[Senate Hearing 110-730]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-730
CURRENT MINE SAFETY DISASTERS:
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EDUCATION,
LABOR, AND PENSIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EXAMINING ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FACING CURRENT MINE SAFETY
__________
OCTOBER 2, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming,
TOM HARKIN, Iowa JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
PATTY MURRAY, Washington JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JACK REED, Rhode Island LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BERNARD SANDERS (I), Vermont WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio TOM COBURN, M.D., Oklahoma
J. Michael Myers, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Katherine Brunett McGuire, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
STATEMENTS
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2007
Page
Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., Chairman, Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, opening statement.............. 1
Enzi, Hon. Michael B., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming,
opening statement.............................................. 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah,
statement...................................................... 7
Murray, Hon. Patty, a U.S. Senator from the State of Washington,
statement...................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Allard, Hon. Wayne, a U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado,
statement...................................................... 12
Brown, Hon. Sherrod, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio,
statement...................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Stricklin, Kevin, Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health,
Mine Safety and Health Administration, Arlington, VA........... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Kohler, Jeffrey, Associate Director for Mine Safety and Health
Research....................................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Osterman, Joseph, Managing Director, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
O'Dell, Dennis, Administrator for Health and Safety, United Mine
Workers of America............................................. 45
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Ferriter, Robert, Director of Mine Safety and Health Program,
Colorado School of Mines....................................... 54
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Watzman, Bruce, Vice President for Safety and Health, National
Mining Association............................................. 65
Prepared statement........................................... 67
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Statements, articles, publications, letters, etc.:
Letter from John Howard, M.D., Department of Health and Human
Services, Washington, DC................................... 79
Letter from Cecil E. Roberts, United Mine Workers of America,
Fairfax, VA................................................ 79
Jennifer Joy Wilson, National Stone, Sand, and Gravel
Association, Alexandria, VA................................ 80
Response to Questions of Senator Enzi by:
Dennis O'Dell............................................ 84
Robert Ferriter.......................................... 113
Response to Questions of Senator Murray by Dennis O'Dell..... 111
Response to Questions of Senator Isakson by:
Dennis O'Dell............................................ 111
Jeffrey L. Kohler........................................ 115
Robert Ferriter.......................................... 115
Response to Questions of Senator Hatch by:
Dennis O'Dell............................................ 112
Jeffrey L. Kohler........................................ 118
(iii)
CURRENT MINE SAFETY DISASTERS:
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in SD-
430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Edward M. Kennedy,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Kennedy, Murray, Brown, Enzi, Hatch, and
Allard.
Opening Statement of Senator Kennedy
The Chairman. We all will come to order. Today our
committee considers again the pressing problem of mine safety.
We are joined by family members of the fallen miners and rescue
workers from Crandall Canyon. Thank you for being here with us.
The Nation held its breath, along with you during those long
weeks this summer, hoping that your husbands, your brothers,
fathers, friends, would be found alive, and we mourn their
passing with you.
Some of the family members from West Virginia are here as
well. We know your losses were also very difficult to bear.
You've been true champions for mine safety, and miners'
families around the country. And miners are the better off for
it.
The tragedy at Crandall Canyon has again put mine safety on
front pages across the country. Already this year, 24 men have
been killed in the Nation's coal mines. Ineffective
enforcement, outdated technology, and inadequate safety
standards are the heart of the problem.
After the terrible accident at the Sago mine last year,
members of our committee went to West Virginia to talk to
miners, their families, and to the community. We held a hearing
on that disaster. We heard particularly about the inadequacy of
emergency air supplies and communication technology.
We left those hearings with a commitment to work together,
Republicans and Democrats, to do all we could to correct the
problem and prevent further tragedies. Senator Enzi, Senator
Murray, Senator Isakson, Senator Rockefeller, Senator Byrd,
Senator Hatch, and I worked to pass the MINER Act, the most
comprehensive mine safety reform in a generation. It required
more emergency air supplies, more mine rescue teams, and faster
adoption of cutting-edge technology in the mines.
That act has made a difference. Senator Murray, our
subcommittee chair, held an oversight hearing this spring,
which found that the legislation was making mines safer.
But today, we find ourselves asking new questions about
whether this did enough to make mines safer--make mining safe.
For the sake of all miners, we need to understand what went
wrong at Crandall Canyon. It is too early to expect these
answers today, but at least we can begin to ask the right
questions about the Crandall Canyon Mine, about whether MSHA is
effectively doing its job, about whether the Congress must do
more.
MSHA's basic role is to see that mine plans are safe. At
Crandall Canyon, however, MSHA apparently missed the warning
flags about serious safety problems. We will hear from NIOSH
today about its independent analysis of the Crandall Canyon
plan, which raises very serious questions about whether MSHA's
review process is strong enough and independent enough. Such
questions about the review process are not just about Crandall
Canyon, they have nationwide implications.
Another major MSHA responsibility is to control the rescue
effort when accidents take place. Mines are inherently
dangerous, both for miners and for rescue workers. Tragically,
in addition to the six miners, three rescue workers also died
at Crandall Canyon. Clearly, something went very wrong.
We had questions, too, after the Sago tragedy about whether
rescue workers were used as effectively as possible and were
adequately protected in their efforts. So we must also look at
how decisions are made at the mine site after an accident takes
place.
In particular, we're concerned about MSHA's duty to manage
information at mine rescue sites. In the MINER Act, we gave
MSHA additional power to control information for the public and
the miners' families. We must examine whether MSHA is
sufficiently exercising that control in such disasters.
Finally, our committee continues to press the need for
better technology to locate and communicate with miners in an
emergency. The deaths at Crandall Canyon clearly show that
miners are paying the price for this lapse in technology. It's
outrageous that the trapped miners could not be located. In the
MINER Act, we sought to expedite the adoption of the latest
technology. In this hearing, we'll discuss how we can do more
and do it faster.
Our work in Congress will continue after today's hearing.
We will continue our investigation of the cause of the recent
disaster and take up new legislation to strengthen current
laws. We clearly need to do more to prevent such disasters, and
will do our best to meet that responsibility.
The Chairman. Senator Enzi.
Opening Statement of Senator Enzi
Senator Enzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate
your holding this hearing.
Like all Americans, I'm saddened that we're here again
discussing another tragic mining accident, in Crandall Canyon,
Utah. Six miners have been lost and three rescue team
professionals, who risked their lives to save them, have been
lost, as well. I appreciate that the family of those who were
lost are here today. I do want to take a moment to say publicly
that we all share your terrible loss.
In my home State of Wyoming, next door to Utah, just a few
weeks ago a 17-year mining veteran lost his life when the
vehicle he was operating underground overturned. I'd like to
express my condolences to his family in the Green River Trona
mining community as well.
Every mining accident has a profound impact on the loved
ones of those whose lives have been lost. Our prayers and
sympathies go out to all of them. Every mining accident of the
magnitude of Crandall Canyon demands thorough investigation and
appropriate action against anyone found culpable. The
investigation and law enforcement efforts, if any, must be
carried out by those with the expertise and authority to do so.
Every mining accident must be an occasion for us to learn
and to change, if necessary. We honor those whose lives have
been lost, when we act to ensure that the tragedy will not be
repeated.
Every mining accident should not, however, become an
opportunity for political posturing. Likewise, while every
mining accident should be a learning experience, not every
mining accident will require legislative action. There is an
understandable--but not always productive--tendency, among
those involved in regulating the mining industry, to
prematurely react to those accidents with significant
fatalities, rather than taking a wider view of best practices
and learning from every single accident, whether fatal or not.
The MINER Act--the bipartisan legislation that Senator
Kennedy referred to, that Senators Kennedy, Rockefeller, Byrd,
Isakson, Murray, Hatch, and I drafted last year, was enacted to
break that cycle--was done in record time, in a very bipartisan
way. The MINER Act stands for individual mine-based accident
prevention instead of a one-size-fits-all approach. With that
law, we required that every mine become as best prepared as
possible for an accident. We raised the standards for rescue
teams, breathable air, communications technology, and seals,
among other things. And we sought to turn the power of American
inventiveness toward creating improved mine communication and
rescue technology, and the emphasis is on inventiveness.
The MINER Act is a law we can all be proud of. It's been in
place a scant 16 months. Some of its provisions have not yet
become effective. I would mention that that was the first
change in mining law in 28 years. Yet, some are proposing that
Congress amend the mining laws again. This is something we
should look at very closely. Some are trying to connect the
legislative proposal to the Crandall Canyon tragedy, but
actually it would have done nothing to prevent that accident,
and relates not at all to the high-cover mining, retreat mining
techniques, seismic activity, and other issues that are raised
by that tragedy that we have to look at.
One of the reasons I'm so proud of the MINER Act, is that
we wrote it in a way that I believe all legislation should be
drafted. We brought in all of the stakeholders, the union, the
industry, the safety experts, MSHA, the families, and we sat
with them all and worked through the biggest safety concerns
and the best way to approach them. MINER was the first major
revision of the Mine and Safety Health Act in 28 years. I
believe it's appropriate that we spend some time and get it
right.
That's not to say that there won't be lessons from Crandall
Canyon, that may require changes, however, most changes in this
highly technical area should be accomplished by safety experts,
both inside and outside of government, that deal with these
complex matters on a daily basis.
In that regard, I'd note that this committee's current work
on the MINER Act itself, is still not done. This committee
significantly enhanced the mission of the Office of Mine Safety
and Health within NIOSH, and I believe we're all very anxious
to follow up on their research into wireless two-way
communications and tracking devices that might actually help
work in most underground mines.
They're also exploring breathable air apparatus that will
last longer, be less cumbersome for miners, and be safer to
operate.
I'm pleased to see Dr. Jeffrey Kohler from NIOSH here
today. I've invited the mining experts here at NIOSH to come
and brief me on the State of testing and research they're
conducting, just how far we are away from wireless two-way
communication systems that can really work on a consistent
basis through rock. Of course, any of my committee colleagues
that are also interested in these questions, are welcome to
join in that briefing.
Clearly, there is much this committee can do for miners.
The Crandall Canyon tragedy should certainly re-double our
commitment to this agenda. And to harness the promise of
technology to ensure miners return home safely to their
families. Let us honor those miners and all miners by focusing
on real ways to improve mine safety, not just chasing
headlines.
I look forward to the hearing and the witnesses' testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Enzi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Enzi
I want to thank Chairman Kennedy for holding this hearing.
Like all Americans, I am saddened that we are here again,
discussing another tragic mining accident. In Crandall Canyon,
Utah, six miners are presumed dead, and three rescue team
professionals who risked their lives to save them are also
lost. And in my home State of Wyoming just a few days ago, a
17-year veteran in the underground Trona mines lost his life
when the vehicle he was operating overturned. I'd like to
express my condolences to his family and the mining community
there in Green River.
Every mining accident has a profound impact on the loved
ones of those whose lives have been lost. Our prayers and
sympathies go out to all of them. Every mining accident of the
magnitude of Crandall Canyon demands thorough investigation;
and appropriate action against anyone found culpable. The
investigation and law enforcement efforts, if any, must be
carried out by those with the expertise and authority to do so.
Every mining accident must be an occasion for us to learn, and
to change if necessary. We honor those whose lives have been
lost best when we act to ensure that the tragedy will not be
repeated. Every mining accident should not, however, become an
opportunity for political posturing. Likewise, while every
mining accident should be a learning experience, not every
mining accident will require legislative action.
In Wyoming, we are blessed with many natural resources and
mining is a major source of employment. So it is very important
to me that we do all we can here in the HELP Committee to keep
mining as safe as it can be and to improve conditions wherever
and whenever we can. In the case of Crandall Canyon, once all
the facts are known and once the experts have fully analyzed
the situation, we will then have an accurate picture of what
may have gone wrong. This factual picture should be the guide
for any future action.
There is an understandable, but not always productive,
tendency among those involved in regulating the mining industry
to prematurely react to the last accident with significant
fatalities, rather than taking a wider view of best practices
and learning from every accident, fatal or not. One of the
goals of the MINER Act, the bipartisan legislation Senators
Kennedy, Rockefeller, Byrd, Isakson, Murray and I drafted last
year and which was enacted, was to break that cycle.
The MINER Act stands for individual mine-based accident
prevention instead of a one-size-fits-all approach. With that
law, we required that every mine become as best prepared as
possible for an accident. We raised the standards for rescue
teams, breathable air, communications technology and seals,
among other things, and sought to turn the power of American
inventiveness toward creating improved mine communication and
rescue technology.
The MINER Act is a law we can all be proud of. It has been
in place a scant 16 months, and some of its provisions have not
yet become effective. Yet some are proposing that Congress
amend the mining laws again. This is something we should look
at very closely. The legislative proposals some are trying to
connect to the Crandall Canyon tragedy actually would have done
nothing to prevent that accident, and relate not at all to high
cover mining, retreat mining techniques, seismic activity or
other issues raised by that tragedy.
I would also like to bring to the committee's attention an
article in the New York Times last week. They sent a reporter
to Huntington, Utah to cover a meeting of the State Mine Safety
Commission. The reporter wrote that every miner in attendance
opposed new laws and believed current regulations were not
inadequate. So that is the view of miners there in Utah,
according to the New York Times. One of the reasons I am so
proud of the MINER Act is that we wrote it in the way I believe
all legislation should be drafted. We brought in all of the
stakeholders--the union, the industry, the safety experts,
MSHA--and we sat them all around the table and worked through
the biggest safety concerns and the best way to approach them.
MINER was the first major revision of the Mine Safety and
Health Act in 28 years. I believe it is appropriate to wait at
least 28 months before going into the statute again.
That is not to say that there will not be lessons from
Crandall Canyon that may require changes. However, most changes
in this highly technical area should be accomplished by the
safety experts both inside and outside of government that deal
with these complex matters on a daily basis. We should listen
to those experts to inform our decision about whether a change
in the law is warranted. This is an area in which the experts
should lead, and we should make sure the way is clear for them
to do so.
In that regard I'd note that this committee's current work
on the MINER Act itself is still not done. This committee
significantly enhanced the mission of the Office of Mine Safety
and Health within NIOSH and I believe we are all very anxious
to follow up on their research into wireless two-way
communications and tracking devices that might actually work in
most underground mines. They are also exploring breathable air
apparatus that will last longer, be less cumbersome for miners,
and be safer to operate. I am pleased to see Dr. Jeffrey Kohler
from NIOSH here today. I have invited the mining experts there
at NIOSH to come and brief me on the state of the testing and
research they are conducting. Just how far away are we from
wireless two-way communications systems that can really work on
a consistent basis? Of course, any of my committee colleagues
that are also interested in these questions are welcome to join
in that briefing.
Additionally, the committee is awaiting reports on the belt
air technical review panel and on mine refuge chambers. The
rescue team provisions from the MINER Act must be finalized by
regulation before the end of the year, but there have been
concerns raised in some States that have state-rescue teams
that the new rules may be problematic. The HELP Committee has a
responsibility to ensure that the MINER Acts' provisions are
properly carried out so that they fulfill the promise we have
made to miners. I hope we will do that.
Following the Crandall Canyon tragedy Chairman Miller in
the House and our own Chairman made it clear that they would
initiate an aggressive oversight effort into what went wrong.
Chairman Kennedy and I asked the Dept. of Labor Inspector
General to investigate MSHA's actions at Crandall Canyon before
and after the accident, and I'm glad to say that review is
underway. The Secretary of Labor has also initiated an
independent review by mining experts and the State of Utah has
established a review panel. But these are not the only
investigations going on. There are six official investigations
into the Crandall Canyon accident, and by some counts as many
as eight. Majority committee staff in both chambers are running
separate and overlapping investigations, making extensive
document requests of private citizens and State agencies,
issuing subpoenas, questioning witnesses before MSHA has a
chance to question them, and making multiple trips to the
accident site. The Department of Labor's Solicitor has issued a
warning that such committee activities could easily compromise
MSHA's investigation and pleaded with Congress not to
jeopardize MSHA's ability to hold those who may have violated
the law accountable.
Let me make it clear, I want to understand what went wrong
and learn from this accident as much as anyone. But I believe
that the best way to accomplish that goal is to allow experts
to review these highly technical issues and issue reports.
Based on these reports, Congress should determine whether there
was misconduct by Federal agencies or mine operators and ensure
that proper actions are taken. These multiple, overlapping
investigations simply complicate the picture, delay results,
add an unnecessary level of combativeness into the situation,
and they cost a lot of money. When we are talking about
protecting miners lives, it is certainly not something we put a
price tag on. But the worst of the duplicitous investigations
are not really targeted at protecting lives; they are about
scoring political points. And the cost of this misuse will be
taken out of the MSHA resources that really do protect miners'
lives.
Colleagues, we have established an Office of Inspector
General for the Labor Department that has 423 employees and a
budget of 71 million taxpayer dollars. They are investigating
at our behest, and they have the access, expertise and staff
necessary to conduct this investigation. Quite frankly,
congressional committees do not. Let's allow the IG to perform
their role and stop diverting resources away from MSHA's
fundamental functions. We may be just one of the committees
currently conducting this sort of oversight, but we could set
an example for the others.
Finally, I would like to point out another important
responsibility this committee has towards miners. One I hope we
will be able to keep. The Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission (MSHRC) is an independent agency which acts as a
lower court for questions of law and regulation under the Mine
Safety and Health Act. This Commission is especially import now
as many of the MINER Act provisions which will better protect
miners are going into effect and facing challenges. Yet the 5-
member Commission is 2 members short and will lose a third by
the end of the year. With only two members, it will be unable
to make any rulings (but will still spend appropriations!). Two
nominees for the Commission have been pending before the
committee since January with no activity. I hope that we will
move these nominations and ensure that the Commission is able
to act to enforce our mining safety and health laws.
Clearly, there is much this committee can do for miners.
The Crandall Canyon tragedy should certainly re-double our
commitment to this agenda. Let us honor those miners and all
miners by focusing on real ways to improve miner safety, not
just chasing headlines.
The Chairman. Thank you, thank you very much, Senator Enzi.
We would welcome to hear from Senator Hatch and maybe Senator
Murray, if they'd like to, or other members. This is Senator
Hatch's home State and he has been very much involved in
working on this issue with all of us. We imagine he'd want to
say a word. We'd welcome it if he did.
Statement of Senator Hatch
Senator Hatch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much
appreciate your holding this hearing. This is an important
hearing today.
I would like to just recognize my constituents who are in
the audience today. I think I've got them all here. They are
the family members of both the trapped and rescue miners, who
gave their lives at the Crandall Canyon Mines in Huntington,
Utah. We are joined this morning by family members of Manuel
Sanchez, Kerry Allred, Louise Hernandez, Carlos Payan, Brandon
Phillips, and Don Erickson, each of whom gave their lives in
this noble profession of mining.
Let us not forget the three brave rescue miners, who gave
their lives in an attempt to rescue the six trapped miners at
the Crandall Canyon Mine. We are also honored to be joined by
members of their families, those of Mr. Brandon Kimber, Mr.
Dale Black, and Mr. Gary Jensen. The three rescue miners who
bravely gave their lives, made the ultimate sacrifice in an
attempt to free their six trapped colleagues.
All of these men are examples of the best of Utah. Their
courage, their sacrifice, are why I'm so honored to serve the
people of Utah, they are among some of the most selfless
individuals in the country today. My thoughts and prayers are
with each and every one of you at this time.
I would also like to take another brief moment to thank all
of those Utahans that participated in the rescue effort. My
list is long and varied of the many that have sacrificed and
given their time, knowledge, and resources to help with this
tragedy. The list includes members, or officials from the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, Murray Energy
Corporation, the U.S. Air Force, Utah's Transportation and
Public Safety, Natural Resources, and Human Services, the Utah
Air National Guard, local, State, and national government, and
last but perhaps most importantly of all, the men, women, and
children in the communities impacted by this tragedy.
Mr. Chairman, these are good people. They're hardworking
people and we understand how important mining is in our country
today. We also understand that it's a dangerous profession. We
want to get to the bottom of these things and see if there's
any way we can protect more people in the future.
I'm personally grateful for the work that you and Senator
Enzi and others have done on the Mining Act and I'm very
grateful that you're hosting this hearing this morning.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We want to, if we could, hear from our chairman of our
Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety. Senator Murray
has had a special interest in this subject matter, has had
oversight hearings, and has been a leader in the legislative
undertakings that we've had on this committee. If she'd say a
word, we'd be grateful.
Statement of Senator Murray
Senator Murray. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for holding this hearing to talk about the tragic events that
surrounded the Crandall Canyon Mine disaster and the ongoing
mine safety concerns that face our country today.
I want to join with others in recognizing the family
members who are here and I want you to know that across the
country, families are praying for all of you, from as far away
as Washington State to the other end of the country. We all
know what you're going through and are with you and want you to
know that our thoughts and prayers are with you every day as
you go through this.
Mr. Chairman, we all know that miners work very hard every
day on the job to provide the energy demands of our country and
the needs of our families here at home. As a nation, I think we
owe them a lot more than a debt of gratitude. We owe them our
sincere efforts to ensure that each and every miner returns
home safely. We also owe their families. We owe their families
a guarantee that they will be treated with respect and with
dignity and with consistency if they are ever faced with a
tragedy.
I know that many of my colleagues and the witnesses here
have talked with a lot of these families who've lost husbands
or fathers or brothers or sons to mining tragedies. The pain in
their eyes is something that you just don't forget. I know that
that will remain with all of us as we work our way through a
response to this tragedy.
As I watched from my home State of Washington, the tragedy
play out at Crandall Canyon, I was angered that the families of
the victims were subject to such an emotional rollercoaster
caused by inaccurate and inconsistent information sharing. I
think we can all agree that the families of victims deserve
better than receiving life and death information from the
nightly news. Tragedies like Sago, that we saw before, and
Crandall are only compounded when family members are not given
the best information first.
So, Mr. Chairman, as a result, I've been working with
others and will soon be introducing legislation, the Mine
Disaster Family Assistance Act of 2007, to address that
problem. I am also Chair of the Transportation Appropriations
Subcommittee, and I am very familiar with the model that is
used by NTSB to ensure that families have the best information
when a tragedy occurs. I believe that we should incorporate
elements of that highly effective model, when we deal with the
Nation's mine safety legislation.
We are very fortunate to have Mr. Joseph Osterman, who's
the Managing Director of NTSB, with us today. He will be
testifying about the NTSB model and help us learn how we can be
more effective in supporting miner families during a tragedy.
I want the families that are here today to know that we
watched what you've gone through, we have learned from that,
and we want to make sure that other families, if they're ever
faced with a tragedy like this--we obviously want to prevent
any tragedies first--but if they are ever faced with a tragedy,
don't have to go through what all of you have suffered through.
I appreciate your being here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Murray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Murray
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing
to examine the tragic events surrounding the Crandall Canyon
Mine disaster and the ongoing mine safety concerns facing our
country today.
I would like to take a moment to join my colleagues in
expressing my deepest sympathy to the families of the brave men
who lost their lives in this tragedy, many of whom are here
with us today. Thank you for honoring us with your presence
during such a difficult time.
Miners work hard on the job every day to provide for the
energy demands of our country and the needs of their families
at home. As a nation, we owe them more than a debt of
gratitude--we owe them our sincerest efforts to ensure that
each and every miner returns home safely and that their
families will be cared for with respect, dignity, and
consistency if they are ever faced with tragedy.
pain of families
As I know many of my colleagues and the witnesses here have
done, I have talked with many of the families who've lost their
husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons in previous mining
tragedies. The pain I saw in their eyes is something very few
of us have had to endure. And, it's something I'll never
forget.
After the tragedies in West Virginia last year, Senators
from both sides of the aisle quickly worked together toward the
same goal--crafting bi-partisan legislation designed to improve
mine safety in the hope that tragedies like Sago and Alma would
never be repeated.
The MINER Act was a landmark piece of legislation and an
important first step in meeting our goals but, as we have seen,
we still have work to do.
As was the case in Sago, we can't undo what happened and we
can't take away the pain. But we can resolve to work together
to give miners better protection and, when tragedies do occur,
ensure that their families receive the best care possible. And
that's why we're here today.
miner health and safety enhancement act of 2007
That's also why I, along with Senators Kennedy and Byrd,
introduced the Miner Health and Safety Enhancement Act of 2007
earlier this year, to address critical improvements to mine
safety.
mine disaster family assistance act of 2007
But tragedies like the one at Crandall Canyon don't just
focus our attention on the thousands of brave men who enter our
coal mines every day to produce the energy our Nation relies
on--they remind us that there are families who anxiously await
word on their loved ones during times of disaster. And they
deserve honest and clear answers from their government.
We need to do more to make sure that if there is a mining
incident they have access to accurate and consistent
information from government officials.
As Chair of the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee,
I am very familiar with the model used by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to ensure families have the
best information first in the aftermath of an accident. And I
believe we should consider incorporating elements of this
highly effective model into the Nation's mine safety
legislation.
I think we can all agree that tragedies like Sago and
Crandall are only compounded by inaccurate and inconsistent
information sharing. That's why I'm proud to soon introduce the
Mine Disaster Family Assistance Act of 2007 to address this
problem.
Modeled after the NTSB model, my bill does three things:
First, it establishes a family care and support
program director at MSHA that puts the concerns of the accident
victim's family first. Oftentimes there is confusion about the
responsibilities of the party's involved and who is
communicating with the family and the public about what is
happening during an emergency. This bill defines those
responsibilities and delegates a family support services
director to ensure family members are getting support services
and accurate information from a credible source. The program
would work closely with an organization that specializes in
disaster assistance, such as the American Red Cross, along with
mine operators and other vital partners in mine safety.
Second, this bill requires all mine operators to
develop a disaster family assistance plan that must be approved
by MSHA, requiring mine operators to strategically plan for
family care before an incident happens.
Finally, this bill establishes a task force to
provide MSHA with additional recommendations on how to support
families during mining disasters. It includes vital partners in
the conversation such as the Bureau of Land Management, the
American Red Cross, mine operators, including operators of
smaller mines, union representatives, and, most importantly,
families who have lost loved ones in past mining tragedies.
It is critically important that family members who have
experienced these tragedies have a voice in deciding how
families in the future are cared for after an incident, and
this bill aims to make that a reality.
We're fortunate that Mr. Joseph Osterman, the managing
director of the National Transportation Safety Board, could
join us today to discuss the NTSB model and help us learn how
it can be effective in supporting miner families. I understand
that several members of your staff including Ms. Bryson, who's
here with you today, have been very helpful to my staff during
this process, and I would like to express my gratitude for
their efforts.
implementing promising technologies
Finally, we also need to make sure that if promising
technologies are available, they're implemented sooner rather
than later. I'm anxious to hear a progress report on that from
NIOSH.
As I've said before, I hope that as we move forward, we
will not allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good. We know
that every technology has limits, and nothing is foolproof, but
if there are steps we can take to make progress--we shouldn't
hold back.
So, we have an important mission, Mr. Chairman. As Chairman
of the Employment and Workplace Subcommittee, I look forward to
working with my colleagues to identify how we can prevent
future mining tragedies and better care for families during an
emergency.
The Chairman. I want to thank Senator Murray. That's
enormously important, the issue in question and one that she's
been very much involved in. We certainly welcome her leadership
in this area.
We have two other members here, who represent States which
have important and significant mining responsibilities. I'd
welcome a brief comment from Senator Allard then Senator Brown,
if they would, and then we'll get on with the witnesses.
Statement of Senator Allard
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I understand that
you're anxious to get on to hear from the witnesses as I am, so
I will keep my comments very brief. I wanted to thank you and
Senator Enzi for holding this hearing. This is an important
hearing.
I'd also like to express my sympathies to the Senators from
Utah, as well as the families that we have here in the hearing
room today.
I would also like to welcome Robert Ferriter, who is the
Administrator of Mine Safety and Health, from the Colorado
School of Mines, and his testimony here. I won't be able to be
here for the full hearing and may very well miss his testimony
because I have a conflict with another meeting.
But I am very interested in what happens in this hearing. I
think that we have to be ever vigilant. I come from a State
where we've had mine tragedies occur and I can relate to many
of their concerns. I'd also, just again, say that I think this
is a very important hearing because it's been 16 months since
we passed new legislation and I think we need to see how things
are operating as far as mine safety is concerned, so that we
fully understand the facts and take whatever action may be
necessary to prevent tragedies from happening again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, and we'll look forward
to listening to the Professor. He has a very interesting
background and a wide range of experience. I know his testimony
will be very helpful.
Senator Brown.
Statement of Senator Brown
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to acknowledge the many Utah families that
have traveled here today and offer you my condolences as you go
through this period of mourning, and my prayers.
Sometime during, after the tragedy, there was an article
online where a woman wrote, and I'd just like to quote from
what she said. She wrote,
``I'm a coal miner's wife as well as a coal miner's
daughter. I think that everyone that can not physically
or otherwise assist in the rescue efforts needs to pray
and ask God to take care of these families and their
loved ones who are under that mountain. This is a fear
you live with every day in the mining community. I also
want to say that these men know what they're going
into, they know the risks, they do it anyway. My
husband would never do anything else. It's like it's in
their blood. They are the most respectful, loyal
individuals you'll ever meet.''
How important their services are to this Nation as a whole.
For the last 6 or 7 years, I have worn on my lapel a little pin
that depicts a canary in a bird cage. You all, of course, know
this story a hundred years ago, of the miners taking the canary
down into the mines. That really represents to me, a lot about
mine safety, worker safety, protections for workers. It
illustrates to me how far we've come in mine safety, but it
also challenges us, that we need to do a good bit more on mine
safety and on all the issues that Senator Murray talked about.
You--the mine workers--do their jobs every day. We, in the
Senate, need to do our jobs.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Brown follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Brown
I would like to acknowledge the many Utah families that
have traveled here today.
My condolences go out to you. And I pray that you will find
strength and peace in your time of mourning.
I would also like to thank the HELP Committee Chairman,
Senator Kennedy for calling this important meeting.
In response to an online article written about the tragedy
in Crandall Mines in Utah, a reader posted comments that I
imagine mirror the way many people in this room feel today.
Her words were straightforward and plain. She wrote,
``I am a coal miner's wife, as well as a coal miner's
daughter. I think that everybody that cannot physically
or otherwise assist in the rescue efforts, needs to
pray, and ask God to take care of these families, and
their loved ones who are under that mountain. This is a
fear you live with everyday in the mining community.''
She continued,
``I also want to say that these men know what they
are going into. They know the risk and do it anyway. My
husband would never do anything else. . . . It is like
it is in their blood.''
She finished,
``They are the most respectful, loyal individuals you
will ever meet. How important their services are to
this Nation as a whole.''
Coal miners, and their families, are a humble people who
proudly perform their jobs. They provide for their families and
take pride in their communities. Our country depends on them to
extract the resources necessary to power this country.
More than anyone else, coal miners and their families
understand the dangers of a coal mine. They live with that risk
day-in and day-out. As that coal miner's daughter stated,
``They know the risk and do it anyway.''
But to the extent we can minimize the risks coal miners
face, we must do it. And we must do it now.
It was only a short time ago that this committee was
discussing the Sago and Alma disasters. And yet here we are
today, again, reeling from a mine disaster, holding yet another
hearing on mine safety.
You would have thought that we would have finally learned
our lesson. You would have thought that we had experienced
enough loss and heartbreak. The most frustrating fact of this
hearing today is how tragically familiar it sounds. If the loss
was not so painfully real, you would think we were simply
reliving the past.
Unfortunately, that's not the case. Another miner has lost
his life, another spouse has lost a partner, and another child
has lost a parent.
The passage of the MINER Act was a step in the right
direction. It provided needed updates to the outdated 1977 law.
The MINER Act finally provided miners with emergency plans,
increased supplies of oxygen, and improved rescue teams.
The MINER act was a step in the right direction, but it is
only a first step. Tragedies like the one at Crandall Canyon
demonstrate the need for the continued improvement of our
mining practices, regulations and equipment.
We owe it to the Crandall Canyon coal miners and their
families to take action. Congress, MSHA and coal mine operators
must work together to learn from our mistakes. We must pledge
not to repeat them.
The miners we lost in Utah went to work every day and
simply did their jobs. It's time for us to do ours.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Our first witness, Kevin Stricklin, worked for MSHA for 26
years and has been the Administrator of Coal Mine Safety and
Health at MSHA since October 2006. He's been involved in many
mine emergencies throughout his career as District Manager of
Coal Mine Safety and Health, MSHA's Morgantown, West Virginia
District Office. Mr. Stricklin's a graduate of the University
of Pittsburgh with a degree in mining engineering.
Then we'll hear from Jeffrey Kohler, who's an Associate
Director of Mine Safety and Health Research at the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Dr. Kohler served
as the Director of the NIOSH Pittsburgh Research Laboratory
from 1998 to 2004, which is internationally renowned for its
work in all areas of mining safety and health. He holds a B.S.
in engineering science, M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in mining
engineering, all from Pennsylvania State University.
Joseph Osterman has served as the Managing Director of the
National Transportation Safety Board since March 2005, has
worked for the Board since 1986. He is responsible for the
Family Assistance Center, which cares for family members of
transportation disasters. He has been involved with, or
overseen the investigation of, over 2,500 serious
transportation accidents and the issuance of over 900 safety
recommendations.
Gentlemen, welcome. You are here and we'll ask Mr.
Stricklin if he would start, please?
STATEMENT OF KEVIN STRICKLIN, ADMINISTRATOR FOR COAL MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
ARLINGTON, VA
Mr. Stricklin. Chairman Kennedy, Ranking Member Enzi,
members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you
today.
My name is Kevin Stricklin, and I currently serve as the
Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health. I have 28 years
of experience in mining, including 27 with the Mine Safety and
Health Administration.
I am deeply saddened by the tragic accident that occurred
at the Crandall Canyon Mine on August 6, which claimed the
lives of six miners and by the subsequent accident that claimed
the lives of three rescue workers, including one MSHA employee
on August 16. Such losses are always felt deeply by all of us
in the mining community, including the personnel of MSHA.
