[Senate Hearing 110-201]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-201, Pt. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1547
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 4
AIRLAND
----------
APRIL 25 AND 26, 2007
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008--Part 4 AIRLAND
S. Hrg. 110-201 Pt. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1547
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 4
AIRLAND
__________
APRIL 25 AND 26, 2007
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39-438 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN CORNYN, Texas
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Michael V. Kostiw, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Airland
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JOHN CORNYN, Texas
EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN WARNER, Virginia
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Testimony on Whether the Army is Properly Sized, Organized, and
Equipped to Respond to the Most Likely Missions Over the Next Two
Decades While Retaining Adequate Capability to Respond to All
Contingencies Along the Spectrum of Combat
april 25, 2007
Page
Geren, Hon. Preston M. ``Pete'' III, Acting Secretary, United
States Army.................................................... 6
Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff, United States
Army; Accompanied by LTC Paul Haddon, Deputy Director for
Operations for the Program Manager Future Combat System
Program, Brigade Combat Team; SGM Thomas W. Coleman, PEO
Soldier; and MSG Richard Haddad, Future Force Warrior,
Technology Program Office, Natick Soldier Research Development,
Engineering Center, Natick, MA................................. 11
Air Force and Navy Aviation Programs
april 26, 2007
Balderson, William, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Air Programs,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development, and Acquisition, Department of the Navy........... 57
Chandler, Lt. Gen. Carrol H., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Air, Space, and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements,
Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Air Force............... 66
Hoffman, Lt. Gen. Donald J., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,
Department of the Air Force.................................... 75
Castellaw, Lt. Gen. John G., USMC, Deputy Commandant for
Aviation, United States Marine Corps........................... 76
Clingan, RADM Bruce W., USN, Director, Air Warfare, Vice Chief of
Naval Operations, Department of the Navy....................... 83
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
TESTIMONY ON WHETHER THE ARMY IS PROPERLY SIZED, ORGANIZED, AND
EQUIPPED TO RESPOND TO THE MOST LIKELY MISSIONS OVER THE NEXT TWO
DECADES WHILE RETAINING ADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO ALL
CONTINGENCIES ALONG THE SPECTRUM OF COMBAT
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Webb,
Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, and Cornyn.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Creighton
Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken,
professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional
staff member; and Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Micah H.
Harris.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant
to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner;
Jeremy Shull, assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Todd Stiefler,
assistant to Senator Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Lieberman. Good morning. The hearing will come to
order. Thanks very much to all of you for being here,
particularly to Secretary Geren and General Casey.
The U.S. Army is the best in the world, but, as the full
Senate Armed Services Committee heard at a hearing last week,
it is under severe stress because of the demands our country
has placed on the Army since the global war on terrorism began
on September 11, 2001. That is why this hearing is going to be
different from the typical Airland Subcommittee hearing, where
we focus primarily on Army acquisition programs and issues
related to those programs. I want to talk, today, about Army
acquisition programs, but we have to go beyond that and expand
our view to raise some of the critical questions that come out
of the conclusion I stated in the first sentence. How can we
relieve the stress that the Army is under? How large should the
Army be? How should it be organized and equipped for the
missions it will be called on to carry out over the next two
decades? What do we need to do now, as we are involved in the
preparation of the fiscal year 2008 budget, to make sure that
the Army will be better able to be all we ask it to be in the
years ahead?
I'm very grateful that Acting Secretary Geren and Chief of
Staff Casey are here with us this morning to help our
subcommittee answer these questions, and, in some measure, to
respond to the concerns expressed at the full committee hearing
last week about the stress on the Army.
This year, one of the most consequential issues confronting
Congress is increasing the size of U.S. ground combat forces.
While there have been attempts for several years to increase
the force size, including a bill that I submitted with several
colleagues to increase the Army by 100,000, until recently, the
Army has not advocated that course, concluding that a temporary
manpower increase of no more than 30,000 to permit conversion
to brigade combat teams (BCTs) would suffice, and that, in due
course, the Army might actually revert to the permanent end
strength authorization of 482,400.
To support this argument, the Army asserted that it could
find enough additional manpower for this temporary increase by
significantly decreasing uniformed positions in the
institutional Army by as much as 60,000, and handing their
duties to private contractors. Many people were skeptical that
this was possible or desirable. I will say, now, that it seems
to me that those questions are moot, because the President has,
at the Army's request now, proposed a permanent Active Army end
strength increase over a 5-year period to 547,400. This is
clearly, in my opinion, a big step in the right direction, but
there is really little on record to enable us to decide if that
number is the right number or the right schedule. I'd like to
explore those questions with the Secretary and the General this
morning.
Some people believe that number is not enough. Some are
concerned that the Army may not be able to recruit, train, and
equip the envisioned force on that schedule and within the
budget that is proposed. Some doubt that the Army can attain
and maintain the increase without substantially lowering the
quality of personnel. Those are important questions that I want
to pursue this morning.
As I see it, the Army has four great challenges if we're
going to keep it the best in the world that it is and we know
it will be.
First, deploying, supporting, and sustaining an increased
troop commitment in Iraq. The Army's been asked now to provide
five additional brigades in Iraq, perhaps for an extended
deployment, and prepare to replace them with an equal number in
the future. That's going to be a challenge. But the challenge
is compounded by the fact that none of the brigades in the
United States are rated fully combat ready, principally because
of shortages in equipment. In addition, troop protection
equipment is short, and there may be no way to fix those
shortages quickly. That's challenge number one.
Second is to correctly size an Army that is currently too
small. Many troops are returning to Iraq for the third time,
and a few for the fourth time. That's bound to have an effect
on our soldiers, and perhaps even more on their families, on
recruiting and retention, potentially. The President has
decided to increase the number of soldiers now in the Army, and
that surely will relieve some of the stress. Now we have to
determine if the proposed increase yields the correct size soon
enough.
The third challenge is adequately and appropriately
equipping the force we have now and, at the same time,
equipping the force of the future that we want to have. Before
the end strength increase was announced, General Schoomaker was
asking for $138 billion in fiscal year 2008 to keep 19 brigades
deployed, reset the force, transition to the new brigade
structure, begin to recapitalize equipment, and keep the Future
Combat System (FCS) on schedule. That's $20 billion more than
Congress appropriated in fiscal year 2007. So, it's a
significant increase. But I'm concerned that the Army still
will not have enough to keep those 19 brigades deployed, make
up attrition losses, raise the readiness rates for next-to-
deploy forces, and retain enough in reserve for adequate
training of nondeployed brigades.
I'm also concerned that, at this point, the budget for
2008, 2009, and 2010 is not adequate to meet those
requirements. In fact, the Army's unfunded priority list (UPL)
is of concern to me, because it shows how many programs needed
in the irregular wars we are fighting, and will fight, are
unfunded in the President's budget, programs not withstanding
the $20 billion increase, programs like upgraded protection
vehicles, aircraft survivability equipment, counter-improvised
explosive device (IED) jammers, weapons, radios, night-vision
equipment, and combat training centers. We must give these
questions close attention in this subcommittee during the
current authorization, and beyond that, appropriations process,
to ensure that the procurement accounts are sufficient to equip
the current, as well as the projected, force, and that the Army
is buying the right equipment.
The fourth and final challenge that I want to note this
morning is properly organizing and equipping the Army for the
future. We have to determine the correct structure for the Army
to deal with the most probable missions we will ask it to take
on over the next couple of decades, to determine the correct
balance between the operational and institutional Army, and to
find the money to adjust the program to equip both a larger and
potentially differently-organized force. Again, I'm encouraged
that the Army will grow in end strength, but I personally
believe that the currently-planned increase is too small, and
will take too long to implement.
General Schoomaker, in his last appearance before our
committee, said that the 547,000 is actually a conservative
number, that a less conservative number would be 565,000. I
personally believe we need an Army of at least 600,000, and
that we must make sure we build the right kind of units and
capabilities for what the Army must be ready to do over the
next 20 years. I know that will cost us a lot of money, but
this, to me, is an investment in our security and our freedom.
I'm concerned that if the Army isn't big enough, the
institutional Army will continue to be cut in order to increase
the number of brigades. As many respected former Army leaders
pointed out to us in the hearing we had last week, it is the
institutional Army that is the keeper of Army values and
skills, and that passes those values and skills on to new
recruits.
General Schoomaker testified before our committee in his
last appearance, and I quote--because I think it's right on
point--he said, ``I'm concerned about whether or not we have
enough going towards building the institutional part of the
Army that's required, because I think that's fundamental to
some of the problems we have in things like training, and
Walter Reed. The Army, right now, of all the Services, has the
smallest percentage of its personnel end strength committed to
the institution.'' That's an important point. He went on to say
that, ``I worry that we've taken too much risk in the important
aspects of the Army, like the medical system, like the
education and training system, the kinds of things that support
and are so important, because we've taken a lot of efficiencies
there, and where we have overreached.''
As General Schoomaker pointed out that day, the Army has
about 27 percent of its strength in the institutional Army.
Compare that to the Navy and Air Force, which have about 50
percent invested in the institutional side. To me, that's an
unacceptable balance for the service of our military that we
are depending on most in the global war on terrorism, and why I
hope this subcommittee can do everything possible to make sure
that the end strength that we give you, Secretary Geren and
General Casey, is enough to maintain a good institutional Army,
as well as a great operational Army.
We are a nation at war with an enemy that is brutal, smart,
and despises our way of life. We cannot, in our national
interest, put the Army in a position where its leaders are
forced to shape our strategy with inadequate resources. The
danger is, those resources will determine the strategy, rather
than the strategy determining what resources you need.
In my opinion, we have to work together to give our Army
everything it needs to achieve victory for us and our country
in the war on terrorism.
I'm delighted and honored to be working with my friend and
colleague, Senator Cornyn, as ranking member of this committee.
We've worked on many matters together on the floor of the
Senate, and he becomes, now, the ranking member of this
subcommittee, replacing Senator McCain, who apparently has gone
on to better things.
So, Senator Cornyn, I call on you now for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN
Senator Cornyn. Senator Lieberman, Mr. Chairman, thank you
very much. It's a pleasure to serve with somebody who I admire
and respect a great deal. I'm confident this subcommittee will
be a hardworking one, and from your opening statement, I can
tell you that you and I see things much the same way. Thank
you.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and
also for their service to our Nation, and congratulate General
Casey upon assuming his new responsibilities as the 36th Army
Chief of Staff.
I'd like to convey to you my personal word of commendation
and my deep admiration for the dedicated men and women who
serve in our Army. Soldiers in our Army, which certainly
includes all members of the Army Reserve and National Guard,
have performed magnificently and with the highest degree of
courage and professionalism that reflects on the very best
traditions of the Army's heritage.
No one would disagree that the Army's increased operational
tempo and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have
put the Army under heightened burden. The announcement last
week that combat tours would be lengthened to 15 months
reflects the complexity of the current circumstances.
In recent months, there have been reports that warn of
costs on the troops and the readiness of the Army as a result
of multiple deployments. The subcommittee will look forward to
your response to issues in this ongoing public debate, which
include the declining readiness of nondeployed units, the
extremely high equipment usage rates, the departure of mid-
grade officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) leaving the
service at higher rates, the over-reliance on the National
Guard and Reserves as Active Force augmentees, and the impact
of the high operational tempo on Army families.
In addition, you should be prepared to respond to concerns
that the planned expansion of the Army cannot be accomplished
soon enough to mitigate the impact of the current pace of the
force, subsequently averting the hollow Army that some suggest
may be looming.
Turning to Army modernization, the subcommittee will want
to examine whether the Army's modernization and transformation
programs will provide the country with the capability to
provide relevant land power to full-spectrum combat missions,
stability and support missions, and be prepared for other
uncertain and complex threats to our homeland defense and
national interests.
With regard to specific modernization programs, the
subcommittee will want to better understand the progress being
attained in the development of the FCS and the status of
project technology spinouts.
Further, the subcommittee will want to know if you expect
the Army can concurrently modernize, transform, and restation
the force under the demands of ongoing operations and rotation
cycles.
