

**ADDRESSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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ADDRESSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2008

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICE,
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Carper, Levin, Akaka, and Coburn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

Senator CARPER. The Subcommittee will come to order. Welcome to Senator Feingold and Senator Akaka. We will be joined by a number of our colleagues here in a little bit, but I just want to thank all the witnesses that are here, especially Senator Feingold who has joined us here today. He is going to talk for a little bit about his recent visit, he led a CODEL to a number of places, including to Pakistan.

I understand Senator Feingold serves on three committees. Among them are the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Judiciary Committee. And over the past recess, he was in both Pakistan and in India?

Senator FEINGOLD. That is right.

Senator CARPER. All right. But as I understand, most of your time was in Pakistan?

Senator FEINGOLD. That is correct.

Senator CARPER. My staff, who visited Islamabad, just missed you there, but they came back with press accounts. They said a lot of the stories were above the fold, which is not bad for an American Senator in a foreign country.

And I understand that you traveled there because you view Pakistan, as do I, as the central front in the fight against extremism and critical to our national security. And while there, I am told that Senator Feingold was vocal on the ousting of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, noting that this and the reinstatement of other former judges is a simple rule of law matter that could jump-start institutional reform in Pakistan. And again, I would concur with that.

He has also expressed some skepticism about the negotiations surrounding the Federally Administered Tribal Areas?

Senator FEINGOLD. Correct.

Senator CARPER. OK. And Senator Feingold, we thank you for your willingness to stop by today before we kick off this hearing, and invite our other witnesses just to share with us your thoughts about what our country should be doing with respect to our relationships with Pakistan. Senator, should we just go right to you? Take as much time as you wish.

**TESTIMONY OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,¹ A U.S. SENATOR
FROM WISCONSIN**

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Akaka.

This is really very kind of you and I am happy to be asked to talk about this issue that I have been thinking about a great deal since my trip.

This hearing is particularly timely given the critical juncture and this partnership with Pakistan. Although we have a checkered history with Pakistan, the recently elected civilian government provides an opportunity to develop a sound, comprehensive, bilateral relationship that serves the needs and the principles of both of our countries while also ensuring our national security and theirs over the long term.

As you said, I recently returned from a four-day trip to Pakistan where I had the chance, as, frankly, other Senators did who were in the region at the same time, to meet with a broad range of political officials from numerous parties as well as with President Musharraf, Pakistani intelligence officials, the ousted Chief Justice—we actually met with him in his home where he had been held under house arrest—and representatives of Pakistan's civil society. I traveled to Peshawar, which lies near the border with Afghanistan and the tumultuous Northwest Frontier Province and to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.

Senator CARPER. How long were you there?

Senator FEINGOLD. A total of 3 days. And then in the Kashmir area, we were able to visit successful U.S.-funded earthquake recovery programs, which I think would make everybody feel very good about the schools and the dairies and the other things that we were able to help restore fairly quickly after a disastrous earthquake in an area that, frankly, has not been known for being a particularly pro-American area. So this is a real opportunity.

I chose to visit Pakistan because it is out of that country, and I think obviously the Chairman sees this, as well, that we face our most serious national security threat. As the intelligence community has confirmed again and again, intelligence is the central front in the fight against al Qaeda. Confronting this threat, which includes addressing the al Qaeda safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, must be our top national security priority. That means tracking down Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda operatives and working with the Pakistan government to neutralize forces before they plot or carry out attacks against Americans. And yes, as you alluded to in your opening remarks, Mr.

¹The prepared statement of Senator Feingold appears in the Appendix on page 53.

Chairman, it means making clear to our Pakistani friends that cutting deals with the al Qaeda or the Taliban is simply unacceptable.

But these cannot be our only goals. The fight is more than a manhunt. If we are serious about fighting al Qaeda and preventing future generations of bin Ladens from emerging, we also must recognize the needs of the local population and expand our development assistance throughout a country where poverty and anti-Western sentiment is pervasive.

A key part of this approach will require Pakistan's newly-elected government to rein in the military apparatus, which has historically controlled much of Pakistan's politics and policies, sometimes overtly by a military dictator running the country and other times more discretely from behind the screen of a civilian-led government. And as Pakistan's new government seeks to establish itself, we have to find a way to defend our national security interests while recognizing that the emergence of a democratic civilian government in Pakistan is in our long-term strategic interests. We need the support of the Pakistani people and their democratically-elected leaders to successfully counter al Qaeda and extremism.

There is an opening right now for the United States to develop a new relationship with Pakistan. This Administration's reliance on a single unpopular leader who came to power through a coup was a serious mistake that was inconsistent with our values and our national security interests. Now we must end that mistake by expanding our relationships and supporting basic democratic institutions. A more inclusive policy will allow our counterterrorism partnership to hopefully withstand the frequent turbulence of Pakistan's domestic policies and help mitigate already high levels of anti-American sentiment.

I have never been to a country, Mr. Chairman, where you ask people all over the country who are being very cordial to you, we understand there is anti-Americanism here, and they say, "Yes, that is right." They usually try to tone it down a little bit. It was not hostile in terms of the comment, it was just, "That is right," and they gave various explanations for it.

Senator CARPER. That is interesting because in Iran, I am told that the feelings toward our country are actually for the most part very cordial.

Senator FEINGOLD. That is an interesting contrast. I think that would—yes, you wouldn't get the same response.

This Administration's policies toward Pakistan have been highly damaging to our long-term national security. Although Pakistan's domestic politics remain fragile, we must seize this occasion by working with those who promote democracy, human rights development, and the rule of law. We must align ourselves with the moderate forces critical to the fight against extremism and commit to supporting economic reform, legal political party development, and initiatives to integrate the FATA into the rest of Pakistan. This will not be easy, but it is long overdue and will help ensure that we are using all the tools at our disposal to fight al Qaeda and associated terrorist threats.

Combating extremism and denying terrorists the safe haven now found in the FATA requires, among other things, creating sustainable development strategies that provide both opportunities for

the Pakistani people and, again, tangible examples of American good will as I saw in Pakistani Kashmir. This must include not only traditional development projects, but institution building and political engagement in a region long deprived of such opportunities. While we target terrorists and extremists in the FATA, we must also make sure that the people of the FATA have economic options that can help them resist terrorism and extremism while reducing anti-American sentiment.

Supporting the Pakistani people as they seek to strengthen development initiatives and democratic institutions is not just an outgrowth of our values, it is in our national security interests. This is not to say that this process will be free from challenges. There are already serious hurdles that must be dealt with, including negotiations in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province, both of which I think are cause for serious concern and skepticism. America's allies must know that there can be no negotiations with terrorists who have sworn to harm our country. Those who would plot against American troops in Afghanistan or Americans here at home must be pursued relentlessly.

We must however recognize that the new leadership was elected democratically by the Pakistani people and we must try to work with them to advance our mutual interests in fostering security and development in the region, and again, Mr. Chairman, I am so pleased with your interest and the growing interest in the Senate that I think will be very valuable, quite a few Senators and also members of the House who really want to work on this Pakistan-America relationship over the long term.

Thank you so much for having me.

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. Sometimes when Senators testify to lead off a hearing, we don't ask questions. Would you be willing to take a question or two?

Senator FEINGOLD. Sure.

Senator CARPER. Senator Akaka, do you have a question or two you would like to ask of Senator Feingold, our colleague?

Senator AKAKA. I don't have a question but I want to thank Senator Feingold for his statement before this Subcommittee and to tell you that I first visited Pakistan 3 months after Musharraf took over the country after the coup. I visited with him and felt that he had some great ideas for the country and I am glad to hear you now say that it is about time that they move on democratically to a system. I am very interested in your comments about that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator, we can't ignore the fact that President Musharraf did side with us and provide help, but the level of resentment toward the United States among Pakistani leaders and the Pakistani people because we seem to put all our eggs in that basket, is a significant part of the anti-American feelings that I have described.

Senator CARPER. Senator Biden, my colleague from Delaware, has said to me from time to time that what we have had in Pakistan is not a Pakistan policy, we have had a Musharraf policy, and he suggested what we need is a Pakistan policy.

Had you been there before?

Senator FEINGOLD. I was there briefly with Senator McCain and Senator Clinton—

Senator CARPER. That was an interesting group to go over with. Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. In 2005. Yes. The story I like to tell is they get off the plane and all the women in the country would run up to Senator Clinton, all the military men would run up to Senator McCain, and I would hold the luggage. [Laughter.]

But actually, it was a fabulous trip and we had a very long conversation with Musharraf, and the contrast between meeting with him now with his changed political situation and then was really striking.

Senator CARPER. When you look at our policy and the things that we are doing as a country in Pakistan now, what makes sense and what doesn't?

Senator FEINGOLD. In terms of our policy right now?

Senator CARPER. Yes.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, we have to engage these new political leaders. They are impressive people. They include at least two major political parties that are a very tenuous coalition. But these are strong people—

Senator CARPER. Is this a coalition sort of like the coalition governments they put in Israel, or would it be a coalition more like putting the Democrats and Republicans together here?

Senator FEINGOLD. A little bit closer to being the Democrats and Republicans being together, although not exactly, but these really are political parties that are not terribly similar. They have represented two very different views of the future of Pakistan, two different philosophies. But what they do share is a desire to return Pakistan to a democratic system, and they are talented and they are interested in our views.

I also want to add that among the upbeat things I felt in Pakistan was a better attitude about their future relationship with India, which has been a source of such difficulty. Now, no one is naive to think that is easy, but that was almost an upbeat topic and there seemed to be a willingness and an interest in that, which I think would be good for us and good for India.

So to me, we need to engage these folks. On the other hand, we can't say that our relationships with them are more important than making sure that the FATA region is not used as either a safe haven for al Qaeda or a launching pad for attacks on our troops in Afghanistan. That is non-negotiable for us, and I tried to make that clear, that is the bottom line for us. They can't have complete internal peace and democracy in Pakistan at the expense of our national security, that the two have to work hand in hand.

Senator CARPER. Speaking of security, did you get a feel for the kind of security that is provided for their nuclear weapons? I am told they have anywhere from 50 to 100 warheads or more.

Senator FEINGOLD. I did not get a detailed feel for that. I actually had longer, more extensive conversations on that with Ambassador Crocker in the previous visit, who at the time was the Ambassador to Pakistan. But I did get some briefings on it, and without getting into any details, there are concerns, but there are also some feelings that there are real efforts being made to secure that. But that is a matter of great importance.

Senator CARPER. All right.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, may I now ask a question here? When I first went there at that time, I was very impressed with Musharraf because he told us some things that literally had my jaws fall open. One was that he wanted to make Pakistan literate, and so he introduced us to a woman who was going to be the Minister of Education and she was going to make it literate.

Second, he introduced us to his financial person and he said he was going to correct the mistakes that they had financially there. Secretary of Treasury Rubin at that time told me that they hired this person through their firm in New York and that Musharraf was taking him there to work there.

The third was he introduced us to a Minister of Foreign Affairs who also worked in the United States and had ideas about relationships. So those were three areas that he said he wanted to really improve. Did you have any sense as to these areas and those improvements?

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, in fairness to President Musharraf, as I understand it, he did pass significant legislation, working with the government there to improve women's rights, which were a serious issue in Pakistan, continue to be, something I pressed him on. But I actually had a chance to meet with some civil society leaders and a woman who was particularly known for her leadership in that area and she told me that things were somewhat improved.

In terms of the economy, President Musharraf spoke at length about how proud he is of the growth of the Pakistan economy under his leadership and his greatest concern was that might be slipping under this new government. Now, of course, the new leaders of the new government didn't agree with that, but he cited some of the things that you alluded to, Senator Akaka, as being important results of his presidency and I, of course, can't deny that economic development and the future of Pakistan is a terribly important thing, but it isn't more important than having a democracy, and so the two must work hand in hand.

Senator CARPER. One last comment and maybe a question. In the elections that were held 6 months or so ago, as I recall, the party was tending to be supportive of President Musharraf, their turnout, their support was greatly diminished.

Senator FEINGOLD. That is right.

Senator CARPER. The support of the other two major parties rose up dramatically. But as I recall, there were religious parties that were involved, as well, and their support turned out to be rather small.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, one particularly interesting development was in the Northwest Province, where—I want to be corrected if I get this wrong, but I believe it is right—a more traditional religious hard-line party was defeated—

Senator CARPER. Yes—

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. By a more open-minded, at least in my view, party, and I had a chance to meet with some of their new officials, and this is out in one of the more conservative areas where we were near the FATA. And so that was an exciting development, that instead of a hard-line, sort of narrower approach, that actually suggested maybe that people in that region were tired of

that and that they wanted some hope and economic opportunity and a sense of being connected to the rest of Pakistan and the rest of the world. So I believe that was one of the encouraging results of the election, and they are affiliated, as I understand, with the government now.

Senator CARPER. Well, there is an irony that is not lost on me, and probably not lost on the others. I watched a film a couple of months or two ago with my older boys and with my wife—"Charlie Wilson's War." At that time, we were using our influence and our resources to help destabilize—undermine the Soviet position in Afghanistan and using folks that were pretty much in the North-western part of Pakistan to help do that. So we have actually seen—I am kind of mixing metaphors here, but we have seen this movie before while we were sitting in a different seat when we watched it the last time.

Senator FEINGOLD. And the part of the movie that the Pakistanis don't like is that after we did that, we just took off—

Senator CARPER. Yes.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. And we didn't stay committed to that region, and so it is not only that we backed Musharraf, it is this feeling that we are there when it sort of fits our purposes but then we are not around—we don't have a consistent policy. And so, I got one question in Pakistan from people saying, well, why are all these Senators running around Pakistan meddling, U.S. Senators, meddling in our affairs? And I said, I take a different view. I said, I think it is a big mistake for us not to have this kind of exchange. We certainly shouldn't go over our bounds, but the biggest mistake we could make is to not be knowledgeable and engaged with the Pakistanis.

So I thought it was great that there were as many as 10 Members of Congress over there during the May break. I hope it is a sign in the long run to the Pakistanis that we aren't going to be fair-weather people in terms of being interested in our relationship but that it will be maintained, and that is up to all of us to keep going there and talking about it and doing exactly what you are doing today, Mr. Chairman, which I think is really positive. Thanks so much.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, there is one final question here. We are interested in the military because he was General Musharraf—

Senator FEINGOLD. Yes.

Senator AKAKA [continuing]. And at that time, he had military people all over the buildings. And so a question to him was, will this be a military government, and his answer was, as soon as he could, that he would relieve the place of any military security, and I just wondered whether that has happened.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, he didn't move very quickly on demilitarizing the tone of his regime. In fact, I specifically asked him, as many others did, if he would please not be both president and head of the army at the same time, which he maintained for a very long time, until recently, which was an inappropriate combination. So there was an inappropriate connection there that was bad for Pakistani democracy.

Now that the new government is in place, the military leaders of the country are making a concerted effort to show that they are not trying to meddle in political affairs. In fact, some of them would not meet with some of the Senators, including me, because they didn't think that was appropriate. They did meet, as I understand it, with some of our armed services people, but the message I think they are trying to send is that civilian leaders will be your contact rather than military leaders in most cases, which I think, depending on whether that is really what they are trying to do, is probably a good sign of a different approach rather than such a heavily military-laden look to the Pakistani government.

Senator CARPER. We don't have time to ask these. I wish we could get into whether or not the Pakistani leaders with whom you might have spoken, if they felt any kind of a sensitivity or understanding with respect to our concern about the safety of our troops—

Senator FEINGOLD. That was a—excuse me.

Senator CARPER [continuing]. And the fact that they are not doing what they need to do in the Northwestern Region, it puts our people more at risk.

Senator FEINGOLD. I met with the governor of the Northwest Frontier Province, a very eloquent man, and he gave a very long and very precise explanation of what these agreements were, how they are trying to put language in the agreements to make sure that it was understood that there should be no border crossings into Afghanistan, etc., and he was very precise.

But after he finished, I said to him, look, there are two things you have to understand about the American people. There are two things we can't tolerate. One is Osama bin Laden is in your area, not just in Pakistan, he is right here. That is what most people believe, and the others. Second, this is used as a launching pad to kill American troops.

Senator CARPER. We are trying to protect a democratically-elected government in Afghanistan.

Senator FEINGOLD. That is right. I just said, those two things are not acceptable to any people in the world and the American people can't accept it. So we do want you to be able to achieve peace within your region, but not if that is the price that we, as Americans, have to pay. So that is a message I tried to convey not only in Islamabad, but directly in the region where we are pretty sure these folks are.

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. This is a great opportunity and I appreciate it.

Senator CARPER. We appreciate very much your being our lead-off hitter, a good one, too. Thank you so much.

I am going to ask our next witness, Donald Camp, to go ahead and approach the table. I am going to give a statement while you do that and then yield to Senator Akaka for a statement. Then if there is no one else who has joined us by that point in time on our panel, I will ask you, Mr. Camp, to proceed.

We are going to have a vote starting around 3 p.m. and we will probably have to be over to the floor to vote by about 3:15 p.m.. There is a chance that we may be able to get through our opening

statements and your testimony before that happens, so hopefully that is my goal.

But before I start off, I just want to give special thanks to the over 500 men and women serving in the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. Based on a recent visit to Islamabad, my staff tells me that our Ambassador there, Anne Patterson, runs a tight, organized ship. I understand she is a woman from Arkansas, as is Wendy Anderson. We commend our Ambassador for her leadership and all our personnel there for the capable service to our country.

Political instability, a growing Islamic insurgency, a demoralized army, and an intensely anti-American population are the hallmarks, unfortunately, of today's Pakistan. In fact, most national security experts agree that Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently called the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this is his quote, "the site of planning for the next attack," his words, "on the United States." The region is also widely thought to be the hiding place of Osama bin Laden, as pointed out by Senator Feingold.

It has become clear in recent months that the billions of U.S. dollars poured into Pakistan have not helped, unfortunately, to secure its borders with Afghanistan, in large part because we failed to link assistance to specific policy goals. We also know our policies toward Pakistan since September 11, 2001, have failed to stop or even to mitigate anti-Western militants or religiously-based extremist elements in Pakistan.

In fact, a study released by the RAND Corporation says that Pakistani intelligence agents have aided both Afghani and Pakistani Taliban insurgents and compromised U.S. military movements. RAND warns that the United States will face, in their words, "crippling long-term consequences," if insurgent strongholds in Pakistan are not removed.

In light of the virulent anti-American Islamic insurgency raging on the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan today, from Balochistan to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, FATA, and up to the Northwestern Frontier Province, we must decide how to effectively move forward with this partnership.

I think it goes without saying that the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of utmost importance. Again, I said earlier, anywhere from 50 to maybe as many as 200 warheads are involved here. Preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the wrong hands should remain a top priority for all of us. The possibility of al Qaeda or another terrorist group acquiring a warhead or enough radioactive material to create a dirty bomb is something that we simply cannot leave to chance. And while there appears to be a very small chance that Pakistan's nuclear assets could be seized by terrorists or other militant groups, the United States should pursue policies that promote the safety of Islamabad's nuclear capabilities.

These facts lead to a series of urgent questions. If, in fact, the mountainous border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the site of planning for the next attack on the United States, as Admiral Mullen has stated, what, therefore, will the United States

do in the short-term, say between now and January 2009, vis-a-vis the lawless region between Afghanistan and Pakistan?

What are the long-term objectives on how to address this dangerous region?

The Bush Administration, Congress and the 9/11 Commission have recognized that the United States needs a long-term comprehensive plan to address the terrorist threats in Pakistan. Why hasn't the Administration developed such a plan?

In October last year, the U.S. State Department provided Congress with a report that certified that Pakistan was making significant and sustained progress toward eliminating the safe haven for terrorists. However, a recent GAO report noted that there was broad agreement, including among the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Embassy officials in Islamabad, the Department of Defense, and others that al Qaeda had established a safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and reconstituted its ability to attack the United States. What was the basis for the State Department's finding that Pakistan was making significant and sustained progress?

The RAND study also reported continued support by Pakistan government agencies of the Taliban. Is there any recent evidence of the Pakistani intelligence or military officials supporting terrorist elements in acquiring or training to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon technology?

What do we know about the Pakistani government's involvement in nuclear missile proliferation activities? How effective has the U.S. policy been in stopping or reducing these activities? How credible is the Pakistani's government's disavowal of any knowledge of former Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities, especially in light of his very recent recanting of his confession? How secure are Pakistani government controls on its nuclear weapons arsenal and facilities?

Today, with these questions in mind, I want us to try to do the following: First, to accurately assess to date the efforts of the Bush Administration, our country's policy toward Pakistan. I want us to discuss the most effective strategic policy options regarding Pakistan, particularly with regards to ensuring the safety and security of its nuclear arsenals and addressing Islamic extremism. And finally, I would like to see us solicit some ideas about how Congress, how my colleagues and I, can play an active and effective role in the path forward.

If our national security is linked to the success, security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan, I believe the United States has no choice but to do more. Dr. Stephen Cohen, one of our witnesses today, summed it up well in his written testimony. He said, "Short term measures regarding terrorism and nuclear technology should not get in the way of long term strategies to stabilize Pakistan."

Therefore, we must work with Pakistan and our other allies to develop a strategy that creates long-term goals for success. This should include providing much more U.S. non-military assistance and demanding greater transparency and accountability in U.S. military aid to Pakistan, as our colleague, Senator Joe Biden, a strong leader on this issue, has asserted.

Again, we thank all of our witnesses for taking this opportunity to talk with us today about the nature of the challenges before us and how best to address them.

Senator Coburn, welcome.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN

Senator COBURN. Thank you. Given the fact that we have a vote on, I concur with a lot of the questions you have asked, and then we will get forward to our testimony.

Senator CARPER. Thanks so much.

Senator Akaka, would you like to make an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, I will submit my statement for the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

I'd like to thank Senators Carper and Coburn for holding this hearing. We all recognize the vital importance to American security of maintaining a strong strategic relationship with Pakistan. I just have two comments.

First, I am concerned that Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain sanctuaries for our enemies. If history is to guide us, there is very little hope that this will change. These areas have always been ungoverned except by tribal law. I am not fully confident that our strategy to aid Pakistan forces to assert control is going to be successful. Our main hope may instead be to contain our enemies in this enclave.

Second, I am concerned that the longer political instability continues in Pakistan, the greater the risk that Pakistan's nuclear program will be infiltrated by al Qaeda. To date all indications are that Pakistan maintains firm control over the security of its program. But this security could be affected by a breakdown of authority. We need to do more, much more, to reinforce Pakistan's democracy and the rule of law.

I would again like to thank Senators Carper and Coburn for arranging this hearing and add my welcome to our witnesses.

Senator CARPER. Thanks so much.

Mr. Camp, just a brief introduction. He is currently a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs. From 2006 to 2007, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations, and now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen. And prior to that, I understand, among other things, you were Deputy Assistant Secretary and then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia from 2001 to 2006. You have a long resume and we are grateful that you are here and grateful for your service.

Please proceed. Your entire statement will be made part of the record. Feel free to summarize.

TESTIMONY OF DONALD CAMP,¹ PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. CAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize it briefly. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to discuss U.S. strategy with regard to Pakistan. Like Senator Feingold, I welcome the growing interest in the Senate in our policy toward Pakistan. More than ever, our national security

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Camp appears in the Appendix on page 55.

is linked to the success, security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan.

We must build a comprehensive, long-term partnership with the Pakistan government and people. The February 18 elections provided a new opportunity for us to do so. Our strategic priorities in Pakistan include strengthening its democratic civilian institutions, enhancing counterterrorism cooperation, particularly in the border region, and ensuring its nuclear weapons remain secure and unused. Economic and social development is an essential element to achieving each of these strategic objectives.

Ensuring the success of Pakistan's democratic transition is a core priority. On February 18, the Pakistani people cast their votes for moderate leaders, repudiating extremist voices and demonstrating that a moderate democratic center prevails as the country's dominant political force. We are engaging with the new government and all the political parties to strengthen participatory democracy and to build a broad-based, long-term relationship between our two countries.

We believe that a moderate government with a democratic mandate will be a more effective partner in the fight against terrorism. Pakistan is a significant partner on the front line in this war. Pakistan has lost over 1,400 members of its security forces since September 11, 2001.

Recently, we have heard about the negotiation of peace agreements with certain groups in the Tribal Areas. Negotiations with tribes in Pakistan are not a new tactic. We understand that the recent negotiations are part of Pakistan's hopes for bringing security and stability to the Tribal Areas. However, outcomes are what matter. Any agreements must advance the goals of ending al Qaeda and Taliban activity, ending suicide bombers, ending cross-border attacks. Each agreement must be weighed case by case based on results.

Our efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan are intrinsically linked. In order to achieve stability and security in either country, we must achieve it on both sides of the border. Our challenge is to more effectively coordinate and synchronize operations by both nations and by our coalition partners.

Let me say a couple of words about nuclear security. Non-proliferation cooperation is another critical aspect of our long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan. Pakistan has taken constructive steps to enhance the security of its nuclear materials and assets and to prevent diversion of sensitive items and technologies, as occurred with the A.Q. Khan network. We are encouraged by Pakistan's improvements in export controls and its participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We will continue to work with Pakistan to help ensure that its nuclear weapons remain secure.

On the development side, a sustained commitment to help Pakistan develop its economy is essential to achieving our key strategic objectives. It will strengthen Pakistan as a partner with the United States and the international community.

I would like to mention Reconstruction Opportunity Zones as an important piece of our long-term strategy. These zones can attract domestic and foreign investment and create sustainable employ-

ment opportunities in the FATA. There is a bill before the Senate to address these now and we support that bill.

There is a comprehensive frontier strategy presented by the government of Pakistan which emphasizes economic and social development. The United States has committed \$750 million over 5 years in support of this sustainable development plan for infrastructure development in the territories.

Additionally, we have partnered with the government of Pakistan in launching the Security Development Plan to enhance its ability to secure the border. This involves training the Frontier Corps, improving the capabilities of Pakistan's special forces, and constructing Border Coordination Centers.

In conclusion, for our commitment to Pakistan to be long-term, it must also be bipartisan. We appreciate the Congress's sustained commitment to Pakistan, particularly the interest of Members of this Subcommittee. I understand that Senator Levin recently returned from a successful trip and that you, Mr. Chairman, are interested in visiting soon. I hope you will do so. We hope that together, Congress and the Administration can establish a new framework, a long-term framework for economic and security assistance that can support Pakistan's democracy.

In conclusion, our long-term commitment is of immense importance to our partnership with the Pakistan people and their security, as well as to the security of the American people and the international community. That is why we need to work together to help the newly-elected Pakistan government build strong democratic institutions, combat the threat of terrorism, and ensure the security of its nuclear weapons.

Thank you. I would be happy to take your questions.

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much for your statement.

I thought earlier I might just submit questions for the record, but I would like to ask some questions, but would you like to lead it off, Senator Coburn?

Senator COBURN. Yes, I will. Thank you, and thanks for your testimony.

The \$1 billion aid package, the FATA development strategy, why were there no conditions on that aid package on political reforms in the Tribal Regions, such as rule of law reforms, integrating the FATA into the Northwest Frontier Province under the full jurisdiction of both the legislature and the judicial system? Why were there no strings attached to that that would certainly further our interests and their stability with that money?

Mr. CAMP. Senator, I think that the question, particularly of integrating the Tribal Areas with the rest of Pakistan, is an issue that needs to be addressed. It needs to be addressed by Pakistan. It is a tough issue. The FATA has been separate for decades. I don't think it is an issue that we can necessarily impose our will on Pakistan. There are many voices that have spoken up in favor of this integration into the settled areas of Pakistan, as they are called, but again, it is not so much for us to condition our assistance, it seems to me. The assistance that we are offering is really in our interest, as well, because we have a basic national security interest in helping to develop and stabilize the border areas.

Senator COBURN. The economic package that you have is about three-quarters of a billion dollars, \$750 million, and in your statement just a minute ago you said outcomes are what matters, except on that package there are no metrics. There is nothing with that that says how we are going to measure what the outcomes are. What are the measurements? How do we know the three-quarters of a billion dollars we are going to invest in this economic package will work, since the State Department has no metrics to say, this is what we conclude is a success?

Mr. CAMP. Sir, I think that the metrics are basically poverty alleviation, economic development, literacy, raising of literacy rates. Literacy rates in the FATA are abysmally low. I have heard the figure of 3 percent for female literacy in the Tribal Areas. Enrollment in schools is going up. There is a metric that I think is a useful one.

All of these things will demonstrate that we are achieving success. In the long run, I think we have to look at intangibles, too, things like the existence of open democratic elections, which is not something that necessarily is susceptible to tangible measurements, but certainly is very important. So I would say that there are performance plans. When we put together these assistance programs, we make very clear what the expectations are in terms of raising people out of poverty and providing new opportunities, particularly employment opportunities in the FATA.

Senator COBURN. Balance for me, if you will, if there is not a judicial system, if there is not rule of law, and we are going to invest in infrastructure, whether it is clinics or schools or roads, prime targets for violence, prime targets if there is no other infrastructure—I guess what I am asking is which comes first and how do we measure them.

And then the second part of the question, in the oversight of this investment, where U.S. AID failed in Afghanistan was because there was not the security available to U.S. AID to oversee what was actually happening. What are you doing in terms of making sure the security is there for the investment so that we can see what the contractors are doing and making sure when we say a school is built, it was built, or a hospital is built, it was built? What have we learned from the failures in the investment in Afghanistan?

Mr. CAMP. Well, in fact, I asked this question of a colleague who works for U.S. AID in anticipation of just this kind of question, and his answer was rather interesting, and that is to say we have learned from—we have moved into the FATA in a rather measured way. We understand that there are problems in working in parts of the FATA for security reasons, but we do work actually in all seven agencies, as they are called, of the FATA.

What we are trying to do is develop sort of innovative oversight techniques. One that he cited, for instance, is building schools. We have satellite images. We can verify that schools have been built, where they have been built. That is just one example.

Senator COBURN. Well, the problem was in Afghanistan, we built the schools and the first snow, the roofs caved in. So, I guess do we have a structure in place so that the overseers of the contrac-

tors can actually get there and see that the investment is what we expected it to be?

Mr. CAMP. I would say that, first of all, we are building up our personnel in Peshawar, which is the center of the Northwest Frontier Province, in order to be able to do this. That doesn't mean that Americans will be traveling to Waziristan or one agency to inspect. We are working through NGOs. We are working through the government of Pakistan. We are depending on them to do these verifications, to do this assessment, basically.

Senator COBURN. I understand the security risk, but—

Senator CARPER. I think we have about seven minutes to go. What do you say we recess here and we come right back?

Senator COBURN. OK. All right.

