[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF U.S. EFFORTS TO TRAIN AND EQUIP POLICE AND ENHANCE THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2008
__________
Serial No. 110-185
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.oversight.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York TOM DAVIS, Virginia
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DAN BURTON, Indiana
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri CHRIS CANNON, Utah
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York DARRELL E. ISSA, California
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
Columbia VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee BILL SALI, Idaho
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JIM JORDAN, Ohio
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
------ ------
Phil Schiliro, Chief of Staff
Phil Barnett, Staff Director
Earley Green, Chief Clerk
Lawrence Halloran, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts DAN BURTON, Indiana
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JIM COOPER, Tennessee KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
PETER WELCH, Vermont VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
------ ------
Dave Turk, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 18, 2008.................................... 1
Statement of:
Johnson, Charles Michael, Jr., Director, International
Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office;
and Frank Ward, Office of the Inspector General, U.S.
Department of State, accompanied by Erich Hart, General
Counsel, U.S. Department of State.......................... 6
Johnson, Charles Michael, Jr............................. 6
Ward, Frank.............................................. 31
Johnson, David T., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State; Major General Bobby Wilkes (retired),
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South Asia,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
Defense; Mark Ward, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator,
ASIA Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development; and
Bruce Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice....................... 66
Johnson, David T......................................... 66
Swartz, Bruce............................................ 105
Ward, Mark............................................... 96
Wilkes, Bobby............................................ 85
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Johnson, Charles Michael, Jr., Director, International
Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
prepared statement of...................................... 9
Johnson, David T., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, prepared statement of................. 69
Swartz, Bruce, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, prepared statement of 107
Ward, Frank, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department
of State, prepared statement of............................ 33
Ward, Mark, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, ASIA
Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development, prepared
statement of............................................... 98
Wilkes, Major General Bobby, (retired), Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for South Asia, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared
statement of............................................... 88
OVERSIGHT OF U.S. EFFORTS TO TRAIN AND EQUIP POLICE AND ENHANCE THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 18, 2008
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tierney, Lynch, Braley, Van
Hollen, Welch, Shays, and Foxx.
Also present: Representative Moran.
Staff present: Dave Turk, staff director; Andrew Su,
professional staff member; Davis Hake, clerk; Andy Wright,
counsel; Rebecca Macke, intern; A. Brooke Bennett, minority
counsel; Nick Palarino, minority senior investigator and policy
advisor; and Benjamin Chance and Todd Greenwood, minority
professional staff members.
Mr. Tierney. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs' hearing entitled,
``Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and
Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan,'' will come to
order.
I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and the
ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening
statements. Without objection, that is so ordered.
And I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Moran from Virginia be
allowed to participate in the hearing. Without objection, that
is so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be
kept open for 5 business days so that all members of the
subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the
record. Without objection, that is also ordered.
Before I begin with the opening statements, I would just
like to acknowledge that we have with us today a group of
individuals from Afghanistan comprising of six members of
Parliament, the Lower House of the Afghan National Assembly,
from the Committee on National Defense and the Committee on
Internal Security, and officials from the Ministry of Interior.
They have been kind enough to speak with us this morning and to
give us some insight from their perspective, which was
incredibly helpful. We are appreciative that they have made the
trip here, spent time with us, and that they are going to spend
some time in the hearing this morning. We welcome them.
At this point we are going to break the normal course of
action, and I am going to ask Mr. Shays to please give his
opening statement first. He has to testify at another
committee, following which he will return to this committee.
Mr. Shays, you are recognized for your opening statement.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy, and
thank you for holding this important and timely hearing on the
U.S.' effort to train and provide equipment to the Afghan
security forces and to build capacity in their justice sector.
Before turning to the subject of this hearing, I want to
highlight a recent development in Iraq. This September, the
entire Iraqi 275-member Legislative Body will move their
offices and meetings to the Saddam Hussein-era Parliament
Building, which is outside the heavily protected international
zone. This move is a further indication of the improved
security situation in Baghdad, in spite of the horrific
bombings that occurred there yesterday, and the progress that
is being made in that country.
It was the men and women of the Coalition Force in Iraq who
brought about this change for the better. They had the help of
the Iraqi Security Force, including the Iraqi Army, Border
Patrol, and the police, who were trained not only by the United
States but also by other members of the international
community.
This brings me to the subject of today's hearing. What
action is the United States taking to develop and sustain the
Afghanistan National Police and the Rule of Law in Afghanistan?
Police forces for any country are essential, but they are
especially important in countries fighting insurgence and
terrorists. A government that cannot provide security to its
citizens will never be able to gain legitimacy.
When subcommittee staff met with the group of Provincial
Council leaders from Afghanistan, they said that the three most
important concerns to the Afghans today are: one, security;
two, educational opportunity; and three, economic progress.
These are inherently connected. Police provide protection in
the villages so that students can go to school, and these
increased educational opportunities afford Afghan children
greater professional and economic choices, but the crucial step
is providing an environment in which students and parents can
feel safe and secure sending their children to school.
As we see in Iraq, if a nation's people do not have a
police force they can trust and depend on, they will look to
others to defend them. We have already seen villages in
Afghanistan starting to turn to the Taliban for protection, and
that is impeding the success of the Afghan government and the
success of the international community.
Just as we train the military and police forces in Iraq, we
are providing training to the security forces in Afghanistan.
With that, Mr. Chairman, let me put the rest of my comments
in the record and I will return as soon as I testify.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Shays. We appreciate your
opening remarks.
We do try to work on a bipartisan basis in this committee.
I think your remarks will be reflected in mine, as well.
I again want to welcome everybody here, our witnesses in
particular. This hearing is a part of a sustained oversight
effort this committee has had.
We have managed to send three congressional delegations to
Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2007. During the most recent
trip, which was just a few months ago, we sat down with
Afghanistan's Minister of Justice, His Excellency Sarwar
Danish. It was the last meeting we had in Afghanistan. It was
later in the day. We had just completed a somewhat ambitious
schedule of travel to Herat within Kabul. We had visits with
U.S. troops and our top generals, with President Karzai and
local Afghan leaders and with U.S. diplomats and development
workers in the field.
Justice Minister Danish, along with just about everybody
else with whom we met during that trip, stressed the vital
importance of police as the first line of security and `the
Rule of Law.
It was also stressed that police cannot be viewed in
isolation. Afghans need professional, honest, and well-trained
judges; they need prosecutors and defense attorneys; they need
a functioning and legitimate legal code; and they need safe and
secure jails.
The Minister laid out the immense challenges that face his
fellow Afghans, and this morning the delegation, who I
mentioned earlier, also cited those challenges. After over 30
years of conflict, Afghans face widespread illiteracy, decades
of exodus of educated Afghans, rampant corruption fueled by the
opium trade, and competing, urgent national priorities.
There appears to be growing consensus forming about the
vital nature of the justice sector in Afghanistan; that this is
absolutely crucial in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and to
bring law and order to all Afghan communities.
The Rule of Law is necessary to successfully take on the
terrorists and the insurgents, to quell the insecurity, and to
root out the corruption that provides space and opportunity for
the Taliban and other extremists, narcotics traffickers, and
war lords to prosper. The International Crisis Group put it
this way in a report entitled ``Reforming Afghanistan's
Police.'' They said, ``Policing goes to the very heart of state
building. . . . A trusted law enforcement institution would
assist nearly everything that needs to be achieved in
[Afghanistan].''
A recent RAND Corp. study commissioned by the Secretary of
Defense on counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan even
placed the importance of capacity building in the police ahead
of that of the Afghan army: ``Building the police in
counterinsurgency should be a higher priority than the creation
of the army because the police are the primary arm of the
government in towns and villages across the country. . . . They
have close contact with local populations in cities and
villages and will inevitably have a good intelligence picture
of insurgent activity.''
The State Department Inspector General's office recently
stressed: ``Confidence that the government can provide a fair
and effective justice system is an important element in
convincing war-battered Afghans to build their future in a
democratic system rather than reverting to one dominated by
terrorists, war lords, and narcotics traffickers.''
The next question that must be asked is: how are we doing?
With us today is the head of the Government Accountability
Office team that just completed an in-depth, on-the-ground
assessment of U.S. efforts to develop Afghan national security
forces, including the Afghan National Police.
The Government Accountability Office offers a stark answer
to the question of how we are doing. Here is what it reports:
Not a single Afghan police unit is ``fully capable of
performing its mission.'' In fact, ``96 percent (296 of 308) of
uniformed police districts and all border police battalions (33
of 33) were rated at the lowest of four possible capability
ratings.'' Less than one-quarter of the police have mentors
present to provide training in the field and verify that police
are on duty.''
``[S]hortages remained in several types of police equipment
that Defense considers critical, such as vehicles, trucks, and
body armor.''
``[T]he slow rate at which the rule of law is being
implemented across Afghanistan inhibits community policing,''
and ``police in the field also face persistent problems with
pay, corruption, and attacks.''
The GAO's specific findings are both shocking and
disheartening, but consistent with other recent analyses. Just
last week, RAND noted that while ``the [Afghan army's]
competence improved in the early stages of the
counterinsurgency campaign,'' the ``same cannot be said for the
[Afghan police], which suffered from a lack of attention, low
levels of initial funding, no initial mentoring, corruption,
and a paucity of loyalty to the central government.'' As of
2007, 65 percent of the Afghan people believed that the Afghan
police force ``is unprofessional and poorly trained.''
The State Department Inspector General recently concluded,
``the continuous turnover of U.S. government staff and the
conflicting priorities among even U.S. government entities, in
the context of the desperate straits of the Afghan justice
sector, indicate that the challenges of the [Rule of Law]
Coordinator will only continue to grow.''
Startlingly, the State Inspector General found that ``no
one [United States Government] source seems to have a clear
picture of the scope of U.S.' expenditure in this field.''
Perhaps the following images are worth 1,000 words when it
comes to the challenges faced by the Afghan prison sector.
[Videotape presentation.]
Mr. Tierney. And these breakdowns in the Afghan justice
sector have real-world consequences. Taliban fighters have
reportedly now taken control of nine villages a dozen or so
miles from last Friday's prison break.
Some commentators have dubbed our efforts in Afghanistan
``the forgotten war.'' Unfortunately, the Government
Accountability Office finds some evidence to substantiate that
moniker. It notes that, ``according to Defense Officials
leading the effort in Kabul, the shortage of mentors is the
primary obstacle in building a fully capable [police] force.''
They also conclude that ``the shortfall in military mentors for
the [police] is due to the higher priority assigned to
deploying military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq.''
Afghan police equipment shortages are also partly
attributable to ``competing priorities, particularly the need
to equip U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly
Iraq.''
Nearly 7 years after the invasion of Afghanistan, I don't
think anyone can take a whole lot of pride in the answer to the
question of how we are doing. But the stakes here are enormous.
Put simply, effective and honest Afghan police and a well-
functioning justice systems are critical to the future of
Afghanistan and to the security of all Americans. We simply
have to do better, and time is of the essence.
We should note also that it is not for lack of Afghans
being intent on trying to come to their own aid. A substantial
number of Afghanistan residents have died as police officers,
and they are being targeted regularly. The extremist forces are
not unconscious of the fact that a better trained police force,
an effective police force, is probably the best thing that
could happen to that country in terms of turning down the level
of extremism and fighting it, and preventing its capacity to
keep interrupting the progress in Afghanistan.
We have a brave people in Afghanistan willing to step
forward. They need assistance being trained and equipped. The
real questions are: how are we going to do that? When can we do
it? And are we on the best path now to get it done?
I look forward to engaging in this critical dialog. While I
think we are all frustrated at the lack of the degree of
capacity we would have liked to have seen over the last 7
years, I hope this subcommittee can play a constructive role in
the path ahead, and look forward to the testimony of all of our
witnesses.
Now we will receive testimony from the first panel that is
before us today.
Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., good morning.
Mr. Charles Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Johnson is the Director of the
International Affairs and Trade Division of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Congress' investigatory arm. Mr. Johnson
has had an extremely distinguished 27-year career with the
Government Accountability Office, having won numerous awards,
including special commendation awards for outstanding
performance, leadership, management, and high congressional
client satisfaction.
I should also add that this subcommittee has kept Mr.
Johnson and his team very busy over the recent weeks and
months. This will be the second time, I think, that you have
testified before this subcommittee just in the last month. We
appreciate your maintaining the pace and the professionalism
that you and your staff have done, and thank them as well as
you for your efforts, and the entire team.
Mr. Frank Ward is the State Department's Deputy Assistant
Inspector General for Inspections. He has inspected the U.S.
mission in Russia and served as deputy team leader for the
inspections in our embassies in Khartoum and Nairobi, the Rule
of Law program in Afghanistan, and the Voice of America news.
Mr. Ward joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1978. We also note
that Mr. Ward's involvement in Afghanistan can be traced back
at least three decades, when he participated--presumably as a
child--in a USAID educational project there.
And Mr. Erich Hart also joins Mr. Ward. I don't know if he
will be presenting testimony or just assisting in the
responses. We welcome you, as well.
It is the policy of this subcommittee to swear you in
before you testify, so I would ask you to please stand and
raise your right hands. If there are any other persons who may
be assisting you in responding to the questions, I ask that
they also stand and raise their hand, as well.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Tierney. The record will please reflect that all of the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
With that, and with the knowledge that your written
comments will appear on the record in full, we have 5 minutes
that we generally allocate for opening statements. We will try
to be lenient and allow you to go over, of course, to a certain
degree without being rude with you going on too long. We want
to bring it to a close. We may tap the gavel, ask you to
summarize and conclude. I know that Members on the panel here
do have a number of questions that they have from reading your
written testimony and from the various reports that are here.
Mr. Johnson, thank you again for being with us. We are
anxious to hear your testimony.
STATEMENTS OF CHARLES MICHAEL JOHNSON, JR., DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE; AND FRANK WARD, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ERICH HART, GENERAL
COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STATEMENT OF CHARLES MICHAEL JOHNSON
Mr. Charles Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to
be here today to discuss the U.S. efforts to assist in
developing the Afghan National Police and the establishment of
Rule of Law in Afghanistan. My statement is based on our
report, being released today, that focuses on U.S. efforts to
develop Afghan national security forces; that is, an Afghan
National Army and an Afghan National Police.
First, I will describe the current status of the ANP, the
Afghan National Police; second, I will address challenges the
United States faces in developing fully capable Afghan National
Police forces, including the Rule of Law; third, I will discuss
Defense and State efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed
plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National Security
force.