In closing, we should not forget that our ground forces are
more than a collection of battalions and brigades. It is, at
its core, about the people who wear the uniform and their
families. Our military forces, volunteers, all, are America's
sons and daughters, who each and every day put themselves in
harm's way, away from those they love, and often on multiple,
and now extended, combat tours. We'd also like to recognize,
with our most sincere gratitude, the military families who
sacrifice so much, especially those who have lost loved ones,
and those who are caring for those wounded in service to our
Nation.
I look forward to hearing today's important testimony.
Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Senator Cornyn, thank you. Thank you for
your kind words. We have a lot of good work I know we can do
together.
Again, Secretary Geren and General Casey, thanks for being
here.
General Casey, a particular thanks to you. You're just a
couple of weeks into this latest assignment, in an
extraordinary career of service to your country. I know you've
just come back from an aggressive, energetic tour of Army
installations around the country, and talked to a lot of our
personnel out there. So, you have a very fresh perspective on
some of the questions that we're going to ask.
So, I appreciate that you both have come in here this
morning.
Secretary Geren, do you want to begin?
STATEMENT OF HON. PRESTON M. ``PETE'' GEREN III, ACTING
SECRETARY, UNITED STATES ARMY
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cornyn,
Senator Inhofe, Senator Webb. Thank you for holding this
hearing.
In your letter of invitation, you asked us whether the Army
is properly sized, organized, and equipped to respond to the
most likely missions over the next 2 decades while retaining
adequate capability to respond to all contingencies along the
spectrum of combat. That question, and our answers, in a
variety of forms, should drive everything we do, as your Army's
leadership. It should drive our budget decisions, our
acquisition and personnel decisions, and our policy decisions.
I welcome the opportunity to work with this committee and with
the new Chief of Staff of the Army and the full Congress to
provide answers to that question, recognizing that the future
we face is not static, nor can the answers be.
As we reflect on the question, I'm humbled by my personal
experience in seeing the future, looking over the horizon. I
was in the House of Representatives from 1989 to 1997, and
served on the House Armed Services Committee for much of that
time. I shared in the euphoria when the Berlin Wall fell, and
in the great triumph of our coalition forces in the first Gulf
War. I served in the House, under Republican and Democratic
majorities, with Armed Services Committee chairmen as
philosophically diverse as Ron Dellums and Floyd Spence, and
served with Republican and Democratic administrations.
As a committee, as a Congress, and as a Nation, we made
some decisions during that decade that do not hold up well when
judged with 20-20 hindsight. Smart, hardworking, and dedicated
people did their best to predict the future, but the future
surprised us, nonetheless. I voted with the overwhelming
majority of my colleagues to cash the peace dividend,
participated in drawing the Active Army down from 781,000 to
482,000. I supported policies that made the Army Reserve and
National Guard together 55 percent of our total Army force; by
necessity, changing the Reserve component from a strategic
reserve into an integral part of the operational force. We
built an Army that could not go to war without the Reserve
component, yet we failed to develop policies or make the
investments in the Reserve component commensurate with the new
and expanded role we are asking of it.
I'm reminded that Don Rumsfeld, in his confirmation hearing
as Secretary of Defense, neither offered testimony, nor was
asked, about Afghanistan. The same with Dick Cheney in Iraq,
and Secretary McNamara in Vietnam. We were caught flatfooted by
the North Korean attack of the South.
In spite of our limitations, we must look into the future.
It takes years to shape a 1.3-million-person organization of
soldiers and civilians. It takes decades to design, build, and
deploy new weapons systems. Whatever we plan and do now, we're
going to live with for a long time. Our Abrams tanks, Bradley
fighting vehicles, and our Black Hawk and Apache helicopters
are the progeny of the 1970s, older than most of the soldiers
who are operating them in combat today.
What are the challenges of the next two decades? Certainly,
counterinsurgency warfare, for which we organize the majority
of our combat forces today. But the list of other threats is
long: near-peer competitors muscling their way onto the world
stage; a loose-nuke scenario; the proliferation of nuclear
weaponry; chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks on the
homeland; and increasing radicalism in regions of the world
with a history of antagonism to the United States, just to name
a few.
How do we best plan for that uncertain future? A
foundational principle for your current Army leadership is that
the years ahead will be years of persistent conflict--years of
persistent conflict--and we must organize our programs and
policies to reflect that reality. We must prepare the total
force, Active, Guard, and Reserve, as well as our Army families
for that reality. For your Army to be prepared for whatever is
out there, we must enhance our strategic depth and build full-
spectrum readiness. We will continue to work with Congress to
accomplish that goal.
You asked, can we transform and modernize our Army and
fight a war at the same time? Yes, we can, and we are. The
demands of the war and the threats over the horizon give us no
choice in the matter. We fight an adaptive and a smart enemy.
The demands of the war also give us opportunities to make hard
decisions about the future we could never make in peacetime. We
must grow the Army. We're working to do that, adding 65,000 to
the Active-Duty Force, 8,000 to the Guard, and 1,000 to the
Reserve over the next 5 years. But we must remain flexible to
adjust the numbers and the rate of growth as circumstances in
our vision of the future changes.
We cannot allow the demands of the present to rob the
future. We must modernize the Army. The FCS is spinning into
the force now and over the next two decades, and you're going
to see some examples of those incredible transformational
concepts in just a moment. It will provide our soldiers the
training, technology, and tools to remain the world's
preeminent land power. The future is now. The soldier is the
centerpiece of the FCS. We must not use the FCS as a billpayer
for today's undeniably critical needs. We do not ever want to
find ourselves, in the future, in a fair fight.
We also must build the capacity of our international
partners and allies. We cannot face the challenges of the
future alone. Just as President Roosevelt invested in the
arsenal of democracy to defeat the axis powers during World War
II, enabling our partners to share the burdens of the global
war on terrorism can produce the same results in the future we
face. We must invest in partner nations who know the culture,
language, and geography of our enemies. The President's budget
includes vital funds for that effort.
There is much about the next two decades we cannot predict,
but let me close with a few facts and undeniable certainties.
First, as Senator Warner reminded us a couple of weeks ago,
our All-Volunteer Force is a national treasure. It is a
treasure that must be protected. As Senator Warner cautioned
us, we must be careful: it also can be squandered. Half of our
soldiers today are married, and the health of the All-Volunteer
Force depends on the health of those families. We must provide
those Army families a quality of life commensurate with the
quality of their service and reflective of their sacrifice. It
is the right thing to do. Furthermore, our ability to recruit
and retain soldiers depends on the health of those families,
and our readiness requires it. The health of the All-Volunteer
Force requires it. We are asking much of the Army family, and
we must do more for them.
Second, the Reserve component--the Guard and Reserve
together--are no longer a strategic reserve, they are part of
the operational force. We are one Army. We cannot go to war
without the Reserve component. We must organize, train, and
equip the Guard and Reserve so that we can train and fight as
one Army. We must complete the transformation that has begun.
The Reserve component must be ready to meet both the needs of
our Governors and the needs of our combatant commanders. That's
a high challenge. Policies and budgets must reflect that
reality. That's a fact.
Third, we have 134,000 soldiers in combat today in
Afghanistan and Iraq. We must plan for the future, but we can
never take our eye off of that ball. We owe those soldiers and
those families everything we can do to help them succeed in the
mission they're shouldering for our Nation. They are the best.
They deserve our best.
Secretary Harvey and Chief Schoomaker have led our Army
well, modernizing business practices, transforming the Army
from a division-based to a modular brigade-based organization,
building a campaign quality expeditionary Army, and making
needed investments in present and future readiness. Under their
leadership, working with Congress, we built the best-trained,
best-led, best-equipped Army our Nation has ever fielded. As
the Acting Secretary of the Army, and with George Casey as our
Chief of Staff, our job is to sustain the momentum that they
created. As were they, we are part of a great Army team, and a
strong Army team, and we look forward to working with this
committee and this Congress to plan for the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Geren and General
Casey follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Pete Geren and GEN George W. Casey,
Jr., USA
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, on
behalf of more than 1 million soldiers that comprise our Army--Active,
Guard, and Reserve--their families and nearly 300,000 Army civilians,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Army's plan to ensure it
remains the world's preeminent land power.
Our Nation is locked in a long war--potentially a multi-
generational conflict--against a global extremist network that is
committed to destroying the United States and our way of life. The next
decade likely will be one of persistent conflict against an enemy that
is not bound by the concept of nation states, geography or laws of war.
We must counter that threat and remain prepared to conduct major combat
operations to deter and, if necessary, defeat the threats posed by
traditional nation states who would challenge our interests and those
of our allies and partners.
As we increase our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we also
must face the challenges of meeting the requirements of our national
defense strategy and demands of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Today, over 258,000 soldiers are deployed fighting the war on terror
and forward-stationed deterring our Nation's adversaries. Our Army is
approaching its sixth year of sustained combat. For the last 4 years we
have maintained 15 to 21 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) deployed in
Afghanistan and Iraq, which is above the 18 BCT commitment rate
anticipated in the QDR. While engaged in this long war, we must
maintain the health and quality of the All-Volunteer Force. We must
also provide soldiers and their families a quality of life commensurate
with the quality of their service.
It is essential that we grow and transform the force in order to
build an Army to sustain protracted campaigns and defeat adversaries in
the 21st century, and we are doing so. To meet future challenges,
continue to sustain the high demand for Army forces and to improve
readiness and strategic depth, we must receive timely and sufficient
resources in order to transform, reset, grow, and modernize the force.
Over the last 4 years, we have made considerable progress
transforming the Army from a Cold War structured organization into one
best prepared to operate across the full spectrum of conflict--from
full-scale combat to stability and reconstruction operations, including
the irregular war that we face today. Converting all components of the
Army--Active, Guard, and Reserve--from a division-based organization to
brigade-centric modular formations is producing more units and
increasing their expeditionary capabilities. This is enhancing our
ability to execute protracted campaigns and support the demands of the
combatant commanders around the globe.
Concurrent with our modular conversion, we continue implementing
the Army Force Generation model to ensure we deploy only fully manned,
equipped, and trained forces into combat. This model provides improved
predictability for soldiers, families, communities, and employers. Just
as important, it synchronizes deployments with the preparations of our
next-to-deploy forces and the reset of recently deployed forces.
Last year we projected that our fiscal year 2008 reset requirements
would be approximately $13.6 billion. Our reset requirements are
increasing as we increase our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Equipment is being used up at rates much faster than previously
programmed. Resetting and recapitalizing this equipment and improving
our strategic depth will require significant levels of funding for a
minimum of 2 to 3 years beyond the duration of the current conflict.
Recent decisions to grow the Army by 65,000 in the Active Force,
8,200 in the Army National Guard, and 1,000 in the Army Reserve are
clear recognition of the need to increase ground forces in light of the
high level of demand and future strategic requirements. We are growing
six new BCTs in the Active Force and the associated enabling
organizations across all components. This will expand our rotational
pool to 76 BCTs and more than 225 support organizations in the
operational force of the Total Army. Through this growth, we will be
able to provide a continuous supply of 20 to 21 BCTs to meet global
commitments by 2013. Whether the Army will be properly sized cannot be
answered with certainty as the future demand on the force is unknown--
although we believe it is unlikely to decrease for the foreseeable
future.
In the near-term, to field forces for victory in the long war,
sustain the full range of our global commitments and defend our
homeland, we must have all components of the Army ready and able to
deploy together. With 55 percent of the Army's capabilities in the
Reserve components, the recent changes in Reserve component
mobilization policies are essential as we continue the transition of
the Reserve component to an operational force. These new policies will
improve predictability and facilitate the deployment of trained, ready,
and cohesive units, while decreasing the overall burden on our soldiers
and their families. We are working to implement these changes rapidly
and will require continued congressional support to do so.
In the decade prior to 2001, our investment accounts were under
funded, resulting in $56 billion in equipment shortages across the
force. To meet combatant commanders' immediate wartime needs, we are
continuing to pool equipment from across the force to equip soldiers
deploying into harm's way. This practice increases risk for our next-
to-deploy units, and limits our ability to respond to emerging
strategic contingencies.