Senator CARPER. We have about 7 minutes left. We will be back in about 15 minutes or so. We are going to stand in recess now and we will be back shortly. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Senator CARPER. Let us resume our proceedings. Thank you for your patience. I am going to turn now for further questioning of our first witness, Mr. Camp by Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I want to say that I had two concerns and one is that concern about Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas that remain sanctuaries for our enemies. If history is to guide us, there seems to be very little hope to change this.

Also, my other concern is that the longer political instability continues in Pakistan, the greater the risk that Pakistan's nuclear program could be or will be infiltrated by the al Qaeda, and to date, all indications are that Pakistan maintains firm control over the security of its programs.

Mr. Camp, Ahmed Rashid's book, "Descent Into Chaos," describes a double game that Pakistan's military intelligence agencies have been playing. On the one hand, appears to support the Taliban and other militias as a weapon against India. On the other, these agencies are working with the United States to counter hostile militias in the FATA. Is this true?

Mr. CAMP. Senator, I would just say that the government of Pakistan has been very clear, and President Musharraf, in fact, was very clear after September 11, 2001, and has fully supported the war on terrorism. The newly-elected civilian government has not only reiterated this commitment, but made it very clear that they view the war as their war. In other words, it is not just the Americans and it is not just about protecting the homeland, but it is about protecting Pakistan from people who are their enemies, as well. Therefore, I would say that I take with a grain of salt the assumption that Pakistan's official agencies are playing this kind of double game.

Senator AKAKA. In your testimony, you mentioned that Pakistan's new export control organization has been reaching out to technology holders and law enforcement officials. Is the United States providing any assistance to Pakistan's new export control system?

Mr. CAMP. We have been very supportive of their new laws on export control licensing and their enforcement body. We have worked with them in things like the Global Initiative, and I think really it is probably best to leave that discussion right there. If you would like me to get further information on specifically what we are doing on export controls, I would be glad to provide that separately.

Senator AKAKA. I would like to have that information, and to include this one, if you can't answer it now. Can you identify any instances where enforcement has prevented the proliferation of sensitive exports?

Mr. CAMP. I will find out if we have such evidence. I don't have it with me right now.

Senator AKAKA. Fine. We look forward to that information.

Mr. Camp, the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship cannot ignore nuclear weapons or India. Recently, India's prime minister announced that India has no intention of getting rid of its nuclear weapons unless other major powers also disarm. In this situation, it appears that Pakistan would also be unlikely to disarm. Should the United States be encouraging nuclear disarmament in the region, and if so, what should we be doing?

Mr. CAMP. Senator, I think that, first of all, it is well established U.S. policy and certainly something we all believe in that the subcontinent would be far safer, far better without nuclear weapons. That said, I think what we can do and what we should do is do everything we can to support those two countries developing a better relationship, encouraging them to work independently to develop a more amicable relationship, and I am pleased to say that the trend is in that direction, that India and Pakistan both have recognized the importance of working together, and I think that goes for this newly-elected government of Pakistan, as well, very much.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Camp, in Dr. Cohen's testimony, he argues that the United States should also consider a criteria-based nuclear deal with Pakistan as a way of encouraging them to limit and secure their existing nuclear weapons. He also suggests that Pakistan might get support for its civilian nuclear program in exchange for greater security assurances. What is your opinion of this suggestion?

Mr. CAMP. I think, Senator, that I will reserve judgment on that because that is a new idea that we really don't have an established position on and I would just rather not get into that area, if I may respectfully hold back on that.

Senator AKAKA. All right. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARPER. Mr. Camp, a couple of questions, if I could. The first is a series of three short questions and I am going to repeat them maybe twice just to let you think about them. You have lived in Pakistan, right?

Mr. CAMP. I have visited many times. I have never actually lived there.

Senator CARPER. All right.

Mr. CAMP. I have lived in other parts of the—

Senator CARPER. When most recently were you there?

Mr. CAMP. Two months ago.

Senator CARPER. All right. What is your broad assessment, please, of the outcomes of U.S. policy toward Pakistan since 2001, and a couple of follow-ups. One, what aspects of our policy there do you think have been most successful in serving, first of all, our national interest, but also the national interest of Pakistan, and what are some aspects that you might want to change? So if you will, again, the broad assessment of the outcomes of our policy toward Pakistan since 2001, what parts or portions of that policy do you think have been successful, both for us and for the national interests of the Pakistanis, and what are some aspects that you would change?

Mr. CAMP. I would say that what has been most important is that we have been there and we have made the commitment to Pakistan that we are planning to be a long-term partner of Pakistan. President Bush, in particular, made a commitment to a 5-year assistance program, something that is not something we normally do. It was a 5-year, \$3 billion assistance package, evenly divided between security assistance and development assistance. That was from fiscal year 2005 to 2009. It has been, I think, successful in demonstrating our commitment in both sides of the equation with Pakistan.

As we complete that package in 2009, this is the opportunity, I think—and this is along the lines of what we should be doing—this is an opportunity to renew the long-term strategic framework with Pakistan to find a way to make very clear to the Pakistan people that the United States and Pakistan have a long-term future, because that is something that is often questioned in Pakistan.

Senator CARPER. What aspect of our policies would you change?

Mr. CAMP. I would say, Senator, that we are adapting to a new situation—

Senator CARPER. Yes, we are.

Mr. CAMP [continuing]. And very pleased to have a newly democratically-elected government. What we are doing, and this is not to say it is a change in policy but it is something that we always do, that Ambassador Patterson, whom you mentioned in your opening statement, has been assiduously meeting every political leader in Pakistan and making sure that Pakistanis understand that we want to work with all the political parties in Pakistan, work with the new government, and that includes across the board, including the religious parties that have been referred to, as well, and I think that is a very important signal for our future relationship with Pakistan.

Senator CARPER. What is the likelihood that the Chief Justice, their top judicial leader who was deposed, what is the policy, or how would he come to be reinstated? How would that happen?

Mr. CAMP. There are all sorts of scenarios out there, Senator. It is very much tied up in domestic Pakistani political politics at the moment—domestic politics at the moment. There are proposals to—

Senator CARPER. I wonder if their judicial nominating process is as convoluted as ours can be here.

Mr. CAMP. In fact, there is no sort of confirmation process in Pakistan that I am aware of.

Senator CARPER. I wonder if they have a blue slip policy that we have here. Probably not.

Mr. CAMP. They do have a Pakistan Bar Association, which, in fact, has been very much involved in the lawyers' movement. There is legislation pending now before the Pakistani Parliament and I am confident that the Pakistani parties will work out a way to handle this, but it is very complicated because you have a Chief Justice in place at the moment and the proposal is to replace him with the previous Chief Justice.

Senator CARPER. Obviously, there is enormous complexity in terms of the groups that are operating in a lawless region northwest of—between Afghanistan and Pakistan. You have different groups operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Pakistani Taliban, we have the Afghan Taliban, we have al Qaeda, and we have other sectarian groups, as well. Do you believe that we, in this country, have a sufficient understanding of just who we are fighting? And next, which groups do we work against first and how do we go about prioritizing that?

Mr. CAMP. Sure. I think, first of all, we are dealing with Pakistani sovereign territory, so, in fact, we work with the Pakistanis to attempt to address these problems. I think that you are quite right. The situation in the Tribal Areas is extremely complicated. I think, in fact, outsiders do not probably have a great understanding of tribal dynamics in that region and I think it is—

Senator CARPER. Although, again, 20 years ago, or however long ago it was when we were fighting Charlie Wilson's war, I wonder if we had a better understanding.

Mr. CAMP. And again, during that period, we worked through the Pakistani government to achieve our aims, and in fact, they were our main sort of conduit to the tribes in those days. I think the British had a long history in Pakistan and they also, I think, did not feel themselves to be experts in the Tribal Areas, which were even then an unsettled, relatively lawless area.

But your question basically is who should we be addressing first.

Senator CARPER. Yes.

Mr. CAMP. My answer is we have to focus on all of those groups who pose a threat to our coalition forces across the board in Afghanistan.

Senator CARPER. And among those, who would be first?

Mr. CAMP. Well, al Qaeda certainly is target No. 1 in my book.

Senator CARPER. All right. Some analysts argue that the Pakistani military remains wedded to a conventional war strategy and we are accused in this country of always fighting the last war and maybe not the next war. But apparently it remains focused on figuring out how to fight a conventional war with India and it has been slow to reorient itself toward counterinsurgency planning, which we feel is more relevant today. To what extent might this be a problem in the context of our Nation's interest in the region? And second, how has U.S. military assistance sufficiently strengthened its counterterrorism capabilities?

Mr. CAMP. The Pakistani military is a large and professional institution with a long and storied history. They have, in fact, traditionally focused most of their effort on their Eastern border, that is to say their border with India. They are developing a counter-

terrorism force. One important way in which we are helping is our Foreign Military Financing, which is, in fact, focused on counterterrorism goals and it is going to items like communications, radios and the like, TOW missiles and things that are used for counterterrorism. In fact, the Congress has mandated, in 2008, that FMF should be used for counterterrorism purposes and that is what is happening.

Senator CARPER. In our negotiations with the new leaders of Pakistan, the democratically-elected leaders of Pakistan, do those discussions include what are their military priorities in terms of funding and how are those consistent with our greater interest in funding counterterrorism capabilities?

Mr. CAMP. Yes. We have very broad discussions on both the civilian side and the military side about priorities and about how our assistance can be used, and certainly Pakistan understands very well what our concerns are and certainly understands Congressional restrictions on the use of FMF funding, which is something that is important, as well.

Senator CARPER. All right, thanks. Dr. Coburn.

Senator COBURN. Just to follow up, in the self-interest of Pakistan, if we weren't involved right now, would they be seeing that the Northwest Territories were a significant problem for them?

Mr. CAMP. I believe that they recognize that the areas of the frontier are a problem for them, as well, unless that area can be brought under Federal control, and I will give you one very good example, and that is that the assassination of Benazir Bhutto last December is generally acknowledged to have been carried out by a member of the Masud tribe located in Waziristan. That in itself is an indication of the threat to Pakistan itself from the Tribal Areas, and certainly the number of suicide bombings that Pakistan has seen in its major cities is another example of the threat that is posed.

Senator COBURN. So they have every indication in their own self-interest to try to decrease the lawlessness, bring order to the Northwest Territories?

Mr. CAMP. And they have been very clear about that, yes, sir.

Senator COBURN. Some of the critics of the FATA development strategy say the timeline for the strategy to work is 10 to 15 years. We talked a minute ago about benchmarks, but how are they wrong? What do you expect to see 2 or 3 years from now in an ideal world if everything that you all were doing was working appropriately? Describe the situation as you believe it should be if we were 100 percent effective in carrying out our aims through the State Department with the dollars that are following.

Mr. CAMP. Well, we are asking for something like \$200 million per year for training and equipping of the Frontier Corps. This is a substantial amount of money and this will train, I would say, several thousand members of the Frontier Corps every year. That is progress.

Now, we have to acknowledge that, in fact, this is not a short-term process, and I think, in fact, Chairman Mullen was quoted just the other day as saying this will not be over within a couple of years. I think that we have to view this as a process and every

year that we make the Frontier Corps more capable, we are helping Pakistan and we are helping ourselves.

Senator COBURN. OK. How often are U.S. AID, the State Department, and the Department of Defense required to report on the implementation of the FATA development strategy?

Mr. CAMP. I am not sure there is any formal reporting requirement on that strategy for Congress, but certainly we are prepared to come and brief on it at any time—

Senator COBURN. Well, I am not talking about the Congress. How about Condoleezza Rice? Does she get a report from U.S. AID on the progress?

Mr. CAMP. Actually, our embassy in Islamabad sends a report, I think it is virtually every week, on what is happening in the FATA and our development strategy and our security strategy there, and that, of course, is available to the Secretary and we keep her posted, certainly.

Senator COBURN. OK. I am going to have some other questions to submit for the record. One of the things that we saw in Afghanistan is that we used external contractors to measure performance of other contractors, and given the security problems within Pakistan, especially in Waziristan and the FATA area, I assume that we are going to be doing the same thing again. How do we know that the contractors that we hire to oversee the contractors that we have paid to accomplish things are reliable if we don't have boots on the ground to check it ourselves?

Mr. CAMP. Well, I would say, first of all, Senator, that Pakistan has some advantages over Afghanistan in that it is a much more, how shall I say, developed society. Pakistan itself carries out rather detailed surveys of the things you described. We talked about benchmarks before—literacy, household—

Senator COBURN. In this area?

Mr. CAMP. Throughout Pakistan.

Senator COBURN. Including Waziristan and the Northwest area?

Mr. CAMP. I think they probably have the same difficulties that we would in gathering detailed statistics, but yes, in principle, they collect on the whole country.

Senator COBURN. The whole point I am getting at, I don't want us to have a hearing 2 years from now and discover another \$3 billion blown down the tube because we are spending money in an effort to help a country and we are not doing good follow-up and oversight to make sure that the money was actually spent on the people we intended it to help, and I guess that is a question.

Reassure me that we have some process in place so that we know if we are going to spend \$750 million, it is actually going to help the people of the area and we are going to be able to confirm that it did. How are we going to know that? That is my problem. I don't disagree with the strategy. It is how do you measure it and how do you know if we are getting value? How does the American taxpayer know the \$750 million actually bought \$750 million worth of stuff?

Mr. CAMP. I guess I would come back to the fact that U.S. AID has very strict procedures and processes that they are required to carry out.

Senator COBURN. No, they don't. We have had hearings here. They don't. They did not carry them out in Afghanistan. They did not.

[Crowd discourse.]

Mr. CAMP. Senator, as the FATA becomes more settled, as it becomes more secure, and that is our goal, we will have greater access. We as Americans, we as contractors, and as NGOs, will have greater access to the area to verify on the ground what is being done. I think if you go to Peshawar and get a briefing on, for instance, the kinds of things that our Office of Transition Initiatives is doing, you will see that, in fact, we are verifying—to give you an example, the placement of mini-hydroelectric projects in some villages, things like that. We can verify. We can take pictures. We can come back and say, this is in such-and-such a village. And that is some of the verification we can—

Senator COBURN. I plan on going there in the near term and what I would like for you to do is, after you leave here, answer in a way that gives us some assurance that we are not going to see a repeat of some of the failures. That is not a reflection on the people, it is a reflection on the system. We didn't do a good job of being good stewards as we invested in many of the projects. As a matter of fact, we got pictures from the Afghani government about the schoolhouses that weren't built that were paid for. We have got a picture of the slabs that were poured but we didn't ever get the school, but we paid for the school.

So all I am saying is, please answer back in a formal way to give me some assurance. We just had staff over there and visiting with U.S. AID, and I have to tell you, based on my staff report, I do not have the feeling that we have any metrics or real way to know whether or not where that money is going to. It is just a concern and I want you all thinking about how we address that, if you would.

Mr. CAMP. We will get back to you on that, Senator. Certainly.

Senator COBURN. Thank you.

Senator CARPER. Before we release you, I just want to conclude by saying I have approached this hearing in a belief that for a number of years, we have been wedded to a Musharraf policy and that it is important for us to pivot now and to develop a Pakistan policy, and I am encouraged that we are beginning to move in that direction and it is evident that we need to continue to do so and maybe to accelerate that distance.

We have at least three major concerns for me, and one of those is the safety and the potential success for our troops and allied troops in Afghanistan as they attempt to help stabilize the democratically-elected government and to enable them to be successful.

A very grave concern I have is with respect to those nuclear weapons that are in Pakistan and which could fall in the hands of people who would use one or more of them to do harm to any number of people, including to us.

And finally, just feeling concern for the Pakistani people that the potential that they may face for a better day, a better future, if their latest effort to put in place a democratically-elected government, to make sure that reaches its full potential. Those are at least three things that we have in mind as we go forward.

We appreciate your testimony here today. We would ask that you respond for any follow-up questions that Dr. Coburn and myself or others would provide. Dr. Coburn.

Senator COBURN. I just would ask unanimous consent that I am going to have questions for the other witnesses. I cannot stay, and if I could have those submitted for the record, I would appreciate it.

Senator CARPER. We spoke to the other witnesses before. They said they would prefer not to—

Senator COBURN. They would prefer not to answer my questions? [Laughter.]

Senator CARPER. They said, anything to enable us to avoid answering them in person. We will take whatever he has in writing. No, we would be happy to do that, without objection.

All right, Mr. Camp.

Mr. CAMP. Thank you.

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much for joining us today, and we will invite our second panel to join us, please.

[Crowd discourse.]

Senator CARPER. I would just ask that our guests continue to be good guests. We appreciate everybody being here, but we would like for our guests to remain seated and just to behave with the appropriate decorum, please.

[Crowd discourse.]

Senator CARPER. I would again ask our guests to please be seated and allow us to proceed. Thank you very much.

[Crowd discourse.]

Senator CARPER. I would ask our guests please to—thank you very much.

[Crowd discourse.]

Senator CARPER. I am going to go ahead and begin our introduction of our second panel. We are led off by Alan Kronstadt.

Mr. KRONSTADT. Yes.

Senator CARPER. He is a specialist with the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, where since 2002, he has researched and written on U.S. relations with India, with Pakistan, and Sri Lanka for Members of Congress and our staffs. I understand he was previously a lecturer at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles and worked for nearly two decades as an analyst of U.S. foreign policy and international security and have published a number of journal articles and book chapters.

We thank you for the time you spent with our staff on this hearing, and thanks also to Paul Kerr, who I believe is here with you today, for preparing my staff, in their recent visit to Pakistan.

Second, Lisa Curtis. Ms. Curtis is a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, where you focus primarily, I am told, on India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Previously, you have worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a professional staff member, handling South Asia for a fellow named Senator Lugar—a good man. From 2001 to 2003, you served as Senior Advisor in the State Department's South Asia Bureau, where you advised the Assistant Secretary on India-Pakistani relations. We are lucky that

you are here and we appreciate your being here and look forward to your testimony.

Dr. Stephen Cohen joined The Brookings Institution as a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies in 1998 after a career as a professor of political science and history at the University of Illinois, in Champaign?

Mr. COHEN. Correct.

Senator CARPER. All right. In 2004, he was named by the World Affairs Councils of America as one of America's 500 most influential people. That is a list I have yet to crack. Dr. Cohen is the author and co-author and editor of over 12 books, mostly on South Asian security issues, and you have consulted for numerous foundations and government agencies and were a member of the State Department's Policy and Planning Staff from 1985 to 1987. Currently, a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control and a founder of several arms control and security-related institutions in the United States and South Asia.

And finally, Michael Krepon, founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington-based NGO focusing on security issues. He is also a diplomatic scholar at the University of Virginia. Your area of expertise, I am told, includes space and security and nuclear-related issues and regional expertise in South Asia. Previously, I understand that Mr. Krepon served under President Jimmy Carter at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the State Department. He has worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Capitol Hill handling Armed Services and Defense appropriations matters and has authored numerous books. I think you have a new book coming out, don't you, called *Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living With the Bomb*.

We really want to thank you all for coming today. We will start off, if I may, with Alan Kronstadt. Your entire testimony will be made a part of the record. If you would summarize for us, that would be fine. Five or so minutes would be good.

Please proceed. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF K. ALAN KRONSTADT,¹ SPECIALIST IN SOUTH ASIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE AND TRADE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Mr. KRONSTADT. Thank you for this opportunity to address the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship.

While not without success, U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 2001 have largely failed to neutralize anti-Western militants and reduce religious extremism within Pakistan, in turn hindering efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan. However, Pakistan's recent upheavals may offer an opportunity to alter the nature of this bilateral relationship. The 2008 elections indicate Pakistanis are moderates not driven by extreme militant religious world views.

Still, anti-American sentiments are widespread in Pakistan, apparently rooted in a general disapproval of U.S. global policies and a specific resentment of U.S. policy toward Pakistan itself. Most observers agree that reducing these negative perceptions will be nec-

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Kronstadt appears in the Appendix on page 67.

essary to advance U.S. interests. Many argue that this goal is overshadowed by shorter-term policies that may fuel the very distrust the United States seeks to overcome.

The salience of mutual trust and respect, not only between governments but between peoples, is often understated in assessments of the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship. In the political realm, Pakistanis resent perceived U.S. meddling in their country's internal politics. In the security realm, many Pakistanis believe the United States relies too heavily on military efforts, thereby damaging Pakistan's legitimate interests in sovereignty.

Given President Musharraf's status as a moderate pro-Western ally of the United States, his political diminishment and potentially ignominious exit from power complicates U.S. policymaking, yet these complications may be seen as opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Respect of and active support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and rule of law are explicit non-controversial U.S. policies. There is, however, vigorous debate over whether such policies have been manifest in both words and deeds.

The Pakistani Nation was traumatized by a huge increase in domestic religiously-motivated violence in 2007, with more lives lost to Islamist militancy than in the previous 6 years combined. Concurrently, al Qaeda and affiliated groups have resurfaced on Pakistani territory and continue to plot anti-Western terrorist attacks. Senior U.S. officials, including President Bush, believe possible future attacks on the U.S. homeland likely would originate from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

For the first time in many years, the United States must deal with a political structure in Islamabad that has fundamentally differing views on how to combat religious extremism. Pakistan's new civilian leaders reengaging efforts at negotiation with religious extremists claim that military confrontation has allowed militants to become stronger. Most Pakistanis, though not all, appear to welcome this policy shift.

A key metric for the United States is preventing pro-Taliban militants from using tribal regions to plan and launch attacks. So far, the indicators are not encouraging. Cross-border raids in Afghanistan reportedly are up significantly in recent months and Pakistani officials show signs of diminished concern about this issue, perhaps reflecting Pakistani dissent from the multi-national strategy being pursued in Afghanistan. Myriad analysts counsel U.S. patience. Many insist that only by bringing Pakistan's Tribal Areas under the full writ of the state and facilitating major economic development there can the FATA region problem be solved.

Decisionmakers in Washington face the difficult task of supporting a holistic long-term Pakistani approach to its militancy problem while making clear to Islamabad's leaders that international jihadis represent a threat that should be neutralized in the near term. Reported Predator strikes on Pakistani territory may kill al Qaeda operatives, but often take civilian lives, as well. Pakistani leaders strongly condemn such attacks, reflecting a widely-held Pakistani view that the United States myopically pursues its own national interests.

Recognition of Pakistan's legitimate security concerns and interests regarding Afghanistan and active support for warmer Paki-

stan-Afghanistan relations are also explicit non-controversial U.S. policies. Yet on this topic, too, vigorous debate exists on whether the United States is genuinely committed to a long-term role in the region that will address Pakistani concerns.

U.S. public diplomacy gains following the 2005 earthquake were measurable, but have since receded. By one accounting, 86 percent of Pakistanis believe that weakening and dividing the Muslim world is a U.S. goal. A scant 9 percent thought Pakistan should cooperate with the United States in its so-called war on terror.

These findings may give pause to any observer and serve as a stark reminder that the national interest and the human interest do not always correspond in the minds of ordinary citizens. U.S. interlocutors cannot force upon Pakistanis the notion that the fight against religious militancy is in their own best interests. Weakening and dividing the Muslim world is not a goal of U.S. foreign policy, as a huge majority of Pakistanis appear to believe. To the extent these misperceptions exist, they are likely to create formidable obstacles to a genuine mutually-held trust and respect that could benefit the governments and peoples of both countries.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.

Senator CARPER. Great. Mr. Kronstadt, thank you very much.

Ms. Curtis, I understand that you come late to the game because we invited you late. We are just delighted that you were willing to make time in your schedule to come and testify. I didn't have a chance to read your testimony, so this will be the first time I have heard it, but I very much look forward to it and thank you so much for joining us.

**TESTIMONY OF LISA CURTIS,¹ SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,
ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION**

Ms. CURTIS. OK. Well, thank you very much for having me here, Mr. Chairman. It is very much an honor. I will focus my remarks on mainly containing the terrorist threat in Pakistan, which of course is critical to the future of Pakistan as well as global security.

Despite a successful election 4 months ago, Pakistan's political and security situation remains highly unstable and demands close attention from U.S. policy makers and legislators. The power struggle at the center among the three main political parties, Asif Ali Zardari, Nawaz Sharif, and President Musharraf—Asif Ali Zardari leads the Pakistan People's Party, the main leader in the coalition government; Nawaz Sharif leads the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz faction, which is the junior coalition partner in the coalition government. There is a power struggle between these three leaders that is distracting the new government from coping with the grave economic and terrorism challenges that are facing the country.

A revived lawyers' movement to restore judges deposed by President Musharraf last year is adding to the political uncertainty, and I understand tens of thousands of people are en route from Lahore to Islamabad as we speak, so just to give you a sense for the political uncertainty in Islamabad at the moment.

¹The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis appears in the Appendix on page 77.

But perhaps the most worrisome trend in Pakistan is the advance of Taliban militants in the Northwest part of the country and the government's lack of a strategic approach to roll back the rising extremist threat. The United States and Pakistan share the same objective of uprooting terrorism from Pakistan, but they have not yet developed and agreed upon a comprehensive joint plan to achieve this goal over the long term.

Tuesday night's air strike that killed 11 Pakistani security forces along the Afghan border will likely strain U.S.-Pakistan relations and create opposition within the lower ranks of the army and the Pashtun paramilitary Frontier Corps to any further cooperation with the United States. The incident points to the challenges of fighting an effective campaign against insurgents who cross freely back and forth along a porous border and the confusion that prevails when coalition forces can operate aggressively on one side of the border, but must rely on their Pakistani counterparts to control the other side. Mostly, the incident highlights the need to improve communication between the coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani forces along the border.

In September 2006, Pakistani President Musharraf pursued a peace deal with militants in the North Waziristan agency of the Tribal Areas. The deal failed by all accounts. Within 2 months, cross-border attacks against coalition forces increased by 200 percent, and by the summer of 2007, senior U.S. intelligence officials declared that the Pakistani peace deal had allowed the region to develop into an al Qaeda stronghold. The extremists also took advantage of the decreased military pressure and instituted strict Islamic edicts in the region, such as closing down girls' schools, barber shops, and video stores, demonstrating that they could challenge the writ of the government.

The Pakistani government has once again embarked on a new set of peace deals in the region. The government hopes that negotiations will separate tribal leaders from the extremists, but the problem is the tribal leaders do not have the wherewithal to confront the extremists. The Pakistani government says that it needs time for the negotiations to bear fruit. The danger lies in promoting a negotiating process that legitimizes the extremists and increases their influence.

During a recent trip to Pakistan, I was struck by the level of concern expressed about the situation in the Northwest Frontier Province by the people of that region. Pakistanis understand that the Taliban militants are competing for political power with the Pakistani State. They do not support the agenda of the militants, but they were pessimistic that the government was capable of successfully countering their growing influence.

The militants almost certainly will use the current law to strengthen their ability to fight coalition forces in Afghanistan. The United States must encourage Pakistan to go back on the offensive with full U.S. support. But military operations alone will not uproot the terrorists' safe haven in the Tribal Areas, which could take several years. It will require a strategic approach that also relies heavily on economic development and investment in the region.

In addition to implementing a large-scale economic development program in the FATA, the United States should move forward with

Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), as they are referred to, legislation that was introduced in the U.S. Senate on March 13, 2008. The ROZs are meant to encourage investment near the underdeveloped Tribal Areas by permitting certain products produced there to enter the U.S. duty-free.

And I just want to add, during my recent visit to Pakistan, there was a lot of skepticism because this initiative was introduced several years ago. President Bush announced this in March 2006, and here we are 2 years later and it is still not implemented. So I just want to make the point of how important it is to keep the faith of the Pakistanis that we really are truly interested in contributing to the development of this region.

The United States should also speed up its plans to provide counterinsurgency training to Pakistan's paramilitary troops stationed in the FATA. The training of Pakistan's Frontier Corps, who come from the region and are familiar with the culture, is scheduled to begin this summer, but it really should have started long ago.

Washington should also increase efforts to encourage peace building and greater military-to-military cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistani initiatives to bring political reform to the FATA could actually strengthen Islamabad's claim to the region and help dispel any controversy between Kabul and Islamabad on the status of their shared border.

The United States should also make a quiet yet focused diplomatic effort to prod the India-Pakistan peace process. Substantive movement on Kashmir is needed to demonstrate that the two countries are truly putting their past behind them and moving toward a new era of peace and cooperation in South Asia.

Finally, the United States should fully support the democratically-elected coalition government. Washington should avoid being viewed as meddling in Pakistani internal politics, including working toward the preservation of President Musharraf, whose role and influence are declining in Pakistan, which I think many of the witnesses have indicated. A policy of clinging to Musharraf in the face of Pakistani opposition will only increase hostility toward the United States from the broader population and contribute to greater instability within the system. Maintenance of the current coalition government offers the best hope for stabilizing Pakistan as it copes with the economic and terrorism challenges that threaten political unrest.

That concludes my statement. Thank you.

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. It was worth waiting for. Thanks so much.

Mr. Krepon, you are recognized. Please proceed.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL KREPON,¹ CO-FOUNDER, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

Mr. KREPON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding this hearing. You have asked me to focus on the nuclear weapons issue—

Senator CARPER. Yes, sir.

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon appears in the Appendix on page 84.

Mr. KREPON [continuing]. Which I am going to do. The first question, how safe and secure are Pakistan's nuclear weapons? Nobody knows for sure how the current system, which is an improved system, will work under circumstances of great stress.

Senator CARPER. Excuse me for interrupting, but when you say an improved system, improved how recently?

Mr. KREPON. Well, there was a time, regrettably, when A.Q. Khan, who ran one of the major nuclear laboratories, was in charge of security at that lab. That was not a good idea.

Senator CARPER. No.

Mr. KREPON. But that has changed and now the Pakistan army has full control over the security system. It has full control over the nuclear weapons system within the country, from soup to nuts.

But the improvements that they have made, thankfully, have not been tested under periods of prolonged great stress. If there is great turbulence within the country, and there are possibilities of that because of this triangular competition between the political big-wig, or big-wigs, the current president of the country, and the army chief, that triangular system of control, there is jockeying there all the time. But it could get a lot worse.

A period of prolonged political turbulence where the country's problems grow and divisions within the country grow, that will also be reflected in the Pakistan army. The Pakistan army is not some foreign culture that has been imposed on Pakistan. It reflects the country. And so divisions and grievances, when they grow within the country, are also going to grow within the army.

And the biggest, or one of the biggest threats to the safety and security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan is a breakdown of unity of command within the army. So unity of command is a hierarchical institution. The chief gives orders. The orders are followed. With a breakdown of command, orders don't get followed. So I think that is something to focus on.

We want to prevent a prolonged period of instability in governing this country and there is just so much we can do. Our policies aren't determinative, but they do influence outcomes. So worry about political instability within the country.

