

AFGHANISTAN

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

MARCH 1, 2007

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AFGHANISTAN

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, Pryor, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Dole, Thune, and Martinez.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Mark R. Jacobson, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, research assistant; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.

Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; John Bonsell and Jeremy Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. First let me welcome our witnesses to this morning's hearing on Afghanistan. The committee will first hear from Ambassador Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, Director of Operations, J-3, of the Joint Staff. These witnesses will

be followed immediately by a second panel consisting of General Jim Jones, former Commander, United States European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; and Dr. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies at the Center for International Cooperation at New York University, where he heads up the Afghanistan Reconstruction Project.

Afghanistan under the Taliban provided a haven in which al Qaeda planned and trained for the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. While there are deep differences in Congress about the way forward in Iraq, I believe there is great unity behind doing everything that must be done militarily and economically to prevent Afghanistan from again providing a safe haven for terrorists.

The past year, however, has seen several alarming trends in Afghanistan and the border area with Pakistan. First, the security situation, particularly in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, has been steadily deteriorating. Overall attacks on coalition forces are up threefold in 2006 from the year before. The number of roadside bombs has almost doubled. Suicide attacks have jumped nearly fivefold from 2005 and large-scale operations by the Taliban in units of 50 or more combatants are up significantly as well. The past year was the most violent since 2001, and 2007 is expected to be no less violent.

Just as disturbing is the increase in insurgent attacks on coalition forces along the Afghan-Pakistan border. U.S. military officials reported a two- to three-fold increase in attacks along sections of Afghanistan's border with Pakistan within weeks after Pakistan signed an agreement with pro-Taliban militants in September of 2006 ceding control over Pakistan's North Waziristan border region, presumably in exchange for ending attacks on government officials and halting the cross-border movement of insurgents to Afghanistan. Instead, al Qaeda is reportedly establishing training camps again for terrorists within the border region.

A third disturbing trend over the past year is the Afghan people's growing loss of confidence in the institutions of government at the national level and below. A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) shows increasing discontent among the Afghan public with the Afghan government and a significant drop in their view of the government's legitimacy and effectiveness. The report attributes this decline to, "high levels of corruption and nepotism, the perception of the Karzai government as weak and ineffective, and the appointment of government officials connected to criminal networks, private militias, the drug trade, and human rights abuses."

A fourth worrisome trend is the growth of the narcotics trade and its corrupting influence. General Jones, who will testify later on the second panel, said in January that "The narcotics problem is affecting economic revival, it is providing money for the insurgency, it is contributing to the corruption of public officials, and prevents the emergence of the new Afghanistan." A November report released by the United Nations and the World Bank found that poppy cultivation increased 59 percent and opium production by 49 percent over the last year.

I hope our witnesses today can provide answers to a number of key questions regarding what we can do to help reverse these trends and to restore security, promote reconstruction, and build the legitimacy of the Afghan government and its institutions.

The United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and cooperating nations need to have a comprehensive strategy for providing security, stability, and democracy in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates at the Munich conference in early February stated that “The NATO allies agreed on the need for a comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan, combining a muscular military effort with effective support for governance, economic development, and counternarcotics.”

President Bush in a speech on February 15 announced a new strategy for Afghanistan focusing on building the capacity of Afghan security forces, strengthening NATO forces in Afghanistan, improving provincial governance and development, countering narcotics, and fighting corruption.

The question before us is whether this multifaceted strategy is sound, whether the United States, NATO, and the international community are willing to provide whatever resources are required to implement the strategy successfully, and if not what resources or policies need to be changed. For example, do we have the right plan for countering the growth of narcotics production in Afghanistan? Should U.S. and NATO forces have an explicit counternarcotics mission? Should the Karzai government be doing more?

Are the United States, NATO, and the international community sufficiently committed to the mission in Afghanistan? U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan are being increased to around 27,000, the highest level since 2001. NATO has made an unprecedented commitment to the mission in Afghanistan, the first major out-of-area operation in the alliance’s history. Our NATO allies have provided over 20,000 soldiers as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is deployed under a U.N. mandate. A number of our NATO allies have upped their commitment of troops or equipment in theater, including recently Britain, Poland, and Denmark. However, pledges of other NATO members to provide additional troops or equipment have not been met. What will it take to get those commitments honored?

Are restrictions imposed by NATO governments on their own troops, on the deployment or use of those troops in Afghanistan, hampering NATO operations and if so what more can be done to get those restrictions removed?

Is the reconstruction assistance being provided by the United States and our coalition partners sufficient to help the government of Afghanistan meet the needs of the Afghan people?

A final question that I hope our witnesses will address this morning is probably the most important question: How to address the threats to Afghanistan’s security posed by Taliban and al Qaeda extremists in Pakistan’s border areas? Why is Pakistan not doing more to eliminate the havens and the training camps? Also, what role is Iran playing in Afghanistan, particularly in the Shiite areas of the country? Are there regional strategies that should be pursued to promote security and stability within Afghanistan?

Let me conclude by thanking on behalf of the committee our service men and women who have served in Afghanistan over the last 5½ years, often on multiple tours. They have served courageously to bring security and hope to the Afghan people and to prevent that country from returning once again to being a haven for terrorists and fanatics. We owe them and their families our gratitude and our support.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Levin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Let me welcome our witnesses to this morning's hearing on Afghanistan. The committee will first hear from Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Lieutenant General Douglas E. Lute, Director of Operations, J-3, of the Joint Staff. These witnesses will be followed immediately by a second panel, consisting of General Jim Jones, former Commander, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe; and Dr. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies at the Center for International Cooperation at New York University where he heads up the Afghanistan Reconstruction project.

Afghanistan, under the Taliban, provided a haven in which al Qaeda planned and trained for the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. While there are deep differences in Congress about the way forward in Iraq, I believe there is great unity behind doing everything that must be done militarily and economically to prevent Afghanistan from again providing a safe haven for terrorists.

The past year, however, has seen several alarming trends in Afghanistan and the border area with Pakistan.

First, the security situation, particularly in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, has been steadily deteriorating. Overall attacks on coalition forces are up three fold in 2006 from the year before; the number of roadside bombs has almost doubled; suicide attacks have jumped nearly five fold from 2005; and large-scale operations by the Taliban—in units of 50 or more combatants—are up significantly as well. The past year was the most violent since 2001, and 2007 is expected to be no less violent.

Just as disturbing is the increase in insurgent attacks on coalition forces along the Afghan-Pakistan border. U.S. military officials reported a two- to three-fold increase in attacks along sections of Afghanistan's border with Pakistan within weeks after Pakistan signed an agreement with pro-Taliban militants in September 2006, ceding control over Pakistan's North Waziristan border region, presumably in exchange for ending attacks on government officials and halting the cross-border movement of insurgents to Afghanistan. Instead, al Qaeda is reportedly establishing training camps again for terrorists within the border region.

A third disturbing trend over the past year is the Afghan people's growing loss of confidence in the institutions of government, at the national level and below. A study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies released on February 23 shows increasing discontent among the Afghan public with the Afghan Government and a significant drop in their view of the government's legitimacy and effectiveness. The report attributes this decline to "high levels of corruption and nepotism," the perception of the Karzai Government as weak and ineffective, and the appointment of government officials connected to criminal networks, private militias, the drug trade, and human rights abuses.

A fourth worrisome trend is the growth of the narcotics trade and its corrupting influence. General Jim Jones, who will testify later on the second panel, said in January that the narcotics problem is affecting economic revival, "it's providing money for the insurgency; its contributing to the corruption of public officials and prevents the emergence of the new Afghanistan." A November report released by the United Nations and the World Bank found that poppy cultivation increased 59 percent and opium production by 49 percent over the last year.

I hope that our witnesses today can provide answers to a number of key questions regarding what we can do to help reverse these trends and to restore security, promote reconstruction, and build the legitimacy of the Afghan Government and its institutions.

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port for governance, economic development, and counternarcotics.” President Bush in a speech on February 15 announced a new strategy for Afghanistan, focusing on building the capacity of Afghan Security Forces, strengthening NATO forces in Afghanistan, improving provincial governance and development, countering narcotics, and fighting corruption. The question before us then is whether this multi-faceted strategy is sound, whether the United States, NATO, and the international community are willing to provide whatever resources are required to implement the strategy successfully, and if not, what resources or policies need to be changed.

For example, do we have the right plan for countering the growth of narcotics production in Afghanistan? Should U.S. and NATO forces have an explicit counternarcotics mission? Should the Karzai government be doing more?

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Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Might I ask that our colleague from Oklahoma be recognized for a few minutes? As ranking member of the Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee he must depart the hearing.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Warner.

This will be very brief. Let me mention that, to this committee, we have several members of this committee who are also members of EPW. I happen to be the ranking member of EPW and the second ranking member of this committee, and so it makes it very difficult. I would hope there is a way we could try to correct that so that we would be able to do our duties in both committees.

Let me just mention first of all to the Honorable Edelman who is here: You have a tough job. You and I talked about this when you were the Ambassador in Turkey. You follow, I think, a great man who was very unfairly treated in my opinion. I know that it is going to be difficult for you and I am hoping that as a result of that you are not going to be inhibited in any way of using information to the security of this country as you see fit.

I would say this with General Jones. I did not even recognize you sitting over there without your uniform on. I spent my 12th trip over to the area of responsibility (AOR) with General Jones and I just am so proud of the service that you have rendered and the things that you have taken, some unorthodox positions that were not popular at the time. I think with the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) problems that you and I have been trying to address together, I am hoping that you will remain active and using the expertise that you have shared with us for a long period of time.

I am very proud of what has happened over there. I happened to be over there when the Afghan National Army (ANA), they officially transferred the training of the ANA from us to themselves. They were doing a good job. I think that serves as a model perhaps for some of the things that are going on over there in Iraq. I might add also it is the Oklahoma Guard 45th that handled that, the training and that transfer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Chairman Levin, on behalf of the distinguished ranking member, Senator McCain, I shall put a statement in the record, but if I might just have a minute to add a comment or two of my own.

I welcome this distinguished panel of witnesses. I have had the privilege of working with each of them for a number of years. To my distinguished friend and colleague, General Jones, delighted to see that you carry on public service by coming here before Congress and in many other ways as you work your way back into the private sector. We thank you and your family, General.

I listened to the chairman carefully here, but I would like to put a positive note on Afghanistan. So much has been achieved in these few years. We have a freely elected and a democratic government, a legislature. It is a struggle and more needs to be done, but the criticality of this region is not just to the United States or the other coalition nations there with us, but it is to the whole world.

The chairman quite correctly addressed the poppy question. I have seen figures as high as 90 percent of the world's supply emanating from this area. That has to be addressed. General Jones, when you get up we will have the opportunity to cross-examine you on this. But the national caveats were of great concern to you at the time you were Supreme Commander. You made some progress, and let us hope that further progress can be made on that, because the actual troops themselves I think are anxious to do and accept equal risks. It is a problem back with the respective governments with regard to the orders that they receive. I note that Great Britain is going to send another contingent to Afghanistan and I expect that you will be addressing that. So there are a lot of very strong positive features, and we must support this government and its effort to continue to grow and strengthen and to meet the challenges, and I hope that our Nation will continue to do just that.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Chairman Levin, thank you for scheduling this important hearing.

I would like to welcome Ambassador Edelman and General Lute back to the committee.

Doctor Rubin, I would like to thank you for accepting the committee's invitation to appear today and share your experience and expertise in nation building and the regional affairs of Central Asia.

A special welcome to the now-retired General Jim Jones, the former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and the 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps. Our Nation has benefited greatly from your 40 years of distinguished service in uniform—not only to your own credit but to the credit of the men and women of the Marine Corps.

We look forward to the testimony of all of our witnesses today.

It has been a long 5½ years since the disbanding of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. In the intervening years, coalition and Afghan forces have made progress in some areas; however, the future of Afghanistan is still at risk.

The fighting in 2006 was fiercer than any time since Afghanistan's liberation, with an increase in coalition casualties from the previous year, a doubling in the number of roadside bombs, and a five-fold rise in the number of suicide bombings. The poppy crop hit another all-time high, and Afghanistan is now the source of 90 percent of the world's supply of raw materials for heroin. The Taliban is resurgent in several areas throughout the south and east of the country, and the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan have publicly feuded over who is to blame.

These challenges should not obscure the progress Afghanistan has made over the past 5 years. More than 2 million refugees have returned, the economy has improved, infrastructure expanded, education enhanced, and elections held. Most importantly, the people of that long-suffering country were freed from the murderous Taliban rule.

Our Nation and our NATO allies must put focus and attention on Afghanistan. I was particularly struck by a comment made by Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, the outgoing commander of United States Forces in Afghanistan, on 13 February. In his prepared remarks, he wrote that the long-term threat to success is "the potential irretrievable loss of legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan." With a Taliban offensive expected this spring we must seize the moment and avert that warning. NATO members can help ensure that we keep the Taliban on their heels by at least matching the U.S. troop increase of 3,000 and by reconsidering national caveats, which restrict military operations.

In addition to quelling the violence, reconstruction and development are central to lasting success in Afghanistan. The administration's new request for \$10.6 billion, \$2 billion of which would be devoted to reconstruction and anti-narcotics projects, is a welcome sign, and I applaud the European Commission's pledge of \$780 million in aid over 4 years. Yet the international community still falls far short in meeting its prior pledges and in committing the resources Afghanistan needs to avoid failure.

Chairman Levin, thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. Senator Warner, while you are here let me just make a statement about the revelation relative to the uranium enrichment program in North Korea, that the level of confidence that apparently we have relative to that enrichment program is somewhat different from what it was previously thought to be. Senator Reed asked a question the other day which triggered this. I have talked to Senator Warner about the next step in this, because this represents a very significant, at least possibly a very significant difference from what the previous assessment had been, and if so when did the change occur and a number of other questions.

What we are going to do is submit to the Department of Defense (DOD) a series of questions about this. We would invite all of our colleagues on the Senate Armed Services Committee to submit to our staffs by tomorrow afternoon any questions that any member of the committee might have, that we can then include in our questions, in our letter that will be going out to Secretary Gates and probably to Secretary Rice as well.

But this is a very significant development potentially. We want to get all the facts that we possibly can before we take any steps beyond that. So we will send a letter. You might tell the Secretary

that he will be receiving a letter by Monday with a series of questions.

Senator WARNER. On that, Mr. Chairman, you shared that thought with me. I certainly will give it careful review, but I do believe that there has been a significant first step towards the reconciliation of differences by the Six-Party Talks and I believe a lot of credit is owing to all the nations that participated, particularly the efforts of Ambassador Hill. So this issue that you raise should be clarified and I hope to be able to join you with this letter.

Chairman LEVIN. We surely agree that the step which has now been taken is a useful step, long overdue, and we welcome it.

Secretary EDELMAN.

STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC S. EDELMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Ambassador EDELMAN. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and other members of the committee: Thank you very much for giving my colleague, General Lute, and me the chance to come and talk to you about Afghanistan this morning. I have a very short statement, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to read. There is a longer version that has been circulated to members of the committee and I apologize, I think it did not get here in as timely a fashion as would be desirable. That was due, though, to my travel overseas from Sunday to Tuesday and my desire to make sure the written statement answered all the questions at least in a preliminary way that you and Senator McCain had raised in your letter to me.

Chairman LEVIN. That is fine. Thank you for that, and just please proceed. We will put your entire statement in the record.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Thank you, sir.

To date much has been accomplished in Afghanistan, as Senator Warner just alluded. We often lose sight of the fact that since September 11, 2001, the Taliban regime has been driven from power, al Qaeda no longer enjoys a safe haven to plan and launch attacks against the United States in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is a democracy. It is also worth noting that in the intervening years the Afghan economy has doubled, more than 5 million Afghan children now attend school.

The Afghan national assembly includes more than 90 women in a country where women were once brutalized and pushed to the margins of society. The Afghan people themselves have made tremendous strides and have demonstrated their commitment to the principles of a democratically elected government. President Hamid Karzai enjoys justifiable popularity and broad-based support throughout his country and in the international community.

Our allies have demonstrated their commitment to Afghanistan as well. On October 5, 2006, NATO's ISAF expanded its mission to support security, stability, and reconstruction throughout all of Afghanistan. This past fall, in a series of effective combat operations, ISAF contributors demonstrated their willingness to take the fight to the Taliban on the battlefield and achieved a series of important tactical successes.

Although our allies play a key role in the overall mission in Afghanistan, the centerpiece of our efforts is a strong and enduring U.S.-Afghan relationship, characterized by the joint declaration of

the U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership signed by Presidents Bush and Karzai in 2005. In about 2 weeks time, my State Department colleague, Ambassador Nick Burns, and I will go to Afghanistan for the second meeting of the U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership talks.

Nonetheless, we must recognize that these gains in Afghanistan remain vulnerable and that our enemies are tenacious. This past summer, the Taliban launched a bloody campaign of violence against Afghan and international forces as well as Afghan civilians. We expect an even greater increase in Taliban violence this coming spring. They seek to undermine the Afghan people's sense of security, their confidence in the Afghan government, as well as the commitment of the international community to stand with the Afghan people. We must not let that happen.

To that end, Secretary of Defense Gates recently approved the extension of the 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, for 120 days in Afghanistan, and he further approved the deployment of a brigade combat team, 3,200 soldiers strong, from the 173rd Airborne Brigade to replace the 3rd of the 10th when it rotates out.

Simultaneously, we are encouraging our NATO allies to do more. Although the alliance understands the importance of the mission in Afghanistan, we continue to work to ensure that member countries fulfill their commitments and remove remaining restraints on the use of their forces.

To ensure long-term success in Afghanistan, the National Security Council staff has led a comprehensive inter-agency review of the overall U.S. strategy. Mr. Chairman, I think you mentioned that in drawing attention to the President's comments outlining that strategy. Based on the conclusions of this review, we are adopting an approach that seeks to better integrate political initiatives, a development agenda, regional diplomacy, and a counter-narcotics effort with our military operations. Our review was based on the recognition that we have seen an important shift in the strategic environment in Afghanistan. The ANA has surpassed our expectations, but simultaneously the Taliban presence and strength have grown in some areas of the country, especially in the south.

The shift in the strategic environment highlights the need to refocus and strengthen the Afghan national security force training and equipment program. The \$5.9 billion requested in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental and the \$2.7 billion requested in the 2008 global war on terror request will accelerate the pace of our Afghan national security force train-and-equip program and expand the size and capability of those forces. These funds are in addition to the \$1.5 billion included in the fiscal year 2007 bridge supplemental. Our goal is to have the Afghan national security forces become less reliant on international forces in the long-term and more capable of independently taking the fight to the Taliban.

The Afghan national security forces continue to demonstrate the will to play a greater role and we must accord them the means to do so. The ANA is a component of our program that is building on past success. We now have 32,000 trained and equipped personnel out of an authorized strength of 70,000. The ANA has won the respect of the Afghan people and has matured into a highly regarded institution of the national government.

The acceleration program will provide Afghan soldiers with more reliable and capable weapons, force protection equipment, medical equipment and vehicles, and will build capacities that will allow the ANA to operate on a self-sufficient basis.

We also recognize that a more robust and capable police force is required for the mission at hand. We have developed a plan to train and equip an expanded force of 82,000 police personnel, which will build on some strides made in the past year by the ministry of the interior. The ministry is in the final stages of completing reform of its pay and rank system, which we hope will have a major impact on morale and on reducing corruption.

Additionally, the ministry of interior is removing corrupt leaders from its ranks. We are helping to develop several specialized units, including the counternarcotics police, and this increased Afghan capacity to arrest major traffickers and remove corrupt officials linked to trafficking will be an essential part of helping the Afghan government meet the threat posed by the growing challenge of narcotics that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Warner, you mentioned as well.

I need to stress, though, that improved security by itself will not win the fight in Afghanistan. Afghanistan will need improved governance, better infrastructure, and greater economic development. At the January 2006 London conference which launched the Afghanistan Compact, 64 donors pledged over \$10 billion to assist Afghanistan in its reconstruction and development efforts. However, the magnitude of the problem requires still more. In addition to addressing security and reconstruction with Afghanistan, we must remain actively engaged in the broader region. Every effort must be made to ensure Afghan and Pakistani cooperation to thwart violence in Afghanistan. We have been and will continue to work with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other international partners to bring order and security to these border areas.

The stakes in Afghanistan could not be higher, as you said, Mr. Chairman, and you said, Senator Warner. But we are working hard to set the conditions for success. In the near-term, we must respond assertively and effectively to the threat the Taliban and others pose as they seek to undermine the Government of Afghanistan and intimidate the Afghan people.

I think sometimes we talk about the possible Taliban spring offensive and it gives more credit to the Taliban than they deserve by making this sound as if it is some kind of legitimate military operation. The Taliban spring offensive really translates into Taliban coming into villages, burning schools, killing school teachers, intimidating children, particularly young girls, from getting an education. When people talk about the Taliban spring offensive, that is what they need to keep in mind.

In the longer term, success in Afghanistan will largely depend on non-military factors, such as improved governance, infrastructure development, and tangible progress in countering the threat of illegal drugs. The people of Afghanistan have made clear their commitment to a future that is democratic and prosperous. They also realize the road ahead is full of challenges and they will need to sustain the commitment and support of the international community in order to achieve their goals.

The United States along with our Afghan and international allies must seize the strategic opportunities at hand. We must secure the gains we have made and work together to set the stage for even more progress in the years ahead.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That completes my statement. I think General Lute may want to say a few words or we can go to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Edelman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ERIC EDELMAN

Thank you for inviting me to appear before this committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you about Afghanistan.

To date, much has been accomplished in Afghanistan. We often lose sight of the fact that since September 11, 2001, the Taliban regime has been driven from power, al Qaeda no longer enjoys a safe-haven to plan and launch attacks against the United States, and Afghanistan is a democracy. It is also worth noting that in the intervening years the Afghan economy has doubled, more than 5 million Afghan children now attend school, and the Afghan National Assembly includes more than 90 women—this in a country where women were once brutalized and pushed to the margins of society. An independent ABC News poll shows increasing confidence in the stability and economy of the country. An overwhelming 79 percent of Afghans polled are confident in their personal security under the current government, versus just 36 percent who felt safe under Taliban rule. The significance of these remarkable achievements cannot be overstated. We, in conjunction with the Afghan Government and our international partners, are working to secure our gains and set the conditions for continued progress.

The Afghan people themselves have made tremendous strides and have demonstrated their commitment to the principles of democratically elected government. President Hamid Karzai justifiably enjoys popular and broad-based support throughout his country and the international community. The Afghan National Assembly, although still in its early stages, has already achieved recognition as an impressive governmental institution. The group has had an auspicious start: confirming Cabinet and Supreme Court appointments, passing a national budget, and reviewing presidential decrees.

Our Allies have demonstrated their commitment to Afghanistan as well. On October 5, 2006, NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) expanded its mission to support security, stability, and reconstruction throughout all of Afghanistan. ISAF is the first NATO mission where Alliance forces have deployed outside of the European theater. More than 35,000 ISAF personnel from 42 countries are currently serving in Afghanistan under the command of a U.S. General, Dan McNeill. This past fall, in a series of effective combat operations, ISAF contributors demonstrated their willingness to take the fight to the Taliban on the battlefield and achieved a series of important tactical victories. Moreover, ISAF plays a key role in the effort to rebuild Afghanistan by overseeing 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout the country. In 2006 alone more than 2,000 PRT projects were completed; and an excess of \$255 million was spent by the U.S., allies, and other partners in support of those projects.

Although our allies play a key role in the overall mission in Afghanistan, the centerpiece of our efforts is a strong and enduring U.S.-Afghan relationship, characterized by the "Joint Declaration of the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership," signed by Presidents Bush and Karzai in 2005. A major component of this Strategic Partnership is strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which include both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. The ANSF, now with over 90,000 military personnel and policemen trained and equipped, are increasingly taking the lead in providing for the security and safety of their countrymen. In 2 weeks, Ambassador Burns and I will go to Afghanistan for the second meeting of the U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership talks.

Nonetheless, we must recognize that these gains in Afghanistan remain vulnerable and that our enemies are tenacious. This past summer, the Taliban launched a bloody campaign of violence against Afghan and international forces, as well as Afghan civilians. We expect an even greater increase in Taliban violence this coming spring. The Taliban are aware they cannot defeat the conventional military might of the United States and our Afghan and international allies. They seek to undermine the Afghan people's sense of security, their confidence in the Afghan Government, as well as the commitment of the international community to stand with the

Afghan people. We must not let that happen. We must ensure that the offensive this spring is “our” offensive.

To that end, Secretary of Defense Gates recently approved the extension of the 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, for 120 days. Secretary Gates further approved the deployment of a Brigade Combat Team, 3,200 soldiers strong, from the 173rd Airborne Brigade to replace the 3rd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division when it rotates out.

Simultaneously, we are encouraging our NATO Allies to do more. Within the past few months allies, such as the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Poland, and Norway have stepped up and offered more forces for the Afghan mission. Since Riga, progress has been made on lifting most operationally restrictive national caveats; however more work remains. We are working with our Allies to come to a common understanding and way-ahead for implementation of a NATO counterinsurgency strategy. Additionally, SACEUR identified equipment and manning shortfalls are being addressed with allies and in several cases filled. Secretary Gates raised these concerns with his counterparts during the recent NATO Informal Defense Ministerial in Seville. Secretary Gates also encouraged Allies to share best practices learned in the field, to better communicate NATO’s and the Afghan government’s successes, both military and non-military, to the Afghan people. Although the Alliance understands the importance of the mission in Afghanistan, we continue to work to ensure that member countries fulfill their commitments and remove remaining restraints on their forces.

To ensure long-term success in Afghanistan, the National Security Council staff led a comprehensive interagency review of the overall U.S. strategy. Based on the conclusions of this review, we are adopting an approach that integrates military operations with political initiatives, a development agenda, regional diplomacy, and a counternarcotics effort. The overall conclusion of the review is that while our goal remains a stable and democratic Afghanistan, we must increase and accelerate our efforts across the spectrum of activities in order to reach the goals. With regards to development, State and USAID requested increased funds to accelerate key infrastructure projects and governance and capacity building programs. Both Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates have expressed the importance of this comprehensive approach with our allies and urged them to similarly increase their efforts at recent NATO ministerial meetings. I will focus my comments primarily on the security portion of the review developed by the Department of Defense.

Our review was based on the recognition that we have seen an important shift in the strategic environment in Afghanistan. Taliban presence and strength have grown in some areas of the country, especially in the south. The relatively weak institutions of the Afghan Government enable insurgents to operate more freely in areas without a robust security presence, and to exploit the Afghan people’s unmet expectations where they exist. Furthermore, the Taliban enjoy areas of sanctuary in the region, allowing its leaders to direct and support operations with low risk of military response. Simultaneously however, the ANA has surpassed our expectations. They have demonstrated conspicuous bravery and professionalism in operations alongside our own forces.

The shift in the strategic environment highlights the need to refocus and strengthen the ANSF training and equipping program. The \$5.9 billion requested in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental and the \$2.7 billion requested in the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request will accelerate the pace of our ANSF train-and-equip program and expand the size and capabilities of these forces. These funds are in addition to the \$1.5 billion included in the fiscal year 2007 bridge supplemental. Our goal is to have the ANSF become less reliant on international forces in the long-term, and more capable of independently taking the fight to the Taliban. The ANSF continues to demonstrate the will to play a greater role—we must provide them the means.

Achieving our vision for the ANSF will require a significant initial investment, primarily for infrastructure and equipment, which we are looking to fund primarily through the fiscal year 2007 Emergency Supplemental and to complete with the fiscal year 2008 global war on terror request. We expect to complete this “build” phase of the ANSF development plan by the end of 2008—at which point 152,000 ANSF personnel will be trained and equipped. Our focus in the out-years will shift to sustainment, which we estimate at approximately \$2 billion annually. At last years Riga Summit, allies agreed to undertake a significant role in both training and equipping the ANSF. Allies have come forward with thousands of tons of equipment, weapons, and ammunition, and Allied forces are on the ground assisting in the training of the ANSF. We will continue to work with NATO Allies and other partners to share the burden for assisting the Afghans sustain this capability.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) component of our program builds on past success. The ANA now has more than 32,000 trained and equipped personnel of an authorized strength of 70,000. Through the skilled leadership of the Afghan Ministry of Defense, the ANA has grown into a truly national army that represents Afghans of all backgrounds. Additionally, the Ministry deserves praise for its successful efforts to decrease absenteeism and to ensure new recruits are properly vetted. Afghan soldiers have fought bravely alongside international forces. Perhaps more importantly, the ANA has won the respect of the Afghan people and has matured into a highly regarded institution of the National government.

The acceleration program will provide Afghan soldiers with more reliable and capable weapons, force protection equipment, medical equipment, and vehicles. Six battalions will receive specialized training to become rapid response Commando Battalions, focused on counterinsurgency missions. The program also will build capabilities that will allow the ANA to operate on a self-sufficient basis. The full force will include a small air corps, including both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, that will significantly increase the ANA's combat mobility. Additionally, the ANA will now include combat support units, including engineering units, military intelligence companies, and military police.

