

S. HRG. 110-234

**EXPLORING A COMPREHENSIVE STABILIZATION,
RECONSTRUCTION, AND COUNTERTERRORISM
STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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FEBRUARY 6, 2007
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EXPLORING A COMPREHENSIVE STABILIZATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY FOR SOMALIA

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Feingold, Cardin, Webb, Coleman, and Sununu.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Good morning. The hearing will come to order.

On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to the hearing of this subcommittee in the 110th Congress.

Before we begin, I want to offer a warm welcome to my friend Senator Sununu in his new capacity as the ranking member of this subcommittee. I'm excited to have such a dedicated and hard-working Senator as a ranking member, and look forward to working with him on the full range of pressing issues facing the Continent of Africa. And even though the Senator has not been here for many years, I have had many good opportunities to work with him and find him to be an excellent person to work with.

As members of this subcommittee know, there are few issues that we deal with here that are partisan or ideological. On my recent trip to Ethiopia and Kenya, where we were focusing on this Somalia issue, I told everybody that this subcommittee's always been a place where there hasn't been partisan divides, and it's a good example of what can be done. And that was very well received by everybody in the African countries we visited. We all want to end violence and promote democracy, defend human rights and reduce poverty, and improve security in a continent beset with challenges but bestowed with almost limitless potential.

So, welcome, Senator Sununu, I look forward to working closely with you.

With that said, I think it's only right that we start the 110th Congress off with a hearing that addresses one of the biggest chal-

lenges we face in Africa today, and that is Somalia. We have entitled today's hearing "Exploring a Comprehensive Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Counterterrorism Strategy for Somalia." I look forward to today's conversation with the administration and expert witnesses about how to address the persistent, ongoing, and dangerous instability in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.

This subcommittee, under the chairmanship of both Republicans and Democrats, has, for years, been pushing the executive branch to develop a comprehensive strategy to address instability in Somalia, as well as the security and humanitarian concerns that have resulted from almost two decades of instability there. As I and my other colleagues have argued in the past, Somalia actually represents the new types of challenges that face our country and our friends and allies around the world. It represents the complex threats that the U.S. Government must learn to identify and contain combat in the post-9/11 world. It is challenging the way our Government is organized, and is pressing us to make changes to the way we deal with lawlessness and weak governments, corruption, and humanitarian tragedy.

It is also forcing us to reevaluate how our Government works to eliminate terrorist safe havens and what tools we have available to not only defeat terrorists, but also to defeat the conditions that allow the terrorists to plan, train, recruit, and ultimately attack the United States or others. If we have learned anything since 9/11, it is that we can no longer ignore instability in places like Somalia. Unfortunately, after traveling to the region, extensive study, conversations with the administration, briefings and hearings, it is clear to me that we have yet to effectively organize our Government to deal with these challenges. I hope that this hearing will help clarify a new strategy for going forward that will seize the current opportunity to help the Somali people dig themselves out of almost two decades of chaos.

To that end, I urge our witnesses, and particularly those on our first panel, to focus on what we've learned as a government, what we're doing differently and what we expect to get done in the coming weeks, months, and years. I know that both of our first witnesses are working hard on this very difficult issue.

Let me tell you why I'm so concerned about the progress our Government is making on Somalia. I chaired a hearing on this—by this subcommittee exactly 5 years ago, on February 6, 2002, on this exact topic. During that hearing, we discussed policy options, we discussed terrorism and al-Qaeda, we discussed the absence of a transitional government, we discussed the need for a more farsighted, comprehensive U.S. Government policy. Most importantly, and most troubling to me now in today's context, we also discussed how important Somalia was to our national security in a post-9/11 context and how it needed to do more. Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa at that time, began his opening statement by pointing out, "that it is far easier to prevent failure than to cope with its consequences." He then admitted on the record, "Somalia has not been on the U.S. Government's radar screen since, really, about 1994."

Now, following the capture of Mogadishu by the Islamic Courts Union last summer, the subcommittee met again on this very same

issue. Under the leadership of then-Chairman Martinez, we brought together most of the witnesses who sit before us again this morning to get a sense of the administration's plan for responding to that major development. In her testimony, Assistant Secretary Frazer assured us, "President Bush and Secretary Rice have made it a priority to confront the ongoing turmoil in Somalia with a multilateral coordinated strategy."

Now, we took this statement seriously; so seriously, in fact, that we legislated on the issue. As you know, Secretary Frazer, I obtained the support of a bipartisan coalition of colleagues, including my friend from Minnesota, Senator Coleman, to include an amendment in the FY07 defense authorization bill that required the administration to devise and share with Congress a comprehensive stabilization and reconstruction strategy for Somalia, as you outlined in your testimony in front of the committee last July. The 90-day deadline for receipt of this report passed last month, with no sign of the report and no sign of a strategy. We received no sign or call or letter suggesting that the administration was any closer to not only complying with the law, but creating a comprehensive plan for addressing the urgent interrelated challenges we face in Somalia and throughout the Horn of Africa.

In other parts of the world, we've seen what happens when decisions are made and executed without the benefit of a long-term comprehensive strategy backed by sufficient resources and political commitment. I want our Government to avoid making bad or rash decisions, or no decisions at all, and I want to ensure that our approach to Somalia takes into consideration the complex nature of the problem and the need to view Somalia comprehensively, not just through a counterterrorism lens. Unfortunately, we have only a very limited amount of time to establish the conditions that will lead to political stability in Somalia, and that window is closing fast.

Before I turn to my colleague Senator Sununu, let me note that my colleagues, both Senator Coleman and Klobuchar of Minnesota, have joined me today in introducing a bill that addresses these major challenges and authorizes significant resources to ensure that this multilateral endeavor to stabilize and secure Somalia is more successful than the last. The bottom line is that, unless the United States works aggressively with Somalis, regional actors, and the international community to create stability in Somalia, that country will remain what it has been since the early 1990s, a haven for terrorists and warlords and a source of instability in a critical region. That is why this hearing is so critical. Whether and how we respond to the issues at hand will have a profound and long-lasting impact on the people of Somalia, on stability in the region, and, above all, on our national security.

With that said, let me also introduce our two panels before I turn to Senator Sununu.

On our first panel, we have two witnesses from the United States Government. We have Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer, and Mr. Michael Hess, the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development. We've asked each of them to address current U.S. Government efforts re-

lating to Somalia and to discuss key challenges, resource requirements, and the detailed components of the administration's strategy for Somalia. To the extent possible, we'd like to avoid general talking points or generic outlines and hope this can be a frank and detailed conversation.

We're very glad that you're both here today, and we appreciate your willingness to testify. Thank you, and welcome.

Our second panel will feature a range of individuals that are well qualified to speak on the unique challenges related to this complex country and the impact that developments there have on neighboring nations in the volatile Horn of Africa, as well as on U.S. national security.

We're privileged to welcome Dr. David Shinn back to the subcommittee. Ambassador Shinn was a U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia between 1996 and 1999. He has testified in front of this committee a number of times and always provides a pragmatic and balanced view of the situation in the region. He currently serves as an adjunct professor of international affairs at George Washington University.

We look to you, Mr. Ambassador, for analysis of the regional and international dynamics relating to developments in Somalia, as well as your opinion of how the United States and international community can most effectively address the challenges we face here.

After him, we'll hear from Dr. Ken Menkhaus, also no stranger to the Senate. Professor Menkhaus is a professor of political science at Davidson College and has written extensively on the political and security dynamics in Somalia.

We look to you, Professor, to help paint a detailed picture of dynamics on the ground and the conditions that have emerged as a result of recent developments. We hope that your analysis will help this committee have a better sense for the complexities we need to address.

And finally, we welcome back Dr. Steve Morrison, who's the executive director of the Center for Strategic International Studies Africa Program. We've asked Dr. Morrison to speak to Somalia-related developments here in Washington, and we hope that he'll lay out the challenges and requirements for developing an effective strategy to address instability in Somalia and throughout the Horn.

I'd like to extend a special welcome to each of you this morning. I know I speak for my colleagues when I tell you how much we appreciate your coming here today. Your insights will inform and guide our discussion of immediate actions with serious, lasting implications for the Somali people, for the Horn of Africa, and for the United States and international security, and I'm looking forward to hearing from you.

And it is now my pleasure to turn to the distinguished ranking member, Senator John Sununu.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE**

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. And welcome to our witnesses today. I appreciate the very kind comments in your opening, and look forward to working with you on

this subcommittee, the importance of which I think you've outlined very effectively in your opening statement.

I ask consent to submit a more formal written statement for the record.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Senator SUNUNU. But I do want to make a few points. And one is to underscore how complex the situation in Somalia is. And that doesn't mean that it—those complexities are an excuse for not making more progress or not being clearer about our approach to the situation, but it means that we can learn a great deal about dealing with complex situations. The economic, political, religious, and civil society issues that have to be dealt with in Somalia have few parallels anywhere else in the world, and we need to understand that. Of course, this hearing is a small part in developing a better picture of these complexities. But if we develop better methodologies for addressing the failures and the weaknesses in these areas, then I think we'll have a framework that can be applied elsewhere in the world.

And that brings me to the second point, which is the need to develop a better framework and organizational structure, as you described, for addressing failed states around the world, because of the natural implications that this can have for national security. There's been a great deal of discussion about both organizational and policy changes within State and other organizations in the Federal Government to better equip those organizations for addressing these problems and the security consequences that can flow from a failed state. And I hope that our discussions today might help illuminate the kinds of organizations, emphasis, focus that might come from our Government and other governments, in order to be more effective, not just in Somalia, but in other parts of the world where we see the breakdown of economic structures, judicial structures, government structures, necessary for stability.

And the third point I'd want to make is how important it is to develop a regional approach. You mention this in your remarks. But all of the players in the region have both a responsibility and an interest in addressing this situation in Somalia, they have different roles to play. And, while it's true that there are competing interests in the region, I think all of the regional players are affected by a lack of security, movement of militias, weapons, financing for terrorism, and the instability that results. So, I think there's an opportunity for the United States to take the lead in this effort, but there's also a very real opportunity for regional players to become a more significant part of the solution.

So, again, I thank you for putting the hearing together—thrilled to be a part of this subcommittee and look forward to the witnesses' testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Sununu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this important hearing in order to explore a comprehensive stabilization, reconstruction, and counterterrorism strategy for Somalia.

The Horn of Africa and especially the country of Somalia have been plagued with violence for a number of years, and attempts to quell the terror have had limited success. Since the early 1990s, there have been over a dozen conferences, supported by countries in the Horn, the United Nations, and others to try and bring peace to the region. As the United States and other countries around the world are engaged in another theatre, the issues that have plagued Somalia, while not overlooked, have been somewhat overshadowed.

The United States should continue to stay engaged in efforts to combat terrorism and bring about a lasting peace in Somalia. I applaud the steps taken by the State Department toward building a strategy for stabilization, reconstruction, and counterterrorism operations in Somalia, and it is my hope that they continue these worthwhile efforts. Achieving peace is vital to the interests of Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to explore such a timely and important issue, and as this is the first hearing of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I look forward to working with you on many more important issues throughout the 110th Congress. Finally, I would like to thank the witnesses for taking time out of their busy schedules to join us here today.

Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu.

And now, I'd like to turn to Senator Coleman, who has shown a strong interest in leadership in this area, for any remarks he has.

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

Senator COLEMAN. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to thank you for your leadership. I am very, very grateful for the leadership that you have consistently displayed on this issue. The legislation that we talked about, just introduced, that—which you championed, will hopefully help us do those things that have to be done to bring some stability to the region, including, you know, pushing for a special envoy. We've got to move Somalia up on the radar screen. We've talked about that with State Department, but this is a way to do that.

So, I simply want to say thank you. Thank you for this hearing, thank you for your strong voice, thank you for your consistent efforts. I'm pleased to join with you. We estimate there may be 70,000 Somalians in Minnesota. This is personal for me. This impacts a lot of folks in my community.

If I—just one bit of optimism, with the challenges we face, understanding that Somalia is on the front line in the war on international terrorism today, what happens there does have an impact. With the recognition that you've talked about, that we need to approach this with a broad-range plan—it's not an isolated piece. We'd have to have a strategy that—a comprehensive plan to deal with Somalia, but there is great diversity of the Somalian community back in Minnesota, and I have seen folks come together on this. And so, if a diverse community back home can come together with a—the goal, the commitment being greater stability, peace in the region, then we should figure out a way to work with them to make that happen.

So, again, I ask unanimous consent to submit a more detailed formal statement, but I do want to thank you for your leadership on this issue.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

I am privileged to represent the State of Minnesota, which is home to the largest community of Somalis outside of Somalia. It is estimated that there may be up to 70,000 Somalis back home, and this thriving community has enriched the fabric of our State through its vibrant culture. It is through my friendship with our Somali community that I have become familiar with the harsh realities of the situation on the ground in Somalia, and the tragic implications this has had on the many families that have ultimately sought refuge in our State. It is my hope, and the hope of our Somali community, that we can help to one day establish a peaceful and stable environment in their homeland. And while I understand that the challenges we face are very large, the commitment of our Somali Community here in the United States to work for stability in Somalia provides me with hope that we can make progress if we all work together.

I have worked to be a voice of the Somali community in Washington, DC, as I believe the United States should be actively involved in helping Somalia overcome many years of neglect and civil strife. And I am very happy to participate in this hearing today with my distinguished colleague, Senator Feingold, who has demonstrated great compassion and leadership on the issue of Somalia.

Over the past year, we have witnessed a great deal of instability, conflict, and even natural disasters in Somalia. As we will hear from our witnesses today, this situation stems from a variety of factors, not the least of which include a lack of functional institutions, economic opportunity, and the involvement of neighbors in its internal affairs. It has long been my belief that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, which cannot be underestimated, should compel the United States to be more involved in the country's affairs. Additionally, however, the United States has vital national security interests at stake in Somalia. A Somalia without a functioning government poses a grave risk to its neighbors as well as the international community. As we saw in the case of Afghanistan, states without a functioning government can become a haven for terrorists and destabilize an entire region.

It is for these reasons that I am currently working with my colleague, Senator Feingold, on legislation addressing Somalia. This legislation not only seeks to focus greater resources on dealing with this very critical situation, but also works to shape our overall policy into one that will address the root causes of instability. As Senator Feingold and I have pointed out repeatedly, we are long overdue for a comprehensive U.S. strategy that aligns all of our objectives in Somalia, which include political, economic, development, and counterterrorism. Indeed, Somalia has served as a clear example of the dangers involved in policies that are too narrowly focused on one objective.

While the events that have unfolded in Somalia over the past year have been extremely unfortunate, I only hope that at the very least they will serve to spark the United States and international community toward greater concerted action in Somalia.

I greatly admire the leadership of Senator Feingold on this issue, and am grateful that he has organized this timely hearing. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Minnesota.

I'd just point out that some of the Somalis that lived in Minnesota have had the wisdom to move to Wisconsin, so—

[Laughter.]

Senator COLEMAN. Must be a warmer climate over there. [Laughter.]

Senator FEINGOLD. Yeah. Not today. [Laughter.]

Anyway, thanks to both of you. And now, we'll turn to the first panel.

Secretary Frazer.

STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. FRAZER. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Sununu, Senator Coleman.

At this first hearing of the Africa Subcommittee, I would like to congratulate both Senator Feingold and Senator Sununu on your new positions. I look forward to working closely with you and other members of this subcommittee during the 110th Congress.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling a hearing on this timely and important issue, and for your focus on Africa, more generally.

With your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony for the record.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you.

I'm pleased to have this opportunity to publicly discuss U.S. policy and engagement with Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Somalia occupies a unique space, both geographically and strategically. The country sits at the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East. The region's overall security is directly affected by Somalia's internal situation. And, for the first time in 16 years, Somalis have a real opportunity to rebuild their nation. We will assist Somalis to realize this opportunity by restoring effective governance that is representative of the full spectrum of Somali society.

A lot has happened, and significant diplomacy has been undertaken since I last appeared before this subcommittee in July 2006. At the time, the United States was encouraged by the June 22, 2006, agreement between the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions and the then-Union of Islamic Courts. The United States supported this agreement, which came to be known as the Khartoum Declaration, including the points of mutual recognition and cessation of hostilities.

While negotiations initially offered great promise, by late July the actions of the Islamic Courts (CIC) were beginning to run counter to the spirit and the reality of dialog. Immediately after the Khartoum Declaration, the Union of Islamic Courts was renamed the Council of Islamic Courts, and Hassan Dahir Aweys, designated by both the United States and United Nations as a terrorist, was elected to be the chairman of the CIC Consultative Council. During the following months, extremist elements within the CIC, particularly the radical al-Shabaab organization, hijacked the broader Court's movement, driving the CIC toward an agenda of military expansion and aggression.

Despite international efforts to encourage dialog between the CIC and the TFIs, the CIC chose to repeatedly violate the terms of the Khartoum Declaration, due to the September 18, 2006, terrorist bombing attack on the Parliament building in Baidoa, the takeover of Kismaayo on September 25, and military buildups around Baidoa and Puntland. These were decisive moments. Ultimately, the CIC miscalculated in its decision to pursue a military agenda and to refuse to join the governance process and the TFIs through peaceful dialog. When the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia launched a counteroffensive against the CIC in December, the CIC's structure disappeared rapidly, driven in large part by the withdrawal of support from the Somali population. The extremists within the CIC very clearly did not reflect the will of Somalis, as represented by civil society and their government.

In the last 2 months, I have traveled to the region twice, conveying the strong commitment of President Bush and Secretary Rice to the people of Somalia. The most striking lesson I took away from my trip to the region in early January is this, the Somali people are ready for peace and tired of war. While the TFIs are not yet ready to stand entirely on their own, they offer a promising vehicle forward for Somalia.

At this moment of opportunity, we are proceeding purposefully. We are pursuing a strategy to establish stability, move forward with a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation, and begin reconstruction in Somalia. Under my leadership and that of President Bush's Special Assistant for Africa, Mr. Bobby Pittman, there is a growing interagency team working together to advance the United States policy objectives in Somalia. That interagency policy team is part of our broader strategy working with the International Contact Group on Somalia multilaterally and very much coordinating with our regional partners, especially Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, but also with Ghana, Yemen, and Tanzania.

While the overall U.S. policy goals remain consistent—to eliminate the threat of terrorism and improve regional stabilities by supporting the reestablishment of effective governance and respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people—the changing dynamics inside Somalia require us to constantly adapt to ensure that our engagement remains effective.

To take advantage of the current window of opportunity available in Somalia, our immediate policy priorities are: Encourage inclusive dialog among Somali stakeholders; mobilize support to build the governance capacity of the TFIs; provide development and humanitarian assistance to the Somali people; achieve deployment of an African stabilization force; and continue to track the terrorists to prevent Somalia remaining a safe haven for terrorism. These goals are also shared by our partners in the international community.

The United States believes that the key to long-term stability in Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation within the framework of the transitional federal charter. The United States has encouraged the leadership of the TFIs to make clear, through statements and actions, that they are committed to an inclusive process of dialog and reconciliation. We have been clear. We see a role in the future of Somalia for all those who renounce violence and extremism, and we strongly believe that the TFG must reach out to groups that have previously been marginalized from the political process.

In addition, we remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda have succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Somalia. Somalia's continued exploitation by terrorist elements threatens the stability of the entire Horn of Africa region. We will, therefore, continue to take measures to deny terrorists' safe haven in Somalia, as well as the ability to plan and operate from Somalia.

The United States Government remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to all Americans, Somalis, and citizens in neighboring Horn of Africa countries. The administration will continue working with Somalis, regardless of clan, religious, or secular affiliation, to eliminate this common threat.

As we look ahead to the next 2 years, Somalia's assistance needs may look overwhelming. To support our policy objectives and help achieve a lasting solution in Somalia, the United States has identified three priority areas for U.S. or foreign assistance: Security and stabilization, No. 1; second, political dialog and reconciliation; and, third, service delivery and governance capacity.

Sufficient funding is required to enable the United States to successfully and adequately pursue these three important policy goals.

Under the first objective of security and stabilizations, funds would be used to support the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), security sector reform, and post-conflict stabilization activities.

Under the second objective, of political dialog and reconciliation, funds would be used to support reconciliation and dialog through support for conflict mitigation, civil society, and media freedom.

Last, under our third foreign assistance priority, funding would be used to improve the ability of the Transitional Federal Institutions to provide social services and build the government's capacities, other TFIs, at the local, regional, and national level.