I also worry about the crisis with India because whenever there is a crisis with India, then nuclear weapons which are usually in repose, and they are most safely guarded in repose, they move around. Some portion of their nuclear arsenal, the launchers and the weapons, move when there is a period of significant crisis. The reasons are simple. People can look down on this country by means of satellites and get the geographical coordinates of where the nuclear storage sites are, where the missile bases are, where the air bases are. So all of these are targetable, so you have got to put something in motion. When you put something in motion in a crisis, then you are more susceptible to insider threats and you are more susceptible to accidents, and if a crisis turns into a limited war, then, of course, all of these concerns really grow exponentially.

So what can the United States do? We can offer assistance for nuclear security. The Pakistanis, there is this huge trust deficit with the United States and every time there is an incident like yesterday, the trust deficit grows. So they are not going to let us get

hands on their crown jewels. They are going to keep us at a safe distance.

Support that can be provided from a safe distance, like our best practices, our lessons learned—which, by the way, we have to relearn about nuclear safety and security. But if we can offer assistance that is at a safe distance, chances are, and if it is kept with a low profile, the Pakistan army will say yes, as long as they can keep us at arm's length. Those are small things. If we offer big assistance programs for nuclear security, it may make doing smaller things even harder.

And, of course, the other two things, because of my worries, we can do crisis management if there is a problem with India. Even better, we could do peacemaking, help with peacemaking in a low-profile way. We haven't done much of that, unfortunately.

I agree that these assistance packages are required to help reorient the Pakistan army, Frontier Corps, economic development. You will be sorely tempted to walk away from these programs because there is going to be so much friction between us and Pakistan in so many specific cases. But disengagement doesn't help. Thank you.

Senator CARPER. Thank you for an excellent statement and for responding to the questions that we asked you to respond to. We are glad you accepted our invitation and thank you for your testimony.

Dr. Cohen, you are batting cleanup here. Thank you. Please proceed.

**TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN P. COHEN,¹ SENIOR FELLOW,
FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator Carper. I am honored to be invited to again speak and offer some advice to the Senate.

Let me begin my remarks by making two general observations. Somebody said earlier these hearings are timely, but they are timely because Pakistan is in a protracted crisis that is measured in decades, not just years. So Pakistan is going to be with us in one form or another for a very long time. It is not just a sudden event that is taking place.

Second, there is also a great danger of wishful thinking regarding Pakistan, projecting on Pakistan our desires and our belief that we have found leadership or a program that actually works, and, of course, this is sometimes played back to us, ratifying our own imagination.

When I worked for George Schultz for a couple of years, he said to us once, hope is not a policy, so I think we have to bear that in mind with regard to Pakistan. I hope that this and that will happen in Pakistan, but I think we also have to take a realistic assessment of what is actually going on.

I will try and summarize some of this because Mr. Krepon has said a few things already, but I think there are four nuclear-related dangers we have to worry about in this Administration and the next and perhaps the one after that. A small but real possibility

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen appears in the Appendix on page 92.

that the next India-Pakistan crisis could lead to escalation to nuclear use.

Second, Pakistan may decide as a matter of state policy—this is looking ahead a couple of years—to extend a nuclear umbrella or engage in nuclear sharing with one or more Middle Eastern States, especially if Iran acquires a nuclear device.

Third, there is a hard-to-quantify risk of nuclear theft in Pakistan. Mr. Krepon has talked about that. I won't repeat it.

And finally, there is some small chance that should Pakistan unravel—again, it has once already—that its nuclear assets will be seized by remnant elements of the army for political, strategic, or personal purposes.

While nuclear proliferation or nuclear theft should not be the sole or even the determining element in a relationship with Pakistan, some of these are frightening scenarios. Our policy paradox is that we want many things from Pakistan but that we cannot directly address Pakistan's inability to deliver. We want Pakistan to cooperate on terrorism. We want it to normalize with India. We want it to control its nuclear weapons. We don't want it to proliferate. And we want it to transform its domestic order by normalizing the FATA.

Even if Pakistanis wanted to do some or all of these things, it is not certain that they have the capability to do them. So no matter how much money we pour into Pakistan, we cannot expect full compliance. We must pick and choose among our policy goals.

In the case of nuclear security, we should go beyond encouraging better safeguards. Within the limits of American law, we are providing technologies to Pakistan and systems to Pakistan to help secure their systems and it may be that China has also done so. I certainly hope they are doing that.

Beyond this, we should consider a criteria-based nuclear deal with Pakistan, somewhat different than the one we offered to India, which I support, but one in which Pakistan has to meet certain criteria to get assistance as a way of encouraging them to limit and secure their existing nuclear weapons. As far as I can see, Pakistan is simply going to be building nuclear weapons in large numbers as fast as they can indefinitely, something that is not in our interest and I don't think it is in their interest.

Pakistan could receive support for a civilian nuclear program in exchange for greater assurances regarding the security of its nuclear assets and technology and transparency regarding past leakages.

Finally, we should marginally increase our engagement in the India-Pakistan relationship—our involvement in the India-Pakistan relationship, as Mr. Krepon has said. The Pakistan army still regards India as its main threat and nuclear weapons as its main defense. We need to address their chief incentive to acquire more and bigger nuclear weapons. The reason Pakistan is engaged in Afghanistan or allows individuals based in Pakistan to become involved in Afghanistan is not because they have ambitions of expansion themselves. They do not want India to fill the vacuum in Afghanistan. So it is essentially a continuation of the India-Pakistan rivalry to Afghanistan that is part of the problem.

Short-term measures regarding—

Senator CARPER. Excuse me, Doctor. Just say that last sentence again.

Mr. COHEN. Pakistani strategists see Afghanistan as a vulnerable spot because of Indian engagement in Afghanistan, and historically there has been an Afghan-Indian alliance or relationship because both regarded Pakistan as their major threat. So, in a sense, we have to understand this realpolitik balance of power issue. From a Pakistani military point of view, they do not want to see India establish themselves in Afghanistan, so that is why our Pakistan-Afghanistan policy, our Pakistan and our Afghan policies and our India policy are linked at some level, at a strategic level, and we must keep that in mind.

Short-term measures regarding terrorism and nuclear technology should not get in the way of long-term strategies to stabilize Pakistan. We should devote as much attention to shoring up Pakistan's broken institutions and helping Pakistanis resolve their permanent domestic critical crises as we devote to terrorism and nuclear issues, and I think I agree with the rest of the panelists on this point. If we fail to do the latter—the former, the latter would certainly become more acute. If we don't address Pakistan's coherence as a state, it will be a bigger problem regarding terrorism and nuclear weapons.

Fortunately, there are other states that share this interest with us, that want to see a stable Pakistan. These include Saudi Arabia, China, India, Afghanistan, the major European powers, and Japan. The Chinese and the Indians, in particular, are concerned about Pakistan becoming a radical Islamist State. Of course, Saudi, you could look at the Saudi view on that several ways, but they share with us a concern that Pakistan not be an export center for radical Islamic behavior. In a sense, we have some common interest with the Chinese and the Indians regarding Pakistan's stability and normalcy.

Our Pakistan policy should, therefore, be framed by a regional policy that seeks to stabilize relations between Pakistan and its neighbors, especially India and Afghanistan, but also Iran. We also need to make our support more effective. I won't go into the details. I agree with what others have said about this.

Finally, I think we should be aware that Pakistan may yet fail comprehensively. The state has failed in bits and pieces over the last 25 years in civil war, separatism, economic collapse, and the rise of a truly authoritarian leader are all possible futures for Pakistan. This is the core argument of the book I published in 2004 and I think I would stand by everything I wrote there. It is still a possible future for Pakistan.

Pakistan should not be written off as a failed state. It is not a failed state. It has failed in bits and pieces. But if it cannot take advantage of this second-last chance, then its future will be grim, and you and other American policymakers should not be taken by surprise.

That concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to respond to questions.

Senator CARPER. Dr. Cohen, thank you. Thank you for your testimony.

I am reminded as I listened to each of you testify, reminded of the words of Thomas Edison, who used to say that sometimes people miss out on opportunity because it comes along wearing overalls and is disguised and looks a lot like work. There is a potential for great calamity here, nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands, the Taliban, al Qaeda continue to find refuge and create mischief both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, danger to our troops in Afghanistan. But there is also real potential here, maybe for getting it right. It doesn't say it is going to be easy.

One of the best ways for me to learn, aside from very informative panels like the ones that are gathered here, is to actually go to a country to visit that country, to talk to the folks who are involved, our people as well as the folks who live in those countries. Senator Levin has just returned, I believe, from that part of the world. I am delighted that he is here. As you know, he Chairs the Armed Services Committee and is a very senior member of this Committee, as well. Senator Levin, you are recognized for as much time as you wish to consume.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Carper, so much, and thanks for holding this hearing. As you mentioned, I just returned with Senator Casey from a very brief visit but a very useful visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan. I think I changed my mind about a number of things just in talking to those leaders and talking to our military people during those 3 days. I learned a lot about the border and the problem that border creates for Afghanistan, for our troops in Afghanistan because of the flow of Taliban across that border and other terrorist forces that emanate from Pakistan, where they really have safe havens in a number of areas of Pakistan.

The fundamental question that we grappled with, Senator Casey and I, is to what the real intent or attitude of the Pakistani government is. Do they really want to stop that flow into Afghanistan or not? Some argue, particularly in Afghanistan, but some in Pakistan, that if they could buy off some of the groups that are violent and persuade them to focus their fire on Afghanistan next door, that maybe they can have peace at home in Pakistan, and that is a theory which has a lot of support, including some very explicit support from some of our diplomats in Afghanistan as well as our generals as well as the Afghan leadership that has absolutely no confidence in Pakistan's either intent or capability to stop those cross-border movements.

Now, from a military perspective, there are a lot of issues about rules of engagement, what happens when people are being fired at on the Afghan side from the Pakistan side. What should be the response? The NATO rules of engagement, surprisingly, do not even allow a return of fire across a border after they have been fired at. That, to me, is a stunning restriction on what is common sense military conduct, which is at least go after the folks that are firing at you, but NATO has rules of engagement that says if that attack comes from across the border, you cannot respond across the border, even with fire, much less personal activity crossing the border.

Our rules that we follow in the area that the United States is patrolling and has responsibility for militarily, with obviously the support of the Afghans, our rules of engagement are not that. We will fire back at sources of attack from the Pakistani side of the border. But that is a kind of an important issue, but a more military technical issue.

The big issue for us is what is the intent of the Pakistani government? What do they really intend to do, either in the Tribal Areas or south of the Tribal Areas? These peace agreements that are being discussed, we heard a lot of promises from the Pakistani leader that those peace agreements would have to contain explicit commitments which would be enforceable to stop the flow of people crossing the border into Afghanistan who intend to attack our troops. We have those assurances that come right from the highest sources you can get in Pakistan, which are the top elected leaders in Pakistan, including the president and the prime minister and the heads of all major political parties.

But then you read about a press conference which is held by the head of a tribe whose first name I am afraid I will mispronounce, Baitullah Masud. Mr. Masud holds a—he is a very militant man who says at his press conference he vows that he will continue the jihad in Afghanistan. He has an open press conference in Pakistan. Everybody knows where he is. The press knows where he is. He makes these vows openly and publicly. He is the man who, by the way, many think is responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and yet he has an open press conference in Pakistan.

So I guess I would ask Ms. Curtis and Mr. Kronstadt this question, since our other witnesses are on a different part of this subject, but what are, in your judgment, do the Pakistanis have the will and have the capability—either or both—of stopping these attacks from these safe havens on the Pakistani side of the border into Afghanistan where they are creating huge problems?

It is our greatest problem, I believe, in Afghanistan, where you have got a national army which is committed to defeating the Taliban. Their morale is very high in the Afghan army. The capability, at least in terms of intent and will and courage and strength of determination, is high in the Afghan army. They don't have the military capability yet. But in terms of the willpower, it is there. In terms of the fighting strength, our military leaders tell us that the Afghan army has got this kind of a determination, that they are willing to do everything they can inside of Afghanistan to stop terrorist attacks relative to the border, going back to that.

Let me start with you, Ms. Curtis. What is the intent, in your judgment, of the Pakistan government in terms of stopping these incursions from their soil into Afghanistan?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, let me just start by saying I think it is extremely difficult to judge intent, but what I can say is if we look at what has happened in Pakistan over the last year, literally 50, 60 suicide bombings killing over 1,000 Pakistani civilians and security forces, I think clearly Pakistan wants to stop the terrorists. It understands the threats to the Pakistani State.

In my opening remarks, I pointed out I was recently in Peshawar and it was very clear the people of Peshawar are extremely concerned about what is happening. They understand that the Taliban

militants are competing with the Pakistani authorities for political power and they are very alarmed by this.

So I would say that we really need to think about the issue of capability, and I understand the recent RAND study that has come out that was mentioned earlier about whether or not Pakistani services, intelligence services, were actually supporting the Taliban. But I would point out, I think some of this stems from some media reporting that we saw last year talking about Frontier Corps who were allowing Taliban to cross, and I would say there is a difference between allowing or not being able to intercept because of capability and supporting or helping, and we have to keep this in mind. It is my understanding that the pickets along the border are often made of up to 10 to 20 Frontier Corps troops and they may face a band of militants of 50 or more Taliban.

So I think we need to look at this question, but I certainly share your concern and I think it is something we need to bring up in a very forthright manner with our Pakistani counterparts when we do have these crossings and we do know that the Pakistani border posts are not doing their job. We need to figure out why and we need to address that issue.

Senator LEVIN. We do bring them up forthrightly with the Pakistani leaders. Believe me, we were very direct with them on this question and they assure us that, it is their intent. They are not going to sign any peace agreements which don't have explicit language prohibiting it with enforcement mechanisms to carry out those commitments.

But the RAND study that you referred to says something more than just people on the border allowing, and I agree with you, there is a difference between, a gradation between allowing and supporting or assisting. But what the RAND study says is that there are a number of instances where Pakistani intelligence agents tipped off Taliban forces about the location and movement of Afghan and coalition forces, that there was actually an affirmative step that was taken, not just passivity but tipping off Taliban forces.

And there is other evidence, by the way. We talked to one of our generals there who reported an incident, if I can quickly find this, where there were some people who went over the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan to assist people from—and participated in an incursion from Pakistan military into Afghanistan to help them get back safely. It was Senator Casey, and I were told by our military commanders of a recent incident in which Pakistan Frontier Corps forces sent an ambulance in to evacuate wounded militants back across the border into Pakistan.

So these are not just passive actions, failure to act, although that is not acceptable, either. These are affirmative actions on the part of the intelligence and the part of the Frontier Corps people to help militants and to help the Taliban inside of Afghanistan.

And I agree with your distinction, though, Ms. Curtis. I don't disagree with that. I am just afraid that there has been much more than just passive acceptance.

Mr. Kronstadt.

Mr. KRONSTADT. Senator, I would, I think, first of all, agree with Ms. Curtis's emphasis on the capability or capacity question. I

think it has become clear to most observers that Pakistan's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts have been hampered by a number of problems, including equipment, training, so forth.

With regard to what you were just saying about the Frontier Corps, I might offer that even what we saw on the news yesterday calls attention to the problem of training and discipline within that organization. Part of the potential benefits of working with the Frontier Corps, it seems, are the fact that they are local Pashtun ethnicity, often live in the very areas that they are deployed. But there is a potential downside to that in terms of concerns about sympathies that they may have. It is possible that these concerns could be ameliorated by more fully engaging the training and discipline of this force and I think that has been a focus.

With regard to the intent of the government of Pakistan, I would call attention first to the fact that it is a very difficult region that is being operated in, and very often when I converse with Pakistani interlocutors, they will raise the issue of our border with Mexico and the difficulties we find with securing that border, and then go on to explain that they are dealing with a much more difficult terrain and an actual division, a Durand Line that was purposefully dividing members of the same ethnicity—

Senator LEVIN. Yes. The terrain in the north is more difficult, but down with the Quetta area, that is not particularly difficult terrain. They openly meet in Quetta. They have this press conference that I made reference to, Mr. Masud. It is an open press conference. He is the guy who is threatening. He says the jihad in Afghanistan will continue. Now, how do we explain that in terms of intent?

Mr. KRONSTADT. I am certainly not in a position to explain that. I will call attention to the fact that Deputy Secretary Negroponte himself called for the capture and bringing to justice of Baitullah Masud, so I think the U.S. Government's position on so-called irreconcilable elements such as Masud are clear. I can't explain the apparent public appearance of a person like Masud in South Waziristan. But again, it is in a Tribal Area and it is useful to separate, as you have done, the Balochistan region and the Quetta local region from the Tribal Areas, which are operating under a different set of—the Pakistani government is operating under a different set of constraints there.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take up time beyond my allotted amount. You were nice enough not to give me a specific time, but I don't want to abuse your good nature.

I would just say this in conclusion, I guess. We were notified a couple of weeks ago by the Administration that they intended to spend \$75 million to train and equip the Pakistan Frontier Corps. During our recent trip, as I mentioned, we, Senator Casey and I, heard from so many officials, Afghan and U.S. commanders, about either the failure to prevent activity crossing the board by the Pakistan military or actively supporting these cross-border attacks, that we are, frankly, troubled by whether or not that money is going to be used to stop the cross-border incursions into Afghanistan or to be training a force which doesn't have the same interest and goals that we do.

And so I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that you insert in the record two things here. One would be a trip report of Senator Casey and myself on our visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is a fairly short report, but it does contain some of the questions which you and the witnesses and I have raised.¹

But I also have a second request, which would be to insert a letter which I recently sent to Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense, raising a question about that \$75 million.² It is not up to us to approve it. We don't have that power with this particular expenditure. But I do think we have to make a decision fundamentally as to whether or not the folks that we are training, equipping, making stronger, have the same goal and interest that we do. I don't think we have made that. I haven't heard a very strong case being made that we have confidence that Frontier Corps, in fact, will have its mission and purpose the same one that we do.

And I think there are real questions about it and I think some of Ms. Curtis's earlier testimony about complicated motives—these are people who are countrymen. These are people who have a similar—they are part of the same tribe and they have a—there is no border for them. I don't think they even acknowledge a border. It is an artificial line. And I just want to make sure that before American taxpayer dollars are spent to equip and arm and train folks that they are not going to be turned on us and not going to be helping forces that have a different interest. So thank you.

Senator CARPER. You bet. Thank you so much for coming and for sharing with us your insights, not only from your recent visit, but from your years in the Senate and your chairmanship of the Armed Services Committee and your role on this Committee.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator CARPER. You bet. What happens to Musharraf? What do you see in his future? I would just ask each of you to share some thoughts. Mr. Krepon.

Mr. KREPON. If you look at Pakistani history as closely as Mr. Cohen has, I think it is possible to come to the conclusion that when a military strongman really messes up in Pakistan, he is not part of the clean-up crew. The clean-up is enhanced by his departure and retarded if he sticks around. Would you agree with that, Mr. Cohen?

Mr. COHEN. Yes. I think that a key element in this will be the army's own views. They will not want to see a former army chief disgraced or humiliated in any way, and his major outside supporter seems to be the United States, or elements of the United States. So I suspect that as our political system changes, support for him may diminish—it has diminished already—and they will find a graceful way for him to exit Pakistan. On the other hand, he may have hopes that some dramatic reversal will take place where he will again be seen as indispensable. But that will depend on the army. I think the army is a critical factor here, and they will not—but above all, they will not want to see him humiliated or the army humiliated by his humiliation.

¹The prepared report of Senator Levin and Senator Casey appears in the Appendix on page 47.

²The letter to Robert Gates from Senator Levin appears in the Appendix on page 51.

Senator CARPER. In some countries, they have a strong chief executive. This country is an example of that. Israel has quite a different situation with the president as a largely ceremonial position. Is that a potential graceful way out of this, is for the folks in Pakistan to decide that their president should be a largely ceremonial office—

Mr. COHEN. Well, that is the way the constitution had it, until he changed the constitution. And again, if he would be willing to revert to such a ceremonial president, that would be fine, but he may be waiting around. Certainly the army is waiting around for the politicians to fail to come to an agreement. So if the politicians cannot again agree, and we are talking about the two dominant centrist secular political parties of Pakistan, if they cannot come to an agreement as to the management and the stability of Pakistan, he will have a role, no two ways about it.

Senator CARPER. Who selects the leadership of the military?

Mr. KREPON. Well, under the current constitution, the president chooses, not the prime minister. But this is in play now because the new political dispensation has offered some major constitutional amendments. The constitution is not a settled document in Pakistan.

Mr. COHEN. That is why I said Pakistan is in a permanent state of crisis because there is no agreement on the fundamental law of the land, the constitution, and personality plays a role, outside powers play a role. We do. The Saudis do. The Chinese do. So there is no political coherence in Pakistan, or it has lost whatever coherence it did have, and I think we can expect this to go on forever, indefinitely.

Senator CARPER. Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. Sir, there has been a fundamental political change in Pakistan that I am not sure that the Bush Administration has fully absorbed. I think the election showed that the support for President Musharraf's party, the Pakistan Muslim League, KDS and PMLQ, did not do very well. In fact, it did a lot worse than people expected. So I think this was one indicator that people were not happy with some of the things President Musharraf had pursued in the last year, particularly the institution of emergency rule, the clamping down on the press, throwing thousands of political workers, human rights workers, in jail for a certain period. So I think this really needs to be absorbed by the U.S. Administration, this fundamental change.

And one thing that was made clear to me when I was in Pakistan was that Pakistan has traditionally followed the British system where the prime minister does have the majority of the power and that there was a sense that many Pakistanis wanted to return to that particular mode of government. So I think there is definitely interest in moving in that direction. How quickly it will happen because of all the political instability, because of this three-way power struggle that we see, I wouldn't want to hazard a guess.

Senator CARPER. Do you want to add anything to that, Mr. Kronstadt?

Mr. KRONSTADT. I would just add that I think it is safe to say the default setting for Pakistan since the 1973 constitution is a

parliamentary system of government where the prime minister would be the sovereign and head of government.

Senator CARPER. Thank you. If you look at the level of popularity or popular support within Pakistan for President Musharraf and you look at the drop in our own support, one seems to mirror the other. I wonder if he is bringing us down or if the converse might be true or something to both of those.

Mr. COHEN. There is a relationship, and one of the reasons he is unpopular is that he seems to be doing our bidding and that we have—there have been American incursions in Pakistan continuously. The recent attack wasn't the first one.

Senator CARPER. Yes. I want us to talk about that here, and this might be a good place to pivot and to talk about that. It sounds like a tragic incident that occurred in the last 48 hours where, I believe, weapons delivered by maybe one of our Predators or a Predator-like system may have led to the death of a dozen or more Pakistani anti-insurgent troops. Any idea how that happened?

Mr. KREPON. No idea, but I want to lengthen your frame thinking about this problem of hot pursuit and bombing on Pakistani soil, because it is not so long ago when it was the Soviet Union and Soviet fighters and Soviet bombers were dropping ordinance on Pakistani territory, the same area. So Pakistanis—

Senator CARPER. Bombing folks that we were supporting?

Mr. KREPON. Well, when we were supporting the Mujahideen, they were using Pakistani territory as safe havens and there were plenty of instances where the Soviet Union would just happen to strafe and bomb Pakistani soil. So we have—I am in no way paralleling what the Soviets did in Afghanistan and what the United States is doing in Afghanistan. Let me be clear about that. But the sanctity of Pakistani soil, which doesn't seem to apply to cross-border incursions by pro-Taliban elements, does apply to bombing runs.

So every time the United States finds it necessary to carry out an attack by a drone or by some other mean on Pakistani soil, there are huge reverberations within the country and it impacts on the nuclear security issue that we were talking about. It impacts on U.S. popularity within the country. So we are on the horns of a dilemma here, and to my way of thinking, we have to have really good intelligence when we pick out a target on Pakistani soil, current intelligence, and we have to have real good communication so that Pakistani forces, including the Frontier Corps, are not collateral targets.

Now, the two of these imperatives can also conflict with each other because of problems that Senator Levin was talking about. If we give a heads-up, we are not sure that the target will be there, and this is really hard.

Senator CARPER. I agree. Dr. Cohen, and then others.

Mr. COHEN. I don't want to sound too cynical, but for a billion dollars, you can bomb a country occasionally, which is what we have been doing, in a sense. What is remarkable about this last bombing is that none of the Pakistani press reports have linked it to the actual amount of money we are giving Pakistan, and I think the Administration feels and maybe our forces in Afghanistan feel that the part of the billion dollar package includes the necessity or

the ability—I won't say the right, but allowing us to occasionally drop a few weapons into Pakistan, and Pakistanis haven't protested that since the governor of the Northwest Frontier said, "If you do this again, we will be very unhappy." That struck me as a fairly weak response from a state, but it could be that this is part of where our money is going, in a sense, to buy goodwill, if that is the right term, among Pakistani leaders.

But in the long term, I agree that it is hurting us among Pakistani people. Imagine how we would feel if we were being bombed occasionally by Canadians or Mexicans or any other country. And, of course—that was the point I would make.

Senator CARPER. Does anyone else want to comment on this before we move on?

Ms. CURTIS. I just think it points to the need for better cooperation, and there have been efforts to move in this direction. The establishment of Border Coordinating Centers along the border, which would be manned by Pakistani, Afghan, and coalition forces—it is my understanding that the trilateral meetings that take place between the three have not been happening as frequently in the last couple months. Perhaps this is because of some of the political instability in Pakistan. I am not sure. But I think this just shows how important these trilateral efforts are and I hope that Pakistan will participate fully in making them successful.

Senator CARPER. All right. Let me just change our focus just a little bit. In listening to your testimony today and in reading your testimony and some other materials, it strikes me that in the Pakistanis' view, India is their major nemesis. They don't have a very fond regard for Afghanistan. It sounds like the folks who voted in Pakistan in the last 6 months, they voted to say that they don't want to become an extremist country. They want to basically be a modern society and a democratic society, but not one that is governed by religious extremists of any quarter.

Pakistani people, as I understand it, are concerned with the upsurge of violence, suicide bombs and that sort of thing in their own country, so I don't know if there is a tension that is going on here, too. You have got the Taliban or remnants of the Taliban there along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan creating mischief over in Afghanistan, which may be to the pleasure of some of the Pakistanis, I am not sure. But at the same time, to the extent that the Taliban and al Qaeda elements are in the mountainous region, the remote regions there, they are also in a position where they can create mischief for the Pakistanis, too.

Where do the Pakistanis come down as to what is acceptable and what is not, where they are going to have enough or decide that it is not—as much as they might like to poke a stick in the eye of the Afghanis, the idea of knowing that they are at risk, too, in Pakistan is on their minds.

Also, I look, I think maybe it is not a perfect correlation here, but I look at what is happening in the Anbar Province in Iraq, where for a number of years there was just a hotbed of violence, people killing one another, trying to kill us, the Iraqi troops, as well, and the Sunni awakening has emerged, taken root, and you have gotten the folks, the people who live—the tribal units who live

in that province have said, enough. We are going to turn to work in concert with the U.S. forces, with the Iraqi forces, and to turn against the al Qaeda and Iraq elements.

Are there any lessons to be learned from what has happened in the Anbar province that might apply in some way to Pakistan? I am not sure if there are, and I acknowledge it is not a perfect correlation.

Mr. COHEN. I think in Pakistan, what has happened is that, among Pakistani civilians especially in the Eastern part of the country where the major cities are—

Senator CARPER. Excuse me just for a minute. What we have tried to do in Iraq, as you know, we tried to take the lessons from Anbar Province and tried to apply them in other parts of the country, and I think with some success. I don't know if it is transferrable from one country to another.

Mr. COHEN. No, I think much of it is, and in the case of Pakistan, especially the Eastern portions of Pakistan, the civilian population has been repelled by these suicide attacks and they do not want to be subject to extremist Islamic rule. They are generally secular Muslims. They voted for two major secular political parties. And frankly, I was surprised that the election took place relatively freely, Musharraf didn't intervene, but I was not surprised that the Islamist parties did badly and the secular parties did well. So in a sense, there is hope for Pakistan, and that is where most of the people live.

But there is still ambivalence in the military. They still regard India as a major threat and one of the theaters in which they combat India is Afghanistan. So I think you asked what are their intentions in Afghanistan. They want to have it both ways. They want our assistance, but they also want to make sure they have a hand in Afghanistan because from their point of view, Afghanistan is a critically important backyard for them. It is not that they have expansionist plans, but they don't want to see other countries fill into Afghanistan. So you can't separate the two.

Let me make a point which hasn't been made here but I think is very important. From an American perspective, neo-American perspective, the Taliban is not important. Taliban are not going to reach out and hurt us. Al Qaeda can and will and has. It is Taliban's willingness to host al Qaeda that is the danger. So if I had a choice of Afghanistan becoming Taliban without al Qaeda, I might take it rather than an endless war. So I think you have to bear in mind that from an American point of view, neo-American point of view, al Qaeda is the real threat. For most Pakistanis, also, al Qaeda is seen as an un-Pakistani kind of organization. They are seen as foreigners.

Senator CARPER. That is an excellent point. Thank you for making it. Anyone else on this issue I have raised?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think I have a different view in that I see the Taliban and al Qaeda, they have a symbiotic relationship and I think that you can't get rid of one without dealing with the other, and I think this has been the fundamental problem because I do think that most Pakistanis would not see it that way and they have a hope of separating the two. And I think if you look at the leadership connections and support for each other, while they

might have short-term objectives that differ, they certainly support each other, they cooperate, and I don't see that kind of cooperation ending any time soon.

So I think that would be a fallacy and I think that would be a mistake because we know—we have seen what happens when the Taliban is in power in Afghanistan and we saw Afghanistan become a sanctuary for al Qaeda, for terrorists, and I think it would be a mistake if we don't recognize that fundamental threat.

And I think what Mr. Cohen just articulated is the Pakistani assumption that the United States is not going to stay in Afghanistan. It is going to turn its back. It is going to leave, and that is why Pakistan has to continue to protect its own interests. And I think this is something that we need to overcome because this is hurting our ability to achieve the aims that we want to achieve in Afghanistan. So I think that the more that we remain committed, demonstrate we are committed, will commit troops, will commit resources, will keep the international community focused, as well, I think we will be able to achieve our objective not only in Afghanistan, but Pakistan, as well.

Mr. COHEN. Ms. Curtis, I said if we could separate al Qaeda and Taliban, but Taliban appear to be the sea in which the al Qaeda are swimming.

Ms. CURTIS. Right.

Senator CARPER. All right.