We also recognize that a more robust and capable police force is required for the mission at hand. They have the task of holding ground won by the ANA and spreading the rule of law. The development of the police force lags behind that of the ANA. Building on the work of our allies, particularly Germany, the Departments of Defense and State are taking decisive steps to further develop the police. In fiscal year 2006, \$200 million was transferred from the ANA program to the ANP program to procure weapons and equipment for the police. We have developed a plan to train and equip an expanded force of 82,000 police personnel, which will build upon important strides made in the last year by the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry is in the final stages of completing reforms of its pay and rank system, which will have a major impact on morale and reducing corruption. Additionally, the Ministry of Interior is removing corrupt leaders from its ranks. We are helping to develop several specialized units, including the Counternarcotics Police (CNP-A), which will be accelerated to develop a force modeled on the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. The CNP-A will target drug traffickers and producers, improving Afghanistan's interdiction capabilities. This year and next, we expect to complete helicopter deliveries to Afghanistan to support the CNP-A's National Interdiction Unit, improve overall investigative capacities, and expand the reach of the CNP-A to remote regions. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) also will receive additional capabilities and equipment to improve its performance in securing the border—which will simultaneously help the Afghans reap greater benefits from customs revenues. This increased Afghan capacity to arrest major traffickers and remove corrupt officials linked to trafficking will be essential to helping the Afghan Government meet the threat posed by the narcotics industry.

Improved security, however, will not by itself win the fight in Afghanistan. Afghanistan will need improved governance, better infrastructure, and greater economic development. Much has been achieved in this regard. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineering District (AED), for example, has executed over \$2 billion on various infrastructure projects. These included border crossing posts, ANSF barracks, and road projects. Between 2004 and 2006, commanders have used nearly \$400 million of Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to carry out critical reconstruction and assistance projects that provide immediate and highly visible benefits to the Afghan people. For example, in fiscal year 2006 \$77.4 million of CERP funding was used for local and district level road construction. At the January 2006 London Conference, which launched the "Afghanistan Compact," 64 donors pledged over \$10 billion to assist in Afghanistan's reconstruction and development. As impressive as these figures are, however, the magnitude of the problem requires still more.

In addition to addressing security and reconstruction within Afghanistan, we must remain actively engaged in the broader region. Every effort must be made to ensure Afghan and Pakistani cooperation to thwart violence in Afghanistan. Despite some indications of greater cooperation, cross-border movement by the Taliban remains a significant problem. We are working to build on the Presidents' tri-lateral dinner agreements from September by encouraging the planning and coordination of the agreed Pakistan-Afghan Joint Jirgas to address issues pertaining to the border areas. Secretary Gates and President Musharraf addressed many of these issues in their meeting in February. We will continue to work with Pakistan to bring order and security to the border areas. Further, we must work to ensure that other regional actors recognize the importance of a stable and prosperous Afghanistan as being in their own interest, and work towards that goal.

The stakes in Afghanistan could not be higher, but we are working hard to set the conditions for success. In the near-term, we must respond assertively and effectively to the threat the Taliban and others pose as they seek to undermine the Government of Afghanistan and intimidate the Afghan people. For the Afghan National Security Forces, this will require our support and commitment to increasing their size and capabilities. In the longer-term, success in Afghanistan will largely depend on non-military factors such as improved governance, infrastructure development, and tangible progress in countering the threat of illegal drugs. NATO has dubbed this the “Comprehensive Approach,” meaning both military and reconstruction efforts must be employed to defeat the Taliban, rebuild Afghanistan, win confidence of the Afghan people, and develop the Government capacities. The people of Afghanistan have made clear their commitment to a future that is democratic and prosperous. They also realize the road ahead is full of challenges, and that they will need the sustained commitment and support of the international community to achieve their goals. The United States, along with our Afghan and international allies, must seize the strategic opportunities we now face—we must secure the tremendous gains we have made, and work together to set the stage for even more progress in the years ahead.

Thank you once again for inviting me to appear before this committee. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Edelman.
General LUTE.

STATEMENT OF LTG DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, J-3, THE JOINT STAFF

General LUTE. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening statement, but we are prepared to respond to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

We are going to have a 6-minute round here with this panel. I hope that will do the job because we have a second panel that we also want to spend significant time with.

General Lute, General Maples, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), testified here on Tuesday that it was the DIA’s judgment that, despite absorbing heavy combat losses in 2006, the insurgency strengthened its military capabilities and influence with its core base of rural Pashtuns. Do you agree that the threat which is posed by the Taliban-led insurgency today is greater than it was a year ago?

General LUTE. I would, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of troop levels, General Craddock, who is our supreme allied commander now, reportedly recommended an increase in NATO troop levels in Afghanistan, as well as additional helicopters and transport aircraft. We have increased our troop levels, the United States has, and a number of countries have joined us. Britain, Poland, and Denmark have upped their commitment. But some NATO members have not fulfilled their earlier pledges and I am wondering if you would identify for us—maybe, Ambassador Edelman, you could take this one, either one—what are the current shortfalls in troop levels and equipment from NATO members that have not kept their pledges? Just those countries that have not met the pledges, give us the numbers? Either one can answer that if you have it.

General LUTE. Mr. Chairman, let me start. I think, first of all, you had basically the categories of shortages about right. There are some maneuver unit shortages, both maneuver units required in Afghanistan, but equally significant, Reserve units stationed outside Afghanistan but on alert to respond to crisis inside the country.

There were also shortages in manpower for PRT's shortages in helicopters, and shortages in Special Operations Forces.

So those are the four broad categories.

Chairman LEVIN. Which countries have made pledges that have not been kept?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that it is as much a question of pledges not being kept as countries not stepping up to meet the combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR).

Chairman LEVIN. If you can furnish that for the record, then. It is our understanding a number of countries made commitments that have not been kept. If that is not true, then that is, I guess, a little bit better news, not by much, because the need and the requirement is still there. But nonetheless, if you would supply it for the record what commitments, if any, have been made that have not been kept.

Ambassador EDELMAN. We will go back and take a look at that. [The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Ambassador EDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I might, I think also at the Seville ministerial Secretary Gates pushed very hard on these issues and it may be that some members indicated at Seville they would do things that have not occurred yet. But again, I would be a little chary of saying it is an unkept commitment.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

Director McConnell, our new Director of National Intelligence (DNI), told us that basically eliminating extremist sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas is necessary to end the insurgency in Afghanistan. Do you both agree with that?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes.

General LUTE. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Would it be correct to say that the global terrorist threat from al Qaeda will not be eliminated without ending al Qaeda's sanctuary in Pakistan? Do you agree with that, General?

General LUTE. I do.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you believe that Pakistan could do more to eliminate those sanctuaries? General?

General LUTE. I do.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Secretary?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes, sir, I agree they could do more. I think we need to bear in mind that Pakistan has made major efforts in the federally Administrated Tribal Areas. They have taken a lot of casualties over the last year and have had some successes. But it is an area of Pakistan that has never really been controlled by the Pakistani government nor by the British Empire before that, nor as far as I can tell by anybody going back to Alexander the Great. So it is an extremely difficult, challenging area and, while I think we do agree that Pakistan can and should do more, we need to bear in mind that they have already made some significant efforts.

Chairman LEVIN. Recently a Taliban official captured in Afghanistan reportedly claimed that Pakistan's intelligence service was protecting Mullah Omar in Qetta, Pakistan. Do you know whether that claim is credible? General?

General LUTE. I have seen similar reports, Mr. Chairman. As for the details of those, we would probably need to go into a closed session. I think that the statements from the new DNI and from General Maples the other day pretty much framed that appropriately.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Did the British agreement with local elders in Musa Qala—am I pronouncing that correctly?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Effectively cede control over that portion of Helmand Province to the Taliban?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think, to be precise, I do not think it was actually a British agreement. It was a local agreement that the tribal elders made.

Chairman LEVIN. With whom?

Ambassador EDELMAN. With the provincial government, between the provincial government and the national government; but that the British did not object to.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

Ambassador EDELMAN. They had an assessment of what the results might be. I think we have always been more skeptical about that and believe that in the final analysis right now the Taliban is violating the agreement and they are in the district capital.

Chairman LEVIN. Does the Pakistan government agree that that deal has been violated by the Taliban? You say it has been violated. It is obvious it has been violated. We have elders that come pleading with our NATO folks to—

Ambassador EDELMAN. I would have to check, but I believe that in Kabul people also feel that it has been violated. But I have to check specifically to see what the Government of Afghanistan may have said or not said on that subject, sir.

There are two different agreements that people sometimes confuse. There is the Musa Qala agreement, which involves the Afghan government, and then there is the North Waziristan agreement which involves Pakistan.

Chairman LEVIN. Right. Let me go back to the North Waziristan, and I confused them. Forgive me. The Pakistan government reached the agreement apparently with pro-Taliban leaders in North Waziristan ceding control of those areas in exchange for promises that cross-border attacks would cease. Since then, NATO and U.S. commanders have said that there has been an increase in insurgent attacks along those portions of the Afghan-Pakistan border.

So let me now clarify my own question. Has the Pakistan government agreed that that deal was violated?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think certainly your characterization of it coincides with our own judgment, which is that there has been an almost immediate and steady increase of cross-border infiltration and attacks immediately after the agreement was reached. We have expressed over a period of time directly to President Musharraf and to others our skepticism and reservations about the agreement.

I think we have had the Vice President recently talking to President Musharraf and Secretary Gates, and I think the state of it is that at a minimum President Musharraf would agree that the agreement has not been implemented as he intended it to be. But I think for further details we would either want to give you a classified answer for the record or maybe address it in closed session.

Chairman LEVIN. I will close by saying if there is any reluctance on the part of the President of Pakistan to acknowledge that a deal which they announced has been violated to the detriment of Afghanistan, the detriment of America and everyone else who is trying to take on the terrorists that are using that border, it seems to me that would be pretty strong evidence that Pakistan is not doing everything that it needs to do. Indeed, if they cannot acknowledge what is obvious it seems to me that is such a beginning point for a Pakistan acceptance of their responsibility to act in that area.

So we can save that for a classified session, but I would hope that the administration could be clear in its answers that, on this issue at least, that we ought to press Pakistan for at least an acknowledgment that the deal that they made has not worked out, in fact quite the opposite, that cross-border attacks have increased, insurgent attacks have increased, and that the agreement that they reached has not been—has not worked.

So I would hope that you will give us a more thorough answer for the record both in classified and unclassified form.

Ambassador EDELMAN. We would be happy to do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to defer to my colleague from Georgia, who has a schedule problem. I am going to be here throughout the hearing.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Senator Warner, for that accommodation. I appreciate it very much.

Gentlemen, welcome, as always. Thanks for the great service you render to our country. General Jones, again it is a pleasure to see you and I echo what Senator Warner said: Strange to see you without that uniform and those stars on. But what a great American hero you are, and thanks for your great service and your commitment.

Gentlemen, I had the privilege several weeks ago of visiting with Assistant Minister of Defense for Afghanistan, Mr. Moybullah, and we discussed the progress of the ANA and the area of training. He reiterated to me the importance of a strong commitment by the United States for a continuing period of time. At the same time, one of his priorities is to try to make sure that the Afghan forces are trained to the point where they are ultimately going to be able to take over the protection of their country, which we know is our ultimate goal.

You discuss, both of you, in your written statements the importance of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan continuing to train the ANA and the police, and I am glad to see that our allies are

stepping up to the plate in this area. I would appreciate your discussing that training in a little more detail. What is that training consisting of? How much progress are we making? What can we look for in the near-term as well as the long-term regarding the training of the ANA and the police?

General LUTE. Thank you, Senator. Let me, I think, start by trying to place this project, the creation of an ANA, in context. First of all, we are trying to do this in conditions that are very trying. The Afghans have almost no experience of a national army or any other national institutions. There is very little physical infrastructure on which an army can be built and on which it would then operate. We are also dealing with an illiteracy rate that is probably above 70 percent. So for example, to try to conduct classroom instruction where we try to build the noncommissioned officer corps or an officer corps, these are all inhibiting conditions that make the challenge significant.

Nonetheless, as your report indicates, Senator, there has been progress. We are about halfway towards our goal for the end of 2008, which is an army of 70,000 Afghan national soldiers. We are growing a total of 14 brigades. These brigades will mostly be regionally-oriented and work in close cooperation with regional and provincial government structures.

There are 46 Afghan battalions which today are either in the lead in operations or operating alongside our forces. So 47 battalions is a sizable structure out there on the battlefield.

Today I would argue that the ANA, even though it is still only emerging, is really the only true national institution that represents the government as a whole.

With the police we have made more progress in terms of numbers, but I would argue that we lag behind in terms of quality and effectiveness on the battlefield. We are about three-quarters of the way towards our end of 2008 goal for 82,000 police. But the police have not developed as quickly and not, candidly, received as much attention as they deserve, and therefore we have actually shifted resources recently from the ANA effort towards our support for the police.

On the battlefield, these are good fighters. They are very hard, seasoned fighters. Afghanistan has been at war with someone for at least a generation. So they are experienced, they are committed, they are brave soldiers. We have had success in sustaining our recruitment rates. There is no lack of volunteers for the ANA and the police. Our retention rates, so those which we want to keep in the field beyond their initial 4-year commitment, is about 70 percent, which again is quite favorable. Recently we have made inroads against a problem which has plagued us and that is the absent without leave or the missing rate, the absent without official leave (AWOL) rate. In the last month's worth of experience, we have that down considerably, to only 13 percent. So that is not great. It is not yet satisfactory, but we have made improvements.

I think the big challenges that lay ahead are really three. First of all, we have to build institutions. There has to be a training institution, there has to be a command and control structure, there has to be a finance structure, a supply and maintenance structure that supports this national institution. There have to be leaders

that are grown that can sustain the progress that we make. Then finally, there have to be national institutions to which this army and police attach. So most prominently, I would argue that the police are reasonably ineffective until they are attached to a national law and order or justice structure of courts and prisons and so forth that really make the effects that they bring to a village or a district more permanent and more prominent.

So by way of a short overview, I think that is where we are with the project.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Chambliss, if I could just add to what General Lute said. I think one of the things that we are trying to do in the relatively large supplemental request we have made for acceleration of the training of the Afghan national security forces is, first of all, to increase the end strengths both of the army and the police, so we have more folks who can get into the counterinsurgency fight. Then we have some specific things that will be done with that money to give them better arms to make sure they are not outgunned by the Taliban, that is to say assault rifles, howitzers, mortars, other kinds of weaponry; to improve their force protection, body armor, and armored vehicles; give them some rotary wing, mostly rotary wing but some fixed wing lift, so they have greater mobility, can get to the fight; to develop some commando battalions that can take on some of the counterinsurgency mission; and to develop some of the combat support, combat service support that they need to be able to operate independently over time, engineering units, et cetera. That is part of what we are looking at going forward.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks, Senator Warner, I appreciate that accommodation.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your presence here. Good to see General Jones as well.

In response to earlier questions about whether Pakistan could do more, I think you have both indicated that you believe that they could do more. Can you outline for us what steps we ought to expect Pakistan to take now to try and deal with the border areas, which are effectively safe havens and which testimony before our committee, General Maples, the head of the DIA, indicated that the insurgency has strengthened its military capabilities and influence and also its threat to the security to the west.

What in particular should we expect the Pakistanis to do?

Ambassador EDELMAN. First, Senator Kennedy, let me say that I think that part of the challenge that President Musharraf faces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province is an insurgency problem as well. He has developed a counterinsurgency strategy to provide some economic and social development in this region, and we are working—it is something my Department of State colleagues are engaged in, but we are working with the Government of Pakistan to help make sure that effort is funded.

He is looking as well to increase the capability of the frontier forces that he has, the local constabulary that has some relationship with the local inhabitants and therefore might have a better

ability than units brought in from outside to help stop the flow of people across the border. The problem is this, people on both sides of the border are related by ties of kinship and it is not a very well-defined border, if you will. So we need him to step up and do more in that area.

Senator KENNEDY. I am just trying to find out what he ought to step up and do, what we are expecting, besides some economic development and reviewing of the troop strength?

Ambassador EDELMAN. One thing that our President has helped promote with both President Karzai and President Musharraf is the idea of holding joint jirgas on both sides of the border with tribal leaders to get them engaged in this. That is an effort we continue to promote. It has not quite happened yet. It has been slower than we would like.

Senator KENNEDY. What are we prepared to do or what should we be prepared to do if he does not move in some of these areas? The areas you have mentioned are fairly modest, I must say, given the——

Ambassador EDELMAN. There are others. I think there are others. We need him obviously to capture senior Taliban and al Qaeda leaders. The balance of effort I think we have seen so far has been much stronger on al Qaeda than it has been on the Taliban. We would like to see a similar level of effort in that area with the Taliban.

Senator KENNEDY. My question is what should be our policy if he does not do these things? You have outlined very modest steps for him to do. Now what if he does not do these things? What are available policy choices to us?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think the question always has to be in terms of what the real world alternatives are, and I think he has shown that he can take steps when we engage with him. I think we have really no alternative but to continue to work with him as best we can, to encourage him to do more. He has to face some difficult political choices at home and we have to encourage him to face up to those.

Senator KENNEDY. General Lute, how do we convince Musharraf and the Pakistanis that it is in their interest to be more responsive, to be more cooperative with the United States over any medium- or long-term? How do we convince them to take the steps? These are very modest steps that have been outlined that we expect, but we are very limited, according to this testimony, about what we can do about it if they do not take it. How do we convince Musharraf and the Pakistanis to line up with us effectively?

General LUTE. Senator, I believe that President Musharraf and the Pakistani leadership have no doubt that the al Qaeda dimension of this threat is a threat to them as well as it is to us. So they have the same attention on al Qaeda as we have.

I think as you come down the scale of threats, though, to the Taliban and in particular the Taliban, with a capital "T", the one which used to control Afghanistan, that the threat—there is not a clear and compelling shared understanding that the Taliban is as threatening to Pakistan as we believe it is and as we believe it is to Afghanistan as well.

So below al Qaeda, we need to do more in terms of sharing intelligence, which we do routinely but obviously not yet to the point that it is compelling that the Taliban too represents a threat.

Senator KENNEDY. General, how do you respond to those that think that it is like putting your finger in the dike? We put a finger in the dike, and have tried to hold back the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. There is a mixture about how much progress has been made. Some progress has been made. There is also the direct testimony from General Maples about the continued problems, increased suicide, other kinds of attacks.

Some say, well, it is just a finger in the dike. Then they go over to Pakistan. They go into those border areas, and they enhance their own kind of capability. Unless we are going to have some kind of a regional effort in that area and convince Pakistan it is in their interest to line up with the United States, we are not going to get the job done. If you could comment on that.

Then I would be interested also, as I understand Secretary Gates went to the Afghanistan and the commanders requested more troops, and we find the Brits are now taking troops out of Iraq. They are sending more troops there. Can you comment as well about what was requested and what we can expect?

General LUTE. Senator, to the first part of your question, I do not think that there is any question that, with respect to sanctuary for especially Taliban senior leadership in Pakistan today, in the border regions of Pakistan, is a major factor in the ability of the Taliban to be resurgent and probably quite active militarily this spring in Afghanistan. There is no question that that sanctuary exists and that it is a major asset for the Taliban.

Now, if I may go back just a bit to your previous question. There are good signs of progress in coordinating operationally on the ground with the Pakistanis in the immediate area of the border trace itself. So, for example, we have given them radios. We have exchanged telephone numbers. We have a Pakistani officer in Bagram today at our U.S. headquarters. I was actually quite surprised to see this young fellow there. But he has a direct line to the Pakistani command structure.

There is good along-the-border cooperation. What I would offer we could do operationally to begin to erode this safe haven is to extend that kind of cooperation—Pakistani, Afghan, NATO—deeper across the border into some of the areas that represent more secure sanctuaries for the Taliban, so the Miralee, Miram Shah, Qetta, Peshawar areas, which are not right along the border, but are tens of kilometers deep.

So I think the border cooperation gives us a model on which we could build. We just need to extend it deeper into Pakistan.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Kennedy, there is an institutional expression of what General Lute just described, the Tripartite Commission between the NATO ISAF command, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and we need to build on that to make it more effective.

General LUTE. Then as to your question, Senator, on force structure, recently the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Craddock, General Jones's successor, has conducted a thorough review of the force structures available to NATO in Afghanistan and

as a result of that he has asked for some increase in forces. The U.S. portion of that, that which he directed directly to us here in the Pentagon, was a total of three battalions. With the extension of the brigade of three battalions which Ambassador Edelman mentioned, coupled to a replacement brigade this summer, we will fulfill that three-battalion commitment over the next 18 months.

So we have been quite active.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator WARNER.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, my colleague from Florida, if you would like to proceed, and then I will follow because I am going to stay.

Mr. Chairman, it is very interesting that General Lute mentioned this report by General Craddock, the successor to General Jones. I think the committee would be desirable to have that report be available to the committee, as to his increase in force structure recommendations in Afghanistan.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. We will make that request. Can you pass that along?

General LUTE. We will. We will, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Martinez.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we welcome you both this morning and thank you for your willingness to speak to us. I continue to be concerned, Mr. Ambassador, with the poppy production and how that plays such a destructive factor in the whole effort that we are undertaking. Can you speak a little more to that issue? What efforts are under way to try to curtail it and what more can be done along those lines?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator, I think we are all very concerned about this. It is a very difficult issue. Chairman Levin in his opening remarks talked about the increase in production that was noted in the U.N. report. I would say that that took place against a backdrop of almost tripling of the amount of area that had been eradicated from 2006 from 2005 and a very large increase in interdiction as well.

So the scale of the problem is enormous. To put it in perspective, if you look at the percentage of the economy in Afghanistan represented by opium production, it was about 50 percent. It is now down around in the high 30s, mid to high 30s percent.

To just frame it for you, in Colombia, where we had for years a struggle with a country that was teetering on the brink of being a narcostate, cocaine was never that big a percentage of the Colombian economy. So we are facing an enormous challenge.

I think it is important to understand that we do have a strategy that is quite broad as a government for dealing with this, that has five pillars to it. One is public information. Another is developing alternative livelihood, other kinds of crops that can be raised. Interdiction, as I mentioned. Law enforcement and justice reform,

because we basically have to be able to stop not only the production but the transmission of the product, arrest the people who are engaged in the traffic, try them—prosecute them and jail them. Unless you have all those parts of this, the other part, which is the fifth pillar, eradication, will not really get you anywhere.

I think we have done a number of things from the point of view of the DOD to try and support this activity. We are involved in helping the border management initiative, to set up a number of different border posts. The model was the one at Islam-Kallah in the west, but there are a number of others, where we try to bring together the different elements of the Afghan government to be able to deal with this and other challenges as well.

We have been working with our colleagues in the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on providing some helicopter support that they can use with the Afghan counternarcotic police. These are refurbished Mi-17 helicopters. We, I think, have six now in country. We have run into some problems, frankly, on getting them airworthy, that have been very frustrating, I know, to Director Tandy, my colleague at the DEA, but to us as well.

I think we are on the cusp of being able to solve those problems and in the next couple of weeks get those helicopters flying so we can get the counternarcotics police a little bit more mobility.

But the reality is this is going to be an enormous challenge. It is one that others in the international community have to step up to as well as the United States. There are other countries who have had the lead responsibility for different parts of this—the U.K. for the counternarcotics strategy, the Germans for the police training, the Italians for the rule of law programs. I think we are not as far along in all of those areas as we need to be, and we need to redouble our own efforts as a nation, focus them more intensively, I would say, on those areas that present the greatest challenge—I would say right now it is Helmand and Kandahar for narcotics production—and understand that it is going to be a very, very long time. It is going to take a long time and a lot of money to deal with this problem.

Senator MARTINEZ. If I might follow up on that, which of our coalition partners, NATO partners, is in charge of economic development? Because it seems to me with the South American experience that that is the most effective of all of the above. You cannot really jail two-thirds of the population that somehow or another is involved in the trade.

So it would seem to me that, while all those things need to be in place, that alternative crops and other economic development opportunities may be at the top of the list.

Ambassador EDELMAN. No question, and I think there was some reference by Chairman Levin to the report that the CSIS released on Afghanistan over the weekend. One of the bright spots in that report, which was, I think, a fair and pretty sober account of what is going on, was that the economy is in fact improving, although it is not improving across the board and some of the benefits have not trickled down as far as one would like.

But I agree with you that economic development is a key piece of this. I do not know that there is any one country in charge of economic development. It is really now a function of the so-called

International Compact for Afghanistan, under which the Afghan government undertook to take certain steps in order to make reforms in its economy, some of which they have done quite effectively, in exchange for the international community providing assistance, I think I mentioned, about \$10 billion worth. But there are countries who on that score have not followed through on their commitments and, Senator Levin, if you would like we can get you a list of those who have not followed up on those commitments.

[The information referred to follows:]

The international donor community has shown, on the whole, a strong commitment to Afghanistan. The attached spreadsheet [deleted] provided by the State Department identifies the international donor community's multi-year pledges, commitments, and disbursements to Afghanistan, from the Tokyo Conference in January 2002 to the London Conference in February 2006.¹

The chief problem remains the effectiveness of the disbursement of these funds. For various reasons related to security, bureaucracy, lack of capacity, logistical challenges, and political factors, donors have in some cases been slow to implement programs or failed to allocate pledges to specific projects.

We support the State Department's work with our international partners to tackle these problems, improve donor performance, and increase coordination. Another mechanism that aims to improve donor effectiveness is the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, a joint Afghan and international community forum that meets in Kabul to discuss reconstruction efforts.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you. My time is up.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Speaking of that, it just seems to me, having concentrated more recently on the cocoa production in Latin America, where we have had some success, particularly you mentioned with regard to Colombia, that at the end of the day we can do all we want in trying to eradicate, but one of the big things that we are missing is the education and the rehabilitation in our own population to lessen the demand, whether we are talking about cocoa here or heroin over there.

I just want to make that editorial comment. We are spending a huge amount of money in our interdiction in Latin America, which is good and it is having some success. But are we spending the requisite attention to lessening the demand for these drugs through an education and rehabilitation program? I do not think we are. Anyway, I will pursue that in another forum.

Mr. Secretary, do we have to have the approval of the Pakistani government in hot pursuit across the border?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think I would rather defer to General Lute on that, Senator Nelson, who can tell you exactly what arrangements we have on the border. I would note, of course, that Pakistan is a sovereign country. We do work with Pakistan. We have a base at Jacobabad and so we are trying to be mindful of their sovereignty, but I will defer to General Lute on the specifics of how we have worked it out on the border.

Senator BILL NELSON. So the answer is yes?

¹The Afghan government is limited in its ability to comprehensively and accurately track all assistance flows. The commitment and disbursement data in the attached spreadsheet [deleted] the State Department provided, for instance was last updated in March 2006. Further, we believe that some of the disbursement figures reflect "assistance in kind" rather than monetary transfers.

General LUTE. No, actually the answer is no, Senator. All of our kill-capture, capture-kill, what we call direct action authorities in Afghanistan, really spring from one provision and that is that each commander under U.S. authority has the responsibility and an obligation to protect his forces and is free to strike against those demonstrating either a hostile act, caught in the act, or demonstrating hostile intent.

The judgment here is on behalf of the on-scene commander. So if those conditions are met in Afghanistan—hostile act or a hostile intent—and the enemy in the course of this action attempts to flee across the border, and if this action is continuous, so it is not 2 or 3 days later, but it is the same action, then we have all the authorities we need to pursue either with fires or on the ground across the border.

Senator BILL NELSON. What happens if the initial spotting of them and they are not in Afghanistan, but right across the border in Pakistan?

General LUTE. If they demonstrate hostile intent, so for example if just across the border inside Pakistan we have surveillance systems that detect a Taliban party setting up a rocket system which is obviously pointed west into Afghanistan, we do not have to wait for the rockets to be fired. They have demonstrated hostile intent and we can engage them, and by the way, we have.

Senator BILL NELSON. What if we find, not the setting up of the launching of rockets, but the manufacture of rockets over into Pakistan?

General LUTE. The hostile act, hostile intent provision has a degree of imminence of the threat attached to it. So in this instance—first of all, these activities are not typically done right along the border, but rather more in the depth of Pakistan. Our recourse there would probably first be to turn to Pakistani authorities and share, as we say, target folders, giving them the evidence of this activity, and then making the bid that they should do something against it.

Senator BILL NELSON. Therefore, if we wanted to strike we would have to get the permission under that circumstance?

General LUTE. That is correct, Senator.

Senator BILL NELSON. Has Pakistan ever turned us down?

General LUTE. Senator, on this line of questioning, from here forward, we would probably need to go to a closed session.

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me ask you, do we have to seek authority to go after Usama bin Laden in Pakistan?

General LUTE. Again, here we are into some very fine authorities. I am happy to answer your question, but we would need to go to a closed session.

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Let me ask you, in another setting I had asked you about your observations as to the reliability of the Iraqi army. You want to give a similar kind of percentage answer on the reliability of the Afghan army?

