[Senate Hearing 110-1071]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-1071
TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL (TWIC) IMPLEMENTATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 12, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman
Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director, and General Counsel
Kenneth R. Nahigian, Republican Deputy Staff Director, and Chief
Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 12, 2007................................... 1
Statement of Senator Carper...................................... 30
Statement of Senator DeMint...................................... 55
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 3
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 5
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 3
Witnesses
Hawley, Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'', Assistant Secretary,
Transportation Security Administration, DHS.................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Himber, Lisa B., Vice President, Maritime Exchange for the
Delaware River and Bay......................................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Pomaikai, Sr., Capt. Paul Kaipo, Assistant Port Captain, Sause
Bros.; on behalf of the American Waterways Operators........... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Rabkin, Norman J., Managing Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, GAO............................................ 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Rodriguez, Michael J., Executive Assistant to the President,
International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, AFL-
CIO............................................................ 47
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Salerno, Brian, Rear Admiral and Director of Inspections and
Compliance, USCG, DHS.......................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Appendix
Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO, prepared statement.......... 64
Passenger Vessel Association, prepared statement................. 62
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell
to:
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley................................ 74
Capt. Paul Kaipo Pomaikai, Sr................................ 89
Norman J. Rabkin............................................. 85
RADM Brian Salerno........................................... 82
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye
to:
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley................................ 67
Lisa B. Himber............................................... 87
Capt. Paul Kaipo Pomaikai, Sr................................ 88
Norman J. Rabkin............................................. 84
Michael J. Rodriguez......................................... 89
RADM Brian Salerno........................................... 81
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg to:
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley................................ 71
Lisa B. Himber............................................... 87
Michael J. Rodriguez......................................... 91
RADM Brian Salerno........................................... 83
Response to written question submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley.................................. 79
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to:
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley................................ 71
Norman J. Rabkin............................................. 85
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. David Vitter to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley.................................. 80
Wells, Ken, President, Offshore Marine Service Association,
prepared statement............................................. 59
TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL (TWIC) IMPLEMENTATION
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 12, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Inouye, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
The Chairman. The Transportation Worker Identification
Credential program, the TWIC, has been under development since
2001, and despite $99.4 million in appropriations from
Congress, unfortunately the program still is languishing at the
Department of Homeland Security.
In our last hearing on this subject about a year ago, we
heard testimony about severe cost over-runs, contract
mismanagement, excessive personnel turnover, poor
communications and ineffective planning. At this hearing, we
will examine whether the Transportation Security Administration
and the United States Coast Guard have taken actions to address
those criticisms.
Additionally, I hope to hear how the agencies plan to
deploy the biometric card enrollment and issuance process, just
as importantly, how the agencies plan to execute the pilot
program for card-reader technology.
While I do not want to dwell on the mistakes of the past,
this Committee needs assurance that the Administration has
taken seriously the mismanagement of the TWIC program. Given
that comprehensive management plan for TWIC required in the
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 is over two years past due, I
can only conclude that the Administration is not taking its
responsibility seriously enough. If the agencies continue to
neglect the basic tenets of contract management and
programmatic planning, failure is certain to follow.
Completion of this program is a crucial step towards
improving the security of our ports. And so, failure is
unacceptable.
When Congress considered the SAFE Port Act, we established
implementation deadlines in consultation with the Department of
Homeland Security. We did not want to impose a set of deadlines
that the agencies would not be able to achieve. Working
collaboratively, we required TWIC enrollment at the Nation's
top ten high-risk ports by July 1, 2007. As of today, we do not
have even the most basic deployment schedule. However, I am
informed that enrollment scheduled to begin in Wilmington,
Delaware, in late March has been postponed until late May, at
best.
We are all concerned that the low estimates of the
population affected by the program are not realistic. This
estimate is significant, in that it will determine the number
of enrollment stations the contractor sets up and the number of
trusted agents the contractor hires to process employees. An
underestimate of the affected population would thus cause a
domino effect, resulting in long wait times at the enrollment
stations, poor customer service, and ultimately a slowing of
the flow of commerce as labor circulates through a clogged
enrollment and card issuance process.
As we move forward with testing and implementing card-
reader technology in the rough maritime environment, the TSA
and the Coast Guard must appropriately balance their multiple
missions of safety, security and efficiency for both facilities
and vessels. The card reader system cannot slow the flow of
commerce through our terminals. The security practices the
Department puts into place cannot compromise crew safety.
I can appreciate the challenges associated with addressing
these divergent issues. It is a difficult balancing act.
However, after six years and $99.4 million, we still do not
have access controls in our ports. I'm certain all agree that
we need to get this program on track, and on schedule, for the
safety and security of our Nation.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inouye follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program
has been under development since 2001 and despite $99.4 million in
appropriations from Congress, it is still languishing at the Department
of Homeland Security.
In our last hearing on this subject almost 1 year ago, we heard
testimony about severe cost-overruns, contract mismanagement, excessive
personnel turnover, poor communications and ineffective planning. At
this hearing, we will examine whether the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and the United States Coast Guard have taken
actions to address those criticisms.
Additionally, I hope to hear how the agencies plan to deploy the
biometric card enrollment and issuance process, and just as
importantly, how the agencies plan to execute the pilot program for
card reader technology.
While I do not want to dwell on the mistakes of the past, this
Committee needs assurance that the Administration has taken seriously
its mismanagement of the TWIC program. Given that the comprehensive
management plan for TWIC required in the Intelligence Reform Act of
2004 is over 2 years past due to Congress, I can only conclude that the
Administration is not taking its responsibility seriously enough. If
the agencies continue to neglect the basic tenets of contract
management and programmatic planning, failure is certain to result.
Completion of this program is a crucial step toward improving the
security of our ports. Failure is unacceptable.
When Congress considered the SAFE Port Act, we established
implementation deadlines in consultation with the Department of
Homeland Security. We did not want to impose a set of deadlines that
the agencies would not be able to achieve. Working collaboratively, we
required TWIC enrollment at the Nation's top ten high risk ports by
July 1, 2007. As of today, we do not have even the most basic
deployment schedule. I am informed that enrollment scheduled to begin
in Wilmington, Delaware, in late March has been postponed until late
May, at best.
I am also concerned that the low estimates of the population
affected by the program are not realistic. This estimate is
significant, in that it will determine the number of enrollment
stations the contractor sets up and the number of trusted agents the
contractor hires to process employees. An underestimate of the affected
population would thus cause a domino effect, resulting in long wait
times at the enrollment stations, poor customer service, and ultimately
a slowing of the flow of commerce as labor circulates through a clogged
enrollment and card issuance process.
As we move forward with testing and implementing card reader
technology in the rough maritime environment, the TSA and the Coast
Guard must appropriately balance their multiple missions of safety,
security and efficiency for both facilities and vessels. The card
reader systems cannot slow the flow of commerce through our terminals.
The security practices the Department puts into place cannot compromise
crew safety.
I can appreciate the challenges associated with addressing these
divergent issues. It is a difficult balancing act. However, after 6
years and $99.4 million, we still do not have access controls in our
ports. We need to get this program on track, and on schedule, for the
safety and security of our Nation.
Senator Stevens?
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have to
leave here almost immediately, but I did want to stop by and
state that I am encouraged that some progress has been made on
this Transportation Worker Identification Credential, TWIC,
since our hearing took place a little over a year ago. In
January, I understand the final rules were issued for the
biometric smart card to be used in the TWIC program. The Coast
Guard is developing a process for expedited temporary clearance
for newly-hired port and vessel workers. And, stakeholders
indicate that communication within the Transportation Security
Administration, TSA, has improved significantly. There is,
however, room for improvement.
Over four years have passed since the first legislative
mandate requiring the development of this program, TWIC. Most
recently, the SAFE Port Act established a timeline for
deployment of the program to begin at 10 ports no later than
July of this year. It is now my understanding that this
statutory deadline, which was developed in coordination with
the Department of Homeland Security and TSA, will likely not be
met.
Our Nation's ability to secure our ports largely rest in
part on our ability to timely verify and identify our port
workers and to prevent unauthorized access to these secure
maritime areas.
Absent this ability, port operations will remain at risk.
The program is a complex undertaking. TSA and the Coast Guard
and others are trying to ensure that we do have secure port
operations. The Congressional tolerance, I'm sure you're aware,
is waning because of the missed deadlines.
I do have to leave, as I said. I look forward to reviewing
the testimony from our witnesses, particularly their
suggestions on how to get the program back on track and keep it
on track.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you. Not to be repetitious, but as I listened to the
Chairman's statement, we are talking about similar things, in
our views, and we can't leave this situation as it is. It
presents too many risks for our society. And, so when we talk
about the failures of the past, it's simply to make sure that
we understand what hasn't taken place that should have taken
place. And, to get an examination of what's required. That's
the most important thing.
The Delaware River port system in South Jersey is the
busiest crude oil tanker port in the United States and it's the
third busiest in the world. The Port of New York and New Jersey
is the largest port on the East Coast and it's the second
busiest container port in the country. And, Northern New
Jersey's port sits alongside an area that has been defined as
the two most dangerous miles in America for terrorism,
according to the FBI.
Now, New Jersey's ports are vital to our region, not only
vital to our region, but our national economies as well. And,
the security of the vessels that dock there, longshoreman who
work there and surrounding communities are even more critical
to me. It's an area that is home to--whether during their
business or residential hours--to approximately 12 million
people. So, we've got to be very arduous in terms of getting
this program underway, it's essential.
The White House has had a chance to demonstrate their
commitment to port security by getting the TWIC program up and
running. But, instead of making this program a success, the
Administration has let it become another example of
mismanagement, poor planning, and neglect of our Nation's
security.
Almost 6 years after 9/11, only 1,700--one thousand seven
hundred--are known to be in the hands of cardholders, that's
after 6 years, almost 6 years. And the Bush Administration has
spent, as the Chairman said in his comments, nearly $100
million administering this program. That, my friends, is nearly
$60,000 a card they've spent.
With so many workers lacking their TWIC cards, the Bush
Administration tried to conduct more basic security measures by
running the names of port workers against the Nation's Terror
Watch List. But, while the Administration did background checks
on dock workers with access to secure areas of the port, they
failed to check truck drivers--so numerous--with access to the
same secure areas of the port.
With the help of Chairman Inouye and Vice Chairman Stevens,
I secured language in last year's SAFE Port Act, to require
them to include truck drivers, to get this right, by January
2007. But, thus far, the law has been ignored by the
Administration. And now, to try and get TWIC back on track, the
Administration wants to charge employees for their IDs, at a
cost of $135 apiece.
Worse still, we have no assurance that our ports will have
the technology to scan these biometric cards, because the
President didn't request any funding for it. This kind of
mismanagement is not fair to our workers, it's not fair to our
ports, it's not fair to our communities, and it's not the level
of security that we need in our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Smith?
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for all your good
work, and for holding this hearing.
I thank our witnesses, also, for being here today. It has
been a long road getting to this point.
When we first mandated the issuance of the biometric
transportation security card, known as TWIC, as part of the
2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act, I was--at that
time--the Ranking Member on the Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Subcommittee. After a hiatus of 4 years, I'm
once again the Ranking Member. And, unfortunately, we're still
dealing with the TWIC program implementation.
No question, there have been mistakes along the way and
it's understandable given all of the difficulties and
complexities of starting up a Department like Homeland
Security. The fact remains, that we're entrusted as stewards of
the public's fiscal resources, and more importantly, in
providing for the safety and security of the American people.
The SAFE Port Act mandated the Transportation Security
Administration rollout the TWIC program at 10 U.S. ports later
this year. The Port of Portland, in my home State of Oregon is
not one of those ports selected for the initial phase, the
roll-out, but I'm told the Port's Maritime Security Manager is
meeting with the TWIC contractor this morning to talk about the
implementation schedule for Portland. So I, along with folks
back home in Oregon, am watching this phase of the roll-out
very closely with the expectation that it will soon be
Portland's turn.
I believe that TWIC is an important program, and it's
important to get it right, so for that reason, I know we're
holding this hearing, and again, I thank you for that, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. This morning we have two
panels, the first panel consists of the Assistant Secretary of
Transportation Security Administration, Mr. Ed ``Kip'' Hawley,
from the United States Coast Guard; Rear Admiral Brian Salerno;
and the Managing Director of the Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office, Mr. Norman J. Rabkin.
And, I call upon Secretary Hawley.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDMUND S. ``KIP'' HAWLEY,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DHS
Mr. Hawley. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, thank you and
members of the Committee, Ranking Member Smith. Thank you for
this opportunity to discuss the TWIC program. I'm pleased to be
here this morning with Admiral Brian Salerno, our partner from
the Coast Guard, and Norm Rabkin from the Government
Accountability Office.
I'd like to spend a little bit of time talking in detail
about the program overall, its technology, business process and
timetable. But to start off, I think I should answer one
fundamental question, which is why is this taking so long?
In a city where most of us wear one or more security ID
cards, what is so hard about producing a TWIC? There are four
major differences from this kind of a card.
First, TWIC uses the latest, most advanced Federal
Government biometric standard, and for the first time, applies
it to the commercial sector. Second, TWIC issues cards that
work anywhere in the Nation's private port environment, by
anyone working there, across companies, and industries. Third,
TWIC has not only unparalleled flexibility, it has massive
scale. Somewhere in the realm of 1 million cardholders in 3,200
ports. In comparison with our prototype project, we will
process in one day, more credentials than we did in one year,
under the prototype.
Finally, TWIC security checks will be integrated into all
of TSA's vetting programs, which means that we can connect the
dots throughout the entire transportation sector. TWIC is an
advanced, sophisticated, credentialing system. In other words,
the hard part is not the card, it is the network behind the
card.
Breaking new ground in technology has obvious advantages,
but it always brings schedule risks, and TWIC is no different.
Three developments in the last year have made this project even
more complex. First, we made the decision to bring TWIC into
alignment with a new Federal Government biometric standard
called FIPS 201. Second, we identified and closed potential
data privacy gaps, as of this past February. And third, working
with the Coast Guard, we incorporated more than 1,900 comments
received during our rulemaking process, into the detailed
blueprint for TWIC. That rule became final several weeks ago.
On top of the challenges I mentioned of introducing new
technology on a massive scale, while at the same time, making
the three major program adjustments, we have one more
additional complexity, and it is a big one. We will connect
TWIC into what we call the screening gateway.
As you know, TSA vets many different people in different
industries--aviation, truck drivers, now maritime--and in order
not to miss potential links among them, we now use a
centralized vetting system. So, in turning TWIC on, we must be
absolutely certain that we do not jeopardize the stability or
security of this larger vetting system. The only way to be sure
is to flight-test TWIC extensively.
All of the internal moving parts to TWIC must work
together, and they must work in combination with the larger
screening gateway. Rigorous performance testing is the only way
to know for sure that TWIC is ready to go live. That's where we
are in the process, and what remains is the testing.
Everybody wants to know when TWIC enrollments will start,
and we are all very mindful of the SAFE Port Act deadline of
July 1 to enroll 10 ports in TWIC. So, where are we on that?
TSA has already conducted--as Senator Lautenberg
mentioned--Watch Lists and immigration checks for over 750,000
port workers, and will do it again over the Summer to keep that
assessment fresh. I believe that addresses the near-term, real-
world security concerns about the current workforce, even
before the cards are issued.
For us, the stakes are enormously high. For the people who
pay for these cards, and use them daily to enter workplaces and
jobs, they are also high. Out of respect for these employees
and the businesses, we must spend the time to ensure that the
program is tested, fully integrated, and does not compromise
security in any linked system.
We respect the deadline, and April is too soon to give up
on a July deadline. But, if it is a choice between meeting that
deadline, and program integrity, we will choose the latter.
We have a strong new team onboard from Lockheed Martin with
excellent program support from TSA and the Coast Guard. The
industry and its workers have been forthcoming and
constructive. For commerce, TWIC means that thousands of
independent businesses will have one, interoperable security
network for the first time in history.
We look forward to working with the Committee to ensure the
success of the TWIC program, and port security, generally.
Thank you for the opportunity, I'd be happy to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant
Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, DHS
Good morning Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Stevens, and
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity
to speak with you about the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) program.
I would like to acknowledge the leadership this committee has
provided in defining the vision and requirements for TWIC. The TWIC
program is moving aggressively toward its objectives with a focus on
making good security and business decisions. This leading edge program
is developing essential processes, capabilities and expertise that will
be beneficial to other programs.
The final rule for TWIC went into effect on March 26, 2007. With
the passing of this critical milestone, this hearing provides an
excellent opportunity to highlight program developments and describe
how we are incorporating our lessons learned into an effective,
efficient business plan for TWIC enrollment.
We have framed our program decisions and processes within the
context of the Nation's port security goals, including the need to:
Identify authorized individuals who require unescorted
access to secure areas of Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA) regulated facilities and vessels;
Determine the eligibility of an individual for access
through a security threat assessment;
Ensure unauthorized individuals are denied access through
biometric confirmation of the credential holder;
Revoke access promptly for individuals who fail to maintain
their eligibility;
Apply privacy and security controls to protect TWIC
information; and,
Fund the program entirely by user-fees.
Achieving these ambitious goals has required creative planning,
flexible implementation, effective stakeholder communication, and
adaptive contract management. The basic program deployment philosophy
has been a commitment to evaluate all practicable technical
alternatives that will provide adequate port security and minimize
adverse impacts, either economically or logistically, to our Nation's
citizens and our international trading system. This has been and will
continue to be the program's implementation premise.
TWIC Milestones to Date
An estimated 750,000 workers currently have unescorted access to
our ports. The central technical TWIC challenge is providing facilities
and vessels with a reliable tool for identifying individuals who have
been granted authorized access to our ports. Simply put, TSA has been
tasked with the development of a 21st century identification system.
The key element of the system is a card that includes biometric
technology that makes it virtually impossible for the card to be used
by anyone other than the person to whom the card was issued.
The technical principle underlying TWIC's ability to authenticate a
person's identity includes three factors. When using the full extent of
TWIC's authentication ability each person can be identified by:
Something they know--a worker's Personal Identification
Number (PIN);
Something they have--the TWIC credential; and
Something they are--a biometric.
Obviously, new processes and technologies require systematic pilot
studies. The prototype study was deployed to 26 locations in the areas
of Los Angeles/Long Beach, Wilmington/Philadelphia and Florida's
deepwater ports. The prototype TWIC was successfully issued to more
than 4,000 volunteer workers including truck drivers, longshoremen,
container terminal, railway, and airport personnel. A name-based threat
assessment was completed on each individual. A criminal background
check was conducted by the State of Florida for the deep-water port
volunteers. These efforts were a success on multiple levels; it
provided invaluable experience and a much deeper understanding of the
technical and logistical challenges.
Security improvements could not wait until TWIC is fully deployed.
We have gone forward with significant interim security enhancements and
actions during TWIC's initial development phase. These actions
included:
The Coast Guard worked effectively with National Maritime
Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC) to define secure areas.
This definition will have a direct impact on over 10,000
vessels and more than 3,200 facilities. These secure areas
delineate where a TWIC will be required for unescorted access.
The joint rulemaking process between the Coast Guard and TSA
was accelerated resulting in TWIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) being published on May 22, 2006.
The Coast Guard and TSA worked with industry partners to
develop an interim process that compares a worker's
biographical information against our terrorist watch lists and
immigration databases.
Facility owners, facility operators and unions submitted
worker names, date of birth, and, as appropriate, alien
identification number. The worker's immigration status was
checked by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service using
its Central Index.
To date TSA has completed 740,000 name-based threat
assessments on port workers and longshoreman. These assessments
were an interim measure and did not include the criminal
history records check or biometric credential that is part of
TWIC.
TWIC Rule and Stakeholder Input
The TWIC rule was posted on the TSA and Coast Guard websites on
January 1, 2007, and published in the Federal Register on January 25,
2007. The rule is the result of extensive public involvement and
interagency coordination. In addition to the direct involvement of the
National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, TSA and the Coast Guard
held four public meetings in Newark, NJ; Tampa, FL; St. Louis, MO; and
Long Beach, CA. Over 1,900 comments were received from workers, port
owners and operators, small businesses and others affected by the new
program. All comments were carefully considered and we made significant
changes to the NPRM in the development of the Final Rule. These changes
include:
The Coast Guard and TSA delayed the requirement to purchase
and install electronic readers to allow for additional field
testing, technology improvements, and more public comment.
We created an expedited interim threat assessment process
for new hires so that they may go to work pending completion of
the full threat assessment.
We expanded the immigration requirements to permit certain
visa-holders who are prevalent in the maritime industry to
apply for TWIC.
In addition, the TWIC NPRM and Final Rule include provisions that
respond to comments we received from workers subject to similar threat
assessment programs. These include:
Creating a new process where TSA can make a determination
that a security threat assessment conducted by another
government agency is comparable, eliminating redundancy and
reducing costs for workers;
Providing workers more time to apply for an appeal or
waiver;
Streamlining the process, jointly with the Coast Guard, for
merchant mariner credentialing and ensuring that there was no
duplication of requirements resulting from the TWIC process.
TWIC cards will be required not only for port facility workers, but
for anyone who seeks unescorted access to secure areas of a MTSA
regulated facility or vessel, regardless of frequency. The workers
covered by this rule include certain truck drivers, rail employees,
security guards, longshoremen, as well as all U.S. merchant mariners.
TSA will use the time tested security assessment procedures and
standards that are currently used for commercial motor vehicle drivers
licensed to transport hazardous materials, known as Hazardous Material
Endorsements (HME). In short, TWIC will be issued to workers who
successfully complete a security threat assessment, which includes: (1)
a check against terrorist watch lists, (2) an immigration status check,
and (3) a FBI fingerprint-based criminal history records check.
TWIC Card Readers
The TWIC rule does not currently include a requirement for owners
and operators to use card readers. This was done as a response to
important public comments received on the NPRM and concerns from
Congress expressed in the SAFE Port Act. The card reader requirement is
being formulated and coordinated by extensive technical input from
industry and the public. In the interim, workers seeking unescorted
access to secure areas will present their cards to authorized
personnel, who will compare the photo, inspect security features on the
card, and evaluate the card for signs of tampering. At facilities with
various sophisticated access control systems, the magnetic stripe on
the credential could be used to grant or deny access at entry gates.
The Coast Guard will also institute periodic unannounced checks to
confirm the identity of the holder of the TWIC.
We will continue to work closely with all interested parties to
address the ever evolving technology issues. The TWIC technical
architecture is compatible with Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD) 12 and Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
201-1 requirements which provide an open standard that will ensure
interoperability and real-time exchange for supply chain security
cooperation between the Department and the private sector. The
applicant's photograph, name, TWIC expiration date, and a unique
credential number are printed on the card. An integrated circuit chip
on the card stores two fingerprint minutia templates and a PIN as well
as a digital photo of the applicant, the applicant's name, and card
expiration. The embedded computer chip is capable of being read by both
contact and contactless card readers and also contains the magnetic
strip and linear bar codes.
In addition to previously conducted prototype testing, pilot test
planning and discussions with interested port, facility, and vessel
operators began late last year. The pilots will test access control
technologies in real-world marine environments. The National Maritime
Security Advisory Committee is providing invaluable input regarding
operational requirements and has recommended specifications for
contactless biometric smart cards and card readers. Public feedback is
being collected and analyzed on the recommendations. As part of the
outreach efforts for the TWIC program and the Department's Port
Security Grant Program we have met with a number of maritime interests
to invite their participation in the pilot tests. Our objective is to
include pilot test participants that are representative of a variety of
facility and vessel types and sizes which operate in a variety of
geographic locations and environmental conditions. There appears to be
sufficient interest from the maritime community to achieve this
objective.
The Department is currently reviewing Port Security Grant
applications relating to these pilot studies and will announce awards
later this spring. While the grant process is proceeding, TSA and Coast
Guard are working with Department test and evaluation experts to
develop a comprehensive plan that addresses the unique pilot test
challenges. The evaluation of the pilot tests will greatly facilitate
the Department's efforts to propose a TWIC reader requirement rule that
effectively addresses security requirements, maintains the flow of
commerce, and protects the personal information used to validate the
TWIC holder's identity.
Rollout Contract
A key operational piece of the rollout plan was the award of a
competitively bid, indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract to
Lockheed Martin Corporation. The TWIC enrollment and systems operations
and maintenance contract will include a Quality Assurance Surveillance
Plan (QASP) that establishes detailed metrics to be monitored through
the life of the contract and will determine whether the contractor will
receive any award fee for services performed.
Lockheed Martin will establish approximately 130 enrollment centers
near the port facilities where applicants will provide biographic
information and fingerprints. This information will be transferred to
TSA so we may conduct a threat assessment involving checks of criminal
history, immigration, and intelligence databases. Once a worker
successfully completes the threat assessment process, the government
will produce the credential and send it to the enrollment center, where
the worker will retrieve it. TWIC enrollment will begin initially at
select ports based on risk and other factors and will proceed
throughout the Nation over the next 18-24 months.
TWIC Card Costs
As required by Congress, the costs of the program will be borne by
TWIC applicants. Therefore, we are obligated to look for practicable
ways of controlling costs, eliminating duplicative processes, providing
timely decisions, and, most importantly, ensuring accuracy and
fairness.
The fees for a TWIC will be slightly lower than was anticipated in
the Final Rule. A TWIC will be $137.25 for a card that is valid for 5
years. Workers with current, comparable background checks (e.g.,
HAZMAT, Merchant Mariner Document (MMD) or Free and Secure Trade
(FAST)) will receive a discounted fee of $105.25. The cost of a lost,
damaged or stolen credential is $36, although we have solicited comment
on raising that fee.
We fully realize that these costs are not an insignificant amount
to some workers. However, we feel that the costs compare very favorably
with equivalent HSPD-12 compliant card fees and in some instances may
actually reduce the costs for some workers. For example, the Coast
Guard is in the process of completing a companion rule which will
consolidate existing mariner credentials and streamline the application
process for mariners who have already applied for the TWIC. This will
reduce the overall cost burden for these workers. Preparations are
underway to reduce duplication by having TSA provide the Coast Guard
with electronic copies of the applicant's fingerprints, proof of
identification, proof of citizenship, photograph, and if applicable the
individual's criminal record, FBI number and alien registration number.
This will eliminate the need for TWIC holding mariners to visit a Coast
Guard Regional Exam Center to apply for or renew their Merchant Mariner
Credential unless an examination is required.
Rollout Communication Plan and Pre-Enrollment
Effective public communication is fundamental to our rollout plan.
The TWIC program office has used the lessons learned from the prototype
phase to develop a multi-dimensioned outreach strategy for all of the
enrollment phases. A toll-free help desk, Frequently Asked Questions,
informational brochures, and a centralized e-mail address will provide
up-front assistance and guidance for workers, owners, and operators.
These services include program information, response to enrollment
questions, pre-enrollment assistance, lost/stolen card reporting,
credential replacement support, updates on an individual's case, and
information on appeals and waivers. Applicants are encouraged, but not
required, to ``pre-enroll'' and provide biographic information at the
secure TWIC website which should help reduce waiting time at the
enrollment centers. An additional service that is provided during pre-
enrollment is an opportunity for the applicant to schedule an
appointment for appearing at the enrollment center.
Lockheed Martin is required by contract to develop a communication
plan to ensure that applicants, operators, and relevant industry
associations are educated and knowledgeable about the TWIC enrollment
process. The communication plan will identify TSA goals and
responsibilities, contractor goals and responsibilities, port facility
and vessel responsibilities, target audiences, communications
processes, and supporting communication tools. A key plan element is
the use of a communication committee to ensure sustained two-way
communication with major stakeholders. This vital effort is calculated
to provide the most current, accurate program information to interested
stakeholders and provide a mechanism for continuing stakeholder input
during the rollout.
Enrollment Centers
Enrollment sites will be operated by trusted agents who are
employees of a vendor under contract with TSA. These trained agents
will have undergone a TSA security threat assessment before being
allowed to collect the data. The trusted agents will provide applicants
with a privacy notice and consent form, by which the applicant agrees
to provide personal information for the security threat assessment and
credential. The trusted agents will verify an applicant's identity,
confirm the accuracy of biographic information, collect biometric
information (a full set of fingerprints and a facial photograph), and
obtain the applicant's signature on the enrollment documents. The
contract performance parameter for the trusted advisor enrollment
process will be an average enrollment time of 15 minutes. The
enrollment process for a pre-enrolled applicant is fully expected to
take less time. As you can see, focused planning that fosters
convenience for applicants will benefit workers as well as our process
efficiencies.
Data Security Vetting and Card Issuance
After enrollment, an applicant's data is sent to the TSA system,
and the vetting process (i.e., terrorism database, criminal history
records check, immigration check) is started. We anticipate that the
TWIC threat assessment processing time will be similar to our
experience in the HME program. Since the inception of the HME program,
threat assessments have frequently been completed in 3 days or less.
During this same period the average time for completing HME threat
assessments has been approximately 14 days, which includes all appeals
and waivers. The process will be impacted by steps where there is
minimum governmental control. For example, applicants need to promptly
provide corrected records, and respond to initial determinations. Other
factors that we anticipate could result in processing delays include an
applicant providing incorrect information, watch list determinations,
evaluation of the nature of threats, whether the applicant is currently
under criminal investigation, and confirming immigration status that is
not available in electronic format. Nonetheless, the 14 day average for
processing the HME assessments includes the time required to meet the
same threat assessment challenges that we will face with TWIC.
If TSA determines that an applicant does not pose a security
threat, the applicant's information is sent for card production. After
the card is developed it is sent to the enrollment center, where the
worker will be notified to pick up the card. Due to the secure nature
of the credential, the smart cards are shipped as ``inactive.'' An
applicant must verify his or her personal identity by providing a
biometric (i.e., fingerprint) that is matched to the cards electronic
template. After identity is verified, the applicant selects a secret
PIN which is stored on the card as an additional identity
authentication factor.
Worker Redress/Waivers/Appeals
If an applicant is denied a TWIC they will be notified of the
reason and instructed on how to apply for an appeal or waiver. All
applicants have the opportunity to appeal a disqualification and may
apply to TSA for a waiver. In order to expedite processing time,
applicants who are aware of a potential disqualifying crime may begin
the waiver process when they initially apply for a TWIC.
The standards for denial of a TWIC are the same standards that
apply in the HME process. Any applicant who is subject to removal
proceedings or an order of removal under the immigration laws of the
United States is not eligible to apply for a TWIC. An individual will
be disqualified if he or she lacks legal presence and/or authorization
to work in the United States, has a connection to terrorist activity,
or has been determined to lack mental capacity.
A person will also be denied a TWIC for a criminal history
involving certain disqualifying crimes. TSA received valuable NPRM
comments on the list of disqualifying crimes and decided to fine tune
the list to better reflect crimes that are more likely to result in a
terrorism security risk or a risk that the individual may engage in a
transportation security incident. Permanent disqualifying criminal
offenses include: espionage, sedition, treason, terrorism, improper
transportation of a hazardous material, unlawful possession, use or
sale of an explosive, murder, threats to a place of public use
(government facility, public transportation system, or infrastructure
facility), violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act in which the predicate act is one of the
permanently disqualifying crimes, or a crime involving a transportation
security incident. A transportation security incident is a security
incident resulting in a significant loss of life, environmental damage,
transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a
particular area.
Individuals are ineligible for a TWIC if convicted in the last 7
years or incarcerated within the last 5 years of the following crimes:
Unlawful possession, use or sale of a firearm or other weapon,
extortion, fraud, bribery, smuggling, immigration violations,
distribution or importation of a controlled substance, arson,
kidnapping or hostage taking, rape or aggravated sexual abuse, assault
with intent to kill, robbery, RICO violations that do not involve a
permanent disqualifying crime.
The appeal process involves ensuring that the information on which
TSA bases its threat assessment is completely accurate. This process
allows the applicant to correct the record on which that threat
assessment occurs.
Fairness and accuracy in TWIC waiver determinations are further
ensured by an opportunity for independent review by an Administrative
Law Judge. As previously noted, the regulations provide a lengthened
period for appealing denial of waivers, from 30 days to 60 days, to
accommodate workers who tend to travel for extended periods of time.
Furthermore, the regulations allow a worker to file a request for a
time extension after the deadline has passed by filing a motion
describing the reasons why they were unable to comply with the
timeline. The extra procedural measures are intended to give workers
every reasonable chance to bring legitimate concerns and issues to the
attention of people who are trying to make the best and correct
decision regarding security risks.
Lessons Learned and Future Efforts
The initial rollout of TWIC will be focused on the maritime mode.
However, once the initial maritime rollout is complete DHS will
evaluate deployment of this program in other modes of transportation.
The analysis and planning for any resulting decision will benefit from
the experience, technical expertise, and lessons learned that evolved
under the TWIC program.
There are several vital lessons learned during the development of
this program that must be prominently considered in future efforts:
Look for efficiencies in duplicative regulatory processes.
As noted previously, TSA and Coast Guard are developing
procedures for the sharing of mariner fingerprints, identity
verification, criminal history, and photographs for TWIC which
is expected to save not only money but time. In addition,
merchant mariners will no longer be required to visit a
Regional Exam Center to obtain and renew their credentials,
resulting in substantial time and travel savings.
Address the impact on small businesses. TSA and the Coast
Guard worked closely with the Small Business Administration to
minimize the financial and operational impact on small
businesses wherever possible. The rule includes provisions that
allow MTSA-regulated passenger vessels (excluding cruise ships)
to establish employee access areas for crewmembers that do not
require unescorted access to secure areas such as the pilot
house and engine room. This provision reduces the impact on
those employees who rarely need to use spaces beyond those
designated for support of passengers while maintaining the
integrity of vessels' secure areas. We are also producing and
distributing a Small Business Compliance Guide to assist small
businesses in their implementation of the program.
When practicable, preserve state regulatory flexibility.
Mariner regulations and port security plans preempt state
regulations. However, TSA does not preempt states from
requiring background checks and badging systems in addition to
TWIC. States may need to set standards for important purposes
other than terrorism threats, such as preventing drug
trafficking or organized crime.
Plan for privacy. All data collected at an enrollment center
will be deleted from the enrollment center work stations. The
entire enrollment record (including all fingerprints collected)
is stored in the TSA system, which is protected through role-
based entry, encryption, and segmentation to prevent
unauthorized use.
Technical innovation requires adaptive contract management.
TWIC is attempting to develop a 21st century technology that
accommodates evolving IT standards suited to emergent needs
that span local, international, public, and private interests.
This requires continual reevaluation of the scope and methods
of contracting. The recent Lockheed Martin contract award is a
culmination of our efforts to date. Due to the nature of this
task, however, we will need to continue to look for and
implement adaptive planning, metrics, and changes to ensure
this effort stays on track.
Don't expect a ``silver bullet'' technology solution.