Mr. KRONSTADT. Mr. Chairman, could i just echo what Ms. Curtis was talking about? I want to emphasize, I think, the importance of the long-term commitment. It is easy to sit in Washington and make conclusions about what is going on there, but for the people there and in Pakistan, with the history—experiencing a history of seeing the United States seem to abandon the region or become disengaged from the region, they have continued to see a friendly government in Kabul as being in their very keen interests and that becomes a special focus with any signs that the United States might not be committed.

So it is not possible to make a long-term commitment by making a long-term commitment. It, of course, has to be lived out that way. But I think to the extent that the Pakistanis are reassured in that regard, it would serve U.S. interests.

Senator CARPER. Thank you. A couple of short questions and then we will call it a day. Thank you for bearing with us.

Is there any recent evidence of Pakistani intelligence or military officials supporting terrorist elements in acquiring or training to use nuclear or chemical or biological weapons that you might share with us?

Mr. KREPON. Well, the—

Senator CARPER. Or technology relating to those.

Mr. KREPON. Right. The public record has plenty of evidence of technology transfer, no evidence of the transfer of fissile material, bomb-making material, no evidence of the transfer of bombs. The available evidence in the public domain may grow. We are getting little bits and pieces along the way. There is probably much we will never know about the complete picture. But A.Q. Khan seems to have drawn the line, at least as far as we know, with respect to technology transfer.

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Others, please. Dr. Cohen, anything you would like to add? Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. You meant technology transfer to terrorist groups?

Mr. KREPON. Oh, no. Thank you very much for clarifying. These are to governments, not to non-state actors.

Senator CARPER. All right. But the question I was asking—maybe I wasn't clear, but we are looking for evidence that might suggest that Pakistani intelligence or military officials may be supporting terrorist elements in acquiring nuclear, chemical, biological weapons or weapons technology.

Mr. KREPON. I know of no such public evidence.

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Anyone else? Dr. Cohen.

Mr. COHEN. I have never heard of anything.

Senator CARPER. All right. Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. No, never heard of anything like that, and I just wanted to add that also in former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet's memoirs, he points out that A.Q. Khan rebuffed several approaches by Osama bin Laden for access to nuclear know-how. So I just wanted to point that out.

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Another question, really for all of you, but particularly for the three that I directed the last question to. What is the biggest threat to a secure nuclear arsenal in Pakistan? For example, is it a threat by terrorists or other militants? Is it a military coup, a leakage of nuclear materials or expertise? I am not sure if it was Mr. Krepon or Dr. Cohen who was talking about heightened threat with India. The movement of nuclear weapons pose a greater threat.

Mr. KREPON. In my judgment, it is not the take-over of the government or a coup within the army leadership by radical Islamic elements. It is not that. Pakistan is not that kind of a country. My judgment is the biggest threat right now is prolonged governmental incoherence.

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you.

Mr. COHEN. Yes. I had four nuclear-related problems or threats. I didn't assign a probability to any of them. I would say that—well, and I can't do that now. It would take a more detailed analysis. But I agree with Mr. Krepon that instability in the government generally could lead to problems. Another crisis with India might force the Pakistanis to put their nuclear weapons on the road again, in a sense, disperse them. If that took place simultaneously with the domestic political crisis in Pakistan, then you would have both opportunity and availability. Again, that is the perfect storm of situations to create a nuclear crisis. But again, the possibility is low, probability is low, but the consequences would be very great.

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Anyone else? Please.

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think another threat would be retired nuclear scientists or retired military terrorists gaining access that way. I agree that it is not the overthrow of the government. That is highly unlikely to result in such a danger. But I point to something that happened in 2001 where two retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission officials were found to be meeting with terrorists, I think with Osama bin Laden himself, and this was something that the United States brought to the attention of the Pakistanis. So I think this points out the need for personnel reliability

programs. It points at the need for the United States continuing to help Pakistan in securing its nuclear weapons.

Mr. COHEN. Yes. Senator, you should know that—I am sure you are aware that A.Q. Khan is, in a sense, on the loose again. He visited the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, visited old friends there—

Senator CARPER. Isn't he supposed to be under house arrest?

Mr. COHEN. Oh, no. He has received visitors. He has traveled around Pakistan. He has visited the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission headquarters which are in Islamabad, not too far from his house, in fact.

Senator CARPER. And I understand he has recanted some of his earlier—

Mr. COHEN. Well, and he has also recanted—I think this is an unfolding story. I am not quite sure whether he is telling the truth now or he told the truth then. I wouldn't draw conclusions one way or the other. You get into the whole classified realm at that point.

Senator CARPER. All right. OK. The last question I have is how credible do you find the Pakistani government's disavowal of any knowledge of Mr. Khan's proliferation activities, especially in light of his recanting of his confession? Any thoughts on that?

Mr. KREPON. I don't think these disavowals, blanket disavowals, are credible. I do think that each of his activities needs to be looked at separately. I see separate motivations, separate rationales, and separate possibilities for collusion with certain governmental officials in each of these cases. So I wouldn't wrap everything together. The only general conclusion I would make in answer to your question is that the non-collusion of others is very implausible.

Senator CARPER. All right. When you look at the relationship between Pakistan and, we will say, North Korea, in terms of the exchange of technology, does it make sense for the Pakistanis to want to trade nuclear weapons technology in exchange for weapons delivery technology? Is that a reasonable trade or not?

Mr. KREPON. No, not now.

Senator CARPER. No, in the past.

Mr. KREPON. In the past, Pakistan was in a bind. Pakistan was looking at India's missile programs advancing across a broad front and Pakistan was stuck and it needed missiles and it went to two countries for help. It went to China for help with respect to solid fueled missiles and it got help. And it went to North Korea for help with liquid fueled missiles. Pakistan didn't put all its eggs in one basket. What we are trying to get to the bottom of is what the basis of the transaction was with North Korea.

Senator CARPER. Do you think we will ever know?

Mr. KREPON. Well, there is a new piece that has come into the public domain. It does appear that even though North Korea doesn't admit it, that they got some help with respect to centrifuge technology, the technology to enrich uranium. Pakistan's bomb program was going down a separate route, plutonium production, and it appears that Pakistan got some help on centrifuges. Now, whether this was a discrete transaction, as has recently been reported, we still haven't gotten to the bottom of it.

Senator CARPER. All right. Anyone else on this point?

Mr. COHEN. I would just add that it is my experience that one of A.Q. Khan's great assets was his Rolodex, which he apparently has shared with other countries. That is, he knew, and he talks about this now, he knew a lot of places in Europe where he could buy this stuff, buy the technology, put the pieces together, and so presumably he kept it secret by only telling one country at a time.

Senator CARPER. OK. I am going to do something—I don't often do this, but I am going to ask each of you to take maybe one minute. In the House of Representatives—I used to be a House member years ago, but we had the opportunity at the beginning of business every day when the House opened for business to give a one-minute speech on any subject of our choice. I am not going to ask you to speak on any subject of your choice, but if there is something that you would like to just reiterate, to underline, or given the conversation we have had here today you think is especially relevant as a take-away for me and for my colleagues, or anyone else that might be following this and interested in this discussion, what might be your one-minute speech or your one-minute closing comments? Mr. Kronstadt.

Mr. KRONSTADT. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I, of course, won't have any speech for you, but I would just reiterate a couple of points.

Senator CARPER. Please.

Mr. KRONSTADT. One is, and I think these have been illuminated some at the hearing today, just how complex the situation is in Pakistan—

Senator CARPER. Well, if nothing else is clear, that is.

Mr. KRONSTADT. Well, the challenge is clear and I am, I think, encouraged by signs that the U.S. Government is focusing more clearly on addressing these challenges, and the hearing you have called today is evidence of that.

And I would again call attention to the role of mutual respect and trust. Again, long-term commitment is something that everyone agrees the United States is pursuing with Pakistan and the proof is in the pudding. As Dr. Cohen mentioned, there are going to be times when there will be a reflex to pull back and that can be reevaluated in the context of the complexity.

So I think a lot of the problems that have been raised here today can be traced back to a kind of fundamental distrust or trust deficit between the two countries and between the governments of the two countries, and to the extent this can be ameliorated, it would serve us well.

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. I guess I would just say from your doing Congressional oversight, don't forego the good for the perfect. I have seen this happen too many times. Certainly the oversight has to be done, but in a case like Pakistan, sometimes you have to move forward if you don't have all the answers ready before you, and I say this reflecting on the FATA development plan and the \$750 million in assistance that we are now moving forward with. We probably should have done it a long time ago. I understand there were a lot of questions in Congress. How do we know if the money is going to go to the right people? Sometimes you just have to move forward and then learn as you go.

I would just say, I received very good briefings when I was in Pakistan on what we are doing with our assistance that has begun to flow into the Tribal Areas and I am very encouraged. The program is being conducted very creatively, very professionally. My one concern would be that as the plan—the more money goes in, big aid goes in, that the same structure is not kept. So I would just urge you, your staffers to get the briefing, what is happening now, and try to keep that same kind of structure going for as long as possible.

And also on the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone issue, here is another issue where something that makes eminent sense, but I understand because we are trying to use trade or private investment for really a counterterrorism goal, that is difficult legislatively to do, but it is so incredibly important and, I think, will contribute tremendously to overcoming a lot of the complicated problems that we have been talking about today. So I would just end on that note.

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Mr. Krepon.

Mr. KREPON. I would like to thank you very much for holding this hearing.

Senator CARPER. No, we are the ones who are indebted to each of you. Thank you.

Mr. KREPON. I would like to leave you with a thought—

Senator CARPER. It wouldn't have been much of a hearing with just us. Some of these guys are pretty good. Senator Levin is good and Senator Feingold is good, so is Senator Coburn. But it wouldn't have been much of a hearing without all of you.

Mr. KREPON. I want to leave with you a message that still rings in my ear that Richard Armitage talks about. He was the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the first Administration. It is awfully hard to see how Afghanistan becomes a success story if Pakistan fails, and vice-versa. We really—this is doubly hard because we need two successes.

And so this is taking me back to something that Senator Levin talked about. The Frontier Corps is a very weak reed and it is not clear if they can get the job done. What has been clear so far is that the regular Pakistan army has not been able to do very well in countering these groups that are causing so much trouble. It is going to take a while to get the Pakistan army trained and equipped to deal with this problem. It will probably take even longer for the Frontier Corps. And it is not clear whether intent will be properly aligned with the capability once the capability grows. But I am having a hard time seeing what other instruments we have got to work with in tackling this problem.

So what is the right number? What is the right amount of money? I don't know. How do we monitor what is spent? Tough problem. But I don't see a dual success story unless we invest in the current direction. So I would ask you, like Ms. Curtis, these are very imperfect policy initiatives, but I don't see something better out there.

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Dr. Cohen.

Mr. COHEN. I agree that these new initiatives are important and I think they should be pursued, and I think that the real problem in Pakistan is it is still an unsettled country. But we do have re-

sources and we have assets and I say the Chinese, we should be working with the Chinese to some degree, a considerable degree, with India to a degree, to some degree the Saudis. The Chinese and the Saudis aren't interested in promoting democracy anywhere, let alone in Pakistan, but clearly they have an interest in the outcomes in Pakistan.

So I think that I was pleasantly surprised at the way in which the election was held, the way in which young people are revitalizing Pakistani politics. Pakistan is—

Senator CARPER. Like America.

Mr. COHEN. Yes, there are analogies. Pakistan is like somebody who is caught in a door. It can't go forward to democracy, but it doesn't want to go backward to dictatorship. As long as it is stuck between there, we are going to have problems with Pakistan. So I think we should continue the present programs we have had. I think we should make a lot of them conditional.

Sometimes we give foreign aid for not obvious reasons, and I refer to essentially the bombings in Pakistan and obviously that is going to take place. But our developmental aid should be seen by the Pakistani people as aimed towards their betterment and their improvement. In a way, I think we have been very negligent in that and I think we have been cynical in the way in which we supported a military leader who is not a great Ataturk—who is not a great man—I think he was well intentioned, but not up to the job—in lieu of broadening our contacts with the Pakistani people. That has changed quickly, but I hope the next American Administration changes it even further.

So I am optimistic about Pakistan in the—I can't say I am optimistic about Pakistan, but failure would create much greater problems for us and for all of Pakistan's neighbors.

Senator CARPER. All right. Well, I am glad we took that extra minute or two for each of you.

I mentioned to Wendy Anderson, who works on our Majority staff here, and to Trey Hicks, who works for Dr. Coburn on the Republican side, this has just been an extraordinarily good hearing, starting with Senator Feingold and with Mr. Camp and then finally with the four of you. I want to thank the members of our staff for, first of all, helping us—members don't think of all this by themselves and come up with a witness list by ourselves by any stretch, as you know.

But you have provided a great deal of illumination in an area of the world in which our policy needs illumination, and have certainly for this Member and think for others helped better inform our path ahead. For that, I am very grateful, and speaking for my colleagues, we are grateful. They are grateful, as well.

The hearing record will remain open for two additional weeks. During that period of time, some additional questions may be raised. Members can offer statements for the record. And I would just ask if you do receive a question or two from my colleagues, if you would take a few minutes and try to respond promptly to those questions so that your response can be submitted for the record, too, that would be just terrific.

With that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you so much.

[Whereupon, at 5:21 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



NEWS FROM

The United States Senate

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
June 3, 2008

Contacts: Dave Pollock (Levin): 202-228-3685
Kendra Barkoff (Casey): 202-228-6367

Report of Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and Senator Bob Casey (D-PA) Travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan

June 3, 2008

We visited Pakistan on Sunday, May 25, and Afghanistan, Monday, May 26. Additionally, Senator Levin remained in Afghanistan on Tuesday, May 27, while Senator Casey continued his trip to Karachi, Pakistan, and several days in India.

In Pakistan, we visited with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf; Army Chief of Staff General Ashfaq Kayani; Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani; Asif Zardari, Co-Chairman, Pakistan Peoples Party; Chaudhary Nisar Ali-Khan, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PLM-N) Party; and U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson. We also attended a dinner hosted by Ambassador Patterson, which included a number of Pakistani ministers, including Mohammad Ishaq Dar, Minister of Finance; Ahsan Iqbal, Minister of Education; and Farooq H. Naik, Minister of Law and Justice.

In Afghanistan, we visited with Afghan President Hamid Karzai; U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan William B. Wood; General Dan McNeill, Commander, NATO International Security Assistance Force; Speaker of the Lower House Younis Qanuni; and Speaker of the Upper House Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. The delegation also had lunch with the troops at Camp Eggers. After Senator Casey's departure on the evening of May 26th, Senator Levin attended a dinner hosted by Ambassador Wood with Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak and met on Tuesday, May 27th with Kai Eide, United Nations Special Representative for Afghanistan and head of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; Major General Robert Cone, Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan; and Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 101. Senator Levin also toured a new primary school and met with elders from the three Village Community Development Councils who oversaw the planning and building of the school using international development funds under the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program.

At the outset, we want to pay tribute to the courageous and dedicated servicemen and women we met throughout our trip and, as we commemorated Memorial Day in Afghanistan, to those who made the ultimate sacrifice in the cause of our nation in today's and past wars.

Pakistan's new civilian government is presently weakened by a disagreement among the two main coalition parties over the process to restore the judges dismissed by President Musharraf, resulting in the resignation of a number of Cabinet officials. This is taking place in the midst of sharply rising energy prices, wheat shortages and increased violence.

Pakistan has been plagued by terrorism in recent times and its Army has suffered substantial casualties in recent months. The safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (including North and South Waziristan) and the Quetta area provide training areas and launching points for Al Qaeda and Taliban incursions into Afghanistan. The newly elected government of Prime Minister Gilani, as well as his coalition partners, maintain that they recognize that terrorism is a threat to their own nation as well as to Afghanistan. All of the Pakistani officials with whom we met insist that they will ensure that any peace agreement they enter into with the Tribal elders in the areas along the border with Afghanistan will contain an explicit commitment by the latter to prevent cross-border incursions into Afghanistan and that the commitment will have strong enforcement mechanisms which will be enforced. Although that is welcome news, it remains to be seen if this is more than words, especially in light of previous unkept commitments along this line.

Congress was recently notified by the Administration of the intention to use \$74.5 million for a Security Development Plan (SDP) to train and equip the Pakistan Frontier Corps to conduct counterinsurgency activities within the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province and to stop cross-border incursions into Afghanistan. This would be on top of the reimbursement to Pakistan of approximately \$5.6 billion over the last 6 years out of Coalition Support Funds.

Afghanistan is in the seventh year of a war that has seen the expulsion of the Taliban, the restoration of democracy, the installation of a transitional government, the adoption of a Constitution, the election of a President and a bicameral legislature, and the mounting of an insurgency by a rejuvenated Taliban that draws support from al Qaeda and drug traffickers. It produces more than 90% of the world's heroin. Afghanistan's particular vulnerability stems from Taliban and al Qaeda safe havens in the FATA and Quetta areas of Pakistan from which terrorists cross the border into Afghanistan to attack Afghan, U.S. and NATO targets. Afghanistan is an extremely poor country, whose economy has been wrecked by 30 years of conflict and wide-spread corruption. Afghanistan badly needs to strengthen its governmental institutions.

Afghan officials with whom we met, from President Karzai on down, believe that Pakistan provides significant support to the Taliban and wants to maintain Afghanistan as a weak neighbor. There is a consensus among Afghan leaders that, even if the Pakistani Government leaders want to prevent cross-border incursions, the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the overarching Pakistani intelligence agency, are not under government control and either actively support the Taliban or look the other way while they cross the border into Afghanistan. We were advised by senior U.S. military officials that the day we arrived in Afghanistan, during a firefight in the vicinity of the border with Pakistan, Pakistani forces sent ambulances to retrieve wounded Taliban or al Qaeda affiliated fighters and to bring them back within Pakistan. They also pointed out

that in August of last year, some 250 Pakistani soldiers, including a colonel and 8 other officers, were taken prisoner when they offered no resistance to pro-Taliban militants who ambushed their convoy.

On the good news side, the Afghan soldier is a capable fighter and has a strong will to fight for his nation, and the Afghan Army is increasingly taking the lead against the insurgency. The Afghan Army does not have a role in border security, however, which is left to an under-equipped and under-armed border patrol. The Afghan military leadership worries about the United States' staying power. The Afghan police, whose training was recently taken over by the U.S. military, has a long way to go to overcome its corrupt and ineffective legacy, resulting, at least in part, from its abysmally low pay.

The Afghan government has been ineffective and apparently uncommitted to dealing with the drug problem. President Karzai, however, committed to us, as did the Prime Minister, to take drug labs down if they are identified to the Afghan government. NATO and U.S. forces, meanwhile, do not have counterdrugs as a mission, despite the contribution of drug money to the funding of terrorist activities.

NATO continues to be hampered by national caveats, i.e. the refusal by some nations to allow their forces to take offensive action against the insurgents or even to be located in areas where the insurgents routinely operate. NATO's rules of engagement (ROE) do not even permit the use of force in self-defense against imminent threats, i.e. the clear indication of hostile intent, accompanied by the capability to act. This is clearly unacceptable. In border areas, the NATO ROE are particularly troublesome, because, unlike U.S. ROE, they also do not permit firing across the border, even in response to a hostile act. Finally, NATO nations continue to fail to provide the additional troops and equipment (principally helicopters) requested by the on-scene commander and approved by the Alliance.

Issues

Has Pakistan decided that terrorism is a threat to itself or will it continue to make deals with the terrorists to allow them safe havens for training and to launch incursions into Afghanistan in return for "assurances" not to mount an insurgency inside Pakistan?

Is the stated intention by all Pakistani officials to stop cross-border incursions into Afghanistan sincere and will it be implemented, both in the FATA and in Quetta?

Should the United States provide substantial funding to train and equip the Pakistani Frontier Corp, which is drawn from the local population in the FATA, to stop cross-border incursions into Afghanistan, or will that strengthen a capability that will be used against Afghanistan, as the Afghan leaders believe?

Conclusions

The Afghan Army should take over the responsibility from the lightly armed Afghan border police for border security in the Eastern border area, where a robust U.S. quick reaction capability exists.

The United States should expand the number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on patrol in the Pakistan/Afghan border area to collect better intelligence and conduct surveillance of potential targets.

The Afghan Army, the U.S. military and the forces of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) should be given the mission to destroy drug labs when they find them in view of the contribution that drug money makes to the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists.

The NATO rules of engagement should be changed to authorize the use of force in self-defense in response to imminent threats, i.e. the clear manifestation of hostile intent coupled with the capability and the will to act, as well as hostile acts themselves, including across the Afghan/Pakistan border.

Funding for the Pakistan Frontier Corps should be conditioned upon the inclusion in the peace agreements being negotiated between the Pakistan Government and the tribal leaders of an explicit commitment to stop the incursions of Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists into Afghanistan and a clear determination to do so. Such funding should be suspended if the tribal leaders and the Frontier Corps do not maintain a focused effort to end those incursions.

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United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

June 5, 2008

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20310-1000

Dear Secretary Gates:

The Senate Armed Services Committee on May 23, 2008, received the 15-day notification regarding the Department of Defense's plan to use up to \$75 million in DoD funds to provide assistance to the Pakistan Frontier Corps to enhance the Frontier Corps' ability to conduct counterterrorism operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This program is one element of the Security Development Plan in Pakistan.

Earlier this week I sent you the trip report of Senator Casey's and my visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan at the end of May. As the report discusses, one of the foremost security issues in the region is halting the incursions across the Afghanistan border by militant extremists hiding out in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and around Quetta. Senator Casey and I heard repeatedly from senior Pakistan officials that any peace agreement entered into with tribal elders along the Afghanistan border would contain an explicit commitment by the latter to prevent cross-border incursions and strong measures to enforce that commitment. While I welcome this, I remain skeptical that these commitments will be enforced, in light of previous failed peace accords.

Senator Casey and I also heard in Afghanistan from their officials and our commanders who questioned Pakistan's commitment to eliminate the problem of cross-border incursions. Among Afghan leaders there is a consensus that the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence either acquiesce in or actively support the Taliban and other extremists engaged in attacks across Pakistan's border with Afghanistan.


Senator Casey and I conclude that funding for the Pakistan Frontier Corps should be conditioned on the inclusion in these peace agreements of an explicit commitment to halt cross-border attacks by Taliban militants and Al Qaeda terrorists into Afghanistan, with clear mechanisms to judge if the stated intent of the Government of Pakistan is carried out. It is also our view that such funding should be suspended if a focused effort is not maintained by Pakistan to end those incursions.

I request that you provide us written assurance that the \$75 million in funding for training and equipping the Pakistan Frontier Corps will be conditioned on the conclusion of a peace agreement between the Government of Pakistan and tribal leaders from the border region which includes an explicit commitment to stop incursions by Taliban militants and al Qaeda terrorists

into Afghanistan with a clear way to judge its effectiveness. I also request you assure us that such funding be suspended if you determine that tribal leaders or the Government of Pakistan have failed to maintain a focused effort to halt those incursions.

I look forward to a prompt response.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carl Levin". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Carl Levin
Chairman

Opening Comments of Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) at the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services,
and International Security: "Addressing the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Relationship."
Thursday, June 12, 2008, 2:30pm

I would like to thank Chairman Carper for inviting me to give some brief opening comments at this very important hearing on the US-Pakistan strategic relationship. This hearing is particularly timely given the critical juncture at which this partnership stands. Although we have a checkered history with Pakistan, the recently elected civilian government provides an opportunity to develop a sound and comprehensive bilateral relationship that serves the needs and the principles of both countries while also ensuring our national security – and theirs – over the long term.

As some of you may know, I recently returned from a four-day trip to Pakistan, where I met with a broad range of political officials from numerous parties, as well as with President Musharraf, Pakistani intelligence officials, the ousted Chief Justice, and representatives of Pakistan's civil society. I traveled to Peshawar, which lies near the border with Afghanistan in the tumultuous Northwest Frontier Province, and to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, where I visited successful U.S.-funded earthquake recovery programs.

I chose to visit Pakistan because it is out of that country that we face our most serious national security threat. As the intelligence community has confirmed again and again, Pakistan is the central front in the fight against al Qaeda. Confronting this threat, which includes addressing the al Qaeda safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, must be our top national security priority. That means tracking down Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda operatives, and working with the Pakistan government to neutralize forces before they plot or carry out attacks against Americans. It also means making clear to our Pakistani friends that cutting deals with al Qaeda or the Taliban is simply unacceptable.

But these can not be our only goals. This fight is more than a manhunt – if we are serious about fighting al Qaeda, and preventing future generations of bin Ladens from emerging, we must also recognize the needs of the local population and expand our development assistance throughout a country where poverty and anti-Western sentiment is pervasive.

A key part of this new approach will require Pakistan's newly elected government to rein in the military apparatus, which has historically controlled much of Pakistan's politics and policies – sometimes overtly by a military dictator running the country and other times more discreetly from behind a screen of a civilian-led government. And as Pakistan's new government seeks to establish itself, we must find a way to defend our national security interests while recognizing that the emergence of a democratic, civilian government in Pakistan is in our long-term strategic interests. We need the support of the Pakistani people and their democratically elected leaders to successfully counter al Qaeda and extremism.

There is an opening right now for the United States to develop a new relationship with Pakistan. This administration's reliance on a single, unpopular leader who came to power through a coup

was a serious mistake that was inconsistent with our values and our national security interests. Now we must end that mistake by expanding our relationships, and supporting basic democratic institutions. A more inclusive policy will allow our counterterrorism partnership to withstand the turbulence of Pakistan's domestic politics, and help mitigate already high levels of anti-American sentiment.

This Administration's policies toward Pakistan have been highly damaging to our long-term national security. Although Pakistan's domestic politics remain fragile, we must seize this occasion by working with those who promote democracy, human rights, development, and the rule of law. We must align ourselves with the moderate forces critical to the fight against extremism and commit to supporting economic reform, legal political party development, and initiatives to integrate the FATA into the rest of Pakistan.

This will not be easy, but it is long overdue and will help ensure that we are using all the tools at our disposal to fight al Qaeda and associated terrorist threats. Combating extremism and denying terrorists the safe haven now found in the FATA requires, among other things, creating sustainable development strategies that provide both opportunities for Pakistani people and tangible examples of American good will. This must include not only traditional development projects, but institution building and political engagement in a region long deprived of such opportunities. While we target terrorists and extremists in the FATA, we must also make sure that the people of the FATA have economic options that can help them resist terrorism and extremism, while reducing anti-American sentiment.

Supporting the Pakistani people as they seek to strengthen development initiatives and democratic institutions is not just an outgrowth of our values -- it is in our national security interests. This is not to say that this process will be free from challenges -- there are already serious hurdles that must be dealt with, including negotiations in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province, both of which are cause for serious concern and skepticism. America's allies must know that there can be no negotiations with terrorists who have sworn to harm our country. Those who would plot against American troops in Afghanistan, or Americans here at home, must be pursued relentlessly.

We must, however, recognize that the new leadership was elected democratically by the Pakistani people. And we must try to work with them to advance our mutual interests in fostering security and development in the region.

UNCLASSIFIED

**Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Camp's Written Testimony for
the Senate Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government
Information, Federal Services, and International Security
June 12, 2008**

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss U.S. strategy with regard to Pakistan. On the front lines in the battle against terrorism, and the world's second most populous Muslim state, Pakistan is also situated at a geopolitical crossroads. Its neighbors are Afghanistan, India, Iran, and China. More than ever, our national security is linked to the success, security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan.

We must build a long-term, comprehensive partnership, not only with the Pakistani Government but with the Pakistani people. Pakistan's February 18 elections provided a new opportunity for us to build upon. We recognize that enabling the Pakistani Government to control its territory and to govern its people justly and humanely will lead to a more stable and secure future for Pakistan, and strengthen Pakistan as a partner to the United States and the rest of the international community. Working with the new government, our strategic priorities include strengthening Pakistan's democratic, civilian institutions; broadening counterterrorism cooperation, particularly in the border region; and ensuring the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Support for economic and social development is an essential element to achieving each of these strategic objectives.

Democracy

Ensuring the long-term success of Pakistan's democratic transition is a core priority in our partnership. We called for free, fair and transparent elections and worked closely with Pakistan to ensure this. On February 18, the Pakistani people cast their votes for moderate leaders, repudiating extremist voices, and demonstrating that a moderate, democratic center prevails as the country's dominant political force. Notably, in the Northwest Frontier Province, the moderate Awami National Party emerged victorious over Islamist political parties.

In March, the two most successful parties in Pakistan's February 18 parliamentary elections, the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, formed a coalition government. We are engaging with the new government to strengthen and build a broad-based, long-term relationship between our two countries. President Bush met with Prime Minister Gilani in Sharm-el Sheikh, Egypt on May 18. Pakistan faces tough economic, governance, and security challenges on a daily basis. We engage regularly with Pakistan's leaders about developing solutions to those real and pressing problems.

Moving forward, one critical objective is to help Pakistan develop strong civilian institutions, to encourage a separate and stable relationship between its civilian and military establishments. The military has made several visible efforts in this regard. For example, they recalled all military personnel working in civilian

government positions. In April, Army Chief Kayani formally briefed Prime Minister Gilani and the cabinet on security developments in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, demonstrating the military's commitment to the civilian government's leadership role.

Counterterrorism

We continue to cooperate closely with Pakistan's government and military to combat violent extremism. We believe a moderate government with a democratic mandate is the most effective partner in this effort. Pakistan is an important partner in the War on Terror, and its own security is at stake in this battle. Pakistan has lost over 1,400 security personnel in this fight since September 11, 2001, including over 700 since July 2007 alone. The numerous attacks that have taken place since last summer include more than a dozen suicide bombings and hundreds of civilian deaths, including the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

We are concerned about the negotiation of peace agreements with certain groups in the Tribal Areas. Negotiations with tribes in Pakistan are not a new tactic, and we understand that the recent negotiations are part of the new government's plan for bringing security and stability to the Tribal Areas. However, outcomes are what matter. An agreement that allows extremists to regroup and rearm is not acceptable. Any agreement must advance the goal of

ending Al Qaeda and Taliban activity, the training of suicide bombers, cross-border attacks, and the infiltration of settled areas.

Bin Laden is likely hiding somewhere in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is forbidding territory where the Pakistani government has limited reach. We are confident that Pakistan understands the dangers posed to it and its allies by Al Qaeda and other terrorist elements. When they, or we, find senior Al Qaeda leaders, they will be brought to justice. We will not be satisfied until violent extremism emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is brought under control. Pakistan's government must bring the frontier area under its control and we are prepared to provide the necessary assistance to achieve that objective. Violent extremists cannot continue to exploit Pakistan's rugged tribal areas as a safehaven and cross the border to attack Afghan and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Our efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan are intrinsically linked. The challenge is more effective coordination and synchronization of the operations of both nations, to reduce the operating space where common enemies function.