General LUTE. Why not, Senator. The conditions are very different. The army in Afghanistan does not suffer the same sectarian challenges that we see in Iraq. But they have separate challenges that affect their reliability. One is simply the pay structure again. If you get paid—if you are in an ANA battalion in the south and

your family is from the east, basically you have to go on leave to go feed and care for your family. So there is a sizable portion of the overall structure, say 100 percent, that is diminished by the fact that there are huge inefficiencies in things like the pay structure and so forth.

The good news in Afghanistan, however, is that we do not suffer the sort of sectarian infiltration in especially the army that we face or that is a challenge in Iraq. So it is good news and bad news. On the one side, they are very much more, I think, committed to the cause and committed to their support of the Karzai government. On the other hand, Afghanistan is Afghanistan, so they still have huge challenges, which overall will diminish the strength of any one unit.

Senator BILL NELSON. But like your answer to my question about the Iraqi army, you do not want to give me a percentage?

General LUTE. It is just more difficult in Afghanistan. I would say that you could subtract off the top of a unit's full manning about 25 percent of its strength due to these infrastructure inefficiencies, so the requirement to put soldiers on leave, for example, to take care of their families. So if they are 100 percent manned, I would say 75 percent as a rough rule of thumb. Of course, that varies widely across units.

Senator BILL NELSON. My final question would be, if the Karzai government has to cede huge territories basically to the warlords, how are we ever going to know if we are going down the road to success or the road to failure?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator, I think we need to start by recognizing that we are dealing with a country that is extremely poor. It has 50 percent the per capita GDP of Haiti. It is about 80 percent illiterate and it does not have a tradition of strong governance from the center. It has always been decentralized, local authorities who have ruled in various areas.

So a lot of what people will say and what I expect you will hear from people in the next panel will discuss the difficulties that we have had in getting central government authority out into the provinces. One of the reasons we set up the PRTs was to try and help do that. But those PRTs, areas where there has been a vacuum, where there has not been a presence that is connected at the provincial level to the government, that is places where the Taliban has moved in, and you see that I think particularly in Helmand and Kandahar, some other places in the south.

So a great deal of our effort, as both we and particularly working with our NATO colleagues, is to try and fill in those areas and put an emphasis on the non-military, non-kinetic parts of this, because that is where this ultimately is going to be won, not as a military effort. Part of our struggle with our allies—we are going to have a conference on counterinsurgency that we are co-sponsoring with our NATO colleagues in Germany at the end of this month, where we are going to bring a lot of the NATO countries in. We need them to step up and do what Secretary Gates asked them to do at Seville, which is have a comprehensive, across the board approach to this where they are not only providing elements to commit the CJSOR, fill the CJSOR requirements, but are taking on these other non-kinetic areas.

So the answer to your question is we have to try and move greater governance and presence of the government into the provinces, and we have to not cede areas to the Taliban. But it is going to take time for that to happen, given the low base from which we start.

General LUTE. Senator, if I may, the means by which we try to extend the reach of the Kabul-based central government out to the provinces is of course our PRTs, these 25 teams that are out in some of the most remote, God-forsaken valleys on Earth, and trying very hard to enable the elected provincial councils to connect to the Karzai government. So we have a role in that, in the manning of the PRTs.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Nelson, thank you.

Senator WARNER.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up on Senator Nelson's question there and your response about the PRTs. Give us a current status of the ability of the coalition of nations working in that area to fully man those teams today. What percentage of those teams are manned and are up to, let us say, expected operational capabilities?

General LUTE. Senator, as I mentioned, there are 25 PRTs now, all working for NATO. So as the mission passed to NATO, these all work for NATO. 12 of those 25 are U.S. teams, so we contribute 12.

Just to frame this, a typical PRT is about 100 souls and inside the U.S. teams there are typically one or two State Department specialists, if we are lucky an Agriculture Department specialist since the economy of Afghanistan is so keyed to agriculture, and occasionally we have a rule of law or law and order specialist as well. The rest of that team is largely U.S. military—civil affairs officers, psychological operations officers, protection teams, and so forth.

So that small team of 100 is trying to influence an entire province.

Senator WARNER. I understand that. My question was, of the 12 are they fully manned and fully operational?

General LUTE. They are fully operational, but not fully manned, and even when fully manned their manning is along the lines I just outlined. So for example, one or two State Department folks.

Senator WARNER. For example—I will certainly turn to Secretary Edelman here momentarily, but are the State Department positions being filled, the Agriculture Department, the Justice Department? Are they filled, General, of the 12 teams?

General LUTE. No, Senator, not 100 percent.

Senator WARNER. How long have they been lacking in that number?

General LUTE. For most of this venture.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Warner, if I might.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Ambassador EDELMAN. For instance, I believe this is an accurate figure, but of the 12 U.S.-led PRTs I think only 7 of them have folks from the U.S. Department of Agriculture as agriculture ex-

perts. Of course, part of what our struggle is is that 80 percent of the population of Afghanistan earns its living from the land.

Senator WARNER. That is understood. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the chair to request of these two witnesses an accurate, up to date report on the 12 teams, what positions have been filled, what have not, and what is the expectation that these positions will be filled. This committee has taken a lead in trying to provide the legislative basis for our cabinet, U.S. cabinet officers and agencies to provide that manpower, womanpower.

Chairman LEVIN. Can you give us that, up to date, PRT by PRT manning status? Senator Warner has indeed been the leader in this effort and others of course have a great deal of interest in it on the committee, but he has taken the lead. He has focused on this. It is a very important question. Give us that status report.

Ambassador EDELMAN. We will be happy to get that to you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Also you could give a little bit of direction over time. In other words, give us today's status report, but does that represent an improvement over 6 months ago?

Ambassador EDELMAN. We can do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. When do we anticipate they will be filled? Because, to the credit of the President, he makes these pronouncements, which I support him—we are going to do thus and thus—and yet his bureaucracy is not moving at the pace that I think the President anticipated.

Now, on the question of the relationship between Pakistan, the United States, and the other coalition forces, we do not live in a perfect world and I have been privileged to have had a long association working with Pakistan since I have been here in the Senate, and they have gone through a series of evolutions. But right now I think, under the leadership of Musharraf, they are doing the best they can, but the realities are there is a fragility in the political system in Pakistan, and Pakistan is a member of the nuclear nations. Should the Musharraf government fall, then we do not know what the structure of the replacement government will be.

Therefore, I think we have to give him the benefit of the doubt when he says he is doing the very best he can to meet our requirements, because we certainly do not want a destabilized government and a government in Pakistan then that would have its finger on the trigger of these very lethal weapons.

In Iraq today we are experiencing the growing proliferations of weapons which we can attribute—I use that word cautiously—attribute to sources in Iran. We see a growing number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) employed in the Afghan arena. Are they of the same lethality as the ones that we are now experiencing in Iraq? What can you tell us and what is the attitude of Iran?

We should lay the foundation, Mr. Ambassador, that Iran at the initiation of our operations in Afghanistan was a helpful, if not almost an ally, in undertaking the initial military phases. Could you characterize Iran's role today in the Afghan operation, and to the

extent there is any linkage in the IEDs now being employed in Afghanistan to possible sources from Iran?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I will be happy to respond, Senator Warner. If I could, before I do that, though, I would like to go back to your previous comments about President Musharraf because I think you have framed the conundrum that we face far more eloquently than I did. So I agree with you that the constraints within which he operates are the ones that you outlined.

On Iran, I would just perhaps take issue with one thing you said. That is to say, I do not think one can completely describe Iran as a unitary actor with regard to Afghanistan. So the initial phase you described I think is accurate to the extent that there were certain elements of the formal Iranian regime, the ministry of foreign affairs, that worked quite closely together with us in the period of the Bonn conference and then subsequently under Ambassador Khalilzad's term of office in Afghanistan. But not all elements of the Iranian regime were as constructive in trying to stabilize the situation.

I think you really see with Iran a kind of multivariate approach. They have a formal relationship of support for the Karzai government, but they continue to have ties to some of the former members of other groups that they had been involved with in the past. They also maintain some ties with particular ethnic populations in the west and central part of the country. They clearly would like to limit the influence of the United States and the NATO forces in Afghanistan over the long run.

So I think it is a more mixed picture.

Senator WARNER. What we frequently ask in the Iraq situation, what is their long-term goal with regard to their current status, which is multiple in many ways, of influencing actions in Iraq. What is the comparable answer to the question, what is their long-term goal? What do they want to see Afghanistan become?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think they would like to see an Afghanistan where there were no U.S. forces, where the government was—I think they do have a common interest in terms of narcotics because they are a recipient and that is a problem for them. But I think they would like to see us out and an Afghan government more beholden to them and more subject to their influence, I think that is their ultimate objective.

But on the question that you raise specifically about IEDs, I think we have seen a growth in both IEDs and suicide bombing in Afghanistan. I think Chairman Levin referred to that in his opening statement. I think the state of our knowledge is that it is not completely clear how those tactics, techniques, and procedures have come to Afghanistan, through what route or what mechanisms.

I think, on the specific question about the lethality of IEDs, I would prefer to—and General Lute might want to say a word on this—get back to you either in a classified session or with a classified answer for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. We have discussed in open session the linkage of facts that raise some clear indications that Iran—the IEDs most

lethal in Iraq are made with parts that appear to have been manufactured outside of Iraq and likely in Iran.

Ambassador EDELMAN. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. Now, positive legal linkage remains to be done. But do we have a similar situation of weaponry now being employed, namely IEDs and perhaps others, in Afghanistan which can be attributed to sources of supply within Iran?

General LUTE. We do not have the body of evidence in Afghanistan as we do in Iran—in Iraq, rather. So the sophistication of the IEDs is in a different order of magnitude.

Senator WARNER. A lower level?

General LUTE. It is a lower level in Afghanistan as compared to Iraq.

Senator WARNER. Nevertheless, lethal.

Last question. I would like to ask of our distinguished Ambassador Edelman here: on this question of poppies, I would like to have you reply for our record, why do we not look at what we call a set-aside program that we have utilized here from time to time in the United States? Other governments have utilized it. We simply pay the farmers the street value of that narcotic in London or Paris or throughout Europe a hundredfold times what that farmer gets for his crops.

If you choke it off at the source and somehow convince the farmers, we are going to pay you what you get for that poppy, you turn it over, and take it out of the hands of the middleman. That is where the money is made.

I would like to know why we are not more conscientiously trying to pursue those plans, which have worked in agricultural situations for other reasons, quite other reasons, in other countries.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Warner, it is a good and fair question. It is a difficult one, and we can certainly get you a fuller answer for the record. I would say that—and I note, I think it is in the CSIS report as well that they make some recommendations in a similar vein. I would say that we are wrestling with a couple of different issues. One is that, when I outlined the 5-pillar strategy we have for dealing with counternarcotics I mentioned that public information, education, is a big part of that. One of the things that President Karzai has invested a lot of effort into is trying to convince people that this is not an Islamic activity, that it is un-Islamic to grow poppy and to sell poppy and poppy products, for instance, opiates.

If you start paying people for growing it, you are starting to create an incentive structure for them.

Senator WARNER. For not growing it.

Ambassador EDELMAN. If you reward people who are not growing it, that is a slightly different question. That is something that there is I think a rewards program. It is a small one, and we are looking at whether that is something that ought to be increased.

Senator WARNER. There is a trail of death associated with this narcotic from the moment it is grown there, and death to our own military forces and those of the coalition, all the way along the path, and corruption.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Agreed.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

The request on the PRTs from Senator Warner, if you will give us the manning levels of the American-led PRTs, would you do the same, to the extent it is feasible, for all of the PRTs?

Ambassador EDELMAN. We can certainly do that. I would just note that, for the 13 NATO and other allied PRTs that are out there, the level of effort varies a lot with the capability and capacity of the countries.

Chairman LEVIN. If you could give us PRT by PRT, to the extent you can do that, we would appreciate it.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator Ben Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country. As we ask these very difficult questions, we are always mindful of the service of our men and women in uniform and we appreciate so much and are so proud of their service.

I think Senator Warner in proposing a farm bill for Afghanistan has hit on a very important point, and that is the economic value to producers is achieved through asking them not to pay—not to plant and not to grow, and the cost of that to our government would be considerably less in my opinion than the cost of the war. I know they are not interchangeable, but certainly as a part of our effort it would seem to me that, rather than eradicate, put people in jail and try to go through a justice system that does not exist in Afghanistan at the present time, we would just be better off to face the economic realities and move forward on that.

I suspect what we are seeing here is the difficulty that we achieve for ourselves in trying to move toward what kind of a government we think suits our purpose versus what is endemic to a country. The first thing we want to do is establish a central government. Even in the midst of all the tribal and warlord governments, it seems to me that we want to move in and impose that kind of a government. Part of the problem we have is that we cannot continue to be the senior partner indefinitely. At some point the best we can hope for is to become the junior partner as they take over.

Is that possible in the structure that we are dealing with in Afghanistan, the way we are doing it? Or should our approach be to work with the local leaders that have been the leaders for years, instead of calling them warlords? Is that our term or is that their term? Let me ask you that first, Mr. Ambassador: Is that our term or is that their term for their local type of government?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I would have to defer to Dr. Rubin on specifically whether Afghans refer to the folks as warlords. I do not think it is purely our appellation.

But I agree with the general thrust of your comment, which is I think we have to find a mechanism where we support the positive things that the Karzai government is doing, but also figure out a way to engage at the local level. Again, the PRTs are meant in some sense to be doing that and facilitating that more decentralized approach.

On the question of how to deal with the counternarcotics piece, as I said, we are I think looking at this, but I think we want to

be careful not to be creating a monetary incentive structure that actually would encourage people to grow poppy.

Senator BEN NELSON. I think we have to be careful that we do not end up with that. But I think the economics that exist right now encourage them to do it or the amount of production would not be increasing.

Senator Warner is right, the actual producer gets a very small part of the economic value of that crop, and it would be a lot less expensive for all of us to just pay them not to grow it, until we work with them, with the PRT, if we can get some Agricultural Department employees over there to help them come up with alternative crops.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I agree, Senator, and I think Senator Levin, at the outset raised the question in his opening statement about whether there should be some military role in eradication. I think one of the reasons we have been reluctant to have the military take on the eradication role is precisely for the reasons you mention, which is that you are focusing on the person at the lowest end of the chain, the farmer, who is getting the least amount of benefit for this. In fact, not only is he getting the least amount of benefit; he is probably stuck in a debt cycle that keeps his family perpetually at the mercy of the traffickers.

Senator BEN NELSON. If you do not have a justice system with a police force and able to do it, what is it we are accomplishing? I think I am one who considers the economic value of something as an important way to work with these other countries and their governments.

For example, who set the reward for Usama bin Laden? Do we know?

General LUTE. Sir, that is called the Reward for Justice Program. It is run out of Department of State.

Senator BEN NELSON. Then I keep asking the wrong Secretary, because I keep asking Secretary Gates if we cannot find a way to make the monetary reward work, because \$25 million—is that what it is, \$25 million?—does not seem to have gotten anybody's interest in Waziristan or anywhere else. Why do we not consider moving that \$1 million a week, increasing it?

Now, Secretary Gates and I have had a colloquy where we have had a little bit of fun about it becoming the lottery for Bin Laden. But it seems to me, put it on eBay, I do not care where we put it, but let us increase it a million dollars a week until there is a taker. Somebody in Waziristan will sell at some level. I do not care whether it is \$50 million or \$75 million. Somebody will sell out, as someone sold out on Saddam Hussein's sons.

So I think we are not always focusing on the economic reality of cutting our expenses by going to a more efficient and effective way to get support. American dollars, and growing their own crops, ultimately alternative crops, and get them out of the production of poppy, make a good deal of sense.

It is also my concern—and I really do hope that we will take a closer look at how we work with local governments that may be different than anything we accept, rather than going in and saying that we are creating a democracy because we created a vote, the right to vote. The right to vote in a democracy involves a lot more.

The right to vote is important to a democracy, but it is not the only element of a democracy.

Can a democracy function without the civil justice system, the criminal justice system, a non-corrupt military, an efficient military, a loyal military, an efficient and non-corrupt police force? If you do not have those, that infrastructure, governmental infrastructure, the vote is important, but it is largely symbolic if the reality is that you do not have a functioning democracy at the end of the day.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Nelson, I really agree with much of what you say. I want to be a little careful here and not—

Senator BEN NELSON. What do you disagree with?

Ambassador EDELMAN. No, I want to make sure I do not get out of my lane, because the rule of law programs are actually administered by our colleagues in the Department of State. But I agree, for instance, that when you have a nascent justice system that you should not overburden it with taking on all the tasks of enforcing the law in a culture and a society where you have lots of local informal justice systems.

So whether there is some way to find a way to let those systems take care of lower level problems and focusing the new nascent justice system on things like prosecuting drug traffickers, I think is something we obviously have to look at. But to be fair, it is our colleagues in the Department of State who have the responsibility for that, not us.

Senator BEN NELSON. I will save my other questions for them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. Senator Reed is next.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ambassador, and General Lute.

Mr. Ambassador, getting back to the PRTs, what are the authorized civilian positions in a PRT? Previous testimony suggests there is one or two State Department officials, one Agriculture, et cetera. Is that the authorized positions?

General LUTE. That is right, Senator.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think that is correct.

Senator REED. So the bulk by design are uniformed military personnel?

General LUTE. That is correct. I should add that of the 12 U.S.-led PRTs, 11 of the 12 are led by military. One of the 12, in the Panshir Valley, is led by a very good State Department officer.

Senator REED. Mr. Ambassador, there has been a great deal of important discussion about the opium production. The CSIS report suggests that the eradication approach has failed because it was targeted at the poorest farmers, who essentially could not pay. What I am trying to get at is, unfortunately, usually corruption and opium production are inextricably linked. How complicit is the Afghani government in this problem and at what levels?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think the CSIS report makes the argument, I think fairly compellingly, that corruption in general is probably the most corrosive problem that the Karzai government faces, and it has been the one that has contributed the most to the decline in legitimacy. I think President Karzai has taken some steps to remove some corrupt officials. I think there is a sense that

it has not been as persistent an effort and as an across-the-board effort as it ought to be. I think it is something we continue to discuss with him.

We also have a new attorney general on the scene, Attorney General Sabbitt, who has made this a very persistent effort, a serious effort on his part to do it.

I would be hard-pressed, Senator Reed, to tell you how extensive it is or to what levels it reaches. It is a very big, persistent problem which, I think, is the best way I could characterize it.

Senator REED. I think that is fair, Mr. Ambassador. But I think, given the centrality of the issue, I think we have to get a better handle on it, frankly, that we really do have to understand at what levels, how far up, because at a certain point it becomes decisive.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I do not want to suggest that we do not do that. When we become aware of corrupt officials, I know it is an issue that gets taken up with President Karzai and other responsible authorities by Ambassador Neuman and other people as appropriate.

Senator REED. Let me raise another issue and that is, I understand that the Indian government is providing significant resources, which is a bone of contention with the Government of Pakistan for obvious reasons. Talking to Pakistan officials about Afghanistan, it seems their greatest fear is India, not the Taliban, not anything else. But as a result of the lack of cooperation, Indian relief efforts and supplies have to move through Iran, which is not the best relationship we want to encourage.

To what extent can we talk to the Pakistanis about allowing the Indian support to Afghanistan?

Ambassador EDELMAN. It is a good question, Senator Reed. First of all, it is an issue we have taken up. I myself have taken it up with Pakistani counterparts from time to time. It is, as you say, a very sensitive issue. For Pakistanis, Afghanistan has been regarded for some time as part of their strategic depth vis a vis India. So I think it is really very deeply ingrained in the strategic culture in Pakistan.

Some of what we see in terms of persistent ties at lower levels that sometimes may affect the ability of President Musharraf to even implement those things that he has agreed to I think dates from that era and that view. In that sense, an Indian role in Afghanistan is seen in that light and therefore it is inimical to Pakistan's national security.

So it is an issue that we do take up with them, because obviously India can play and should play a helpful role. I discussed it with my Indian colleagues when I was there hosting our under secretary level discussions in November, and I will be having a similar discussion with Pakistan in April and I suspect I will be raising that issue then.

Senator REED. I hope you do. I have the impression when I am traveling through Pakistan particularly, that they have a very real fear of being encircled by the Indians, which to most observers seems to be ridiculous. However, it is very real out there. Many of their policies might have little to do with Taliban, al Qaeda, or anything else, Karzai, et cetera; it is the old great game between the Indians and the Pakistanis.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think that is fair.

Senator REED. Let me turn to General Lute. General Lute, one of the problems with NATO is they have not provided all the forces. Another problem is the fact that some of these forces have significant restrictions on their operational capacities. Can you outline these problems and suggest ways we are trying to deal with them? Because forces on the ground if they cannot go to certain places and do certain missions are not particularly helpful.

General LUTE. You are right, Senator. We call these caveats in NATO language, and General Jones will be the expert in this room on NATO caveats as he has dealt with this for much more time than I have.

There are really two varieties. One is what we call geographic or locational caveats, where a nation will say: we will provide forces to the NATO command; but these forces may only operate in a particular geographic region. So if the commander needs them, the ISAF commander needs them elsewhere, they are restricted from making that movement. So there is a geographic caveat.

Then there are other caveats that fall in the category of missions or tasks allowed to be performed. So for example, some nations will provide military forces for PRTs, but those military forces are not allowed to move beyond that reconstruction and support role to conduct combat operations. So there are really those two varieties.

Together they impose a huge inefficiency on the NATO commander. So for example, today we are over-resourced or overstructured in Kabul with combat forces, but understructured in Regional Command South, centered on Kandahar. But the NATO commander of both of these forces cannot balance the equation because of national caveats.

Most of the attack, the assault, on caveats has taken place at SHAPE, so General Jones's former headquarters, General Craddock's headquarters today. It really comes down to national decisions on behalf of the 26 members of NATO.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Could I add, Senator Reed, one thing on the caveat question, in addition to the caveats that General Lute outlined, I think we also have a phenomenon of undeclared caveats. I think General Lute was talking about those that are officially registered with NATO, but maintain, we have no caveats, but as a matter of practice will not in fact do things that would benefit the kind of flexibility that General Lute has been discussing. This has something that President Bush and Secretary Rice raised pretty forcefully at the Riga summit, and Secretary Gates raised it again, and Secretary Rice raised it at the January foreign ministers meeting in Brussels, and Secretary Gates at the Seville meeting of defense ministers in early February. So it is something that we persistently attack.

Senator REED. I appreciate that.

My time has expired. Just a comment, and that is we have multiple problems there. If this corruption problem is as large as some might suspect, that could undermine all of our best efforts, and if we cannot get an effective force, not just numbers but an effective force, from NATO, that could undermine our efforts.

I would expect—and I know you are, Mr. Ambassador and General Lute, going to take these issues up at the highest levels.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Thune.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Would Senator Thune yield a minute? I think this issue of the caveats is so important. We talk about them here, but there are a lot of people that may be watching this hearing or read about it later or view it. Enumerate some of what "caveat" means, because I think Americans should understand it simply means that the American GI is undertaking a greater degree of risk than the other troops.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think in practice—and again I would defer to General Lute, who can—and General Jones can as well address it. But it means if, for instance, you have NATO ISAF forces in province X and you have a firefight going on somewhere south and you need a quick reaction force to go down there and help those colleagues in extremis, some countries have a caveat that says, no, I cannot leave wherever I am until I call home and talk to my national government in capital Y, whatever it is; or I cannot really do it because I am, as General Lute said, I am limited to being in, essentially in my PRT role, and I cannot take on a lethal role.

Chairman LEVIN. Usually the role that they are allowed to act in is a safer role.

Senator WARNER. Much safer.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think that is a fair statement.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Thune.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate that discussion because I was there in December and that was an issue that was raised by our commanders at the time by General Eikenberry, who was the commander in Afghanistan. It seems to me at least that this is an issue that we really have to get resolved, because otherwise our troops are increasingly at risk and those of our allies, because of these geographic, and some rules of engagement, type caveats that they are under. It makes it very, very difficult for us to accomplish the mission there.

So I know that our State Department and our diplomats are working on that, but I guess I would just encourage you to continue to keep that pressure on, because that was clearly a problem that was raised.

I have a question with regard to the poppy production. When we were over there, and of course the thing that they really lack in that country is a farm-to-market transportation system, which we take for granted in this country. We can get our products out. I was somewhat troubled to find out that we do not have over there—my assumption had always been that we have a lot of our assets from Department of Agriculture, other agencies in this country, that can help train the Afghan people, farmers in particular, in the techniques that we use to grow other crops. Their growing conditions are very similar to those in this country in places like where I live and you can raise wheat and soybeans and corn and those sorts of things. They do not do it. They raise poppies, obviously because I am sure the profit margin is there.

But I also think it seems to me at least that we are not doing what we should be doing on the soft side of this equation, and that is bringing the assets to bear that would allow them to begin to move into these other areas of production. I heard we have two people over there, is all we have.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think it is seven, Senator Thune, but it is still not enough and I agree with that.

You are right. I think part of the problem is there are inadequate roads and there is inadequate infrastructure for getting product to market. Most of the farmers there are subsistence farmers. Part of the attraction of poppy is not just the money, but that it is, as I understand it, easily transported and preserved. It does not spoil. You can roll it up in a ball, the opiate product, and carry it around in a sack for weeks on a mule. So it is a function of the kind of agricultural economics of the area as well.

The point you raise is one, and I think General Lute would echo this, that has been a persistent frustration for all of us who have been engaged in this, because it is not completely under the control of the DOD. But I agree with the general proposition. We need more agricultural expertise out there and I think we need a better way to—I think there is a lot of untapped capacity in our own country in terms of the State agricultural extension services.

I happen to have been an undergraduate at a university that had a rather good agricultural school and so did the Secretary of Defense, who has just come out of being president of a university that has a rather good agricultural school, and I think his sense, as well, is that the resources we have have not been adequately tapped.

Senator THUNE. I posed that question to him when he was in here for his confirmation, because I really believe that it is not just United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Federal resources that we have. But private sector and, as you said, a lot of our schools, for instance, land grant universities like South Dakota State University and others, that have these expertises, that are not being effectively utilized to begin to transition that country from an economy that is dependent upon illegal type products and drugs to a legitimate farm economy.

I realize it is an infrastructure issue partly, but I also think that we are not doing a good enough job comprehensively. We have the military piece of this with NATO at least somewhat addressed, but there are so many other parts of this puzzle and it just does not seem like we are doing an effective job on that.

Ambassador EDELMAN. One of the things, Senator, that we have done, I think, is tried to use our money for the Commanders Emergency Response Program, to do a lot in the road-building area, and I think for the reasons you just mentioned.

Senator THUNE. That is coming, and I know this beltway or this transportation system, this highway they are building around there, I think, is going to be helpful.

We also heard when we were there that they expect a very bloody spring when it warms up and these organizations, terrorist organizations, get more active again. I guess one question I have, as well, has to do with that on the Afghan-Pakistani border—and we visited Camp Salerno when we were there and there were a lot

of guys who were out there on the front lines and fighting these fights in caves and the mountainous area on the border there—but that my impression has been that we had kind of fragmented the opposition, that you had the foreign fighters in the north, some Taliban, and then some other terrorist type groups on the southern border.

But it seems to me that they are getting further integrated, that they are developing a communications system and that this opposition that we are facing there is becoming more lethal because they are more connected. I am just wondering, perhaps, what steps have we taken to disrupt some of those networks? It is a real concern in that border area, and partly it is a relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan at the governmental level, and these agreements that have been entered into by the Pakistanis.

But it also seems like there is a growing network there. They are becoming much more integrated, and that is, I think, a very concerning development.

General LUTE. Yes, let me just comment on that, Senator. I think you are right, there are—the threat in Afghanistan is as you described it, is threefold, starting from the north as the Hekmatyar network outside of Peshawar and sort of the northern part of the frontier region; in the center, centered on Miralee is the Hikane network, which is a Pashtun-based network; and then further to the south, headquartered in Qetta, Pakistan, is Taliban.

They are similar in a couple ways that are dangerous to us. First of all, they all rely on the support of the Pashtun people of that tribal area. As Ambassador Edelman mentioned earlier, the Pashtun, the demographics of the Pashtun people extend on either side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. So one thing that unites them there is the sort of common support base.

The other is their sanctuary in Pakistan, as your question alluded to. They all move with relative impunity and operate with relative impunity within 30 to 40 kilometers, so 25 or 30 miles, of the border, where in effect, the reach of the Pakistani government does not extend.

Senator THUNE. In terms of steps that we are taking to disrupt that, are there things that we can be—

General LUTE. The disruption inside Pakistan belongs to Pakistan.

Senator THUNE. Right.

General LUTE. Inside Afghanistan, we are able to take some steps and we have. So for example, we do not see Hekmatyar in the south. We do not see—and so forth. But without going into too much detail, there is some segregation of those threats in Afghanistan, but not effectively in Pakistan.

Senator THUNE. We need greater, it seems to me at least, cooperation from Pakistan in those ungoverned spaces along the border there.

General LUTE. That is right.

Senator THUNE. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Senator Bayh.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

I believe this is one of the most important priorities facing our country today from a national security perspective. Ambassador, I agree, I think—the words you used—the stakes could not be higher. I agree with that. This problem has been underemphasized for too long, and one of the ironies of the Iraq situation is that it has taken so much of our attention, so many of our resources, from a place from which we were actually attacked.