Before I discuss findings, I would like to note that
establishing a capable Afghan National Police force and Rule of
Law are considered vital to stabilizing Afghanistan.
U.S. support for the Afghan National Police increased
significantly in 2005 in response to concerns that the security
situation within Afghanistan was getting worse and that the ANP
development was moving too slowly. Since 2005, Defense, with
the support of the State Department, has directed U.S. efforts
to develop the Afghan National Police.
With respect to the current status of the Afghan National
Police, our work revealed that, despite an investment of over
$6 billion, no Afghan National Police force is fully capable of
conducting operational missions without routine assistance or
reliance on the international community. In fact, over three-
fourths are assessed as formed but not yet capable of
operational missions.
Furthermore, our ANP has reportedly grown in number to a
force of nearly 80,000; what the ANP has actually grown is
questionable, given the concerns with the reliability of the
figures reported by the Afghan Minister of Interior.
A September 2007 Defense census noted that about 20 percent
of the Afghan uniformed police and about 10 percent of the
Afghan border police could not be verified in some provinces.
Concerning challenges, we found that several factors
impeded the U.S. efforts to build a capable Afghan National
Police force.
Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the first challenge that we
discovered was that there was a shortage that existed in the
number of police mentors needed to conduct training, evaluate
capability, and verify that the police were actually on duty.
Defense officials identified the shortage of mentors as a
primary obstacle to building fully capable police forces and
referenced competing demands in Iraq.
Second, the ANP continues to encounter difficulties with
some equipment shortages and quality. As you mentioned earlier,
the equipment shortages relate to vehicles, body armor, and
radios, in particular.
Third, the ANP faces a difficult working environment,
including persistent problems with pay, corruption, and attacks
from insurgents, and a weak judicial sector.
In 2005, we reported that few linkages existed between the
Afghan judiciary system and the police, and that the police had
little ability to enforce Rule of Law. Our recent work revealed
that the Rule of Law challenges continue to exist.
In November 2007 Defense began a focused district
development initiative to address some of these challenges.
This new initiative is an effort to train, equip, and deploy
police as a part of a unit rather than as individual police
officers. This is similar to how the Afghan National Army is
being trained and equipped.
We have not fully assessed this particular initiative;
however, the continued shortfalls in the police mentors may put
this initiative at risk.
With respect to planning, despite our 2005 recommendation
calling for a detailed plan for completing and sustaining the
Afghan National Security Forces and a 2008 congressional
mandate requiring similar information, Defense and State have
not developed a coordinated, detailed plan that, among other
things, includes clearly defined roles and responsibilities and
interim milestones for achieving objectives, future funding
requirements, and a strategy for sustaining results achieved.
In the absence of a plan that clearly states the various
agencies' roles and responsibilities, coordination difficulties
have occurred. In the absence of a plan with interim milestones
against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if
current ANP status represents where the United States should
have been at or what goals the United States should have
achieved by 2008.
In the absence of a plan containing a transition strategy
that includes a focus on sustainment, it is difficult to
determine how long the United States may need to continue
providing funding and other resources to complete and sustain
the Afghan National Police.
In summary, after more than $6 billion invested, no Afghan
police unit is assessed as fully capable of carrying out its
mission, the ANP development continues to face several
challenges, and a coordinated detail plan has yet to be
established.
To help ensure coordination and enhance the accountability
of U.S. efforts, our report being released today on U.S.
efforts to build capable Afghan National Security forces
encourages the Congress to consider conditioning portions of
future appropriations relating to the training and equipping of
the Afghan National Security Forces on the completion of a
coordinated plan.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this
concludes my opening statement. I am pleased to take any
questions at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. We are going to have
some questions, I am sure, once the other panelists finish
testifying. I appreciate your willingness to stay for that.
Mr. Ward.
STATEMENT OF FRANK WARD
Mr. Frank Ward. Thank you, Mr. Tierney, Ranking Member
Shays, members of the Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs. Thank you for inviting the State Department
Office of the Inspector General to discuss our inspection of
Rule of Law programs in Afghanistan, which was published last
January.
I am joined by, as you said, by Mr. Erich Hart, our General
Counsel, but also a Retired Air Force Judge Advocate General
officer who is part of our inspection team.
We commend the committee's decision to focus attention on
both Rule of Law and police training activities in Afghanistan.
From what we have observed, we believe that any assessment of
Rule of Law programs requires an understanding of, first,
United States and Coalition strategic conditions in the region;
second, the current state of Afghan civil society, the
interaction of the emerging civil law system, and the customary
or informal legal system; third, the relationship among police,
prosecutors, and judges; fourth, the impact of pervasive
corruption within Afghan institutions; fifth, the way we invest
and how we invest in counternarcotics, police training, and
Rule of Law programs; last, the coordination among multiple
U.S. Government, civilian, and military programs.
Mr. Chairman, we published a series of recommendations for
our Rule of Law programs that underscored basic precepts.
First, the importance of maintaining a senior Foreign Service
officer or senior Federal official with comparable rank and
experience as the Rule of Law Coordinator. We also recommended
that mission leadership be regularly involved in program
strategy and planning.
Concurrently, we recommended that the Department of Justice
senior official in Kabul report directly to the Deputy Chief of
Mission, along with the Rule of Law Coordinator.
We found that a gap in cooperation exists between U.S.
police training programs and the judicial sector programs. We
believe that the Embassy officer with the police training
portfolio should participate effectively in the Embassy Rule of
Law Coordinating Committee, which had not been the case.
To promote better cooperation, coordination with military
task force officers, with Rule of Law responsibilities, we have
encouraged the Rule of Law Coordinator and program experts to
conduct in-depth Rule of Law briefings for incoming military
commanders and Judge Advocate General officers. Additionally,
we recommended that the coordinator should develop a shared
training schedule for use by all training providers in order to
deconflict their work.
We recommended that a 5-year strategic plan is needed to
meet the challenges faced in the formal Afghan justice sector
with its historically low capacity for change, its reputation
for corruption, and its limited reach outside of major cities.
We believe Embassy Kabul, after coordinating with the
Afghan government, U.S. agencies, and international donors,
should determine whether linkage should exist between the
positive aspects of the informal justice sector, which is
understood and trusted by many Afghans, and the formal justice
system.
Rule of Law programs are concentrated in and around Kabul
and a few other Afghan cities, not in the provinces, where 90
percent of Afghans live. Outreach is in its early stages, but
we strongly encourage the Embassy to ensure that Provincial
Reconstruction Team officers are thoroughly briefed by any
Attorney General with Rule of Law responsibilities.
There is a need for an anti-corruption strategy that
crosses all sectors of the Embassy's Rule of Law institutions.
Last, the Director of Foreign Assistance, the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the
Embassy, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
should identify and track all justice sector funds for
Afghanistan. This is crucial so that we know what sources of
funding are being used and where there is a duplication of the
work.
Mr. Chairman, advancing the Rule of Law is a global
objective of the Department of State. It is critical in
Afghanistan, where the absence of a modern, functional
government sustains terrorism and encourages the rapid growth
of the opium trade.
I would be pleased to respond to any of your questions.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shays, and
the committee. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ward follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hart, are you going to offer any testimony, or be
available just for questioning.
Mr. Hart. I am available for questioning.
Mr. Tierney. Great. Thank you for joining us this morning.
Thank you for your testimony, both of you. We will enter
the question period now.
If I might start, I want to start with what appears to be
the lack of strategy, or at least a plan indicating what the
strategy is, right across the spectrum of Rule of Law issues on
that. If each of you would speak to the importance of that and
what the benefit of having a plan at every level would be.
Mr. Charles Johnson. Mr. Chairman, our work, as we
recommended, as I mentioned before, in 2005 that we felt like a
plan was needed. Primarily, given the dual role of the State
Department, as well as Defense, a plan would have helped to
deconflict some situations where we have discovered there has
been some unclear guidance or direction in terms of who is in
charge. In particular, DynCorp is a contractor working on
behalf of the State Department, but the Defense Department is
implementing the program, and at times we have been made aware
that there have been some conflicting priorities, conflicting
guidance in terms of who is in charge of what. So such a plan
would help in that area.
Not only that, more so a plan would help. A plan that
includes interim milestones would be critical and very
important because it would help us know where the Department of
Defense and State should have been in progressing the Afghan
National Police Forces, as opposed to a plan that does not have
interim milestones for which we could assess progress.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Ward.
Mr. Frank Ward. Mr. Chairman, our inspection was focused
primarily on the judicial section, less so on police training.
We had gone out because there was concern of lack of
coordination between the various parties. What we had found was
that the Embassy had been working to create a coordinator
position. In the course of the months since we began our
inspection and since our inspection ended, there has been an
Afghan judicial program has been produced. There was work at
the Rome Conference in the summer of 2007, and now the donor
nations and the Embassy are working on their own strategies in
response to the strategy that had not previously existed but
which now the Afghan government has developed.
Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Johnson, you felt pretty strongly about
this, folks at GAO, as you recommended that Congress withhold
certain amounts of funds unless and until the plan and a
strategy were put forward on that. I think that is an
interesting recommendation. Of course, I see problems coming
from it. If there is a stubbornness in not producing that plan
and the funds are withheld, we get further behind the eight
ball. But I think what it does, certainly, is put some emphasis
and concern on that. We have to consider taking some action on
that if we don't see a plan.
I might just add that in this morning's conversation with
our friends from Afghanistan, the frustration is palpable, not
just in this country and the international community, but
Afghans, as well. It would be helpful for them to know what the
benchmarks are, are we meeting them, how close are we, when
might this be accomplished, and how is progress going. So for
the whole psyche of the international community, including the
Afghans, it would be important to see progress and know how to
measure it and know how to determine whether or not we are on
the right path in that regard. So that obviously is important.
Let me ask you about capacity. In your opinion, having been
investigating this for a while, does the capacity exist in
Afghanistan to actually have the personnel needed to fill the
positions of judges and prosecutors and lawyers and police
officers in a reasonable period of time? What is your
assessment of that?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Well, I think clearly there has been a
report. We raised issues with the reliability of the numbers,
but it shows that there has been some progress in manning, and
that is recruiting individuals to serve as Afghan National
Police. Obviously, there are efforts underway to do some
reforming in that particular area with respect to vetting
individuals, but yes, there have been numbers in terms of the
number of recruits that are available. It is going to take time
to train those individuals, to get them fully capable, as I
noted earlier.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Ward, do you have the same impression?
Mr. Frank Ward. Yes, sir. Indeed, the challenges are great.
The numbers needed are many. The programs have been set in
motion, but we are talking about a very long-term commitment.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Johnson, do you get the feeling that if we
were to get the equipment up to the level where it ought to be,
in terms of being functioning equipment that is usable, and if
we get more police mentors, that could have an immediate impact
in a positive way?
Mr. Charles Johnson. I think the benefit of having the
mentors and equipment that has been deemed to be critical by
the Defense Department, that the United States can make
progress toward this goal. Right now we are of the
understanding that there is some substitution with Eastern
equipment as opposed to Western equipment, which is what we
intended to train them on. That equipment is critical in terms
of getting them to the capacity that we would like to have them
at. But yes, the mentors is the greatest challenge that we have
been made aware of by all levels, including folks in
Afghanistan who are carrying out this mission, that is the
biggest challenge they face.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Thank you both.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. I am happy to have you ask some of your
colleagues first on your side of the aisle.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Lynch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the ranking
member for his courtesy, as well.
First of all, I want to thank the panel for coming before
us and helping work, and also I want to thank the members of
the Jirga, the Afghan Parliament, for coming forward, as well.
We appreciate your input on this issue.
At the chairman's request, I have had an opportunity to
travel to Afghanistan a number of times now, and I just want to
ask Mr. Johnson, as I remember, the responsibility for training
the Afghan National Police was initially assigned, under the
Coalition authority, to the German Army, basically.
Mr. Charles Johnson. That is correct.
Mr. Lynch. They were responsible for doing the initial
training; is that correct?
Mr. Charles Johnson. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Lynch. OK. And I am not throwing the Germans under the
bus here, but I have to admit when I was there it was not going
well. I give them credit that the government of Germany
committed resources with us to help out in the situation in
Afghanistan, but when did the United States--I understand we
had to go in there and take that over at some point. When did
that occur?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Well, in 2005 we began an effort to
contribute more to this effort. That was out of concern that
the progress of building the Afghan National Police Forces and
even the Afghan Security Force as a whole was moving too
slowly. The police, in particular, was the responsibility of
the Germans as the lead nation.
Mr. Lynch. Are we now the lead on this, on the training, or
are the Germans still the lead?
Mr. Charles Johnson. You could pretty much say that we have
significantly increased our efforts and that we have pretty
much taken over the lead on that.
Mr. Lynch. OK. I understand. Because that is a problem. We
had a false start to begin with, and I think it was an effort,
it was a well-intentioned, good faith effort to dole out the
responsibility there, but I have to admit it did not go well.
It sort of parallels the situation that the chairman had us
review in Iraq. We went in there initially and reviewed the
Iraqi police training, and it seems that we are making some of
the same mistakes that we made in Iraq. We had some false
starts there, as well.
But we spent an awful lot of money. We have spent over $6
billion. That is a huge amount of money in that country. And we
have not a single unit that you regard as being adequately
trained and prepared to assume the responsibilities of a
competent police force.
Mr. Charles Johnson. That is actually the Department of
Defense's own assessment of the capability of the police
forces, so even the Department of Defense does not deem them as
being fully capable.
Mr. Lynch. Right. So what is happening? What is happening
here? I understand the projection. Well, the government's
ability to project its authority and influence is limited, and
that in some of the outlying areas and areas of the south,
Helman Province, there are real difficulties on the border. But
elsewhere in the country, where you don't have that influence
coming over the Pakistan border, we don't see any success
there, as well.
So where are the breakdowns in this process? We are
spending a lot of money and we are getting very little for our
effort here. I think, as the chairman pointed out, the American
people are getting pretty tired of this. They want to see some
progress. And I don't believe it is the fault of our friends
here; I think it is really a lack of coordination among the
Multi-National Force there that is not serving them well.
If you can point out where the breakdowns are, that would
be enormously helpful.
Mr. Charles Johnson. I think the biggest breakdown, as we
point out in our report released today, is the lack of
sufficient number of mentors that are needed to train these
individuals, as well as evaluate their capacity, and to also
move them forward in terms of, once the unit is trained, the
trainers and mentors go with that unit and continue to work
with them. So there is an insufficient number of those mentors
that are needed to move along with the units and to continue
making progress in terms of getting these individuals to being
fully capable of operating on their own.