We are enhancing coordination among Afghan, Pakistani, U.S., and NATO forces in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. On March 27, we and our partners inaugurated the first of several Border Coordination Centers at Torkham, Afghanistan. The Centers will make it possible for Pakistani, Afghan, and International Security Assistance Force representatives to more effectively

coordinate to counter efforts by our common enemies from using their superior knowledge of the terrain to skirt both sides of the rugged border to avoid engagement.

Within the State Department, new Border Coordinator positions in Islamabad, Kabul, and Washington serve to increase our ability to focus on the trans-border region and advance our goal of drawing the Afghan and Pakistani governments into cooperative projects to better address the region's challenges.

Nuclear security

Nonproliferation cooperation is another critical aspect of our long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan. Pakistan has taken constructive steps to enhance the security of its nuclear materials and assets and to prevent diversion of sensitive items and technology as occurred with the A.Q. Khan network. Notably, pursuant to a comprehensive law passed in 2005, Pakistan established a modern export control system, led by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and staffed by representatives of appropriate agencies. This new organization is reaching out to Pakistan's technology holders to ensure that they are aware of their responsibilities under the law, which includes appropriate penalties, and is helping train customs and frontier police in the visual recognition of controlled commodities. Pakistan takes this responsibility very seriously. We are also encouraged by Pakistan's participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and strongly support these efforts. We will continue

to work with Pakistan to help ensure that its nuclear weapons remain secure and prevent nuclear proliferation.

Development

A sustained commitment to developing Pakistan's economy and social infrastructure is essential to achieving our three key strategic objectives. Health care, education, job training, good governance and other development goals are key focus areas for the Pakistani government and the United States. Economic and social development will not only enhance Pakistan's internal success, but will also strengthen Pakistan as a partner with the U.S. and the international community. In Fiscal Year 2009, the Administration is seeking \$70 million in the Economic Support Fund bridge supplemental request to expand our governance, education, and health programs outside of the FATA region. These development needs are also particularly critical in the tribal areas on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Reconstruction Opportunity Zones

For example, Reconstruction Opportunity Zones are a critical piece of our long-term strategy to counter extremism by stimulating sustainable economic development in Pakistan and Afghanistan. We have been consulting with Congress and hope that Reconstruction Opportunity Zone legislation like that introduced in the Senate will be introduced in the House of Representatives very soon, and that the legislation will be quickly passed by Congress.

We believe Reconstruction Opportunity Zones are a low-cost way to encourage legitimate economic activities in critical areas such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and other areas along the border with Afghanistan. These Zones can attract domestic and foreign investment, create sustainable employment opportunities, and promote capacity-building to link populations in these isolated regions to the global economy, thus providing alternatives to extremism, narcotics trafficking, and other illicit activities. The capacity building would also extend the credibility and authority of the government into these areas where writ of the central government is weak.

Frontier Strategy and Sustainable Development Plan

The Government of Pakistan has undertaken a comprehensive strategy to better integrate the Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Pakistan's economy and body politic. These tribal areas have some of the worst social and economic conditions in all of Pakistan. In some areas, the female literacy rate is as low as 3%. There is little access to safe drinking water or to even rudimentary health care. The system of public education is largely nonexistent.

The Government recognizes that it cannot rid its territory of violent extremists by military means alone. It must also create an environment inhospitable to terrorism and extremism. To this end, the Government of Pakistan

developed a comprehensive Frontier Strategy which emphasizes economic and social development, while strengthening governance.

The government's objective is to persuade the people living in this traditionally autonomous region that their interest lies in supporting government efforts to bring development, good governance, and prosperity to the area. The government hopes thus to weaken the sway of terrorists and extremists there.

The Pakistani military is waging a campaign against terrorists and insurgents; is defending its population against attacks; and is countering extremist efforts to find recruits for terrorist acts. In March 2006, President Musharraf asked President Bush for U.S. assistance in developing and funding a comprehensive strategy to deny terrorists and violent extremists the ability to exploit the under-governed Federally Administered Tribal Areas as a hideout and safehaven. The United States agreed to provide support to the Frontier Strategy, a nine-year, two-billion-dollar sustainable development plan for infrastructure development, social welfare, and capacity building initiatives in the tribal areas. The new civilian government in Pakistan is strongly committed to improving conditions and expanding governance in the Tribal Areas. On our part, the United States has committed \$750 million over five years in support of the Pakistani effort.

The Government of Pakistan's strategic decision to cooperate in this effort with the United States, the United Kingdom and other international partners, such

as Japan and Australia, demonstrates a strong commitment to deny terrorists and violent extremists the ability to exploit its territory.

Our economic development programs in the Tribal Areas target regions with few jobs, low literacy, little hope and great vulnerability to militant infiltration. Just as our earthquake assistance to Pakistan in 2005 and 2006 had a profoundly positive impact on the people of Pakistan – generating good will toward the U.S. that has lasted to this very day – we believe our support for developing the Tribal Areas will promote stability and increasing prosperity.

The U.S. effort is fully operational in the Tribal Areas, with 16 projects already underway. This month, we will begin to refurbish several hospitals' delivery and surgical facilities, train maternal health and other medical professionals, and work with local officials to restore police authority to a central market. We recently provided water and sanitation facilities to 108 girls schools and 54 communities in the Tribal Areas, and continues to support a range of education programs, from school construction, to introducing better teaching methods, that seek to expand opportunities at all education levels.

Other projects initiated in April, in the to improve health, drinking water, girls' education, government capacity building, and media training. These projects were identified through a consultative approach that aims to build confidence and trust between the Government of Pakistan and tribal communities. Pakistani

government partners noted that the competitive and open procurement process used to implement these small projects has increased their credibility. These are just a few examples among countless others of the activities we are pursuing to improve lives and enhance governance in the Tribal Areas, Northwest Frontier Province, and Balochistan. Congressional support of the \$60 million request for Pakistan in the Fiscal Year 2008 supplemental will allow us to continue advancing these goals. We are also leading efforts to broaden regional economic cooperation, particularly ties between South and Central Asia, and to better integrate Afghanistan and Pakistan's trade ties through regular meetings of the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference, and of Trade and Investment Framework Agreements with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.

Security Development Plan

Additional resources are being sought to support what we see as the security component to Pakistan's Sustainable Development Plan, the Security Development Plan. This is a five-year multi-faceted program to enhance Pakistan's ability to secure its border with Afghanistan. Providing a secure environment that fosters economic growth, opportunity and social development is critical to displace extremist influences in the region.

The Plan proposes to train and equip the indigenous Frontier Corps, improve the capabilities of Pakistan's Special Forces, and construct Border Coordination

Centers. These centers will be jointly manned by U.S., Pakistani, Afghan and NATO personnel to facilitate intelligence sharing and coordination along the border.

Pakistan has launched a program to increase the size of its Frontier Corps, a Pashtun-based paramilitary force raised in the border region. Members of the Frontier Corps have unique advantages operating in the Tribal Areas due to their linguistic and ethnic ties. The United States is supporting this expansion through the Security Development Plan and will help to train and equip the Frontier Corps to enhance Pakistan's ability to secure its border and provide security to the indigenous population.

In addition, the Department of Defense will equip and train special operations units of the Pakistan Army. Training will focus on the Special Services Group and its helicopter mobility unit, and the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron, to enhance its ability to execute combat missions in the border region. Those units are presently engaged in combat operations and have suffered casualties and losses. U.S. training and equipment has allowed the Special Services Group to continue operating, survive engagements, and prevail over the enemy. The Plan was carefully developed by our Embassy in Islamabad and Central Command and has the full support of the Government of Pakistan. In Fiscal Years 2007 to 2008, the Department of Defense provided over \$200 million for the Security Development Plan. In Fiscal Year 2009, the Administration is seeking at least

\$100 million in Foreign Military Financing for the Plan in the bridge supplemental request.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, for our commitment to Pakistan to be enduring, it must also be bipartisan. Senators Biden and Lugar, in particular, have provided exemplary leadership supporting our funding for Pakistan and a strong U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Senator Biden has issued a new, far-reaching proposal to restructure our assistance to Pakistan, which we are studying closely as we develop our own proposal. We appreciate Congress's sustained commitment to Pakistan, and particularly the interest of members of this Subcommittee. I understand that Senator Levin recently returned from a successful trip to Pakistan, and that the Chairman is interested in visiting soon. I hope our Embassy in Islamabad will have the chance to welcome you soon, Senator Carper, and continue this dialogue with you. We hope that together, Congress and the Administration can establish a new long-term framework for political, economic, and security assistance to Pakistan – one that represents a partnership between two democracies with a common interest in good governance, economic development, and combating violent extremism.

Thank you, and I'd be happy to take your questions.

Written Statement of K. Alan Kronstadt
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
Congressional Research Service
Washington, D.C.

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“Addressing the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Relationship”

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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you this opportunity to address the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship.

Pakistan, the world’s second most populous Muslim state, is a nuclear weapons power occupying a strategic location abutting Afghanistan, Iran, China, and the Arabian Sea, among others. The country sits at the locus of several major U.S. policy concerns, including international terrorism, nuclear weapons security, democratization, relations with the Muslim world, and Afghan and regional stability. U.S. policy makers thus widely recognize that U.S. interests are served through the development of multi-tiered and direct engagement with Pakistan across a broad spectrum of issue areas.

Yet anti-American sentiments are widespread in Pakistan. Most observers agree that reducing these negative perceptions — a long-term and potentially difficult goal — will be necessary to meaningfully advance U.S. interests in its relations with Pakistan. Many argue that this goal is overshadowed by shorter-term policies that may fuel the very distrust the United States seeks to overcome.

A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is vital to U.S. interests. Pakistan has played and continues to play a central role in U.S.-led efforts to combat religious militancy. Yet the outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 2001, while not without meaningful successes, have failed to neutralize anti-Western militants and reduce religious extremism in that country, in turn hindering efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan. Many observers have thus urged a broad re-evaluation of such policies. Such a re-appraisal appears to have come in tandem with a significant increase in religiously-motivated extremism and violence in Pakistan in 2007, as well as with a series of political crises in Islamabad that severely undermined the status and credibility of Pakistan’s president and long-time army chief, Pervez Musharraf.

Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post-2001 period and became especially prevalent in 2007. According to the U.S. intelligence community, “Radical elements in Pakistan have the potential to undermine the country’s cohesiveness.”¹ The recent spate of violence has coincided with political instability in Islamabad, where democracy has fared poorly (the country has endured direct military rule for more than half of its existence). In 2008, and for the ninth straight year, the often-cited Freedom House rated Pakistan as “not free” in the areas of political rights and civil liberties. Among political crises in Pakistan in 2007 were a judicial crisis that began in March and is yet to be resolved; a “second coup” by Pakistani President Musharraf, who imposed emergency rule for six weeks beginning in November; and the December assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a former prime minister and the country’s leading opposition figure.

¹ See [http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080227_testimony.pdf].

The Bush Administration did continue to proclaim its ongoing support for Musharraf even after his imposition of emergency rule and, to a lesser extent, following the sweeping rejection of Musharraf's parliamentary allies by Pakistani voters. However, in 2008, the Administration has shown signs of a shift in its long-standing Pakistan policies, in particular on the issues of democratization and on Islamabad's counterterrorism policies in western tribal areas.

Pakistan's worsening economic conditions, unstable political setting, and perilous security circumstances make the job of U.S. decision makers more difficult. Yet the country's political developments in particular may offer a rare opportunity to qualitatively alter the nature of this important bilateral relationship. As troubled as Pakistan's history with representative governance has been, the recent elections there appear to have reflected well the will of the country's electorate and to have set the stage for a much-needed consolidation of its democratic institutions. Moreover, the sweeping poll victory by Pakistan's two mainstream parties — and the correspondingly weak showing of the country's Islamist political coalition — is further evidence that Pakistanis are moderates not driven by extreme, much less militant, religious worldviews. Nowhere was this more evident than in the country's North West Frontier Province (NWFP), where a secular party ousted the Islamist incumbents to lead a new provincial coalition government based in Peshawar.

Mr. Chairman, in considering the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship, my statement today seeks to emphasize the important role played by mutual trust and respect, not only between governments, but between peoples. In order to properly portray the current setting, it may be useful to begin with a brief review of two key aspects that create both difficulties and opportunities for the United States: 1) Pakistan's political setting is extremely fluid, and 2) Pakistan's security circumstances are extremely precarious. In the former realm, Pakistani resentments grow when the United States is seen to be meddling in or seeking to substantively influence the course of their country's internal political developments. In the latter realm, many Pakistanis believe the United States does not recognize Pakistan's legitimate security interests and does damage to these through a perceived over-reliance on military efforts in the region.

Pakistan's Fluid Political Setting

The status and development of Pakistan's democratic institutions are key U.S. policy concerns, especially among those analysts who view representative government in Islamabad as being a prerequisite for reducing religious extremism and establishing a moderate Pakistani state. Bush Administration officials repeatedly have insisted that they themselves take this view. However, many critics of Administration policy assert that the Islamabad government was for more than six years given a "free pass" on the issue of representative government, in part as a means of enlisting that country's continued assistance in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Moreover, Washington has come under criticism for seeking to interfere in Pakistan's domestic politics, especially with regard to preserving the status of President Musharraf.²

² For example, two former senior Clinton Administration officials criticized President Bush for choosing to "back the dictator" rather than offer clear support for democracy and rule of law in Pakistan. They assert that such a policy has damaged U.S. interests in South Asia and in the Muslim world (Sandy Berger and Bruce Riedel, "America's Stark Choice," *International Herald Tribune*, October 9, 2007). In late 2007 testimony before a Senate panel, one former U.S. diplomat offered that, "Overall U.S. policy toward Pakistan until very recently gave no serious attention to encouraging democracy in Pakistan" (statement of Amb. Teresita Schaffer before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 6, 2007). Numerous other U.S. officials have found the Bush Administration's allegedly meager attention to Pakistani democratization rooted in an aversion to any moves that could alienate Musharraf and so reduce his cooperation on counterterrorism ("Democracy Gets Small Portion of U.S. Aid," *Washington Post*, January 6, 2008). U.S. congressional committees have long expressed concern with "the slow pace of the democratic development of Pakistan" (S.Rept. 109-96) and "the lack of progress on improving democratic governance and rule of law" there (H.Rept. 109-486).

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice counters these types of criticisms by contending that strong U.S. support for Pakistan's democratization process has been a "very well kept secret," and she rejects as untrue claims that the U.S. supported a military government in Islamabad without attention to democracy there.³ In an example of how the State Department itself contributed to keeping U.S. support for Pakistani democratization "secret," its 2006 *Country Report on Human Rights Practices* — issued by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor — did not use the word "democracy" or any of its derivatives in discussing Pakistan. It did, however, note that "restrictions on citizens' right to change their government" represented a "major problem."⁴

Pakistan's already fluid political circumstances were dramatically altered when February 2008 national elections seated a new civilian-led government in Islamabad. This government comprises a coalition of political parties opposed to President Musharraf's continued rule, and it may seek to oust the president from office well before the scheduled 2012 end of his present term, which is itself a matter of controversy. The relatively credible polls allowed the Bush Administration to issue a determination that a democratically elected government had been restored in Islamabad after a 101-month hiatus.⁵ This permanently removed coup-related aid sanctions that President Bush had been authorized to waive annually in the interests of U.S. national security.

Both before and after the elections, U.S. officials expounded a desire to see "moderate forces" within Pakistani politics come together to sustain their country's political and economic reforms and to carry on the fight against religious extremism and terrorism. The White House anticipates Pakistan's "continued cooperation" in this regard.⁶ In his first meeting with the new Pakistani prime minister, President Bush expressed an appreciation of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani's commitment to "strong and vibrant and productive" relations with the United States, and for his understanding of the terrorism threat faced by both countries.⁷

By some accounts, however, the U.S. government sought to influence Islamabad's coalition-building process, in particular by pressuring the coalition-leading Pakistan People's Party (PPP) to strike a deal with remnants of the Musharraf-friendly Pakistan Muslim League Q-faction. Most Pakistanis expressed a keen sensitivity to signs of U.S. attempts to influence the post-election coalition-building negotiations. Some observers suspect the Bush Administration remains wedded to a policy that would keep the embattled Musharraf in power despite his weakness and lack of public support.⁸ This tack may fuel interagency disputes in Washington, with some career diplomats arguing the United States could damage its position by appearing to go against a clear popular mandate rejecting Musharraf. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte — in the first post-election visit to Islamabad by a senior U.S. official — offered little in the way of public defense for Musharraf and called his future status a matter to be determined by "the internal Pakistani political process."⁹ His statement was viewed by many observers as a stark and, for some, encouraging signal of a shift in U.S. policy.

³ See [<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/05/104634.htm>].

⁴ See [<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78874.htm>].

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Federal Register 73, 69, p. 19276-19277, April 9, 2008.

⁶ See [<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080325-3.html>].

⁷ "Bush and Pakistan's Gillani Pledge to Fight Terror," *Reuters*, May 18, 2008.

⁸ See, for example, "Pressure on Asif, Nawaz to Work With President," *Dawn* (Karachi), February 23, 2008; M.B. Naqvi, "Untangling the Web of Intrigues" (op-ed), *News* (Karachi), April 16, 2008.

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Given Musharraf's status as a generally moderate, pro-Western ally of the United States — an ally so valued that he was called “indispensable” by Bush Administration officials¹⁰ — his political diminishment and potentially ignominious exit from power complicates U.S. policy making. It may be useful, however, to view these complications as opportunities to participate in a renewal of representative government in Pakistan.

Never before in Pakistan's history have the country's two leading political parties come together to share power. While many observers praise what could be a new conciliatory style of party politics, others note that the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League faction led by Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) spent most of the 1990s as bitter enemies. Opposition to President Musharraf's continued power unites these parties at present, but with Musharraf likely to fan the flames of party competition — and with his possibly imminent departure from power removing the key unifying factor between them — many analysts are pessimistic that a PPP-PML-N accommodation can last. Indeed, domestic political squabbles over the modalities for restoring to office several Supreme Court and other high court judges who were deposed by Musharraf's in November 2007 have led the PML-N to withdraw from the new federal cabinet and illuminate the fragility of the new ruling coalition.

Former Prime Minister Sharif, the same leader deposed in the Musharraf-led 1999 military coup, has past links to Pakistan's Islamist parties and he issues sometimes strident anti-American rhetoric. He also calls for President Musharraf's impeachment and subsequent trial for treason. Some analysts, especially in Pakistan, speculate that the United States is engaging in behind-the-scenes efforts to keep Sharif from return to the prime minister's office, as he might well do if early national elections were to be held. Whether true or not, opinion polls suggest that the mere perception of such U.S. meddling is damaging to U.S. interests in Pakistan. Respect of and active support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and rule of law is an explicit and noncontroversial U.S. policy. There is, however, a vigorous and ongoing debate over the extent to which such policy has been manifest in both words and deeds.

Pakistan's Precarious Security Setting

It is not unreasonable to assert that the Pakistani nation was fairly traumatized by a huge increase in domestic, religiously motivated violence in 2007 and early 2008. According to U.S. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, the loss of human life related to Islamist militancy was greater in 2007 than in the previous six years combined.¹¹ In 2008, the influence of Islamist militants appears to grow unchecked in large parts of Pakistan beyond the western tribal areas, bringing insecurity even to the NWFP provincial capital of Peshawar, where signs of “Talibanization” include orders that schoolgirls wear burkas and attacks on stores selling film DVDs and music CDs. Other so-called settled areas of Pakistan beyond the tribal regions have come under attack from pro-Taliban militants.¹²

⁹ “US Says No Meddling to Save Musharraf,” *Associated Press*, March 27, 2008. See also “US Offers Support for Pakistan's Parties,” *Associated Press*, March 11, 2008.

¹⁰ “U.S. Official: Pakistan's Musharraf ‘Indispensable’ Ally,” *CNN.com*, November 7, 2007.

¹¹ Statement before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2008. The Lahore-based Pak Institute for Peace Studies issued an annual report which counted 1,442 “terrorist attacks, incidents of political violence, and border clashes” in 2007. These attacks, along with 61 military operations in western Pakistan, left 3,448 people dead (see [<http://pips.com.pk/san/pakistan/july7/AnnualReport.html>]).

¹² “Frontier Insurgency Spills Into Peshawar,” *New York Times*, January 18, 2008; “Taliban Spreading Across Pakistan,” *McClatchy Newspapers*, January 29, 2008; “In Northwestern Pakistan, Where Militants Rule,” *Christian Science Monitor*, February 28, 2008.

Concurrent with this sharp increase in domestic insecurity in Pakistan has been the apparent resurgence on that country's territory of the very threat the United States has sought to neutralize in Afghanistan: Al Qaeda and affiliated groups who continue to plot anti-Western terrorist attacks. Despite years of effort and billions of dollars worth of resources, the estimated number of Al Qaeda suspects reported killed or captured in Pakistan — around 700 — has remained essentially unchanged since 2004. At an April 2008 House hearing on Al Qaeda, a panel of nongovernmental experts agreed that the ongoing hunt for Al Qaeda's top leaders was foundering. At the same time, however, the head of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Hayden, later portrayed Al Qaeda as being on the defensive in South Asia, claiming that its leadership is losing the battle for hearts and minds in the Muslim world. Yet Hayden's conclusion came only two months after his March 2008 assertion that the situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border "presents a clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to the West in general, and to the United States in particular." He agreed with other top U.S. officials who believe that possible future terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland likely would originate from that region.¹³

While the U.S. government largely has removed the hyphen from its relationship with Pakistan and India, a new hyphen has appeared in the region as what for many years was seen as an Afghanistan problem is increasingly being identified by U.S. policy makers as an Afghanistan-Pakistan issue. Tensions between the Kabul and Islamabad governments — which stretch back many decades — have at times reached alarming levels in recent years, with top Afghan officials accusing Pakistan of manipulating Islamic militancy in the region to destabilize Afghanistan. Likewise, U.S. military commanders overseeing operations in Afghanistan have since 2003 complained that renegade Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters remain able to attack coalition troops in there, then escape across the Pakistani frontier. They have expressed dismay at the slow pace of progress in capturing wanted fugitives in Pakistan and urge Islamabad to do more to secure its rugged western border area. U.S. government officials and independent experts have voiced similar worries, even expressing concern that elements of Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies might be assisting members of the Taliban. In late 2006, the Commander of the U.S. European Command told a Senate panel it was "generally accepted" that the Taliban headquarters is somewhere in the vicinity of Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's southwestern Baluchistan province.¹⁴

Pakistan's mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Taliban elements operating from its territory. The "Kandahari clique" reportedly operates not from Pakistan's tribal areas, but from populated areas in and around the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta. Many analysts believe that Pakistan's intelligence services know the whereabouts of these Afghan Taliban leadership elements and likely even maintain active contacts with them at some level as part of a hedge strategy in the region. Reports continue to indicate that elements of Pakistan's major intelligence agency and military forces aid the Taliban and other extremists forces as a matter of policy. Such support may even include providing

¹³ Transcript: House Select Committee on Intelligence Holds Hearing on Al Qaeda, April 9, 2008; "U.S. Cites Big Gains Against Al Qaeda," *Washington Post*, May 30, 2008; "CIA: Pakistan Border's Clear and Present Danger," *Associated Press*, March 30, 2008.

¹⁴ Statement of Gen. James Jones before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 21, 2006. See also "In the Land of the Taliban," *New York Times*, October 22, 2006; "Next-Gen Taliban," *New York Times*, January 6, 2008. The Pakistani Taliban differ from their Afghan brethren in several respects, perhaps most significantly in a lack of organization and cohesion, and they possess no unified leadership council. Moreover, the Pakistani Taliban appear to have more limited objectives, in contrast with the Afghan Taliban who are struggling to regain national power in Kabul. At the same time, however, both groups pledge fealty to a single leader — Mullah Omar — and both share fundamental policy objectives with regard to U.S. and other Western government roles in the region (see "The Emergence of the Pakistani Taliban," *Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst*, January 1, 2008).

training and fire support for Taliban offensives.¹⁵ Other reports indicate that U.S. military personnel are unable to count on the Pakistani military for battlefield support and do not trust Pakistan's Frontier Corps, whom some say are active facilitators of militant infiltration into Afghanistan. At least one senior U.S. Senator has questioned the wisdom of providing U.S. aid to a group that is ineffective, at best, and may even be providing support to "terrorists."¹⁶

Pakistan's New Efforts to Negotiate Settlements With Militant Elements . For the first time in more than eight years, the United States must deal with a new political structure in Islamabad, one that has fundamentally differing views not on the need to combat religious extremism, but on the methods by which to do so. Pakistan's new civilian leaders have called for renewed efforts at negotiating with the country's Pashtun tribal leaders and pro-Taliban militants, claiming a strategy reliant on military confrontation had backfired and allowed the militants to become stronger and more influential. Prime Minister Gillani insists that his government will not negotiate with "terrorists" nor with "anyone refusing to lay down arms." His foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, has said the new government believes in "political engagement." He reportedly has assured Secretary of State Rice that Pakistan would "continue its role in the international struggle against terrorism."¹⁷ The Islamabad government insists it will maintain the army's presence in "restive areas" and is negotiating only with elements willing to lay down arms, and not with terrorists or militants. Pakistani military officials claim that "monitoring mechanisms" not included in past peace deals will ensure the success of present efforts.¹⁸ Truce deals reportedly have been struck in the Swat Valley and may be near completion in several of the tribal agencies.

Most Pakistani analysts appear to welcome the new government's policy shift and maintain some optimism that representatives of the people can succeed where past efforts have failed. Yet some commentators there are less sanguine and warn that without assurances that militants will end attacks across the Durand Line, peace agreements will not serve Pakistan's core interests and are bound to fail.¹⁹ One senior Pakistani political pundit called the May truce deal in Swat "the most abject surrender of state sovereignty in Pakistani history" and he predicted that the government's "opportunism" would lead to a worsening of Pakistan-U.S. relations.²⁰

Despite acknowledged setbacks — and a widely held view that the new government's dialogue efforts are destined to fail — the Bush Administration claims to strongly support Islamabad's efforts to adopt a more comprehensive approach to include economic and social development, and governance reform in the region, flowing in part from an acknowledgment that purely military solutions are unlikely to succeed.²¹ The Administration seeks to significantly

¹⁵ See, for example, Ashley Tellis, "Pakistan's Mixed Record on Anti-Terrorism" (interview), February 6, 2008, at [<http://www.cfr.org/publication/15424>]; "Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan," *Salon.com*, March 10, 2008.

¹⁶ "Border Complicates War in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, April 4, 2008; "Democrat Questions US Aid to Pakistan," *Associated Press*, May 27, 2008.

¹⁷ Yousaf Raza Gillani, "Pakistan's Moment" (op-ed), *Washington Post*, April 30, 2008; [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/April/PR_087_08.htm].

¹⁸ "Pakistan Seeks to Allay West's Fears of Army Pull Out," *Reuters*, May 18, 2008; "There Are Mechanisms in the Agreements This Time to Ensure Success" (interview), *Friday Times* (Lahore), May 30, 2008.

¹⁹ "Engaging the Mehsuds" (editorial), *Dawn* (Karachi), and "Truce With Taliban Won't Last" (editorial), *Daily Times* (Lahore), both April 25, 2008.

²⁰ Najam Sethi, "No Man's Land" (op-ed), *Friday Times* (Lahore), May 23, 2008.

²¹ Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia, "Regional Overview of South Asia," March 7, 2007.

increase development aid to the FATA to bolster Islamabad's own efforts there. Islamabad and Washington may, however, increasingly be at odds over counterterrorism strategy. An emphasis on negotiation alarms U.S. officials, who are concerned that such a tack would only allow extremist elements the space in which to consolidate their own positions, as appeared to be the case when truces were struck in 2005 and 2006.²² During his late March visit to Islamabad, Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte asserted that "irreconcilable elements" cannot be dealt with through negotiation. In early May, Negroponte was emphatic about U.S. apprehensions:

Let me be clear: we will not be satisfied until all the violent extremism emanating from the FATA is brought under control. It is unacceptable for extremists to use those areas to plan, train for, or execute attacks against Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the wider world.

He expressed being "concerned" and "skeptical" about official Pakistani efforts to negotiate with the region's extremist elements.²³

A key metric for the United States in gauging the value of truce deals will thus be the extent to which militants refrain from using tribal regions to plan and launch terrorist attacks. So far, the signs are not encouraging. Violent attacks against Afghan and NATO troops in Afghanistan reportedly have increased significantly in recent months, and Pakistani officials are showing signs of diminished concern about the cross-border movement of Pashtun militants at a cost to U.S. interests.²⁴ In a development alarming to Western military commanders, Pakistan appears to have suspended its participation in Tripartite Commission meetings with U.S., Afghan, and NATO officials to discuss cross-border issues.²⁵ Meanwhile, international donors and lending agencies appear hesitant to finance projects in the region while the security situation remains tense, and some in the U.S. government reportedly are wary of infusing development aid that could end up in the hands of elements unfriendly to U.S. interests.²⁶

Many independent analysts counsel U.S. patience that would allow the demoralized Pakistan army to recover from past setbacks as well as allowing the new civilian dispensation in Islamabad to win more broad public support for the battle against terrorism. A fundamental respect for Pakistan democracy would, from this perspective, seem to require U.S. government tolerance for Islamabad's approach, at least in the near-term.²⁷ One former Bush State Department official favors cautious U.S. support for Pakistan's deal-making efforts, offering that Islamabad appears to have learned from past mistakes, that the new civilian government there needs the "breathing space" that cease-fires could bring, that Pakistani security forces need time to recover from a recent series of setbacks, and that truces could open the space to initiate new development projects. He does acknowledge, however, that the United States must carefully monitor the progress and outcome of such negotiations.²⁸

²² "Pakistan's Planned Accord With Militants Alarms U.S.," *New York Times*, April 30, 2008.

²³ See [<http://www.state.gov/s/d/2008/104366.htm>].

²⁴ The outgoing commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, U.S. Gen. Dan McNeill, has said he is "troubled" by Pakistan's negotiations with insurgent groups, noting that violence in eastern Afghanistan increases significantly when truces are arranged on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. NATO's top commander has echoed the concerns ("ISAF Commander 'Troubled' by Pakistan Negotiations," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, May 21, 2008; "Nato 'Concerned' Over Pakistan," *BBC News*, May 27, 2008).

²⁵ "NATO Chief in Afghanistan Says Pakistan's Tack on Militants is Not As Expected," *New York Times*, May 30, 2008.

²⁶ "Aid to Pakistan in Tribal Areas Raises Concerns," *New York Times*, July 16, 2007.

²⁷ See, for example, Ashley Tellis, "Pakistan's New Tack on Fighting Terror," *YaleGlobal Online*, May 9, 2008.