Evolving technology, such as card readers, creates a changing
environment and program control constraints. This is especially
the case when the technology must be deployed to a vast
multitude of entities with remote connectivity challenges
(e.g., vessels) and varying degrees of access control system
capabilities.
Place the highest value in stakeholder input; it is time
well spent. The public hearings, comments to the NPRM, meetings
with operators and associations, and contributions of advisory
councils all added pure value. We came away from each and every
one of these efforts better informed about the challenges, the
unacceptable impacts, and the practicable options for
protecting our ports.
Conclusion
The steps we are taking will be an extremely important aspect to
the security of our port facilities and vessels. It's an effort which,
when completed, will assure our citizens that those people who have
unescorted access to secure areas of these port facilities and vessels
have been screened to make sure that they are not a security threat.
I appreciate the keen interest that this Committee has in an
effective implementation of TWIC, and I thank you for your support. Mr.
Chairman, this concludes my testimony and I am pleased to answer any
questions that you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
And now I'll recognize Admiral Salerno.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN SALERNO, REAR ADMIRAL AND DIRECTOR OF
INSPECTIONS AND COMPLIANCE, USCG, DHS
Admiral Salerno. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of
the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you
about the current status, and the way ahead for the TWIC
Program.
I would specifically like to update the Committee on the
Coast Guard's efforts, working in partnership with TSA to
implement this program, which will strengthen maritime
security, while balancing the need to facilitate commerce, and
minimize negative effects on our port and vessel stakeholders.
Although the TWIC Program has not moved as rapidly as all
of us would like, important milestones have been accomplished.
Working relationships have been strengthened with the public
and key industry stakeholders, and our commitment to protecting
the maritime transportation system, while facilitating
commerce, has not wavered.
Since publication of the final rule on January 25 of this
year, the Coast Guard and TSA have continued to meet with our
stakeholders in various venues. We've received considerable
input on their ongoing concerns. These venues include the
Passenger Vessel Association Conference, SMART card, and
biometric industry conferences, maritime union meetings, and
National Petro-Chemical Refiner's Association meeting, an
American Waterways Operator's Executive Committee meeting, and
the American Association of Port Authorities Conference, to
name just a few.
The concerns expressed in these meetings have included the
roll-out process for the initial TWIC cards, and the need to
ensure that new hire provisions contained in the rules function
as intended, which is of particular interest to small
businesses. And, of course, the pilot program, which will pave
the way for follow-on rulemaking for the card readers.
To address the roll-out, Coast Guard and TSA have worked
together to develop supplemental documents, designed to assist
those affected by the regulations. These documents include a
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular, or NVIC, which is
meant to explain the processes and procedures related to the
implementation of the TWIC.
We have solicited and received input from the affected
industry, as well as from Coast Guard field personnel on the
draft of this NVIC, and have had generally positive feedback on
the guidance contained within it.
We have also assisted in the development of two Small
Business Administration compliance guides, and we have
developed flyers, working with the contractor, Lockheed Martin,
which will provide information to TWIC applicants.
We are also developing internal guidance documents for
training, implementation and consistent enforcement. These
documents will be cleared through Coast Guard Headquarters, and
will be reviewed both by DHS and OMB, prior to distribution.
As we move into the implementation phase, we will continue
working with industry to bring about the smooth transition to
this much-needed security measure. We remain mindful of
industry's concerns that vital provisions, such as the new-hire
provision, function as intended, and our draft guidance
reflects those concerns.
We also plan to verify that the security enhancement
envisioned by the TWIC Program is having the intended effect.
To this end, we intend to procure hand-held readers for use
during our vessel and facility examinations and spot-checks.
After the compliance state is reached in a given port, the
Coast Guard will use portable card readers to randomly check
the validity of an individual's TWIC. This will serve as an
interim measure, until the second rulemaking on card readers is
finalized and put into effect.
Meanwhile, we are working very closely with DHS and TSA in
coordinating the pilot program, which will provide key
information and practical lessons learned to inform the second
rulemaking. We requested, and received, recommendations from
the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, NMSAC, on
technical specifications to be considered for card readers,
which will be the subject of the second rulemaking. NMSAC's
recommendations were also published in the Federal Register for
public comment, and we are considering those comments
carefully, to balance privacy, security and commerce, as we
move forward with the card reader requirements.
TSA and Coast Guard continue to reach out to our private
sector stakeholders, in the interest of fashioning regulations
that will strengthen America's maritime security, while
advancing commerce. While a TWIC Program is multi-faceted and
includes numerous players, we are committed to developing a
useful and valuable system.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today, and I
will be happy to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Salerno follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Salerno, Rear Admiral and Director of
Inspections and Compliance, USCG, DHS
Good morning, Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, and members of the
Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you about the
current status and the way ahead for the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) program. Specifically, I would like to
update the Committee on the Coast Guard's efforts, in partnership with
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to implement a
program that will strengthen maritime security while balancing the need
to facilitate commerce and minimize negative impacts to our port and
vessel stakeholders.
Background and Authority
As a result of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), the
Coast Guard developed regulations establishing security requirements
for maritime vessels and facilities posing a high risk of being
involved in a transportation security incident. As part of these
regulations, these vessels and facilities were required to conduct
detailed security assessments and in turn, develop security plans under
which owners and operators have been required to operate since July 1,
2004. The Coast Guard has been responsible for implementing and
ensuring compliance with MTSA.
This same law requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
issue a biometric transportation security card in order to be granted
unescorted access to secure areas of vessels and facilities to those
individuals who satisfactorily pass a security threat assessment. TSA
was assigned this requirement, and because of our overlapping
responsibilities, the Coast Guard and TSA formally joined efforts to
carry out the TWIC program in November 2004. In this partnership, TSA
is responsible for TWIC enrollment, security threat assessment and
adjudication, card production, TWIC issuance, conduct of the TWIC
appeal and waiver process, and management of government support
systems. The Coast Guard is responsible for establishing and enforcing
TWIC access control requirements at regulated vessels and facilities.
Both agencies work very closely every day to make sure that our efforts
achieve the objective of increased security that MTSA intended.
The TSA and the Coast Guard published a joint TWIC Notice of
Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) on May 22, 2006. Following the publication
of the NPRM and the subsequent comment period, Congress enacted the
Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006. The SAFE
Port Act placed new statutory requirements for the TWIC Program. Among
these requirements were: the commencement of a pilot program to test
the viability of TWIC cards and readers in the maritime environment;
deployment of the program in priority ports by set deadlines; inclusion
of a provision to allow newly hired employees to work while the TWIC
application was being processed; and concurrent processing of the TWIC
and merchant mariner applications.
TSA and the Coast Guard published the TWIC final rule on January
25, 2007 in which the Coast Guard's MTSA regulations and TSA's
Hazardous Material Endorsement regulations were amended to incorporate
the TWIC requirements. This final rule did not require the installation
of card readers at vessels and facilities as originally proposed in the
NPRM. This requirement will be proposed during a second notice and
comment rulemaking.
Joint Rulemaking by TSA and the USCG
In the TWIC Program, TSA is responsible for TWIC enrollment and
issuance, including hardware and software applications and the data
storage system. This responsibility involves conducting a security
threat assessment on TWIC applicants, which includes a check against
terrorist watch lists, an immigration status check, and a fingerprint-
based criminal history records check, as well as perpetual vetting
against the terrorist watch lists throughout the 5 year life of the
TWIC. The Coast Guard is responsible for implementing TWIC in the
maritime environment. The Coast Guard is achieving this by requiring a
TWIC for all individuals who need unescorted access to secure areas of
MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels and requiring a TWIC for all U.S.
merchant mariners with active credentials.
TSA and the Coast Guard are also working together to develop
several supplementary documents to help those affected by this
regulation. These documents include a Navigation and Vessel Inspection
Circular (NVIC); two Small Business Administration Compliance Guides;
fliers for TWIC applicants; and internal guidance documents for
training, implementation, and enforcement for Coast Guard and TSA
personnel. Since publication of the Final Rule, the Coast Guard and TSA
have conducted outreach at national venues such as the Passenger Vessel
Association Conference; SMART card and biometric industry conferences;
maritime union meetings; American Waterway Operators Executive
Committee meeting; and the American Association of Port Authorities
Conference to name a few.
Public Comments and Concerns
TSA and the Coast Guard received almost 2,000 comments on the TWIC
NPRM. A general theme throughout the comments was the technological and
economic feasibility of the TWIC cards and card readers in the maritime
environment. While smart cards, open slot card readers, and the use of
biometrics have been used for a number of years in controlled, office-
like environments, very few studies have examined how currently
approved biometric card readers will withstand the comparatively harsh
environments of vessels and maritime facilities. Also, several
commenters stated that the cost of biometric card readers would be
extremely detrimental for small entities. TSA and the Coast Guard found
the comments received to be invaluable in determining the best way
forward for this rule.
Throughout February and March of this year, the Coast Guard also
solicited comments from field units and industry stakeholders while
drafting the TWIC Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular. We
received over 400 comments, which were used to construct a clear and
thorough guidance document for industry and Coast Guard units during
implementation. This guidance document is currently in concurrent
clearance at Coast Guard Headquarters and will be reviewed by both DHS
and OMB prior to distribution.
Pilot Program
Based on the comments received from all sources, the Department
chose to bifurcate the rule. In order to address concerns about the
adequacy of current reader technology, the Coast Guard is not requiring
facility and vessel owner operators to purchase, install, and maintain
card readers. We will address this requirement in a separate rulemaking
following the pilot program required by the SAFE Port Act and will
provide all interested parties ample opportunity to comment on the new
proposals during the comment period following the second NPRM.
In addition, the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee
(NMSAC) formed a working group of maritime industry and biometric
technology representatives to propose specifications for TWIC cards and
card readers using a contactless (or proximity) interface. The
specifications were presented and approved on February 28, 2007 at
NMSAC's quarterly meeting. A notice of availability of the
specifications was published in the Federal Register for public comment
on March 16, 2007. NMSAC's specifications will inform the pilot program
set to begin in the Ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach, CA, in June 2007.
The Way Ahead
Work continues on several aspects of the TWIC Program. The Coast
Guard is in the process of procuring handheld open slot card readers
for use during vessel and facility inspections and spot checks. The
Coast Guard will use the card readers to randomly check the validity of
an individual's TWIC. Also, the provision for newly hired employees to
work while they await issuance of a TWIC is in development and on track
between the Coast Guard's Homeport web-portal engineers and TSA's
Identity Data Management System engineers. Internally, policy is being
written for implementation and enforcement of the TWIC Program in our
ports through collaboration of our law enforcement, port security, and
technology experts. We are working to meet the deadlines set by the
SAFE Port Act.
Conclusion
TSA and the USCG continue to reach out to our private sector
stakeholders in the interest of fashioning a regulation that
strengthens America's maritime security while advancing commerce. While
the TWIC Program is multifaceted and includes numerous players, we are
committed to developing a useful and valuable system. I would be happy
to take any questions you have at this time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Admiral.
May I now call upon Mr. Rabkin?
STATEMENT OF NORMAN J. RABKIN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GAO
Mr. Rabkin. Chairman Inouye, members of the Committee,
thank you very much for inviting me this morning to participate
in this hearing on the status of the TWIC Program.
In December 2004, and September 2006, we reported on the
status of the development and testing of the program. Our 2004
report identified challenges that TSA faced in developing
regulations and a comprehensive plan for managing the TWIC
Program, and several factors that caused TSA to miss the
initial deadlines for issuing TWIC cards.
Our 2006 report identified the challenges encountered
during the TWIC program testing, and several problems related
to TWIC contract planning and oversight.
My testimony today focuses on two key areas, first, the
progress that TSA has made since September, and second, some of
the remaining challenges that TSA, the Coast Guard and the
maritime industry must overcome to ensure the successful
implementation of the TWIC Program.
TSA has made progress towards implementing TWIC and
addressing several of the problems that we have previously
identified regarding contract oversight, planning and
coordination with stakeholders. Specifically, TSA has first
issued the rule about enrolling workers and issuing the cards
to workers in the maritime sector. Second, it has awarded a $70
million contract for enrolling these workers in the TWIC
program. Third, it has assured us that it has a schedule for
enrolling these workers and issuing the TWIC cards at ports,
and conducting the pilot program to test TWIC access control
technologies. Fourth, it has added staff with program and
contract management expertise to help oversee the TWIC
enrollment contract. And, finally, it has improved
communications in coordination with the maritime stakeholders,
and has plans for conducting public outreach and education
efforts.
Nevertheless, TSA and the maritime industry stakeholders
still face several challenges to ensuring that the TWIC Program
can be implemented successfully. First, TSA and its enrollment
contractor need to transition from limited testing of the TWIC
Program, to successful implementation of the program on a much
larger scale, covering over 770,000 workers at over 3,000-3,500
maritime facilities and over 5,000 vessels.
During testing, TSA issued TWIC cards to only about 1,700
workers, far short of its goal at that time of 75,000. Although
TSA has learned from the testing experience, and has taken
steps to help address problems that we previously identified,
it remains to be seen whether TSA and the enrollment contractor
will be able to implement the TWIC Program on such a large
scale, in reasonable time-frames.
Second, TSA and the enrollment contractor will also need to
educate workers about the TWIC requirements, ensure that
enrollments begin in a timely manner, and process numerous
background checks, appeals and waivers. Identifying the
thousands of workers located throughout this and neighboring
countries who will need to have the TWIC card, and educating
them about their responsibilities for obtaining the card, will
require a communication and coordination effort on the part of
TSA and the enrollment contractor. Furthermore, processing
these appeals, and doing so in a timely manner will also be a
challenge.
Finally, TSA and the stakeholders must also ensure that the
TWIC access control technologies will work effectively in the
maritime environment, be compatible with the cards that have
been issued, and will balance security with the flow of
commerce. Access control technologies will need to withstand
the harsh rigors of the maritime environment. If biometric card
readers do not work effectively, ports could experience long
lines, delaying other workers or trucks from entering. Such
delays, of course, will negatively impact maritime commerce,
costing port facilities time and money.
As TSA continues to implement the TWIC Program, we believe
it should establish reasonable time-frames for holding itself,
and its contractor accountable, and ensure that it learns and
implements lessons as it phases in the enrollment function and
pilot tests the access control technologies.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I also would
be glad to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rabkin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues, GAO
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on the
status of the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program.
Ensuring that only workers that do not pose a terrorist threat are
allowed access to secure areas of the Nation's transportation
facilities is critical to helping prevent a terrorist attack. The TWIC
program was created to help protect these facilities from the threat of
terrorism by issuing identification cards only to workers who do not
pose a terrorist threat and allow these workers unescorted access to
secure areas of the transportation system. To accomplish this
objective, the TWIC program will include collection of personal and
biometric information to validate workers' identities, background
checks on transportation workers to ensure they do not pose a threat to
security, issuance of tamper-resistant biometric credentials that
cannot be counterfeited, verification of these credentials using
biometric access control systems before a worker is granted unescorted
access to a secure area, and revocation of credentials if disqualifying
information is discovered, or if a card is lost, damaged, or stolen.
The TWIC program was initially intended to serve all modes of
transportation; however, TSA, in partnership with the Coast Guard, is
focusing initial implementation on the maritime sector and is planning
to implement the program in other modes in the future.
In December 2004 and September 2006, we reported on the status of
the development and testing of the TWIC program.\1\ Our 2004 report
identified the challenges TSA faced in developing regulations and a
comprehensive plan for managing the TWIC program and several factors
that caused TSA to miss initial deadlines for issuing TWIC cards. Our
September 2006 report identified the challenges encountered during TWIC
program testing and several problems related to TWIC contract planning
and oversight. In August 2006, TSA decided that the TWIC program would
be implemented in the maritime sector using two separate rules. TSA
issued the first rule in January 2007 requiring worker enrollment and
card issuance and plans to issue a proposed rule on access control
technologies in 2008. Since our September 2006 report, the Congress
passed the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of
2006, directing TSA, among other things, to implement the TWIC program
at the 10 highest risk ports by July 1, 2007.\2\ In January 2007, TSA
awarded a $70 million contract to begin enrolling workers and issuing
TWIC cards to workers at these maritime facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and
Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, GAO-05-106
(Washington, D.C.: December 2004), and Transportation Security: DHS
Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential Program, GAO-06-982 (Washington, D.C.:
September 2006).
\2\ Pub. L. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884, 1889 (2006).
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My testimony today focuses on two key areas: (1) the progress TSA
has made since September 2006 in implementing the TWIC program; and (2)
some of the remaining challenges that TSA and the maritime industry
must overcome to ensure the successful implementation of the TWIC
program. My comments are based primarily on our December 2004 and
September 2006 reports on the TWIC program, which reflect work
conducted at TSA and the Coast Guard, as well as site visits to
transportation facilities that participated in testing the TWIC
program. In addition, in March and April 2007, we interviewed TSA
officials and obtained some supporting documentation regarding the
agency's efforts to implement the TWIC program. We also interviewed
officials at port facilities in California, Delaware, and Florida that
participated in TWIC testing concerning the implementation of the TWIC
program. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Summary
Since we issued our report on the TWIC program in September 2006,
TSA has made progress toward implementing the TWIC program and
addressing several of the problems that we previously identified
regarding contract oversight and planning and coordination with
stakeholders. Specifically, TSA has:
issued a TWIC rule that sets forth the requirements for
enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards to workers in the
maritime sector;
awarded a $70 million contract for enrolling workers in the
TWIC program,
established a schedule for enrolling workers and issuing
TWIC cards at ports and conducting a pilot program to test TWIC
access control technologies,
added staff with program and contract management expertise
to help oversee the TWIC enrollment contract, and
developed plans to improve communication and coordination
with maritime stakeholders, including plans for conducting
public outreach and education efforts.
TSA and maritime industry stakeholders still face several
challenges to ensuring that the TWIC program can be implemented
successfully:
TSA and its enrollment contractor need to transition from
limited testing of the TWIC program to successful
implementation of the program on a much larger scale covering
770,000 workers at about 3,500 maritime facilities and 5,300
vessels.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ TSA estimated the total number of workers, facilities, and
vessels affected by the TWIC rule in the Regulatory Impact Assessment
of the TWIC rule.
TSA and its enrollment contractor will need to educate
workers on the new TWIC requirements, ensure that enrollments
begin in a timely manner, and process numerous background
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
checks, appeals, and waivers.
TSA and industry stakeholders will need to ensure that TWIC
access control technologies will work effectively in the
maritime environment, be compatible with TWIC cards that will
be issued, and balance security with the flow of maritime
commerce.
As TSA works to implement the TWIC program and begin enrolling
workers, it will be important that the agency establish clear and
reasonable time-frames and ensure that all aspects of the TWIC program,
including the TWIC access control technologies, are fully tested in the
maritime environment.
Background
Securing transportation systems and facilities is complicated,
requiring balancing security to address potential threats while
facilitating the flow of people and goods. These systems and facilities
are critical components of the U.S. economy and are necessary for
supplying goods throughout the country and supporting international
commerce. U.S. transportation systems and facilities move over 30
million tons of freight and provide approximately 1.1 billion passenger
trips each day. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach estimate that
they alone handle about 43 percent of the Nation's oceangoing cargo.
The importance of these systems and facilities also makes them
attractive targets to terrorists. These systems and facilities are
vulnerable and difficult to secure given their size, easy
accessibility, large number of potential targets, and proximity to
urban areas. A terrorist attack at these systems and facilities could
cause a tremendous loss of life and disruption to our society. An
attack would also be costly. According to testimony by a Port of Los
Angeles official, a 2002 labor dispute led to a 10-day shutdown of West
Coast port operations, costing the Nation's economy an estimated $1.5
billion per day.\4\ A terrorist attack to a port facility could have a
similar or greater impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Testimony of the Director of Homeland Security, Port of Los
Angeles, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, May 16, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One potential security threat stems from those individuals who work
in secure areas of the Nation's transportation system, including
seaports, airports, railroad terminals, mass transit stations, and
other transportation facilities. It is estimated that about 6 million
workers, including longshoreman, mechanics, aviation and railroad
employees, truck drivers, and others access secure areas of the
Nation's estimated 4,000 transportation facilities each day while
performing their jobs. Some of these workers, such as truck drivers,
regularly access secure areas at multiple transportation facilities.
Ensuring that only workers that do not pose a terrorism security risk
are allowed unescorted access to secure areas is important in helping
to prevent an attack. According to TSA and transportation industry
stakeholders, many individuals that work in secure areas are currently
not required to undergo a background check or a stringent
identification process in order to access secure areas. In addition,
without a standard credential that is recognized across modes of
transportation and facilities, many workers must obtain multiple
credentials to access each transportation facility they enter.
TWIC Program History
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) was enacted in November
2001.\5\ Among other things, ATSA required TSA to work with airport
operators to strengthen access control points in secure areas and
consider using biometric access control systems to verify the identity
of individuals who seek to enter a secure airport area. In response to
ATSA, TSA established the TWIC program in December 2001 to mitigate the
threat of terrorists and other unauthorized persons from accessing
secure areas of the entire transportation network, by creating a common
identification credential that could be used by workers in all modes of
transportation.\6\ In November 2002, the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) was enacted and required the Secretary of
Homeland Security to issue a maritime worker identification card that
uses biometrics, such as fingerprints, to control access to secure
areas of seaports and vessels, among other things.\7\
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\5\ Pub. L. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
\6\ TSA was transferred from the Department of Transportation to
the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to requirements in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
\7\ Pub. L. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
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The responsibility for securing the Nation's transportation system
and facilities is shared by Federal, state, and local governments, as
well as the private sector. At the Federal Government level, TSA, the
agency responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, has
taken the lead in developing the TWIC program, while the Coast Guard is
responsible for developing maritime security regulations and ensuring
that maritime facilities and vessels are in compliance with these
regulations. As a result, TSA and the Coast Guard are working together
to implement TWIC in the maritime sector. Most seaports, airports, mass
transit stations, and other transportation systems and facilities in
the United States are owned and operated by state and local government
authorities and private companies. As a result, certain components of
the TWIC program, such as installing card readers, will be the
responsibility of these state and local governments and private
industry stakeholders.
TSA--through a private contractor--tested the TWIC program from
August 2004 to June 2005 at 28 transportation facilities around the
Nation, including 22 port facilities, 2 airports, 1 rail facility, 1
maritime exchange, 1 truck stop, and a U.S. postal service facility. In
August 2005, TSA and the testing contractor completed a report
summarizing the results of the TWIC testing. TSA also hired an
independent contractor to assess the performance of the TWIC testing
contractor. Specifically, the independent contractor conducted its
assessment from March 2005 to January 2006, and evaluated whether the
testing contractor met the requirements of the testing contract. The
independent contractor issued its final report on January 25, 2006.
Since its creation, the TWIC program has received about $79 million
in funding for program development. (See Table 1.)
Table 1.--TWIC Program Funding From Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Appropriated Reprogramming Adjustments Total funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 0 0 0 0
2003 5.0 0 0 5.0
2004 49.7 0 0 49.7
2005 5.0 0 0 5.0
2006 0 15.0 0 15.0
2007 0 0 4.7 4.7
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 59.7 15.0 4.7 79.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: TSA.
Note: TSA's Fiscal Year 2008 Congressional justification includes $26.5 million in authority to collect fees
from transportation workers for TWIC cards.
Key Components of the TWIC Program
The TWIC program is designed to enhance security using several key
components (see Fig. 1). These include:
Enrollment: Transportation workers will be enrolled in the
TWIC program at enrollment centers by providing personal
information, such as a social security number and address, and
be photographed and fingerprinted. For those workers who are
unable to provide quality fingerprints, TSA is to collect an
alternate authentication identifier.
Background checks: TSA will conduct background checks on
each worker to ensure that individuals do not pose a security
threat. These will include several components. First, TSA will
conduct a security threat assessment that may include, for
example, terrorism databases or terrorism watch lists, such as
TSA's No-fly and selectee lists. Second, a Federal Bureau of
Investigation criminal history records check will be conducted
to identify if the worker has any disqualifying criminal
offenses. Third, workers' immigration status and mental
capacity will be checked. Workers will have the opportunity to
appeal the results of the threat assessment or request a waiver
in certain limited circumstances.
TWIC card production: After TSA determines that a worker has
passed the background check, the worker's information is
provided to a Federal card production facility where the TWIC
card will be personalized for the worker, manufactured, and
then sent back to the enrollment center.
Card issuance: Transportation workers will be informed when
their cards are ready to be picked up at enrollment centers.
Once a card has been issued, workers will present their TWIC
cards to security officials when they seek to enter a secure
area and in the future will enter secure areas through
biometric card readers.
TSA Has Made Progress Since September 2006 in Implementing the TWIC
Program
Since we issued our report on the TWIC program in September 2006,
TSA has made progress toward implementing the TWIC program and
addressing several of the problems that we previously identified
regarding contract oversight and planning and coordination with
stakeholders. In January 2007, TSA and the Coast Guard issued a TWIC
rule that sets forth the requirements for enrolling workers and issuing
TWIC cards to workers in the maritime sector and awarded a $70 million
contract for enrolling workers in the TWIC program. TSA is also taking
steps designed to address requirements in the SAFE Port Act regarding
the TWIC program, such as establishing a rollout schedule for enrolling
workers and issuing TWIC cards at ports and conducting a pilot program
to test TWIC access control technologies. TSA has also taken steps to
strengthen TWIC contract planning and oversight and improve
communication and coordination with its maritime stakeholders. Since
September 2006, TSA reported that it has added staff with program and
contract management expertise to help oversee the TWIC enrollment
contract and taken additional steps to help ensure that contract
requirements are met. In addition, TSA has also focused on improving
communication and coordination with maritime stakeholders, such as
developing plans for conducting public outreach and education efforts.
TSA Issued a TWIC Rule and Awarded a Contract To Begin Enrolling
Workers and Issuing TWIC Cards This Year
On January 25, 2007, TSA and the Coast Guard issued a rule that
sets forth the regulatory requirements for enrolling workers and
issuing TWIC cards to workers in the maritime sector. Specifically, the
TWIC rule provides that workers and merchant mariners requiring
unescorted access to secure areas of maritime facilities and vessels
must enroll in the TWIC program, undergo a background check, and obtain
a TWIC card before such access is granted. In addition, the rule
requires owners and operators of maritime facilities and vessels to
change their existing access control procedures to ensure that merchant
mariners and any other individual seeking unescorted access to a secure
area of a facility or vessel has a TWIC. Table 2 describes the specific
requirements in the TWIC rule.
Table 2.--Requirements in the TWIC Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirement Description of requirement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation workers Individuals who require unescorted
access to secure areas of maritime
facilities and vessels and all
merchant mariners must obtain a TWIC
card before such access is granted.
Fees All workers applying for a TWIC card
will pay a fee of $137 to cover the
costs associated with the TWIC
program. Workers that have already
undergone a Federal threat
assessment comparable to the one
required to obtain a TWIC will pay a
reduced fee of $105. The interim
replacement fee for a TWIC card will
be $36.
Access to secure areas of By no later than September 25, 2008,
maritime facilities and vessels facilities and vessels currently
regulated by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act must
change their current access control
procedures to ensure that any
individual or merchant mariner
seeking unescorted access to a
secure area has a TWIC card.
Newly hired workers and escorting Newly hired workers, who have applied
procedures for, but have not received their
TWIC card, will be allowed access to
secure areas for 30 days as long as
they meet specified criteria, such
as passing a TSA name-based
background check, and only while
accompanied by another employee with
a TWIC card. Individuals that need
to enter a secure area but do not
have a TWIC card must be escorted at
all times by individuals with a TWIC
card.
Background checks All workers applying for a TWIC card
must provide specific types of
personal information and
fingerprints to TSA to conduct a
security threat assessment, that
includes an FBI fingerprint-based
criminal history records check, and
an immigration status check. In
order to receive a TWIC card,
workers must not have been
incarcerated or convicted of certain
crimes within prescribed time
periods, must have legal presence or
authorization to work in the United
States, have no connection to
terrorist activity, and cannot have
been found as lacking mental
capacity or have been committed to a
mental health facility.
Appeals and waiver process All TWIC applicants will have the
opportunity to appeal a background
check disqualification through TSA
or apply to TSA for a waiver, either
during the application process, or
after being disqualified for certain
crimes, mental incapacity, or are
aliens in Temporary Protected
Status. Applicants who appeal or
seek a waiver and are denied by TSA
may seek review by an administrative
law judge.
Access control systems The Coast Guard will conduct
unannounced checks to confirm the
identity of TWIC card holders using
hand-held biometric card readers to
check the biometric on the TWIC card
against the person presenting the
card. In addition, security
personnel will conduct visual
inspections of the TWIC cards and
look for signs of tampering or
forgery when a worker enters a
secure area.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of TWIC rule.
The TWIC rule does not include the requirements for owners and
operators of maritime facilities and vessels to purchase and install
TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric TWIC card readers.
As a result, the TWIC card will initially serve as a visual identity
badge until access control technologies are required to verify the
credentials when a worker enters a secure area. According to TSA,
during the program's initial implementation, workers will present their
TWIC cards to authorized security personnel, who will compare the
cardholder to his or her photo and inspect the card for signs of
tampering. In addition, the Coast Guard will verify TWIC cards when
conducting vessel and facility inspections and during spot checks using
hand-held biometric card readers to ensure that credentials are valid.
According to TSA, the requirements for TWIC access control technologies
will be set forth in a second proposed rule to be issued in 2008, at
which time TSA will solicit public comments and hold public meetings.
As part of the TWIC rule, TSA is also taking steps designed to
address various requirements of the SAFE Port Act including that it
implement TWIC at the 10 highest risk ports by July 1, 2007. According
to TSA, the agency has categorized ports based on risk and has
developed a schedule for implementing TWIC at these ports to address
the deadlines in the SAFE Port Act. In addition, TSA is currently
planning to conduct a pilot program at five maritime locations to test
TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric card readers, in
the maritime environment. According to TSA, the agency is partnering
with the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to test TWIC access
control technologies and plans to select additional ports to
participate in the pilot in the near future. TSA and Port of Los
Angeles officials told us that ports participating in the pilot will be
responsible for paying for the costs of the pilot and plan to use
Federal port security grant funds for this purpose. According to TSA,
the agency plans to begin the pilot in conjunction with the issuance of
TWIC cards so the access control technologies can be tested with the
cards that are issued to workers. Once the pilot has been completed,
TSA plans to use the results in developing its proposed rule on TWIC
access control technologies.
Following the issuance of the TWIC rule in January 2007, TSA
awarded a $70 million contract to a private company to enroll the
estimated 770,000 workers required to obtain a TWIC card. According to
TSA officials, the contract costs include $14 million for the
operations and maintenance of the TWIC identity management system that
contains information on workers enrolled in the TWIC program, $53
million for the cost of enrolling workers, and $3 million designated to
award the enrollment contractor in the event of excellent performance.
TSA officials stated that they are currently transitioning the TWIC
systems to the enrollment contractor and testing these systems to
ensure that they will function effectively during nationwide
implementation. TSA originally planned to begin enrolling workers at
the first port by March 26, 2007--the effective date of the TWIC rule.
However, according to TSA officials, initial enrollments have been
delayed. While TSA officials did not provide specific reasons for the
delay, officials from the port where enrollments were to begin told us
that software problems were the cause of the delay, and could postpone
the first enrollments until May 2007. In addition, TSA and the Coast
Guard have not set a date by which workers will be required to posses a
TWIC card to access secure areas of maritime facilities and vessels.
According to the TWIC rule, once the agency determines at which ports
TWIC will be implemented and by what date, this schedule will be posted
to the Federal Register.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Contract Planning and Oversight and
Better Coordinate With Maritime Industry Stakeholders
Since we issued our September 2006 report, TSA has taken several
steps designed to strengthen contract planning and oversight. We
previously reported that TSA experienced problems in planning for and
overseeing the contract to test the TWIC program, which contributed to
a doubling of TWIC testing contract costs and a failure to test all key
components of the TWIC program. We recommended that TSA strengthen
contract planning and oversight before awarding a contract to implement
the TWIC program. TSA acknowledged these problems and has taken steps
to address our recommendations. Specifically, TSA has taken the
following steps designed to strengthen contract planning and oversight:
Added staff with expertise in technology, acquisitions, and
contract and program management to the TWIC program office.
Established a TWIC program control office to help oversee
contract deliverables and performance.
Established monthly performance management reviews and
periodic site visits to TWIC enrollment centers to verify
performance data reported by the contractor.
Required the enrollment contractor to survey customer
satisfaction as part of contract performance.
In addition to these steps, TSA has established a TWIC quality
assurance surveillance plan that is designed to allow TSA to track the
enrollment contractor's performance in comparison to acceptable quality
levels. This plan is designed to provide financial incentives for
exceeding these quality levels and disincentives, or penalties, if they
are not met. According to the plan, the contractor's performance will
be measured against established milestones and performance metrics that
the contractor must meet for customer satisfaction, enrollment time,
number of failures to enroll, and TWIC help desk response times, among
others. TSA plans to monitor the contractor's performance through
monthly performance reviews and by verifying information on performance
metrics provided by the contractor.
In addition to contract planning and oversight, TSA has also taken
steps designed to address problems that were identified in our
September 2006 report regarding communication and coordination with
maritime stakeholders. We previously reported that stakeholders at all
15 TWIC testing locations that we visited cited poor communication and
coordination by TSA during testing of the TWIC program. For example,
TSA never provided the final results or report on TWIC testing to
stakeholders that participated in the test, and some stakeholders
stated that communication from TSA would stop for months at a time
during testing. We recommended that TSA closely coordinate with
maritime industry stakeholders and establish a communication and
coordination plan to capture and address the concerns of stakeholders
during implementation. TSA acknowledged that the agency could have
better communicated with stakeholders at TWIC testing locations and has
reported taking several steps to strengthen communication and
coordination since September 2006. For example, TSA officials told us
that the agency developed a TWIC communication strategy and plan that
describes how the agency will communicate with the owners and operators
of maritime facilities and vessels, TWIC applicants, unions, industry
associations, Coast Guard Captains of the Port, and other interested
parties. In addition, TSA required that the enrollment contractor
establish a plan for communicating with stakeholders.
TSA, the Coast Guard, and the enrollment contractor have taken
additional steps designed to ensure close coordination and
communication with the maritime industry. These steps include:
Posting frequently asked questions on the TSA and Coast
Guard websites.
Participating in maritime stakeholder conferences and
briefings.
Working with Coast Guard Captains of the Ports and the
National Maritime Security Advisory Committee to communicate
with local stakeholders.
Conducting outreach with maritime facility operators and
port authorities, including informational bulletins and fliers.
Creating a TWIC stakeholder communication committee chaired
by TSA, the Coast Guard, and enrollment contractor, with
members from 15 maritime industry stakeholder groups. According
to TSA, this committee will meet twice per month during the
TWIC implementation.