A rough estimate of the disparity in the investment of resources is that over the last 3 to 4 years five times the amount of resources have been invested in Iraq as in Afghanistan. We have begun to correct that now. I can only hope that it is not too late. One of the things that we have seen, Mr. Chairman, in Iraq is that once the trend lines turn against us, once we squander an opportunity, it is difficult to turn around.

So the situation we face now is that, as you both mentioned, the situation in Afghanistan is more difficult today than it was a year ago. Our intelligence services report that al Qaeda is reconstituting itself to a greater degree, so those are not moving in the right direction. The Pakistanis through the agreement they signed with the tribal leaders have kind of backed off from at least in part doing what needs to be done here.

So my questions build upon Senator Kennedy's and Senator Thune's to a certain degree. That is, what do we do about all this? So I want to focus on Pakistan. You alluded, Mr. Edelman, in response to Senator Kennedy's question—he said, what specifically should we do. You mentioned redevelopment assistance. You mentioned trying to improve the capabilities of the border troops, which have been somewhat uncertain. Then you also said—and I think this is a quote—that General Musharraf needs to confront “the difficult political choices.”

Specifically what political difficult choices does he face?

Ambassador EDELMAN. He has a situation at home where there is a certain amount of sympathy in some places for, if not al Qaeda, then certainly for people who are more Islamistly inclined and who—

Senator BAYH. Do you refer to his public or do you refer to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and his military, or both?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think he faces challenges in a variety of different areas. He has—as I mentioned in, I think, my answer to Senator Reed, there are some deep historic reasons for concern about Afghanistan in Pakistan as part of the strategic culture there. So I think there are bureaucratic issues he has to take on, as well as political ones.

Senator BAYH. By bureaucratic issues, are the ISI and the military supportive of being more aggressive in these tribal regions?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think it depends, and I would not want to go too far in an unclassified session, Senator Bayh, but I think a little bit depends on what level you are talking about. At lower levels I think it is harder for any bureaucracy—

Senator BAYH. To get back to the General's point, is it true that they tend to view al Qaeda and the Taliban differently.

Ambassador EDELMAN. There is no question that that is part of it.

Senator BAYH. So they are more supportive of acting against al Qaeda, but not the Taliban, even though al Qaeda is receiving substantial aid and comfort from the Taliban?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think they tend to see the threats in a slightly different way than we do and do not see the tight connection which we do between the two.

Senator BAYH. How tenuous is his political hold if he begins to make some of these tough choices? I mean, in some respects I understand the difficult situation he faces, but it is in some ways in his interest to make himself look somewhat vulnerable as an excuse for not taking more aggressive steps. So if he began to—if they abrogated the agreement, if he began to go back to be more aggressive in confronting these lawless areas, just how hard would that be for him politically?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think it is a hard judgment for me to make. I regret the fact that we do not have one of our intel community colleagues here to answer that question. I think they would be better equipped to do it than I am. It is a difficult judgment to make.

I think what bears repeating is that President Musharraf has been a quite good partner in the war on terror. He has given us a lot of assistance in fighting this fight. It is difficult and complicated in Pakistan, and I was merely suggesting earlier that there are some issues that are unavoidably going to have to be addressed.

Senator BAYH. I agree with that. He is in a tough spot. But we are in a tough spot.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I agree.

Senator BAYH. My question is what did we learn from September 11? I mean, if, as a friend of mine is fond of saying, whatever Musharraf faces, for instance the difficult choices and this and that, it is what it is. We have a lawless area. Al Qaeda is reconstituting itself. They are destabilizing a neighbor.

You mentioned that they are a sovereign state. Well, sovereignty denotes some level of control, and if they simply cannot control that area what do we do? I mean, it seems to me this is fairly analogous to the situation in Afghanistan pre-September 11, except that in that case we had a regime that was aiding and abetting al Qaeda. Here we have one that is trying to do something about it, but may be ineffective in doing something about it.

So the bottom line to all of this is, if he is trying but just cannot get the job done what do we do? When do we allow a lawless area where al Qaeda is reconstituting itself to exist?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Bayh, I think I mentioned earlier in comments that I made in response to one of your colleagues that this is an area, first of all, that has never been under the control of, not just President Musharraf's government, but any government in Pakistan or under the British Raj going back in history. So I do think that the challenge is enormous.

What I think our challenge is to try and help make him a more effective partner in working with us. We have tried to do that in a number of different ways. This committee gave us some authorities in the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act to do training

and equipping. We have used some of those funds to help train his counterterrorist forces and, as I said, we are looking at—

Senator BAYH. Look, I appreciate all of that. This is a complicated, difficult situation. But I will just cut to the bottom line here, which is we encourage him, we support him; what if, at the end of the day, he is just not able to do what needs to be done. So that the balance we have here is the risk of destabilizing Afghanistan on the one hand, combined with the risk of al Qaeda reconstituting itself and attacking our troops in Afghanistan and possibly launching terrorist attacks upon us once again—those are the risks on the one hand of not being more aggressive, versus the risks of destabilizing his regime, which has been helpful in some regards. They have nuclear weapons. We have to net that out at some point.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I agree. I think it is fair to say that all of these issues you have raised—the threat to our troops, the plotting against our homeland that is going on in this area, et cetera—are issues that we raise regularly and frequently with the Government of Pakistan and directly with the President.

Senator BAYH. My time has expired, but this eventually will face us with difficult choices, and it is difficult to explain to the American people how a group that slaughtered 3,000 Americans, is attempting to attack us again, is attacking our troops in Afghanistan, is allowed a sanctuary and our reason for not acting more aggressively in dealing with that is because we are concerned about the political consequences in Pakistan.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator, I just would like to go back and say one thing, which General Lute talked about, I did as well. I think you just drew the connection to al Qaeda and the attack on the homeland here on September 11. I think President Musharraf has been very persistently going after al Qaeda and I think that I would not want to leave the hearing with the impression that he has not. I mean, I think he himself has had two or three or maybe more attempts on his life by al Qaeda, which both indicates the degree to which they feel he is their enemy as well as they are our enemy.

I think it is a question more here of the level of effort and balance of effort between the things that they have done on al Qaeda—they have taken a lot of casualties going after al Qaeda. In fact I think over 100 Pakistani troops have been killed in the last year or so going after al Qaeda.

Senator BAYH. Then they backed off.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Well again, I think one needs to draw the distinction between al Qaeda and Taliban in what he is doing. I do not know if General Lute wants to add.

Senator BAYH. He took his troops back into the barracks, regardless of who they were fighting.

General LUTE. Fundamentally, the role of the Pakistani military changed with the North Waziristan agreement, which of course, was preceded by a similar agreement in South Waziristan, so two of the key provinces of the seven in the tribal area. In both cases the Pakistani military moved back into barracks essentially, based on the provisions of the agreement.

The problem is that, while the Pakistani military abided by their part of the agreement, the tribal leaders, which were to have

quelled the violence and stopped the cross-border attacks and so forth, have not.

Senator BAYH. My time has expired. These are not naive people we are dealing with here. They had to anticipate some of these consequences. My interpretation of it was that they just could not take the pressure any more. Either his military was agitating because of the losses they were taking, or the political ramifications with an election coming up were too great. It kind of is what it is, but if they back off and the consequences flow from that, that could be reasonably expected and that means a greater risk to our country. Eventually we have to do something about it, or at least tell them we are seriously contemplating doing something about it, so we put a thumb on the other side of the scale and they get the troops back out of the barracks doing what needs to be done.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman LEVIN. A 30-second add-on, because this gets to the question that I asked before. Senator Bayh, I do not know if he was here at the moment, but the refusal apparently of Pakistan even to acknowledge that that agreement has been violated, it seems to me, adds to the troubling nature of this. By the way, apparently under international law if you are attacked from an area which is not governed by the sovereign country next door there is some authority to go into that ungoverned area and go after the source of attacks against you. So this is not as though there is a prohibition under international law; to go into the ungoverned territory if that territory is the source of attacks against a sovereign neighbor, or the entity which that sovereign neighbor, including NATO, has authorized to do so, particularly when that entity, NATO, has been authorized by the Intelligence Community, through the U.N., to be there.

I think the point that Senator Bayh is making is even more pungent in a way, if that is possible, to add to your pungency. I am not sure.

Senator BAYH. I hope it is penetrating and not pungent.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Those are fair points, Senator Levin. I would not take issue with those.

Chairman LEVIN. To the cake that you baked, I just want to put a little additional frosting on it here.

Senator BAYH. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. It is a critically important point and I think we have to insist that, on this issue, we be given a clear answer by our State Department, probably, and the DOD whether or not we, authorized by Afghanistan, being NATO, and particularly where there is a U.N. sanction for a NATO presence, do not have authority under international law to go to an ungoverned area next door to go after the source of attacks against forces which are authorized to be in Afghanistan and to protect Afghanistan.

Then to get into the issues which Senator Bayh has raised, it seems to me we need that opinion and we are going to ask for that opinion, following your lead, Senator Bayh.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador, just one last comment. If the source of the difficulty here is political uncertainty within Pakistan and the Pakistanis' difficulty in making hard choices, what they need to contemplate

is which is harder for them, them acting to do something about this or us acting to do something about this. That ultimately is what they need to get their minds around.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you both.

Senator SESSIONS, we have been holding you up a few minutes with that colloquy.

Senator SESSIONS. A very interesting discussion. I would agree fundamentally with the comments of my colleagues, and would like to ask you this Ambassador Edelman. Does the Defense Department and has the President, the Commander in Chief—do we have a clear policy that if bases are reconstituted in any way similar, even a fraction as significant as the ones in Afghanistan that were used as a base to attack the United States, that we will take some action to eliminate that?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Sessions, I think before you came in General Lute discussed the kind of rules of engagement that we do have for dealing with issues along the border. I do not think that the situation we face right now in the federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province have risen to the level that you just described in terms of Afghanistan.

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Levin pointed out the argument that it was consistent with international law when we responded against Afghanistan was either you are supporting these people or you are not assuming control over your country; either way, we cannot wait.

Ambassador EDELMAN. I understand.

Senator SESSIONS. Surely you are not unwilling to say that we will act to protect the United States' interests if there is a base that plans to attack us?

Ambassador EDELMAN. I think the President has made it clear both by his words and his actions that we are prepared to do that if we have to do it to defend the people of the United States of America.

Senator SESSIONS. That needs to be clear. I understand there is some consolidation there and also a lot of movement of people here and there, and they are not setting up so much permanently and it is hard to know, in that very huge area—the last time I was in Afghanistan I was impressed with how huge this area is, how remote and ungovernable it has ever been, and it is very, very problematic.

But let me ask a couple of things. General Jones, it is great to see you. If I do not have a chance to talk with you, I am glad that you are looking mighty fine in that uniform, but you looked better in that Marine uniform, I have to tell you, we appreciate your service.

You have mentioned in your statement your concern about the legal system. I have raised that in Iraq at some length. I just remain absolutely convinced, based on my experience as a prosecutor, that if you apprehend bad people and they are not tried promptly and in an effective way and if they are guilty they are not punished in a significant way commensurate with the enormity of their criminal act, then no government will be well respected.

It seems to me, first of all, that that is not where—we are not nearly there in Afghanistan and we certainly are not in Iraq. I

doubt that we have sufficient prison bed spaces for the criminals in Afghanistan. I know we do not in Iraq. So therefore that just poisons the whole relationship. If you arrest somebody—if you arrest 100 and 100 go out the back door, that does not work.

I understand it is the Italians that have responsibility for that.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Correct, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to our presence in the country, is it the DOD's responsibility to create a judicial system or is it our ambassador's responsibility? Who on the American side is ultimately responsible for ensuring we have a legal system?

Ambassador EDELMAN. The responsibility for the rule of law programs resides really with the Department of State and the ambassador and his country team. It is the Department of State that has the resources, through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Criminal Justice, the INL Bureau, and some of the support is provided by the Department of Justice.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it is not getting done, right?

Ambassador EDELMAN. We are not where we need to be, I agree with your characterization, Senator Sessions. In terms of rule of law, I think I mentioned that perhaps in the response, a couple of responses to questions before you came in.

Senator SESSIONS. General Jones's note said he learned, in his written statement, that prosecutors are making \$65 a month, whereas an interpreter for the U.N. makes 500 euros a month. That is even more than \$500. That a top Afghan judge earns less than \$100 a month.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Absolutely.

Senator SESSIONS. That tends to cause corruption. Low, low pay of law enforcement officials, would you not agree, leaves them vulnerable economically and tends to further corruption?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Absolutely agree.

Senator SESSIONS. How are we going to do something about it?

Ambassador EDELMAN. We definitely need to do more in the rule of law side, as I said. But it is a little hard for me to answer because it is not in the province of the DOD to do this. It is others who have to do it. Part of the problem was, as you mentioned, there was an initial disposition to allow international division of labor and lead countries. We did not have the lead for rule of law. We are now taking on some of that in the DOD, I should say, because of the work we are doing on the Afghan National Police. We programmed about \$200 million last year because we recognized that we were behind in the police side, that we were lagging, as General Lute said.

We are just beginning to see some of the results of that come out now because that was a year ago, and we have now asked the Congress for a rather substantial increase in resources for the police.

But you are quite right, the police are only one part of the system and if you have police who arrest people but then they cannot be prosecuted and tried and incarcerated, you do not get the full result. So we need to have the across the board effort.

Senator SESSIONS. What I am going to tell you—this will be as plain as I can be—one of my growing concerns is that our effort is almost dysfunctional. We have been talking about this from the beginning in Afghanistan and the beginning in Iraq and no progress

has been made. I believe—the only thing I personally have had experience with is law enforcement. I believe it jeopardizes our entire effort in both of those countries.

Please, let us go beyond talking and somebody else's responsibility. If you want congressional support around here, I think we need to have our Government deal with some things that we know can be done. We can get these salaries up. We can add more bed spaces. That is not impossible. Would you agree?

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Sessions, I do agree. I would say we have done some things and have made some progress, just not enough. We have done some—we have made some progress in rebuilding and rehabilitating some prison space in the Policharki Prison. We have done some work on training of prison guards, et cetera. So we have done some things, but overall I think we have not gotten to the place where we need to be.

Senator SESSIONS. In Iraq I am convinced we are at least five to maybe ten times under the number of beds we need, and probably that is a similar situation. So we need not just incremental steps; we need a big step here.

Ambassador EDELMAN. You and I have had a chance to discuss this on Iraq before, and I can tell you that your concerns have been registered loud and clear, and I think we are moving in a direction—and I think we are going to try and come and brief you about this. I think actually we have a briefing for the whole committee that is due. But I think we are moving towards a much bigger capacity of bed space to address many of the problems that you have raised.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to join other members of this committee in recognizing the presence of General Jones, a long-time friend and one of the fine military leaders of our generation. I cannot help but recall, given the subject matter of this hearing, that General Jones and I were having breakfast together in his dining room on the morning of September 11 when the word came in that—we first thought it was a missile that had hit the Twin Towers, the first of the towers. I have a tremendous admiration for all the service he has given our country. Great to see you again.

I have been watching a lot of the exchanges here this morning. It seems to me that there are two areas that a lot of people have been throwing out ideas on. One is the drug issue, whether there are alternatives in terms of perhaps paying off farmers and this sort of thing, and the other is the issue of the sanctuaries. I think Dr. Rubin, who has been very perceptive in his comments about the overall nature of this drug problem, to start off with—and this is not a supply-push problem, quite frankly. This is a demand-pull problem. It is international.

The situation that we face is that the markets are there and as long as the markets are there there are going to be people who are going to try to sell into that market. That is a reality I do not think we can overlook with respect to Afghanistan.

Listening to this, I must say, Mr. Chairman, I have one concern that perhaps we need to work very hard to make sure we are see-

ing this problem clearly. I would like to back up a little bit. I was a journalist in Afghanistan in 2004. I was embedded. I was in a number of different places with the Army and the Marine Corps. I was in the squad level. I went out in the villages. Quite frankly, I think I was able to see a lot of things and absorb a lot of things that I would never be able to see from this point forward, given my present circumstances.

On the one hand, we talk about the push from the Karzai government to say that growing drugs, selling drugs is against the tenets of Islam, and at the same time I can tell you on the ground, walking through every village that I walked through, every village I went through where I was with the First Battalion, Sixth Marines, they had an opium patch. They were growing poppies. Many of them had marijuana patches.

Then, one of the most striking things that I saw that reflects the problems that we face was when I was up against the Pakistani border, very near where the helicopter went down last April actually, with an Army Special Forces unit in a compound where the Marines were providing security, and on the one hand, going to your comment, Mr. Chairman, about these sanctuaries and why we should not be going into these sanctuaries, this is incredibly imposing terrain, given the limited number of troops that we have and other things that we might be doing.

On the other, in this compound, they were expanding the construction of this compound. There were Afghanis living inside the compound who basically had been loaned out by—we can put whatever “lord” we want on the front of it. Was it a warlord, was it a drug lord, whatever? But the individual with the power in that area, who was living across the river. They were being paid by our people. But when you look at where that individual lived and operated, as far as the eye could see were poppy fields.

When you have that kind of intersection in another country between the power structure and the drug trade, it is very difficult to sit down, for me it is difficult, to see now from a distance how much of the increase in hostilities that we are seeing and projecting is due to a true insurgency and how much of it is due to reaction to things like anti-drug policies.

I think it is very important for us to be able to clearly enunciate that if we are going to understand the military threats and if we are going to be developing policy. I think failing to address that reality can create inaccurate perceptions that we are reacting to and also just by its very nature can fuel corruption. We talk about corruption. We are concerned about corruption. But when you have a situation where people in a power structure because of the reality of the dominance of drugs in that region, they do not have a cultural hesitation or an ethical problem with being less than straightforward with the facts.

That to me capsulizes the difficulty that I have right now in understanding where we need to go, and I would appreciate your comment.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Webb, first of all, I agree with you completely that a lot of this is driven by the demand signal. I think Senator Nelson mentioned that earlier. I think part of the thinking initially behind having an international division of labor

was that the vast bulk of this opiate production as it is transformed into drug, heroin and other drugs, ends up in Europe. So I think the initial idea was that we needed to have the Europeans and in this case our U.K. colleagues step up and take the lead.

I think we are now at a point where we do not want to allow those attempts to have an international division of labor hamper what we are doing and so we are trying to move out on our own.

I agree with your concern that the military role in eradication could be as much fueling resistance and insurgency as not, and that has been one reason I think our colleagues at Central Command (CENTCOM) have been very reluctant to see the military take that on and why we have approached the eradication problem through governor-led eradication, having the Afghans take the lead in doing the eradication piece.

But again, I think in the end, unless you have all these other pieces we were talking about just a few minutes ago with Senator Sessions—the rule of law, the ability to prosecute people—if you end up only focusing on the lowest end person on the food chain here, we are just not going to be successful.

Senator WEBB. My time is up, but I would just suggest that it is a much more difficult problem than simply keeping the military out of the eradication. It is a whole problem with the way that we are addressing that issue as compared to the reality on the ground. All these alternate programs that might take place are facing a time line that is pretty well downstream, while we have the reality, I was looking at it when I was even there saying, if we go after these guys on drugs—it was in the works in 2004 when I was there. If we go after these guys on drugs, the drug lords are going to stop their cooperation. They are going to do it in a way that is sort of below the waterline.

It is a bit of a conundrum, but you do have the situation trying to figure out how much of the military challenge that we face really is from the Taliban, really is from terrorist elements, rather than just the obstructionism of people who are depending on their economy with the drug trade.

Ambassador EDELMAN. It is a fair comment, Senator Webb, and I think we face elements of both because, as you say, it is a very, very complex set of circumstances out there. As a former ambassador to Turkey, I have thought a lot about the question of, since Turkey faced this problem as well in the 70s and 80s, how to address this. I at one point was talking in Kabul with Hykma Catin, who was a former foreign minister of Turkey and was the NATO Secretary General's High Rep for 2 years to Afghanistan. I asked Minister Catin what his thoughts were about the comparison between Turkey and Afghanistan. He said: "Well, first of all, we started from a way higher level of development in Turkey." He said: "Second, it took a very long time and a lot of money."

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb.

Senator CLINTON.

Senator CLINTON. I really appreciate Senator Webb's line of questioning because it really illustrates the continuing difficulty we have in sorting out what it is that is happening on the ground. What I am concerned about is whether we are losing time to be

able to get that figured out. I think we are really at a tipping point in Afghanistan. I felt that when I was there last month.

I hope that the administration's commitment to new troops, the effort to get NATO more focused, the hope that we can strengthen the Karzai government—all has to happen simultaneously in order to take on these challenges, whether it be a new offensive this spring or the growing strength of the drug lords.

I want to just switch gears for a minute, though, because there are many things that have been spoken about that are very clearly difficult for America to influence. I want to talk about force protection for our forces and their quality of life, because we are putting more in, number one; and number two, I think we all believe the violence will increase. Whether we will see an explosion of violence that brings other elements of the Afghan society into it, as we saw after the bombing of the mosque in Samarra, I do not know. But clearly with the uptick in suicide bombers and some of the other activities that we are seeing, there is going to be a big push to escalate the violence.

Now, earlier this month the 82nd Airborne Division assumed responsibility for the combat mission, from the 10th Mountain Division, which is based at Fort Drum in upstate New York. As subordinate units from the 82nd moved into position, 10th Mountain Division, 3rd Brigade combat teams were displaced to Jalalabad. What we are getting in reports back to Fort Drum—in fact a February 26 Fort Drum news release highlights the issue I want to discuss with you. There is a sergeant first class who is quoted by saying: "The amount of people on the FOB and the amount of billeting did not coincide."

In other words, soldiers were living in a variety of very difficult and challenging living conditions. My concern is that with a build-up in an offensive capability coming from Pakistan and other areas within Afghanistan, whether we are also leaving our troops more exposed than they need to be, particularly in these forward operating bases.

It is disconcerting to extend a brigade by 4 months, which is what we did with the 10th Mountain Division, and make further demands if we do not have some adequate planning and execution for their logistical needs. We are getting reports that we do not have enough bunkers, force protection barriers, checkpoint security systems, artillery radar systems, UAVs, and other critical equipment for expanding the mission, as I think the majority, certainly speaking for myself, agree we must do.

The deficiencies in the GAO report highlighted equipment shortages in the CENTCOM areas of operations. I have referred to that earlier in hearings focused on Iraq because that was a constant source of complaint on my recent trip, and in my discussions with a lot of the soldiers and marines who have returned from their deployments.

So I think that it would be incumbent upon you, General, and others, to make sure we do not have shortages in resources as we are adding more American troops, and that we have the services and logistics for the arriving troops. Again, I see this as an issue of force protection primarily.

What I wanted to ask about is an article in today's New York Times that NATO and American forces knew there was a suicide bomber in the Bagram area before the suicide bomb attack that killed 23 at the main gate. Probably all of us have been at Bagram. We know the security checkpoints one goes through. We know, obviously, that the Vice President was there and that the timing of the suicide attack, some have said, at least contributed to the selloff in the stock market. Whether it did that or not, it was a serious and concerning incident.

Apparently, according to this article, the Afghan police chief in the area said he had not been informed of the possible threat. I would like to ask the General first and then the Ambassador: Is there a reason why the Afghan police forces would not have been notified? What mechanisms exist for coordinating with Afghan forces when intelligence threats are received? How would you analyze what happened or what went wrong here?

General LUTE. Well, Senator, I am aware of the same reports today that you refer to. It is not usual that specific threats would not be coordinated with all elements that could address them, to include the Afghan National Police, or the Afghan police. I do know that there are force protection mechanisms in place around Bagram, and every place also we have Americans stationed, that feature close coordination with local officials. So this caught me a bit short as well, and I really cannot explain it today until I have some time to look into it.

The other point, though, I would make is that, without crossing into the classified realm, is that with a suicide bomber roughly every third day last year in Afghanistan, so over 100 suicide bombers last year, most of them acted without any specific indications in terms of time and place. So while there may well have been a report, it was probably not specific in terms of time and location. Of course that does not lead us very far in terms of what we might do by way of prevention.

Senator CLINTON. I think it would be useful, General, to perhaps submit some additional information to the committee after you have conducted further inquiry.

General LUTE. Fair enough. We will do so.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator CLINTON. Ambassador, do you have anything to add?

Ambassador EDELMAN. No, I do not really, Senator Clinton. I saw the same story in the Times today. But like General Lute, I did not have any awareness that there had been a specific intelligence report. So we will check into it and get back to you.

Senator CLINTON. Let me also ask that, with the changes in command that have occurred recently with General McNeil, the overall senior NATO commander, with our ambassador in Afghanistan scheduled to leave, with our ambassador in Pakistan leaving, I think we are really going to regret the disruption of all these relationships. I have suggested to the White House that they at least try to get some permanent presence with a high level presidential envoy to move back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is so much disagreement and misunderstanding, as well as

different perspectives about what should be in the interests of both of these leaders and their countries.

But I am just worried that what we are seeing is an unraveling situation that will accelerate because there are no—there is nobody there who has any ongoing relationship base.

I am also concerned about the command changes and adjustments about lines of authority in Afghanistan. Again, General, maybe you could get back to us on this. Who authorizes targets to be bombed? Who gets priority for med-evac assets? What gets priority for artillery support or receives logistics in what priority?

What rules of engagement are now actually in effect? We have had these problems with NATO countries sending in troops but having different rules of engagement. Where does that stand now, and who sorts out all of the potential disagreements among the various troops?

General LUTE. Senator, the 32,000 troops, to include 15,000 Americans that are part of the NATO structure, so ISAF, are under one set of rules of engagement. They are approved by the North Atlantic Council. General Jones is the resident expert in this room in terms of the specifics, but all those troops operate under the same rules.

What distinguishes some national contributions inside that structure from others is that some are assigned missions that do not take them into the combat realm. So there are some forces inside that 32,000 NATO force structure that conduct PRT missions and not combat operations. But they nonetheless operate under the same rules of engagement.

As for all the list of different forms of support—casualty evacuation, close air support, logistics, and so forth—those are all today coordinated by a four-star NATO commander, who happens today to be a U.S. commander, General Dan McNeil, out of Kabul.

Senator CLINTON. Just one final follow-up. Are they the same rules of engagement that we had in Iraq prior to this latest escalation?

General LUTE. They are not precisely the same, but they are very close.

Senator CLINTON. There were many complaints about the rules of engagement, at least for our forces in Iraq, and they have been changed because of the escalation. I would like to know what the differences are.

General LUTE. The key difference in Baghdad, I think is the place in particular that you are citing, was that before this recent change in Azimuth in Iraq there were political constraints on locations inside Baghdad and some political party affiliations inside Baghdad which prohibited or at least inhibited our operations against them. Those have been removed, and we do not suffer that same problem in Afghanistan.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Senator Clinton, if I might also address some of the understandable concerns I think you raised about continuity with some of the changes. I think there are some mitigating factors. One is that General McNeil, of course, is going back for a second tour in Afghanistan. So although he is new to his current job and responsibilities, he does have a familiarity with the key

players, like President Karzai and others. I think General Freakley is there for some period of time, the U.S. dual-hatted deputy. So there are some I think mitigating circumstances.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Clinton.

You have many follow-up items to attend to. One I want to emphasize has to do with that legal opinion that we will expect from you, Ambassador Edelman, and your general counsel at the DOD, as to whether there is any doubt that if there is a sanctuary in Pakistan, which there is, where there are al Qaeda training camps, which there are, that the United States and NATO have the right under international law to go after the source of those threats with the permission of the host country, Afghanistan, particularly in light of the fact that the United Nations has authorized NATO to carry out operations in Afghanistan.

That border is a huge threat to us, and to the world. Al Qaeda is a growing threat and it seems to me we have to be real clear as to whether there is any doubt that we can go after those sanctuaries if Pakistan is either unwilling or unable to go after them.

[The information referred to follows:]

On April 18, 2007, the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel briefed Senate Armed Services Committee staff on the issues related to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as requested by Senator Levin at the hearing and by Senator Warner by a follow-on letter.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would simply request the chair to expand our request to the witnesses to provide the status quo of the PRTs, that we have a similar, General and Secretary, status quo of the PRTs in Iraq, and what are the—because the committee is addressing that issue in both AORs. We need to know also what is the status of the participation of the Iraqi forces thus far in the Operation Surge? We get mixed reports back here, that in some instances they are showing up undermanned, some other anecdotal reports, largely from military people, who frankly email all of us—let us face it, we are on a real-time basis, fortunately, with our troops—that the Iraqis are not kicking down the doors, not going into the back alleys, not taking on the real tough aspects of this Operation Surge, and that it time and time again falls on the U.S. forces, whereas the President, with due respect to our President, said the Iraqis will take the lead and we are in support, basically, in this Operation Surge.

Too much of the evidence that this Senator is receiving is to the fact that that is not being borne out in the actual day-to-day operations. So I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that that also be done.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

So, Ambassador Edelman, you have some tasks ahead of you. We thank you both. Ambassador Edelman, General Lute, thank you.

Ambassador EDELMAN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Let us now welcome our second panel.