We will not know the cause of these tragedies until MSHA
completes its accident investigation, which is now ongoing. As
in every investigation, MSHA has committed to providing a full
report as expeditiously as possible to the public when the
investigation is complete. We're also cooperating with
officials from Governor Huntsman's Office, as well as Utah
State Mining Commission, and has offered to provide all
relevant information to the Commission as soon as possible
without prejudicing its ongoing law enforcement investigation.
A separate investigation of the Agency's role into this matter
is being directed by another investigative team headed by
experienced mining professionals who are not MSHA employees.
That report will also be made public.
MSHA's records indicate the first plan for retreat mining
at Crandall Canyon Mine was approved on September 27, 1989.
Retreat mining is a common practice nationwide, where coal
pillars are mined--where coal is mined from coal pillars. When
this coal is mined the roof normally falls in a structured
manner to relieve the pressure placed on the underground mine
workings.
Currently, 223 underground mines have approved roof-control
plans that allow for pillar removal, which represents about 48
percent of all active underground coal mines. When conducted
according to proper engineered roof-control plans that are
developed by mine operators and reviewed and approved by MSHA,
retreat mining can be done safely, especially with today's
technology advances that include mobile remote-controlled roof
supports.
Overall, the roof fall fatality rate in the U.S.
underground coal mines has averaged .001 per 200,000 hours
worked in recent years, prior to the Crandall Canyon accident,
which is significantly down from its average in the past.
But while this practice has become safer, mine operators
must still follow the approved roof-control plans to ensure
that the practice is safe. By way of comparison, the entire
mining industry fatal rate, incident rate is .0142.
Since Murray Energy took control of the mine in August
2006, MSHA has approved two amendments to the roof-control plan
that allowed for pillar extraction in both the North Barrier of
main west and in the South Barrier of main west. Prior to the
approval of these amendments, an MSHA roof-control supervisor
and specialist visited the mine to assess the conditions in the
north main barrier. And based on their observations, required
additional roof support.
The operator subsequently amended the plan to meet the
additional MSHA requirements and then the plan was approved.
The operator submitted another amendment to its roof-control
plan, asking for permission to use retreat mining in the south
main barrier on May 17. Again, an MSHA roof-control supervisor
and a specialist were underground on the section on May 22, to
evaluate the submitted plan. The retreat plan, with the
increased pillar dimensions, was approved on June 15 of this
past year.
Before each of these plan amendments were approved, MSHA
technical specialists in the area of roof-control support made
onsite visits to the mine, reviewed the technical supporting
data submitted by the operator, and made evaluations of the
proposal, based on their knowledge of deep-mine conditions that
prevail in the Rocky Mountain underground coal mines.
With more mining operations moving into reserves under
deeper overburden and/or below previously mined areas, there is
a need to understand methods to prevent, and in the event they
do occur, to mitigate the consequences of bumps in such new
circumstances. For this reason, MSHA is reviewing the
operator's ground control plans, to assure operators minimize
the dangers associated with bumps.
In District Nine, which has jurisdiction over the mines in
Utah, we have rescinded all room and pillar retreat mining
plans in areas with greater than 1,500 foot of cover.
Again, thank you for inviting me to be here today, and I'll
look forward to answering any questions that any of you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stricklin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin G. Stricklin
Chairman Kennedy, Ranking Member Enzi, members of the committee, I
am pleased to appear before you today.
My name is Kevin Stricklin, and I currently serve as the
Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health. I have 28 years of
experience in mining, including 27 years with the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA).
I am deeply saddened by the tragic accident that occurred at the
Crandall Canyon mine on August 6, 2007, which claimed the lives of six
miners and by the subsequent accident that claimed the lives of three
rescue workers, including one MSHA employee on August 16, 2007. Such
losses are always felt deeply by all of us in the mining community,
including MSHA.
We will not know the cause of these tragedies until MSHA completes
its accident investigation, which is now ongoing. As in every
investigation, MSHA has committed to providing a full report to the
public when the investigation is complete. A separate investigation of
the Agency's role in this matter is being directed by another
investigative team headed by experienced mining professionals who are
not MSHA employees. That report will also be made public.
retreat mining
Retreat mining is a common practice nationwide where coal is mined
from coal pillars. When this coal is mined the roof normally falls in a
structured manner to relieve the pressure placed on the underground
mine workings. Currently, 223 underground coal mines have approved roof
control plans that allow for pillar-removal. This represents 48 percent
of all active underground coal mines. When conducted according to
properly engineered roof control plans that are developed by mine
operators and reviewed and approved by MSHA, retreat mining can be done
safely, especially with today's technological advances that include
mobile, remote controlled roof supports. Overall, the roof fall
fatality rate in U.S. underground mines has averaged 0.001 per 200,000
hours worked (or 1 annually per 100,000 full-time miners) in recent
years (prior to the Crandall Canyon accident), down significantly from
its average in the past. But, while the practice has become safer, mine
operators must follow the approved roof control plans to ensure that
the practice is safe.
retreat mining at crandall canyon mine
MSHA's records indicate the first plan for retreat mining at
Crandall Canyon Mine was approved on September 27, 1989. Prior to
Murray Energy taking control of the mine, longwall mining at Crandall
Canyon had been completed and the previous ownership was conducting
retreat mining at various locations. Since Murray Energy took control
of the mine in August 2006, MSHA approved two amendments to the
Crandall Canyon roof control plan that allowed for pillar extraction in
both the North Barrier of Main West and in the South Barrier of Main
West of the mine. The first plan for retreat mining under Murray Energy
Corp.'s ownership was submitted on January 3, 2007, and approved on
February 2, 2007. The roof-control plan for the mine was amended to
allow retreat mining of the North Barrier of the Main West and was
signed by the MSHA District Manager Allyn Davis. A second amendment to
the roof control plan was approved on June 15, 2007, for retreat mining
of the South Barrier of the Main West. The accident on August 6, 2007,
occurred in the South Barrier of Main West. Before each of these plan
amendments were approved, MSHA technical specialists in the area of
roof control support made onsite visits to the mine, reviewed the
technical supporting data submitted by the operator and made
evaluations of the proposal based on their extensive knowledge of deep
mining conditions that prevail in the Rocky Mountain underground coal
mines.
As part of the operator's submission for roof control approval of
the North Barrier, two geotechnical reports by Agapito Associates, Inc.
(Agapito) were provided, upon request, to MSHA for review and
consideration. In their reports, Agapito concluded that retreat mining
could be conducted safely in that area of the mine. Prior to the
approval of the plan, a MSHA roof control supervisor and specialist
visited Crandall Canyon to assess the conditions in the North Main
Barrier and based on their observations, required amendments to the
roof control plan for additional roof supports. The operator
subsequently amended the plan to meet the additional MSHA requirements
and then the plan was approved.
Mining took place on the North Main Barrier until March 2007, when
a mountain bump occurred, but MSHA was not officially notified about
this bump or the magnitude. According to Murray Energy this was not a
reportable incident because the outburst did not significantly disrupt
mining activity, impair ventilation, or impede passage in the area.
However, after the bump, mining was abandoned in that section. The
accident investigation team will confirm whether the incident was
required to be reported to MSHA as part of its work. The operator
submitted another amendment to its roof control plan asking for
permission to use retreat mining in the South Main Barrier. Murray
Energy again commissioned Agapito to evaluate the stability of that
section of the mine. While Agapito again concluded that retreat mining
could be conducted safely, it also suggested enlarging the dimension of
coal pillars that were left to support the roof from 80 by 92 feet to
80 by 129 feet. A MSHA roof control supervisor and a roof control
specialist were underground in the South Barrier Section on May 22,
2007, to evaluate the operator's submitted plan to retreat mine. The
retreat mining plan with the increased pillar dimensions was approved
by MSHA on June 15, 2007.
msha inspection activity at crandall canyon
Under the Mine Safety and Health Act, MSHA is required to inspect
all underground coal mines four times a year. Since the purchase of the
Crandall Canyon mine by Murray Energy, MSHA performed five regularly
scheduled inspections and two spot inspections, responded to a safety
complaint from one of the miners, and performed a roof control
technical inspection. One of the regularly scheduled inspections was
occurring when Murray Energy Corp. purchased the mine.
mine bumps
One of the most difficult, longstanding engineering problems
associated with mining is the catastrophic failure of mine structures
known as bumps. Coal and rock outbursts caused by bumps or bounces have
presented serious mining problems for decades in metal, nonmetal, and
coal mines. Fatalities and injuries have resulted when these
destructive events occur.
Bumps have been categorized as either pressure or shock bumps. A
pressure bump occurs when a pillar in a developed area is statically
stressed past the failure strength of the pillar. A shock bump is
caused by dynamic loading of the pillar through dramatic changes in
stress distribution within the overlying strata as the result of
breaking of thick, massive strata. In many cases bumps are the result
of the combination of both pressure and shock forces. Bumps occur when
complex arrangements of geology, topography, in situ stress and mining
conditions interact to interfere with the orderly dissipation of
stress. Strong, stiff roof and floor strata not prone to failing are
also contributing factors when combined with deep overburden. Questions
about the influence of individual factors and interaction among factors
arise, but are difficult to answer owing to the limited experience at a
given mine.
Bumps have occurred in all types of mining systems. A U.S. Bureau
of Mines report that reviewed bumps that occurred between 1936 and 1993
found that pillar retreat mining accounted for 35 percent of the bumps,
barrier splitting for 26 percent, longwall mining for 25 percent, and
development mining for 14 percent. Longwall mining methods have
increasingly replaced pillar retreat mining since the 1960's and would
most likely account for a higher percentage of bumps today.
With more mining operations moving into reserves under deeper
overburden and/or below previously-mined areas, there is a need to
prevent, and, in the event they do occur, to mitigate the consequences
of bumps in such new circumstances. For this reason, MSHA is reviewing
operators' ground control plans to ensure operators minimize the
dangers associated with bumps, and District 9 has rescinded all room
and pillar retreat mining plans in areas with greater than 1,500 feet
of cover.
the crandall canyon mine accident
On August 6, at approximately 2:50 a.m. Mountain Daylight Time, a
mine bump occurred at the Crandall Canyon mine, located near
Huntington, Utah. The force of this mine bump was registered by
seismographs, and the U.S. Geological Survey National Earthquake
Information Center initially disclosed that an earthquake with a
magnitude of 3.9 on the Richter Scale occurred near the mine.
Seismologists with the U.S. Geological Survey National Earthquake
Information Center in Colorado and the University of Utah have since
stated that the seismic event was a mine collapse, not an earthquake.
Inside the mine, the force of this bump was so intense that it blew the
ventilation stoppings out through cross-cut 95--more than a mile from
the area where the miners were working. After the event, six miners--
Manuel Sanchez, Brandon Phillips, Alonso Hernandez, Don Erickson,
Carlos Payan, and Kerry Allred--were missing. The subsequent rescue
attempt within the mine moved slowly, because safety dictated the
installation of rib supports consisting of 40-ton rock props, chain-
link fence and steel cables to protect the rescue workers from further
mine bumps. These safety precautions--which were recommended by experts
from MSHA and outside the agency--proved not strong enough to prevent a
second burst from fatally injuring three rescue workers. At that point,
MSHA halted the rescue attempts inside the mine, while continuing the
rescue work from the surface.
crandall canyon accident outline
On the early morning of August 6, 2007, a ground failure occurred
at the Crandall Canyon Mine in Huntington, Utah, that, according to the
U.S. Geological Survey, registered 3.9 on the Richter Scale, and was
initially reported by the Associated Press as an earthquake. MSHA's
call center was subsequently notified and MSHA quickly dispatched an
inspector to the mine site. Before arriving onsite, MSHA issued a
section 103(k) order over the phone which required management to
evacuate the mine and effectively secure the site. This verbal order
was put into writing early on the morning of August 6.
MSHA ``(k) orders'' are an enforcement tool used to ensure the
safety of any person in a mine when accidents occur. The mine operator,
in consultation with any appropriate State representatives must, under
a (k) order, obtain MSHA's approval of its rescue or recovery plans.
The original (k) order issued by MSHA was modified several times in the
days following the initial mine collapse. At Crandall Canyon, MSHA
modified the (k) order to allow recovery operations to continue in
accordance with approved site specific plans. These plans were signed
by the senior onsite mine operator's official and by the senior onsite
MSHA official prior to their implementation.
Shortly after arriving onsite, the MSHA inspector contacted the
MSHA Field Office to report that a six-man crew was working in the
South Barrier section when a bounce occurred that extensively damaged
the mine's ventilation controls. These individuals were unaccounted
for, but they were believed to be working approximately four miles from
the mine's entrance.
On the afternoon of August 6, 2007, with MSHA's approval, Murray
Energy Corp. began removing coal and debris from the No. 4 entry at
crosscut 120. Meanwhile, a mine rescue team had breached the No. 1 seal
in Main West, hoping to be able to get behind that seal and clear an
easier pathway to reach the trapped miners. Unfortunately, the rescue
team encountered significant amounts of coal blocking its pathway, and
then had to withdraw altogether from the sealed area because another
bounce occurred.
Mucking or clearing out the fallen coal from the main entry was a
time-consuming process and Murray Energy and MSHA believed that it
needed to reach the trapped miners more quickly to save their lives, if
they survived the initial collapse. Thus, following the first day of
the rescue operation, Murray Energy decided, with MSHA's consultation
and approval, to drill bore holes into the mine from the surface in an
attempt to establish contact with the miners and to assess the
conditions in the area where they were believed to be.
By August 7, drilling had begun on the first borehole, which was a
two-inch hole at crosscut 138. The mine operator selected all of the
borehole locations with input and approval from MSHA. These locations
were based upon the probable locations of the missing miners after the
first bounce occurred on August 6. The first set of boreholes was
drilled to intersect the mine at the location where the miners were
last thought to be working at the time of the accident. Mine survey
coordinates were used to pinpoint specific drilling locations.
In all, seven boreholes were drilled (the rest being 8 and 5/8
inches in diameter) but rescuers were not able to determine the
location of the miners. In every borehole, rescuers attempted to insert
a microphone and camera to either hear or see the trapped miners.
Rescue workers also tapped repeatedly on the drill steel to signal to
the trapped miners; miners are trained to reply by tapping below the
surface. However, none of these communication efforts were successful.
As the rescuers continued to drill boreholes from the mine's
surface, another group continued the mucking and clearing efforts in
the mine's entry until another bounce occurred on August 16, which
claimed the lives of three of the rescuers and injured six others.
Because of that bounce, mucking efforts within the mine were suspended
indefinitely. Neither MSHA, nor the outside experts brought to the mine
site to review the mining conditions and rescue plan could devise a way
to stabilize and reenter the mine. MSHA believed the plan it approved
for the rescue operations prior to August 16 provided the maximum
amount of protection to the rescuers possible, but it was not enough.
msha's communication response at crandall canyon
Immediately after MSHA was notified of the Crandall Canyon
accident, MSHA began acting as the primary communicator with the
families, policymakers, the public and the media; a responsibility
which MSHA takes very seriously after the Sago Mine accident.
On the morning of August 6, 2007, MSHA dispatched three family
liaisons to the location where the family members were gathered to
begin regularly updating them on the rescue operation. MSHA also
provided interpreters for the Spanish speaking families. Clergy and
counselors were also available. In the evening of August 6, MSHA began
participating in these briefings providing updates and answering family
members' questions.
MSHA also acted as the primary communicator with the media. MSHA
held regular briefings every day for reporters off of the mine site at
the sheriff 's command center. During these briefings, we provided
detailed updates regarding the rescue effort and answered reporters'
questions. MSHA also provided regular updates on the Agency's Web site
regarding the rescue effort and issued media advisories concerning our
updates at the mine site.
In addition, MSHA personnel regularly updated Utah's governor and
congressional delegation on the status of the rescue operations, both
on and off-site. I also briefed the Utah Legislature at an open public
forum on August 29, 2007, in Salt Lake City.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify today to present
a technical review of the accident at Crandall Canyon. I look forward
to answering any questions you may have.
______
Appendix 1: Crandall Canyon Roof Control Timeline
In spring 2006, Genwal Resources, Inc. (Genwal) discussed the
possibility of pillar mining the Main West barrier pillars. (Robert
Murray is the current Controller of Genwal.) MSHA required an adequate
justification for this activity.
september 8, 2006
Genwal provided MSHA with two Agapito geotechnical
engineering reports that concluded the Main West barrier pillars could
be safely developed and retreat mined.
october 2006
MSHA reviewed the Agapito geotechnical reports.
MSHA reviewed accident/injury data for the mine.
MSHA reviewed retreat mining data from other mine areas.
november 13, 2006
MSHA received Genwal's site-specific plan to develop North
Main West barrier pillar.
november 21, 2006
MSHA completed its review and approved the 4-entry 3-
pillar development of the North Main West barrier pillar.
MSHA requested additional information regarding the
Agapito report data.
december 2006
MSHA discussed the Agapito report data with mine personnel
and clarified outstanding issues.
january 3, 2007
MSHA received Genwal's site-specific plan to retreat mine
North Main West barrier pillar.
january 9, 2007
MSHA conducted an onsite evaluation of ground conditions
in the North Main West barrier pillar development; MSHA then made
recommendations for additional bleeder entry support and top coal roof
support.
january 18, 2007
MSHA completed its review and approved a plan revision
that allowed top coal in areas of weak immediate roof.
january 31, 2007
MSHA e-mailed the mine to stipulate the minimum
requirements that would provide acceptable support for the bleeder
entry.
february 1, 2007
MSHA received the requested information with bleeder
support revisions.
february 2, 2007
MSHA completed its review and approved the plan to retreat
mine the North Main West barrier pillar.
february 23, 2007
MSHA received Genwal's site-specific plan to develop South
Main West barrier pillar.
march 6, 2007
MSHA received the Agapito report, dated December 8, 2006,
onsite visit to North barrier development; in-mine conditions reflected
accuracy of computer models.
march 8, 2007
MSHA completed review and approved the 4-entry 3-pillar
development South Main West barrier pillar.
march 12, 2007
MSHA received information from Genwal that pillar mining
in North Main West barrier had stopped due to ground stability
problems.
may 15, 2007
MSHA received the Agapito report containing
recommendations for mining the South Main West barrier pillar.
may 17, 2007
MSHA received the plan to retreat mine the South Main West
barrier pillar.
may 22, 2007
MSHA conducted an onsite evaluation of ground conditions
in the South Main West barrier pillar development and made
recommendations against mining the eight pillars from crosscut 139 to
crosscut 142 to protect the bleeder entry; Genwal agreed with the
recommendation.
june 15, 2007
MSHA completed its review and approved the plan to retreat
mine the South West Main barrier pillar.
______
Appendix 2: Accident Timeline
august 7, 2007
In the early morning hours, repairs to damaged ventilation
systems continued. MSHA's roof control personnel traveled into the mine
to evaluate conditions to help determine whether or not clearing this
entryway could resume safely.
The drilling equipment used to drill the first 2 inch
borehole was put in place at crosscut 138 approximately where the
miners were believed to be the evening before and drilling began.
august 8, 2007
In the morning, MSHA approved a new mine rescue plan
presented by Murray Energy to allow clearing the No. 1 entry, but with
extensive rib support.
In the evening, drilling of the second borehole began.
This borehole was drilled with an 8 and 5/8 inch bit.
august 9, 2007
In the evening, the drill for the first borehole broke
through the mine cavity and a microphone was lowered in to determine
whether or not any underground activity could be heard. No activity was
detected and rescuers continued drilling the second borehole.
august 10, 2007
An analysis of the atmosphere in the first borehole
revealed low oxygen readings, but a 3\1/2\ foot void was detected in
the bored area in the mine.
In addition, a two-man team tried to advance in the No. 1
entry but to no avail.
august 11, 2007
Early in the morning, the second borehole (8 and \5/8\
inches) broke through the mine cavity, but no communication was
detected from underground. A roof height of 8 feet was detected and a
camera was lowered into the cavity but only wire mesh in the roof was
detected.
august 12, 2007
In the evening, another camera was lowered into the number
2 borehole and compressed air began to be pumped in. No response from
the trapped miners was detected.
In addition, a pad for a third borehole began to be
constructed.
august 13, 2007
Early in the morning a third camera was lowered into the
second borehole, and again no sign of the miners was detected.
In addition, the drilling equipment was moved from the
second to the third borehole and drilling began in the evening.
august 14, 2007
Drilling of the third borehole continued while a drill pad
began to be constructed for a fourth borehole.
august 15, 2007
Mid-morning, the third borehole broke through the mine
cavity. A microphone was lowered into the hole but no communication
with the trapped miners resulted. Seismic equipment, however, picked up
an unidentified vibration that was not heard again. A camera was
subsequently lowered into the hole, but nothing of note was seen.
august 16, 2007
In the early morning, the drilling equipment was moved to
the site of the fourth borehole and drilling began.
Later in the evening, a significant bounce occurred in the
mine and several rescuers were covered up by coal. In the end, six
rescuers were injured and three were killed, including one MSHA
employee.
As a result, rescue efforts proceeding inside of the mine
were halted indefinitely after advancing over 900 feet. These have not
resumed because no way to proceed safely has been identified by either
MSHA or outside ground control experts.
august 18, 2007
In the morning, the fourth borehole broke through the mine
cavity. No response from the trapped miners was detected.
In the evening a camera was lowered into the hole and
nothing was detected. Nothing was detected with seismic equipment.
august 19, 2007
In the evening, rescuers began drilling a fifth borehole.
august 22, 2007
Drilling in the fifth borehole broke through the mine
cavity. Rescuers could not, however, get a camera into the hole because
the hole became blocked.
august 23, 2007
Rescuers began drilling a sixth borehole in the evening.
august 25, 2007
Drilling in the sixth borehole broke through the mine
cavity. A camera was lowered into this hole in the early morning of
August 26, but there was no sign of the trapped miners. On August 27,
rescuers also attempted to lower a robot into this hole, but were
unable to complete this task because there was too much debris in the
area.
august 28, 2007
In the early morning, rescuers began drilling a seventh
borehole, which broke through the mine cavity on August 30, 2007.
september 1, 2007
MSHA declared that it exhausted all known options to reach
the six miners after 25 days of rescue and recovery operations.
______
Appendix 3: Inspection Record for Crandall Canyon During Murray
Energy's Control
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beginning Event
Inspection Code Inspection Type Date Ending Date Number
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E01......................................... Regular Inspection............ 7/5/2006 9/22/2006 4476247
E01......................................... Regular Inspection............ 11/2/2006 12/13/2006 4474244
E01......................................... Regular Inspection............ 12/29/2006 3/29/2007 4476407
E01......................................... Regular Inspection............ 5/30/2007 7/2/2007 4474428
E01......................................... Regular Inspection............ 7/5/2007 Present 4474193
E03......................................... Hazard Complaint Investigation 2/1/2007 2/7/2007 4474269
E16......................................... Spot.......................... 9/25/2006 10/3/2006 4477639
E16......................................... Spot.......................... 4/11/2007 4/11/2007 4474279
E20......................................... RC Technical Investigation.... 5/22/2007 5/22/2007 4476485
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Kohler.
STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY KOHLER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH RESEARCH
Mr. Kohler. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and other
distinguished members of the committee. My name is Jeffrey
Kohler, and I am the Associate Director for Mine Safety and
Health Research, at the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, which is part of the Centers for Disease
Control, within the Department of Health and Human Services. I
am pleased to be here today to give you an update on NIOSH's
mine safety activities, including those that have been
initiated under the MINER Act.
Mine safety has improved significantly over the years, yet
the mine disaster in 2006, and the recent disaster at the
Crandall Canyon Mine, serve as painful reminders of the dangers
inherent to this industry, as well as drawing attention to our
need to ensure the safety of all miners.
Moreover, these tragedies expose the challenges associated
with escape and rescue, and underscore the importance of
prevention of disaster.
The Crandall Canyon Mine disaster has focused attention on
coal mine ground control. The prevention of fatalities and
injuries from failures of the roof, pillars or floor has been a
priority area at NIOSH for many years, and significant
improvements has been achieved.
Coal bumps have been a longstanding hazard in some mines in
the Southern Appalachia, Colorado and Utah coal fields. Bump
prevention was the subject of intensive research by NIOSH and
the former Bureau of Mines, and this work has resulted in the
development of best practices booklets and mine planning tools,
such as computer models.
Over the past decade, for example, we have conducted many
workshops out in the coal fields, and now NIOSH tools such as
the Analysis of Retreat Mining Pillar Stability, known as
ARMPS, are widely used to improve ground control.
This program, along with others, provides an excellent
basis for properly designing coal mine pillars for a wide range
of mining conditions.
We have moved ahead with our responsibilities under the
MINER Act with a sense of urgency, and today I am pleased to
share examples of our progress, which has been facilitated by
the $10 million emergency supplemental appropriations provided
to us in 2006.
Emergency communications and tracking technologies--our
goal is to improve both the coverage and survivability of these
systems, such as leaky feeder and wireless mesh, in the near
term, while providing a platform that can be expanded in coming
years to realize even better performance. We've had some
notable breakthroughs in the past few months.
For example, in tests at two underground mines,
transmissions from a wireless system were successfully received
over a 2-mile
distance, despite twists and turns in the mine entries.
Addition-
ally, we have demonstrated the feasibility of combining medium-
frequency systems with UHF leaky feeder systems, a significant
benefit for both improved coverage and survivability.
These tests have not yet yielded a final product, but they
tell us that technologically feasible systems are achievable
within the timeframe of the MINER Act.
Recently, we initiated promising, through-the-earth, two-
way voice systems work, and the in-mine installation of the
improved leaky feeder and wireless mesh systems is still on-
target for 2008. While none of these will be the perfect
system, they will represent important improvements that will
bring benefits to miners.
The next generation Self-Contained Self-Rescuer will have
improved performance, and will allow miners to replace their
oxygen supply without removing the mouthpiece. The first
prototypes were successfully demonstrated a month ago, and
delivery of the final units for NIOSH certification should be
expeditious.
Separately, we are tackling the more difficult challenge of
replacing the mouthpiece with a full-face mask.
The refuge alternatives--our work to advance these on-
schedule, and based on findings to date, we anticipate that
practical means for refuge can be made available in the near
future. Also, we are addressing training to ensure that refuge
becomes part of effective escape and rescue strategies.
In closing, I'd like to tell you about collaborations with
our Federal partners under the interagency working group that
was established by the MINER Act. for example, the Naval
Research Laboratory in NASA have offered their knowledge on
human performance and survivability in closed systems, and are
working with us to apply this to our refuge chamber research.
Collaborations within this interagency working group will
promote rapid development and implementation of needed
technology.
I appreciate the opportunity to present our work to you,
and I thank you for your continued support. I am pleased to
answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kohler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey Kohler, Ph.D.
introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the
committee. My name is Jeffrey Kohler, and I am the Associate Director
for Mine Safety and Health Research at the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which is part of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), within the Department of
Health and Human Services. I am pleased to be here today to give you an
update on NIOSH's mine safety activities, including those that have
been initiated under the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response
Act of 2006 (MINER Act).
The United States is fortunate to have an abundance of mineral
resources to power the economy and the highly skilled men and women who
work in the mining industry every day are our most precious resource.
Mine safety has improved significantly over the years, yet the mine
disasters in 2006 and the recent disaster at the Crandall Canyon Mine
in Utah serve as painful reminders of the dangers inherent to this
industry, and our shared responsibilities to ensure the safety and
health of our mineworkers. These tragedies raise serious concerns about
coal mine safety among all constituencies of the mining industry. In
the wake of a mining disaster, NIOSH is available to assist MSHA and
provide technical assistance and support as needed. We have a long and
rich history of advancing mine worker safety and health and we remain
vigilant to the practices that we recognize work to prevent future
disasters.
Under the legislative mandates provided in the MINER Act of 2006,
current changes are underway, and represent the most significant
improvement in mine safety in three decades. New communications and
tracking technologies, Self Contained Self Rescuers (SCSRs), and refuge
alternatives are being developed. New and more effective training
programs, emergency procedures, and mine safety practices are being
designed using innovative risk analysis and management systems. Any one
of these alone would improve mine safety, but in combination the effect
is expected to be great. The legislative mandates have created an
unprecedented environment of partnership among labor, industry, and
government.
progress on niosh miner act activities
Under the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006
(MINER Act) (P.L. 109-236), NIOSH was given the responsibility of
conducting research to help develop new technologies for the survival
and successful rescue of trapped miners after a mine emergency.
Inside the mine, survival hinges on the availability of safe
shelter and breathable air. Above ground, because every hour counts,
rescue crews need reliable and precise means of locating and
communicating with those who are trying to escape or have become
trapped. Specifically, the legislation gave us the responsibility for
meeting these needs through research critical for developing new
technologies for communication and tracking, safe refuge, and oxygen
supply.
Underground mines are uniquely rugged and complex environments. In
working to advance beyond current technologies for survival and
communications, researchers must test their technical expertise and
ingenuity against some basic laws of nature. For example, in seeking
improvements in communications and tracking technologies in
emergencies, we face fundamental limitations in both types of systems--
wired and wireless--that are used for transmitting voices or signals
over long distances or through the earth.
Signals sent by wireless systems, such as radio signals, are
blocked by rock and other barriers. This poses a basic hurdle, whether
the intent is communication from above ground to trapped miners
hundreds or thousands of feet below, or communication from the mine
opening into a tunnel that has been blocked by rock after an explosion
or a mine collapse.
Wired transmissions depend on signals sent along wires and cables.
Wires and cables are susceptible to being snapped or damaged beyond use
in an explosion or a crushing roof collapse. The breaks or damage may
occur at locations that are not readily accessible.
To engage such challenges, we have had to apply a mix of scientific
know-how and creativity, our close-working knowledge of the underground
mine environment, and persistence in working through the technical
questions that always come up in scientific studies.
We have also had to design research across several related but
different tracks, and to administer contracts and award funds to
outside partners with resources and expertise that complement ours. We
have moved ahead with a sense of urgency while doing everything we can
to assure high-quality research.
Some of the more significant accomplishments include:
Communications and Tracking Technology.--We have awarded
seven research contracts to outside partners that address key needs for
advancing communication technologies. The partnerships join NIOSH's
resources and expertise with complementary outside resources and
expertise. The projects address several related but separate targets
for improving communication systems in emergencies. Among these, three
important targets are: (1) a more survivable leaky feeder system; (2)
an improved medium frequency capability that is integrated with either
leaky feeder or wire mesh systems; and (3) a through-the-earth, two-way
voice system. Taken in total, reaching these targets will contribute to
the overall goal of significantly improving both the coverage and
survivability of emergency communications systems. We expect that
combinations of these technological innovations will become available
within the timeframes specified by the MINER Act.
A Subterranean Wireless Electronic Communication System.--
We achieved a notable milestone in August in the research to improve
communication technologies. In tests at two underground mines,
transmissions from a wireless system were successfully received over a
2-mile distance, despite twists and turns in the mine tunnel and other
physical barriers. To date, such barriers have limited two-way wireless
communications to much shorter distances. In simplest terms, we tested
a system in which a signal would hop along all available conductors
such as electrical wires and water lines to get around barriers. The
tests have not yielded a final product, but they tell us that it is
technologically feasible to develop a system that communicates over
much longer distances than existing systems, which was a fundamental
challenge that we faced. We are proceeding toward next steps of this
research with our partners, to address questions about other key
aspects of this promising approach.
Self-Contained Self-Rescuer (SCSR).--The major goal of the
oxygen supply work is to develop a next generation Self-Contained Self-
Rescuer (SCSR), which will be ``dockable'' \1\ and will overcome
existing performance problems. Under the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane
Recovery, 2006 (P.L. 109-234), which provided $10 million to NIOSH for
mine safety technology research, the first prototypes of this unit have
been designed, built, and evaluated. All of the performance parameters
have been achieved. At a meeting with industry and labor
representatives, in which they examined the new units, concerns were
raised about their shape and the comfort in wearing them. Accordingly,
the manufacturer has been directed to redesign the housing to make the
units smaller and easier to wear. The new prototypes are expected
within the next 9 months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The docking port mechanism is designed to allow the user to
plug in additional oxygen units without opening the breathing circuit
to the potentially poisonous atmosphere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Refuge Alternatives.--All of our work in advancing safe
shelter or refuge alternatives is on schedule, and we expect to
complete the report required of us under the MINER Act by the deadline
set by the act. In a related project, we have also offered to help the
State of West Virginia by developing and conducting a test program for
refuge chambers. Although the program has been delayed as we wait for
test equipment to be delivered, and it has placed additional demands on
our limited number of staff, our stakeholders have emphasized to us
that this is an important need, and we agree. We expect to begin
testing within a few weeks. Based on findings to date, we anticipate
that practical means for refuge or safe shelter can be made available
to mines in the near future. However, it will be important to establish
appropriate training and other administrative procedures for mines, to
ensure that alternatives for refuge become a part of more effective
escape and rescue strategies.
We have also pursued a flow of information back and forth with
other Federal agencies, with whom we have been collaborating under the
Interagency Working Group that was established by the MINER Act. Our
Federal partners have made us aware of technologies currently used in
other applications that may be adaptable to our needs in the mining
environment, and are helping us to see how they may fit. For example,
the Naval Research Laboratory and NASA have offered their knowledge on
human performance and survivability in closed systems that protect
humans from hostile environments, such as submarines and spacecraft.
They have worked with us to see how this knowledge may advance our
research on refuge chambers. The U.S. Army and the Department of
Homeland Security are leveraging their knowledge and needs in regard to
communications and tracking systems with ours. These and other
partnerships will save time, resources, and trial-and-error for NIOSH,
and we hope that these collaborating agencies will benefit similarly.