Several stakeholders we recently spoke to confirmed that TSA and
its enrollment contractor have placed a greater emphasis on
communicating and coordinating with stakeholders during implementation
and on correcting past problems. For example, an official from the port
where TWIC will first be implemented stated that, thus far,
communication, coordination, and outreach by TSA and its enrollment
contractor have been excellent, and far better than during TWIC
testing. In addition, the TWIC enrollment contractor has hired a
separate subcontractor to conduct a public outreach campaign to inform
and educate the maritime industry and individuals that will be required
to obtain a TWIC card about the program. For example, the port official
stated that the subcontractor is developing a list of trucking
companies that deliver to the port, so information on the TWIC
enrollment requirements can be mailed to truck drivers.
TSA and Industry Stakeholders Need To Address Challenges To Ensure the
TWIC Program Is Implemented Successfully
TSA and maritime industry stakeholders need to address several
challenges to ensure that the TWIC program can be implemented
successfully. As we reported in September 2006, TSA and its enrollment
contractor face the challenge of transitioning from limited testing of
the TWIC program to successful implementation of the program on a much
larger scale covering 770,000 workers at about 3,500 maritime
facilities and 5,300 vessels. Maritime stakeholders we spoke to
identified additional challenges to implementing the TWIC program that
warrant attention by TSA and its enrollment contractor, including
educating workers on the new TWIC requirements, ensuring that
enrollments begin in a timely manner, and processing numerous
background checks, appeals, and waiver applications. Furthermore, TSA
and industry stakeholders also face difficult challenges in ensuring
that TWIC access control technologies will work effectively in the
maritime environment, be compatible with TWIC cards that will be issued
soon, and balance security with the flow of maritime commerce.
TSA and Its Contractor Face Challenges in Enrolling and Issuing TWIC
Cards to Large Populations of Workers at Numerous Port
Facilities and Vessels
In September of 2006, we reported that TSA faced the challenge of
enrolling and issuing TWIC cards to a significantly larger population
of workers in a timely manner than was done during testing of the TWIC
program. In testing the TWIC program, TSA enrolled and issued TWIC
cards to only about 1,700 workers at 19 facilities, well short of its
goal of 75,000. According to TSA and the testing contractor, the lack
of volunteers to enroll in the TWIC program testing and technical
difficulties in enrolling workers, such as difficulty in obtaining
workers' fingerprints to conduct background checks, led to fewer
enrollments than expected. TSA reports that it used the testing
experience to make improvements to the enrollment and card issuance
process and has taken steps to address the challenges that we
previously identified. For example, TSA officials stated that the
agency will use a faster and easier method of collecting fingerprints
than was used during testing and will enroll workers individually
during implementation, as opposed to enrolling in large groups, as was
done during testing. In addition, the TWIC enrollment contract
Statement of Work requires the contractor to develop an enrollment test
and evaluation program to ensure that enrollment systems function as
required under the contract. Such a testing program will be valuable to
ensure that these systems work effectively prior to full-scale
implementation. We also reported that TSA faced the challenge of
ensuring that workers are not providing false information and
counterfeit identification documents when they enroll in the TWIC
program. According to TSA, the TWIC enrollment process to be used
during implementation will use document scanning and verification
software to help determine if identification documents are fraudulent,
and personnel responsible for enrolling workers will be trained to
identify fraudulent documents.
Since we issued our report in September 2006, we have also
identified additional challenges to implementing the TWIC program that
warrant attention by TSA and its enrollment contractor. We recently
spoke with some maritime stakeholders that participated in TWIC testing
and that will be involved in the initial implementation of the program
to discuss their views on the challenges of enrolling and issuing TWIC
cards to workers. These stakeholders expressed concerns regarding the
following issues:
Educating workers: TSA and its enrollment contractor face a
challenge in identifying all workers that are required to obtain a TWIC
card, educating them about how to enroll and receive a TWIC card, and
ensuring that they enroll and receive a TWIC card by the deadlines to
be established by TSA and the Coast Guard. For example, while
longshoremen who work at a port every day may be aware of the new TWIC
requirements, truck divers that deliver to the port may be located in
different states or countries, and may not be aware of the
requirements.
Timely enrollments: One stakeholder expressed concern about the
challenges the enrollment contractor faces in enrolling workers at his
port. For example, at this port, the enrollment contractor has not yet
begun to lease space to install enrollment centers--which at this port
could be a difficult and time-consuming task due to the shortage of
space. Stakeholders we spoke to also suggested that until TSA
establishes a deadline for when TWIC cards will be required at ports,
workers will likely procrastinate in enrolling, which could make it
difficult for the contractor to enroll large populations of workers in
a timely manner.
Background checks: Some maritime organizations are concerned that
many of their workers will be disqualified from receiving a TWIC card
by the background check. These stakeholders emphasized the importance
of TSA establishing a process to ensure timely appeals and waivers
process for the potentially large population of workers that do not
pass the check. According to TSA, the agency already has established
processes for conducting background checks, appeals, and waivers for
other background checks of transportation workers. In addition, TSA
officials stated that the agency has established agreements with the
Coast Guard to use their administrative law judges for appeal and
waiver cases and plans to use these processes for the TWIC background
check.
TSA and Industry Stakeholders Face Challenges in Ensuring That TWIC
Access Control Technologies Work Effectively and Balancing
Security With the Flow of Maritime Commerce
In our September 2006 report, we noted that TSA and maritime
industry stakeholders faced significant challenges in ensuring that
TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric card readers,
worked effectively in the maritime sector. Few facilities that
participated in TWIC testing used biometric card readers that will be
required to read the TWIC cards in the future. As a result, TSA
obtained limited information on the operational effectiveness of
biometric card readers, particularly when individuals use these readers
outdoors in the harsh maritime environment, where they can be affected
by dirt, salt, wind, and rain. In addition, TSA did not test the use of
biometric card readers on vessels, although they will be required on
vessels in the future. Also, industry stakeholders we spoke to were
concerned about the costs of implementing and operating TWIC access
control systems, linking card readers to their local access control
systems, connecting to TSA's national TWIC database to obtain updated
security information on workers, and how biometric card readers would
be implemented and used on vessels and how these vessels would
communicate with TSA's national TWIC database remotely. Because of
comments regarding TWIC access control technology challenges that TSA
received from maritime industry stakeholders on the TWIC proposed rule,
TSA decided to exclude all access control requirements from the TWIC
rule issued in January 2007. Instead, TSA plans to issue a second
proposed rule pertaining to access control requirements in 2008, which
will allow more time for maritime stakeholders to comment on the
technology requirements and TSA to address the challenges that we and
stakeholders identified.
Our September 2006 report also highlighted the challenges that TSA
and industry stakeholders face in balancing the security benefits of
the TWIC program with the impact the program could have on maritime
commerce. If implemented effectively, the security benefits of the TWIC
program in preventing a terrorist attack could save lives and avoid a
costly disruption in maritime commerce. Alternatively, if key
components of the TWIC program, such as biometric card readers, do not
work effectively, they could slow the daily flow of maritime commerce.
For example, if workers or truck drivers have problems with their
fingerprint verifications on biometric card readers, they could create
long queues delaying other workers or trucks waiting in line to enter
secure areas. Such delays could be very costly in terms of time and
money to maritime facilities. Some stakeholders we spoke to also
expressed concern with applying TWIC access control requirements to
small facilities and vessels. For example, smaller vessels could have
crews of less than 10 persons, and checking TWIC cards each time a
person enters a secure area may not be necessary. TSA acknowledged the
potential impact that the TWIC program could have on the flow of
maritime commerce and plans to obtain additional public comments on
this issue from industry stakeholders and develop solutions to these
challenges in the second rulemaking on access control technologies.
In our September 2006 report, we recommended that TSA conduct
additional testing to ensure that TWIC access control technologies work
effectively and that the TWIC program balances the added security of
the program with the impact that it could have on the flow of maritime
commerce. As required by the SAFE Port Act, TSA plans to conduct a
pilot program to test TWIC access control technologies in the maritime
environment. According to TSA, the pilot will test the performance of
biometric card readers at various maritime facilities and on vessels as
well as the impact that these access control systems have on facilities
and vessel business operations. TSA plans to use the results of this
pilot to develop the requirements and procedures for implementing and
using TWIC access control technologies in the second rulemaking.
Conclusion
Preventing unauthorized persons from entering secure areas of the
Nation's ports and other transportation facilities is critical to
preventing a terrorist attack. The TWIC program was initiated in
December 2001 to mitigate the threat of terrorists accessing secure
areas. Since our September 2006 report, TSA has made progress toward
implementing the program, including issuing a TWIC rule, taking steps
to implement requirements of the SAFE Port Act, and awarding a contract
to enroll workers in the program. While TSA plans to begin enrolling
workers and issuing TWIC cards in the next few months, it is important
that the agency establish clear and reasonable time-frames for
implementing TWIC. TSA officials told us that the agency has taken
steps to improve contract oversight and communication and coordination
with its maritime TWIC stakeholders since September 2006. While the
steps that TSA reports taking should help to address the contract
planning and oversight problems that we have previously identified and
recommendations we have made, the effectiveness of these steps will not
be clear until implementation of the TWIC program begins. In addition,
significant challenges remain in enrolling about 770,000 persons at
about 3,500 facilities in the TWIC program. As a result, it is
important that TSA and the enrollment contractor make communication and
coordination a priority to ensure that all individuals and
organizations affected by the TWIC program are aware of their
responsibilities. Further, TSA and industry stakeholders need to
address challenges regarding enrollment and TWIC access control
technologies to ensure that the program is implemented effectively. It
is important that TSA and the enrollment contractor develop a strategy
to ensure that any potential problems that these challenges could cause
are addressed during TWIC enrollment and card issuance. Finally, it
will be critical that TSA ensure that the TWIC access control
technology pilot program fully test all aspects of the TWIC program on
a full scale in the maritime environment and the results be used to
ensure a successful implementation of these technologies in the future.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee may
have at this time.
Senator Lautenberg [presiding]. Thank you very much. Mr.
Hawley, how many workers nationwide do you expect will need
TWIC cards?
Mr. Hawley. The initial estimate is somewhere between
750,000 and 1.5 million.
Senator Lautenberg. That's a fairly broad spread. Well, the
Port of New York and New Jersey currently issues some form of
ID to allow access to port facilities, and they believe that
they need 128,000 TWIC cardholders among the workers. And
that's double what TSA's contractor has estimated. So, what
figures does TSA intend to use? Because that's going to
determine what resources need to be available to provide these
cards in a timely and efficient manner.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir. I think it points out some of the
improvements that have been made recently in the program, in
that the contractor, in this case Lockheed Martin, is paid by
the card. That's their incentive to do it quickly and well. It
is scaleable and if we need to increase the number of cards,
they're able to scale right along with that. And so, we do not
have a situation where we have got a particular appropriation
that we have to fit everything in. It is whatever the Coast
Guard identifies as those positions, or the people who work in
areas, that need this security. As many people that fall under
that category, our contractor has the capacity to enroll.
Senator Lautenberg. But it has to be paid for.
Mr. Hawley. Yes. It's paid for by itself. In other words,
when the port worker pays $137.25, that pays for the card and
what's behind it.
Senator Lautenberg. Is it fair to ask the cardholders, the
workers, to pay for, $137 in fee if the card readers are not
going to be in place at the time? It's not fair to ask them to
underwrite a development program.
Mr. Hawley. They're not underwriting the development.
They're underwriting the cost of their card; and it's a
professional credential that they have. It comes out to about
$30 a year that it will cost them. So, it has less to do with
the specific workplace, and everything to do about that
individual. Because once an individual has a TWIC card, they
have been verified. They can take it anywhere in the maritime
sector. It will first, work, and second, meet all of the
security requirements without question. So, it's an
extraordinary value to the individuals who get them; and for
$30 a year, that's a good deal.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, how about the value to the
country? It seems unfair to me to ask them to pay for something
that still has a long way to go in terms of development. How
many card readers are there in place now?
Mr. Hawley. Well, those are done in the private sector, and
the ones that will be specifically related to TWIC, we've put
that off based on the stakeholders input, including all of the
workers, of wanting to have a full opportunity to explore that,
and have a notice and comment period before that is selected.
So, the card is flexible enough to be compatible with the
standards that are selected.
And, I think as Admiral Salerno mentioned, our Advisory
Committee has come back with draft standards for that, that
showed the way.
Senator Lautenberg. How is that cost determined, Mr.
Hawley; to be sufficient to cover the cost of the card
preparation. And if someone has a short-term job going into the
port, are they going to have to pay $135 or $137? And depending
upon the private sector, not fully, to have the card readers
there, and they're not in place at this point.
Mr. Hawley. That's correct. But there is significant
security value for the card. Just having the card, and as
Admiral Salerno mentioned, the check-in. Maybe the Admiral
could mention the new-hire process and the other security.
Senator Lautenberg. Wouldn't it, according to your policy,
Admiral Salerno, only Coast Guard personnel can confiscate a
misused TWIC card. Local law enforcement, and they are limited
to holding an individual until Coast Guard personnel arrives to
confiscate the TWIC card. That's a pretty cumbersome system.
Wouldn't it make more sense to allow bona fide law enforcement
officials to confiscate a TWIC card based on a reasonable
cause?
Admiral Salerno. Senator, the policy was put in place so
that we could maintain control over the system. The facility
operator has the authority to deny entry to any person that
does not have reason to be on the facility, so we would
anticipate----
Senator Lautenberg. Can they confiscate the card?
Admiral Salerno. They would not confiscate the card, that
would be done by Coast Guard personnel.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, if a card has been denied access,
then that would obviously have to be proven, perhaps, in a
court room. How efficient can the system be if they have to
wait for Coast Guard to catch up with this person, and
confiscate the card?
Admiral Salerno. Senator, we do--as you know--have a
presence in all of the major ports, and have teams of people
who are tasked with conducting facility inspections, and vessel
inspections, and it's a part of their job description that they
would visit these facilities on a regular basis. So, by
notifying the Coast Guard, these teams could be dispatched to
take whatever action----
Senator Lautenberg. I think you're going to have to look
very deeply into that problem, because it seems to me that the
Coast Guard is busy altogether. I always think that the Coast
Guard has been issued too many assignments for the body of
personnel that it has. And when I think of them having to run
down and confiscate the card.
And I think about an employer's dilemma--got a lot of work
to do, I'm going to pick up these cards from these three
fellows, and put them aside--would they only be people that
were on they, who don't qualify to pass the terrorist watch
list?
Admiral Salerno. It would be, in cases where it appears to
be held by a person who's not entitled to a card, some
fraudulent activity. It would not be based on the background
check itself, that would be done--we would not issue a card
unless a person has passed the background check. It would only
be in cases where there appears to be something inappropriate
taking place.
Senator Lautenberg. Without these card readers in place, I
think what we'll see is more confusion and longer delays.
Mr. Hawley, it's my understanding that TSA has suggested
taking resources from the Port Security Grant Program to pay
for the TWIC pilot project. Why wasn't funding requested
separately for the pilot project?
Mr. Hawley. Well, the pilot project relates to access
control, and that has to be the subject of--it will have
pilots, and then the rulemaking. The standards are just now
being set. And we have a number of ports who have come forward,
including ports in New York, and New Jersey, who are anxious to
be among the pilot. Since it is a permanent part of the port
infrastructure that they're doing, it is eligible for the Port
Security Grant. So, that is a way to jumpstart the program, and
then as we work further to define the nature of the other
pilots, that's when we'll look at the money and see if we need
more, and if we do, we'll ask for it.
But, the Port Security Grants, that's what they're for, and
this is a process that's already underway, and they can move
very quickly to get them going.
Senator Lautenberg. Are you comfortable with the progress
made thus far, and the ability to set a target date to get
things relatively in place to effectively read the cards?
What's the timeline that you suggest would be a timeline that
could be met? And where we're really getting a test of this--I
mean, issuing the cards is one part of it, but I think the
larger part in terms of having it work effectively is whether
or not these can be read electronically, and with some degree
of dispatch, get them done?
Mr. Hawley. Yes, I think the--one of the features of the
standard that we'll have for the access control system is the
flexibility to allow the individual operators to use their own
existing access control. That can be enabled on the card. So
the TWIC cards, when issued, will be able to be used
immediately in that environment.
Senator Lautenberg. Well. We don't have to look through the
list to----
Senator Carper. It's just us.
Senator Lautenberg.--see who's next. Senator Carper?
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Gentlemen, welcome. It's good to see you,
Secretary Hawley, Admiral Salerno. I said to Beth Osborne, a
member of my staff, ``Is it my imagination, or are the Admirals
getting younger?''
Mr. Rabkin, thank you for coming, and thanks for all of the
good work that you do at GAO.
We have a special interest in this particular issue in
Delaware because of the Port of Wilmington. Not everybody in
the audience who might be watching this hearing knows that the
Port of Wilmington is the top banana port, and we all want to
be top banana in some respect or the other, and for us in
Delaware, our port is a place where a lot of bananas come
through. If you ate a banana this morning with your cereal,
there's a pretty good chance that it came through the Port of
Wilmington. We're a big port for Chilean fruit, all kinds of
stuff that we bring through that helps feed--especially people
on the eastern side of our country.
We bring in other things, and export among other things,
the Saturn Sky. We don't export a lot of automobiles, but we
export the Saturn Sky, made in Wilmington, Delaware by GM.
But, we're proud of our port, and it's a major employer,
and not just at the port, but also helps support a variety of
businesses and parts of our economy, not just in Delaware, but
in the Greater Delaware Valley and the Del Mar Peninsula. So,
we have more than a little bit of interest, as you might
imagine.
This is an issue we've followed for a few years in
Delaware, and Delaware was the first state to ratify the
Constitution and our moniker is ``The First State''--we like to
be first in a whole lot of things.
I think we might get to be first with respect to the TWIC
card. And, it has taken us awhile to get here, and one of the
questions I wanted to ask, and one of the things I'd like to
explore with the panel is a little bit of chronology. When was
the first gleam in somebody's eye that there ought to be a TWIC
card, and did it grow out of legislation in 2001, was it part
of the Patriot Act, was there, was it part of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, is that where the genesis really
lies?
Mr. Hawley. I believe out of MTSA was where TWIC was
originated.
Senator Carper. All right. Could somebody just kind of walk
me through the TWIC in terms--I think, if someone had said back
when the legislation was enacted that we'd still be here, and,
in the Spring of 2007, waiting to implement the program, in
even one port, I think folks would have been surprised. We're
told, the folks in Wilmington, the Port of Wilmington are told
that we can anticipate the initial deployment maybe in May, and
now we're hearing it may not be May, we were told before it was
before May.
So, first question--somebody, I don't care, Mr. Rabkin, if
it's you, I don't care, Secretary Hawley, if it's you--somebody
just kind of walk us through why it has taken this long?
Mr. Hawley, you've not been in your job forever, I know
that, I know that--how many years have you been there?
Mr. Hawley. About a year and a half.
Senator Carper. How long does it seem?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hawley. About that.
Senator Carper. OK. You've not been there since this
legislation--but why so long?
Mr. Hawley. Well, it has to do with the system that's
behind the card. As you know, it is that network behind the
card that is complex. We made some decisions in the last year,
that added complexity, and therefore, probably time, to the
process. But it was, in our view, worth it. It has to be
compliant with the FIPS 201 process, which is the latest
Federal Government biometrics standard. So changes were needed
to align TWIC with that. We thought that was prudent going
forward.
And then there were some privacy data issues, gaps
identified by our internal folks as well as the DHS Inspector
General. So, we had to get after those, and close those, and
that's now done as of February. And the rulemaking, we went
through a long rulemaking. We had 1,900 comments. So that's
why, that's why it has taken so long.
Senator Carper. Do you have, do you have a fair amount of
confidence that we're almost--I'll use a football metaphor--the
ball is almost in the end zone?
Mr. Hawley. Well, it--which end zone? No, but I think the--
--
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hawley. Yes, I do. I think a year ago, all of the
points that Mr. Rabkin made and the Chairman made earlier in
terms of where is your process; where are your professional
program managers, a whole lot of those things have now been
fixed. The system is built. We've awarded the procurement; and
now we're in the stage of testing. The hard part about testing
is you just don't know how long it's going to take, because if
it passes the first try, we're out of here and ready to go. And
because of the importance of it in the real world, we're not
going to move forward until the testing is done. That is the
reason why the cards are not being issued today, because the
testing is not complete.
So, in answer to the Port of Wilmington, which will be
first for TWIC and when I mentioned in my opening about the
port community being enormously forthcoming and constructive,
the Port of Wilmington leads that charge, and we will have a
minimum of a 45-day head start before we begin to go to the
port and start enrollment. So, whenever we get to that point,
the TSA, the Coast Guard will communicate with the port, and
then there will be plenty of time to get the thing up and
running.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Mr. Rabkin, should we be encouraged that we're making
reasonable progress and the expectations that Secretary Hawley
has suggested will be realized?
Mr. Rabkin. Well, I think there's reasonable progress, but
I'm not as optimistic as the Secretary is about how much has
been shown, and how close we are--if I may--to the goal line.
TSA conducted a prototype test that was underwhelming, it did
not achieve any of its goals, although it did create some
lessons to be learned, and I think the TSA has learned those
lessons.
They still have to meet certain deadlines, they have to
hold their contractor accountable for getting this next test of
issuing cards in the 10 highest-risk ports done, and it's not
off to a very auspicious start, because it's delayed there, and
we're still not confident about when it's even going to start,
let alone finish.
And then, that's just getting the cards out. It's a very
important process, but from my perspective, that's the easy
part. And then they have to move the technology, and having it
work, and work quickly and work accurately, all the time, is, I
think, even more of a major challenge. So, there's a lot to be
done yet.
Senator Carper. Let me follow up with a question about
communication; between TSA and whether it's the Port of
Wilmington or other ports that will be coming down the road
here. Just tell us about the quality of that communication, are
you satisfied with it? Is it getting better? We've been told it
has been--from our perspective, not very good.
Mr. Hawley. Well, I think the communication is excellent,
actually. And, it's a team thing between the Coast Guard and
TSA, and now our contractor. And we've stood up a formal
consultative group to formalize that process.
Senator Carper. I'm talking about communicating with ports,
with the folks that are----
Mr. Hawley. Well, first of all, the Coast Guard is in the
port.
Admiral Salerno. If I may, sir----
Senator Carper. Please.
Admiral Salerno. In each port there is a, what we call an
Area of Maritime Security Committee which represents a broad
cross-section of stakeholders in the port. In addition, there
is a harbor safety committee, which again, represents broad
sections of the port. One is for security purposes, one for
safety, but each of them represent opportunities to reach out
and communicate with the full spectrum of port stakeholders.
We have communicated with our staffs in all of the ports,
and have prepped them to make this outreach in a very
deliberate way, in conjunction with TSA and with the
contractor. Essentially, they're waiting for the green light on
the go-ahead that, you know, once we have the schedule
established, there will be a very deliberate process of
informing people. It will start with a notice in the Federal
Register, but there will be--you know, to make it official--but
there will be all sorts of informal means, including these
committees, to get the word out to people.
Senator Carper. I think there's a disconnect here. Because
the people who run our port, the folks who work there, believe
there has not been good--in fact, the word was given to me as
``poor'' communication. So there are some differences between
``excellent'' and ``poor.'' And, we always say, ``The
customer's always right.'' I'm not sure who the customer is
here, but it could be the port and the folks that the port
serves.
But, the message I would ask you to take back to your folks
is, people in my port are not pleased with the communication
with the program managers and I would just ask you to, let's do
better. I know, everything I do, I could do better, and I
suspect the same is true here. So I'd ask that you re-double
your efforts. OK. All right.
Mr. Hawley. Yes, sir.
Senator Carper. Could I ask just one more quick one?
Thanks.
On one hand, we want to make sure that the folks that,
whose background is such that would raise alarms and concerns--
we want to make sure that they have a system here to catch
those, to detect those folks.
At the same time, I'll be honest with you, folks who work
at a lot of these ports, whether it's my port, or ports in New
Jersey or other states, a lot of them you would look through
the high school yearbooks, they weren't picked to be ``Most
Likely to Succeed,'' and a lot of them have had troubled pasts,
they've--some of them have been in trouble with the law, some
have been incarcerated, some have been pardoned, some have not.
And, let me just ask, for the folks, for some people in the
State of New Jersey this is the first good job they've ever
had, and they've straightened themselves out, and they're
staying out of trouble. How do we balance the desire, the
earnest desire, to make sure that we're not allowing people who
shouldn't be, who have a past that suggests that they shouldn't
be allowed to have access to the port, and do pose a security
risk, from those who just made bad choices in their lives
earlier, and have straightened themselves out?
Mr. Hawley. It's a very, very, very important issue,
because this is a credential to work. And, the standard is
terrorist risk. And that is for what we all hope is an
infinitesimal part of the population.
Our Hazardous Materials Endorsements in the trucking
population is an analogy that gives me some confidence, because
we've done 2.7 million of those, and the adjudication process,
appeal, waiver process has been very effective, and has not
been the problem we all might have anticipated. So, we are
very, very zeroed in on that specific issue.
Senator Carper. We want to work with you closely on that.
Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Senator Carper.
One thing, and that is, according to the schedule as we've
heard it, we're supposed to start issuing cards Monday in the
New York/New Jersey region. And, it's now moved back, as I
understood you to say, to somewhere in the fall. And, I don't
think there can be a lot of optimism that this program is going
to be meeting any of the targets outlined. We, you said, that
the employee population that may be covered could be 750,000,
could be 1.2 million, or 1.5 million. Now, how do you plan to
provide the resources, depending on what number you finally
come up with?
Mr. Hawley. Yes. The program is scaleable. Using Port of
Wilmington as an example, we've already hired the 8 trusted
entities who will do the enrollment. That is part of the
communication with the port, to identify how many people are
going to be enrolled when the team goes in, and then they scale
up to do it. So, I think, of the concerns, that is not one of
the major concerns. I think we'll be able to handle the
population. The part that is most important and still out there
is the part Mr. Rabkin mentioned, in terms of the extensive
testing that is required for the system.
Senator Lautenberg. I really don't understand how these
parameters are being dealt with, because to me they don't pass
the early testing that we've done, and we're stuck in limbo,
and we're going to ask the employees to pay $137 to get this
card, but it may not be system-wide. You said that that person
could take that card anywhere in the country and use it to gain
access. But, also, I think the Admiral said that this isn't
necessarily the terror watch list, but it could be for any
other reasons as well. Now, if this is going to be presenting a
person's full background, looking at this card, this has got
several tests it has got to pass so that one's liberties aren't
encroached upon.
I'm sorry, but we have another panel here, and we are going
to have a vote soon. So, I would ask that the second panel of
witnesses be seated.
Thank you very much for being here with us.
Mr. Pomaikai, Mr. Michael Rodriguez, please take your
seats. Thank you.
Ms. Himber is Vice President of the Maritime Exchange for
the Delaware Ricer and Bay, the Maritime Exchange is the
industry trade association for the Delaware River port system,
including ports in Camden, New Jersey, and Philadelphia, and we
thank you for joining us today, Ms. Himber.
Mr. Pomaikai is the Assistant Port Captain for Sause Bros.,
Incorporated, in Honolulu, Hawaii, and Mr. Michael Rodriguez,
Executive Assistant to the President of the International
Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots. And we thank all of
you for being here.
We're going to ask you to summarize your statements within
a five-minute time range, if there's another minute needed,
we'll permit that, but otherwise it will encroach on the other
person's ability to have the microphone. So, Ms. Himber? Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF LISA B. HIMBER, VICE PRESIDENT, MARITIME EXCHANGE
FOR THE DELAWARE RIVER AND BAY
Ms. Himber. Good morning, and thank you for inviting me to
present testimony today, particularly on behalf of our members
in New Jersey and Delaware, who have been involved in the TWIC
pilot program since its inception in 2002.
Our members of the Maritime Exchange, include both private
and public regulated facilities, as well as vessels, and the
individuals who need access to secure maritime areas.
I've been involved with the TWIC Program for its--since the
beginning--and in addition, as a member of the National
Maritime Security Advisory Committee, have chaired two working
groups developed to address TWIC issues.
And, I believe everybody's aware of the many setbacks,
we've talked about some of them today. My feeling is, despite
the setbacks which occurred in the past, the pilot program did
allow TSA to gain an understanding of the challenges that they
will face in implementing a program of this magnitude.
My testimony today will focus on issues surfacing from the
TWIC rulemaking, as well as concerns relating to the second
part of the program, the use of the TWIC readers at ports and
vessels.
In drafting its final rule, it is evident that stakeholder
comments to last year's proposed rule were given serious
consideration. Particularly, we believe DHS made exactly the
right decision to separate the card issuance, and reader
installation processes. Yet, obviously in a program of this
scope, there remain additional concerns about the program.
First, the rule is silent on casual labor, which is such an
integral part of maritime operations that it must not be
overlooked. While the rule does provide for accommodation for
escorting non-TWIC holders, there's no clear pathway to
implementing the escort requirement in any practical manner. In
addition to the operational and physical impediments, other
questions have arisen about the escort's liability and
responsibility.
Similarly, our members are concerned about access for non-
TWIC holding truck drivers, especially during the initial
program roll-out.
The second major concern we have relates to the costs,
which simply stated, and as you've stated, are too high.
There's little incentive for individuals to seek employment at
maritime facilities when the cost of such an employment may
exceed his wages for the day. And, if the company pays--and
some trade union agreements require that they do--it may cost
several thousands more beyond the cost of the card to pay for
meals, and time spent applying for and retrieving the card.
Significant additional costs will accrue for companies to
escort non-TWIC holders. This is particularly troublesome given
that some employers or employees may pay for cards that the
individuals never receive, as a result of their security threat
assessments.
Another question has been raised regarding processes for
individuals who, for religious reasons, may not have their
pictures taken, or must have their heads covered when being
photographed.
These are just a few of the concerns which have surfaced
over the last several months, and there are many others.
On the other hand, there are issues industry has voiced in
the past as preventing successful TWIC implementation, and we
would like to compliment DHS on the steps that they are taking
to address them.
Predominant among these issues is--as everybody has
mentioned today--has been the problem of communicating
information to stakeholders, particularly as it relates to
program setbacks and delays. But, we appreciate the creation of
the TWIC Stakeholder Communications Committee, and look forward
to seeing some improvement in that regard.
In addition, our local Coast Guard sector, Delaware Bay,
has done an excellent job in facilitating outreach and sharing
information as it becomes available.
Further, we've also been concerned that many TWIC
technologies were excluded from the pilot program tests, and we
are pleased that DHS will conduct an additional pilot. And for
that, I'd like to talk for a minute about the card readers.
One of the key concerns submitted to the proposed rule
related to the use of contact cards in the maritime
environment. In response, the National Maritime Security
Advisory Committee was asked to develop recommendations for a
contactless TWIC reader, and we completed that work in
February. There was one critical area where DHS and the
maritime industry could not come to terms, and that's whether
or not the fingerprint template should be encrypted. This may
very well be one of the single-most important issues DHS will
have to address as it enters the second phase of the TWIC
rulemaking process.
Industry believes that individual privacy is more than
sufficiently protected by virtue of the fact that the TWIC will
not contain a full fingerprint image. There are other
outstanding issues surrounding the selection and use of card
reader technology, such as the use of a PIN, integration with
existing port access control systems, and future expansion of
the card, just to name a few.
In addition to addressing these and other remaining
questions, we suggest that DHS revisit its approach to the TWIC
reader implementation. The Department should first make the
final TWIC policy decisions, such as the use of readers at low-
risk facilities and vessels, or access control recordkeeping
requirements, and then identify the technology that we need to
support them.
We also suggest that DHS work with industry in the pilot
program design phase, as well as its execution and evaluation
and the subsequent rulemaking process.
In closing, let me say that although there are still a lot
of serious concerns, DHS has made progress in bringing this
program to fruition. We remain committed to the TWIC Program,
and want to continue to work with TSA and Coast Guard, to
ensure there are no unintended consequences, and that the
program is going to be deployed in the most secure and
efficient manner possible.
And, that concludes my remarks, and I'll be happy to answer
any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Himber follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lisa B. Himber, Vice President,
Maritime Exchange for the Delaware River and Bay
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and members of the
Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony today. My
name is Lisa Himber, and I am Vice President of the Maritime Exchange
for the Delaware River and Bay. The Maritime Exchange is a non-profit
trade association representing the members of the commercial maritime
industry in Southern New Jersey, Southeastern Pennsylvania, and
Delaware, and our mission is to promote commerce at Delaware River
ports. We accomplish this by engaging on issues and developing programs
to support the safety, security, economic viability and environmental
health of the tri-state port complex. Included among our 300 members
are those companies and individuals who operate, or provide service to,
the 2,800 vessels calling Delaware River ports each year. Our
membership includes regulated vessels, port authorities and private
maritime facilities as well as the many businesses and individuals who
need access to one or multiple facilities to do their jobs on a daily
basis--such as tug and barge companies, steamship agents, labor
organizations, surveyors, line handlers, and trucking companies, just
to name a few.
Although the Maritime Exchange is focused on activity at Delaware
River ports, we address issues of national significance with our sister
maritime organizations under the umbrella of Maritime Information
Services of North America, known as MISNA, as well as through NAMO, the
National Association of Maritime Organizations.
In addition, I serve as Vice Chair of the National Maritime
Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC), which as you are aware was
established under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of
2002. NMSAC has been actively engaged with the Department of Homeland
Security on the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
program since its initial meeting in March of 2005, and I'll talk more
about our recent accomplishments in a few minutes.
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the TWIC program and
issues associated with implementation of the final rule issued in
January of this year. TWIC has long been one of the priority Federal
projects for my organization and our members in the Delaware River
maritime community.
Background
The Exchange role in the port--Like most associations, the Maritime
Exchange is an advocate on issues of concern to its members, much like
a Chamber of Commerce. However, what sets the Exchange apart from a
traditional trade association is its operating role in the port. The
Exchange operates on a 24/7 basis, and one of our primary
responsibilities is to collect, store and disseminate information on
all commercial cargo ships moving through the port. We also serve as a
maritime information and communications hub for the region, conveying
messages between ships and their shoreside service providers as well as
distributing Federal safety, security, operational, and procedural
bulletins to the maritime businesses community. Because of the
importance of this function, which we have been providing since 1875,
coordinating information through the Maritime Exchange communications
center has been incorporated into the Area Maritime Security Plan for
Coast Guard Sector Delaware Bay.
In addition to our traditional Ship Reporting function, in the mid-
1980s the Exchange began the development of what is now known as
Maritime On-Line (MOL). This system is a community-based information
network which provides a mechanism not only to obtain anticipated,
current and historical vessel movement information but also offers a
tool for steamship carriers and their agents to submit cargo manifest
data to U.S. Customs and Border Protection and advance electronic
notice of vessel arrival and departure information to the U.S. Coast
Guard. Through MOL, the Exchange provides Delaware River port operators
with a cost-effective means to both comply with Federal information
reporting requirements as well as to share information, such as
manifest data or cargo release status, with local public and private
sector transportation partners through a centralized maritime
intelligence system.
