be back home.
I am here to deliver a very simple but important message:
We must make our borders safe but not close them to trade and
community. While the Nation must be dedicated to enhancing the
security of our borders, that commitment must be made with a
concurrent commitment to ensuring that our borders continue to
operate efficiently in moving people and goods.
In Laredo, Texas, we think that can be summed up in a
simple statement: We need to build bridges, not walls.
Laredo is at the center of the primary trade route
connecting Canada, the United States and Mexico. Laredo and
Nuevo Laredo, ``Los Dos Laredos,'' offer markets, business
opportunities, and profit potential which business and industry
simply cannot find anywhere else. We were the first official
port of entry on the U.S.-Mexico border in 1851 and, today, are
the largest customs district on the southern border.
Today, Laredo handles more trade than all other ports on
the southern border combined. Let me repeat that statement so
that we can understand that this is not a typo. Laredo handles
more trade than all other ports on the southern border
combined.
We are not only the largest southern port, we are the
fourth-largest customs district in the United States. We move
more products by truck and rail than all land and water ports
in the United States, with the exceptions of New York, Los
Angeles-Long Beach, and Detroit.
While we are honored to be in their company, Laredo is one-
twenty-fifth the size of the smallest of these other MSAs.
Also, unlike these other three ports and many others than
handle far less freight than my community, Laredo is not
entitled to any direct Federal funding under any of the
Homeland Security programs.
So how many trucks need to traverse Laredo to carry so much
freight?
According to the Laredo Development Foundation, whose
statistics are attached to my testimony, last year there were
more than 3 million trips through Laredo. Those numbers
translate to 13,000 truck trips every business day travelling
in one direction or the other through our city.
Allow me to provide some kind of visual for you to
understand just how many truck trips we are discussing. If you
line up 13,000 trucks end to end, assuming a 70-foot length, it
would equal to a convoy that is more than 172 miles. It would
stretch from the Capitol, right here, to Trenton, New Jersey.
And that is what we deal with every day.
If you line up the 3 million truck trips between the two
countries, it would be a convoy that would stretch just short
of 45,000 miles. That would be the same as having a convoy that
would circumnavigate the Equator just short of twice. That is a
long two-lane highway.
The 13,000 trucks have all the same problems as trucks in
your community; it is just that there are so many more. That
many fully loaded trucks add congestion to our streets,
accelerate the erosion of our streets. And yet, we are not
eligible for highway funds based upon their presence in our
community.
The job of releasing these trucks after they leave the
customs zone is the responsibility of our police force,
including whether the drivers are licensed and insured as well
as whether the trucks are safe. Again, it is not that the
trucks are any better or worse than the trucks you may find in
your community. It is just that there are so many more, and our
resources are rather limited.
In addition to the number of trucks, we must also be
concerned with what the trucks are carrying. There are the
security concerns regarding illegal paraphernalia such as drugs
and counterfeit goods. But there are also legal goods that may
pose a threat to our community. My police department, fire and
health department, must deal with these 13,000 daily potential
threats once they leave customs.
The level of HAZMAT training and equipment that may be
found in our city is far greater than you would find in any
city of comparable size because of the threats that we face on
a daily basis.
Yet today, under DHS programs, because the border is not a
threat criterion and because our population does not meet the
UASI threshold, Laredo can make no claim to direct Federal
funding for this enhanced threat level, nor is Laredo being
reimbursed for the services we provide for our nation.
And while that may sound like an extraordinary number of
trucks blocking Laredo's streets and polluting Laredo's air,
unless we are able to obtain relief from ``at grade'' railroad
crossings, trucks are preferable to trains in our community for
moving freight. For while trucks may slow down traffic, trains
requiring inspections split the city in half, requiring our
city's first responders to have standing contingency plans for
ambulance and fire response, as there are times that you cannot
physically get to the closest hospital or have the closest fire
station respond because a train has bifurcated the city.
With all the years of my service--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mayor? Are you almost wrapping--
Mr. Salinas. I am going to, yes.
Let me give you just four simple ideas on how we feel you
might be able to help us with national security issues in our
city.
Port grants must be available to land ports. If there is a
threat from freight, then we are the fourth-largest threat, yet
not eligible for any funding.
Prioritize international bridges in national asset
database. Should the port of Laredo be closed for any reason,
the national economies of both Mexico and the United States
would feel the impact in a day, perhaps as soon as 2 hours
after closing.
UASI criteria must include border communities that serve as
the nation's first responders.
These are just a few ideas on how the committee may provide
leadership on the issue of border security while enhancing
economic development. There are other ideas that you have in
our testimony.
I thank you. I ask for your assistance and know that, in
Laredo, ``su casa es mi casa,'' ``su casa, mi casa.'' Gracias.
[The statement of Mr. Salinas follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Raul Salinas, Mayor, City of
Laredo, Texas
1. INTRODUCTION
Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Lungren and Members of the
Subcommittee, good afternoon. I am Raul Salinas, the mayor of Laredo,
Texas.
It was a great honor for me last summer, as one of my first
official duties as the Mayor of Laredo, to welcome a delegation of the
United States Congress, including Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, to Laredo for
a hearing on border security. Madam Chair, we were honored to have you
in Laredo and we are grateful that you heard our plea that border
communities be involved in border policy debates. As I said then, while
the issue of border security is of national significance, for us on the
border, border security means a safe and operational border.
Before offering my testimony, you will all forgive me if I brag
just a little about our hometown hero, your colleague, Congressman
Cuellar. We could not be more proud of his leadership here in Congress
as a subcommittee chair of the Homeland Security Committee.
I would also like to share with the Subcommittee that my first two
jobs as an adult were here in Washington. I was a legislative aide to
Representative Kika de la Garza and later joined the Capitol Hill
Police Force while earning my degree at Maryland. After graduating from
Maryland, I also graduated from the Capitol Police Department to a
career in the FBI, the last five years of which were spent as an
attache in Mexico City. You can only imagine how much pride I take in
testifying today on behalf of my adopted home, in the city that gave me
my professional start.
2. LOS DOS LAREDOS AND THE ROLE WE PLAY ON THE BORDER
Madam Chair, I am here to deliver a very simple, but important
message. We must make our borders safe, but not close them to trade and
community. While the nation must be dedicated to enhancing the security
of our borders, that commitment must be made with a concurrent
commitment to ensuring that our borders continue to operate efficiently
in moving people and goods. In Laredo we think that can be summoned up
in a simple statement. We need to build bridges, not walls.
Laredo is at the center of the primary trade route connecting
Canada, the United States and Mexico. Laredo and Nuevo Laredo, ``Los
Dos Laredos'' offer markets, business opportunities and profit
potential which business and industry simply cannot find anywhere else.
We were the first ``official'' Port of Entry on the U.S./Mexico border
in 1851 and today are the largest Customs District on the Southern
Border. Today, Laredo handles more trade than all the other ports on
the southern border combined. Let me repeat that statement so that you
understand that it is not a typo. Laredo handles more trade than all
the other ports on the southern border combined.
We are not only the largest southern port; we are the 4th largest
Customs District in the United States. We move more products by truck
and rail than all the land and water ports in the United States with
the exceptions of New York, Los Angles-Long Beach and Detroit. While we
are honored to be in their company, Laredo is 1/25th the size of the
smallest of these other MSAs. Also, unlike these other three ports, and
many others that handle far less freight than my community, Laredo is
not entitled to any direct federal funding under any of Homeland
Security program.
3. TRENTON TO THE CAPITOL BUILDING EVERY DAY
So how many trucks need to traverse Laredo to carry that much
fright?
According to the Laredo Development Foundation, whose statistics
are attached to my testimony, last year more than 1 million LOADED
trucks traveled northbound from Mexico into the US, and more than 1.2
million LOADED trucks traveled from the US into Mexico. The total
number of truck trips is estimated at just over 3 million trips, as not
all trucks are LOADED. Those numbers translate into 13,000 truck trips
every business day traveling in one direction or the other through my
city.
Allow me to provide some kind of visual for you to understand just
how many trucks trips we are discussing. If you line the 13,000 trucks
end to end, assuming a 70 foot length, it would equal a convoy that is
more than 172 miles long. It would stretch from the Capitol building to
Trenton, New Jersey. And that is what we deal with every day. If you
line up the 3 million truck trips between the two countries, it would
be a convoy that would stretch just short of 45,000 miles. That would
be the same as having a convoy that would circumnavigate the equator
just short of twice. That's a long 2 lane highway.
4. THE NUMBERS ARE AN ISSUE
These 13,000 trucks have all the same problems as trucks in your
community, its just that there are so many more. That many fully loaded
trucks add congestion to our streets, accelerate the erosion of our
streets, and yet we are not eligible for highway funds based upon their
presence in our community.
The job of policing these trucks after they leave the customs zone
is the responsibility of my police force, including whether the drivers
are licensed and insured as well as whether the trucks are safe. Again,
it's not that these trucks are any better or worse than the trucks you
find in your communities; it's just that there are so many more and our
resources are so limited.
In addition to the number of trucks, we must also be concerned with
what the trucks are carrying. There are the security concerns regarding
illegal paraphernalia such as drugs and counterfeit goods. But there
are also legal goods that also pose a threat to my community. My
police, fire and health department must deal with these 13,000 daily
potential threats once they leave customs. The level of hazmat training
and equipment that may be found in my city is far greater than you will
find in any city of comparable size because of the threats we face on a
daily basis. Yet, today, under DHS programs, because the border is not
a threat criterion, and because our population does not meet the UASI
threshold, Laredo can make no claim to direct federal funding for this
enhanced threat level. Nor is Laredo being reimbursed for the services
we provide to the nation.
And while that may sound like an extraordinary number of trucks
blocking Laredo streets, and polluting Laredo's air--unless we are able
to obtain relief from ``at grade'' railroad crossings, trucks are
preferable to trains for in my community for moving freight. For while
trucks may slow down traffic, trains requiring inspections split the
city in half requiring my first responders to have standing contingency
plans for ambulance runs and fire response as there are times you
cannot physically get to the closest hospital or have the closest fire
station respond because a train has bifurcated the city..
5. THE NEED FOR LOCAL INPUT
While I was asked to focus my testimony on the issue of cross
border freight shipments, I would like to take a moment to reiterate
our most fervent wish. As Congress seeks solutions to border issues, it
is best to do so in consultation with the officials on the border that
will have to live with the decisions you make. More importantly, it is
the local government officials and our professional staffs that will be
your allies in achieving the shared mission of border security.
For instance, the mission statement for Laredo's four bridges
reflects this balancing act. In Laredo we seek ``To Serve as the most
convenient and safe crossing point for all citizens and tourists of
both U.S. and Mexico, as well as to facilitate the crossing of all
freight and import-export trade that utilizes the Port of Laredo.''
6. SUGGESTED STEPS
With all my years of service to homeland security, I feel very
confident that my credibility is sufficient to state that this nation
can be safer without closing or slowing our borders. Let me give you
but four simple ideas of how the Congress might enhance national
security here in Laredo while promoting efficient borders.
Port Grants Must be Available to Land Ports
Just yesterday the Department of Homeland Security
announced a new round of funding availability for port
security. As I explained above, Laredo is the nation's
largest inland port and is number 4 in terms of freight
moved for all ports, land or sea. Still, Laredo does
not qualify for this port funding because we are not a
seaport. The Committee would provide great leadership
in helping address this shortcoming. I am sure my
colleagues in Detroit and Buffalo would concur with my
pleas for assistance.