To help achieve these objectives, the administration has included a request for \$60 million for Somalia in the President's supplemental funding request for FY 2007. That \$60 million figure includes \$20 million in humanitarian assistance and \$40 million to support a peacekeeping operation. We are working to identify additional resources for these efforts, which includes the \$40 million that Secretary Rice announced in January, bringing our total FY07 to \$100 million for Somalia.

However, post-conflict institution-building is ultimately a locally led enterprise. If international donor support is to be effective, these resources must be linked to progress made by Somalis in achieving broadbased political dialog and reconciliation on the part of clans, religious leaders, business people, civil society activists, women's leaders, and other political groups. Along with our African and international partners, the United States will remain engaged in supporting this much-needed process of inclusive dialog, while also attending to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

The situation inside Somalia has changed a great deal since July, when I last testified before this body about Somalia. The United States, along with our African regional partners and international partners, have made significant progress toward supporting the TFIs and moving toward the rapid deployment of a peacekeeping force since last July. Work remains to be done, but the political process is going to be inclusive and successful. One important factor continues to work strongly in our collective favor: The Somali people are tired of war and yearn for what the TFIs offer—namely, stability, security, and governance. Our comprehensive strategy for Somalia is already showing promise, and we are likely to see more progress in the coming months.

Thank you, and I would be happy to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Frazer follows.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Feingold and Ranking Member Sununu. At this first hearing of the Africa Subcommittee, I congratulate you both on your new positions. I look forward to working closely with you and the other members of this subcommittee during the 110th Congress. Thank you for calling a hearing on this timely and important issue. I am pleased to have this opportunity to publicly discuss U.S. policy and engagement with Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Mr. Chairman, given your longstanding interest in Somalia, I am not at all surprised that this is the subject of the subcommittee's first hearing.

Somalia occupies a unique space, both geographically and strategically. The country sits at the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East. The overall security of the region is affected by Somalia's continued lack of internal stability. In this regard, U.S. interests in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa region are to promote and support regional stability and representative government, to eliminate any platform for al-Qaeda or other terrorist operations, to provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of drought, flooding, and 16 years of near-constant conflict in southern and central Somalia, and to work with governments in the region to transform the countries through investing in people and good governance and promoting economic growth.

For the first time in 16 years, Somalis face the prospect of rebuilding their nation. We have a real opportunity to help Somalis restore effective governance that is representative of the full spectrum of Somali society. We are pursuing a strategy to help establish stability, move forward with a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation, and begin reconstruction within Somalia. Under my leadership, there is a growing interagency team working together to advance our policy objectives in Somalia.

DECISIVE MOMENTS

A lot has happened since I last appeared before this subcommittee in July 2006. At the time, the United States was encouraged by the June 22, 2006, agreement between the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and the then-Union of Islamic Courts. The United States supported this agreement, which came to be known as the Khartoum Declaration, including the points of mutual recognition and cessation of hostilities.

While negotiations initially offered great promise, by late July the actions of the Islamic courts were beginning to run counter to the spirit and the reality of dialog. Immediately after the Khartoum Declaration, the Union of Islamic Courts was renamed the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) and Hassan Dahir Aweys, designated by both the United States and the United Nations as a terrorist, was elected to be the chairman of the CIC Consultative Council. On July 19, 2006, the CIC attempted to provoke Ethiopia into a broader conflict by advancing toward the interim capital of Baidoa. During the following months, extremist elements within the CIC—particularly the radical al-Shabaab organization—hijacked the broader courts movement, driving the CIC toward an agenda of military expansion and aggression. Despite international efforts to encourage dialog between the CIC and the TFIs, the CIC chose to repeatedly violate the terms of the Khartoum Declaration through the takeover of Kismaayo, the September 18, 2006, terrorist bombing attack on the Parliament building in Baidoa, and military buildups around Baidoa and Puntland.

These were decisive moments. Ultimately, the CIC miscalculated in its decision to pursue a military agenda and to refuse to join the governance process and the TFIs through peaceful dialog. When the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopia launched a counteroffensive against the CIC in December, the CIC structure disappeared faster than anyone had anticipated. However, they were also weakened immensely by the withdrawal of support from the Somali population. The extremists within the CIC very clearly did not reflect the will of Somalis, as represented by civil society and their government.

A HOPEFUL MOMENT IN TIME

Following these developments, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent me back to the region to conduct regional diplomatic efforts. My trip included visits to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen in support of broader efforts to achieve lasting stability in Somalia.

The most striking lesson I took away from my early January trip to the region is this: Somalis are ready. Somalis are ready for peace; they are tired of war. While

the TFIs are not yet ready to stand entirely on their own without international support, they offer a promising vehicle forward for Somalia. While developments on the ground have maintained a frenetic pace, there are many reasons to be hopeful.

In an effort to make the most of this moment of opportunity, we have engaged in conversations and negotiations with Somalia's various stakeholders and regional governments. This approach is in keeping with Secretary Rice's Transformational Diplomacy approach. I have met with my counterparts in African countries and regional organizations, and I have been seeking the advice and counsel of African officials and diplomats to resolve this situation.

During my trip at the turn of the year, I participated in a series of high-level diplomatic meetings, conveying the United States Government's position on various issues. I spoke with President Museveni of Uganda and representatives of the African Union in Ethiopia. I also met with the leadership of the TFIs, including President Abdullahi Yusuf, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi, and former Parliament Speaker Shariff Hassan Sheikh Adan, and representatives of Somali civil society.

On January 5, Kenyan Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju, Norway's Deputy Foreign Minister Raymond Johansen, and I cochaired a meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia. This gathering demonstrated the depth of the international community's commitment to supporting a sustainable political solution in Somalia through broad-based national dialog and providing appropriate development, security, and humanitarian assistance.

The Contact Group issued a communique at the meeting's end that recognized the historic opportunity now within the grasp of the Somali people, as they seek a sustainable political solution based on the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. Further, the Contact Group affirmed the importance of inclusive governance and additionally emphasized that funding to facilitate the deployment of a stabilization force in Somalia, based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1725, remains urgent. This communique and the other sentiments expressed by members of the Contact Group that day demonstrate the unity and common priorities of the international community on Somalia. These themes continued during my consultations and bilateral meetings on the margins of the January 29–30 African Union Summit in Ethiopia.

POLITICAL DIALOG

The United States strategy for Somalia includes three major priorities in Somalia. First, encourage inclusive political dialog between the leadership of the TFIs and other key Somali stakeholders. Second, mobilize international support to help build the governance capacity of the Transitional Federal Institutions and provide development and humanitarian assistance for the Somali people. And third, although perhaps most urgent, move forward with the deployment of an African stabilization force in Somalia.

These objectives remain consistent with the objectives that I articulated to this subcommittee in July 2006. While the United States does not believe that the now-defunct Council of Islamic Courts should be reconstituted in order to engage in dialog with the TFIs, the United States believes that the key to long-term stability in Somalia now lies in a process of inclusive dialog and reconciliation leading to the formation of an inclusive government of national unity within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter.

To a great extent, this process will rely on the government's willingness to reach out and create an inclusive political process. This remains the greatest challenge. The leaders of the TFIs must serve as symbols and architects of this process. The statement that President Yusuf made to the Contact Group regarding his intention to engage with Somali stakeholders was a positive step. He further announced at the African Union Summit the intention of the TFIs to convene a national reconciliation conference inside Somalia involving all key stakeholders in an inclusive process of dialog.

In recent months, the United States has encouraged the leadership of the TFIs to make clear through statements and actions that they are committed to an inclusive process of dialog and reconciliation. We have been clear—we see a role in the future of Somalia for all those who renounce violence and extremism, and we strongly believe that the TFG must reach out to groups that have previously been marginalized from the political process.

The TFIs must reach out to key groups inside Somalia, including: Clan leaders, business and civil society, women's groups, and religious leaders, among others. These groups, particularly those in Mogadishu, must also demonstrate their willingness to engage with the TFIs and to work together constructively. Additionally, this means that we suggest that the leadership of the TFIs reach out to religious au-

thorities, including the diverse range of local, organic courts affiliated with various clans. The courts' members were, of course, also a heterogeneous group from the outset, so there are moderate individuals who could be drawn into the larger, official political process.

This is not an either/or proposition. The security and political components of the policy I have just described must function as two simultaneous efforts, progressing toward the same end point.

SECURITY AND STABILITY

This dialog must move forward very quickly to reach a sustainable solution, on the basis of the Transitional Federal Charter, in order to stabilize the situation in Mogadishu and allow all components of the TFIs to relocate to the country's capital. Rapid deployment of an African stabilization force in Somalia will help create a secure environment in which this political process can move forward and will help instill confidence in the Somali people that the peace process is moving forward.

The United States is working closely with the African Union (AU), as they prepare for the deployment of a stabilization force to help provide a secure environment for political inclusiveness and transition. On January 19, the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed the deployment of this force. Several AU member-states have expressed their desire to contribute troops or provide logistical support for this effort. Uganda came forward first, offering to deploy 1,500 troops based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1725. Ugandan President Museveni's initial offer has since been followed by other countries, including Ghana, Nigeria, and Burundi, expressing a desire to provide troops for this effort.

As a crucial component of our strategy in Somalia, the United States is actively supporting the deployment of this force, particularly the Ugandan contingent, which requires support with strategic transportation, equipment, and other logistics. Immediate U.S. support includes \$2 million for strategic transportation and \$8 million for equipment for the Ugandan force, as well as technical assistance. With our help, and following approval by the Ugandan Parliament, we anticipate that the Ugandans can deploy to Somalia as early as this week.

This remains very much an AU-led and AU-coordinated effort. The United States and other donor partners are working closely with the AU, which recently selected Ghana's President John Kufuor as its chair. The AU is already working on plans to strengthen the Ugandan deployment with further troop deployments, and Kenyan Foreign Minister Tuju traveled to several African countries last month to solicit additional troop contributions.

Africans have developed a strong record of conflict resolution and peacekeeping in recent years. As Nigeria took the lead in Liberia and South Africa did in Burundi, we are hopeful that Africans will once again help what President Mbeki has called one of their "sister countries" move beyond strife and toward reconciliation.

However, it is the Somali people who must be responsible for local-level security without resorting to the warlordism of the past. We have advised the TFIs to make development of a civilian police force a priority, and ultimately the political process should lead to the formation of a unified military representative of all of Somalia's clans. For that reason, the United States has supported the call of the International Contact Group on Somalia to quickly "establish local-level stability throughout Somalia, effective Somali security forces, including a civilian police force." These efforts will be supported by the deployment of the stabilization force to Somalia, which will provide a secure environment in which a political process can move forward and effective security institutions can be developed.

In addition, we remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists associated with al-Qaeda have succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Somalia. Somalia's continued exploitation by terrorist elements threatens the stability of the entire Horn of Africa region. We will therefore take strong measures to deny terrorists safe haven in Somalia, as well as the ability to plan and operate from Somalia. In this regard, the United States continues to work with East African countries to build their capacity to counter terrorism and criminality that originates in Somalia. The United States Government remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to all Americans, Somalis, and citizens in neighboring Horn of Africa countries. The administration will continue working with Somalis, regardless of clan, religious, or secular affiliation to eliminate this common threat.

SUPPORTING THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Developments in Somalia remain highly fluid. The fragile, nascent TFIs are only beginning to function and are only beginning to control territory, while spoilers and extremists continue to undermine stability.

U.S. engagement seeks to support the TFIs and encourage reconciliation among key Somali stakeholders. Given the absence of functioning governance institutions in Somalia for over 15 years, the rebuilding of governance and security institutions will largely be starting from scratch and will require significant external assistance. It is critically important that the United States help enhance the governance capacity of the TFIs, as well as support efforts to build governance capacity at the local and regional level. In this regard, U.S. assistance aimed at supporting short-term quick impact and high visibility, will be a critical element in building support for the TFIs and demonstrating to the Somali people that the TFIs offer a means of improving their overall quality of life.

At the January 5, 2007, meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia, I signaled the administration's intention to take concrete steps to assist Somalia. We are providing \$40.5 million in new assistance for Somalia. This contribution is a reflection of our commitment to, and engagement with, Somalia's revitalization. As announced by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on January 4, this total includes \$16.5 million in humanitarian assistance and \$24 million that will be used to support both deployment of a peace support mission and provide development assistance for the Somali people. We are also requesting \$60 million in FY 2007 supplemental funding for Somalia, including \$40 million for peacekeeping and \$20 million in humanitarian assistance for those affected by the current humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

We have signaled clearly that the United States intends to remain engaged for the long term in Somalia. Other donor partners have also agreed to identify additional resources for Somalia. However, post conflict institution-building is ultimately a locally led enterprise. If international donor support is to be effective these resources must be linked to progress made by Somalis in achieving broad-based political dialog and reconciliation on the part of clans, religious leaders, business people, civil society activists, women's leaders, and other political groups.

We understand that this is an ongoing process, and that we have not reached the end. Along with our African and international partners, the United States will remain engaged in supporting this much-needed process of inclusive dialog, while also attending to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

CONCLUSION

The situation inside Somalia has changed a great deal since July. The United States, along with our international partners, have made significant progress toward supporting the TFIs and moving toward the rapid deployment of African peacekeeping forces.

Work remains to be done, if the political process is going to be inclusive and successful. While we welcome the positive statements from Somali leaders and encourage them to take positive action, we are cognizant of the challenges we face—which could include a lack of political will from some elements of the TFIs to engage in such a process.

One important factor continues to work strongly in our collective favor. The Somali people are tired of war and yearn for what the TFIs offer—stability, security, and governance. Our comprehensive strategy for Somalia is already showing promise, and we are likely to see more progress in the coming months.

Thank you, and now I would be happy to take your questions.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your remarks.

And now, we turn to Mr. Hess.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. HESS. Hopefully this is on.

Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Sununu, and Senator Coleman. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the U.S. Government assistance and a way forward in Somalia.

With your permission, sir, I will submit my written statement for the record.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Mr. HESS. Having just returned from a trip to the Horn of Africa, where we have a Disaster Assistance Response Team monitoring the needs in Somalia, in the Somalia region of Ethiopia and the Kenya/Somalia border, I plan to give you a picture today of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and a sense of how our humanitarian and development partners on the ground regard the situation. I will also discuss what we see as a way forward and what USAID is going to assure that the way forward brings peace and stability to a population that has suffered more in 1 year than most do in a lifetime.

In July, when I addressed this subcommittee, I spoke about the disastrous toll that the drought had taken on central and southern Somalia, and the 1.7 million agropastoralists and pastoralists whose lives and livelihoods had benefited from the robust U.S. Government humanitarian response and the generosity of the American people. Since July, these same Somalis have experienced some of the worst flooding they can remember. Although the death toll has been minimal, 255,000 people were displaced, crops were destroyed, and livestock were lost. Flooding has seriously hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly food, to the region. During my trip to the region, I had the opportunity to visit Dadaab camp. It's a refugee camp 80 kilometers inside the Kenya/Somali border, where I heard firsthand from Somalis about the situation in their home country. The camp hosts some 170,000 refugees, 98 percent of whom were Somalis who have fled the country. However, in the last year, when the Islamic Courts were making advances in Somalia, nearly 35,000 additional people crossed over from Somalia and are—now reside in that camp.

There are two points I would like you to remember about this camp. First, it has been there for 16 years and has a global acute malnutrition rate of 22 percent, which is 7 percent over the emergency level, even though the people in these camps receive a full ration. Points out the challenges that we face and what Fred Cuny taught us a long time ago, that it's more than just food that prevents malnutrition.

Second, the families with whom I spoke, particularly the women, were not willing to return to Somalia when peace returned. That is a striking comment, and one on which we'll have to work in the future.

Across the border in Somalia, our partners estimate that the most recent round of conflict has displaced 40,000 people in south and central Somalia. Almost all of those have returned to their homes, and a number of people estimate that the acute food crisis has dropped by more than half. However, as the rains and floodings begin to ease, our partners are prepared for an increase in water and mosquito-born diseases, such as cholera, dysentery, and malaria, which pose a particularly serious threat to children under the age of 5, the elderly, and the populations already compromised by undernourishment.

Livelihoods are also at risk. In addition to human disease, animal disease is a threat. Rift Valley fever is suspected in hundreds of recent animal deaths and several human deaths in southern Somalia, where conflict has made it difficult to collect and transport

samples for confirmation. Rift Valley fever can disseminate herds of cattle and sheep, and it poses a serious health threat to the human—weakened human population. It is also a potential—disastrous potential economic effect on Somalia and its neighbors. Our U.N. partners and NGO partners are working together with the Transitional Federal Government to identify the fever and treat humans and animals.

So far, in fiscal year 2007, the U.S. Government has provided nearly \$16 million to mitigate the impacts of the drought, floods, and conflict resulting in the displacements in Somalia and across its borders. This assistance builds on a carryover of resources from \$92 million in 2006. The availability of these resources permitted our partners to respond immediately and robustly to the flood emergency in the fall and ensured a strong food pipeline through the first quarter of this fiscal year.

USAID's ongoing humanitarian programs are targeted in the drought- and flood-affected areas of southern and central Somalia and addresses food insecurity, nutrition, health, water, sanitation, and hygiene. Our partners have well-established programs and a thorough knowledge of the local and regional issues affecting the populations they serve. It is this experience that has enabled them to continue to serve beneficiaries and implement programs throughout the political turmoil of the past year.

While in Nairobi, I met with our partners. I was uniformly impressed with their dedication and the knowledge each one brings to their work. None of the groups felt that the conflict occurring around the withdrawal of the courts had dramatically increased humanitarian needs, but they all stressed the need to continue support of drought and flood victims.

Access appears to be improving in many parts of Somalia. The Government of Kenya has pledged to soon reopen its borders for humanitarian deliveries into Somalia, and most of our NGO partners are back in Somalia.

I also met with the United Nations country team for Somalia. They have an impressive team. The head of the UNDP, which returned to Mogadishu—had just returned from Mogadishu, where he led a U.N. delegation to assess the possibility of the return of U.N. personnel. It is clear that the United Nations regards the next few months as a window of opportunity to support Somalis to achieve peace and security in their country.

The U.N. country team outlined a set of priorities for the next 6 months which bridge humanitarian, stabilization, and initial reconstruction efforts. These priorities also include building the capacity of key Transitional Federal Institutions, strengthening the security sector, and assisting the Transitional Federal Institutions in jump-starting urgent basic social services, particularly in education and health. In addition, they will ensure that the livelihood and job creations launched earlier in this year will be community-based activities.

Our own priorities are much the same as these, since we helped them draft the plan. Last year, we programmed \$7.9 million in FY06 development assistance to strengthen the capacity of civil society, support conflict mitigation, address basic education needs, including distance learning and teacher training, to increase access

to water through rehabilitation of urban water systems, and development of rural water services.

Also, while I was in Nairobi I met with Admiral Hunt, commander of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, with whom we have been working very closely throughout the entire Horn. I am optimistic with—that with the coordination established between the State Department, USAID, and CJTF–HOA, and the Somalia working group in Nairobi, we are creating a coordination model capable of serving both our national security interests and the interests of the people of Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

I would like to outline for you our priorities over the next 90 days.

First, we will continue to respond to humanitarian contingencies which may arise in this volatile area.

Second, we will identify opportunities to increase training and capacity-building in our current emergency programs, particularly in nutrition, health, and water services, jump-starting long-term efforts addressing the delivery of critical public services.

Third, we will develop a post-conflict Somalia livelihoods recovery strategy similar to the lessons learned in the pastorals recovery and alternative livelihood programming we have been doing in Ethiopia and Kenya and other parts of Africa.

Fourth, support the efforts made on the part of the United Nations and our nongovernmental partners to ensure that the ongoing emergency response provides a foundation for recovery and reconstruction.

Fifth, ensure that the protection of humanitarian space becomes part of the diplomatic dialog with the Transitional Federal Government.

In closing, I want to remind the committee of the dire situation on which I reported last July, and that, for the people of Somalia, the situation has only gotten worse. But we are here today talking about a window of opportunity, when it may be possible to help Somalia find a pathway out of political chaos, hunger, and suffering. Seizing this opportunity will increase the chances that the region, as a whole, finds its way to a stable, peaceful, and productive future. The approaches that I have outlined today are our best efforts at maximizing this opportunity, and we look forward to working with you and the interagency to make sure that these opportunities are not lost.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you, again, for having me back to talk about Somalia and what we hope to accomplish there. I look forward to responding to any questions you or members of this subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hess follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Government assistance and the way forward in Somalia.