The partnerships will also help us meet our duties under the MINER Act
more quickly and efficiently.
ground control in underground mining
The recent disaster at the Crandall Canyon Mine in Utah has brought
several topics to national attention in the area of ground control in
underground mining. The prevention of fatalities and injuries from
failures of the roof, pillars or floor has been a priority area of
research, development, demonstration, and research to practice
activities at NIOSH for many years. Significant safety improvements
have been achieved. Coal bumps, bounces, and outbursts have been a
longstanding safety hazard in some mines in the Southern Appalachian,
Colorado, and Utah coal fields. A coal bump is the sudden and violent
failure of highly stressed coal or surrounding strata. Bumps caused
many fatalities in past decades, and were the subject of intensive
research by NIOSH and its predecessor agencies. The results of this
research were best practices documents and mine planning tools, such as
computer models. Over the past decade, for example, many workshops have
been conducted and now the NIOSH tools are widely used to improve
ground control in the mines.
NIOSH has developed several computer programs to help mine planners
design coal pillars. For longwall mining, there is the Analysis of
Longwall Pillar Stability (ALPS). For room-and-pillar and retreat
mines, there is the Analysis of Retreat Mining Pillar Stability
(ARMPS). Both of the programs are widely used throughout the United
States. These programs, along with others developed by industry or
academia, provide an excellent methodology for properly designing coal
mine pillars for a wide range of mining conditions. Important
enhancements to the NIOSH models are the associated databases, which
document observed in-mine failures and successes of various designs.
The application of seismic monitoring has been mentioned in recent
weeks as a potential technology for predicting coal bumps. For more
than 30 years scientists and engineers around the world have invested
hundreds of millions of dollars attempting to understand coal bumps and
rock bursts, and to develop systems that could predict or warn of
impending events. Much has been learned about the events and how to
reduce their occurrence through engineering design, but no success has
been achieved in prediction. Today, seismic monitoring is used more in
hardrock mining, as part of a risk management program, but very
infrequently in coal mining. Despite advances in technologies, such as
geophones, signal processing equipment and computers, many of the
fundamental barriers that existed 30 years ago remain today.
Notwithstanding, there could be value in applying seismic monitoring at
mines with a history of bumps, as part of a larger risk management
program, as is done in Australian and many European coal mines.
conclusion
In closing, NIOSH continues to work diligently to protect the
safety and health of mineworkers. The relevance of our past work and
continued need for further safety and health research is highlighted by
the recent mine disasters. We have made significant improvements in the
areas of communication and tracking, oxygen supply, and refuge
alternatives. Moreover, our safety and health research program is
addressing the critical areas identified by our customers and
stakeholders, and through our research, development, demonstration, and
diffusion activities, we are enabling a shift to a prospective harm
reduction culture in the mining industry. I appreciate the opportunity
to present our work to you and thank you for your continued support. I
am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Osterman.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH OSTERMAN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
TRANSPORATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Osterman. Good morning, Chairman Kennedy, Ranking
Member Enzi, and members of the committee. Thank you for
allowing me the opportunity to present testimony on behalf of
the National Transportation Safety Board during today's hearing
regarding mine safety disasters.
Let me add that Ms. Sharon Bryson, Director of our
Transportation Disaster Assistance Program, is here with me
today.
The Safety Board is an independent Federal agency charged
by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident,
and significant accidents in other modes of transportation, and
the NTSB makes recommendations from those investigations to
prevent similar accidents from happening again.
Eleven years ago, the Board assumed the additional
responsibility of coordinating assistance to victims and their
families, following major aviation accidents.
This responsibility grew out of a series of major aviation
disasters in the 1990s when a number of family members shared
with the Board and congressional leaders, their experiences
involving the lack of a coordinated response from the airlines.
In response, Congress passed the Aviation Disaster Family
Assistance Act in 1996, that designated the Safety Board as the
lead Federal agency for coordinating information and services
of local, State, and Federal agencies to victims and their
families, impacted by a major aviation disaster.
It gave the Board additional responsibilities to facilitate
the recovery, and identification of fatally injured passengers,
ensure family members briefings prior to a public release, and
inform family members of the Board's public hearings and
meetings.
The Safety Board created the Office of Transportation
Disaster Assistance, and carefully recruited experienced
individuals in the primary disciplines of victim recovery and
identification, mental health, and emergency response
operations. This four-member unit travels with the
investigative teams to all major aviation disasters, as well as
selected major accidents in other modes of transportation.
The act also details the responsibilities of the air
carriers, including publicizing a reliable toll-free telephone
number, providing trained staff to handle calls from family
members, timely notification to families of passengers about
the accident, and assisting family members in traveling to the
accident city. Carriers must file their plans about these
responsibilities with the U.S. Department of Transportation and
the Safety Board.
The 1996 legislation also requires the establishment of a
task force comprised of representatives from Federal agencies,
the American Red Cross, air carriers, and family members
involved in aircraft accidents to make recommendations to those
agencies and the air carriers regarding their family assistance
plans, and to devise best practices.
The recommendations became the foundation for the
development of the Board's Federal Response Plan for Aviation
Disasters. The input of these stakeholders has been critical to
the success of the NTSB Program.
Our Family Assistance Program also continues after the on-
scene response. TDA staff communicate with the family members
throughout the investigative process, they provide updates,
information regarding the Board's public hearings and meetings,
and respond to family members' questions. For the air carriers,
the NTSB serves as a neutral agency that helps facilitate
coordination and communication with family members by serving
as the single-source of factual information concerning the
accident, allowing the carriers to respond more effectively.
The two largest industry groups--the Air Transport
Association and the Regional Airline Association--both strongly
support the Program, and advise TDA staff on air carrier
concerns.
At the time the legislation was passed, there were some
concerns that the primary investigative agency--the Safety
Board--may not be the best-suited organization to execute the
responsibility for Family Assistance. However, the TDA team
quickly earned a reputation for handling its tasks effectively,
and became an integral part of every go-team launch in all
transportation modes.
The Family Assistance Program's effectiveness resides
largely in our ongoing interaction with our private and public
partners to ensure their readiness to respond. Because of its
success, the TDA team has assisted other Federal agencies in
developing Family Assistance Plans and training, and has worked
with representatives of the Mine Safety and Health
Administration on family assistance issues and challenges.
In 2002, the Board assisted MSHA in training, and sharing
best practices, and in January 2007, the TDA team delivered a
2-day training course to members of MSHA, to the MSHA Family
Liaison Program.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and I will be
happy to respond to the questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Osterman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Osterman
Good morning Chairman Kennedy, Ranking Member Enzi, and members of
the committee. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to present
testimony on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board
regarding mine safety disasters. In particular, I will provide
testimony regarding the NTSB experience providing assistance to victims
and their families following a transportation disaster. The NTSB is an
agency dedicated to the safety of the traveling public and it is my
privilege to represent such an agency.
As you know, the Safety Board is an independent Federal agency
charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in
the United States and significant accidents in other modes of
transportation--marine, highway, railroad and pipeline. In addition,
the Board conducts safety studies on issues of national significance
such as personal watercraft safety and operator fatigue. Based upon
these investigations and studies, the Board makes recommendations to
prevent similar accidents from happening again. Eleven years ago, the
Board assumed the additional responsibility of coordinating assistance
to victims and their family members following a major aviation
disaster.
I would like to take a moment to first explain how the Board was
identified for this important responsibility and then briefly discuss
how the program has worked.
After a series of major aviation disasters in the early to mid-
1990s, including USAir flight 427 in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, ValuJet
flight 592 in the Florida Everglades, and TWA flight 800 off Moriches,
New York, a number of family members began sharing with the Board their
experiences involving a lack of a coordinated response from the
airlines, continuous busy signals on the airline's 800 number, untimely
and often incomplete notification of the accident, misidentified
remains of loved ones, personal effects being destroyed without family
members' consent, and the use of confidential information in
litigation. Family members felt abandoned and in some cases abused at a
time when they needed guidance, assistance, and compassion. These
feelings were not isolated but shared by family members of many other
accidents.
In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Aviation
Disaster Family Assistance Act in 1996. This legislation designated the
Safety Board as the lead Federal agency responsible for coordinating
information to victims and their families impacted by a major aviation
disaster. This act gave the Board its authority to bring together
Federal, State and local government agencies to assist victims and
their families when an aviation disaster occurred. It gave the Board
additional responsibilities to facilitate the recovery and
identification of fatally injured passengers, ensure to the maximum
extent possible that family members were briefed about the
investigation prior to any public release, and make sure family members
were informed of and allowed to attend any public hearings and meetings
on the investigation that was held by the Board. Additionally, it
directed the Board to designate a director of family support services
who would be responsible for acting as a primary point of contact
within the Federal Government and act as a liaison between the carrier
and the family members. The act also directed the Board to designate an
independent non-profit organization to be responsible for coordinating
the emotional care and support of those family members. The Safety
Board designated the American Red Cross to be that independent
organization.
To carry out the assigned task, the Safety Board created the Office
of Family Affairs, currently the Office of Transportation Disaster
Assistance (TDA). The Office has carefully recruited skilled and
experienced individuals in the primary disciplines of victim recovery
and identification, mental health, and emergency response operations.
Members of the TDA team travel with the investigative teams to all
major aviation disasters as well as selected major accidents in other
modes of transportation. The team also provides assistance on a case-
by-case basis to the Board's regional investigators handling general
aviation accidents. For the first time in history, a trained and
experienced team is now in place to coordinate the response to
transportation accident victims and their families.
In addition to the Board's disaster assistance role, the act also
requires air carriers to prepare for and assist victims and their
families. All domestic air carriers are required to have a plan to
publicize a reliable, toll-free telephone number and provide trained
staff to handle the calls from family members and have the plan on file
with the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Safety Board. The
plan must also include a process for notifying families of passengers
in a timely manner that an accident has occurred, an assurance that the
carrier will assist the family members in traveling to the location of
the accident, and provide for their physical care while they are in the
accident city.
Following a 1997 crash in Guam, the Board realized that foreign air
carriers flying in and out of the United States were not covered by the
1996 legislation. As a result, Congress passed the Foreign Air Carrier
Family Support Act of 1997 that required foreign air carriers serving
the United States to develop family assistance plans and fulfill the
same responsibilities as domestic air carriers. This helped to ensure
equitable support and assistance to anyone impacted by an aviation
disaster occurring in the United States.
The 1996 legislation also required the establishment of a Task
Force that consisted of representatives from the Department of
Transportation, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, the American Red Cross, air carriers, and
family members who have been involved in aircraft accidents. The Task
Force was convened to make recommendations to government agencies and
the air carriers regarding the implementation of their family
assistance plans and to devise ``best practices'' for conducting family
assistance operations. The recommendations collaboratively developed by
this group of individuals were delivered to Congress approximately 1
year after the passage of the legislation. These recommendations became
the foundation for the development of the Board's Federal Response Plan
for Aviation Disasters. The Board believes the input and ``buy-in'' of
all of the stakeholders through this Task Force has been critical to
the success of its work in assisting victims and their family members.
The Safety Board has learned through extensive experience in all
modes of transportation that no one agency or person can manage
catastrophic events alone. The Board is also aware that each and every
event is unique and therefore must be met with a well thought out
response. This Federal Response Plan solicits the support of private
and public agencies through a series of Victim Support Tasks (VSTs).
Again, the Task Force members articulate the needs of family members,
and the Federal Response Plan, through the VSTs, identifies the agency
most capable of assisting the family members. While on scene, all of
the responding agencies are required to coordinate through a Joint
Family Support Operations Center (JFSOC). The JFSOC is managed by the
Board and is designed to be the primary location to address the issues
of victims and their families.
While the Board has important responsibilities during the initial
response to a transportation accident, our contact and support to the
victims and their families continues throughout the Board's process by
continuing to communicate with the family members through investigative
updates, providing information regarding the Board's public hearings
and meetings, responding to family members' questions on recovery and
return of personal effects, recovery and identification of their loved
one, and other issues and concerns. The Board has learned that it is
critical to provide family members easy access to trained professionals
who can provide answers to their questions.
The interaction between TDA staff and family members underscores
the importance of the process of family assistance. Families frequently
comment on their desire for a consistent source of factual information,
an understanding of what to anticipate in the days, weeks, and months
following the accident, and most importantly compassion. The family
assistance process provides this in a focused way. A family member from
a recent accident commented ``the process of family assistance gave me
some positive memories that I was able to carry with me as a source of
hope beyond the horrible experience of the disaster.''
For the air carriers, the NTSB serves as a neutral agency that
helps alleviate unproductive tensions that may exist with family
members by being the single source of factual information concerning
the accident. The Air Transport Association and the Regional Airline
Association, the two largest industry groups, both strongly support the
NTSB family assistance program and help advise TDA staff on air carrier
concerns. This ongoing relationship with the associations and the air
carriers has allowed the airlines to respond more effectively.
While today we enjoy a well-integrated and effective family
assistance program, that has not always been the case. Many
individuals, even some at the Safety Board, did not believe the Board
should have the responsibility for family assistance. Some were
concerned that this additional role would detract from and interfere
with the Board's independence and make it more difficult to maintain
objectivity. To address those valid concerns, the Board put a
``firewall'' between the TDA team and the investigative team. The TDA
team quickly earned a reputation for handling its tasks effectively
while also protecting the integrity of the investigation. Over time,
the TDA team has become an integral part of every go-team launch, and
our accident investigators in all modes of transportation have grown to
depend on their expertise in communicating with family members and rely
on their assistance throughout the investigative process.
While we believe our program has established the ``gold'' standard
in victim and family assistance, we know there is always more work to
be done. The TDA team remains involved with its private and public
partners to ensure their readiness to respond. Regular meetings are
held with the air carriers, our Federal partners and with non-profit
agencies. In addition, due to the demand for information, the TDA team
has developed several courses on Family Assistance which are currently
held at the NTSB Training Center.
The NTSB model of family assistance is evolving beyond large
aviation accidents. In addition to serving NTSB in both general
aviation accidents and non-aviation disasters, the TDA team has also
been asked to assist other Federal agencies in developing plans and
providing training to their teams to respond to victims and their
family members. Those teams include the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Health and Human Services following
Hurricane Katrina, and the Mine, Safety, and Health Administration
(MSHA) on family assistance issues and challenges.
As far back as 2002, the Board was asked by MSHA to provide
training and share ``best practices.'' In January 2007, members of the
TDA team traveled to the MSHA Academy where they delivered a two-day
training course to members of their family liaison program. There have
also been a number of MSHA employees who have attended our Basic Family
Assistance course offered at our Training Center.
While the Board has responsibility for coordinating assistance to
victims of major transportation disasters and their families, it is
very much aware that it takes
the hard work of many agencies and individuals to be effective. The
Board is also prepared to assist our colleagues in other agencies to
develop and enhance their
programs. The Board has discovered that assistance to families and
victims during disasters not only helps them cope, but it improves our
ability to investigate those disasters.
This concludes my statement, and I will be happy to respond to any
questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, thank you very much, a lot of
material to cover, we're very grateful for all of your
testimony, and also for your services.
Mr. Stricklin, I listened carefully to your testimony. What
was the announcement that you made with regards to the retreat
mining now, that are suspended? Could you tell us that, and
what its implications are, just quickly?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, that was done toward the end of August.
Basically, me and the District Manager had a conversation and
we decided to pull all the retreat mining plans in District
Nine, which is west of the Mississippi in any mine that has a
cover over 1,500 feet.
The Chairman. You're going to review those plans? Is that
what your intention is?
Mr. Stricklin. Well, we're going to review and make sure
that the plans can be done safely, based on what has occurred
at Crandall Canyon.
The Chairman. And that's a pretty big chunk of the market,
is it not? And it covers about how many people, could you just
give us an estimate?
Mr. Stricklin. I don't know how many people, but I think
there were eight mines involved in that.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. Stricklin. District Nine has approximately 30
underground mines, so it would be one-fourth of their mines.
The Chairman. Let's just, if we could, go back and follow
the sequence here, Mr. Stricklin. One of the most important
jobs is to test and analyze the mining plans before they're
implemented, make sure they're safe. What I find troubling
about the Crandall Canyon Mine situation is that MSHA
apparently missed several red flags about the safety of mine
plans.
The report the committee has received from NIOSH suggests
that there were significant weaknesses in the analysis of the
Crandall Canyon Mine plan that Murray Energy submitted to MSHA.
Yet, MSHA approved the plan.
Of course, the investigation into the incident is ongoing,
but can you help us understand the process that led to the
approval of the Crandall Canyon Mine plans? Who reviewed the
Crandall Canyon plan?
Mr. Stricklin. Typically, a mine operator will submit a
plan to our District Office, in this case it would be located
in Denver, CO, and it would go through the Roof Control Group,
in this case. They, basically, would do a review of the
information, in addition, they may want to do an onsite
investigation to include in that review. In both cases, both in
the northern barrier and the southern barrier, the roof control
supervisor, and a roof control specialist went onsite. As well
as, in the District Office, there was a graduate engineering
student who basically investigated the Agapito information that
was submitted to us.
The Chairman. Agapito is an independent company, and they
do the review in terms of the mine safety. They're basically
contracted by the mine operators, is that correct?
Mr. Stricklin. That's correct, sir.
The Chairman. So, you're relying on, here, they're the
independent company that's paid by the miner operators
themselves, now they are doing the review, and they submit that
information to MSHA, is that correct?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And they----
Mr. Stricklin. What----
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Stricklin. What occurs is the mine operator would pay
the services of Agapito to do that information, and then the
mine operator would submit that to us.
The Chairman. OK, and you have a chance to review that?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And you did, with regards to the North
Barrier?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. But, it is true that you didn't re-run the
models for the South Barrier, is that so?
Mr. Stricklin. I'm not exactly sure of that. My
understanding was the graduate student looked at the
information that was submitted to us from Agapito. I did not
hear what you may have heard, that he didn't run it for the
South Barrier.
The Chairman. Just so that we have on this chart here that
you're very familiar with, but it's helpful to some of us,
these are the North Barrier and the South Barrier. The North
Barrier is the place where--as you just mentioned--the MSHA
took the information from Agapito and said that it met the
safety standards, and they went ahead in that area in March
2007. The circled black area is the place where they had the
bump, as I understand it, does that seem--can you see well
enough from there?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I'm sure you know this like the back of your
hand. That was the area.
Now, that is an area that is how far from the red
designated area, would you say--as I understand it, it's about
900 feet--does that sound about right to you?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, it does.
The Chairman. And so, you had the bump on the north area,
and they stopped, effectively, the mining, and then went to the
other area, which is designated here in July 2007, and the red
square indicates where the tragedy took place, the loss of
life.
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. So, they went from what they call the North
Barrier here, they used the NIOSH models, they contracted with
Agapito, MSHA made the judgment to go ahead. Then they have
this bump that took place, which threatened this whole process
in that particular section, so they made a judgment and
decision to go in this other area, where they also ask Agapito
to conduct a review. They make a review, and this is paid for
by the company itself, and they move ahead in the mining of
that area. Is that your understanding?
Mr. Stricklin. The one thing I want to mention to you is, I
don't think my folks in MSHA knew of the extensiveness of this
bounce, or bump that occurred in the North Barrier section.
The Chairman. If they had, what would have been their
recommendation?
Mr. Stricklin. I guess they would have probably dug into it
further, and evaluated further. But, at the time our
understanding was that they were pulling out of that section
based on the fact they could not travel the bleeder entry,
which is a ventilation course to the back of that area. And we
were unaware of the extensiveness of the bounce that we found
out after this occurrence on August 6.
The Chairman. So, when approving the plan to do the South
Barrier, just 900 feet away, did the MSHA--as I understand from
your response here--the MSHA's analysis of whether the March
bump indicated that the retreat mining in this area was
hazardous, MSHA didn't know the magnitude of the March bump?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, our understanding----
The Chairman. Can you tell us a little bit why--my time is
moving on, and your answers have been very fair, and I
apologize for, sort of, moving through this--but why wasn't
MSHA more concerned that the deteriorating condition in the
North Barrier would be repeated in the South Barrier?
Mr. Stricklin. Again, the reason that we had heard that
they were pulling out of that area was because they could not
travel to the back end of the bleeder system. That's typical
when you have retreat mining sometimes, to have conditions in a
bleeder entry that could cause travel to be hindered. A mine
operator would submit a plan to say that he wanted to move an
evaluation point, and not travel to the back end. We had told
the operator that we would not move that evaluation point,
allow him to come out, we wanted them to travel to the back
end. That was the determination they made, that they were going
to seal that section.
The Chairman. Just finally, Mr. Kohler, can you explain the
significance of the report we received on Friday, from NIOSH?
Mr. Kohler. The report--at your request--took a
retrospective analysis of the Crandall Canyon North and South
mains, using the NIOSH ARMPS Program and recommended
procedures, and also with the laminar model, the model. The use
of the ARMPS Program indicated that there was an elevated risk
of coal bumps in both the North and the South mains, in which
the stability factors were significantly less than those that
had been published by NIOSH in previous reports.
The Chairman. So, how would you summarize that? That's a
good statement, and a fair one. But, in layman's language, how
would you characterize it?
Mr. Kohler. Well, in layman's language, the NIOSH
scientists over a period of 10 or 15 years went out to more
than 100 mines, and collected several hundred case studies of
which pillars failed and which pillars did not fail. They
attempted to understand why they did or didn't fail.
Based on all of that, they put together a database from
which one could find suggested or proposed stability factors to
reduce the risk of having a bump. If the published stability
factor of 2.0 is adhered to, the risk of, the number of cases
in which a bump would be likely to occur approaches zero, if
it's less than the recommended or suggested factor of 2.0, the
risk goes up, maybe, to 60 percent.
So, in layman's language, the ARMPS Program and database
provides the mine planner with a first step to inform the
decision of how to design the pillars to prevent failures.
The Chairman. My last question to Mr. Stricklin--why didn't
MSHA recognize the problem with Agapito's use of the models, do
you think?
Mr. Stricklin. I think that's something that the
investigation team is going to have to come up with. I mean,
we're in a process of interviewing people, and determining what
evaluations that we did use, and see if we agreed or disagreed
with Agapito.
The Chairman. Senator Enzi.
Senator Enzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kohler, what are the technical options that NIOSH has
been studying to provide reliable deep mine communication that
would remain usable in a post-accident situation? What's the
current distance that solid material wireless signals can be
reliably transmitted through? And, is there wireless
communication through large amounts of solid material? Is it
technologically possible?
Mr. Kohler. Senator, as you're aware, the technical
challenges of communicating in an underground coal mine
environment surpass even the technical challenges in
communicating between, say, the earth and the moon.
The issues with the rock layers in between, the limitations
on power usage in the underground mine to prevent the
communications equipment from causing an explosion in itself--
all of those present formidable challenges.
Despite all of the challenges, however, we believe that
there are three or four different technologies, all of which we
are advancing in parallel--we believe that of those, some of
them will come online within the timeframe of the MINER Act to
provide increased coverage and survivability. Really, the key
issue is, after the explosion, after the disaster, we want to
increase the chances that the system will remain operable.
Second, we'd like to increase the distance from which the
miner can be, and still utilize the communication system, that
is, to increase coverage. As I indicated in my opening
statement, just a few weeks ago at a couple of mines in West
Virginia, we had some important breakthroughs which
demonstrated that within the timeframe of the MINER Act, we
will have technologies that will provide improved--not
perfect--systems, by any means, but will provide improved
communications capabilities. So, we've got a number of things
that are showing great promise.
Senator Enzi. I know the Navy has trouble with some deep
transmissions through water. This is deep transmissions through
solid material. At present, is wireless communication through
that feasible?
Mr. Kohler. Under certain conditions, for smaller
distances. Certainly, maybe not with 1,500 feet of cover, but
we believe it can be done.
This summer, we had a group of experts from all branches of
the military, NASA, Homeland Security, other agencies, and we
addressed this very problem. They had no silver bullet to
offer, but we agreed that jointly there are some very promising
approaches.
We recently initiated work with, I believe it was, Lockheed
Martin, to apply some defense-type technologies for through-
the-earth two-way voice communication. No guarantees that it
will work, but we believe it shows considerable potential to
get to the goal that we really want, and that would be ultimate
in survivability, no dependence on infrastructure in the mine,
would go straight through the earth layers themselves.
Senator Enzi. I think that as long as there's an increased
use of coal, that there will be increased inventions for mining
in coal.
What can Congress do most effectively to assist NIOSH in
research and development of better deep mine communication
technology?
Mr. Kohler. I think that the emergency supplemental
appropriations that Congress provided, both in 2006 and in 2007
have been a tremendous benefit to us. We have seen more
developments, and interest, in the past year than we have in
the entire course of the program.
Currently, I think that in the last few months, we've
received as many as 50 or so proposals for new ideas for
improving survivability, communications, rescue, all of those
technologies. We're very grateful for that. I think that that
money has really positioned us to do the job that we need to
do.
You know, beyond that, it takes this amount of time, the
timeframe of the MINER Act, that is our target, we think that
there is some important things that are achievable there, and
you know, we're anxious to continue working toward that goal.
Senator Enzi. Thank you, that's very encouraging.
Mr. Osterman, as we've all witnessed, the National
Transportation Safety Board plays an important role in incident
management in post-accident settings. There has been some
question as to whether or not MSHA should adopt the NTSB model.
In thinking about this issue, there are a number of differences
between a serious mining accident, and for example, a
commercial airliner crash.
In a mining disaster, the victims and their families
typically live in close proximity to the mine. In an airline
disaster, the victims and families could be from all over the
country, and typically are at a great distance from the
disaster site.
Also, mining disasters almost always involve protracted
rescue efforts, while--unfortunately--most airline tragedies
are limited to recovery operations. Do you think that these,
and other distinctions, should dictate a different approach to
incident management by MSHA than that utilized by the National
Transportation Safety Board?
Mr. Osterman. Senator, I think the model that is utilized,
and that is derived from the legislation from 1996 is very
sound, but we recognize, even within the modes that we deal
with at the NTSB, the differences that exist between aviation,
and highway, marine and so on. So, each of these programs has
to be modeled on some sound principles, but also tailored to
the specific needs of that community. As you correctly pointed
out, each of these industries--even in transportation--are
vastly different. Although the tragedy is identical for the
families, their needs do change with the nature of the
disaster, and the industry.
Senator Enzi. Thank you, I'm not aware of any major NTSB
accident investigations that have involved two contemporaneous
congressional investigations, a State investigation, as well as
other investigations aimed at reviewing the same physical
evidence, interviewing the same witnesses, all for the purpose
of determining the cause of the accident, and the potential
culpability of any of the parties. In my view such multiple
investigations are, at best, enormously wasteful of time and
resources, and at worst, jeopardize the integrity of the
process, as well as any possible subsequent law enforcement
efforts.
In the first instance, we need to leave accident
investigations in the hands of experts that have the knowledge
and resources to conduct them. I'd appreciate your comments as
to how the NTSB typically operates, and whether or not you
agree with these kinds of multiple accident investigations, and
how they would interfere with a typical NTSB investigation?
Mr. Osterman. Well, Senator, the National Transportation
Safety Board is the primary Federal agency responsible for the
investigation of transportation disasters. In that role, we
work with our other Federal partners, but are recognized as the
lead agency for those investigations. As we conduct our
investigations, however, there are frequently concurrent
criminal investigations that are underway at the State, and
sometimes, Federal level. Frequently there are other program
audits or reviews being conducted by the Department of
Transportation Inspector General, for example, or the
Government Accountability Office.
We have learned over our history that the best method to
ensure that we're delivering--not only the right probable cause
and thorough investigation, but are working with these other
entities to deliver the best products for the American people--
is to, early on, meet with these organizations, and identify
our different pathways and authorities. Now, that seems to have
worked out very well for us, we definitely do not want to
interfere, in any way, with criminal investigations when they
occur, and we are very successful in--early on--meeting with
the prosecutors or the District Attorneys, the ADAs and
defining the parameters of our investigation and theirs. We
work very hard to protect evidence so that it can be used for
both investigations.
But we do segregate the accident investigation activity
exclusively to the NTSB.
Senator Enzi. Thank you, I have a number of follow up
questions, but I too have over-utilized my time, and I've got
some that are related for Mr. Stricklin, but I'll submit those
in writing, and would appreciate answers to them, so we can
figure out how best to handle it. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stricklin, let me start with you--the MINER Act does
require MSHA to temporarily assign a DOL official as a family
liaison between the Agency and families in an incident with
multiple deaths. For those employees that are designated as
family liaisons, is this their primary duty, or do they serve
the organization in other capacities?
Mr. Stricklin. They serve the organization in other
capacities. What we did after Crandall Canyon occurred was
immediately notified three of the trained family liaisons to
get to Utah as quickly as possible, and we had someone there
around the clock and they basically dedicated their time in
Utah to being the family liaison.
Senator Murray. Typically, what kind of professional or
educational background do those liaisons have?
Mr. Stricklin. I believe, the three that was out there, one
was an engineer, one was a geologist, and I'm not sure what the
third individual was. But they were trained by the family
liaison training conducted at the Academy that the NTSB
participated in.
Senator Murray. Does MSHA currently have any kind of
structured program, or dedicated staff, with the sole
responsibility of providing a full range of support for needs
of families?
Mr. Stricklin. No, they do not.
Senator Murray. They do not.
Were you aware of the March 10 bump at Crandall Canyon that
resulted in the abandonment of the North Canyon?
Mr. Stricklin. Not until after the accident occurred, after
August 6.
Senator Murray. Would you have--if you had known--
reassessed the South Barrier roof plan?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, we would have.
Senator Murray. Do you know Bob Murray?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, I do.
Senator Murray. Are you aware of the news accounts,
describing retribution from Bob Murray that resulted in the re-
assignment of an MSHA Inspector to a different district?
Mr. Stricklin. I've heard of those.
Senator Murray. Can you tell us, is it common knowledge
among inspectors that Bob Murray had an MSHA Inspector
reassigned?
Mr. Stricklin. I think a lot of people heard those
allegations, I don't know if that is true or not.
Senator Murray. Have you ever been contacted by an elected
representative, making requests on behalf of Bob Murray?
Mr. Stricklin. No, I have not.
Senator Murray. OK.
From recent press articles and the September 5 hearing that
we had in our Labor, HHS Subcommittee, I understand that MSHA
is significantly behind in their regular quarterly inspections
in District Four, and that they have endorsed using these spot
inspections as a replacement for the regular quarterly
inspections.
I also understand that you approved the spot inspection
program, and I don't think it's difficult to understand that
Congress included those required inspections in the MINER Act
to identify potential problems before they turned into
disasters, and we fully expected MSHA to comply.
If you are 60 percent behind in District Four, it leads me
to ask you--how far behind were you in District Nine?
Mr. Stricklin. District Nine was pretty close to being on
target. District Four was the one District that was the
hardest-hit with attrition--you're aware of the Aracoma
disaster taking place, we had some initiatives down in that
area that we felt needed our attention. What occurred when the
District Manager who's in place now got the job last August, he
evaluated his needs and decided----
Senator Murray. Last August, like in several months ago? Or
last August, like in----
Mr. Stricklin. I'm sorry, August 2006, over a year ago.
When he got the job, he realized that he was not going to be
able to complete every EO-1 inspection. So, what he did was a
risk analysis of the mines that he had, and decided which ones
he needed to ensure got the EO-1 inspections done, and he
basically laid out a plan that he wanted participation or
inspectors at each other's mine, even though he knew that he
did not have enough people to complete the EO-1 inspection.
Senator Murray. Can you tell us what MSHA's plan is for
fulfilling its statutory requirement on these quarterly
inspections?
Mr. Stricklin. Well, the one big thing is, Congress has
passed a supplemental hiring, and allowed us to hire 170
additional inspectors. Since June 2006 until the present, I've
hired 253 inspectors. They're in training now, but I know help
is on the way.
Senator Murray. Do you have a written plan?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, I do.
Senator Murray. Can you submit that for this committee's
peruse?
Mr. Stricklin. Yes.
Senator Murray. I appreciate that.
I just have a few seconds left, and I do have some other
questions, but let me just ask, Mr. Osterman, can you tell me
what the catalyst was for the creation of NTSB's Disaster
Assistance Program?
Mr. Osterman. The catalyst, Senator Murray, was a series of
major aviation accidents that occurred in the mid-1990s in
which the airlines, quite frankly, were unprepared, and poorly
handled dealing with the families. So much so, that it was
mentioned in one of the members previous statements, they were
learning about issues from the television.
Senator Murray. OK, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. Mr. Stricklin, what are the strengths and
weaknesses of using a collaborative command approach that would
include MSHA, State and local operators in directing rescue
efforts?
Mr. Stricklin. With a rescue effort, I think it's important
that you try to get everybody working together. My boss who was
onsite, Richard Stickler, really promoted that idea, that we
all need to work together for a common goal of getting in there
as quickly as we can. That still gave us the ability to
oversee, and supersede any plan that we did not like. But,
basically, we wanted to work as a team to try to get in there
as quickly as possible, unfortunately in this case, that did
not occur. But typically, after a disaster, an emergency, you
have the company, the Union, the State and MSHA all working
together in a rescue effort.
Now that the investigation has started, all bets are off. I
mean, we're on our own, and there's no collaborative effort.
But during the rescue operation, we try to work as a team.
Senator Hatch. I see.
Now, Mr. Kohler, as you know, the MINER Act was designed to
enhance the intra-governmental sharing of research and
information that would aid in the development of better mine
safety technology. Now, is NIOSH currently receiving sufficient
cooperation and assistance from other agencies and departments?
Mr. Kohler. Yes, we are, in fact, the level of cooperation
has exceeded any expectation I had as we moved into that
process. We're getting full access to information and people.
Senator Hatch. OK, Mr. Stricklin, how would you
characterize the safety record at the Crandall Canyon, prior to
the incident of August 6--what was the record of MSHA
violations at Crandall Canyon? Was the mine's safety and
citation record higher or lower than other mines of comparable
size?
Mr. Stricklin. It was basically about average, I would say.
Senator Hatch. About average.
Mr. Stricklin. Yes, sir.