Development of a regional standard ID--Because the Exchange had
demonstrated its ability to bring together the various maritime
stakeholders to develop, implement, and use a community information
system, several members approached us in the late 1990s to discuss the
feasibility of developing a system under Maritime On-Line which could
be used to identify truck drivers accessing the various cargo
facilities in the three states.
The Exchange organized a working group of system users and
developed a set of requirements for what would become known as the
Electronic Driver Identification (EDID) System. By September 2001, the
system design was complete, and the Exchange was working to identify a
means of funding the initial program development. The premise behind
this system was a centralized database and the issuance of an ID card
that would be accepted at all participating Delaware River maritime
terminals.
Immediately after the events of September 11, 2001, Exchange
members asked whether the system we had designed to identify truck
drivers could be expanded to include anyone requiring access to
maritime facilities. Like truck drivers in the State of Florida, those
doing business in the Delaware River were required to obtain multiple
identification cards, and the maritime community agreed that
development of a single, standard ID card would be a critical program
under new heightened security programs at maritime facilities.
As a result, by December 2001, the Exchange, in partnership with
the Port of Wilmington, Delaware, had identified funding to develop a
pilot program, and successfully programmed and tested what would become
the Delaware River ID (DRID) system. We subsequently received a Port
Security Grant to expand this program.
It was because of this effort that the Delaware River was selected
as one of the TWIC pilot program locations. It was generally agreed
that if such a system could work effectively at Delaware River ports,
with three states and multiple private and public port facilities, it
could work at all U.S. ports.
TWIC Pilot Program
Having been involved in the TWIC program even prior to the
establishment of the TSA and the August 2002 launch of the East Coast
TWIC pilot project, my organization and its members have been keenly
interested in the successful deployment of this program.
Members of the Delaware River port community participated in all
three phases of the TWIC pilot program, beginning with the Planning
Phase which spanned the Fall of 2002 through the Spring of 2003, the
Technology Evaluation from May to October of 2003, and the Prototype
Phase, which started in November 2004 and officially ended in June
2005, although TSA continued to support Delaware River sites well into
2005.
I believe everyone is aware that there were a great number of
setbacks which plagued the TWIC pilot program, which was originally
scheduled for completion in December 2003. Despite some of the problems
encountered by the Transportation Security Administration, some of
which were discussed at a hearing before this Committee last May, it
seems clear that the pilot program did afford TSA with the opportunity
to gain an understanding of what would be required to implement a
program of this magnitude.
Moving Forward
Program Deployment--Card Issuance--The Final Rule published in
January is an extremely complex document which many maritime
professionals are still working to comprehend. However, we cannot
emphasize enough that we believe the Department of Homeland Security
made the right decision in separating the card application and issuance
processes from the reader installation and usage processes. Taken
separately, each of these components of the TWIC program is extremely
intricate and creates multiple possibilities to unduly hamper maritime
operations if not implemented in a thoughtful and deliberate manner; we
appreciate that DHS is allowing sufficient time to address the
challenges of card issuance prior to attempting to introduce the
component of accessing and communicating with a central TWIC database,
which was never tested during the pilot program. There is no doubt that
had both phases been implemented concurrently, the transition to full
program deployment would have been fraught with multiple unanticipated
problems.
In drafting its final rule, it is evident that DHS took into
consideration the thousands of comments submitted by maritime
stakeholders in response to the Proposed Rule published last May.
Several of the issues cited have been addressed, such as the need to
accommodate temporary and seasonal workers, and the elimination of the
formal employer sponsor relationship. In addition, the Coast Guard
drafted a very clearly-written and helpful Navigation and Vessel
Inspection Circular (NVIC) guidance document; and we appreciated the
opportunity to comment on the draft document prior to its finalization.
This is not an opportunity the regulated public often enjoys.
Needless to say, however, in a program of this scope, there still
remain some additional questions and concerns about the regulation.
First, the rule is silent on the issue of casual labor, which is
such an integral part of efficient maritime operations that it must not
be overlooked. While the regulation and the draft NVIC provide
accommodation to escort non-TWIC holders, there is no clear pathway to
implementing the escort requirement. Foremost among the challenges is
the fact most facilities operators within the Delaware River and
elsewhere have determined that the secure and restricted areas defined
in their security plans will be contiguous, such that the entire
facilities are restricted.
The effect of that decision directly relates to the numbers of non-
TWIC holders who may be escorted by any one-TWIC holder. As outlined in
the draft NVIC, escorting in a restricted area is limited to five non-
TWIC holders for every one TWIC-holding escort. In addition, unless
this guidance changes in the final version, the escort must be constant
and side-by-side (i.e., no monitoring via video or random patrol). The
impact of this can be seen in the following scenarios: at the hiring
hall, a longshoreman offers to drive three or four day laborers to the
pier to report for work. Upon arrival, these individuals may be
assigned to work different ships, and therefore the TWIC holder is no
longer in a position to serve as an escort for the others. Or perhaps
one of the workers is a female and the TWIC holder is male; surely he
cannot be expected to stay by her side during the entire workday. In
any case, it is not conceivable that one worker could escort even one
individual, let alone several others, on a constant basis while still
fulfilling his own responsibilities. In addition to the practical
difficulties, in some cases the physical layout of the marine facility
prohibits the ability of the card holder to fulfill his/her
obligations. For example, while it is obvious where the vessel berthed,
the final resting place of the cargo is sometimes several hundred
yards--or even miles--away from the vessel in a storage yard, warehouse
or transit shed.
Further questions have arisen about the escort's liability and
responsibility. If an individual under escort causes a Transportation
Security Incident or otherwise violates existing laws, regulations or
facility/vessel policies, what is the ramification to the escort? This
question has yet to be resolved, and depending on the answer, it may be
difficult, if not impossible, to identify willing escorts.
Similar issues arise as they relate to truck drivers. Many drivers
arrive at Delaware River ports from other parts of the country. Of
necessity, until the program is fully implemented, these drivers will
not have their TWIC cards, and with the sheer volume of trucks moving
through facility gates every day, it is not feasible that facilities,
importers, or others could provide resources to escort these drivers.
Even after initial TWIC rollout is completed, there will always be
random arrivals by drivers who had never previously hauled cargo to or
from maritime facilities.
The card application and issuance processes are not designed to
accommodate long-haul truck drivers. For example, during initial
rollout, if a driver arrives at the Port of Wilmington, he can, and
should, apply for his TWIC card at that time. Yet the processes require
that he return to the place of issuance to retrieve and activate his
card after the security threat assessment has been completed. Needless
to say, the driver may be long gone from the area with no immediate
opportunity to return.
Suggestions for addressing the above issues include: allow TWIC
applicants to designate that cards be returned to a different
enrollment center than that where the individual originally applied, or
include a mechanism to mail a card to an applicant's office or home--or
other appropriate location--after which the individual could return to
a convenient enrollment location to activate the card.
In addition, facilities should be given the option to create a
``temporary'' credential or visitor's pass in lieu of requiring
escorts. If appropriate, when the individual's identification
documentation is validated, his photograph could be taken and other
information entered into the facility access control system. If
necessary, this information could be submitted to DHS. Such a mechanism
might be designed along the lines of the Florida ``5 in 90'' rule:
Florida State regulation allows for a temporary credential, and if an
individual presents himself for access to a regulated facility more
than 5 times in 90 days, he or she would no longer be eligible for a
visitor's card and would be required to obtain a Florida card. Needless
to say, both DHS and the maritime industry would need to agree to
mutually acceptable details to implement such a program within TWIC,
but the idea bears consideration.
A second major concern relates to the cost of the TWIC card. Simply
stated, the cost is too high. Although we anticipated there would be a
significant cost saving associated with DHS centralizing the purchasing
and production of the cards, these do not appear to have been realized.
Again, keeping in mind that the maritime industry is highly reliant on
casual, seasonal and temporary workers, there is little incentive for
these individuals to seek employment at maritime facilities and vessels
when the cost of such employment may exceed his wages for the day. Non-
profit organizations, such as the Seamen's centers are also greatly
impacted by the high price tag. At the Seamen's Center of Wilmington,
where I serve on the Board of Trustees, the estimated cost to obtain
TWICs for volunteers is $8,000; this represents an 8 percent increase
in operating expenses for the upcoming year. Also, of particular
concern is the fact that an applicant is required to pay the full price
at application, even if he/she is subsequently denied a card and it is
never produced. TSA should charge only the cost of processing the
enrollment application and for the security threat assessment, with the
balance to be paid only after the card is produced and activated.
Third, one additional question has recently surfaced in our region:
how can we process TWIC applications for individuals who for religions
reasons may not have their pictures taken or require that their heads
be covered when photographed? While I would not hazard a suggestion on
how to address such an issue, it may not have previously been
considered and is certainly a challenge DHS will need to address.
These are just a few of the questions and concerns which have been
raised over the last several months; there are countless others--far
too many to address today. However, we expect that many of these will
be resolved when the final NVIC is released.
In addition, there are a few issues the Maritime Exchange and
others have raised in the past as preventing successful TWIC
implementation, and we compliment DHS on the steps taken to address
them.
Predominant among these has been the problem of successfully
communicating information to the maritime industry--particularly as it
relates to program setbacks and delays. We appreciate that that the
Lockheed Martin contracting team has established a TWIC Stakeholder
Communications Committee specifically to address the issues of
communications. To date, the Committee has held only one meeting, so we
are not yet in a position to evaluate its effectiveness; however we
remain optimistic and look forward to working with the TWIC team toward
a successful and smooth implementation.
In addition to efforts underway at the national level, our local
Coast Guard personnel, who are responsible for coordinating activities
between TSA, the contractors and the maritime community, have done an
excellent job over the last several months in facilitating outreach
sessions, helping identify enrollment center locations, and providing
maritime stakeholders with information as it becomes available. We are
confident that local Coast Guard will approach the implementation and,
ultimately, enforcement of the TWIC program with the flexibility it
demands.
In addition, during the last 5 years, many have held the belief
that the constant turnover in DHS, TSA and TWIC program office
leadership has contributed significantly to the ongoing delay in
implementing the program. Over the last year, the personnel roster has
been completely stable, and we are pleased to note that DHS seems to
have addressed some of the internal issues associated with employee
turnover.
Finally, the Exchange and others have expressed concerns about the
fact that many of the critical technologies, such as communication with
the database, use of biometrics, or individual (versus corporate)
program enrollment were not tested, or tested insufficiently, during
the original TWIC pilot program. We appreciate that DHS, as required by
the SAFE Port Act, will conduct a TWIC pilot program to test reader
technology and processes.
Installation and Usage of Card Readers--As stated previously, DHS
elected to defer this component of TWIC implementation. We
enthusiastically applaud this decision and appreciate the efforts of
DHS to work with industry to determine the appropriate technology for
use in the maritime environment.
One of the key concerns expressed by those commenting on the
Proposed Rule last Spring related to the use of contact cards.
Requiring that a card be swiped at a TWIC reader would not only
significantly delay maritime operations, but contact readers are more
susceptible to failure due to environmental elements, and they also
present an easy and attractive target to vandals. In response, last
November DHS asked the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee to
develop recommendations for a contactless card reader which could be
used at ports and vessels.
NMSAC agreed to accept this challenge, and it was my pleasure to
co-chair the working group established to develop the recommendations.
The Working Group included approximately 130 individuals, not including
the Federal Government participants, and was organized into a maritime
team and a security technology industry team. The maritime group was
comprised of public and private terminal owners and operators, vessel
owners and operators, maritime labor and employer organizations, trade
associations, and a host of others. These individuals, with counsel of
the security industry team members spent the months of December 2006
and January 2007 developing a series of operating requirements which
would guide the development of the technical documentation. This
document was completed by mid-February in advance of the February 28
deadline established by DHS.
For the most part, the technical team was able to meet the
requirements outlined by the maritime industry representatives, and the
technical specification endorsed by NMSAC reflects the combined efforts
of the full working group.
However, there remains one critical area where the DHS and the
maritime industry could not come to terms. This relates to the level of
protection which should be placed on the fingerprint template
transferred between the TWIC card and the reader. This is one of the
single most important issues DHS will have to address as it enters the
second phase of the TWIC rulemaking process.
In its simplest form, DHS has stated that the fingerprint template
is to be encrypted; the maritime industry holds that individual privacy
is more than sufficiently protected simply by virtue of the fact that
the TWIC will not contain a full fingerprint image but only a minutiae
template which cannot be re-generated if it is ``stolen'' during
contactless transmission.
The following text is excerpted directly from the NMSAC
recommendations:
A. Privacy and Security Considerations--NMSAC supports the
inclusion of measures to protect individual privacy and
acknowledges that this prerequisite, along with the need to
enhance commerce and improve transportation security, has been
included as a required goal of the TWIC program since it was
announced in February 2002.
It is our understanding that all personally identifiable
information about an individual gathered during enrollment will
be retained by TSA in its central data bank. The card itself is
expected to show and/or contain a photo, a unique cardholder
identification number, and the individual's biometric
fingerprint template.
In its design, TSA wisely elected to utilize the fingerprint
template rather than a full fingerprint image specifically to
address both privacy and operational efficiency concerns. Since
only a fingerprint template will be passed between the card and
the TWIC reader, the information cannot be reverse-engineered
to a full fingerprint image.
Even if the template were ``stolen'' during contactless
transmission to a TWIC reader, and even if somehow it could be
used to replicate the original fingerprint, for which we
understand no technology currently exists, the ``thief'' would
not be able to use this illegal TWIC as the fingerprint image
would not match his own when presented to a biometric reader in
conjunction with a TWIC. In addition, an individual interested
in ``stealing'' a fingerprint would meet much less technical
resistance and obtain a more accurate representation by lifting
it from an object in a public place such as a car door, window
or drinking glass.
B. Operational Considerations--There are several concerns with
encrypting the fingerprint template. First, every transaction
will require encryption and decryption, each of which affords
time and opportunity for a problem to arise. In addition, prior
to encryption and decryption, some form of authentication or
``handshake'' between the card and reader is necessary to
validate that the transaction about to take place is
legitimate. In order for such authentication to take place,
some form of key management must be in place. Thus, if a key is
compromised at one instance, it affects every reader in that
``key community.''
In summary:
Adding encryption generally makes the TWIC system more
complex and therefore more difficult to develop, use, manage,
and maintain.
Adding encryption will slow processing time to read cards at
vessels/facilities.
The use of keys places an administrative burden and certain
liabilities (e.g., responsibility to ensure the key is not
compromised) on those charged with key management. Vessel and
facility operators are neither prepared nor able to accept
these responsibilities.
Adding encryption will increase TWIC costs.
Therefore . . . ``Given the limited amount of information
transmitted between the TWIC and the reader, the Working Group
does not believe encryption will provide any additional
security benefit, but it will increase both cost and processing
time.'' The NMSAC TWIC Working Group (TWG) closely studied the
issue and as a group concluded that the operational
complexities increase by a level of magnitude and to the point
where they are not proportionate with any perceived benefit of
encrypting the biometric template. In short, there is no
empirical evidence that encrypting the fingerprint template
affords any additional protection of personal privacy.
DHS published the NMSAC recommendations for public comment,
approximately 30 organizations or individuals responded, and an
overwhelming majority agreed with the NMSAC on this critical issue.
While it is possible that a compromise solution to this challenge
may be identified, the NMSAC group was unable to explore these
opportunities given the fact that DHS did not provide any indication
that it would expressly require encryption of the biometric until
February, after the maritime team had completed its work. Further, DHS
has not effectively presented rationale for taking this position;
indeed, the original task statement presented by DHS stated that the
recommendations shall incorporate ``reasonable security and privacy
controls,'' which we believe the NMSAC-endorsed recommendations did.
There are several other outstanding questions and concerns
surrounding the selection and use of card reader technology. These
include the use of a PIN during the TWIC verification procedures,
integration with legacy access control systems, and future expansion of
the card. However, we believe DHS will work effectively with the pilot
program participants and the National Maritime Security Advisory
Committee to meet the challenges associated with this phase of the
rulemaking process.
In addition to addressing the above, we suggest that DHS reverse
its approach to the TWIC reader implementation. Specifically, rather
than first developing a TWIC reader specification and subsequently
finalizing policy decisions and promulgating a rulemaking on reader
usage, we recommend that DHS first resolve the TWIC policy questions
(e.g., the requirement for use of readers at low-risk facilities and
vessels, processes for enrolling individuals whose fingerprint cannot
be captured, access recordkeeping, etc.), and then incorporate the
appropriate technology to support them.
Finally, we suggest that DHS work with industry in the pilot
program design phase as well as its evaluation and subsequent
rulemaking activities.
Conclusion
Over the years, the maritime sector perhaps more than any other has
recognized the need to implement new programs and practices in an
effort to enhance the security of our homeland. We have dramatically
altered business processes and worked closely with DHS agencies to help
them achieve their missions. As with many Federal programs, we want to
continue to work with TSA on the TWIC program to ensure there are no
unintended consequences, such as those which might arise if we are
unable to credential casual labor, and that the TWIC will be deployed
in the safest, most secure, and efficient manner possible.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
Mr. Paul Pomaikai, we welcome you.
STATEMENT OF CAPT. PAUL KAIPO POMAIKAI, SR.,
ASSISTANT PORT CAPTAIN, SAUSE BROS.; ON BEHALF OF
THE AMERICAN WATERWAYS OPERATORS
Mr. Pomaikai. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today,
and for the support you have shown the industry.
My name is Paul K. Pomaikai, Senior, I am the Assistant
Port Captain----
Senator Carper. Excuse me, would you pronounce your name
again, your last name, very slowly?
Mr. Pomaikai. Pomaikai.
Senator Carper. Pomaikai.
Mr. Pomaikai. Pomaikai.
Senator Carper. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Pomaikai. Yes. I'm Assistant Port Captain for Sause
Brothers, I also hold a Master's Ticket from the United States
Coast Guard, going on my seventh issue.
We've come out of Honolulu, Hawaii. Sause Brothers has been
in marine transportation business since 1937. Our Hawaiian
Island division was incorporated in 1983.
I am testifying today on behalf of the American Waterways
Operators, the national trade association for the tugboat,
towboat and barge industry.
Mr. Chairman, Sause Brothers and other members of AWO
consider ourselves partners with Congress, and the Department
of Homeland Security in ensuring the security of our country.
We take that responsibility very seriously.
We are here today because we have serious concerns about
the impact of TWIC and the TWIC Program on our industry and the
men and women who work in it.
These issues are very personal for me, I grew up in the
maritime industry. My father was on the dock at Pearl Harbor on
that fateful day, December 7, 1941.
My wife, Donna Laurie, is also a licensed mariner, sailing
in the engine room department on the container vessel LURLINE,
of Matson Navigation Company, as we speak. In 2003, Donna and I
founded the Wai'anae Maritime Academy, located at Leeward
Community College, a unit of the University of Hawaii.
Our intention was to provide young people with the
education and training to begin a career in the maritime
industry. So far, we have graduated 180 cadets in 9 classes.
I love this industry, and I know what a wonderful place it
can be to make a career. I do not want to see my industry or
the people who work in it harmed by well-intentioned, but
misguided government regulations.
Mr. Chairman, AWO has two major concerns with the TWIC
Program. First, we are concerned that the process for obtaining
a TWIC will become a barrier to entry that will discourage new
hires from beginning a career in the maritime industry. This
will compound the existing shortage of personnel for our
vessels.
Second, we believe requiring card readers on small vessels
like towing vessels will add no practical security value and
should not be a part of the proposed rule that TSA and the
Coast Guard will issue later this year.
Let me elaborate on these concerns, briefly. First, AWO is
very grateful that the SAFE Port Act passed by Congress last
year included a provision requiring an interim work authority
for new hires. However, under the process laid out in the TWIC
final rule, an individual cannot begin working under the new
hire provision, until he or she has traveled to a TWIC
enrollment center, which could be many hours away, and for some
of us in Hawaii, an island away, make an application for TWIC
and pay the $137 fee.
This is an enormous hurdle for a young man or woman or an
older worker, looking to make a career change. It is also a
problem for employers who need to be able to put new hires to
work as soon as they have passed the drug screen and physicals.
If new employees are scared away from seeking employment in
the maritime industry because of the burdens involved in
applying for a TWIC, companies could be forced to tie up boats
for lack of crew members to operate them. Given the importance
of maritime transportation to the economy of Hawaii, and other
states, this would be a very major problem.
As an alternative, we would propose that the process begin
with a computerized check against a terrorist watch list, not a
trip to the TWIC enrollment center, with an employees consent,
the employer could enter his or her name, birth date, Social
Security number into the Coast Guard's Homeport website, to
initiate a check against a terrorist watch list.
Provided this initial screening turned up no red flags, the
individual could be put to work on an interim basis. Later,
once the new hire has had the taste of life and work on a
vessel and sees that it will work for him or her, the mariner
could be required to complete the TWIC enrollment process.
Second, AWO believes that the card readers should not be
required on vessels with small crews, like towing vessels. The
SAFE Port Act gives the Department of Homeland Security the
authority to limit the card reader requirement to vessels with
more than a certain number of crew, to be determined by that
agency.
On a typical U.S. flag-towing vessel with four to ten crew
members, all of whom are familiar to management and fellow crew
members, an electronic card reader adds no practical security
value. We strongly recommend that card readers not be required
on vessels with less than 10 crew members.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
testify.
[The prepared statement of Captain Pomaikai follows:]
Prepared Statement of Capt. Paul Kaipo Pomaikai, Sr., Assistant Port
Captain, Sause Bros.; on Behalf of The American Waterways Operators
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, I am Paul Kaipo Pomaikai, Sr.,
Assistant Port Captain for Sause Bros., Inc., in Honolulu, Hawaii. I
want to thank you for holding this hearing and for the support you have
shown for our industry.
Sause Bros., headquartered in Coos Bay, Oregon, is a privately held
towing company, carrying forest products, building materials and
petroleum to and from Alaska and Hawaii and up and down the U.S. West
Coast. We employ over 500 people, including 300 mariners as crew on our
boats. Sause Bros. owns and operates a fleet of 35 tugboats and 25
barges, and has been in the marine transportation business since 1937.
Sause Bros. has been engaged in common carrier service to the
Hawaiian Islands since 1966. Our Hawaiian Island division was
incorporated in Hawaii in 1983 to more effectively serve Island
customers. The Hawaiian fleet provides inter-island and Military
Sealift Command towing services, and distributes West Coast cargoes to
Island customers. Our Island barge fleet carries products ranging from
lumber, plywood, sand, and containers, to heavy equipment and petroleum
products. Our ship assist fleet has gained a reputation among the
Island shipping industry for safety, reliability, and professionalism.
As Assistant Port Captain for Sause Bros., I am responsible for all
of our operations in the Hawaiian Islands. In addition, in 2003, my
wife, Donna Laurie, who is also a licensed mariner, and I founded the
Wai'anae Maritime Academy, located at Leeward Community College at
Wai'anae, a unit of the University of Hawaii, to provide young people
with the education necessary to begin a career in the maritime
industry. We have graduated 180 cadets in nine classes, and this May we
will be holding our tenth class. One of our commitments to our students
is to help them find employment on board vessels following their
graduation. We help them to meet the qualifications and get the
documents they need, and we also help them develop the lifestyle that
allows them to be productive workers in the maritime industry or other
places they may decide to go with their lives.
I am appearing before the Committee today on behalf of The American
Waterways Operators. AWO is the national trade association for the
tugboat, towboat, and barge industry. The industry AWO represents is
the largest segment of the U.S.-flag domestic fleet and a vital part of
America's transportation system. The industry safely and efficiently
moves over 800 million tons of cargo each year with a fleet that
consists of nearly 4,000 tugboats and towboats, and over 27,000 barges.
Our industry employs more than 30,000 mariners as crewmembers on our
vessels. While a few companies in the towing industry are relatively
large, according to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, over 90 percent
of U.S. towing companies are actually smaller than Sause Bros.
Mr. Chairman, Sause Bros. and the other members of The American
Waterways Operators have been, and will continue to be, partners with
Congress and the Department of Homeland Security in ensuring the
security of our country. Immediately after the September 11, 2001
attacks, the members of AWO worked in cooperation with the Coast Guard
to develop security plans for our vessels, even before they were
required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. We take
security seriously, and we are proud of the fact that our vessels and
their crews are considered to be the ``eyes and ears'' for the Coast
Guard on our Nation's waterways.
Nevertheless, we have serious concerns about the impact of the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program on our
industry and the men and women who work in it. Our primary concern is
that the process for obtaining a TWIC card will become a barrier to
entry into the maritime industry for new hires, and this will
exacerbate an existing shortage of personnel for our vessels. We are
also concerned that requiring card readers on small vessels like towing
vessels will add no practical security value and should not be part of
the proposed rule that TSA and the Coast Guard will issue later this
year. Allow me to elaborate on these concerns.
The May 2006 NPRM contemplated a TWIC enrollment process taking 30
to 60 days. In its comments on the NPRM, AWO said that such a time-
frame would ``seriously impede the ability of companies to bring new
mariners into the industry in a timely manner.'' AWO and many of the
2,000 other organizations and individuals commenting on the NPRM
suggested that the Department of Homeland Security include an interim
work authority provision in the TWIC rule which would enable new hires
in the industry to begin working immediately once they have passed an
initial security screening.
We are enormously grateful that the Congress recognized these
concerns, and as a result, a provision of the SAFE Port Act, Public Law
109-347, signed into law on October 13, 2006, required the inclusion of
an interim work authority in the final rule. The statute provides:
``The regulations shall include a background check process to enable
newly hired workers to begin working unless the Secretary makes an
initial determination that the worker poses a security risk. Such
process shall include a check against the consolidated and integrated
terrorist watch list maintained by the Federal Government.'' This
language embodied the request we had made in our comments to the NPRM
and made mandatory a process to allow new hires to begin working after
an initial screening unless there is a determination that the worker
poses a security risk (emphasis added).
The final rule issued on January 25, however, does not follow the
intent of the statute to avoid creating barriers to new hires entering
the industry. The proposal would deny a new hire the ability to begin
work until the expensive and burdensome application process for a TWIC
has been completed. Under the process called for in the final rule, new
applicants must first travel to a TWIC enrollment center to make
application for a TWIC in person, as well as pay the TWIC enrollment
fee of $137, before undergoing an initial check against the terrorist
watch list.
For many applicants in Hawaii and other parts of the country, this
trip to the TWIC enrollment center will not be quick, easy or
inexpensive. In Hawaii, for example, an applicant might have to fly
from one island to another simply to apply for a TWIC. In other parts
of the country where there is not a TWIC enrollment center nearby,
applicants will also have to travel significant distances in order to
make the application. This process creates a very high barrier to entry
for new entrants to the industry who are not sure whether a career in
the maritime industry is right for them.
Under the final rule, the ``initial'' security screening can only
occur after the applicant has gone through the time and expense of
completing his or her application. At that point, the employer may
enter the individual's information into the Coast Guard's Homeport
website to obtain the results of the check against the terrorist watch
list. The rule indicates that a response can be expected within 24 to
72 hours after enrollment is completed. The problem is that for new
hires and their employers, the TWIC enrollment process is only one step
in a larger process of coming to work in the maritime industry. The
first thing a company does when a new hire makes application is put him
or her through a drug screen. If he or she passes that test, the next
step is a physical exam, followed by a reference check. In the real
world, neither the applicant nor an employer will want to invest in a
trip to a TWIC enrollment center until those steps are taken. What that
means is that it could easily take more than a week before an applicant
is ready to travel to an enrollment center and make application for a
TWIC, and then wait an additional 3 days for the results of the
terrorist watch list check to be available.
Mr. Chairman, we are concerned that requiring new applicants to
undergo such a burdensome process will deter individuals from entering
the maritime industry. My company, and companies like mine, provide
entry level opportunities for high school graduates looking to begin a
career in the marine industry as deckhands on our vessels. These men
and women come to our company with a need to begin earning a paycheck
and providing for themselves and their families right away. Faced with
the burdensome requirements surrounding the TWIC process, many will
seek employment in another industry where the barriers to entry are not
so high. Even without the TWIC rule, we are struggling with a chronic
shortage of personnel to man our vessels. AWO estimates that the annual
turnover of entry level personnel in the towing industry is 50 percent.
New hires may find that they get seasick or homesick and choose not to
continue with a maritime career. Companies must also evaluate an
individual's ability to perform on the job. Both the new hire and the
company must come to the conclusion that a career as a working mariner
is the right ``fit'' for the individual and the company before a long
term commitment is made. For many new hires, the first manifestation of
that commitment is the trip to the TWIC enrollment center and the
payment of the application fee. That commitment should not be required
until both the company and the applicant have concluded that the
individual will continue in the industry.
In this environment, we are very concerned that the burdensome
requirements for obtaining a TWIC card will exacerbate the current
personnel shortage and could even force companies like ours to tie up
boats for lack of crewmembers to operate them. Such an outcome would
have a very negative impact on our ability to deliver the cargoes that
are the building blocks of the economy in Hawaii, and would have the
same negative impact on the national economy by affecting hundreds of
towing companies around the country that also deliver the goods that
are essential to maintain America's economic vitality.
As an alternative, we would propose that the process begin with a
computerized check against the terrorist watch list, not a trip to the
TWIC enrollment center. (This could be done concurrently with the drug
screen or physical exam described earlier.) With an employee's consent,
the employer could enter the new hire's name, birth date, and Social
Security number into the Coast Guard's Homeport website to initiate a
check against the terrorist watch list. Provided this initial screening
turned up no red flags, the individual could be put to work on a vessel
on an interim basis. Later--once the new hire has a taste of life and
work on a vessel, and sees that it works for him or her--the mariner
could be required to complete the TWIC enrollment process.
Another significant concern for the towing industry is the
potential requirement for TWIC card ``readers'' on every towing vessel.
The NPRM proposed a requirement for readers at both facilities and
vessels. The Department subsequently announced that the card reader
requirement would not be implemented as part of the initial TWIC rule
but would be considered further as part of a separate rulemaking. This
was a proper response to the many comments that were received about the
card reader requirement, but the issue of card readers for towing
vessels remains an open one.
Card readers are simply unnecessary for towing vessels. As AWO
pointed out in its comments on the NPRM, crew sizes on tugboats and
towboats typically range from four to ten mariners. In a typical U.S.-
flagged towing vessel operation, every employee is known to management
and fellow crewmembers. A stranger onboard the vessel is immediately
obvious. Personal knowledge of fellow employees provides a higher
security standard than reliance upon an electronic reader, no matter
how sophisticated the technology employed. Access control procedures
can be included as part of a vessel security plan. The validity of TWIC
cards can be checked through means other than mandating computerized
equipment onboard each vessel to constantly communicate with the
database.
Mr. Chairman, even if card readers could be operated reliably in
the severe marine environments where towing vessels routinely go--and
that has not yet been demonstrated--there is simply no need to require
their installation on every towing vessel in order to ensure the
security of those vessels, or to ensure the security of the maritime
transportation system. The SAFE Port Act gives DHS the authority to
limit the card reader requirement to vessels with more than a certain
number of crew, to be determined by the agency. On behalf of AWO, I
would like to suggest that, at a minimum, vessels with 10 or fewer crew
members requiring a TWIC should not be required to have a card reader
installed onboard.
These problems with the TWIC program are very significant,
especially for the many small businesses in the towing industry. They
also have serious implications for companies throughout the towing
industry and for the economy we serve. The provision for an interim
work authority for new hires into the industry must be a workable one.
The requirement to begin the process by traveling to a TWIC enrollment
center must be eliminated. Failure to do so will have a significant
negative impact on the ability of vessel operators to attract and
retain the individuals necessary to crew their boats. In addition, card
readers provide no additional security value in a small vessel
environment and should not be required for vessels with ten or fewer
crewmembers.
Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today. AWO and its member companies stand ready to work with
this committee and with TSA and the Coast Guard to ensure the security
of our country while keeping mariners working, vessels moving, and the
commerce of the United States flowing. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much for your testimony
and the wonderful story about how you built a business and the
important services you render. We congratulate you for that.
Mr. Pomaikai. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Rodriguez, please.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. RODRIGUEZ, EXECUTIVE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
MASTERS, MATES AND PILOTS, AFL-CIO
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I have submitted written testimony to the Committee. I'd
like to read a brief statement to highlight a couple of points.
Senator Lautenberg. I would point out, Mr. Rodriguez,
thanks for the reminder, that your full statements will be in
the record as written, and that the summary--we hope--covered
the points you wanted to make. But, be assured that your full
statement will be in the record.
Please, Mr. Rodriguez, start.
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Michael Rodriguez, Executive Assistant to the
President of the International Organization of Masters, Mates
and Pilots. I began my career in the maritime industry in 1979
as a graduate of the United States Merchant Marine Academy at
King's Point.
I sailed as a Deck Officer aboard U.S.-flag vessels until
1995. At MMP, I report on regulatory matters to the
organization's leadership. I have been monitoring the
development of the TWIC Program since the beginning.
I am also a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Naval
Reserve, and a Veteran of Operation Enduring Freedom. I'll
touch on a couple of points that are in my written statement.
The TWIC Program must be a national program. We believe
Congress envisioned a national maritime security system that
would pre-empt state and local systems. However, current
provisions allow state or local governments to impose their own
duplicate systems. This will result in higher costs and
additional burdens for our workers and vessel operators as they
trade between States, even between facilities, within the same
state. We are also concerned about processing delays at the
state and local levels.
The TWIC Program should be compatible with international
systems. We have argued that the TWIC Program should take
advantage of proven biometric technology by using the
International Civil Aviation Organization standards. The ICAO
standards are simple, efficient, and recognized worldwide.
Machine-readable travel document control systems used by
the United States for electronic passports that monitor entry
of foreign travelers into the United States employ the ICAO
standard. We feel the ICAO standard is the logical choice for a
biometric security card that could be interoperable with the
TWIC and the Seafarer's Identity Documents that will be carried
by crews of foreign ships trading to the U.S.
Finally, we are concerned about the administrative law
judge program that would be put in place to handle denials and
waivers. We feel it is imperative that a sufficient number of
ALJs be in place to handle the increased case load generated by
the TWIC. If reviews are not processed in a timely manner,
there will be a substantial negative impact on workers who are
wrongly denied their TWICs.
That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodriguez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Rodriguez, Executive Assistant to the
President, International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots,
AFL-CIO
I want to thank the Committee for inviting the Masters, Mates &
Pilots (MM&P) to present our views concerning the implementation of the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) in the maritime
sector. Our organization represents Ship's Masters and Licensed Deck
Officers and Engineers working aboard U.S.-flag commercial vessels
operating in the international and domestic trades, and on the inland
waterways; and on civilian-crewed ships in the government fleet. The
MM&P also represents harbor pilots.