Senator WARNER. We also should have the record reflect that Ambassador Neuman has discharged his responsibilities in Afghanistan with distinction. His father was ambassador to Afghanistan.

He followed on and has done his very best, and I want to commend him. He frequently on his return trips came and visited members of Congress, Mr. Secretary, and that is important.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you both.

Now let us welcome our second panel. We thank them for not only being here today, we thank them for staying with us. It has been a long morning, very valuable to us, and their testimony is also extraordinarily valuable and we are glad that they stayed the course, as sometimes is spoken of these days.

As many of my colleagues have already mentioned, we are joined here today by General Jim Jones, the former NATO and EUCOM Commander; sitting beside him, Dr. Barnett Rubin, Center on International Cooperation. The committee is eager to hear the views of these witnesses.

If I can single you out, General Jones—and forgive me for doing this, Dr. Rubin, but so many of us have had so many connections with General Jones over the years. I cannot even think that there is anybody in Congress or the executive branch who has not benefited from your wisdom, and I know that our troops have benefited from your leadership. They have been inspired by that leadership. They have benefited by that leadership.

I think you look great whether you are in a Marine uniform or just in a suit like the rest of us. But in any event, we welcome you. I think this may be your first testimony after your retirement, and you will be called upon many other times, hopefully without such a long wait before we reach you.

Dr. Rubin, we do not want to leave you out. We know of your background in this area. You have been the Special Advisor to the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan. You are an expert on Afghanistan, as well as on conflict prevention and peace-building. You are currently the Director of Studies and the Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation. We look forward to hearing from both of our panelists. We thank you for your patience.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with your remarks. Of course, I have known General Jones for a very long time. I spoke earlier about my unlimited respect for this fine individual and how he continues to avail himself in the public interest, not as a paid public servant, but as a volunteer public servant.

Dr. Rubin, I have had a chance to read over your testimony here and it is really remarkable. I am hopeful that we can address some of these issues in our questions here. But our distinguished colleague from Virginia, my junior Senator and good friend Senator Webb, I thought—I hope you will comment on his colloquy. He did not get to ask the question to you, but I will on his behalf, about his commentary and his perception with regard to the drug trade. Your prepared statement addresses in many respects some of the issues raised by Senator Webb.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you both. General Jones.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC [RET.],
FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COM-
MAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE**

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Warner. Thank you for asking us to be here. It is not the first time I have participated with Dr. Rubin, who I have enormous respect for, on the issue of Afghanistan and I am honored to be here with him today.

I will be very brief because I have really enjoyed listening to everything that has been said. I am going to try to focus on just a few things to try to summarize what has been said, at least from my perspective. My frame of reference for Afghanistan goes back to virtually my entire assignment as the NATO operational commander and I was tasked with drawing up the initial operational plan that still governs the activity of NATO troops today.

I continue to believe, Mr. Chairman, that our success in Afghanistan is eminently achievable. I believe that it will be determined by things other than military and I think we need to really understand the meaning of that statement, that Afghanistan, despite resurgent activity, despite IEDs, despite attacks, Afghanistan's destiny is that it will be solved by things other than military.

I believe it can get worse. I believe there can be a military, much greater military challenge, but it does not have to. It does not have to if we do some things over the next 2 or 3 years that absolutely must be done.

I believe that what the international community does over the next 2 or 3 years will probably largely determine the probability of our long-term success. Much has been said this morning about the good things going on in Afghanistan and I will not dwell on them, but they include the elections of 2004, the relative stability of the country in the north and the west, the PRTs, the fact that NATO is present nationwide, having executed a gradual expansion first from the capital region, then to the north, then to the west and the south and to the east, and the fact that the U.S. is now within the NATO command structure.

I would like to emphasize one thing that I did not hear being mentioned here this morning. There is a NATO mission and there is an Operation Enduring Freedom mission and the two are somewhat different. We need to understand that one, to use a familiar term, one is much more kinetic than the other. Both are extremely important, but they are different, and the entire operational plan allows for those differences.

The emergence of the ANA has been a positive thing. I would say that we need to do more. More nations need to help us train the Afghan army. It is a U.S.-led pillar according to the G-8 agreements. Another successful pillar has been the disarmament-reintegration pillar led by Japan. Reconstruction, schools, roads, health care—80 percent of the Afghans have access to some sort of health care now. The tripartite council, policy action groups—there are many positive things that are going on.

I need to focus on the few things that I have come to believe over the last few years that absolutely have to be tackled and are not being tackled effectively. I will say it very simply by suggesting that it is evident to me that some of our international structures

that are present and in place are not functioning as well as they should be in order to bring about the desired end state.

Specifically, when you have a problem like Afghanistan, where over 60 countries are present on the ground doing things in Afghanistan, 37 of which are troop contributing nations, 26 nations of the NATO, a U.N.-led—all the legitimacy that one could want for an international operation of this kind, a U.N.-run organization. Let us face it, the United Nations is in charge in Kabul of coordinating the international effort. G-8 agreements that apportion responsibilities for specific aspects of reconstruction; the NATO present in full force with a special representative, both political and a NATO commander and the European Union present and in force. It leads me to wonder why it is that we cannot organize ourselves in such a way to do the four or five things at least, in addition to all the wonderful things that we are doing, that absolutely have to be done, that will largely dictate the future direction of Afghanistan.

Specifically, I have said this before both in uniform, and I will continue to restate it outside of uniform because I believe it to be true. The Achilles heel of Afghanistan is largely found in the narcotics problem. It affects every aspect of Afghan life. It prevents the legitimate development of an economy. It corrupts institutions and people, and of late and most worrisome, there seems to be a greater connectivity between the funding for the various insurgencies and criminal acts around the country than ever before. If that is true, then we need to do something about it.

Now, the second pillar that I would like to comment on is the pillar that we have talked about this morning on judicial reform. In the G-8 this is an Italian-led pillar. It is, in my view, on life support. I have seen very little progress in Afghanistan over my many visits in combatting corruption, in prosecuting criminals, and putting them in jail where they belong. I believe that this is something that can be tackled.

The third pillar that I am concerned about is police reform. Now, all three of these pillars are led respectively, according to the G-8, by the United Kingdom for narcotics, by Italy for judicial reform, and by Germany for police reform.

Now, one of the things that I have observed is that many nations have taken that agreement where those countries agreed to step up to the leadership and basically said, well, that is your problem. But my sense of success here is that those countries should not be held accountable for doing the entire work themselves, but they should be held accountable and should be responsible for coordinating the effectiveness of the international organizations, multi-governments, that can focus on the aspects of the problem.

So in the case of narcotics, since we do not have that cohesion internationally that I have seen, we devolve into bilateral relations between countries who alternatively try to do things. But the coordination and the cohesion is lacking and the problem continues to get worse.

I think that a fourth metric that I am concerned about in addition to those three pillars is the fact that the Pakistani-Afghan relationship simply has to be resolved in a way that is beneficial for

both nations. This is a problem, this is a regional problem, and it has to have a solution of some sort.

As a NATO commander I had the first two meetings with the Pakistani military authorities, in Islamabad, actually, and once in my headquarters in Brussels. My colleague from Pakistan explained in great detail the terms of the agreements for the federally Administered Tribal Areas, and I can say that at the end of the conversation I told him that on paper, the agreement looks fine; if everybody does what they agreed to do, we will be just fine.

The fact is, that has not happened. As we saw during my time, up until December of last year, increasing evidence that the border problem was getting worse, not better. In my final conversation with General Al-Huq, I mentioned to him that we will go into this winter recess, so to speak, where violence will go down and by spring time it will be very important that Pakistan and Afghanistan find a way to talk respectfully among themselves to solve this problem, along with the NATO forces on the ground in Afghanistan.

I believe that we are going to see a spring offensive. There always is a spring offensive. I would be hesitant to characterize how violent it is going to be or how successful it is going to be because that is not knowable. But I think that I would be careful about making the Taliban 10 feet tall. I do not think the Taliban is 10 feet tall. The Taliban is present in the east and in the south, largely coming from the safe havens that they have been accorded. But it is not an insurmountable problem. There is not going to be a military defeat of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

The opposition, which includes the Taliban, the remnants of al Qaeda, the drug cartel empire, the criminals, tribes, tribe on tribes, remnants of warlords, and people who operate in a lawless region, do have more access to funds and can in fact attrite the force, and the attrition. Their goal is simply to attrite the force at the rate of four or five a day, eventually causing political instability in the many capitals of nations who are troop contributing and gradually dismembering the coalition.

This can be stopped and this can be halted if we do the things that will swing the people around to supporting the government. That is reconstruction, it is judicial reform, it is some sense of success trying to swing this narco-economy back away from its dependence on narcotics, and it is about providing a safe and secure environment, through having quality and quantity of police adequately trained and not corrupted in the hinterlands to protect the people.

So I will close by simply saying that I am optimistic because I think the exit strategy that everybody wants is definable. I think it is visible. I think we know what we have to do. I do not want to oversimplify it. It is difficult. But the biggest challenge that I see is the proper organization that brings together the effects that we want in order to achieve the trends that we want, which the people understand and are waiting to see. If we can do that, then I believe that Afghanistan can turn in the right direction and we can be successful.

But as long as we continue to talk about Afghanistan in purely military terms, without affecting the reconstruction of the country

and those particular pillars that have been on, as I said, on life support, then we will have a longer problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC, (RET.)

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and for having this hearing. Congress remains focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) ambitious undertaking in Afghanistan. This interest and the continued support of the United States for this mission are absolutely essential to its success.

It is a great privilege to be before you today, exactly a month since my retirement from active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps. Today I hope to offer the committee some insights into both the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, and the importance of sustaining NATO as it continues to perform valiantly in the execution of its mission, one that is vital to the future of Afghanistan.

I appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2006, also to discuss Afghanistan. Since then, we have witnessed some impressive successes in the ISAF's mission—to establish security and stability throughout the country. What has not changed since then is that ISAF remains NATO's most important and challenging mission. The Secretary General of NATO has repeatedly said that NATO cannot fail in Afghanistan; I agree with him completely on this point.

NATO's operations are now carried out at greater distances and they are more ambitious than ever before. Thirty-eight thousand NATO soldiers are deployed today on three different continents performing a wide variety of missions—from Baltic air policing to a 15,000-man unit keeping a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, to our mission in Iraq, NATO's New Response Force (NRF) is the most visible expression of our increasingly global operational capability, one which provides capable strategic Reserve Forces and operational Reserve Forces on ready-to-move standby. That being said, no mission is more important than the one in Afghanistan; it is no longer only the United States' reputation that is "on the line" in Afghanistan, it is the reputation of the 26 nations that form NATO in the 21st century, the 11 non-NATO nations who also have troops on the ground, and the 23 others who all are contributing of their national treasure in one manner or another. In short, Afghanistan's fate is about us . . . all of us!

There are currently over 34,000 forces in ISAF—with 15,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from the United States under NATO Command. The Alliance now has responsibility for ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan and works alongside an additional 13,000 U.S.-led coalition forces of Operation Enduring Freedom. The 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under ISAF are the leading edge of NATO's efforts for security and reconstruction, supported by military forces capable of providing necessary security and stability. ISAF's assumption of the entire security and stability mission in Afghanistan is testament to its growing capacity to engage in defense against common security challenges, including terrorism. What makes these reconstruction teams so effective is that they're empowered. Many, but not all, PRT commanders, usually at the rank of lieutenant colonel, have the independent authority and funding to bring about immediate effects in the region by building a bridge, opening a school, digging a well, turning on electricity, paving a road, and giving a sense of comfort and reassurance in the hinterlands where the government will some day be able to get out there and replace the PRTs. As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) I witnessed what PRTs can do and I continue to believe that one PRT of up to 100 people is worth a battalion of troops in terms of all the good it can bring to the people. Proactive engagement is always cheaper than reactive engagement. I would have rather had 100 people dedicated to a certain thing every single day for 365 days, than a few thousand caved troops for only 60 days.

While I was assigned as SACEUR, I witnessed NATO's civilian leadership spend a considerable amount of time working to sustain a unity of purpose for the men and women of the Alliance, along with 17 other troop contributing nations in Afghanistan. This is a tough job, but essential to sustaining the role of NATO in Afghanistan, and in other areas of operation as well. The military forces deployed under NATO are a visible and effective demonstration of NATO's collective resolve to project security in unstable regions and to deter, disrupt and defend against terrorism. ISAF continues to be a model of teamwork—a cooperation of comrades in arms working together to solve very difficult problems. I am confident that it will

continue that way. In the months since the full transfer of authority to NATO last fall, opposing militant forces have tried to test NATO to see if NATO troops had the will and the capability to prevail when challenged. The answer was a resounding “yes.” Operation Medusa, last fall, not only defeated the insurgents near Kandahar, but helped establish the conditions for reconstruction and development activities that are moving the southern province forward.

While ISAF is focused on establishing security and stability throughout the country, the international community’s efforts in Afghanistan remain based on five main pillars: training the Afghan Army, Training the Police Forces, Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups, Judicial Reform, and Counternarcotics. As SACEUR, I shared with many of you my belief that the ultimate success in Afghanistan depends not simply on the military. It depends in large measure on the efforts of the cohesive international community and the performance of the Karzai government itself. On that score I am not as optimistic as I once was. Collectively, the international effort need to ensure that military efforts are immediately followed up with the needed reconstruction and development activities in the short run, and success across all five pillars of reform in the long run. Development and reconstruction activities will help meet expectations of the Afghan people who have massively signaled in two national elections, one for president, and one for parliament, that they overwhelmingly understand and support this effort. Progress in education, judicial reform, agriculture, economic development, public services and health has to go hand in hand with providing a stable and secure environment. Afghan authorities and ISAF are now focusing on the key tasks of ensuring that reconstruction and development can take place in accordance with the priorities identified by the local authorities and the National government themselves; this is encouraging.

Today the Afghan national army is about 30,000 strong and plays a pivotal role in the security of Afghanistan. The U.S. commitment to train an army of approximately 70,000 soldiers continues. NATO nations have been fielding NATO operational mentor and liaison teams. Currently, NATO has 15 such teams offered by troop-contributing nations, with 7 of them completely fielded and 17 more remaining to be fielded. The more rapidly NATO can build a capable and sufficiently robust Afghan national army, the faster it will establish conditions for success.

When I last testified in September, it was my judgment that much more needed to be done to train the police force, as well as provide adequate numbers, equipment, training, and pay, coupled with the need to fight against corruption. ISAF’s contribution to the Afghan national police training remains within means and capabilities. Sadly, this is work that still needs to be done.

Judicial reform is not a NATO task in Afghanistan, but it is vital to everything that transpire in the country. Judicial reform remains one of the key areas where a progress must be made, as the courts and prosecutorial capabilities of the state remain distrusted, overly corrupt and resource starved. A major problem with judicial reform is the low pay of prosecutors, which makes them susceptible to corruption. I remember a meeting last year with the Attorney General of Afghanistan, who told me that prosecutors’ average pay was \$65 a month. By comparison, an interpreter working for the United Nations makes 500 Euros a month. A top Afghan judge earns less than \$100 a month—less than the cost to rent an apartment in Kabul; less than what the Taliban pay locals to support their military operations. This situation cannot be allowed to stand. Italy, as the lead G-8 nation of this effort, should be encouraged to do much more than it has to date.

Proper training of police forces is also in need of a massive infusion of resources in order to provide security in the countryside. Germany is the lead G-8 nation for the coordination of this effort, but it has been inadequate to date.

Afghanistan’s most serious problem is not the Taliban, it is the alarming growth of its economic dependence on narcotics. It now permeates nearly every aspect of Afghan society and underwrites much of the violence we are fighting throughout the nation. It is Afghanistan’s true “Achilles’ Heel”. Afghanistan does not need to become a narco-state, but it is unfortunately well on its way to becoming one. The parts of Afghanistan which are currently producing the largest poppy crops are not those that are traditionally known for the growth of such product. The need to find the right means to ensure that farmers can economically grow and sell legal produce, in addition to developing an overarching and understandable way ahead in the overall fight against narcotics, is vital. Ninety percent of Afghan narcotics are sold in the European markets. The money returns to Afghanistan and fuels the IEDs and terrorism that kills and wounds our soldiers. In my opinion this is the number one problem affecting the recovery of the nation. The lead nation for this effort is the United Kingdom, and it is failing in developing and implementing a cohesive strategy to even begin to resolve a problem that will result in international failure in Afghanistan if not addressed.

There remains a need for closer cooperation and coordination between NATO and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as those nations, governmental and non-governmental organizations, involved in security sector reform. President Karzai has recognized this and has sought to create a policy action group to make decisions and coordinate across the spectrum of reform. This body is Afghan-led and chaired by the president. The Policy Action Group is designed to reach down to the provincial district and community level in order to provide integrated programs that implement policy and serve the interests of the Afghan people. I believe that this group has a good chance of succeeding and will contribute to the enhanced cohesion and coordination that thus far has been absent in the delivery of international relief.

One word about Afghanistan's relationship with its neighbor Pakistan. If the international community fails to impose its will on the two leaders of the Nations in questions, it is quite likely that the border situation, left unaddressed, will continue to destabilize both countries. Metrics of behavior should be imposed on both national leaders in order to bring about a healthier relationship that is less focused on "finger-pointing" and more focused on effectively securing the vital border region. We will have much less to fear from a so-called "Spring offensive" by the insurgent forces if some accords between the two nations can be reached and implemented. Thus far, I am not encouraged.

The evidence before us is clear—over the past 5 years there has been solid progress throughout Afghanistan. However, efforts of the international community combined with those of NATO need to be increased in order to consolidate and expand the gains made throughout the nation to ensure long-term success. NATO's leadership role, as well as that of the United States remains crucial. With the continued support of the people of the United States for what is an internationally approved mission, and with the support of this Congress, I believe we can and will ultimately succeed in solidifying the conditions necessary for sustained peace and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan. There is an "exit strategy" for Afghanistan, the question before us is whether, as an international community, we can organize ourselves in such a way as to successfully reform those pillars of this new society that absolutely must be reformed. Time is not on our side in this worthy quest.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. Thank you for asking me to appear before this distinguished committee and I would be pleased to respond to any questions you might have at this time.

Chairman LEVIN. General Jones, thank you.
Dr. RUBIN.

STATEMENT OF HON. BARNETT R. RUBIN, Ph.D., DIRECTOR OF STUDIES AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner. I too have benefited for several years from my association with General Jones, informal as it has been.

I have a written statement and an article that I recently published that I submitted, and I will ask those to be put in the record.

Chairman LEVIN. They will be.

Dr. RUBIN. What I thought I would do now is just briefly react to a number of the subjects that came up during the previous discussion. The first point is that we should be clear about one thing, which is we have accomplished many good things in Afghanistan. But, we are not in Afghanistan to accomplish good things; we are in Afghanistan to succeed. We are in danger of not succeeding, despite all those good things. So that is what I am going to focus on in my remarks.

Second, as General Jones said, this is a fully international operation, and when we talk about "we" in Afghanistan we should not be talking solely about the United States Government, but about how we can make the multilateral system work much better. That includes all issues, including how to deal with Pakistan, because it is not only American and Afghan troops that are being killed by

people coming across the border from Pakistan. It is the troops of all the NATO troop contributors, and the destabilization of Afghanistan affects the entire region and the entire world.

Now, the first point. In general, one thing that I think people do not bear in mind adequately, one of the Senators mentioned that Afghanistan's legal per capita GDP was half of Haiti's. Afghanistan is the poorest country in the entire world outside of sub-Saharan Africa. Its level of economic development is comparable only to the five or six poorest countries in Africa.

Now, that is a very slender reed on which to rely for global security. Its government is also, in terms of its own resources, the weakest government in the world. The tax base of the Afghan government is \$13 per capita per year. So the government from its own resources can buy everybody in the country a case of Coca-Cola and have nothing left over for army, police, courts, education, health, and so on.

So in order to succeed in Afghanistan, because as we have said we can fail on the military side, but we can only succeed on the civilian side, we need to have an effort at capacity-building and support on the civilian side comparable to our military effort, which many people still believe has been inadequate.

I was somewhat disappointed in the recent proposed supplemental appropriation, that it provides 80 percent for building security services and only 20 percent for economic development and reconstruction. Certainly when you go to Afghanistan, I hear as much about unemployment from average Afghans as I hear about the Taliban.

Now, in terms of security sector reform, the reason that it is so out of whack is largely because of the United States' national caveats, which we often do not talk about. But the two biggest national caveats in this whole operation were those imposed by the United States from the beginning, which were (1) no nation-building and (2) no peacekeeping. Therefore, the United States Government was not willing to be involved in police, judiciary, counternarcotics, or disarmament, but only in building the army.

We went to this lead donor system because of that and without a coordination mechanism. So if you build up the army but you do not have police and courts, the people in the country do not feel secure. They might, in fact, fear a military regime. So we are now way behind in the effort to build up a coordinated security sector in Afghanistan. I fully endorse what General Jones said about the police and the judiciary. I will not go into that any further.

Now, with respect to Pakistan, I just want to emphasize that if we do not deal with the problem of the sanctuary for the Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan, we will not succeed in Afghanistan. But we should recognize that, as General Jones said, this is a regional problem. It is not a problem that Pakistan is pro-terrorist and tries to pretend it is anti-terrorist. No. Pakistanis perceive the situation in Afghanistan in terms of their interests. Pakistan and Afghanistan have had antagonistic relations for as long as those two countries have existed.

We helped Pakistan, with Saudi Arabia, build up a huge infrastructure to wage jihad against Afghanistan, against the Government of Afghanistan, when it was controlled by the Soviet Union.

That infrastructure is still there and it is being used by the same people to fight against us, including the same people in the Pakistan military and intelligence on the ground level, who have been involved in this thing for 20 years and are still there on the ground level and have not changed, even if their orders have changed.

Now, first what needs to be done, was the question I believe Senator Kennedy asked. The first point is the problem is not at the border. There is a problem at the border, a border which Afghanistan, by the way, has never recognized, the problem is behind that border. The problem is the command and control of the Taliban, such as it is—I would not want to exaggerate it; it is not the Pentagon, but—their logistics, their training, fundraising organization, recuperation, medical treatment, and so on, is inside Pakistan. The least credible thing that the Government of Pakistan says is that they have no intelligence about this, because we have been relying on them for intelligence about all these groups for 30 years now. Therefore when they say that, I find that American officials are far too credulous in believing them, and we need to say, we understand it may be difficult for you, but we do not believe you have no information. The intelligence cooperation needs to be much better and it needs to be much more honest.

Second, politically, I believe some Senator asked what is General Musharraf's political problem. The problem is that President Musharraf is the head of the largest political party in Pakistan, which is the Pakistan military. The Pakistan military is not a military organization in the sense that we understand a military organization. The Pakistan military is the ruling organization in Pakistan. Musharraf is the president and he is the chief of army staff, and he is running for election this year.

So let us think, what are the political alliances of that political organization in Pakistan, the military? The Pakistan military has always been aligned with the Islamist parties in Pakistan. Currently, the party that was founded and supported by President Musharraf is in alliance with an openly pro-Taliban party, in the provincial Government of Baluchistan.

Now, in anticipation of this year's upcoming elections, President Musharraf has been conducting discussions with other political parties. He has not been able to reach an agreement with any of the Pakistani civilian political parties that support our effort in Afghanistan. So he is going to be running either by himself or de facto again in political alliance with those jihadi parties.

I think what this illustrates is that military rule in Pakistan is not the solution. Military rule in Pakistan is the problem. The way that Pakistan can build up a political base for supporting our effort is through a process of civilianization of the political system. All Pashtuns do not support the Taliban. There are Pashtun parties—I was in Peshawar and I participated in a big jirga of Pashtuns in November against the Taliban. There are political parties in that area who are opposed to the Taliban, who are supportive of the efforts of democracy in the area. But those political parties have always been in opposition to the military regime and they continue to be treated as opposition. So as long as the military is in control, it will be difficult to change the political orientation of those regions.

Finally, Pakistan does have some legitimate interests in Afghanistan which we need to recognize, such as its concerns about India. General Jones recently published an article in which he suggested some ways of possibly addressing those. We can talk about that. Pakistan, part of its national security doctrine is that the United States is an unreliable ally. That is an article of faith. Therefore they are planning for the day that we leave, and they do not want to abandon the people that they relied on in our absence.

A word about Iran. Iran and the United States had very compatible objectives in Afghanistan, but they do not have compatible objectives in Iran. Therefore Iran, while it supports the government that we jointly helped to establish there, it also does not want the United States to be completely comfortable there.

But I met with some Iranian officials in Kabul in November. They have intelligence they would like to share with the United States about, in particular, al Qaeda and Taliban activities, and they are very frustrated that the policies of both Teheran and Washington prevent them from doing so. I know there are people in both governments, and certainly in the Afghan government, who feel it would be very beneficial if the U.S. and Iran could cooperate there.

Finally, on narcotics, I always hesitated to say this in the U.S. Congress until recently, but I found a better reception than I thought. I think what Senator Webb was getting at is that there is a demand for these substances. The historical results of Prohibition are not very positive. It is the fact that they are illegal which makes them so valuable, which gives Afghanistan, which has a comparative advantage in the production of illegality, such an opportunity to make profits out of them.

As long as they are prohibited substances and there is a demand, they will be produced somewhere, and they will be produced where there is least legality. As long as we keep prohibition in effect, however, we need to focus on the economic question and on interdiction. That is, we need to win over the farmers and attack the drug lords and warlords. I believe we should stop crop eradication because crop eradication prevents us from giving aid to farmers, because they do not allow you in the area. We should focus on interdiction. If there is a military role, it would be high-level interdiction and getting high-level officials who are involved with drug trafficking out of the government, while we flood the area, the rural areas of Afghanistan, with the type of agricultural assistance that I believe Senator Thune was talking about earlier.

I will leave it at that. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rubin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. BARNETT R. RUBIN

The United States missed an opportunity to stabilize Afghanistan and isolate al Qaeda and the Taliban after the tactical military victory in 2001–2002. The failure to invest adequately in either security or reconstruction and the diversion of United States political, intelligence, military, and financial resources to Iraq left the Afghan government unable to satisfy popular expectations for security and development. This neglect led neighboring countries to conclude that the United States was not serious about success in Afghanistan but gave priority to other objectives. Hence they hedged their bets by continuing to support their clients in Afghanistan.

The administration's fixation on Iraq and Iran led it to neglect the development of greater threats to the United States and the world within Pakistan, which the

administration is addressing only belatedly and with half-measures. As a result, the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) now have more military forces in Afghanistan than ever before, expenditure on assistance to Afghanistan is higher than ever before, and yet both the Afghan government and the international forces supporting it are in a less advantageous position than at any time since the overthrow of the Taliban.

As former NDI John Negroponte testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 11, the most serious threat to the United States is the reconstitution of the al Qaeda leadership and headquarters in a joint Taliban-al Qaeda safe haven in Pakistan. The result is a burgeoning insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan that threatens the joint effort of the United States, United Nations, and the entire international community there. Pakistan, not Iran, has been the source of rogue nuclear proliferation and aid to terrorism that is directly targeting United States and allied troops as well as Afghan troops and civilians with IEDs, rockets, and suicide bombers. Pakistan needs to do much more, but its leaders are correct when they observe that they are now being pressured to deal with the consequences of negligent policies of the United States.

In the coming months we can expect to see the insurgency launch attacks on both military and civilian targets in Afghanistan. The insurgency's leadership and logistical bases are largely in Pakistan, but it can operate freely in large parts of Afghanistan. As United States and NATO spokesmen say, the Taliban and other insurgents do not constitute a conventional military threat to NATO or to the Afghan government. They do not need to constitute such a threat in order to achieve their objective, which is to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the Afghan government to the point that the international presence in support of that government becomes untenable. The recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as well as other public opinion surveys, support the conclusion I had drawn from my own observations during 4 visits to Afghanistan last year, the latest of 28 total visits since 1989, when I first entered the country with mujahidin resistance fighters. All indicators show that support for and confidence in the government and the international presence has rapidly deteriorated in the past year as they have proven unable to protect the security of Afghans from the insurgency or to curb the safe haven the insurgents enjoy in Pakistan. Failure to do the latter, in particular, seriously undermines the credibility of the United States.

Many other factors, such as a perceived increase in crime, abuse and corruption by the police and judiciary, poorly conceived and incompetently executed counternarcotics policies, and extensive waste and mismanagement in the underfunded reconstruction program also contributed to this deterioration. This loss of confidence does not translate directly into support for the Taliban, whose disastrous policies, especially their alliance with al Qaeda, Afghans do not want to return. But the loss of confidence does translate into reluctance to defend the government and to comply with its directives, as in counternarcotics.

U.S. policy discussion focuses excessively on military questions such as the number of troops and the need to end national caveats of NATO troop contributors. The original and most damaging national caveats were those imposed on our own forces by the Bush administration at the start of the operation: no peacekeeping and no nation building. As a result criminalized armed groups gained a hold on power in much of the country, and Afghans have not seen the expected improvements in security or their own well being. The Afghanistan Compact, which constitutes the internationally agreed framework for assistance to Afghanistan, places equal emphasis on security, governance, and development. From the highest government officials to the most humble illiterate laborer Afghans emphasize that the most urgently needed measures are ending the Taliban's external sanctuary, reforming the police and judiciary to curb corruption and abuse, and investing in the economy to create licit employment.