Senator Hatch. OK, what was the inspection history at
Crandall Canyon? How often were MSHA inspectors present at the
mine in the 6-month period prior to the August 6 collapse?
Mr. Stricklin. We had conducted two complete regular
inspections, or EO-1s, and in addition, we had done a couple of
spot inspections that included the Roof-Control investigations.
We had been onsite and we were in the process of conducting a
special investigation, dealing with a complaint that we
received, I believe, the inspections were ongoing.
Senator Hatch. I see.
What steps does MSHA take to fulfill its role as a primary
source of public communication in a post accident setting? In
that regard what challenges does MSHA face in this respect,
generally, and what challenges did it face, specifically in the
Crandall Canyon Mine disaster?
Mr. Stricklin. The first challenge we faced was making sure
that the families were aware of all of the information, prior
to going to the press. When Richard Stickler arrived onsite on
August 7, his interest was making sure that the families were
aware and having two meetings with the families per day.
Sometimes he offered the opportunity to them that he would
meet one-on-one, in case they did not want to ask a question in
front of other people, or they just wanted to talk to him.
Unfortunately, sometimes the press conferences were set up to
start up immediately after these family meetings. So, in my
opinion, he did the right thing by staying there to talk to the
family members, and sometimes the press conference got started
just a little bit before he showed up. I think we kind of
worked through that a little later in the emergency, and
basically started holding off on the press conferences until
Richard showed up to be the lead person to talk at those news
media hearings.
Senator Hatch. I, personally, thought that Mr. Stickler did
a good job of that, and did his very best while he was down
there, having been there a number of times myself.
But, Mr. Osterman, let me just ask you one final question--
given that an airliner or train operator has a right, and may
have an interest, in making public statements following a
transportation accident--what procedures or protocols does NTSB
have in place to ensure the dissemination of accurate
information?
Mr. Osterman. Well, Senator, there's really two processes,
one is the investigative information, which is channeled
through the NTSB. We control the information that is delivered,
so that we can ensure its accuracy and that it's factual in
nature.
As parties to our investigation, the airlines and the
aircraft manufacturers, and other agencies are essentially
restricted from discussing the investigation in the press. It
does not prohibit them from talking about other issues, but it
does confine the investigative information to the NTSB.
Second, with the families, the NTSB is the neutral liaison
between the carriers and other entities to the family members,
so that we can guarantee that the information that they are
receiving is timely, it is first, and it is, in fact, accurate,
it is not conjecture. We also spend a great deal of time
answering their questions, and working on those kinds of things
that they have heard that may be speculative.
Senator Hatch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, if I could ask just
one other question, I know my time is expired.
Mr. Stricklin, I know that the Governor of Utah set up a
special Commission to review this and study this, too, and
they're a little bit uptight about the fact that--maybe more
than a little bit uptight--that MSHA is not willing to work
with them or cooperate with them. Is there anything we can do
about that?
Mr. Stricklin. Well, I think we're trying to sit down and
work through some of these issues. We do have a State
representative that does participate with us in our interview
process and our investigation at the mine. That's been in place
since we started the investigation. We were just a little
concerned that sharing information with the Utah Commission,
possibly if it ever got out into the press or something like
that, it could affect the other people that come in to testify.
Maybe their information that they share with us won't be as
firsthand as we would like it to be.
We're willing to share as much as we can with them, we just
don't want to compromise our interview process with the
accident.
Senator Hatch. Well, I think I understand that. They have
some very good people on this Commission, and of course,
naturally we're very concerned in Utah, and of course, the
Governor has been extremely concerned, as has the congressional
delegation. To the extent that you can cooperate, I would like
you to do that. But I do also understand how important it is to
be able to get the interviews done, and get them done in a way
that--without media interference or any other type of third-
party interference. So, I do understand.
But, to the extent that you can cooperate with them, I know
the people on the Commission, they're very good people, and I
think that they would be capable of being very discrete in
handling any information without going to the media.
Mr. Stricklin. My understanding is the Solicitor from the
Department of Labor and the chairman of the Commission is going
to be in discussions tomorrow, to see how we can work better
together.
Senator Hatch. That would be great. Well, anything you can
do, I think we'd appreciate it out there. I know the people on
the Commission, and there's some very, very good people. We'd
appreciate any kind of cooperation you can give.
I personally have appreciated the work of you and Mr.
Stickler and others of MSHA at the mines, staying on top of it
throughout the process. I know how difficult it was for the
families, it was just awful, and it was very difficult for you
folks, as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Just some wrap-up questions.
Mr. Stricklin, did I understand earlier in response to a
question that, when Murray submitted the plan to MSHA, this was
approved by a graduate student?
Mr. Stricklin. No, it was not, it was evaluated by a
graduate student. It would have gone through the process of the
roof-control supervisor looking at it, a roof-control
specialist. My----
The Chairman. What was the evaluation? What was his role?
What was the graduate student's role?
Mr. Stricklin. He basically would have evaluated the
numbers that Agapito had submitted, and looked at it from the
MSHA standpoint, and basically given a recommendation to the
roof-
control supervisor, who would have done the same thing with the
numbers.
The Chairman. Yes. And how much training do they have?
Mr. Stricklin. As far as evaluating, they would go through
the Mine Academy in Beckley, WVA, as well as travel with
inspectors. In this case, this was an engineer, so he would
have had an engineering background to evaluate it, as well.
The Chairman. Just, finally, in looking at the NIOSH
report, they have these kinds of observations, on page 16, the
BPSF, which is the barrier pillar stability factor, says,
``The Barrier Pillar Stability for these structures
were 1.0, significantly lower than the 2 percent
guidelines that was based on the deep cover case
histories collected by NIOSH. A BPSF of 2 would have
required barrier pillars that were approximately 250-
feet wide, without such substantial barriers, the
pillars developed within the original are subjected to
substantial abutment loads which likely exceed their
load-bearing capacity.''
Then it continues along on page 16, Agapito's calculation
uses another model that you've used the word results have
proved to be ``misleading.'' I'm just wondering. And then on
page 9, you have NIOSH criticizing Agapito's analysis as not
conservative enough on safety. It uses these words,
``The result is a very unconservative analysis,
because a solid 210-foot barrier has far more load-
bearing capacity than 130-foot solid pillar, plus a row
of 60 or 60-foot square pillars.''
I'm just wondering, as you go through this, whether it
doesn't raise sufficient kinds of issues that are enormously
distressing?
Mr. Stricklin. I understand your position. On our
investigation, we've put two mining engineers who have a lot of
roof-control expertise, and basically they're evaluating the
same thing that you're looking at here, looking at the NIOSH
report, and discussing with our own folks their thought process
in approving these plans.
The Chairman. OK. Well, thank you very much.
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up----
The Chairman. Sure. Yes.
Senator Murray [continuing]. With two clarifications that I
understand--in response to a question you were just asked, Mr.
Stricklin, about safety inspections at the Crandall Mine you
said, about average. For those of us who don't know what
``average'' is, can you tell us what ``average'' means? How
many safety violations were there?
Mr. Stricklin. It depends on the size of the mine. In this
case, it was just basically a one-section mine, so I wouldn't
expect to see the large number of violations that we issue at a
mine, say, that has six sections.
I guess my position is, there's no good mines, and no bad
mines. There are just mines, and if we find it, we issue it.
Senator Murray. But, about average. You can't tell us how
many safety violations occurred over, say, the last 6 or 8
years?
Mr. Stricklin. We would have those numbers available to us,
I don't have them in front of me, but I can get you those,
Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. I did ask my staff, there was 154
violations in 2003, 129 in 2004, 70 in 2005. Those numbers
sound fairly high for ``about average.'' Were there a lot of
fines assessed with that, as well?
Mr. Stricklin. They would have had to meet the criteria
that the regulations spell out, as far as how many violations
you get--there's a formula that's used to determine those
numbers.
Senator Murray. Well, if you could supply the committee
with what they've actually paid in fines, and how many safety
violations, I think that would clarify for us what average is.
Mr. Stricklin. I guess, Senator Murray, just--we have coal
mines that we issue over 1,000 violations in a 1-year period.
Senator Murray. My other question, really quickly--do
graduate students typically approve plans?
Mr. Stricklin. There was no approval by a graduate student,
approval has to be done by the District Manager.
Senator Murray. What did the graduate student do?
Mr. Stricklin. He basically evaluated, when Agapito
submitted the report to us, he had a firsthand look----
Senator Murray. Based on his evaluation, that's what the
approval was done on? Graduate students, are they the ones who
are doing the evaluations? That you then look at and approve
from?
Mr. Stricklin. In this case, he just talked to the roof-
control supervisor, gave him his opinion, and then the roof-
control supervisor did, basically, an evaluation of the plan as
well. I may have misspoke and gave you the impression that the
graduate student was the one who approved the plan. He,
basically, had the first look at the plan, and then it went to
the roof-control supervisor who basically did the same type of
thing.
Senator Murray. Well, let me ask again--are graduate
students typically the ones who are doing the evaluations for
your, then, later use?
Mr. Stricklin. No, ma'am.
Senator Murray. Can you give the committee, in writing
then, how often the only evaluation that is done, is done by a
graduate student? For the record?
Mr. Stricklin. Could you repeat that?
Senator Murray. Could you, for the record, give us, the
committee, the information on how often a graduate student is
doing the evaluation that MSHA then uses for their final
approval?
Mr. Stricklin. I can do that.
Senator Murray. Thank you.
Senator Hatch. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one further
question?
The Chairman. Yes, sure. Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. To folks who may not understand mining, 100
violations or thereabouts, seem like a lot of violations. Could
you give us some idea of what the range of violations, what
type of violations they are, and especially if you can tailor
it to the Crandall Mine it would be helpful to us.
Mr. Stricklin. The most violated mines in the country last
year, Senator Hatch, probably had about 1,000 to 1,200
violations.
Senator Hatch. What kind of violations, from minor ones to
major ones.
Mr. Stricklin. It could be anything from what we refer to
as a non-S&S violation--that basically costs about $112 to a
flagrant violation, that could go up to $220,000.
Senator Hatch. Describe those violations, what would be a
non-S&S violation?
Mr. Stricklin. Non-S&S violation would be that the Port-a-
Potty on the section wasn't ready for use.
Senator Hatch. I see.
Mr. Stricklin. A flagrant violation would be a mine
operator who continues to mine coal when he knows that the fan
is not operating.
Senator Hatch. Do you know how many flagrant violations
there were, or near-flagrant violations there were at Crandall
Canyon?
Mr. Stricklin. At Crandall Canyon, there were no flagrant
violations.
Senator Hatch. I see.
OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Just to finish this up in my own mind, isn't
it true that Andalex, prior to the Murray ownership, considered
the mine to have been completely mined out, and that the Bureau
of Land Management agreed?
Mr. Stricklin. My understanding, Andalex completed all of
the long-wall mining.
The Chairman. That's a lot less risky, as I understand, is
that correct?
Mr. Stricklin. Well, basically it took up most of their
property that had already been mined, and it left these areas
that Murray Enterprise wanted to come in and mine. I don't know
anything about the BLM report.
The Chairman. Well, as I understand, you're the expert on
it. They have to get the approval to mine, they have to get the
sign-off that the mining is terminated, at the very end. Don't
they have to get that?
Mr. Stricklin. Well, basically, we have no involvement with
BLM.
The Chairman. No. Well, that's another point I want to just
mention, because, some people believe that it's not
coincidental that you had the earlier owners basically close
that mine down. And then you have the BLM report,
``On October 27, 2004, John Lewis, Mining Engineer of
Andalex called and informed me that Genwal would need
to seal off the west portion of the main west mains at
the Crandall Canyon Mine (those are the North and South
Barriers). Conditions were deteriorating,''
and it has the whole report here, here's the BLM--yet you don't
know--you don't get that information. This is like the CIA not
talking to the FBI when we're getting attacked by the
terrorists. I mean, here's the Bureau of Land Management making
these judgments here, and you don't know about it, they're not
supposed to let you know, the Bureau of Land Management make
these judgments? ``The situation in Main West is untenable for
future pillar recovery''--I mean, did that grad student know
this? Did they have this information?
Mr. Stricklin. That information was not shared with us,
that I'm aware of, sir.
The Chairman. Don't you think it's useful if they do
share--Bureau of Land Management, they make a report on safety
issues that they give you a copy or include you?
Mr. Stricklin. I think that's important that we would have
that, yes, sir.
The Chairman. OK.
Thank you very much.
Our next panel will be Dennis O'Dell, who oversees Health
and Safety Operations for the United Mine Workers of the United
States. Mr. O'Dell sits on several boards for mine safety,
including NIOSH Mine Safety and Health Research Advisory
Committee. Also, he is a member of the Utah State Commission
investigating the Crandall Canyon disaster.
And then we'll have Robert Ferriter, who has served as the
Director of Mine Safety Programs at the Colorado School of
Mines since 1999. In that role, he develops programs to provide
training, professional education, on a wide variety of topics
related to safety and occupational health in mining, including
risk assessment, regulatory compliance and safety management.
Mr. Ferriter previously spent 26 years at the Mine Safety
and Health Administration at the Department of Labor. We thank
you very much, thank all of our guests here, and Mr. O'Dell, if
you'd wish to proceed, we'd be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF DENNIS O'DELL, ADMINISTRATOR FOR HEALTH AND
SAFETY, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
Mr. O'Dell. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
Senator Enzi, and members of the committee, I appear before you
today, currently serving as the Administrator of Occupational
Health & Safety for the United Mine Workers of America.
The Chairman. Excuse me, I didn't, Bruce Watzman, I
apologize, I didn't introduce you on this. The National Mining
Association Vice President for Safety and Health, and is
responsible for the development of NMA's policy position on the
matters when pending before both the Congress and governmental
agencies.
Responsibilities also include working with member companies
in the design of safety and health programs for use in the
mines with Federal and State regulators on the management of
safety and health programs. We're delighted to welcome you
here. Thank you very much.
Mr. O'Dell.
Mr. O'Dell. Yes, sir. I appear before you today currently
serving as the Administrator of Occupational Health & Safety
for the United Mine Workers of America, but more proudly, I am
a coal miner with 30-years experience in the industry, 20
years, approximately of which I mined coal.
It is with great sadness that I appear before you today to
discuss, yet again, and in far too short a span of time, the
deaths of mine workers. We pray for the families of the six
miners who remain trapped in the Crandall Canyon Mine and for
the families of the brave rescuers who perished trying to
rescue them.
We have family members attending this hearing today. I wish
to both acknowledge their presence, and to personally express
my deep sorrow to them, as well as my gratitude for their
coming to the halls of Congress to witness and participate in
the legislative process.
Together, we seek to ensure that what happened at Crandall
Canyon will never be repeated.
Unfortunately, all of the factors that led to the
catastrophic collapse at Crandall Canyon Mine may not yet be
evident, and they may never be fully known.
What is apparent, after reviewing the available information
and examining the mine map, which you have before you, is that
the conditions that led to this tragic event should have been
avoided. Contrary to what some may tell you, there is little
doubt that this was a man-made disaster.
Let me explain why I believe this to be true, not only as a
safety expert, but from a coal miner's perspective.
It is important to understand that the Crandall Canyon Mine
was in the last stages of its productive life. The previous
operator, Andalex Resources, had extracted most of the mine's
recoverable reserves, utilizing a technique that we call long-
wall mining.
After a completion of the final long-wall panel, the only
remaining reserves were the barrier pillars and the mine's main
entry pillars, Andalex Resources deemed this remaining coal
crucial to maintaining the mine's stability.
In documents filed with the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and
Mining, the Company stated,
``Although maximum recovery is a design criteria,
other considerations must be looked at in the final
analysis of the extraction of the coal. These factors
consider the insurance of protection of personnel and
the environment.''
In their statement they say,
``Solid barriers will be left to protect the main
entries from being mined-out panels, and to guarantee
stability of the main entries for the life of the
mine.''
This means that only the North and South Barrier pillars
separated the mine's main entries from vast areas of
unsupported roof.
Yet, Murray Energy sought to mine in this area. They
submitted plans to MSHA, and it was improved by MSHA's District
Nine office in Denver, CO. Because of the extent of the
previous long-wall mining, there can be no doubt that the
overburden was exerting extreme pressure on the remaining coal
reserves, adversely impairing and impacting the conditions of
the mine.
In early March 2007, you heard that the mine then
experienced a large mountain bump while pillar extraction was
being conducted in the North Barrier. The bump was so severe
that Murray Energy abandoned its plans to develop the remaining
North Panel, and sealed that area off.
While it's unclear if Crandall Canyon Mine management
officially notified MSHA of this event, the resulting seal plan
that they had submitted to the Agency should have, at least,
raised questions about why the operator has abandoned that
large area of a mine to where they left approximately 54 blocks
of coal that they intended to mine.
As we all know, in August, another catastrophic mountain
bump trapped 6 miners in the south section, approximately 900
feet due south from the north area that had been abandoned for
the same reason. This is why I believe that the plans to
perform pillar development and extraction of the barrier
pillars should never have been submitted. Further, and perhaps
more importantly, MSHA--which is charged with protecting
miners' health and safety--should have never approved such
request.
As I said earlier, we may never fully know, because the
main parties involved in this investigation are MSHA and Murray
Energy. Utah Governor Huntsman recently appointed me to the
Utah Safety Commission as one of his members. Our Chairman, Mr.
Scott Mathison, has made several requests to MSHA to be
provided the information from MSHA's investigation, as it
progresses, so that our Commission can make recommendations to
Governor Huntsman to improve miner's protection as a result of
what happened at Crandall Canyon Mine.
MSHA is refusing to cooperate, saying that they will only
provide information to us that they release to the general
public. In other words, we're being shut out, and therefore,
handcuffed from being able to make recommendations that will
improve the safety at the miners' workplace.
MSHA has to allow independent parties to be a part of their
investigations to restore the miner's and miners' families
trust and faith in them. As it stands now, the company which
submits the mining plans, and MSHA who approves the plans, are
the only parties involved in this investigation, other than one
observer from the State, which means that they are
investigating themselves. This is preposterous, because they
are the two parties with the most at risk when it comes to
uncovering the failures and shortcomings that caused this
disaster to occur in the first place.
I can also tell you that Mr. Scott Mathison, our Chairman
from the Utah Mine Safety Commission, is equally frustrated
with MSHA's roadblock. I am also equally disappointed that MSHA
has also refused the United Mine Workers of America the ability
to represent the families during the investigation, as they had
requested by us.
What is it that they are trying to hide? By MSHA taking
this approach, a great injustice is being imposed on the
miners, and miners' families.
I'm closing up, but let me further clarify that I am not
referring to MSHA inspectors, when I talk about MSHA. These
inspectors are in the mine on a day-to-day basis, trying to do
the best job they can. These are dedicated, hardworking
individuals that are trying to ensure our mines are safe to
work for our miners. I am referring to the culture of the
Agency, of those running the Agency, the policymakers. They're
the ones that need to change. Our inspectors need to be
restored with the tools necessary to allow them the ability to
do their job.
Miners are still dying, unnecessarily. There are many more
improvements that need to be made, and I have included them in
my written testimony. I hope that you will be able to take the
time to review these, so that more improved regulations can be
made to ensure our miners get the health and safety protections
we deserve.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for
your time and devotion to this very important matter. I will be
happy to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Dell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dennis O'Dell
On behalf of the United Mine Workers of America (``UMWA''), I
appreciate having this opportunity to testify about the many health and
safety issues and challenges that continue to confront miners in this
country. The UMWA has been an unwavering advocate for miners' health
and safety for 117 years.
It is with great sadness that I appear before you today to
discuss--yet again, and in far too short a span of time--the deaths of
mine workers. We pray for the families of the six miners who remain
trapped in the Crandall Canyon mine, and for the families of the brave
rescuers who perished trying to rescue them. Seven of those miners have
family members attending this hearing. I wish to both acknowledge their
presence, and to personally express my deep sorrow to them as well as
my gratitude for their coming to the halls of Congress to witness and
participate in the legislative process. Together we seek to ensure that
what happened at Crandall Canyon will never be repeated.
I come out of the coal fields, having been an underground coal
miner for 19 years where I was elected and served as Chairman of the
Local Union health and safety committee. From there I was appointed as
an International health and safety representative for the United Mine
Workers of America for 9 years. In 2005 and currently I serve as the
Administrator of the UMWA's International Health and Safety Department
giving me 30 years experience in the coal mining industry. I have
participated in and spoken about the recent and most tragic mining
disasters of the last decade, including the Jim Walters No. 5 mine
explosion in September 2001, the three multi-fatal coal mine accidents
of 2006: Sago and Aracoma, both in my home State of West Virginia and
Darby in Kentucky, as well as other mine fatal-related investigations.
I was also recently appointed by Utah Governor Huntsman to the Utah
Mine Safety Commission to consider a number of issues that arose in
connection with the Crandall Canyon disasters.
Last year this committee was instrumental in enacting legislation
that brought about the first improvements to miners' health and safety
legislation for nearly 30 years. Nevertheless, there are many more
improvements yet needed to ensure that miners can return home after a
day's work, and not fall ill from their work. I will offer you some of
my thoughts about areas of concern based specifically on the Crandall
Canyon disasters, as well as the coal mining disasters of 2006.
I appeared before this committee's Subcommittee on Employment and
Workplace Safety earlier this year to express thoughts about progress
made since the MINER Act was passed last year and about the areas still
requiring legislative attention. Today I will update and expand upon
those remarks. The Crandall Canyon disaster demonstrates that the
remaining needs are substantial.
communication and tracking
Despite passage of the MINER Act over a year ago, very little has
changed concerning the inability to communicate with and locate trapped
miners. Despite the repeated assurances at press conferences by Bob
Murray that he knew exactly where to find the miners trapped in the
Crandall Canyon Mine, 8 weeks later the six trapped miners still have
not been located. It goes without saying that until they can be
located, recovering them is virtually impossible. Yet, we still ask
that the miners be recovered and brought home.
The situation at Crandall Canyon stands in stark contrast to the
experiences last year when a Polish miner was pulled from wreckage
after he was located through use of a tracking device, and when
Canadian miners trapped underground were safely retrieved from the
safety chamber to which they had retreated. Throughout the last 18
months, we have learned more about what is available in terms of
communications and tracking, but very few operators have taken
advantage of the technology and equipment that is available. Yet, if
other countries' miners can survive and escape these disasters, then so
should American miners. We need change, and we need it now. Why our
miners do not have the benefits of these protections is a key question
that demands an answer in the wake of the Crandall Canyon disaster.
MSHA and the industry must aggressively require the use of improved
communication systems and tracking devices. Improved communication and
tracking technology, including one-way text messaging and two-way
wireless systems, is available now and should be immediately installed
in all mines. Any system that can increase the ability for miners to
escape or be rescued from a mine emergency, even if it is limited in
scope, must be utilized. The Federal Government, through NIOSH and
MSHA, should fund and direct continued studies and research to develop
the next generation of tracking and communication devices. As this
newer technology becomes available, mine operators should be required
to upgrade existing systems at all their operations.
the risks of pillar mining at crandall canon
Unfortunately, all the factors that lead to the catastrophic
collapse at Crandall Canyon Mine may not yet be evident, and they may
never be fully known. However, what is apparent after reviewing the
available information and examining the mine map, is that the
conditions that lead to this tragic event were man-made. The disaster
at Crandall Canyon could and should have been prevented. Contrary to
what some may say, there is little doubt that this was a man-made
disaster.
We hope that by figuring out all that went wrong at Crandall Canyon
we will be able to prevent further needless death. It is important to
understand that the Crandall Canyon Mine was in the last stages of its
productive life; it had already been in operation for about 50 years.
The previous operator, Andalex Resources, had extracted most of the
mine's recoverable reserves utilizing a technique known as longwall
mining. After completion of the final longwall panel the only remaining
reserves were the ``barrier pillars'' and the mine's main entry
pillars. Andalex Resources deemed this remaining coal crucial to
maintaining the mine's stability. In documents it filed with the Utah
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining that company stated,
``Although maximum recovery is a design criteria, other
considerations must be looked at in the final analysis in the
extraction of coal. These factors consider the insurance of
protection of personnel and the environment. Solid barriers
will be left to protect the main entries from the mined out
panels and to guarantee stability of the main entries for the
life of the mine.''
Despite these expressed concerns of Andalex Resources, e-mail
correspondence between the engineering firm of Agapito Associates, Inc.
and Mr. Lane Adair of GENWAL Resources on August 9, 2006, indicated it
had completed a preliminary review of the ``. . . proposed retreat
mining sequence in the Main West Barriers. . . . '' This correspondence
occurred on the same day that Murray Energy Corp. apparently became the
``controller'' of the operation. On December 10, 2006, Agapito
President and Director, Michael Hardy, sent a letter to Mr. Adair after
visiting the mine to ``. . . review the ground conditions of the room
and pillar mining in the north pillar along Main West. Mr. Hardy
determined that, ``There was no indication of problematic pillar
yielding or roof problems that might indicate higher-than-predicted
abutment loads.'' Beginning 10 days later, December 20, 2006, Murray
Energy's subsidiary, UtahAmerican Energy, Inc. (hereafter referred to
as ``Murray Energy'') submitted several amendments to the roof control
plan to develop entries into the North Barrier, Main West; it sought to
remove pillars from those entries during retreat mining operations
after the entries were developed. MSHA, District 9 Office in Denver,
Colorado approved each of these plans.
In early March 2007, the Crandall Canyon Mine experienced a large
``mountain bump'' while pillar extraction was being conducted in the
North Barrier. The bump was so severe that Murray Energy abandoned its
plans to develop the remaining north panel (consisting of approximately
54 pillars), and sealed the area. While it is unclear if Crandall
Canyon Mine management officially notified MSHA of this event, the
resulting seal plan that had to be submitted to the Agency should have
at least raised questions about why the operator was abandoning that
large area of the mine. It will be interesting to see whether MSHA will
decide that the mountain bump of March 2007 was ``reportable'' under
existing law; if that comes back negative, then we should consider what
changes are needed to ensure that future events of that magnitude are
considered by MSHA when it reviews a mine's operating plans.
Before the large ``mountain bump'' in early March, Murray Energy
had submitted plans to develop the South Barrier of Main West. On March
8, 2007, MSHA approved a request by mine management to pillar the area.
Pillar extraction continued until August 6, 2007, at which time the
retreat mining was almost due south of the area where the bump had
caused the operator to abandon the North Barrier section. At that time,
a catastrophic ``mountain bump'' trapped the six miners in the working
section. The force of the bump registered approximately 3.9 on the
Richter Scale at the University of Utah Seismic Stations.
Considering that only the North and South Barrier pillars separated
the mine's main entries from vast areas of unsupported gob, and that
the previous owner refused to mine these barriers for safety reasons,
it is deeply distressing that Murray Energy sought to mine in this
area, and submitted such plans to MSHA. Because of the extent of the
previous mining there can be no doubt that the overburden was exerting
extreme pressures on the remaining coal reserves. It is impossible to
believe that development and pillar extraction of the barrier pillars
in the Main West area of the mine, which began sometime after August
2006, would not adversely impact the conditions in the mine.
From all that we have seen, we believe that plans to perform pillar
development and extraction of the barrier pillars at the Crandall
Canyon Mine should never have been submitted. Further, and perhaps more
importantly, MSHA is charged with protecting miners' health and safety,
and should never have approved such a request. It is high time for mine
operators and MSHA to realize that miners' lives, and not the mining
product, is the most valuable resource of the mining industry. Only
when this happens can we arrest the needless loss of life in our
Nation's coal fields.
external communications problems at crandall canyon
It is unfortunate that the management team at the Crandall Canyon
Mine spent so much energy trying to deflect blame in this tragedy. It
is equally unfortunate that MSHA ignored the will of Congress in its
reaction to this disaster.
Section 7 of the MINER Act states that MSHA ``shall serve as the
primary communicator with the operator, miners' families, the press and
the public.'' Nevertheless, in Utah, it appeared as though MSHA
surrendered its role as chief communicator. As a result, a great deal
of inaccurate and misleading statements and information went over the
airwaves. The effect was that millions of Americans were given
incorrect and misleading information right from the start of this
disaster, and MSHA allowed it to happen. Here are some examples:
1. From the very beginning, Murray Energy's Owner and Chief
Operating Officer, Robert Murray, asserted that ``an act of God'' in
the form of a natural earthquake caused this catastrophe. He suggested
that the ``seismic activity'' at the mine was uncontrollable and
unrelated to his company's activity. However, from tapes made of calls
to the local Sheriffs office that same morning, it is apparent that
from the time it occurred, University of Utah seismologists believed
the activity was the result of coal mining.
2. Time and time again Mr. Murray emphatically stated that he knew
exactly where the trapped miners were. Yet 8 weeks and many boreholes
later he still has not been able to locate the miners.
3. Mr. Murray also strenuously objected to reports that miners were
performing a final method of mining referred to by the media as
``retreat mining.'' Again, he was not giving true information: from the
approved mining plan it is evident that this mine was in the process of
``pulling pillars,'' which is a particular type of retreat mining. Not
only was this operation performing ``pillar mining'' or ``pillar
extraction,'' but in communications involving this mine, principals
characterized this mining process as ``retreat mining.''
4. Mr. Murray claimed that the mine was perfectly safe when he
invited non-
essential personnel from the media and families to tour the underground
rescue work. However, not only did they experience a ``bump'' while
they were underground, but it was in the same vicinity where nine
rescuers were injured and three were killed just days later.
5. Mr. Murray stated that he had not had any major accidents at any
of his mines prior to this. The truth is that four miners have been
killed at Mr. Murray's mines. Any time a miner is killed, that
constitutes a major accident.
6. Mr. Murray continually said that the UMWA was trying to organize
the Crandall Canyon mine, and that somehow was intended to suggest
nothing we had to say about this incident could be trusted. While we
strongly believe that all miners should have the benefits of a union
contract--not the least of which is the enhanced safety language
written into our contracts--we were not engaged in an organizing
campaign at that mine at the time of the incident there, nor had there
been any organizing activity at that mine for years.
7. Mr. Murray also claimed that the UMWA was responsible for the
stories about the company intending to reopen a part of the mine to
production, when in fact it was his own Murray Energy vice president
who made those statements to reporters.
These are but some examples of the inaccurate and misleading
statements Mr. Murray made that met with no contradiction from MSHA--
statements that were seen by many as having an ``official'' stamp of
approval since in most cases they were made with MSHA officials looking
on, making no attempt to correct him.
What was so astounding about the press conferences at Crandall
Canyon is that the conduct of Mr. Murray, and MSHA's indulgence of him,
were directly contrary to Section 7 of the MINER Act, which Congress
expressly added to prevent the kind of misinformation debacle that
occurred at the Sago mine. There, the families were first told their
loved ones were alive and were leaving the mine, whereas the reality
was that only 1 of the 13 survived; it was hours before the
misinformation was corrected.
Regardless of whether Mr. Murray may have wanted to convene and
conduct press conferences, there was no reason, requirement or benefit
to the miners, their families or the public for MSHA to participate in
the events that he, as the private operator, staged. As the Federal
Agency affirmatively charged with communicating with the families and
press, MSHA should have exercised its power and conducted independent
press conferences to provide objective reports of developments at the
disaster site. Instead MSHA representatives yielded their authority; at
best they stood in the shadows as the coal operator spun his story, at
worst they cowered out of view refusing to correct the half truths and
misstatements. Further, it has been widely reported that Mr. Murray's
attitude was abrasive and demeaning to these grieving family members.
MSHA's responsibility to serve as the liaison should have protected the
families from him.
families facing a mine disaster deserve better
In the MINER Act, Congress took action to ensure that families
facing mining disasters would be treated with the dignity they deserve
and would be kept abreast of the most accurate information available.
This did not happen for the families of the trapped miners at Crandall
Canyon. Like the Sago families in January 2006, they were held almost
as captives, awaiting any bits of information (or misinformation)
delivered by the coal operator.
How is it possible that MSHA could get it so wrong in Utah? How
could it ignore the mandates of Congress, which requires the Agency to
take charge of such accidents and serve as the liaison with the
families and press? By allowing this mine owner to take center stage,
MSHA ignored the directives of the MINER Act. In so doing, it failed
the families at Crandall Canyon. They deserved--and still deserve--much
better. If the leadership of MSHA is not willing or able to limit the
activity of a single mine operator in the face of express authority to
take such control, how can we expect them to effectively lead the
Agency that is charged with regulating an entire industry?
On behalf of their loved ones, the families of those trapped at
Crandall Canyon asked the UMWA to serve as their miners'
representative. They want their designated representative to
participate in the accident investigation. However, MSHA has rejected
their request, claiming that it would have to first verify that the
miners themselves made the designations. Obviously, a trapped miner
cannot provide that assurance. Their next of kin attempted to fill the
void to ensure that the trapped miners have a representative looking
out for their interests.
By denying the family members a right to designate a miners'
representative for their trapped miners, MSHA has essentially said that
when miners are trapped in a mine, they forfeit their right to
designate a section 103(f) representative; their Mine Act rights are
thereby nullified through no fault of their own. In denying the
families the right to make such a designation for their trapped miners,
MSHA has prevented those most affected by the tragedy from having a
voice at the table during the investigation. This is offensive and must
be corrected.
MSHA's spokesperson criticized the UMWA for attempting to serve as
the trapped miners' designated representative, claiming that we ``are
trying to use a law enforcement investigation for its own purposes.''
We confirm that the UMWA does have its own purpose in mind. The reason
is simple: we want honest and complete information about everything
that happened--from before the latest mining plan got prepared,
submitted and approved. We want to make sure no more miners' lives are
needlessly lost. The UMWA is the ONLY organization in this country that
is dedicated to advocating for miners' health and safety. We are proud
of advancements that have been made at our urging, and we don't plan to
stop anytime soon.
So yes, the UMWA does have a purpose of its own here: to fight for
and improve mine safety in America. We invite MSHA to join us in that
endeavor, instead of casting veiled aspersions on our efforts on behalf
of coal miners and their families.