BACKGROUND

Having just returned from a trip to the Horn, where we have a Disaster Assistance Response Team monitoring needs in Somalia, the Somali region of Ethiopia and the Kenya-Somalia border, I hope to be able to give you a good picture of what the humanitarian situation currently is in Somalia and a sense of how our humanitarian and development partners on the ground regard the situation. I will also discuss what we see as a way forward and what USAID is doing to assure that the way forward brings peace and stability to a population that has suffered more in one year than most do in a lifetime.

In July, when I last addressed this subcommittee, I spoke about the disastrous toll that drought had taken on central and southern Somalia, and of the 1.7 million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists whose lives and livelihoods have benefited from a robust USG humanitarian response and the generosity of the American people.

Since July, these same Somalis have experienced some of the worst flooding they can remember. Although deaths were minimal, 255,000 people were displaced, crops were destroyed, and livestock was lost. The worst of it occurred in November and December, but as recently as last week flooding displaced 1,000 people in the Lower Shabelle valley. Flooding has seriously hindered the delivery of humanitarian assistance—particularly food assistance—with entire convoys being mired for weeks at a time.

DADAAB

During my trip I had the opportunity to visit Dadaab refugee camp—80 km from the Kenya-Somalia border—and hear first-hand about the situation in Somalia. The camp hosts some 170,000 refugees, 98 percent of whom are Somalis fleeing their country. The majority of them have been there since 1991. The protracted refugee situation is testimony to the longstanding chaos in Somalia. Just last year, when the Islamic courts were making advances in Somalia, nearly 35,000 people crossed over to Kenya into the refugee camps. Owing to security concerns, Kenya closed its border to new asylum-seekers on January 3 and forcibly returned several hundred from the border transit center. Acknowledging shared security concerns, the USG has pressed the Kenyan Government to reopen the border to legitimate asylum-seekers.

At the Dadaab camp, I witnessed a food aid distribution—supported in part through our Food for Peace program—and met with some of the newer arrivals. The severe flooding that hit Somalia also hit northeastern Kenya, including the refugee camps where the State Department and Department of Defense worked to support UNHCR's flood relief efforts with U.S. military airdrops. In the section for new arrivals, in sparse vegetation and sandy soil, refugees had made homes out of branches and plastic sheeting. They rely completely on the international community for their survival. Aid agencies admit that they have not been able to get water services out to the new arrivals area that has received tens of thousands of people in the last year, and women now living there asked that I look into the situation. Digging wells is a difficult job in Dadaab. Water is some 150 meters below the sandy soil, requiring technical expertise that is not easily found. Emergency refugee funding made available by the State Department will help alleviate the pressures caused by increased refugee numbers.

Standing among the women and children gathered in the new arrivals area, I could only imagine the difficult journeys these families had made to get to this desolate place—most had come from the Juba River Valley or Gedo Region—hundreds of kilometers away—and the long, hard road that lies ahead for them. When I spoke to these women, they talked of insecurity, uncertainty, and threats. They spoke of family members they had left behind in Somalia. They spoke of the hardships they had fled and their fear of having to return.

NEW THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Across the border in Somalia, our partners estimate that the most recent round of conflict displaced 40,000 people in south and central Somalia. In contrast, almost 90 percent of those displaced by flooding have been able to return home, and the number of people estimated to be in an “acute food security crisis” has dropped by more than one half.

However, as the rains and flooding begin to ease, our partners are preparing for an explosion of water and mosquito borne diseases such as cholera, dysentery, and malaria, which pose a particularly serious threat to children under 5, the elderly and the population already compromised by undernutrition.

Livelihoods are also at risk because, in addition to human disease, animal disease is also a threat. Rift Valley Fever is suspected in hundreds of recent animal deaths and several human deaths in southern Somalia, where conflict has made it difficult to collect and transport samples for confirmation. Rift Valley Fever (RVF) can decimate herds of cattle and sheep, and it poses a serious health threat in weakened human populations. Its potential economic impact on Somalia and its neighbors is significant: An outbreak in Somalia in 1997 led to a ban on imports of livestock from all Somali ports to the Persian Gulf States and the loss of as much as \$100 million in revenue within 2 years. To curb rumors of RVF, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) recently announced new regulations regarding the identification and treatment of the disease in Somalia. Our U.N. and NGO partners have the capacities and resources to assist in controlling the spread and mitigating the impact of the disease; but in order to do so they will require the ability to collect and share information and test results in a transparent, proactive fashion.

So far in fiscal year 2007, the USG has provided nearly \$16 million to mitigate the impact of drought, floods, conflict, and resulting displacement within Somalia and across its borders. This assistance builds on carryover resources from \$92 million provided in fiscal year 2006. The availability of these resources permitted our partners to respond immediately and robustly to the flood emergency in the fall, and ensured the existence of a strong food pipeline in the first quarter of this fiscal year.

USAID's ongoing humanitarian programs are targeted in the drought and flood affected areas of south central Somalia and address food insecurity, nutrition, health, water, sanitation, and hygiene. Our partners have well-established programs and a thorough knowledge of local and regional issues affecting the populations they serve. It is this experience that has enabled them to continue to serve beneficiaries and implement programs throughout the political turmoil of the past year.

PARTNER PERSPECTIVES

While in Nairobi in mid-January of this year, I had the opportunity to meet with all of our partners. I was uniformly impressed with the dedication and knowledge each one is bringing to their work. None of the groups I met with felt that the conflict occurring around the withdrawal of the courts had dramatically increased humanitarian needs, but they all stressed the need for continued support of drought and flood victims. After the withdrawal of the Islamic courts, our NGO partners took a cautious, "wait and see" attitude. Access appears to be improving in many parts of Somalia, the Government of Kenya has pledged to soon reopen its border for humanitarian deliveries into Somalia, and most of our NGO partners are back in Somalia. However, they made clear that as we move forward, humanitarian space will need to be protected, and they ask that this become a part of our diplomatic dialog with the Transitional Federal Government.

I was very impressed with the United Nations Country Team for Somalia, which includes the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the World Health Program, UNHCR, the World Food Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNICEF, and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). They are completely engaged, and they talked openly about the challenging and critical issues they are currently facing on the ground. The head of UNDP had just returned from Mogadishu, where he led a U.N. delegation to assess the possibility of a return of U.N. personnel. It is clear that the United Nations regards the next few months as a window of opportunity to support Somalis to achieve peace and security in their country. The U.N. Country Team has outlined a set of priorities for the next 6 months which bridge humanitarian, stabilization, and initial reconstruction efforts. These priorities also include building the capacity of key Transitional Federal Government Institutions, strengthening the security sector, and assisting the Transitional Federal Government jump-start urgent basic social services—particularly in education and health. In addition, they will ensure that livelihood and job creation be launched early in these community-based recovery activities.

USAID PRIORITIES

Our own priorities are much the same. Last year we programmed \$7.9 million in FY06 development assistance to strengthen the capacity of civil society, support conflict mitigation, address basic education needs—including distance learning and teacher training—and increase access to water through the rehabilitation of urban water systems and development of rural water services. In 2007—in accordance with USG policy aimed at strengthening the capacity of governing institutions—development assistance is planned to reinforce the capacity of executive, legislative, and local authorities. Our assistance will also reinforce the TFG's capacity to deliver integrated social services—particularly in the areas of health, water, and edu-

cation—thereby enhancing its credibility among diverse constituencies. Through support for ongoing reconciliation programming, we are facilitating the broad-based, inclusive participation of diverse civil society actors in Somalia’s social, political, and economic decisionmaking. Through these venues, our development assistance programming serves to mitigate the underlying threats and conditions that encourage extremism, instability, and terrorism.

While I was in Nairobi, I had the opportunity to meet with Admiral Hunt, commander of our Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF–HOA) in the Horn. He reports that coordination and collaboration between the task force and USAID staff—both in the Horn and here in the United States prior to his deployment to Djibouti—has been invaluable to the task force’s civilian-military operations. From a USAID perspective, we feel that the best and most efficient use of USG resources in the Horn is likely to come from good coordination and a mutual understanding of the roles, responsibilities, capacities and strengths of our respective agencies and operating units. Over the past 12 months, USAID, State and the Department of Defense have worked hard to operationalize an approach in Somalia and the region that truly reflects the three Ds—Diplomacy, Development, and Defense. Defined as pillars to our national security in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, the elevation of development—as a key pillar—is seen as reinforcing diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. I am optimistic that with the coordination established between USAID, State, and CJTF–HOA in the Somalia Working Group in Nairobi, we are creating a coordination model capable of serving both our own national security interests and the interests of the people of Somalia and the Horn.

NEXT STEPS

I’d like to share with you USAID’s priorities over the next 90 days. Over this period we will use the resources available to us to:

- Respond effectively to humanitarian contingencies which may arise in this very volatile situation;
- Identify opportunities to increase training and capacity-building in our current emergency programs—particularly in nutrition, health, and water services—jump-starting longer term efforts addressing the delivery of critical public services;
- Develop a post-conflict Somalia livelihood recovery strategy, using lessons learned in recent pastoralist recovery and alternative livelihood programming in Ethiopia and Kenya and in post-conflict programming in other parts of Africa;
- Support efforts made on the part of the United Nations and our nongovernmental partners to ensure that ongoing emergency response provides a foundation for recovery and reconstruction;
- Ensure that the protection of humanitarian space becomes part of the diplomatic dialog with the Transitional Federal Government.

I’ll close by sharing with you something that has been in the back of my mind ever since I received the invitation to provide testimony today.

On July 11 of last year, I presented a picture of a people who were on the edge of a precipice, with years of chaos and conflict, catastrophic drought, disease, malnutrition, and a staggering loss of livestock resulting in the near collapse of an entire livelihood system. That was a true picture, and had anyone asked me that day to imagine that this same, beleaguered population would have to withstand months of devastating floods followed by renewed conflict, I would have found it nearly impossible to do. It is still hard for me to do, despite knowing that this is exactly what has happened since July.

But we are here today talking about a window of opportunity when it may be possible to help Somalia find a pathway out of political chaos, hunger, and suffering. Seizing this opportunity will increase the chances that the region as a whole finds its way to a stable, peaceful, and productive future. The approaches that I have outlined today are our best efforts at maximizing this opportunity, and we look forward to working with you and the Interagency, to make sure that these opportunities are not lost.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having me back to talk about Somalia and what we hope to accomplish there. I look forward to responding to any questions that you and members of the subcommittee may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Hess. And thank you, to the panel, for your testimony.

I'll begin the questioning in a minute, but first I want to say how pleased I am that Senator Webb has joined us—not only today, but that he has asked, and has become a member of this subcommittee. He's already made the effort to meet with me to talk about the work of the subcommittee, and I'm extremely pleased to have his expertise.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be a member of the subcommittee, and I look forward to working with you on all the issues under its jurisdiction.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator.

And I'll start up with—we'll do a 10-minute round.

Secretary Frazer, can you tell us why the administration has failed to comply with the requirement in law that it provide a report on Somalia, including a strategy for dealing with instability in Somalia?

Dr. FRAZER. Should I just take that question, or are you going to ask a number of questions?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I'm going to ask you a lot of questions, but first I'm—

Dr. FRAZER. Well, can I just—

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Asking you why you haven't complied with the law.

Dr. FRAZER. Sorry, no; I'm used to—

Senator FEINGOLD. I thought I'd start off with that one. [Laughter.]

Dr. FRAZER. I'm used to getting five or six questions at once.

Senator FEINGOLD. Oh, you'll get some of that, but I—

Dr. FRAZER. But I—

Senator FEINGOLD. This one, I want to hear what you have to say right away.

Dr. FRAZER. Well, let me just say, sir, that we haven't failed to comply with the law. What we're trying to do is to develop, as you have asked, and that Congress has asked, a comprehensive strategy. Let me just state that part of developing a comprehensive strategy is actually responding to the events on the ground and actually implementing the strategy that we have in place. And I know that we've spent quite a lot of time dealing with very fast-moving events in the Horn of Africa, building the multilateral approach that you in our consultations, private and public, have called for, and building the coalition with our regional partners. And so, I think that the spirit of the request from the Congress is to have effective impact on the Horn of Africa, and I think that we've demonstrated that over the past year.

And so, we certainly are working on trying to get that strategy paper to you, but we're also very much focused on implementing an effective strategy, which I think that we have seen in the results that are taking place in Somalia today. When you requested that strategy, the Transitional Federal Government was isolated and sitting in Baidoa; today, it's in Mogadishu. And so, I think we've got to do both things, and we're trying to manage both things.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I—you know, I understand that. I am concerned, though, about, essentially, the lack of communication about not following the law. I look at it as putting the cart before the horse. Without the benefit of a shared and coordinated vision,

I think it's difficult to make tactical or daily decisions and respond to the changing environment. So, this report, which should have been in by now, would hopefully provide the general goal, the objectives, the tasks, and the contingencies involved in pursuing our interests in the region. It should take into account the changes on the ground and the fluid nature of the situation.

Look, Secretary, the Congress passed a law and expressed its desire to understand how the administration was going to deal with instability in Somalia, about how it addressed the terrorist safe havens there, and it troubles me, obviously, as a Senator and somebody who was involved in passing that law, that the administration would sort of put this to the side without any real communication.

So, I will urge you, Madam Secretary, to take immediate action to comply with the law that was passed and signed by the President.

Now let me turn to the current situation on the ground. You and I have talked about this before, and I'd like an update. What is the status of the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops on the ground?

Dr. FRAZER. The Ethiopian troops have started their withdrawal, Senator. They started withdrawing forces in January. And, as you know in your discussions, having traveled to Ethiopia and met, yourself, with Prime Minister Meles, and in my discussions with him, as well, and in Secretary Rice's discussions, Prime Minister Meles said that he wanted to be out of Somalia within 2 weeks. More than 2 weeks have passed. Many in the international community have urged him to slow down that timeline because of fear that there would be a vacuum created by the too-rapid withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. So, the withdrawal has started, but it hasn't been completed. We would expect it to be a phased process, as we phase in the African peacekeeping forces.

Senator FEINGOLD. What percentage of the troops—Ethiopian troops—have been withdrawn?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, you'd have to have a concrete number of how many were there in the first place to decide on that percentage, and that number has varied. Some people have said 2,000, some people have said up to 8,000 forces. So, I don't know what the—

Senator FEINGOLD. Is it your sense that most of the troops have been withdrawn, or just a small percentage?

Dr. FRAZER. It's not my sense that most of the troops have withdrawn at this point, no.

Senator FEINGOLD. Will the AU peacekeeping force be deployed before the last Ethiopian troops are withdrawn from Somalia?

Dr. FRAZER. That is the idea. And we would hope to soon have the Ugandan battalion—in particular. President Museveni has promised to put in 1,500 troops, and we've been working with them. Right now, the Ugandan Parliament has to approve that and the Minister of Defense put a motion before Parliament on January 31. They take 3 working days to decide. Their opposition was out, so they're trying to give opposition time to actually consider the deployment of those Ugandan forces. As soon as that Parliament approves the decision, we will be prepared to help them deploy.

Senator FEINGOLD. And I know it's your strategy to support the TFG, but what happens if the TFG is unable to create the political agreements and the consensus needed to govern the country effec-

tively? I know it's hard to discuss this, because that's not what we want to happen. But, given this country's history, I think we need to be prepared for the possibility. So, would you talk a little bit about what that strategy might be?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, we're planning for the TFG to be able to build the consensus necessary, and we think that they have made good progress in that regard in a very short period. We continue to see the Prime Minister reaching out to the various clans. The TFG President at the African Union Summit announced a reconciliation conference that would include all stakeholders. They've made appointments of the mayor to Mogadishu, and the deputy mayor, that have been broadly accepted and supported. So, we will continue to work with them to actually accomplish inclusive governance.

Senator FEINGOLD. I'm pleased—

Dr. FRAZER. That's going to be—

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. To hear that, but what's the backup plan if they can't?

Dr. FRAZER. That's not going to be easy, as you said, because they actually are going against the trends of the last 16 years.

Senator FEINGOLD. But what's the backup plan if they can't?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, I'm getting to that, Senator, because I think that the backup plan is based in the effort to actually try to achieve the inclusive dialog. We would expect that if that's not going to happen, the analysis is that it would probably be a very narrow community—two communities that would create a counter to this inclusive dialog. That's a particular sub-sub clan which needs to be brought into the dialog, and that's remnants of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorists.

So, what would happen? We expect to be able to reach out to that sub-sub clan and deny those foreign terrorists that support of the community. If it doesn't work, it's very likely going to be because of outside influence, it's going to be because of outside support for terrorists. And we would hope to have, as you know, a peace-keeping force there—

Senator FEINGOLD. Yeah.

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. That would help to provide some of the stability while they create the space to drain the swamp, essentially, of—

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. One—and—

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. Those foreign terrorist elements.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. And on that point, of draining the swamp—in December, shortly before the Ethiopian incursion, you stated that the Council of Islamic Courts was, “controlled” by al-Qaeda in East Africa. And this characterization implicitly compared the CIC to the Taliban, the last regime to be under the control of al-Qaeda. However, DNI head Negroponte was quoted in the Washington Post, saying, “I don't think there are hard-and-fast views,” on the question. Asked whether the CIC was the next Taliban, he stated, “I don't think I've seen a good answer.” And in January, DIA Director General Maples testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee that, “al-Qaeda is assessed to be assisting the radical Islamist elements of the CIC with leadership and training, with hopes of establishing a future Taliban-like state.”

Now, that testimony would seem to contradict your assertion that al-Qaeda had already asserted control of the CIC. Would you like to take this opportunity to revisit your earlier statement?

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify my earlier statement and to say that quotes from the newspapers are hardly quotes at all, because, certainly, people change what one has actually said to them when they write it in newspapers. But what I specifically said was that the Council of Islamic Courts was a heterogeneous group which had been hijacked by terrorist elements, people like Hassan Abdullah al-Turki, designated under U.S. Executive Order 13224 of the United Nations Security Council 1267. What I said was it is led by Dahir Aweys, designated under U.S. Executive Order 13224 and under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267. What I said was that the al-Shabaab militia specifically was of the extremist order and was led by individuals like Aden Hashi Ayro, who was trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to 2001, and that those individuals had hijacked what was a heterogeneous Islamic Courts. And so, I was much more specific than what—

Senator FEINGOLD. All right.

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. Was quoted in the Washington Post.

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. I hope to get back to this in another round, but thank you for that. And, since I'm running out of time here, I do want to at least ask a question of Mr. Hess.

And thank you for your patience. After your recent travel to the region, can you give us a sense for what impact the ongoing humanitarian challenges are having and will have on the political efforts in Mogadishu?

Mr. HESS. Yes, sir. We feel that the humanitarian community is pulling together with the United Nations, as well, to take this opportunity to work with the TFIs and the TFG to build capacity in service delivery. And so, this humanitarian assistance that's being provided will assist in building that capacity and delivering services to the people who need it the most, especially in terms of education, health, and water and sanitation.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Hess, I hope to return to you, but now I'll turn to the ranking member, Senator Sununu.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you very much.

And let me pick up the questioning. Mr. Hess, could you speak, with a little bit more detail, about the activities of the Disaster Recovery Team, the DART team, that is operating? What's the size of the group? You know, what activities have they prioritized at the highest level? And what are the weaknesses of a DART group like this? You know, what areas are they not ideally suited to address? And, obviously, therefore, these are areas that we should, you know, find other ways to complement their efforts.

Mr. HESS. Yes, sir. We looked at—we don't take the formation of a Disaster Assistance Response Team lightly. When you create one of these, as you know, it sends a signal and a message, which was exactly what we were trying to do. We were concerned about the humanitarian situation starting in December, and the fact that it might deteriorate as people were on the move during a bad time.

Senator SUNUNU. When was the response team first put together?

Mr. HESS. In the end of December, sir——

Senator SUNUNU. OK, December——

Mr. HESS [continuing]. During the holiday.

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Of 2006, so that it's only——

Mr. HESS. 2006.

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Been in place for a couple of months. And the——

Mr. HESS. Absolutely.

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. And the size?

Mr. HESS. Right now, it's about eight members.

Senator SUNUNU. OK.

Mr. HESS. But it varies. One of the members is sitting behind me now. So, they rotate occasionally.

In terms of what they're focusing on, we look at the primary basic humanitarian needs. We are concerned about the global acute malnutrition rates in south-central Somalia, where we have seen rates of 22, 23, some places high as 30 percent of global acute malnutrition rate, in the Gedo region. Again, we can't address that specifically with food, but food insecurity is a large part of that. And certainly, we look at food as a big component of that. And our partners—World Food Program and CARE—are doing a good job of distributing food. But we also have to look at water sanitation, and they are focused at working—the team is focused very closely on working with our partners who are rehabilitating wells, digging new bore holes. And the flooding, unfortunately, especially in the lower Juba region, disrupted a lot of the work we had been doing on water and sanitation, so that was a problem. We're also worried about the health situation from the Rift Valley fever, malaria, mosquito-borne diseases, diarrhea, and cholera, which we were—we saw some minor outbreak of that—but, again, working with the Disaster Assistance Response Team, had the ability to respond quickly to cordon off the area where the cholera initially broke out.