Two major issues further threaten success in Afghanistan: conflict with Iran and counterproductive counternarcotics policies. Any confrontation between the United States and Iran could have disastrous consequences for Afghanistan. The United States and Iran cooperated closely both on the ground and diplomatically in order to remove the Taliban and support the United Nations-led process. Iran has contributed to the reconstruction and stability of the country. Afghanistan enjoys very favorable trade and transit relations with Iran, which are vital for the country's economy. Iran has lost more soldiers and police than any country in battling drug traffickers coming from Afghanistan. Iranian officials with whom I met in Kabul last November expressed alarm at the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban and argued that the leaderships in both Tehran and Washington were damaging their national interests by failing to cooperate against this common foe. They had intel-

ligence data they wished to share but were unable to do so because of the policies of both countries.

Finally, counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan has the potential to drive strategic parts of the population into the arms of the Taliban. Let us be clear on what the purpose of counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan is: it is to reduce and ultimately destroy the flow of illegal funds to corrupt officials, insurgents, and terrorists. It is not to end the production and consumption of illegal drugs in the United States or Europe. It is the height of self-deluded folly to suppose that if the richest and most powerful countries in the world cannot end drug trafficking at home with all of the resources they have directed against socially marginal criminal groups, they can instead solve it in Afghanistan, one of the world's six poorest countries with one of the world's weakest states, where drug traffickers control many of the levers of power.

The eradication of the peasants' crops drives villagers into the arms of the Taliban and warlords, while actually enriching the traffickers. The traffickers benefit from increased prices and use their oligopsonistic control of the market to shift cultivation around the country and increase the volume planted to compensate for eradication. Crop eradication also provokes armed resistance that makes it impossible to deliver aid for alternative livelihoods where it is most needed. The expansion of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is thus far the main result of our counternarcotics policy.

Meanwhile, major traffickers and their political protectors, many of whom received millions of dollars in cash from the Central Intelligence Agency in 2001 and 2002, continue to enjoy nearly complete impunity. To Afghans our counternarcotics policy looks like a policy of rewarding rich traffickers and punishing poor farmers. A counternarcotics policy that served the National interests of the United States as well as Afghanistan would consist of interdiction, including destruction of heroin laboratories; dismissal from office and, where possible, criminal prosecution and extradition of key traffickers and their political protectors; and massive aid and employment creation in rural areas both to reward those farmers who have not cultivated opium poppy and to assist those who are willing to shift away from it. Carefully monitored purchase of opium for medical use from provinces that reduce their production could also play a role.

In amplification of these remarks I append an article I published in *Foreign Affairs*.

SAVING AFGHANISTAN

By Barnett R. Rubin, From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007

Summary: With the Taliban resurgent, reconstruction faltering, and opium poppy cultivation at an all-time high, Afghanistan is at risk of collapsing into chaos. If Washington wants to save the international effort there, it must increase its commitment to the area and rethink its strategy—especially its approach to Pakistan, which continues to give sanctuary to insurgents on its tribal frontier.

Barnett R. Rubin is Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at New York University's Center on International Cooperation and the author of *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*. He served as an adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the U.N. Talks on Afghanistan in Bonn in 2001.

Taliban Resurgent

Afghanistan has stepped back from a tipping point. At the cost of taking and inflicting more casualties than in any year since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 (and four times as many as in 2005), NATO troops turned back a frontal offensive by the Taliban last summer. The insurgents aimed to capture a district west of Kandahar, hoping to take that key city and precipitate a crisis in Kabul, the capital. Despite this setback, however, the Taliban-led insurgency is still active on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, and the frontier region has once again become a refuge for what President George W. Bush once called the main threat to the United States—"terrorist groups of global reach." Insurgents in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have imported suicide bombing, improvised explosive technology, and global communications strategies from Iraq; in the south, attacks have closed 35 percent of the schools. Even with opium production at record levels, slowing economic growth is failing to satisfy the population's most basic needs, and many community leaders accuse the government itself of being the main source of abuse and insecurity. Unless the shaky Afghan government receives both the resources and the leadership required to deliver tangible benefits in areas cleared of insurgents, the international presence in Afghanistan will come to resemble a foreign occupation—an occupation that Afghans will ultimately reject.

For decades—not only since 2001—U.S. policymakers have underestimated the stakes in Afghanistan. They continue to do so today. A mere course correction will not be enough to prevent the country from sliding into chaos. Washington and its international partners must rethink their strategy and significantly increase both the resources they devote to Afghanistan and the effectiveness of those resources' use. Only dramatic action can reverse the perception, common among both Afghans and their neighbors, that Afghanistan is not a high priority for the United States—and that the Taliban are winning as a result. Washington's appeasement of Pakistan, diversion of resources to Iraq, and perpetual underinvestment in Afghanistan—which gets less aid per capita than any other state with a recent postconflict rebuilding effort—have fueled that suspicion.

Contrary to the claims of the Bush administration, whose attention after the September 11 attacks quickly wandered off to Iraq and grand visions of transforming the Middle East, the main center of terrorism “of global reach” is in Pakistan. Al Qaeda has succeeded in reestablishing its base by skillfully exploiting the weakness of the state in the Pashtun tribal belt, along the Afghan-Pakistani frontier. In the words of one Western military commander in Afghanistan, “Until we transform the tribal belt, the U.S. is at risk.”

Far from achieving that objective in the 2001 Afghan war, the U.S.-led coalition merely pushed the core leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban out of Afghanistan and into Pakistan, with no strategy for consolidating this apparent tactical advance. The Bush administration failed to provide those Taliban fighters who did not want to defend al Qaeda with a way to return to Afghanistan peacefully, and its policy of illegal detention at Guantánamo Bay and Bagram Air Base, in Afghanistan, made refuge in Pakistan, often with al Qaeda, a more attractive option.

The Taliban, meanwhile, have drawn on fugitives from Afghanistan, newly minted recruits from undisrupted training camps and militant madrasahs, and tribesmen alienated by civilian casualties and government and coalition abuse to reconstitute their command structure, recruitment and funding networks, and logistical bases in Pakistan. On September 19, 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told his nation that he had to cooperate with Washington in order to “save Afghanistan and Taliban from being harmed”; accordingly, he has been all too happy to follow the Bush administration's instructions to focus on al Qaeda's top leadership while ignoring the Taliban. Intelligence collected during Western military offensives in mid-2006 confirmed that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was continuing to actively support the Taliban leadership, which is now working out of Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan Province, in western Pakistan. As a result, a cross-border insurgency has effectively exploited Afghanistan's impoverished society and feeble government.

In May 2006, Amrullah Saleh, the director of Afghanistan's national intelligence agency, completed an assessment of the threat posed by the insurgency. Saleh, who acted as the Northern Alliance's liaison during Operation Enduring Freedom, concluded that political progress in Afghanistan had not been matched by an effective strategy of consolidation. “The pyramid of Afghanistan government's legitimacy,” he wrote, “should not be brought down due to our inefficiency in knowing the enemy, knowing ourselves and applying resources effectively.” U.S. commanders and intelligence officials circulated Saleh's warning to their field commanders and agents in Afghanistan and their superiors in Washington. Sustaining the achievements of the past 5 years depends on how well they heed that warning.

“Still Ours to Lose”

In the past year, a number of events have raised the stakes in Afghanistan and highlighted the threat to the international effort there. The future of NATO depends on its success in this first deployment outside of Europe. Although it suffered a setback in the south, the Pakistan-based, Taliban-led insurgency has become ever more daring and deadly in the southern and eastern parts of the country, while extending its presence all the way to the outskirts of Kabul. NATO deployed to areas neglected by the coalition, most notably to the southern province of Helmand—and the Taliban responded with increased strength and maneuverability. On September 8, a particularly bold attack on a coalition convoy in the city killed 16 people, including two U.S. soldiers, near the U.S. embassy—the most heavily fortified section of Kabul. Even as NATO has deployed its forces across the country—particularly in the province of Helmand, a Taliban stronghold that produces some 40 percent of the world's opium—the Taliban have shown increasing power and agility.

Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the Taliban's limited institutions and the ruthlessness of their retribution against “collaborators” neutralized much of the Afghan population; only the successful political consolidation of NATO and coalition military victories can start to build confidence that it is safe to support the government. In

some areas, there is now a parallel Taliban state, and locals are increasingly turning to Taliban-run courts, which are seen as more effective and fair than the corrupt official system. Suicide bombings, unknown in Afghanistan before their successful use by insurgents in Iraq, have recently sown terror in Kabul and other areas. They have also spread to Pakistan.

On the four trips I made to Afghanistan in 2006 (in January, March-April, July-August, and November), the growing frustration was palpable. In July, one Western diplomat who had been in Afghanistan for 3 years opened our meeting with an outburst. "I have never been so depressed," he said. "The insurgency is triumphant." An elder from Kunar Province, in eastern Afghanistan, said that government efforts against the insurgency were weak because "the people don't trust any of the people in government offices." An elder from the northern province of Baghlan echoed that sentiment: "The people have no hope for this government now." A U.N. official added, "So many people have left the country recently that the government has run out of passports."

"The conditions in Afghanistan are ripe for fundamentalism," a former minister who is now a prominent member of parliament told me. "Our situation was not resolved before Iraq started. Iraq has not been resolved, and now there is fighting in Palestine and Lebanon. Then maybe Iran. . . . We pay the price for all of it." An elder who sheltered President Hamid Karzai when Karzai was working underground against the Taliban described to me how he was arrested by U.S. soldiers: they placed a hood on his head, whisked him away, and then released him with no explanation. "What we have realized," he concluded, "is that the foreigners are not really helping us. We think that the foreigners do not want Afghanistan to be rebuilt."

Yet no one I spoke to advocated giving up. One of the same elders who expressed frustration with the corruption of the government and its distance from the people also said, "We have been with the Taliban and have seen their cruelty. People don't want them back." A fruit trader from Kandahar complained: "The Taliban beat us and ask for food, and then the government beats us for helping the Taliban." But he and his colleagues still called Karzai the country's best leader in 30 years—a modest endorsement, given the competition, but significant nonetheless. "My working assumption," said one Western military leader, "is that the international community needs to double its resources. We can't do it on the margins. We have no hedge against domestic and regional counterforces." After all, he noted, the battle for Afghanistan "is still ours to lose."

The 30-Year War

The recent upsurge in violence is only the latest chapter in Afghanistan's 30-year war. That war started as a Cold War ideological battle, morphed into a regional clash of ethnic factionalism, and then became the center of the broader conflict between the West and a transnational Islamist terrorist network.

It is no surprise that a terrorist network found a base in Afghanistan: just as Lenin might have predicted, it picked the weakest link in the modern state system's rusty chain. Today's Afghanistan formed as a buffer state within the sphere of influence of British India. Because the government, then as now, was unable to extract enough revenue from this barren territory to rule it, its function had more to do with enabling an elite subsidized by aid to control the territory as part of the defense of foreign empires than with providing security and governance to the people of Afghanistan. Hence, the oft-noted paradox of modern Afghanistan: a country that needs decentralized governance to provide services to its scattered and ethnically diverse population has one of the world's most centralized governments. That paradox has left the basic needs of Afghanistan's citizens largely unfulfilled—and thus left them vulnerable to the foreign forces that have long brought their own struggles to the Afghan battleground.

In the 18th century, as neighboring empires collapsed, Afghan tribal leaders seized opportunities to build states by conquering richer areas in the region. In 1715, Mirwais Khan Hotak (of the same Kandahari Pashtun tribe as the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar), overthrew the Shiite governor of Kandahar, then a province of the Iranian Safavid empire; 7 years later, his son sacked Isfahan, the Iranian capital at the time. Subsequently, a Turkmen leader, Nader Shah, captured Isfahan and went on to conquer Kabul and Delhi. When Nader Shah was assassinated in 1747, the commander of his bodyguard, Ahmad Khan Abdali (a member of the same Kandahari Pashtun tribe as President Karzai), retreated back to Kandahar, where, according to official histories, he was made king of the Afghans at a tribal jirga. He led the tribes who constituted his army on raids and in the conquest of Kashmir and Punjab.

The expansion of the British and Russian empires cut off the opportunity for conquest and external predation—undermining the fiscal base of the ruler’s power and throwing Afghanistan into turmoil for much of the nineteenth century. As the British Empire expanded northwest from the Indian subcontinent toward Central Asia, it first tried to conquer Afghanistan and then, after two Anglo-Afghan wars, settled for making it a buffer against the Russian empire to the north.

The British established a three-tiered border to separate their empire from Russia through a series of treaties with Kabul and Moscow. The first frontier separated the areas of the Indian subcontinent under direct British administration from those areas under Pashtun tribal control (today this line divides those areas administered by the Pakistani state from the federally Administered Tribal Agencies). The second frontier, the Durand Line, divided the Pashtun tribal areas from the territories under the administration of the emir of Afghanistan (Pakistan and the rest of the international community consider this line to be the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, although Afghanistan has never accepted it). The outer frontier, the borders of Afghanistan with Russia, Iran, and China, demarcated the British sphere of influence; the British enabled the emir to subdue and control Afghanistan with subsidies of money and weapons.

In the 20th century, however, the dissolution of these empires eroded this security arrangement. The Third Anglo-Afghan War, in 1919, concluded with the recognition of Afghanistan’s full sovereignty. The country’s first sovereign, King Amanullah, tried to build a strong nationalist state. His use of scarce resources for development rather than an army left him vulnerable to revolt, and his effort collapsed after a decade. The British helped another contender, Nader Shah, consolidate a weaker form of rule. Then, in the late 1940s, came the independence and partition of India, which even more dramatically altered the strategic stakes in the region.

Immediately tensions flared between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan claimed that Pakistan was a new state, not a successor to British India, and that all past border treaties had lapsed. A *loya jirga* in Kabul denied that the Durand Line was an international border and called for self-determination of the tribal territories as Pashtunistan. Skirmishes across the Durand Line began with the covert support of both governments. At the same time, Islamabad was aligning itself with the United States in order to balance India—which led Afghanistan, in turn, to rely on aid from Moscow to train and supply its army. Pakistan, as a result, came to regard Afghanistan as part of a New Delhi-Kabul-Moscow axis that fundamentally challenged its security. With U.S. assistance, Pakistan developed a capacity for covert asymmetric jihadi warfare, which it eventually used in both Afghanistan and Kashmir.

For the first decades of the Cold War, Afghanistan pursued a policy of nonalignment. The two superpowers developed informal rules of coexistence, each supporting different institutions and parts of the country; one Afghan leader famously claimed to light his American cigarettes with Soviet matches. But this arrangement ultimately proved hazardous to Afghanistan’s health. An April 1978 coup by communist military officers brought to power a radical faction whose harsh policies provoked an insurgency. In December 1979, the Soviet Union sent in its military to bring an alternative communist faction to power, turning an insurgency into a jihad against the invaders. The United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and others began spending billions of dollars to back the anticommunist Afghan mujahideen and their Arab auxiliaries—laying the foundations for an infrastructure of regional and global jihad.

The civil war seemed to come to an end with the 1988 Geneva accords, which provided for the withdrawal of Soviet troops (while allowing continued Soviet aid to the communist government in Kabul) and the end of foreign military assistance to the mujahideen. But the United States and Pakistan, intent on wiping out Soviet influence in Afghanistan entirely, ignored the stipulation that they stop arming the resistance. The result was a continuation of the conflict and, eventually, state failure.

In the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union dissolved and the United States disengaged, ethnic militias went to war. Drug trafficking boomed, and Arab and other non-Afghan Islamist radicals strengthened their bases. Pakistan, still heavily involved in Afghanistan’s internal battles, backed the Taliban, a radical group of mostly Pashtun clerics (the name means “students”). With Islamabad’s help, the Taliban established control over most of Afghanistan by 1998, and the anti-Taliban resistance—organized in a “Northern Alliance” of feuding former mujahideen and Soviet-backed militias, most of them from non-Pashtun ethnic groups—was pushed back to a few pockets of territory in the northeast. As their grip over Afghanistan tightened, the Taliban instituted harsh Islamic law and increasingly allied themselves with Osama bin Laden, who came to Afghanistan after being expelled from Sudan in 1996.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Washington assumed that the collapse of Afghanistan into warring chiefdoms—many of them allied with neighboring states or other external forces—was not worth worrying much about. The Clinton administration began to recognize the growing threat in Afghanistan after the al Qaeda bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998. But it never took decisive action, and when the Bush administration took office, it gave priority to other concerns. It took September 11 to force Washington to recognize that a global terrorist opposition was gathering strength—using human and physical capital that the United States and its allies (especially Saudi Arabia) had supplied, through Pakistan's intelligence services, in pursuit of a Cold War strategic agenda.

Opportunities Lost

When the Bush administration overthrew the Taliban after September 11, it did so with a “light footprint”: using operatives and the Special Forces to coordinate Northern Alliance and other Afghan commanders on the ground and supporting them with U.S. airpower. After a quick military campaign, it backed the U.N. effort to form a new government and manage the political transition. It also reluctantly agreed to the formation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help the new Afghan government provide security and build new military and police forces. In 2003, the ISAF came under NATO command—the first-ever NATO military operation outside of Europe—and gradually expanded its operations from just Kabul to most of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. About 32,000 U.S. and allied forces are currently engaged in security assistance and counterinsurgency under NATO command, while another 8,000 coalition troops are involved in counterterrorist operations. The U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan coordinates the international community's support for political and economic reconstruction.

In the immediate aftermath of the Taliban's overthrow, the presence of coalition troops served as a deterrent against both overt external subversion and open warfare among the various forces that had been rearmed by Washington. This deterrent created an opportunity to build a functioning state; that state, however, now at the center, rather than the margins, of global and regional conflict, would have had to connect rather than separate its neighboring regions, a much more demanding goal. Accomplishing that goal would have required forming a government with sufficient resources and legitimacy to secure and develop its own territory and with a geopolitical identity unthreatening to its neighbors—especially Pakistan, whose deep penetration of Afghan society and politics enables it to play the role of spoiler whenever it chooses. Such a project would have meant additional troop deployments by the United States and its partners, especially in the border region, and rapid investment in reconstruction. It also would have required political reform and economic development in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Too little of this happened, and both Afghanistan and its international partners are paying the consequences. Rearming warlords empowered leaders the Afghan people had rejected; enabling the Northern Alliance to seize Kabul put those Pakistan most mistrusted in charge of the security forces. The White House's opposition to “nation building” led to major delays in Afghanistan's reconstruction.

Effective economic aid is vital to addressing the pervasive poverty that debilitates the government and facilitates the recruitment of unemployed youths into militias or the insurgency. Economically and socially, Afghanistan remains far behind its neighbors. It is the poorest country in the world outside of sub-Saharan Africa, and its government remains weak and ineffective. Last year, it raised domestic revenue of about \$13 per capita—hardly enough to buy each of its citizens one case of Coca-Cola from the recently opened bottling plant near Kabul, let alone take on all of the important tasks at hand.

Because Afghanistan has been so poor for so long, real nondrug growth averaged more than 15 percent from 2002 until this year, thanks in large part to the expenditures of foreign forces and aid organizations and the end of a drought. But growth fell to 9 percent last year, and the U.N. and the Afghan government reported in November that growth “is still not sufficient to generate in a relatively short time the large numbers of new jobs necessary to substantially reduce poverty or overcome widespread popular disaffection. The reality is that only limited progress has been achieved in increasing availability of energy, revitalizing agriculture and the rural economy, and attracting new investment.”

High unemployment is fueling conflict. As a fruit trader in Kandahar put it to me, “Those Afghans who are fighting, it is all because of unemployment.” This will only get worse now that the postwar economic bubble has been punctured. Real estate prices and rents are dropping in Kabul, and occupancy rates are down. Fruit and vegetable sellers report a decline in demand of about 20 percent, and construction companies in Kabul report significant falls in employment and wages. A

drought in some parts of the country has also led to displacement and a decline in agricultural employment, for which the record opium poppy crop has only partially compensated.

Moreover, the lack of electricity continues to be a major problem. No major new power projects have been completed, and Kabulis today have less electricity than they did 5 years ago. While foreigners and wealthy Afghans power air conditioners, hot-water heaters, computers, and satellite televisions with private generators, average Kabulis suffered a summer without fans and face a winter without heaters. Kabul got through the past two winters with generators powered by diesel fuel purchased by the United States; this year the United States made no such allocation.

Rising crime, especially the kidnapping of businessmen for ransom, is also leading to capital flight. Although no reliable statistics are available, people throughout the country, including in Kabul, report that crime is increasing—and complain that the police are the main criminals. Many report that kidnapers and robbers wear police uniforms. On August 24, men driving a new vehicle with tinted windows and police license plates robbed a bank van of \$360,000 just blocks away from the Ministry of the Interior.

The corruption and incompetence of the police force (which lacks real training and basic equipment) were highlighted after riots last May, set off by the crash of a U.S. military vehicle. Rioters chanted slogans against the United States and President Karzai and attacked the parliament building, the offices of media outlets and non-governmental organizations, diplomatic residences, brothels, and hotels and restaurants that purportedly served alcohol. The police, many of whom disappeared, proved incompetent, and the vulnerability of the government to mass violence became clear. Meanwhile, in a sign of growing ethno-factional tensions within the governing elite, Karzai, a Pashtun (the Pashtun are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan), suspected opposition leaders of fomenting violence by demonstrators, who were largely from Panjshir, the home base of the main Northern Alliance group. (Panjshiri leaders deny the charge.) Karzai responded not by strengthening support for police reform but by appointing commanders of a rival Northern Alliance group to positions in the police force. Karzai argued that he was forced into such an unpalatable balancing act because of the international community's long-standing failure to respond to his requests for adequate resources for the police.

The formation of the Afghan National Army, which now has more than 30,000 troops, has been one of the relative success stories of the past 5 years, but one reason for its success is that it uses mostly fresh recruits; the 60,000 experienced fighters demobilized from militias have, instead of joining the army, joined the police, private security firms, or organized crime networks—and sometimes all three. One former mujahideen commander, Din Muhammad Jurat, became a general in the Ministry of the Interior and is widely believed—including by his former mujahideen colleagues—to be a major figure in organized crime and responsible for the murder of a cabinet minister in February 2002. (He also works with U.S. Protection and Investigations, a Texas-based firm that provides international agencies and construction projects with security guards, many of whom are former fighters from Jurat's militia and current employees at the Ministry of the Interior.)

Meanwhile, the drug economy is booming. The weakness of the state and the lack of security for licit economic activity has encouraged this boom, and according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, opium poppy production in the country reached a record 6,100 metric tons last year, surpassing the 2005 total by 49 percent. This increase belies past claims of progress, made on the basis of a 5-percent cultivation decrease in 2005. Although the decrease was due almost entirely to the political persuasion of farmers by the government, the United States failed to deliver the alternative livelihoods the farmers expected and continued to pressure the Afghan government to engage in counterproductive crop eradication. The Taliban exploited the eradication policy to gain the support of poppy growers.

Counter-narcotics efforts provide leverage for corrupt officials to extract enormous bribes from traffickers. Such corruption has attracted former militia commanders who joined the Ministry of the Interior after being demobilized. Police chief posts in poppy-growing districts are sold to the highest bidder: as much as \$100,000 is paid for a 6-month appointment to a position with a monthly salary of \$60. While the Taliban have protected small farmers against eradication efforts, not a single high-ranking government official has been prosecuted for drug-related corruption.

Drugs are only part of a massive cross-border smuggling network that has long provided a significant part of the livelihoods of the major ethnic groups on the border, the Pashtun and the Baluch. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, warlords, and corrupt officials of all ethnic groups profit by protecting and preying on this network. The massive illicit economy, which constitutes the tax base for insecurity, is booming, while the licit economy slows.

Sanctuary in Pakistan

Pakistan's military establishment has always approached the various wars in and around Afghanistan as a function of its main institutional and national security interests: first and foremost, balancing India, a country with vastly more people and resources, whose elites, at least in Pakistani eyes, do not fully accept the legitimacy of Pakistan's existence. To defend Pakistan from ethnic fragmentation, Pakistan's governments have tried to neutralize Pashtun and Baluch nationalism, in part by supporting Islamist militias among the Pashtun. Such militias wage asymmetrical warfare on Afghanistan and Kashmir and counter the electoral majorities of opponents of military rule with their street power and violence.

The rushed negotiations between the United States and Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of September 11 changed Pakistan's behavior but not its interests. Supporting the Taliban was so important to Pakistan that Musharraf even considered going to war with the United States rather than abandon his allies in Afghanistan. Instead, he tried to persuade Washington to allow him to install a "moderate Taliban" government or, failing that, at least to prevent the Northern Alliance, which Pakistanis see as allied with India, from entering Kabul and forming a government. The agreement by Washington to dilute Northern Alliance control with remnants of Afghanistan's royal regime did little to mollify the generals in Islamabad, to say nothing of the majors and colonels who had spent years supporting the Taliban in the border areas. Nonetheless, in order to prevent the United States from allying with India, Islamabad acquiesced in reining in its use of asymmetrical warfare, in return for the safe evacuation of hundreds of Pakistani officers and intelligence agents from Afghanistan, where they had overseen the Taliban's military operations.

The United States tolerated the quiet reconstitution of the Taliban in Pakistan as long as Islamabad granted basing rights to U.S. troops, pursued the hunt for al Qaeda leaders, and shut down A.Q. Khan's nuclear-technology proliferation network. But 5 years later, the safe haven Pakistan has provided, along with continued support from donors in the Persian Gulf, has allowed the Taliban to broaden and deepen their presence both in the Pakistani border regions and in Afghanistan. Even as Afghan and international forces have defeated insurgents in engagement after engagement, the weakness of the government and the reconstruction effort—and the continued sanctuary provided to Taliban leaders in Pakistan—has prevented real victory.

In his September 21, 2006, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, James Jones, a Marine Corps general and the supreme allied commander, Europe, for NATO, confirmed that the main Taliban headquarters remains in Quetta. According to Western military officials in Afghanistan, intelligence provides strong circumstantial evidence that Pakistan's ISI is providing aid to the Taliban leadership shura (council) there.

Another commanders' shura, directing operations in eastern Afghanistan, is based in the Pakistani tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan. It has consolidated its alliance with Pakistani Taliban fighters, as well as with foreign jihadi fighters. In September, Pakistani authorities signed a peace deal with "tribal elders of North Waziristan and local mujahideen, Taliban, and ulama [Islamic clergy]," an implicit endorsement of the notion that the fight against the U.S. and NATO presence in Kabul is a jihad. (During his visit to the United States in September, Musharraf mischaracterized this agreement as only with "an assembly of tribal elders.") According to the agreement, the Taliban agreed not to cross over into Afghanistan and to refrain from the "target killing" of tribal leaders who oppose the group, and the foreign militants are expected to either live peacefully or leave the region. But only 2 days after the agreement was signed, two anti-Taliban tribal elders were assassinated; U.S. military spokespeople claim that cross-border attacks increased threefold after the deal.

Further north, the veteran Islamist leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a favorite of the ISI since 1973, operates from the northwestern Pakistani city of Peshawar and from the Bajaur and Mohmand tribal agencies, on the border with northeast Afghanistan. This is where a U.S. Predator missile strike killed between 70 and 80 people in a militant madrasah on October 30, and where bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda's number two leader, are most likely to be found.

The strength and persistence of the insurgency cannot be explained solely by the sanctuary the Taliban enjoy in Pakistan. But few insurgencies with safe havens abroad have ever been defeated. The argument that poverty and underdevelopment, rather than Pakistani support, are responsible for the insurgency does not stand up to scrutiny: northern and western Afghanistan are also plagued by crime and insecurity, and yet there is no coordinated antigovernment violence in those regions.

The Center Can Hold

For several years, Washington has responded to the repeated warnings from Karzai about the Taliban's sanctuary in Pakistan by assuring him that Islamabad is cooperating, that public protests are counterproductive, and that the United States will take care of the problem. But assurances that U.S. forces would soon mop up the "remnants" of the Taliban and al Qaeda have proved false. Nor did the United States offer adequate resources to Karzai to allow him to strengthen the Afghan state and thereby bolster resistance to the Taliban. Karzai's short-term strategy of allying himself with corrupt and abusive power holders at home—a necessary response, he says, to inadequate resources—has further undermined the state-building effort.

Western and Afghan officials differ over the extent to which Pakistan's aid to the Taliban is ordered by or tolerated at the highest levels of the Pakistani military, but they have reached a consensus, in the words of one senior Western military leader, that Pakistani leaders "could disrupt the senior levels of [Taliban] command and control" but have chosen not to. Disrupting command and control—not preventing "infiltration," a tactical challenge to which Pakistan often tries to divert discussion—is the key to an overall victory. That will require serious pressure on Pakistan.