Mr. Lynch. OK.
Mr. Ward, I understand that you really looked at the Rule
of Law in a broader sense and you didn't focus really on the
training, but last time I was there some of the inefficiencies
were very glaring. No. 1, we were paying the Afghan National
Police about $60 to $70 a month. Al Qaeda was paying their
folks almost $300 a month. The same situation on the other side
of the border. I happened to travel up into the Waziristan area
on the Pakistan side, where the Pakistani government was paying
their Frontier Corps about $120 a month, when the pay arrived,
if it arrived, and then, again, Al Qaeda and some Saudi money
there was able to pay the insurgents almost three times that
amount.
So what are we doing about paying the Afghan National
Police? The problems are multiple, but they don't have the pay,
so we are not getting the quality of people that might be
helpful in this situation. We are having problems with
equipment. We have another hearing next week on the AEY
contract where the Defense Department was providing VietNam era
munitions and equipment to the Afghan National Police through a
questionable contract.
We are not able to establish the respect among the Afghan
population for the police force, so there is a complete
breakdown there.
What are we doing now about those aspects of this training
process?
Mr. Charles Johnson. There is an effort underway to pay
reform currently and to make the pay of the Afghan National
Police comparable to that of the Afghan Army. I think that is
part of their current initiative they have.
I mentioned the focused district development initiative, in
particular. I guess, in addition to the pay, what they are
doing is training and equipping these units to move out, as
opposed to as individuals. But as an entire unit, so I think
again this all goes back to having a sufficient number of
mentors to get that done, and also to have the reform effort
completed, as well as the vetting that needs to be done. The
pay and rank reform is needed. That is something we are also
looking at, as well.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much, Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. I am yielding back, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
say that I think that the confidence of the people in this
government is directly related to their confidence in their
local police force, and so I think we have a serious problem
then.
I yield back.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Van Hollen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Van Hollen. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this important hearing. Thank you to our witnesses.
If you look at the National Intelligence Estimates, if you
look at the statements by the Director of National
Intelligence, they are very clear that the No. 1 terrorist
threat to the United States remains an attack that originates
out of that area along the Afghan-Pakistan border, especially
from the FATA areas, the Federal Minister tribal areas in
Pakistan, where Al Qaeda continues to have refuge and sanctuary
and the Taliban continue to be very active, as we have seen in
recent weeks.
Despite the fact that remains, according to our
intelligence agencies as publicly reported, the No. 1 threat to
the United States, we continue to see the results of a
diversion of resources and attention from the problems in
Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iraq.
If I could just ask the witness, Mr. Johnson from the GAO,
to turn again to this question of mentors, because it has been
clear in your statements, it is clear in your report, that the
lack of mentors has been one of the biggest problems in
establishing a viable police force; isn't that correct?
Mr. Charles Johnson. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Van Hollen. OK. And as I read your statement here in
your report, it says, ``According to Defense officials--'' and
I want to stress the basis of that statement is reporting from
Defense officials to you--``the shortage of available police
mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct
training and evaluation and to verify that police are on
duty.''
Then you go on to say, ``According to Defense officials,
the shortfall in military mentors for the ANP is due to the
higher priority assigned to deploying U.S. military personnel
elsewhere, particularly in Iraq.''
If you could just expand on what Defense officials told
you, because the administration has often dismissed criticisms
that our energy and resources folks in Iraq has taken away from
our focus in Afghanistan, but this seems to be very clear
evidence. This is sort of hard, empirical data that there are
real consequences to the fact that we have diverted lots of
resources in Iraq when we never finished the job in
Afghanistan, and again our NIE and intelligence folks tell us
that is where the No. 1 threat emanates from.
Mr. Charles Johnson. Congressman, that statement actually
came from Defense officials, and particularly from Defense
officials in Kabul at the Command Security Transition Command,
in particular, CSTC-A, made that sort of the point that they
wanted to emphasize in terms of why there was a shortage of
mentors. We also heard that, here in headquarters at the
Pentagon, there were competing demands with Iraq.
We were also informed that there has not been a denial of
those resources, but yet there is a priority. In essence, Iraq
is the priority with respect to the resources. There are
resource limitations here.
Mr. Van Hollen. Were they able to quantify it at all for
you? In other words, if you didn't have as many folks in Iraq,
you would be able to fully supply the mentors necessary to the
situation in Afghanistan?
Mr. Charles Johnson. That response was not specifically
provided. In essence, we were informed that providing resources
to Iraq has had some impact on the resources needed for
Afghanistan.
Mr. Van Hollen. Right.
Mr. Charles Johnson. And that is the mentors, in
particular.
Mr. Van Hollen. Right. I would encourage my colleagues.
There is a recent book published by author Ahmed Rashid, who is
a Pakistani author. Its title is Descent into Chaos. The
subtitle: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building
in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. It is a scathing
criticism of the U.S. approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan in
terms of rebuilding the infrastructure there following the
decision to go in there, which I think there was consensus in
this country that we should go after the Taliban and Al Qaeda
in the aftermath of 2001, but it chronicles in great detail the
failures, including the failures in this area of rebuilding the
Afghan National Police, because obviously part of building the
stability in the country requires that you feel somewhat safe
when you go out in the neighborhood.
If you could talk a little bit about the situation outside
of Kabul, where there has been this ongoing question about
whether the United States has really taken on the war lords,
the folks that control a lot of these regions, and whether that
has been an impediment to being able to build an independent
police force in those more remote areas.
Mr. Charles Johnson. We did not specifically look at
Operation Enduring Freedom or the U.S. forces and their efforts
in terms of combat missions, but we were made aware that the
security situation over time has gotten worse and, as I pointed
out earlier, since 2005 it has deteriorated, and there are
concerns with respect to attacks from insurgents on the Afghan
National Police, in particular. But we have not done work
specifically looking at our own forces' efforts.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Van Hollen.
Does that book give ideas on how to resolve the situation,
as well?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Sir?
Mr. Tierney. Does that book give ideas on how to resolve
the situation, as well? Could we get the author up here?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Actually, it is an excellent book and
it talks about the mis-steps in U.S. policy in Afghanistan. It
focuses a lot on the fact that we have allowed the Taliban to
have the sanctuary up in the Fattah areas of Pakistan. But I
think he would be willing to do it. I think it would be well
worth having him.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Charles Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Braley, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Braley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to take a slightly different tack away from the
policing function and talk about the broader concept of respect
for the Rule of Law. We know one of the fundamental
distinctions that separates our democratic society from other
societies around the world is the longstanding tradition in
this country of maintaining respect for the Rule of Law over
the influence of individuals who may have positions of power
and influence at a given point in our country's history.
One of the disturbing things that we have seen in Pakistan
is an attack on an independent judiciary in a region where we
share some of the same concerns about trying to develop
effective policing systems that are going to be backed up by a
competent judiciary that has an independent role in the
functioning of its government, and where the citizens of that
country have a uniform respect for the process that leads to
justice, not just the individuals responsible for enforcing it.
So, Mr. Ward, I want to start with your statement where you
said the confidence that the government can provide a fair and
effective justice system is an important element in convincing
war-tattered Afghans to build their future on a democratic
system rather than reverting to one dominated by terrorists,
war lords, and narcotics traffickers.
What is the current state of the Afghan judiciary to be
able to deliver that type of public confidence that, when
citizens are called to justice before that judiciary, they are
going to be free from the types of influences that have long
played in countries that are trying to aspire to a better
democratic society?
Mr. Frank Ward. Well, Congressman, it is a situation where
they are struggling up from the bottom. As you know, there had
been a functioning system in the past. It was destroyed for 30
years of civil disorder. Now it is in the process of
rebuilding.
A few years back there were surveys that indicated very
little support, very little confidence in the system. In recent
months, since the beginning of our inspection last October,
there have been some indications that the Afghan public is
beginning to look on the formal system as viable. The numbers
are still low, but apparently rising. So the new effort to re-
establish a formal system is working in the right direction,
but it is an uphill fight.
Mr. Charles Johnson. And I would like to add that both the
Department of State and the USAID are conducting training
programs, training for prosecutors. There is also training for
judges, etc., because, again, for 30 years the country was in
war footing.
I would also like to mention that one of the issues is that
the formal system covers basically Kabul and some major
metropolitan areas, so the U.S. Institute of Peace, working
together with the Afghan government, is looking at the
desirability of perhaps linking certain aspects of the informal
justice system with the formal system.
Mr. Braley. Well, I practiced law for 23 years before I was
elected to Congress, and, like many of my colleagues, I was
inspired and motivated by the courage shown by the members of
the Pakistani bar and judiciary in facing up to the challenges
during the crack-down on their independent judiciary.
What are we doing to encourage public/private partnerships
to create exchange programs to bring Afghan jurists, Afghan
attorneys, prosecutors, and other people in the justice system
here to be part of mentoring programs and getting our people
who are wanting to contribute in some meaningful way, who have
the resources to make a positive impact? Right now, I am
hearing very little about opportunities that are available to
them to help provide the type of mentoring to get this system
in a position that is going to be meaningful to help the people
of Afghanistan.
Mr. Frank Ward. Congressman, I am going to defer largely to
our colleagues from the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, because they have several of those
programs in operation, training programs in-country and the
justice sector, and external programs. They do, as does USAID
and also the U.S. Embassy, international visitor type exchange
programs. There are also training programs at different
American institutions where Afghan attorneys, prosecutors have
gone for LLM degrees, as well.
But let the people who are funding those talk about them. I
think they are on the second panel.
Mr. Braley. All right.
Mr. Johnson, in the report that you have been talking about
there was a conclusion that establishing a working judiciary in
Afghan--
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Braley, is this going to be a short
question?
Mr. Braley. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. You are eating up Mr. Welch's 5 minutes.
Mr. Braley. Well, I don't want to do that.
Mr. Tierney. If you have a short question I will let you go
forward.
Mr. Braley. I just wanted to ask about the comment that
establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the
Rule of Law as a prerequisite for effective policing, and the
report talks about corrupt judiciary. Can you expand upon what
efforts are being taken to restore confidence in the public
that the judiciary is not a corrupt system?
Mr. Charles Johnson. We did not specifically look at the
judicial system in this work we did. We touched on it
previously in a 2005 report that we issued. At that time we
noted that it was important to have that judicial pillar stood
up at the same time you are standing up the security pillar.
Obviously, if you have police who are out doing their job,
they need to have a judicial system that is going to support
that, but we did not specifically look at the judicial sector.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. I think our next panel
perhaps will be able to provide some light on that, as well.
Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
witnesses, and I especially want to thank our guests from
Afghanistan.
Mr. Johnson, you noted, I gather--I regret I wasn't here to
hear your testimony, but I have read the presentations--that
the GAO has not fully assessed the focused district development
program, but your opinion, as I understand it, or the GAO
opinion, was that the continuing shortfall in police mentors
may put this effort at risk.
How do we get police mentors? Who provides them? And what
is the problem in getting them there?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Well, the police mentors are military
personnel on the military side, but there are also civilian
mentors. I guess I should note that the civilian mentors pretty
much are at over 90 percent, and those are provided by DynCorp.
Mr. Welch. So those are contractors?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Welch. What do we pay them?
Mr. Charles Johnson. I am not sure if I have that figure.
We don't have that figure, sir, but I think it is roughly a
little over 500 DynCorp mentors.
Mr. Welch. I am just trying to get a sense of the cost,
too, as we go along. We pay DynCorp an amount of money per
mentor. What is it?
Mr. Charles Johnson. I am not precisely sure. We can get
you that information.
Mr. Welch. All right.
Mr. Charles Johnson. We can get that information to you.
Mr. Welch. What do we pay a military mentor, or what is the
cost to the military?
Mr. Charles Johnson. I think the military is based on the
salary that they are being paid as a soldier.
Mr. Welch. And it would be in the range of what?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Again, I would have to get that, as
well.
Mr. Welch. OK. That would be great to get that back. What
do we pay DynCorp for this job, what do we pay the military
person for that job?
Mr. Charles Johnson. OK.
Mr. Welch. And what is the status of us being able to have
mentors? Your conclusion, as I understand it, is that without
mentors this program is unlikely to be successful?
Mr. Charles Johnson. And that is what we have been told by
the individuals in-country and in the Department of Defense,
that there are challenges with respect to getting enough
mentors and because of competing demands, as we noted earlier.
Because of competing demands with respect to Iraq, there have
been challenges to getting an adequate number of mentors to
meet the requirements that they have.
Mr. Welch. All right. And we need those in order for this
focused district development program to have any chance of
success, correct?
Mr. Charles Johnson. That is correct, based on what the
Department of Defense says. There is what is called a mentor
team, that is, mentors made up of a certain number of mentors:
civilian mentors, as well as military mentors, as well as
individuals who are also needed for force protection, so they
go out as a team. As I noted earlier, the focused district
development is a unit-based training, as opposed to individual-
based training, and so the number of mentors is important,
having that complete set of mentors to go with those teams as
they move out into the different provinces.
Mr. Welch. So we have 500 DynCorp mentors now, or that is
the projection, right?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Correct.
Mr. Welch. And what do we expect? How many military mentors
will we have?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Roughly the mentor requirement on the
military side is roughly 2,400. There are roughly about 746
military mentors that have been actually assigned, which is
about 32 percent of what is the requirement. On the civilian
side, it is roughly 550, and 540 have been assigned, so close
to 98 percent. So there is a shortage on the military side in
terms of military mentors.
Mr. Welch. And these mentors are not fluent in the local
language?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Well, part of the mentoring team is to
have--going forward with the focused district development,
there are two linguists assigned to the mentor team.
Mr. Welch. Right. So they have translators.
Mr. Charles Johnson. Right.
Mr. Welch. But the mentor himself or herself is not fluent?
Mr. Charles Johnson. I am not sure if that is the case.
Mr. Welch. What I understand is that the State Department's
written testimony says that these shortfalls in the police
mentors have resulted in roughly one-fourth of the police
mentor teams required for the focused district development
program being staffed.
Mr. Charles Johnson. That is consistent with what we have
been told.
Mr. Welch. Yes. And what are your thoughts on how those
shortfalls will impede the ability to implement the program?
Mr. Charles Johnson. There are concerns with respect to
making progress in getting these individual police forces to be
fully capable of turning out their mission, to move from the
different--
Mr. Welch. So bottom line, then: in order to have any
chance for this plan to be successful, we would have to ramp up
the funding to have the number of mentors required?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Well, I am not certain that funding is
the issue, as opposed to having the human resources available
to fill those requirements. I think the funding, from what we
understand, is there and has been provided. It is a matter of
having the resources available, which now are not available
because they are in other priority areas.