Prioritize International Bridges in National Asset
Database
According to the Congressional Research Service, ``The
Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been
developing and maintaining a National Asset Database.
The Database contains information on over 77,000
individual assets, ranging from dams, hazardous
materials sites, and nuclear power plants to local
festivals, petting zoos, and sporting good stores.'' It
is Laredo's understanding that with just in time
inventories, should the port of Laredo be closed for
any reason, the national economies of both Mexico and
the United States would feel the impact in a day,
perhaps as soon as 2 hours of closing.
UASI Criteria to Include Border Communities
The Department of Homeland Security has created the
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program with the
stated goal of making grants for law enforcement
terrorism prevention efforts. The grants also seek to
enhance fire departments' response to terrorism and
other major incidents. The criterion for funding used
by the DHS, however, has failed to recognize what this
Committee already knows--Investments made in border
communities may be the best investments the nation an
make. Because of the current criteria, Laredo has never
been a direct recipient of UASI funds. We would welcome
this Committee's leadership in seeking to amend the
funding formulae of UASI programs.
Have Federal Government Bear Fair Share of Border
Service
Recognize the benefits derived by creating a border
port entry are not limited to the port itself; the
entire country benefits as well. Congress should reject
a recent any initiatives to require local entities to
construct and donate to the General Service
Administration (GSA), the federal facilities at new
border ports of entry.
. Fund COPS and Provide Emphasis on Border
With the assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice
COPS program, the Laredo Police Department has hired
approximately 155 police officers to focus on community
policing issues, which many times are in fact border
security issues. The added personnel have enabled the
LPD to implement the philosophy at a citywide level and
establish the foundation of COPS. The COPS program has
been under funded or subject to ear mark only
appropriation for the last number of years and Laredo
has not been a continuing beneficiary, despite our
ongoing service to the nation.
U.S./Mexico Border Health Region with Dedicated Funds
While I am very proud of the Federal, state and local
law enforcement officers on the border, there are times
that I believe the most important homeland security
officer on the border may be Dr. Hector Gonzalez, the
head of the City of Laredo's health department. When
Washington was caught in the gripe of the anthrax
scare, our Health Department was asked to examine
envelopes with powdery substances from both sides of
the border. We had the SARs threat in Laredo, and I
fear that next major biological threat will also be
addressed here. Yet, it is the citizens of Laredo alone
that fund Dr. Gonzalez' efforts. This Committee's
leadership to create a U.S. Mexico Border health
resources program to address public health, emerging
disease control and prevention services would be of
great service to the nation.
These are just a few of our ideas on how the Committee may provide
leadership on the issue of border security while enhancing economic
development.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to the discussion.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mayor, thank you for a very instructive
testimony and your presence here today.
Mr. Salinas. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I now recognize Mr. Ward, with Detroit-
Windsor Truck Ferry, to summarize your statement in 5 minutes.
Mr. Ward, thank you.
STATATEMENT GREGG M. WARD, VICE PRESIDENT, DETROIT-WINDSOR
TRUCK FERRY
Mr. Ward. Thank you. I won't be speaking French Canadian to
echo what the mayor has said.
[Laughter.]
But thank you very much for the opportunity to present
today.
I agree with what the mayor said about building bridges and
its importance. And I think that is a big part of the security
question of trucks crossing the border. It is not just having
more bridges, but it is having safe and efficient bridges.
And I think today--and I am speaking for the Detroit area,
the busiest commercial crossing area in North America--there
isn't consistent enforcement authority at our bridges and
tunnels and truck ferries.
There are private ownership questions, which I think really
impact the ability of government to enforce laws and therefore
keep our borders safe.
I think it is necessary that we have a very consistent
enforcement policy at our border and at any new bridges. And I
think there is an opportunity, with all the discussions of new
bridges being built--there are a couple in the U.S.-Canada
border, one in Detroit being considered, one in the New York
area being considered.
And I think it is very important for this committee to
reflect on what the Canadian government has done, with the
International Bridges and Tunnels Act, which gives the
government, for the first time, absolute control and authority
over the border.
As a small example, after 9/11, our company--we transport
hazardous materials across the border. We have never received
any vetting from government of who we are, what other
businesses we are involved in, where we get our financing, who
owns our company. And I think that is wrong, I think that is
dangerous.
And I think we need more attention paid to our border
crossings. And at every border crossing, we ought to be
transparent, no matter if it is privately owned, if it is owned
by a commission, or if it is owned by government.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Ward follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregg M. Ward
Chair Jackson-Lee and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
allowing me to testify today. My name is Gregg Ward, Vice President of
the Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry.
At the northern border of the United States, the efficient movement
of cross border trucks is essential to our manufacturing base and
economic prosperity. With consistent and transparent border safety and
security measures in place at all international crossings, rules and
regulations are uniformly enforced. This immediately and significantly
reduces threats posed by these international trucks.
On Earth Day 1990 the Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry service was
started by my father and me. We chose this start-up date 16 years ago
to symbolize our commitment to environmental stewardship and a belief
that marine transportation can reduce highway congestion, air pollution
and the consumption of finite fossil fuels. The company operates a
border crossing between Detroit, Michigan and Windsor, Ontario. In
about 20 minutes, using a flat deck barge and a tugboat, up to eight
trucks roll-on, cross the river and roll-off again on the other side.
We transport hazardous material laden trucks that are restricted by US
regulations from crossing the Ambassador Bridge and the Detroit-Canada
Tunnel.\1\ The alternative route requires a detour of 165 miles.
Hazardous materials crossing our facilities include flammables, acids,
radioactive materials and explosives. We also move trucks too large or
heavy for the other crossings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ US 49 CFR 397.67 (a) it states, ``a motor carrier transporting
NRHM (Non Radioactive Hazardous Materials) shall comply with NRHM
routing designation of a State.'' The State of Michigan NRHM Restricted
Routes specifically has restrictions at the Ambassador Bridge and
Detroit-Canada Tunnel for all materials that are explosive, flammable,
radioactive and corrosive. http://hazmat.fmcsa.dot.gov/nhmrr/
index.asp?page=route.
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At times of significant congestion at the bridge, we provide surge
capacity to trucks carrying critical automotive freight. September 11
proved the value of redundancy in cross-border transportation options.
The merit of a cross border marine link was evident by the success of
the Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry in helping to avert post 9/11 plant
closing of a major automotive assembly operation. General Motors, in a
letter to US Customs following September 11, stated, ``The Detroit-
Windsor Truck Ferry became our only alternative that would enable
General Motors to continue operation of the Detroit/Hamtramck Assembly
Plant.'' \2\
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\2\ Letter from General Motors, Assembly Plant Manager to US
Customs Port Director. September 17, 2001.
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With regard to risks posed by cross border trucking, I make my
comments specific to Detroit where close to $300 million in daily just-
in-time deliveries move by truck through the region. The integrated US
and Canadian auto industry is heavily dependent on sufficient capacity
at the privately owned and operated Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. Every
day, this industry sends thousands of cross-border truck shipments
across this border. Assembly plants creating hundreds of thousands of
jobs in Michigan as well as many other US states and Ontario rely on
the just-in-time delivery of automotive parts.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ June 4, 2007 Ontario Chamber of Commerce and Detroit Regional
Chamber letter to Senator Alan Cropsey, Majority Floor Leader, State of
Michigan.
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It has been said that ``one well-placed bomb here could have a more
devastating effect on both the United States and Canada than the
destruction of the World Trade Center. Simply put, there is no
substitute for the Ambassador Bridge.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Uncovered bridge. By Jack Lessenberry. MetroTimes, March 7,
2007
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With over 9,000 trucks and 15,000 passenger cars crossing it each
day,\5\ the Ambassador Bridge is a symbolic and economic target for
those who wish our nation harm. The chairman of a National Defense and
Security Committee in Canada has said ``the Ambassador Bridge is the
``best target'' in Canada for terrorists looking to cripple the
country's economy.'' \6\\7\ I believe it undeniably has the same
devastating target value for those who would harm the United States.
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\5\ BTOA Traffic Figures for 2006.
\6\ Ambassador Bridge `plum' terror target: Attack would cripple
economy, senator says. By Dave Battagello, Windsor Star, March 24,
2005.
\7\ Bridge OKs risky cargo, Letter of permission given to chemical
company. By Doug Schmidt, Windsor Star, April 12, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The loss of the Ambassador Bridge because of a terrorist action,
serious accident or natural disaster would have a crippling, cascading
effect on our national economy.
The Department of Homeland Security national strategy to prevent,
protect and respond to all hazards is integrally linked to the word
``recovery.'' Moreover, in many respects ``recovery'' is linked to the
resiliency of our cross border transportation system.
When a section of the Washington Beltway closes, traffic snarls and
delays abound, but the system continues to operate through the use of
secondary roads that absorb the temporary excess traffic demand. If the
Ambassador Bridge closes, no such relief valve exists. US bound freight
would have to divert 100 miles to the international bridge crossing in
Sarnia, Ontario or 250 miles to Fort Erie, Ontario--just to enter the
United States. The just-in-time system manufacturers rely upon would
collapse within hours.
Notwithstanding its importance, the US Federal Highway
Administration and the state of Michigan do not physically inspect the
Ambassador Bridge.\8\ They are told by private owners of the Ambassador
Bridge (Detroit International Bridge Corporation) that government has
no such authority.\9\
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\8\ Private Bridge on Canada Border a Security Concern. By Pam
Fessler, National Public Radio, Morning Edition, May 21, 2007.
\9\ The Troll Under the Bridge. By Stephane Fitch and Joann Muller,
Forbes, November 15, 2004.
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A bridge company official said, ``The 1920s legislation that gave
Detroit International its charter entrusted the bridge with a level of
authority tantamount to a public utility's, so it has a prerogative to
behave differently from other companies.'' \10\
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\10\ Matty Moroun Beat Buffett in Bridge Deal, May Lose Monopoly.
By John Lippert and Erik Schatzker, Bloomberg Markets magazine, January
22, 2003.
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The bridge owner ``won't release maintenance records and refuses to
let law enforcement officials onto the bridge to nab trucks that could
be carrying explosives, toxic waste or other materials banned by law
from crossing the bridge.'' \11\
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\11\ Billionaire's Bridge. By Kenneth Kidd, Toronto Star, November
13, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manuel ``Matty'' Moroun's habit of snubbing the United States and
Canadian governments' efforts to control and regulate his bridge goes
back decades. The Economist in 1980 expressed outrage at the company's
``cavalier behavior'' when Moroun told the Canadians they had no right
to review his purchase of the international bridge.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Bridges to Understand, World Business, The Economist, March
22, 1980.
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In November 2001, Moroun startled GSA and Detroit officials by
starting construction on four new Customs booths--without Goods and
Services Administration approval. The city of Detroit sued him, arguing
he needed building and zoning permits. Moroun's attorneys insisted
local laws didn't apply because the bridge, since it handles cross-
border commerce is a ``federal instrumentality.''