So far, the United States and its allies have failed even to convey a consistent message to Islamabad. U.S. officials should at least stop issuing denials on behalf of Islamabad, as General John Abizaid, the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, did in Kabul on August 27 when he claimed that he "absolutely does not believe" that Pakistan is helping the Taliban. NATO and the coalition members have similarly failed to devise a common course of action, in part out of the fear that doing so could cause Pakistan to reduce its cooperation on counterterrorism. But failing to address Pakistan's support of the Taliban amounts to an acceptance of NATO's failure. The allies must send a strong message to Pakistan: that a lack of forceful action against the Taliban command in Baluchistan constitutes a threat to international peace and security as defined in the U.N. Charter. Pakistan's leaders, who are eager to show that their government is a full participant in the international community (partly in order to establish parity with India), will seek to avoid such a designation. Washington must also take a stand. Pakistan should not continue to benefit from U.S. military assistance and international aid as long as it fails even to try to dismantle the Taliban's command structure.

On this issue, as on others, Washington should reverse the Bush administration's policy of linking as many local conflicts as possible to the global "war on terror" and instead address each on its own terms. A realistic assessment of Pakistan's role requires not moving Pakistan from the "with us" to the "against us" column in the "war on terror" account books but recognizing that Pakistan's policy derives from the perceptions, interests, and capabilities of its leaders, not from those of the U.S. government. The haven and support the Taliban receive in Pakistan are partly a response to claims Afghanistan has made against Pakistan and are also due to Islamabad's concern about both Indian influence in Afghanistan and Afghan backing for Pashtun and Baluch nationalists operating across the Durand Line.

Accordingly, unified pressure on Pakistan should be accompanied by efforts to address Islamabad's core concerns. The United States and its allies should encourage the Afghan government to open a domestic debate on the sensitive issue of recognition of the Durand Line in return for guarantees of stability and access to secure trade and transport corridors to Pakistani ports. Transforming the border region into an area of cooperation rather than conflict will require reform and development in the tribal territories. Washington should ask India and Afghanistan to take measures to reassure Pakistan that their bilateral relations will not threaten Islamabad. If, as some sources claim, the Taliban are preparing to drop their maximalist demands and give guarantees against the reestablishment of al Qaeda bases, the Afghan government could discuss their entry into the political system.

Such a shift in U.S. policy toward Pakistan requires a change from supporting President Musharraf to supporting democracy. Pakistan's people have shown in all national elections that support for extremist parties is marginal. The reassertion of the civilian political center, as well as of Pakistan's business class, which is profiting from the reconstruction of Afghanistan, has provided an opportunity to move beyond the United States' history of relying on military rulers. Washington must forge a more stable relationship with a Pakistan that is at peace with its neighbors and with itself.

Back From the Brink

Creating a reasonably effective state in Afghanistan is a long-term project that will require an end to major armed conflict, the promotion of economic development,

and the gradual replacement of opium production by other economic activities. Recent crises, however, have exposed internal weaknesses that underscore the need for not only long-term endeavors but short-term transitional measures as well.

The two fatal weak points in Afghanistan's government today are the Ministry of the Interior and the judiciary. Both are deeply corrupt and plagued by a lack of basic skills, equipment, and resources. Without effective and honest administrators, police, and judges, the state can do little to provide internal security—and if the government does not provide security, people will not recognize it as a government.

In 2005, coalition military forces devised a plan for thoroughgoing reform of the Ministry of the Interior. The president and the minister of the interior appoint administrative and police officials throughout the country. Reform cannot succeed unless President Karzai overhauls the ministry's ineffective and corrupt leadership and fully backs the reform. In any case, this plan, already 3 years behind that of the Ministry of Defense, will show Afghans no results until mid-2007. In September, the government established a mechanism to vet appointees for competence and integrity. Finding competent people willing to risk their lives in a rural district for \$60–\$70 a month will remain difficult, but if implemented well, this vetting process could help avoid appointments such as those hastily made after the riots last spring.

Government officials have identified the biggest problems in civil administration at the district level. In interviews, elders from more than ten provinces agreed, complaining that the government never consults them. Some ministers have proposed paying elders and ulama in each district to act as the eyes and ears of the government, meet with governors and the president, administer small projects, and influence what is preached in the mosques. They estimate the cost of such a program at about \$5 million per year. These leaders could also help recruit the 200 young men from each district who are supposed to serve as auxiliary police. They are to receive basic police training and equipment and serve under a trained police commander. Unlike militias, the auxiliary police are to be paid individually, with professional commanders from outside the district. Elders could be answerable for the auxiliary forces' behavior.

Courts, too, may require some temporary supplementary measures. Community leaders complain forcefully about judicial corruption, which has led many to demand the implementation of Islamic law, or sharia—which they contrast not to secular law but to corruption. One elder from the province of Paktia said, "Islam says that if you find a thief, he has to be punished. If a murderer is arrested, he has to be tried and executed. In our country, if a murderer is put in prison, after 6 months he bribes the judge and escapes. If a member of parliament is killed . . . his murderer is released after 3 to 4 months in prison because of bribery." Enforcement by the government of the decisions of Islamic courts has always constituted a basic pillar of the state's legitimacy in Afghanistan, and the failure to do so is turning religious leaders, who still wield great influence over public opinion, against the government.

The August 5 swearing-in of a new Supreme Court, which administers the judicial system, makes judicial reform possible, but training prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers will take years. In the meantime, the only capacities for dispute resolution and law enforcement in much of the country consist of village or tribal councils and mullahs who administer a crude interpretation of sharia. During the years required for reform, the only actual alternatives before Afghan society are enforcement of such customary or Islamic law or no law at all. The Afghan government and its international supporters should find ways to incorporate such procedures into the legal system and subject them to judicial or administrative review. Such a program would also put more Islamic leaders—more than 1,200 of whom have been dropped from the government payroll this year—back under government supervision.

Attempts to inject aid into the government have hit a major bottleneck: in 2005 and 2006, the government spent only 44 percent of the money it received for development projects. Meanwhile, according to the Ministry of Finance, donor countries spent about \$500 million on poorly designed and uncoordinated technical assistance. The World Bank is devising a program that will enable the government to hire the technical advisers it needs, rather than trying to coordinate advisers sent by donors in accord with their own priorities and domestic constituencies. The United States should support this initiative, along with a major crash program to increase the implementation capacity of the ministries.

As numerous studies have documented over the years, Afghanistan has not received the resources needed to stabilize it. International military commanders, who confront the results of this poverty every day, estimate that Washington must double the resources it devotes to Afghanistan. Major needs include accelerated road building, the purchase of diesel for immediate power production, the expansion of

cross-border electricity purchases, investment in water projects to improve the productivity of agriculture, the development of infrastructure for mineral exploitation, and a massive program of skill building for the public and private sectors.

Afghanistan also needs to confront the threat from its drug economy in a way that does not undermine its overall struggle for security and stability. At first, U.S. policy after the fall of the Taliban consisted of aiding all commanders who had fought on the U.S. side, regardless of their involvement in drug trafficking. Then, when the “war on drugs” lobby raised the issue, Washington began pressuring the Afghan government to engage in crop eradication. To Afghans, this policy has looked like a way of rewarding rich drug dealers while punishing poor farmers.

The international drug-control regime does not reduce drug use, but it does, by criminalizing narcotics, produce huge profits for criminals and the armed groups and corrupt officials who protect them. In Afghanistan, this drug policy provides, in effect, huge subsidies to the United States’ enemies. As long as the ideological commitment to such a counterproductive policy continues—as it will for the foreseeable future—the second-best option in Afghanistan is to treat narcotics as a security and development issue. The total export value of Afghan opium has been estimated to be 30–50 percent of the legal economy. Such an industry cannot be abolished by law enforcement. But certain measures would help: rural development in both poppy-growing and non-poppy-growing areas, including the construction of roads and cold-storage facilities to make other products marketable; employment creation through the development of new rural industries; and reform of the Ministry of the Interior and other government bodies to root out major figures involved with narcotics, regardless of political or family connections.

This year’s record opium poppy crop has increased the pressure from the United States for crop eradication, including through aerial spraying. Crop eradication puts more money in the hands of traffickers and corrupt officials by raising prices and drives farmers toward insurgents and warlords. If Washington wants to succeed in Afghanistan, it must invest in creating livelihoods for the rural poor—the vast majority of Afghans—while attacking the main drug traffickers and the corrupt officials who protect them.

Know Thy Enemy, Know Thyself

Contemptuous of nation building and wary of mission creep, the Bush administration entered Afghanistan determined to strike al Qaeda, unseat the Taliban, and then move on, providing only basic humanitarian aid and support for a new Afghan army. Just as it had in the 1980s, the United States picked Afghan allies based exclusively on their willingness to get rid of U.S. enemies, rather than on their capacity to bring stability and security to the state. The U.N.-mediated political transition and underfunded reconstruction effort have only partially mitigated the negative consequences of such a shortsighted U.S. policy.

Some in Washington have accused critics of the effort in Afghanistan of expecting too much too soon and focusing on setbacks while ignoring achievements. The glass, they say, is half full, not half empty. But the glass is much less than half full—and it is resting on a wobbly table that growing threats, if unaddressed, may soon overturn.

U.S. policymakers have misjudged Afghanistan, misjudged Pakistan, and, most of all, misjudged their own capacity to carry out major strategic change on the cheap. The Bush administration has sown disorder and strengthened Iran while claiming to create a “new Middle East,” but it has failed to transform the region where the global terrorist threat began—and where the global terrorist threat persists. If the United States wants to succeed in the war on terrorism, it must focus its resources and its attention on securing and stabilizing Afghanistan.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you both. Great testimony from both of you.

Just picking up on the drug issue for a moment, you say we should not be doing the destruction of crops, we ought to be interdicting at a high level. So that would mean militarily you would think that it would be appropriate for us to capture drug lords, and to dismantle labs in Afghanistan?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, first let me say the most important element of any policy is sending a credible signal that you are serious about succeeding at it. I would say that is the main weakness of our policy toward Pakistan and our drug policy.

People in Afghanistan believe that the drug trafficking in Afghanistan is actually controlled and protected by a number of very well-known people, most of whom received millions of dollars from our covert operations in 2001 and 2002 and who they believe are still effectively under our protection. As long as they see that, they do not take our counternarcotics strategy seriously.

Chairman LEVIN. These are Afghans?

Dr. RUBIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. These are Afghans who have received support from us?

Dr. RUBIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. You want to name names?

Dr. RUBIN. No.

Chairman LEVIN. I do not blame you. Is it because you do not know the names or for some other reason?

Dr. RUBIN. I know the names. I do not have the kind of evidence that would stand up in a court of law were I to be sued for defamation, for instance.

Chairman LEVIN. You do not have the same kind of immunity that we have.

Let me go to the issue, General, that I raised with the previous panel. That has to do with going after the sanctuaries in Pakistan where Pakistan is either unwilling or unable to go after training camps, for instance, of al Qaeda in Pakistan along the border. Do you agree that we would have the legal right, providing NATO supports it, providing the host country, Afghanistan, supports it, with the U.N. understanding, to go after those sanctuaries if they represent a threat to us and if Pakistan is not either willing or able to handle them?

General JONES. I listened intently to that conversation. This is why I injected that there is a difference between the NATO mission and the Operation Enduring Freedom mission, the way I would characterize it is that the NATO mission is more defensive in the face of terrorism and attacks, and the Operation Enduring Freedom mission is more offensive in nature.

The only capability in Afghanistan to do that kind of mission right now is Operation Enduring Freedom. There is not a NATO agreement that is part of the mandate.

Chairman LEVIN. To be more specific, we have the capability militarily from the air, I presume, to do significant damage to al Qaeda training camps in Pakistan. Are you saying that there is no NATO approval, would not be NATO approval of that mission, even though al Qaeda in Pakistan could be a threat in Afghanistan as well as to the rest of the world?

General JONES. I believe that that falls outside of the mandate.

Chairman LEVIN. Is there any reason why the mandate could not be amended?

General JONES. All it takes is 26 nations to agree.

Chairman LEVIN. You think there would be disagreement with that mandate?

General JONES. I think there could be. I think that is why, frankly, that is why the nuance of the two missions was agreed to. The Operation Enduring Freedom portion of the mission, which would be U.S.-led, is in fact the kinetic end of the mission, and in that

context, that mission everybody agrees could be done. To apply it to the totality of the NATO mission, my opinion is that that would have to go back to the North Atlantic Council for a debate.

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of Operation Enduring Freedom having the legal right to do that with the approval of the host nation, there would be some doubt in your mind about that?

General JONES. No.

Chairman LEVIN. So we would come to the same conclusion?

General JONES. Yes, sir. It is a question of who is able to do it.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. The troop levels in Afghanistan. In response to Secretary Gates's request in February that NATO allies provide additional troops for Afghanistan ahead of a spring offensive by the Taliban, the German defense minister said he did not think it was right to talk about adding more and more military capability, saying that, "when the Russians were in Afghanistan they had 100,000 troops and did not win."

General, do you believe that we have the right level of troops for Afghanistan? What more do we need and who has either committed to supply them or should supply them?

General JONES. I think that General Craddock is essentially saying roughly the same thing I did, and that is within the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements, which is the base document that was approved by NATO to say these are the forces—my job was to say, these are the forces I think I need in order to do this mission. It was reviewed by the military committee at NATO and approved by the North Atlantic Council.

Then it goes into the force generation process at NATO. We have always been somewhere between 2 and 3,000 troops short of the fully resourced statement of requirements—helicopters, mobility. The list is known to you.

I still believe that a fully resourced Combined Joint Statement of Requirements that nations have agreed to and to support the plan that nations have agreed to is what needs to be done. I think that is what General Craddock is trying to do as well.

Chairman LEVIN. Are there any nations which have made commitments to provide forces which have not?

General JONES. No. The way it works, Senator, is that when you get your Combined Joint Statement of Requirements approved, then you sit around the table with 26 nations and try to raise the force. In other words, some people, some nations, announce what they are going to do up front. Others hold back a little bit. There is an awful lot of work that goes into rounding out this force.

Chairman LEVIN. But specifically, are there nations that have made commitments that have not carried out those commitments that you know of? We keep hearing that and reading that.

General JONES. I think the more worrisome thing is that nations make the commitment and then put caveats on their forces that make their forces marginally useful.

Chairman LEVIN. The forces are there that they have committed?

General JONES. The forces generally are there that they have committed, but those who have the operationally restrictive caveats generally become less useful.

Chairman LEVIN. Did you hear Dr. Rubin's comment about the U.S. caveat being against nation-building?

General JONES. I did. In the NATO sense of “caveat,” it would not fit that definition.

Chairman LEVIN. But in the general sense of the word—

General JONES. But as a matter of our policy, if in fact our policy was to only go in and take care of the kinetic end of things, the classical military end of things, without worrying about reconstruction and development, then that certainly will be proven to be something that we have to take care of in time.

Chairman LEVIN. Has that been our policy? It is a big “if” you put in there. I mean, do you agree that it has been our policy not to participate in nation-building?

General JONES. Well, I think we have. I think the PRTs are evidence, for example. I think the U.S. PRTs are the example that all nations should follow to the extent that they can.

General JONES. Let me get back to you, Dr. Rubin. What did you mean that it has been our policy not to participate, given the PRT presence, that we have led or are leading in at least some of the cases in Afghanistan?

Dr. RUBIN. Certainly the U.S. policy has changed. However, when the Karzai government was established after the U.N. talks on Afghanistan there were a number of measures that were envisaged, such as the establishment of the ISAF in Kabul, the withdrawal of all Afghan militias from Kabul, the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force, throughout the country, then the withdrawal of militias from all the provincial capitals, plus the creation of a joint and coordinated program in line with the recommendations of the UN report on peace operations, which was also chaired by Mr. Brahimi, for comprehensive security sector reform.

Instead, in January 2002 when the first G-8 meeting on security sector reform was held as a sidebar at the Tokyo donor conference, the U.S. delegation—and you can interview Jim Dobbins, who was the head of it there—was instructed that the United States was not going to become involved in nation-building. The United States did not commit any new money to reconstruction of Afghanistan at that time, and also on the security side the U.S. would only be involved in building the ANA and not in the other pillars of security sector reform.

Chairman LEVIN. When did that change, then?

Dr. RUBIN. My impression was that in fact it was the experience of our military commanders in the field in Afghanistan who finally convinced the decisionmakers back in Washington that it was necessary for us to make that change, and in fact they developed the idea of the PRTs to compensate for the refusal to expand ISAF.

Chairman LEVIN. When did that happen?

Dr. RUBIN. It happened gradually over the course of—from the end of 2002 through 2004. But I still consider that our contributions to Afghanistan are too heavily weighted on the military side and insufficient on the civilian side.

Chairman LEVIN. That was your 80-20 comment.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. You made a reference to, if I heard this correctly, to intelligence, that Iran would be willing to help us with

intelligence relative to al Qaeda and to the Taliban—did you say in Kabul? Is that what you said? Did I miss that?

Dr. RUBIN. I met with some Iranian officials whom I have known for many years in Kabul in November. They are people who have been involved with Afghanistan for a long time. They believe that al Qaeda is the number one threat to Iran, maybe after the United States, but at any rate that al Qaeda is a major threat to Iran. They believe that al Qaeda is posing new threats to Afghanistan and therefore to them, and they told me they had some information about it and they would like to cooperate with the United States, but neither their government in Teheran nor our Government in Washington had authorized the sharing of that information, which they found frustrating.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you spoken about that or written about that before?

Dr. RUBIN. I have spoken about it in private to relevant officials of the U.S. Government.

Chairman LEVIN. What we will do, then, is, given the fact that we apparently are going to have—

Senator WARNER. A letter, send them the transcript.

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, exactly. Given the fact that there are going to be meetings now, apparently, relative to stability and since that directly relates to even the limited purpose that's been stated for meetings with Iran and for Syria, that we will send the transcript of your testimony to the State Department. I take it, if you want to expand on it in any way, we would hope the State Department would get hold of you. In fact, we would ask the State Department after they read the transcript to get hold of you to get more details about that, because that's pretty important information.

That relates to al Qaeda, not to the Taliban?

Dr. RUBIN. Also the Taliban. Actually, if I may say, every time I meet with Iranians they warn me that I should tell the U.S. Government not to make a deal with the Taliban, because they're concerned that the U.S. is too soft on the Taliban.

Chairman LEVIN. Too soft.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. I have not gotten a card, but I am sure I am over 6 minutes. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. I would like to join you on that, Chairman Levin, to take the transcript as it now stands and allow our witness a chance to do such editing he feels necessary, and let us forward it.

Chairman LEVIN. We will send that to the witness and he will have a chance to look at it, modify it or correct it or add to it in any way you like.

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Senator Jones—"Senator Jones." You would make a great senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Is that an announcement, a pre-announcement here? [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. No.

Senator Levin and I have been sitting here side by side for 29 years, and I would have to say that the testimony of this panel, these two gentlemen, has absolutely been electrifying and extremely informative. I just regret that the commitments of our colleagues precluded their attendance. But perhaps through the electronics some of this is being conveyed to them.

Chairman LEVIN. You are being watched, in other words.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

I would like to go back, General Jones. Let us make it clear that this participation by NATO is a dramatic chapter in its history. It is the first significant out-of-area challenge that they have stepped up to, and indeed I am very hopeful that they can achieve. But their credibility, their viability, their future, in many ways is predicated on showing a measure of success. Am I not correct?

General JONES. Absolutely. This is NATO's most important mission and, in the words of the Secretary General, NATO cannot fail.

Senator WARNER. I just wanted that to be part of the record.

Then I think it would be helpful—in your introductory remarks you very carefully delineated the mission of Operation Enduring Freedom. I would like to have you expand on that for the record. We know the composition of NATO. The composition of the forces in Operation Enduring Freedom, why do you not lay that out, and their command and control structure, and then how do the two forces operate, as you said, NATO doing basically the defensive concept and the offensive concept being delegated to Operation Enduring Freedom?

General JONES. Senator, the main distinction is that within the construct of the military chain of command that the, for lack of a better word, the operations officer, the one who directs the operations, is dual-hatted. He is an American and he has on the one hand responsibilities to coordinate the campaign of Operation Enduring Freedom and also in his NATO hat the NATO campaign, so that they can deconflict both, because frequently elements of either operation can be operating in each other's areas.

So that is the point of deconfliction, and that is the point in the hierarchy of the military chain of command where the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, which is more kinetic, and the NATO mission are deconflicted.

General McNeil, as the commander of ISAF, is a NATO commander. He is an American, but he is a NATO commander, just as his predecessor, General Richards was Brit and he was a NATO commander. He reports through Brunson, through his operational commander, and then to General Craddock at SHAPE.

Senator WARNER. I want you to talk about the chain of command on the Operation Enduring Freedom then.

General JONES. Well, on the Operation Enduring Freedom side we have, I think it was testified this morning that we have 14 or 15,000 U.S. troops committed to Enduring Freedom.

Senator WARNER. Right, but we also have some other countries participating.

General JONES. There are other countries that participate in that more kinetic mission.

Senator WARNER. Notably France.

General JONES. France, yes. France had announced that it was going to withdraw its special forces. They have had roughly 250 special forces with that mission ever since, almost since its onset.

Senator WARNER. That has been a very important and integral contribution by France.

General JONES. Very important. Most of the fighting and the activities along the border come out of that Operation Enduring Freedom envelope, so to speak.

Senator WARNER. Including the pursuit of Osama bin Laden.

General JONES. Exactly.

Now, that chain of command, Senator Warner runs up through the U.S. CENTCOM.

Senator WARNER. Right.

General JONES. I must say, as General Abizaid gets ready to depart, that I could not have had a better partner in creating this, helping to create this operational interface between NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom over these past few years. I think General Abizaid's vision and leadership in that part of the world has been absolutely superb and he has done a magnificent job in helping us get the United States back, at least in Afghanistan, back into the NATO framework, because for a while, for a long while, in Afghanistan we divided the country in half. The north was NATO and the south was CENTCOM, and most U.S. forces were not under NATO.

So this counterclockwise rotation that started—as you recall, I briefed you I think in London in 2004 on how we were going to do this. We effectively did that. It just took a couple years.

Senator WARNER. I remember that briefing very well. I associate myself with your remarks about General Abizaid. What an extraordinary officer he has been. He deserves a great deal of credit from the citizens of this country.

General JONES. He deserves our collective thanks and admiration for a superb job.

Senator WARNER. Now, let me turn to our distinguished professor. I was really fascinated to read your testimony. I would like to go back. I happen to be a lover of history, military history. Why do we think today that we can succeed when in the late 1800s Great Britain had forces of up to 30,000 in Afghanistan trying to fulfill such mission as they had? They failed and, frankly, they were sent packing home in a relatively defeatist manner. Am I not correct?

Dr. RUBIN. You are correct about the First Anglo-Afghan War. The British in the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the British actually suffered a very bad military defeat, just where the British are now fighting against today—

Senator WARNER. Well, give us some date-time groups for those?

Dr. RUBIN. That was in 1880. However, the British accomplished their political objective in the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

Senator WARNER. Which took place?

Dr. RUBIN. 1879 to 1881.

Senator WARNER. Look at the involvement that they had, though. It was extraordinary.

Then along comes the Soviet Union. The British were the superpower of the world in the 1880s. Now the Soviet Union, and they

failed. What is it that we can do today such that we collectively with NATO will not fail?

Dr. RUBIN. First, I do not think that our mission is the same as those nations. One very important point to bear in mind—although there is one similarity, which I will come to—is that those were periods of imperial competition in the region, and it was Britain versus Russia, then U.S. versus the Soviet Union. The major reason the Soviet Union was defeated was because there was a safe haven for the mujahedin in Pakistan, which we were funding very heavily.

Now, today there is a nearly universal international consensus about what we are trying to accomplish in Afghanistan and I believe it also enjoys the support, even if skeptical support or disappointed support, of a large majority of the Afghan people.

The problem that we have now is still primarily that there is not a regional consensus about the government in Afghanistan. So that Pakistan continues to be unhappy with the political composition of the government in Afghanistan, the presence of India there, and in various ways that continues to undermine the stability of the country.

Senator WARNER. But that has been going on since, as you said, they were two nations.

Dr. RUBIN. That is correct.

If I may say, things do change in history. The Afghanistan of today is not the Afghanistan of 100 years ago.

Senator WARNER. Fortunately.

The corruption, that has been a part of the culture of that region from the first time of man, am I not correct?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, I believe corruption is a part of human nature for as long as human beings have existed. But the type of corruption that we are speaking about in Afghanistan today is of a different dimension and really is due to the drug trade. Of course, it was always necessary to pay little bribes and people always hired their relatives, and people can live with that fairly comfortably. The problem today is that there are important portions of the Afghan state that are effectively under the control of or at least collaborating with the drug cartels and other non-legal power holders.

Senator WARNER. It is discouraging.

You are also quite familiar with Iraq in your studies in your career, am I not correct?

Dr. RUBIN. Not really, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Well, I was just trying to see, are there some parallels? The American people wanted only to try and bring about a measure of freedom for the peoples of Iraq and indeed the people of Afghanistan, and secondarily of course was to eliminate the base camps for terrorists. But we are constantly perplexed here at home that, after we contribute this enormous life and treasure to achieve these results, we do not see a mutual expression of gratification and cohesion of the people to begin to seize what we have given them, namely their autonomy, their sovereignty, and to take a stronger hand in exercising those controls that must accompany any measure of democracy.

What is the failing here?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, Senator, I would have to say the failing is primarily in the United States, in that in both of those cases, but much more seriously in Iraq, we did not go in with an understanding of what the aspirations and views of the people themselves in that country were. For instance, you spoke about freedom. Freedom is very important, but there are other values that people may value more highly under some circumstances, such as security and justice.

You said the American people only desired good things. That may be the case, but that is not how people around the world view us. I could go into that more, but one of the problems we are facing around the world, including in Pakistan, is that U.S. prestige has never been as low as it is today. It is political suicide for almost any government, including our closest allies, to collaborate with us at the moment. That is one of the arguments that the Government of Pakistan gives when we ask them to take these difficult measures. I will not give a political speech, but unfortunately that undermines a lot of things that we are trying to do.

Senator WARNER. Well, certainly there are facts that support—

General JONES. If I could just—

Senator WARNER.—there are facts which establish the opinions that you have just rendered, regrettably.

Yes, General?

General JONES. Just to comment about the nature of cultures. I started off in Vietnam and was privileged to operate in a number of areas, including Bosnia, including—

Senator WARNER. Turkey.

General JONES.—Iraq, Turkey, and now in—

Senator WARNER. Kurdistan.

General JONES.—and in Africa, and also now in Afghanistan. I have a sense in Afghanistan from going all over the country and trying to get a sense of the people themselves, what is it that they are about and what is it that they want, that, as opposed to perhaps Iraq, for example, since we are talking about the two, the people in Afghanistan are genuinely tired of fighting. I get the sense that they voted massively in 2004 in the presidential elections and in parliamentary elections, and we have all read about these heroic stories about women walking for 3, 4 days to get to a polling station. There was a lot of—

Senator WARNER. This is Afghanistan now.

General JONES. In Afghanistan. There was a lot of enthusiasm. What has happened in the intervening period is that a substantial number of those same people are now saying: How has my life changed? The Taliban are still in my back yard. I still am having to pay bribes to the governor. The police are corrupt. My children are not any safer than they were 2 or 3 years ago, and they are getting impatient.

That is why I come back and I think we both come back to the same point, that the good news about Afghanistan is that all of the elements of success are there. They are already there on the ground—60 countries, the U.N., the big organizations, the European Union (EU), NATO, the G-8. What is lacking, what has been lacking, at least in my view, is a central authoritative figure on the

international side that can coordinate and prioritize this effort so that it makes sense.

Senator WARNER. My final question—

General JONES. I give a lot of credit to a distinguished diplomat named Paddy Ashdown, who was the de facto international czar, if you will, in Bosnia and by his power was able to coordinate the three different entities—the Muslims, the Croats, and the Serbs—into organizing themselves, stopping the killing, stopping the fighting, and starting the reconstruction of the country.

We have a lot of organizations in Kabul, but notoriously ineffective in tackling those four or five things that I talked about that absolutely have to be tackled. If we can solve that, if we can figure that out, then I think Afghanistan can turn in the right direction.

Senator WARNER. That was my final question to you. Now, that person in the Balkans came up through the United Nations structure. I presume that that would be—

Chairman LEVIN. Was he not the EU?

General JONES. European Union.

Senator WARNER. EU?

General JONES. EU.

Senator WARNER. That is right, I do recall that.

How would we construct it this time? I mean, without promoting yourself so you are going to get drafted to do the job, what—I think you need a break. What would you say if the President invited you to contribute to that solution? How would you want it structured and what organizations does it come up under?

General JONES. I think there has been some international discussions on this, talking about the European Union, for example, to see if the European Union would advocate such a solution. But it is very clear to me that some group, or some central authoritative figure in the international arena to coordinate, prioritize, shape, direct, however you want to put it, coupled with a military commander who is already in place, would be, I think, a good thing to do, and I hope we can do that.

As I said, the good news is that the structures are already there.

Senator WARNER. The pieces are there.

General JONES. The pieces are all there.

Senator WARNER. They need to be brought together.

General JONES. Exactly.

Senator WARNER. Someone made finally accountable for the performance of each.

General JONES. Exactly.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Rubin, you would like to comment on that concept?