The areas where we'd like to see some more work, where we are looking at, is how we can facilitate more directly the capacity-building of the government. And we have—our Office of Transition Initiatives has a member on that Disaster Assistance Response Team looking for the opportunity to get in and directly facilitate the building of that capacity along with UNDP.

Senator SUNUNU. Are—do any of the response team personnel work directly in Somalia, or are they primarily located in Kenya—or——

Mr. HESS. They are——

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Exclusively located in Kenya?

Mr. HESS [continuing]. All in Kenya. They have not been able to get in yet.

Senator SUNUNU. You said that the—most of our NGO partners are back operating again in Somalia. What level of effectiveness have they reached? And is there more capacity that they can build, or that we can help them build within the country?

Mr. HESS. The points that we tried to make with the—with our NGO partners is building local capacity at the same time that they try to deliver the assistance. As you can imagine, most of what they do is through local partners, but we're trying to build up that capacity so that they can carry on through the challenging period,

if you will. And we want to make sure that they have that capacity specifically on the monitoring side, because if—we're concerned about this global acute malnutrition rate, we're concerned about the spread of Rift Valley fever and other mosquito-born diseases. And if we can build that monitoring capacity on the local side, we'll be a lot further ahead.

Senator SUNUNU. How is the team's relationship with the Government of Kenya and/or Government of Ethiopia? Either intentionally or not, have those governments—or do those governments have anything in place that acts as a restriction on our ability to have the positive impact?

Mr. HESS. It's a good point. We have a good working relationship with both governments, because we've had teams and we have had missions in the area for a long time. One of the areas which we are working very closely with the Kenyan Government on now is the Dadaab camp. As I pointed out, the global acute malnutrition rate is pretty high. One of the things that we're looking at is using area around the camps to increase alternate livelihood development there. What we're looking at is the planting of alternate crops so that we can vary the diet of the people in the camps, and also to drill some more wells in the region. But, as you know, when you're talking about a water table that is vulnerable to begin with, that's a problem. The Government of Kenya worked very closely with us during the flooding of the Dadaab camp. As you remember, one of the sub-camps, Ifo, was wiped out. And the Kenyan Government worked very closely with us to help alleviate that situation. So, they have a good working relationship with the government.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Assistant Secretary Frazer, you mentioned the negotiations that are expected to take place at the end of February and some of the outreach of the contact participation that needed to take place at the sub-clan level. What other participants are important to the success of those negotiations? And are there any parties that have been reluctant to participate?

Dr. FRAZER. Yes; thank you, Senator. Specifically, the inclusive dialog is already taking place, with the Prime Minister and the President reaching out to various stakeholders. The key stakeholders would be, I believe, the Somalia business community, the business leaders, which provided financing for the courts in the past and will be an important part of providing the assistance and support for the Transitional Federal Government. Also, it's very clear that the Ayr sub-sub clan, in the past, had been a base of support for the Islamic Courts, and that there are some concerns about trying to make sure that they feel that they are adequately represented, or represented—that they have their own representatives as part of the Transitional Federal Government and part of the inclusive dialog. So, I think that those are two key sectors.

Somali women are extremely strong and, I think, very much, reaching out to the women's groups, and civil society groups will be key to building that inclusive dialog.

Senator SUNUNU. But you expect each of these groups to be effectively represented in the February discussions?

Dr. FRAZER. Yes. I think you're talking about the National Reconciliation Conference. I would expect them to be represented, most certainly, as well as the Somali diaspora.

Senator SUNUNU. You spoke a little bit about the troops committed by Uganda; 1,500 troops under the African Union. What other commitments have been made for troop participation? And what does the United States do—or what can the United States do—what have we offered to do to support the logistics and deployment of those troops?

Dr. FRAZER. For the Ugandan troops, we've offered—we have military planners working in Uganda with the Ugandan chief of defense forces and chief of general staff. We will do contract airlift for the Ugandan forces. We also have planners at the African Union working at headquarters on command-and-control systems. The Nigerians have also offered a battalion. The Burundians have offered a battalion of about a thousand troops, as well. And Malawi originally was reported to have offered them, but I think that they need to go through their parliamentary system, as well, to get the final approval.

Other countries, like Rwanda, Tanzania, have offered to train the Transitional Federal Government's national army, and we are hoping that South Africa will provide some type of assistance. Algeria has also offered to provide airlift to AMISOM. And so, they're still in the process of finalizing the troop contributors and the way in which they will contribute, but we can provide planners. The Ghanaians have offered a few hundred troops, as well. They've asked us for planners to go to Ghana, to Accra, and to work with their military to prepare them for deployment. We would provide some equipment, contract airlift, some sustainment support.

Senator SUNUNU. When do you expect deployment to take place? And at what numbers do you expect will be achieved?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, the first deployment that we're hoping for is of the Ugandan forces, and we're on standby waiting for their Parliament to decide. We can deploy them a day after their Parliament decides. We also know that they have teams right now in Mogadishu and in Addis, coordinating their planning within the AU structure. And so, we're ready to assist its—the timing, I'm hoping—I keep hoping, in the next week or two.

Senator SUNUNU. And the total number that you hope to attain?

Dr. FRAZER. For that first deployment, we're talking about—

Senator SUNUNU. But in the aggregate, including the other commitments that you've referenced.

Dr. FRAZER. The AU has said that they want a force of about 8,000. They feel that they have commitments right now for actual forces—

Senator SUNUNU. They think they can—

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. Of about—

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Reach that.

Dr. FRAZER [continuing]. 4,000.

Senator SUNUNU. OK, thank you.

Last question, Assistant Secretary Frazer, what should the status of Somaliland be? And what is the official interaction between the U.S. Government and the governing organizations in Somaliland?

Dr. FRAZER. I think we in the administration, agree with the sense of Congress that the status of Somaliland should be held off right now. We have always said that we will follow the lead of the African Union, and I think that the African Union also feels that now is not the time to push for decisions on Somaliland. They have been invited to be part of the National Reconciliation Conference that President Yusuf announced. I don't know whether they'll take up that offer. We meet with representatives of the Somaliland Government. They have a representative here. We have met with them. When I was at the African Union Summit, I met, on the margins of the African Union Summit, with the Foreign Minister of Somaliland, and have done so in my travels to the region in the past.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Sununu.

I'm also very pleased to see Senator Cardin here, who is a new member of the subcommittee and the Senate, but obviously no stranger to these issues, as a long-time distinguished member of the House. Welcome.

And normally we would rotate and go to Senator Cardin now, but, out of courtesy, he has deferred to Senator Coleman, who has been here for some time.

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Senator Cardin.

Let me first talk a little bit about the resources we have focused—are dealing with, with this issue. How many State Department folks do we have in Nairobi who are focused on Somalia, just Somalia? What kind of complement do we have there?

Dr. FRAZER. There are currently six people, full time, working on Somalia in Nairobi, including a Somalia coordinator, a senior Foreign Service officer, Ambassador John Yates. He is leading that Somali working group under the leadership of, obviously, our Ambassador Rannenberger, who I'm not including among the six.

Senator COLEMAN. In addition, we've talked about the global nature of the war on terrorism and the concerns about Somalia and being a base for expanded terrorist activity. Is the Bureau of Near East Affairs—are they—how globally are we looking at dealing with this situation in Somalia?

Dr. FRAZER. Yes, they are involved, and we work closely with them. I sometimes feel that a lot of it is them suggesting that I travel to countries in their region, but certainly Assistant Secretary David Welch raises the Somalia issue, our Ambassadors in the region are constantly reporting, meeting with officials in their countries, and sending in those reports. We have reports in significant interaction with Yemen, but also from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, from the Arab League. We're engaging all of them.

Senator COLEMAN. Senator Feingold, the chairman, talked about legislation that was introduced today, which myself and Senator Klobuchar cosponsors. One of the parts of that legislation talks about a special envoy to Somalia and lays out very specific duties: Direct U.S. Government efforts to establish a credible, capable government of national unity, provide detailed assessments of challenges and progress on the ground in Somalia and the Horn of

Africa, to pursue a truly comprehensive and sustainable peace in Somalia. What is the administration's position in regard to the appointment of a special envoy to Somalia?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, as I said, we have Ambassador Yates as our Somalia coordinator. He took up his position, based in Nairobi, January 2007, and we would expect for him to play the role of the special envoy that—as outlined, to work in the region to develop that diplomatic engagement in the region itself.

Senator COLEMAN. Does he have the authority—the recognized authority to do what a special envoy—does he have the leeway, the independence to be able to do what a special envoy would be called upon to do?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, in—yes, Senator, in the context of—the lead on our foreign policy is, as you very well know, Secretary Rice, and she's very much in the lead on our Somalia policy. She convenes her team, she has been part of this development of the strategy with the National Security Advisor within the context of the inter-agency. So, yes, indeed; like our other Ambassadors who have authority in their countries as chief of missions, he is empowered with helping us to develop that strategy and to implement the strategy.

Senator COLEMAN. And my concern would not be necessarily from above, in terms of that, I just want to know that folks on the ground—I want to know that folks in the Embassy, folks in other areas, would recognize that he has, then, the ability to pull things together, to get information to help put in place a plan. That's my concern. Is it recognized that he's going to have those abilities that we would expect a special envoy to have?

Dr. FRAZER. Senator Coleman, yes, indeed. Ambassador Rannenberger is our chief of mission with responsibility in the region overall to coordinate our policy in the region, and he does so by convening conference calls with the regional Ambassadors, their chief of mission. Ambassador John Yates works very closely with Ambassador Rannenberger to help us implement that strategy. So yes, he has the authority, but line authority belongs, in the region, to our chiefs of mission, and we hold that and guard that very closely. And, obviously, in Washington, the Secretary of State leads our foreign policy.

Senator COLEMAN. And I recognize that. I mean, my concern is that the bureaucracy recognize that we've got—that we're focusing resources or we're putting somebody in position to pull things together. It's tough working within a system if people don't recognize—that's my concern. We've talked about a special envoy rather than, I'd say respectfully, just a bureaucrat. I want somebody out there who's able to say, "This is important, this is"—the—we—both witnesses talked about this window of opportunity. There's a window of opportunity now, but if we don't seize it, if we don't direct the resources, if we don't say that this is important, then I don't know if we'll seize that window of opportunity. So, that's really where I'm getting to in this line of questioning.

Dr. FRAZER. And I understand it, Senator. And I appreciate it. And I've said that I think that the Ambassador has all of the authority necessary to do that. But you're hearing me hesitate because I don't understand why we would want to take—or suggest

that the Secretary of State, who is actively engaging and involved on a daily basis on Somalia, and is a senior diplomat for our Government—why we would suggest that she not stay in that lead role. Why would we devolve, in some ways, the authority away from the line responsibility for it, if it's being carried out. If it's not being carried out, a special envoy, I think, can help to manage, but when the line authorities are managing the policy, I'm left puzzled, frankly, by the desire to put another person into that line command.

Senator COLEMAN. Well, in part, because the Secretary—we'll talk about the Secretary of State, because the Secretary of State is involved in trying to get support in the region for our efforts in Iraq. The Secretary of State is involved with trying to deal with the situation of the—preventing the rearmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Secretary of State is involved with the very delicate negotiations dealing in six-party talks with North Korea, because the Secretary of State—and I could go on and on—in Venezuela, the Secretary of State, in the Sudan, in Darfur. And so, my concern—

Dr. FRAZER. Somalia.

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. Is—and Somalia—and that's my concern, that there are all these critical areas and issues that we face today. And I just want to make sure that we are putting the focus, the attention, and the resources with the kind of independence that allow people to do what has to be done, knowing that the Secretary of State's attention is going to be diverted by a whole range of other critical issues. This is also important. And I don't want to minimize that importance when—and recognizing that there are other things going on the world today that are going to take her attention and her focus.

Dr. FRAZER. The Secretary of State has prioritized Somalia on her range of issues that she's dealing with. Anytime we need to go to see the Secretary of State, she leads our policy on Somalia, she's one who decided to give us the \$40 million in January, when we went to the International Contact Group. She's the one who blessed and decided on the regional strategy.

Senator COLEMAN. OK.

Dr. FRAZER. So, it's a priority for her.

Senator COLEMAN. And I appreciate that.

Mr. Hess, I'd like to look a little bit at the resources. I think in the President's budget request talked about—was it—\$9 million was the figure for development assistance for Somalia in 2008. Does this represent all the assistance that we're providing Somalia to accomplish all the objectives that you mentioned?

Mr. HESS. No, sir. We have a—we have more money than that. As you know, in the supplemental there was an increase of \$20 million that was asked for. We have additional food aid resources that will be available as needed. We have 41,000 metric tons on the ground right now. We did a call forward for another 18,500 tons in January. So, the pipeline's in good shape there. But we have funds available if we need more food resources. We're looking at nonfood items, particularly on the water sanitation side, rehabilitation of wells. We have asked our partners to look particularly at those areas, and also on education.

Senator COLEMAN. Do we have a figure as to what your—what the total costs will be? What do we need to make a difference in Somalia, understanding that we have a whole range of humanitarian crisis—in flooding, malnutrition, et cetera, et cetera?

Mr. HESS. It's hard to estimate exactly what that number is right now, but we're looking at anywhere from \$20 to \$60 million. But we need our partners on the ground to come back to us after they've done a thorough assessment, because you don't want to attach a number to that right now without an accurate assessment. We need to look primarily at the damage that was done by the flooding on the wells that we had dug during the drought last year.

Senator COLEMAN. Are you satisfied with the level of international cooperation that we're getting to deal with the situation in Somalia?

Mr. HESS. Yes, sir. I've met with the donors when we were out there. That's a very good question. I met with all the donors. They're very seized with the issue. ECHO and the European Union have done a very good job of coordinating the effort. DFID, our U.K. partners, are very much engaged in the area, and they meet on a weekly basis to ensure—because what we're talking about here are gaps and where the gaps exist, and we want to make sure that those gaps are covered, and we work very closely with them to ensure that we don't have those gaps. And that's also the role of that U.N. Team, OCHA, U.N. Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance, has done a very good job on the coordination role. They've got a good team player out there, and he's doing a great job, as well.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Senator Cardin.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me turn to Senator Cardin, but, just before I do, I want to thank Senator Coleman for the remarks he just made in the context of special envoy. I know the Secretary indicated she's puzzled by our request for a special envoy, but I'm puzzled that you would be puzzled. I mean, let's face it, in Sudan we had a special envoy, in John Danforth, to try to resolve the dispute between the north and the south. We currently have a special envoy with regard to Darfur, Ambassador Natsios. And presumably Secretary Rice is engaged in those matters. I know she is, I know she cares about them. It's just a question of: How much can one person do with such an incredible range problems, which Senator Coleman just identified, post-9/11? It's essentially impossible.

So, you know, I'm loathe to just call for a bunch of special envoys, but we're in a very unusual situation. Ambassador Rannenberg, an excellent Ambassador who I had a chance to work with in Kenya, is obviously doing Somalia part-time, because Kenya is a very important country, and it requires an enormous amount of his attention. John Yates is a retired temporary appointment. So, this is about authorities, in part, you're correct about that, but it's also about capacity. Just how much can people do, given the resources? I mean, we had Newt Gingrich, of all people, come before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and say that it had been a mistake to cut back on our State Department people, and he advocated a significant increase in State Department staff. I mean, this is the symbol of the Contract with America admitting that he

was wrong to do that. So, we are in a different era. And it is not necessarily an attack on your authority or Secretary Rice's authority to say, in this particular situation, it may be necessary to have a special envoy. I hope we can continue the discussion of this special envoy issue in that context and in that spirit.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me concur in your comments. Somalia is very important to U.S. interests and I think a special envoy is appropriate, and certainly we need the resources if we're going to be able to be effective.

Administrator Hess, thank you for being here. Secretary Frazer, appreciate both of your testimonies.

As I understand your testimony, Secretary Frazer, the mission—or our priorities in Somalia, I think, are without dispute: To encourage political dialog between leadership with the stakeholders; to mobilize international support to build the governance capacity clearly for credibility, and we need the international community working with us; and deployment of an African stabilization force in order to deal with the humanitarian circumstances. I think all that is—are goals that we agree with.

I want to concentrate, if I might, on the issue of terrorism within Somalia and the mission—the air strikes that the United States participated in, beginning of January. Can you just give us the status of those air strikes—the targets and how successful we were?

Dr. FRAZER. Yes, Senator; I can try my very best. There were two A-130 air strikes, as you said. They were targeting convoys. They were in a remote area in Somalia, near the border, between Somalia and Kenya. We don't have full information on the results at this point. I think that probably my colleagues from DOD might be able to help, but I think that there's also an issue of the fog of war, and we need greater clarity. We're fairly certain that some of the terrorists that were targeted have been captured or killed, but I think that probably time will tell and we'll be better able to know exactly who has been killed in those attacks and who has escaped.

Senator CARDIN. Well, I'm certainly interested in that, and perhaps we'll follow up with DOD. I'm also interested what impact it has on the other goals. It's been reported that the Europeans were not very pleased with these air strikes. Maybe you could give us a little more information about how the stakeholders have responded to American air strikes.

Dr. FRAZER. Senator, the key stakeholders that we've been focusing our strategy on are the Africans themselves, particularly those in the region who have some leverage and whose interests are most threatened by these terrorists who are operating in Somalia. We've worked very closely, as I said, with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. We've shared intelligence with them to try to track these terrorists. We will continue to work with them.

I think that everyone wants to work in coordination and cooperation, and so, we have to maximize that, but I think that we have a shared goal to try to track these guys and our cooperation with the key partners, being those neighbor—the countries in the neighborhood, has not been undermined by the strikes, the two air strikes.

Senator CARDIN. Well, I certainly agree with us doing what is necessary against terrorism. My question is a little broader, as to what impact that's having on our overall strategies in Somalia as it relates to our diplomatic efforts.

Dr. FRAZER. Our diplomatic efforts continue strong. The International Contact Group on Somalia is a focal point for our diplomatic multilateral efforts. We continue to have key institutions and member countries—key institutions being the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development—that are involved, as well as key countries, like Norway, the United States, Tanzania, and others. There has been no diminishing of that multilateral effort. In fact, more countries have asked to join the International Contact Group on Somalia.

Senator CARDIN. But do you anticipate that additional air strikes will be necessary?

Dr. FRAZER. That's really an operational question, sir. It is clearly tracking these terrorists who continue to threaten American lives, the Somalis themselves, and their neighbors, is a key priority for the United States, but that is really an operational question of the combatant commanders in the field.

Senator CARDIN. I'm trying to get from you, but I'm not succeeding, as to whether this is having any significant impact in our discussions with our international partners on the goals that you have articulated in Somalia.

Dr. FRAZER. Clearly, the issue of what actions the United States takes, in terms of tracking these terrorists, all of our actions—sharing information, air strikes, putting forces on the ground, if we should do that—are part of the dialog that we have, especially with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, our regional partners but also more broadly. But our focus on the diplomatic effort is to ensure that whatever we do is coordinated with those key countries around Somalia that have the greatest leverage over it. Secondary is working and making sure that we remain coordinated with countries throughout Africa. We do that most effectively through the African Union (AU). I had dialog with Chairman Konare at the AU. It was good dialog. I think we're still latched up. And then, from there, obviously the international partners, working with the European Union and especially with Norway, who cochairs the International Contact Group on Somalia. So, what I'm saying—

Senator CARDIN. It would seem to me, though, that it—that part of the diplomatic effort is to work with our European friends and have a greater understanding on the use of our air support to deal with terrorism. Was that done?

Dr. FRAZER. Frankly, this just wasn't—in my interaction with the Europeans—an issue high on the agenda. It came up in one of my conversations with one European country. All of the others were focused on the question of conditioning aid specifically to the AMISOM force and its deployment, whether the EU position, that until the TFG did more on dialog, would hold up funding for AMISOM. That was really the focus of attention and the major diplomatic issue that we were addressing on Somalia at the African Union Summit, in which I had consultations broadly with the European countries. Maybe it'll come up at the International Contact

Group on Somalia, which will meet on February 9. It didn't come up at the last one, because, in December—or January, when we had that meeting, the air strikes took place after the meeting was over.