Mr. Welch. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. The gentleman makes a good point. I
might just add that our guests this morning were also pointing
out if you don't have the military mentors who have part of the
responsibility to provide the security once you go out, as you
get further from the urban areas and you try to put teams out
there, you are just exposing the police that you have trained
to being attacked by the extremists, or whatever, and, of
course, that is going to result in death.
So a question that we will have for our later panel is how
are we going to get the capacity up there, so there are enough
military mentors going out with those people, so that they are
not just exposed. And if that continues the way it is going,
how do you entice people to become police officers if you are
going to continue to put them in that type of position?
Thank you.
Mr. Shays, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Afghanistan is a huge country with 32 million people.
I apologize to you, Mr. Ward. Your issue is very important
about justice, but I am going to use my 5 minutes just to
continue as it relates to security.
I have spent all my time in my visits in Iraq, not
Afghanistan, but as I hear this story and I read this story I
feel like it is just the same story being repeated. But I want
to first say Iraq is an American operation. Afghan is a NATO
operation. We are talking about the EU that has a gross
domestic product of $16.8 trillion, the United States has $13.5
trillion. They have a bigger gross domestic product, and we are
spending our primary focus in Iraq. Their job is in
Afghanistan, and we are a partner there as part of NATO.
One, I want to ask you, Mr. Johnson, did you just look at
this from the standpoint that it is our responsibility, or is
it NATO's responsibility, which we are a part of?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Our primary focus was on the larger
job, which looked at the U.S. efforts to develop fully capable
Afghan National Security Force, the army and the police, so we
did look at the U.S. efforts.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask this, though: is it NATO's
responsibility or is it our responsibility? And are we there as
a partner with NATO?
Mr. Charles Johnson. We are there as a partner; however, we
do have the lead in developing a fully capable Afghan National
Army, and we have somewhat taken more of a lead role in
developing the police.
Mr. Shays. It is not the matter we have taken the lead; we
have taken it because there is default, as I see it. I mean,
this is their responsibility. The reason there is default is
there are only four European countries that are willing to have
their soldiers in harm's way. Now, it is one thing for them to
criticize us in Iraq and say we shouldn't have been there. That
is one thing they can say. But they can't say that about
Afghanistan, and even there they are saying we have to do the
heavy lifting.
I wrestle with that. I wrestle with the fact of why should
we have to when there are literally many, many countries in the
EU, there are many countries in NATO. They have the financial
capability and they are not stepping up to the plate.
What I think I am hearing you say is, because they aren't,
we have to. That is kind of what I am wondering.
Now, what I really wonder, as well, is, now, just speaking
with our part of this equation, what I wrestle with is this: in
Iraq we said we were training their police, their border
patrol, and their Army, but we weren't training enough of their
police, their border patrol, and Army. How many are we training
in a country that is very large, with a population of 32
million people? How many police do we think we need? Is there
any study that says what we need? And do we have that number?
And are we trying to reach that number?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Well, the number was based on an
agreement, again, with the Coalition partners, as well as the
Afghan government, so that number stands now at an authorized
level of 82,000.
Mr. Shays. I mean, isn't that a joke? Eighty-two thousand
are going to police 32 million people? I mean, I think that has
to be absurd. What did you think?
Mr. Charles Johnson. We did not have an opinion on the
actual number, because the number was reached as a part of the
agreement.
Mr. Shays. Well, what is the point of training people
really well but only ending up with 80,000? By the time you
spread them out among the population, they are going to have no
critical mass? I mean, I wonder what we have in terms of police
just in New York City. New York City has 19 million people. The
thought that we would only have 80,000 police throughout all of
New York State would be laughable.
I am just going to start by saying I think the number is
absurd.
Mr. Charles Johnson. OK.
Mr. Shays. And I am going to have to have someone explain
to me how we arrived at that number. Is that just that is the
political number we could reach, or the number we were willing
to pay? What is the answer?
Mr. Charles Johnson. It is the number that has been reached
as a part of the agreement with the Coalition, as well as the
Afghan government.
Mr. Shays. Based on?
Mr. Charles Johnson. I believe it started with the Bahn
Agreement.
Mr. Shays. But do you have any documentation that says that
was based on a study that said that was what they needed?
Mr. Charles Johnson. No, I did not, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Shays. I hope you will stay for
the next panel, because that is a great place to put that
question, and the answer would be interesting.
Mr. Moran, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moran. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Incidentally, a terrific job on C-SPAN Morning Journal this
morning on this very subject.
Before I get to my question, my good friend Mr. Shays
raises an interesting issue, but we recall we had a similar
problem in the Balkans. We had to take the lead and NATO filled
in after we had stabilized the situation, but invariably, you
know, it is our military leadership that is going to have to
put their chin up.
What I wanted to ask about, it seems to me if we are going
to have a sustainable judicial structure it is going to have to
be something of a hybrid. Now, Mr. Ward talked about the
informal system of justice, but we are really talking about
tribal codes that have developed over centuries. They may
differ from tribe to tribe, but there are similarities. It
seems to me there is going to have to be some integration. We
can't just impose the western canon of law on these tribal
areas and think it is going to be readily adopted.
On the other hand, it gives me pause to even suggest that,
because we read about cases of women who have been gang raped
whose only offense was that they were members of another tribe.
We read about under-aged girls being given away to satisfy
debts. I mean, those things are just anathema to our sense of
most basic human rights. But, on the other hand, there is going
to have to be some compromise. We can't just impose our system
of jurisprudence in areas that have their own system of
justice. And the personnel have developed credibility and
leadership in terms of rendering that justice, so they have to
somehow be incorporated, it seems to me.
I wonder if you, Mr. Ward, and perhaps Mr. Johnson, if he
has any thoughts about that, would address that so that we can
have a truly sustainable judicial structure after we have
eventually leave.
Mr. Frank Ward. If I may, Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Yes.
Mr. Frank Ward. Everybody understands that whatever system
is built has to be Afghan driven. I mentioned earlier that the
U.S. Institute of Peace was looking at the feasibility of
integrating certain parts of the informal sector. As you noted,
there are many different parts to that, also, but integrating
that with the formal sector, they are working very closely with
the Afghan government.
Many people have reservations because of, as you mentioned,
some of the human rights abuses. But what people are looking at
is linking the more positive aspects of some of these informal
sectors with the formal judicial system, which right now, as I
said, only exists in Kabul and some other major areas.
Some of the ideas that are being looked at are limiting the
linkage to discrete issues, and perhaps whatever decisions are
made by these particular bodies, such that these decisions
would be appealable to a formal system, so that would be
somewhat of a check.
I believe the U.S. Institute of Peace just concluded their
6-month study and will be issuing a report, and I think that
will answer a lot of your questions.
Mr. Moran. Thank you. That is helpful.
Did you want to say anything, Mr. Johnson?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Well, what I can add is that the
gentleman is correct that the United States has been working
with the Afghan government as part of the Afghan national
development strategy, in which the United States is advising
the Afghan government.
Mr. Moran. Thank you.
It was clear, Mr. Chairman, particularly with regard to the
trip I had the privilege of going on with you and the majority
and minority members and staff of the committee, that so much
of our problem is the lack of civil society, and it is the lack
of justice, if you will, or reliable, predictable form of
justice that has to be implemented initially by the police, not
by the military, but by the police who live there in the
communities. Then people can rely on justice being served on a
consistent basis.
I know you have emphasized that, Mr. Chairman. I thank you
for doing it. I thank you for giving this issue the priority it
deserves.
I yield back.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Moran. Thank you for joining us
on our trips there, for the work that you do on the
Appropriations Committee in this regard, as well.
Ms. Foxx, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe that Mr. Shays has additional questions he would
like to ask, and I would like to yield my time to him.
Mr. Tierney. The gentlewoman yields to Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I thank you for yielding.
Mr. Johnson, we have the overall number. Where are those
police dispersed?
Mr. Charles Johnson. The police are dispersed throughout
different provinces, in terms of once they are trained and
dispersed as a unit, it is in various provinces throughout
Afghanistan.
Mr. Shays. What is the smallest unit of police that exists?
Mr. Charles Johnson. We don't have the actual number of the
smallest unit of police.
Mr. Shays. How do they integrate with the National Security
Forces, the military?
Mr. Charles Johnson. I think there may be some provinces
where you may have police as well as Army located in the same
particular region or same area.
Mr. Shays. In this undertaking, we have spent $10 billion
to develop the Afghanistan National Army since 2002, which is
not a lot of money--it is a huge amount of money, but in the
realm of a country where you are creating a whole new Army,
that is a small amount, and if you compare what we have done in
Iraq it is an extremely small amount--and $6 million for the
Afghan National Police. What have our allies invested in
training the Army and police?
Mr. Charles Johnson. I don't think we have that figure
either, sir, but we do know that our allies are paying the
police salaries, although we are contributing to that
particular trust fund.
Mr. Shays. I think probably the questions that I then have
I will just ask of the next panel, but I am just struck with
the fact that you should be able, because you would have these
documents from the military, to tell us why 80,000 is the
number that makes sense based on the needs that exist. Given
that doesn't seem to be available, it is going to be very
interesting to hear what we hear from the next panel.
Mr. Tierney. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Shays. With that, I would yield back.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Just as we close down here, in your report, Mr. Johnson,
you note that the Afghan National Police has reportedly grown
in number to nearly 80,000 personnel. Concerns exist, however,
about the reliability of this number. What district do you get
that estimate from, and what concerns exist?
Mr. Charles Johnson. The 80,000 number is actually reported
by the Minister of Interior, and that number we obtained in-
country. We get monthly reports that we have received from the
Department of Defense. The concerns are U.S. Government
concerns, as well as the U.N., which has concerns with the
accuracy and reliability of that number. Again, that is based
on going out and trying to validate the accuracy of that
number, as I reported earlier. In some census that were done,
there was an inability to validate the numbers in some random
samples that were done. I think there is more of an effort
underway under the reform efforts to take a closer look at that
particular issue.
Mr. Tierney. Just so that everybody appreciates the
magnitude of what we are doing here, there are 433 Afghan
National Police units: zero are fully capable, 3 percent are
capable with Coalition support; 4 percent are only partially
capable; 77 percent are not capable at all; and 16 percent are
not formed or not reporting.
Mr. Charles Johnson. That is correct.
Mr. Tierney. We will look to the next panel for some
explanations of what that means and where we go from here and,
as Mr. Shays indicated, whether or not the 80,000 is even
enough if we were to get to that point.
Mr. Shays, do you have one final question?
Mr. Shays. I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Sure.
Mr. Shays. You report states that the field level plan
developed by the Combined Security Transition Command
Afghanistan in January 2008 is inadequate because it ``is not a
substitute for Defense and State policy guidance needed for
near- and long-term resource planning.'' There is an
assumption, it seems to me, that you implicitly believe that it
is the Defense and State Department's responsibility. I just
want to know, before we get to State and Defense, why you make
that assumption?
Mr. Charles Johnson. We acknowledge in our full report the
field level plan that has taken place. There are some
deficiencies in that plan in terms of things we see that are
critical. One, the clear role of the State Department needs to
be identified since they are a partner, in particular, in
training the police, in particular. Also, we are looking for
interim milestones, because I noted earlier it is important to
be able to measure progress, which we have been--
Mr. Shays. I understand that part. I am getting at another
point. I will just try to make it one last time. You say it is
inadequate, the Security Transition Command Afghanistan January
2008 is inadequate because it is not a substitute for Defense
and State policy guidance needed for near- and long-term
resource planning. I am trying to get at the point: why is it
our responsibility if it is NATO's?
Mr. Charles Johnson. It is our responsibility because we
are investing U.S. dollars, and we have invested over $6
billion, and there are plans to invest additional U.S. dollars,
so in terms of us spending that money and undertaking an
effort, it is important that we have a plan for how we are
going to utilize our own funds, and also for congressional
oversight. We think that is important to know where we should
have been by now, where--
Mr. Shays. I will put it in my words. Because NATO isn't
doing its job properly, you are basically saying it is up to
State and Defense to step in?
Mr. Charles Johnson. Given that we have taken the lead, it
is important that we do have a plan that lays out where we are
planning to go.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Charles Johnson. And you are correct that there are
concerns with NATO's role.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Johnson, as I understand it, we have the
lead in this now, so it is an opportunity for us to plan and
strategize about how all the resources will be applied
hopefully in a more effective way.
Mr. Charles Johnson. We have taken the lead.
Mr. Tierney. Right. Thank you.
I want to thank you, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Ward, and Mr. Hart,
very much for your testimony here today, both written and oral,
and appreciate the good work that all of you do. It helps our
committee do its job, as well. We appreciate that.
We will take about a minute recess here as we allow this
panel to go about its way and invite our next panel up for
testimony.
Thank you again.
Mr. Charles Johnson. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you for joining us, to all of our
witnesses here. I note that we have yet another Johnson and we
have another Ward. It is like deja vu all over again, except
different on that, as Yogi Berra would say.
We are now going to receive testimony from our second panel
of witnesses. Our first will be Ambassador David T. Johnson,
who is the Assistant Secretary of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Prior
to this most recent appointment, Ambassador Johnson served as
Deputy Chief of Mission for the U.S. Embassy in London. From
1995 to 1997 he was the Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign
Affairs at the White House and Spokesman for the National
Security Council. Ambassador Johnson joined the U.S. Foreign
Service in 1977.
Major General Bobby Wilkes is retired. He serves as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central Asia in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. In this capacity he is
responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on all
aspects of policy formulation for U.S. bilateral relations with
central Asian countries. General Wilkes is a graduate of the
U.S. Air Force Academy and completed his career as a Major
General.
Mr. Mark Ward is the Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator
in the Asia Bureau at the U.S. Agency for International
Development. He has the principal responsibility for the USAID
programs in south-central and east Asia. He has also chaired
the agency's Tsunami, Pakistan Earthquake, and Lebanon
Reconstruction task forces. Mr. Ward's most recent overseas
post was as a Mission Director in Pakistan from 2002 to 2003.
Mr. Bruce Swartz is the Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for the Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice. He
previously served as Deputy Independent Counsel for a Housing
and Urban Development corruption investigation, as counsel for
international law enforcement detail to Britain's Serious Fraud
Office, and as Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General.
Again, we want to thank all of you for being here with us
today. We especially want to thank you for your continued
public service in so many different respects. Your experiences,
and your first-hand knowledge of the work that you are doing
here, are going to help us have a robust and hopefully
constructive discussion this morning, so welcome.