With Congress' help, we have made great progress increasing soldier
and unit effectiveness over the last 4 years. However, we still require
considerable assistance to overcome the significant equipment shortages
with which we entered this war and to ensure our soldiers--Active,
Guard, and Reserve--are armed with the best equipment our Nation can
provide. The pending fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request contains $16
billion to increase critical force protection capabilities in our
deployed forces and to fill critical equipment shortages that are
degrading readiness in our next-to-deploy forces. For example, the
supplemental includes funding for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicles and procurement of medium tactical trucks to fill existing
unit shortfalls and to replace obsolete trucks in Reserve component
units.
Modernizing our equipment is critical to ensure we build an Army
ready to defend the Nation in the 21st century. Operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan underscore the importance of investing in superior
technologies and equipment that enable our most important asset--the
soldier--to remain dominant against adversaries who continually adapt
their methods, tactics, and tools of warfare. Investing in our future
readiness through modernization is a strategic necessity that must be
considered a top national priority, not as an issue of affordability.
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) is the centerpiece of the Army's
broader modernization strategy, our first major modernization program
in decades and our most critical investment priority. FCS is designed
to counter threats of the 21st century; it will enable us to keep
soldiers mounted longer, increasing their survivability, while
providing an ability to see and engage the enemy from greater distances
using an assortment of aerial and ground sensors.
Procuring FCS is the most effective and efficient means of
providing full-spectrum, networked capabilities required now and for
the future, and to ensure our soldiers get these essential capabilities
as quickly as possible. By building a common chassis, we greatly
simplify the fleet acquisition and sustainment costs for the Army. For
example, the cost of building individual platforms is reduced by 50
percent (from $12 billion to $6 billion). Over time, all current force
and FCS vehicles will be using the same components and software,
thereby reducing the overall maintenance and support costs of the
ground force, and greatly simplifying the training and logistical
burden for tactical commanders as well as the institutional Army.
Our ability to simultaneously transform, reset, grow, and modernize
while meeting the high demand for ground forces and providing a quality
of life required to sustain the All-Volunteer Force is dependent on
full and timely resourcing. As a result of the significant support we
have received from this committee and Congress, the units we have
deployed are the best trained, best equipped, and best led we have ever
sent into combat. While we are meeting the readiness needs of deployed
forces, our challenge remains to meet the needs of our non-deployed
forces and our ability to respond to future threats. If received in a
timely manner, the fiscal year 2008 President's budget request,
combined with requested fiscal year 2007 supplemental and fiscal year
2008 global war on terrorism funding, sets the Army on a path to
filling equipment shortages and posturing to respond to future
contingencies.
We are in this Long War to win. We would like to reiterate the
strategic necessity of investing in our future readiness through
modernization. It is imperative that we not shortchange future
investments as a billpayer to improve current readiness. Furthermore,
we solicit your support to accelerate improving readiness, building
strategic depth and ensuring the Army's ability to prevail against
future threats. The young men and women who volunteer to defend our
Nation deserve nothing less.
Finally, we ask for your assistance in providing fiscal year 2007
supplemental funding as soon as possible. We already have been forced
to curtail spending across our installations to ensure the soldiers in
combat have the resources they need. We have had to slow the purchase
of repair parts and other supplies, relying instead on existing
inventory to keep equipment operational. Priority will be given to
repair and refurbishment of immediately needed warfighting equipment,
while training and other non-mission critical equipment repair will be
deferred. We have also postponed or canceled non-essential travel and
restricted the shipment of equipment and supplies. In May we will be
forced to take more restrictive measures, including a civilian hiring
freeze, terminating temporary employees and slowing production lines to
support current operational needs. The Army remains determined to do
whatever is necessary to execute its mission: defend the Nation and
provide forces for victory in the Long War while ensuring uninterrupted
support to the families of our deployed soldiers. However, we cannot
repeat last year's disruptive cash flow experience and still meet the
increased operational demands now facing us.
Thank you for your continued support of our soldiers and their
families.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Secretary Geren, for that very
thoughtful and responsive opening statement.
General Casey?
STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY LTC PAUL HADDON, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS FOR THE PROGRAM MANAGER FUTURE COMBAT
SYSTEM PROGRAM, BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM; SGM THOMAS W. COLEMAN, PEO
SOLDIER; AND MSG RICHARD HADDAD, FUTURE FORCE WARRIOR,
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM OFFICE, NATICK SOLDIER RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT,
ENGINEERING CENTER, NATICK, MA
General Casey. Thank you, Senator Lieberman, Senator
Cornyn, Senator Warner, Senator Inhofe, and Senator Webb. I do
appreciate the opportunity to come here 2 weeks into this. I
may not be quite at the subcommittee level of detail yet, but
I'll get there, over time.
Senator Lieberman. We know you will. [Laughter.]
General Casey. I'd like to associate myself with Secretary
Geren's comments, and then I'd just like to really add three
points, and then we'll show you some of the systems here that
have actually come out of our technology development, and are
on the ground in Iraq right now, helping our soldiers.
First of all, this does give us the opportunity, 2 weeks in
the saddle, probably a month or so in the saddle, to come and
tell you that you should look for continuity from us, in terms
of the direction that the Army has headed. Speaking for myself,
I was the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army when we began this
modular transformation of our organizations, and actually
helped initiate the Army campaign plan that is driving that.
So, I believe, and am committed to, the fundamental direction
of transformation that the Army is on. So, I think that's an
important message for me to give to the committee here.
Second, I'd just like to say a few words about the
transition process that I've been going through since about a
week after I got back from Iraq, to try to help me get a sense
of what direction we needed to take with the Army. What's
striking to me, and I think you commented on it, Senator
Lieberman, is how similarly we all see what we have. We all
recognize the situation that the Army is in, and, as you
suggest, the question is, what's an appropriate way forward,
particularly over the next 3 to 4 years? That's what I think is
important to talk about, and that's what I asked my transition
team to look at.
We had two groups that we formed. One, under a brigadier
general, we said, ``Go out and talk to people that think about
the Army, inside and outside the Army, and tell us what they
think about the Army we have today.'' A lot of that's spawned
some of the data that you talked about. Then we had a second
group, under a brigadier, also, and we said, ``Go out and talk
to people that think about the future, and tell us what they
think the future is going to look like in 2020, and what kind
of Army we're going to need for that future.'' They did that.
I also just asked them to go back 13 years in the other
direction, since we went out to 2020, and I said, ``Tell us
what we, as a country, were doing and thinking in 1994.'' It
was instructive, and Secretary Geren alluded to some of this.
We were basking in the glow of the victory in Operation Desert
Storm, and in the Cold War. We were trying to figure out how to
spend the peace dividend. We were in the process of drawing the
Army down from 780,000 to 480,000. Candidly, I think we made
some decisions over that decade based on a view of the future
that looked fairly benign, that put us in the situation that
we're in today.
We then took all that, and said, ``Okay, if you're here
now, in 2007, and you want to be here, in 2020, what are the
things you need to do over the next 4 years to meet your
current commitments and to put the Army in a position to be the
Army it needs to be in 2020?'' That transition review spawned
six initiatives, and I'll just talk about them briefly. I think
you'll see, they get at a lot of the issues that you've raised
here.
First of all, we have to accelerate the growth of the Army
and the readiness improvements so that we can both meet our
current requirements and posture ourselves to be the campaign-
quality expeditionary force our country needs in 2020. We had
the same reaction when we saw that we weren't going to complete
the growth to 547,000 until 2012. The first thing I said was,
``We have to be able to do that faster,'' and the staff is
working on that, and will come back to me shortly.
I will tell you that what I have in my mind here is to
develop a strategy to get us to 547,000 as quickly as we can,
and then to back off and do a more detailed look at whether or
not that is enough.
Second, we need to improve the quality of support to our
soldiers, civilians, and family members. What we are asking of
our soldiers and families is a quantum difference from what I
would have expected, in terms of our rotational cycles. We do
good things for families, but we're asking more of them, and we
need to raise the ante and help them.
One thing I get as I go around to these different
installations is that there is a cumulative effect on the
soldiers and families because of 5 years of war, and we should
expect to be at war for a while longer. One spouse told me,
``General, running a family readiness group for the third
deployment is a lot harder than it is for the first
deployment.'' So, we have to raise the ante in what we can do
for families.
Third, we have to continue the momentum and the continuity
of our modernization efforts. As I said, I believe we are on
the right track. An integral element of our modernization
strategy is to spin out real technologies, that we're going to
show you here in a second, to help the force that's fighting,
every day. I think we're well-postured to do that.
A fourth initiative is to complete the transition of the
Reserve component to an operational force. The Secretary
addressed this. We are moving away from the Cold War
mobilization policies and procedures that the Reserves operate
under, and we just need to complete that transition. I believe
that we are headed in the right direction and can accomplish
that in the next 3 or 4 years.
The fifth is we need to pay closer attention to how we are
training and developing our leaders, not only in terms of how
we do it, but what we're teaching them to do. From my personal
experience, the complexities of the environments that we're
asking these young men and women to operate in requires
mentally agile leaders that can cut through that complexity and
confusion, and point their organizations in a winning
direction.
Lastly, we have some internal work to do, to adapt our
institutional processes to truly support an expeditionary Army
in an Army that is suffering under the cumulative effects of 5
years at war. I think what you saw at Walter Reed is a good
example of how the cumulative buildup of wounded soldiers
overwhelmed the system. As I go around, there are other things
that we need to look at. This will be a hard internal look at
some of our policies and procedures that were designed for
another time. We have to streamline our ability to provide
effective services for our soldiers and civilians and families.
So, those are the six initiatives. We have teams working on
those right now. My timeline is to have them report out with
resourced action plans by July. I'd be happy to come back and
share the outcome of that with the committee.
So, those are really the three points that I wanted to
leave with the committee today.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I'd turn it over to
Lieutenant Colonel Haddad here, just to show you a few of these
systems here that are actually in Iraq today, being used by our
soldiers.
Senator Lieberman. Excellent. Thanks, General Casey.
Colonel, it's all yours.
Colonel Haddon. Senator Lieberman, honorable members, my
name is Lieutenant Colonel Paul Haddon. I'm the Deputy Director
for Operations, for the Program Manager FCS program. What I'd
like to do today is to show you some of the current systems
that we are developing in conjunction with Program Executive
Office (PEO) Soldier that will help the soldier to be more
effective and more efficient, and enable them to accomplish
their mission on the battlefield.
The bottom line to this is that the future is now. The
equipment that I show you here is real. It's operational. It's
in the hands of the soldiers. It will save lives, not only for
the soldiers associated with the BCTs, but for all the soldiers
in the Army.
Gentlemen, with that, I'd like to go ahead and introduce
Command Sergeant Major Coleman. He is a veteran of four
operations in theater. He is currently serving as the command
sergeant major for PEO Soldier. He is currently wearing the
armament of the current soldier, with the integrated outer
tactical vest. What I'd like to do is have him demonstrate that
to you very quickly.
Sergeant Coleman. Sir, yes. Senators, Mr. Secretary,
General Casey, I am wearing the improved outer tactical vest,
and I'd just like to take a second to give you a real quick
rundown, since there seems to always be a discussion of body
armor either in the paper or on TV.
Senator Lieberman. Right
Sergeant Coleman. We got a lot of feedback from the field
that said, ``Hey, I need a quick release, and make it
lighter.'' That's what I personally had sent up the chain. This
vest does that. It has a quick release, which I'm going to
demonstrate in a minute, that will help the soldier egress if
he or she finds himself either in water, in a Humvee, any
circumstances where you need to get out of the body armor
quickly. Currently, we have multiple Velcro flaps we have to
get through to get out of it. This will get me out in a hurry.
Again, I'll demonstrate it in a second.
The next one was weight, ``Make it lighter for me.'' Which
was great, you can always make something lighter, but there's a
risk associated. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) said, ``We want to make it lighter, but we are not
going to give up any of our protection requirements in doing
so.'' This vest is 3 to 3.8 pounds lighter than the current
vest that's in the field. It's starting to be fielded right
now. The 3 to 3.8 pounds definitely makes a difference, as an
infantry soldier out there on the battlefield of Iraq or in the
mountains in Afghanistan.
Senator Lieberman. What's the total weight?
Sergeant Coleman. Total weight, with plates, sir, for a
size large is about 25 pounds.
Senator Lieberman. Right. For this one?