Senator CARDIN. It just seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we would be in a stronger position in carrying out the goals that are—Madam Secretary, you have announced—if there was a broader involvement in decisions made in regards to the terrorist activities in Somalia and what we need to do in order bring that under control.

I thank the chairman for the time.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin, for your participation.

And we do need to get to the next panel soon, but I do want to take a little more time to ask some questions, Secretary Frazer. And thank you for your patience here.

Thinking more broadly, can you explain how the U.S. Government is working to eliminate the conditions that have allowed the terrorists to use Somalia as a safe haven for so long? We—as you've indicated, we've known that al-Qaeda affiliated individuals have been in Somalia for years. So, what are we doing differently now?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, what we're trying to do is, as I said, of course, working very closely with the region to share information about the movement of these terrorists. We're not going to completely eliminate terrorists in Africa—in the Horn of Africa, or anywhere else around the globe, unless we work in close partnership with countries themselves—strong, capable countries that can monitor their own borders. We will continue to work with the United Nations, and we're doing so in the Security Council, to try to track terrorist financing. We also very much work in partnership with the neighboring countries. Obviously, also building a capable, inclusive government in Somalia will be a large part of trying to prevent terrorists from maintaining safe haven there. And I think that we saw that most dramatically with the CIC and how the Somali people withdrew their support from the CIC helped it to collapse. And so, building those strong governance institutions on an inclusive basis, I think, is part of a longer term strategy, and even a medium-term strategy, of preventing terrorists from taking hold in Somalia.

Senator FEINGOLD. And then, what is the state of play with the Islamic Courts right now? Do they actually pose any security risk to the TFG? Are you confident that the TFG, with international support, will be able to change the very conditions that led to the rise of the warlords and then the Islamic Courts in the first place?

Dr. FRAZER. I think the situation is still very dynamic. We're clearly working to try to make sure that they don't. I've heard, in my consultations, two different analyses of the continued insecurity in Somalia. One is that it's coming from certain sub-sub clans that feel that they are not sufficiently part of inclusive dialog. Then they're making—they're attacking to indicate, "Bring us in." Second, I've heard that—analysis that it's remnants of the Council of Islamic Courts; as the leadership withdrew, they left behind certain fighters, they handed out weapons, and it may be those remnants that are trying to start an insurgency and reconnect with the reconstituted leadership of the CIC.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, and this relates to one of the really tough questions, which is—obviously, we want this TFG to be as inclusive as possible for it to work, but are there any specific red lines or specific groups or individuals that should not be part of the process? And how do you determine that?

Dr. FRAZER. We've stated very broadly that those who renounce violence and terrorism should be part of the process. The Transitional Federal Government has drawn the lines a bit more narrowly. They have said that those who have invited terrorists into their country should not be part of an inclusive dialog.

Senator FEINGOLD. But we do not share that narrow view, apparently.

Dr. FRAZER. Well, it's a sovereign country; and so, we work with them, and we advise and consult, but they have to make the decisions for their own government, and how they're going to govern. But our statement has been fairly broad, which is that those who renounce violence and extremism should be eligible to be part of the process. Having said that, I must say that many of our partners have advised us to be careful, and that people say things, but intend to do something very different. And so, we're trying not to micromanage the process of inclusiveness, but to state broadly what is necessary for that longer term stability.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I can see this is one of the hardest questions here and in other places. I mean, who can we actually deal with? Who is irreparably an enemy of the United States? And who is sort of in between? This is one of the toughest parts of this job, and I recognize that.

A couple of quick questions on the African Union stabilization force. We're all optimistic and hopeful about the deployment of the AU-led stabilization force, but let me ask you to be as frank as you can. Is this force going to be deployed in a timely manner? And, more specifically, as you in the international community plan to support this deployment, what are the major challenges and shortfalls and gaps that have to be considered?

Dr. FRAZER. Well, I think that we're hopeful that it will be in a timely manner. Frankly, I think we're a little bit behind the timetable that we, the U.S. Government, had hoped for. We had hoped that that deployment would take place in early January, but other governments have to go through their own national process.

We expect that the AMISOM force will eventually transition into a U.N. operation and that, say, within 6 months, that transition could occur—that UNDPKO would be prepared to take over, to sustain this force over time, and to build it. And so, the AU force would be an immediate insertion into Mogadishu to prevent that security vacuum from occurring as the Ethiopians withdraw, but that it would then get the broader international support of the U.N. Security Council, and they're working on a resolution to that effect now.

Senator FEINGOLD. Have any of the nations that have pledged forces suggested that they'll only be involved for a certain period of time?

Dr. FRAZER. No.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, thank you both for your patience.

We'll now move to the second panel.

[Pause.]

Senator FEINGOLD. All right, let us begin with the second panel. Dr. Shinn, would you begin, please?

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador SHINN. Thank you very much, Chairman Feingold, for inviting me again to speak to this committee about Somalia.

And if I may submit a longer statement for the record, I would—

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Ambassador SHINN. OK.

I want to look briefly at the issue of the neighbors of Somalia. There are three now, if you include Somaliland, which declared its independence unilaterally from Somalia in 1991. Fortunately, the TFG wisely has avoided a confrontation with the authorities in Hargeisa as it tries to consolidate power in the former Italian Somalia. The other two neighbors with very long borders are Kenya and Ethiopia, and there's a longstanding problem here involving irredentist claims by Somalia concerning the resident Somali populations in Ethiopia and Kenya, which, in the case of Ethiopia, includes about one-quarter of its land area. Unfortunately, this issue was revived during the period of the Islamic Courts, when at least one senior member of the Islamic Courts, Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was chairman of the Shura of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts, on more than one occasion claimed Ethiopia's Ogaden as part of Somalia, although others in the Courts did not subscribe to this view.

Ethiopia appears, almost from the beginning of its recent military operation, to have planned a brief campaign—one, because of the high cost of the operation; and, two, I think the fact that even Ethiopia understood that a continuing presence in Somalia would incite Somalia nationalism against Ethiopia and lead to further problems.

The dilemma today for the Transitional Federal Government, as we have already heard this morning, is that the early departure of the Ethiopians leaves a potential power vacuum in Somalia. The TFG has not yet shown a capacity to maintain control on its own in the country. And although there have been numerous press reports about various warlords and others turning over their arms and weapons to the TFG, frankly I would take those with a grain of salt. Somalia remains awash in small weapons. And even though there may be some control over the larger weapons, you can be assured that there are plenty of handcarried weapons to go around for years to come, and they're not going to be turned over to any authority.

Ethiopia clearly prefers to have a moderate, friendly national government in Mogadishu. On the other hand, I think Ethiopia could live with a return to numerous fiefdoms ruled by individual warlords if that were the other option. Obviously, they do not want a return to extremist rule coming from any element of the Islamic Courts.

As the Islamic Courts gained power last year, Kenya joined Ethiopia in strong support of the TFG, but Kenya has now more recently turned to a more neutral role on this question. Kenya remains the chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD. During the past year, IGAD members have been deeply divided on the best way to deal with Somalia. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda strongly supported the TFG. Eritrea strongly supported the Islamic Courts. Djibouti began 2006 as a supporter of the TFG, but shifted its sympathy to the Islamic Courts after they took control of Mogadishu. Sudan almost certainly sympathized with the Islamic Courts. Because of these past and continuing divisions in IGAD over Somalia, there's little prospect the organization can play a leading role in resolving the ongoing differences over the short term. Over the medium/longer term, perhaps IGAD can return to a useful role.

Looking at the wider region beyond IGAD, Yemen has legitimate interests in Somalia, because a large number of Somali boat people continue to make their way to Yemeni shores. Egypt has longstanding historical interests along the Somali coast, and is always concerned about developments involving Ethiopia, which is the source of 86 percent of the Nile water which reaches the Aswan dam.

Dubai and the UAE serve as the financial center for both Somalia and Somaliland. There's been a history of money from Saudi sources and government-supported Islamic charities finding its way to both legitimate and illegitimate Islamic causes in Somalia. And then you have Libya and Iran that just seem to meddle because it's an opportunity.

Looking at the African Union and the Arab League, the primary role of the African Union has been to deploy an African Union mission in Somalia, AMISOM, which has been referred to this morning, for a period of 6 months. The AU envisages that AMISOM will consist of nine infantry battalions of 850 personnel each, supported by maritime, coastal, and air components, appropriate civilian personnel, and a police training team. This mission is expected to evolve into a U.N. operation, after 6 months, that will support the long-term stabilization of post-conflict reconstruction in Somalia. Most of the contributing countries seem to have attached conditions, such as approval only after ratification of its legislative body. So far, I'm not aware that any country's legislative body has approved participation.

Estimates suggest that AMISOM will cost \$34 million each month. The United States has promised \$14 million to support the force and the airlift of African troops to Somalia. As we heard this morning from Assistant Secretary Frazer, the United States is prepared to pledge another \$40 million for this purpose. The European Union has already released 15 million euros, or about \$20 million, for the same purpose.

There is still no date for the arrival of the first troops, and it is apparent most potential African troop-contributing countries are concerned about the situation on the ground and whether they will be entering a friendly or a hostile environment. The Arab League had an opportunity to make a real contribution to the establishment of peace in Somalia, which is an Arab League member, but,

with the defeat of the Islamic Courts, the Arab League seems to have largely abdicated responsibility for Somalia.

Let me just conclude with a couple of comments about the United Nations and the international community.

U.N. Resolution 1725 on Somalia, adopted by the Security Council on 6 December 2006, has been largely overtaken by events as a result of the Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government military victory. The 19 January 2007 AU communique has effectively replaced the U.N. resolution. The U.N. Security Council, on February 2, urged the AU to send peacekeepers to Somalia quickly so that Ethiopia could withdraw its forces. The enormous amount of energy being devoted by the African Union and the international community to the raising of a peacekeeping force for Somalia would be better spent in convincing, maybe demanding, that the TFG and other parties begin, immediately, a serious process that leads to power-sharing. This should be the highest priority of the international community, including the United Nations, African Union, Arab League, European Union, and United States. If meaningful talks—and I underscore “meaningful”—get underway soon, it will reduce the likelihood of conflict or violence and increase the possibility that African troops can enter the country peacefully.

Yesterday, there was a beginning of a precursor effort to move forward with this reconciliation conference in Mogadishu. It’s not clear who attended, but it does appear as though the moderate elements of the Islamic Courts were not invited.

The outcome of this reconciliation effort may well result in a restructuring of the Somali Parliament and Ministries, which are far too numerous, somewhere in the vicinity of 50, and will certainly involve power-sharing with some elements of Somali society that are poorly represented in the TFG. The alternative will be a phantom peacekeeping force that arrives too late to achieve any real purpose in Somalia. In any event, the TFG probably envisages AMISOM as tantamount to a praetorian guard to keep it in power. The TFG must prove to the Somali people that it is prepared to win their respect and support. Only then will there be a meaningful role for AMISOM, and only then will the TFG be in a position to create a national government that has long-term prospects for survival. The beginning of a meaningful reconciliation process should serve as the signal to the international community to increase substantially its humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shinn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID H. SHINN, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA AND STATE DEPARTMENT COORDINATOR FOR SOMALIA; ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

I thank the subcommittee and Chairman Feingold for inviting me to participate in this hearing. This is the third occasion in 5 years that I have had the opportunity to present my views on Somalia before the subcommittee. On this occasion, I have been asked to discuss the current diplomatic state of play with a focus on both regional and international players.

THE IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS

Somaliland was previously known as British Somaliland and from 1960 until it unilaterally declared its independence in 1991 the northwestern region of the Somali Republic. That part of Somalia now controlled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has since 1991 had three neighbors—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somaliland—and a long Indian Ocean coastline. The TFG claims Somaliland, which has not been recognized by any state, but has wisely avoided a confrontation with the authorities in Hargeisa as it tries to consolidate its power in the former Italian Somalia. Once there is a national government in Mogadishu that is widely accepted and clearly in control of the country there inevitably will be discussions between Mogadishu and Hargeisa on the future of their relationship. In the meantime, it is advisable for the TFG to focus on more immediate challenges and leave the question of Somaliland, which is doing just fine on its own, for another day.

Somalia's two other neighbors are Kenya and Ethiopia. It was the policy of the Somali Republic beginning in 1960 to encourage the incorporation into Somalia of those parts of Kenya and Ethiopia inhabited by the Somali people. In the case of Ethiopia, this included about one-fourth of its land area in southeastern Ethiopia known as the Ogaden and Haud that borders Somalia and Somaliland. It also included the Northeastern Frontier District in Kenya that borders southern Somalia. These irredentist claims led to war on several occasions between Somalia and Ethiopia and considerable conflict along the Kenya-Somalia border. Following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia in 1991 and the absence of an effective national Somali Government, Somali calls for incorporation of this land ended.

Extremist elements in the Islamic Courts that seized power in Mogadishu last summer and then consolidated control throughout about 50 percent of the former Somali Republic revived the irredentist policy. Hassan Dahir Aweis, Chairman of the Shura of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts, on more than one occasion claimed Ethiopia's Ogaden as part of Somalia. Others in the Islamic Courts did not subscribe to these views by Aweis. His public statements on Somali-inhabited parts of Kenya were more ambiguous, but left the impression this territory should also become part of Somalia. Combined with a call by the Islamic Courts for jihad against Ethiopia, which had sent military personnel into Somalia in support of the TFG based in Baidoa, Ethiopia became increasingly concerned about the situation in Somalia. No one in the TFG has publicly suggested that Somali-inhabited land in Ethiopia be turned over to Somalia.

Following attacks by the Islamic Courts militia against the TFG and Ethiopian forces in the vicinity of Baidoa, the TFG requested and Ethiopia agreed to send significant numbers of troops into Somalia to defeat the Islamic Court militias. We all know the outcome of the Ethiopian intervention. Ethiopia appears from the beginning to have planned a brief campaign because of the high cost of the operation and the fact that a long Ethiopian presence in Somalia would further incite Somali nationalism against Ethiopia. I believe both of these reasons explain Ethiopia's desire to remove its forces quickly from Somalia or, at a minimum, pull them back to the Ethiopian-Somali border area.

The dilemma today for the TFG and the Ethiopians is the possibility of a power vacuum, especially in Mogadishu, if the Ethiopian troops leave too soon. The TFG has not yet shown it has the capacity to maintain control of the capital on its own. There is a continuing or potential threat from the remnants of Islamic Court militias, Somali warlords with personal agendas, and ordinary-armed Somalis who have for years survived as hired guns or used their weapons to loot for personal gain. I would take with a grain of salt the numerous reports that warlords and others have turned in their weapons to the TFG or joined the TFG. Somalia remains awash in hand-carried weapons even if some control has been obtained over the larger pieces of military equipment.

Ethiopia is no doubt weighing carefully requests from the TFG that it remains in Somalia until the arrival of an African Union "peace support" mission. (Actually this is a euphemism for a Chapter Seven peacekeeping mission.) For the reasons already noted, Ethiopia is not likely to be very sympathetic to these requests. In fact, Ethiopia probably believes that it has accomplished what it set out to do—the removal from power of the Islamic Courts and especially the destruction or scattering of armed extremists among them. Although Ethiopia clearly prefers to have a moderate, friendly, national government in power in Mogadishu, it can, if necessary, live with a return to numerous fiefdoms ruled by individual warlords. Ethiopia has an especially close relationship with TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi.

Kenya has traditionally tried to play a neutral role in the Somali conflict and for years was the designated member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Develop-

ment (IGAD) to mediate the dispute. As the Islamic Courts gained power last year, Kenya joined Ethiopia in support of the TFG but made clear that it would not send Kenyan troops into Somalia. As Ethiopia became more involved militarily in Somalia, Kenya began to return to its more neutral role. After the military defeat of the courts, President Mwai Kibaki was one of the leaders, however, in efforts to identify troop contributors for an African peacekeeping force.

Because of the swiftness of the Ethiopian and TFG military victory over the Islamic Courts, the number of Somali refugees that might normally head toward Kenya has been mercifully small. Unless the security situation deteriorates significantly or there is a return to severe drought and/or floods, Kenya may escape a humanitarian disaster inside and along its border with Somalia. Kenya will do what it can quietly to support the TFG. It does not want to see a return to power of extremist elements of the Islamic Courts. In order to minimize refugee movements into Kenya, it prefers the creation of a moderate, Somali Government that exercises firm control over the entire country.

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT

In addition to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, members of IGAD include Uganda, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan. During the past year, IGAD members have been deeply divided on the best way to deal with Somalia. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda strongly supported the TFG. Ethiopia and Uganda continue their support while Kenya seeks to be an honest broker.

Eritrea strongly supported the Islamic Courts, primarily because the courts posed the biggest threat to Eritrea's enemy, Ethiopia. In fact, Eritrea sent an undetermined number of military personnel to train and support members of the Islamic Court militias. The U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia placed the number of Eritrean military personnel in Somalia last fall at 2,000. This figure appears to be exaggerated; a couple of hundred is probably closer to the actual figure. Eritrea also provided substantial quantities of military equipment to the courts. Even today, there are unconfirmed reports that Eritrea continues to support remnants of the Islamic Court militias.

Djibouti, an overwhelmingly Muslim country, began 2006 as a supporter of the TFG but shifted its sympathy to the Islamic Courts after they took control of Mogadishu. It received a number of emissaries from the courts and urged the courts and the TFG to resolve their differences in a process chaired by Sudan as current chair of the Arab League. Djibouti seems now to be reassessing the Somali situation but should have no difficulty supporting the TFG if it can establish security throughout the country.

Sudan played its Somali cards close, in part because it was the designated mediator between the TFG and the Islamic Courts. Khartoum presided over one promising meeting last June when the courts and the TFG agreed to recognize each other, cease military operations, and meet again to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement. That was the end of progress in the Khartoum process. Sudan almost certainly sympathized with the Islamic Courts and made clear that it was not prepared to contribute troops to an African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia.

Because of these past and continuing divisions in IGAD over Somalia, there is little prospect the organization can play a leading role in resolving ongoing differences over the short term. If the situation clarifies in Somalia, there will be a tendency for IGAD members to mitigate their internal differences. This may allow IGAD to reengage usefully in the issue.

THE WIDER REGION

There were numerous reports last year that a variety of countries in the wider region were supporting one side, usually the Islamic Courts, or the other in Somalia. If they did not actually take sides, they showed unusual interest in a problem that, except for Yemen, was far from their borders. In addition to Yemen, engaged countries included Libya, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Yemen has legitimate interests in Somalia because of the large number of Somali boat people who make their way to Yemen's shores. Potentially, Yemen is in a position to help bring competing Somali groups together. Egypt has longstanding historical interests along the Somali coast and is always concerned about developments involving Ethiopia, which is the source of 86 percent of the Nile water reaching the Aswan Dam. Dubai in the UAE serves as the financial center for both Somalia and Somaliland. Before the defeat of the courts, Qatar may have been trying to play a mediating role. There has been a history of money from Saudi private sources and government-supported Islamic charities finding its way to both legitimate and

illegitimate Islamic causes in Somalia. Libya and Iran just seemed to be meddling because Somalia offered an opportunity.

With the defeat of the Islamic Courts, most of these countries with the notable exception of Yemen and the UAE, which continues to serve as a Somali financial center, have shown less engagement in Somali affairs. The involvement last year of all these countries illustrates, however, the potential to return to Somali affairs quickly if they find it in their interest or just want to meddle.

THE AFRICAN UNION AND THE ARAB LEAGUE

The primary role of the African Union (AU) has been an effort to deploy an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for a period of 6 months. A 19 January 2007 communique of the AU Peace and Security Council reiterated the AU's commitment to the unity, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Somalia. It called for an all-inclusive and genuine process of dialog and reconciliation. The African Union envisages that AMISOM will consist of nine infantry battalions of 850 personnel each supported by maritime coastal and air components, appropriate civilian personnel, and a police training team. This mission is expected to evolve into a U.N. operation after 6 months that will support the long-term stabilization of post-conflict reconstruction in Somalia. The model for the operation is the AU mission in Burundi. The African Union urged the U.N. Security Council to consider authorizing a U.N. operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the expiration of its 6-months mandate. The United Nations seems inclined to oblige.

Each day there are new press accounts about African countries that have committed, are considering or rejected the contribution of troops for the standing up of AMISOM. Most of the contributing countries seem to have attached conditions such as approval only after ratification by its legislative body. Malawi's Defense Minister reportedly promised troops only to have the President rescind the announcement. It is not clear at this writing which countries are irrevocably providing troops for AMISOM, although contingents from Uganda and Nigeria seem the most promising. Estimates suggest AMISOM will cost \$34 million each month. The United States has promised \$14 million to support the force and the airlift of African troops to Somalia. It is not clear if the cost of airlifting troops will come out of the \$14 million. The European Union has released 15 million euros to finance the peacekeeping operation.