Ambassador, if we could please start with you, you are
recognized for 5 minutes for your opening statement.
Actually, please stand and raise your right hands. We do
swear in our witnesses, when the chairman remembers.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Tierney. The record will please reflect that all of the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Now, Ambassador Johnson, that you are fully sworn and ready
to go, your testimony, please.
STATEMENTS OF DAVID T. JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MAJOR GENERAL BOBBY WILKES (RETIRED),
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SOUTH ASIA, OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MARK
WARD, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, ASIA BUREAU, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; AND BRUCE SWARTZ, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
STATEMENT OF DAVID T. JOHNSON
Ambassador David Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other
distinguished members of the committee. We appreciate the
opportunity you are giving us to come before you to discuss two
of the State Department's critical missions in Afghanistan
today: to train and equip the Afghan National Police and to
develop its justice system.
I have submitted a written statement that I will summarize.
Mr. Chairman, my colleague, Ambassador Tom Schweich, had
the pleasure to brief you, Congressman Moran, and your staff
earlier this past April, and I look forward to continuing that
discussion here today. Tom has served as the U.S. coordinator
for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan since
March 2007 and leaves this week to return to the private
sector. I wanted to take a moment to thank him for his service
and note the contribution he has made to our country.
Mr. Chairman, following the liberation of Afghanistan in
2001, nearly three decades of armed conflict had left much of
Afghanistan's infrastructure destroyed and its human resources
depleted. Like other government institutions, the criminal
justice sector had to be built almost entirely from the ground
up. This morning I wish briefly to describe how the State
Department and the Bureau I lead are working to establish an
effective police force and criminal justice system.
The U.S. program to train and mentor the Afghan National
Police is a coordinated effort of the Departments of Defense
and State. The Afghans' goal, which we support, is to develop
an 82,000-strong professional and democratic police force
capable of providing public security and enforcing the law. The
development of the ANP from the national level to Afghanistan's
most remote districts is challenging. Afghan capacity is
lacking, and we need to link policing to a viable justice and
corrections system.
Moreover, in some areas, particularly in the south, the
relatively lightly armed police faced heavily equipped
insurgents, resulting in casualty rates three times higher than
those of the Afghan National Army.
In 2005, the Department of Defense was given authority over
efforts to organize, train, and equip the Afghan National
Security Forces, which includes the Afghan National Army and
the ANP. Through its Combined Security Transition Command
Afghanistan [CSTCA], the Department of Defense determines
overall program requirements in accordance with policy
direction from the U.S. Chief of Mission.
INL provides critical support to the Defense Department by
providing approximately 540 U.S. civilian police mentors and
trainers to develop core curricula and to build institutional
and individual capacity of the Afghan National Police.
We operate a central training center in Kabul and seven
regional training centers, where approximately 94,000 police
have been trained since 2003.
Civilian police advisors support the development of the ANP
through on-the-job mentoring at headquarters and at field
locations throughout Afghanistan.
To provide a more comprehensive and unified approach to
developing the ANP, the Afghan Ministry of Interior, with
support from the international community, introduced the
focused district development program late in 2007. This program
is designed to build on earlier training by bringing the
holistic, district-based approach to the development of the
police. It provides comprehensive assessments, training,
equipping, and on-the-job mentoring over a minimum of 6 months
for each district.
Interim U.S. assessments and other feedback indicate that
this program has improved the capability and professionalism of
the police.
While these are encouraging signs, establishing an
independent, capable, professional police force will require
long-term effort by the Afghan government, as well as the
international community.
Mr. Chairman, an equally critical challenge to
Afghanistan's security is the establishment of a functioning
judicial system to complement Afghanistan's law enforcement
capacity. An effective justice system not only improves public
confidence in the police; it also deters crime and extends the
reach and authority of the central government.
Decades of war left the Afghan justice sector devastated,
with prosecutors lacking even such basic equipment as paper and
pens, and judges earning roughly one-fourth of the country's
living wage.
To help reinvigorate international efforts in the justice
sector and encourage donors to get out of Kabul and branch out
into the provinces, the United States hosted an Afghan Rule of
Law coordination meeting in Dubai in late 2006, a meeting that
helped lay the groundwork for the July 2007 Rome Conference on
Afghanistan Rule of Law attended by the Secretary General of
the United Nations, as well as the Secretary General of NATO.
The Rome Conference resulted in a number of achievements,
including pledges totaling $98 million and an agreement that
the government of Afghanistan would develop a unified strategy
to rebuild its justice sector. Based on that Afghan plan, donor
countries would then develop an action plan to implement the
strategy. This justice sector strategy was formally adopted as
part of the Afghan National Development Strategy at this
month's Paris conference.
The U.S. justice sector strategy for Afghanistan seeks to
strengthen the central government's institutions, expand
justice assistance to the provinces, and improve donor
coordination. Our efforts are divided among the Departments of
State, Justice, and Defense, as well as U.S. Agency for
International Development, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
and the Marshals Service.
With funding from INL, the Justice Department has deployed
six senior Federal prosecutors and three criminal investigative
advisors to train and mentor prosecutors and investigators of
the Criminal Justice Task Force.
We also support 30 U.S. contract advisors and 35 Afghan
legal consultants for the justice sector support program.
In early 2006 we established the correction systems support
program. It provides prison guard training, records and
information management, and infrastructure and equipment
support.
We are also supporting a U.S. Master of Laws program for
visiting Afghan law professionals and a U.S. Institute of Peace
Project to help Afghans establish an appropriate jurisdiction
for their informal justice system.
To engage the private sector in justice sector development,
Secretary Rice and the Afghan Attorney General launched the
Public/Private Partnership for Justice Reform in Afghanistan in
December 2007. Through this program, law firms and law schools
provide support for low-cost, high-impact projects for Afghan
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. One of their
programs is going on at this time at the University of Utah
School of Law.
Mr. Chairman, while we have made a great deal of progress
since 2001 in both the police and justice sectors, many
challenges lie ahead. Overcoming Afghanistan's troubled past
and securing a lasting democratic and just society for the
future will take time and effort, both by the Afghans and the
international community.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
appear before you today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Johnson follows:]
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General, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BOBBY WILKES
General Wilkes. Thank you, Chairman Tierney and members of
the subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify today on the
U.S. Government's efforts to train and equip the Afghan
National Police and enhance the Afghan justice system. The
long-term prospects of the broader reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan are dependent, to a large extent, on progress in
these areas.
My comments will focus on the Afghan National Police
development, as the Defense Department's equities lie
principally in this mission. Afghan National Police development
is part of the broader effort to develop the Afghan National
Security Forces, which include the Afghan National Army. The
in-state for the Afghan National Police was articulated in the
2006 Afghanistan Compact as follows: ``By the end of 2010, a
fully constituted, professional, functional, and ethnically
balanced police, with a combined force of up to 62,000, will be
able to meet the security ends of the country effectively and
will be increasingly fiscally sustainable.''
In May 2007, the fifth meeting of the Joint Coordination
and Monitoring Board [JCMB], approved an expansion of the ANP
to 82,000 personnel at the request of the Ministry of Interior
of Afghanistan.
In recognition of a lack of resources and unity of effort
within the international community, the United States assumed a
more expansive role in ANP development in mid 2005. The
Department of Defense, through the Combined Security Transition
Command Afghanistan [CSTC-A], in coordination with the State
Department, leads the effort to support the Afghan government
in ANP development.
Strategic direction for U.S. efforts to support the ANP
development program is developed by the U.S. Interagency. A
strategic review agreed upon in November 2006 concluded that
there was a need to accelerate the development of the ANSF, and
particularly the ANP.
As the security situation in Afghanistan has evolved in the
previous 2 years, and we now face a resilient insurgency, the
need for an effective and professional ANP could not be
greater. Police are the most visible expression of the Afghan
populace of the central government's writ and strength. The
insurgents recognize this fact, and it is no surprise that they
are increasingly targeting the ANP.
Throughout 2007 ANP combat losses were roughly three times
higher than those of the ANA. Importantly, despite this
statistic, the ANP in most cases remain in the fight.
Currently the ANP has fielded approximately 97 percent of
its forces, over 79,900 assigned out of 82,000 authorized.
However, the ANP continues to lag behind the ANA in capability.
This is due, in part, to the fact that the United States did
not become significantly involved in the police development
until 2003, and the Defense Department did not begin its
expanded role until late 2005. Moreover, the majority of the
funding, the 2007 supplemental, was not available until July
2007, with equipment deliveries now underway and largely
targeted toward the end of this year.
ANP development also has been hindered by endemic
corruption and an insufficient number of trainers and mentors,
among other things. Our interagency efforts are focused on
addressing these shortcomings.
A key focus of effort is mentoring the ANP. CSTC-A, in
conjunction with State Department, mentors police at all
levels, although the current program does not reach all
locations. The objective is to provide a police mentoring team
to each police district and provincial and regional
headquarters. PMTs are 8- to 14-member teams comprised of
civilian professional police, military personnel, and linguists
to assist, coach, and mentor the ANP. There currently are some
540 civilian police advisors and 900 military police mentors in
Afghanistan. Because mentoring must occur locally in all of
Afghanistan's 364 districts, CSTC-A is currently unable to
cover the majority of ANP units and organizations.
In an effort to maximize the effects of limited resources
on overall ANP development, the Afghan Ministry of Interior in
November 2007, with support from CSTC-A, launched the Focus
District Development program to concentrate training,
equipment, and mentoring in priority districts. FDD consists of
phases, which include assessing the status of the police in a
giving district; withdrawing the police for 8 weeks of
training, equipping, and leadership changes necessary; and,
finally, returning the police to a district with intensive
follow-on mentoring and monitoring.
FDD is planned to reform more than 50 priority districts by
the end of this year. While the FDD program is still relatively
new, initial perceptions are favorably. Importantly, FDD could
act as a catalyst for similar programs that might benefit other
government branches.
As the ANP continues to develop, it is essential that we
are able to measure their performance. CSTC-A has in place a
system that assesses ANP units' ability to perform their
mission. Units are assessed with one of the four capability
milestones, ranging from CM4, which is least capable, to CM1,
which is most capable. At present, 12 ANP units--6 ANCOP
battalions and 6 district uniform police units--are assessed as
being CM2, which indicates that they still require occasional
external assistance.
Ensuring the ANP has the necessary equipment to perform its
mission is critical to a broader ANP development program. The
ANP basic kit includes sidearm, rifle, a uniform, body armor,
and short-range radios. Units at the squad level are equipped
with tactical vehicles, first aid supplies, machine guns, and
grenade launchers.
Pay and rank reform is also a key element of the ANP
development program. Rank reform looks at over 17,000 top
officers within a top-heavy structure, and through extensive
testing and review and an international vetting process
reducing the officer corps by more than 9,000 personnel. The
Ministry of Interior also is developing a comprehensive
promotion and recognition program.
Additionally, pay parity is being implemented to provide
police with salaries comparable to the ANA. Efforts also are
underway to improve the overall payment process, such as
verifying police rosters and establishing electronic pay
systems and funds transfers. By the end of this May, 19
provinces had implemented electronic funds transfers for police
to be paid directly.
Steps are being taken to enhance accountability within the
ANP. These include an identification card program, which will
permit tracking of police personnel from accession to attrition
using a record management system.
The Ministry of Interior also is developing a new
disciplinary and personnel regulations and has commissioned a
legislative drafting committee to revise outdated police
personnel laws to provide for the administrative separation of
corrupt or inept police personnel.
To conclude, I believe we are implementing the programs and
policies and making necessary investments and adjustments to
realize a significant improvement in the ANP in the coming
years; yet much will depend on our ability to expand the number
of personnel assigned to the crucial mentoring mission, as well
as the Ministry of Interior's own ability to implement internal
reforms to enhance the professionalism and integrity of its
personnel.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Wilkes follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, General.
Mr. Ward.
STATEMENT OF MARK WARD
Mr. Mark Ward. Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Shays,
members of the subcommittee, thanks very much for asking USAID
also to participate in this hearing on U.S. assistance to the
justice sector in Afghanistan.
We spent $4 billion on development programs in Afghanistan,
USAID has, since 2002, to encourage economic growth led by the
private sector, establish a democratic and stable state
governed by the Rule of Law, and provide basic services like
health and education for the people.
To help Afghanistan become less donor dependent and stand
on its own feet, it needs a strong private sector and greater
domestic and foreign investment, and USAID is working to build
institutions that strengthen the private sector, encourage
investment, and create jobs and taxes to sustain Afghanistan in
the future.
Now, the security situation in the country is real, and my
fellow witnesses are here to describe the work that we are
doing to build a professional Army and police force, but it is
also important that we ensure that Afghanistan has strong
institutions in place so that, as the security situation
improves, Afghanistan will be able to attract and effectively
utilize greater private investment. After all, that is the
future.
Improving justice institutions, I am happy to say, is also
a priority for the Afghans. Last week in Paris the donor
community celebrated the launch--you heard about this this
morning--of the Afghan National Development Strategy, and one
pillar of that new strategy is governance, Rule of Law, and
human rights.
The goal for the justice sector is strengthening democratic
processes and institutions, human rights, the Rule of Law,
delivery of public services, and government accountability. And
the new strategy specifically recognizes the need to reform the
justice system as a way to improve the business environment and
increase investments and jobs.
So, specifically, what are we doing with the Afghans? USAID
is helping the Ministry of Commerce, the Central Bank, and the
Parliament to draft good commercial legislation. The work
focuses on specific priorities identified by the Afghan
Ministries, the private sector, and the donor community for
attracting more investment into the country.
With our encouragement, the process is much more open now.
For example, a conference for prominent Parliamentarians--I am
sure it will include some of these prominent Parliamentarians
behind us--is planned for next month to introduce, promote, and
solicit comments on five new laws that have recently been
drafted by the Ministries of Commerce and the Central Bank to
benefit the private sector.
We are also working with the judicial system, primarily
through training programs. We train sitting judges in the
classroom, in the courtroom, and in service. We train them on
commercial dispute resolution, on standards for legal
education, and on court administration, personnel management,
accounting, budgeting, and their own internal processes.
The results are pretty impressive so far. We have trained
over 70 percent of the sitting judges in Afghanistan, and we
plan to train all of the sitting judges by the end of this
fiscal year.
There is increased awareness among the Afghan people
regarding their basic legal rights. I heard the question to the
panel this morning about perceptions among the Afghan people,
and as you heard, the latest polls show that there is growing
confidence in the ability of their courts to resolve disputes.