Sergeant Coleman. I'm wearing a large, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Sergeant Coleman. This is about 25 pounds. Then, when I put
my gear on it, it can be anywhere from an additional 10 to 20
pounds, depending on what configuration I have. I have a basic
rifleman configuration, and you can see that one of the other
improvements is I still have plenty of other attachment room
for additional devices or equipment that I may need to attach
to it.
Not only did we maintain the same level of protection in
this vest, but we've increased the protection level. It has an
additional 2 inches along the bottom, approximately 100 square
inches more of soft armor protection, and the folks up at
Natick Labs are still sorting out the exact dimensions.
So, what we've done is, we've made it lighter, we've made
it more adjustable, we've integrated. When I crossed the berm,
sir, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)-1, with the 101st, I had
a vest on, and, as I progressed through OIF-1, I got upgraded
plates, I have my Deltoid and Auxiliary Protectors that some
good specialist medic, I think, came up with as a great idea
for the groin protector, and moved it up.
When I went back for OIF-4 and -5, I had even better
plates, I had side armor. What we were doing is just sort of
attaching that to the current vest. This vest integrates it
all. So, it's lighter, it's a quick-release, and the
equipment's integrated, so it gets me in and out of my 1114/
1151 vehicle a little bit quicker.
So, with that being said, I'm going to go ahead and give a
quick demonstration of how a soldier can get out of his vest.
To simplify this, I'll just stand up and not hurt my battle-
buddy over here. It has a quick-release lanyard right here,
that's Velcroed in for airborne operations. Of course, we can
tuck it up inside here, and it's out of the way. You have to
remove the entire cord; that way, it doesn't accidentally get
jerked a couple of inches. Once I'm in a bind, I just simply
grab this lanyard right here, and I just pull it, and the vest
is off, and I can knock my arm pieces out, and I'm completely
cleared of the vest, as you can see.
Senator Inhofe. How long does it take to put it back on?
Sergeant Coleman. It takes me about 3 to 5 minutes, sir,
it's in two complete pieces. Obviously, the goal is that a
soldier will spend his entire 12- to 15-month deployment and
never have to tug on that lanyard.
I can quickly put the shoulders together, if I needed
additional protection immediately. So, that being said, sir,
I'll sit down.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, that's great.
Colonel Haddon. Sir, I'd now like to introduce Master
Sergeant Haddad. Master Sergeant Haddad has two tours in
theater, and is currently preparing to deploy with the 10th
Mountain in the upcoming months. He is currently wearing the
Future Force Warrior ensemble. The key to this, sir, is that no
longer is he an individual soldier; he is now a node on the
network. All of these systems that I'm showing you are nodes on
the network. It increases their operational capabilities, it
increases their awareness, and they now have information that,
historically, the soldier at the lowest level did not have
access to.
Senator Lieberman. So, tell us what you mean by a node on a
network.
Colonel Haddon. Sir, with the system that he has, Master
Sergeant Haddad has the capability of being tracked using Blue
Force Tracker, so he is now being followed as they're going
into an environment, whether it's Military Operations on Urban
Terrain (MOUT), operational, or desert, et cetera. He also has
integrated communications and heads-up displays, so that he can
see the current operational environment, the common operating
picture, on their screen. So, he has awareness of what's to his
left, what's to his right, what's in front of him, and what's
to the rear. Historically, the only way the soldier would hear
that is if they called on a radio, the radiotelephone operator
went to the commander, the commander told them, and it was a
whole chain of information that was going from person to person
to person; and as it went from one to another, it was getting
degraded. If you've ever done the pass-a-message along the row,
by the last person it's an orange, and it started out as a
wrench.
But what he's doing is, he has situational awareness in the
systems, and he can provide information not only to other
members in his squad, but, also, it's information on the
network. The commander, the company commander, the battalion
commander, the brigade commander now have access and awareness
at their different levels of what he is doing. As we're finding
in theater, the individual soldiers now are affecting
strategic-level missions with their actions. So, it enables
them to do that.
So, the next thing I wanted to bring up is, we have the
class-1 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). This is approximately a
35-pound UAV that is controlled at the squad level by the
robotics operator. It now gives them the capability to have
eyes over that wall. Historically, if a squad came up to a
large wall, they would have to look over it. The enemy strike
sniper knew that, and would position his sights where he would
see a head popping up. That would put a soldier into harm's
way. With this system, you fly it over the wall, you have
vision behind that wall and the squad doesn't have to put the
soldier in harm's way. You now have a piece of equipment
protecting them.
The next piece of equipment that you'll see pulling up is a
small unmanned ground vehicle. This system is, again, a squad-
level asset that would deploy with the squad. It has the
capability of seeing over small obstacles, and can go into a
building, and can negotiate stairwells.
All this equipment here was utilized during Experiment 1.1
that was performed by the program as a test and proof of
purpose of the equipment.
This has visual capabilities with a sensor and an infrared
(IR) camera. The soldier can put this into the vehicle--or into
the building, clear the building, and the squad now knows, and
has situational awareness of what they're going into.
So, we now are using technology; whereas, historically, a
soldier would be put in harm's way, now we can use technology
to enable that soldier to survive and continue the mission.
General Casey. You can imagine the benefit we get putting
these things into buildings. We found buildings rigged with
explosives and the whole building comes down around the people.
So, this is a great advantage.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, it's quite remarkable. It's
actually miraculous.
Colonel Haddon. So, the next thing that we have are the
squad-level joint tactical radio systems. These are the
preproduction prototype models, and they were actually being
used during Experiment 1.1. I talk about the network, I talk
about the capability of transmitting this information across.
This is the transport layer, and it is going to enable us to do
that. This is going to enable us to transmit the data from the
squad-level soldier to the battery commander to the battalion
commander, and also to other elements outside the theater
through a network of radio systems. This is just a
preproduction prototype demonstration of some of those. They
are being tested, and were tested during Experiment 1.1.
The last thing I have to show you, gentlemen, is the
tactical and urban unattended ground sensors. These systems, we
have right here, are the urban unattended ground sensors. A
soldier would go into a building, place these on the wall, and
now, instead of having to, historically, leave a soldier behind
to maintain the security of that building, this now enables
them to move forward and keep their firepower and strength
forward, where they need it. So, now you're keeping the
fighting capabilities, the lethality of that squad, intact,
while still maintaining security for the soldier. So, this is
another set of eyes. We're using technology to replace
soldiers.
The next thing that we have are the unattended ground
sensors-tactical. This, right here, has an IR camera. You place
it along a logistics route, along the road, and this gives you
vision of what's coming up and going down that road. Now we
don't need to leave that critical military personnel soldier in
a Humvee with a weapon. We can deploy that equipment forward
and leave technology behind to protect that route.
We also have acoustic and seismic sensors that would cue
the IR sensor, or the camera, if something is coming along that
route. All of this is enabling the soldier to be more effective
and efficient in their mission and maintain their lethality
where they need it to engage the enemy. That is what we are
bringing. The future--as I said before, the future is here and
now. This technology that you see before you is enabling the
soldier to be more effective, more efficient, and more
survivable on today's battlefield, as well as the future
battlefield.
With that, gentlemen, I'm prepared to answer any questions,
along with Command Sergeant Major Coleman and Master Sergeant
Haddad.
Senator Lieberman. Perhaps we'll just do a few quick ones,
if individuals want, because then I want to get to a question.
But, first, though, this is very impressive. I thank you
each for your service. I must say, my colleagues, that I think
we should feel some pride that this committee, over the years--
and I look to Senator Warner, particularly, because of the
leadership he's had in this committee--has invested a lot in
the kind of research and development (R&D) to take the
extraordinary technological advances of our time and convert
them to use in our military. Some of this stuff, for soldiers
of an earlier generation, it's science fiction, but it's real.
It not only will make you all who serve for us more effective,
but it also keeps you safer. It's quite remarkable.
The only question that I have, and I know this is the kind
of question we'll get from folks back home, and you'll get from
families, this new vest, which is more protective, lighter, and
easier to get out of, are they out there now? How soon will
everyone who needs one get one?
Sergeant Coleman. Yes, sir, they are out there. We filled
the first unit earlier this month, 4/9 Manchus, up in Fort
Lewis. They're in Kuwait, as we speak, and they're ramping up.
I'm not the production guru, but I do know that production's
being ramped up, and will be in full mode here starting in May,
full production by the end of this summer.
So, I'll have to talk to the acquisition guys about
numbers, but it's hitting the field, starting May.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
General or Secretary, do you have anything to add to that
answer about how soon?
General Casey. No, I couldn't tell you how long it will be
until everyone has one, but, as he said, they will be in full
production here by the summer, so I'd say it'd take at least
another year, 18 months until we get the whole force fielded.
Sergeant Coleman. Yes, sir. Hopefully, by this winter,
we'll have at least enough to cover down on the entire Iraqi
force by this winter.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Any other questions from my colleagues? If not, I thank
you, gentlemen, very, very much.
I'm going to go to the question period now. I note that the
Senate has one vote at 11:10 a.m., so I'd like not to have to
recess the hearing, and maybe we'll take turns going over to
vote. I was going to suggest that we have 10-minute rounds of
questioning, since we have so few members here, Senator Cornyn.
It'll give each of us a chance to build a line of questioning.
I thank you both for your opening statements.
General Casey, I appreciate your opening statement very
much. It looks to me, and feels to me, like you're hitting the
ground running. You obviously have a lot of experience, not
just in Iraq, but, for those with short memories, you were Vice
Chief of the Army in an earlier time. I think you're asking
exactly the right questions, and I appreciate that you've put
your folks on a relatively short timeline to get these answers
back to you with action plans by July.
I am particularly encouraged by the question that you've
asked both about the end strength we should be aiming for and
the pace of that end strength, because, as you and I discussed
before the hearing, it is a big step forward to add 65,000
soldiers to the Army, but if you look at the plan right now, we
don't get to that 65,000 until 2013, as we're in the midst of a
conflict where the shortage of personnel is obviously having an
effect on morale, and certainly family attitudes, in addition
to the impact it's had on the institutional Army.
So, I'm greatly encouraged that you've asked your
transition team to see if you could accelerate the growth. Can
you get to the 547,000 earlier than 5 years from now? Do you
want to add anything to that part of what you've told us?
General Casey. Obviously, they've been working on this for
a few weeks here.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. But there's a lot more to it than just the
people, and that's what makes it complex. As you mentioned
yourself, it's the equipment that goes with it, the basing, and
then growing the leaders.
Senator Lieberman. Training.
General Casey. The training and growing of the leaders.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. We made some decisions that impacted the
number of officers we assessed back in the 1990s. They're the
majors of today.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. So, we're short on them. So, it takes a
while to grow leaders and equipment and basing to put all that
together. So, it's going to take, I think, 3 or 4 years, but
we'll squeeze as much out of it as we can.
Senator Lieberman. Secretary Geren, do you want to add to
that?
Mr. Geren. Really, nothing to add to that, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Then, I take it from what you said, General Casey, that
once that's completed, in July, you're going to come back and
take a look at the question of whether the 65,000 increase is
enough to meet the demands that our country is going to put on
the Army.
General Casey. I think that's the prudent thing to do, and
we'll have to ask ourselves hard questions within the
Department, ``enough for what?'' I think we need to be careful
on two things. One, I don't think we should just size the force
to deal with Iraq. I think that may be a shorter-term
proposition.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. But, two, and as you suggested, sustaining
large formations is expensive. If we're going to grow it, I
think we need a commitment from everybody to sustain it at
appropriate levels so that we have a force that is well-
resourced, and we can take care of our families and our
installations and the whole bit. So, I think it's something we
all need to think about.
Senator Lieberman. Right. I want to ask you a big question.
I'd just ask you to give me a short answer, but I think it's
important to build a record on this. What are the impacts of
not increasing end strength? Obviously, we're in conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and there's a call for more troops, but
am I right that one of the things you're concerned about here
is the morale of the troops, because they're deploying so
rapidly, and particularly the impact that has on their
families?
General Casey. The current plan will bring us to the point
where we will have enough brigades to put the Active Army on a
one-increment-out/two-increments-back----
Senator Lieberman. Whereas, we're about one and one now.