There is still no date for the arrival of the first troops and it is apparent most potential African troop-contributing countries are concerned about the situation on the ground and whether they will be entering a friendly or hostile environment. The bad experience of the much larger and better equipped U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) in 1992-1993 and the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), which took over from UNITAF and remained until 1995, has not been lost on African troop contributors. It is not realistic to expect there will be a fully equipped and staffed AMISOM on the ground anytime soon. The African Union deserves considerable credit for what it is trying to accomplish in Somalia, but it must also face reality.

The Arab League had an opportunity to make a real contribution to the establishment of peace in Somalia, an Arab League member. Under the chairmanship of Sudan, the Arab League started well with the June 2006 agreement in Khartoum between the Islamic Courts and the TFG. But as the courts gained power and extended their authority in Somalia, the Arab League seemed to lose interest in the reconciliation process. If the Arab League had pressed the Islamic Courts harder to engage in meaningful dialog with the weak TFG, it might have been possible to avoid a war and to create a government of national unity that included both the TFG and the courts. Admittedly, this would have left open the possibility of extremists, some of whom have ties to international terrorism, remaining in positions of authority. There is obviously no room for extremists or supporters of terrorism in a Somali Government. Close collaboration between the TFG and the moderates in the Islamic Courts might have been able, however, to solve this dilemma. With the defeat of the Islamic Courts, the Arab League seems to have abdicated responsibility for Somalia.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

U.N. Resolution 1725 on Somalia adopted by the Security Council on 6 December 2006 has been largely overtaken by events as a result of the Ethiopian and TFG military victory. The resolution urged dialog between the TFG and the Islamic Courts and authorized IGAD and the AU to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia known as IGASOM. The 19 January 2007 AU communique has effectively replaced the U.N. resolution. The African Union, the United Nations, and the international community are now supporting the establishment of AMISOM,

which has replaced IGASOM. Presumably the U.N. Security Council will propose a new resolution on Somalia that takes account of the very different situation on the ground and the more recent AU communique. The U.N. Security Council on 2 February 2007 urged the AU to send peacekeepers to Somalia quickly so that Ethiopia could withdraw its forces. It also supported the deployment of a U.N. technical assistance mission to Somalia to make recommendations on security needs.

The non-African parties most engaged in efforts to find a solution to the situation in Somalia have been the European Union and the United States. Both the European Union and the United States, but especially the European Union, have emphasized the need for creation of a broad-based Somali Government and reconciliation with disaffected elements of Somali society, including moderate elements of the Islamic Courts and civil society organizations. TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf has agreed to the holding of a reconciliation conference, although no place or date has been set. There are also unsettling reports from other elements of the TFG that raise questions about its commitment to this objective.

The enormous amount of energy being devoted by the African Union and the international community to the raising of a peacekeeping force for Somalia would be better spent in convincing, no demanding, that the TFG and other parties begin immediately a serious process that leads to power sharing. This should be the highest priority of the international community, including the United Nations, African Union, Arab League, European Union, and United States. If meaningful talks get underway soon, it will reduce the likelihood of conflict or violence and increase the possibility that African troops can enter the country peacefully. This should be a Somali-driven reconciliation process that ideally takes place in Mogadishu. There is no longer a time or place for another Somali peace conference in three-star hotels in foreign countries. The outcome may well result in a restructuring of the Somali Parliament and Ministries, which are far too numerous, and will certainly involve sharing power with some elements of Somali society that are poorly represented in the TFG.

The alternative may well be a phantom African peacekeeping force that arrives too late to achieve any real purpose in Somalia. In any event, the TFG probably envisages AMISOM as tantamount to a praetorian guard to keep it in power. The TFG must prove to the Somali people that it is prepared to win their respect and support. Only then will there be a meaningful role for AMISOM and only then will the TFG be in a position to create a national government that has long-term prospects for survival. Its ability to govern will be sharply limited and its longevity highly doubtful if it remains dependent on the presence of foreign troops.

The beginning of a meaningful reconciliation process should serve as the signal to the international community to increase substantially its humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia. The United States has been especially generous in providing humanitarian aid while the European Union has been somewhat more forthcoming with development and reconstruction activities. U.N. specialized agencies such as the World Food Program, UNDP, and UNICEF have done most of the heavy lifting in recent years. Real progress on Somali reconciliation should result in much more effort by all international partners.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor, for a very clear and helpful presentation.

Dr. Menkhaus.

**STATEMENT OF DR. KEN MENKHAUS, PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE, DAVIDSON, NC**

Dr. MENKHAUS. I'd like to thank the subcommittee members and Chairman Feingold for the opportunity to participate in this timely hearing on Somalia.

And, with your permission, I'd like to submit my written testimony.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Dr. MENKHAUS. Also, with your indulgence, I'd like to speak loosely off of my notes, rather than read them, in the interest of avoiding duplication of what other speakers have had to say.

I've been asked to provide a brief analysis of Somalia's recent political developments as a point of departure for discussion of the de-

velopment of a U.S. strategy toward Somalia, and I'd like to begin by discussing the dramatic events in 2006.

Many of those events have already been touched on, but just to refresh our memory, after 15 years of complete political paralysis and state collapse in Somalia, we had quite an eventful year, starting with the TFG Parliament reconvening unexpectedly after being moribund for over a year. At the same time, an Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, a group of U.S.-backed militia leaders and businessmen formed a coalition. That alarmed the ascendant Islamist movement in Mogadishu. A 4-month war ensued in Mogadishu, which culminated in a dramatic victory on the part of the Islamists. They consolidated control not only over all of Mogadishu, but quickly expanded their authority through most of south-central Somalia, leaving the TFG, at that point in time, precariously perched in a transitional capital in Baidoa and holding a few other hinterland areas, but really looking like they were on the verge of collapse.

It's important to remind ourselves, too, that the Union of Islamic Courts, or the CIC later, provided Mogadishu with a level of rule of law, public order, and governance that it—the city had not seen in 15 years, and that earned the CIC a fairly strong measure of public support in Mogadishu.

We also know that—over time, that the CIC, as Assistant Secretary Frazer pointed out, became increasingly radicalized. Its most reckless policies were those directed toward Ethiopia. And to put that set of policies in perspective, I think it's worth pointing out that hard-liners in this broad umbrella saw fit to mobilize for jihad against Ethiopia as a way of conflating their Islamist ideology with pan-Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopianism to increase their base of support, marginalize the moderates. In the short term, this was highly effective. In the long term, that bought them a war, a disastrous war, with the largest standing army in sub-Saharan Africa.

Dialog during that time between the Council of Islamic Courts and the TFG was attempted. The United States and other governments sought to bring them together to negotiate a government of national unity. All agreed that that was the best window of opportunity at the time. All were disappointed with the lack of progress. And I think as we look back, we'll see that intransigence on both sides was very much to blame. The TFG feared negotiating from a position of weakness, feared losing key positions. Ethiopia was not entirely sure it wanted to support a process that could lead to Islamists essentially taking over the TFG as a Trojan horse. And many of the hard-liners in the Islamist movement saw no reason to revive a TFG that they thought they were about to defeat from within, in a matter of weeks or months.

Finally, in late 2006, we had the war. The Ethiopian offensive occurred. Again, the details of that have been provided already, but, just to reinforce what Assistant Secretary Frazer said, one of the things that was remarkable about that war was the extent to which the CIC was not defeated, but was dissolved internally. The loss of support from inside Mogadishu signaled to many of us that the hard-liners had gone too far. It's not entirely sure that they actually sought a war with Ethiopia, they may have just sought mo-

bilization for war—were playing brinksmanship, and lost. But a broad section of the Mogadishu population was very angry at them—that included clan elders, it included the business community, and it included moderate Islamists—for drawing them into an unnecessary war, forcing the Islamist leaders to flee southward toward the Kenyan border or melt back into Mogadishu.

That culminated with Ethiopia occupying Mogadishu, another very unexpected development, and the TFG's arrival as a fledgling administration in the capital.

Where do we stand today? The situation in Mogadishu is tense, it's fragile, and it's deteriorating. Ethiopia is intending to partially withdraw its troops to avoid a quagmire. The good news with that is that, if they withdraw their forces, they are eliminating the main target that an insurgency would attack. The downside, as has been pointed out, is that runs the risk of leaving a vacuum if the African Union forces are not able to deploy in a timely manner.

The TFG itself still remains very, very weak. It is not providing basic administration in the capital. The population there compares now the kind of public security that they earned under the Council of Islamic Courts to the TFG, and the comparison is not flattering. The public response to the TFG inside Mogadishu ranges from tepid and opportunistic support to outright hostility and rejectionism.

Criminal lawlessness is up dramatically in the city. Warlords have returned and reassumed their place in their fiefdoms. There is a rise in sporadic violence targeting both Ethiopian troops and Transitional Federal Government installations and officials, including the beginnings of what looks like another dirty war, such as we had in 2004–05, a rise of political assassinations. It's important to point out, I think, that that is not, at present, an insurgency, as we would normally define it. The violence is a combination of criminal violence, of clan-based resistance, of warlord opportunism, and some Islamist violence directed at Ethiopia and the TFG, as well.

In the midst of this deteriorating situation in Mogadishu, we have an international response that's based on three pillars that have already been described. That is, first, mustering and deploying an African Union peacekeeping force to replace the departing Ethiopians; second, generating revenue, the funding and support to build the governance capacity of the TFG; and then, third, the promotion of political dialog to make the Transitional Federal Institutions more inclusive, to make Mogadishu population stakeholders in the TFG, as opposed to opponents.

Political dialog is not going particularly well. The fact is, when you take the temperature in Mogadishu, the sense is that the TFG leadership is seeking a victor's peace, it is engaged in a variety of policies that seem designed to alienate and marginalize its key opponents, rather than bring them into the government. Even the reconciliation conference that has been called for by the President appears designed more to bring people in who already support the TFG, rather than the key opponents to the Transitional Government.

Both sides are responsible for the impasse, at this point. The TFG has certainly done its part in seeking this victor's peace. But, on the other side, the Mogadishu opponents seem committed, at

this point, to rendering Mogadishu ungovernable. They don't have to defeat the TFG. All they have to do is play for a draw, and then run the clock out while the TFG has only 2½ years left on its mandate. And they appear perfectly capable of doing this. They don't need outside help to foil the TFG's progress. All they need is a base support in Mogadishu from the population and from some political elites, and they have that in abundance, at this point.

To the three pillars. In my view, the deployment of African—

Senator FEINGOLD. I'm going to have to ask you to conclude pretty soon so we can hear—

Dr. MENKHAUS. OK.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. From Dr. Morrison.

Dr. MENKHAUS. Very good.

I would say that, of the three pillars that we are pursuing in support of peace and reconciliation in Somalia, dialog has to be privileged. If African Union peacekeepers are sent in the absence of dialog toward a more inclusive government, they will be viewed as enemies in Mogadishu, and they are likely to be targeted. If they aren't targeted, they are likely to have to pay for their own protection. Likewise, state-building funds, if they are provided to the TFG in the absence of dialog, are—were going to be perceived by opponents of the TFG as having taken sides.

Just as a final point: What happens if we get to that worst-case scenario, where the TFG, in fact, is not able to bring together a large consensus and a government of national unity?—the question that you asked—

Senator FEINGOLD. Yes.

Dr. MENKHAUS [continuing]. Earlier this morning. And I think one of the scenarios that we have to start looking at is: Can we assist the Transitional Federal Institutions to move forward on the key aspects and functions of the transition, which is to say, deliberating over a constitution, setting up a referendum, and setting up elections to end the transitional process and bring in a full-fledged government in Somalia, even if it has not been able to govern most of the country. That may sound like an absurd scenario, but, in fact, we've seen that already in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the government was essentially paralyzed throughout the entire time, and yet, it muddled through, thanks to a strong national electoral commission and robust external support. That's important, because what that does is, it would send a signal to the potential spoilers that, "You can block the government's capacity to govern in Mogadishu, but if you don't join the Transitional Institutions, and they're the only game in town, you lose out on a voice in the final dispensation of the country."

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Menkhaus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. KEN MENKHAUS, PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE,
DAVIDSON COLLEGE, DAVIDSON, NC

I would like to thank the subcommittee members and Chairman Feingold for the opportunity to participate in this timely hearing on Somalia.

The task of crafting a comprehensive strategy for Somalia which harmonizes different, sometimes competing U.S. policy priorities in the country will stand a much better chance of success if grounded in accurate analysis of the nature of both the crises and opportunities posed by Somalia. To that end, I have been asked by the

subcommittee to provide a brief analysis of Somalia's recent political developments as a point of departure for discussions of U.S. strategy toward Somalia.

THE SEISMIC CHANGES OF 2006

After 10 years of political paralysis and state collapse, Somalia experienced a dramatic series of political changes in 2006. These developments began with the establishment in February 2006 of a U.S.-backed Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism in Mogadishu. That alliance brought together a group of rival militia and business leaders with whom the U.S. Government was partnering in an attempt to monitor terrorist activity in Mogadishu. U.S. concern over possible misuse of Somalia as a safe haven for foreign al-Qaeda terrorists focused on a small number of individuals implicated in the 1998 terrorist attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, as well as a bombing of a Mombasa resort in 2002 and a failed attempt to take down an Israeli chartered flight leaving Mombasa. Those "high value targets" were enjoying safe haven in Mogadishu under the protection of a small group of hard-line Somali Islamists who held top positions in the umbrella group known at the time as the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts, later renamed the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).

The establishment of the counterterrorism alliance inadvertently triggered an extraordinary chain of events. The Islamists, alarmed at what they viewed as an alliance set up to attack them, launched preemptive attacks against the alliance militias. The 4-month war which ensued culminated in a decisive victory for the Islamists in June. The UIC quickly imposed effective control over Mogadishu, bringing dramatically improved rule of law to the city, earning a measure of "performance legitimacy" and enjoying widespread support from Somalis both inside and out of the capital. By July, the UIC expanded its control across most of south-central Somalia, and emerged as the most powerful and popular political force in the country. Its principal rival, the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), retained nominal control over the provisional capital, Baidoa, and some other regions in the hinterland, but was in a position of grave weakness and appeared vulnerable to internal collapse.

External actors, including the U.S. Government, urged the TFG and moderates within the UIC leadership to engage in political dialog with the aim of creating a more inclusive transitional government which would be accepted in Mogadishu. Talks held in Khartoum yielded little, however, and tensions quickly arose. For their part, the TFG leadership appeared unwilling to engage in serious power-sharing discussions, and Ethiopia was unwilling to risk allowing the Islamists to use the TFG as a Trojan horse. Ethiopia increased its troop presence in and around Baidoa, inflaming the Islamists. As for the UIC, hard-liners in the umbrella movement appeared intent on stoking hostilities with Ethiopia, in large part to mobilize support and marginalize moderates within the movement. Islamist hard-liners such as Hassan Dahir Aweys repeatedly invoked jihad against Ethiopia, called for Ethiopians to rise up against the Meles regime, and made irredentist claims on Somali-inhabited territory in eastern Ethiopia. The UIC also forged close links to Ethiopia's rival Eritrea, and funneled arms to two armed insurgencies inside Ethiopia, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front. In the short term, the call for jihad against Ethiopia proved to be a very effective political tool for Aweys. By conflating Islamism, pan-Somali nationalism, and anti-Ethiopianism, he won broad support from Somalis at home and in the diaspora, including many who did not subscribe to the increasingly draconian Islamist rule imposed on residents of Mogadishu. In the long run the tactic bought Aweys and his supporters a disastrous war against sub-Saharan Africa's largest and most seasoned standing army.

The UIC's slide toward radicalization in the latter half of 2006 made war with Ethiopia likely if not inevitable, and eventually led many external observers to conclude that the many moderates in the UIC movement were too weak to redirect the movement's increasingly reckless policies. The position of the U.S. Government shifted toward greater emphasis on the UIC's alleged al-Qaeda links and Ethiopia's legitimate security concerns, a signal that some observers construed as amounting to American "tacit support" of an Ethiopian offensive against the UIC. That Ethiopian offensive was launched in late December, and produced not only a decisive victory in initial battles in the open countryside but also an unexpected internal collapse of the UIC back in Mogadishu. There, hard-liners were confronted with widespread defections by clan militias, businesspeople, and moderate Islamists. Local clan and business leaders also refused to allow the UIC to conduct a guerrilla war in Mogadishu, on the grounds that that would produce devastating loss of life and damage to property. Residual UIC forces and leaders, including an undisclosed number of foreign jihadists who had joined the UIC in 2006, were forced to flee south-

ward to Kismayo, where they were again blocked by local residents from using the city as a base. The remnants of the UIC forces either melted back into Mogadishu, sought to cross the Kenyan border, or remained hidden in the inaccessible forested areas along the coastal Kenyan-Somali border area. At least two aerial attacks were launched by American AC-130 gunships at convoys suspected of containing the three foreign al-Qaeda suspects sought by the United States. There is no evidence that those high-value targets were hit in the attacks; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer reported that eight members of the Somali jihadist militia known as the shabaab were killed in one attack.

The UIC's sudden collapse led to the subsequent Ethiopian occupation of the capital and the arrival of the TFG leadership to the capital. Despite efforts by the TFG to create a police force and name a local administration, the capital quickly slid into lawlessness and armed criminality. Militia leaders deemed "warlords" by many Mogadishu residents returned to their neighborhoods and reclaimed their militias. By January 2007, armed attacks against Ethiopian forces and TFG installations increased, raising the specter of a complex insurgency by a loose combination of Islamists, warlords, armed criminals, and clan-based militias. Determined to avoid being drawn into a quagmire, Ethiopia announced intent to withdraw its forces within weeks and appealed to the African Union to send replacement protection forces into Somalia.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

As of early February 2007, the situation in Somalia is precarious. Efforts to encourage the TFG leadership to engage in dialog with Mogadishu-based leaders, including moderate elements of the dissolved UIC, have met with frustration. The TFG coalition remains narrow, and is deeply resented by most Mogadishu groups. Top TFG leaders appear committed to imposing an elusive victor's peace on Mogadishu. Armed attacks against TFG personnel and buildings are on the rise. Efforts to deploy an AMISOM (African Mission in Somalia) peace enforcement force to Somalia remain the subject of intensive diplomatic energies, but it is not yet clear that those forces will be mustered in a timely manner, if at all. Somali jihadists have issued threats to kill foreign peacekeepers should they be deployed.

The mood in Mogadishu is, by all accounts, weary, sullen, and angry. Anti-American sentiment is high. Rightly or wrongly, the United States is held indirectly responsible for the collapse of public order in Mogadishu. Though most residents are said to be desperate for a return to rule of law and public order, most expect a return to wider violence. Those with the means have relocated their families abroad. The price of ammunition and small arms has shot up in local markets in anticipation of troubles.

The TFG has made almost no progress in providing improved public security or other government services in the capital. This record stands in stark contrast to the performance of the UIC administration, the standard against which the TFG is now being judged by impatient Mogadishu residents.

Ironically, the end result of the seismic changes of 2006 is to some extent a return to the status quo ante bellum. Somalia in early 2007 looks very much like Somalia of 2005, featuring a weak and unpopular TFG facing resistance from a loose coalition of clans, Islamists, and other interests in Mogadishu, in a context of de facto state collapse.

ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS

The best hope for Somalia at present is initiation of sustained political dialog which yields a more inclusive transitional government—one which empowers and reassures key constituencies in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. Anything less than that will leave important segments of the Mogadishu population inclined to play the role of spoiler. To date, neither the TFG nor the loose coalition of interests in Mogadishu opposing the TFG have made genuine efforts to pursue political dialog. The TFG leadership has embarked on a series of policies seemingly intended to alienate its rivals, including ill-advised and unfeasible calls for forcible disarmament of Mogadishu. Most Mogadishu opposition to the TFG appears intent on pursuing a strategy of making Mogadishu ungovernable as a means of blocking the TFG. The TFG's opponents do not need to defeat the TFG; they only need to play for a draw, prevent the TFG from extending an administration across key part of the country while waiting for the clock to run down on the TFG's remaining 2½-year mandate.