To the extent that MSHA feels current law may not allow it to
recognize the UMWA as a miners' representative absent proof that the
miners themselves have made the designations--something the trapped
miners obviously cannot satisfy--we urge Congress to change the law.
Family members of those trapped, injured, or killed in a mine accident
should have the right to designate a trusted representative to
participate in the accident investigation.
MSHA has further indicated that regardless of whether the UMWA
would be recognized as the miners' section 103(f) representative, the
Agency plans to limit attendance at witness interviews to just MSHA and
representatives of the State of Utah. Not only is the Agency excluding
the UMWA, but MSHA is refusing to share access to interviews and
documents with the Utah Mine Safety Commission until after MSHA
completes its investigation, which will likely be many months from now.
It is also denying such access to the press.
While MSHA claims that providing such access might ``compromise the
integrity of the investigation and potentially jeopardize MSHA's
ability to enforce the law,'' we are skeptical of the asserted bases
for restricting access. Moreover, this is materially different from how
MSHA conducted investigations of the Jim Walters and Sago disasters. I
participated in both of those investigations and the UMWA had access to
information while MSHA pursued its investigation. After making our own
independent review of the facts from each disaster, the UMWA issued
separate reports: they were critical of MSHA, as well as the respective
operator. In considering MSHA's rationale for denying access during its
investigation at Crandall Canyon, it is important for you to know that
MSHA has never claimed that access to other interested parties during
either the Jim Walters or Sago investigations in any way compromised
the Agency's ability to engage in its law enforcement efforts.
We have asked Secretary Chao to reverse the position MSHA has taken
both in response to our effort to serve as the trapped miners'
designated representative, and our request to attend the witness
interviews. We await her reply.
Further, and as we have written to you, the UMWA feels that it is
imperative that there be a truly independent investigation of this
tragedy. A copy of the letter President Roberts sent to congressional
leaders is attached. Curiously, Secretary Chao claims to have appointed
an independent team, but those she appointed assuredly are not
independent. Rather her team is being lead by two retired MSHA
inspectors. Thus, MSHA and the operator are once again investigating
what they themselves (i.e., their colleagues) did. This is not the best
way to ask the hard questions or to get the full truth. Our goal must
be to learn from what went wrong at Crandall Canyon so that no more
families will suffer such needless loss of life.
collection of civil penalties
In the MINER Act, Congress charged MSHA with revising and enhancing
its penalty structure. While it has adjusted the penalty structure, the
Agency still needs to do a better job of tracking and collecting the
fines it imposes and enhancing the pressure when operators refuse to
pay final penalties.
Last year MSHA blamed computer problems on its inability to track
fines; we understand that it still faces some technological challenges.
If that is the case, then MSHA needs to fix the problem. When fines go
unpaid it not only gives an unfair competitive advantage to the
delinquent operator, but that operator's disregard for the mine health
and safety laws and regulations imposes excessive risk on its
employees. Moreover, the fine system itself is not working well.
Indeed, GAO reported that almost half of the fines that underground
coal operators challenge are compromised, and that of those contested
the fine has typically been cut by about 50 percent!
To the extent that MSHA takes the position that it cannot close an
operation for having substantial unpaid fines, we submit that Congress
should expressly grant the Agency such authority. MSHA's top personnel
claim that if MSHA had that authority the Agency would exercise it to
close operators who refuse to pay their fines. We would welcome that.
msha hotline and retaliation
The Union has complained for some time that the current hotline
system miners use to report hazardous conditions is ineffective. When a
UMWA member called the 800 number listed on MSHA's Web site to report a
problem at the mine, his call was answered by a contract employee who
did not have any knowledge of mining, making it extremely difficult for
the miner to convey his message. Further, the individual at the call
center was not remotely familiar with MSHA's District structure and
therefore did not know which office should receive the complaint.
The Union has stressed on many occasions that the MSHA hotline
should be staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week by MSHA personnel with
an understanding of both the mining industry and the Agency. The
current practice of contracting this work out to call centers lessens
miners' health and safety.
Also, many miners are reluctant to voice their concerns about
safety and health problems due to a fear of retaliation and black-
balling. Coal mining jobs are good jobs and in many mining communities
they are by far the best (if not only) jobs to be had. Unfortunately,
the problem of retaliation plagues the entire industry, from East to
West, and North to South.
The most recent examples involve Crandall Canyon Mine owner Bob
Murray. He has sent threatening letters to at least some of those who
criticized him while the Crandall Canyon disaster was playing out. We
understand that he has sent such letters to press and private citizens,
as well as politicians.
The UMWA has its own experience defending against such claims of
Mr. Murray. He sued the UMWA's Secretary Treasurer for comments made
during a labor dispute we had with some of his Eastern operations.
Though the UMWA successfully defended those suits and both were
dismissed by the courts, his threats could serve to silence some would-
be critics, and we suspect that is his chief goal. His threats are
inconsistent with this country's notion of free-speech, though they
illustrate the kind of challenges a rank and file miner might worry
about before daring to speak out.
When miners fear that speaking out will cost them their livelihood,
they remain silent, even when they have bona fide concerns about mine
health and safety. I submit that no job is worth sacrificing your
health or safety. It is the role of the government to protect miners'
safety and health. The Mine Act states that plainly. Nevertheless, when
miners are afraid to speak out, the government is not doing its job of
providing them with adequate protection.
mine rescue teams
We are also troubled by MSHA's failure to undertake meaningful
action to facilitate the creation and training of additional mine
rescue teams. Over the past 20 years MSHA and some operators have
weakened how the regulations regarding mine rescue teams are
interpreted and applied. The existing mine rescue team structure is
spread too thin. It takes a lot of time and much practice for any mine
rescue team to function well.
Congress in the MINER Act clearly outlined its intent regarding the
need for additional mine rescue teams. In addition, the language
clearly defines how this is to be applied at both large and small
mines. Nevertheless, MSHA's newly proposed regulations fall far short
of what is needed. We will be submitting comments through the
rulemaking procedure, but I can tell you today that the regulations
bear little resemblance to what we anticipated, and what is needed.
The MINER Act contains language that was negotiated between the
union and management representatives based on numerous shared concerns.
Both sides of the table were concerned about the inadequate number of
rescue teams as well as the fall-off in training opportunities, and
teams' participation in contests that offer them a chance to experience
mock emergencies so they can respond with skill and confidence when
they confront real disasters. The proposed regulations do not meet the
statutory language or its intent.
Though the MINER Act provided for MSHA to certify mine rescue teams
every 5 years, the certification process MSHA has proposed consists
largely of paperwork reviews, rather than testing of rescue teams'
practical skills. Thus, not only is the mine rescue system no better
today than it was in January 2006 when it took many hours for the first
teams to arrive at Sago, but the regulations MSHA has proposed will not
induce the creation of more highly-skilled mine rescue teams. The need
is real and it is immediate.
We believe MSHA will require additional funding to do the kind of
certifications that are needed to ensure that mine rescue teams are
qualified as contemplated by the MINER Act. The UMWA has training
facilities and is willing to provide mine rescue training and first
responder training if we receive the necessary funding. Miners cannot
afford to wait any longer for the training of new teams to begin.
additional safety issues and challenges
Miners should be provided multi-gas detectors to alert
them to the mine atmosphere they are working in.
Atmospheric monitoring systems should be mandated at all
mines to alert miners if any dangers occur throughout the entire mine,
not just in the area they are working.
We need to push the development of a new self-rescuer that
will last longer and be more user-friendly when switching from one to
another if necessary during escape.
Stronger ventilation controls should be required that are
used to separate our fresh air escapeways that miners have to travel in
the event of a mine fire.
additional health issues and challenges
While my concern for miners' safety is substantial, I would be
remiss if I did not also speak briefly about challenges miners confront
with regard to outstanding health issues:
Miners are still dying from Black Lung. The use of a new
device called a Personal Dust Monitor can be a very helpful tool in
keeping miners from being overexposed to high levels of dust
concentrations.
With the development of the PDM we also need to explore a
new dust standard that would reduce the miners level of exposure to
coal dust and silica.
A new rock dust standard should be put in place that would
decrease the amount of coal dust that is currently allowed to
accumulate on the mine roof, ribs, and floor.
Equipment manufacturers should be made to design less
noisy mining machinery, which would help reduce hearing loss.
Addressing these matters would represent a good start in addressing
today's challenges. If and when we can address all these issues then
maybe we would bring our safety and health standards up to the 21st
century. There are still other recommendations listed in the UMWA's
Sago report, which has already been made available to you. That report
can also be seen on our Web site at UMWA.org. We expect to be making
further recommendations after more information comes to light about all
that transpired throughout the Crandall Canyon disaster.
We are most appreciative that Congress has worked towards
increasing MSHA's budget so that more mine inspectors can inspect mines
to ensure compliance with the Mine Act, which it now fails to
accomplish. The need is immediate and continuing. We also need to take
the next step in being more proactive in our approach to miners'
protection. Operators have long been quick to introduce new
technologies that improve production. It is time that they dedicate the
same resources to the miners' health and safety.
I also urge you to do all that you can to ensure that the
investigation of the Crandall Canyon disaster is full and independent
and that the families touched by this disaster get all the answers they
want and deserve.
conclusion
Although some changes have been made, I am sorry to report that
MSHA's efforts over the past year have done little to change much for
miners confronting a mine emergency. The Crandall Canyon disaster made
that all too apparent.
We are here to demand that MSHA commit to a full and consistent
enforcement of both the Mine Act and the MINER Act, to improve miners'
health and safety so that our industry will never again experience
another mine disaster like Jim Walters, Sago, Alma, Darby, or Crandall
Canyon. New technology is progressing on a daily basis and the UMWA
urges MSHA to require mine operators to employ these technologies as
they become available.
We also seek assurances that MSHA will be aggressive in performing
all mandated inspections, protecting miners who speak out for mine
health and safety, assessing and collecting meaningful penalties when
operators violate the law, and taking the lead when disaster strikes.
I thank you for your attention today and your interest in miners'
health and safety. I would be happy to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Senator Allard introduced you before, if you
want to expand on that, otherwise we'll go right to his
testimony. Thank you.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT FERRITER, DIRECTOR OF MINE SAFETY AND
HEALTH PROGRAM, COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES
Mr. Ferriter. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and other
distinguished members of the committee. My name is Robert
Ferriter, I am the Director of the Mine Safety Program at the
Colorado School of Mines in Golden, CO, and I very much
appreciate the opportunity to add my comments, and address the
events of the Crandall Canyon Mine disaster.
I know that we are running short on time, so I'm going to
abbreviate my remarks and just go to the meat of the things,
because a lot of this has already been said.
First of all, I'd like to clarify for the committee what a
coal mine bump is. What is a coal mine bump? We've heard that
expression used here several times this morning. What causes a
coal mine bump? It's the fact that we have a very strong roof
and floor, sediments above and below the coal deposit. These
sediments in the area of Crandall Canyon, as a matter of fact,
in the entire Wasatch Plateau--we have these sediments that are
ranging in depth from two to three hundred feet. They are very
heavy, very stable and what they do is squeeze the coal, or
load the coal, until the coal is mined, and then it can
explode.
The Bureau of Mines in its previous research stated that a
bump is an explosive-like failure of a pillar, part of a
pillar, or many pillars. And if you saw some of the videos that
were taken in Crandall Canyon, you see all of the debris, and
the floor heave, we know this was a bump. It was caused by
excess pressure on the overlying, on the strata.
To move on, quickly, my personal experience with coal mine
bumps, having been an MSHA technical person, about 10 years in
the supervisory capacity and about 17 years working in the
different coal mines in Utah and other places--I have always
been of the opinion that we will experience coal mine bumping
in the Wasatch Plateau Coal Fields, when we reach depths of
about 1,000 or 1,200 feet. So, the mine design should always be
prepared to handle these type of things.
Now, to mitigate the frequency of gate road pillar bumps in
these mines in the Utah area, over the years mine operators in
the area have used what is called a two-entry gate road
yielding road configuration. Now, the gate roads are the
entries which are developed to access the coal area of a long-
wall panel, and if you look on the map up there, you will see
that there are two entries there, going back to where the long
walls were.
Mine crews, supplies, ventilation air, and extracted coal
are moved through these entries. This approach attempts to
soften the ground around the gate road system, thereby
restricting bump-
inducing stresses, to deep within the confines of the adjacent
barrier pillars.
In general, this approach has been very successful when
employed correctly. Problems, however, arise when pillar sizes
are too large or too small, and the improperly sized pillars
are termed critical pillars, and these are the ones most likely
to suffer a bump.
There are several techniques commonly accepted in the coal
fields: de-stressing of the pillars, volley firing, hydraulic
fracturing--all of these are an attempt to soften the pillar by
one means or another, and actually move the stresses deeper
within the pillar so they don't fracture out where they can
actually injure miners.
NIOSH and its predecessor agency, the Bureau of Mines, has
done an extremely good job, in my opinion, of preparing the
industry for handling coal mine bumps, they have issued a lot
of publications, they have done a lot of research. The Denver
Center, in Colorado, did a lot of computer modeling of coal
mine bumps, and have issued many, many publications on this.
Probably the most noteworthy at this time is the NIOSH
Publication 1-95, which was published in 1995, and it's really
considered the Bible of bump control. There are other NIOSH
publications addressing this topic, also.
In more recent years, in 1995, NIOSH developed the ARMPS
program with some of the panel members you talked about
earlier. This program has been proven and it is readily
available through the Internet. It is available to consultants,
to mining companies, and to anyone who wants to use it.
They have also developed the program called ``The Model.''
These technologies were developed, documented, and have been
distributed freely as engineering design tools to assist both
long-wall, and room and pillar coal operators in their daily
decisionmaking process. The tools are particularly useful
during the mine planning stage, pillar design and layout, and
the retreat mining warning of early red flags of potential
catastrophic events.
The second aspect of computer modeling is you have to have
physical property testing, which you can put into the models.
And this has to be realistic. Again, NIOSH has created a
comprehensive database that includes more than about 4,000
tests, strength tests, from 60 different coal seams, and these
data were compared with about 100 case studies of in-mine
pillar performance in the Retreat Mining Stability Database,
and are available on a default basis in the computer programs.
So, we have the publications and we have the techniques to
handle bumps.
Now, in the Crandall Canyon Mine disaster, in the pre-
planning mining configuration, both pillars--the north and the
south of the main entries there--the main entries are actually
the lifeline of the mine--all of your ventilation comes in
through this, the coal is removed, mining crews travel these
entryways, so the mine operator will protect those entries at
all costs. If he loses those entries, he loses the mine.
But, in this case, they are both--both barrier pillars are
subjected to loading and stress build-up, one from the adjacent
gob areas, and your drawing up there does not show the gob area
to the north, but it's about the same size as what the one on
the south is, and it goes up to the ceiling there. These
adjacent gob areas are caved areas left after the long-wall
mining process, and they are definitely areas to be considered
when you are modeling any of these type of things.
The Chairman. Is this more reflective of what you were
just----
Mr. Ferriter. That's more reflective, yes, because that
shows the gob areas both to the north and to the south of the
main entries. Yes.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Ferriter. Naturally occurring overburden above the coal
seams--and in this case, we had something in the neighborhood
over 1,700 to 2,200 feet--the loading created by the planned
cave-in event on the extracted pillars in the pillar-robbing
area, basically taking these barrier pillars, some 415 feet in
length, when Murray coaled this, this was kind of a salvage
operation of the mine. I mean, you would not operate the mine
unless those pillars were in place for a long period of time,
and in my opinion, Murray was merely trying to get recoverable
coal resources out of the mine, because it was going to be
abandoned. So, I would classify this as a salvage operation.
Now, we know we had bumps in the North Barrier pillar, and
we moved to the South. This, to me, is a real red flag. We had
the same geologic conditions in the South Barrier that we had
in the North Barrier, we've had bumping in the North Barrier,
we've made minor changes in the mining plan in the South
Barrier, and then we went in there and started mining again.
The first few months, as you would expect, as you retreat a
pillar mining section, you will develop your cave behind the
pillar line, so we probably did not see any bumps in the first
few months. But as that cave area gets bigger and bigger, and
then you load the pillar line, and then you will see bumping.
Now, I checked MSHA's accident data files, and I did not
see any reported bumps in the South Barrier pillar in the
months of May, June or July. However, my experience tells me
that bumping probably did occur. I suggest that the committee
interview miners who worked in the South Barrier pillar, and
they will either confirm or counterject this opinion.
Miner interviews should also be conducted to validate if
visual signs of excessive pillar loading, such as stress
buildup or pillar hour glassing, floor heave, unstable roof,
the abnormal breaking of pillars--all of these things are
indications, visual indications, which can be attributed to
over-stressing of the pillars and they should be taken
seriously to prevent a major catastrophic event.
Now, there's been some erosion of bump expertise in the
West. The Wilberg Mine disaster, which I'm sure some of us here
remember, was not caused by a bump, but the Wilberg Mine
disaster was a mine fire in December 1984.
The Chairman. We're going to give you another minute and a
half or so, just so you know.
Mr. Ferriter. OK, I'll just--we have a broken system here
with the approval of the plan. Let me just make a couple of
recommendations and then you can ask questions.
In my opinion, the recommendations that the committee
should take is the rescue effort at the Crandall Canyon Mine
was severely hampered by the inability to both locate the
missing miners and determine their physical condition, heart
beat, respiration, etc. The importance of through-the-earth
two-way communications and tracking was spotlighted in the
development of new technology to alleviate this condition needs
to be addressed. The sooner the better.
Also, I would strongly recommend to the committee, that
accidents involving multiple fatalities or disasters, should be
investigated by a Federal entity, independent of the regulatory
department. To protect the validity of the investigation and to
ensure impartiality and fact finding, an independent entity
needs to conduct these investigations. This will allow an
unbiased determination of process errors, misjudgments by all
involved parties, and speed the requirements for corrective
actions to further improve workplace safety for our Nation's
most valuable resource, the miner.
If this is not done, I don't believe anything will change
and these miners will have died in vain. So I would strongly
make that recommendation to you.
Thank you for your time and attention and I will answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ferriter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert L. Ferriter, EM, PE, CMSP and Nick
Kripakov, MSME, PE
Good morning Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the
committee. My name is Robert Ferriter. I am the Director of the Mine
Safety and Health Program at the Colorado School of Mines in Golden,
Colorado. I very much appreciate the opportunity to address the
committee today to present my views on the events and conditions which
led to the disaster at the Crandall Canyon Mine, and the actions of
both the operator and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA)
during the failed rescue attempt. Based on my observations of the
recent disaster, my experience as a mining engineer, an MSHA employee
(27 years) and supervisor (17 years), and frequent evaluator of
underground mining practice in the Utah coal fields, I believe there is
much that needs to be done to improve safety and workplace conditions
in western underground coal mines to protect our Nation's most valuable
resource--the miner.
To offer my views in an orderly fashion, I will briefly revisit the
Crandall Canyon disaster in chronological order, adding pertinent
geologic information, explanation, historical safe mining practices,
and applicable MSHA safety regulations and contributing events which
framed the disastrous event of August 6, 2007.
a. first reports
(a) Earthquakes. On the morning of August 6, 2007, the company
reported to the news media that a seismic event, or earthquake, caused
a major underground mine collapse at the Crandall Canyon Mine located
in Carbon County near Huntington, Utah. These reports were immediately
challenged by various mining experts who had studied the coal mine bump
phenomena in the Wasatch Plateau and Book Cliff coal fields in east-
central Utah. By Tuesday, August 7, 2007, the very next day,
seismologists and the U.S. Geological Survey's National Earthquake
Center in Golden, Colorado established that the August 6, 2007 event
recorded on various seismographs throughout the west was indeed an
implosion, or mine collapse located at the Crandall Canyon Mine. There
is no debate among professionals that this was a mining-induced seismic
event (coal mine bump).
(b) Coal Mine Bumps. Coal mine bumps have presented serious mining
problems in the United States throughout the 20th century to the
present day. Fatalities and injuries have resulted when these
destructive events occurred at the working face of the mine. Persistent
bump problems have caused numerous fatalities and serious injuries, the
abandonment of large coal reserves, and premature mine closure and loss
of coal reserves. Bumps are characterized as releases of energy
associated with unstable yielding that occurs with progressive mining.
An unstable release of energy occurs when the coal and rock is not able
to absorb the excess energy released by the surrounding rock during the
yielding process. Holland (BuMines Bulletin 535, 1954) defined a bump
as a sudden and explosive-like failure of a single pillar, part of a
pillar, or several pillars with varying degrees of violence accompanied
by a very loud noise.
Through the years, a variety of techniques were proposed and
implemented to mitigate bumps. Mining history is rich with examples of
innovative proposals that, at best, temporarily alleviated this complex
problem. From the 1930's to the present, NIOSH (former USBM) has
conducted fundamental research on the geologic environments and failure
mechanisms responsible for coal mine bumps and on methods to control
them.
During the 1930's, USBM research indicated that both geology and
mining practice (geometry and sequence) play key functions in bump
occurrence. Strong, stiff roof and floor strata not prone to failing or
heaving were cited as contributing factors when combined with deep
overburden. Various poor mining practices that tended to concentrate
stresses near the working face were identified and discouraged.
Although such qualitative geologic descriptions and design rules-of-
thumb have persisted through the years, the need to better quantify
bump-prone conditions remains.
Mine operators take little comfort in generalities when they have
experienced a bump and must determine if another is imminent. Specific
questions about the influence of individual factors and the interaction
among factors arise but are often difficult to answer owing to the
limited experience at a given mine. Often, many parameters change
simultaneously, i.e., strength and stiffness of roof and floor,
proximity of strong lithologic units in a coal bed, depth of
overburden, mine geometry, and mining rate. (Above discussion
referenced from--Occurance and Remediation of Coal Mine Bumps, by
Iannacchione and Zelanko, 1995.)
b. geologic conditions which cause bumps
(a) Strong Roof and Floor Strata. Strong floor strata immediately
below the coal seam and strong roof strata within 30 to 50 feet of the
seam have long been recognized as major contributors to coal bumps
(Holland and Thomas, 1954; Iannacchione and DeMarco, 1992; Peparakis,
1958). In fact, the confinement offered to the coal seam by these
stronger, stiffer strata appears necessary to generate levels of stored
energy sufficient to cause bumps within and immediate to the coal seam
structure (Babcock, 1984).
(b) Sandstone Channels in Immediate Roof. Sandstone channels are
stress-concentrating structures that are directly related to bumping
along longwall panels nationwide. The massive nature of many of these
units appears to be the major factor affecting bump initiation
immediate to these features.
(c) Strong Coal Seams. While it has been shown that most U.S. coals
can be made to bump under the right combination of confinement and
loading conditions (Babcock, 1984), it is worthwhile to mention the
seam characteristics in some Western operations that appear to
influence bumps. The two most prominent contributors are: (1) randomly
changing coal cleating, and (2) the presence of strong rock splits in
the mid to upper portion of the seam. While it is not necessary for
these conditions to be present for bumps to occur, they have been
linked to some of the worst bump conditions documented in Western
mining.
(d) Fault and Shear Zone Structures. Investigations of fault and
shear zone structures in the central Utah coalfields point to basic
concerns: (1) the effect of significant changes in the stress field in
the vicinity of these discontinuities, and (2) the loading potential of
isolated blocks of strata above the seam. Whether strike-slip movement
along fault structures is responsible for dynamic load changes has yet
to be more thoroughly determined (Boler, 1994), but changes in loading
conditions have been noted as major contributors to bumping when mining
approaches a discontinuity (Iannacchione and DeMarco, 1992; Peparakis,
1958).
(e) My personal experience in dealing with coal mine bump problems
in the Utah coal fields have indicated that one should always
anticipate bumping when mining deeper than about 1,200 feet, and
develop the mining plan accordingly.
c. mining techniques to reduce bump occurrences
(a) Mine Design. To mitigate the frequency of gate road pillar
bumps, over the years mine operators in the Wasatch-Book Cliffs
coalfields have implemented the use of two-entry, yielding-pillar gate
road configurations. (Gateroads are the entries which are developed to
access the coal extraction area of a longwall panel. Mine crews,
supplies, ventilation air and extracted coal are moved through these
entries.) This approach attempts to soften the ground around the
gateroad system, thereby restricting bump-inducing stresses to deep
within the confines of the adjacent panel abutment. In general, the
approach has been very successful when employed correctly. Problems
arise, however, where pillar sizes are too small or too large. These
improperly sized pillars are termed ``critical pillars'' and their use
can result in the most extreme hazard possible.
(b) Destressing. Coal, or in some instances roof and/or floor rock,
is intentionally fractured and made to fail. As a result, high stress
accumulations can not occur in the fractured part of the mine
structure. Unfortunately, destressing can occasionally trigger a bump
in another section of the mine.
(c) Volley Firing. Destressing by volley firing has successfully
reduced the number of bumps in several Western coal mines. In this
method, explosives are used to fracture the coal face to a certain
depth before mining. The method is used prior to face advance or entry
development to advance the high stress zone away from the working face.
(d) Hydraulic Fracturing. This method involves the injection of
fluid under pressure to cause material failure by creating fractures or
fracture systems. Hydraulic fracturing is most effective in the roof
and coal seam ahead of the longwall face.
(e) Recent Publications. Special Publication 01-95, U.S. Bureau of
Mines (BOM)(Function transferred to NIOSH).
Papers presented at a BOM technology transfer seminar describes the
causes of violent material failure in U.S. mines, measurement
techniques for monitoring events that result in violent failure, and
mitigation techniques for controlling failure. The BOM looked at 16
mines--both coal and hard rock--and analyzed 172 bumps or mining-
induced seismic events. The BOM publication describes new monitoring
and analysis techniques developed as tools for assessing violent
failure; and seismic methods for determining source locations,
calculating energy release, and determining source mechanisms are
described. USBM studies identified the advantages using both yielding
and stable pillars for coal bump control. A computer program has been
developed as an aid for selecting room-and-pillar layouts. Additional
available references include:
Deep Cover Pillar Extraction in the U.S. Coal Fields (see
NIOSH Web Site).
Preventing Massive Pillar Collapses in Coal Mines (see
NIOSH Web Site).
(f) Modeling Programs. NIOSH (former BOM) has developed three
computer-based technologies for use by the mining industry to evaluate
proposed mine designs. The programs are called LAMODEL, ALPS and ARMPS.
These technologies were developed, documented, and have been
distributed freely as engineering design tools to assist both longwall
and room-and-pillar coal operators in their daily decisionmaking
process. The tools are particularly useful during: (1) the planning
stage (pillar design and layout), and (2) retreat mining, as an early
warning of potential impending failure.
(g) Physical Property Testing. NIOSH (formerly BOM) created a
comprehensive database that includes more than 4,000 compressive
strength test results from more than 60 coal seams. These data were
compared with 100 case studies of in-mine pillar performance from the
Analysis of Retreat Mining Pillar Stability (ARMPS) database.
There is also evidence showing why laboratory strength does not
always correlate with pillar strength. The data showed clearly that the
``size effect'' observed in laboratory testing is related to coal
structure. Laboratory tests do not account for large-scale
discontinuities, such as roof and floor interfaces, which apparently
have more effect on pillar strength than a small-scale laboratory
mining structure.
d. evaluation of mining plan
(a) Pre-pillar mining configuration. Prior to the practice of
retreat mining in the Crandall Canyon Mine, previous mine development
by Andalex Mining Co. had left a five-entry primary ventilation, belt
conveyor, and services conduit known as Mains West. This primary access
to the mine was protected on both the north and south sides by a
massive ``barrier pillar'' of solid coal approximately 500-ft. wide.
Longwall extraction panels had been extracted both to the north and
south of Mains West barrier pillars. Apparently, this configuration was
stable, as no indication of bumping or roof falls were recorded in the
area of planned retreat pillar mining. In several areas, both the North
and South barrier pillars lie beneath approximately 1,700 to 2,200 feet
of massive sandstone and various sedimentary strata.
In the pre-pillar mining configuration, both barrier pillars are
subjected to loading and stress buildup from: (1) the adjacent longwall
gob areas, (2) naturally occurring overburden above the coal seam
(1,700 to 2,200 ft.), and (3) loading created by the planned cave in-by
the extracted pillars. Therefore, the pillars to be extracted are
subjected to the combined loading from these three separate sources,
which create high stress levels in the pillars and increase the
probability of bumping. The geologic environment in the mining area is
known to be conducive to the occurrence of coal mine bumps. In spite of
these known conditions, the complete removal of all the weight bearing
pillars was planned.
(b) Mining of North barrier pillar. As the North barrier pillar was
mined and the coal pillars removed, a cave developed in-by the pillar
line. Apparently, bumping problems occurred about x-cut 137 and two
rows of pillars were left to alleviate the bumping. However, weight
transfer overrode these pillars and major bumping occurred when the
three pillars at x-cuts 133 through 135 were mined. This forced
abandonment of coal extraction in the North barrier pillar near the end
of March 2007 and movement of the extraction process to the South
barrier. One should note that the overburden in both mining areas is
1,700-plus feet in thickness indicating that very high static ground
pressures existed in both mining areas.
(c) Mining of South barrier. Pillar extraction was initiated in the
South barrier sometime in May 2007. Extraction pillars were increased
in size from 80 ft. by 92 ft. to 80 ft. by 129 ft. This increase was
intended to isolate bumps to the face area and reduce the risk of
larger bumps over-running the crews in out-by locations. The South
barrier was also slabbed to a depth of about 40 feet to improve caving
conditions and reduce concentrated loads at the face. (To slab in
mining means to remove additional coal from the barrier pillar, thereby
reducing the effective width of the barrier.) Again, it is noted that
the geologic environment in the North and South barrier pillars is
similar. Minor changes to the pillar sizes were made to reduce bumping
at the face; however, basically a similar mining plan was in effect.
Considering the similarities in geologic conditions, the similar pillar
extraction plans with only minor modification, the history of bumping
in the immediate mining area, and the development of an active cave in-
by pillar extraction mining, one could reasonably anticipate the
occurrence of additional coal mine bumps. The risk was quite clear.
MSHA accident files do not document any reported bumps in the South
barrier area during the months of May, June and July, 2007. However, my
experience tells me that bumping to some degree most likely occurred,
even though it is not documented. Interviews with miners who worked in
the South barrier pillar area will either confirm or contradict my
opinion. Miner interviews should also be conducted to validate if
visual signs of excessive pillar loading and stress buildup (pillar
``hour-glassing'', floor heave, unstable roof, abnormal breaking of
pillars, roof and/or floor) were observed. These are all common visual
expressions of stress build-up which should be evaluated by competent
technical personnel.
(d) Post-Seismic Event Observations. Two observations of interest
are readily apparent from the August 6, 2007 MSHA Web site postings and
seismic event records: (1) the reported elapsed time of seismic event
is approximately four (4) minutes. Based on my experience in similar
investigations, this means that the event was initiated in one or more
pillars (probably in the active pillar extraction area) at some
location in the mine, and that not all pillars bumped at the same time.
Rather, after the initial pillar(s) disintegrated, a weight transfer
occurred, overloading adjacent pillar(s), which then disintegrated and
transferred their load to successive pillar(s), in effect creating a
domino effect, or ``cascading pillar failure.'' This would account for
the extraordinarily long run of the bump; and (2) all the pillars that
failed appeared to be located under approximately 1,700 feet or more of
overburden. In my opinion, this indicates that all pillars under 1,700
feet or more of cover were subjected to combined loads (as previously
explained) which created stress levels somewhat under the failure level
for the pillar. As the ``domino effect'' of the failure mechanism
occurred, the weight transfer from the failed pillars to the adjacent
pillar(s) increased the stress level of the receiving pillar(s) to the
failure level, etc. Pillar(s) under less than 1,700 feet of cover had
lower initial stress levels and, therefore, were able to accept the
weight transfer without reaching unacceptable (failure) stress levels.
e. continuing erosion of coal mine bump expertise in the west
(a) Wilberg Mine Disaster (1984). Although not caused by a bump,
the Wilberg Mine disaster (mine fire in December, 1984) focused
significant attention on the geologic environs of the Utah coal
deposits, their depths, bump occurrence, and the stability of deep
(2,000 ft.) underground coal mine entries.
In the Wilberg disaster, 27 miners lost their lives due to carbon
monoxide poisoning. An underground compressor overheated, igniting and
setting fire to the surrounding coal bed which burned for nearly 1 year
before it could be extinguished. The miners underground at the time
were trapped, unable to escape and died from poisonous gases.
The mine used the two-entry retreat longwall mining method for
removing coal. Access to the longwall panels was by what is known as
the two-entry longwall gateroad access system. This system requires
MSHA approval of an operator initiated 101 (c) Petition for
Modification to use two-entry gateroads rather than three entries (one
for intake air, one for return air, and one for the conveyor belt to
remove coal from the longwall face). With only two-entries, the
conveyor belt must be placed in either an intake or a return entry.
Either case is a violation of current MSHA regulations, mandating
approval of a 101 (c) Petition to use only two access entries.
(b) MSHA's Two-Entry Longwall Task Force (1985). Immediately
following the Wilberg mine disaster, the United Mine Workers of America
(UMWA) began criticizing the use of the two-entry longwall mining
system. The basis for their criticism was that with only two entries
available for escape, the Wilberg miners were trapped, and that only
three-entry longwall gateroad systems should be allowed by MSHA. Stung
by this criticism and lacking any technical study to rebut the UMWA's
charges, MSHA, in partnership with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, convened
its Two-Entry Longwall Task Force to study all aspects of the Two-Entry
system including, but not limited to: ground control, ventilation, fire
prevention, electrical, dust control, escapeways, etc. The resulting
report overwhelmingly endorsed the two-entry system because of its
proven ability to reduce the occurrence of devastating coal mine bumps
in western deep coal mines. The report, however, recognized the
reduction in escapeways from face areas of the mines, and compensated
for this reduction by recommending numerous safeguards, in addition to
those required by MSHA regulations. The two-entry longwall gateroad
system is now commonly used by Utah mine operators developing longwall
extraction panels under more than 1,000 feet of overburden.