The city of Detroit attorney who prosecuted the city's complaint
said, ``You can't have it both ways. You can't claim you're immune from
regulation because you're a federal instrumentality and then, at the
same time, tell the federal government to go to hell.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The Troll Under the Bridge. By Stephane Fitch and Joann
Muller, Forbes, November 15, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Openly ignoring the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
National Hazardous Material Route Registry, Moroun allowed restricted
gasoline tankers from Canada to cross his bridge after September 11,
2001. These trucks were destined for the bridge owner's duty free
complex at the foot of the bridge.
Michigan State Police said ``Even though the bridge is a private
structure, Michigan Department of Transportation says that it is a
restricted route and those items cannot cross.'' The President of the
bridge company responded, ``We don't believe the state has the
authority to determine what crosses a private piece of property.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Hazmat Trucks On Bridge Leads to Crackdown. Local 4
Investigation Uncovers Suspect Hauling Practice. January 10, 2002
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In my February 15, 2007 testimony before the Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, the issue of ongoing illegal transportation of
hazardous materials across the Ambassador Bridge and the risk to our
national transportation system is extensively documented.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ February 15, 2007 testimony before the Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, pages 6--8 and Attachments A--G.
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In May 2007, National Public Radio exposed how trucks are allowed
to park directly under the Ambassador Bridge after paying a toll,
allowing the driver to walk to the duty free store located several
hundred feet away. According to the report, ``A spokesman for the
Federal Highway Administration says his agency has raised concerns
about the trucks with Moroun, but it doesn't have jurisdiction. Neither
does the federal agency that oversees the transportation of hazardous
materials. Nor does the Coast Guard. Nor does the Michigan State
Police.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Private Bridge on Canada Border a Security Concern. By Pam
Fessler, National Public Radio, Morning Edition, May 21, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The failure of government to make safety and security decisions at
the privately owned Ambassador Bridge is an invitation to terrorists to
disable it. But large fuel storage tanks are buried in the ground
adjacent to the Ambassador Bridge. They are there today. Imagine 13,000
gallon fuel tankers parking directly under the bridge to replenish the
storage tanks. This happens on a regular basis and the government seems
powerless to stop it.
[Information follows:]
Figure 1
Figure 2
The tanker that exploded in April 2007 and caused an intense fire
melting steel girders and bolts supporting a Bay Area bridge ramp had
only 8,600 gallons of gasoline and no fuel storage tanks below it.
Until recently the Canadian government had no clear authority to
regulate matters concerning approvals for the constructing new, or
altering existing, international bridges or tunnels; approvals for
changes in ownership, operation or control; and issues about
maintenance, operations, safety and security.
To resolve this problem, the Canadian government recently enacted
the International Bridge and Tunnels Act. This legislation provides the
federal government with legislative authority to ensure effective
oversight of the existing 24 international vehicular bridges and
tunnels and nine international railway bridges and tunnels, as well as
any new international bridges or tunnels built in the future. The
Minister, through the governor-in-council, has the power to regulate
the safety, security, operation and use of international bridges and
tunnels. The Minister will have the authority to issue an emergency
directive in response to a threat to the safety or security of any
international bridge or tunnel. To help protect the safety, security
and efficiency of the transportation system, Ministerial approval will
be required for transactions that result in changes in ownership or the
operation of any international bridge or tunnel.
This determined Canadian action contrasts with the United States,
where there is no similar authority or oversight in respect of
privately owned international border crossings. This endangers our
national security. Even after September 11, 2001, our company, a
transporter of dangerous cargoes across the border, has never been
formally interviewed about how we finance operations, who beneficially
owns our company or what other companies do we control and operate.
As these questions have not been asked of our company, it is
reasonable to conclude that there has not been any vetting of other
privately owned border crossings.
I submit that this Subcommittee should consider the dire national
consequences of leaving our federal law enforcement agencies without
clearly defined legislative authority to control our international
borders and regulate the flow of trucking at crucial border crossings.
Our northern frontier needs to remain accessible to trucking, safe
and secure. By strengthening government oversight and providing uniform
controls at the border, the risks posed by cross-border trucks can be
mitigated, efficiency of movement improved and the vitality of our
trading nation protected.
Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You have provoked us to want to ask you
questions right away. But we thank you so very much for your
testimony today.
And I now recognize Mr. Russell to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN RUSSELL, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, CELADON GROUP,
INC., ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATION
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the
committee. My name is Steve Russell, and I am chairman and CEO
of Celadon Group, headquartered in Indianapolis. I actually
founded the company 22 years ago.
Celadon is a truckload carrier, with approximately 2,900
power units, 8,000 trailers and 4,000 employees. We are a U.S.
trucking company that provides transportation services within
the U.S., as well as to Canada and Mexico.
Celadon was the first motor carrier approved to participate
in both Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, C-TPAT,
and we were also the first company to be approved for the
Automated Commercial Environment, or ACE. In addition, 100
percent of our drivers have been trained under Highway Watch
security and safety awareness.
Today I am appearing also on behalf of the American
Trucking Associations, or the ATA. And I commend the
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection for holding this hearing.
There is no doubt that securing our nation's borders is
essential to our national security interests. I would also add
that the efficient and effective flow of legitimate cargo
across our land borders is vitally important to our nation's
well-being.
The trucking industry has worked with government agencies
and other economic sectors to establish security programs that
accomplish the goal of increasing security while improving
trade facilitation. The trucking industry plays a critical link
with America's two largest trading partners, transporting
almost 70 percent of the value of surface trade with Canada and
about 83 percent of the value between U.S. and Mexico.
Security has long been a part of cross-border trucking
operations with Canada and Mexico, even before 9/11. In 1998,
the then-U.S. Customs Service established the Land Border
Carrier Initiative to process low-risk cargo, carriers and
drivers more efficiently, while focusing the agency's
enforcement resources on higher-risk operations.
After 9/11, C-TPAT was developed jointly by government and
industry, establishing a more robust and comprehensive security
program for U.S. imports around the globe. I strongly believe
that the C-TPAT program is an excellent model for ensuring the
security of the international supply chain.
Importers, motor carriers, customs brokers, and foreign
manufacturers all have to comply with the security standards in
order to participate in C-TPAT. Time and money have to be
invested to develop security processes and systems for
compliance with C-TPAT, which are verified by CBP.
The FAST program was developed by U.S., Canada and Mexico
to provide C-TPAT members access to FAST lanes at our borders.
The FAST program also requires commercial drivers to undergo a
thorough background check in order to obtain FAST cards to
access these lanes.
I encourage members of this committee to work with other
relevant congressional committees to look at ways to accelerate
the development of FAST lanes at border crossing points of
entry. And I also encourage members to continue supporting C-
TPAT and FAST programs, which have created security
consciousness within the cross-border trucking industry.
Another key tool for improving border security is ACE,
which is now being fully deployed on our land border ports of
entry. ACE includes an electronic manifest which allows CBP to
collect information, target and do risk analysis on U.S.
imports and members of the trade community.
Lastly, industry and government must work together to
improve information collection and sharing mechanisms and
eliminate the burden of repetitive data entry from multiple
agencies in all three countries. Doing so will improve the
competitiveness in North America and also improve our security.
I thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer
any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Russell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen Russell
Introduction
Madame Chair and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Steve
Russell, and I am Chairman and CEO of Celadon Group, Inc.,
headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana. Celadon is a truckload carrier
with approximately 2,900 power units, 8,000 trailers and 4000
employees. Celadon is one of the top truckload carriers in North
America serving a variety of customers providing time-sensitive cargo
shipments through trailer door-to-door transport in and between any of
the NAFTA countries. We have built Celadon on industry leadership in
Safety, Technology, Service and Security.
Celadon is a certified and validated member of the Customs--Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (``C-TPAT'') program, and we were the
first motor carrier approved for participation in the Automated
Commercial Environment's electronic manifest system. Both of these
programs, as described further below, play an important role in
improving the security of international commerce at our land borders.
In the domestic arena, Celadon, including 100 percent of its
professional drivers, participates in the Highway Watch'
program, a joint ATA and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'')
initiative with the goals of increasing the overall security of our
highways and roads. Because Celadon transports hazardous materials, we
are also compliant with U.S. Department of Transportation (``DOT'')
requirements under HM-232 for developing security plans and training to
transport such commodities.
In addition, Celadon is an ISO 9001 certified company and plays an
integral role in our customers' supply chain management process as we
service a variety of high-intensity production lines, distribution
channels, and customer direct traffic. In addition, we were awarded
back-to-back 1st Place finishes by the Truckload Carriers Association
for its 2005 and 2004 National Fleet Safety Award among carriers
hauling over 100 million miles per year.
Today I am also here on behalf of the American Trucking
Associations, Inc. (``ATA''), a federation of motor carriers, state
trucking associations, and national trucking conferences created to
promote and protect the interests of the trucking industry. ATA's
membership includes more than 2,000 trucking companies and industry
suppliers of equipment and services. Directly and through its
affiliated organizations, ATA encompasses over 37,000 companies and
every type and class of motor carrier operation.
I commend the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and
Infrastructure Protection of the U.S. House of Representatives for
holding this hearing to gather information regarding border security.
The trucking industry supports efforts to address and eliminate to the
greatest extent possible any threats posed by terrorists to our
nation's security, including developing strong cross-border security
programs.
These comments focus on three primary areas in relation to
border security:
Ongoing security programs involving trucking
operations across our borders with Canada and Mexico to ensure
supply chain security;
Implementing automated systems to improve the
gathering and analysis of data for targeting and release of
cargo, people, and equipment entering the U.S.; and,
Strengthening the relationships among the three North
American governments to develop joint border infrastructure and
improve information sharing mechanisms.
Background
Trucking is a critical component of the United States' economic
strength, with 9 billion tons of freight transported by inter-city and
local trucks, representing 68% of the total domestic tonnage shipped.
The trucking industry generates revenues of $610 billion annually,
equaling almost 5% of our Gross Domestic Product, and a figure that
represents nearly 87% of all revenues generated by our nation's freight
transportation industry.\1\ Our nation's transportation infrastructure,
in particular the highway system, provides the opportunity for the
trucking industry to play such a large and important role in the U.S.
economy. The protection and improvement of our country's existing
infrastructure will help ensure a strong and vibrant economy both now
and in the future.
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\1\ American Trucking Associations; American Trucking Trends;
(2006)
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The trucking industry also plays a critical link in the economic
interdependency among the United States, Canada and Mexico, moving
almost 70 percent of the value of freight between the United States and
Canada, and about 83 percent of the value of U.S.-Mexico freight.\2\
The increasing trade volumes that have been generated among the three
North American Free Trade Agreement (``NAFTA'') partners have
demonstrated the success of the largest trading block in the world. Not
only have companies such as retailers and manufacturers throughout
North America been able to diversify, expand and improve their ability
to grow their businesses, but this agreement has provided access to new
markets to goods and services produced in the U.S. The trucking
industry is proud of its primary role in delivering these growing trade
volumes. According to U.S. government data, in 2006 7 million trucks
entered the U.S. from Canada, while 4.2 million entered from Mexico,
resulting in more than 14 million truck crossings a year on the
northern border, and more than 8 million crossings on the U.S. southern
border.\3\
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\2\ Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of
Transportation (2006)
\3\ Ibid.
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In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the U.S. trucking industry
has worked diligently to support our nation's goals of keeping our
country and our economy moving forward. As part of our efforts, these
comments will focus on initiatives the trucking industry is
participating in to improve the security of both domestic and
international cargo. More importantly, the trucking industry has been
at the forefront of efforts to establish partnerships with federal,
state and local governments to improve the sharing of information
between the private sector and public sector entities, and among the
various industry sectors within the private sector.