Civil filings in the courts are growing each quarter, and
for the first time in 30 years, judges are conducting public
trials and appearing in the media to explain what courts are
for.
We also provide training to members of the Law and Sharia
Faculties at Kabul University and three regional universities
about teaching methodology, legal writing, and research, and we
also teach English. And with our support this group of legal
and religious scholars have played a role in establishing a
standard law school curriculum for Sharia Law faculty and
students. This is an important benchmark to ensure a strong
legal professional, and I am pleased to say that the new
curriculum that both the Sharia Law School and the law faculty
have adopted stresses very modern secular commercial
principles.
We, as you have heard, also sponsor study tours for the
Afghan law faculty to go to the United States and other
countries in the region.
At the Afghan Supreme Court, we have helped put in place a
new case management and tracking system which will be rolled
out to all courts in the country by the end of this fiscal
year.
Working with the government of Italy, we have helped
establish the National Legal Training Center. It opened a year
ago on the campus of the University of Kabul, and is used for
continuing legal education and accreditation programs within
the legal community. I was there a couple of weeks ago and very
pleased to see that it is open and full of students, judges and
others, using classes.
We also tried very hard to include women in all of our
programs. We have had over 100 women judges and judicial
candidates participate in our programs, and I am very pleased
to say, particularly to the women in the room, that our studies
indicate so far that the women in the judicial training courses
are out-performing the men. Maybe there is no surprise there.
We have built and rehabilitated 40 courthouses and justice
facilities in 17 provinces in the country.
Just to sum up, the Afghan Support Conference that was held
last week in Paris, the United States pledged $10.2 billion to
help the people of Afghanistan, and in that vein, we will work
with institutions such as the Parliament and the Supreme Court
and others to try to build a transparent and predictable court
system that will benefit the private sector. We think a strong
private sector is vital to Afghanistan's stability to create
jobs and opportunities where there were none before.
Thanks very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ward follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Ward.
Mr. Swartz, please.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE SWARTZ
Mr. Swartz. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shays,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the role of the U.S. Department of
Justice in U.S. efforts to enhance the justice sector in
Afghanistan. DOJ prosecutors and law enforcement agencies are
and have been on the ground in Afghanistan. They have followed
a focused strategy of developing and working with vetted Afghan
teams of prosecutors and agents. The work of our four
components on the ground in Afghanistan has both advanced the
Rule of Law and has resulted in significant law enforcement
successes.
First, since 2005 we have had a team of senior Federal
prosecutors working in Afghanistan both on law reform and
working and developing and mentoring the Criminal Justice Task
Force. As Ambassador Johnson noted, we have received State
Department funding for these efforts.
The work of these prosecutors has resulted in remarkable
successes. First, on the legislative front, our prosecutors
worked closely with their Afghan colleagues to develop the
counternarcotics law of Afghanistan, which has put in place
innovative techniques and possibilities with regard to law
enforcement investigations in narcotics cases. That work has
resulted in, for instance, the first controlled delivery of
narcotics in the United States, resulting in a prosecution
here.
Second, as I noted, these teams, our prosecutors teams,
have developed and mentored the Criminal Justice Task Force, a
group of specially vetted and trained investigators and
prosecutors that work with the Central narcotics Tribunal of
Afghanistan. They have done hundreds of narcotics anti-
corruption cases and the work of the prosecutors that we sent
by DOJ to Afghanistan have also resulted in successes here in
counternarcotics prosecutions, including the first conviction
of a narco-terrorist, Khan Mohammed, and the conviction of a
designated foreign kingpin, Baz Mohammed, in the United States.
The second component that we have present in Afghanistan,
DEA, has also played a central role. Shortly after Coalition
forces entered Afghanistan, DEA established its long contacts
in Afghanistan and re-established its office there. They have
worked closely with the training of the counternarcotics police
of Afghanistan, and in particular with three specialized units
of the counternarcotics police: the NIU, the National
Interdiction Unit; the Sensitive Investigations Unit [SIU]; and
the TIU, the Technical Investigations Unit.
Here, too, that work has resulted in significant successes
with significant investigations having been conducted, arrests
and prosecutions followed, including the largest seizure ever
of narcotics, the seizure last week of 235 metric tons of
hashish in Afghanistan.
Third, the FBI has also been present in Afghanistan, both
through its legal attache office, which has established a long-
term presence, and with agents from the Counter-Terrorism
Division, and agents from the Criminal Justice Information
Systems Division. We have worked carefully both on narcotics
cases in conjunction with DEA, but also with counterterrorism
matters. And the Criminal Justice Information Systems Division
in particular has launched a very important biometrics project
that has captured more than 16,000 biometric records, both of
persons that are incarcerated in Afghanistan, but also as part
of the vetting system for police and the Army. We have also,
through the FBI, engaged in training of our Afghan
counterparts, including training in these biometric systems.
Fourth, the U.S. Marshal's Service has been present for the
critical role of judicial security and security of those who
testify in court. Obviously, a court system cannot function
unless that kind of security is in place, and the Marshal
Service brings unparalleled expertise to that task.
Finally, if called upon, the experienced police and
corrections experts of our police training arm, ICITAP, are
ready to serve in Afghanistan should that prove useful.
In conclusion, I would like to commend the courage and
professionalism of the teams that we have deployed to
Afghanistan, and to note that their work has made both the
citizens of Afghanistan and the citizens of the United States
safer.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Swartz follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Swartz.
I thank all of our witnesses here for their testimony.
Let me start with the questioning.
General, looking at the report of GAO, there are zero fully
capable units of the police, 3 percent capable with Coalition
support, 4 percent partially capable, 77 percent not capable,
and 16 percent where the unit hasn't been formed or isn't
reporting. We have your own assessment, Defense assessment, of
the capabilities. Uniformed police, only 6 are partially
capable, 6 capable with Coalition support, 296 units capable,
57 not formed or not reporting. Border police, nobody fully
capable, nobody capable with Coalition support, nobody
partially capable, 39 or 33, I guess, not capable. Civil order
police, 6 only capable with Coalition support, 2 partially
capable, 2 not capable at all, 10 not formed or not reporting.
Counternarcotics, 10 only partially capable, 3 not capable, 2
not reporting or not formed.
The bottom line is I take that and I measure it against
your statement that by the end of 2010 a fully constituted,
professional, functional, ethnically balanced Afghan National
Police and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to
62,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country
effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable. Do
you still stand behind that?
General Wilkes. Sir, that is our plan.
Mr. Tierney. Well, it is your plan, but how realistic is
your plan?
General Wilkes. Well, as you know, the investment on this
was late to need. We had funds released in the summer of 2007.
Mr. Tierney. I don't mean to cut you short. I know the
problems that you have had, and you recounted them well, so my
real question is: is 2010 still your year, or are you saying
now, understanding all the complications that came in, I wish I
had set some later date?
General Wilkes. As of right now we are going to stick with
the 2010. There are a couple of issues there that you are
probably well aware of. One is assume the equipment gets in in
2008 as planned, and it is still planned to arrive in 2008, and
some of the vehicles as late as summer of 2009, but that also
assumes that we get the mentors that we need in there.
Mr. Tierney. So you are basing your assumption that you are
going to get the mentors on?
General Wilkes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. No, no. What are you basing the assumption
upon? You have an assumption that you are going to get the
mentors. Why do you believe this to be the case? What resources
have you been given?
General Wilkes. Well, there is a RF-620-MOTU that is out,
and that has been out on the street since late 2006. We have
known that this requirement is there and we are at the point
now where we need to fill it. In the last couple of months we
have put the 27 Marines in, which is a unit of about 1,000
Marines. They have gone into RC South. That will be part of the
contingent that is doing this police security and training.
Right now there is a review underway with Joint Forces
Command and the Joint Staff and CENTCOM looking at continuing
that capability. Additionally, we are continuing to ask NATO to
fulfill their requirement that is a shortfall in their CG-SOAR
of three battalions. That was brought up in recent ministerial
action over in NATO. If that can be filled, then we will have
the capacity we need to do the training.
Mr. Tierney. So we are still wishing and hoping, is what it
comes down to, and pressing on that, but with no assurances? We
still have people tied up in Iraq, where the report is pretty
clear that is where the equipment need priorities have been,
and that is where the police mentors have been, so I am just
not hopeful that 2010 is realistic, and I hope you understand
why I say that.
Let me move on to another question if I can. It seems to me
that people are making heroic efforts here, from Justice all
the way down the line on that, but isn't the real question
scope? We can train some judges, Mr. Ward, we can take care of
some prosecutors, Mr. Swartz, and all that, but do we have
enough judges trained? Do we have enough prosecutors, enough
lawyers, enough police? And how do we get this up to scope? Is
the human capacity within Afghanistan there? Ambassador?
Ambassador David Johnson. Mr. Chairman, as several of your
colleagues have pointed out, as have we, we started off with a
country working that had been at war for almost 30 years.
Mr. Tierney. I understand.
Ambassador David Johnson. So we believe that the capacity
can be built, but no, the capacity is not there right now. The
Afghans have adopted a plan on justice that was part of the
document that was adopted in Paris. It gives our international
partners, as well as us, an ability to work with them more
clearly to bring donors, not just in Kabul but outside, so I
think the capacity can be built, but no, the capacity is not
there yet.
Mr. Tierney. And I suspect it is not going to be built by
2010, either. That is just an observation from here from what I
am hearing today on all of these things, whether it is judges,
or prosecutors, or police, or the military component of the
police mentors, all of that. It seems troubling that we are
working on these. The 2010 numbers are much more optimistic. We
have to be honest with the American people and the Afghan
people, as well. We have exhausted a lot of people's patience
with foreign ventures in Iraq. People in this country are
pretty upset about that situation. There has been a great
effort by the administration to conflate Iraq with Afghanistan,
and now they wish they could deconflict it, as they say,
because people have lost their patience everywhere. Yet we have
a situation here where you are saying 2010 you hope, but you
don't know that you are going to have all these things in
place, and this is a long-range effort on that.
Is 82,000 police officers actually ever going to be enough?
I think Mr. Shays raises a good question. Whoever feels capable
may answer that.
Ambassador David Johnson. The number 82,000 was reached by
a process of consultation with the Afghans and with the
international community, including ourselves, who were
supporting the training operation. It is possible that it will
need to be augmented. It has been augmented in the past. The
82,000 is the most recent number.
Mr. Tierney. Is there any metrics or anything used? Is
there some basis for these numbers?
Ambassador David Johnson. If we were to look at the Los
Angeles police force, it is a little more than them. It is a
little less than New York City. I don't think those are really
good measures, but they do tell you that we are some place in
the ball park. It is not grossly out of kilter with what a
normal police force would be. But we are in a different
environment here, and so I think that measuring up what the
police ratio ought to be has to be more closely coordinated
with what we are building in terms of an Army, because we are
dealing with a police force that is operating within an
insurgency environment.
Mr. Tierney. As I understand it, it has already gone from
52 to 60-odd to 75 and now 82, and I think the point is that
this is a quite different situation than you find in Los
Angeles or New York, and a lot more complicated activities for
the police besides just what we would think of as community
policing. So I would guess that is going to get quite
complicated on that.
This new Focus District Development, General, I know that
you say you plan to have 50 of these in place by the end of
2008. How many are actually going to be in place by the end of
2008?
General Wilkes. Sir, that is the plan right now, and it
should be 50.
Mr. Tierney. How many are in place right now?
General Wilkes. We are about halfway through that. We have
about 25 in the districts. In the process, we are in phase
three. As I explained, it is kind of a 6-month or so process
from start to finish of each of these districts, and they are
overlapping throughout the time. So we are finishing up with
the third district here this month and beginning on a fourth
cycle here, so we should get through the full six by the end of
this year.
Mr. Tierney. And six districts would be 50 units?
General Wilkes. Fifty units. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. All right. And there are how many total units
needed for the entire country?
General Wilkes. We would like to have one for each
district, 365.
Mr. Tierney. So how many years is that projected out at
this pace?
General Wilkes. At this pace it is probably about a 5-year
plan, so 2012.
Mr. Tierney. So 2013, not 2010, right?
General Wilkes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. One of the issues that was brought up by our
guests here today, and I think it was very pertinent, is if you
take the police and you train them such as you have them, and
you put them out into a district and you don't have enough
security for them, you have wasted a lot of time and endangered
a lot of people. That seems to be happening over and over
again. What are we doing about that?
General Wilkes. With the Focused District Development, we
provide the trainers, mentors, the security piece that goes
with them, and those folks go out and stay with them for the
next few months.
Mr. Tierney. And that unit is going to be able to sustain
an attack by extremists or Taliban or anyone that might come in
and try to take over that village or that community?
General Wilkes. We are attempting to train them to--I won't
say quite the SWAT level, as you might expect in the States--
but we are training them beyond what normal police you would
see on the street.
Mr. Tierney. How does it hurt the police mission of dealing
with people in the community and learning nation intelligence
of what is going on with the insurgents or whatever, and being
able to gain their confidence, if you are also training them to
have a military posture? Is there a conflict between their
military mission and their police mission and the way they are
perceived by the public, and does that create a problem for us?
General Wilkes. We are very careful not to militarize the
police. That was one of the early on issues that DOD had in
undertaking the police training role. We do not want to create
a military force there. You do have to keep the police focused
on what they are doing with the community. So we are not
militarizing them; we are training them to be able to handle
situations and extremists, and we provide a capability. The
Afghans also provide capability via the ANCOPs that would be
able to come in at the national level and help if it gets into
a large riot-type situation.
Mr. Tierney. Here is what we are told is the problem from
people in Afghanistan: as you are looking for the numbers of
police people to fill up the personnel slots that you need, the
farther you get out from the urban areas, the more rural, the
less educated the pool of people available for that. In fact,
quite uneducated, though not a lot of numbers. So what are we
going to do to try to get that capacity up if we actually run
out of people that have even a high school diploma, a high
school education, and certainly beyond that? How do we get that
level of people that don't have the sufficient education up
quickly enough to sustain this effort to get a full force out
where we need to get them out with at least sufficient training
to do the job?
General Wilkes. This is a very difficult issue for us. We
are vetting the people through the local elders, so therefore
you are kind of putting a trust factor in the senior
leadership, and they are picking the people that can succeed in
this. They won't necessarily be at the education level that you
and I would expect, but they will have the training, they will
know how to use the weapons and how to do the basic police
mentoring. The senior leadership in those areas will have more
the conscience, if you will, of how to do police work, so we
are relying on the elder leadership.