²⁸ Daniel Markey, "Why Pakistan Plays 'Let's Make a Deal,'" *Foreign Policy*, May 2008.

Among the most irreconcilable of elements in western Pakistan may be Baitullah Mehsud, the Waziri militant commander named as a prime suspect in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and in numerous other domestic suicide bomb attacks. Mehsud refuses to recognize the Durand Line as a legitimate frontier and he explicitly rules out any end to the “jihad in Afghanistan.”²⁹ The NWFP governor has claimed Mehsud oversees an annual budget of up to three billion Pakistani rupees (about \$45 million) devoted to perpetuating regional militancy. Most of this amount is thought to be raised through narcotics trafficking. Mehsud and his top lieutenants also reportedly are being used by the government as conduits for the payment of compensation to locals who have been negatively affected by fighting in South Waziristan.³⁰

Many analysts — both in Pakistan and beyond — insist that only by bringing the tribal areas under the full writ of the Pakistani state and facilitating major economic development there can the FATA problem be resolved. Officials of the newly seated Islamabad government appear to agree.³¹ From this perspective, any policies that strengthen the hands of destabilizing, anti-state elements such as Baitullah Mehsud can be considered counterproductive. Decision makers in Washington now face the difficult task of encouraging and materially supporting a holistic, long-term Pakistani approach to its militancy problem while simultaneously making clear to Islamabad’s leaders that religious extremists intent on pursuing a violent international jihad represent a threat to all concerned parties and should be neutralized in the near-term.

U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism Cooperation . With a drastic increase in violent attacks in Pakistan in the latter half of 2007 — especially those targeting the country’s security forces — it was hoped that Pakistan’s military leadership might take a more welcoming view of U.S. offers of direct military assistance. Yet reports suggest that U.S. officials remain frustrated by signs that the Pakistani military is slow to shift away from a conventional war strategy focused on India. These officials have made clear that the United States stands ready to assist Pakistan in “reorienting” its army for counterinsurgency efforts, even if the now explicit U.S. readiness to increase bilateral counterterrorism cooperation is described by some as expressed to Islamabad in the form of “pressure.”³² One recent first-person account by a well-known Pakistani journalist quoted Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Kayani as openly declining to “retrain or re-equip troops to fight the counterinsurgency war the Americans are demanding.” Instead, according to this author, Kayani intends to keep the bulk of his forces on the Indian frontier.³³

The United States has limited options for directly addressing ongoing religious militancy in Pakistan, and Pakistani officials remain adamant in their rejection of U.S. proposals for greater direct U.S. military action on Pakistani territory.³⁴ Missile strikes in Pakistan launched by armed, unmanned American Predator aircraft have been a controversial, but sometimes effective tactic against Islamist militants in remote regions of western Pakistan. By some accounts, U.S. officials reached a quiet January understanding with President Musharraf to allow for increased

²⁹ “Pakistani Taliban Leader Vows Jihad in Afghanistan,” *Reuters*, May 24, 2008.

³⁰ “Mehsud Spending Up to 3bn on Militancy Annually: Ghani,” *Daily Times* (Lahore), May 30, 2008; “Baitullah Now Govt’s Trusted Ally,” *News* (Karachi), May 31, 2008.

³¹ Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 176, October 2006; “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” International Crisis Group Asia Report 125, December 11, 2006; “BB’s Assassination Reshaped History of Pakistan: Sherry Rehman,” *Associated Press of Pakistan*, May 30, 2008.

³² “New Bid to Control Pakistan’s Tribal Belt,” *Christian Science Monitor*, January 31, 2008; “Pakistan’s Musharraf Says No to US Troops,” *Associated Press*, January 24, 2008.

³³ Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s Worrisome Pullback,” *Washington Post*, June 6, 2008.

³⁴ “Islamabad Tribal Deals Spark Concerns,” *Financial Times* (London), May 15, 2008; “Pakistan Defies U.S. on Halting Afghanistan Raids,” *New York Times*, May 16, 2008.

employment of U.S. aerial surveillance and Predator strikes against suspected terrorist targets on Pakistani territory. With the defeat of Musharraf-allied parties in Parliament, many in Washington are concerned that this policy will be curtailed.³⁵ Indeed, an apparent mid-May Predator strike in the Bajaur agency may have killed a mid-level Al Qaeda operative, along with several civilians. Prime Minister Gillani strongly condemned the attack, calling the killing of “innocent people” “absolutely wrong” and “unfair.”³⁶

Prime Minister Gillani’s strong words may be seen to reflect a widely held Pakistani view that the United States has been selfish and myopic in pursuit of its own national interests, taking actions that are “penny wise and pound foolish.” Among the costs of such a tack appears to be a further increase in anti-Americanism in Pakistan. Recognition of Pakistan’s legitimate security interests and concerns regarding Afghanistan, and active support for warmer Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, are further explicit and noncontroversial U.S. policies. Yet on this topic we can identify another vigorous and ongoing debate over the extent to which the United States is genuinely committed to a long-term role in the region that will address Pakistani concerns. Perhaps first among these is Islamabad’s persevering perception of India as the leading threat to Pakistani security. This leads some commentators to urge a greater U.S. role in efforts toward a Pakistan-India rapprochement.

Pakistani Public Opinion

Nearly all empirical evidence suggests that anti-American sentiments are widespread in Pakistan. There is a tragic irony to this development, given Pakistan’s official status as a major non-NATO ally and key partner in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. The animosity appears rooted in a general disapproval of U.S. global policies and a specific resentment of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, itself. In a 2005 interview, President Musharraf conceded that “the man on the street [in Pakistan] does not have a good opinion of the United States.” He added, by way of partial explanation, that Pakistan had been “left high and dry” after serving as a strategic U.S. ally during the 1980s.³⁷ Some Pakistanis argue that their current “Waziristan problem” is largely traceable to U.S. policies in the region; my own interactions with Pakistani nationals of all stripes commonly touch upon this historical narrative.³⁸ Opinion polls consistently show a significant segment of the Pakistani public citing U.S. support for President Musharraf and the Pakistani military as having been an impediment to, rather than facilitator of, the process of democratization there. Some will go further in identifying Musharraf’s so-called “U.S. dictated” military policies in western Pakistan as the central cause of the spate of suicide bombings that plagued the country in 2007 and early 2008.

A major poll taken shortly before Pakistan’s catastrophic October 2005 earthquake found only 23% of Pakistanis expressing a favorable view of the United States, the lowest percentage for any country surveyed. That percentage doubled to 46% in an ACNielsen poll taken after large-scale U.S. disaster relief efforts in earthquake-affected areas, with the great majority of Pakistanis indicating that their perceptions had been positively influenced by witnessing such

³⁵ “Pakistan Shift Could Curtail Drone Strikes,” *New York Times*, February 22, 2008; “US Launches Waziristan UAV Strike With Tacit Pakistani Approval,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly*, March 19, 2008.

³⁶ “Anger After Apparent U.S. Missile Strike in Pakistan,” *Reuters*, May 15, 2008.

³⁷ “10 Questions for Pervez Musharraf,” *Time*, October 3, 2005.

³⁸ From this perspective, the United States essentially abandoned the region after infusing it with money and arms during the 1980s, thus “leaving the jihadi baby in Pakistan’s lap.” Furthermore, a U.S. failure to decisively defeat Afghan Taliban remnants in 2002, a diversion of key resources to the war in Iraq and the recruiting boon that war provided to jihadi groups, and a perceived over-reliance on allegedly ill-equipped NATO troops all combined to build and sustain in western Pakistan a religious extremist movement that did not previously exist (see, for example, Ali Abbas Rizvi, “American Connection to the Waziristan Problem” (op-ed), *News* (Karachi), January 29, 2008).

efforts. However, a January 2006 missile attack on Pakistani homes near the Afghan border killed numerous civilians and was blamed on U.S. forces, renewing animosity toward the United States. Another noteworthy episode in 2006 saw Pakistani cities hosting major public demonstrations against the publication in European newspapers of cartoons deemed offensive to Muslims. These protests, which were violent at times, included strong anti-U.S. and anti-Musharraf components, suggesting that Islamist organizers used the issue to forward their own political ends. Subsequently, a June 2006 Pew Center poll found only 27% of Pakistanis holding a favorable opinion of the United States, and this dropped to 19% in a September 2007 survey by the U.S.-based group Terror Free Tomorrow, suggesting that public diplomacy gains following the 2005 earthquake had receded.³⁹

In January 2008, the University of Maryland-based Program on International Policy Attitudes released a survey of public opinion in Pakistan. The findings indicated that significant resentment toward and distrust of the United States persist among large segments of the Pakistani public:

- 64% of Pakistanis do not trust the United States to “do the right thing in world affairs;”
- more than two-thirds believe the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan is “a critical threat to Pakistan’s interests;”
- only 27% feel that Pakistan-U.S. security cooperation has benefitted Pakistan; and
- 86% believe that weakening and dividing the Muslim world is a U.S. goal (70% believe this is “definitely” the case).⁴⁰

Another public opinion survey conducted the same month found nearly three-quarters of Pakistanis agreeing that religious extremism represented a serious problem for their country, yet only one-third supported Pakistani army operations against religious militants in western Pakistan, and a scant 9% thought Pakistan should cooperate with the United States in its “war on terror.”⁴¹

These consistent survey findings should give pause to any informed observer and serve as a stark reminder that the national interest and the human interest do not always correspond in the minds of ordinary citizens. It may be something of a cliché in policy circles to aver that Pakistanis need to recognize the fight against religious militancy as being in their own best interests. This does not seem to be a point that American interlocutors can force upon them. We at the Congressional Research Service are not aware that weakening and dividing the Muslim world is among the goals of U.S. foreign policy, meaning that a huge majority of the Pakistani people appear to be misapprehending the role the United States wishes to play in its relations with their country. To the extent that these misapprehensions persist, they are likely to create a formidable obstacle to the kind of genuine, mutually-held trust and respect that could benefit the governments and peoples of both countries.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I am ready to answer any questions you may have.

³⁹ See [http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252] and [http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagesft/Pakistan%20Poll%20Report.pdf].

⁴⁰ See [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan_Jan08_rpt.pdf].

⁴¹ See [http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/2008-02-11-pakistan.asp].



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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

**“U.S.-Pakistan Strategic
Relationship”**

Testimony before

**Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee on Federal Financial
Management, Government Information,
Federal Services, and International Security
United States Senate**

June 12, 2008

Lisa Curtis

**Senior Research Fellow
Asian Studies Center
The Heritage Foundation**

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for asking me to testify today on the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship. I will focus my remarks mostly on the terrorist challenge in Pakistan and how the U.S. and Pakistan can work together to address this issue that is critical to the future of Pakistan as well as global security. The views expressed in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of the Heritage Foundation.¹

Despite a successful election four months ago, Pakistan's political and security situation remains highly unstable and demands close attention from U.S. policymakers. A power struggle at the center among the three main political players – Asif Ali Zardari (leader of the ruling Pakistan People's Party and widower of Benazir Bhutto), Nawaz Sharif (party leader of the junior coalition partner, the Pakistan Muslim League/Nawaz), and President Pervez Musharraf—is distracting the new government from coping with grave economic and terrorism challenges facing the country. Inflation has hit double digits and an acute energy crunch has led to daily power outages lasting six – eight hours per day. A revived lawyers' movement to restore judges deposed by President Musharraf last year is adding to the political uncertainty. Perhaps the most worrisome trend in Pakistan, though, is the advance of Taliban militants in the northwest part of the country and the government's lack of a strategic approach to roll back the rising extremist threat.

U.S. officials' frustration with Pakistan is mounting as the Pakistan Army and new civilian government engage in indirect negotiations with extremists that so far appear unwilling to give up support for international terrorism and the destabilization of

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Afghanistan. Although the U.S. and Pakistan share the same objective of uprooting terrorism from Pakistan, they have not yet developed and agreed on a comprehensive joint plan to achieve this goal over the long-run. Unless the U.S. and Pakistan work more closely on an operational level to address the terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan's border areas and engage in frank diplomatic discussions that address Pakistani regional security concerns, maintaining friendly U.S.-Pakistan ties will become increasingly difficult.

The U.S. must tread cautiously with Pakistan at this delicate juncture to avoid tipping the balance in favor of anti-U.S. elements who may be seeking to cause a rupture in the relationship. Tuesday night's air strike that killed 11 Pakistani security forces along the Afghan border will further strain U.S.-Pakistan relations and create opposition within the lower ranks of the Army and within the Pashtun paramilitary Frontier Corps to further counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. According to a statement from the U.S. military at Bagram Air Base, the air strikes were taken in defense of coalition forces that were under fire from anti-Afghan forces in the area. The U.S. military also reported that it had informed the Pakistan Army that coalition troops were engaged in military operations against anti-Afghan forces in the area previous to the incident. The incident points to the challenges of fighting an effective campaign against insurgents that cross freely back and forth along a porous border and the confusion that prevails when coalition forces can operate aggressively on one side of the border but must rely on their Pakistani counterparts to control the other side.

Background

When the U.S. cut off assistance to Pakistan in the early 1990s following the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan and because of the advancing Pakistani nuclear weapons program, there was debate within the Pakistani security establishment over how to protect Pakistani security interests without backing from the U.S. Subsequently Pakistan began engaging in risky activities such as proliferating nuclear technology and know-how to North Korea in exchange for missiles it deemed necessary to meet the threat from India.² Also during this period, Pakistan supported the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Kashmiri militants fighting in Indian Kashmir as a way to protect what it viewed as its vital national security interests.

Pakistan officially broke its ties to the Taliban shortly following 9/11 and helped to capture several major al-Qaeda leaders. Pakistan also engaged in military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan beginning in 2003 to disrupt the activities of Taliban and al-Qaeda militants who fled to the area after the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan in December 2001. These military operations damaged traditional tribal institutions, increased radicalism in the region, caused the deaths of several hundred Pakistani soldiers, and met with increasing opposition from the broader Pakistani population. Because of the growing problems with the FATA military operations, President Musharraf in September 2006 announced a "peace deal" with tribal leaders of the North Waziristan Agency that included an end to offensive Pakistani

² Sharon A. Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade between North Korea and Pakistan," Congressional Research Services Report RL31900, March 11, 2004, pp.6-7 and 9-10.

military operations in exchange for the tribal rulers' cooperation in restricting Taliban and al-Qaeda activities.

The 2006 peace deal failed miserably: Within two months, cross-border attacks against coalition forces reportedly increased by 200 percent, and by the summer of 2007 senior U.S. intelligence officials declared that the Pakistani peace deal had allowed the region to develop into an al-Qaeda stronghold. According to a recent RAND study, the deal failed in part because it rested on the false assumption that the tribal leaders had control in the region when, in fact, the extremists enjoyed the upper hand.³ The extremists also took advantage of the decreased military pressure by instituting strict Islamic edicts in the region—the same tactics employed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The extremists closed down girls' schools, barbershops, and video stores, demonstrating that they could challenge the writ of the government, even in some of the settled areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). By the end of last summer and following the military showdown at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, the North Waziristan peace deal broke down completely and the Pakistan military resumed operations in the region.

New Peace Deals

The Pakistan government (the military with the backing of the new civilian leadership) has once again embarked on a new set of peace deals in the region. There is little reason to believe that these agreements will be any more successful at curbing terrorism in the area than the 2006 deal was. The government hopes that negotiations will separate tribal leaders from the extremists and encourage them to turn against the terrorists. The problem is that the tribal leaders do not have the wherewithal to confront the extremists, and the negotiations so far seem only to have strengthened the radicals in the region. The Pakistani government says that it needs time for the negotiations to bear fruit and is ready to back the negotiations with force if necessary. The danger lies in promoting a negotiating process that legitimizes the extremists and increases their influence.

The Pakistan military claims it is negotiating from a position of strength this time, having conducted a major military operation in South Waziristan in January before offering indirect talks with Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) leader Baitullah Mehsud. At least one of the peace deals being pursued in the Tribal Areas involves withdrawing the Army from the region and turning over security to the paramilitary Frontier Corps and releasing captured Taliban leaders. It also states that foreigners must leave the area but that al-Qaeda operatives can stay "as long as they pledge to remain peaceful." The agreement further stipulates that the Taliban may not establish a parallel government and must halt attacks on government and security forces personnel.⁴

During a recent trip to Pakistan (May 4 – 8), I was struck by the level of concern people expressed about the situation in NWFP. Pakistanis are beginning to understand that the

³ Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Volume 4 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), p. 58.

⁴ Anand Gopal, "Secret Accord Sheltered al-Qaeda Linked Militants in Tribal Pakistan," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 11, 2008, at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0611/p99s01-duts.html>.

Taliban-backed elements are competing for political power with the Pakistani state. Some even acknowledge that the battle between Pakistani authorities and the violent extremists in the border areas and parts of the NWFP is pivotal to the future of the province, if not to the future of Pakistan itself. The people of NWFP do not support the agenda of the Taliban militants but were pessimistic that the government was capable of successfully countering their growing influence.

Taliban militants have also made inroads into some settled areas of the NWFP. The Pakistan military deployed 10,000 troops to the Swat Valley in the fall of 2007 to quell a Taliban-backed insurgency before the new provincial government negotiated an agreement with militants there in May of this year. According to Pakistani press, the Swat peace deal calls on the Taliban to accept the writ of the central and provincial governments, halt terrorist attacks, and lift the ban on girls' education, while the government agreed to implement a Shariat court system in Malakand Division, withdraw security forces gradually "in view of the security situation in the area," and open an Islamic university run by a committee made up of both government and Taliban representatives.⁵

Although some Pakistanis downplay the significance of the implementation of Shariah law in Malakand, others notes that it would essentially block the people of this region from appealing the decisions of the Shariat Court to the Peshawar High Court or the Pakistani Supreme Court. In this light, it appears the government may be negotiating away the people's rights despite the fact that religious parties suffered a major electoral defeat in the NWFP. Allowing Taliban-backed militants to demand political changes through force undermines the legitimacy of the elected government and will be viewed by the militants as a victory in their efforts to turn Pakistan into a Taliban-like state.

There is still a great deal of confusion and secrecy surrounding the peace agreements. U.S. officials are increasingly wary of the deals but some parts of the U.S. government appear more willing to exercise patience and let the deals play themselves out for a limited period of time. Senior U.S. military officials, especially those serving in Afghanistan, however, are less patient and are convinced that the number of attacks in Afghanistan has already increased due to the implementation of the peace deals. The Pakistan military may be pursuing the peace deals to re-gain its footing and achieve some breathing space following a series of terrorist attacks against the security forces that have weakened Army morale.

Policy Recommendations:

Peace deals with tribal leaders under current circumstances have proven insufficient, and even self-defeating. The results are predictable. They almost certainly will once again lead to an increase in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan and allow the insurgents to use the lull to strengthen their ability to fight coalition forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan should stay on the offensive—and the U.S. should support it.

⁵ Daud Khattak, "Text of the North West Frontier Province Government's Agreement with the Taliban," *Daily Times*, May 22, 2008, at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5CO5%5C22%5Cstory_22-5-2008.

But military operations alone will not uproot the terrorist safe haven in the Tribal Areas, which could take several years. It will require a strategic and forward-looking approach that also relies heavily on economic development and investment in the region.

In addition to implementing large-scale economic development programs in the FATA, the U.S. should move forward expeditiously on Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation that was introduced in the U.S. Senate on March 13, 2008. The ROZs are meant to encourage investment in and around underdeveloped tribal areas by permitting certain products produced there to enter the U.S. duty-free. Delays in moving ahead with this initiative in the U.S. are creating mistrust in Pakistan about U.S. commitment and undermining the broader U.S. objective of winning hearts and minds through social uplift programs.

The U.S. should also support efforts to bring political reform to the FATA, including incorporation of the region into Pakistan proper in order to increase government writ in the areas. The leadership of the PPP and Awami National Party (ANP), currently ruling the NWFP, supports implementing the Political Parties Act in the FATA, which would extend Pakistani election laws to the region and encourage political activity. Political parties are currently prohibited from operating in the FATA, and a political agent, or federal bureaucrat, runs the affairs of each of the seven FATA agencies. There are 12 seats reserved for FATA members in the National Assembly and eight in the Senate. However, parliament has no authority to legislate on matters concerning FATA, and the FATA legislators wield little authority.

The U.S. should speed up plans to provide counterinsurgency training to Pakistani paramilitary troops stationed in the FATA. The training of Pakistan's Frontier Corps is scheduled to begin this summer, but it should have started long ago. It is uncertain whether Tuesday's incident along the border will affect the training program and whether it will be viewed by the Pakistanis as an incident of "friendly fire." Washington must encourage Pakistani security forces to remain on the offensive in the border areas until the terrorist threat dissipates. The alternative—relying solely on American military action in the FATA—risks destabilizing Pakistani politics in favor of the extremists and could leave the U.S. facing a far larger terrorist threat in Pakistan than it faces today.

Washington should step up efforts to encourage peace building and greater military-to-military cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The effort to establish joint border coordinating centers along the border that are manned by coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani military officials is a step in the right direction. The U.S. should also encourage the jirga process started last August as well as trade and economic initiatives that give both sides an interest in stabilizing and securing the borders. Pakistani initiatives to bring political reform to the FATA and to incorporate the region into Pakistan proper will strengthen Islamabad's claim to the region and help dispel any controversy between Kabul and Islamabad related to the status of their border.

The U.S. should also take a more pro-active role to encourage peace efforts between Pakistan and its historical foe India. Pakistan's dialogue with India, started in January

2004, is still on track as evidenced by the recent visit of the Indian Foreign Minister to Islamabad. However, substantive movement on the issue of Kashmir is needed to demonstrate that the two countries are truly putting their past animosities behind them and moving toward a new era of peace and cooperation in South Asia. As long as the threat from its larger neighbor looms for Pakistan, there will be pressure within the Pakistani security establishment to maintain the option of engaging in asymmetrical warfare through militancy and resistance to shutting down the militant infrastructure in Pakistan.

Washington should seek out ways to work more closely with European allies who also have an interest in promoting stability and shutting down terrorist networks in Pakistan. Recent terrorist trials in the UK reveal that Pakistan provides a key nodal link for international terrorists seeking to carry out large-scale attacks in Europe. Three of the suicide bombers involved in the July 7, 2005, London public transport attacks attended terrorist training camps or madrassahs (religious schools) located in Pakistan in 2003 - 2004 to prepare for the attacks. The ringleader of the foiled London attacks that were planned for July 21, 2005, also attended al-Qaeda terrorist training camps in Pakistan at the same time as the 7/7 bombers.

In August 2006, British and American intelligence officers thwarted a plan to detonate liquid explosives on at least seven commercial transatlantic flights headed from Britain to the U.S. and Canada. Using explosives and detonators disguised as drinks, cosmetics, and everyday electronic equipment, the explosions would have resulted in a projected death toll of at least 1,500.⁶ The alleged ringleader, Rashid Rauf, was arrested by the Pakistani security services after the airliner plots were foiled but his mysterious disappearance from police custody in December 2007 means that little more is known about his role in the plot.⁷

Finally, the U.S. should fully support the democratically elected coalition government, which is struggling to stay together over the issue of reinstatement of judges deposed by President Musharraf last year. Washington should avoid being viewed as meddling in Pakistani internal politics, including working toward the preservation of President Musharraf, whose role and influence are declining in Pakistan. A policy of clinging to Musharraf in the face of Pakistani opposition will only increase hostility toward the U.S. from the broader population and contribute to greater instability within the system. Continued cooperation between the strongest political parties – the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League/Nawaz -- offers the best hope for stabilizing Pakistan as it copes with economic and terrorism challenges that threaten further political unrest.

⁶James Auger, "Eight Britons on Trial over 'Unprecedented' 2006 Terrorist Plot Against Multiple Airliners," *Global Insight*, April 4, 2008.

⁷Sally McNamara, "Why NATO Must Win in Afghanistan: A Central Front in the War on Terror," Heritage Foundation Background (forthcoming).

Testimony of Michael Krepon
Co-founder, The Henry L. Stimson Center and
Diplomat Scholar, University of Virginia
Before the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
“Addressing the U.S. - Pakistan Strategic Relationship”
June 12, 2008

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to testify. As requested, I will focus my remarks on nuclear safety and security in Pakistan, and what further steps the United States and Pakistan might consider to reduce the likelihood that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and bomb-grade fissile material might fall into the hands of extremist elements.

There is much we do not know about the stewardship of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Stewardship arrangements changed for the better after national leaders could no longer plausibly deny the evidence regarding A.Q. Khan’s misdeeds. Subsequently, public statements by authoritative Pakistani officials have mostly been confined to organizational matters, but very little else, leaving much room for conjecture.

Current events in Pakistan provide ample grounds for further uncertainty. The country’s political leadership is unsettled, especially with respect to relations among Pakistan’s President, Prime Minister, and Chief of Army Staff. All three positions have key roles in Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which oversees all matters pertaining to nuclear weapons. Control over the nation’s nuclear assets will remain in the hands of the military, even if the locus of power shifts away from the President.

The assessments that follow cannot be provided with a high degree of confidence. I can, however, offer educated guesses based on the

Stimson Center's work for over fifteen years with colleagues in Pakistan to reduce nuclear dangers on the Subcontinent. In 1995, Stimson began to host Pakistani military officers from the Strategic Plans Division at Joint Staff Headquarters. The SPD now handles most nuclear-related matters. Pakistan also has a Strategic Command responsible for operational matters. In 2006, Stimson began to host Visiting Fellows from Pakistan's Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which looks after civil nuclear facilities. One of the PNRA's responsibilities is to help prevent acts of terrorism against these facilities.

Pakistan's nuclear assets are its most closely guarded man-made objects. My sense is that the guardians of these "crown jewels" are now subject to improved personnel reliability screening procedures, and that security practices at sensitive sites have also been upgraded. The United States has over six decades of experience regarding security arrangements for nuclear weapons. We have developed a body of knowledge regarding best practices that might be of interest to other nations. (Clearly, the keepers of the U.S. nuclear arsenal need to relearn these lessons, given grave lapses in U.S. security procedures in the recent past.)

At first, I suspect that it was not easy to have official discussions with Pakistanis on best practices for nuclear security. There is very great suspicion in Pakistan about U.S. intentions regarding its nuclear assets. One example: When General Pervez Musharraf announced to the nation that he was severing ties with the Taliban and joining forces with the Bush administration's "war on terror," one reason he gave for doing so was that to rebuff Washington's demands could jeopardize Pakistan's strategic assets.

Pakistan's mistrust of the United States grows with every press report or idle comment about U.S. contingency plans to "seize" or otherwise take action against Pakistan's nuclear assets in the event of an imminent breakdown of governmental authority or a prospective rise of Islamist extremists into leadership positions.

I do not know whether such plans exist. I do believe, however, that if such plans exist and if they were to be executed, the results would almost certainly be catastrophic for Pakistan, India, and the United States. I also believe that speculation regarding U.S. contingency plans reinforces the natural instinct of Pakistani military authorities to keep U.S. officials at a very “safe distance” from their nuclear assets.

Providing “best practices” on how to improve security at sensitive sites can be provided at a safe distance: The United States doesn’t need to visit such facilities in order to impart the lessons we have learned based on long experience. Nor does it require classified sensors and technologies to upgrade the security perimeters at sensitive sites. Statements by Lt. General (retired) Khalid Kidwai, the Director General of the SPD, suggest that Pakistan has, after due deliberation, been willing to accept U.S. advice and assistance regarding personnel reliability programs, export controls, and safe transportation and storage – as long as it is provided at a safe distance. Under these ground rules, there are clear limits as to what kind of U.S. assistance on nuclear safety and security, if offered, Pakistan would be willing to accept.

How safe and secure, then, are Pakistan’s nuclear assets? I do not place much credence in scenarios that project a takeover of the Pakistan government or Army leadership by Islamic extremists.

To be sure, there are ample reasons to be worried about the growth of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, as is most evident in the borderlands with Afghanistan and now in parts of the North West Frontier Province. Car bombs and suicide bombers are now part of Pakistan’s woes. While holding the reins of power, General Musharraf forged a political alliance with the country’s religious parties, and the negative consequences of this partnership are now becoming increasingly evident. Because these and so many other contributing factors have led to Pakistan’s misfortunes, it will take many years for the country to be placed on a sound footing.

Even so, Pakistan retains many positive attributes. Despite that country's many strains, the Pakistan Army leadership continues to follow the principle of unity of command: decisions are made from the top down, and senior officers follow their orders. Pakistan's two largest political parties do not define themselves primarily in religious terms. Civil society has not given up the fight for Pakistan's future, as is evident from the lawyers' movement to push for an independent judiciary. Many capable Pakistanis can be called upon by a government that is willing to confound cynics and tackle the country's many problems.

Pakistan's religious parties do not fare well in national elections. The most hard-core Islamic extremists have turned against their former handlers in Pakistan's military and security services, but they are in no position to take over the state. Acts of Muslim-on-Muslim violence, especially those that claim the lives of innocent bystanders, do not win hearts and minds.

If the takeover threat by extremists is overblown, what developments in Pakistan would most threaten the safety and security of Pakistan's "crown jewels"? There are many ways to answer this question. The scenarios that worry me the most are a breakdown of the unity of command within the Pakistan Army, and a serious crisis or a military clash with neighboring India.

When tensions rise precipitously with India, the readiness level of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent also rises. Because the geographical coordinates of Pakistan's main nuclear weapon storage sites, missile, and air bases can be readily identified from satellites – and therefore targeted by opposing forces -- the dictates of deterrence mandate some movement of launchers and weapons from fixed locations during crises. Nuclear weapons on the move are inherently less secure than nuclear weapons at heavily guarded storage sites. Weapons and launchers in motion are also more susceptible to "insider" threats and accidents.

If a crisis spills over into combat, no one can count on rosy scenarios. Previous wars between India and Pakistan have been marked by surprises, but no surprise would be worse than a breakdown of command and control relating to nuclear weapons. An escalating war with nuclear forces in the field would increase the probability of accidents, miscalculations, and the use of nuclear weapons.

Since 2002, India and Pakistan have avoided crises. Usually, these crises relate to the dispute over Kashmir. But the Line of Control dividing Kashmir, which has previously been the scene of heavy shelling and high levels of infiltration supported by Pakistan's military and intelligence services, has been fairly quiet. After the last India-Pakistan crisis, sparked by an attack on the Indian parliament by Islamic extremists, Pakistan's diplomatic stance toward the Kashmir dispute has become more pragmatic. Confidence-building measures have been adopted to ease tensions and promote modest trade along the Line of Control.

It is still possible, of course, that a horrific act of violence within India by Islamic extremists could spark another confrontation. But the Pakistan Army leadership can be expected to try to avoid having heightened security concerns on two fronts. This means that, as long as activities along the border with Afghanistan preoccupy Pakistan's military and intelligence services, they will seek to avoid serious tensions with India.