The trucking industry supports programs that help motor carriers
increase the security and safety of their operations, especially if
such programs can be implemented in an effective and efficient manner
and provide real security. ATA believes that the end goals of security
and efficiency are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, ATA has been
working to ensure that programs designed to augment our national
security do not hinder our ability to provide transportation services
to our customers which support our nation's economic security and
growth.
The trucking industry has been proactive in ensuring our national
security and in protecting our nation's way of life through its
security programs, including the Highway Watch' program and
through our efforts in the Highway Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (``ISAC''). These two programs emerged from the effort to
improve communication and improve the sharing of information, both at
an intra-industry level and between industry and government agencies.
Our industry has taken a number of steps to reduce the possibility
of our equipment being used for terrorism purposes. We also recognize,
as we know you do, that no level of defense can achieve perfect safety
and security in stopping a terrorist attack. However, we strongly
believe that by increasing awareness among company personnel, by
implementing simple cost-effective security measures, and developing a
security culture within our operations, trucking companies can reduce
the odds of being targeted by terrorists.
In the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, otherwise known as the ``9/11 Commission
Report'', the authors stated the following recommendation in Chapter
12:
The U.S. border security system should be integrated into a
larger network of screening points that includes our
transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as
nuclear reactors. The President should direct the Department of
Homeland Security to lead the effort to design a comprehensive
screening system, addressing common problems and setting common
standards with systemwide goals in mind. Extending those
standards among other governments could dramatically strengthen
America and the world's collective ability to intercept
individuals who pose catastrophic threats.
ATA fully agrees with the intent of this recommendation and several
efforts have been undertaken to elevate the coordination of human
resources, infrastructure, and technology in improving clearance
systems and processes at our land borders. For the purpose of this
hearing, following is a description of the implementation of cross-
border security programs, the development of automated systems to clear
cargo, crews and vehicles, and the establishment of a single border
agency with a uniform set of guidelines, procedures, and chain of
command. Again, these programs are not foolproof, but they have
certainly allowed the trade community and government agencies to
increase security and reduce the threat from potential terrorists
threats.
Cross-Border Security Programs
It is important to note that for motor carriers that participate in
cross-border operations with Canada and/or Mexico high-security is not
something that began on 9/11. Years before the terrorist attacks on our
Nation, ATA and the trucking industry had been actively involved in
security programs which established risk-criteria to allow low-risk
legitimate cargo, crews and vehicles to expedite their clearance for
entry into the U.S. Allowing for the rapid processing of known low-risk
cargo, carriers and personnel, frees law enforcement personnel at our
air, sea and land Ports of Entry (``POE'') to focus their efforts and
resources on higher risk shipments and carriers.
For instance, in 1998 the then U.S. Customs Service (``USCS'')--now
part of the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (``CBP'')
within DHS--in a joint effort with the trucking industry, implemented
the Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (``LBCIP'') for U.S. bound
cargo entering from Mexico by truck. Trucking companies and their
drivers were certified by USCS (via audits and background checks) to
participate in the program. In return for participating in the LBCIP,
motor carriers gained expedited clearance of their cargo.
In the past few years, the trucking industry and other members of
the international trade community, have worked with CBP in developing
the C-TPAT program, and its North American focused security program
known as Free and Secure Trade (``FAST''). The overall goal of C-TPAT
is to ensure the security of the entire international supply chain:
from overseas manufacturing operations, to air, sea and land
transportation providers, to entities such as importers, brokers, and
forwarders involved in the processing of cargo entering our country.
Motor carriers participating in this program agree to meet a set of
Minimum Highway Security Criteria in their operations (see Appendix I).
In order to participate in FAST, motor carriers must become C-TPAT
certified and their commercial drivers must complete an application and
undergo a background check through various databases. Once such steps
have been taken and verified, motor carriers benefit by receiving
expedited clearance of the cargo--as long as the cargo belongs to a C-
TPAT importer--their equipment, and driver, in addition to getting
access to a dedicated FAST-lane for use only by FAST participants.
Though the development of FAST-lanes has been slow due to
infrastructure and capacity limitations at POEs, motor carriers have
been signing up for C-TPAT and getting drivers registered under the
FAST program. As the C-TPAT continues to grow, trucking companies have
been promoting membership in C-TPAT to their customers, relating to
clients the benefits of joining C-TPAT in expediting the movement of
their goods. In turn, many shippers have also been requesting that
their motor carriers participate in C-TPAT if they want to continue to
provide cross-border transportation services for the customer.
As part of the security partnership established between the U.S.
and Canada, both countries established similar security supply chain
programs, with Canada implementing its Partners in Protection (``PIP'')
program, which is equivalent to CBP's C-TPAT. The northern border FAST
program is a jointly designed strategy between the U.S. and Canada,
functioning as a single security program for both C-TPAT and PIP
approved motor carriers. In addition, CBP and Aduanas de Mexico
(Mexico's Customs agency) also began the joint implementation of the
FAST/Express program in 2003 on the southern border, operating now at
six POEs.
Such joint industry-government efforts have allowed the trade
community and law enforcement agencies to share information and improve
security for the transportation of international cargo across our
mutual land borders. These joint efforts will continue to work well
into the future to help eradicate the flow of illegal and/or dangerous
cargo or aliens into the United States in commercial conveyances and
increase the security of our transportation operations in international
trade. The Committee should encourage the continued development of
programs, such as FAST/C-TPAT.
Automated Clearance Programs
The trucking industry is also closely involved in the development
of information systems and technologies to facilitate enforcement
activities while at the same time expediting the movement of cargo
across our borders. The Automated Commercial Environment (``ACE'') is a
system that has been under development by CBP for over a decade, and is
now being fully deployed along our land border POEs. ATA and many of
its members worked on the design and development of the ACE Multi-
Modal-Manifest data requirements necessary for the transmission of data
by all transportation modes through an electronic manifest, or e-
manifest. The development of ACE is an important tool to improve the
efficiency for capturing trade data, clearing cargo entering the US,
and provides CBP an improved system for targeting, risk analysis, and
release of cargo.
CBP is also developing the International Trade Data System
(``ITDS'') as an integral part of ACE. The ITDS concept is simple:
Traders and carriers submit commercially based, standard electronic
data records through a single federal gateway for the import or export
of goods. As a single information gateway, ITDS distributes these
records to the interested federal trade agencies, such as CBP, the Food
and Drug Administration (``FDA''), DOT and others, for their
selectivity and risk assessment. In standardizing the process, ITDS
reduces the confusion and complexity of international trade, and speeds
the processing of goods, equipment and crews across our borders. ITDS
also benefits the government by providing more current and accurate
information for revenue, public health, statistical analyses, safety
and security activities, as well as significantly reducing data
processing development and maintenance costs.
The development and implementation of the ACE/ITDS is an essential
component in accelerating the flow of commerce while also improving the
ability of CBP to analyze and target data entries.
One Face at the Border
ATA also recognizes and commends the efforts by CBP and DHS in
establishing the ``One Face at the Border'' program to create an
interdisciplinary force of officers working at our POEs. Prior to
establishing this effort, officers representing various agencies
operating at the POEs had separate reporting mechanisms, chains of
commands, regulations to enforce and differing pay-scales. Furthermore,
each border agency managed and utilized its own databases and
information systems to perform their relevant clearance activities for
goods and people entering the US. Of even greater concern was the fact
that at various times during the day these systems, which generally
lacked interoperability, were prone to be ``down'' for extended periods
of time, greatly limiting the ability of inspectors to access essential
information in performing their duties. The trucking industry strongly
supports the ``One Face at the Border'' initiative, and believes that
this effort has greatly improved land border security and trade
facilitation.
U.S. VISIT Program
ATA has closely followed the development of the United States
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (``USVISIT'') program
due to the potential for additional delays at POEs and possibly
additional processing requirements for some drivers. ATA has been in
close communication with the USVISIT development office. ATA recognizes
that the implementation of this challenging program is mandated by
various statutes, including sections of the Data Management Improvement
Act (``DMIA''), the USA PATRIOT Act, and the Enhanced Border Security
and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. Although USVISIT is not yet fully
operating at land border POEs, ATA understands that DHS continues to
work towards expanding its requirements for entry and exit controls.
The following bullets describe the essential areas that we believe
are necessary for DHS to focus on as it moves forward in implementing
USVISIT at our land borders:
Consider how USVISIT will interact with other border
security programs, including those that ensure supply chain
security, such as FAST/C-TPAT, and those that clear U.S.
international trade, primarily ACE/ITDS. Foreign drivers that
have been cleared to participate in the FAST/C-TPAT program
should not be required to comply with entry/exit requirements
of the USVISIT program due to their ``low-risk''
classification;
Continue to exchange information and increase
cooperation with our international trading partners, especially
with Canada and Mexico. Special consideration must be given as
to how we can address infrastructure and information technology
needs and requirements for developing an entry/exit control
process at land borders. In order to mitigate the costs of such
technology and physical infrastructure development, greater
consideration must be given to harmonizing and leveraging
systems and resources with our NAFTA partners.
The trucking industry encourages the U.S. government, in
cooperation with both Canada and Mexico, to improve and to facilitate
the capture and exchange of information on goods and people crossing
our land borders. A large portion of the U.S. international trade and
immigration transactions generated every day occur from transactions
with our two NAFTA partners. ATA recommends that the U.S. government
move forward with an aggressive timeline in implementing both the Smart
Border Accord between the U.S. and Canada, and the 22 Point Plan
between the U.S. and Mexico, as well as implementing the
recommendations established under the North American Security and
Prosperity Partnership.
Conclusion
ATA recognizes and commends this committee for holding this hearing
and we urge you to support efforts to establish security initiatives
that promote both security and trade. It is essential that this be done
in close cooperation with our counterparts in Canada and Mexico. ATA
believes that any successful effort for preventing the entry of
terrorists through our air, sea or land borders will have to rely on
the cooperation of foreign governments, in essence ``pushing our
borders out''. From the land border perspective, this means working
with Canadian and Mexican government agencies and officials in
developing programs to share facilities and information systems in
order to capture data prior to cargo and people arriving at our POEs.
The trucking industry considers the present security environment to
be quite robust for cross-border trucking operations along both our
northern and southern borders, and we believe that such programs are
heading in the right direction. In summary, we make the following
comments to continue to increase the security and efficiency benefits
of cross-border operations:
Continue the promotion and marketing efforts related
to C-TPAT and FAST to increase participation by importers,
manufacturers and carriers. Increasing the number of
participants that are in compliance with these programs will
improve the allocation of financial and human resources to
focus on shipments and entities that require further
information and/or examination.
DHS must take a leading role among federal agencies in
managing systems and processes at POEs for U.S. imports and
exports, especially with agencies outside of the DHS chain of
command. Though other federal agencies not within DHS have
statutory mandates requiring them to implement procedures for
clearing certain goods entering at U.S. ports of arrival (for
example FDA's implementation of the prior import notice
requirements under the Bioterrorism Act), these agencies should
be required to coordinate and work closely with CBP and the
ACE/ITDS system.
We encourage this committee to work with other
relevant congressional committees to analyze funding to improve
border facilities and infrastructure. This is essential in
ensuring a smooth flow of legitimate travelers and commerce
across our borders while ensuring our national security. We
encourage that such an analysis consider an appropriate level
and mix of technology, equipment and personnel to maximize the
capabilities of border facilities.