Mr. Tierney. I assume that gives us some issues of either
corruption or patronage if you then pay the police at a higher
level to try to attract people in, and there will be some
demand for those jobs, and under the tribal system and others
we hope the demand goes on capability as opposed to taking care
of our friends.
General Wilkes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Shays, you are recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. Shays. I yield.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Lynch, you are recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to thank the panelists for coming in,
Ambassador, General, Mr. Ward, Mr. Swartz.
I would like to talk about a couple of things. It is an
overlap. I have heard the General talk and also Mr. Swartz, we
had a problem in Iraq, and I don't mean to compare the systems,
but the processes are the same. We had a system in Iraq on
weapons distribution to both the military and to the police
where GAO reported to us on the committee and to the chairman
that about 190,000 small weapons had gone missing because we
didn't have an accurate tracking system.
Now, you have described here this morning a biometric
system. I was in Tataji, the weapons depot in Iraq just north
of Baghdad, a few weeks back. They had a system where we
brought the cadets in and the personnel in. We photographed
them. We got fingerprints from them. We did an iris scan. We
had a registration of their weapon. We even got a photograph of
them posing with their weapon before it went out the door.
Now, when I am in Afghanistan next month is that the system
I am going to see?
General Wilkes. Sir, I believe that is where we are headed.
I don't know if you were there today that you would see that,
but that is what we are trying to do, all these different
reforms. We are trying to get the ID cards. I think about
20,000 or so have been issued so far, and we are headed in that
direction.
We are also working with the Ministry of Interior on
reforms with their Inspector General process and how they will
do investigations or inspections out there to ensure that this
equipment is available.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Swartz, have you got anything on that?
Mr. Swartz. Chairman, I will have to confirm that our quick
capture technology that the FBI has put in place will be used
for that purpose, but certainly we have attempted, as I noted,
to ensure that we have gotten the biometrics of Army members
and national police members to help ensure security in the
future.
Mr. Lynch. Thanks. I am hearing a little back-pedaling, but
let me assure you that is the system that we need here in
Afghanistan. I think May was the first month, at least the
report I read, May 2008 was the first month in which had more
U.S. casualties in Afghanistan than we did in Iraq. That is a
watershed moment here.
I do want to say, Mr. Swartz, I had a chance to work with
DEA in Afghanistan a few months ago, and I agree they are doing
a great, great job. I think some of the structural deficiencies
here that we are exposing is, No. 1, you have a country here in
Afghanistan that about 5 percent of the people have access to
electricity--5 percent of the people have access to
electricity, 95 percent do not, and so we have a structural
problem there. Also, the literacy rate is below 20 percent for
men and it is below 10 percent for women, so we have some real
structural problems there that it is going to be tough to get
at.
My last question is this. Again, we have a situation that
has a parallel in Iraq. The legal system that we have in place,
I think it was inherited from the Judge Advocacy system in
France. The system in Afghanistan, first of all, we don't have
a dual role for defense attorneys. This is basically a system
that the judge is the finder of fact and, in the best case, the
appeals judge is going to review his application of law to the
facts. We don't have a system in which defense attorneys in our
own system have an opportunity to defend the accused in that
system. Even if we did, under their system the judge may decide
on their own not to hear the defense attorney on a given case.
That is a structural problem within their own system of the
Rule of Law.
How do we get at that? It seems to me that the credibility
of the government, itself, and of their system is going to rely
in great part on the ability of the accused to have some
semblance of rights. Are we trying to get at that, No. 1,
getting defense attorneys actually trained and adopting some
type of system where they would actually have a role in the
Afghan legal system? Ambassador.
Ambassador David Johnson. Congressman, we are working hard
on bringing the formal system of criminal law into some sort of
union with the informal system through a grant we have through
the U.S. Institute for Peace, which was mentioned by one of the
previous witnesses in the previous panel. We are attempting to
help unite these, along with the other ways, including
religious law.
I think the point that you make about whether code law is a
form which gives defense an adequate opportunity to defend
their client is something that other people with code law
systems may disagree with you about. There is a role for the
defense attorneys. We do have a program for training defense
attorneys to operate within this system.
On the other hand, I think Mr. Swartz would confirm that he
and I and our colleagues are working hard in other parts of the
world, particularly in Latin America, to bring countries closer
to the kind of justice system that we recognize. The Mexicans
achieved a major milestone in the signing into law of a
transformation of their justice system just yesterday. So we
recognize the issue that you raise, the ability to have justice
not just done but to be seen to be done in a public way, to
have the accused have the presumption of innocence--the things
that are part of a code law system.
But it is used effectively in parts of the world where I
think we feel comfortable appearing as accused in courts such
as Europe.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Swartz.
Mr. Swartz. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I would
certainly join Ambassador Johnson in that it is a long-term
process to move courts from an accusatorial to an adversarial
system. We have had experience doing that through our DOJ
prosecutors on the ground in other countries. Certainly, the
prosecutors we have in place in Afghanistan are interested,
within the constraints of existing Afghan law, to advise how an
adversarial system could be put in place and how that can
advantage the citizens of Afghanistan.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. I am going to be going.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
It seems to me that there are three bottom line issues here
with regard to our role in Iraq. Ever since we concluded
Charlie Wilson's war by enabling the Afghan people, themselves,
to rout the Russians from what had been a brutal occupation, we
have not made Afghanistan a sufficient priority. We have said
that time and again, and yet it doesn't change. I can tell you
that every single dime that this administration has ever
requested for Afghanistan has been granted by the Defense
Appropriations Committee, every dime. Never refused anything
that has been requested, in fact, by any agency, not just by
DOD but by State, Justice, you name it.
Maybe there are some problems in terms of the pipeline of
money, but I don't think that is a sufficient excuse.
The second, of course, is that, in fact, because of it not
being a sufficient priority, there have been insufficient
resources. There is no question that, had we put resources into
following up that victory over the Russians and to the
infrastructure of that country, we could have sustained the
government, we could have prevented the fractionalization by
the tribal war lords, and ultimately from the Taliban from
taking over.
We did not invest. We turned our back. There is still
inadequate resources being developed to Afghanistan, and it
seems to me, as this committee--and it has been a bipartisan
point that this committee continues to make--this is the war we
have to win, maybe not in the traditional military sense,
because I am not sure there is a finite number of Taliban to
beat, but we have to win it, and it is going to have to be won
on a number of planes.
But the third is what I would like to address, particularly
to General Wilkes.
It seems to me there has been a misplaced responsibility.
In our trips and reading and talking with the Afghan people, it
is, again, a matter of establishing civil society, and
particularly the police.
Now, when the decision was made by this administration to
give DOD the responsibility, the principal role over the
establishment of an effective police program in that country, I
think that was a mistake. In fact, we have gotten feedback that
supports that contention. The International Crisis Group said
that the U.S. decision to give the leading role in its police
programs to the Department of Defense has blurred the
distinction between the military and police. The police seem to
be conflicted between their counterinsurgency responsibilities
and their main task of working with and protecting communities.
You could have predicted that would happen if DOD had the
principal organizational responsibility, because DOD's role is
not to police communities. It is to win a war ultimately. I am
afraid that the police have, to some extent, been politicized.
You know, one of the reasons why our local police are so
good is that they are not political. They are above politics.
And yet we are establishing a system where they are inherently
political because they have to follow the government and deter
what are considered insurgent forces.
I am concerned that when we talk to General McNeal, for
example, the chairman is fond of referring to him as being
kinetic. He has a problem, and he is very good, but his first
response is, if you can get a critical mass of Taliban
together, you bomb them. Then he lets President Karzai know and
Karzai basically gives him a nice job response. But it was
clear that if it is going to be sustainable, it is going to
have to be this local civil society anchored by the Rule of
Law, which is enforced by local police.
Having said all of that, I would like to see if I can get
any kind of response, because when we take a new approach,
which is bound to happen--whoever is elected in November--
January is going to usher in a new approach to this. I am
wondering if we don't need to change the responsibility that
now rests with DOD to establish civil society as well as win
the military aspects of the conflicts. Is there any response,
General? And the Ambassador, too, I would be interested.
General Wilkes. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate the
opportunity.
DOD, as I said in my earlier remarks, is doing this because
we need to get the training accomplished. It certainly does not
fall within our normal line of duties, and we are very careful
to try to not militarize the police, because we respect the
separation here within the United States and other countries
out there, and we want that same split in authorities within
Afghanistan.
The issue becomes one of security and how do you do this
training out there. The police, in and of themselves, don't
have the capacity within Afghanistan to protect themselves,
protect their district centers, etc., so it does require some
element of security to be with them, and you have to do this
through some form, like a PMT in that case.
When we formed the PMTs, we did that with careful thought
to make sure that we have a couple of police experts that are
done through the State Department INL area, the Blackwater
contract. Those folks are really the lead in the training
effort for the police.
There are a couple of translators that go with that team,
and then the remainder of the team would be military that are
there for security. The military, part of their training would
be, let's say, weapons training that the rest of the team would
be able to accomplish, but that falls well within the
military's training skills and ability to do that.
So we are very careful to not do that.
The second point I would make is that the training piece of
this is done under CSTC-A, which is a training equipped mission
set that is run through CENTCOM. It is absent the
organizational structure of ISAP, so they are not in the war
fighting command of ISAP, so we try to keep that mission set
separate. Granted, they are on the same battlefield and they
will encounter the same insurgents, and some of those skills
for counterinsurgency do have to be translated to the Afghan
police, but we are very careful to try to keep that separated,
realizing your exact point, sir.
Mr. Moran. Thank you.
Perhaps Mr. Swartz apparently had one comment, too, but
whoever wants to. I don't want to abuse my time here.
Mr. Swartz. Thank you, Congressman. Certainly we greatly
respect the efforts of the Department of Defense. We think that
the situation for training police is difficult for exactly the
reasons the General has suggested. As I noted in my opening
statement and in my written testimony, we do have a training
arm intelligence the Department of Justice for police and
correctional training, ICITAP, the International Criminal
Investigation Training and Assistance Program. We work very
closely with the Department of Defense in Iraq, in the Balkans,
and we have done training around the world. So we are ready,
willing, and able to assist to the extent that assistance would
be helpful in this regard.
Ambassador David Johnson. Congressman, I think that the
decision that was made to combine this effort was not just one
based on resources; it was a recognition that the effort to
train the Afghan National Army and the effort to train the
police had to be coordinated because of the level of violence
that they were encountering in their daily work, so this was
our effort to bring this up to speed as rapidly as we could in
a coordinated fashion, not, as the General underscore, not to
militarize the police, but to operate in the same battle space
in a coordinated way.
I think that we have had success here. You are right to
point out to us that we need to make sure that we are
disciplined about it and make sure that we don't accidentally
or incidentally turn the police into an adjunct of the
military, but to help grow them into the type of police service
that we expect to see in our own communities. But it is
something we are paying a great deal of attention to.
Based on the experience that we had before 2005, I don't
see how we can completely separate these, given the threat
level that the police, themselves, face in their work. I think
one illustration of this is the constraint that we have in
terms of the mentoring system. The civilian mentors and the
military are not fungible. They are not the same thing. But the
military are required so that the civilians can, in fact, do
their work. So I think that is an illustration that we need the
kind of security that only the military can organically provide
in order to carry out this mission for the time being.
Mr. Moran. It is understandable why it was done that way
initially, but in terms of following up we may want to take a
different approach. The committee's extraordinarily competent
staff just pointed out that in the written testimony of the
State Department's IG, Mr. Ward we just heard from, said, ``A
number of interviewees expressed concern about the lack of
clarity as to the role of Afghanistan's police forces as law
enforcement agents versus a paramilitary role in
counterinsurgency operations.'' I do think it is a problem, and
I think, in looking to the future, it is something the
committee might suggest that we address, and we ought to, I
think, through the appropriation for Afghanistan.
But again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for giving this the kind of
focus that it needs. I really appreciate it.
Mr. Tierney. Thanks for your participation, Mr. Moran.
Mr. Shays, you are recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman. It is
nice to have Mr. Moran participate in these hearings.
I want to get to this number of 82,000 for police
authorized and 80,000 for the Army. Just the fact that the two
numbers are almost similar is surprising and just tells me that
it was just a number that somehow people in our government
decided they would ask for. I need to know why we only need
80,000 Army and why we only need 82,000 police.
General Wilkes. Sir, a lot of this came from early
decisions in the Bahn part of this where they set some basic
numbers. As you have seen over the last couple of years, given
that the insurgency is increased, we have continued to review
this and increase it. In fact, I think what you are going to
see is discussion here in the near term on the ANA and trying
to increase the size of that, given the threat out there.
Mr. Shays. Here is my concern, General: my concern is if
you can't get the help you need, you ask for less and then
justify the request. I don't think with a straight face we
could justify either the 82,000 or the 80,000. I am not going
to even try to go down that route. I am going to hear your
statement as saying this is a number under review. Is that
correct?
General Wilkes. Yes, sir. Exactly.
Mr. Shays. Yes. Then I want to go on record as saying this
is typical of what we did in the bad years in Iraq. We
underestimated what we needed for police and what we needed for
the security forces. And I will just make this point to you: in
the observations we made in Iraq, we said that 325,000 Iraqi
security force level to be reached on December 31, 2006, is not
adequate to provide internal security, nor is it adequate to
counter any external security threat.
Then this is what the experts testified. The experts
testified at one of our hearings that successful
counterinsurgencies have historically required 20 security
personnel per 1,000 of population, which is, in the case of
Iraq's 26 million, would be 520,000 security personnel. In the
case of Afghanistan, we would be talking, with a population of
32 million, about 640,000.
I mean, the number isn't even close, and what is alarming
to me is that says we are going to be there forever because
they won't have what they need to do what they need to do.
Now, if we had an honest dialog and we were hearing from
the administration we can't find 640,000 for a variety of
reasons--education, training, lack of interest--I mean, in Iraq
they want jobs. In Afghanistan it is my understanding that we
don't see a re-enlistment of 50 percent. So it seems to me that
we are having a dialog about whether we are properly training
numbers when the numbers seem so, so far off.
That is my observation. If you want to comment, you can. I
am not expecting you to.
Let me ask some other questions.
In 2008, the U.S. Congress mandated that the Secretary of
Defense submit to Congress reports detailing progress on
training the Afghan National Security Forces; however,
according to GAO, the first of these reports was due at the end
of April 2008, but it has not been delivered. Has the
Department of Defense completed the 2008 report? If not, why
not? And when should Congress expect to see this report?
General Wilkes. Sir, the report is in its final review and
should be signed out shortly.
Mr. Shays. OK. Are you on schedule to complete the next
installation, which is due 180 days after the end of April
2008?