The MM&P and, in fact, all the American seafaring and longshore
unions, have a vital interest in maritime security and the
administration of the maritime security regime. The members of our
maritime labor organizations will be directly affected by any breach of
maritime security. Many of the members of the MM&P also serve as Ship
Security Officers and are responsible for the implementation of the
U.S. Maritime Security Regulations and the International Code for the
Security of Ships and of Port Facilities (ISPS Code).
Our comments are from the perspective of mariners who are
continually in transit between different terminals, ports, states and
countries for long periods as they work and live aboard their vessels.
Accordingly, and in order to do their jobs efficiently and effectively,
these maritime workers need consistency between national and
international identity credentials, and uniformity with respect to the
administration of access control.
Once fully implemented across all sectors of the transportation
industry, the TWIC program will affect millions of American workers. In
fact, many of our concerns are shared by other transportation workers,
such as longshoremen, truck drivers, rail crews, ship service personnel
and others whose employment is not limited to a single facility or
port.
Seafaring and longshore workers want secure ports and vessels. We
should be and we want to be treated as allies in the war against terror
and not as the enemy. Our members would be among the first affected by
a terrorist attack directed at or using our Nation's maritime
transportation system. Therefore, we understand that access control
procedures, including identification cards, can be important tools in
the effort to prevent terrorist acts against our maritime
transportation system. We support initiatives to identify and bar from
working in security-sensitive transportation jobs individuals who
clearly pose a security risk.
The stated goals of the TWIC program are to improve the security of
our transportation systems, ensure the flow of commerce, and preserve
the rights of workers; workers who are essential participants in the
supply chain and in its security. We believe very strongly that in
order to achieve these objectives, the process of applying for and
receiving a TWIC must be efficient and must not result in unnecessary
burdens upon workers. TWIC cards will be used in a marine environment
covering a vast and diverse maritime workplace and the program must not
only account for and reflect this reality, but must be adaptable to a
wide variety of circumstances. Unfortunately, we are concerned that in
too many areas this is not currently the case.
An Overview of the Current Situation
Support for a National Program
We have no doubt of the need for a ``biometric transportation
security card'' as mandated by Congress in section 70105 of the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA of 2002). Early on
we saw the benefits of a single, national security system based on a
comprehensive security record check that could be used in a uniform
system by a mobile workforce employed across many terminals, ports and
states. Therefore, we support a system based upon background checks to
ensure that transportation workers do not pose a ``terrorism security
risk'' to the United States. However, our support was predicated on the
belief that such a system would be a national system that would become
the standard for all maritime workers throughout the country and would
prevent a proliferation of local systems that would all require their
own background checks and fees. This unfortunately is not the case
today. In the absence of Federal preemption, the program is permitting
local requirements to overlay the TWIC standards for access control.
It should be clear that this situation is inconsistent with the
goals of the TWIC program and unnecessarily burdens transportation
workers who, by the nature of their work, require access to secure
areas throughout a port, a state, the Nation, or even internationally.
Terrorism and the prevention of terrorism are national, not local,
concerns and the standards and system put in place to address these
national concerns should take precedence over all others and not be
left to the vagaries of each individual facility, port, city or state.
Need for International Uniformity
We anticipated and have urged that the TWIC program should take
advantage of proven biometric technology by using standards developed
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO is the
United Nations organization that regulates international air transport.
The ICAO standards are simple, efficient, widely used and recognized
worldwide.
In addition, the ICAO standards form the basis for secure identity
documents recently adopted by the International Labor Organization in
Convention 185 (ILO C185), Seafarer Identity Documents (SID). They also
form the basis for the machine readable travel document control systems
used by the U.S. for electronic passports that monitor access of
foreign travelers to the U.S. It seems to us the ICAO standards are the
logical choice for a biometric security card that could be used in an
interoperable system that could include both our national cards and the
international cards that will be carried by the crews of foreign ships;
a population of seafaring workers employed aboard the foreign flag
ships that carry 95 percent of America's export and import trade in and
out of America's ports. Also, foreign port workers on U.S. flag ships
while working cargo or undergoing repairs in foreign ports are expected
to carry ICAO-compatible identity cards.
Because our TWIC system will not be interoperable with
international standards the vast majority of ships and crews in U.S.
deepwater ports will not be covered under TWIC-based access control
systems. In other words, U.S. ships working cargo in a U.S. port with
U.S. labor will have to comply with United States Coast Guard (Coast
Guard) security provisions while a competing foreign ship with a
foreign crew at the same terminal will be exempt--a situation we can
begin to rectify by requiring that the TWIC system use the readily
available ICAO standards.
An Overly Complex Card
It is disappointing to us that the very clear provisions regarding
security cards in the MTSA of 2002 have still not been fully
implemented in 2007. We attribute this to a number of factors.
First, ownership of the program has been split. Responsibility for
the design of the card lies with the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) while the Coast Guard is responsible for
implementation of access control programs using the TWIC.
Second, rather than accepting the proven ICAO standard, the TSA has
adopted a design standard that is technologically sophisticated but
overly complex and with a functionality that is, in most cases, far
beyond that needed to comply with the MTSA of 2002.
Third, the card design standard and required supporting equipment
is unproven in the maritime environment. Many individuals and
organizations experienced in maritime transportation believe that the
complex access control regime it is intended to support is both
unnecessary and impractical throughout much of the maritime workplace.
Many have also raised objections over the approach taken by the TSA
but, from our perspective, the agenda seems to be dictated by the
concerns of the card manufacturers and contractors rather than by those
of the affected population in the maritime industry who will be covered
by the program. The result is a very complex and expensive program that
we are concerned will cause major disruptions in the maritime
transportation system if implemented as proposed. The cost for all this
will have been borne by the workers in the system.
Leads to Overly Complex Control System
In May 2006, the Coast Guard issued a proposal for a security
regime governing access control using the full functionality of the
proposed card. That proposal met strenuous objections from the maritime
industry which highlighted the proposed card's impracticality. It
appeared that the initial proposal was driven by a desire on the part
of the Coast Guard to utilize the full alleged functionality of the
TSA-designed card across the entire maritime sector regardless of any
risk-based assessment of the threat of terrorism in the various sectors
of a very diverse industry. As an example, vessels would be required to
have onboard card readers interconnected via satellite communications
to a central server maintained by the TSA to monitor use of the TWIC
card. The impracticality of applying such a system to thousands of
small inland towing vessels or offshore supply vessels, or even large
ocean-going ships, should be self evident. While the initial Coast
Guard proposed access control provisions have been withdrawn, they
remain the subject of a future rulemaking that, as far as we know,
still has the objective of utilizing the full functionality of the TWIC
card across the entire maritime sector in a one-size-fits-all approach
to security.
Security systems need to differentiate between high risk operations
and low to no risk operations. Security regimes and controls must be
scalable to the risk. For instance, a high profile cruise ship and a
terminal handling thousands of passengers is in a very different risk
category or tier than an inland towing vessel with a 5 person crew or a
ship and terminal handling crushed rock or iron ore.
Need for Federal Preemption
Since transportation workers will be required to carry a TWIC, it
follows that many of the card holders will travel between states,
ports, and facilities. If the TWIC regulations allow each state, port,
or facility to develop its own unique access control system that does
not conform to a uniform national standard then the TWIC program will
impose tremendous costs upon the industry and its workforce but provide
no real value in terms of ensuring the free flow of commerce. The
imposition of numerous inconsistent local requirements will require
transportation workers to file numerous applications, undergo numerous
background checks and pay the fees associated with all of the perhaps
dozens of identity cards workers would have to carry. We are also
concerned about delays in the various systems that would possibly
deprive workers of employment while they wait for their cards.
Such a system clearly places an unreasonable burden on workers and
on interstate and foreign commerce. We strongly believe there is an
urgent need for Federal laws and regulations governing the TWIC to
preempt any state or local requirements for such workers.
The TWIC Should Focus on Exposing Terrorism Security Risks
In the MTSA of 2002, Congress mandated that those who could be a
``terrorism security risk'' to the United Stated should be denied a
security card. We agree with that standard and recognize that TSA has
made some modifications to its original list of disqualifying crimes.
We remain concerned that some of the broad descriptions of
disqualifying offenses go beyond this standard. As this program is
implemented over the next few months and years, we hope that TSA will
indeed focus on preventing those that are genuine security risks from
holding a TWIC and exercise appropriate discretion to not deny
employment opportunities to those workers who may have simply made a
mistake years ago.
Need for an Adequate ALJ Program
We are pleased that Congress has established a requirement for a
review process before an administrative law judge (ALJ) for individuals
denied a TWIC. It is our understanding that the present intent is to
use the ALJ's within the Coast Guard system. We recognize the merits of
having Coast Guard ALJ's conduct the reviews, but we have concerns as
to the adequacy of the number of ALJ's within the present Coast Guard
system to handle the caseload that may be generated. If the Coast Guard
is not able to process reviews in a timely manner it will have a
substantial impact on the ability of workers who may have been wrongly
denied a TWIC, to earn a living and support their families.
Currently, the Coast Guard's ALJ system handles a caseload
generated by approximately 200,000 credentialed mariners. It has been
estimated that the initial surge into the TWIC program will cover
approximately 850,000 workers. It is imperative that a sufficient
number of ALJ's are in place to handle a vastly increased caseload.
Cost of the TWIC Program
We continue to oppose the concept that workers must pay the costs
for the TWIC program. The security threat assessments and the
background checks mandated by the final rule are considered necessary
to enhance the security of our Nation's ports and are part of the
overall effort to fight terrorist elements.
Security threats against ports and ships are actually aimed at
governments and the public they represent, not the individual worker.
Reducing security threats aimed at destabilizing our political and
social institutions by terrorizing the public is primarily a role of
the government. The general public is the principle beneficiary of
maintaining a secure maritime transportation system and a secure global
supply chain. Therefore, while we understand and appreciate the fact
that some employers are paying these costs, the Federal Government
should fund this program.
Privacy Concerns
As transportation labor has consistently stated, maintaining the
privacy and confidentiality of the information collected and generated
by the TWIC process is crucial. Toward this end and at our request,
Section 70105(e) of the MTSA of 2002 includes a specific mandate that
``information obtained by the Attorney General or the Secretary under
this section may not be made available to the public, including the
individual's employer.'' We do appreciate TSA and the Coast Guard's
stated intent to fully abide by these privacy protections, but
continued vigilance will be needed to ensure that sensitive information
collected in the field, especially at so-called mobile enrollment
centers, is adequately protected.
We also have concerns over discussions at the agency level toward
allowing facilities to use the TWIC card for local applications. The
idea is to store additional information beyond what is required by the
MTSA of 2002. Such local applications might include employment records,
training records, medical records, or other information of a sensitive
nature and would defeat the national character of the system.
As a matter of privacy protection we strongly believe that the
information on the TWIC should be limited to only that necessary for
the Federal Government to comply with the security functions specified
in the MTSA of 2002.
Conclusion
We thank you, again, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to present
our comments on the implementation of the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential. We stand ready to work with you and your
Committee and other concerned and affected parties to achieve a safer
and more secure maritime transportation network.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
And thank each of you for your excellent testimony. It
helped focus in on the magnitude of this problem, and the
consequences of what, if it is finally in place, what it might
mean. So, it's important advice that you give us.
Mr. Rodriguez, how many states are moving forward with
their own security credentialing programs in the absence of a
Federal system? Have states begun aggressively to try to
establish these identity systems?
Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Chairman, I'm aware of only Florida.
That's my own knowledge. I could try to find that information
for you and provide it for the Committee at a later date.
Senator Lautenberg. What do you think about the time frames
discussed by the earlier, in the earlier panel for getting this
program underway, any of you who feel that you have knowledge
about that, please feel free to speak up, Mr. Rodriguez?
Mr. Rodriguez. I feel that some of what Mr. Hawley's
testimony touched on, the functionality of the card, the
``Cadillac'' sort of features it has, is holding us back in
terms of getting a good system that we can test in operation.
What I mean by that is, we're talking about putting a lot
of functionality into this card, and that's opening up the
discussion to what we can put on the card? What sorts of
information? Who gets to write to the card? That's slowing down
the implementation. So, that's one of the reasons we would like
to see the international standard adopted. It's a very simple
standard, and once we get a program running, our recommendation
is to build upon that, the capabilities that we need.
Senator Lautenberg. Either one of you want to comment on
your view of the timeframe that has been discussed to getting
this program really underway?
Ms. Himber. I--perhaps naively so, but am remaining
cautiously optimistic--we do think that there is some momentum
going, and we appreciate what the Secretary said about making
sure we take the time now to make sure it works right, rather
than rushing into it and dealing with problems later.
The experience that we've had with the pilot program is
that that is the wrong approach. So, we're hopeful that once
they do get started it will--the timetable that they ultimately
develop, they'll be able to maintain, because they've worked
out problems in advance.
Senator Lautenberg. So, your time frame is hopeful.
OK, Mr. Pomaikai?
Mr. Pomaikai. Thank you, good morning, Mr. Chairman, again.
We have no problem with the time frame. The time frame is
not a problem. What I fear is, the system will be inundated
with a massive amount of people all at one time. If we roll the
program out in certain areas like we are doing now, the Coast
Guard has to deal with all of the merchant mariners going
through their documents, going through background checks,
probably drawing from the same database once the TWIC is
implemented, they will again be swamped--and they'll have to
deal with that problem.
Our problem is to be able to get new hires on the vessel in
a timely fashion. They have to provide for their families, they
have to go to work. They do so after a process of application
with our company, and the process of obtaining from an MMD from
the Coast Guard, there's a section there--section four of the
application of the MMD--that calls for a background check. That
process alone is done after the application is turned in to the
Coast Guard, sent to Washington, reviewed by the Department of
Homeland Security and the FBI. It comes back, allowing the
mariner to, again, come to the Coast Guard REC and receive his
MMD.
Now, the mariners go through an extensive process for that,
and that is done on their own.
But, after all that he has done, he will have to go through
the TWIC application process, not to mention----
Senator Lautenberg. Well, I think it's fair to say that the
complications are not yet fully dealt with, and frankly, maybe
not even thought about. So, this process has to protect to
the--whatever extent possible, the people around the country
the harbor supports from attack that could take lives, and
really disturb the economies. On the other hand, we do have to
get to work, we have hundreds of thousands, and the number, as
you heard, varied between 750,000 and 1.5 million--it's a
pretty good spread. But people that we have to work with, and a
lot of these people are really itinerant in their work
routines. People come in for a day or two or whatever as
ordinary labor. But, we have to continue to pursue it.
The thing that I object to is the ``pie in the sky'' kind
of deadline, or timeline that's expected. As I see it, based on
the experience we've had so far, it's totally unrealistic. So,
and we don't want it to be competing with other security
measures that are, that have to be taken.
Ms. Himber, how many transportation workers do you think
will require TWIC cards at the Delaware River ports?
Ms. Himber. I'm sorry to say, Senator, that I don't know
that anybody has a really good feel for what that number is.
We've talked about, you know, 75,000 direct jobs. That's just
in the local region, it doesn't count truck drivers who come in
from other regions that are not maritime areas, that might need
to get their TWICs in our region. So, I don't know that anybody
has the answer to that.
Senator Lautenberg. What's the expected beginning roll-out?
When do they expect to be issuing cards?
Ms. Himber. I have heard the same thing that we talked
about earlier in the Port of Wilmington which will be first,
it's at least May, and perhaps later.
Senator Lautenberg. The complications are clear. We--thank
you.
Senator Carper?
Senator Carper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to say to Ms. Himber, Beth Osborne, remember,
my staff who helps on these issues, is very complimentary of
the work that you have done and expressed great pleasure in
that, the relationship, and the way you approach your
responsibilities.
Ms. Himber. Thank you.
Senator Carper. You're the Vice President of the Maritime
Exchange, is that correct?
Ms. Himber. That's correct.
Senator Carper. Who is the President?
Ms. Himber. Dennis Rochford.
Senator Carper. It must be a terrible burden to have to
carry him on your back. How long have you worked there?
Ms. Himber. It'll be 19 years this year.
Senator Carper. Probably seems a lot longer, I'm sure.
Ms. Himber. I was 12 when I started.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. Small world, Delaware. Dennis and his
family, we go to the same church together, so give him our
best.
Ms. Himber. I will.
Senator Carper. I want to follow up, first of all, if I
could with you, let me just say, Mr. Pomaikai and Mr.
Rodriguez, Commander Rodriguez--I'm an old Navy guy, too. My
favorite rank was Commander. I loved being Commander Carper, I
hope you get to be one, too.
Mr. Rodriguez. I hope I get to be one soon.
Senator Carper. You're close, how many years have you put
in?
Mr. Rodriguez. I've got 8 good in now, sir.
Senator Carper. That's good. I take our Boy Scout Troop--my
sons are Boy Scouts--we go to different service academies, and
Senator Lautenberg, Senator DeMint and I get to nominate young
men and women to go to these service academies, and we went to
your academy last year. Had quite a good time.
What is your first name?
Mr. Rodriguez. Michael.
Senator Carper. I remember seeing scratched on one of the
walls somewhere, and I think it was a girl's dorm, ``For a good
time, look up Michael Rodriguez.''
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. I was wondering about that, so----
Mr. Rodriguez. I can tell you, Senator, there are a couple
of loose boards at the far end of the football field that say,
``The Rodriguez Exit.''
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rodriguez. I don't think that's on the tour, though.
Senator Carper. All right.
Ms. Himber, I think you were talking about the rule, you
said the rule is silent on casual labor, do you remember?
Ms. Himber. That's correct.
Senator Carper. Talk about that a little bit more for us,
if you will, because there's a lot of casual labor at these
ports.
Ms. Himber. The ports are completely reliant on casual
labor, and particularly during, what we call, busy seasons, in
the Delaware River, as you mentioned earlier, Chilean fruit
season. You need additional, you need additional men to work
the ships to handle the increased cargo flows that come in at
certain times of the year.
You might have, in a season, at just one facility, 75 to
100 potential, what we call, casual workers, people who may
come one day to work on a port, but you may never see them
again. And that's throughout the maritime industry, not just in
the Delaware River.
Senator Carper. What do we do about those folks?
Ms. Himber. That's a big question that nobody, I don't
think, has gotten the answer to that.
Senator Carper. Well, maybe I should ask, what should we
do?
Ms. Himber. Well, there are some options that are under
consideration. The regulation, and the draft Coast Guard
guidance documents allow that these people could be escorted.
So, that any TWIC holder--perhaps another longshoreman, could
escort one, to possibly ten, depending on the final decision,
non-TWIC holders at any given time. We don't think that's
practical, because the person who holds the TWIC, it's going to
be difficult enough for him to do his own job while watching
other people.
Other suggestions have included the idea of, perhaps,
allowing for some sort of temporary credential that the port
could issue, very similar to what ports are doing today with
issuing a visitor's pass. How we could implement a program like
that and still be in compliance with the legislation, we'd have
to work through that, but that's an idea that we think would be
worth looking into.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Mr. Rodriguez, two questions of you, if I could. I think
you expressed some concerns about workers having to bear the
cost of the issuance of cards, I think we're heard numbers as
high as $150, or somewhere in that range. Do you think it's
appropriate for workers to pay some portion of the cost of the
issuance of these cards?
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, from our standpoint, Senator, no. This
is a function of government to provide this, and we believe
that the Department should fund the program.
As Ms. Himber pointed out earlier, there are some workers,
for whom, $137 is a day's pay. That's quite a bit of money.
Senator Carper. Last question for you, if I could, Mr.
Rodriguez. I think you mentioned how important it was that
there is going to be an adjudication, there's going to be an
appeals process. Folks are going to be denied a card, and they
want to appeal, because of, maybe, a criminal record or some
other issue. And you mentioned it was important that we have an
adequate number of--what was it; administrative law judges? Is
that what we're talking about?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, Senator.
Senator Carper. Talk about that just a little bit.
Mr. Rodriguez. If a person is denied a TWIC because of the
agency's action, then they have redress with the administrative
law judge program. Our understanding right now is that the
Coast Guard has seven openings for ALJs and there are only five
slots filled. So, as this program begins to ramp up, and we
start to look at the numbers, I heard 1.5 million today, I've
been in discussions that say 2 million. So, there are another
500,000 on the table, possibly.
Senator Carper. How many administrative law judges would
there be to handle all of those?
Mr. Rodriguez. My understanding at this time is there are
five.
Senator Carper. And, capacity for adding two more?
Mr. Rodriguez. I believe there are those billets. Somebody
else might be able to answer that.
Senator Carper. Those are going to be very busy people.
Mr. Rodriguez. They would be very busy people, sir.
Senator Carper. Thanks very much.
Senator Lautenberg. Senator DeMint, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMINT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg, and I thank
everyone on the panel. We are embarking on a very difficult
task, and I appreciate you adding your advice today.
We've heard many considerations and I'm sure there are many
more we haven't talked about. Certainly we have to consider the
workers and fairness to workers as we move forward with these
TWIC cards. A lot of technical considerations, cost
considerations, timing--a lot of things that you've brought up
create huge challenges.
I just want to remind everyone, in addition to myself, that
the whole purpose of all of this is security. That, as we look
at our vulnerabilities as a Nation, we see our ports as one of
those points of where we're most vulnerable. Where there's an
opportunity when we look at weapons of mass destruction, of
possibly moving through one of our ports, endangering millions
of American lives, and all of this, in all of its complexity
and difficult aspects comes back that we're trying to address a
very real and new threat to our country. So, security is the
purpose, and we've got to overcome these other problems.
I'd like to just address a question to Mr. Rodriguez, and
again, I appreciate your testimony. As you know, no matter how
much we spend, no matter how much technology we have at the
port, such as the scanning devices and sensing devices, no
matter how many people we have, all it's going to take is one
or two dock workers cooperating with terrorists, to circumvent
the whole process. And, in order for a weapon to be smuggled
into this country, a few people looking the other way can make
that happen.
So, the people in our ports are terribly important. And
that's what this TWIC card is all about; that we can do, at
least a reasonable level of screening to know that we've done
everything we can to keep a criminal element from working in
our ports.
Because, we don't have to have someone who has committed a
terrorist act before. Someone who has demonstrated his
susceptibility to criminal activity could think that he's
helping some pals smuggle in some drugs, when, in fact, it
could be a weapon, a dirty bomb or something of that nature.
So, we've got a serious problem, the TWIC card is designed
to try to screen out those people who might be susceptible to a
criminal element. And my question is this, in the written
testimony that you've provided, you've expressed concern about
the broad descriptions of disqualifying offenses that you think
go beyond the standard. What we've done in this requirement
that excludes folks who've committed serious crimes, is adopt,
pretty much, what we have at our airports at this point. What
is in the language here now, in the regulation is very much
like a bill that we've passed in the Senate, it did not survive
conference. You say that we've got too broad a description. In
fact, there is nothing broad about it. We have very specific
listings of crimes that we think reach the threshold of
criminal activity that we need to avoid in our ports, and I
would just ask you if you could give me some of these
disqualifying offenses that are listed, specifically in the
regulation, that you think go beyond a reasonable standard.
Mr. Rodriguez. Senator, one off the top of my head are
crimes of dishonesty. I think that's quite vague, that's in the
regulation.
Senator DeMint. I don't believe that's in the regulation,
is that in the regulation?
Oh, fraud, you're talking about----
Mr. Rodriguez. Fraud.
Senator DeMint. OK.
Mr. Rodriguez. Fraud.
Senator DeMint. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rodriguez. The crime of robbery, we believe that in the
MTSA the standard is the risk of terrorism, it might be
arguable whether or not that really pre-disposes someone to be
a risk for terror.
Senator DeMint. I don't see that in the language, I don't
know if you're using different words or not.
Mr. Rodriguez. Well, then I need to address that.
Senator DeMint. Oh, OK. I'm not trying to quibble. Again,
these are very specific, as I look at the language of espionage
and sedition, and crimes involving explosive devices and
murder, and we have not picked small offenses, youthful
indiscretions here in this language. We have tried to include
things that indicate a serious bent towards criminal activity,
and certainly I would be interested in any specific changes
that you have, and if we've got something such as misdemeanors
in things that are listed, it's a change from what I've seen.
Everything is specific in the language.
What I would just request from you, perhaps, is if you
could send specific changes that you would like, back to the
Committee, language that you think should be omitted and
changed.
Mr. Rodriguez. Senator, I'll be happy to do that. But I
would like to make the point that we do feel that we have a
starting point there, in the regulation. And that's where these
disqualifying offenses belong.
Some of the testimony today, some of the reports we've been
hearing are that we have this huge number of people that we
don't really have a handle on yet. We want the flexibility in
the hands of the TSA to make those changes. I'll certainly be
happy to provide some language for you.
Senator DeMint. Well, that would be helpful. Again, the
point is not to punish workers who need a second chance, but
our top security areas may not be the place to give some
workers a second chance if they've demonstrated a
susceptibility to criminal activity.
Because, as I've said before, if someone has been involved
with drug smuggling, that is still a problem in our ports. If
they think they're helping to smuggle drugs, but they're
actually not smuggling drugs at all, we just need to look at
that. And I think this is something that is apparently being
contested, and we need to make sure that this is not something
where we create an opening.
Again, all we have to do is make a few mistakes, and we've
basically undermined everything we're working for. But thank
you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. And I thank the witnesses for your
statements. I found it particularly valuable. And, with that,
this Committee hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Ken Wells, President,
Offshore Marine Service Association
The Offshore Marine Service Association (OMSA) thanks the Senate
Commerce Committee for holding this hearing on the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. We appreciate having
the opportunity to submit the following testimony for the record.
OMSA is the national association representing the owners and
operators of U.S.-flag vessels that support the offshore oil and gas
industry. OMSA's members take their role in maintaining America's
maritime security very seriously. They believe that the U.S.-flag
vessel, owned by Americans and manned by Americans, is the heart of our
domestic maritime security. It has often been repeated that the Coast
Guard has designated the American mariner as its eyes and ears on the
water. It created the Waterways Watch program to encourage those
mariners to report suspicious activity. Efforts by the U.S. Government
to encourage and facilitate the use of U.S.-flag vessels in U.S. waters
make us all safer and more secure.
Conversely, actions that make it more difficult for U.S. flag
vessels to operate or discourage U.S. citizens from becoming mariners
have the effect of making us less secure. There is a growing fear in
the maritime community that the TWIC program as it is emerging may
disrupt vessel operations and become an obstacle to putting American
citizens to work. If that were to happen, we would find that our
security has been harmed, not enhanced.
The OMSA membership have a number of specific concerns about the
TWIC program, but at this point, a primary concern for the maritime
sector and for the Congress should be the lack of definition for the
program even as it moves to implementation. The Final Rule on TWIC was
published at the end of January after a short comment period and an
inadequate opportunity for public hearings. In the less than 3 months
since the rule was issued, it has required:
Four published corrections;
Three published addendum/clarifications;
One additional rulemaking on card costs;
One rulemaking on technical standards for touchless readers,
a concept that was never included in the original Proposed
Rule; and
One draft Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC)
on key elements of the implementation which should have been
addressed through a formal rulemaking process, but were not.
There is still no public timetable for rolling out the program in
the different ports and Coast Guard Sectors. Now the implementation
appears to have been delayed by up to 6 months, but anxious mariners
are still being told that they will need a TWIC card by September of
2008. A key component, the testing of TWIC readers, is still in its
infancy and the substantial debate over those readers has yet to be
held. All of this undercuts the integrity of the TWIC program and
increases the skepticism of the maritime industry.
Looking at specific issues, a discussion of the impact of TWIC must
begin with the recognition that the American mariners who crew U.S.
flag vessels already undergo some of the most thorough background
checks of any transportation workers in the world. This means that,
with or without TWIC, U.S. seaman have already been checked out and
approved by the U.S. Government to a standard that is at or above the
level that TWIC will require. Ideally, the Department of Homeland
Security should have been in a position to develop a program that built
on what was already a successful process. Instead, the TWIC program and
the mariner credentialing process were developed on two distinct
tracks. While the Coast Guard is attempting to make those two processes
operate concurrently, there is no avoiding the fact that they will
require mariners to go through two separate processes, pay two fees and
undergo two background checks.
It is important to note that any efficiencies in the background
check process will have to wait for the development of a new Coast
Guard Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC). There is no timetable for that
MMC and, until it is released, mariners will still have to travel to a
TWIC implementation center and undergo a background check for a TWIC
card and then travel to a Coast Guard Regional Examination Center and
undergo a subsequent background check for a Merchant Mariner Document
(MMD).
The SAFE Port Act requires that the TWIC and Coast Guard mariner
credentialing be conducted concurrently. As the processes of the TSA
and Coast Guard are currently envisioned, this requirement of the law
cannot be accomplished. This is because the agencies consider issuance
of the TWIC to be a prerequisite for issuance of a Coast Guard
credential.
If delays in implementation of the TWIC program continue, it may be
worth revisiting whether the Merchant Mariner Document, with its
rigorous background check, should be accepted as meeting the
requirements of TWIC until that program has proven its effectiveness.
This could be accomplished by simply exempting credentialed mariners
from the requirement to obtain a TWIC for a period of time with the
understanding that the Coast Guard will continue to do the background
checks. Mariners could then be folded into the TWIC process once the
large numbers of other maritime transportation workers have been
processed and the Coast Guard MMC is in place.
Much has been said about the need for temporary work authority, a
simple and expedient way to put mariners to work while their TWIC is
being processed. The process that was made a part of the Final Rule
does not meet the spirit or letter of the SAFE Port Act and is far too
cumbersome and difficult to administer to meet the intent of Congress.
The rule promulgated by the TSA addresses the requirement for temporary
work authority by requiring companies to complete onerous paperwork if
they want to grant employees unescorted access to MTSA regulated
vessels or facilities. New hires after passing an initial security
screen by TSA, and after companies complete the administrative
requirements may then be granted ``unescorted'' access so long as they
are ``accompanied.'' The Rule does not adequately define either
``unescorted'' or ``accompanied'' in such a way as to give companies
any confidence that their use of newly hired workers will be
acceptable.
Other groups have suggested much simpler but effective approaches
and we support those suggestions. However, we point out one nuance that
should not be missed. Many mariners who would fall under this temporary
worker concept will also need a Coast Guard credential. So far, the
Coast Guard has been unwilling to also allow for temporary mariner
credentials to go along with the temporary TWIC authorization. Mariners
will need both and they will need the process to be simple and
expedient. Unfortunately, any process that is not simple will result in
more cost for the maritime industry and more hands-on activity by
government agencies.
On a related note, a law change may be necessary to allow for the
waiver for TWIC requirements in the event of a national emergency, such
as a hurricane. Our industry's mariners experienced this problem
firsthand with the loss of the Coast Guard's Regional Examination
Center in New Orleans as the result of Hurricane Katrina. The Coast
Guard has asked Congress to grant it the authority to waive license and
credential expiration dates in these sorts of emergencies. It may also
be necessary to waive TWIC expiration dates. Again, because the
decision was made to require mariners to meet both requirements, any
effort to mitigate the problems caused by a disruption of the
government service will require that both TWIC and merchant mariner
credentials be extended.
There are real concerns over the processing of TWIC applications.
More information is needed on how the Transportation Security Agency
intends to meet the staffing levels to expedite processing, especially
as the estimated numbers of Americans required to obtain a TWIC card
continues to grow. Clearly, many transportation workers will sail
through the TWIC process without problems and will hopefully receive
their TWIC card within the time-frames that TSA has estimated. Just as
clearly, some potential workers will be permanently rejected based on
the disqualifying offenses in the law. However, there will also be a
third group that will fall somewhere in the middle. These individuals
may have their initial application rejected because of errors or
because they committed an offense that requires a judgment call by
someone in government.
Focusing for a moment on individuals who may be rejected by
mistake, we can only look at the TSA No-Fly List to see the problems
that this could create. Much attention has been focused on individuals,
including small children, Coast Guard officials and even U.S. Senators
who have found themselves on the No-Fly List. Several years after the
No-Fly List was created, TSA is still wrestling with how to best remove
people who should not be on the list. TSA has been silent on how it
will ensure that maritime transportation workers will not be rejected
in error or because they have the misfortune of sharing a common name.
Turning to workers who have committed an offense that requires some
interpretation, the list of crimes that are not permanently
disqualifying crimes is extremely vague. The primary example may be
that of ``dishonesty, fraud or misrepresentation.'' If a transportation
worker was once convicted of using a false ID to purchase alcohol or
for purchasing alcohol for a minor, those are regrettable offenses, but
they do not make that individual a terrorism suspect.
As an example of this, Operation Drydock was the Coast Guard's
comprehensive effort to ensure that mariners did not receive false
documents. The exhaustive research into mariner credentials exposed
several hundred instances in which mariners were not truthful on their
applications. However, these were correctly judged to be efforts by
those mariners to avoid admitting to a minor offense in their past.
Action was only taken against a small handful of mariners who were
judged to be truly fraudulent or potential security risks. The lesson
was plain, there are and will be cases of dishonesty that should not be
disqualifying events. Those workers should be allowed to obtain a TWIC,
but it will take some form of human assessment to clear them. TSA
should say how it will ensure that those applications are reviewed
quickly and effectively.
Unfortunately, the TWIC appeal and/or waiver process could delay
approval for these transportation workers for months. The procedures
seem to be clearly designed to allow for denial due to a failure of the
applicant to comply with the rules or time frames. There are no
requirements for timely review or response by the TSA, or applicant
review of detrimental information that is deemed ``secret'' by the
government. At Congress' insistence, the rule allows for an appeal to
an Administrative Law Judge, but given the limits on the ALJ resources,
this will be a long process and may only be a ``court of last appeals''
for the most dedicated workers. It is likely that most entry level
workers will have given up and gotten another job long before they have
exhausted the appeals process.
Throughout the development of the TWIC card process, there have
been numerous examples of the agencies ignoring well established vessel
operations and imposing an unworkable approach. For instance, where the
industry raised concerns over lost TWIC cards keeping mariners from
going to work, the Final Rule says that a worker who loses a card will
have 7 days in which to work while the replacement card is being
processed. This ignores the fact that much of the maritime sector works
a 28 day shift, making it impossible to apply for a replacement card
and then go to work on the vessel.
The biggest unresolved aspect of TWIC involves the reader machines.
The MTSA legislation that called for the creation of the TWIC program
does not require the use of reader systems. The Final Rule makes it
clear that the agency does not believe it needs Congressional approval
to impose reader systems. The Department of Homeland Security has yet
to make the case for how readers on vessels will enhance security,
especially in a cost effective way.
In fact, the debate over readers has not yet happened. However, the
planning for readers is moving ahead in advance of the debate and, we
believe, in advance of the intent of Congress. The National Maritime
Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC) assigned by TSA to develop a
touchless biometric standard for readers cautioned TSA in its final
report that prior to implementing any reader requirements that the
public debate on the technology should be conducted. To emphasize this
failing, a minority report was submitted to TSA signed jointly by
industry groups and organized labor stating in part that ``. . . TSA
and Coast Guard should use the expertise of the various vessel
operating communities to determine whether or not any use of TWIC
readers is justified on any vessels.''