In the post 9/11 environment industry and government must jointly
develop systems and processes that allow us to defend our national
security and protect our economic security. By working together,
industry and government can develop and achieve the right balance in
which heightened operational security is achieved but not at the
expense of our wellbeing and economic security. As the 9/11 Commission
Report points out in another section of Chapter 12:
The U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations to the
American people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a
major effort to collaborate with other governments. We should
do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies,
and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel
and border crossing over the medium and long term through
extensive international cooperation.
The trucking industry agrees with such a goal as a crucial
stakeholder in our nation's efforts to secure our critical
infrastructure and overall wellbeing from terrorist threats and
activities. ATA and motor carriers throughout our nation and North
America are committed to partnering with both government and other
sectors of our economy to improve and ensure our country's national and
economic security well into the future. Again, ATA thanks the Committee
for this opportunity to present our comments and input on the issue of
security in cross-border trucking operations.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the witness for his testimony.
And I thank all of the witnesses for their testimony.
And I think Mr. Ward has established himself as either a
witness that will be invited back on many, many occasions, or
he has made the record for his testimony in terms of the time
that he was given. No reflection on the other distinguished
witnesses, but it was in fact unique.
It doesn't mean that you are going to get shortened
questions, so it is not a quid pro quo.
I yield myself 5 minutes for questions and, again, offer my
appreciation.
We knew there was something here. And I don't think that we
are going to finish the inquiry that we are making in one
hearing.
But let me start with you, Mayor Salinas, because you have,
if you will, either pricked our conscience or incited the
interest of the importance of this hearing. You have
mentioned--and this is where I want to pick up--one, you have
indicated that we have a problem with highway funds, because
you are obviously seemingly a place of a magnitude of trucks,
and you seem to be diminished in that funding.
And you have also indicated that there is a brief moment
where these trucks are in the jurisdiction of our border
authorities but then they are in Laredo. And the
responsibilities are on local law enforcement, which is not
only attributable to issues of safety of driver license, but
there are issues of contraband or terrorism or security.
Please state for us again the danger that poses and also
your perceived solutions.
Mr. Salinas. Madam Chair, let me say that, first of all,
13,000 trucks cross each way into Laredo and to Mexico. That
creates a very difficult situation. It affects us because just
one truck could really create a chaos and create a serious
problem.
One of the things that I think we are lacking at this time
is the fact that we don't have the personnel or resources to be
able to--I am talking in terms of the local police department.
We have worked very, very well, but I think we need additional
sources.
The fact of the matter is, when you have all these trucks
crossing, they do have an impact. Certainly they are bringing
good to our city, with economic trade and so forth. But at the
same time, we have a responsibility to protect our citizens and
protect our city.
And I think one thing that concerns us is that we have
asked, on numerous occasions, for assistance, and we have not
gotten it. I know we are being told that they are working on
this. You know, it creates a lot of problems: the destruction
of our roads and the safety concerns.
I can tell you that, after having been at the Bureau for 27
years, the potential of a very serious incident is there, just
waiting to happen. But we don't have the resources to be able
to--we need to be proactive. I think that is what I am trying
to say here. Because we don't want to respond; we want to
prevent. And that is what we are trying to do.
But the reality is that we need support for our local law
enforcement, whether it be just the police department or the
sheriff's department.
But one thing that has been really healthy for us, about 2
months ago I called for a mini summit of all law enforcement
entities, from the Customs and Border Protection, Immigration--
all the Federal, state and local agencies. And we feel that
that is important, because we need to be proactive and we need
to have communication.
I think one of the problems that we really have had is
dialogue. One thing that we also did in Laredo is create an
international committee on trade. That is our lifeline. That is
what makes Laredo go.
So, in reality, I think there is a potential for something
to happen, but we need to address it and be ahead of the game.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We need to be proactive.
Mr. Salinas. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask this question quickly. You have
heard, we have discussed ISAC and we have discussed the
Homeland Security intelligence-gathering network. And I raised
the question about whether that is an effective source of
information.
Is that an effective source for Laredo? Do you believe your
law enforcement accesses those particular databases? And are
they effective?
Mr. Salinas. Well, I think you touched a very sensitive
nerve. You know, one of the problems that we have today is
that, if we don't establish databases, if we don't have the
informants, the confidential informants, if we don't have
dialogue with our neighbors, here we are thinking about--well,
I think it goes beyond thinking about building a wall, you
know. We ought to be building bridges of friendship.
And really, that is where we have a little bit of a
problem. How do I expect to work with our counterparts, with
our business people on the other side, when we are going to
build a fence?
It is really a very sensitive issue, and I think--
Ms. Jackson Lee. --your law enforcement--
Mr. Salinas. What we did when I was in Mexico City, trying
to work and build friendships, instead of contacting each other
through e-mail or through little notes or something. We have to
have that personal contact and establish real friendships,
real, strong ties and confidence with each other.
I can assure you, Madam Chair, that while we were in Mexico
City for 5 1/2 years with the most wonderful part of my law
enforcement experience, we initiated training programs where
Mexican police officers would pay their own way to go to our
training classes. And they, in turn, would risk their lives to
bring fugitives back to the United States. And the term that I
was there, for the 5 1/2 years, we returned an average of 75 to
80 dangerous fugitives.
And we need that spirit of cooperation. And this is what is
going to help us with easing the potential threat to the United
States of America.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mayor.
Mr. Ward, you raised, if you will, the large issue in the
room: knowing who these individuals are, how they are funded,
how they are going forward. How severe a problem is that, in
your perspective and from a business perspective?
And your suggestion for a solution--you mentioned the
Canadian legislation. But let's step away from the Canadian
legislation. Just give us your assessment. Because obviously it
would mean an intelligence base or intelligence database that
would either retain this information, place to put this
information. We would have to gather the information.
But how crucial do you believe it is for the listing that
you just mentioned?
Mr. Ward. I think it is very important for government to be
the one that controls the border. There can be private
operation of a border crossing, but it should be government
that dictates the safety and security priorities. And that
doesn't happen today.
In my testimony, I give some examples, one on hazardous
materials transport. It was brought up a number of times here.
When I came from the airport, 395 to exit D Street, there is a
sign that says, ``Hazardous materials are prohibited.'' No such
signs exist at the Detroit border.
However, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
has hazardous material routing restrictions. Hazardous
materials that are restricted will go across the bridge.
Michigan state police says you can't. The bridge owner says,
``It is private property; you can't tell us what to do.''
Now, how do you have a nominal detection to pick out who
the good guys and the bad guys when the government isn't even
clear of who is in charge? There are segments of control by
government of certain aspects of the border, but not in
totality.
And I think it is necessary, to ensure safety and security,
that it be a charge of the government. I mean, right now the
Ambassador Bridge in Detroit is looking at twinning the bridge
based on 1920 enabling legislation. You know, I think we might
need an update.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I thank you, Mr. Russell. I will pose
a question at a later time.
I am now going to yield to the distinguished ranking
member, Mr. Lungren from California.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
And I would suggest we might follow up on Mr. Ward's
comments, that operators of bridges that cross international
borders claim that we have no jurisdiction over them. It seems
to me that that flies in the face of everything I know about
Federal law, Federal authority and borders. But maybe you have
some unique situation up there in Michigan. But we ought to
look at it.
I have heard it mentioned several times that we need to
build bridges, not walls. And I respect your opinion, Mayor
Salinas. I happen to have been the attorney general of
California and dealt with my Mexican counterparts on many
occasions with respect to the return of fugitives. And we had
some, but there were a lot of others, particularly cop killers,
that we have never been able to get back. And the Kiki Camarena
case was one that occurred while I was attorney general.
I would just say, at least in my state, where we did build
a fence in the San Diego sector, we actually achieved some
success in terms of the diminution of crime, particularly
violent crime.
And it is not the only answer. I was reading recently about
the Roman empire, and they talked about how if you look in
parts of England, which was the outlying area of the Roman
empire, you will see vestiges of the wall there. Interestingly,
they built walls but they had a lot of gates in them. And maybe
that is what we need to do, is to make sure that we have
carefully observed points of entry.
Mr. Mayor, my question to you would be this: Do you see any
difference in the concerns that you have now, other than an
increase in traffic presumably, if we had a change in law that
allowed the pilot project to go forward or, at some later date,
to pass the pilot project to allow a large number of Mexican
trucking companies to be able to deliver their load somewhere
outside of that commercial zone they have now, and vice versa?
Mr. Salinas. Mr. Ranking Member, thank you.
I think, as a former FBI agent, my primary concern would be
the safety of our citizens. Certainly I think that we have to
have a fair balance. Number one, we need to know who the
drivers are. We need to know everything about their background,
to make sure that we don't put our citizens in any danger. They
have to comply to make sure that their vehicles pass their
vehicular inspection.
I feel that there ought to be a fair balance in the way
that we treat our neighbors. But at the same time, our
neighbors need to obey the laws of the United States, just like
when I went to Mexico I had to obey the laws of Mexico even
though I had a diplomatic passport. I am not above the law, and
neither should anybody.
But as partners, we have to have some kind of conscious and
make sure that we treat everyone fairly. But to answer your
question, I think we have to be very clear that people are
going to come to our country with their vehicles. The vehicles
better be safe. The people who are going to be the vehicles
better be law-abiding citizens.
And we have to establish a mechanism whereby we have a good
database. If we don't have that, Ranking Member Mr. Lungren, I
think that is where it hurts. Because you can't have it both
ways. You have to respect the law, but you have to have a good,
solid database. Because if don't have that, just one vehicle
coming across with somebody going to harm Americans, you know,
we can't have that.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Russell, you are here not only
representing yourself and your company but the American
Trucking Association. We considered this issue of the pilot
project and beyond on several occasions, and I think some
members were surprised the American Trucking Association
supports the effort.
Both from a commercial standpoint but also from a security
and safety standpoint, could you give us an idea of why the
American Trucking Association believes, I presume with the
caveat that Mayor Salinas has given us, believes this is a good
thing for us?
Mr. Russell. I started Celadon 22 years ago, and we were
the first carrier to allow the trailer to go into Mexico. Until
that point in time, the cargo was unloaded, put in a warehouse,
and then on a Mexican truck the rest of the way. We were the
first that allowed it to go through.
And had a small facility in Laredo, which is now a big
facility in Laredo, and this fellow, Salinas, is doing a great
job, by the way.
Basically the way the Mexican border operates is the
following. A tractor will take a trailer from Guadalajara to
Nuevo Laredo. That will be a long-haul Mexican tractor--same
age, roughly, as American tractors; same condition, roughly, as
American tractors--to the south side of the border. It will
drop the trailer into either its own facility or a drayage yard
on the south side of the border.
The crossing will be done, 90 or 95 percent of the time, by
what are called drayage trucks. And they are generally small
companies that run trucks just across the border and then drop
them at an American trucking facility. And then taken the rest
of the way by an American driver.
That is basically how the border has operated for years.
If you put yourself in Europe and were a pasta maker in
Venice and had an order to ship pasta in a truckload to
Amsterdam, it wouldn't go in an Italian truck to the French
border, a French truck to the Belgian border, Belgian truck to
the Dutch border, Dutch truck to Amsterdam. It would be taken
by an Italian truck or a Dutch truck going through.