The Pakistan Army's unity of command, which is essential for nuclear security, would be greatly stressed in the event of an escalating war with India. The Pakistan Army's unity of command can also be jeopardized by a prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the country's President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief. Under the current Pakistani Constitution, the President picks the Army Chief. But Pakistan's Constitution is far from being a settled document, and one of the amendments currently under consideration would shift this important prerogative to the Prime Minister. The President is also the head of

Pakistan's National Command Authority, as presently constituted. This, too, might change in the event of a shift of power in favor of the Prime Minister.

The triangular jockeying for power in Pakistan isn't new. At times, political leaders have chosen Army Chiefs, but their track record has not been good. (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged by his choice, Zia ul Haq, and Nawaz Sharif was toppled, jailed, and exiled by his choice, Pervez Musharraf.) Unwelcome outcomes usually result when Pakistani Army Chiefs are elevated to help advance political agendas rather than by seniority and professionalism.

Pakistan's Army reflects popular sentiment. It follows that, if national governments do not address popular grievances, those grievances will grow, including within the Army. If national divisions widen, they will also widen within the military. Therefore, prolonged incompetence, turmoil, and failed politics at the national level spell trouble for nuclear safety and security.

What, then, can the United States do to help Pakistan improve nuclear safety and security? We can continue to offer suggestions for best practices and technical assistance. Security measures can always be improved - and not just for Pakistan. Pakistani authorities are more likely to accept U.S. offers of assistance that meet the "safe distance" rule and are pursued in a low-profile way. This is admittedly a modest near-term agenda. But grander schemes are unlikely to succeed, and may impair further success through smaller steps.

The United States can also help promote nuclear safety and security on the Subcontinent by acting as a crisis manager if and when Pakistan and India again go eyeball to eyeball. Lessons can be learned from U.S. diplomacy during previous confrontations, but crisis management is by nature pursued on an *ad hoc* basis. Crisis avoidance and peace making are far, far better than crisis management. The United States has focused very little on ways to

promote a Kashmir settlement and reconciliation between India and Pakistan.

Over the long haul, the most effective measures to promote nuclear safety and security are those that help Pakistan to find its footing. A well governed, stable society that is at peace with its neighbors is one in which nuclear weapons are well guarded. Some elements within Pakistan will remain unalterably opposed to government authority. The United States can help Pakistan's military to counter threats to internal security, but this will take time - and a reorientation of a Pakistani military mindset that has previously focused to a very great extent on India's military capabilities.

The United States can't build a more stable, well governed Pakistan - this is the job of Pakistanis. But U.S. policies toward South Asia can still influence outcomes, even if they don't determine them. The first term policies of the George W. Bush administration toward South Asia were exceptional. The administration forced significant changes in Pakistan's policies after 9/11, it engaged in successful preventive diplomacy during the 2001-2002 crisis, and it improved bilateral ties with India as well as Pakistan - all significant feats.

During the second Bush administration, U.S. policies toward South Asia have been demonstrably unwise and unsuccessful. It appears that the topmost regional policy initiative during the second term - at least as measured by the personal engagement of top administration officials -- has been a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India. This was an odd choice, given Pakistan's manifold and growing difficulties. The agreement, which could weaken global nonproliferation efforts, is currently stalled by political difficulties within India.

When Pakistan's difficulties forced this issue to the top of the administration's agenda, it reacted by reaffirming its support for General Musharraf, a leader whose good works have subsequently been overshadowed by the accumulation of poor decisions that

have made him one of the most disliked men in Pakistan. Pakistan's history of military strongmen who have lost public confidence suggests that their departure is key to the country's renewal. The Bush administration thought otherwise: As Musharraf's fortunes dwindled, the administration sought partners for him – principally Benazir Bhutto – on the mistaken assumption that he remained indispensable to stabilization.

Retrieving U.S. standing in Pakistan will be a long, hard slog, since American interests are now widely viewed as pro-Musharraf and anti-Pakistan. Political stability and good governance will be slow in coming in a post-Musharraf Pakistan. These goals will not be advanced by U.S. disengagement. Congress can help Pakistan to find its footing by providing bottom-up, non-military assistance programs that manifestly improve standards of living within the country. Military assistance programs that help Pakistan's armed forces to counter the common threat of Islamic extremism would also be wise investments in the future.

“The US Pakistan Strategic Relationship and Nuclear Safety/Security”

Testimony of Dr. Stephen P. Cohen before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, June 12, 2008.

Senator Carper, and members of the Committee, I am pleased to again share my expertise with the Senate. I have written about Pakistan since the mid 1960s, visited it regularly since 1977 and have written two books on Pakistan: *The Pakistan Army* (1985) and *The Idea of Pakistan* (2004). I dealt with the Pakistan nuclear weapons program during my two years as a member of Secretary Schultz’s Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State. As you are aware, some aspects of the Pakistani nuclear program can only be discussed in classified format, but there is enough publicly available material to come to several conclusions about its security and safety.

Pakistan used to be an important state because of its assets, but it is now important because of its problems. I am sure you are aware of Pakistan’s past reputation as a moderate Muslim state, but it has become virulently anti-American, it was the worst proliferator of advanced nuclear and missile technology and it continues to harbor—partially involuntarily—extremists and terrorists whose dedicated mission is to attack the United States.

Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities present at least four challenges to American policy:

- There is a small but real possibility of the next India-Pakistan crisis escalating to nuclear levels.
- Pakistan may decide, as a matter of state policy, to extend a nuclear umbrella (or engage in nuclear sharing) with one or more Middle East states, especially if Iran acquires a nuclear device.
- There is a hard-to-quantify risk of nuclear theft. Pakistan has a home-grown personnel reliability program, but even this could be circumvented in a determined conspiracy.
- There is some small chance that should Pakistan unravel, that its nuclear assets will be seized by remnant elements of the army for political, strategic, or personal purposes.

While nuclear proliferation or nuclear theft should not be the sole, or even the determining element in our relationship with Pakistan, some of these are frightening scenarios. Even the relatively benign possibility of Pakistan providing a deterrent force to states that feel threatened by Iran raises the possibility of a fresh round of near-nuclear crises in the Middle East, perhaps involving Israel.

Our policy paradox is that we want many things from Pakistan, but that we cannot directly address Pakistan's inability to deliver. We want Pakistan to cooperate on terrorism, we want it to normalize with India, we want to ensure that it will not proliferate nuclear technology, we want it to democratize, and we want it to transform its domestic order by "normalizing" the FATA. Even if Pakistan wanted to do some or all of these things, it is not certain that it has the capability to do them. So, no matter how much money we pour into Pakistan, we cannot expect full compliance. We must pick and choose among our policy goals.

In the case of nuclear security, we should go beyond encouraging better safeguards. Within the limits of American law, we are providing technologies to Pakistan to help secure their systems, and it may be that China has also done so. Beyond this, the US should also consider a criteria-based nuclear "deal" with Pakistan as a way of encouraging them to limit and secure their existing nuclear weapons. Pakistan could receive support for its civilian nuclear program in exchange for greater assurances regarding the security of its nuclear assets and technology, and transparency regarding past leakages. Finally, we should marginally increase our engagement in India-Pakistan relations. The Pakistan army still regards India as its main threat, and nuclear weapons as its main defense. We need to address their chief incentive to acquire more and bigger nuclear weapons.

Short term measures regarding terrorism and nuclear technology should not get in the way of long term strategies to stabilize Pakistan. We should devote as much attention to shoring up Pakistan's broken institutions and helping Pakistanis resolve their permanent domestic political crisis as we devote to terrorism and nuclear issues. For if we fail to do the former, the latter will certainly become more acute.

Fortunately, we are not alone in our concern over Pakistan's stability as well as its ability to cooperate along a number of dimensions. To the degree possible, we should consult with other

important countries that share our interest in a stable Pakistan. These include Saudi Arabia, China, India, Afghanistan, the major EU powers and Japan. While the Saudis and Chinese are not interested in advancing democracy, they certainly want a stable Pakistan, and while India does not want a strong Pakistan, it does not want to see it fail. Our Pakistan policy should be framed by a regional policy that seeks to stabilize relations between Pakistan and its neighbors, India and Afghanistan.

We also need to make our support for Pakistan more effective. We have poured many billions of dollars into Pakistan, but as in the past, we have not done a good job of linking aid, loans, and grants to specific policy goals. We should stovepipe our aid, linking it to performance on those areas we judge to be most important. In addition, the aid process must be far more transparent.

Finally, we should be aware that Pakistan may yet fail comprehensively. The state has failed in bits and pieces over the last twenty-five years, and civil war, separatism, economic collapse, and the rise of a truly authoritarian leader are all possible futures. Pakistan should not be written off as a failed state, but if it cannot take advantage of this second “last chance” then the future will be grim. American policymakers should not be taken by surprise.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Donald Camp by
Senator Daniel K. Akaka
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
June 12, 2008**

Question:

In your testimony you mention that Pakistan's new export control organization has been reaching out to technology holders and law enforcement officials.

- a. Is the United States providing any assistance to Pakistan's new export control system?
- b. Can you identify any instances where enforcement has prevented the proliferation of sensitive exports?

Answer:

Pakistan's new Strategic Export Control Division (SECDiv) began operations last year. Since then, our bilateral Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program (EXBS) has provided assistance in the areas of license review, commodity classification, and outreach, including four training courses since November 2007.

Through this training, we have seen a high level of engagement by Pakistani customs officials and view their participation as the beginning of a serious approach to preventing proliferation-related exports. We hope training together will continue to enhance Pakistani law enforcement approaches.

We will also continue to work with Pakistan to implement its export control legislation effectively and to bring Pakistani export control practices fully in line with international norms.



Memorandum

August 6, 2008

TO: Senator Thomas R. Carper
Attention: Monisha Smith

FROM: K. Alan Kronstadt
Specialist in South Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

SUBJECT: Post-Hearing Questions for the Record

This memorandum responds to your request for responses to post-hearing questions for the record on Pakistan. If you need of further assistance, please call me at 707-5415.

1. **What is your broad assessment of the outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 2001?**

To the extent that U.S. policies toward Pakistan after 2001 were primarily meant to diminish the threat posed by Islamist militancy and terrorism, the great majority of observers likely would characterize such policies as having failed thus far. By nearly all measures, Islamist extremism is a growing problem in post-2001 Pakistan and continues to threaten the security and political stability of both Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan, while also posing an ongoing potential threat to the U.S. homeland itself. Moreover, while there is vigorous debate over the best methods by which the United States could and can foster Pakistani democratization, many observers argue that recent successes in this realm have come *despite* U.S. government policies, which have been subjected to heavy criticism on two major accounts: First, the Bush Administration was long criticized for allegedly personalizing the bilateral relationship through an overemphasis on the role of the increasingly unpopular and discredited Pakistani President and Army Chief, Pervez Musharraf, who was seen to have engaged in explicit efforts to marginalize that country's moderate civilian political forces. A second area of criticism is found in the programming of U.S. assistance and other financial payments to Pakistan, which have tended to be directed toward that country's military and so are identified as bolstering what traditionally have been illiberal forces in Pakistan. Insofar as such assistance has strengthened Pakistan's conventional, as opposed to counterinsurgency, military capabilities, there is further linkage with failure to meet the primary goal identified above.

a. **What aspects of our policy have been most successful in serving the national interests of both the U.S. and Pakistan?**

By most accounts, the United States best serves its own national interests through a broad and deep engagement with the strategically important state of Pakistan. In this context, U.S. interests have been served simply through the 2001 reopening of close ties with Islamabad and the correspondent provision of major aid packages to that country. Given the rocky history of U.S.-Pakistan relations, the symbolic and psychological value of this cannot be overstated. Generous assistance to the Pakistani military likely has strengthened the confidence of that vital institution, although, as noted above, may entail its own problems. A rapid and robust U.S. humanitarian response to Pakistan's devastating October 2005 earthquake was crucial to ameliorating the damage caused and also seemed to bring significant public diplomacy gains to the United States when ordinary Pakistanis saw the U.S. presence in their country as directly and measurably positive. Ongoing USAID programs meant to bolster Pakistan's public education and public health sectors bring like gains while contributing to long-term development goals.

b. What aspects would you change?

As noted above, the most glaring problems for U.S.-Pakistan relations over the post-2001 period have come in the areas of counterterrorism and democratization. While Bush Administration officials have given rhetorical attention to the intimate linkage identified between governance and extremism, opinion surveys regularly find a majority of the Pakistani people convinced that the United States has little regard for improving the former and is intent on pursuing militarized policies to address the latter.¹ A corollary is a perception of the United States as overly close to and reliant upon the Pakistani military, which itself has a storied record of interference in politics. When the United States is viewed as giving largely rhetorical support for democracy and rule of law, while directing most of its material support to the Pakistani military, confidence in the bilateral relationship declines among ordinary Pakistanis and their civilian political leaders. In this respect, many analysts urge a shift in U.S. material support that would more concretely demonstrate a U.S. commitment to the people of Pakistan and to that country's civil society institutions.

2. A RAND study, released this past Monday [June 9, 2008], reported continued support by Pakistani government agencies of the Taliban.

a. Can you address the report's accusation that Pakistani intelligence is providing support to Taliban operations?

Pakistani leaders have long sought access to Central Asia and "strategic depth" with regard to India through friendly relations with neighboring Afghanistan. Such policy contributed to President-General Zia ul-Haq's support for Afghan mujahideen "freedom fighters" who were battling Soviet invaders during the 1980s and to Islamabad's later support for the Afghan Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001.² British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes inhabiting the mountainous northwestern reaches of their

¹ When asked about anti-American sentiment in Pakistan during his maiden July 2008 visit to the United States as head of government, Prime Minister Gillani offered that the impression in Pakistan is that "America wants war" ("A Conversation With Yousaf Raza Gillani," Council on Foreign Relations transcript, July 29, 2008).

² Documentary evidence indicates that Islamabad provided military and economic support, perhaps including the combat troops, to the Afghan Taliban during the latter half of the 1990s (see "Pakistan: 'The Taliban's Godfather'?", National Security Archive Briefing Book 227, August 14, 2007).

South Asian empire with the 1893 “Durand Line.” This porous, 1,600-mile border is not accepted by Afghan leaders, who have at times fanned Pashtun nationalism to the dismay of Pakistanis.³ The Indian government actively supported the Tajik and Uzbek militias which comprised the Afghan Northern Alliance and, more recently, Pakistani officials are alarmed by India’s growing presence in Afghanistan, which has included the establishment of several consulates near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Islamabad’s leaders fear “encirclement” by unfriendly foreign governments and many analysts believe this causes them to build a “hedge” against the rise of an adversarial regime in Kabul. From this perspective, Islamabad may be motivated to maintain links with Taliban or Taliban-friendly elements who could provide worthy interlocutors in the case of the Karzai government’s failure and/or the abandonment of Afghanistan by Western forces.

The report entitled *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, issued by RAND in June 2008, includes the finding that, “There is some indication that individuals within the Pakistan government — for example, within the Frontier Corps and the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate] — were involved in assisting insurgent groups” inside Afghanistan.⁴ In 2006, the State Department’s top counterterrorism official told a Senate panel that elements of Pakistan’s “local, tribal governments” are believed to be in collusion with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but that the United States had no “compelling evidence” that Pakistan’s intelligence agency was assisting militants.⁵ In July 2008, however, top U.S. government officials reportedly presented evidence to Pakistan that ISI agents were providing assistance to militant elements who undertake attacks in Afghanistan. Specifically mentioned was an alleged relationship between ISI agents and members of the Haqqani network believed based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and named as responsible for a July 9 suicide bombing at the Indian Embassy in Kabul that left more than 50 people dead.⁶ President Bush himself was reported to have bluntly asked the Pakistani Prime Minister who was controlling the ISI, and also to have expressed concern that Pakistani intelligence officers were leaking operational information to militants which could allow those elements to evade militarized efforts against them.⁷

³ Pakistan is home to some 28 million Pashto-speaking people, most of them living near the border with Afghanistan, which is home to another 13.5 million ethnic Pashtuns (also known as Pakhtuns or Pathans). A hardy people with a proud martial history (they are disproportionately represented in the Pakistani military), Pashtuns played an important role in the anti-Soviet resistance of the 1980s.

⁴ Seth Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” RAND Counterinsurgency Study 4, 2008, at [<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595/index.html>], p. xiv. A spokesman for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations rejected the report’s findings as “misleading, factually incorrect, and based on propaganda,” saying it was part of a “smear campaign” aimed at disrupting Pakistan’s relations with its partners in fighting terrorism ([<http://www.ispr.gov.pk/Archive&Press/CurrentMonth/10-Jun-2008.htm>]).

⁵ Statement of Henry Crumpton before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 13, 2006. After conducting interviews with numerous active and retired Pakistan army and intelligence officials, an American reporter concluded in 2007 that “many officers of Pakistan’s covert security agencies remain emotionally committed to jihad and hostile to the U.S. role in the region” (“Role of Pakistan’s ‘Captain’ Shows Enduring Taliban Ties,” *Newsday*, October 14, 2007).

⁶ “C.I.A. Outlines Pakistan Links With Militants,” *New York Times*, July 30, 2008; “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” *New York Times*, August 1, 2008.

⁷ “Bush Voices Concern Over ISI Role,” *News* (Karachi), July 31, 2008.

The U.S. government possesses evidence that would confirm what the Afghan and Indian governments have long claimed: elements of the Pakistani government are complicit in Islamist militancy beyond Pakistan's borders. As noted above, the possible motives for such complicity are rooted in a power-political analysis of Pakistan's relative regional position combined with a historic distrust of the United States as an ally of questionable reliability. In this context, the RAND report's assertion, while in itself not supported by anything more than anecdotal evidence, may be seen as fitting with both previously existing and subsequent reports.

b. Can you discuss the report's findings on the relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taliban?

The RAND report cites evidence of some coordination among the myriad insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, asserting that Al Qaeda has been an important enabler of the Afghan Taliban movement, and has provided training facilities and a model for some Taliban tactics, including suicide bombing: Al Qaeda has "played a critical role in the insurgency as a force multiplier, assisting insurgent groups such as the Taliban at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels."⁸ Pro-Taliban tribal militants in western Pakistan also are said to have provided Al Qaeda with operational and financial support. At the same time, however, the report notes that Al Qaeda's strategic goals — including re-establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East — are much broader than are those of the Taliban, which generally limit themselves to seeking regime change in Kabul and/or Islamabad.

The report's conclusions with regard to the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda appear to fit well with previously existing literature. Although the admixture of anti-Western militant groups involved in the Afghan insurgency is a complex and murky one, there is little credible doubt that the post-2001 iteration of Al Qaeda has played an important role in facilitating and sustaining the Afghan Taliban insurgency.

c. Does the government of Pakistan share with the United States, the same view of the threat posed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban?

It is useful to make a clear distinction between the Taliban and Al Qaeda in this regard. Most observers agree that the Pakistani government views Al Qaeda as representing a serious threat to the Pakistani state and its regional and global interests. Pakistani authorities claim to have captured some 700 Al Qaeda suspects and remanded most of these to U.S. custody.⁹ However, despite clear successes in disrupting Al Qaeda and affiliated networks in Pakistan since 2001, there are numerous signs that Al Qaeda is resurgent on Pakistani territory, with anti-U.S. terrorists appearing to have benefitted from what some analysts call a Pakistani policy of appeasement in western tribal areas near the Afghan border. By negotiating peace deals with pro-Taliban leaders in these areas, the Musharraf government may inadvertently have allowed foreign (largely Arab) militants to obtain safe haven from which they can plot and train for terrorist attacks against U.S. and other Western targets.¹⁰

⁸ Ibid., p. 37-38 and 62.

⁹ "Musharraf: Bhutto Knew of Risks" (interview), *CBS News*, January 6, 2008.

¹⁰ "Foreign Fighters of Harsher Bent Bolster Taliban," *New York Times*, October 30, 2007.

Yet Pakistan's mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Taliban elements operating from its territory. The "Kandahari clique" reportedly operates not from Pakistan's tribal areas, but from populated areas in and around the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta. Many analysts believe that Pakistan's intelligence services know the whereabouts of these Afghan Taliban leadership elements and likely even maintain active contacts with them at some level as part of a hedge strategy in the region, as noted above. Reports continue to indicate that elements of Pakistan's major intelligence agency and military forces aid the Taliban and other extremist forces as a matter of policy. Such support may even include providing training and fire support for Taliban offensives.¹¹ Thus, an apparent disconnect exists between U.S. and Pakistani perceptions of the relative threat posed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban.

3. **It goes without saying that there is enormous complexity in terms of the groups operating in this lawless region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. You have different groups operating in the FATA, the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, other sectarian groups.**

a. **Which ones do you work against first?**

As discussed above, non-indigenous religious militants in western Pakistan, primarily Arabs, are identified as representing the most direct and immediate threat to U.S. national security. Any persons or groups aspiring to attack the U.S. homeland or U.S. facilities and/or nationals abroad may be viewed as deserving priority attention from U.S. security forces and agencies.

b. **How do you prioritize?**

Most analysts suggest a rank-ordering of perceived U.S. enemies in western Pakistan based upon the extent to which such enemies have the intention and capacity to attack U.S. nationals, facilities, and, more broadly, interests. As noted in the previous answer, elements that aspire to attack the U.S. homeland and/or U.S. civilians abroad are viewed as representing the priority threat. Thus, Al Qaeda and affiliated international jihadi organizations tend to top the list. Next are Islamist militants who threaten the stability of U.S.-allied governments in both Kabul and Islamabad. These groups, which fall under the generalized label of "Taliban," often mix with criminal elements involved in narcotics trade. At another level are Islamist extremist groups focused on Kashmir and anti-India activities. Perhaps least threatening to immediate U.S. interests are Pakistani sectarian groups that engage in terrorist acts, mostly against Pakistan's Shia Muslim minority, but that are seen to pose only a secondary threat to the stability and integrity of the Pakistani state.

4. **In your view, what elements of U.S. national power are being under-utilized in addressing the problems posed by militancy and poverty in the FATA?**

U.S. public diplomacy has been largely ineffective in post-2001 Pakistan, save for a brief period in the final months of 2005 (with a major earthquake in northern Pakistan and ensuing U.S. humanitarian aid deliveries). Numerous analysts see the "U.S. brand" suffering

¹¹ See, for example, Ashley Tellis, "Pakistan's Mixed Record on Anti-Terrorism" (interview), February 6, 2008, at [<http://www.cfr.org/publication/15424>]; "Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan," *Salon.com*, March 10, 2008.

when the Pakistani people (and other foreigners) are unable to clearly apprehend the human aspect of U.S. aid efforts. Many Pakistan-watchers argue that it could be useful to better target U.S. assistance programs in such a way that they more effectively and more directly benefit the country's citizens. Some analysts call for improving America's image in Pakistan by making U.S. aid more visible to ordinary Pakistanis.¹²

5. To what extent do Pakistan in general and the FATA in particular have the absorptive capacity to effectively use large increases in U.S. economic and development aid as is being proposed by some in Congress?

Absorptive capacity is identified as a serious problem in Pakistan, one that has and likely will continue to hinder U.S. and other foreign donor efforts in that country. Capacity is greatest in the areas of Pakistan that need development aid the least, for example, in Punjab. In the poorer regions where USAID is most active — in Sindh, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and the FATA — capacity-building projects may be needed to precede more substantive development programs. USAID recognizes this problem and is undertaking to strengthen the capacity of the Pakistani government and non-government institutions

to plan, implement and monitor programs at the regional, agency and community level; to improve coordination between security and development organizations; to strengthen communications; and to increase the ability of FATA-based civil society organizations to contribute to development.¹³

Yet there are ongoing concerns that large disbursements of U.S. aid could result in the enrichment of elements unfriendly to U.S. interests, especially in the FATA. USAID has identified “governance deficiencies” that could make sustainable aid delivery extremely difficult, if not impossible. Some analysts suggest that political reform is the key to improving the situation, the assumption being that the effective writ of the Pakistani state is a requirement for meaningful aid delivery in the poorest and most troubled areas.¹⁴

6. Some analysts argue that the multi-year U.S. plan to help train and equip Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps is unlikely to transform that organization into an effective counterinsurgency force. Do you see any potential problems in this regard or are you confident that we will see a future Frontier Corps better able to help in stabilizing the Pakistan-Afghanistan border?

The Bush Administration has launched an initiative to strengthen the capacity of the Frontier Corps (FC), an 80,000-man paramilitary force overseen by the Pakistani Interior Ministry. The FC has primary responsibility for border security in the NWFP and Baluchistan provinces. Some \$400 million in U.S. aid is slated to go toward training and equipping more than 8,000 FC troops by mid-2010.¹⁵

¹² See, for example, Lisa Curtis, “Denying Terrorists Safe Haven in Pakistan,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1981, October 26, 2006.

¹³ See [<http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2008/pr080110.html>].

¹⁴ “Aid to Pakistan in Tribal Areas Raises Concerns,” *New York Times*, July 16, 2007.

¹⁵ “Pakistani Discord Undercuts Vow to U.S. to Fight Militants,” *New York Times*, March 16, 2008; (continued...)

Given that FC recruits predominantly are ethnic Pashtuns and Pashto-speakers who are locally recruited, the FC operates with the advantage of being a largely indigenous force (as opposed to the Punjabi-dominated regular Pakistan army that often is regarded as an invading force in tribal regions). Yet this aspect has a distinct potential downside, as such locals are more likely to sympathize with their Pashtun brethren, perhaps even to the extent of sharing some of their pro-Taliban sentiments. Moreover, structural deficiencies within the FC may preclude effective capacity building.¹⁶ Reports continue to indicate that elements of Pakistan's paramilitary forces aid the Taliban and other extremists forces as a matter of policy. Such support may even include providing training and fire support for Taliban offensives. Other reports suggest that U.S. military personnel are unable to rely on the Pakistani military for battlefield support and do not trust FC units, whom some say are active facilitators of militant infiltration into Afghanistan. At least one senior U.S. Senator has questioned the wisdom of providing U.S. aid to a group that is ineffective, at best, and may even be providing support to "terrorists." Some reports suggest that distrust aggravated by a June 2008 U.S. airstrike on Pakistani territory may further jeopardize the FC program.¹⁷ In the context of these concerns, some observers urge greater focus on reorienting Pakistan's regular armed forces toward counterinsurgency missions.¹⁸ As professional soldiers under the full administrative and operational control of the Defense Ministry, such forces could be expected to exhibit better discipline and loyalty.

¹⁵ (...continued)

"Culture, Politics Hinder U.S. Effort to Bolster Pakistan Border Forces," *Washington Post*, March 30, 2008.

¹⁶ One former Pakistani police official, opines that, without fundamental structural reforms, the prospects for meaningfully improving Frontier Corps capabilities are dim. Among his recommended changes are the appointment of more local tribesmen into command positions and a restoration of the authority of local political agents (Hassan Abbas, "Transforming Pakistan's Frontier Corps," *Terrorism Monitor*, March 29, 2007).

¹⁷ "Border Complicates War in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, April 4, 2008; "Democrat Questions US Aid to Pakistan," Associated Press, May 27, 2008; "Pakistani Fury Over Airstrikes Imperils Training," *New York Times*, June 18, 2008.

¹⁸ "Sen. Carl Levin and Sen. Bob Casey Hold a News Conference on Their Trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan," *CQ Transcriptions*, June 3, 2008.

**Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Ms. Curtis
From Senator Thomas R. Carper**

**“Addressing the U.S.- Pakistan Strategic Relationship”
(June 12, 2008)**

1. I wanted first to ask all of you to go into detail about last night’s U.S. air and artillery strikes that apparently killed 11 Pakistani paramilitary soldiers during a clash with insurgents on the Afghan-Pakistan border. This raises concerns about the already strained relationship we have with Pakistan at the moment. Ms. Curtis, please start us off. How did it happen, and what does the U.S. need to do to move forward more cooperatively?

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Pakistan, and Afghanistan conducted a joint inquiry into the June 10th incident in which U.S. air strikes killed 11 troops of the Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps. The results of that inquiry have not yet been made public. Coalition ground forces in Afghanistan apparently called in air support after coming under fire from positions on the Pakistani side of the border near the town of Gora Prai in the Mohmand tribal agency. Around eight militants were killed in the air strikes, in addition to the Pakistani paramilitary forces. Media reports indicate that the preliminary results of the investigation showed U.S. databases did not include information on any Pakistani border post at the location where the Pakistani soldiers were hit. Pakistani military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas disputed this claim, saying the information on the post’s location had been shared with the U.S. military.

Despite the lack of agreement between the parties to the investigation on the cause of the incident, all sides have decided to resume cooperation and to move ahead with improved coordination, communication, and operational awareness.

As coalition forces engage in more aggressive military operations closer to the Afghan-Pakistani border, it is essential that the two sides closely coordinate their operations. Pakistani forces also must act aggressively against Taliban militants once they cross into Pakistani territory. It is impossible to combat the Taliban insurgency effectively without the ability to strike at Taliban who cross over into Pakistan. The U.S. has taken steps to improve coordination along the border by opening border coordination centers (BCCs) that are staffed by coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani officers who share intelligence and coordinate border activities. At the end of March, the first BCC opened at Torkham Gate, a critical crossing point through the Khyber Pass. The U.S. also has designated staff positions at the both the U.S. Embassies in Afghanistan and Pakistan that will focus solely on coordinating border activities between Afghanistan and Pakistan. While positive steps, these efforts alone will not stem the Taliban’s ability to cross back and forth across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

The establishment of a U.S. Presidential envoy that focuses on promoting better overall relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan could improve the diplomatic dynamics between the

neighboring countries, which in turn could result in greater border coordination and a more sustained effort by Pakistani forces to crack down on the Taliban on their side of the border.

Media reports indicate the U.S. is considering allowing U.S. soldiers greater flexibility to operate against al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory, including sending U.S. Special Forces into the Pakistani tribal areas to hit high-value targets. Without advance notice to the Pakistani leadership, such action would be considered hostile and likely lead to a severe deterioration in U.S.-Pakistan relations.

2. What is your broad assessment of the outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 2001? What aspects of our policy have been most successful in serving the national interests of both the U.S. and Pakistan? What aspects would you change?

U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 9/11 have been somewhat short-sighted and lacking in vision. U.S. officials have often failed to understand the broader political picture in Pakistan and to leverage U.S. influence and assistance effectively. During the last 18 months, however, senior U.S. officials have focused greater attention on Pakistan and thus have begun to improve U.S. policymaking toward Pakistan.