The SAFE Port Act required that TSA perform a test of reader
technology at facilities and on vessels and report back to Congress in
6 month increments until the pilot program is concluded. TSA has
reported that it intends to use port security grants to fund the tests.
This presents a number of practical problems. First, the port security
grants are not generally open to vessel operators. Second, the agency
has not made a concerted effort to engage vessel operators in these
grants. Finally, by wedding the reader tests to the grant process, TSA
has created a number of obstacles for vessel operators, such as:
The reader machines do not yet exist, meaning that the
vessel operator would have to find a manufacturer and oversee
their construction.
Lacking existing machines, it is difficult to determine how
much money the grant applicant should request.
There may be liability questions that cannot be anticipated
but could emerge for a vessel operating company that becomes
the grant applicant.
There have been no common testing criteria, accepted
procedures or control mechanism established.
The schedules for the testing and the schedule for the final rule
are also in conflict. The Congressional timetable requires that the
report of the tests be completed within 20 months, but TSA has said
publicly that it plans to issue a final rule on readers in January of
2009 and that they will issue the reader rules independent of the
study. Under these timetables, the users will be asked to comment and
the agency will make a decision on a technology that it has not had a
chance to adequately test and evaluate. Clearly this does not fit
anyone's definition of sound public policy, especially for a testing
program that has already been identified by the GAO as being
problematic.
In discussing maritime operations we must stress that safety is the
primary goal, trumping even security. Lives lost at sea by unsafe
operations must be avoided. Requirements must be judged by whether they
harm safety before they are blindly accepted in the name of security.
Unfortunately, there has been little or no consideration of what the
reader proposal might do to safety. For example, the NMSAC report on
card readers indicates that they will be wired so that the ``electrical
signal from the panel used to command the door's electromechanical
locking mechanism.'' Vessels do not have any such capability and years
of experience have shown the danger of locking public access doors on
vessels. It is the sort of fundamental acceptance of vessel safety that
has been missing from the TWIC development.
OMSA's members operate vessels that have relatively small crews who
have been specifically assigned by a company to serve on a specific
vessel. Requiring one or, according to the proposed rule on TWIC,
several readers on the vessel does not enhance security, but does
dramatically drive up the cost of the program. Congress assigned the
Commandant the authority to waive the requirement for smaller vessels
based on crew size. OMSA's members believe this authority should be
used in such a way as to exclude offshore vessels from the reader
requirement.
Finally, one of TSA's implementation plans will significantly
increase the cost of the program and has not received the attention it
deserves. At a recent meeting of the National Maritime Security
Advisory Committee, TSA officials indicated that they were finalizing
the new standard for touchless reader systems and, when that standard
was finalized, it would be necessary for every TWIC holder to return to
a TWIC processing center to have his or her card reprogrammed. This
unanticipated requirement will cost the offshore sector several million
dollars alone in lost time and travel costs.
In conclusion, the maritime industry has a number of concerns about
the TWIC program. The specific concerns need to be addressed, but there
is a larger scale concern that the program is still ill-defined and
does not have the support of the industry that will be most affected by
it.
Thank you for allowing the maritime industry to submit testimony on
this issue. We would be happy to respond to any follow-up questions the
Committee may have.
______
Prepared Statement of the Passenger Vessel Association
The Passenger Vessel Association (PVA)--the national trade
association of U.S.-flagged passenger vessels of all types--appreciates
this opportunity to submit testimony on the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC).
Our primary message is: TWIC will affect hundreds of employers and
thousands of employees who are not engaged in international ocean cargo
shipping. Therefore, the TWIC system must take into account the
different circumstances of this segment of the maritime industry.
PVA understands and supports rational security measures. Many of
its members' vessels operate in compliance with an approved security
plan, as required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act. PVA has
developed a Coast Guard-approved Alternative Security Program, as
allowed by the MTSA rule. Yet, this implementation has been very
expensive for our companies. Some have hired a Company Security
Officer, a new position for them, to assist in the completion of risk-
based threat assessments, identify vulnerabilities, and establish
procedures to control access to the restricted areas of their vessels.
PVA members have undertaken extensive training, drills, and audits. All
of this work has costs associated with it. Still to come are the costs
of TWICs, vessel-tracking Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), and
perhaps TWIC readers.
Our members believe that a small company does not need an
electronic TWIC card or a TWIC reader to know that employees Sam and
Karly or Bill are who they say they are when they show up to work each
day. They are the same Sam and Karly and Bill that the small company
interviewed, hired and trained. They believe that there are other
methods that can be used to verify the status of identification that
present little or no cost to the small employer.
Congress intended TWIC to focus on large ships that operate at
commercial port facilities where the flow of cargo depends on numerous
non-vessel, non-facility employees going in and out of the port. PVA
does not believe that a small passenger operation such as operated by
many of its members was ever envisioned by Congress to be included in
the security concerns of America's ports.
Our Members Need To Put Individuals To Work Promptly
In our segment of the maritime industry, the ability to hire
employees and have them go to work quickly is absolutely essential.
Seasonal operators make up a large portion of our membership. Such an
operator may hire seasonal workers for up to 80 percent of the staff,
including deckhands, wait staff, and bartenders. The pool of potential
employees includes students, teachers, and retirees. Clearly, these
employees are not ``professional'' mariners. It is not uncommon for
there to be 100 percent turnover of seasonal employees from 1 year to
the next. These people may be hired only days before they begin work on
the passenger vessel.
Our members compete aggressively with many other businesses for
good seasonal employees. Our competitors for employees are hotels,
marinas and restaurants, not subject to the TWIC requirement. Most of
our seasonal employees are college or high school students who need a
job when school ends to make the money they need for the next school
year. This generally means they are available to the employer for
approximately 90-100 days. They cannot apply for this summer employment
and then wait 30 days for an ID card. They cannot even wait 2 weeks.
It is essential for the law and TWIC rule to recognize the ``facts
of life'' regarding employees on domestic passenger vessels. The rule
needs to accommodate the need to hire these folks quickly.
PVA acknowledges and appreciates the provision in the SAFE Port Act
(section 104(c) of Public Law 109-347) mandating that the final rule
allow employers to put newly-hired workers on the job pending the
processing and issuance of a TWIC. That provision states: ``The
regulations shall include a background check process to enable newly
hired workers to begin working unless the Secretary makes an initial
determination that the worker poses a security risk. Such a process
shall include a check against the consolidated and integrated terrorist
watch list maintained by the Federal Government.'' The final rule
attempts to comply by purporting to allow employers to put new hires to
work with ``accompanied'' access to secure areas for up to 30 days once
new hires have applied for their TWIC and an initial name-based check
is completed. PVA remains concerned, however, as to how this provision
will work in real life.
Reduce The Direct And Indirect Costs Of The TWIC
Most seasonal or temporary workers on domestic passenger vessel
cannot afford or will not pay $137 for a TWIC, particularly when they
have other job options that do not entail such a requirement. Congress
must realize that domestic passenger vessel operators will be forced to
pay the application fee for these potential employees, as they now pay
for their pre-employment drug test, first-aid training, and security
training, all currently required for their employees, but not required
of the waterfront restaurant or the marina up the street.
There are other unaccounted-for costs of this rulemaking. One cost
is the transportation costs for the employee to travel to the
enrollment center. In fact, the employee must travel twice to the
enrollment center, first to apply, then to pick up the TWIC. That means
two round trips, costing gas, parking, and time away from the job. Not
once, but twice! For many employees, the passenger vessel operator will
have to provide this transportation when employees either don't drive
or don't have transportation. Many would have to have Mom or Dad drive
them. This is a roadblock to hiring good seasonal employees. If asked
to make this trip, no matter who pays for it, most will simply chose to
work elsewhere. It's just too much trouble for a summer job.
How many TWIC cards will be requested by applicants who change
their mind and go to work at the restaurant down the street when they
find out that the restaurant will put them to work right away? How many
TWIC cards will be issued, and the applicant never picks up the card,
because Mom decided the family was going on vacation instead? How many
new hires will quit after the first day? These are the unintended costs
for the small employer that we are concerned about.
WIC Enrollment Centers Must Be Located In Places That Are Not
Traditional Ports
Also, PVA fears that the contractor will be inclined to locate TWIC
enrollment centers only in large port cities. This will be where the
contractor can achieve economies of scale to make a profit on the
contract. However, in real life, many PVA operators are located in
remote locations that are not considered to be major maritime centers--
places like the islands of Kauai and Maui, Ketchikan and Kodiak in
Alaska, Down East locations in Maine, Lake Tahoe and Lake Powell, and
inland towns such as Omaha, Pierre, and La Crosse, Wisconsin. PVA has
provided the Coast Guard and the contractor with a list of suggested
places for enrollment centers that are not traditional maritime centers
but that are necessary to accommodate our segment of the U.S.-flag
industry. PVA urges the Senate to instruct the contractor and the Coast
Guard that contractor profit can not be the only or even the
controlling factor in the placement of TWIC enrollment centers.
No Burdensome Recordkeeping On The Employer
PVA also objected to the provision in the proposed rule to require
each employer to keep detailed records for 2 years, showing every
occasion on which an employee enters a secure area. This would do
nothing to prevent security incidents, but would impose a huge
paperwork burden on a small business. Why add a new redundant
recordkeeping requirement, on top of the payroll records and vessel log
books that our members already maintain? Fortunately, the Federal
agencies deferred action on this proposal for now, but PVA urges the
Senate to ensure that this bad idea is not resurrected.
Thank you for your interest in the special needs of the U.S.-
flagged passenger vessel industry, particularly the hundreds of small
employers in this segment who fall within the purview of the TWIC
requirement. Congress, the Transportation Security Administration, and
the Coast Guard must keep in mind that an appropriate level of maritime
security can be achieved without unnecessarily harming American small
businesses.
______
Prepared Statement of the Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO
The Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO, consists of 24
international unions and 19 port maritime councils in the United States
and Canada representing approximately 5.5 million working men and
women. The vast majority of those workers live and work in the United
States. Virtually all of them stand to be affected by the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program, whether
they work aboard vessels or in shipyards or elsewhere in the marine
transportation sector.
The MTD thanks the Committee for this chance to convey our views on
the implementation of the TWIC program in the maritime sector. The
program is enormously relevant to our affiliated unions and their
members. The MTD submits these comments on their behalf, with
particular emphasis on the U.S. Merchant Marine:
Affiliates: Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers and Grain
Millers International Union
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders,
Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers
Communications Workers of America
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
International Union of Elevator Constructors
International Union of Operating Engineers
International Association of Fire Fighters
Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers
International Union
International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and
Reinforcing Iron Workers
International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association
United Mine Workers of America
International Union of Allied, Novelty and Production Workers,
AFL-CIO
Office and Professional Employees International Union
International Union of Painters and Allied Trades of the United
States and Canada
Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' International
Association of the United States and Canada
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and
Canada
Seafarers International Union of North America
Sheet Metal Workers' International Association
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy,
Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union
Transportation Communications International Union/IAM
The MTD acknowledges the scope, complexity, and challenge of
protecting our Nation and our maritime transportation network from
terrorists. We believe that a safe, secure and reliable maritime
transportation system is vital to this Nation's economic, defense and
national security. To that end, MTD affiliates have implemented many
educational and training programs responding to the mandates of the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and, further,
have offered their assistance and views to the government in its
efforts to devise and implement appropriate measures to protect this
Nation and our transportation sector from terrorism.
The MTD generally endorses the concept contained in the statute for
a biometric transportation security card. However, there are certain
items within the implementation of the statute by the Transportation
Security Administration that warrant our concern and comment. The MTD
will focus its comments on those issues, as follows.
Merchant Mariner Document (MMD)
The MTD endorses the idea of a biometric transportation security
card, as mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.
The MTD appreciates the efforts and time expended by the Transportation
Security Administration in attempting to implement this requirement.
However, we believe that the complicated and burdensome process
finalized by the agency is both unnecessary for merchant mariners and
may prove severely disruptive to maritime commerce.
As both the MTD and our affiliated unions have repeatedly
advocated, the current Merchant Mariner Document could and should be
modified to include an encoded biometric, to be used as a biometric
transportation security card in lieu of the TWIC, especially since the
Coast Guard recognizes the MMD as an identity document. We question the
need for yet another document that the merchant mariner must obtain and
carry when the current and time-tested Merchant Mariner Document may be
adapted to encapsulate an encoded biometric. The MTD believes that with
a security vetting process (threat assessment), preferably initiated by
the Coast Guard, the biometric MMD would adequately respond to the
mandate of the MTSA for a biometric transportation security card, given
the fact that the Coast Guard advises that a security assessment is not
required for the mariner population who have an MMD issued after
February 3, 2003, implying that those mariners have undergone a full
security vetting by the Coast Guard and therefore need not undergo a
TWIC security assessment. The MTD urges the Committee to consider this
simplified approach for merchant mariners who are required to hold
Merchant Mariner Documents instead of agreeing to the TSA
implementation process as enunciated in its final rule.
Further, the MTD believes that the Coast Guard itself has the
authority to implement the biometric transportation security card
mandate as recommended above. In fact, the MTSA requires the Secretary
of Homeland Security to issue a biometric transportation security
credential to merchant mariners. Section 102 of the MTSA defines
``Secretary'' to mean ``the Secretary in which the Coast Guard is
operating.'' It is our view that within this definition, the Coast
Guard has the authority to issue an MMD with an encoded biometric as a
merchant mariner biometric transportation security credential.
Moreover, this would certainly negate the need for a change in the Code
of Federal Regulations as proposed in USCG-2006-24371, the
Consolidation of Merchant Mariner Qualification Credentials, currently
being considered as a supplementary proposed rulemaking.
A further reason for utilizing a biometric merchant mariner
document in lieu of a TWIC is the fact that the final rule proposes
standards which will primarily impact merchant mariners and port
workers. Why reinvent the wheel when a proven, time-tested, and
internationally accepted document already exists that, with some
modification, responds to the mandate of the MTSA? In addition, to
date, there are no TWIC requirements for other workers in all modes of
transportation. It is our view that if the TWIC is not applicable to
all modes of transportation, then the system is essentially flawed due
to port intermodalism and the security objective is undermined.
User Fees
In its final rule, the TSA proposes to establish new user fees for
the TWIC process. Although the MTD opposes a TWIC requirement for
merchant mariners, we nonetheless state that it is patently unfair to
impose yet another user fee on the merchant mariner for a credential
that can be encompassed in the MMD. In fact, the merchant mariner is
already charged a user fee for the process associated with the MMD. The
MTD is aware that Section 520 of the 2004 DHS Appropriations Act
requires TSA to charge a reasonable fee for providing credentialing and
background investigations in the field of transportation. The principle
behind user fees is based on the philosophy that beneficiaries of
Federal expenditures should repay the government in the form of a user
charge on all or a portion of the Federal expenditures incurred for a
service. User fees are based on the premise that some agency services
are of benefit only to particular segments of the population and that
fairness dictates that these services be subject to user fees. However,
the MTD contends that the TWIC program is not of benefit to a
particular segment of the population--the merchant mariner in this
case--but primarily in the interest of public security. It is our
belief that one of the key criteria regarding the application of a user
fee for TSA services rendered is whether the service provides a special
benefit to an identifiable recipient above and beyond those that accrue
to the public at large. In this case, it does not. Therefore, given the
fact that obtaining a TWIC is in the interest of public security,
merchant mariners should not be assessed a user fee. It. is neither
fair nor reasonable to assess a user fee on a merchant mariner for a
security mandate that has broader benefits. The background checks and
security threat assessments contained in the implementing final rule
are considered necessary to enhance the security of our Nation's ports
and are part of an overall effort to fight terrorism elements.
Federal Preemption
The MTD recognizes and acknowledges the fact that states have the
right to regulate access to their port facilities. However, once a
national identity standard is promulgated, it is critically important
that these standards supersede state regulations. Thus, the MTD
recommends that the Federal TWIC or MMD program preempt any state or
local regulations covering identity cards for mariners. The entire
purpose of an identification credential is to provide a universally
recognized identity card and to assure a mariner access to vessels and
port facilities. In addition, the mandatory provisions of the
International Maritime Organization's ISPS Code require facilitation of
access by mariners. Additional state or local requirements will create
confusion and intolerable conditions for mariners, undermine the
purpose of the TWIC, and disrupt interstate and foreign waterborne
commerce. Allowing states to arbitrarily impose different or added
security requirements is inconsistent with the intent of the TSA to
achieve a level of consistency governing threat assessments and
transportation credentials.
Additional Comments on the TWIC Program
The MTD believes that the TWIC program, as explained in its final
rule, will cause many unnecessary problems within the maritime
industry, including potentially severe disruption to the livelihoods of
mariners and other transportation workers who pose no threat to
security and who have done nothing wrong. It will not enhance security
but will certainly disrupt commerce and place an intolerable burden on
American merchant mariners. The program is also flawed since it exempts
foreign seamen from the process while focusing completely on U.S.
merchant mariners who are screened, regulated and fully vetted by the
Coast Guard. It has been estimated that 97 percent of our imports and
exports are carried on foreign-flag vessels with foreign crews who in
our view pose the gravest security risk. Yet, these crews are exempt
from the TWIC requirements. In addition to our recommendations
mentioned above, the MTD also advocates:
That any national TWIC issued to American merchant mariners
must be compatible with the International Labor Organization's
Convention 185 (Seafarers Identity Document) so that there will
be a consistency between national and international identity
credentials.
By the nature of their employment, mariners require access
to secure areas throughout a port, a state, or even
internationally. If mariners are required to obtain a TWIC,
they should be guaranteed unfettered access to ports.
There must be a clear nexus between terrorism security and
the crimes that will disqualify an individual from holding a
maritime TWIC, as the list of felony offenses that will
disqualify a mariner from obtaining a maritime TWIC is too
expansive, nebulous and unfocused on eliminating true security
risks. Although some modifications were made in the final rule
to the original list of disqualifying offenses, the MTD urges
the TSA to exercise appropriate discretion to not deny
employment opportunities to those mariners who may have simply
made a mistake years ago.
U.S. mariners are and will always be an effective asset in the
global war on terrorism. They are the best trained, most qualified and
most thoroughly vetted workers in the transportation industry. The U.S.
Merchant Marine's history of answering the call to perform our
patriotic duty in every conflict and disaster is a matter of public
record. In summary and to be clear, we urge the TSA to recognize the
contributions of American mariners to the economic and defense security
of our Nation by exempting them from the unnecessary burden of
obtaining a TWIC.
The MTD remains ready to work cooperatively with the Committee, the
Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard to identify
and implement the most fair and effective systems that promote security
in the domestic maritime transportation network.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. When will the Department provide Congress with the
comprehensive management plan for TWIC that was required in the
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 and is over 2 years past due?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program
Management Plan, as required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, is currently undergoing executive level review
and clearance within the Department. The Transportation Security
Administration anticipates delivery to Congress in the third quarter of
the current fiscal year.
Question 2. Of the 4,000 TWIC cards you reported issued in the
prototype testing, how many were activated? Of those activated how many
were actually tested with a biometric card reader? Were any tested on
vessels?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration issued 4,362
cards during the prototype, all of which were activated. While we do
not have data on how many of the activated cards were used in biometric
readers, 3,209 biometric access attempts were made during the prototype
phase. No readers were tested on vessels during the prototype phase.
Question 3. What vessel operators have you and the Coast Guard
identified for participation in the card reader pilot mandated in the
SAFE Port Act? How many vessels and over what duration of time do you
plan on testing the technology?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) plans to
test contactless biometric authentication technology that meets the
requirements of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) reader specification in a variety of maritime operational
scenarios (container, bulk, petroleum, and passenger terminals; and
vessels), as well as in different geographic regions and climates. The
final reader specification is pending a review of comments received
from the public notice of the specifications recommended by the
National Maritime Security Advisory Committee. The TWIC program, with
assistance from other Department of Homeland Security components, is
developing a comprehensive Test and Evaluation Master Plan which we
anticipate completing this summer. Planning for this project has been
underway since December 2006.
TSA is reviewing potential participants for the upcoming card
reader pilot tests but they have not yet been finalized. Discussions
are ongoing with the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach as well as the
Ports of New York and New Jersey to identify vessel participants to
include small passenger vessels and ferries. We are also working with
the American Waterways Operators Association to identify an appropriate
participant for the towboat and tug boat industry. The duration of the
pilot tests will be such that the card readers will be tested under
various environmental and operational conditions, although the duration
has not yet been finalized.
Question 4. You mention in your testimony that the TSA has
``created a new process where the TSA can make a determination that a
security threat assessment conducted by another government agency is
comparable, eliminating redundancy and reducing costs for workers.''
Can you describe this?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) may
determine that security threat assessments conducted by other
governmental agencies are comparable to the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential/Hazardous Materials Endorsement threat
assessment. In making a comparability determination, TSA will consider
(1) the minimum standards used for the security threat assessment; (2)
the frequency of the threat assessment; (3) the date of the most recent
threat assessment; and 4) whether the threat assessment includes
biometric identification and a biometric credential. The procedures to
apply for a comparability determination are outlined in 49 CFR
1572.5(e) Comparability of Other Security Threat Assessment Standards.
TSA will notify the public by publishing a Notice in the Federal
Register when a comparability determination is made.
Question 5. Have you reached out to other agencies such as the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy to determine what
background check and credentialing process they have in place and how
are they comparable to TSA's background checks for TWIC? What
credentialing programs have you found to be comparable to other Federal
agencies' programs?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration discussed
comparability with both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Department of Energy. DOD is gathering the information needed in order
to make a comparability determination. Thus far, the background checks
performed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection for the Free and Secure
Trade program, and the U.S. Coast Guard for the Merchant Mariner
Document program, have been determined to be comparable to that of the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential.
Question 6. I understand you have developed procedures to reduce
the TWIC fee for transportation worker that have had comparable
background checks, such as the Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME)
and the Merchant Mariner Document (MMD). However, what procedures have
you put in place to ensure that individuals who have received a TWIC do
not have to undergo and pay for redundant background checks when
applying for a HME or MMD?
Answer. The Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) process, fee
structure, and contract vehicles were implemented in January 2005 to
meet the requirements of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-
56). Presently there is no mechanism or ability to reduce this
redundancy for HME drivers within the confines of the present fee rule
and contractual vehicles. The Transportation Security Administration is
in the process of developing a new fee rule, as well as a new
acquisition, that will take this issue into account and will more fully
align the HME check, as well as future threat assessment programs, with
that of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential. The
intention is to reduce the burden on multiple credential holders to the
greatest extent possible.
With respect to the MMD, TSA and Coast Guard are in discussions
regarding the details of this issue. As you know Coast Guard is moving
to a consolidated Merchant Mariner Card (MMC) and expects to recognize
the TWIC as the identity document for merchant mariners. Coast Guard
will not charge mariners a duplicative fee for the same requirement
already fulfilled under TWIC.
Question 7. TSA originally expected TWIC enrollments to begin at
the Port of Wilmington by March 28, 2007--the effective date of the
TWIC rule. However, enrollments did not begin on this date as planned.
What is the reason for the delay and when does TSA plan to begin
enrolling workers at the port?
Answer. It is imperative that enrollments begin as soon as
possible, and TSA is working diligently to that end. At the same time
our highest priority is to ensure that the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) enrollment and credential issuance
process is as efficient and trouble-free for the first worker as for
those who will follow. TSA expects to begin enrollment in the Fall of
2007, but that is subject to our ongoing, rigorous assessment of the
TWIC system.
TWIC is a sophisticated system powered by state-of-the-art
technologies and we are focused on a rigorous program to ``flight
test'' TWIC before it is rolled out to the ports.
The TWIC network includes technology components covering five
important areas:
The Pre-Enrollment website component allows workers to
schedule appointments and provide biographic information ahead
of time to make enrollment easier.
The Enrollment workstation component captures a worker's
biometric and biographic information and submits the
information for completing the Security Threat Assessment
(STA).
The TWIC system includes components that route applicant
information for the STA, store data, conduct data integrity
checks, and manage status on TWIC cards.
The Screening Gateway component is a TSA enterprise asset
that facilitates STA's, working with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Citizenship and Immigration Services, and TSA's
Colorado Springs Operations Center.
Finally, the Card Production component electronically loads
an applicant's information onto a TWIC smart card and then
physically produces the card.
All the internal moving parts must work together, to conduct
accurate and timely security threat assessments. We recognize that TWIC
will affect both businesses and port workers and a top priority is
making sure the program does not negatively impact commerce or people's
livelihoods.
Question 8. How does TSA plan to meet the requirement of the SAFE
Port Act that TWIC be implemented at the 10 highest risk ports by July
1, 2007? How does TSA interpret the term ``implemented'' in this
requirement? What challenges do TSA and Lockheed Martin face in meeting
this and other time frames in the Act? When does TSA plan to set
specific dates requiring TWIC to be used at specific ports?
Answer. It is imperative that enrollments begin as soon as
possible, and TSA is working diligently to that end. At the same time
our highest priority is to ensure that the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) enrollment and credential issuance
process is as efficient and trouble-free for the first worker as for
those who will follow. TSA expects to begin enrollment in the Fall of
2007, but that is subject to our ongoing, rigorous assessment of the
TWIC system. Our highest priority is to ensure that the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) enrollment and credential
issuance process is as efficient and trouble-free for the first worker
as for those that follow. It is our intention to meet the remaining
deadlines set forth in the SAFE Port Act. The Coast Guard will
establish compliance dates by Captain of the Port zones after the base
population has been enrolled and received their TWICs. This date will
be published in the Federal Register at least ninety days before
compliance is required in each Captain of the Port zone.
Question 9. What oversight mechanisms is TSA using to ensure that
all requirements of the TWIC enrollment contract are met? What specific
steps does TSA plan to take to verify contract performance data
provided by Lockheed Martin?
Answer. The current contract is performance based with a defined
Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan with defined Acceptable Quality
Levels (AQLs). An award fee structure is also in place to provide
incentives for improved performance as well as disincentives should the
contractor not meet the AQLs. Performance Management Reviews are being
conducted monthly. In addition, there will be periodic site visits to
enrollment centers to validate and verify reported performance data. As
a further oversight measure, TSA has engaged an IV&V contractor to
review technical deliverables. TSA plans to continue the IV&V contract
as the program moves forward.
Question 10. Mr. Hawley's statement indicates that the Lockheed
Martin contract requires adaptive planning, metrics, and changes. Can
you please explain what you mean by this statement?
Answer. Lockheed Martin is contractually required to support the
enrollment of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
population nationwide. To satisfy this requirement Lockheed Martin has
developed a flexible deployment strategy to take into account the need
to respond to enrollment surges, a mobile population, and enrollment
facility options. The contract clearly defines Acceptable Quality
Levels within the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan with which
Lockheed Martin must adhere. The contract vehicle provides the
Transportation Security Administration with the flexibility to add
enrollment capability as the program is implemented.
Question 11. When does TSA plan to begin the pilot program to test
TWIC access control technologies? What specific technologies does TSA
plan to test during the pilot?
Answer. The first two pilot locations have been awarded grant
funding--Ports of LA (POLA) and Long Beach (POLB). Additional locations
will be selected from the grantees in the latest round of Port Security
Grants. We have finalized the cooperative agreement with POLB, POLA
will finalize shortly. We are developing the comprehensive test and
evaluation plan and expect POLA and POLB to begin working with terminal
operators to identify the right locations for TWIC readers and start
taking metrics for currents operations.
The actual readers will begin testing after finalization of the
contactless biometric authentication specification that will be used
has been published, and industry has developed the necessary card
reader equipment. Planning for this project has been underway since
December 2006.
TSA plans to test contactless biometric authentication technology
that meets the requirements of the TWIC reader specification in a
variety of maritime operational scenarios (container, bulk, petroleum,
and passenger terminals; and vessels), as well as in different
geographic regions and climates. The program has been working with
other DHS entities (S&T Directorate, USCG, G&T, SCO) and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to develop the tests to assure
baseline performance for this technology. TSA is also collaborating
with the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command who will conduct
environmental and ruggedness testing.
Question 12. Does TSA plan to measure the impact that the TWIC
program will have on the flow of maritime commerce during the pilot
program? If so, how does TSA plan to do this? How will TSA ensure
effective communication and coordination with maritime industry
stakeholders during implementation of TWIC?
Answer. Obtaining current ``as is'' state and comparing that to the
``to be'' state utilizing Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) card readers is the primary focus of the pilot. The
pilot Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) will address areas to be
tested, required metrics, and test responsibilities. The Transportation
Security Administration anticipates completing the TEMP this summer.
Stakeholders will continue to be apprised of the deployment status
through regular meetings of the TWIC Stakeholder Communications
Committee (TSCC) and our participation in various conferences,
meetings, and briefings. The TSCC is comprised of stakeholder
representatives from labor, ports, vessels, and other industries that
will be impacted by TWIC.
Question 13. What steps are TSA and Lockheed Martin taking to
identify the entire population affected by the TWIC rule and educate
this population on their responsibilities for enrolling in the TWIC
program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
Lockheed Martin have implemented a robust, multi-faceted outreach and
communications process to identify and educate the population affected
by the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). This
strategy includes regular meetings of the TWIC Stakeholder
Communications Committee comprised of stakeholder representatives from
labor, ports, vessels, and other industries that will be impacted by
TWIC and a Lockheed Martin TWIC field organization that is in contact
with local Coast Guard Captains of the Port, Port Authorities, major
port officials, industry, and labor representatives.
The Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard are
also leveraging their extensive relationships with affected
stakeholders from both industry and labor that have been developed over
years of cooperation in the transportation sector.
Question 14. Why did the TSA and the Coast Guard reject adopting
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standard? Will the
TWIC be designed to be interoperable with the ICAO standard? If no,
why?
Answer. In developing the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC), the Transportation Security Administration
considered a wide variety of document standards. The starting point is
the program's requirements and fundamentally TWIC was developed as a
secure identity document for physical access, pursuant to Congressional
mandates. It is not a travel document that would be recognized
internationally.
It is important that credentials issued to U.S. Federal standards
be interoperable with the TWIC and across the U.S. transportation
system. Therefore, to achieve maximum interoperability with other
programs, TWIC follows Federal Government standards for biometric
credentials which are contained in Federal Information Processing
Standard 201 (FIPS 201) and the underlying Federal standard for Minutia
fingerprint templates contained in the American National Standards
Institute publication 378. The industry expects the FIPS 201 standard
to be the primary standard across such operations into the future.
Question 15. What assurance does TSA have that the agency is
prepared to handle the volume of workers that may appeal the result of
the threat assessment or those that may request a waiver if they do not
meet the eligibility requirements?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
leveraging time-tested processes and procedures that have been
developed and implemented successfully in programs such as the Hazmat
Threat Assessment Program. In the Hazmat program, security threat
assessments are conducted on commercial truck drivers seeking to
obtain, renew, or transfer a hazardous materials endorsement on their
state issued commercial driver's license. The Hazmat program has been
operating successfully since January 2005 and has received over 550,000
applications via a nationwide system of TSA contracted enrollment
stations and state licensing agencies. TSA has received waiver and
appeal requests on approximately 1.5 percent of this population. The
standard operating procedures and policies for adjudications and
redress have been proven successful. TSA has an existing contract in
place to support adjudications including the waiver and appeal process.
This contract is scalable and can surge to meet the demands of TWIC.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question. Millions of dollars have been spent and multiple delays
have been experienced with the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) Registered Traveler (RT), Secure Flight, and Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) programs. Should TSA follow the
path it took with RT and allow the private sector to run these
programs? What assurances can you give that TSA will be able to execute
and sustain these types of programs?
Answer. While there are significant differences in the statutory
language mandating the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) and Secure Flight and the language and intent concerning
Registered Traveler (RT) the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) believes that all three programs cannot be implemented without
significant input from the private sector.
In the case of RT, TSA was provided broad discretion to design and
implement the program. The RT Interoperability Pilot was designed to
test the public-private partnership and to encourage innovation in the
market place. At the same time, there are certain program activities
that are inherently governmental. TSA directly administers those
functions, such as setting program security and compliance standards
and completing the security threat assessment on RT applicants.
Unlike RT, the Secure Flight and the TWIC programs are based on
specific legislative mandates. For Secure Flight, TSA has been directed
to assume the watch list matching currently performed by aircraft
operators. Furthermore, the Maritime Transportation Security Act as
amended by the SAFE Port Act requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to issue a biometric credential (TWIC) and conduct security
threat assessments on individuals who have unescorted access to secure
areas of maritime facilities and vessels. As a result, Secure Flight
and TWIC are centrally managed by the Federal Government to assure
security, privacy, interoperability, and enforcement.
Nevertheless, TSA has sought significant input from the private
sector to develop these programs. For TWIC, TSA has requested the
National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, with representation from
the stakeholder community and credential reader manufacturers, to
recommend standards for use for a contactless credential reading
solution. Secure Flight is being developed with direct input from the
airline industry and is responding directly to requests for a single
DHS interface to air carriers.
TSA recognizes that both programs have faced tremendous challenges
in moving toward implementation. Both involve significant IT
investments and strong program management. TSA has taken steps to
address critical program management requirements, instilling discipline
into the process for both TWIC and Secure Flight, and is positioning
itself to execute and sustain these programs.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. How many workers nationwide are expected to need TWIC
cards? Can you tell me what estimates TSA intends to use for the number
of workers requiring TWIC cards at the Port of New York and New Jersey,
and whether sufficient resources will be available to provide these
cards in a timely and efficient way?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration estimated
750,000 transportation workers would require Transportation Worker
Identification Credentials (TWICs) to meet the mandates of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002. Of that total, approximately
60,000 were estimated to be within the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey. The TWIC contractor is responsible for ensuring sufficient
resources are in place to conduct timely and efficient enrollments and
card issuance during the initial enrollment period. The contractor has
flexibility to add or re-adjust assets as required to ensure adequate
resources are in place to provide these cards in a timely and efficient
manner.
Question 1a. Is the number of enrollment stations based upon the
affected population estimates published in the TWIC final rule? When
will you and the contractor determine where the estimated 130
enrollment centers will be located?
Answer. The number of enrollment workstations in each port is based
on a number of factors including the population estimate for that port,
the geographic size of the port, and the duration of the initial
enrollment period for that port. The Transportation Worker
Identification Credential contractor, in cooperation with the
Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard, is in the
process of evaluating each port to determine the number and location of
enrollment sites.
Question 1b. What steps do you plan to take if your population
estimates are found to be too conservative?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration, the Coast
Guard, and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
contractor will continue to communicate with local stakeholders and
monitor the enrollment population to ensure adequate resources are
deployed to enroll the affected population in an effective manner. The
TWIC contractor is responsible for ensuring sufficient resources are in
place to conduct timely and efficient enrollments and card issuance
during the initial enrollment period. The contractor has the
flexibility to add or re-adjust assets as required to ensure adequate
resources are in place to provide these cards in a timely and efficient
manner.