Essentially the process that now exists is like the old
days of the Pony Express, when one horse couldn't make it.
Three trucks handle the trailer.
That is not how the Canadian border operates. The Canadian
border, since 1982, after a successful pilot project, a driver,
a Canadian driver, will take a load from Toronto to Atlanta and
then must go back to Canada. He is not allowed to do cabotage.
Essentially the Mexican border should operate that way
also.
Mr. Lungren. I would presume that you and your associates
in the American Trucking Association would be upset if there
were substantial violations of our agreement with Canada; that
is, where we would see a number of instances of people not
going directly back, but actually trying to pick up loads
within the United States.
Do I take it by your testimony that we have not seen a good
deal of evidence of that occurring, with respect to Canadian
trucks?
Mr. Russell. Virtually none. We operate a Canadian company.
We own a company in Kitchener with 350 tractors. And it never
happens with us, but I don't think it ever happens with others
either.
Mr. Lungren. So what you are saying is this is not unique.
We have already had a pilot project with our northern
neighbor--
Mr. Russell. For 25 years, and we have run about 350
million miles in the U.S. with Canadian drivers. It is a small
part of the company--
Mr. Lungren. Sure.
Mr. Russell. --but basically every weigh station, every
FMCSA station when you are crossing state lines--
Mr. Lungren. What about the concern about the drivers and
the safety of their vehicles and meeting the standards and all
that sort of thing that we are facing as questions with Mexico?
Mr. Russell. From an ATA standpoint, those issues are being
faced by the FMCSA, which is part of the DOT, and by TSA. From
our standpoint, our Mexican tractors--and we have a smaller
fleet in Mexico--but GPS-tracked, you know exactly--
Mr. Lungren. Do you have any in Italy? Or are you just--
[Laughter.]
Mr. Russell. Most of them right here in America, sir.
But I remember testifying at the committee where both
Chairwoman Jackson Lee was at and you were at in November of
2005 about hazardous material certification. And I was equally
impressed by you guys then.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, particularly for that
last part.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Russell. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You notice I did not gavel you down before
that comment was made.
[Laughter.]
Shows the collegiality of this particular committee.
I am going to yield to myself for a second round and
because I did miss exploring some points that I think are key.
Mr. Russell, first of all, thank you. You seem to be a
company that is aware of the climate in which we live, and it
is important that that occur. And let me thank the American
Trucking Association for having you as their representative.
But I think that we are trying to get to the core element
of what we need to try to improve, I would say fix. And it
would be helpful if you would give me a sense of how well-
versed your ownership, your membership, the trucking industry,
is in security threats. How well-versed are their truckers,
their management?
The owners are not always necessarily, if there are large
trucking companies on the ground, but they have to rely upon
their truckers and sometimes their individual trucks, of
course, and ownership. And that may be a separate entity.
And how are they trained to protect themselves against
these threats, meaning these truckers and the industry? What
type of background checks do your members conduct on their
prospective drivers? And are your drivers encouraged to report
suspicious activity? And to whom do they make that report?
Mr. Russell. We were one of the first carriers that were
100 percent Highway Watch drivers. All of our drivers--and in
America we have roughly 2,600 drivers--they are all Highway
Watch-certified.
There are 600,000 U.S. truck drivers that are Highway
Watch-certified. And they know what it means. And what it means
is when you see something strange, report it. And there have
been various instances where that has actually caught
perpetrators and prevented terrorism.
So is there a focus? Absolutely. There are about 3 million
trucks on the road. Many of those are just intracity trucks.
But 600,000, and I think we are 2 1/2 years into the program, I
think is outstanding. So is there a focus? Absolutely.
C-TPAT--and there are about 8,000 companies that are
members of C-TPAT--the question that you had asked I think the
fellow from CBP--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Customs and Border Protection.
Mr. Russell. --we have been audited, C-TPAT. We were
audited about 8 months ago or a year ago. And they came in and
did a comprehensive, complete audit.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Customs and Border Protection?
Mr. Russell. I think it was them. I am not sure--it was
U.S. government, part of Homeland Security. I don't know which
department. But we were completely audited. We walk around with
badges. Visitors are not allowed in without a picture I.D.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This is where your trucks are housed?
Mr. Russell. Yes, and all of our terminals. And that is
generally done by virtually every major trucking company that I
know of. And we are maybe 12th or 13th largest. There are many
larger than we.
But there is a total focus on homeland security.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And there are background checks
encouraging them to respond to suspicious activity or
suspicious persons? Is that something that is a culture of the
trucking industry and truckers?
Mr. Russell. We and, I assure you, I believe every fleet
over 100 tractors. There is a system called DAC, which provides
criminal background checks on everybody. That is one of the
systems. There are lot of companies that you could use.
But we haul a lot of high-value goods. We don't hire
felons, people that have been in jail for a felony. We have all
that information. We have background checks.
And we are not alone. The industry does that. You have to
do it. You have to do it to protect our own interests as well
as to protect the country's interests. And it is consistent.
And, you know, to say every trucking company does it, I am sure
that is not true. But every major company does it, and I think
a large percent of the industry does.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We have intertwined safety and security in
this room. I want to make it very clear that the question that
has not been asked and answered thoroughly, from my
perspective, is the question of security.
I applaud companies for their in-depth review of their
employees. I, frankly, believe that people with criminal
backgrounds who have paid their dues to society should have a
right to a second chance. And I don't equate a background in
the criminal situation as one that is a security threat.
Mr. Russell. We hire them in a warehousing position, but we
don't put them on the road, because we fear what a plaintiff
lawyer would do if, God forbid, there was--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Now, that is the other threat that he
speaks about. That is one I can't respond to in this hearing
room.
But let me thank you very much.
Mr. Lungren. Are we both lawyers?
[Laughter.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. That we are.
Mr. Lungren. We plead guilty.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Ward, recount for me again--you gave
us a list: you don't know how they are funded, you don't know
who they are. Give us that list again, in the context of
security. When you ended your testimony, you gave a long list
of--and I put a sentence that said, ``We don't know who they
are.'' But this is in the context of security. Would you put
that list before this committee again of what we don't know?
And would you also explain this concept of private bridges
and the question of who is in charge? I think that is a big
question for this committee: Who is in charge? We may not be
the build-a-bridge committee, but we are concerned about all
transportation modes that impact the people of the United
States of America. So could you answer that question in this
context?
Mr. Ward. If I could start with your second question, there
was a recent story on NPR, and they showed trucks parking under
the bridge. They come and they pay a toll, they park under the
bridge, and the driver walks away. So you have trucks parking
under the busiest commercial crossing in North America, and the
truck driver walks away.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And that bridge is?
Mr. Ward. The Ambassador Bridge.
Another thing that happens is they have fuel trucks park
under the bridge. And being from California, the gentleman, you
will be familiar with what happened there recently. And--
Mr. Lungren. I am. And also, the rebuilding of it was done
by C.C. Myers, who is in my district, who builds bridges faster
than anybody. Just thought I would throw that out there.
Mr. Ward. And during the news article, NPR asked Federal
Highway, and Federal Highway said, ``We have talked to them
about the problem,'' but they don't have authority. Neither
does DOT. Neither does Michigan state police.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Neither does the Department of Homeland
Security, to your knowledge.
Mr. Ward. Obviously not.
Mr. Lungren. This is under the bridge on the American side?
Mr. Ward. Yes, sir. There is a picture in the testimony.
And it is just issues like that. It is the hazardous
material issue. There are a number of issues that are well-
documented in the press, where the owner of the bridge says
that the Federal Government doesn't have authority.
And then to the first question, on the list of what I think
should be required--and I am just looking personally from our
business, in the hazardous material transport business across
water--
Ms. Jackson Lee. And when you say that, I think it is
important, because I want to make sure that we are
jurisdictionally focused on this committee, ``hazardous'' can
equate to terrorism or security threats, because an incident
can occur innocently, meaning an accident, or it can occur
purposely. So let me just yield to you, with that
clarification.
Mr. Ward. And how we do it, we receive three grants from
the Department of Homeland Security and TSA at the beginning,
and we put in an advance notification system where we give law
enforcement every bit of information we have. They have cameras
in our office, in our terminal. And we have made our company
completely transparent. And that is the way we feel the border
should be, that the access to all information should be that of
government.
But nobody has, like I said, nobody has done any vetting of
who we are, after 9/11, come and kick the tires, ``Who are you
guys? Where do you get your money? Who else is in your
business? What kind of companies do you own? Are you
transporting hazardous materials across your own ferry? What is
going on?'' And I think that is a significant gap, that there
is not that knowledge.
And it is not like you would have to create a new
department within DHS. There is only a small number of
privately owned crossings.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you are suggesting we don't have to
eliminate those privately owned crossings but we can begin to
have a more cooperative working relationship to bring to their
attention the importance of security.
Mr. Ward. I would, if I may, I would say no. I would think
that the government should dictate the safety and security
priorities. It shouldn't be an option. And that is what kind of
happens now, which is evident by parking trucks under the
bridge, and the Federal Highway Department says, ``You
shouldn't do that,'' and they do it anyway. That shouldn't be
allowed.
The government should be able to say, ``This is how a
border is operated in the security and safety interests of this
nation.'' I think it is very vital.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You say there are about how many of these
bridges?
Mr. Ward. On the northern border, there are two privately
owned bridges. One of the tunnels is privately operated in
Detroit. We are a private company doing commercial cargo. I
think on the Mexican border there are a number of private
crossing--I mean, it is a small number, but you would think
there would be some mechanism of reporting who you are.
You know, if we sell our company tomorrow, we don't tell
anybody. Shouldn't that be in the interest of this committee,
if we sell to al-Qa'ida USA?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, you raise a question that I think
poses food for thought, and it should suggest to this committee
that we have further investigation to do.
Let me just get Mayor Salinas again.
I want to just focus on trucks coming into Laredo, as they
would come into other cities, and where ICE and CBP drops off
and where you pick up as local law enforcement.
Now, one issue is reimbursement, but I don't want to focus
on that. I want to focus on the fact that you don't get
resources from the Department of Homeland Security for that
expanded time frame that these trucks are in and around your
community. And with the limited information that is given at
the border, in your estimation this poses a severe concern.
Mr. Salinas. Yes. And the concern is that we don't have
enough personnel to address these issues. You know, one thing
that we have done is move the inspections. We want to move the
physical inspection of the trucks away from the bridge. Right
now--and I heard you say, Mr. Lungren, about building bridges--
we are in the process of trying to build two bridges. So we
might want to talk to you for a recommendation. But we want to
get the hazardous material out of the city. Right now they do
go through the city.
But I think the uniqueness of our city is that so many
trucks are crossing through downtown Laredo. A lot of them come
through downtown Laredo. It creates a lot of traffic issues,
but we don't have enough personnel. We have gone after the COPS
program to try to get additional people. But it is really a
very serious issue, because we have this enormous tie-ups of
the traffic. We are concerned about public safety.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So then, if a terrorist manages to cross
the border with a truck full of who knows what, and then they
dilly-dally or go through your city and, for some reason, the
destination that they are going to, something happens in your
city that either stalls them or causes whatever they are trying
to do to happen there, what you are suggesting is that we have
a breach, or we have a break from the moment they cross the
border, and then the burden falls on areas like Laredo.