Every effort is being made to simultaneously promote reconciliation, muster, and deploy AU peacekeepers, and generate funds and support to improve the governance capacity of the TFG. Ideally, these three goals will be advanced in tandem. But

there are real dangers if they do not proceed in unison. In particular, if ANISOM forces are deployed and robust capacity-building measures are provided to the TFG in the absence of political dialog, Mogadishu constituencies will view these external policies as a form of aggression against them, by empowering a government they reject. In that event, the AU forces will either be subjected to attacks and kidnappings, or will be forced to pay protection money to local militias to insure their own safety—a practice that occurred frequently in the ill-fated UNOSOM operation of 1993–94. For this reason, promotion of political dialog and other measures designed to make Mogadishu clans and constituencies stakeholders in the transitional government must be afforded top priority. Dialog needs to be considered a precondition for, not a complement to, state-building and peacekeeping initiatives.

The TFG leadership has understandably made passionate appeals to the international community for substantial foreign aid to enable it to build an effective governmental capacity, and many sympathetic external observers have come to equate robust foreign aid to the TFG with commitment to state-building in Somalia. The relationship between foreign aid and state-building in Somalia is actually more complex. In the wrong circumstances; high levels of foreign aid has redirected the energies of political elites away from the onerous task of governance toward controlling and diverting foreign aid. It also tempts political leaders to use cash to play divide and rule, playing off and splitting rivals, rather than engaging in the more direct but more sustainable task of real reconciliation and power-sharing. It is worth noting that the three instances of impressive state-building in Somalia since 1991—the secessionist state of Somaliland, the autonomous state of Puntland, and the UIC's 6-month administration of Mogadishu and surrounding areas—were all achieved with minimal external assistance. What this suggests is that external insistence on a few preconditions for foreign aid—real political dialog, and genuine efforts to begin basic government services—is vital to ensure the success of the TFG.

In the event that AMISOM forces cannot be deployed in adequate numbers to replace the Ethiopian troops, the TFG is unlikely to maintain a meaningful presence in Mogadishu. Security incidents directed against the TFG will increase, and its leaders will pull back to the town of Baidoa or go on extended foreign trips. The result will be a divided Somalia and a paralyzed TFG. Recent actions and statements by Somali figures make this an unfortunate but increasingly likely scenario, one for which policymakers in the international community must develop contingency plans. A withdraw or collapse of the TFG need not coincide with a rise of armed conflict, though it may. External efforts to promote a “soft landing” in Mogadishu, assisting local authorities to revive at least some semblance of local governance structures from the past, would protect the capital from a free-fall into armed anarchy and might earn a small measure of goodwill from a Mogadishu population that harbors deep anger at the outside world—and the United States in particular—for its perceived support of an Ethiopian offensive which destroyed a political order that brought public security to the city for the first time in 15 years.

At present, the growing levels of armed violence in Mogadishu do not amount to an insurgency. The Ethiopian withdraw is depriving would be insurgents of their principal target, and the TFG is not enough of a threat to require an organized insurgency. The current violence is an admixture of armed criminality, sporadic clan-based resistance to the TFG, warlord adventurism, and Islamist resistance. Of these, the latter two will be most difficult to contain. The warlords have a vested interest in creating lawlessness and blocking the TFG; the Islamists have a vested interest in blocking the TFG before setting up their own administration again, at which point their alliance of convenience with the warlords will again turn into an armed rivalry.

The dissolution of the UIC as an organization should not be confused with the fate of political Islam in Somalia. Political Islam remains an ascendant and diverse movement in the country and will play a role in any future political dispensation in Somalia. Treating all Somali Islamists as radicals or al-Qaeda associates would be a serious error.

The unexpected internal collapse of the UIC revealed deep fissures in the movement between moderates and radicals, and exposed the extent to which hard-liners lost support of their core constituencies by pursuing confrontation and jihad with Ethiopia. The fact that business and clan leaders in Mogadishu insisted that the Islamists not wage a destructive insurgency in Mogadishu offers hope that Mogadishu-based groups are keen to protect investments there and avoid war, and may as a result be more open to dialog. The failure of the hard-line Islamists offers lessons about the fate of any political authority in Somalia that opts to embrace authoritarianism, concentrates power in the hands of a few, and is noninclusive.

One of the most important questions emerging from the UIC's collapse in December 2006 is whether and in what form the Islamist movement is likely to regroup.

In the past, setbacks to Islamist movements in Somalia have led them to assimilate back into the local community and remain a loose network of “alumni” until conditions improve. In current conditions, however, the worry is that remnants of the jihadist militia known as the shabaab will regroup in cells and launch terrorist attacks and assassination attempts both inside Somalia and against soft western targets in the region. It is impossible to know if many or any of these radicalized young shabaab members will engage in terrorist acts. But we have learned in Somalia that a small number of committed jihadists have the potential to produce an enormous amount of fear and instability.

Aside from a handful of warlords, state collapse is not in anyone’s best interest in Somalia. Most Somali households and businesses would obviously benefit from revived central government; Ethiopia and Kenya would prefer to have a moderate and functional government on their long borders with Somalia; and the United States would prefer to have an effective government partner to monitor and prevent terrorist activities inside Somalia. But while state collapse is no one’s first choice for Somalia, it is almost everyone’s second choice. Ethiopia, the United States, and many Somali businesses and political leaders have learned to cope with and adapt to a condition of state collapse in Somalia. This is dangerous, because it means that if efforts at reconciliation and state-building become too onerous or risky, many interested parties will be willing to walk away and allow Somalia to revert to a state of collapse.

This latter point has special implications for the subcommittee’s stated aim in this hearing, the promotion of a comprehensive strategy for Somalia. In the past, U.S. counterterrorism activities and its stated aim of promoting state-building in Somalia tended to be delinked and at times even worked at cross-purposes. Though calls to “deconflict” state-building and counterterrorism policies were made, the two remained largely separate enterprises until recently. Since revival of an effective state authority in Somalia is an essential component of our long-term efforts to combat terrorism in the country, this really amounts to a tension between short-term versus long-term counterterrorism measures. Our short-term measures—working through nonstate actors to monitor and apprehend foreign terror suspects in Somalia—were questionable in their effectiveness, and in the process created incentives for militia leaders to block state-building efforts that would in effect put them out of business. If the TFG fails to consolidate control over Mogadishu, the United States will again face worrisome short-term threats that the city could provide a safe haven for foreign terrorists, and will be tempted again to contract with local nonstate partners in the capital. I would submit to the honorable members of the subcommittee that progress toward a comprehensive strategy for Somalia must find a way to resolve this tension between short-term and long-term counterterrorism goals.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Doctor, for that excellent, if troubling, report.

Dr. Morrison, thank you for your tremendous patience and for your work in this area. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. MORRISON. Thank you very much, Senator.

I would request that my full statement be entered into the record.

Senator FEINGOLD. Without objection.

Dr. MORRISON. I’m going to speak briefly, drawing on the January 17 conference that we organized with the U.S. Institute of Peace and with the Council on Foreign Relations, at which you, Senator, honored us by kicking that off.

The most fundamental challenge, it seems to me, for U.S. policy right now is how to proceed with realism and caution and patience, and how to blend or integrate the hard counterterrorism equities that we have there with the softer equities that we have in getting a broadened compact negotiated for governance in Somalia, for

meeting the dire humanitarian needs and beginning some reconstruction.

Right now, there is no clear vision, and there is no strong inter-agency process that brings those two pieces of the hard and soft together. There's quite a bit of imbalance in the approach. And there's quite a bit of confusion and suspicion, within the region and beyond, around U.S. intentions. So, in terms of defining a strategy and a policy, this is, I believe, the core challenge before us.

There are a couple of other key dimensions that I think need highlighting. One is, not only is establishing a viable governing system the sine qua non of progress, and has to be the top priority, but we need to consciously and systematically prepare for at least an interim failure in the near term. This is a—you know, the probabilities are so strong in that regard.

Second is, we should not allow ourselves to become obsessed with chasing after an 8,000-person AU force, when the signs are all there that, at best, we're going to see a modest deployment that will probably be concentrated in and around Mogadishu.

Third, we need to move quickly to strengthen U.S. diplomatic capacities and to enlarge the leadership that we can exercise, particularly in the Security Council.

On the key findings that we have identified, that I think should guide policy, one is that there is great uncertainty surrounding what is happening on the ground and within the region with respect to the Islamist movement. That means we need to intensify our analyses and engagement.

Second, the TFG continues to lack capacity and legitimacy, and has a high probability of folding.

Third, the TFG has, thus far, failed to enlarge its governing coalition, and is moving in that direction, and our leverage on that score, we need to reexamine and be much more creative in how we can move the TFG.

Fourth, the Mogadishu security has deteriorated since the removal of the security network provided by the Islamist Courts, and we have to assume that that trend line will continue.

Fifth, the Ethiopians are withdrawing. They are a lightning rod within Mogadishu. And their withdrawal will create gaps and will stimulate a spike in violence within Mogadishu.

Sixth, Islamism remains popular and legitimate. It is a—it has a strong hand. It is fundamental to whatever governing coalition is going to emerge. And it can wait out the failures of current leadership.

Seventh, our counterterrorism strikes have put us into a strong strategic embrace with Ethiopia and the TFG. If we're going to counteract and distance ourselves from that, we need a diplomatic strategy that consciously seeks to do that.

Our recommendations are that, first of all, we—and this is consistent with what David and Ken have said—intensify the pressures upon the TFG to enlarge the governing coalition, make use of our access in Yemen and Kenya and elsewhere to the Islamist Court remnants, be very realistic about what we can achieve from an AU peacekeeping operation, intensify the Security Council engagement. And I would add there, the Chinese were very helpful in the early phase of putting through 1725, and can be, I believe,

helpful in that regard, if we were to turn to the Security Council to intensify its involvement. We should ensure that we have a robust and sustainable funding flow. And you've put forward, Senator, the idea of a trust fund. I think that's a laudable idea. I hope that can be moved forward. But key to our leverage and our ability to really move forward is getting much higher and more sustainable and predictable forces—flows of resources.

Fifth point, that we can—we have institutional capacities that we are expanding—the humanitarian operations we've heard a lot about today—and those are very laudable. We can add to those expanded work in health and education, in making greater use of the combined joint task force of the Horn of Africa, for a number of constructive operations, and by intensifying our analytic capacities.

I agree that we need—have a need for a senior-level figure to manage the interagency and ride the circuit at a senior level within the region and in Europe. This person can complement and greatly augment our capacities. I would add also that Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte can play a very important role here in making Somalia a part of his portfolio as he begins his work.

Last point is that we can encourage, within the United States, greater unity among the Somalia diaspora community. That community has been very exuberant, but remains divided. It is seeking to unify itself this month. It is making a significant play in that regard. Remittances are estimated at as high as \$1 billion per year to Somalia from the diaspora. This is an influential, highly gifted and talented community, which is moving toward unity, and we should be very strategic in how we make use of that.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Morrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

Senator Feingold, Africa Subcommittee chairman, and Senator Sununu, ranking minority, I commend you both for holding this timely hearing, and I thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the discussions here today.

When we last gathered here, on July 11, 2006, it was to discuss what the U.S. strategy should be toward Somalia, after the Islamist courts had routed the U.S.-backed warlord coalition in May 2006. Six months later, we are gathered to consider what strategy makes sense now that the courts have been vanquished by the Ethiopians, with U.S. support.

The wheel has certainly turned, and U.S. engagement has been enlarged conspicuously on several fronts, following a fallow period of virtual nonengagement dating back to the spring of 1994.

Diplomatically, Secretary Rice has herself weighed in directly at key moments, while Assistant Secretary Frazer has been very active in Washington, in the Horn of Africa, and in Europe. Materially, the administration put on the table a \$40 million assistance package for Somalia that for the first time in over 12 years reintroduces U.S. commitments to peacekeeping, reconstruction, and development in Somalia. On the security front, U.S. forces have been engaged directly in the air and on the ground in targeting terror suspects implicated in the August 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the November 2002 attacks on an Israeli tourist hotel and airliner. In combination, these constitute a dramatic shift in the U.S. posture toward Somalia.

We also see heightened interest in Somalia in other settings. Congress, thanks in no small measure to your leadership, Senator Feingold, has become very active on a promising bipartisan basis in support of expanded U.S. leadership on Somalia. The U.S. media and the U.S.-based Somali diaspora community have each become highly engaged. Here in Washington, the Center for Strategic and International

Studies, in partnership with the U.S. Institute for Peace and the Council on Foreign Relations, launched in the fall of 2006 a very active Working Group on Somalia, as a direct outgrowth of the SFRC African Subcommittee July 2006 hearing, and with the support of your able staff, Grey Frandsen.

The CSIS Working Group's January 17 conference, at which Senator Feingold, Assistant Secretary Frazer, several prominent Mogadishu and Kenya-based experts spoke, was attended by over 200 and widely reported in the media. Its success hinged also on the contributions made by my colleagues at CSIS, most notably John Hamre, Jennifer Cooke, and David Henek, and generous input from David Smock, U.S. Institute for Peace, Princeton Lyman, Council on Foreign Relations, and Howard Wolpe, Woodrow Wilson International Center. The body of my testimony today is a distillation of what was learned at the January 17 conference.

Before I turn to the January 17 conference, I wish to emphasize that in several important respects, what was needed in July 2006 in terms of a U.S. strategy is still very much needed today. What is different is the visibility and urgency of what is required.

Most fundamentally, the United States continues to be under pressure to define a coherent strategy that is grounded in realism, caution, and patience. It continues to lack a clear vision backed by a functioning interagency process that bridges the United States "hard" counterterrorism equities with its "soft" power interests in promoting a negotiated, broadened compact for governing Somalia, meeting dire humanitarian needs, and beginning reconstruction efforts. As in other parts of the world where U.S. counterterrorism interests are strongly at play, it is becoming clear in the Somalia context just how operationally difficult it is to integrate effectively the "hard" and "soft" dimensions of U.S. influence and to explain how those fit within multilateral processes. Much more can, and should be done in this critical sphere. So long as integration between "hard" and "soft" is lacking, there will be substantial confusion in the region and beyond regarding U.S. intentions.

Similarly, we continue to confront the profound weaknesses of the internal parties in Somalia and the urgent need to systematically test the Transitional Federal Government and to engage and test representatives of the Islamic courts. Establishing viable governance within Somalia remains the sine qua non for future progress. Our diplomatic presence inside Somalia is nil, but we do have important access to Somali leaders, including Islamists in Kenya and elsewhere, and we have the ability to lay out how U.S. support can be structured to support improved governance.

Although there is very active planning and discussion around the possible future deployment of an African Union 8,000 person force to replace the Ethiopian military, the picture today is not substantially different from July. There is simply little prospect that an external African Union force will enter Somalia soon that will be able to shape the security situation on the ground substantially. We need to think and focus our actions on priorities such as security in and around Mogadishu, and avoid chasing an unrealizable goal that distracts us from what is really feasible and urgently required.

As in July, the United States continues to need stronger U.S. diplomatic capacities and enhanced leadership in multilateral channels, especially the U.N. Security Council. An integral part of that continues to be the need for a broad and aggressive diplomatic effort aimed at expanding the Somali Contact Group and pressuring Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Emirates, Egypt, and Eritrea to curb materiel and financial support to radical Islamists and warlords.

OUTCOMES OF THE JANUARY 17 CONFERENCE AT CSIS

On January 17, 2007, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in collaboration with the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center, hosted a major conference in Washington, DC, titled "Somalia's Future: Options for Diplomacy, Assistance, and Peace Operations." The conference brought together expert observers from Mogadishu, senior U.S. policymakers, representatives from humanitarian assistance organizations, and regional analysts to convey to a U.S. audience the current situation in Somalia and lay out the challenges before the United States and the broader international community.

Conference participants agreed there is a window of opportunity for the United States, in collaboration with Somalis and the broader international community, to effect positive change in Somalia, but that this window may close in the near future. After 12 years of policy disengagement that followed the failed U.S. military intervention of 1993, the United States has an opportunity to forge a forward-looking, comprehensive strategy to address immediate security concerns and the longer term threat of regional instability. In your opening speech at the conference, Senator

Feingold, you summarized the challenge: “We cannot allow our past to overshadow the pressing security concerns we face in the [Horn of Africa] today. We have an opportunity to help the Somali people dig themselves out of almost two decades of chaos and to strengthen U.S. national security at the same time. But if our government does not move quickly and aggressively on all fronts, we can be sure Somalia will continue to be a haven for terrorist networks and a source of instability that poses a direct threat to the United States.”

KEY FINDINGS: THE SITUATION IN MOGADISHU

1. *Great uncertainty persists.* Regional experts and speakers from Somalia described the great uncertainty that currently pervades Mogadishu and the highly tenuous position of the newly empowered Transitional Federal Government. Major unknowns include the possible emergence of a dual insurgency, emanating at once from alienated clan militias and from ideologically driven “jihadi” fighters, remnants of the radical core of the defeated Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Unclear also is the nature of links between the UIC’s radical leadership, now dispersed in southern Somalia, Kenya, and the Saudi Peninsula, and Islamist networks within Mogadishu.

2. *The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) continues to lack capacity and legitimacy.* It is unpopular and fragile, and today sits precariously in Mogadishu, installed and protected by Ethiopian military forces, who have indicated their intent to withdraw within weeks and reportedly begun that process in earnest. The conditions that allowed the Islamic courts to emerge and win local support in Mogadishu—notably the alienation of the Hawiye clan from the structures of the TFG and the utter lack of security and basic services—today remain very much intact.

3. *The TFG has thus far failed to enlarge its governing coalition.* It is internally fractured, and has sent decidedly mixed signals on its willingness to broaden its base of support and legitimacy. Its leadership has held some consultations with clan elders, members of civil society, and former Somali Presidents, and TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed has recently committed to a national reconciliation conference, but there is little evidence that these consultations have resulted in an enlarged governing coalition.

The dismissal on January 17 of Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, who opposed Ethiopia’s military intervention and called for talks with former leaders of the UIC, does not bode well for unity and tolerance within the TFG or broader reconciliation with remnants of the Islamist movement. The TFG’s imposition of martial law, temporary closure of media outlets, and forceful disarmament of local residents, has left Mogadishu residents uncertain and nervous. As yet the government has not made a clear distinction between those among the UIC leadership whom it considers criminal and the many residents of Mogadishu who supported the courts for their security and services they provided.

4. *Mogadishu’s security has deteriorated since the removal of the security network created by the Islamic courts.* Targeted killings, abductions, and revenge killings are reportedly on the rise. Mogadishu residents, their expectations raised by the success of the courts in providing local security, now look to the TFG for an equivalent level of order. The TFG is currently incapable of providing security, and, until it can forge some agreement with local Mogadishu groups, must rely on Ethiopian or other external forces who may be introduced in the future to replace departing Ethiopian troops. The greatest potential flash point for conflict remains in Mogadishu, and success or failure of stabilization efforts there will determine Somalia’s future.

5. *Ethiopian forces have not created the basis for security.* They are a lightning rod. The presence of Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu is highly divisive, and even if they currently provide some level of security, the longer they remain in large numbers, the more they will generate popular antagonism and resentment. Ethiopia, having successfully eliminated its principal security threat by vanquishing the UIC, has little stake in the longer, more difficult task of stabilizing Mogadishu. Given Ethiopia’s eagerness to leave and the difficulty of quickly mustering adequate numbers of African Union troops, the handover of security operations will be fraught with risk and difficulty.

6. *Islamism remains popular and legitimate, and will be essential to any stable governing arrangements.* Although the UIC as a political entity has dissolved, political Islam remains very much alive and will need to be accorded a role in deciding Somalia’s future political dispensation. Islamic charities, businesses, and networks remain among the most robust and enduring. Mogadishu clan and business networks could become significant spoilers in the reconciliation process, but could also become powerful allies in restoring basic core services and local authority.

7. *U.S. counterterror strikes and the U.S. embrace of Ethiopia are highly controversial and have high costs at the popular level within Somalia and across the region.* Still at large are the three “high-value” al-Qaeda associates accused of organizing the 1998 Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the 2003 hotel and airline attacks in Mombasa, Kenya. The three were allegedly given shelter by UIC leadership and were the principal targets of two successive U.S. air strikes in southern Somalia in January 2007. The status of current U.S. efforts to track down these three individuals and their supporters is unclear, but the air strikes have confirmed in the minds of many Somalis and regional actors that a close strategic alliance exists among the United States, Ethiopia, and the TFG, and that U.S. security interests predominate, at the expense of “soft” interests such as reaching a negotiated internal compact, and addressing humanitarian and reconstruction needs. For this reason, U.S. air strikes remain highly controversial, both in Somalia and among European partners, and feed regional suspicions of U.S. intentions, motives, and commitment to long-term stability. An aggressive U.S. diplomatic strategy will be essential to counteract these sentiments.