General Casey. We're actually at 15 months out 12 months
back. The Reserve is on at one to five. That's what it will
give us. We, frankly, with the Active Force, would like to get
to the point where we could get to a one-increment-out/three-
increments-back, because we think that gives us a better
capability of training leaders and resting the force. But
somewhere between two and three, I think, is the right answer.
Senator Lieberman. That will put them in a position when
you deploy them, to be as effective as possible, but also,
presumably, will improve the morale of their families, because
they'll be away less.
General Casey. Right, and it will allow them to meet the
leader development opportunities they need to grow, so that we
sustain the qualities of leaders in the force, and that's
critical.
Senator Lieberman. Again, I appreciate your coming back to
the question of the institutional Army, and that when we add
personnel, we make sure that we bring them to where we want
them to be, and have the leaders we want them to have, we have
to invest some more in all that backs them up and prepares them
for leadership and for service.
Let me ask you this question. I presume it'll be part of
what your transition team is doing. There are people who have
expressed concern that the Army is lowering standards to meet
the recruitment goals, and, in fact, perhaps lowering demands
in basic training, because, though the standards are lower, a
larger number of people are making it through. So, the critical
question is, at this point, do you think we can meet the 65,000
increase in end strength, not to mention what may be necessary
beyond that, without diminishing the quality of the personnel
in our Army, which is obviously the heart of what the Army's
all about?
Mr. Geren. Let me speak to that, first, and then General
Casey can add to it. We're recruiting, today, Active, Guard,
and Reserve, a force that's about the size of the entire United
States Marine Corps, about 175,000 men and women a year. I'm
proud of every soldier that joins our Army today. It's an All-
Volunteer Force, and we have soldiers joining the Army in time
of war. That tells you a whole lot about the person that stands
up and joins the Army in a time like this, in a time of our
national need. There are a lot of qualities that go into making
a good soldier, but I'd put at the top of the list that level
of commitment, that sense of patriotism, that sense of duty. We
are recruiting fine young men and women.
People have said, ``Then the Army looks like America.'' In
fact, that's really not right. The Army looks like the top 30
percent of America. If you look at our recruiting pool, the 17-
to 25-year-old young man and young woman, only 3 out of 10 of
those young men and young women have the qualifications--
mentally, physically, morally, and emotionally--to be in our
United States Army. So, we're starting with the cream of the
crop, the top 30 percent of our young people.
We do have standards. Congress has set statutory standards.
The Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) has set guidelines. We
have our own standards. Right now, we are accessing about 4
percent of the recruiting in 2006 in the Cat 4 category. That
has increased, but that's the OSD standard; 4 percent. Earlier
in the decade, we were in the 2 percent range. But to put this
in historical perspective, in 1980 about 50 percent of the Army
was in the Cat 4 category.
So, we watch all these metrics very carefully. One-hundred
percent of all the soldiers we recruit either have a high-
school diploma or a general equivalency degree. We would like
to have everyone with a high-school diploma. The last year, it
was 81 percent with a high-school diploma, still way above
historical norms. Our Army requires people of many different
capabilities, everything from the scientist to all types of
manual skills. We take these soldiers and put them in the
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) that suits their
abilities and their needs. We watch this very carefully. We
watch it with metrics that watch it from up above, but, most
importantly, we listen to the NCOs and the leaders on the
field, that tell us what's going on in the life of those
soldiers.
In spite of these changes, and historically speaking, these
changes are very minor, as far as the metrics of our force, we
continue to recruit well. Extraordinarily well, in my opinion,
when you consider that about 1 percent of the country's bearing
the burden of this war.
Senator Lieberman. That's right.
Mr. Geren. If we are going to succeed in recruiting over
the coming decade, and meet these needs, there will have to be
some changes. We will have to have our country's leadership,
all the way down to the level of principals in schools, and
teachers, parents, coaches, as well as those of us in public
life, communicate to the American people the importance of
standing up and defending our country at a time of national
need. Right now, we're not doing as good a job there as we can,
but we have a top-quality Army, sir, and it's the best-led,
best-trained, best-equipped Army, and we're proud of them.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate the answer. I know you'll
keep your eyes on that. I hope that you'll be very forthcoming
with us if you feel you need more support to meet the
recruitment goals at the level of quality that you want,
including, perhaps, more recruiters or other programs to reach
out to authority figures, like principals or clergy-people and
others, to encourage people to come into this.
General, did you want to add something to that?
General Casey. The only thing I'd add, Senator, is that in
my travels here in the last 2 weeks I've been to three basic-
training sites that produce about two-thirds of the basic
trainees. I've talked to recruits, I've talked to drill
sergeants, and I've talked to the leaders. I must say, I'm
fairly impressed with what I saw, in terms of the recruits. I
will tell you that I did talk to drill sergeants who felt they
were spending too much time ``babysitting,'' in their words,
some of a portion of the recruits. But when I talked to the
leaders, and I pressed battalion and brigade commanders whether
they felt pressure or they were being tracked on their
attrition, to my pleasant surprise, they said they were not
called on that. I'd say that's exactly what we want.
This gets to the notion of the attrition rate in initial
entry training being about 6 percent, and whether we're making
it too easy for them. Actually, the attrition rate started to
go down when we put in the warrior tasks and drills, and when
we, in fact, raised the level of what we were asking the troops
to do. I talked to the TRADOC commander; we don't want pressure
on people to meet a specific attrition goal. We want to have
the right soldier, prepared to deal with the challenge he's
going to have to face. So, as I said, I was fairly comfortable
with what I saw at the initial entry training sites that I went
to, but we will keep a close eye on it.
Senator Lieberman. Good. Thank you. My time's up.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question goes to funding our troops. One of my
concerns is that the current debate over the emergency
supplemental has been cast as a political argument between some
in Congress and the President. This, I believe, has very
serious impact, not only on our readiness and ability to equip
and deploy and rotate troops back out of the theater, but also
in terms of protecting the lives of our troops. I guess the one
symbol of that, which comes home to me the most, is, I recently
was down in Sealy, Texas, and looked at some of the new
Cougars, the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP), vehicles
which have been deployed, I believe, by the Marine Corps, with
great success, and because of their V-shaped hull and design,
it actually disperses the explosion, rather than has it channel
up into the Humvee or otherwise cause greater risk of harm to
our troops. As I recall, the supplemental originally had a
significant amount of money that was dedicated to pay for some
of these MRAP vehicles. Senator Biden introduced an amendment
which upped that amount significantly. I think the figure now
is $4.1 billion, which I would like to see get to the troops as
soon as possible. But could you comment, Secretary Geren and
General Casey, on the importance of getting this funding to the
troops as soon as we can?
Mr. Geren. I'll speak, but I'll be brief, because General
Casey can speak from the perspective of the field.
We currently have about 1,000 MRAP vehicles of one sort or
another. All our military police are in MRAP vehicles. We also
have some of the route-clearing vehicles, the Buffaloes. We
consider this a priority. Our current plan is, and the
recommendation to the Chief and me was, for the Army to buy
2,500. That's a subject we're going to look at carefully and
decide whether or not that's the right amount. We have a
requirement from the field that's a larger number than that,
and we are going to take a long, hard look at that. The Marine
Corps is the program manager for this, we're partnering with
the Marine Corps, and we definitely intend to move out with the
program and increase the numbers that we have in the field.
I'd like the Chief to talk about his perspective, the value
in the field, of that type of technology.
General Casey. Were you referring just to the MRAP funding,
Senator?
Senator Cornyn. No, sir, I was using that as an example of
the kind of equipment that is awaiting this emergency spending.
General Casey. Sure.
Senator Cornyn. But if you would comment more generally on
the importance and the consequences, because I think some are
under the mistaken notion that there's no big hurry. There were
people that advert to a Congressional Research Service report
that says, ``Nah, it's okay if we get the money over there to
the Pentagon in June or maybe July.'' But I've seen, from
Secretary Gates, General Schoomaker, and others that there's
very real impact today on the failure to get that funding there
now, some 70-days-plus since the President first requested it.
General Casey. I think, with everything we have going on in
the Army, a predictable flow of resources is critical to
sustaining our transformation efforts, our reset, our
preparation of the forces for combat, and our modernization
efforts. So, anytime you have a perturbation in that, there are
second- and third-order effects.
Now, we have taken some actions, already, that have been
helped by a $1.6 billion departmental reprogramming, to put
ourselves in a position to allow us to continue to prepare our
soldiers to go to combat through the end of June without having
to take any significant steps that would undermine that. But
we, as you suggest, would like to get the supplemental funding
as soon as we can, because the longer it goes, the more second-
and third-order effects there are.
I would like to thank the committee for their approval of
that reprogramming request, because if we don't get that, then
we're in a much tighter box.
Senator Cornyn. The last thing I'll say about this is that
I know there's been some suggestion that the debate in Congress
has actually been helpful to impressing upon the Iraqis the
fact that this is not an open-ended commitment of the United
States, and I believe it was Secretary Gates that said the
clock is ticking. While I appreciate the fact that this debate
is important, I don't think the delay is required for the
debate to go on. The debate will continue on. The delay, I
think, is harmful, and I hope Congress will act as soon as
possible.
I want to touch on the impact of the burdens, the
sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, and on military
families. Secretary Geren, you and General Casey both alluded
to this. The old saying is, ``You recruit soldiers, you retain
families.'' With these multiple deployments, with extended
deployments beyond what originally was anticipated, from 12 to
15 months, obviously that has a very profound impact on the
sacrifices and burdens we're placing on families.
You say that there's other things we want to do for them,
or we want to help, and I wonder if you could comment,
generally, on that impact on our ability to recruit and retain,
as well as other, maybe, specific ideas you have about what we
can do to lighten their load as much as we can.
Mr. Geren. We are asking a great deal of the families. With
the recent decision to extend the deployments to 15 months,
we're asking more of families who have already given a great
deal. A top priority for the Chief and me is to understand
better the plight of the families, and what can we do to make
sure that they have the quality of life that they deserve.
The health care issue at Walter Reed is a perfect example
of how the stresses on the system cause us to lose our focus
and drop the ball in an area that is so important to the health
of the families and the health of the force. We are focusing on
the healthcare needs of the families, and we've taken many of
the lessons we've learned from Walter Reed, and we're applying
them across the force to do a better job of meeting the
healthcare needs of the families, not just for the wounded
warriors, but of the families, as well. That's an area where we
know the families have great concern, and we're going to do a
better job there.
Other programs actually at the facilities; educational
programs, quality-of-life programs, everything from childcare
centers, General Cody and I spent many, many hours trying to
move money around in a constrained budget to make sure that we
have the right funding in the childcare centers and other
educational programs for kids, so moms and dads have the
quality of service they need for their children.
Over the next couple of months, it's an area that we're
going to work on very aggressively to understand the needs of
the families. In some cases we have good programs. The programs
vary from facility to facility. We need to do a better job of
making sure that there's uniformity in quality across the
system.
Senator Cornyn. General Casey, do you have anything you'd
like to add?
General Casey. Yes, just a couple of things, Senator.
With the transition team, I took it a step further, and
asked the question: in an Army that's almost two-thirds
married, is not the impact of that family on the soldier's
decision to stick with the force so significant that we should
treat families as a readiness issue? The answer was, ``Well,
yes, what took you so long?'' For us, calling something a
readiness issue means you do what you have to do to get it
done. As much as we've done for families, my personal view is
we've always been just a little bit off in following through on
our commitments. We need to deliver.
When you talk to the spouses, they say, ``Look, we don't
necessarily need a whole bunch of new programs. We need you to
fund the ones you have, and we need you to standardize them
across the installation. When you go to one place or another,
they say, `No, we don't do it like that here.' '' There's just
so many little irritants out there that, when you're on your
third deployment, are the kind of things that can be the straw
that breaks the camel's back.
Mental health professionals for the children and for the
spouses, as well as for the soldiers, come up every place we
go. It's going to be, I think, probably a national question
here, because I don't know that we have enough social workers
and trained mental health professionals to deal with this,
especially in the areas around some military installations.
Another small one, I expect to be able to announce here in
a month or so that we're going to fund full-time readiness-
group assistance down to battalion level. We're doing it in
some places now, but not everywhere. As the spouse said, ``It's
a heck of a lot harder running a family readiness group for a
third deployment than it is for a first one.'' So, give them a
hand.