Mr. Salinas. The local jurisdiction, yes.
That is why we are asking for assistance in that regard,
because really what we really need is people--and technology.
You know, when we are talking about a wall, we already have a
virtual wall in Laredo, which is the Rio Grande. We already
have that. And really, we have asked, and we will continue to
ask, for technology and boots on the ground. And really, that
is what we are really lacking.
But the good thing--there is also a good thing--that the
cooperation between the city and Homeland Security is
excellent, is excellent. But, you know, we--
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think--
Mr. Salinas. We are potentially in a very difficult
situation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think you are vulnerable, and I
acknowledge that.
Let me yield to the gentleman, if he has any interest in a
second round?
Let me indicate that the gentlelady's time is up. I am
probing this because I think there are a lot of questions that
have been raised.
I think, Mr. Ward, it is important to know that we do have
a process, CFIUS, which is a more refined bill that would now
have a more effective process for any domestic sales to
international entities, to be able to judge whether or not
there is a threat to the safety and security of the United
States.
Personally, let me put on the record that I have great
concern on some of the sales of highways. And this is
prospectively. I think one of the entities that you speak of,
obviously, would be grandfathered--it is existing, the private
ownership. But we certainly need to look at ways that we can
work to ensure that the safety, the security laws of the United
States are utilized and covered whether you are private or
whether or not you are public.
I think the question there is, do we have a defined
interest in securing the American people? And that defined
interest supersedes private ownership, in this instance. And
that is a question I think this committee will certainly have
to address.
But we are very grateful for this instructive testimony.
Let it be known, as well, that we do read your testimony.
And we will now go back with a fine-tooth comb, Mr.
Russell, on behalf of the American Trucking Association,
because we would like to ask a myriad of questions about the
coordinating of the DCC and a number of others and how you rely
upon it. We will pose those questions in a letter. We hope that
you will respond quickly to that.
Mr. Ward, we will have additional questions for you.
And, Mayor Salinas, I think you have crafted a very large
question, which, to be honest, Mr. Lungren, I don't believe our
CBP and TSA answered it, this collaboration, this work that
occurs, you know, 10 miles, 50 miles past the border.
Laredo is right on the border, but it is a city that--you
can at least get 10 miles away from the border in your city. Is
that not accurate?
Mr. Salinas. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And I don't know how we create a
relationship there and how we do that, but I am going to raise
the question of why we have not.
And I also want to raise a question as to whether or not we
are really as coordinated as we should be. And certainly, I
think, a picture speaks a thousand words, Mr. Ward, and frankly
the picture that you have shown us, I don't imagine that that
picture is alone. I imagine that there are bridges that we have
that are governmentally controlled that may have the same kinds
of concerns raised.
And it is the jurisdiction of this committee on the
security end of it to ask the hard question and pose, I
believe, prospectively, a legislative response to some of these
deficiencies that we are seeing as we look at border issues and
security that is so necessary, along with trucking.
So, you gentlemen have provided insight, as the first panel
has.
And I would like to thank the ranking member.
Members are in a number of overlapping hearings. So let me
thank you for your valuable testimony, and let me thank the
members who were here for their questions.
The members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses. We will ask you to respond, as I
indicated, expeditiously in writing to those questions.
And, hearing no further business, the subcommittee now
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I: C-TPAT Highway Carrier Security Criteria
----------
3/13/2006
The supply chain for highway carriers for C-TPAT purposes is
defined from point of origin from the yard or where the tractors and
trailers are stored, through pickup at the manufacturer/supplier/
vendor, through to the point of distribution--and recognizes the
diverse business models C-TPAT members employ.
These minimum security criteria are fundamentally designed to be
the building blocks for highway carriers to institute effective
security practices designed to optimize supply chain performance to
mitigate the risk of loss, theft, and contraband smuggling that could
potentially introduce dangerous elements into the global supply chain.
On a quarterly basis, or as circumstances dictate such as during
periods of heightened alert, security breach or incident, Highway
carriers should routinely assess their degree of vulnerability to risk
and should prescribe security measures to strengthen or adjust their
security posture to prevent security breaches and internal
conspiracies. The determination and scope of criminal elements
targeting world commerce through internal conspiracies requires
companies, and in particular, highway carriers to elevate their
security practices, especially if the highway carrier has the exclusive
benefit of enrollment in the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program.
C-TPAT recognizes the complexity of international supply chains and
security practices, and endorses the application and implementation of
security measures based upon risk*. Therefore, the program allows for
flexibility and the customization of security plans based on the
member's business model.
Appropriate security measures, as listed throughout this document,
must be implemented and maintained.
Business Partner Requirements
Highway carriers must have written and verifiable processes for the
screening of business partners, including carrier's agents, sub-
contracted highway carriers, and service providers, as well as
screening procedures for new customers, beyond financial soundness
issues to include security indicators, such as business references and
professional associations.
Security Procedures
Written procedures must exist for screening business
partners, which identify specific factors or practices, the
presence of which would trigger additional scrutiny by the
highway carrier.
For those business partners eligible for C-TPAT
certification (importers, ports, terminals, brokers,
consolidators, etc.) the highway carrier must have
documentation (e.g., C-TPAT certificate, SVI number, etc.)
indicating whether these business partners are or are not C-
TPAT certified. Non-C-TPAT business partners may be subject to
additional scrutiny by the highway carrier.
Highway carriers should ensure that contract service
providers commit to C-TPAT security recommendations through
contractual agreements. For U.S. bound shipments, C-TPAT
highway carriers that subcontract transportation services to
other highway carriers, must use other C-TPAT approved highway
carriers or carriers under direct control of the certified C-
TPAT carrier through a written contract.
Likewise, current or prospective business partners who
have obtained a certification in a supply chain security
program being administered by a foreign Customs Administration
should be required to indicate their status of participation to
the highway carrier.
As highway carriers have the ultimate responsibility
for all cargo loaded aboard their trailer or conveyance, they
must communicate the importance of supply chain security and
maintaining chain of custody as fundamental aspects to any
company security policy.
Conveyance Security
Conveyance (tractor and trailer) integrity procedures must be
maintained to protect against the introduction of unauthorized
personnel and material.
Conveyance Inspection Procedures
Using a checklist, drivers should be trained to
inspect their conveyances for natural or hidden compartments.
Training in conveyance searches should be adopted as part of
the company's on-the-job training program.
Conveyance inspections must be systematic and should
be completed upon entering and departing from the truck yard
and at the last point of loading prior to reaching the U.S.
border.
To counter internal conspiracies, supervisory
personnel or a security manager, held accountable to senior
management for security, should search the conveyance after the
driver has conducted a search. These searches should be random,
documented, based on risk, and should be conducted at the truck
yard and after the truck has been loaded and en route to the
U.S. border.
Written procedures must exist which identify specific
factors or practices, which may deem a shipment from a certain
shipper of greater risk.
The following systematic practices should be
considered when conducting training on conveyances. Highway
carriers must visually inspect all empty trailers, to include
the interior of the trailer, at the truck yard and at the point
of loading, if possible. The following inspection process is
recommended for all trailers and tractors:
1. Tractors:
Bumper/tires/rims
Doors/tool compartments
Battery box
Air breather
Fuel tanks
Interior cab compartments/sleeper
Faring/roof
2. Trailors:
Fifth wheel area--check natural
compartment/skid plate
Exterior--front/sides
Rear--bumper/doors
Front wall
Left side
Right side
Floor
Ceiling/Roof
Inside/outside doors
Outside/Undercarriage
Trailer Security
For all trailers in the highway carrier's custody,
trailer integrity must be maintained, to protect against the
introduction of unauthorized material and/or persons. Highway
carriers must have procedures in place to maintain the
integrity of their trailers at all times.
It is recognized that even though a carrier may not
``exercise control'' over the loading of trailers and the
contents of the cargo, highway carriers must be vigilant to
help ensure that the merchandise is legitimate and that there
is no loading of contraband at the loading dock/manufacturing
facility. The highway carrier must ensure that while in transit
to the border, no loading of contraband has occurred, even in
regards to unforeseen vehicle stops **.
Trailers must be stored in a secure area to prevent
unauthorized access and/or manipulation. Procedures must be in
place for reporting and neutralizing unauthorized entry into
trailers, tractors or storage areas.
The carrier must notify U.S. Customs and Border
Protection of any structural changes, such as a hidden
compartment, discovered in trailers, tractors or other rolling-
stock equipment that crosses the border.
Notification should be made immediately to CBP, and in advance of
the conveyance crossing the border. Notifications can be telephonically
made to CBP's Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Team (A-TCET) at
the port.
Container Security
When transporting a container or trailer for a C-TPAT
importer, a high security seal that meets or exceed the current
PAS ISO 17712 standards for high security seals must be
utilized.
Conveyance Tracking and Monitoring Procedures
Highway Carriers must ensure that conveyance and
trailer integrity is maintained while the conveyance is en
route transporting cargo to the U.S. border by utilizing a
tracking and monitoring activity log or equivalent technology.
If driver logs are utilized, they must reflect that trailer
integrity was verified.
Predetermined routes should be identified, and
procedures should consist of random route checks along with
documenting and verifying the length of time between the
loading point/trailer pickup, the U.S. border, and the delivery
destinations, during peak and non-peak times. Drivers should
notify the dispatcher of any route delays due to weather,
traffic and/or rerouting.
Highway Carrier management must perform a documented,
periodic, and unannounced verification process to ensure the
logs are maintained and conveyance tracking and monitoring
procedures are being followed and enforced.
During Department of Transportation Inspections (DOT)
or other physical inspections on the conveyance as required by
state, local or federal law, drivers must report and document
any anomalies or unusual structural modifications found on the
conveyance. In addition, Highway Carrier management should
perform a documented, periodic, and unannounced verification
process to ensure the logs are maintained and conveyance
tracking and monitoring procedures are being followed and
enforced.
Trailer Seals
The sealing of trailers, to include continuous seal
integrity, are crucial elements of a secure supply chain, and
remains a critical part of a carrier's commitment to C-TPAT. A
high security seal must be affixed to all loaded trailers bound
for the U.S. All seals must meet or exceed the current PAS ISO
17712 standards for high security seals.
Based on risk, a high security barrier bolt seal may
be applied to the door handle and/or a cable seal must be
applied to the two vertical bars on the trailer doors.
Clearly defined written procedures must stipulate how
seals in the highway carrier's possession are to be controlled
during transit. These written procedures should be briefed to
all drivers and there should be a mechanism to ensure that
these procedures are understood and are being followed. These
procedures must include:
Verifying that the seal is intact, and if it
exhibits evidence of tampering along the route.
Properly documenting the original and second
seal numbers.
Verify that the seal number and location of
the seal is the same as stated by the shipper on the
shipping documents.
If the seal is removed in-transit to the
border, even by government officials, a second seal
must be placed on the trailer, and the seal change must
be documented.
The driver must immediately notify the
dispatcher that the seal was broken, by whom; and the
number of the second seal that is placed on the
trailer.
The carrier must make immediate notification
to the shipper, the customs broker and/or the importer
of the placement of the second seal.
Less-than Truck Load (LTL)
LTL carriers must use a high security padlock or
similarly appropriate locking device when picking up local
freight in an international LTL environment. LTL carriers must
ensure strict controls to limit the access to keys or
combinations that can open these padlocks.