(c) Elimination of U.S. Bureau of Mines (1995). In 1995, the
Secretary of Interior disbanded the U.S. Bureau of Mines. All research
centers were closed with the exception of the Spokane Research Center
and the Pittsburgh Research Center. The effect on western coal mines
was significant with the closing of the Denver Research Center and the
termination of much of the research effort focused on coal mine bump
prevention and multi-seam mining in western coal mines. Although a few
new modeling programs have been written in the intervening years,
significant new research efforts in bump prevention have not been
undertaken.
(d) Closing of MSHA's Denver Safety and Health Technology Center
and Transfer of All Positions to Eastern Centers. Arguably the most
significant negative impact on western coal mine bump remediation
occurred when MSHA closed its Denver Safety and Health Technology
Center. With the transfer of approximately all 50 technical positions
to West Virginia and Pennsylvania when the closure was announced, the
western mining community lost easy access to technical experts in
ventilation, ground and roof control, bump prevention, industrial
hygiene, hoisting, and practically all technical disciplines found in
western coal mining. Of the 50 employees at the Denver Center, only
approximately four (4) employees elected to transfer to West Virginia
and Pennsylvania. Included in loss of technical expertise was a small
group of six (6) highly qualified mining engineers and geologists who
had been engaged in western coal mine bump evaluation for 15 to 20
years. This group regularly reviewed roof control plans for MSHA's Coal
Mine District 9, ran computer simulations, and investigated bump
occurrences and roof falls in western mines. Unfortunately, with the
closure of the Denver Technology Center, all but one member of the
group left MSHA. In my opinion, if this group or a similarly qualified
group had reviewed the Crandall Canyon roof control plan, the disaster
would not have occurred.
(e) Summation--Are Western Miners Less Valuable Than Eastern
Miners? Ever since the Wilberg Mine Disaster in 1984, and the resulting
Two-Entry Task Force Study, MSHA has known that western deep mines are
highly susceptible to explosive-like disintegration of coal pillars.
Apparently MSHA's technical capability to analyze roof control plans
for conditions and mining practices which would encourage bump
occurrence has deteriorated to an unacceptable level. Does MSHA have
any plans to reinvigorate its western technical expertise? With western
coal mines reaching deeper into the earth for their resources (3,000
feet below the surface) (the shallow, easy to mine resources have
already been mined), more hazardous mining conditions will be
encountered. Western miners are as valuable as Eastern miners and
deserve the same protections under the law. As Crandall Canyon has
demonstrated, these protections are not being provided by MSHA.
f. the rescue effort
(1) Initial Response. Initial public briefings were always
conducted by Murray Energy Company. MSHA was noticeably in the
background giving some comments later in the briefings. The message
conveyed to the public was ``its Robert Murray's mine, he's in charge
and can do whatever he thinks is right.'' MSHA was not the primary
communicator the first couple of days, allowing for a poor public
image.
(2) Reporters and TV Crews Filming Underground. Five reporters,
including CNN, were allowed underground while the rescue was taking
place. While the videos were informational, the video and photos did
not in any way aid the rescue effort. In fact, another bump occurred
while the reporters were underground. If one of the crew had been
injured, MSHA would have had another disaster to deal with. Other non-
involved mines in the Price, Utah area probably would have allowed
visits for informational purposes if asked by MSHA.
(3) Safety of Rescue Crews. Anyone involved with mine rescue work
knows that the safety of the rescuers is of primary importance. It must
be assumed that the victims may be fatalities. To risk rescuers for
bodies is unacceptable. Even though Assistant Secretary Stickler stated
that the rescue crews had installed steel sets every 2.5 feet, this
protection proved inadequate, emphasizing the explosive-like force of a
coal mine bump. A more appropriate protective device would have been
pre-fabricated tunnel liners (large U-shaped steel sections) which
construction crews work under when tunneling through unstable soil or
rock.
MSHA standard 75.202 Protection from falls of roof, face and ribs
states:
(a) The roof, face and ribs of areas where persons work or
travel shall be supported or otherwise controlled to protect
persons from hazards related to falls of the roof, face or ribs
and coal or rock bursts.
g. u.s. bureau of land management reports
The following excerpts from Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
Inspection Reports document mining conditions in the West Mains as
described by the BLM inspector. Generally the statements of the
inspector describe deteriorating conditions, bumping, roof falls, etc.,
as mining of both the North and South barrier pillars progressed.
Typically the BLM inspector was Steve Falk and the company
representative was mining engineer Tom Hurst unless otherwise noted.
1. Inspection Report of November 4, 2004:
Andalex mining engineer John Lewis
Conditions were deteriorating (west portion of the West
Mains) and access through the area near impossible.
The barrier planned on both sides looked like it was designed
to only hold up for only a short while. The north entry was
taking weight and extra roof supports and re-bolting had to be
done. Now the situation is even worse.
. . . (overburden) is about 1,500 feet and rises to 2,000
feet . . .
It was apparent from traveling down the intake that the area
is taking unacceptable weight.
It is apparent the pressure arches from both side gobs are
sitting right down on the main entry pillars.
The situation in Main West is untenable for future pillar
recovery.
No mining company in the area has ever pulled pillars in main
entries with mined out sides and under 1,500 feet of cover.
Genwal's thoughts and plans to try pillar recovery was
wishful thinking. . . .
2. Close Out Discussion--1/24/05:
. . . the pillars in Main West are failing over time with
greater than 1,700 feet of cover.
Caves are occurring at intersections by irregular
intersection dimensions.
. . . attempts to split pillars under this depth could not
hold the top and prevent pillar outbursts.
Weight on the pillars is substantial and dangerous conditions
are present.
Mining any of the coal in the pillars will result in
hazardous mining conditions such as pillar bursts and roof
falls.
3. Inspection Report of August 1, 2006:
Genwal is continuing to pull pillars from south to north in
the South Mains . . .
Pillar pulling has been pretty good. Depth at this area is
less than 1,000 feet.
The crew is getting adept at this pillaring as they now had
about 2 years experience.
Though Tom Hurst is new, he is not as pessimistic as the
previous engineer. . . .
4. Inspection Report of December 2006:
The sale of Andalex is complete to Bob Murray's Utah
American.
The new 3 entries in the barrier now would leave 130 foot
barrier to the north gob.
5. Inspection Report of February 27, 2007 (North barrier pillar) :
This section finished driving 4 entries on 92 foot entry
centers and 80 foot crosscut centers.
So far no inordinate pillar stresses have been noted, though
thing(s) should get interesting soon. The face is under 1,600
feet of cover now and will increase to over 2,000 feet by
crosscut 139.
6. Close Out Discussion--March 5, 2007 (North barrier pillar) :
This section is mining coal that was not considered minable
in the previous plan .
. . . BLM is pleased to have them try for coal that was
thought unminable but warned them to beware of the depth above
the ridge and mining a barrier pillar that has been sitting for
a number of years. Pulling pillars will be interesting if even
MSHA will OK a ventilation and roof control plan for the
section.
7. Inspection Report of March 15, 2007 (North barrier pillar) :
. . . Utah American obtained the property in August 06 . . .
. . . water inflows much greater than available pumping
facilities. This was at crosscut 158 which was about 400 feet
short of the back end of Main West next to Joe's Valley Fault.
The section pulling the two bottom pillars on retreat out
this area (between 133 and 132 crosscut) experiencing greater
stresses on the pillars.
Pillar bumps were increasing and some damage to the stopping
to the north bleeder entry were occurring.
Genwal tried to stop the stress override and left two rows of
pillars at 137 to 135 and then started up again . . .
Hurst reported that a few large bounces occurred on off shift
soon after start up of pillar mining which did most of the
damage.
Entry ways out-by two breaks from the face has extensive rib
coal thrown into the entry way.
The bounces had either knocked out or damaged all the
stoppings to the north bleeder entry from crosscut 132 in-by to
crosscut 149.
The weight of the area will only be the same or worse as this
is under the ridge top on the surface.
Hurst said the risks are too great that this event will
happen again out-by should they try pillar pulling again and
east.
8. Inspection Report of June 13, 2007 (South barrier pillar) :
They moved over to this section from the North Barrier block
at the end of March when pillar pulling in the North Barrier
block was halved about half way through due damaging bumps and
out-by pillar loading.
. . . back in March when they were having the tough
conditions in the North Barrier and asked to leave the rest of
the pillars.
After receiving the various reports, it is obvious that mining
conditions in the barrier pillars were extremely hazardous, yet the
removal of coal pillars from the barrier pillars continued.
h. recommendations
(1) The rescue effort at the Crandall Canyon mine was severely
hampered by the inability to both locate the missing miners and
determine their physical condition (heartbeat, respiration, etc.). The
importance of through-the-earth, two-way communications and tracking
was spotlighted, and the development and implementation of the
technology clearly needs to be accelerated.
(2) Using a single or very few runs of the LAMODEL structural
analysis program, or any computer modeling program, does not properly
frame the risk (probability for failure). Rather, varying the values of
input parameters over their practical ranges is important. These input
parameters should include but not be limited to:
a. coal strength (unconfined and confined),
b. peak strain in an element of the model,
c. coal modulus of elasticity,
d. Poisson's ratio,
e. angle of internal friction,
f. depth of cover, and
g. progressive mining steps from initial entry development through
the completion of retreat mining.
By doing this, a practical range of stability factors could have
been calculated for various scenarios of mining (mining entries and
crosscuts in the barrier as well as full or partial retreat of the
pillars created in the barrier).
A consulting firm does only the analyses required in the scope of
work issued by the mine operator, who pays for the analyses. If a risk
assessment with a sensitivity analysis is not requested by the mine
operator, then it will not be done, i.e., it costs more money to run
many more analyses (varying parameters). If MSHA would require a more
thorough risk-based sensitivity analysis, then the company would be
required to do it in order to gain approval of the proposed mining
plan. Requiring a sensitivity analysis with varying parameters would
frame the level of risk mining in bump-prone mines.
(3) MSHA should reevaluate its policy for reviewing and approving
roof control plans (mining plans) and require, as a minimum, several
computer analyses using a range of input data. NIOSH has developed the
Analysis Retreat Mining Pillar System (ARMPS) program by Dr. Chris
Mark. This program is readily available, easily run, and is based on
150 case studies. Some updating of the program may be required to
include deep-cover pillar design.
(4) MSHA should revisit its policies on rescue team safety and
Command Center decisionmaking training. The loss of three rescuers,
including one Federal inspector during a rescue mission, and six
injured rescuers is not acceptable.
(5) Clearly, the technical expertise to recognize and remediate
bump hazards associated with coal mining within the geologic environs
found in the coal-producing areas of Utah and western Colorado has been
lost to both industry and MSHA by the abolishment of Federal offices
(U.S. Bureau of Mines and MSHA's Denver Safety & Health Technology
Center). With the depletion of easily mined, high-grade coal deposits,
mine operators are forced to consider mining deeper deposits with the
ensuing risk of accentuating coal mine bump problems, or leaving large
blocks of coal un-mined (loss of valuable resource). It is recommended
that Congress mandate the creation of a small staff of highly qualified
engineers and geologists within an existing Federal agency to focus
attention on the bumping problem. The office should be easily
accessible by western coal mine operators in Utah and Colorado.
(6) MSHA, through its Mine Health and Safety Academy and its
Educational Field Services Office, should develop new and informative
training material on coal mine bumps, geologic environments and hazard
recognition for operator and miner use. Availability of this material
would enhance the miner's knowledge of hazards and allow early
recognition and remediation of hazardous conditions.
(7) In the long-term, industry should review current pillar load
monitoring technology and determine its acceptability for in-mine use
and remote monitoring of pillars in bump prone areas. Systems such as
current CO and methane monitoring data recorders which can be
continuously read outside the mine are envisioned. This would allow
continuous monitoring of pillar stress buildup in active mining areas.
(8) MSHA's public image at the Crandall Canyon mine was not
impressive. It is obvious that additional training should be provided
to Command Center personnel and Public Information Officers. The
critical role of objectivity and staying on point in briefing the press
and families of victims needs to be emphasized.
(9) The cooperation between the Bureau of Land Management and MSHA
needs to be reviewed. From the referenced BLM Inspection Reports, BLM
noted the effects of the bumps in the North barrier pillar and
expressed concern. Although BLM's primary focus is resource recovery,
their inspectors appear to be quite knowledgeable of underground
hazards, and an early exchange of information between the two Agencies
may have focused MSHA's attention on the bump problems at the Crandall
Canyon mine.
(10) As evidenced by both the Sago and Crandall Canyon disasters,
the need for training of mine rescue crews (teams) and both operator
and MSHA command center personnel remains great. Congress should
consider funding the establishment of several mine rescue training
centers in mining areas throughout the United States.
(11) Accidents involving multiple fatalities should be investigated
by a Federal entity independent of the regulatory Department. To
protect the validity of the investigation and to ensure impartiality in
fact finding, an independent entity needs to conduct these disaster
investigations. This will allow an unbiased determination of process
errors and misjudgments by all involved parties, and speed any
requirements for corrective actions to further improve workplace safety
for our Nation's most valuable resource--the miner.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Watzman.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE WATZMAN, VICE-PRESIDENT FOR SAFETY AND
HEALTH, NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION
Mr. Watzman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. NMA appreciates the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss the efforts to
improve mine safety since passage of the MINER Act of 2006, and
the challenges that remain to realize our goal to return every
miner home after each shift.
The Crandall Canyon accident has affected our Nation's
entire mining community and we mourn our fallen colleagues. We
are determined to return to the path that existed for much of
the past three decades, when steady reductions in fatalities
and serious injuries were achieved. We've heard testimony about
a possible cause of the Crandall Canyon incident. All should
exercise extreme caution and not draw conclusions until the
results and the findings of the various investigations have
been completed. To do otherwise would be premature, given the
complexity of the event.
As you know, the coal industry worked with this committee,
the Congress, and others to pass the most sweeping mine safety
legislation in more than three decades. The requirements
recognize that good safety practices continually evolve, based
upon experience and technologic development, and that every
underground coal mine presents a unique environment. What may
work in one mine, may well not in another.
Since passage of the act, the industry has moved
aggressively to identify technology that satisfies the law's
requirements as quickly as possible. Our written submittal
details some of the progress that has been made, while much
more needs to be done to reach our ultimate goal.
The recent accident at Crandall Canyon spotlighted our
continuing challenge to develop reliable, two-way devices that
could help locate and communicate with trapped miners. Most
Americans are well connected to each other through cell phones
and wonder why we can not communicate with miners underground.
We understand why. Sending a signal through rock deep
underground is far more challenging than signaling through the
air. Despite these challenges, the industry is not sitting idly
by until a reliable system reaches acceptable functionality
under all circumstances.
A recently approved tracking system, that was developed by
one of our member companies, Alliance Coal, is one of several
systems that uses radio frequency identification tags and bi-
directional readers to track miners' movement throughout the
mine. This is an improvement over earlier systems, and is
considered state-of-the-art. Yet it, too, is susceptible to
damage. The system currently requires a connective through the
mine fiber optic cable that is vulnerable to damage and could
potentially render the system useless.
As we continue to work with our colleagues to develop the
technologies to meet the act requirements, we are beginning to
turn our sights to work with recognized experts to develop
safety management systems that encourage integration of safety
into the entire suite of business management systems. In so
doing, we hope to reestablish a safety culture of prevention
throughout the industry. Our efforts will build upon the
recommendations in the report of the Mine Safety Technology and
Training Commission, to formalize risk assessment and
management practices, to identify, eliminate, and manage
conditions or practices that have the greatest potential to
cause harm.
To conclude, the mining industry is eager to learn from our
experience with implementing the MINER Act and with all who
share our determination to safeguard our miners. Fatalities are
tragic, but failing to learn from them and failing to act on
what we learned would be inexcusable. We will not let that
happen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy to answer any
questions you or any members have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Watzman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Watzman
introduction
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am Bruce Watzman, Vice
President, Safety, Health and Human Resources for the National Mining
Association. Thank you for providing us this opportunity to share our
thoughts regarding the issues we face as we strive to meet the mandates
of the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act (MINER) Act of
2006 and the challenges that remain as we strive to return each miner
home safely to their families after each shift.
Today I want to discuss two related issues: safety technology and
safety culture. But, before turning to the specific issues before the
committee let me again express our sympathy to the families of the
fallen miners at the Crandall Canyon mine. We mourn their losses and
are determined to return to the path that existed for much of the past
three decades, when steady reductions in fatalities and serious
injuries were the rule. That is why we supported strong new mine safety
legislation last year, established an independent commission to provide
recommendations for new safety risk-based systems and continue to
partner with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
to develop and test new safety and communication technology.
In 1977 Congress declared in the Mine Act that ``the first priority
and concern of all in the coal or other mining industry must be the
health and safety of its most precious resource--the miner.'' The
mining industry strives to reflect this priority through performance.
Indeed, the industry's commitment is reflected in 35 years of
decreasing injuries and fatalities. And, while last year this steady
progress was tragically interrupted by a series of accidents, 83
percent of our Nation's operating mines worked the entire year of 2006
without a single lost-time accident. Nonetheless, these recent
accidents are a powerful reminder that indicates a need for the
industry to reinforce the ``safety-first'' culture that exists within
companies throughout our industry.
miner act
Last year, NMA joined you in supporting passage of the most
sweeping mine safety legislation in more than 30 years. The MINER Act,
as implemented through Emergency Response Plans, recognizes the need
for a forward-looking risk assessment, that good safety practices
continually evolve based upon experience and technological development,
and that every underground coal mine presents a unique environment and
what may work in one may not be effective or desirable in another.
Since passage of the MINER Act the industry has moved aggressively
to identify technologies that satisfy the law's requirements as quickly
as possible. While more work needs to be done, the industry has made
significant investments and progress. Briefly,
100,000 additional self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs)
have been placed into service, with another 100,000 on back order.
All underground coal mines have submitted emergency
response plans including plans to supply breathable air and other
supplies to sustain miners trapped underground. Units to meet these
requirements are being ordered and installed without the normal testing
that a device such as these would normally receive.
All underground coal miners have received new training and
will continue to receive quarterly training.
Underground coal mines have implemented procedures to
track miners underground.
Existing communications systems have been hardened and
redundant systems installed.
More than 35 new mine rescue teams have or will be added
around the country.
This progress is only the beginning of our continued commitment for
reaching our desired goal, to protect our Nation's miners.
The recent accident at Crandall Canyon spotlighted our continuing
challenge to develop reliable two-way communication devices that could
help locate and communicate with miners trapped underground. At a time
when most Americans are well-connected with each other through cell
phones, many wonder why miners cannot communicate from underground to
the surface. Intuitively, we understand why: Sending a signal through
rock deep underground is far more challenging than signaling through
the air.
Apart from these fundamental technical barriers to in-mine or
through-the-earth signal propagation, explosions, fire and roof falls
produce destructive forces that can damage or destroy system components
and render the system inoperable. At present, there is simply no
available single system that can withstand all potential scenarios
while maintaining mine-wide communications.
Despite these daunting technological challenges, the industry is
not sitting idly by until a reliable system reaches acceptable
functionality under all circumstances. Today one member of NMA,
Alliance Coal, has developed one of several systems that use radio
frequency identification (RFID) tags and bi-directional readers to
track miner's movement throughout the mine, pre-event. This is an
improvement over earlier systems and is considered state-of-the-art.
Yet, it too is susceptible to damage by destructive forces that will
affect its functionality. The system currently requires a connective
through-the-mine fiber optic cable that is vulnerable to damage and
could potentially render the system useless.
NMA member companies recently conducted tests of communication
technology being developed primarily for Department of Defense use. The
results indicate that improved communication systems are possible. The
Kutta system, a subterranean wireless communication system having the
ability to couple onto and transmit radio signals using the existing
metallic infrastructure in the mines, including metal core lifelines,
phone cables, tracks, etc. holds great promise. Its ability to
interface with a mine UHF leaky feeder communication system has the
potential to integrate an analog and digital hand-held multifrequency
radio and complementary repeaters to overcome traditional barriers to
enhanced wireless communication.
Obviously there are other improvements in communication that can be
achieved. Our concern is not that additional communication requirements
will be mandated, nor is it the cost of communication systems. Rather,
it is that realistic expectations of what is technologically achievable
drive whatever requirements become the industry practice. Working with
researchers at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) we continue to approach this issue through sound science
and realistic timeframes for implementation.
In sum, there is no silver bullet technology yet available. True
``through-the-earth'' wireless technology does not yet exist. Until we
overcome the technical barriers that preclude transmission of signals
through the earth, the systems will require some form of underground
backbone and infrastructure, which are susceptible to damage.
Nevertheless, the perfect solution may still be beyond reach, we will
not be deterred in the quest to find and deploy it.
creating a culture of prevention
We have so far commented on technical improvements and these are
clearly important. But perhaps the most important element in improving
safety is the relentless focus on ``safety culture.'' For successful
companies safety culture exists at every level of the organization. In
those companies with outstanding safety performance safety is
emphasized at every meeting, at every shift at the mines and is an
integral part of the business model.
In a recent speech to the Utah Mining Association, J. Brett Harvey,
President and Chief Executive Officer of Consol Energy, Inc. stated
this succinctly. Let me quote key passages from his speech:
``To achieve our goal, we will need to join the science of
safety with a culture of safety.
The science of safety is technology-driven. We use technology
to help us monitor conditions, to provide early identification
of problem areas, to improve communications between sites
underground or between the underground and the surface, and to
enhance the safety of equipment.
By deploying technology to augment the efforts of our
employees, we can minimize physical conditions in a mine as a
source of accidents. We are great engineers, and we intend to
engineer our mines so that the physical conditions in the mine
are as predictable as those inside this room.
The culture of safety, on the other hand, involves engaging
the mind of every employee. We want to make safety their core
value. You do that in many ways: with constant training
regarding safe work practices, with regular discussion of
safety issues--both at work and at home, and with programs that
acknowledge and reward safe work practices and safety
achievements.''
Mr. Harvey's remarks reflect what so many in the industry have come
to recognize, that safety must be a core value that ``trumps
production, it trumps profits, it trumps all other rules, policies or
procedures.'' These same views were captured by the Mine Safety
Technology and Training Commission (MSTTC) in its December 2006 report,
Improving Mine Safety Technology and Training: Establishing U.S. Global
Leadership. In the section on prevention the Commission stated that:
Prevention requires that systematic and comprehensive
approaches be used to manage risks. Compliance is an important
aspect of prevention, but it is more important to realize that
it is only a starting point in a more comprehensive process of
risk management.
A critical action to ensure success of the process for any
company is the creation of a ``culture of prevention'' that
focuses all employees on the prevention of all accidents and
injuries. . . . In essence the process moves the organization
from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. Rather
than responding to an accident or injury that has occurred, the
company proactively addresses perceived potential problem areas
before they occur.
To achieve these goals we will be working with recognized experts
to develop a safety management system that encourages integration of
safety into the entire suite of business management systems.
Our efforts will build upon the strong leadership demonstrated last
year by the industry through the establishment of the MSTTC as an
independent body of safety experts charged with examining how advanced
technology and training procedures can be more readily adapted for use
in our mines. The commission provided a pro-active blueprint for
achieving zero fatalities and zero serious injuries in U.S. underground
coal mines and our actions going forward will further the adoption of
the commission's blue-print.
Risk assessment and management are well-established practices that
are employed in many industrial settings. Our goal is to formalize this
process for use throughout the mining industry so that we can identify,
eliminate and manage conditions or practices that have the greatest
potential to cause injury. In so doing we hope to develop a system that
recognizes the MSTTC objective to foster an approach that is ``founded
on the establishment of a value-based culture of prevention that
focuses all employees on the prevention of all accidents and
injuries.''
Our objective is prevention of accidents, injuries and illnesses
and reinforcing a culture of prevention. Decisions will be based upon
sound science recognizing technologic limits, where they exist. By
developing risk-based safety priorities we will identify and focus
resources on conditions that most directly place miners in potential
peril. Our goal is to foster industry-wide partnerships among coal
companies and equipment and service supply providers for the research,
development and commercialization of new practices and technology that
will raise the performance bar industry-wide.
conclusion
Some believe we must do something quickly with mining legislation
otherwise nothing will change. Mr. Chairman let us assure you that
things are changing and will continue to change until we reach our
mutually shared goal. We would submit to this committee that
legislation without the support of science and facts is not progress.
This committee and the public must not rush to judgment on the
necessity for additional legislation. We achieve more as a total mining
industry to solve a problem, without agendas, when we pool the
collective efforts of industry, labor and government representatives.
Today, mine safety and health professionals face challenges far
different from those anticipated when the Mine Act was enacted. Today's
challenge is to analyze why accidents are occurring at a mine, then use
that analysis as a basis for designing programs or techniques to
eliminate or manage the accident promoting condition or cause. Where
existing technology is not sufficient, mine operators must be afforded
the flexibility to use all existing, non-traditional means to protect
miners.
Mr. Chairman, once again, on behalf of the members of the National
Mining Association, thank you for the opportunity to give our
perspective on this vital public policy matter. If you or the other
members of the committee require additional information, we stand ready
to provide it.
The Chairman. Thank you, thank you very much.
Let me ask you, Mr. Ferriter, would you go in that mine and
mine?
Mr. Ferriter. Having looked at the roof-control plan and
having knowledge of the North Barrier pillar, I might make a
quick visit to look and see if there are any developing signs
of instability in the South Barrier, but I would not work a
crew in there. My visit would be very limited and very short.
The Chairman. OK.
Let me ask Mr. O'Dell, at what points in the approval
process do you think mistakes were made?
Mr. O'Dell. I think it's--it's just a matter of looking at
the map. I mean, it's very obvious that anybody with any mining
experience at all, can look at that map, and when you heard
what Mr. Ferriter had said, as far as all the mineable coal had
already been gone. That should have set a red flag up as the
approval was submitted to MSHA. I mean, that would have been
the first thing I looked at, is there's nothing around us to
protect them.
So the damage didn't just occur--if you look in the north
end, that area wasn't developed, Mr. Murray developed that. So
if you look at that, when he developed that, that actually
started damage to the area. Then when they started pillaring it
out, it became worse. So, I mean, you have coal miners that
could look--I represent coal miners, and when they saw this
map, they just could not believe that it was approved.
The Chairman. Well, I think many of us believe that coal
miners are really the most knowledgeable about safety
conditions. I mean, these are men, some women, who in many
instances spent a lifetime in these different circumstances and
know, too often, of lost friends or loved ones in these. But
they have an accumulated kind of knowledge and sense that
certainly ought to be protected.
Let me just ask you finally, maybe the panel, just quickly
on this, about outside evaluation. We've had this, Agapito did
this evaluation. We looked into it briefly. I guess it's a
highly regarded company, but there were important mistakes that
were made in this particular evaluation. You get the situation
where they're being paid by the companies themselves. I mean,
that's the way that the system is done. Are you troubled by
that? Should this be something that we ought to be interested
in, concerned about? Does this end up being too cozy a
relationship? What's your own experience on this? Just from
left to right.
Mr. O'Dell. Yes, it troubles me. I mean, you always have
heard ever since I was a little kid, that the customer's always
right. So whatever they're paying for, they're going to get.
So, that pretty much sums it up.
The Chairman. Mr. Ferriter.
Mr. Ferriter. Yes, I am very troubled about this. I think
it's a broken system. We had a consultant that obviously made
mistakes on the analysis. That was forwarded by the operating
company. The operator should have been very--they have
experienced people, they should know this. They should be able
to take and make corrections, tell the consultant to change it.
And then it was approved by MSHA.
When I was in MSHA, we had a small group of about six
people that did this for District Nine. We had about 25 years
experience there, geologists, mining engineers. We spent a lot
of time in the Utah coal fields. We spent a lot of time
reviewing these roof-control plans, we used computer
simulations. Quite frankly, I do not know what MSHA does today,
but just a simple run of the ARMPS program, NIOSH's ARMPS
program, I think would have put a lot of red flags out there
that somebody should take a real detailed look at this. I don't
know if this was done by MSHA or not.
The Chairman. Mr. Watzman.
Mr. Watzman. Thank you, Senator. It is not uncommon for
mine operators to use third-party consultants to assist them in
the development of mine plans for submittal to the Agency. I
would venture to guess that that's probably a common practice
in other industries as well, where the company does not have
the expertise in-house to do the detailed work itself. That
work is submitted to the Mine Safety and Health Administration,
who ultimately passes judgment on the validity of it one way or
another.
So, I'm personally not troubled by the fact that there are
third-party consultants used to assist in the preparation of
documents that are submitted to the Agency.
The Chairman. Senator Enzi.
Senator Enzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank the Mining Association and
the United Mine Workers for working together with us on the
MINER Act that we passed. I'm hoping that we'll get the same
kind of cooperation on anything that comes out of the
investigation or ideas that come out of college or ideas that
come from inventors, and approaching any solutions that we can
come up with in the future.
Dr. Ferriter, I'm an accountant, I'm not an engineer. You
mentioned these bumps could happen if the pillar was too small
or too large. I can understand too small. I don't understand
how too large creates bumps.
Mr. Ferriter. Too large, if it's too big and you want it to
yield, you want it to crush slowly, you want it to take and
disintegrate in a controlled fashion. If it's too big, then it
will not do that and it will store the stress in the pillar and
load up, primarily in the core of the pillar. So if you--
especially in a gate-row design. You want that to soften a
little bit to soften the stresses around the gate-rows. So
that's why you have to kind of get that right size in there. If
it gets too big, then it will store too much.
Senator Enzi. OK. I didn't realize that that was in the
process of removal, that we were talking about there. Thank
you.
Mr. Watzman, in addition to the changes that were brought
about by the MINER Act, MSHA has recently changed its penalty
assessment formula. Could you give us an indication of what the
effect of those changes have been, in terms of increases in the
size of assessed penalties? Of course, I'm particularly
interested in the non-serious and substantial penalties.
Mr. Watzman. Thank you, Senator. It must be recognized that
MSHA's regulations governing the assessment of penalties does
not provide the agency the ability to differentiate between
what one would consider a good operator and, on the other hand,
a bad operator. They're driven by the size of the operation.
I will share with the committee and submit to the record,
the results provided by one of our member companies for the
period April 23, when MSHA's new regulations came into effect,
and September 26. They compared 2006 and 2007. This is a
company that operates solely underground coal mines, many
underground coal mines throughout the country.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
Mr. Watzman. Their 2007 incident rate was 2.1, that's less
than half the industry average. I think everyone would consider
this to be a well-run company with a good safety record.
Comparing those two periods of time, their penalties
increased 624 percent. Their non-S&S penalties increased 838
percent. So this is nothing more than punitive behavior or
punitive action directed toward that company.
This did nothing to improve safety in that company. This
company has demonstrated time and time again, that they will do
what it takes to improve the safety conditions for their
miners. There are many examples of this across the industry.
I'm not going to say that this represents the entire industry,
it doesn't. But this is just one example of the result that has
come about through MSHA's regulatory change.
Senator Enzi. Thank you.
I have a number of questions that I'll be submitting to Mr.
Stricklin, that deal with some of the questions about targeted
inspections. I'd like all of your opinions on targeted
inspections, because effective management of an entity always
involves the best allocation of finite resources.
I'm an accountant. When you're doing audits, you pick on
those you most suspect of needing auditing. Then you audit
others just to see if your evaluation is correct on that.
Doesn't it seem like targeted inspection enforcement would be
the best use of an agency's resources, instead of requiring
that every mine get an inspection on a regular basis? Wouldn't
you pick on those that you think need it the most, the ones
that there are indications that there are problems? I'm trying
to get this from a laymen's perspective here.
Dr. Ferriter.
Mr. Ferriter. I think MSHA already has that authority, they
have what they call a spot inspection. So, if there's a
ventilation problem, or a ground-control problem, they can go
in that mine and inspect that particular thing. There could be
a miner complaint, that would be phoned in or called into the
local office, and MSHA could go out there and check that out.
So, I think that mechanism already exists in MSHA.
Senator Enzi. OK, any disagreement, or----
Mr. O'Dell. I would just say, you have to be real careful
when you look at how inspections are made at different mines,
because you've heard other folks tell you today that, depending
on the size of the mine, the number of employees of the mine is
going to dictate how many inspection hours are going to be
spent at that mine.
You may have a small mine that only has one section, and it
may only get four inspections, in a quarter, and then they're
done with them. And they may not be back again for another
quarter, that's a long time to go without an inspector being
back there to see what's going on.
Then, you may have a large mine that has four or five
advancing sections, and maybe one or two longwall sections. You
may have a couple of inspectors there daily, it's going to take
them longer to inspect the area, because there's just more
there to inspect.
The other thing that people don't understand is, the
inspectors don't always spend inspection hours when they're at
the mine. When they write a citation or a violation, they have
to go back to look at that same area to make sure it's abated.
So, you have to be very careful when you look at--I do believe
all mines have to be inspected as they are required under the
act today, I think the mandatory standard as it is today, but
what I do think is that it needs to be more fair and equal than
what it's done.
Mr. Watzman. Senator----
Senator Enzi. I have a lot of follow up.
Mr. Watzman. Can I just respond very quickly? I'd like to
take it one step further than my two colleagues on the panel.
There's a misunderstanding as to how inspections are
carried out, the MINER Act says every underground mine must be
inspected four times a year. For those outside the industry,
that leaves them with the impression that inspectors are there
4 days during the year. Nothing can be further from the truth.
There are mines in this country--some of the safest mines
in this country--where to complete the quarterly inspection
means that an inspector is there every day the mine is
operating, and when that quarterly inspection is closed out,
the next one begins. That is not, in our estimation, a good
allocation of resources. There has to be a better way to
conduct inspections, and manage that program than the way we're
currently doing it.