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. I just wanted to mention that during the negotiation and drafting of the Afghanistan Compact, which I was a part of on contract to the U.N., we did—through that process we came up with something which is supposed to have that function. That is the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, which is co-chaired by the United Nations and the Afghan government; and that under that there are particular working groups that deal particularly with security, like the policy action group, which deals with just those actors that are dealing with security.

But I think it is fair to say that these groups have not, actually worked as envisaged. The main problem is that there is a lack of fit, in that it is the United States which is providing 50 percent of the financial resources and 70, 80 percent of the military resources and it is the United Nations which has the major international coordination responsibility, but, as you can imagine, the United States does not really let itself be coordinated by the U.N. under those circumstances.

Senator WARNER. I would like to ask one more question, but it is your turn now.

Chairman LEVIN. I have two questions, then I am going to have to run. You can just take over, of course.

One would be the question of pressure on Karzai. Is it counter-productive? Would it weaken Karzai to put pressure on him, looking as though, if he complied, that he would just be our agent in some way? For the reasons that you give, he cannot look publicly like he is particularly close to the United States, nor can apparently just about anybody else in the world these days, for reasons which are tragic? But you will not make a political speech and I will not either. I will restrain myself the way you did, Dr. Rubin.

But nonetheless, pressure on Karzai. What do you believe is useful? What could be done to have him take stronger action in the territories, if any?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, I believe President Karzai does not believe he is subject to too little pressure. I think he has the contrary problem. He has nothing but pressures and very little capacity.

Chairman LEVIN. You are talking about the pressures from us?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, no. He is under pressure from the Taliban.

Chairman LEVIN. All kinds.

Dr. RUBIN. He is under pressure from the local power holders, the so-called warlords. He is under pressure from Pakistan, Iran, Russia, the EU, and from us, both our ambassador and our force commander.

Chairman LEVIN. I misspoke. I am talking about Musharraf. I am sorry. Did I say Karzai?

Dr. RUBIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me go back, and I am sorry. I want to go to Pakistan. What pressures can we put on Musharraf that would be constructive, that could lead to stronger action on his part to take over, to take action against the territories, the training camps and so forth? What can we constructively do which might lead him to be stronger? All my references to the difficulties he is in politically, if it looks like he is responding properly should have referred to Musharraf, not to Karzai.

Dr. RUBIN. Okay. First, I do support some form of aid conditionality, such as was put in by the House of Representatives in their bill to implement the recommendations of the 9-11 Commission. I would suggest that the conditionality should only be applied to military assistance; it should not be applied to economic assistance, democracy assistance, or certainly not to humanitarian assistance.

I would add that it should be supplemented by a recognition that Pakistan has legitimate interests in Afghanistan and that we should try to encourage greater transparency concerning Indian activities in Afghanistan as well.

Second, as we increase the pressure through the military assistance package, which is our main source of leverage, we need to have a multilateral approach to Pakistan. Pakistan, when it feels that the United States is not supporting it, has tended to turn to China. It tried to do that after the U.S.-India nuclear deal last year and China turned it down. So it would be very important to have a joint approach with China and the other NATO members on this as well.

Third, Pakistan also needs assistance in building its capacity to do certain things, such as it needs to be able to integrate those tribal areas into the political system and economic system of Pakistan. This is not some foreigner's crazy idea. It is a political program of a number of parties in Pakistan. But they have delayed it for a number of reasons. That is one of the reasons that they have not been able to do anything about the safe havens.

Finally, we need to help both Pakistan and Afghanistan address their bilateral relationship. This is not a personal problem between Karzai and Musharraf. There are a whole set of issues regarding the border, trade, transit, ethnic relations, that have gone unaddressed for 60 years, but we can no longer afford to allow them to go unaddressed.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General Jones, do you have any comment on that? Will it work? Would it be counterproductive to put the kind of pressure, including conditionality of aid, on Musharraf that Dr. Rubin made reference to? Do you have any thought on that?

General JONES. Well, I think that when you have an international mission in Afghanistan the likes of which we have it and our young men and women are putting themselves at risk and occasionally dying, that I think it is fair to make sure that our investments of our most precious assets are well represented by certain metrics that we expect from the people we are trying to help, including the Afghan government and including the Pakistani government.

As I said in my opening comments, this is a regional problem. The strategic catastrophe that would result from a failure in Afghanistan cannot be understated. I think that it would mean that Pakistan would have more problems.

So I think the international community through NATO, for example, since we are all members of NATO, if in fact the border situation does not improve should voice that in unmistakable ways to change, to do the things that are required in order to solve that particular problem.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Do the Afghans call warlords "warlords"? What was the answer to that question?

Dr. RUBIN. In Afghanistan there is a word for warlord. It is jangsalar. It is one of the most commonly used words. My driver in Kabul, whenever some vehicle from the security service cuts us off, he says: "There goes a bunch of warlords."

The people in question do not like the term because they of course fought against the Soviets, some of them. Some of them fought for the Soviets also. They fought against the Taliban. They feel that their sacrifices are not being recognized.

Chairman LEVIN. What is the term they like?

Dr. RUBIN. "Heroes."

Chairman LEVIN. "Heroes," okay. I guess we all like that term. I am going to turn this over to you, Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. I will just keep the witnesses a minute.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you both. You have been really super. I am sorry I have to leave.

General JONES. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Carl.

General JONES. Thank you for having us.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Quickly, back, the history of the narco in Afghanistan. There was a time under the Taliban it was far less in terms of production than today. So what were the controls that were put on the situation then? Or am I correct in that?

Dr. RUBIN. What happened was in 2000 was that the Taliban were looking for something they could do for the international community, and what they did do was in that one season they banned the cultivation of opium poppy. They did not ban trafficking in opium. They were successful in doing that because of their system of governance, every village has a mullah who is answerable to the Taliban, and they used that as a monitoring mechanism and they told the village headmen: You are responsible; we are going to punish you if you grow poppy. It was a little more complicated than that, but they had a degree of penetration that allowed them to do that.

However, we should not believe that is a sustainable policy because the result of their policy was that the price of opium was multiplied tenfold. It was \$40 a kilogram when they banned the production and at the end of that year it was \$400 a kilogram. I am not at all convinced that they could have continued with that same policy at \$400 a kilogram that had worked at \$40 a kilogram. The price has never gone down to pre-Taliban levels. That is one of the problems we are facing today.

Senator WARNER. It is simple. If you reduce the existence of it, in other words simply stop the planting and cultivating of it, eventually the world supply dries up, or at least goes for another source. So I keep coming back. I mentioned the program, the set-aside: Pay the farmers for what they get today and then allow them to keep that money and go out and plant potatoes or onions or whatever it is, so they get a compensation.

Can you not choke it off that way?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, two points, Senator. First of all, I wish that we would put some serious thought to a project on opium that treated it as an agricultural issue as you are talking about, rather than just as a law enforcement issue. I commend you for that and I hope you will get some people working on it. I cannot design it myself.

Second, however, remember it is an economic product. Therefore, if you reduce the supply you increase the price. Therefore it becomes profitable to produce it in new areas. One of the main results of our counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan so far has been the increase in production of opium and the spread of the production of opium poppy to all the provinces of Afghanistan, whereas

previously it was confined to a few where we have focused our eradication efforts.

General JONES. Senator, economics aside, also you do not get anywhere with that. For example, even if you convince the farmer not to grow it and you give him a stipend and everything else, if you do not provide him the police network that protects himself and his family from being forced to grow it, then you put them at risk. If you do not have a court system that can prosecute people who are the violators and they see that effectively being done, it does not work.

So the solution is there, but we have to integrate these other pillars of reconstruction that we have not successfully done yet.

Senator WARNER. Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you very much.

Senator WARNER. The chairman and I appreciate it and other members. Excellent testimony.

General JONES. Thank you, sir.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

1. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Lute, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have traditionally been staffed by U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs personnel trained specifically for these tasks. However, it is my understanding that many of the PRTs in Afghanistan are, in fact, led and staffed by non-Civil Affairs qualified personnel. I am concerned that this may limit the effectiveness of the PRTs. Do all military PRT personnel and commanders go through the equivalent of the complete Civil Affairs course provided at Fort Bragg, North Carolina? If not, please indicate what percentage of personnel and commanders have not received the complete Civil Affairs course or its equivalent and describe any alternative training that has been provided.

General LUTE. [Deleted.]

2. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Lute, many members of the committee have expressed concern that there is not an effective interagency effort in Afghanistan. In your opinion, does the current PRT structure allow for effective interagency coordination and execution of programs?

General LUTE. The PRT structure is one, but not the only, means of achieving effective coordination and execution of programs. The process of coordination for programs executed by PRTs takes place at three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic.

At the tactical level, PRTs execute programs based on Afghan Government priorities in support of its Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). A PRT is under the direction of a PRT Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Command, and ISAF HQ.

At the operational level, each ISAF Regional Command (North, South, East, West and Capital) coordinates program execution under the purview of the HQ ISAF staff. ISAF conducts quarterly PRT Conferences to synchronize PRT activities. The U.S.-led PRTs are primarily in Regional Command-East, commanded by a U.S. officer, Major General Rodriguez.

At the strategic level, U.S. coordination is accomplished in Washington, DC, in a multi-level process. At the working level, an Afghan Interagency Operations Group, whose membership includes representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and others, ensure coordination on the strategy, approach, and funding for PRTs. The NSC also conducts meetings—deputies committee and principals committee meetings—where representatives of every agency participate in policy decisions that affect PRTs.

3. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Lute, have advantages resulted from placing a DOS officer at the head of one PRT?

General LUTE. Having a State Department officer at the head of one PRT provides the opportunity for a “proof of principle” of greater civilian participation in the PRT structure. It will lay the groundwork for adjusting the military/civilian mix in staffing PRTs. The size and composition of the U.S.-led PRTs will continue to vary depending on local conditions and the availability of military and civilian personnel. The closer a local area is to achieving the ultimate goal of Stability and Civil Security and Control, as described in counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, the more opportunity for civilian leadership in areas engaged in stability operations versus military operations. Even when a PRT is not headed by a State Department officer, there can be effective joint efforts if there are sufficient numbers of civilians who are available, trained and prepared to deploy to PRTs. We are supportive of efforts at the DOS and USAID to increase the numbers of trained civilians.

4. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Lute, do you believe this arrangement should be considered for other PRTs as well?

General LUTE. There are State Department officers who can effectively serve as the head of a PRT. This position requires a relatively senior individual with the maturity and experience, as well as the desire to take on an assignment most often accomplished by a Lieutenant Colonel/Commander in the U.S. military. Again, the closer a local area is to achieving the ultimate goal of Stability and Civil Security and Control, as described in counterinsurgency doctrine, the more opportunity for civilian leadership in areas engaged in stability operations versus military operations.

READINESS OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

5. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Lute, a key element of President Bush’s strategy in Afghanistan is expanding the training and equipping of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to a level of 70,000 soldiers and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to a level of 82,000 personnel by the end of 2008. The President’s fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental request states that there were 31,300 ANA and 59,700 ANP personnel trained and equipped by the end of 2006.

However, a November 2006 report produced jointly by the Inspectors General of the Defense Department and the State Department finds that the personnel numbers for the ANP are “unreliable.” Moreover, using new criteria established by the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the command responsible for training and equipping the Afghan Security Forces, the Inspectors General reported that the CSTC-A found that fewer than 31,000 ANP personnel, out of the more than 60,000 who had received entry-level training, met readiness standards for conducting law enforcement operations. Has the CSTC-A established readiness standards for evaluating the ANA as well as ANP personnel? If so, how many ANA and ANP personnel meet CSTC-A readiness standards?

General LUTE. Standards for the ANA units are in terms of four capability metrics (CMs): CM 1, Full Operational Capability; CM 2, Lead with Coalition Force (CF) support; CM 3, Side-by-Side; and CM 4, Formed—Not Capable. As of 6 March 07, the ANA units had 49,000 personnel, including 15,000 personnel at CM 2, 31,000 personnel at CM 3, and 3,000 personnel at CM 4.

Standards for the ANP units are also in terms of the same four capability metrics. As of 6 March 07, ANP units had 72,000 personnel, including 1,000 personnel at CM 2, 20,000 personnel at CM 3 and 51,000 personnel at CM 4.

6. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Lute, the Inspectors General report states that the CSTC-A is developing a standard operating procedure (SOP) for field mentors, who perform routine readiness assessments on ANP regional and provincial leadership, to improve the objectivity of their readiness reports. Has the CSTC-A promulgated SOPs on readiness assessment for mentors assessing the ANP?

General LUTE. The framework SOP for mentors to use in assessing ANP leadership is currently under development.

7. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Lute, have similar SOPs been issued in connection with training the ANA?

General LUTE. Yes, there is a SOP called the Training and Readiness Assessment Tool that has been promulgated for use by the Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) to conduct readiness assessments for the ANA.

8. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Lute, are all ANP and ANA units receiving readiness assessments by field mentors?

General LUTE. Readiness assessments are made for ANA units by the ETTs. Readiness assessments will be made for ANP units as we get Police Mentoring Teams in place at all levels and the ANP assessment tool is completed.

U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

9. Senator LEVIN. General Jones, during your service as the Commander of the U.S. European Command, the administration proposed a major reduction of U.S. military personnel in Europe. The heart of this proposal was a reduction of approximately 47,000 Army personnel and the relocation of 3 combat brigades from Europe to the United States. Do you believe our forces in Europe should be reduced to this extent?

General Jones did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.

10. Senator LEVIN. General Jones, the fiscal year 2008 budget proposes to add 65,000 Active Duty Army personnel over the next 5 years. As part of this increase, the Army proposes to create six new light infantry combat brigades. Do you believe it would be in our strategic interest to base one or more of these six additional brigades in Europe?

General Jones did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.

11. Senator LEVIN. General Jones, the training ranges at the National Training Center in California and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana are already fully utilized. If the ongoing drawdown from four heavy brigades to one Stryker brigade in Europe is fully implemented, it seems likely that the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany will not be fully utilized. Do you believe the DOD, and Congress, should take the availability of this training range into consideration, in addition to the strategic interests you addressed above, in deciding whether or how soon to draw down our ground forces in Europe, and where to base the proposed six new brigade combat teams?

General Jones did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

NARCOTICS

12. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Edelman and Lieutenant General Lute, one of the biggest threats to stability in Afghanistan is clearly the growing and trafficking of narcotics. Despite our efforts in 2006, the poppy crop for 2006 was significantly higher than for 2005. Narcotics sales are being used to fund the insurgency, making them a threat to our troops. Corruption fueled by the drug trade is rampant in the Afghan government and police force. What near-term and long-term strategies are we adopting to reverse the Afghan dependence on an economy of narcotics and the widespread corruption in the government?

Ambassador EDELMAN. We agree that one of the biggest threats to stability in Afghanistan is the growing and trafficking of narcotics. While most of the U.S. Government initiatives that seek to reverse Afghan dependence on an economy of narcotics and widespread corruption in the government are the province of the DOS, U.S. Agency for International Development and the DOJ, DOD is playing a supporting role. Specifically, in the short-term, DOD does provide transportation and other support to U.S. departments and agencies that are responsible for countering drug traffickers. In the long-term, DOD has undertaken several programs designed to increase Afghanistan's capacity to interdict the drug trade, disrupt drug traffickers, and impose consequences on corrupt officials. Some of those efforts include the joint DOD and DOS program to train and equip the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police; the DOD initiative to train and equip the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan and the Afghan Border Police, the DOD Afghan counternarcotics helicopters program and the DOD supported Afghan Border Management Initiative. All these efforts should, when completed, enable Afghanistan to deal with the drug and corruption problem.

General LUTE. The near-term U.S. Government strategy addresses the problem from the perspective of interdiction, alternative livelihoods, justice/police reforms, and eradication. An example of the strategy is being executed now in State's "Plan Helmand." This plan focuses on the central districts responsible for the bulk of

poppy cultivation in Helmand, the highest poppy-producing province in Afghanistan. The long-term strategy is to reverse the Afghan dependence on an economy of narcotics and the widespread corruption in the government and follow a more holistic approach to counternarcotics (CN) as an element of the counterinsurgency strategy. There is broad consensus that progress in the CN mission is essential to COIN success in Afghanistan: the CN-COIN nexus. Successful COIN strategies characteristically focus on drawing the population, the center of gravity, away from insurgents and toward the government. Developing or strengthening a government that is responsive to the people's needs and capable of establishing security is a key effort. Successful CN enforcement enables a more stable and secure environment for development, economic growth, and effective governance. It is clear that counterinsurgency and CN have similar objectives, and success in one complements success in the other.

13. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Edelman and Lieutenant General Lute, how do we help the common farmer turn away from drug crops to growing legal crops?

Ambassador EDELMAN. This question addresses a matter that is more properly the responsibility of the DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development. DOD's programs described in the answer to question 12, help efforts to provide alternative livelihoods by building Afghan capacity to provide security.

General LUTE. An effective, long-term CN strategy to dissuade farmers from planting drug crops must leverage a multi-pillared approach that balances increasing the risk and costs of participating in the drug trade with enhancing farmers' access to sufficient legal livelihoods. Research shows that the majority of Afghan farmers do not grow poppy merely to maximize profits, but as a result of a complex set of motivations. These are influenced by availability of credit; access to land; alternative employment opportunities; existence of viable alternative crops and markets; availability of infrastructure to grow and transport produce; and food security. By addressing the underlying economic factors that drive farmers to cultivate poppy, while continuing to inject risk into the trafficking system through credible enforcement and eradication threat, we can help farmers turn away from drug crops to growing legal crops.

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN BORDER

14. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Edelman and Lieutenant General Lute, the Vice President has warned President Musharraf that the Taliban and al Qaeda are regrouping in Pakistan's remote border region and has strongly encouraged him to counter the threat. The lawlessness of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border is clearly a destabilizing threat to both countries. What can we do to help the Afghans secure their border with Pakistan, besides asking Pakistan to do more?

Ambassador EDELMAN. We work closely with both the Afghan and Pakistani governments to secure the border. Central to this effort is greater cooperation between both countries. Significant progress has been made in this regard. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, have representatives in the Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) in Kabul. The JIOC facilitates the exchange of critical and timely information needed by both Afghan and Pakistani units to prevent and disrupt insurgent activity. Additionally, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and NATO are members of the Tripartite Commission, which is a forum for discussing subjects of mutual interest, including border security. Additionally, both Afghanistan and Pakistan will hold a joint jirga as a means for leaders from both sides to explore ways to reduce violence and illegal border crossings. Lastly, we are looking at ways to develop Pakistani capability to take action along their borders. In the amended fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget, we asked for the authority to provide up to \$71.5 million of training and equipment to the Frontier Corps in the federally administered tribal areas. Strengthening the Frontier Corps would enable more vigorous Pakistani action against Taliban along the border.

General LUTE. [Deleted.]

15. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Edelman and Lieutenant General Lute, we are currently assisting the Afghan government with developing a 70,000-troop military by the end of 2008. Considering the long-term need for the Afghan government to be able to protect its own borders, is this force strength sufficient?

Ambassador EDELMAN. The decision to build the Afghan National Army to a force of 70,000 took into consideration the threats that Afghanistan would face. A part of that consideration included the development of the Afghan National Police to a force of 82,000, approximately 18,000 of which will be Border Police. When properly

configured, trained, equipped, and fully fielded, we believe that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) increasingly will be able to take the lead on protecting their country against insurgents.

General LUTE. The long-term need for the Afghan government to be able to protect its own borders is being addressed by the Afghan Customs Department (ACD) and the Border Management Task Force (BMTF) with DOS's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The solution does not depend primarily on the size of military forces, but rather focuses on civilian security structures. The desired end state is a secure and stable environment maintained by indigenous security and police forces under the direction of a legitimate national government that is freely elected and supports economic development. The ACD recognizes and is taking the initiative to improve the economic development at the BCPs by working with other ministries to develop a comprehensive development plan. The BMTF Border Police Coordinator has drafted follow-up recommendations of the ABP's new mobile strategy detailing the developing infrastructure, equipping and integrated border-specific technology when implementing this new strategy.

16. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Edelman and Lieutenant General Lute, are there plans to continue building the Afghan military after reaching 70,000?

Ambassador EDELMAN. No. Our assessment is that the 70,000 person force we are building for the ANA, combined with the 82,000 person force for the ANP—both with improved capabilities—will be sufficient to enable the ANSF to fulfill their contribution to rule of law, stability, and security within Afghanistan based on the current threat assessment.

General LUTE. No. The current DOD program is to train and equip 70,000 troops for the ANA and 82,000 for the ANP. These concurrent efforts are the responsibility of the CSTC-A, under the direction of Major General Durbin, in close coordination with Ambassador Neuman and the State Department.

COALITION FORCES AND AN ADEQUATE SECURITY STRUCTURE IN AFGHANISTAN

17. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Edelman and Lieutenant General Lute, in your statement, Ambassador Edelman, you point to a recent ABC poll as evidence of increasing stability and confidence in the stability and economy of the country. However, in reading the poll, I have found it to paint a significantly different picture of the trends in Afghanistan. Specifically, it concludes that "public optimism has declined sharply across Afghanistan." Many of the poll findings raise serious issues.

For instance, there is strong evidence in the poll of regional variations in security levels. Overall, 57 percent of Afghans say that international forces have a strong presence in their area. But the sense of a strong international force presence ranges from 83 percent in the north to just 29 percent in the south. Confidence in the international force's ability to provide security is at 67 percent overall, but varies widely from 83 percent in the north to 47 percent in the south. What is the reason for the inability of the coalition forces to provide equal levels of security throughout all regions in Afghanistan?

Ambassador EDELMAN. The threat level in Afghanistan varies between different locations. The Taliban has traditionally been most active in the south and east, where we continue to see the most violence. ISAF and coalition capabilities are directed at these two regions and we are aggressively fighting the Taliban. Additionally, we are coordinating our military operations with reconstruction and development efforts which allow Afghans to see positive changes in their lives and improve their confidence in the central government and its international partners. Lastly, we are working to increase the size and capabilities of the ANSF. The ANSF, in particular the ANA, are increasingly fighting alongside ISAF and coalition forces.

General LUTE. The ultimate goal is for Afghan forces to provide equal levels of security throughout all regions in Afghanistan. Until that goal is reached, coalition forces support that mission. However, each nation has different capabilities and some nations have political constraints or "caveats" under which its forces operate. Not all nations are willing and able to perform the security mission. To measure progress we look at both the public's confidence in security as well as actual security conditions, as indicated by the number of incidents of violence in each of the Regional Commands (North, South, East, West and Capital). According to Charney Research, public optimism is down from 2005, but has recovered a bit from spring 2006. Optimism or "Country Headed in the Right Direction" was: 64 percent/March 2004, 77 percent/October 2005, 44 percent/June 2006, and 55 percent/October 2006. Perception varies by region. Regional variations also exist in actual security levels. Regional Command-South and Regional Command-East are the two regions with

high incidents of violence. The lines of operation that will lead to increased levels of security and stability in Regional Command-South and Regional Command-East are: civil security, essential services, governance, and economic development. The U.S. has a substantial effort ongoing in the civil security sector to train the ANP.

18. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Edelman and Lieutenant General Lute, have we provided adequate force levels to secure the country?

Ambassador EDELMAN. We continuously evaluate the situation on the ground and adjust our troop levels as necessary. The U.S. is the single largest force contributor to the ISAF in Afghanistan. U.S. Army General Dan McNeill commands ISAF. The U.S. has its highest level of force contributions since 2001 with 27,000 personnel in theatre. These personnel are divided between the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom missions. Supreme Allied Commander, General John Craddock recently completed a review of the ISAF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), which outlines the forces necessary to provide essential security for stability, reconstruction, development and institution building. The CJSOR currently has critical shortfalls in terms of quantity of troops and key enablers such as helicopter lift and trainers. ISAF and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Commanders have repeatedly stated that continuing CJSOR shortfalls can potentially jeopardize NATO's mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. recently increased its contribution, notably in Regional Command East, for which the U.S. has responsibility.

General LUTE. [Deleted.]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AL QAEDA AND THE TALIBAN

19. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Edelman, I am struck by your statement that "al Qaeda no longer enjoys a safe-haven to plan and launch attacks against the United States." I assume that you intended this statement to mean from within Afghanistan, since Admiral McConnell has stated that al Qaeda is reconstituting itself in northwestern Pakistan. Can you comment on the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban and the kind of mutual support they are providing to each other? For instance, is the Taliban receiving financial support from al Qaeda?

Ambassador EDELMAN. My statement that "al Qaeda no longer enjoys a safe-haven to plan and launch attacks against the United States" referred to Afghanistan.

[Deleted.]

UNITED STATES AND IRAN

20. Senator AKAKA. Dr. Rubin and General Jones, in your statement, Dr. Rubin, you commented that a U.S. conflict with Iran would have disastrous consequences in Afghanistan. You point out that Iran has supported our efforts in Afghanistan, yet I notice that this is never mentioned by the administration. Can you both comment on why you believe that the U.S. has not been able to build on Iran's cooperation in Afghanistan in establishing a dialog with the Iranian government?

Dr. RUBIN. The administration has consistently demonstrated its opposition to using our cooperation with Iran as a base for improving the relationship. Iran cooperated closely with the United States in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, when the reformist Muhammad Khatami was President of Iran. Less than a month after the Government of Hamid Karzai assumed authority largely as a result of joint work by the United States, United Nations, and Iran, President Bush described Iran in his State of the Union message as a member of the "Axis of Evil." Iranians understood this as a clear message that the U.S. would accept whatever cooperation Iran chose to provide in its own interest but had no interest in trying to improve the relationship. Hence Iranians saw less benefit in supporting reformist candidates, whose efforts to improve relations with the U.S. were futile. This was one of the factors leading to the election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

General Jones did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.

21. Senator AKAKA. Dr. Rubin, in your statement, you indicate that the inability of the Afghan government or the international force to curb the safe haven insurgents enjoy in Pakistan seriously undermines the credibility of the United States. The administration is clearly pressuring the Pakistani government to do more to eliminate the safe refuge for terrorists and the Taliban within their borders. What

additional actions do you feel the United States or the coalition ought to be doing to further reduce the ability of the insurgents to use Pakistan as a safe refuge?

Dr. RUBIN. Certainly we should not have left Pakistan without a United States ambassador at such a crucial time. Moving Ambassador Ryan Crocker from Islamabad to Baghdad again shows the administration's true priorities: saving face in Iraq is more important than defeating al Qaeda in Pakistan, where it is headquartered.

There is no single solution for this problem. The United States needs to engage politically and continuously at a high level to address the many conflicts in the bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have poisoned the situation in the region for decades and which the administration gives no indication of even understanding, let alone addressing at a sufficiently high level. Senator Clinton's proposal of a high-level special envoy to focus on this problem would be a good start. Dinner parties at the White House are not the answer. The entire set of arrangements along the border inherited from the British Empire need to be addressed. The United States needs to support democratization of Pakistan, provide support to Pakistan's international peacekeeping role, promote confidence building measures between Pakistan and India in Afghanistan (addressing Pakistani complaints about Indian intelligence activities), and act as an honest broker between Kabul and Islamabad at the political level, not just on military issues through the tripartite commission. The United States needs to engage the U.N. and NATO to develop and implement forceful and coherent policies toward Pakistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relations. We should also warm relations with Iran, to demonstrate to Pakistan that they do not have a monopoly on relations with us among the neighbors of Afghanistan.

ROLE OF PAKISTAN

22. Senator AKAKA. Dr. Rubin, in your statement you state that Pakistan, not Iran, has been the source of terrorism that is directly targeting U.S. and allied troops as well as Afghan troops with improvised explosive devices, rockets, and suicide bombers. You then state that Pakistan needs to do more but is essentially being pressured to deal with the consequences of negligent policies of the United States. When you state that Pakistan is the source of terrorism targeting coalition troops, are you referring to the flow of support out of Pakistan's uncontrolled regions? Or, are you stating a belief that the Pakistan government is providing this support?

Dr. RUBIN. The Government of Pakistan supported the Taliban from its inception until shortly after September 11, 2001. It abandoned open support for the Taliban only under extreme pressure from the United States at that time. The infrastructure of support for the Taliban, consisting of networks of recruitment, training, and financing, has been hardly disturbed. The leadership of the Taliban by and large enjoys freedom of movement in Pakistan. Its recruitment materials are openly distributed. Leaders whom the Pakistani government claims it cannot find are interviewed on television. "Retired" Pakistani military and intelligence officials advise the Taliban. The former head of Pakistan's intelligence agency openly and enthusiastically supports the Taliban and is frequently invited to address Pakistan military and government bodies on the subject. No Taliban leaders are arrested except on two occasions: the arrival of the British Defense Minister and the arrival of Vice President Cheney.

23. Senator AKAKA. Dr. Rubin, can you elaborate on the "negligent policies" of the United States that you are referring to in your statement?

Dr. RUBIN. I am referring to the entire policy of the administration in prioritizing Iraq over Afghanistan and the fight against al Qaeda ever since September 12, 2001. It would require an entire book to describe this negligence, and I hope you will read it when I am done.

[Whereupon, at 1:16 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