Also, the Secretary mentioned education. As they look at
this, they want to have good educational opportunities for
their children, and they want it in an environment that
appreciates what the families are going through. So, there's a
big push for a lot of folks to stay within the Department of
Defense (DOD) school system here, especially as these
deployments go forward.
Mr. Geren. Senator, could I mention one thing, just about
the supplemental? The delay in the supplemental causes us to
rob from the home front to make sure that the soldiers in
theater have absolutely everything they need. We've been able
to do that. But it does have an impact on the nondeployed. It
has an impact on families. It has an impact on the quality of
life.
Last summer, we had to make cutbacks in programs across our
facilities in order to make sure that the troops in the field
had everything they need. We're in the process of doing the
same thing right now. On 15 April, we started cutbacks; 22
April, we did again; and every day this is delayed, we're going
to see further and further cutbacks. The families and the
quality of life ultimately suffers. The $1.6 billion that
General Casey referred to, your committee has approved that
reprogramming, but nobody else in Congress has. So, we're
awaiting that money. The anticipation of that has allowed us to
delay some more draconian measures that will come in the
future. But, you're exactly right, the timeliness of that
supplemental is key, and ultimately it will affect the quality
of life for our families.
Senator Cornyn. I have one short question, and it just
requires a short answer.
Could you tell us what the limiting factors are on our
ability to grow our end strength faster? Is it money? Is it the
ability to recruit? Is it other factors? Is it all of the
above?
Mr. Geren. I'd say, short answer, all of the above, really.
The training and the recruiting is a big increase, and there's
a lot of work associated with it to make sure that we grow it
well and grow it right. We are going to look and see if there's
any way to do it faster.
Senator Cornyn. Any other thoughts, General Casey?
General Casey. It is all of the above. It is the
recruiting, and it is the equipping. All of those have a time
lag associated with them. If we get the money this year or 2
years later, the equipment pops out. So, that's what we all
have to be cognizant of.
Senator Cornyn [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. First of all, let me compliment both of
you. You did something that no one has done, to my knowledge,
since the 1990s. In your opening statement, you talked about
the mistake we made in the 1990s on the downsizing, on the
budget, and on the modernization programs. The reason that I'm
so pleased you're doing that is I've been the only one talking
about the mistakes we made in 1990. I was chairman of the
Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee during that time,
and there wasn't a week I didn't go down to the floor and say,
``This euphoric attitude that the Cold War is over and we don't
need a military anymore has to stop.'' Now, we're paying for
it. The reason is not to point the finger, not to play the
blame game, but if we don't have the military saying the same
thing that I'm saying, then I have no credibility. So, both of
you talked about that, and I think that's a great thing for the
future, because we don't want this to happen again. It happened
back in the 1980s, as we all know, and the hollow force and all
of this. This, perhaps, can be the end of that.
You said, Pete, that only 3 out of 10 who come in to be
recruited actually end up being accepted. Is that correct? I'm
not real clear, because I've heard one out of eight, and I was
just kind of wondering----
Mr. Geren. Yes. I'm not familiar with the one out of eight
number. We're not talking about the ones that walk through the
door, but we look at the pool of young people that fall in the
17- to 25-year-old category. Only 3 out of 10 of those would
meet our standards.
Senator Inhofe. So, the figure I'd like to have, and you
probably don't have it now, is, of those who come in with the
expression of interest, who want to join, how many of those are
rejected? What kind of ratio are we looking at?
The reason I want to know that is because I've heard some
of the criteria. For example, they said if you are a product of
home-schooling, you may not qualify, or something like that.
So, I think there are criteria I'd like to look at.
Maybe we don't want to reduce the standards, but we might
want to re-evaluate the criteria. That's one of the reasons. In
fact, there is a person in this room right now, seated not far
behind me, who attempted to join the Army. He was not able to
do it because of something that was no longer active, medically
speaking. He's one of the top athletes around today, and so, I
keep thinking, are we passing up a bunch of people who really
want to do this because of the criteria that we're using?
Now, I want to ask you this, also. It was touched upon by
someone else. There are a few highly publicized cases where
antiwar groups are keeping schools from having recruiters on
campuses. What kind of a problem is this? Can you quantify
this?
Mr. Geren. I can't quantify it for you. I know there are
schools that have limited our access. The Solomon amendment,
which I believe is in litigation right now, states that if
you're going to get Federal funds, you have to provide us
access. We have work-arounds that we have in certain campuses,
where we do Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs in
partnership with other campuses. But as far as the specific
response to your question, I'd need to get back with you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Army provides opportunities to any individual that wants to
serve provided they meet Department of Defense standards. Individuals
with the propensity to serve may walk in to any recruiting station and
volunteer. While the walk-in market is small, those individuals are
afforded the same opportunity as the traditional recruit. Regardless of
the source of entry, the Army ensures that every individual enlisting
is qualified medically, morally, and administratively (number of
dependents, weight standards, etc.). Only 3 out of 10 17-24-year-old
youths are fully qualified to join without a waiver, and less than half
qualify with a waiver. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, entrance standards are continuously reviewed to ensure we
are not being overly restrictive in criteria.
By law, both high schools and colleges receiving Federal funding
are required to provide a minimum level of support to recruiters. High
schools are compliant but are reluctant to provide additional support,
if they receive Federal funding, they are required to release their
students' contact information to military recruiters, although parents
have an option to have their child excluded from these lists. Many high
schools have stopped administering the Student Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery, which is perceived to be exclusively a
recruiting tool.
Most colleges receiving Federal funding are compliant with the law
to provide access to military recruiters and are providing the minimum
level of support. There are competing demands for students, thus
college administrators are reluctant to provide the military full
access to campuses. There is a recruiting market on college campuses
targeting students that are graduating, have decided not to continue
their education, or are in need of money to continue their education.
Although college campuses have historically been centers of influence
and focal points for anti-war activists, these have been minimal.
Senator Inhofe. That would be good to take that for the
record because what we're talking about is trying to get more
to come in. If this is a deterrent, if this is happening in a
pretty widespread way, we need to know it. Now, we know about
the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps program in
California. I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about the
active recruiters on our campuses. Okay?
Then, I was going to mention the crisis that we faced last
year. I can remember talking to you, Secretary Geren, about
that when I was working very closely, at that time, with
General Cody. My feeling was, we were getting dangerously close
to having to affect widows' benefits and re-enlistment bonuses,
the things that would just be really disastrous. I just hope
that we do not get in that position this time. I know
everybody's trying, and I'm not sure what the answer is, but
that is a crisis.
Now, FCS, we haven't said much about that. We have things
that are bleeding right now that have to be done. We all
recognize that. The problem that we're having is what normally
happens, as was happening back in the 1990s. They were taking
things that didn't have to be funded on that day. I always use
the example of the real property maintenance accounts affecting
things like the roofs on the barracks at Fort Bragg, almost
like they weren't even there. But they had to use that money to
buy bullets at that time. That's how bad things were. One of
the things that is always a prospect for sliding is
modernization programs. I think the American people are under
the misconception that our kids, when they go out there, have
the best of everything, and they don't. Part of the FCS
program, one of the lead increments of that, would be the non-
line-of-sight cannon. When I tell people that the best thing
that we have out there is the Paladin, which is World War II
technology, this is just totally unacceptable.
So, now, we have had to slide a little bit in FCS. Where do
you see FCS going to right now?
Mr. Geren. FCS is our top modernization priority, and we
have seen significant cuts in the FCS in the last couple of
years. It's something, as you alluded to, that's happened with
so many of our modernization programs over the years. We end up
cutting a little every year. They slide to the right. We do
tend to rob the future in order to pay for the needs of the
present.
FCS is a good example of where the future really is now.
You heard it from the soldiers. We are designing the FCS to
respond to the soldiers in the field, their needs are what are
driving how we allocate our resources in FCS, how we plan the
spinouts. We're trying to take those technologies and get them
to the soldiers, fast.
Senator Inhofe. I've been over there in that area 13 times,
but when you look at the new technologies that are there, that
we're experimenting with; I hope this becomes widespread. We
can't overlook the main program we have right now, which is
FCS.
General Casey. If I could take your analogy of the 1990s
back. So, we looked at the 1990s, and we looked forward, and we
made some decisions based on a rosy view of the future. We
looked out to 2020 and talked to people in the Intelligence
Community, in academia, in think tanks, in staff around here,
and we said, ``What do you think it's going to look like in
2020?'' They said, ``Persistent conflict.'' So, we're not
looking forward to a rosy picture. We're saying, ``Hey, we're
going to be fighting for the next decade or so.''
Senator Inhofe. General, you've heard me saying that we're
going to try to guess what's going to happen 10 years from now,
and, as smart as all you guys are, we're not going to be right.
That's the reason it crosses Service lines, because we had the
same situation in our strike vehicles in the Air Force. So, I
just think when we recognize that if we really want to meet
what I believe are the expectations of the American people, we
should have the best in all Services, and we're not quite there
right now.
General Casey. We're not, and that makes the rationale for
why this FCS is the centerpiece of our modernization program.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Casey. We're up against an adaptive, asymmetric
enemy that is changing his tactics every day. We need to give
our soldiers the decisive advantage, today and tomorrow. We
can't scrimp on that.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate the two of you. You're doing
the Lord's work.
Senator Lieberman. In the absence of another Senator,
though I've had my 10 minutes on the opening round, I'll ask a
few questions. Soon as somebody else comes in, I will yield.
I mentioned earlier that the Army budget has a $20 billion
increase over last year. That obviously occurred before the
surge began. I want to focus on one part of it, which is, the
ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not only had an
effect on personnel, but obviously on equipment. This is tough
combat environment. Equipment is affected, it wears down, so
there's a need for what we'd call, in layman's terms,
maintenance, and also buying some new equipment to replace
stuff that's lost.
This goes directly to the jurisdiction of this
subcommittee. Is there enough in the budget that the President
put before us, which, again, was constructed in an earlier
time, to allow you, Secretary Geren and General Casey, to
recapitalize, reset, and maintain equipment at the necessary
level, or should we be looking at adding some more?
Mr. Geren. As far as the equipment that we wear out in
theater and combat losses, we have made our best estimates, and
have those figures in the supplemental. The money that you all
provided last year, the $17 billion, is a very important step
forward. We've spent, or committed, about 81 percent of that.
We're always having to predict the future and anticipate what
those losses are. That's the value of these supplementals that
are out of the regular budget cycle, they give us an
opportunity to have our budgetary needs in those areas reflect
our needs on the ground. As each supplemental comes along,
we'll do our best to accurately reflect those costs, and you
all have always stood with us in funding those costs. So, the
supplemental system, as imperfect as it is, and fraught with
the delays that it is, does allow us to meet the battle losses
and the battle attrition, albeit in a delayed basis.
Senator Lieberman. General Casey?
General Casey. I'm not in a position to give you specific
numbers, Senator, but my inclination is, probably not.
Senator Lieberman. Probably not enough, at this point.
General Casey. Probably not. As you said, the five
additional brigades were outside of that, so we have to deal
with that.
Senator Lieberman. Excuse me. Just spell it out a little
bit. I think I know what you mean, but in other words, to
adequately equip those----
General Casey. In our projections that were submitted--we
weren't counting on having those five extra brigades over
there.
Senator Lieberman. So, that would mean additional
equipment, obviously, and perhaps additional repair.
General Casey. That's right, additional requirements for
the repair of the equipment that these brigades take over there
with them.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Mr. Geren. To those five new brigades, let me speak to
that, because I don't want you to think that my answer
neglected that piece of it. We do not have the money in the
budget, going forward past the end of this year, for those five
brigades, and that's something we will have to either reprogram
or rebudget for.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Mr. Geren. As far as those five brigades, we do not have
the money in the budget beyond the end of this fiscal year.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. So, as we are now
working on the fiscal year 2008 budget, to begin October 1, to
the best of your ability I ask you to try to come up with a
number that you think you'll need, at least for that, which is
the additional cost associated with those five additional
brigades in battle.
General Casey. The other thing we're likely to see is, if
we want to go faster, it will cost more.