The U.S. made a mistake in not convincing Pakistan to break all ties to the Taliban and other related militant groups directly following the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. instead rewarded and praised Pakistan for apprehending key al-Qaeda leaders in the period from 2002 – 2005, while ignoring the Pakistan government's lax attitude toward the Taliban and other terrorist groups focused on Kashmir. Despite information that clearly demonstrated al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other Kashmiri groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba had operational ties, trained together, and supported the same anti-West pan-Islamic objectives, the U.S. failed to convince Pakistan to crack down on all of these groups. The international community and Pakistan now face a more serious terrorist threat in Pakistan's Tribal Areas, where various militant groups loosely coordinate their activities and increasingly challenge the writ of the Pakistani government.

The Bush Administration was slow in backing the civilian political parties and the transition to democracy in Pakistan, which caused the U.S. to lose support from the broader Pakistani public. When the U.S. finally decided to support a transition to democracy in 2007, it did so by working to facilitate a deal between Benazir Bhutto and President Musharraf that would allow her to return to Pakistani politics and him to remain in a position of power. The U.S. should have kept a greater distance from the behind-the-scenes deal-making between the two leaders, however. The U.S. should have engaged openly with both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and called publicly for the return of all major political players to Pakistan as part of the transition to democracy. U.S. policy toward Pakistan began to shift in the fall of 2007 and played a more positive role in convincing Musharraf to shed his military uniform. The U.S. should stay as removed as possible from the current political machinations in Pakistan involving the coalition government's attempts to oust Musharraf.

The U.S. will likely foster better relations with Pakistan and encourage greater stability in the country if it focuses U.S. aid programs toward the civil sector and grassroots of society. Much of

the assistance provided to Pakistan over the last six years has been either in the form of a direct cash transfer to the Pakistani government or for military equipment aimed at improving Pakistan's conventional war capabilities. The U.S. should increase the size of the USAID mission in Pakistan so that it can effectively administer large-scale aid programs in health, education, agriculture, power, and other programs that directly benefit average Pakistanis.

3. First, the RAND study, released this past Monday, reported continued support by Pakistani government agencies of the Taliban. Can you address the report's accusation that Pakistani intelligence is providing support to Taliban operations? Second, can you discuss the report's findings on the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban? Third, does the government of Pakistan share with the United States, the same view of the threat posed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban?

The RAND report identifies the following Pakistani motivations for failing to crack down on Taliban elements operating on Pakistani territory: a desire to balance against Indian power in the region, to hedge against a potential U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, and to preempt irredentist tendencies among Pashtuns living along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. The RAND report also asserts that some former and active Pakistani government officials from the Inter-Services intelligence (ISI) and Frontier Corps provided logistical support to the Taliban and helped train Taliban and other insurgents for operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir. It further states that ISI operatives have tipped off Taliban forces about locations and movements of coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Several senior U.S. diplomats, military officials, and close observers of the region have made similar assessments as those found in the RAND report. A key question is whether such activity is sanctioned at the highest levels of the Pakistan Army. Another key question relates to whether the Taliban is able to find sanctuary on Pakistani territory primarily through active support from the Pakistani authorities or through lack of a strategic policy aimed at uprooting their bases. According to former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neuman, U.S. military commanders have observed firsthand the incoherent approach of Pakistan military officers toward the Taliban in the Tribal Areas. Neuman attributed the Pakistani Army's ineffectiveness to either "fear of the individual [Taliban] commanders" or sheer "absence of policy."

Since some of these terrorists now directly target the Pakistani state, there appears to be a certain degree of confusion among the Pakistani authorities on who constitutes the enemy. This also is a result of Pakistan's long-held policy of supporting some militant groups to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir and confronting others under U.S. pressure.

The Taliban, which ruled Afghanistan from 1996 – 2001, harbored al Qaeda terrorists, who orchestrated the September 11, 2001, attacks on America, and continue to plot, plan, and conduct attacks across the globe from a safe haven in Pakistani Pashtun areas along the border with Afghanistan. The Taliban's links with al Qaeda remain close: one of al Qaeda's top priorities is helping the Taliban in its fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan, while Taliban support for al Qaeda is critical to its survival in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. Taliban and al Qaeda forces train together and coordinate strategies to spread an extremist brand of Islam through violence and destruction.

Pakistan does not appear to share the same view as the U.S. regarding the threat posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Many within the Pakistani security establishment likely view the Taliban as a strategic asset that may again serve Pakistan's purposes in Afghanistan. These individuals view the Taliban as separate from al-Qaeda and believe the Taliban is a legitimate force in Afghanistan. The U.S. is partially responsible for perpetuating this view as it failed to insist that Pakistani authorities crack down on the Taliban directly following 9/11, even after it was clear the Taliban had no intention of breaking ties with al-Qaeda. Author Roy Gutman writes in his 2008 book, *How We Missed the Story: Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan*, that "pursuing patient diplomacy with the Taliban in 1999--even after top U.S. officials knew that bin Laden had effectively hijacked the regime...sent a signal of indecision and weakness to both Mullah Omar and bin Laden." The U.S. blundered by underestimating the symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and it would be a mistake to allow Pakistani officials to continue to perpetuate the same fallacy of thinking.

According to recent media reports, the U.S. sent a senior U.S. intelligence official to Pakistan in mid-July to confront Pakistani authorities about their links to Jalaluddin Haqqani's terrorist network. Haqqani has long-standing ties to militant activity and is powerful among the Pashtuns in this region and Pakistan has worked with him in the past toward its own objectives. The U.S. up until now has avoided putting pressure on Pakistan to crack down on the Haqqani network and focused instead on obtaining Pakistani cooperation against the al-Qaeda leadership. However, as U.S. casualties mount in Afghanistan and with revelations about the role of Haqqani's madrassahs in training and deploying suicide bombers to Afghanistan, the Bush Administration may now assess it is imperative that Pakistan break all ties to the Haqqani network and assist the US in defeating it. This is a true test for Pakistan. If Pakistan were to assist the U.S. in breaking up the Haqqani network, it would dispel international doubts about Pakistan's commitment to countering terrorism. Pakistan is likely reluctant to move against Haqqani because 1) it would bring an unpredictable situation in Afghanistan in which Pakistan could not ensure its interests would be protected and 2) it would likely lead to a severe backlash against the Pakistani state.

4. It goes without saying that there is enormous complexity in terms of the groups operating in this lawless region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. You have different groups operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, other sectarian groups. Which ones do you work against first? How do you prioritize?

Stabilizing and securing the Tribal Areas will take a long-term, multi-dimensional approach. The first priority for the U.S. and Pakistan should be to decapitate the terrorist leadership in the region, i.e. those who are directing attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan and involved in spearheading international terrorism. This will require greater U.S. access to the region and better intelligence cooperation between U.S. and Pakistani forces. Further details on recommendations for stabilizing the Tribal Areas can be found in my written testimony for the hearing.

5. In your view, what elements of U.S. national power are being under-utilized in addressing the problems posed by militancy and poverty in the FATA?

The U.S. has initiated a small-scale assistance program for the FATA that will soon be augmented to substantial levels. This is a positive initiative that will demonstrate U.S. support for the people of the region. Ensuring security for the aid personnel will be a significant issue and could limit the scope of the U.S. assistance program, especially if an attack occurs. The U.S. should more actively encourage political reform in the FATA so that the people of the region can be more fully integrated into the institutions of the Pakistani state and take part in the political process.

6. To what extent do Pakistanis in general and the FATA in particular have the absorptive capacity to effectively use large increases in U.S. economic and development aid as is being proposed by some in Congress?

Security for aid personnel is the main concern. Some of the U.S. assistance is focused on expanding capacity within the FATA institutions. The U.S. will need to significantly augment the aid mission in Peshawar if it wants to have a noticeable impact in providing social uplift to the impoverished tribal areas.

7. Is there any recent evidence of Pakistani intelligence or military officials supporting terrorist elements in acquiring or training to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons technology?

I am not aware of any recent information in this regard, but see response to question number 8 for information related to a 2001 case.

8. What is the biggest threat to a secure nuclear arsenal in Pakistan? For example, is it a threat by terrorists or other militants, a military coup, leakage of nuclear material or expertise? Could you address the nature of the threat from Pakistan's nuclear weapons and how best to keep them out of the hands of terrorists?

When it comes to preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear bombs, the most worrisome trend in Pakistan is the links between some retired military and intelligence officials and nuclear scientists to Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists. Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet reports in his memoirs that A.Q. Khan rebuffed several approaches by Osama bin Laden for access to nuclear know-how. Although A.Q. Khan avoided engaging al-Qaeda on nuclear issues, earlier revelations about a group of former Pakistani military officials and nuclear scientists who met with Osama bin Laden around the time of 9/11 remind us of the continuing threat of the intersection of terrorism and nuclear weapons in Pakistan. On October 23, 2001, acting on an American request, Pakistani authorities detained Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed, two retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) officials. They had been involved in relief work in Afghanistan since their retirement from the PAEC in 1999 through a non-governmental organization (NGO) they established called Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN). In November 2001, the coalition forces found documents in Afghanistan relating to the UTN's

interest in biological weapons. This prompted Pakistani security forces to arrest seven members of the UTN's board, most of whom were retired Pakistani Army officials and nuclear scientists.

George Tenet speculates in his memoirs that UTN's contacts with the Taliban and al-Qaeda may have been supported by some elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. Tenet says Pakistani interrogations of the seven board members were initially insufficient. He further notes that despite CIA warnings to Pakistani officials about UTN's activities before 9/11, it was only when President Bush dispatched him to Pakistan in November 2001 following revelations of a meeting between Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and UTN leaders that Musharraf took serious action.

U.S. policy should therefore focus specifically on nuclear safety and security cooperation with Pakistan, especially efforts to prevent the penetration of the nuclear establishment over time by individuals sympathetic to al-Qaeda goals. Despite Pakistan's arguments that its nuclear weapons are safely guarded, the U.S. must construct and implement policies that proactively thwart the unwelcome possibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands.

9. How credible do you find the Pakistani government's disavowal of any knowledge of A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities, especially in light of his recanting his confession? Please explain. What efforts is the U.S. government making to gain access to Dr. Khan or to have the Pakistani government respond to these allegations?

Pakistani authorities for a long time dragged their feet in investigating the case of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. U.S. officials had repeatedly raised their concern about A.Q. Khan's activities with President Musharraf, but it was not until Washington provided indisputable proof of its knowledge of Khan's activities and threatened to go public with the information in late 2003 that Musharraf took direct action to halt Khan's activities.

Even after details emerged on the tremendous damage done by the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, there was no formal prosecution of the Pakistani associates of Khan, and Khan himself is merely under house arrest. Pakistani leaders claim they cannot formally prosecute Khan or allow him to be questioned by U.S. or international authorities because of the hero status he enjoys for contributing to the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. More likely, they are worried that an independent probe could reveal information about Pakistani official links to Khan's activities.

According to Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Editor of "Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks," Pakistani government involvement with A.Q. Khan's activities range along a continuum. In the North Korea case, he says there was very clearly Pakistani government involvement. In the case of Iran, however, he said it is difficult to determine whether the Pakistani government sanctioned the nuclear sale.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Mr. Krepon
From Senator Thomas R. Carper

"Addressing the U.S.- Pakistan Strategic Relationship"
(June 12, 2008)

* I wanted first to ask all of you to go into detail about last night's U.S. air and artillery strikes that apparently killed 11 Pakistani paramilitary soldiers during a clash with insurgents on the Afghan-Pakistan border. This raises concerns about the already strained relationship we have with Pakistan at the moment.

* What is your broad assessment of the outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 2001?

* What aspects of our policy have been most successful in serving the national interests of both the U.S. and Pakistan?

A: The biggest positive shift came early in the Bush administration: After the 9/11 attacks, the administration succeeded in redirecting Pakistani policy away from its support to the Taliban. Pakistan also provided significant support in the hunt for al Qaeda leadership living in settled areas (but not in tribal areas). I would also credit the first Bush administration in improving bilateral ties with both Pakistan and India.

* What aspects would you change?

A: The second Bush administration has made unfortunate decisions with respect to South Asia policy. It expended significant time and effort to forge a questionable nuclear cooperation agreement with India - time and effort that could have been spent working on pressing problems within Pakistan, and on improving Pakistan-Indian ties. During this period, the Bush administration pursued a Musharraf policy, rather than a Pakistan policy. As Musharraf's fortunes declined because of poor decisions on his part, U.S. influence within the country declined. It is also telling that the restructuring of US-Pakistani military assistance programs to focus on counter-terrorism did not occur until the very end of the Bush administration.

* It goes without saying that there is enormous complexity in terms of the groups operating in this lawless region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. You have different groups operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, other sectarian groups.

* Which ones do you work against first?

A. I do not feel qualified to answer questions dealing with FATA.

* How do you prioritize?

* In your view, what elements of U.S. national power are being under-utilized in addressing the problems posed by militancy and poverty in the FATA?

* To what extent do Pakistan in general and the FATA in particular have the absorptive capacity to effectively use large increases in U.S. economic and development aid as is being proposed by some in Congress?

* Is there any recent evidence of Pakistani intelligence or military officials supporting terrorist elements in acquiring or training to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons technology?

A. None that I am aware of.

* What is the biggest threat to a secure nuclear arsenal in Pakistan? For example, is it a threat by terrorists or other militants, a military coup, leakage of nuclear material or expertise?

A. In my view, the biggest threats to nuclear security in Pakistan are domestic political instability and a significant crisis with neighboring India.

* FOLLOW-UP: Could you address the nature of the threat from Pakistan's nuclear weapons and how best to keep them out of the hands of terrorists?

A. My testimony pretty much sums up what could be said in the public domain on this matter.

* Please describe your knowledge of the Pakistani government's involvement in nuclear and missile proliferation activities?

A. In my view, the best public account of A. Q. Khan's misdeeds was prepared by the International Institute of Strategic Studies. This account is probably incomplete, however. The complicity of senior Pakistani leaders in proliferation transfers - that of Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Army Chiefs - has not been persuasively confirmed, but it can be inferred, at least in some cases.

* In your view, how effective has U.S. policy been in stopping or reducing these activities? If not, how should our policy be changed?

A. AQ Khan was on intelligence community watch lists even before he absconded from Holland with centrifuge designs in the mid-1970s. The damage he generated over the next thirty years could have been prevented by apprehending and trying him when he was working in Europe. The lesson I draw here is that prompt action in dealing with proliferation risks can be far better than waiting to build a stronger case.

* How credible do you find the Pakistani government's disavowal of any knowledge of A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities, especially in light of his recanting his confession? Please explain.

A. AQ Khans recent public statements and the Pakistani government's disavowals cannot be taken at face value. Khan has scores to settle, and he is not a reliable witness. Some of what he says may be true; some fictional. Pakistani government leaders understand the risks of reopening these cases.

* FOLLOW-UP: What efforts is the U.S. government making to gain access to Dr. Khan or to have the Pakistani government respond to these allegations?

A. This question should be directed at U.S. officials.

* How secure are Pakistani government controls on its nuclear weapons arsenal and facilities?

A. As discussed in my testimony, controls have definitely improved, but no nation - including the United States - can be satisfied or complacent about nuclear safety and security. There is always room for improvement.

* FOLLOW-UP: What type of assistance could the U.S. government offer to better secure Pakistan's nuclear facilities that are consistent with our nonproliferation principles and obligations under the Nuclear-Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)?

A. I would refer you to my testimony.

* What consideration has been OR should be given to linking continued U.S. military assistance to the Pakistani government to providing more information on its knowledge of the A.Q. Khan network?

A. A restructured and redesigned U.S. military assistance effort that is focused on helping to improve Pakistan's counter-terrorism activity should not, in my view, be held hostage to AQ Khan's past practices.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to Mr. Michael Krepon
From Senator Daniel K. Akaka

"Addressing the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Relationship"
June 12, 2008

1. You state that your sense is that security practices at sensitive nuclear sites have been upgraded.

Can you please explain this in more detail?

A. Pakistani officials have publicly stated that they have incorporated lessons learned from briefings provided on U.S. personnel reliability programs and practices. Effective screening of security personnel is essential to guard against the "insider" threat. Under the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program, the United States has provided unclassified sensors and technologies to help improve perimeter security at sensitive sites. In recent years, the executive and legislative branches have wisely agreed to expand the geographical scope of these efforts beyond the former Soviet Union.

2. You imply that Pakistan is willing to accept U.S. advice and assistance concerning the security of their nuclear assets and export controls as long as it is provided at a "safe distance."

What, if anything, can the U.S. do to gain Pakistan's trust in this area?

A. This is a very hard question. The answer is linked to what goes on in the FATA, for starters. U.S. military strikes on Pakistani soil are likely to continue as long as Pakistani authorities cannot or do not control this territory, and as long as al Qaeda and Taliban forces use this land to plan and execute attacks elsewhere. The very mixed record of US-Pakistani military to military cooperation is unlikely to yield a sufficient degree of trust for US government or military personnel to gain close proximity to Pakistan's nuclear assets to engage in Nunn-Lugar-type activities.

3. What do you think of Dr. Cohen's suggestion that we support Pakistan's civilian nuclear program in exchange for greater security assurances?

A. I think that U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan would be most effective if it focused on the provision of basic necessities - food, water, and power. Nuclear energy is a very expensive way to provide electricity, and it takes the better part of a decade for new construction of a nuclear power plant to turn on a light bulb. I am not, therefore, enthusiastic about offering a nuclear deal to Pakistan.

4. You've spent considerable time in both India and Pakistan. What is your recommendation on what they U.S. should be doing that it is not doing to reduce the possibility of armed nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India?

A. The US government has not done very much to promote a Kashmir settlement. One way to do so would be to offer economic assistance to promote a Greater Kashmir Development Authority to improve the quality of life for those residing on both sides of the Kashmir divide.

Responses by Dr. Stephen P. Cohen, to post-hearing¹ questions for the record from Senator Thomas R. Carper

July 21, 2008

Recent strikes on Pakistan, and strains in US Pakistan relations:

Since we discussed this event over a month ago there have been some new developments. There are claims, and denials, of faulty map coordinates regarding that attack, of inadequate US-Pakistan consultation, and even more alarming, there was a serious bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul which India and Afghanistan blame on Pakistan. With a weak government in Afghanistan, a new one in Pakistan, (and probably India in the near future), the region has again demonstrated its volatility, only this time there are US forces directly involved. As these events show, each attack and atrocity is followed by another, and this is likely to continue as long as our attempts to eliminate al Qaeda and the Taliban are hampered by political fragility, the India-Pakistan rivalry (which has been evident in Afghanistan for many decades), and our own failure to provide adequate political and military resources for the Afghan war.

Assessment of US policies towards Pakistan since 2001: What aspects of our policy have been most successful in serving the national interests of both the U.S. and Pakistan? What aspects would you change?

The Bush administration properly lifted sanctions against Pakistan after it came to office, but it failed to address, let alone take seriously, Pakistan's political incoherence. We did not realize soon enough how deeply Pakistan's domestic crisis was, we treated General Musharraf as a great statesman and nation-builder when he was in well over his head, and we tragically ignored Pakistan's centrist secular parties until quite recently. We did provide large quantities of military aid, which permitted us to operate from Pakistan in Afghanistan, and perhaps from Afghanistan into Pakistan, but until very recently we did not make this aid conditional, nor did we provide adequate support for Pakistan's once-thriving civil society, the mainstream parties, and its educational efforts. We did not take the driving engine behind Pakistan's meddling in Afghanistan, a fear of encirclement by India, seriously. Some of these policies are now being reconsidered, and Sen. Biden's bill would go a long way to put our policy regarding Pakistan on a sounder footing, but unless we think about root causes, Pakistan will be unresponsive. A recent article in *The New York Times* captures well the difficulty of working with Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the ISI,² I would conclude that unless there is a change in ISI's direction (which means one in the army as a whole), our efforts to reorient Pakistan, so that it becomes a better partner in our effort to counter the Taliban and its al Qaeda ally, will fail. Sensible Pakistanis understand this, and are fearful that the entire state of Pakistan will slowly come under radical Islamist influence.

¹ "Addressing the U.S.- Pakistan Strategic Relationship" (June 12, 2008)

² See Mark Mazzetti, "When Spies Don't Play Well with Their Allies", *The New York Times*, July 20, 2008.

Regarding the groups operating in NWFP and FATA, which ones do you work against first? How do you prioritize?

Our main enemy is al Qaeda, but it is now intermixed with Pashtun radical Islamists (the Taliban). I doubt that we can get at one without going after the other, but that would require full cooperation on the part of Pakistan's secular Pashtun parties and the army (which is largely Punjabi, and ethnically quite alien to the Frontier and FATA). The present Pakistan government is trying to work with its coalition partner, the Awami National Party (a secular Pashtun party), but I am not optimistic that this will show results in the short run, and in any case the current coalition in Islamabad is under attack for price rises, violence, and political incoherence. I think this will get worse before it gets better.

What elements of U.S. national power are being under-utilized in addressing the problems posed by militancy and poverty in the FATA?

I have not been to NWFP and FATA in recent years, but would defer to Dr. Daniel Markey and other experts on this question.³

To what extent do Pakistan in general and the FATA in particular have the absorptive capacity to effectively use large increases in U.S. economic and development aid as is being proposed by some in Congress?

Regretfully, under Musharraf and his military predecessors (but also under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), Pakistan's core administrative competence was further degraded, and I would be wary of pumping huge amounts of money into Pakistan in the form of economic and developmental aid without careful monitoring. As I noted in my testimony, such aid can be seen as the modern-day version of a subsidy to a state's rulers and elite, but in this case it should be given for purposes of real development. We need to work with Pakistan to re-establish administrative competency, but also with our friends and allies in a collaborative assessment of whether or not this assistance is effective, or simply being recycled into military budgets or private bank accounts.

Is there any recent evidence of Pakistani intelligence or military officials supporting terrorist elements in acquiring or training to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons technology?

None that I know of.

What is the biggest threat to a secure nuclear arsenal in Pakistan? For example, is it a threat by terrorists or other militants, a military coup, leakage of nuclear material or expertise?

My answers to Sen. Akaka contains a detailed response to this question, but I would say that a) it is hard to estimate the overall level of threat, b) they are all about the same, whatever that level

³ See Daniel Markey, "Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt", CSR No. 36, Council on Foreign Relations Press, July 2008 (http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Pakistan_CSR36.pdf).

is, and c) we also need to worry about deliberate state transfer or sharing of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology, especially to states in the Persian Gulf after Iran moves closer to becoming a nuclear weapons state.

***FOLLOW-UP:* Could you address the nature of the threat from Pakistan's nuclear weapons and how best to keep them out of the hands of terrorists?**

See above, and responses to Sen. Akaka.

Please describe your knowledge of the Pakistani government's involvement in nuclear and missile proliferation activities?

It is difficult to answer this question in detail here, but it is likely that at one point proliferation activities were sanctioned by high-level officials, and subsequently were tolerated, but not encouraged. This complicity inhibits a full Pakistani disclosure of its proliferation activities.

In your view, how effective has U.S. policy been in stopping or reducing these activities? If not, how should our policy be changed?

In the 1980s we failed to come to terms with the existence of a Pakistani nuclear weapon program and we chose to look the other way rather than endanger the anti-Soviet operations in Afghanistan. I would say that history is repeating itself. We regard the anti-Taliban/al Qaeda war in Afghanistan our first priority with Pakistan, and worry that serious pressure on Pakistan regarding its nuclear program might reduce Pakistani cooperation in the ill-named "War on Terror." As in 1987, both goals are important, but since Pakistan is now a declared and open nuclear weapon state, our policy should be to accept that situation, but in exchange receive a full-accounting of its proliferation activities with other countries.

How credible do you find the Pakistani government's disavowal of any knowledge of A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities, especially in light of his recanting his confession? Please explain.

See above.

***FOLLOW-UP:* What efforts is the U.S. government making to gain access to Dr. Khan or to have the Pakistani government respond to these allegations?**

I have no information on this.

How secure are Pakistani government controls on its nuclear weapons arsenal and facilities?

See my response above and to Sen. Akaka.

***FOLLOW-UP:* What type of assistance could the U.S. government offer to better secure Pakistan's nuclear facilities that are consistent with our nonproliferation principles and obligations under the Nuclear-Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)?**

See my response to Sen. Akaka.

What consideration has been OR should be given to linking continued U.S. military assistance to the Pakistani government to providing more information on its knowledge of the A.Q. Khan network?

None. Our military assistance should be linked to Pakistan's military cooperation against extremist and violent groups, such as the Taliban and al Qaeda, and should be tailored to that kind of war. As an incentive, however, to gain Pakistani cooperation across the board on proliferation matters, and to reveal more of Dr. Khan's activities, we should consider a criteria-based agreement parallel to that we have offered to India.

**Responses by Stephen P. Cohen, to Post-Hearing¹ Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka**

Q1: You mention in your testimony that Pakistan's home-grown nuclear personnel reliability program could be circumvented in a determined conspiracy. Could you please explain this in greater detail?

A1: Because the primary public source of information on the personnel reliability program (PRP) comes from those responsible for creating and operating it, we do not have good independent sources. However, from what is known about the Pakistani PRP, plus what we can infer by analogy with other states' programs, they now have a well-designed and well-funded PRP. But no system is fool-proof. The United States recently re-discovered this in the case of our mishandling of nuclear warheads and other high technology devices. Risks fall into three broad categories: first, a danger of infiltration into the PRP, with resultant theft. Second, a danger that there are gaps in the PRP. And third, that the political and military framework within which the PRP operates will be transformed. The danger of infiltration of radical elements into the PRP for purposes of theft or misuse of nuclear warheads is impossible to evaluate with precision, but it is in Pakistan's own interest that the risk be kept low; we can ensure that it will be kept low by indicating that we hold Pakistan responsible for misuse, theft or other breaches in the PRP.

There may be gaps in the program that we (and the Pakistanis) are not aware of—the only way to find out if this is so is for Pakistan to be more transparent about the PRP. They are reluctant to do this, naturally, because the more open they are, the easier it would be for others to degrade their nuclear system. In this case, a country that is close to Pakistan might assist in the process, especially China, which has a great deal of experience in such matters, although Chinese-like controls, involving the Party's supervision of the military, may not be possible in Pakistan, where the armed forces are more dominant than any political party in this area. A system of service checks and balances might help, but the main Pakistani entity responsible for PRP, the Strategic Plans Division, is already a multi-service entity.

Finally, we can address the third risk, that the political and strategic context of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program falls into disarray. There could be another war with India, the political system might further deteriorate, with separatist, sectarian, or ideological rivalries coming to the fore. In the long run, the US can assist in the stabilization of Pakistan so that the PRP is not torn apart. This will require a concerted diplomacy, not just assistance to Pakistan's technical control over the warheads and delivery system, and I have addressed this in my testimony and elsewhere.

Q2: You state that no matter how much money we pour into Pakistan, we cannot expect full cooperation on terrorism, normalized relations with India, the prevention of nuclear

¹ "Addressing the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Relationship", June 12, 2008.

proliferation, and the normalization of the FATA. We must pick and choose among our policy goals. What is the top U.S. policy goal with Pakistan?

Q2: I don't want to be pedantic, but we have several "top" policy goals, i.e. there are several interests embedded in our relationship with Pakistan that are of critical, even vital importance (i.e. we might want to use military force to ensure that they are achieved).

First, we are concerned about their nuclear program. I would say we should be more concerned about the Pakistani state's transfer of nuclear weapons to other countries as a matter of state policy than about theft from their arsenals.

Second, we are alarmed about the growing radicalism in Pakistan's frontier regions, which is creeping into the cities.

Third, political instability in Pakistan, even the possible breakup of the state, would further exacerbate the nuclear proliferation problem and might lead to foreign intervention.

Fourth, we need Pakistan's cooperation in our war in Afghanistan, and the two have to be treated as a single strategic problem.

Obviously, these goals cannot all be pursued with the same instruments of policy, and some are short-term while others are more long term. They do imply that we not only work with Pakistan regarding its policies towards nuclear weapons and Afghanistan, but that, as Senator Biden and others have proposed, that we offer Pakistan a long-term strategy of reconstruction and rebuilding that goes beyond military aid. Yet, as I noted in my testimony, we must also be thinking about failure, since we have only addressed Pakistan's long term stability problem seriously in the last few years.

Q3: In your testimony you suggest that a criteria-based nuclear deal with Pakistan may be a way to encourage them to limit and secure their nuclear weapons. Can you please explain this in greater detail? Do you believe that there is any risk that bilateral nuclear arrangements can weaken previously existing multilateral regimes such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? Why or why not?

A3: The NPT should be preserved, but it has three obvious gaps: First, it does not have a place for those states that have acquired nuclear weapons but have not signed the NPT (India, Pakistan, and Israel). The second is that the nuclear weapons states have only slowly begun to fulfill their commitments to reduce their nuclear inventories. The third is that some member states who have violated their treaty obligations have not been sanctioned, or sanctions are too little and perhaps too late to do any good. I would include China in this last category, as well as North Korea and Iran.

A criteria-based arrangement would get around the fact that states that have exploded nuclear devices *after* the treaty went into force cannot be admitted to the NPT. If their proliferation behavior is as good as those NWS who have signed, they should be brought into the global non-proliferation framework, although not the NPT.

By and large the criteria should resemble those embedded in the US-India nuclear deal. A state should not in any way transfer sensitive nuclear material and technology to other states, unless it is part of an internationally verifiable safeguards arrangement for the transfer of civilian technology; it should be as transparent as possible regarding its own military facilities, and totally transparent regarding its civilian ones, and the two should be separated. Finally, its nuclear doctrine should rest on restraint and caution, and it should actively participate in non-NPT multilateral arrangements. I would note that neither India nor Pakistan subscribe to the PSI, but Pakistan has signed up to CSI-like arrangements.

Right now Pakistan is in the midst of a national debate about the disposition of Dr. A.Q. Khan, the man who made Pakistan's enrichment program possible, and who created for himself the role of national savior. We need to get at the truth of what Khan and others have done regarding the spread of nuclear technology; offering Pakistan a criteria-based agreement that falls short of the NPT (which it cannot join in any case), is one way of getting Pakistani compliance with an NPT-like regime. I do not believe that such an arrangement "rewards" Pakistan (or India, in the case of the US-India nuclear agreement) for past behavior, but it helps ensure that it will not go down that road again, and that we have a better understanding of what Pakistan did. Nor do I believe that a criteria-based agreement will increase the incentive of other states to violate their NPT obligations; those that did (Iran, North Korea, perhaps China) were motivated by national security considerations that trumped their treaty obligations. A criteria-based agreement merely sets forth clear standards for future behavior; it has the advantage of helping us understand egregious acts of the past, and better preparing us for future proliferation crises.