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

High risks of regression. The United States, in concert with other Western, African, and Middle East powers, will need to act quickly to avert worst case scenarios: An absolute vacuum of authority in Mogadishu; a dual insurgency led by clan militias and “jihadi” extremists; a worsening humanitarian catastrophe; and regional destabilization. But the United States will also need to be cautious in sequencing and calibrating actions for greatest effect.

Humility and overcoming constraints. Further, the United States will need to approach Somalia with a degree of humility. After a decade of disengagement, the United States operates from a tremendous deficit, in terms of policy, institutional capacities, credibility, and leverage over key players. It lacks real-time knowledge and enduring relationships on the ground, and has no full-time senior-level leadership in Washington or the region charged with directing policy. Beyond humanitarian assistance, which has averaged \$90 million annually and sustains approximately 700,000 Somalis, the U.S. Government has lacked serious funding to leverage its aims in Somalia, although the commitment by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for an initial downpayment of \$40 million to support security operations, humanitarian assistance, and state development is a promising opening for expanded engagement and high-level attention.

Priorities for U.S. policy in the near term will be to:

1. *Press the Transitional Federal Government to resolve its internal differences and to begin immediately a genuine process of dialog and reconciliation*

A first priority must be to create internal governing structures that have some prospect of hope and legitimacy. The United States and its international partners must make clear that confidence in—and support for—the TFG will hinge on a demonstrated commitment to build and broaden its base of support, and begin a process of reconciliation with those groups who have been alienated and excluded. There are local authorities within Mogadishu—the business community, clans, local Islamic courts and charities—who can assist the TFG in rebuilding security and basic services and reassuring local residents. The TFG cannot afford to alienate these groups and should make every effort to earn their cooperation.

U.S. leverage resides not only in its promise of institutional and security support for the TFG, but also in U.S. access and ongoing dialog with Nairobi-based elements of the UIC leadership, in particular Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, former chair of the Executive Council of Islamic Courts. The U.S. Government has made clear to the TFG that it considers Sheik Sharif a moderate who can play a vital role in reconciling Somali factions.

2. *Maintain realistic expectations of an African-Union-led peacekeeping operation*

No amount of external peacekeeping forces will have a chance of success in Mogadishu unless a genuine and credible process of reconciliation and political dialog is under way. Mogadishu’s best hope for security hinges on the TFG’s success in winning cooperation from local clans and business networks to provide a modicum of authority and order. In the absence of clearly defined conditions or a genuine political dialog by the TFG, African Union forces will fuel popular resentment and possibly feed an incipient insurgency. Even a full contingent of 8,000 AU troops will be spread very thin in Mogadishu and will be at strong risk of failure and attack. The international community must remain highly sensitive to this fact as it urges African countries to contribute personnel.

Mounting an adequate AU peacekeeping force will not happen quickly, even in the best of circumstances, and the international community should be prepared for the possibility of a sharp spike in violence in Mogadishu, should there be a gap between Ethiopian withdrawal and AU deployment. The African Union, the international community, and the Somali people will need a clear and common understanding of the mandate, mission, and scope of the operation, which must be achievable both militarily and politically. The African Union is not likely to be able to muster the full 8,000 personnel any time soon, and even with the full contingent will need to set clear and achievable priorities for deployment. Efforts must be centered in Mogadishu, and within the city may have to be limited to protecting critical infrastructures.

3. Urge the U.N. Security Council to elevate Somalia as a priority and identify an overarching diplomatic structure that can convene all relevant international players

The United States should urge the U.N. Security Council and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to refocus its attention on Somalia, elaborating the commitments outlined in U.N. Resolution 1725, reenergizing the Somalia Panel of Experts, and making clear to the TFG its expectations for dialog and governance. The United States should also urge the expansion of the International Contact Group for Somalia to bring in international partners who have the necessary clout, commitment, and neutrality to be helpful. A number of Arab countries, notably Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, have considerable leverage in Somalia and longstanding engagement in the social services sector. Currently Tanzania is the only African member of the International Contact Group, and both the African Union and League of Arab States have observer status. International efforts will need careful coordination, and the United States for the time being will need to play a discreet but transparent role.

4. Ensure robust and sustainable resources to back expanded U.S. engagement

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has committed an initial \$40 million for Somalia, a small amount in the context of Somalia's requirements, but nonetheless a strong signal that the United States is overcoming a decade of entrenched aversion and is prepared to actively reengage. Over time, however, there will be a need for reliable and secure funding flows in order for the U.S. Government to leverage its long-term policy aid. Senator Feingold has suggested a Somalia "trust fund" to support disarmament and demobilization efforts, infrastructure projects, capacity-building and jobs creation. This model could help ensure a sustained and predictable support flow for Somali reconstruction that will endure beyond the current spike in public and administration attention to Somalia.

5. Build U.S. institutional capacities

Policymakers should take advantage of the current resurgence of interest in Somalia and the convergence of opinion between the State Department and Congress to build U.S. capacities for a sustained and comprehensive approach to Somalia. A first step should be to significantly expand Somalia-specific analytic and reporting capacity in the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. The United States should engage the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in training, security sector reform, capacity-building, police training and maritime security, although clearly this will need to be done carefully and in close coordination with other U.S. agencies and international partners. The United States can increase its humanitarian flows and work to enhance the coordination of international humanitarian efforts, leveraging the enduring networks, legitimacy, and community reach of a number of operating agencies. Finally, the United States can increase its investment in longer term institution-building: In health, education, local authorities, and those elements of the TFG that demonstrate some commitment to inclusivity and service delivery.

6. Appoint a senior-level figure to coordinate U.S. policy efforts

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, has devoted considerable attention and energy to the crisis in Somalia, as has U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger. Their efforts and energy are to be commended and should be bolstered by the appointment of a senior-level figure to manage U.S. inter-agency efforts and cooperation with international partners on a day-to-day basis. The stakes for U.S. interests are sufficiently high, and the diplomatic circumstances more than adequately complex to warrant the appointment of a fully empowered and resourced coordinator who will report to the Assistant Secretary. Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, should add the Horn of Africa to his priority regions for engagement and transformational diplomacy.

7. Encourage unity within the U.S. Somali diaspora

The Somali diaspora within the United States is well-placed and eager to play a significant role in rebuilding a stable and secure Somalia. Some sources estimate that remittances to Somalia from the diaspora community worldwide may be as high as \$1 billion annually. And as demonstrated at the CSIS conference, the diaspora community remains highly engaged and passionate about Somalia's future. In many ways clan divisions in Somalia are reflected in U.S. diaspora communities. But many Somali Americans clearly grasp that no one clan or grouping can dominate the Somali political scene for long and that only through broad-based coalitions is there the possibility of sustained peace. There are a number of efforts currently under way to bridge the divisions among diaspora communities. Should the Somali diaspora community come together behind a common set of priorities and goals, they could prove a powerful force in moving and sustaining effective U.S. engagement in Somalia.

Senators Feingold and Sununu, I am grateful for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you today, and am grateful for the leadership and interest you have shown on this important matter. Somalia and the Horn of Africa matter significantly in multiple ways to U.S. national interests, and Congress is well-positioned to help enhance the good the United States can achieve in the Horn, and to avoid the mistakes of the past. I hope my comments have been helpful, and look forward to continuing to collaborate closely with you and your staff.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Dr. Morrison.

I've attended a lot of hearings of this subcommittee in 15 years. This is one of the most useful and best panels I've heard, and I thank you.

Let me ask a couple of questions, although the hour is late.

You know, Dr. Morrison, you basically anticipated the first question that I want all three of you to answer. I take you as having essentially just endorsed the idea of a special envoy for Somalia. Let me ask Dr. Shinn and Dr. Menkhaus their response on that, in light of Secretary Frazer's comments today.

Ambassador SHINN. Thank you, Senator. I strongly support the idea. I know John Yates personally. He's a good personal friend of mine. We joined the Foreign Service together. He's a very fine officer. The fact is, though, that he is not a special envoy. And, as I understand it, and listening to Assistant Secretary Frazer this morning, he reports to Ambassador Rannenberger, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, who is preoccupied with Kenyan affairs. So, you do not, in fact, have someone who is independently, or semi-independently, engaged full time on Somali affairs. And I think this is an ideal location to do just that. Normally, I'm not enthusiastic about special envoys, because they tend to conflict with Ambassadors on the ground. But, in this case, you have no State Department personnel in Somalia, and there is no prospect for conflict.

Senator FEINGOLD. Excellent.

Dr. Menkhaus.

Dr. MENKHAUS. I agree.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. Dr. Shinn, where do U.S. and EU objectives and priorities in Somalia overlap? And what are the most significant areas of divergence?

Ambassador SHINN. I think, in a general sense, they pretty much overlap. I think where the divergence comes is that the European Union, as Assistant Secretary Frazer implied, has been much stronger on pushing the idea on the Transitional Federal Government that they must be more all-encompassing in terms of whom they bring inside that government. And at one point, the European Union said it would not provide any funding to the TFG unless the TFG did engage in a reconciliation process. President Abdullahi

Yusuf said that he would start a reconciliation effort. He has done that. But it remains to be seen whether it's meaningful or not. That's the key. It's one thing to go through the motions; it's quite another to be serious about power-sharing, about revamping, if necessary, Parliament, reducing the number of Ministries from some-50 to what probably ought to be about a dozen for Somalia, and making sure that you have technically competent people in the jobs.

Senator FEINGOLD. So, you implied that the African Union peace-keeping force, as currently envisioned and authorizes, is unrealistic. What do you see as the minimum level of resources, mandate, and deployment timetable necessary to stabilize Somalia in the short and medium term? And do you think this minimum can be achieved? By when? What needs to happen?

Ambassador SHINN. Short of creating a broadbased Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, I, frankly, don't see it working. I think that's the bottom line. The first step is to have a government that is all-encompassing. Once you have that, then the rest, I think, will flow naturally, and I think you will have much less resistance from the Ayr sub-sub clan of the Habr Gedir sub-clan and the Hawiye clan. I think you will have less resistance from the warlords who still have a power role in Mogadishu. I think you will have more enthusiasm from the businessmen in Mogadishu to support such a government. But I'm not sure that there is any number of AMISOM troops that is going to be able to secure all of Somalia. At the height of UNITAF, the American-led operation, there were 25,000 troops there. Some of them, admittedly, were offshore. Even UNOSOM had far more than 8,000. And we all know the difficulties that they had. They had the most highly sophisticated equipment known to military forces around the world. We're asking African units, fairly lightly armed, to go in and do something that both UNITAF and UNOSOM had a great difficulty doing.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Dr. Menkhaus, you've written that, "The United States must not allow support for counterterrorism efforts abroad to become"—and I appreciate your blunt language—"a meal ticket for leaders in failed states." How can we prevent this in Somalia and the larger Horn of Africa region, where corruption and the lack of transparency are obviously common?

Dr. MENKHAUS. Well, for starters, again, by pushing for more accountable, transparent good governance in these governments, including the TFG. There has been a tendency to use the counterterrorism card to try to solicit our unconditional support. And I think one of the messages in the panel today is that support to the TFG does very much have to be conditional.

Beyond that, there is an interesting and important problem that we haven't spoken about directly, related to counterterrorism and our partners in counterterrorism, monitoring on the Horn of Africa, and that is to say that we all agree that a strong, robust state as a partner in counterterrorism is essential as a long-term goal. But we also know that that state-building capacity will take a long time to build up. In the meantime, we'll have a transitional phase in which this government is weak, in which it will be easily penetrated, in which, ironically, foreign terrorists will probably be able

to better exploit Somalia, rather than less able to exploit Somalia. The fact is, Somalia today, as a more or less de facto collapsed state, is not a very conducive environment for many terrorist activities. They actually prefer Mombasa or other places in the region.

We have to have a strategy that will simultaneously allow us to build up that state capacity to monitor criminal and terrorist activities in the country while preventing terrorists from exploiting that transition period. And I think the answer in Somalia is community policing. Somalis, at the community level, know what's going on in their neighborhoods, they know what's going on in their districts. They often know before we do where we're driving, because our driver knows. They're—it's difficult to keep secrets there, but that presumes that the community feels that it's a stakeholder in counterterrorism monitoring, and that it has a functional relationship with the state. And that's been what's been missing for a long time.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. What was your reaction to Secretary Frazer's answers to my questions about how to define the Islamic Courts and about who should or should not be part of the political reconciliation process?

Dr. MENKHAUS. Political Islam is ascendant in Somalia, and if we demonize or criminalize all of them, if we imply that they're all linked to al-Qaeda, as some members in the TFG have tried to do, we run the very strong risk of eliminating a very important and potentially constructive force in Somalia.

We've really been talking—in terms of the foreign al-Qaeda suspects that we have been worrying about, those high-value targets, we're talking about a very small number of people. Three is the number that most often comes to mind. And the handful of Somalis that we've designated as terrorists are also very small. We have to be careful about the lack of proportionality in our policies in pursuit of that small number of people. A lot of pottery was broken in the pottery barn in Mogadishu over the past—over the past few months. A very effective government was overturned in Mogadishu. And we are, rightly or wrongly, held responsible by the Mogadishu community for that.

So, I would argue that we need to, first of all, allow Somalis to make that determination of who represents them in their political fora. We have to recognize that will take on more of an Islamist flavor. And, again, as long as they renounce violence and terrorism, I see no reason not to allow them to participate.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I think that's a thoughtful answer. And clearly if anybody is al-Qaeda, we have to pursue them, and have to pursue them vigorously. But let us not overdefine the characteristics of somebody in a way that would prevent us from reaching out to people who may not be committed to that course at all. I think this is one of the most important questions internationally, and Somalia is a great example.

Dr. MORRISON, how has the security threat or threats that Somalia poses to the United States changed since your last testimony, in July? Has the situation improved, worsened, or just changed?

Dr. MORRISON. Well, the advent of the courts—when we were last together in July, it was at the front end, and it wasn't clear

which direction they were moving. The formation and dominance of the Shabaab in the intervening period, and the escalation of its rhetoric, vis-a-vis the surrounding region, and the threats toward the Ethiopians, the provocations, and the like, and the reports that came forward in the fall around the amalgam of seven or eight sovereign countries, along with Hezbollah, that were professing their support, materially and financially and diplomatically, of the hardcore jihadi elements within the Islamist Courts—these developments were very serious ones. And I think they accounted for the response of the Ethiopians, and drove much of the response of the United States, in partner—in this strategic partnership.

The Shabaab, it would seem to me, has been decimated and scattered. The threat within the boundaries on the soil of Somalia is uncertain, but I do not see it as grave and resurgent. I think it bears careful watching. I emphasized in my comments that there's considerable uncertainty around the nature of the—of an Islamist insurgency and the possibility of a resurgent jihadi element. Also within the region, in Yemen, in Saudi Arabia, in Eritrea, and elsewhere, there are elements there which have every incentive to seek to strike new deals with al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliated organizations. And that is a serious consideration, and one that bears very close watch here.

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, could you go into further detail about the impact that the AC-130 attacks in Somalia could have on the broader political efforts in Mogadishu? Does it impact our credibility and our work throughout the region?

Dr. MORRISON. Well, I—it creates a very strong hostility—a broaden—it has had the impact of broadening this—the suspicion and hostility toward the United States. Whether this was fully warranted or not, that has been one of the impacts. And in some ways that was predictable. The legacy of the U.S. engagement in the early 1990s, and the abrupt withdrawal after the debacle of October 1993, there was a sense of abandonment. There's a sense now within the general population that the interest in counterterrorism and arms strikes by air and on land dominate the U.S. set of concerns at the expense of concerns with reconstruction, with political accommodation, with the humanitarian response. And that's what I mean about the need for a counterbalance or a recalibration of the approach that would integrate the hard and soft. Our counterterrorism equities are real in this part of the world, and are going to continue to be real, and are going to continue to require a response and systematic strategy. But we also have to much better manage what the fallout is, and protect the softer side of the agenda, which remains integral to getting Somalia out of its current mess.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I thank all of you for your expertise and your patience. This has been a long, but, I think, very worthwhile, hearing.

And that concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JENDAYI FRAZER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Question. You mentioned in your testimony that there were six people at Embassy Nairobi working solely on Somalia full time. When did each of them arrive in Nairobi? How many of them are there on temporary duty assignments? What are the exact responsibilities of each of them?

Answer. There are four full-time American employees and two Foreign Service Nationals working on Somalia at Embassy Nairobi. Since January 2007, retired Ambassador John Yates has served as Counselor for Somali Affairs and as the head of Embassy Nairobi's Somalia Unit in close coordination with Ambassador Ranneberger. The three other American employees working on Somalia are mid-level officers, including an FS-02 Political Officer. The two remaining permanent mid-level Foreign Service positions, including an FS-02 Public Diplomacy Officer and an FS-03 Political/Economic Officer, have been established and these new officers are scheduled to arrive in summer 2007.

As a temporary measure until these new officers arrive, two other officers are on temporary duty assignments that began in January 2007. The Foreign Service National employees working on Somalia include one specializing in Public Affairs and another responsible for Political Affairs.

Question. Secretary Rice announced \$40 million in assistance for Somalia last month, \$14 million of which, Congress is told, will be used for peacekeeping. You mentioned in your testimony that the administration is seeking an additional \$40 million for peacekeeping in Somalia as part of the FY07 emergency supplemental. How much does the administration project the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia will cost per month? How long will the AU mission be in place before the United Nations will take over? How much more will we be contributing to the mission?

Answer. The African Union is in the process of developing their plan for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The AU is still soliciting Troop Contributing Countries, developing their concept of operations and identifying exact tasks they are going to accomplish. Without more information, it is difficult to estimate the costs for conducting the mission. Our rough initial estimated costs are \$50 million for the first 6 months and between \$150 and \$200 million for the first year of operations.

On February 20, 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopted UNSC Resolution 1744 to authorize the African Union to conduct peacekeeping operations in Somalia. As a part of that resolution the UNSC requested the U.N. Secretary General to send a Technical Assessment Mission to the African Union and Somalia. The Technical Assessment Mission will report back to the UNSC within 60 days with a recommendation for U.N. involvement, including a possible U.N. Peacekeeping Operation. The African Union has stated that it intends to conduct a 6-month mission before transitioning to a U.N. mission.

The Department has identified \$19.6 million in PKO and GPOI funding (\$5.6 million above \$14 million previously announced) to support the African Union in its initial deployment. Additionally, the Department of State has requested an additional \$128 million for the PKO account in the FY07 emergency supplemental for peacekeeping and stability operations in Somalia and Chad, of which an estimated \$40 million would be used for Somalia. The Department has requested that these be 2-year funds with transferability to the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities account to provide the necessary flexibility to pay the assessed costs of U.N. peacekeeping missions should they be established in Somalia and/or Chad.

Question. During your testimony you stated that the United States is ready to assist the Ugandans with deployment as soon as the Ugandan Parliament approves sending troops to Somalia. What contingency plans has the African Union made should the troops deployed under Phase I need to be evacuated or reinforced? Have we committed to helping evacuate Ugandan troops if need be? Are the military advisors we have in Kampala going to deploy to Somalia with the Ugandan troops?

Answer. The African Union (AU) has not yet finalized the plans for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), including any contingency plans should AU troops require evacuation. However, we expect contingency evacuation to be a part of the eventual plan. Neither the African Union nor Uganda has requested U.S. assistance in providing evacuation, and we are not committed to evacuating Ugandan troops at this time. There are no plans for U.S. military advisors to deploy to Somalia.

Question. How, if at all, will the need for troops to serve as part of the mission in Somalia affect the ability of the African Union to garner additional troops for deployment to Darfur, Sudan?

Answer. In our efforts to resolve conflicts across the African Continent, the task of generating peacekeeping forces has become increasingly difficult. Several countries already involved in peacekeeping operations across Africa, such as South Africa, have said that they will not be able to provide troops for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) due to existing peacekeeping commitments. However, the United States continues to urge the African Union to reach out to potential troop contributing countries and to galvanize support for much-needed equipment, training assistance, and funding for operational sustainment. We are working within the Department to coordinate outreach to potential troop contributing countries for various African peacekeeping missions, including Darfur and Somalia. In this regard, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program is a critical part of our strategy to expand the number and capabilities of African peacekeepers.

The deployment of a robust peacekeeping operation to Darfur remains a central policy priority for the Department. In Sudan, we continue to work with the United Nations, African Union, and international partners to press for a transition from an African Union mission to a hybrid AU/U.N. force. As part of a hybrid force, countries from outside of the African Continent will be able to contribute troops, thereby alleviating somewhat the need for African troop contributions.