After the freight from the pickup and delivery run is
sorted, consolidated and loaded onto a line haul carrier
destined to the cross the border into the U.S., the trailer
must be sealed with a high security seal which meets or exceeds
the current PAS ISO 17712 standard for high security seals.
In LTL or Pickup and Delivery (P&D) operations that do
not use consolidation hubs to sort or consolidate freight prior
to crossing the U.S. border, the importer and/or highway
carrier must use ISO 17712 high security seals for the trailer
at each stop, and to cross the border.
Written procedures must be established to record the
change in seals, as well as stipulate how the seals are
controlled and distributed, and how discrepancies are noted and
reported. These written procedures should be maintained at the
terminal/local level.
In the LTL and non-LTL environment, procedures should
also exist for recognizing and reporting compromised seals and/
or trailers to U.S. Customs and Border Protection or the
appropriate foreign authority.
Physical Access Controls
Access controls prevent unauthorized entry to trucks, trailers and
facilities, maintain control of employees and visitors, and protect
company assets. Access controls must include the positive
identification of all employees, visitors, service providers, and
vendors at all points of entry. Employees and service providers should
only have access to those areas of a facility where they have
legitimate business.
Employees
An employee identification system must be in place for
positive identification and access control purposes.
Employees should only be given access to those secure
areas needed for the performance of their duties.
Company management or security personnel must
adequately control the issuance and removal of
employee, visitor and vendor identification badges.
Procedures for the issuance, removal and changing of
access devices (e.g. keys, key cards, etc.) must be
documented.
Visitors/Vendors/Service Providers
Visitors, vendors, and service providers must present
photo identification for documentation purposes upon
arrival, and a log must be maintained. All visitors and
service providers should visibly display temporary
identification.
Challenging and Removing Unauthorized Persons
Procedures must be in place to identify, challenge and
address unauthorized/unidentified persons.
Personnel Security
Written and verifiable processes must be in place to screen
prospective employees and to periodically check current employees.
Pre-Employment Verification
Application information, such as employment history and
references must be verified prior to employment.
Background Checks/Investigations
Consistent with foreign, federal, state, and local
regulations, background checks and investigations
should be conducted for prospective employees. Once
employed, periodic checks and reinvestigations should
be performed based on cause, and/or the sensitivity of
the employee's position.
Personnel Termination Procedures
Companies must have procedures in place to remove
identification, facility, and system access for
terminated employees.
Procedural Security
Security measures must be in place to ensure the integrity and
security of processes relevant to the transportation, handling,
and storage of cargo in the supply chain. Procedures must be in
place to prevent, detect, or deter unmanifested material and
unauthorized personnel from gaining access to the conveyance
including concealment in trailers.
Security procedures should be implemented that restricts access
to the conveyance and prevents the lading of contraband while
en-route from facilities in international locations to the
United States.
Procedures must be in place to record and immediately report
all anomalies regarding truck drivers to U.S. Customs and
Border Protection. If local, federal, or state laws and union
rules permit, conducting random screening of truck driver
luggage and personal effects should occur.
Documentation Processing
Procedures must be in place to ensure that all
information used in the clearance of
merchandise/cargo, is legible, complete,
accurate, and protected against the exchange,
loss or introduction of erroneous information.
Measures, such as using a locked filing
cabinet, should also be taken to secure the
storage of unused forms, including manifests,
to prevent unauthorized use of such
documentation
Document Review
Personnel should be trained to review manifests
and other documents in order to identify or
recognize suspicious cargo shipments that:
Originate from or are destined
to unusual locations
Paid by cash or a certified
check
Have unusual routing methods
Exhibit unusual shipping/
receiving practices
Provide vague, generalized or
poor information
All instances of a suspicious
cargo shipment should be reported
immediately to the nearest U.S. Customs
and Border Protection port-of-entry.
Bill of Lading/Manifesting Procedures
Bill of lading information filed with CBP
should show the first foreign location/facility
where the highway carrier takes possession of
the cargo destined for the United States.
Additionally, to help ensure the integrity of
cargo received from abroad, procedures must be
in place to ensure that information received
from business partners is reported accurately
and timely.
Cargo
Cargo must be properly marked and manifested to
include accurate weight and piece count.
Customs and/or other appropriate law
enforcement agencies must be notified if
illegal or suspicious activities are detected--
as appropriate.
Physical Security
Procedures must be in place to prevent, detect, or deter unmanifested
material and unauthorized personnel from gaining access to conveyance,
including concealment in trailers. Cargo handling and storage
facilities, trailer yards, etc., must have physical barriers and
deterrents that guard against unauthorized access. Highway carriers
should incorporate the following C-TPAT physical security criteria
throughout their supply chains as applicable.
Fencing
Perimeter fencing should enclose the entire truck yard
or terminal, especially areas where tractors, trailers
and other rolling stock are parked or stored. All
fencing must be regularly inspected for integrity and
damage.
Gates and Gate Houses
Gates through which all vehicles and/or personnel enter
or exit must be manned and/or monitored. The number of
gates should be kept to the minimum necessary for
proper access and safety.
Parking
Private passenger vehicles must be prohibited from
parking in close proximity to parking and storage areas
for tractors, trailers and other rolling stock that
crosses the international border.
Building Structure
Buildings must be constructed of materials that resist
unlawful entry. The integrity of structures must be
maintained by periodic inspection and repair.
Locking Devices and Key Controls
All external and internal windows, gates and fences
must be secured with locking devices. Management or
security personnel must control the issuance of all
locks and keys, to include the locks and keys for
tractors. When parked in the yard, doors to tractors
should be locked and the windows should be closed to
prevent unauthorized access.
Lighting
Adequate lighting must be provided inside and outside
the facility including the following areas: entrances
and exits, parking or storage areas for tractors,
trailers, rolling stock, and fences.
Alarms Systems & Video Surveillance Cameras
Alarm systems and video surveillance cameras should be
utilized to monitor premises and prevent unauthorized
access to vessels, cargo handling and storage areas,
based on risk.
Security Training and Threat Awareness
A threat awareness program should be established and maintained by
security personnel to recognize and foster awareness of the threat
posed by drug smugglers and terrorists at each point in the supply
chain. Employees must be made aware of the procedures the highway
carrier has in place to address a situation and how to report it.
Additionally, specific training should be offered to assist
employees in maintaining trailer and tractor integrity, recognizing
internal conspiracies, and protecting access controls. These programs
should offer incentives for active employee participation.
Information & Technology Security
Password Protection
Measures should be taken to protect electronic assets,
including advising employees of the need to protect
passwords and computer access. Automated systems must
use individually assigned accounts that require a
periodic change of password. IT security policies,
procedures and standards must be in place and provided
to employees in the form of training.
Accountability
A system must be in place to identify the abuse of IT
including improper access, tampering or the altering of
business data. All system violators must be subject to
appropriate disciplinary actions for abuse.
FAST Transponder Controls
Transponders or any technology provided to the highway
carrier by U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
utilize the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program must
be protected against misuse, compromise, theft,
tampering, altering or duplication***.
C-TPAT highway carriers must have documented procedures
in place to manage the ordering, issuance, activation,
and deactivation of FAST transponders. C-TPAT highway
carriers are prohibited from requesting FAST
transponders for any highway carrier company that is
not owned and controlled by the C-TPAT approved highway
carrier.
C-TPAT highway carriers are also prohibited from
requesting FAST transponders for any owner-operator not
under written contract to provide exclusive
transportation services for the C-TPAT highway carrier.
----------------------------------------------------
* Truck Carriers shall have a documented and verifiable process for
determining risk throughout their supply chains based on their business
model (i.e., volume, country of origin, routing, C-TPAT membership,
potential terrorist threat via open source information, having
inadequate security, past security incidents, etc.).
** C-TPAT recognizes the unique situation of the cross-border
cartage industry in the Laredo, Texas corridor and encourages and
endorses carriers to work within the supply chain to make a reasonable
effort to ensure the integrity of trailers, especially during the
cross-border segment.
*** Any misuse of FAST technology, to include loaning FAST
transponders to external carriers will result in suspension or removal
from the FAST Program. FAST is a benefit based on trust and confidence.
Appendix II: Mayor Salinas' Law Enforcement History
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Security Consultant--2002 to Present
Texas Private Investigator Laredo, Texas
Security Consultant in the United States and in the Republic of Mexico.
Conduct Criminal/Civil type Private Investigations. Also Certified
Training Instructor, i.e., Anti-Kidnappings, Interviewing Techniques,
Crisis Management, Crime Scene Matters and Public Relations.
Assistant Legal Attache 1997--2002
Office of the Legal Attache, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City
Violent Crime/Terrorism, Kidnapping and Background Investigations
Coordinator for FBI Fugitive cases in Mexico, with investigative,
liaison and training responsibilities throughout Mexico. Special
emphasis on initiatives in the Mexican states of Guerrero, Hidalgo,
Michoacan, and Morelos. Case Agent for at least 15 kidnappings
throughout Mexico. All victims returned home safely.
Senior Resident Agent 1994--1997
FBI Laredo Resident Agency Laredo, Texas
Senior Manager with direct oversight responsibilities for 16 personnel,
fiscal and personnel matters and a variety of Criminal and Background
Investigations (BI) in the Laredo, Texas/Mexican Border area.
Additional responsibilities included Community Outreach and Media
Relations activities, as well as liaison with senior level U.S. and
Mexican law enforcement counterparts.
Special Agent 1988--1994
FBI Laredo Resident Agency Laredo, Texas
Seasoned Field Investigator specializing in Fugitive, Kidnappings, BI,
Violent Crime and Public Corruption Investigations. Additional
responsibilities included the development and maintenance of liaison
contacts with both U.S. and Mexican law enforcement counterparts.
Special Agent 1975--1988
FBI Washington Field Office Washington, D.C.
Field Investigator for National Security, BI, and Violent Crime
Investigations, to include Terrorism Matters. Credited with the
development of an FBI Hispanic Equal Employment Opportunity Program and
creator and host of a weekly FBI Spanish language radio program
broadcast by 177 radio stations in both the U.S. and Mexico. Foreign
Counterintelligence assignments.
Police Officer 1970--1975
United States Capitol Police Washington, D.C.
Responsibilities included providing physical protection for members of
the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, President, Vice
President and visiting foreign dignitaries. Special Event/Riot Control
duties.
Staff Assistant 1968--1970
Hon. Eligio (Kika) de la Garza, US. House of Reps. Washington, D.C.
Responsibilities included general constituent services casework as well
as constituent correspondence matters. Additional responsibilities
included representing Congressman de la Garza in meetings and hearings.
Also credited with the development of a weekly bi-lingual radio program
for the Congressman, as a means of further reaching out to his
constituency.
Education/Specialized Skills 1970--1974
University of Maryland: BA, Degree College Park, Maryland
Elkins Institute of Broadcasters & Engineers: FCC Broadcaster's License
Dallas, Texas
Skills: Hostage Negotiator; FBI Certified Police Training Instructor-
Crisis Management & Kidnapping; Interviewing & Interrogation; Media;
Public Speaking; U.S.-Mexico Relations; Fluency in Spanish Language;
Excellent liaison contacts in Mexico; Military Police and Foreign and
Domestic Terrorism experience. Licensed Texas Private Investigator and
International Security Consultant and Instructor. Certified in Homeland
Security-American College of Forensic Examiners Institute