Additionally, the TWIC contract contains a Quality Assurance
Surveillance Plan with Acceptable Quality Levels for enrollment and
wait times against which the contractor will be measured.
Question 1c. If population estimates are considered too
conservative, will TSA be required to modify the contract with Lockheed
Martin?
Answer. Modifications to the contract should not be required. The
Transportation Worker Identification Credential contract is performance
based and the prime contractor receives a portion of the user fee for
each transaction. Included in the contract are award incentives for the
contractor to exceed enrollment projections.
Question 2. Given that a transportation worker has to appear at an
enrollment center at least two times (enrollment and card issuance),
how is the TSA going to ensure the level of staffing and processing
times (15 minute processing) are sufficient to minimize the impact on
industry and the flow of commerce?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration will monitor the
contractor's performance through site visits, customer surveys, and
program management reviews. The Transportation Worker Identification
Credential contract includes incentive and disincentive provisions for
contractor performance. The processing time, which is highly dependent
on the contractor's staffing level, will be a significant factor in the
contractor performance evaluation. Also, the system incorporates a pre-
enrollment website component that allows workers to schedule
appointments and provide biographic information ahead of time to make
the enrollment process more efficient.
Question 3. If the initial enrollment is expected to take an
extended period of time in a particular port (i.e., 9-12 months in NY/
NJ), how are the TSA and the USCG going to ensure that transportation
workers avail themselves to the enrollment process throughout the
entire period? Inevitably many people will put off their enrollment
until shortly before the enforcement date. How is the contractor going
to handle the surge in volume that is expected 30 days prior to
enforcement in a given port?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration, the Coast
Guard, and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
contractor are working to develop effective outreach and communications
with stakeholders, including employers, unions, and advocacy groups, to
generate a steady flow of enrollment throughout the enrollment period.
The TWIC contractor is responsible for ensuring sufficient resources
are in place to conduct timely and efficient enrollments and card
issuance during the initial enrollment period. The contractor has the
flexibility to add or re-adjust assets as required to ensure adequate
resources are in place to provide these cards in a timely and efficient
manner. Additionally, the TWIC contract includes award incentives for
the contractor to exceed enrollment projections. Some responsibility,
however, must still fall on facilities, employers, and the
transportation workers themselves to enroll in time to ensure they can
be eligible for unescorted access to secure areas before the compliance
date established for each port.
Question 4. It is my understanding that TSA has suggested taking
resources from the Port Security Grant program to pay for the TWIC
pilot project. Why didn't the President's request separate funding for
the pilot project?
Answer. Terminal and vessel operators are responsible for access
control into their facilities. The use of Port Security Grant funds for
the purchase of card readers and associated infrastructure to conduct
the pilot test is appropriate since the terminal and vessel operators
will be able to keep the equipment and access control system
improvements to comply with the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential reader rule once it is effective. In addition, much of the
work conducted through the test would have to be completed by the ports
and facilities or vessels at their locations, in order to implement the
TWIC reader requirements. We also believe that this use increases the
overall level of security measures in place.
Question 5. I don't expect this TWIC program to be completed
anytime soon. In the meantime, when will you complete the terror watch-
list checks for port truck drivers, as you were required to do in the
SAFE Port Act, and as you have done for other workers with access to
secure areas of ports? Has FMCSA provided a complete list of Commercial
Drivers License holders to you? If not, how will you proceed?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) intends to
meet these requirements through Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) enrollments and security threat assessments which
will begin at the conclusion of our TWIC system performance testing.
TWIC implementation will capture this information and make the vetting
process go smoothly without the need to undertake a second rulemaking.
Section 125 of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
(Public Law 109-347) addresses a population on which no government
entity, association, or industry organization maintains information.
Generally, each port Terminal Operator has contracts with a number of
transportation companies that provide drivers and trucks to transport
containers from secure areas to staging areas. Neither the Terminal
Operator nor the trucking companies know which drivers may enter a port
on any given day or at all. Most trucking companies do not have all of
the information necessary to successfully complete the vetting on each
of their drivers to submit to TSA. There are over 500,000 trucking
companies, many of which are independently owned and operated and tend
to move to where the business is with no single company affiliation.
Question 6. In a joint USCG/TSA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
was published in May 2006, a contact reader with pin technology was
proposed. Industry vehemently opposed this technology solution because
of the negative impact it would have on terminal efficiency. Where does
the TSA now stand on this issue?
Answer. Based on comments received during the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking process the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
bifurcated the rule. The first rule that was published in the Federal
Register on January 25, 2007, does not impose the requirement on
owners/operators to purchase, install, or maintain card readers. A
second rulemaking will address the card readers. The public will have
ample opportunity to comment on this second rulemaking. TSA and the
Coast Guard will consider all comments when determining what technology
or processes are required to ensure that security of information and
privacy is protected, as well as operational efficiency, in developing
a final technology solution.
In March 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard invited public comment on a
draft Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) biometric
reader specification and a draft TWIC contactless smart cart
application recommended by the National Maritime Security Advisory
Committee that did not require use of a PIN. The final reader
specification is pending a review of comments received from the public
notice. TSA then plans to test contactless biometric authentication
technology that meets the requirements of the TWIC reader specification
in a variety of maritime operational scenarios (container, bulk,
petroleum, and passenger terminals; and vessels), as well as in
different geographic regions and climates. TSA, with assistance from
other Department of Homeland Security components, is developing a
comprehensive Test and Evaluation Master Plan which we anticipate
completing this summer. TSA has also been working with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to develop laboratory performance
tests to assure baseline performance for this technology, as well as
the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command who will conduct
environmental and ruggedness testing.
Question 7. The SAFE Port Act requires the TSA to establish a pilot
program to test the card reader technology at 5 geographically distinct
port locations within 6 months of enactment. When and where will these
pilot projects commence and how long are they funded?
Answer. The first two pilot locations have been awarded grant
funding--Ports of LA (POLA) and Long Beach (POLB). Additional locations
will be selected from the grantees in the latest round of Port Security
Grants. We have finalized the cooperative agreement with POLB, POLA
will finalize shortly. We are developing the comprehensive test and
evaluation plan and expect POLA and POLB to begin working with terminal
operators to identify the right locations for TWIC readers and start
taking metrics for currents operations.
The actual readers will begin testing after finalization of the
contactless biometric authentication specification that will be used
has been published, and industry has developed the necessary card
reader equipment. Planning for this project has been underway since
December 2006.
TSA plans to test contactless biometric authentication technology
that meets the requirements of the TWIC reader specification in a
variety of maritime operational scenarios (container, bulk, petroleum,
and passenger terminals; and vessels), as well as in different
geographic regions and climates. The duration of the pilot tests will
be such that the card readers will be tested under various
environmental and operational conditions, although the duration has not
yet been finalized.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. While I appreciate TSA's willingness to further study
the requirement directing each towing vessel to carry a card reader, I
remain concerned about the effect of this requirement on the maritime
industry, particularly its small businesses. As you know, there is
significant opposition to requiring card readers on every towing
vessel. Given that crew sizes on tug boats reportedly run between four
and ten mariners, and each of those mariners is well known to other
mariners on the tug, as well as management, therefore making any
intruder obvious, do you believe a workable compromise could be
reached, such as only requiring card readers on vessels employing ten
or more mariners?
Answer. The Coast Guard will be evaluating and considering multiple
types of operations and scenarios as the proposed requirements for the
second Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) rule are
developed. When determining reader applicability, crew size and vessel
type are very likely to be considered in addition to risk.
Question 2. The TWIC application process remains burdensome on
workers and the industries depending on them. Easier access to TWIC
cards once granted may help relieve some of this burden without causing
undue security concerns. Many are concerned about the cumbersome
process to apply for a TWIC card, including the long distances some
workers will be required to travel to obtain a TWIC card. This is
especially true for those in the long haul trucking industry who may
end up applying for their card at one enrollment center, but due to the
nature of their employment may be far from that center by the time the
card is ready. In your opinion, would allowing applicants to designate
that cards be returned to a different enrollment center than where they
originally applied or alternatively including a mechanism to mail cards
to an applicant's home or office be realistic fixes for this problem?
If not, what do you propose as an alternative?
Answer. Shipping a Transportation Worker Identification Credential
to an enrollment center other than the one at which enrollment took
place was considered during the planning stages of the program. Mailing
cards directly to the applicant was also considered. To make system
changes to accommodate these alternatives at this time would be costly
and could further delay implementation. Mailing cards directly to the
individual raised security concerns as the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) would not be able to ensure the individual
receiving the card was in fact the individual that applied for the
card. Although these methods were excluded as part of our original
business plan, TSA may reconsider these options as experience is gained
with the current system and processes in order to reduce the burden on
the affected population.
Question 3. The costs associated with TWIC may be a barrier for
some workers and businesses. While I understand those costs may compare
favorably with other card fees, they remain a burden for the temporary,
seasonal labor in the maritime industry. Of particular concern is the
fact that an applicant must pay for the full price of the application
up front, leaving those applicants who are denied cards paying for the
production of cards they do not receive. One potential solution may be
not to reduce the overall costs, but the schedule on which they are
paid. In your opinion, would it be possible for TSA to charge only for
the cost of processing the application and the security assessment up
front, with the balance to be paid should a card be granted?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) believes
the current process of payment and fee collection provides the best
value to the total population and limits the overall cost of the
credential. While workers ultimately denied a Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) may pay for the card production and
issuance portion of program costs, they benefit from having all
applicants sharing equally in the cost of the process. Workers whose
criminal history would otherwise result in denial of a TWIC may request
a waiver through the TSA redress process and review by an
administrative law judge. Adopting a position that TWIC applicants
should only pay for the services they directly receive could result in
considerable costs to those applicants utilizing the redress process.
Question 4. The goal of the TWIC program is to strengthen the
security of our transportation system, starting with the implementation
of a pilot without unintended consequences. Unfortunately, a host of
issues have plagued the successful implementation of the pilot,
including an incomplete management plan to date, lack of contract
accountability, and ever-increasing costs to implement the program. I
am concerned that if we don't fix these problems soon, we jeopardize
the health of our workforce, strength of our economy, and overall,
security of our Nation. Given these are just some of the implementation
issues since the TWIC pilot was first authorized in 2001, please
describe how our workforce and economy has been indirectly impacted by
these delays.
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
is only going to improve what is currently a less than ideal situation
in the maritime sector of our Nation's transportation system. The
maritime workforce does not currently have a common, secure,
interoperable credential that can be used for nationwide access to
maritime facilities, as the TWIC is intended to provide. Workers may be
required to purchase multiple credentials and undergo multiple
background checks to gain access to facilities sometimes even within
the same state. The intent of the TWIC is to provide this capability in
the form of a uniform identity credential based on a minimum Federal
security standard and centralized processes that can replace the many
credentials that may be required today.
Question 5. It is my understanding that the TWIC system will not be
interoperable with international standards. I am concerned that without
uniformity of international standards, non-U.S. crewman will be exempt
from complying with our security provisions when entering U.S. ports.
Do you think it is necessary to establish an uniform international ID
standard? What is the agency's plan to sync the TWIC system with the
current biometric technology used by the United Nations and developed
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)?
Answer. Obtaining current ``as is'' state and comparing that to the
``to be'' state utilizing Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) card readers is the primary focus of the pilot. The
pilot Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) will address areas to be
tested, required metrics, and test responsibilities. The Transportation
Security Administration anticipates completing the TEMP this summer.
Stakeholders will continue to be apprised of the deployment status
through regular meetings of the TWIC Stakeholder Communications
Committee (TSCC) and our participation in various conferences,
meetings, and briefings. The TSCC is comprised of stakeholder
representatives from labor, ports, vessels, and other industries that
will be impacted by TWIC.
The United Nations through the International Labor Organization
developed a seafarer credential with the intention of endorsing it as a
universally recognized visa. The U.S. supports the concept of raising
the level of seafarer document security but continues to have some
concerns about the ILO document. TSA will continue to monitor
international developments and protocols to determine what, if any,
benefits to the program they provide.
Question 6. The enrollment of workers at the Port of Seattle was
scheduled to begin on March 26. When and by what means did TSA notify
the Port that the March 26 date would slip? What effort will TSA make
to ensure the Port's management is fully informed of the new schedule
for TWIC enrollment when it becomes available?
Has the TWIC contractor physically established a TWIC enrollment
center for the Port of Seattle? The Port estimates that approximately
100,000 individuals will require a TWIC. How many enrollment agents
does the contractor intend to hire to handle the number of individuals
that will have to be enrolled?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not
published an official enrollment schedule and has not notified the Port
of Seattle when enrollments will commence at that location. TSA and
Lockheed Martin commenced a robust, multi-faceted outreach and
communications process to identify and educate the population affected
by the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). This
strategy includes regular meetings of the TWIC Stakeholder
Communications Committee comprised of stakeholder representatives from
labor, ports, vessels, and other industries that will be impacted by
TWIC and a Lockheed Martin TWIC field organization that is in contact
with local Coast Guard Captains of the Port, Port Authorities, major
ports officials, industry, and labor representatives. Once TSA
determines we are prepared to begin issuing notice on enrollment, this
outreach effort will expand significantly.
Lockheed Martin has met with Seattle maritime officials; however,
specific Seattle enrollment sites have not been established. Lockheed
Martin is contractually required to support the enrollment of the TWIC
population nationwide. In order for them to satisfy this requirement
Lockheed Martin has developed a flexible deployment strategy to take
into account the need to respond to enrollment surges, a mobile
population, and enrollment facility options. The contract clearly
defines Acceptable Quality Levels within the Quality Assurance
Surveillance Plan to which Lockheed Martin must adhere. The contract
vehicle provides TSA with the flexibility to add enrollment capability
as the program is implemented.
Question 7. The SAFE Port Act requires TSA to conduct a pilot
program to test the business process, technological, and operational
impacts of TWIC deployment at not fewer than five distinct geographic
locations and to include vessels and facilities in these tests. What is
the status of these pilot programs and the required testing?
Answer. Planning for the pilot programs has been underway since
December 2006. A pilot test agreement has been reached with the Port of
Long Beach and approval of an agreement with the Port of Los Angeles is
expected in the next few months. Discussions are also ongoing with the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to finalize their
participation. TSA, with assistance from other Department of Homeland
Security components, is developing a comprehensive Test and Evaluation
Master Plan which we anticipate completing this summer. TSA has also
been working with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
develop laboratory performance tests to assure baseline performance for
this technology, as well as the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
who will conduct environmental and ruggedness testing.
Question 7a. When and where will the first full scale pilot program
testing of an automated TWIC system be?
Answer. The first Early Operational Assessment test will be
conducted in conjunction with the Ports of LA and Long Beach this year.
Question 7b. My understanding is that some early testing of TWIC
prototypes was conducted at the ports in Washington. Will TSA be
conducting any further testing of TWIC at these ports prior to
requiring full deployment?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential
prototype tests were conducted in three geographic areas: Los Angeles
and Long Beach; Delaware River Basin; and Florida.
Question 7c. Has TSA determined all five locations that will be
used for testing? If not, when do you expect to do so?
Answer. The first two pilot locations have been awarded grant
funding--Ports of LA (POLA) and Long Beach (POLB). Additional locations
will be selected from the grantees in the latest round of Port Security
Grants. Discussions are also ongoing with the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey to finalize their participation and we are working
with the American Waterways Operators Association to identify an
appropriate participant for the towboat and tug boat industry.
Question 7d. What is the required error rate for the TWIC card? Can
you please describe the scope and methodology that will be used to test
the error rate of the TWIC card?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential will be
aligned with the Federal standards for government credentials contained
in the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST's)
Federal Information Process Standard 201-1 and associated standards
such as those in NIST's Special Publication 800-76. 800-76 specifies a
false rejection rate (FRR) of less than or equal to 1 percent and a
false acceptance rate (FAR) of 1 percent. The FRR is the percentage of
incorrectly rejected valid users. The FAR is the percentage of
imposters incorrectly matched to a valid user's biometric.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), with assistance
from other Department of Homeland Security components, is developing a
comprehensive Test and Evaluation Master Plan which we anticipate
completing this summer. TSA has also been working with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to develop laboratory performance
tests to assure baseline performance for this technology, as well as
the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command who will conduct
environmental and ruggedness testing.
Question 7e. Were private sector representatives, such as terminal
and vessel operators, included in developing the scope and methodology
for this testing?
Answer. TSA has used comments provided in response to the TWIC NPRM
published in May 2006 as well as its work with the National Maritime
Security Advisory Committee in developing the scope of the pilot tests.
We are working with the Ports of LA and Long Beach and will work with
the other pilot locations as well to incorporate their feedback.
Specifically to testing parameters, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), with assistance from other Department of Homeland
Security components, is developing a comprehensive Test and Evaluation
Master Plan which we anticipate completing this summer. TSA has also
been working with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
develop laboratory performance tests to assure baseline performance for
this technology, as well as the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
who will conduct environmental and ruggedness testing. TSA will, at the
appropriate time, seek operator input as the test plans are developed
to ensure full participation from stakeholders and a robust meaningful
pilot test is conducted.
Question 8. Your agency, along with the Coast Guard, has requested
comments on the TWIC technology specification recommendations developed
by the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee (NMSAC). I
understand that those comments where due on March 30 of this year. Can
you give the Committee a general overview of the comments received?
Answer. Over thirty separate entities submitted comments to the
questions posed in the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) Contactless Biometrics Specification Public Notice published in
the Federal Register. Entities were predominantly from the maritime
community and its trade associations but some represented technology
companies and technology trade associations. Generally the commenters
praised the work of the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee
(NMSAC) TWIC Contactless Specification Workgroup.
Commenters also generally agreed that a PIN was not a good idea for
general use due to operational concerns. Others believe the PIN should
be considered only if it can be shown not to affect operations. A
number of commenters believe the impact of lost PINs would be
burdensome to the TWIC users and to the program.
Most commenters agreed that privacy was important but most in the
maritime industry did not have concerns that any measures were required
to protect the privacy of biometric fingerprint templates. On the other
hand, most in the technology industry believe that biometric
fingerprint templates should be protected, but that the TWIC Privacy
Key (TPK) scheme is sufficient to protect the template.
A number of maritime commenters carried forward their concerns
about PINs, encryption of fingerprint biometric templates and use of
the TPK card magnetic stripe swipe concept as having potential negative
impact on port and facility operations. Commenters also mentioned that
the pilot tests would be useful for identifying impacts on facility and
vessel operations. Specifically, commenters were concerned about error
rates that might impact gate throughput, operation during extreme
situations, allowing cleaning and vending personnel into facilities
without a TWIC, the effect of TWIC at various Marine Security levels.
Commenters generally agreed that TWIC would have a large impact on
currently deployed personnel access control systems (PACS) if they were
to be integrated and duplicative if they are not.
A number of commenters reiterated their endorsement of the NMSAC
recommendation as being the one that would have minimal impact on the
cost of port security operations. Commenters with PACS were concerned
with integrating TWIC into their operation, especially the impact of
the recommendation that includes encryption of biometrics and possible
need of wiring upgrades. Commenters were interested in impacts on both
acquisition/installation and operational costs. Commenters without
current PACS were concerned that TWIC would require PACS to be
procured, installed, and maintained.
Almost universally commenters agreed that a Qualified Products List
should be developed.
Question 8a. When do you expect to complete a review of the
requested comments and provide a proposed rule on the technology that
will be required to be deployed at our Nation's port to support the
TWIC?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's goal is to
publish the final specification within the coming months. The
Transportation Worker Identification Credential rule requiring readers
will follow the notice and comment rulemaking process after initial
pilot test results have been collected and reviewed.
Question 8b. How is the development and deployment of the
technology behind TWIC being coordinated with the testing required by
the SAFE Port Act?
Answer. The pilot tests TSA is planning pursuant to the SAFE Port
Act, will inform the follow-on rulemaking to require deployment of TWIC
readers. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), with
assistance from other Department of Homeland Security components, is
developing a comprehensive Test and Evaluation Master Plan which we
anticipate completing this summer. TSA has also been working with the
National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop laboratory
performance tests to assure baseline performance for this technology,
as well as the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command who will conduct
environmental and ruggedness testing.
Question 8c. When do you expect to publish a final rule on the
technology of TWIC technology and will it be published before your
agency completes the testing?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
rule requiring readers will follow the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) process after initial pilot test results have been collected and
reviewed. The Coast Guard and the Transportation Security
Administration have begun work on the TWIC II NPRM and expect to
publish it in early 2008.
Question 9. Regarding the testing at the Ports of Los Angeles and
Long Beach: I understand that the Ports where awarded Maritime Security
Grants to help cover the cost of testing and implementation. These
grants in general, require the ports to provide matching state and
local funding in the amount of 25 percent. I am told that your agency
is requiring the full 25 percent match in the case of both testing and
implementation. Do you agree that the development and testing of the
TWIC technology standards is a Federal security responsibility? If not,
why not?
Answer. Yes, although the Transportation Security Administration
has sought, and continues to seek, input from affected industry
stakeholders to ensure security goals are achieved while minimizing the
effect on commerce and people. In addition, the pilot test TSA is
conducting pursuant to the SAFE Port Act will facilitate implementation
at the participating locations. As such, they are critical partners.
Question 9a. Can you explain the reasoning behind requiring select
state and local governments to match Federal funding for testing a
system that will be deployed nationwide?
Answer. Federal funding provides for equipment and infrastructure
improvements that will remain in place during and after the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) pilot test has
concluded and will facilitate compliance with the TWIC card reader
rule. Therefore, it is appropriate for owners and operators to fund a
portion of the infrastructure.
Question 9b. Will your agency be requiring the other ports at which
you will be conducting pilot program testing to provide matching
funding for the testing phase?
Answer. Yes, all ports that participate in the pilot program using
grant funding will be required to provide matching funds pursuant to
the grant guidance.
Question 9c. How much total funding are state and local governments
going to be expected to pay for testing the purposed TWIC technology?
Answer. The total amount of funds expended by state and local
governments will depend on the amount awarded and utilized for
equipment and infrastructure improvements by those ports and facilities
participating in the test.
Question 9d. What happens if the testing proves the system that is
developed does not work? Will you reimburse state and local governments
for the money they contributed to testing?
Answer. The fingerprint template biometric technology that will be
used by Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) has been
extensively tested both by the biometrics industry and the Federal
Government (National Institute of Standards and Technology and General
Services Administration) and is in use in numerous applications. The
primary question to be answered by the pilot test is not whether this
technology works, but what the impact of requiring its use in the
maritime industry will be where current regulations only require a
visual inspection of identification. As noted above, facilities will be
the beneficiaries of equipment purchases and infrastructure
improvements; therefore, there are no plans to reimburse participants
for funds expended for this purpose.
Question 9e. What alternatives, such as public-private partnership
have you explored to get testing completed in a timely manner?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential pilot
testing, and the specification development preceding the pilot test, is
an example of a public-private partnership. The contactless
specification published for public comment was recommended by the
National Maritime Security Advisory Committee working group in
partnership with the Transportation Security Administration and the
Coast Guard. Pilot test plans will be developed with input from the
volunteer participants.
Question 10. I understand that the terminal operators at the Ports
of Los Angeles and Long Beach already maintain a database of over 9,000
transportation workers (mostly truckers) that regularly call on the
terminals and require unescorted access. Have you considered using this
existing database as a way to move forward with testing technology
before prior to completing registration of port and transportation
workers? If so, where does this effort stand? If not, why not?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will
consider all options for pilot testing within the parameters of its
Testing and Evaluation Master Plan. TSA intends to conduct end-to-end
testing of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
system and it is unlikely an existing database contains the
fingerprints needed to create the fingerprint template for use in
biometric matching. Additionally, during prototype testing, TSA
attempted to use existing databases of maritime workers to expedite
enrollment with unsatisfactory results. The databases contained data
element errors (nick-names instead of given names, out of date address
and phone information, no audit trail of identification verification,
among others) and technical errors in formatting that were difficult to
identify and resolve. TSA has no plans to rely on other databases for
enrollment information for actual TWICs or to issue test credentials.
Question 11. The ports in my State of Washington, and I am sure
elsewhere as well, can not afford to have port and transportation
workers denied access or repeated delays in access due to faulty
technology. Whatever technology is used to implement TWIC, it must
support commercially acceptable error rates, processing times, and
overall reliability. While I understand your agency is in the process
of reviewing comments on the TWIC technology standards recommend by the
NAMSAC, I would like to know what steps your agency is taking to ensure
that any technology that is deployed or required to be deployed is
error free and economically viable.
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential will be
aligned with the Federal standards for government credentials contained
in the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST's)
Federal Information Process Standard 201-1 and associated standards
such as those in NIST's Special Publication 800-76. 800-76 specifies a
false rejection rate (FRR) of less than or equal to 1 percent and a
false acceptance rate (FAR) of 1 percent. The FRR is the percentage of
incorrectly rejected valid users. The FAR is the percentage of
imposters incorrectly matched to a valid user's biometric.
Planning for the pilot programs has been underway since December
2006. A pilot test agreement has been reached with the Port of Long
Beach and approval of an agreement with the Port of Los Angeles is
expected in the next few months. Discussions are also ongoing with the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to finalize their
participation. TSA, with assistance from other Department of Homeland
Security components, is developing a comprehensive Test and Evaluation
Master Plan which we anticipate completing this summer. TSA has also
been working with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
develop laboratory performance tests to assure baseline performance for
this technology, as well as the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
who will conduct environmental and ruggedness testing.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question. In 2002, the State of Florida enacted a law requiring a
Florida Uniform Ports Access Credential (FUPAC) in order to ensure the
safety and security of Florida's twelve public seaports. At
approximately the same time, Congress passed and the President signed
into law the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), which
contained many of the same goals.
In an effort to harmonize and maximize the effectiveness of both
programs, the State of Florida signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in
September 2003 to design and implement a prototype Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) in the State of Florida. The
goal of the MOU was to create a prototype credential that could meet
both the state and Federal port security requirements. Since that time,
Florida has been the only state to reach a level of readiness to
actually implement such an access credential, including the ability to
read the card electronically for each entry and exit from the state's
public seaports.
The TWIC final rule published in the Federal Register allows for
equivalent credentials, but seems to imply that those equivalencies
will only apply to certain Department of Defense (DOD) cards or
credentials. As the rule makes clear, there is a need for national,
uniform standards for the issuance of a TWIC. However, in light of the
pre-existing MOU and pilot TWIC program, has the TSA considered
grandfathering the FUPAC as an equivalent credential to the Federal
TWIC?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) partnered
with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, via a
signed Memorandum of Understanding on October 17, 2003, ``to mutually
plan for and execute the implementation of the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) as the common inter-modal credential
to support both programs and to fulfill the vision of the TWIC and the
requirement of the Florida Uniform Port Access Credential Program
(FUPAC) as outlined in Florida statute (311.12 and 311.125).''
The TWIC Final Rule does not preempt any entity from issuing
credentials in addition to the TWIC. TSA continues to work closely with
Florida officials to align FUPAC with the TWIC program. Both parties
agree that it would be in the best interest of port workers to issue a
single credential. TSA has informed the State of Florida that it cannot
grandfather FUPAC as an equivalent credential or substitute FUPAC for
TWIC, because of key distinctions between their requirements and the
TWIC. The two parties are discussing options for Florida to integrate
the TWIC into their process to comply with their state regulations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. David Vitter to
Hon. Edmund S. ``Kip'' Hawley
Question 1. Given the delays in the process and so many unanswered
questions at this late date, what are you doing to ensure that the
maritime industry will have time to meet requirements without
unacceptable disruptions?
Answer. Each port will receive notice prior to the commencement of
enrollment at the port. The Captain of the Port will assess the
progress of enrollment levels and will publish, at least 30 days in
advance of the effective date, notice to comply with Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) requirements. This provision
was included in the regulations to ensure the vast majority of
individuals within a COTP zone requiring a TWIC would have at least 3
months official notice of the compliance date.
Question 2. I feel that the Department did not follow Congressional
intent in developing an interim work process. From what I have heard
from my constituents in the various maritime industries, without a
significant interim period on the front end, it seems that the maritime
industries will either have to pay workers to not work while they wait
for the TWIC process or lose the employees and face a potential labor
shortage.
Answer. A new hire provision is included in the TWIC final rule.
This provision is intended to limit the risk presented by an individual
who has not undergone a full security threat assessment and is waiting
to receive a TWIC while balancing the need to enable individuals to
begin work as soon as possible. This provision enables direct employees
of the owner or operator, who comply with additional interim
requirements, to be eligible for access within 3 days of enrolling for
their TWIC for up to 30 days, with an additional 30 days if necessary
(upon approval by the Coast Guard), while awaiting TWIC issuance.
Question 3. Can you explain the difference between the thoroughness
of an interim security check and a longer term security check?
Answer. The interim security check conducted on port workers last
year was a name-based/biographic check of watch lists and databases
related to terrorism and legal status. Employers submitted employee
names and limited biographic data for the interim check. The interim
check did not include the fingerprint-based criminal history records
check that will be conducted prior to issuing a credential as part of
the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. The
information used to conduct the TWIC security threat assessment will be
gathered by TWIC enrollment personnel and will be checked against
specific identity documents presented and verified at the time of
enrollment. The security threat assessment also includes a fingerprint-
based criminal history records check.
The interim check was not intended to replace the TWIC program nor
was it intended to capture the entire maritime port worker population.
Rather, it was an immediate security measure designed to check those
populations employed within the port area and with frequent access,
such as employees of facility and vessel operators and longshore labor.
A broader maritime port worker population will be covered when the TWIC
program is fully implemented.
Question 4. The rule on TWIC allows 1 month for workers to replace
a lost card. This seems to create a problem in that mariners often work
for 30 day shifts. If a mariner loses a card and files for a
replacement, they would almost certainly be onboard a vessel when their
work authority runs out. Did you give any consideration to the
operations of vessels when you issued this rule? Are you considering
any updates to avoid the situation of someone being unable to legally
work while on a vessel out to sea?
Answer. Yes, vessel operations were considered during the
development of the TWIC regulations. Field guidance pertaining to a
mariner's inability to visit an enrollment center while underway, is
currently being considered for inclusion into a Navigation and Vessel
Inspection Circular (NVIC). The NVIC will serve as robust field
guidance to assist the Coast Guard Captain of the Port and the maritime
industry with TWIC implementation and compliance and the maritime
industry in operationalizing the statutory and regulatory requirements
of TWIC implementation and compliance.
Question 5. As we have seen with the No-Fly List, sometimes people
with similar names are denied access to a flight. What resources will
you have in place to make sure that problems of mistaken identities or
other issues such as that are dealt with quickly so that TWIC
applicants are not unreasonably delayed?
Answer. During Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) enrollment, the applicant provides biometrics and extensive
biographic information, well beyond what is available in the No-Fly
process that will significantly reduce the number of individuals
identified as potential matches.
The initial adjudication process includes an assessment of each
applicant's criminal history and citizenship status. Each applicant is
also vetted against relevant intelligence databases. Any applicant with
potential disqualifying information is assessed through a process of
review by multiple trained adjudicators who determine whether the
applicant meets the requirements to hold a TWIC. The process is
designed to reduce the risk of improperly adjudicating the applicant
while minimizing the time of adjudication. Legal counsel is available
to the adjudicators to help resolve issues before reaching a decision
concerning an applicant's threat to transportation security within the
confines of the regulation.
TWIC applicants who are initially determined to present a security
risk are advised by letter of this initial finding. The letter explains
the applicant's right to appeal the finding or request a waiver as
appropriate. If the applicant wishes to appeal an initial
determination, the applicant has the opportunity to request the records
on which the initial determination was based. The applicant may submit
additional information, such as corrected official records on his or
her criminal history, citizenship status, or other relevant information
that may allow the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
rescind the initial determination. When possible, TSA will make a
reasonable attempt to assist the applicant by identifying or acquiring
information that enables TSA to grant a favorable final determination.
The waiver process is similar, although waivers are based on an
assessment of risk despite the applicant being ineligible for a TWIC
due to the applicant's criminal history. This information is reviewed
by a board of TSA personnel. If a waiver or appeal is denied, the
applicant has the right to request review by an Administrative Law
Judge who then provides a recommendation on the merits of each
individual case.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
RADM Brian Salerno
Question 1. The SAFE Port Act requires the Coast Guard and the TSA
to concurrently process applications for individuals applying for a
TWIC card and a Merchant Mariner Document (MMD). How are the Coast
Guard and the TSA addressing this issue? What steps are you taking to
ensure the MMD applications are processed as expeditiously as possible?
Where is the Coast Guard in the process of completing a companion
rule to consolidate existing MMDs and to streamline the application
process for mariners who are also applying for a TWIC?
What processes and procedures has the Coast Guard established to
ensure that information is appropriately shared with the TSA and that
mariners do not endure excessive delays in obtaining their MMD?
Answer. The Coast Guard and TSA have agreed to share information,
but all the details have not been finalized at this time. We will
publish the details before the TWIC requirement come into effect for
mariners (September 25, 2008, per the TWIC final rule). In the
meantime, in an effort to ensure MMD applications are processed as
quickly and consistently as possible and reduce delays in obtaining
MMDs, the National Maritime Center (NMC) is in the process of
centralizing the mariner evaluation process in Martinsburg, WV. The NMC
is also working on a paperless application process.
Public comments for the Consolidated Merchant Mariner Credential
(MMC) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) closed on April 25, 2007 and
are being reviewed. An MMC format decision meeting is scheduled for May
2007. The MMC final rule will be published and in effect prior to the
requirement for mariners to obtain a TWIC.
The USCG and TSA are currently working on resolving a number of
issues related to:
Printing the TWIC digital photo on the MMC in International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) format.
Printing the TWIC digital fingerprints on the MMC in
accordance with ILO185-SID convention.
Ensuring the Coast Guard is able to retrieve TWIC mariner
applicant FBI information, for the purpose of additional safety
vetting, after the security vetting is complete.
Passing, from TSA to the Coast Guard, the names of mariners
who apply for a TWIC and are denied by TSA.
Question 2. How does the Coast Guard plan to handle the potential
increased Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) case load when the TWIC
enrollment process begins?
Answer. The Coast Guard believes that there may be a notable
increase in ALJ case load once TWIC enrollment begins. However, we do
not anticipate that this increase in case load will come at the cost of
other important Coast Guard work. The Coast Guard has performed ALJ
work for other government agencies, including the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), via reimbursable agreement for some
time. Any new resources necessary to support the increase in case load;
including Federal employees will be funded via a modification to the
current reimbursable agreement with TSA.
Question 3. Did the Coast Guard participate in the negotiations
regarding the development the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) Standard? Why has the United States declined to ratify the
resolution? Do you think this poses additional burdens for U.S.-flag
vessels operating in international commerce?