General Wilkes. Yes, sir. Being that this was the first
report, it took a little bit longer to put the pieces together,
and we will be on schedule for the 180-day review.
Mr. Shays. I am going to just end by asking: could you
explain to me or anyone here about the break-in and the release
of over 700, I think, prisoners, over 1,000? Some were Taliban.
Just tell me what happened, and how many ultimately were let
loose, and why.
Ambassador David Johnson. Congressman, that was a
coordinated attack on a prison by a paramilitary group. It
began with a large explosion at the entrance. While we in the
U.S. Government have not been active in that prison, it is
something that the Canadians have taken on, because it is an
area where they have been working. I think it is the kind of
attack, given the size of the explosion, that would not have
been possible for the corrections people to, if you will,
defend against. It would have had to have been done by a----
Mr. Shays. Were the corrections all Afghans, or were there
some Coalition forces?
Ambassador David Johnson. I believe they were all Afghan,
Congressman. I am not certain, and I can find that out, but I
don't believe there were any Coalition personnel at the
facility at the time.
Mr. Shays. Were there contingency plans that were in
anticipation of this kind of attack, or was this somehow not
something that was prepared for?
General Wilkes. Sir, my understanding is that the Afghan
government has responded to that under their contingency plans.
Mismulakahn has deployed down there to take over the situation.
This is within 6 hours of it happening. They have, I believe,
transported a candac of response forces, Afghans down there,
about 700 or so Afghan National Army to assist and stabilize
that area.
Mr. Shays. Was it determined to be, in part, an inside job?
General Wilkes. Sir, the investigation is still ongoing,
but I think it is going to have to probably have been something
coordinated both inside and outside.
Mr. Shays. From the outside looking in this seems
catastrophic. Any one of these Taliban could potentially kill
many Coalition forces and Afghans. Any one. The fact that such
a huge number got out is beyond my comprehension, frankly. Tell
me the consequences of this successful effort on the part of,
frankly, the enemies of the Afghan government.
General Wilkes. Sir, the potential is that you put another
I guess 380-ish or so Taliban back on the streets. The efforts
now undergoing will be trying to round all those prisoners up
again and get them back into confinement somewhere.
If we are unsuccessful, then obviously you have those
fighters back out there against the Coalition.
Mr. Shays. Well, I will end by saying in the last year-and-
a-half, when I spoke to our Government officials, they would
say things are going really well in Iraq and we are concerned
about Afghanistan. That is what I have heard for the last year.
When I look at these numbers of 80,000 Army, 80,000 police, I
am just struck with the fact that we are so far behind in
Afghanistan that it is more than alarming. I mean, I don't see
anything that makes me feel encouraged.
I think the thing that concerns me the most is that some of
this appears to be extraordinarily bad planning, bad
anticipation.
I have three constituents, they are all from the same
family, and two of them are CEOs of Fortune 500 companies and
the other is a very financially successful financier. I asked,
Why are you as a family so successful? All they said, they
think their biggest reason for success is they all deal with
reality, not what they want it to be but what it is. And it
just strikes me that we are not dealing with reality in
Afghanistan. I hope that you, General, are able to get the
troops together to just totally rethink this.
If you have to come back to Congress and say 80,000 is way
off and we need 200 or 300, I think that is what you owe our
troops, what you owe our citizens, and what you owe Congress.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
None of you gentlemen are responsible for this, but I think
the underlying focus of this whole hearing--not focus of the
hearing, but result of the hearing--is that at one point we
took our eye off the ball. We had activity going in Afghanistan
and the Pakistani area and we got diverted over to Iraq, and
the consequences are 7 years later we are starting to do things
that should have been done six or 7 years ago. Certainly, if
they were allocated for some other international entity or
other country to do it, we should have noticed well before we
finally did that things weren't going right. That falls right
in the lap of this administration, and I don't think there is
any way they are going to get around that.
But the fact of the matter is that is the consequence of
that type of activity, of moving over to Iraq when we did and
the way we did, but I want to get back to one other point.
We talked about the military mentors that are needed, some
2,400, 2,600, and we are short a substantial number of those,
and the assessment by the Department of Defense is that we are
short because the priority was to put them in Iraq, and the
priority to put the equipment was in Iraq on that basis.
Where are we going to get the remaining military mentors
that we need in a reasonably short period of time? Are they
going to come because they are going to get redeployed out of
Iraq? Are they going to come because they are now in Bosnia, or
Korea, or Japan, or Germany, or somewhere on our continent? Are
they going to come from an international source? If you could
clarify, gentlemen, that for me: where are they going to come
from, and when are they going to get there?
General Wilkes. Sir, that is the process that we are
undertaking right now for review and where are they going to
come from. We have asked our allies. We are still looking at
fulfilling the CJ SOAR requirements, which are three
battalions. That is roughly 2,500 troops there, which would
help with the security situation. And we are continuing to go
through--we have put in the 27 Marines, which was about 1,000
here a few months ago. They will be there for another 5 or 6
months. And we are looking at how we are going to replace
those.
So all of that is undergoing right now, and hopefully we
will come up with solutions here in the next couple months to
it.
Mr. Tierney. Hopefully. I would assume that part of the
problem with the prison escape was also related to a faulty
design or construction of that building, where it was done, how
it was done, that somebody could, in fact, get a bomb close
enough to take out part of the structure and allow people to
escape. My concern now is: are we looking and reviewing any
other prison facilities there to correct that kind of a
problem? Ambassador.
Ambassador David Johnson. We have an ongoing program
looking at prison facilities, providing them with engineering
assistance, providing them with technical training for guard
training, but there are a number of prisons throughout
Afghanistan. I don't want to be misleading that we are looking
at every single one of them or that we have already, but it is
a program that we are also focused on.
Mr. Tierney. Now, I heard General say that the GAO
recommendation for a plan and a strategy is about to be
presented to us in the near future. Is that going to meet the
satisfaction of the GAO, going to hit the criteria that they
laid out in their recommendation?
General Wilkes. Sir, I think there are two separate things
here. The 12/31 report on ANSF development is, I believe, what
Mr. Shays was asking about. That will come fairly soon. I am
not sure that will totally answer what the GAO report suggested
they needed.
I will tell you that our take on that was that, when we did
the review back in November 2006, the strategic review element,
we provided all the necessary detail and guidance to the forces
in the field to start development of this ANSF, and that their
operations plan that they produced is sufficient to provide you
with all the milestone markers that you need to track where
they are in this in the CM4 through CM1 rating system, and we
do provide that to congressional committees monthly.
Mr. Tierney. That report provides to us when you expect to
get them from C4 to C1, what timeframe or whatever?
General Wilkes. Yes, sir. We call it a star chart. It gives
you a timeframe on that. Absolutely.
Mr. Tierney. I suspect the you and the GAO are just having
a disagreement--they want more and you don't want to give it.
General Wilkes. Well, it is not that we don't want to give
it, sir; we think that we have given sufficient guidance, and
they don't. Really, it is kind of a difference in format
really. A lot of this stuff is done through PowerPoint, and
what the GAO wanted was a very thick report on it, and it is
just difference in the way management is done.
Mr. Tierney. Sounds way too simple. We are going to have to
take a look at that. Is there any possibility that you could
work with GAO to try and show how your information that they
are looking for is really in your PowerPoints and get back to
us and show us how that exists?
General Wilkes. Yes, sir. We have provided all that detail
with them during the report process. I met with the team on
several occasions here in the last month on this and other
issues, and we are willing to provide them whatever we need to.
Mr. Tierney. Because the only other alternative we have is
to meet with GAO, get them to specify what they think is still
missing, and ask you to followup in responses to written
questions, which seems like an awful lot of work to get to a
relatively simple end to this.
General Wilkes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. So we will get it that way if we have to get
it that way, and I will ask you to respond to the written
questions if necessary, but I would rather have you sit down
with Mr. Johnson and his people and iron that out and get it in
a form that we can all use.
General Wilkes. Absolutely. We can do that, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Last, corruption. What I hear over and over again when we
visited Afghanistan from people in all different walks of life
is nobody is going to have confidence in the government over
there until some of the people that appear to be connected,
whether it is to the President or other officials in
government, start getting arrested and prosecuted. What are we
doing to encourage that to happen and to give the support
necessary for that to be successful?
Ambassador David Johnson. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Swartz also
talked about this issue, as well, in some remarks that he made.
We are working to help the Afghans build a justice system to
provide them with training that they need. But you are asking--
--
Mr. Tierney. I am talking about the question of who is
going to give them the will to use the justice system are the
people that most Afghans perceive are getting a walk here in
heroin trade and elsewhere.
Ambassador David Johnson. I understand your question. I
think giving them the capability then gives them the
opportunity to do that. Some of the issues that Bruce alluded
to having for some of them who have committed crimes with a
locus in the United States gives us an opportunity to
prosecute.
We have had a number of prosecutions, a number of
successful ones, but I think that there is a perception, and in
some sense a reality, that there are not prosecutions at the
very highest level. That is the missing ingredient.
Mr. Tierney. You look to Mr. Swartz to find out what we are
going to do about that?
Ambassador David Johnson. No, I am not pointing. I was just
suggesting that this might take longer than both we and the
Afghan people might like.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Swartz, would you like to make a comment on that point?
Mr. Swartz. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is certainly not a simple
task, as Ambassador Johnson suggests, but we think that a key
to this is precisely the type of vetted unit of investigators
and prosecutors we set up in the context of the
counternarcotics setting, and we think there may be some
utility in extending that to the anti-corruption setting, since
it is simply that kind of situation with the guidance from
Justice prosecutors that allows some confidence that high-value
and high-level corrupt officials will be prosecuted.
Mr. Tierney. While we have our friends here from the
Department of Interior and from the Parliament, are there any
laws that need to be passed to ensure that there is no
interference from those high-level individuals in the process?
Mr. Swartz. Mr. Chairman, I think that is something I will
have to take back for the record, but I think it is an
important issue to determine. In the counternarcotics context,
as I mentioned, the passage of the narcotics law was central in
that regard and has provided some path in toward prosecuting
corruption, simply because there is a close nexus between
narcotics and corruption in Afghanistan. But we will look at
that.
Mr. Tierney. If you would. If we have people looking at
that, we would be happy to provide at least our take on it to
our colleagues from Afghanistan, and then they can either agree
or disagree, but at least the assessment would be there and
that would be helpful.
Thank you.
Mr. Swartz. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Mark Ward. Mr. Chairman, could I just add something on
that last question?
Mr. Tierney. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Mark Ward. Not going directly to your question of
whether corrupt officials are being removed and prosecuted, but
there is a new institution that has been established in
Afghanistan, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance,
that has been charged by President Karzai with the authority to
remove Governors that are found to be corrupt and replace them
with Governors. They have agreed now on a new standard, a more
transparent standard about what it takes to be qualified to be
a Governor. So at least we are beginning to see some Governors
being removed. Now, prosecuted is another question, but at
least seeing them removed will begin to restore people's
confidence in their public officials.
Mr. Tierney. Apparently it is started in some part. Thank
you.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I understand with your
help, as well, that we have some political leaders as well as
leaders from the ministries of Afghanistan here. Any Member is
allowed to submit additional information for the record. Is
that correct?
Mr. Tierney. We are happy to entertain it. We give 5 days
for additional written materials on the record.
Mr. Shays. Correct. So what I would like to say to our
guests who are here from Afghanistan, if they would like to
give this committee any documentation about what they have
heard today and their reaction to the number of police that you
need or the number of security forces, if you provide me that
information I will, out of courtesy and with the chairman's
permission, submit it to the committee for part of the record,
and then I know our staff will consider it.
Mr. Tierney. If the gentleman will yield on that?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. Our guests have already been invited to do
just that before we had the hearing on an informal basis. I
think, without objection, we would be happy to enter that on
the record as a result of your recommendation, as well.
Mr. Shays. Terrific. That would be great. So any of our
guests, if they would like to submit something for the record
based on this hearing, I think it would be very helpful.
I would say the part that I agree with you, Mr. Chairman,
in terms of taking our eye off the ball in Afghanistan as it
relates to Iraq, is that we may not have put the resources or
our own personnel in Afghanistan where we needed to, but the
part that it doesn't apply is that we have experts in the
Department of Defense who know in theory what you need under
certain circumstances, and the documents that we have from DOD
do not seem to be in line with what the request should have
been, and that part to me cannot be an excuse to DOD or State
or anyone else that somehow the war in Iraq has been a
distraction. We know there are basic principles that should
apply to Afghanistan or Iraq, and in the case of Afghanistan
the asked-fors were not the proper ask-fors, and we should have
had the proper ask-fors, and if then there was a big disconnect
with what we could provide or what we did provide, that would
be part of the record and it would be far better to have that
be, I think, the record.
In other words, it is important for people in the
administration to ask Congress for what they need, not what
they think they are going to get from the administration or
from Congress.
I think it is an obvious statement, but I just want to put
it on the record.
Mr. Tierney. That is a point well taken. I guess our fear,
our combined or joint fear on that, would be it would just
exacerbate the shortage of things that we have, because the
probable need for additional police and security.
Mr. Swartz.
Mr. Swartz. Mr. Chairman, if I might supplement my answer
on the corruption, I have just been passed a draft law from
earlier this week that is apparently going to be introduced in
Afghanistan creating a high-level office on anti-corruption,
and we think that this is well worth supporting, simply because
it, among other things, would bring Afghanistan into compliance
with the U.N. Convention Against Corruption.
Mr. Tierney. That is already filed with the Parliament?
Mr. Swartz. I believe it is going to be submitted to
Parliament.
Mr. Tierney. Great, so our friends and colleagues.
First of all, I want to thank all of our witnesses on both
panels, and the ones on the first panel that were kind enough
to stay for the second panel--I appreciate that, because we
will get some feedback on that--all four of you gentlemen for
testifying and answering our questions. We may, as I said, have
more, in which case I know you will be kind enough to respond
if we get back on that.
We thank you for your service to the country and your
willingness to grapple with what is a serious and huge
undertaking. We fully appreciate that. Whatever comments that
were made here that might have seemed critical today are
probably frustration, and some critiquing of just where we find
ourselves 7 years into this, and a need to get this moving as
quickly as possible and as efficiently as possible in order to
be successful.
A final word, let me thank again our colleagues from
Afghanistan who were kind enough to join us here today to share
their ideas with us before the hearing, and any ideas you want
to share afterwards will be greatly appreciated. We wish you
all the very best of luck.
Thank you all. This hearing is over.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]