If you want to grow the Army faster, it will cost more.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Casey. It will mean buying equipment sooner than we
had thought, for example. It will, maybe, require building
bases or military construction sooner than we thought. So, that
could cause us to come in with some additional requirements, as
we look through this.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask you about one specific
program, because, in some ways, it comes off of the
extraordinary display of advances in support for our troops
that the soldiers here gave us, and that deals with the Land
Warrior Program. The Army has not funded procurement of the
Land Warrior Program in the fiscal 2008 budget, or not asked
for funding, after years of development and a cost of about $2
billion. Over the years, I'm afraid, the Land Warrior suffered
not only from management plus performance and schedule
problems, but also with requirements growth in challenges
associated with so many information technology and software-
based programs. However, the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E) recently did an assessment of Land Warrior
during tests with the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, a Stryker
unit getting ready to deploy to Iraq.
They gave a carefully-worded report, that I thought was
encouraging, that said that the program was on track to be
operationally effective and suitable, even though it hadn't
completed its initial operational test. This adds to all that
we've talked about, the extraordinary ability to communicate,
to locate, and know where soldiers are. So, I'm troubled that
this didn't get funded. I understand that you only had so much
money in the budget. Obviously I'm concerned about all the
money we've put into it. I think it adds capability. The fact
that the Army listed it as an unfunded requirement means,
literally, you consider it to be a top requirement, but simply
didn't have the money to fund it.
I wanted to ask you just to comment on where we are in Land
Warrior, consistent with what we've seen. I think it's part of
that whole picture of taking advantage of technology to put our
troops in the best position we can. Should this committee,
bottom line, look at funding Land Warrior in the fiscal year
2008 budget?
General Casey. Senator, I'm less than a millimeter deep on
this one.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
General Casey. I couldn't give you a good answer.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Understandable. Then we'll come
back to Secretary Geren?
Mr. Geren. I'm not familiar with the details of the
decision. I know we did cut it from the budget. We have
attempted to take the technologies of the Land Warrior Program
and roll them into FCS, so we have the benefit of that research
and the technological advances. I'd like to get back with you,
with further details, but we have attempted to take the Land
Warrior concept and make it a part of FCS.
[The information referred to follows:]
While the Land Warrior Program was terminated, the Army will not
lose the capabilities resulting from the program. We learned a great
deal about how to extend the network to the soldier that will guide our
future efforts. The 4-9 Manchus (4/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team), who
conducted the Land Warrior limited user test, will deploy with Land
Warrior to Iraq. This deployment will serve to inform work on Ground
Soldier System and the integration of these capabilities into current
and future forces.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I want to keep in touch with you
on it, because, for one, I think it offers extraordinary
additional capacity to our troops.
Have you experienced it, Sergeant Major? Have you see the
system?
Sergeant Coleman. Yes, sir, I have.
Senator Lieberman. What's your impression of it?
Sergeant Coleman. The capability that it brings, I think,
is impressive, and that's why 4/9 is taking it with them.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, that's what I had understood.
Sergeant Coleman. I'm not educated on it enough to sit here
and talk in detail, but it does get them a little bit better
connected to the network.
Senator Lieberman. Just take a minute and describe it. I'm
not asking you to make a judgment, which is not yours to make,
about whether we should fund it or not, but just tell us what
additional capacities it gives you and your forces?
Sergeant Coleman. The biggest thing that I've seen--and,
again, I am not extremely familiar with it, just vaguely
familiar--what I've seen, though, is that it connects the
soldier to the command group significantly quicker.
Senator Lieberman. So, this is a unit that everybody would
carry.
Sergeant Coleman. It depends on your position, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Sergeant Coleman. The ground soldier is still a ground
soldier. He's focused on his 180 degrees to close with the
enemy in his immediate front. But it gives a lot more to the
leaders, as far as a link back to the command be that company
or battalion.
Senator Lieberman. Gotcha.
Sergeant Coleman. It has some better optics, as far as
getting on target, not necessarily at that level, but it can
reach out there, and the squad leader can look through an
eyepiece and identify where his people are at. He can get more
accurate, and quicker, information to call for either indirect
fire or close-air support from the command group for clearance,
like I said, be that company or battalion.
So, it's a big communication piece. A great example was
that, at Fort Polk last year they were going after a high-value
target (HVT), the target identity had changed, the battalion
commander was able to get that down to the ground-pounders in
realtime, and they were able to apprehend the HVT right there
on the spot.
So, in closing, sir, it's a good communication link to the
better C2 levels that we have.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
I'm corrected by staff. I apologize. It is not on the
unfunded priority list, it is an unfunded priority, but it
didn't make the cut above the line.
Mr. Geren. Sir, the smart guys behind me have provided me a
little additional information.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Geren. Money for R&D for the system is in our 2008
budget.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Geren. The program was canceled, for budgetary reasons,
and also weight/power limitations. But the R&D is staying
alive, and we're, again, working to incorporate it in the FCS.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Thanks very much. We're interested
in that.
Senator Warner, I presume you did not have a round of
questioning?
Senator Warner. That's correct.
Senator Lieberman. I would be delighted to call on you now.
Senator Warner. I thank the usual courtesy of the Chair and
my ranking member, and I join you in welcoming this
distinguished panel. I would only say to you that, as I reflect
back on history, I can think of few times in contemporary
history when there's been more turbulence and challenge, and
we're fortunate that both of you draw on extensive public
service, previous service, and have the knowledge and the
courage to tackle the unknown. You're dealing with a lot of
unknowns in this situation.
I would just like to start off that, and I'm respectful of
the differing views in Congress today as it relates to our
Nation's policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, I do find a very
united front among the people of the United States in standing
foursquare behind the uniformed personnel of all of our Armed
Forces. It's quite unlike what some of us experienced when we
were in positions that you are now in during the Vietnam war.
But today, America has in its hearts, every day, these young
people in uniform, most particularly those that are serving in
Iraq and Afghanistan and other places of the world where
there's a high risk.
I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, your reference to the All-
Volunteer Force. It is something that I view is a national
treasure. It was conceived at a time when there were a lot of
unknowns in the immediate closing days of Vietnam and the years
afterwards, but it has worked, and has successfully served this
Nation, and served the men and women who have been in uniform.
There's a great deal of reliance that one can put on your
fellow soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, knowing that he or
she is there because they want to be there, and they accept the
risk commensurate with what you're accepting. It has worked.
We have to make sure that, in these uncertain times ahead,
you can continue to preserve that national treasure. I hope, as
I mentioned in a previous hearing, that you will put in place,
gentlemen, those guideposts, those benchmarks, maybe not unlike
this roadside monitoring system, put all kinds of monitors out
there to watch it, because it could turn, very quickly, one
direction or the other.
As I look at the next 6 months, they're going to be months
of very difficult decisions between the executive and the
legislative branches, and I'm hoping for the best. But the
challenge is squarely in your lap to not only maintain the
Army, but to let it grow, and grow in an orderly way.
I think the record should reflect, certainly, the views of
this Senator, that in no way could you look to this population,
which is highly supportive of the uniform today, to support any
initiatives in Congress to reinstate a compulsory service in
the form of a draft or whatever name might be attached to it. I
do not see that as an option, and I would urge you never to
even think about it as a planning factor for the future.
I then turn to several parts of the program, as I see it
today, and I was struck, yesterday--impressed, indeed, if I may
say, General Casey, with General Bell. I have dealt with a
series of very fine individuals who have served in that command
in the Korean Peninsula. He handled himself remarkably well, in
my judgment, on a broad range of issues and questions. But the
one thing that struck me is that he is considering a plan
whereby the current service tour of an Army person in Korea
would be 3 years, and that would involve the family. Certainly,
for that extended period of time, it's essential that the
family be a part of it. Now, that's a major shift in the over-
half-century that our forces have been an integral part of the
security structure in that Korean Peninsula. Heretofore, we've
used the unaccompanied tour, I think, basically, for a year.
Now, having had some modest experience, myself, there, a half-
century ago, the weather is really extraordinary. That's a
challenge to families and young children and the like.
But I want to make certain that this plan has to originate
with the Secretary and the Chief of Staff, as opposed, with no
disrespect, to a forward-deployed commander. Could you advise
me where you are in that thinking process of that 3-year
commitment?
Mr. Geren. I've not been briefed on that, Senator. I was
not aware of that plan. I did meet with General Bell a couple
of days ago, and covered several issues, but we did not discuss
that one.
Senator Warner. Then, let me say, I think it's a matter of
some urgency, for the following reason; not that he would go
off on his own without the concurrence of the apparatus, in
other words you and headquarters, that have to look over the
entire Army and tours. We're already going through the
perturbations of the 15 month deployment in Iraq. Then troops,
being what they are, they hear, ``Well, it's 3 years in Korea,
and there's 15 months in Iraq,'' and this all begins to feed a
certain amount of uncertainty, I would think, in the ranks, at
what their next posting might involve.
I think you have to look to a certain degree of uniformity,
if I may say, and I would work with General Bell. There may be
valid reasons for that policy to be adopted. But, if it is,
it's strikingly different, is my understanding, than any other
overseas deployment. Am I correct in that assumption?
General Casey. You are, and we talked a little bit about
this.
Senator Warner. Who is the ``we''?
General Casey. We, the former commander there, General
LaPorte and I. We offered the opportunity, in fact, bonuses to
extend over there, because the Korean economy has risen such
that it can provide a quality of life that is not what it used
to be.
Senator Warner. Oh, yes. Its cost is significant.
General Casey. I'm actually, Senator, heading there next
week.
Senator Warner. Okay. Then you're on top of it.
General Casey. Yes.
Senator Warner. But I think the uniformity, or the extent
you have uniformity, has to originate right where these two
seats are that you're occupying.
General Casey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Geren. That decision certainly would be secretarial and
Chief of Staff level.
Senator Warner. All right, that's fine. Let me move on.
We come to the question of our Army people serving in Iraq,
and alongside is a fellow marine. He may not be more than a
couple of miles away, in his sector, fighting courageously, yet
he's there for 6-7 months versus your 15 months. Now, how do
you deal with that issue? From a morale standpoint, primarily.
Mr. Geren. Right.
Senator Warner. I realize these tours are driven very
carefully by planning doctrines and those back in the various
headquarters that look at these issues. But I'm talking about
the good old GI up there, day in and day out, plugging along,
and he's getting his e-mails from home, and he's hearing about
the marines coming home, and he's staying. How do you work
through that?
General Casey. I think the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
talked about that earlier.
Clearly, both Services are on their own deployment cycles
for their own Service needs. I'll get this wrong, but
basically, the marines have a shorter dwell time on the other
end.
Senator Warner. That's correct.
Anyway, you're getting too complicated. All I'm saying,
gentlemen, you have to take a look at those little things and
see how they work.
General Casey. When you look at it over time, Senator, it
doesn't come out all that different, maybe a month or two, one
way or the other.
Senator Warner. Can you explain that to the good old
American GI that's down there?
General Casey. I wouldn't want to, probably the GI, not his
wife.
Senator Warner. Well, therein is a challenge.
Now, this 15-month deployment, we've now had it in the
public domain and being considered by the units. How
successfully is it going down with the troops, in your
judgment, General?
General Casey. I've had direct feedback from groups of
spouses and soldiers in the installations that my wife and I
have visited, and I've had feedback from the field. I would
characterize it as resignation, certainly not happy about the
extension, but they understand. I do think it's important that
we did it for some very sound reasons, and we actually, as a
result, have given the families about as much predictability as
we could give them in what's a very uncertain and unpredictable
environment. I think the most important thing is the 12 months
at home.
Senator Warner. All of us study a great deal about what's
going on in Iraq, but am I correct that the Iraqi units that
were brought in to, as the President said, take the lead in the
surge operation, are going to be there for a period of maybe
only 90 to 120 days, then rotated out and replaced by other
units? Now, there again, I'll go to the good old American GI.
He's in there, and he's in there for the duration of that
surge, and he sees the Iraqi forces, whom presumably he's
working with, rotating back to their home base or from whence
they came, and another unit coming in. Now, what impact does
that have on morale?
General Casey. I think that would be a good question for
General Petraeus, this afternoon.
Senator Warner. Very well, I will quote you as saying that
``therein resides the answer to that question.'' [Laughter.]