Senator Enzi. Thank you, and I'll have some follow up
questions on all of that, and my time's expired. I've got a lot
of other questions. I appreciate the expertise of this panel,
and the previous one, and we'll make use of it.
Senator Murray [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Enzi,
Senator Kennedy had to step away for a few minutes, he has
asked me to chair in his absence.
Let me start with you, Mr. O'Dell, do you know if any of
the miners at Crandall were aware of the conditions at the
North and South Barriers that they were mining?
Mr. O'Dell. It would be unfair of me to answer that. I
think that's something that the miners themselves would have to
answer. But, I think if you take that a step further, you make
an important point, and that is that any condition that is at a
mine site that management is aware of, they need to educate the
workers.
The workers, you know, know certain conditions because of
the environment that's around them, but they may not
necessarily know what's going on above them, what they can't
see. So, I think it's important that any education or any
information that can be shared with the workers should be done.
Senator Murray. OK, I have heard you say that you believe
that the second bump that killed three rescue workers could
have been anticipated, how did you come to that conclusion?
Mr. O'Dell. Because we saw a history. We saw a history of
what happened in the north end, and then we saw a history of
what was going on during the recovery time. I mean, I think
most people watching TV at all even saw when CNN was
underground, that they experienced a bump that occurred. They
had been reporting--even through the general public--that
several bumps had occurred. I mean, it was a sign that people
needed to pay attention to. I'm not sure that that was the
case.
Senator Murray. Was it surprising to you, then, that a CNN
crew went in?
Mr. O'Dell. I was very surprised by that, yes.
Senator Murray. I know that you don't represent any of the
Crandall Canyon Miners, but in your past experience and
communications you've had with miner families, how do you think
communications and updates to miners' families at Crandall
Canyon could have been handled more effectively?
Mr. O'Dell. Well, first of all, the communications should
have started with the workers when the mine first opened and
employees were hired. That's what's important--at mines we
represent, and I'm sure there's other mines we don't represent
do the same thing, from what I understand they may have done
this--to have safety meetings and explain to miners what their
conditions are, what their duties are, what citations are
existing and what have you.
After the accident occurred, I think the family members
should have been taken to a place where they could have had--I
don't think their questions were answered, there was a lot of
misinformation that was given out from the very beginning. I
think that MSHA being the person, you know, as of the MINER
Act, who was in charge of the investigation, should have been
the ones that was giving the information to the families. I
think with the information, they should have been very careful
about what they did, and they didn't tell them. Because it's so
easy--we saw it at Sago and we saw it again at Crandall Canyon,
it's so----
Let me tell you something. I mean, I'm sitting on the edge
of my seat while this whole thing's unfolding, hoping and
praying--just as everybody else was--that the miners were okay.
There was a lot of information that was given out that led us
to believe that that was the case, only to find out, maybe
hours later, just for example, the first information we got was
that the oxygen was good underground. So, that left us to
believe that there was hope, that they had oxygen to sustain
their life. But hours later, they tell us it was below 7
percent, and we know that won't sustain life.
So, you know, that up and down roller coaster, you should
not put anybody through that, especially the family members.
Senator Murray. One other question for you, I heard Dr.
Ferriter talk about the regulatory agency being the same one
doing the inspection--what is your opinion of that? Or doing
the investigation, I'm sorry, MSHA doing both the regulation,
and the investigation?
Mr. O'Dell. Are you asking me?
Senator Murray. I'm asking you.
Mr. O'Dell. I think MSHA plays a role in investigating what
occurs, but when you only have the Agency and the operator
doing the investigation, I don't think you get a fair
investigation, because those are the two parties with most at
risk, just as I had mentioned in my testimony.
So, I think you need an independent source that comes in.
That's what we pride ourselves on, the United Mine Workers. We
consider ourselves a voice for the miners, because when any
investigation I've ever been involved in, we demand answers for
our miners, for our family members, and somebody has to be in
there that can do that.
So, we say, ``OK, there's going to be an independent
investigation,'' according to Ms. Lynn Chao, Secretary Chao,
and she hires two former MSHA employees. I don't think that's a
fair, independent investigation. I think a fair independent
investigation would be, maybe, a mine operator, an MSHA
employee, somebody who represents labor, somebody from a
government, somebody from academia--I mean, you have to have a
well-rounded group of people with some knowledge to do an
investigation, but not just in a small group that is
investigating themselves, and that's what's going on today.
Senator Murray. Thank you, and I'm out of time.
But I did want to ask Dr. Ferriter that--I understand as we
progress in mining out a lot of the Nation's coal reserves that
conditions for underground coal miners are expected to worsen.
Can you give us what recommendations you would have for MSHA to
proactively prepare for these increasingly dangerous
conditions?
Mr. Ferriter. Yes, in the Utah area, of course, we're now
down to about 3,000 feet, which is quite--we have to take in,
you know, miner education is another thing that has to be
stressed. We have to take and develop new computer modeling
techniques, to make sure that we can analyze these conditions.
We need to look at different mine designs, because there are
obviously, more coal resources left underground to provide
additional support, so we have to take and develop some
guidelines on that--it's a whole new world that we need to look
at and analyze what is going to happen, and what are going to
be the dangers down there?
Senator Murray. Thank you very much.
Mr. Watzman, we had a chance to meet and talk a short while
ago, and I talked to you about my Family Assistance Program
thoughts and asked for some response back from any of your
representatives. If you could get back with us and share any of
their thoughts, I would really appreciate it.
Mr. Watzman. We will do so.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much.
Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. Well, thank you, Senator Murray.
Mr. O'Dell, let me just begin by thanking you for your
willingness to participate on the Utah Commission that was
ordered by Governor Huntsman to look into the Crandall Canyon
Mine disaster, or accident.
I wanted to make you aware that I am currently working with
the Department of Labor to see that the government and that the
State Commission has access to all documents and any other
materials pertaining to that mine. So, we'll continue to work
with you to see what we can do to make sure that you have
access to these things.
Mr. O'Dell. Thank you, sir.
Senator Hatch. You bet.
Mr. Ferriter, and Mr. Watzman, I understand that there used
to be a technology center in Denver to examine new ways for
miners to communicate, among other technological advancements,
and many other thoughts in the mining industry.
Now, this Center, as I understand it, has now been moved to
West Virginia. I'm wondering if it might be useful, once again,
to have a Mining Technology Center out West, perhaps even in
Utah, because of the peculiar problems that we have in mining
like we do, in deep mining. Do you both have an opinion on
this? The differences between the Western and Eastern mines?
Mr. Watzman. Senator, Dr. Ferriter has talked to that in
his testimony, and has recommended the reestablishment of that,
and we agree with that. It was unfortunate that Assistant
Secretary McAteer decided to close that down and consolidate
the Agency's functions at the facility in Beckley, WVA at their
Approval and Certification Center. Clearly, there is a need for
such a facility in the West.
Senator Hatch. You feel the same way, I'm sure, Mr.
Ferriter.
Mr. Ferriter. I feel the same way, when the Center was
closed, I was very much against it. There was a lot of
expertise lost there. In my ground, you know, with the ground-
control conditions that were out in Utah, that expertise was
totally lost, there was only one person that stayed with MSHA,
the rest of us retired.
I think as Senator Murray has stated here, we're going into
a new environment, we're going deeper. I think there's going to
be more problems, and we have to investigate those and we have
to look at those. So, there's going to be a research and also
an operational-type area there that we have to take and
address. I would highly recommend reestablishment of a
technical group out there.
Senator Hatch. Mr. Watzman, some have tried to suggest that
unless mandated by Congress, the mining industry will not
invest in new safety technology and equipment. Do you agree
with this view, and if not, could you provide the committee
with some background on the industry's voluntary efforts, at
least in that regard?
Mr. Watzman. No, I don't agree with that view, universally,
Senator. There are those who comply with the regulations. There
are others who believe that the regulations are just the floor,
and that to bring about true safety improvement, to develop a
safety culture within your organization, requires much more
than just complying with the law and the regulations.
The industry continually works on new technologies, both in
terms of productivity and safety, that will bring about
improvements in the industry, in the absence of regulatory
requirements. Things like proximity-detection devices that are
being developed by equipment manufacturers in conjunction with
Massey Energy. Those are not mandated by regulation, but the
company is investing in that with an outside vendor to develop
that technology for introduction into the mines.
There are numerous examples of that, where the industry has
gone above and beyond the regulatory requirements to bring
about improvements in safety.
Senator Hatch. I'm pretty well aware of the mine safety
violations going from almost nothing to very serious
violations. I think we need to--you know, one of the things we
need to answer is just how serious were these violations there
at that mine, and were these miners sent down into a mine that
was unsafe. At least, according to the knowledge that existed
at that time.
It's always easy in retrospect to blame people and to find
fault. On the other hand, if we knew enough about it before,
and I think Mr. O'Dell's testimony has been very interesting on
that, as well as Mr. Ferriter's testimony has been--we ought to
get down to brass tacks on that. Because there's a lot of
people that are suffering, as a result of this particular
mining accident. I just hope that we get to the bottom of it,
and I'll do everything in my power to make sure that our Mining
Commission in Utah gets the information that it needs to make
careful evaluations.
Because we've got--it is different mining in the mountains
than it is mining in Beckley, WVA or Pennsylvania. Sometimes it
can be safer, and it can be more dangerous. We need to do
everything we possibly can to make sure that this never happens
again. In the process, do everything we can to help these
families who are left after this mining disaster.
I just want to thank you all, I'll submit some questions,
my time is up, but I want to thank you for your testimony and
your help in this matter. Thanks.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch.
Senator Enzi, unless you have further questions?
Well, I want to thank all of our panelists who have been
here today, it's been very helpful to this committee. We will
leave the record open for the next 10 days for any additional
questions, we would ask all of you to respond promptly to
those.
To the family members, I again, want to thank all of you
for being here. We can not change your tragedy, but we
certainly can look at what we are doing to make sure that we're
doing everything possible to make sure that no one else suffers
what you have suffered. Your being here today helps us do that,
and I want to personally thank you.
With that, this committee is adjourned.
[Additional material follows.]
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Department of Health & Human Services,
Washington, DC 20201,
September 28, 2007.
Hon. Edward M. Kennedy,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510.
Dear Senator Kennedy: I am writing in response to your letter of
September 19, 2007 requesting an ``analysis, using ARMPS and LaModel,
of retreat mining in the North and South Blocks, Main West of Crandall
Canyon.''
Please find enclosed an analysis pertaining to the evaluation and
control of coal bumps using the ARMPS and LaModel tools.
If you should have any questions regarding the technical analysis
contained in the enclosed, please contact Jeffrey Kohler, Ph.D., at
412-386-5301.
I am also sending the enclosure to Senator Murray who co-signed the
September 19th letter with you.
Sincerely,
John Howard, M.D., Director,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
[Editor's Note: Due to the high cost of printing, previously
published materials are not reprinted. To view the analysis referred to
above, please go to http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/
NIOSHCrandallCanyonReport.pdf.]
______
United Mine Workers of America,
Fairfax, VA 22031-2215,
August 21, 2007.
Hon. Harry Reid,
Senate Majority Leader,
U.S. Congress,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
U.S. Congress,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Reid and Representative Pelosi: I write to urge
Congress to appoint an independent bi-partisan committee of coal mine
safety experts to investigate the Crandall Canyon disaster. The public
needs a reliable way to obtain meaningful information and insights
about this horrific tragedy: both the initial trapping of six miners
and the subsequent rescue efforts, which resulted in three deaths last
week. I do not believe the American public and our Nations' coal miners
will be well-served by another instance of MSHA investigating itself in
this disaster.
Just last year this Nation was witness to three dramatic multi-
fatal accidents beginning with the Sago mine explosion on January 2,
2006, followed less than 3 weeks later by a mine fire at Aracoma, and
then an explosion at the Darby mine. Together these three disasters
took 19 lives, and devastated entire communities. Since the beginning
of last year, 64 coal miners have been killed on the job. That's an
average of three each month.
In a demonstration of bi-partisan support for the Nation's coal
miners, Congress enacted the MINER Act which President Bush signed into
law on June 15, 2006. The MINER Act served as an important first step
for improving miners' health and safety. However, it was the first
piece of miners' safety and health legislation in nearly 30 years, and
did not address all the shortcomings in the laws that are needed to
protect miners. One of the many things that bill did not accomplish was
to change the way mining accidents are investigated.
The problem with the status quo is that the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (``MSHA'') investigates mine accidents. However, time
and again MSHA's performance has been found to have had a role in
sanctioning the very conduct that developed into subsequent disasters.
For example, MSHA must approve mining plans, ventilation plans and roof
control plans, not to mention to ensure through enforcement procedures
that each operator adheres to all the plans once the respective MSHA
District approves them. Yet, after the disasters of 2006, MSHA's
Internal Review determined that:
[At] Aracoma . . . the majority of contributory violations
were obvious and should have been identified by MSHA inspectors
prior to the fatal fire that killed two miners. The team
determined that inspection personnel failed to exercise their
authority in a manner that demonstrated an appreciation for the
importance of strict enforcement of the Mine Act and failed to
conduct inspections in a manner that reliably detected
violations.
Inspection personnel also demonstrated a lack of technical
know-how necessary to effectively evaluate and address complex
safety and health conditions, and failed to comply with MSHA
policies and procedures that, if followed, would have
significantly improved the scope, quality and effectiveness of
mine inspections. The lack of effective management oversight
and controls also contributed to enforcement deficiencies at
Aracoma. MSHA has referred its findings at Aracoma to the Labor
Departments Office of Inspector General for further
investigation of employee misconduct.
The Sago internal review found that . . . failure by
personnel to follow inspection procedures, coupled with
inadequate managerial oversight, resulted in a number of
enforcement deficiencies. Among the areas cited as needing
improvement was the district's mine emergency response
capabilities.
The Darby internal review found that district personnel did
not effectively utilize the mine operator's history of repeat
violations to elevate the level of enforcement. Failure to
follow inspection procedures, along with inadequate managerial
oversight, resulted in many of the deficiencies identified in
the report.
From MSHA press statement 07-975-NAT, dated June 28, 2007.
Three different MSHA District offices, but all three substantially
failed in their primary responsibility of protecting the miners. What
makes this MSHA statement especially frustrating is that the Agency
came to the same kind of conclusions following an explosion that took
13 miners' lives at the Jim Walters Mine #5 in Alabama back in 2001.
There is an integral problem at the very heart of the Agency where
there seems to have developed a culture of accepting the status quo and
not rocking the boat.
MSHA has had many opportunities to correct what is wrong; yet it
still has not arrested its well-documented problems. We need an outside
group of experts to analyze what happened at the Crandall Canyon mine
in Utah, not only on August 6, 2007 and during the subsequent rescue
efforts, but also the events that set the stage for the August 6
disaster. We also would welcome the recommendations such independent
experts could make about how the Agency should change to better keep
all miners safer.
The status quo simply isn't working to protect miners. Miners at
Crandall Canyon and their families deserve better. In the same
bipartisan fashion that Congress demonstrated on the heels of the three
coal mining disasters last year, we urge you to appoint an independent
committee of experts to investigate what went wrong for the Crandall
Canyon workers.
Respectfully,
Cecil E. Roberts.
______
Prepared Statement of Jennifer Joy Wilson, President and CEO, National
Stone, Sand, and Gravel Association, Alexandria, VA
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the National Stone, Sand
and Gravel Association (NSSGA) appreciates the opportunity to submit a
statement for the record of this hearing on the Miner Health and Safety
Enhancement Act of 2007 (S. 1655).
Based near the Nation's capital, NSSGA is the world's largest
mining association by product volume according to the U.S. Geological
Survey. NSSGA's member companies represent more than 92 percent of the
crushed stone and 75 percent of the sand and gravel consumed annually
in the United States, and abide by three sets of guiding principles:
safety and health of workforce and communities; environmental
stewardship and compliance; and sustainability. Nearly three billion
tons of aggregates (crushed stone, sand and gravel) were produced in
2006 at a value of approximately $21 billion, contributing over $40
billion to the GDP of the United States. Every $1 million in aggregate
sales creates 19.5 jobs, and every dollar of industry output returns
$1.58 to the economy.
There are more than 11,000 construction aggregate operations
nationwide. Seventy percent of the Nation's counties and virtually
every congressional district are home to a crushed stone, sand or
gravel operation. Aggregates are used in nearly all residential,
commercial and industrial building construction and in most public
works projects, such as roads, highways, bridges, railroad beds, dams,
airports, water and sewage treatment plants and tunnels. While the
American public may not be familiar with the uses of these raw natural
materials, aggregates are the majority ingredient of asphalt and
concrete, and also have environmental benefits with erosion control,
storm water runoff, flue gas desulpherization, acidity control on land
and in waters, and offer many reclaimed benefits to communities.
Pulverized aggregates are used in the manufacture of glass, paper,
paint, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, chewing gum, household cleansers,
and many other consumer goods.
The first priority of the aggregates industry is and will continue
to be the safety and health of its workers. The safety record of the
aggregates industry has improved due to the heightened level of effort
invested by the industry to sustain an improved performance. The
improvement in the aggregates industry safety record is attributable to
several factors. The first is that aggregate companies have realized
that to stay competitive in today's business environment, companies
must provide a safe and healthy workplace or they will not be able to
attract the best workforce possible. Companies realize that to remain
competitive in America today you must care about your people.
The Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER
Act) was signed into law on June 15, 2006. We believe the Miner Health
and Safety Enhancement Act of 2007 (MHSE Act) is premature because it
comes before MSHA and the industry have had adequate time to fully
implement the MINER Act and, therefore, could undermine the success
that has been achieved. Further, imposing another layer of regulation
on an industry that already is highly regulated and has shown continued
safety improvements at this time would create confusion and threaten
further progress.
The MHSE Act takes a one-size-fits-all approach that fails to
recognize that mines are unique. NSSGA members have achieved a
continuously improving safety performance record. In fact, NSSGA
members have never experienced an accident similar to the recent
tragedies in the coal sector. Written as a result of these tragedies in
the coal sector, the MINER Act has impacted the aggregates industry.
Further extension of the MHSE Act to the stone, sand and gravel
industry is not warranted and contradicted by the industry's safety
performance.
Notice and comment rulemaking is a precept fundamental to the MINER
Act and its predecessor statutes. The basic purpose of such rulemaking
is to afford stakeholders the due process required by law of providing
a reasoned forum that allows all interested parties to comment on
proposed regulations. The MHSE Act would circumvent this crucial
rulemaking process in key areas. The MHSE Act would require MSHA, with
no opportunity for public comment, to automatically adopt the
recommended exposure limits developed by the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as legally enforceable
Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs). The bill would also require MSHA to
automatically adopt standards, such as the Hazard Communications
standard, established by private and quasi-governmental organizations.
To impose statutory health standards on the mining industry without
benefit of notice and comment rulemaking to develop a rulemaking record
that evaluates risk of material impairment of health, as well as
technology and economic feasibility, is unwise, unjustified and could
be counterproductive.
We are concerned that the MHSE Act changes the rules and
responsibilities of MSHA and NIOSH in a number of key respects. It also
introduces an organization unfamiliar with the mining industry into the
safety process which will create regulatory confusion. Under the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, the role of NIOSH in
standard-setting is advisory in nature. The MHSE Act would require
NIOSH to establish the frequency of dust sampling rather than MSHA. The
MHSE Act would also require MSHA to adopt technology designed and
certified by NIOSH. This would undermine a well-established and
effective standard setting regime by mandating that MSHA simply accept
NIOSH recommendations. It would circumvent the current approval and
certification process.
The MHSE Act contains several provisions that are impractical and
will be administratively difficult to implement. For example, it would
require all mine operators to notify MSHA of a number of incidents that
are not likely to cause injury or are otherwise life-threatening.
Notifying the agency of a near miss incident or other events that are
not clearly defined by the MHSE Act will lead to confusion and a waste
of valuable time and resources by both operators and MSHA inspectors.
It is imperative that when a serious accident or mine disaster
occurs, that a comprehensive and unbiased investigation takes place to
prevent a recurrence. The MHSE Act would permit a ``miner's
representative'' or a representative of the injured party's family to
request a public hearing or special investigation. This process does
not lend itself to an objective investigation of the facts. Other
motives, such as politics, labor-management issues, or potential future
civil litigation should take a back seat to determining the facts
contributing to an incident for purposes of prevention.
The MINER Act substantially increased penalties. In addition to
proposing more penalty increases, the MHSE Act requires the Secretary
of Labor (the Secretary) to revise section 104(e) of Federal Mine
Safety and Health of 1977, which addresses ``pattern of violations,''
or POV, and restricts the ability of mine operators to contest
inappropriate enforcement actions. MSHA published new civil penalty
regulations, covering all mines, on March 22, 2007. The new regulations
addressed the statutory requirements of the MINER Act related to civil
penalties. They also revised the agency's formula for calculating
assessments related to violations. MSHA estimated that the cost
increase of these new penalty regulations would range from 127 percent
to 228 percent. Many conservative estimates from mine operators project
penalty cost increases of 200 percent to 300 percent. MSHA's new
penalty regulations should be given a chance to work before any further
statutory changes are made.
The MHSE Act would require mine operators to escrow the assessment
related to a contested violation pending resolution of dispute. This
requirement is clearly designed to discourage mining companies from
contesting enforcement actions, thereby forcing many small businesses
to choose between placing funds in escrow and meeting payroll for their
employees. It also would limit the ability of mine operators to defend
themselves against unfair treatment and inappropriate actions. A
significant consequence of this provision would place another burden on
an individual miner who has a bona fide disagreement with a personal
citation the miner receives if the miner wishes to contest the
citation. By requiring an individual miner to escrow payment when there
is simply a difference in opinion, the MHSE Act unduly burdens the
individual miner that the statute would protect.
If enacted, the MHSE Act will result in many mines installing
inappropriate or unnecessary technology. The proposed legislation is
prescriptive, as opposed to being risk-based in design. Mine operators
would be required to adopt technology that is neither proven to be safe
nor commercially viable at this time. While the majority of aggregate
operations are above ground, there are a significant number of other
types, ranging from water-based dredging to underground operations that
may require different types of technology.
In addition to increased penalties, the industry continues to
endure a lack of consistency from MSHA during inspections and issuance
of citations. Lack of consistency also may be due to inadequate
training. MSHA inspectors do not necessarily have training facilities
which clearly differentiate between the various mining sectors and the
different types of product within each sector (i.e., granite mine,
limestone mine, sand and gravel operation). Proper training of
inspectors ensures an improved consistency in inspection and issuance
of citation, and therefore, an improved compliance on behalf of
operators. NSSGA strongly supports improving the training capabilities
of MSHA inspectors, so they are prepared to conduct consistent and
comprehensive inspections of stone, or sand and gravel operations.
Unlike coal, underground stone mines produce material that is non-
combustible and non-flammable. No combustible gas such as methane is
present, and no underground stone mine is categorized as liberating
methane or containing a combustible ore. MSHA-approved
(``permissible'') equipment is not required in underground stone mines
because mine fires or explosions cannot occur due to electrical
equipment contacting an explosive gas, since explosive gas is not
present. Mining methods create large open spaces for access by large
equipment. Large openings accommodate emergency equipment used by non-
mine emergency services. More stable mineral formations result in
stable mine roofs, minimizing the need for additional roof supports and
emergency escape is easier due to the large spaces in the mine. Because
of large open spaces and mining methods, mechanical mine ventilation
generally is not required since natural ventilation provides an
atmosphere in which people can work.
Additionally, while most quarries are mined for decades, some sand
and gravel operations move rapidly from one site to another. Also,
there is a wide range of climate differences among the 11,000 plus
operations nationwide that may make certain safety technologies more
feasible than others. Operators should have the flexibility to
introduce the types of technology best suited to their mines and
specific circumstances. In other words, ``one-size-does-not-fit-all.''
NSSGA developed and agreed to a set of safety principles to assist
member companies in their efforts to understand the importance to their
individual organizations, as well as to the industry as a whole. In
addition, a safety pledge was developed in 2002 incorporating the
safety guiding principles. More than 90 percent of the NSSGA member
companies now have agreed to the pledge, signifying the importance of
safety and a commitment toward ensuring the safety and health of all
their employees.
NSSGA was one of the first organizations that formalized an
alliance with MSHA. Subsequently, MSHA has entered into alliances with
other industries it regulates, as well as with labor organizations,
including the International Association of Bridge, Structural,
Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers and the International Union of
Operating Engineers. Important alliances also exist with the National
Safety Council and the American Society of Safety Engineers. While some
argue that these alliances have aligned the agency too closely with the
regulated community, we would argue the opposite. In 2002, NSSGA and
MSHA set forth a cooperative agreement to develop programs and tools
for the improvement of safety and health in the aggregates industry.
The reduced incidence rates that resulted speak for themselves. Through
these alliances, individual working miners have gained access to more
educational materials from their companies, and MSHA has been able to
enhance its mission of protecting worker safety and health.
Another collaborative effort resulted in the MSHA Part 46
``Training and Retraining of Miners'' regulation in 2000. This
effective regulation ensures every miner knows and understands how to
perform their job safely by covering the important safety and health
information prior to starting work and annually thereafter. This
regulation was developed collaboratively, with input from both labor
and industry groups, guaranteeing support of the rule by all involved
stakeholders and assuring their commitment to the ultimate goal of
injury reduction. The Coalition for Effective Miner Training included
many industry groups working in a joint industry/labor arrangement in
conjunction with MSHA to develop an effective standard for the
aggregates industry, and the part 46 miner training resulted from the
group's combined efforts.
Another example of an effective collaboration between MSHA and
NSSGA is a cooperative workplace-based training program of noise and
dust monitoring workshops. Agency and association leadership developed
and signed an agreement, and the training workshop program launched on
December 1, 1997. These workshops have been given every year since
1997, and training specialists from the Mine Safety Academy have
educated miners in dust and noise issues. The joint venture aimed at
reducing hearing loss and silicosis through a program of recognition,
evaluation and control of workplace hazards has won two awards from
Innovations in American Government.
The NSSGA/MSHA Alliance does not interfere with the compliance
program of the agency, but instead enhances communications and
understanding of risk for improved education and training. MSHA has an
important role in ensuring that aggregates mines and quarries maintain
safety standards that protect employees. The MSHA enforcement program
operates independently of any of the cooperative industry alliances.
Unlike any other safety and health enforcement agency enabling
legislation, the act requires complete inspections of every mine
property two or four times per year depending on whether it is surface
or underground, respectively.
It is imperative that Congress allow the original MINER Act to be
fully implemented in order that the overall impact of it can be
comprehensively measured. Congress should exercise caution before
rushing to impose another layer of regulations on the already highly-
regulated mining sector so as not to jeopardize the progress being made
in enhancing the safety of miners. Congress must look to MSHA to
develop a model that combines enforcement with incentives for safety
performance and with education and training and assistance on best
safety practices rather than penalties as the sole motivator.
The first priority for the aggregates industry is and will continue
to be the safety and health of its miners. The industry recognizes that
its employees are its most valuable asset, an asset that must be
protected for the well-being of the industry now and in the future.
______
Responses to Questions of Senators Enzi, Murray, Isakson, and Hatch
by Dennis O'Dell
senator enzi
Question 1. Like you, I would prefer, during a situation like the
disaster at Crandall Canyon, that there was no public comment by anyone
not in possession of all the facts, or anyone attempting to advance
their own agenda in the wake of such a tragedy. That would include not
only a mine owner, but the media, outside commentators, and all others,
as well. However, I am sure you recognize that there are serious
practical and constitutional issues implicated here. In a situation
such as Crandall Canyon should the Federal Government impose
limitations on the free speech rights of individuals? Should the
Government limit freedom of the press by placing restrictions on news
reporters? Would UMWA be opposed to Government action that would limit
its speech rights in these circumstances?
Answer 1. The Government should not limit freedom of press on news
reporters.
Question 2a. The availability and utility of communication
equipment in particular is routinely misrepresented to the public.
Mandating equipment that does not work does absolutely nothing but
create false confidence and waste resources that could be better
utilized in achieving real technical progress to enhance miners'
safety. There is no question that we share that common goal. With this
in mind I would ask: What exactly, by name or operational description,
is the communication/tracking technology you claim should have been
required at Crandall Canyon, and would have survived and been usable
post-accident?
Answer 2a. If approached correctly, possibly the PED, see response
2d. Also see attached MSHA report.
Question 2b. Again, exactly, by name or operational system, what is
the wireless technology that can accomplish one or two-way
communication through substantial amounts of solid material?
Answer 2b. Again, though the earth could have been established with
the use of the boreholes drilled, the experts needed to think outside
of the box.
Question 2c. I'm sure you are aware that some have advocated that
we mandate so-called ``leaky feeder systems'' as underground
communication ``gold standard.'' However, virtually every expert agrees
that a leaky feeder system at Crandall Canyon would have been
inoperable post-accident. Do you agree? And, if not, why not?
Answer 2c. See attached MSHA report.
Question 2d. As you know, many argued that the so-called PEDs
tracking system was the way to ensure the ability to locate a lost or
trapped miner. I'm sure you're aware that there was a full PEDs system
in place at Crandall Canyon, however, it was wiped out by the collapse,
and immediately ceased working. What is the tracking system that you
believe should have been installed and would have survived the
collapse?
Answer 2d. If the agency would have thought outside the box, they
could have overcome the problem of the limited use of the PED's caused
by the mine collapse. If the UMWA would have been a part of the command
center where the decisions were made, we would have suggested that the
agency drop a receiver down the various boreholes that had been drilled
to see if they could have detected any response from the PED's. Because
this was not done we really aren't sure if these devices failed or not.
Question 3. Could you detail the specific evidence on which you
rely to support your claim that the investigatory panel named by
Secretary Chao to investigate the Crandall Canyon accident is ``not
independent.'' As I read your testimony, the sole basis for that claim
is that two of the panel members were once employed by MSHA. Is
everyone who has previously worked for MSHA. for example, another
witness on the panel Dr. Ferriter, not independent or impartial?
Answer 3. The United Mine Workers of America is the only true
independent voice for miners.
Question 4. I gather from your testimony that UMWA believes it
should be present and should participate in MSHA's interview of all
witnesses and have immediate access to all documents pertinent to
MSHA's accident investigation, is that correct? Are you aware of any
other situations in which a labor organization has the right to be
involved as a virtual partner in the Government's law enforcement
functions? Does Section 103(f) of the Mine Act on which you appear to
rely say anything about post-accident investigations? Isn't it limited
to inspections, and inspection conferences held at the mine?
Answer 4. The United Mine Workers of America has always been a part
of MSHA's investigations where we have been designated as
Representative of the miners. The union and MSHA have always been able
to work collectively through this process because they (MSHA) recognize
that we have a lot to offer during these types of investigations.
Responsible operators have also encouraged this type of co-operation
between all parties. It is usually the bad operators that have
something to hide that tries to keep this joint co-operation from
occurring.
Question 5. The Secretary of Labor and the Solicitor of Labor have
both noted that allowing access and participation by non-government
entities in the investigatory process could ``compromise the integrity
of the investigation and potentially jeopardize MSHA's ability to
enforce the law.'' In your testimony, you say that UMWA is skeptical of
the validity of these claims. What is the factual basis for UMWA's
skepticism?
Answer 5. This has nothing to do with MSHA's ability to enforce the
law or compromising the integrity of the investigation. It is all about
accountability. If there is no honest broker to hold the parties
accountable, then a fair investigation may not take place. In many
cases, the agency, MSHA, is glad that we are a part of their
investigations because we support them by testifying on behalf of the
agency when the operators challenge them in court.
One example is the Jim Walters Resource #5 case where we were a
party to the agency in the hearings against the company. There are many
more examples where MSHA relies on the union to support them from mine
inspections, violation conferences, accident investigations, to
comments on rulemaking. In this statement where you quote that the
Secretary of Labor and the Solicitor of Labor has noted that allowing
access and participation by non-government entities in the
investigatory process could compromise the integrity of the
investigation and potentially jeopardize MSHA's ability to enforce the
law. . . . rather than you asking what is the basis for the UMWA's
skepticism, you should be asking MSHA, if they did everything that they
should have done and have nothing to hide, then why would they deprive
a designated representative such as us, the same access that they have
given us at every union operation that we represent.
[News Release-U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Public Affairs, Jan.
31, 2008]
(Contact: Amy Louviere 202-693-9423 or Matt Faraci, 202-693--9406;
Release Number: 08-126-NAT)
msha approves first wireless tracking system
New technology represents significant progress under MINER Act
ARLINGTON, VA.--The U.S. Department of Labor's Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA) announced it has issued its first official
approval of a wireless tracking system for use in underground mines.
The approval was issued by MSHA's Approval and Certification Center to
Venture Design Services Inc. for the MineTracer Miner Location
Monitoring System.
``Since the Sago Mine disaster, MSHA has received dozens of
proposals from manufacturers and distributors of emergency
communication and tracking systems,'' said Richard E. Stickler, acting
assistant secretary of labor for mine safety and health. ``This
approved system provides a wireless means for mine operators to track
miners underground both before and after an emergency event.'' The
system components normally will be interconnected with low-voltage DC
power cables; however, in the event of an emergency, the power cables
become de-energized, and the system will resort to battery power and
can remain operational wirelessly. Although not yet incorporated in the
design, Venture Design intends to add text messaging and gas detection
to the system in the future.
Since 2006, MSHA has issued 36 new or revised approvals for
communications and tracking systems, including a hand-held portable
radio, several leaky feeder systems and several radio frequency
identification (RFD)) tracking system components. MSHA currently is
examining 41 additional communications and tracking approval
applications, including several wireless communications and tracking
systems.
The Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act of 2006
requires that each mine evacuation plan include provisions for tracking
the pre-accident location of all underground miners. Furthermore, the
MINER Act requires that mine operators adopt wireless communications
and electronic tracking systems by June 2009.