Answer. No, the Coast Guard did not participate in development of
the ICAO standard. However, the Coast Guard did participate in the
development of the ILO Convention 185, which specifies an ICAO standard
for the printing of information on a Seafarer's Identity Document.
The Coast Guard defers to the State Department regarding why the
U.S. decided not to ratify this convention. The Coast Guard has not
evaluated the effect that the ICAO Standard would have on U.S.-flag
vessels. However, regardless of ratification, the Coast Guard intends
on developing the Merchant Mariner's Credential in a manner that is
compliant with ILO Convention 185 to ensure that U.S. mariners comply
with this convention should it be mandatory in a foreign port-of-call.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
RADM Brian Salerno
Question. Rear Admiral Salerno, I have heard back from several
ports in my state that the Coast Guard has done a good job in keeping
port managers informed on issues relating to TWIC regulation and
implementation. As you know, Washington State falls within District 13
and is served by both Sector Seattle and Sector Portland. Are you aware
of any inconsistencies between Sectors within District 13 regarding
TWIC implementation policies? For example, there are a number of non-
traditional port facilities in my state where there may be a need for
greater flexibility in TWIC implementation. How do you ensure
consistency between Sectors so there is not confusion on TWIC policy
between non-traditional ports in the same state?
Answer. The Coast Guard is not aware of any inconsistencies between
Sectors within District 13 regarding TWIC implementation policies.
Flexibility in determining compliance dates does exist however in that
compliance dates will be established based on input from the Captain of
the Port (COTP), Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and TSA's
contractor Lockheed Martin. It is the CG's and TSA's goal to ensure the
majority of workers within a COTP Zone have ample opportunity to apply
for and receive a TWIC during the initial enrollment periods before
setting a compliance date. The USCG is currently developing robust
field guidance in the form of a Navigation and Vessel Inspection
Circular (NVIC) to assist COTP and the maritime industry in
operationalizing the statutory and regulatory requirements of TWIC
implementation and compliance. National consistency is one of the
USCG's goals regarding the TWIC program and the NVIC is a useful tool
to assist in that endeavor.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
RADM Brian Salerno
Question 1. Primary law enforcement responsibility in US ports
rests with a port authority police force or a local law enforcement
organization and USCG personnel are generally not onsite everyday. How
does the USCG plan to accommodate this provision and minimize the
impact to local law enforcement by needing to hold an individual
``until Coast Guard personnel arrives to confiscate the TWIC card?''
Wouldn't it make more sense to allow a bona fide law enforcement
official to confiscate a TWIC card based on reasonable cause?
Answer. The Coast Guard is currently exploring the legal and
operational issues involved in allowing bona fide law enforcement
officials to confiscate TWICs based on reasonable cause. This is one of
several options currently being evaluated as the Coast Guard develops
the policy and field guidance associated with TWIC enforcement. The
USCG is currently developing robust field guidance in the form of a
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) to assist COTP and the
maritime industry in operationalizing the statutory and regulatory
requirements of TWIC implementation and compliance.
Question 2. In a joint TSA/USCG Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
was published in May 2006, a contact reader with PIN technology was
proposed. Industry vehemently opposed this technology solution because
of the negative impact it would have on terminal efficiency. Where does
the USCG now stand on the issue?
Answer. The proposed requirements for biometric readers and
Personal Identification Number (PIN) usage by Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) holders prior to accessing secure
areas of regulated facilities and vessels were excluded from the Final
Rule which was published on January 25, 2007. Under the existing rule,
the TWIC is required to be utilized as a visual identity badge, but a
PIN will not be required for routine unescorted access to facilities or
vessels. A PIN however will be necessary to ``unlock'' the biometric
template stored in the TWIC integrated circuit chip, to facilitate the
holder's authentication during USCG spot checks. Spot checks are not
anticipated to have a negative impact on terminal efficiency.
The TSA and the USCG are currently evaluating options, including
the presence or absence of a PIN requirement, for a contactless
biometric specification for TWICs and readers with this capability.
During this process, we are taking serious consideration of comments
received from regulated industry and labor, including comments from the
National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, on the requirement for a
PIN, but no decision has been reached yet. The specification will be
published and tested in operational environments, pursuant to the SAFE
Port Act. Implementation will require a follow-on rulemaking effort.
Question 3. The National Maritime Security Advisory Committee
(NMSAC) has recommended that the transmission of the biometric
fingerprint template from the TWIC card to the card reader not be
encrypted because it would complicate the processing, add unnecessary
cost and maintenance concerns as well as slow down terminal operations.
On the other hand, the biometric industry has recommended encryption
even though they admit that a fingerprint template cannot be re-
engineered into an identifiable fingerprint and offers no privacy
protection. Where is the USCG on the issue of encryption? What is the
timeline for making a final decision on the selected TWIC chip/reader
technology? When will it be published? Finally, what is the expected
timeline for the publication of the TWIC Phase II NPRM?
Answer. The fingerprint template is considered Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) and therefore should be protected. When
the template is transmitted from the TWIC to a contactless reader it is
subject to being intercepted. Additionally, it is possible to use radio
frequency waves to simulate a reader and thus ``skim'' an unprotected
template from a card. Therefore, in allowing contactless operation, the
TWIC fingerprint template must be protected in some manner. As NMSAC
ruled out using a Personal Identification Number (PIN) to protect the
template during transmission, encryption to establish a secure link
over which to transmit the template is one way to accomplish this
protection.
NMSAC does not believe the protection above which is afforded by
the Minutiae template is necessary and therefore their recommendation
was to not encrypt the transmission. They did provide an additional
specification for encryption with the understanding that encryption
might be a government requirement.
Currently if a template were compromised it is unlikely there would
be any security or privacy implications. However, as technology moves
forward and biometrics become more commonly used, we cannot be certain
this will be the case in the future. Therefore, since a person cannot
change their fingerprint template if it is compromised, the government
must ensure that a level of protection is provided.
The final contactless specification will be published in the
Federal Register in the coming months. The USCG and the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) have begun work on the TWIC II NPRM and
expect to publish it in early 2008.
Question 4. Is encryption contemplated for the TWIC program
consistent with the requirements put forth by the DHS in the REAL ID
Driver's License program NPRM? Or any other DHS identification card
programs now underway?
Answer. Yes. When a biometric template or other PII is being
transmitted in a contactless manner or otherwise embedded in an
identity document, this information is protected. The best example is
HSPD-12/FIPS 201 documents, upon which the TWIC standard was based.
REAL ID does not require the collection of biometrics. However, DHS
proposed that PII embedded in the mag stripe be encrypted.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Norman J. Rabkin
Question 1. You state in your testimony that TSA has developed a
schedule for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards at ports. Have
you seen this deployment schedule, and is it based on risk? Did you
find it to be reasonable and achievable schedule?
Answer. TSA reported to us that the agency has developed a schedule
for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards at ports, but we have not
seen a copy of this schedule. As a result, we did not evaluate whether
the schedule is based on risk or is reasonable.
Question 2. When you reviewed the prototype contract in your
September 2006 report, did you find how many card readers were
deployed, and actually tested? If so, at which locations were they
tested?
Answer. According to the TWIC prototype report, 99 TWIC card
readers were installed at 19 locations during prototype testing.
According to the prototype report, these locations included: MacArthur
Airport in New York; Los Angeles International Airport; Broadway
Terminal in New Jersey; the Maritime Exchange of the Delaware River and
Bay; Gloucester Terminal in New Jersey; the Amtrak Operations Center in
Delaware; the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach; Wilmington,
Delaware; Pensacola, Panama City, Fernandina, Canaveral, and Manatee,
Florida; and 5 private port terminal facilities at the Ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach.
Question 3. As the Coast Guard moves forward with completing a
companion rule to consolidate existing mariner credentials, I believe
it is important for the Committee to have a better understanding of the
impacts these cumulative fees are having on the industry. Can you
please provide a summary of the procedures and the costs a mariner
incurs to serve on a U.S.-flag vessel?
Answer. According to the Coast Guard, to qualify for issuance of an
entry-level merchant marine license or entry-level rating endorsed on a
Merchant Mariner Document (MMD), an applicant must acquire required sea
service experience, complete training specified in regulation, and pass
a drug screen and physical examination. This information is submitted
to a Coast Guard Regional Examination Center for evaluation. The
applicant must also appear once during the evaluation process to be
identified and be fingerprinted. If the evaluation shows that the
applicant meets all of the requirements for the credential and a
background check and review of the National Driver Register are
satisfactory, the applicant must then demonstrate professional
competence by passing an examination or completing training that
substitutes for the examination. No examination is required for entry-
level ratings.
According to the Coast Guard, the cost that a merchant mariner
incurs to serve on a U.S. flag vessel can vary based on region of the
country and other factors. Coast Guard officials provided an estimate
of these costs as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Entry level officer Entry level rating
Cost category -------------------------------------------
Seagoing Inland Seagoing Inland
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training $30,000 $2,000 $1,000 $0
Physical 75 75 50 50
Drug Screening 85 85 80 80
User Fees 300 300 140 140
Travel/Miscellaneous 1,000 800 250 250
-------------------------------------------
Total Cost $31,460 $3,260 $1,520 $520
------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Coast Guard, travel and miscellaneous costs
represent the costs of appearing for examination, identification, and
fingerprinting. Distance from an examination center will affect travel
costs. Travel costs to attend training are included in the cost of
training. For the officer levels, the costs are those applicable to an
applicant for a license as third mate unlimited (seagoing vessels) or
for a license as mate 1,600 gross register tons (inland vessels). These
license levels represent common entry points into a seagoing career. In
some cases, employers will reimburse applicants for some or all of the
costs to qualify for a license or MMD.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to
Norman J. Rabkin
Question 1. Mr. Rabkin, in your written testimony you mentioned
both progress made and challenges remaining for the TWIC program. Does
TSA have sufficient force and assets to handle this type of large scale
program implementation?
Answer. Until TWIC program implementation begins later this year,
it is difficult to evaluate whether TSA and the enrollment contractor
have dedicated the staff and resources necessary to successfully
implement the program. Since we issued our September 2006 report, TSA
has added staff to the TWIC program office to better manage the program
and established an office to more closely monitor the performance of
the enrollment contractor. However, we did not evaluate the number of
staff or resources that the TWIC enrollment contractor has dedicated to
implementing the program as part of our review. While additional staff
with expertise in program and contract management should help TSA to
implement the program, it remains to be seen whether TSA and the
enrollment contractor will be able to implement the TWIC program on
such a large scale covering 770,000 workers at about 3,500 maritime
facilities and 5,300 vessels in the required time frames.
Question 2. If not, what suggestions does GAO have to ensure an
effective implementation of TWIC?
Answer. Addressing the primary challenges facing the TWIC program
is the most important step to ensure effective implementation. TSA and
maritime industry stakeholders face several challenges to ensuring that
the TWIC program can be implemented successfully. Although TSA has
learned from TWIC testing experiences and has taken steps to help
address problems that we previously identified, transitioning from
limited testing to full scale implementation will be a major challenge.
In addition, TSA and its enrollment contractor will also need to
educate workers on the new TWIC requirements through an effective
communication and coordination strategy, ensure that enrollments begin
in a timely manner, and process numerous background checks, appeals,
and waivers. Furthermore, TSA and industry stakeholders will also need
to ensure that TWIC access control technologies will work effectively
in the maritime environment, be compatible with TWIC cards that will be
issued, and balance security with the flow of maritime commerce. As TSA
works to implement the TWIC program later this year, it will be
important that the agency establish clear and reasonable time frames
and ensure that all aspects of the TWIC program, including the TWIC
access control technologies, are fully tested in the maritime
environment.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Norman J. Rabkin
Question 1. While I appreciate TSA's willingness to further study
the requirement directing each towing vessel to carry a card reader, I
remain concerned about the effect of this requirement on the maritime
industry, particularly its small businesses. As you know, there is
significant opposition to requiring card readers on every towing
vessel. Given that crew sizes on tug boats reportedly run between four
and ten mariners, and each of those mariners is well known to other
mariners on the tug, as well as management, therefore making any
intruder obvious, do you believe a workable compromise could be
reached, such as only requiring card readers on vessels employing ten
or more mariners?
Answer. According to TSA, the agency will address all requirements
regarding TWIC access control technologies, such as biometric card
readers, in a second proposed rule that the agency plans to issue
during 2008. Until access control requirements are set forth in this
proposed rule, it is not clear in what circumstances TWIC card readers
will be required on vessels. In addition, the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 states that TSA cannot
require card readers on vessels unless TSA determines that the vessel
is at severe risk or that readers are necessary due to the number of
individuals on board. As such, TSA must consider this requirement as
well as any public comments regarding the installation on card readers
on vessels as part of the second rulemaking in the future.
Question 2. The TWIC application process remains burdensome on
workers and the industries depending on them. Easier access to TWIC
cards once granted may help relieve some of this burden without causing
undue security concerns. Many are concerned about the cumbersome
process to apply for a TWIC card, including the long distances some
workers will be required to travel to obtain a TWIC card. This is
especially true for those in the long haul trucking industry who may
end up applying for their card at one enrollment center, but due to the
nature of their employment may be far from that center by the time the
card is ready. In your opinion, would allowing applicants to designate
that cards be returned to a different enrollment center than where they
originally applied or alternatively including a mechanism to mail cards
to an applicant's home or office be realistic fixes for this problem?
If not, what do you propose as an alternative?
Answer. According to TSA, shipping a TWIC card to an enrollment
center, other than the one at which enrollment took place, was
considered as well as mailing cards directly to the applicant during
the planning stages of the program. TSA officials determined that it
would be preferable to follow the process set forth in Federal
Information Processing Standard 1, which calls for individuals to
retrieve identification credentials in person so that their identity
can be verified. According to TSA, mailing TWIC cards directly to the
individual raises security concerns because TSA would not be able to
ensure the individual receiving the card was in fact the individual
that applied for the card. However, TSA officials stated that they
understand that the return visit to the enrollment center will be
inconvenient for some TWIC applicants and may reconsider this process
in the future to reduce burden on the affected population. Our review
focused on the results of the TWIC prototype test and did not evaluate
the feasibility of having TWIC cards mailed to a worker's home or
office or any other alternative method of picking up a TWIC card.
Question 3. The costs associated with TWIC may be a barrier for
some workers and businesses. While I understand those costs may compare
favorably with other card fees, they remain a burden for the temporary,
seasonal labor in the maritime industry. Of particular concern is the
fact that an applicant must pay for the full price of the application
up front, leaving those applicants who are denied cards paying for the
production of cards they do not receive. One potential solution may be
not to reduce the overall costs, but the schedule on which they are
paid. In your opinion, would it be possible for TSA to charge only for
the cost of processing the application and the security assessment up
front, with the balance to be paid should a card be granted?
Answer. According to TSA officials, the agency considered allowing
workers to initially pay for the enrollment and threat assessment
portion of the TWIC fee and pay the remaining balance when the card is
issued. However, TSA officials stated that the current process of
payment and fee collection provides the best value to the total
population and limits the overall cost of the TWIC card. According to
TSA, while workers ultimately denied a TWIC may pay for the card
production and issuance portion of program costs, they benefit from
having all applicants sharing equally in the cost of the process.
Workers whose criminal history would otherwise result in denial of a
TWIC may request a waiver through the TSA redress process and review by
an administrative law judge. Adopting a position that TWIC applicants
should only pay for the services they directly receive could result in
considerable costs to those applicants utilizing this redress process.
As part of our review, we did not evaluate TSA's rationale for
requiring the fee to be paid in full at the time of enrollment or the
feasibility of any alternate methods of paying for the TWIC card.
Question 4. The goal of the TWIC program is to strengthen the
security of our transportation system, starting with the implementation
of a pilot without unintended consequences. Unfortunately, a host of
issues have plagued the successful implementation of the pilot,
including an incomplete management plan to date, lack of contract
accountability, and ever-increasing costs to implement the program. I
am concerned that if we don't fix these problems soon, we jeopardize
the health of our workforce, strength of our economy, and overall,
security of our Nation. Given these are just some of the implementation
issues since the TWIC pilot was first authorized in 2001, please
describe how our workforce and economy has been indirectly impacted by
these delays.
Answer. Our past work on the TWIC program has identified program
delays, problems regarding testing and contract management, and
additional challenges that the program faces. However, we did not
evaluate either the direct or indirect impact that TWIC program delays
and problems have had on the workforce and economy.
Question 5. It is my understanding that the TWIC system will not be
interoperable with international standards. I am concerned that without
uniformity of international standards, non-U.S. crewman will be exempt
from complying with our security provisions when entering U.S. ports.
Do you think it is necessary to establish an uniform international ID
standard? What is the agency's plan to sync the TWIC system with the
current biometric technology used by the United Nations and developed
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)?
Answer. According to TSA, the agency determined that it is
preferable to have TWIC be interoperable with credentials issued to
U.S. Federal standards rather than ICAO standards for international
travel documents. TSA officials stated that TWIC is not intended for
international travel, but does have potential applications with other
U.S. Government credentials. Therefore, to achieve maximum
interoperability with other programs, security and protection of
personal information, TWIC follows the Federal Government standards for
biometric credentials which are contained in FIPS 201 and the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) publication 378. TSA plans to
continue monitoring international developments and protocols to
determine what if any benefits to the program they provide. As part of
our review, we did not evaluate the interoperability of the TWIC system
with international standards or TSA's plans to synchronize the TWIC
system with biometric technologies used by the United Nations or ICAO.
In addition, we did not examine the need to establish a uniform
international identification standard.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Lisa B. Himber
Question. How would you advise the TSA and the Coast Guard to
address the seasonal labor issue for the maritime industry?
Answer. After discussion with various facility operators and labor
organizations, the issue remains one for which there is no clear
answer. While many members are in favor of a provision that allows for
a ``temporary credential'' which would be capped after an appropriate
number of port visits (e.g., after the third time, the worker would be
required to obtain a TWIC for access), others see this as difficult to
monitor.
We respectfully request that this issue be tabled until after the
Coast Guard finalizes its Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
document, which will provide guidance on the escort provisions. In
addition, we expect it will be necessary to re-evaluate this issue once
the TWIC program is underway and the impact can be accurately assessed.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Lisa B. Himber
Question. I understand you have been involved in efforts to develop
biometric standards for the TWIC card readers that are ``contact-
less''--meaning they would not require entering a password, for
example. Doesn't this type of technology reflect the ``lowest common
denominator'' as opposed to the highest possible level of security?
Answer. The term ``contactless'' refers to the fact that a card can
be read without the need to insert or swipe it into a reader. The
maritime industry believes it is important to use contactless TWIC
readers because contact readers are more quickly subject to damage by
the normal usage, the environment, and vandalism.
A contactless biometric may or may not require the use of a
Personal Identification Number (PIN) or other password. The National
Maritime Security Advisory Committee recommended to DHS that under
normal operating conditions (i.e., MARSEC I) those who seek access to
regulated facilities and vessels be required to present their TWICs
only. During times of heightened security (MARSEC II and III),
individuals would be required to present a biometric for verification
in addition to the card.
However, it is important note that during normal operations,
persons seeking access to a regulated area must verify that they have a
legitimate need to enter, and in most cases, the individual's name must
be on a gate or appointment list.
In keeping with the overarching philosophy that DHS must seek to
find an appropriate balance between enhanced security and facilitation
of commerce, the maritime industry believes that adding a requirement
for use of a PIN presents an additional and largely unnecessary
potential point of failure which could lead to lengthy delays in vessel
and cargo processing.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Capt. Paul Kaipo Pomaikai, Sr.
Question 1. The interim work authority process the TSA provided for
in the final rule appears to be more restrictive than what your
industry was hoping for. As I understand it, newly hired workers must
apply for their TWIC, pay the fee, pass the named-based background
check from TSA and still be accompanied by an individual with a TWIC
card at all times while in a port. Is my understanding of this process
correct? Can you explain how that presents difficulties to your
operations?
Answer. Yes, that is the process that is outlined in the final
rule. The biggest problem with the interim work authority process
provided by TSA is that the process doesn't begin until a new hire has
traveled to a TWIC enrollment center and applied for his or her TWIC in
person, plus paid the $137 fee. This is a problem, first of all,
because of the burden it imposes on mariners. When you're a young
person seeking a job who doesn't even know yet if the maritime industry
is right for you, it's a big hurdle to be told you've got to fly to
another island or take a bus halfway across the state to a TWIC
enrollment center. And, $137 is no small change when you haven't even
started working yet. From an employer perspective, companies in our
industry are very concerned that folks considering employment in our
industry will look at these burdens and say, ``No thanks. I think I'll
go do something else.'' The maritime industry is already facing a
severe personnel shortage, and the last thing we want to do is set up
barriers to entry that discourage prospective employees from coming to
work for us.
The second problem with the TSA process is the additional time it
requires before a new hire can be put to work on a vessel. As a
practical matter, an employer will not want to send a new hire to a
TWIC enrollment center to start the process until the new hire has
passed a drug screen, taken a physical, and had his or her references
checked. What all of that means is that it may be a week before the
individual goes to the TWIC enrollment center and ``starts the clock''
on the interim work authority process.
We could address both of these issues--reducing burdens on mariners
that discourage new entrants into the industry, and enabling employers
to put new employees to work more quickly--if we could begin the
process with a computerized check against the terrorist watch list
instead of a trip to the TWIC enrollment center. This approach would
not diminish security in any way, since it's the same check that TSA is
proposing to use to grant interim work authority in the final rule.
But, it would save a mariner the time and expense of a trip to the
enrollment center, and it could be done immediately, concurrently with
the drug screen, physical, and reference checks that the company will
conduct. This would enable mariners to get to work sooner, since the
terrorist watch list check could be in process while the mariner is
completing these other essential steps in the new hire process.
After a reasonable period of time--say, 90 days--a new hire that
intended to stay in the industry would be required to go the enrollment
center, apply for a TWIC, and pay the $137 fee. This would be a
meaningful interim work authority provision that would work for the
maritime industry without compromising security.
Question 2. As the Coast Guard moves forward with completing a
companion rule to consolidate existing mariner credentials, I believe
it is important for the Committee to have a better understanding of the
impacts these cumulative fees are having on the industry. Can you
please provide the Committee a summary of procedures and of the costs a
mariner incurs to serve on U.S.-flag vessels?
Answer. A career in the maritime industry is rewarding, but it's
also expensive. In addition to the cost of the TWIC--$137 for a five-
year credential--mariners who are required to hold Coast Guard licenses
or Merchant Mariner's Documents also pay user fees for those
credentials. Those fees range from $140 for an original MMD with no
endorsement, to $255 for a license as Mate or Master of Towing Vessels,
to $280 for an MMD with a tankerman endorsement. As with the TWIC,
though, the cost of the credential itself is only part of the story--
it's the hidden costs like the time and expense of travel to a TWIC
enrollment center or Coast Guard Regional Exam Center that are even
more significant for most mariners. An even more serious concern of
many mariners today is the cost of medical tests that may be necessary
to prove that a mariner is medically qualified for a license or
document. A draft Coast Guard policy document (a Navigation and Vessel
Inspection Circular, or NVIC, on medical and physical standards for
merchant mariner credentials) would require a mariner who has one of
more than 200 listed medical conditions to provide extensive
information to the Coast Guard. In some cases, the required information
includes consultations with specialists and medical test results that
may or may not be covered by insurance.
For mariners in the coastal and oceangoing towing industry, there
are also enormous expenses associated with the training courses
required for an STCW certificate. (STCW is the International Convention
on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers.).
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Capt. Paul Kaipo Pomaikai, Sr.
Question. You have stated your concern regarding the proposal to
require card readers on every towing vessel. In your opinion, would
requiring card readers only on vessels employing larger numbers of
mariners (for example, ten or more) be a workable middle ground? Would
such a compromise help alleviate the burden this requirement could
cause on those in the maritime industry?
Answer. This would certainly provide an acceptable compromise. The
SAFE Port Act gives DHS the authority to limit the card reader
requirement to vessels with more than a certain number of crew, to be
determined by the agency. We suggest that, at a minimum, vessels with
12 or fewer crew members requiring a TWIC should not be required to
have a card reader installed on board. Card readers are simply
unnecessary for vessels with small crews, such as towing vessels whose
crew sizes typically range from four to ten mariners. In an average
U.S.-flagged towing vessel operation, every employee is known to
management and fellow crewmembers. A stranger onboard the vessel is
immediately obvious. Personal knowledge of fellow employees provides a
higher security standard than reliance upon an electronic reader, no
matter how sophisticated the technology employed. Access control
procedures are already included as part of a Coast Guard-approved
vessel security plan.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Michael J. Rodriguez
Question. Why is it important that we utilize the International
Civil Aviation Organization standards for U.S.-flag vessels operating
in international commerce?
Answer. There are several important reasons for using the
International Civil Aviation Organization standards to implement the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential.
First, we agree wholeheartedly that the implementation of a uniform
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) system is an
important tool in the effort to prevent maritime terrorism. Maritime
workers, whether they are longshoremen, seafarers or harbor pilots are
on the front lines. We are deeply disappointed by TSA's inability to
establish a program to identify and bar from security-sensitive
transportation jobs those individuals who clearly pose a security risk.
We shared the Committee's frustration when we learned, during the April
12, 2007 hearing, that the schedule for TWIC implementation is falling
so far behind. We believe that one of the reasons it is falling behind
lies with the policy decision to use the unproven and inappropriate
FIPS-201 standard for the biometric identity cards in the TWIC program,
rather than the widely used and internationally recognized
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards.
ICAO is an organization within the United Nations with headquarters
in Montreal. It was established by international convention in Chicago
in 1946. Today ICAO has 190 member states including the United States.
Our country is also a member of ICAO's governing council.
Civil aviation is a critical service that is vital to the global
economy. Therefore, ICAO members work toward standards of practice in
biometric identity systems for machine readable travel documents to
facilitate the movement by air of persons around the world. Maritime
shipping is likewise essential to our global society. The movement of
cargo, passengers and workers through our ports would also benefit from
the implementation of uniform international standards.
We believe Congress anticipated the need for compatibility between
identity documents for transportation workers in the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) section 103(a). The MTSA
encourages the U.S. Coast Guard to:
``. . . negotiate an international agreement, or an amendment
to an international agreement, that provides for a uniform,
comprehensive, international system of identification for
seafarers that will enable the United States and another
country to establish authoritatively the identity of any
seafarer aboard a vessel within the jurisdiction, including the
territorial waters, of the United States or such other
country.''
Likewise, Section 303(b)(1) of the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Border Security Act) very clearly
establishes Congress's intent that the US system of machine readable,
tamper-resistant travel documents conform to international standards.
The section reads, in part:
``The Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall jointly
establish document authentication standards and biometric
identifier standards to be employed on such visas and other
travel and entry documents from among those biometric
identifiers recognized by domestic and international standards
organizations.''
Furthermore, in section 110(a) of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 (SAFE
Port Act), Congress expressed its desire for the Secretary of Homeland
Security to expedite the crewmember identification process when it
amended the MTSA. The amended section 70111(a) of the MTSA now reads:
``Requirement.--Not later than one year after the date of
enactment of the SAFE Port Act, the Secretary, in consultation
with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, shall
require crewmembers on vessels calling at United States ports
to carry and present on demand any identification that the
Secretary decides is necessary.''
If foreign crewmembers will be carrying ICAO-compliant identity
documents, it is difficult to imagine why the Department of Homeland
Security has selected a transportation worker identification system
that is not compatible with ICAO. We feel that if the TWIC program were
designed to comply with the ICAO standards, then TSA and the U.S. Coast
Guard would have a much greater chance of meeting the deadlines
established by Congress.
Given the unambiguous intent of Congress as expressed in the MTSA
and the Border Security Act that the TWIC and U.S. travel documents
conform to international standards, its is clear that Congress
recognized the value of globally interoperable systems and has directed
the relevant agencies to pursue interoperability. What is not clear is
why TSA and the Coast Guard have ignored this aspect of the
Congressional mandate and have chosen instead an internal Federal
Government standard for the TWIC that will never be interoperable with
international standards and was untested and unproven on the massive
scale required for the TWIC program.
The International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations
organization responsible for seafarer identity documents, after special
sessions, adopted the ILO Seafarer Identity Document (SID) Convention
185 (C-185) in June 2003. The purpose of the SID Convention is to
establish uniform interoperable biometric identity document standards
to be used in conjunction with the International Maritime
Organization's (IMO) International Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS
Code) that establishes the international maritime security system. The
ISPS Code is the product of an initiative launched by the United States
under the auspices of the United Nations organization responsible for
the regulation of international shipping, to establish a uniform
international maritime transportation security regime. The U.S. Coast
Guard's Federal maritime security regulations (33 CFR 104 and 105) are
based upon the ISPS Code. In addition to setting out the fundamentals
for a comprehensive Seafarer's Identity Document management system, C-
185 prescribes the use of the ICAO biometric identifier standards as
the basis for the SID. The ICAO standards are currently in use
worldwide for passports, visas and other travel documents and cards.
The ICAO standards are a proven and internationally accepted
technology for identity documents. The readers and other supporting
hardware have also been proven at airports around the world. We believe
TWIC should start with this established system and build upon it as
technology advances and new capabilities emerge.
There are several benefits to this approach for the TWIC program.
First, the Department of Homeland Security and the American
taxpayer will not have to invent a new technology. In our view, this is
what Congress envisioned in authorizing the TWIC program.
Second, because the SID's carried by seafarers from other nations
will be ICAO compliant, port facility operators and the Coast Guard
would be able to scan and track the identity documents of foreign
seafarers as they enter and exit the United States. Additionally, there
would be less of a tendency for facility operators to lock down
seafarers aboard their vessels. Lock downs are frequent today, in part,
because the seafarers do not have acceptable identity documents. The
identity card carried by a professional mariner should allow the
mariner the same freedom of movement in the United States that
passports and visas give other travelers.
Third, American seafarers would be able to use their TWIC cards
abroad for access to facilities in foreign ports. This would have the
effect of ensuring American seafarers will have free access for shore
leave, crew changes, and travel to and from their ships.
By starting from a straightforward and uncomplicated foundation--by
adopting the same proven technology that is widely used for access
control of foreign visitors to the United States as well as at
international airports and in foreign ports, we can dramatically reduce
the problems with the present TWIC program and increase the ease and
speed of implementation of the TWIC.
We understand that TSA and the Coast Guard have invested a great
deal of time and money in trying to develop a new technology for the
TWIC program. However, TSA has issued not even a single working TWIC
card 5 years after being directed to do so by Congress. We believe it
is not too late to get the program right by moving forward with a
simple, internationally accepted and interoperable identification
program based on the ICAO standards.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Michael J. Rodriguez
Question 1. How many states are moving forward with their own
security credentialing programs in the absence of a Federal system?
Answer. At this point, we are aware of only one state--Florida--in
which individual ports have each put in place their own unique security
credentialing and access control programs. However, it is important to
understand that under the existing statute, there is no Federal
preemption over such programs--not only each state, but each individual
port and individual facilities within the same port are free to impose
their own requirements for access control and security credentialing.
This means that mariners who have a Federal TWIC card and who work
aboard vessels that trade from port to port, from state to state, and
from the United States to overseas ports will nevertheless be subjected
to numerous costly and time-consuming background checks and application
processes, delaying and impeding their opportunity to do their jobs and
earn their livelihood and unnecessarily disrupting the movement of
American commerce.
In addition, the lack of a Federal program could mean that
mariners: (1) who do not possess a credential issued by the local
facility will be prohibited from taking shore leave or joining a vessel
while the vessel is docked at the facility, (2) will have to pay each
facility for an access card, (3) will have to continue to pay
outrageous fees for escort and security services or face imprisonment
aboard their vessels, and (4) will be discouraged from remaining in the
industry by additional, unnecessary administrative and financial
burdens.
The preamble to TSA's Final Rule on TWIC (January 25, 2007) on the
question of Federal preemption states:
``Under this rulemaking, States will not be preempted from
instituting their own background checks or badging systems in
addition to the TWIC.''
In the recently published USCG circular that contains guidance for
the implementation of the TWIC program port facilities are advised that
they may incorporate the TWIC into their own unique existing access
control systems.
It is clear that if individual states and port facilities are
permitted to retain their own unique access control systems, the
national character of the TWIC card will be destroyed and the TWIC
program will be worthless from the standpoint of mariners, ship service
personnel, long haul truck drivers, rail crews and other traveling
workers who require a single credential that can be used across the
entire system.
Transportation workers require a universally accepted card that can
be used across all ports where their employment may take them. Such
workers are an integral part of the transportation system that makes
interstate and foreign commerce possible. Imposing additional local
requirements that demand numerous applications, background checks and
fees, perhaps for dozens of individual cards, clearly places an
unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce. There is an
urgent need for Federal laws and regulations governing the TWIC to
preempt any state or local requirements on the same subject matter for
such workers.
We believe that unless the Federal Government acts to ensure that
the Federal TWIC preempts any and all state and local programs, the
maritime workforce will be negatively affected and the efficient flow
of commerce will be impeded without the achievement of any additional
security benefits for our Nation. Requiring maritime workers to obtain
a separate access control credential for every port, facility and
terminal at which their vessel calls or at which they work will subject
American maritime transportation workers to additional financial and
administrative burdens, discouraging Americans from entering our
industry and encouraging others to leave the industry for other
employment--adversely affecting the civilian maritime manpower base
relied upon by the Department of Defense.
From a security standpoint, there is nothing to be gained from
subjecting American mariners to the whims and vagaries of each
individual state, port and facility that decides to issue its own
access and security credential. The final rule to implement the Federal
TWIC program has been published and these national requirements, and
not local requirements, should prevail.
Question 2. How long do you think they will wait for the DHS to get
this right?
Answer. Although we do not have access to information regarding the
intentions of individual states, ports and facilities, we believe it is
fair to conclude that the legitimate concerns about the risks of a
maritime-related terrorist act and the delays in implementing a Federal
program will lead to more state and local access control systems. We
understand these concerns, and we understand why states, ports and
individual facilities may see the need to act unilaterally to fill a
vacuum. We also understand that the more this happens, the more
disruptive it will be for maritime commerce.
To the degree to which states, ports and facilities act, each
different system will require a separate application process, a
separate background check, separate administrative procedures, and
separate paperwork burdens. This will not enhance security as much as
cause confusion and disruptions. We reiterate that the best way for the
Federal Government to act quickly and efficiently, and to fulfill its
responsibilities to protect national security and to encourage the
unimpeded flow of commerce, is to adopt the ICAO standards we
referenced previously and to ensure that the Federal system preempts
all others. Acting expeditiously and forcefully is, in our opinion, the
best way for the Federal Government to ``get it right''.
We thank the Committee for the opportunity to give testimony on the
TWIC program and we are pleased to answer these questions. We look
forward to continuing to assist the Committee in whatever manner
necessary, including bringing in technical experts who can speak with
greater authority on the technical aspects of our views.