MSHA's Approval and Certification Center tests a wide range of
mining equipment, components, instruments and materials to ensure that
they meet government standards for safe design and construction. This
work helps to ensure that the various products will not contribute to
an explosion, fire, electrical failure, vehicle crash or other kind of
accident. The center, located near Wheeling, WV, houses laboratories,
explosion galleries and offices that perform administrative work and
recordkeeping.
***
(U.S. Department of Labor releases are accessible on the Internet
at www.dol.gov. The information in this news release will be made
available in alternate format (large print, Braille, audio tape or
disc) from the COAST office upon request. Please specify which news
release when placing your request at 202-693-7828 or TTY 202-693-7755.
The Labor Department is committed to providing America's employers and
employees with easy access to understandable information on how to
comply with its laws and regulations. For more information, please
visit www.dol.gov/compliance.)
MSHA Approved Communications & Tracking Technologies
(Updated 01/25/2008)
Handheld Two-Way Radios
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer Model Number Approval #
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kenwood USA Corporation......... TK-290, TK-390..... 23-A060002-0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leaky Feeder Communication Systems
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer Model Number Approval #
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mine Radio Systems.............. Flexcom 9B-219
Communications
Systems.
Varis Mine Tech................. Model IS Leaky 23-A050001-0
Feeder
Communication
System.
DAC............................. Type RFM 2000 Radio 9B-201
System.
EL-EQUIP, INC................... Model VHF-1 Radio 9B-196
System.
Tunnel Radio of America......... Model UltraComm 23-A070005-0
Distributed
Antenna
Communication
System.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mine Page Phones
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer Model Number Approval #
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comtrol Corporation............. ``Loudmouth'' Page 9B-71
Phones.
Gai-Tronics..................... Model 491-204 Mine 9B-221
Dial Page Phone.
Gai-Tronics..................... Part Nos. AM7011, 9B-155
AM7012, AM7021,
AM7022
Loudspeaking
Telephones.
Pyott Boone..................... Model Nos. 112 and 9B-102, 9B-163
112P, 118 and 119
Page Phones.
Pyott-Boone..................... Model 128 Mini Page 9B-158
Boss.
Mine Safe Electronics........... Model IIA Mine 9B-164
Phone.
Mine Safety Appliances (MSA).... Pager III.......... 9B-85
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Tracking Systems
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer Model Number Approval #
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mine Site Technologies.......... Model TAG IV 2G-4162-0
Transmitter.
Mine Site Technologies.......... ICCL Integrated 23-ISA080001-0
Communications Cap
Lamp with Optional
Tracker.
Marco........................... Model PRIM Model 23-A060001-0
PTT-1.
Matrix Design Group, LLC........ Model MatrixTracker 23-A060003-0
T1000 RFID Tag.
NL Technologies................. Model Standalone 23-A070001-0
WiFi RFID Tag.
NL Technologies................. Cap Lamp with RFID 23-ISA070001-0
Tag.
Venture Design Services......... MLT Mobile Location 23-A070003-0
Transponder Tag.
Wholesale Mine Supply........... Model i-Q8X rfid 23-A070004-0
Tag.
Koehler-Bright Star............. Model TAG5 Tracker 23-ISA07000-2
Tag Module.
Koehler-Bright Star............. Model MultiTAG TP1 23-ISA07000-3
Transmitter TAG
PCB Assembly.
Mine Radio Systems.............. Model TP2/ISPT..... 23-A070006-0
American Mine Research, Inc..... Mine Net Tag....... 23-A070007-0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paging/Text Messaging Systems
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer Model Number Approval #
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mine Site Technologies.......... Model PED1......... 6D-46-0
Mine Site Technologies.......... ICCL Integrated 23-ISA080002-0
Communication Cap
Lamp with Optional
PED.
Nl Technologies................. Model Gil Cap Lamp 23-ISA070004-0
with Messenger
Circuit.
Stolar Horizon.................. RGU104-001 Remote 23-A070002-0
Graphical User
Interface.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wired Intercom Systems
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Manufacturer Model Number Approval #
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Con-Space Communications........ Model CSI-2000 9B-199-0
Confined Space
Intercom System.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
senator murray
Question 1. After reviewing the details of the Mine Disaster Family
Assistance Act, how helpful do you think this initiative could be to
the families of mine victims and mine operators? Do you have any
recommendations?
Answer 1. I am hopeful that this can be a valuable tool for
families that lose their loved ones as a result of a tragic disaster.
For many years, families have been placed aside and not dealt with in a
respectful and proper manner.
senator isakson
Question 1. Have you had a chance to review the official MSHA
investigation reports from Sago, Darby, and Aracoma mine disasters? If
so, do you believe these reports were done in a biased manner?
Similarly, do you believe these reports were done in a careless or
hasty manner?
Answer 1. Yes and to a certain degree yes. They could have gone
farther.
Question 2. Do you believe that MSHA's resources are allocated
properly? How would you recommend MSHA target their enforcement
efforts?
Answer 2. All miners have ever asked is that the agency enforce the
laws that they have on the books. If this were to be done across the
board, miners would be safer today. Is there room for improvements?
Yes. Hopefully with the passage of the Miner Act, and now the S-Miner
Act that Congress just passed, additional protections will be put into
place along with the hiring of additional inspectors to better protect
our miners in the future.
senator hatch
Question 1. Are you aware of effective policies implemented at the
State level to promote mine safety? What areas of State involvement
have been the most effective in promoting safer mines?
Answer 1. Although they may not have gone far enough, I am hopeful
the recommendations sent to the Governor from the Utah mining
Commission will help the State to be more pro active towards protecting
miners health, safety, and training.
Question 2. Do deep underground mining operations in Utah require
special safety measures in the areas of communications, miner tracking,
air supply, and rescue chambers?
Answer 2. All operators should be required to comply with the Miner
Act, as all mines in the country are required. Each mining State has
its own uniqueness that needs to be dealt with. Although the
recommendations of the Utah mining Commission may not have gone far
enough, hopefully the Governor will take it to the level it needs to
overcome any roadblocks of conditions that exist in Utah that other
States don't have.
Question 3. Do the mining plans for deep underground mining
operations in Utah require a higher level of scrutiny for safety than
other operations?
Answer 3. No all mining operations across the country deserve a
high level of scrutiny for approving plans.
Question 4. In addition to MSHA, what parties, including the State,
should be involved in reviewing of the mine operators' overall mining
plan for the purpose of promoting mine safety?
Answer 4. The miners.
Question 5. Do miners who are employed in Utah mines require
specialized training due to the deep underground conditions in which
they work?
Answer 5. No, but hopefully more detailed training will occur.
Question 6. Do mine rescue teams and other emergency responders
need special training and additional emergency response support for the
risks posed by deep underground mining in Utah?
Answer 6. This should be covered under the passage of the Miner
Act.
Question 7. Is the current MSHA regulatory structure designed and
staffed to address the safety issues associated with the underground
mining technique known as retreat mining?
Answer 7. No response until I have had a chance to review MSHA's
final investigation results of Crandall Canyon.
Question 8. Are there areas of technical expertise that are
especially well-suited to address the unique safety issues associated
with deep underground mining in Utah?
Answer 8. Current law provides this if properly enforced. Before
budget cuts took place, MSHA had experts in the field of roof control
specialist as well as other areas that dealt with their areas of
expertise only. Because of the lack of manpower, they are taken away
from these duties to help finish regular inspections at the mine sites,
therefore spending less time on their primary duties.
Question 9. Are there safety benefits in having the State involved
with MSHA in the review and approval of mine operators' emergency
response plans?
Answer 9. Yes.
Question 10. What role should State and local government play in
the emergency response to a critical incident involving an underground
coal mine?
Answer 10. Hopefully the Utah mining Commission recommendations
will help spell this out. We found this was of great importance based
on testimony before the Commission.
Question 11. What are the areas of greatest potential for effective
partnerships involving Federal, State, and local government in
promoting mine safety? (E.g., training, inspection, accident
prevention, accident response)
Answer 11. All of the examples given in the question plus
communication.
Question 12. Do you have any specific recommendations for Utah
State Government that would increase mine safety and help prevent an
incident like the Crandall Canyon Mine disaster from ever happening
again?
Answer 12. I have addressed these with the Utah Mining Commission.
I think that it is of great importance that the State of Utah
establishes a division or office of miners health safety and training.
Response to Questions of Senator Enzi by Robert Ferriter
Question 1. Would overall mine safety benefit from re-ordering our
priorities, and in a world of finite resources, devoting an increased
share to research, the acquisition of more technical expertise and the
development of better safety equipment?
Answer 1. Overall mine safety, especially in western coal
operations would clearly benefit from admitting mistakes were made
beginning in 1995 as part of Federal budget cuts and re-ordering
funding priorities. As mentioned in my testimony and as evidenced by
the Crandall Canyon tragedy, arguably the most significant impact on
western coal mine bump remediation occurred when MSHA closed its Denver
Safety & Health Technology Center and the Bureau of Mines was
abolished. These two budget actions eliminated competent bump control
experience within MSHA and forward looking research conducted at the
BOM's Denver Research Center. In spite of valiant efforts to save these
organizations, the impact of the decisions to eliminate them were
somehow justified, rationalized and minimized by arguing that their
functions could be easily handled from eastern offices or from the
existing NIOSH office in Spokane, Washington. In reality, these offices
appear to have shown little interest and may not have received the
proper resources to provide the necessary technical support to western
coal operators. Now, years later, we see the impact of these decisions.
The more pressing question that needs an answer is . . . how could
the Crandall Canyon tragedy occur? I offer the following observation.
MSHA's District 9 in Denver does not maintain the technical expertise
to review high-risk mine design plans. MSHA requires an operator to
justify (prior to approval) the safety of any proposed roof control
plan. Various consultants are retained by the operator to perform risk
analyses. Problems arise because MSHA often lacks adequate technical
support. Having only past experience and common sense, the approving
official in MSHA's District 9 office may primarily rely on the
consultant's report as the basis for a decision. The operator of course
is concerned about the safety of the workforce, but at the same time is
concerned about production. The operator may not be willing to spend a
lot of money on engineering analyses. So the operator is able to
justify, rationalize and minimize the importance of a more thorough
assessment in a high risk bump prone area to get his roof control plan
approved by MSHA. The consultant is somewhat caught in the middle. The
consultant will only run the amount of analyses required to satisfy the
operator (his boss) or he will not be retained. The problem is not of
any one entity, but of the system. As I see it, the solution is to fix
the approval system by re-establishing technical expertise, both office
and field experience, in close proximity to where bump problems occur,
and encouraging additional research of the conditions which contribute
to the occurrence of bumps, and developing mining techniques that
reduce the probability of these occurrences. The $1 million seed money
recently provided to NIOSH by the committee to study retreat mining at
depths greater than 1,500 feet is a good start, but not the final
solution.
Question 2. Is there any comprehensive research currently available
that has studied pillar stress levels as a predictive factor in coal
mine bumps?
Answer 2. Prior to the abolishment of the U.S. Bureau of Mines in
1996, two significant references were published: IC 9315--Proceedings
of the Workshop on Coal Pillar Mechanics and Design (1992); and Special
Publication 01-95 Proceedings: Mechanics and Mitigation of Violent
Failure in Coal and Hard-Rock Mines.
The papers published in Special Publication 01-95 (noted above)
were presented at a U.S. Bureau of Mines technology transfer seminar,
and describe the causes of violent material failure in U.S. mines (rock
bursts and coal bumps), measurement techniques for monitoring events
that result in violent failure, and mitigation techniques for
controlling failure. Specific factors contributing to violent failure
are identified on the basis of geotechnical monitoring in 16 U.S. hard-
rock and coal mines and on the statistical analyses of 172 coal bump
events. New monitoring and analysis techniques developed as tools for
assessing violent failure; geo-tomography methods that provide new
capabilities for the study of material failure and stress changes over
large areas; and seismic methods for determining source locations,
calculating energy release, and determining source mechanisms are
described. Fair correlations have been established among seismic
parameters, elastic stresses, face support load, and violent events.
USBM studies identified the advantages using both yielding and stable
pillars for coal mine bump control, and the practical aspects of
implementing a de-stressing program to mitigate coal mine bumps.
Since the abolishment of the USBM and the transfer of MSHA's Denver
Safety and Technology Center positions to eastern locations, a limited
amount of new research in this area has been produced. The state-of-
the-art essentially remains at the 1996 level. It should be noted,
however, that extensive research has been done on this topic in South
Africa, Canada, and possibly other countries, e.g., Russia. At present,
coal mine bumps and rock outbursts cannot be predicted, but the seismic
activity associated with changing stress levels can be monitored to
estimate the increased level of risk for entering impacted work areas.
The case studies documented in NIOSH's computer code called ARMPS
(Analysis of Room and Pillar Systems) do embrace, to a limited extent,
the pillar stability factors in the bump prone areas of Colorado and
Utah, and give a lower limit for a stability factor (0.85), beyond
which the risk for a coal mine bump increases significantly. The ARMPS
software plots pillar stresses that can be expected as well.
In summary, although minimal new research into the coal bump
phenomena has been conducted since the closing of the USBM, the above-
noted publications provide a substantial body of information on
conditions which have contributed to coal mine bumps, and the
techniques to mitigate their occurrence. NIOSH's ARMPS program was
updated in 2003 to include mines located at great depths (generally
1,500 feet or deeper). In addition, the LaModel stress analysis tool
has been available for quite some time to assist mining operations in
assessing their site specific conditions. Although, a substantial body
of knowledge is available, research needs to continue to ensure safer
mining conditions as coal reserves extend under deeper cover. New
researchers and engineers need to be trained to apply the research and
correctly interpret model results. As of this date, to my knowledge, no
focused effort has been made to reestablish the expertise lost
following the closure of MSHA's only western technology center, or the
coal mine bump research program at the USBM's Denver Research Center.
If knowledgeable researchers and engineers experienced in coal mine
bump mitigation were available to the Crandall Canyon mine operator and
MSHA for consultation, the mine planners would have been cautioned
against initiating the proposed mining plan.
Question 3. Is there any way to reliably predict seismic activity?
Answer 3. To my knowledge, seismic activity cannot be accurately
predicted, although it certainly increases with mining activity
extending deeper than 1,500 feet. Seismic monitoring can be used to get
a sense of increasing seismic activity in an area of a mine, and the
related risk it represents.
Prior to the closure of the USBM's Denver Research Center,
significant advances were made in studies conducted to monitor micro-
seismic activity surrounding active coal mine workings. These studies
were coupled with static pressure cells installed in pillars to monitor
pressure buildup in individual pillars just prior to failure. To my
knowledge, this research was minimized with the closing of the U.S.
Bureau of Mines.
Question 4. Could you explain in a bit more detail what you mean by
a ``risk-based sensitivity analysis?''
Answer 4. Risk-based sensitivity analysis involves assessing the
impact of different parameters on mine safety. Using a single or very
few runs of any structural analysis computer modeling program does not
properly frame the risk (probability of failure). Rather, varying the
values of input parameters over their practical ranges is important.
Geotechnical modeling should address at least best-case, average-case,
and worst-case scenarios in assessing the stability in active mining
areas. These input parameters should include, but not be limited to:
a. coal strength (unconfined and confined)
b. peak strain in an element of the model
c. coal, roof and floor modulus of elasticity
d. Poisson's ratio (ratio of lateral/longitudinal strain of
compressed rock)
e. angle of internal friction
f. depth of cover
g. progressive mining steps from initial entry development through
the completion of retreat mining
By performing multiple analyses, a practical range of stability
factors can be calculated under various scenarios of mining (mining
entries and crosscuts in the barrier pillar, as well as, full or
partial retreat of the pillars created in the barrier).
For illustration purposes, if one uses NIOSH's ARMPS program and if
one-half of the calculated stability factors are above 0.85 and one-
half are below 0.85, then intuitively, there is a significant risk
(possibly as high as 50 percent) for pillar failure in a region prone
to coal mine bumps.
A consulting firm does only the analysis required in the scope of
work sanctioned by the mine operator, who pays for the analyses. If a
risk assessment with a sensitivity analysis is not requested by the
mine operator, then it will not be done, i.e., it costs more money to
run many more analyses (varying parameters). If MSHA would require a
more thorough risk-based sensitivity analysis (or perform these
analyses themselves), then the company would be required to do it in
order to gain approval of the proposed mining plan. Requiring a
sensitivity analysis with varying parameters would frame the level of
risk when mining in bump-prone mines.
Response to Question of Senator Isakson by Jeffrey L. Kohler
Question 1. Last time you were here, we discussed ``piggy-back''
technology whereby a trapped miner can replenish his oxygen supply
underground. What is the status of that research?
Answer 1. The research has made good progress and should be
completed early in 2008. We expect to receive the first commercial
products resulting from this research later in 2008.
The goal of the research is to develop a new generation of belt
wearable self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR) respirators, and the most
important feature is the ``docking'' or ``piggy-back'' capability that
would allow a fresh oxygen cartridge to replace the spent one without
the need for the miner to remove his mouthpiece. This new device would
include other improvements as well.
NIOSH awarded a contract to Technical Products, Inc. (TPI) in
February 2007 to design and fabricate an oxygen-supplying SCSR
respirator with ``piggy-back'' technology to allow a trapped or
escaping miner to replenish his oxygen supply while underground. The
new SCSR design includes a docking port mechanism that allows the user
to plug in additional oxygen units without opening the breathing
circuit to the potentially poisonous atmosphere. The docking port
requires that a second oxygen unit be plugged in before the valve can
be repositioned to the alternate port. Other innovative materials and
design features will make the SCSR easier to manufacture and more
comfortable to wear and use.
Researchers completed testing of the prototype on August 8, 2007.
The device met the requirements of the contract and regulations for
SCSR certification. However, a subsequent focus group of industry
representatives, assembled in August 2007, provided recommendations for
making the device easier for the miner to wear. A contract for the
Ergonomically Enhanced Self Contained Self Rescuer (E2SCSR) was awarded
in November 2007, and the first production units should be delivered to
NIOSH for initial testing by March 2008. In-mine testing is expected to
begin by May 2008. Commercial versions of the new SCSR should be
submitted to NIOSH for certification testing by the fall of 2008.
Response to Questions of Senator Isakson by Robert Ferriter
Question 1. Have you had a chance to review the official MSHA
investigation reports from Sago, Darby, and Aracoma mine disasters? If
so, do you believe these reports were done in a biased manner?
Similarly, do you believe these reports were done in a careless or
hasty manner?
Answer 1. I have read in detail the MSHA investigation report on
the Sago mine; however, due to pressing work demands, I have only
conducted a cursory review of the Darby and Aracoma investigation
reports. Based on these reviews, I believe that the reports were done
in an honest, forthright manner and basically documented the disasters
and the rescue efforts in a deliberate, factual manner. MSHA should be
commended for these reports.
However, that said and to draw your attention to the more important
issue of an independent investigative panel for mine disasters, I would
like to comment on the MSHA initiated Internal Review Reports issued on
the Sago Mine, the Aracoma Alma No. 1 Mine, and the Darby No. 1 Mine,
all issued on June 28, 2007. These reports severely criticize MSHA's
enforcement of mandatory regulations written to safeguard underground
coal miners. Although the writers of the reports, indicate in all three
reports, and specifically state in the Darby report, that ``Although
the internal review team identified significant deficiencies in MSHA's
actions, the team did not find evidence that these deficiencies cause
or contributed to the fatal explosion.'' (Refer to MSHA Internal Review
Report on Darby No. 1 Mine Explosion on May 20, 2006, Harlan County,
KY.) This report was issued on June 28, 2007.
A random selection of enforcement deficiencies noted in a cursory
review of these internal review reports reveal:
aracoma mine--msha district--4
Inspectors at Aracoma failed to notice absent stoppings,
failed to act on chronic accumulations of coal dust, and failed to
discover mis-marked escapeways, non-functional firefighting equipment,
a deficient carbon monoxide monitoring system, and other hazards.
``Inadequate supervision and management contributed
greatly to the failure of the MSHA personnel to provide an adequate
level of enforcement'' at Aracoma.
Inspectors at the mine disproportionately made required
spot inspections at fans and portals on the surface, rather than
traveling underground.
darby mine--msha district 7
Inspectors apparently failed to notice numerous missing
entries in the required safety examination books.
sago mine--msha district 3
Inspectors performing regular inspections neglected to
inspect SCSR's, observe or discuss fire drills, travel with pre-shift
examiners, check the carbon monoxide monitoring system and cover some
other aspects of a complete regular inspection.
In my 26 years of employment with MSHA, I have never seen such
harsh internal reviews of MSHA actions, and Assistant Secretary Richard
Stickler deserves great credit for ``blowing the whistle'' on his own
agency and establishing the new Office of Accountability. I sincerely
hope that this office will enhance MSHA's enforcement programs for the
safety of our miners. In my career in MSHA, I can remember instances
where such criticisms would never have been published, and in fact were
removed from final reports.
With respect to the Crandall Canyon disaster, MSHA is even more
involved, as it has presumably technically reviewed, inspected the area
and approved the mine operator's inadequate mining plan (retreat mining
of massive barrier pillars). As you will note in the NIOSH Critique of
the Agapito report recommending ``full pillar extraction'' in the North
and South barrier pillars, NIOSH states that the calculated stability
factors were substantially below recommended values and both of the
ARMPS and LAMODEL analysis programs were incorrectly used. However,
MSHA accepted and approved the mining plan. MSHA was the last line of
defense between life and death for the mine's miners and the rescuers
killed in the Crandall Canyon disaster. MSHA failed to provide that
defense. Therefore, I stand solidly behind my recommendation:
``Accidents involving multiple fatalities should be
investigated by a Federal entity independent of the regulatory
Department. To protect the validity of the investigation and to
ensure impartiality in fact finding, an independent entity
needs to conduct these disaster investigations. This will allow
an unbiased determination of process errors and misjudgments by
all involved parties, and speed any requirements for corrective
actions to further improve workplace safety for our Nation's
most valuable resource--the miner.''
Even though the recent internal reviews are admirable, the tendency
to absolve the Agency of any misconduct, or staffing or technical
review inadequacies still exists. Therefore, only an outside,
independent investigation will convince miners, unions and the public
that MSHA is committed to improving its enforcement activities and
protecting the safety and health of our Nation's miners. An outside,
independent investigation of the Crandall Canyon disaster would be a
major step in restoring MSHA's severely damaged public image. This
investigative entity should be focused on investigating disasters at
industrial facilities (e.g. refineries, manufacturing facilities,
mines, etc.), and should be structured similar to the National
Transportation Safety Board. Only in this manner can miners, unions and
the public be assured that the Federal oversight Agency is doing the
job it is mandated to do, and that problems that may require corrective
actions can be quickly and fairly corrected.
MSHA's involvement in the Crandall Canyon disaster is undeniable.
MSHA's questionable approval of a reckless mining plan must be
investigated and explained in an open and honest manner. Some will say
that we are already seeing an attempt to direct the outcome of any
investigation by the appointment of two former MSHA employees (Earnie
Teaster and Joe Pavlovich) to conduct the Department of Labor's (DOL)
investigation of the incident. Although these gentlemen may be the most
honest people in the world, the mere fact that anyone from MSHA was
chosen to conduct a DOL oversight investigation breeds thoughts of
insuring the outcome (favorable to MSHA and DOL) of the investigation.
I believe many people would see a conflict of interest here. Only by an
outside, independent investigation and necessary corrective actions can
miners, unions, operators and especially the public regain their trust
and respect for MSHA.
Question 2. Do you believe that MSHA's resources are allocated
properly? How would you recommend MSHA target their enforcement
efforts?
Answer 2. In my opinion, MSHA's resources are poorly allocated and
geographically distributed. If one was to conduct an unbiased and
factual study of the location of the Nation's coal and metal and
nonmetal mines and compare the number of inspectors servicing the
various centers of mining activity with the number of operating mines
at these locations, I believe the study would show a dramatic
difference in the number of MSHA inspectors at eastern locations, while
western mines are serviced by a significantly lower number of
inspectors per mine. Accentuating this presumed inspector deficiency at
western mines is the significantly greater dispersion of western mines
(eastern inspectors can generally travel to several mines in 1 day and
be back home that night; whereas, western inspectors may need to travel
1 whole day just to get to a mine). Thus, western inspectors most
likely spend considerably more time traveling, and less time
inspecting, than their eastern counterparts.
A glaring example of poor resource allocation is the existence of
two technical centers within approximately 40 miles of one another near
Pittsburgh, PA while no technical support group exists outside of this
area. Therefore, little, if any, technical support is readily available
to western enforcement districts or mine operators.
Earlier in my answers to your first question, I cited MSHA's
internal reviews of the Sago (District-3), Aracoma (District-4) and
Darby (District-7) mines which indicated staffing deficiencies in
technical areas such as ventilation plan reviews, electrical
specialists, and other technical specialists. With two technical
centers within a 1 day's drive to any of these eastern coal districts,
one wonders why MSHA management did not attempt to assign some of the
technical center's specialists to temporarily fill the staffing
shortages at the District level. Is this a reflection on MSHA
management's ability to maximize the use of scarce resources? I
consider this an enlightening example of MSHA's poor resource
allocation.
To more effectively target MSHA enforcement efforts I would
strongly urge Congress to reduce the mandatory four (4) underground
inspections per year to two (2) mandatory underground inspections per
year. This would free-up thousands of underground inspector hours per
year to address safety issues in the less safe mines. Another way to
accomplish this increased emphasis on poor performers without
increasing inspector resources would be to allocate more inspector
hours during each of the four quarters to poor operator inspections by
cutting inspector hours at good operations with proven records (based
on Pattern of Violation analysis). Then, I would reinforce to industry
that it is their primary responsibility to safeguard their work force
and comply with all safety regulations. If these measures prove
ineffective, I would raise the monetary penalty significantly at all
levels.
I would use the pattern of violation program to target mines with
poor safety performances, and expend a large portion of the inspection
hours gained from reducing the four (4) mandatory underground
inspections per year, or reallocation of inspection hours to these
mines. In other words:
``If management is actively addressing safety issues and
holding accident occurrences to a minimum, they will see less
of MSHA. If management is not addressing safety issues and the
mine is experiencing a high number of accidents, they can
expect to see a lot of MSHA inspectors.''
Give MSHA District Managers the flexibility to manage their limited
resources.
However, to use the pattern of violations program as a tool to
target poorly performing mines, some modifications to the existing
program would probably be required, and, in all fairness, give the
operator a better understanding of how he is being evaluated. The
program's general formula should be modified to adjust the index number
by a mine's major hazards experience, as gleaned from reported data on
fires, explosions, roof falls, bumps, etc., and violations related to
the major hazards, such as citations on fire fighting systems, rock
dusting, combustible material accumulations, roof falls, escapeways,
mine inspections for major hazards, ventilation and methane control
plan, roof and rib control plan, etc.
In addition to these actions, I would anticipate scheduling more
spot inspections of critical items such as ventilation stoppings, roof
control and ventilation plan compliance, rock dusting in coal mines,
accumulation of combustible materials, and other hazardous occurrences
as identified from MSHA's accident and citation data bases.
I would encourage more interaction with the miner's representatives
and union safety committee men at all mines. These miners know their
mines and the hazards being confronted.
I would incorporate into the law a requirement that all mines spend
1 day per year reviewing accidents that occurred at that mine during
the previous year, the cause of the accidents, and the corrective
actions taken by the mine. If the mine accumulated less than five (5)
lost-time accidents, per year, the allotted time could be spent on
other applicable safety and health training.
I believe these actions would send a strong message to the
industry, and give MSHA the ability to apply its resources to the
``problem mines'' and the most significant safety problems in a timely
manner; thus improving safety and health conditions industrywide.
Response to Questions of Senator Hatch by Dr. Jeffrey L. Kohler
Question 1. Are you aware of effective policies implemented at the
State level to promote mine safety? What areas of State involvement
have been the most effective in promoting safer mines?
Answer 1. A number of States, including Pennsylvania and West
Virginia, have mining agencies that provide oversight and guidance for
promoting miner health and safety. We are not aware of evaluations
investigating the effectiveness of these State activities, but the
State agencies may have conducted or funded evaluations of their own
activities.
Question 2. Do deep underground mining operations in Utah require
special safety measures in the areas of communications, miner tracking,
air supply, and rescue chambers?
Answer 2. Underground mining operations have some conditions that
need to be dealt with on a mine specific basis, and there are also
conditions of particular concern across a certain region or within a
specific coal basin. For example high gas content, and subsequently
high methane emissions, are of particular concern in the underground
coal mines in Alabama and Virginia. While all underground coal mines
have to deal with methane emissions, these mines have to provide
additional engineering solutions to prevent the accumulation of
explosive concentrations of methane. The underground coal mines in
Utah, because of the topography, the depth of mining operations, and
the coal characteristics, face high stresses and the potential for coal
bumps. Bump-prone mines also exist in Colorado, Virginia and West
Virginia, and mines in those areas have to be designed and operated
accordingly. Each mine must conduct major hazard risk analyses and plan
to manage their principal risks, such as gas explosions or coal bumps.
Question 3. Do the mining plans for deep underground mining
operations in Utah require a higher level of scrutiny for safety than
other operations?
Answer 3. All underground coal mining operations require a high
level of scrutiny. The level of risk associated with each particular
hazard may differ for mines in different parts of the country but risk
assessment and management are important for every mine. Each mine plan
should be scrutinized with a particular emphasis on the highest risk
hazards of that mine. For example, the ground control plan for a deep
mine in Utah would address the bump hazard, and the ventilation control
plan for a deep mine in Alabama would address the hazards associated
with high-methane liberation rates. Nonetheless, a mine in Utah would
also address explosion hazards and a mine in Alabama would also address
failure-of-ground hazards.
Question 4. In addition to MSHA, what parties, including the State,
should be involved in reviewing of the mine operators' overall mining
plan for the purpose of promoting mine safety?
Answer 4. Mining plans should be reviewed comprehensively and
rigorously. Any system of safety review, such as in mining, should
include safeguards commensurate with the risks, but NIOSH does not have
a view regarding the extent to which such safeguards should be internal
to MSHA or should involve additional reviews by other agencies.
Question 5. Do miners who are employed in Utah mines require
specialized training due to the deep underground conditions in which
they work?
Answer 5. Each specific mining operation has training requirements
that address concerns and issues that are particularly relevant to that
particular site. These training topics are generally developed as part
of the MSHA-mandated training requirements and are covered during
annual refresher training. Thus, Utah miners should be given specific
training on coal bump hazards as part of the MSHA-
mandated training course.
Question 6. Do mine rescue teams and other emergency responders
need special training and additional emergency response support for the
risks posed by deep underground mining in Utah?
Answer 6. All mine rescue teams should be trained to deal with the
hazards and operational issues specific to the mine designs and the
geological and geotechnical conditions of the types of mines where they
would be responding. Training at the mine site is optimal and the mine
rescue team members should be composed of experienced miners.
Question 7. Is the current MSHA regulatory structure designed and
staffed to address the safety issues associated with the underground
mining technique known as retreat mining?
Answer 7. The current MSHA regulatory structure provides the means
to address safety issues associated with retreat mining. For example,
30 CFR Part 75, Subpart C, ``Ground Control'' addresses the principal
hazards associated with retreat mining. Moreover, 30 CFR 75.220, which
requires an approved roof control plan for each mine, requires that the
particularly relevant conditions and attendant hazards are addressed.
NIOSH is not an expert on staffing at MSHA but is aware that MSHA
employs some recognized and respected ground control engineers who
evaluate ground control plans, including those for retreat mining
operations.
Question 8. Are there areas of technical expertise that are
specially well-suited to address the unique safety issues associated
with deep underground mining in Utah?
Answer 8. Specialized ground control expertise would be
particularly important to address the safety challenges posed by the
high stress and bump-prone mines in Utah. Ventilation expertise is also
particularly important.
Question 9. Are there safety benefits in having the State involved
with MSHA in the review and approval of mine operators' emergency
response plans?
Answer 9. In the case of emergency response, there is often
involvement by State and local agencies. Thus, presumably the State
agency would provide input and concurrence on their role as it is
written into a mine's emergency response plan.
Question 10. What role should State and local government play in
the emergency response to a critical incident involving an underground
coal mine?
Answer 10. State and local agencies can be invaluable to MSHA, as
was demonstrated during the Quecreek Inundation, the Sago Mine
Explosion, and the Crandall Canyon Mine Collapse. State and local
officials worked closely with MSHA during these rescue efforts
providing operational support, technical expertise, and a wide range of
services including security, equipment, food, water, medical, and
spiritual support. The value of these local and State efforts has been
documented in hearing testimony and State reports. There are also,
however, important coordination issues that arise with the involvement
of multiple agencies. We believe that the primary goal at the mine site
during the crucial incident is the safe rescue of trapped miners.
Accordingly, MSHA should have ultimate control of the site. The
ancillary roles of the various State and local agencies should be
planned, understood by all, and documented as part of the mine's
emergency planning activities.
Question 11. What are the areas of greatest potential for effective
partnerships involving Federal, State, and local government in
promoting mine safety? (E.g., training, inspection, accident
prevention, accident response)
Answer 11. Partnerships can be important for accident response, as
discussed above. MSHA has used an ``Alliance'' concept with its
stakeholders to promote safety in a range of areas, which it can
address in more detail. NIOSH has partnerships to address specific
high-priority health and safety needs of the mining community. These
include partnerships on dust monitoring, mine emergency communication
systems, coal and metal and nonmetal diesel emissions control, and rock
shield systems. These partnerships have been instrumental in expediting
advancements in these areas. These partnerships include representatives
from labor, industry, Federal and State agencies.
Question 12. Do you have any specific recommendations for Utah
State Government that would increase mine safety and help prevent an
incident like the Crandall Canyon Mine disaster from ever happening
again?
Answer 12. NIOSH is not likely to be aware of all ongoing
activities but MSHA has a State grants program that might be used to
improve the safety of mining operations in Utah. The MSHA accident
investigation on the Crandall Canyon Mine disaster, once completed,
should be useful for identifying opportunities for State involvement in
improving mine safety in Utah.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]