To me, these are matters of great consequence, because,
modest though it be, I have some specific recollections of
experiences where there was a difference in treatment of people
and personnel issues, and it just diverts the attention of a
conscientious soldier, sailor, airman, or marine from his or
her job, when he hears that some other person is getting a
little better deal than perhaps they're getting.
I thank the Chair.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Geren and General Casey, the
DOD has been very clear that we have a policy that is to ensure
the National Guard has unprecedented equipment and support over
a period of years, and that we have a firm commitment to
bringing them up to readiness in that regard.
Based on the extended tours in Iraq, the movement of
equipment to Iraq, the budget challenges that you face, and
other things that have occurred, can you tell us, is that plan
on track? Can I go back to my State and say, ``We have a plan
that's going to fix these shortages of equipment'' or is it
something that's in jeopardy at this point?
Mr. Geren. The plan that we have described to you in the
past is on track. For the Guard, it's $38 billion in new
equipment between 2005 and 2013; for the Reserves, it's $10
billion.
Senator Sessions. Now, I believe General Schoomaker said
that's an unprecedented financial equipment support package.
Would you describe it that way?
Mr. Geren. It is unprecedented, and it's a real break from
the past, as far as how we treated the Guard. We're committed
to equipping the Guard and the Reserve so that they train the
same way the Active-Duty Force trains, and able to deploy with
the same kind of training and same kind of equipment. We are
examining now whether that $38 billion gets it all done. It
probably falls a little short. But, yes, it is unprecedented.
It's an investment that is going to do a great deal to bring
the Guard up to the standards of the Active Duty, instead of
having them be content with out-of-date equipment and out-of-
date training.
Senator Sessions. So, are there threats to this part of the
budget? I guess Congress can fail to fund in the out years the
requirements to make this a success. Is the Defense Department
committed to asking for what it takes to get this done?
Mr. Geren. Yes, it is. Those figures are actually in our 5-
year budget plan. The $38 billion for 2005 to 2013, and the $10
billion for the Reserves, those are in our budget.
Senator Sessions. Set aside in your budget, and if it
doesn't get there, it's because Congress or the President
blocked it or unless you change your mind.
Mr. Geren. It's in the budget approved by the President.
Senator Sessions. General Casey, do you support that
concept of fully equipping the Guard and Reserve, and is by
2013 sufficient time, or does it need to be done sooner?
General Casey. We'd like it done sooner, but I'm not sure
we can. But, I think, before you came in, I mentioned that my
transition team has spun out six initiatives. One of them is to
complete the transition of the Reserve component to the
operational force that we need it to be, while still preserving
their citizen-soldier status. The equipping is the major part
of that. I don't know whether they need to be fully-equipped
all the time, but they clearly need to be equipped well enough
to meet the Governors' needs, to have some equipment to
basically train on, and then they need to have the equipment
they're going to fight with, to train with before they go. I
think we can be creative enough to work with the Reserve
components to figure out how to do that. I'm committed to doing
that.
Senator Sessions. I think that can allay some of the
concerns that we have. Although we do have a window period now,
I think that a lot of the units are not rated ready to deploy
because of the lack of equipment.
Would you say, and would you care to comment, that the
ability of the units to deploy is not impacted with regard to
an Iraq deployment, because they will fall in on equipment
that's there, as opposed to some other deployment?
General Casey. Yes, I think, as General Schoomaker has
testified in the posture hearings, it is the readiness of the
next-to-deploy forces that are the challenges. The ones going
to Iraq get the equipment that they need.
Senator Sessions. One of the things we heard about from
General McCaffrey, Lawrence Korb, and General Scales is a
shortage of middle-grade officers, captains, and majors. I've
heard that some of that is due to the new brigade concept
calling for more captains and majors than we heretofore
expected to need; therefore, that could explain some of our
shortage.
Would you give us a rundown on where we are with regard to
majors and captains, if there's a shortage, and how our
retention is going?
General Casey. Do you want to do that?
Mr. Geren. Go ahead.
General Casey. I think there's two reasons we're short
those mid-grade officers. One is, we under-assessed in the
1990s. The major today came in the Army in 1997, and there were
year groups we didn't recruit enough folks into, so we are
starting off short some majors in year groups now. The second
reason is exactly what you said. There are more majors in these
modular brigade headquarters. I'd go around to meet each of the
new brigades as they came into Iraq. When I was a brigade
commander, I had two majors in my brigade headquarters. I'd go
down, and I'd say, ``Hello, Major So and So, the personnel
officer; Major So and So, the intelligence officer; Lieutenant
Colonel So and So, the operations officer; Major So and So, the
logistics officer.'' They were all majors. It made a quantum
difference in the tasks that these brigades could handle in
Iraq. So, it's the right thing to do, but, you're exactly
right, it's a major reason for the current shortages.
Mr. Geren. Let me mention, there is a third contributing
factor, as well, though. We do have attrition in those grades
that's above our average. It's not greatly above it, but it is
above it, and it's a high-demand grade. We recognize that and
we're putting incentives in place to try to retain captains and
majors. We have a proposed menu of incentives for captains that
includes a $20,000 bonus, post of choice, branch of choice, and
providing opportunities for graduate school recognizing the
professional development needs of these young men and young
women and using it to encourage them to stay in the Service.
So, the Chief mentioned two reasons, but this third one's also
a factor. Again, not a big factor, but it is part of the
equation.
Senator Sessions. So, you're slightly below your retention
goals for majors/captains.
Mr. Geren. We are.
Senator Sessions. You need more majors and captains. You
can't snap your fingers to create a major or a captain, because
it's how long to be major? How many years, normally?
General Casey. Eight to 10 years, I think.
Senator Sessions. Eight to 10 years. So, it takes that much
time to produce a major?
General Casey. We have to retain more captains to fix our
major shortage.
Senator Sessions. How serious do you consider that to be?
Is it an indicator that we're placing too many demands on the
young officers?
General Casey. I think it is something that we have to
continue to take action to mitigate and it's going to take us 3
years to get through this period here, particularly with the
majors.
I personally believe that putting the additional majors
into the structure is very important for the types of
operations that we are going to be conducting in the middle
part of the 20th century. So, yes, it stretches us, but I
believe it's very important to give our units the capabilities
they need to succeed when we deploy them. So, I think it's
worth the risk.
Senator Sessions. I'm thinking of Korea, having been there
a couple of times, and seen the inadequate housing, and know
it's mainly unaccompanied tours. This is my thought. Let me
just express it to you. I'm not exactly sure what Senator
Warner's thoughts were on it, but my thought would be, let's
reduce, as much as we can, the number of personnel we commit to
Korea. Let's make as much of that accompanied tours as possible
so that when we do have to deploy an Army person to a hostile
area of the world where it's unaccompanied, that'll be 1 less
year they've been away from their family. Is that a goal?
General Casey. I wouldn't call it a goal, but it's a good
idea.
Senator Sessions. If we have to spend a little more on
housing, I'd say, let's do it, because the housing in Korea is
inadequate. I've seen that housing, and I hope that you'll look
at the cost and how we do that, but it's a high-cost area. I
think it would be a mistake to shortchange that investment,
particularly in light of the fact that the Koreans are,
themselves, paying about three-fourths of the move. We ought to
follow through and create housing for no more people than we
really need in Korea, and then make it good, so it's not seen
as a hardship tour in a person's career in the Army.
My time is up, so unless you have a comment, we'll leave it
at that.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Sessions.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. General Casey, I want to take the
opportunity to get your impressions about how things are going
in Baghdad, generally. I know we are here to talk about Airland
Subcommittee issues, and we'll do that some more, but, from the
benefit of having served in Baghdad in charge of our forces
there for a long time, and, with General Petraeus, the new
strategy that's being employed there, could you give us a
minute or two of your general impressions about how you think
things are going?
General Casey. I think Dave will give you his insights this
afternoon, which are much more current than mine would be.
But I think what I said when I was there was, we'll start
to see some initial results, but we weren't going to really see
if this impacted until late summer. From what I see, they're on
track for that. They're seeing some improvements in the numbers
of people that are killed in murders, that's falling off. But
they're really wrestling with these car bombs, these large-
scale car bombs, and that was something that frustrated my
folks when we were there.
What I don't have as good a feel for as I did when I was
doing it every day is what's happening on the political side.
That's where the progress has to continue. I'm actually hearing
some less positive news about where the oil agreement is. If
that starts splitting, that would be problematic, because they
have to have a couple of big pieces to tie this reconciliation
initiative together. Oil is one of them.
Senator Cornyn. I appreciate your comments, and we'll ask
General Petraeus this afternoon when we get an opportunity. But
I personally get a little bit frustrated when I hear people
say, ``There is no military solution, there's only a political
solution.'' But it strikes me that there is no political
solution without a security solution. Obviously, our goal is to
hand this security situation off to the Iraqis as soon as we
can, as soon as conditions permit. But it seems to me that it's
not one or the other. It has to be both.
General Casey. They have to go forward together.
Senator Sessions. Senator Cornyn, can I just follow with
one question?
Senator Cornyn. Sure.
Senator Sessions. With regard to these large-scale car
bombs, to what extent is that the al Qaeda activity in Iraq?
General Casey. I think it's a combination of al Qaeda and
other Sunni extremists.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you. That's an important point.
I've been intrigued, General Casey, there's been some
recent reporting in the newspapers. General Abizaid was
credited with coining the phrase ``the long war.'' I'm not sure
whether that was justified or whether he was just attributed
with that phrase. But I saw a report that said that Admiral
Fallon, his successor at U.S. Central Command, has said,
``We're not going to use that language anymore. We're not going
to call it the long war.'' But then, you were quoted recently,
as saying, ``The next decade is likely to be one of persistent
conflict.'' As somebody who's interested in words, and
believing that words actually have intended meaning, could you
comment on that?
General Casey. Sure. That ``persistent conflict'' came from
the feedback that my transition team got from going around the
country talking to people about the future. Whether it's a long
war or persistent conflict, the flat fact of the matter is, we
are engaged in a long-term struggle with an enemy that has
attacked us and who's not going to walk off the field easily.
So, as we prepare ourselves and look ahead across the next
decade, we should prepare ourselves for a tough slog, I'd say.
Senator Cornyn. Should we read a lot into the word choice
between ``persistent conflict'' and ``long war''?
General Casey. I don't know anything about the dialogue
about ``long war'' or ``not long war.'' I don't know anything
about that. I certainly didn't choose ``persistent conflict''
to get away from saying ``long war.'' That's the way it was
presented to me by the group that I sent out there.
Senator Cornyn. That's very helpful.
Following up on Senator Sessions' question, regardless of
what's happening with the sectarian violence, the fact remains
that al Qaeda has a substantial presence in Iraq. Is it your
belief that al Qaeda's primary mission is to maintain maximum
chaos by inciting and inflaming that sectarian violence, or
could you comment on that, as well?
General Casey. In their own words, Senator--this is from
some papers we captured a few years ago--they want to get us
out, they want to establish a caliphate, and export terror to
the region, and then get on to Israel. That's the plan. I
believe this sectarian violence that they're trying to foment
is the way to create so much chaos that they'll ultimately
think they can force us out.
Senator Cornyn. I want to ask you about UAVs, since we have
one that has been demonstrated here today, or at least shown to
us. The Air Force has recently asserted that it should be
designated as executive agent for UAVs that fly above 3,500
feet. It's reported, I'm told, that 60 percent of the Army's
UAVs fly above that altitude. Since the Air Force isn't here,
and the Army is, I wanted to get your views on that, and we'll
give them equal opportunity at some other time. In your
opinion, how could the Services best deliver joint UAV
training, planning, doctrine, and technology? How can we
prevent duplicative effort without having an executive agent
for UAVs? What alternatives would you suggest to the Air
Force's recent assertion that it should be designated as the
executive agent for UAVs?
General Casey. General Moseley and I have already talked
and begun a dialogue. It was his initiative that he and I ought
to get together and direct another round of Chief of Staff of
the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, initiatives like
they did back in the 1980s. This will be one of them. It's
almost the same issue as bombers. Can you do more if you keep
things centralized, or decentralized? We can work through this.
We will work through this, between us and the Air Force, to
ensure that all of our forces get the timely intelligence that
they need to accomplish their missions.
Senator Cornyn. I certainly appreciate that.
The last subject I want to talk about in this round is
military medicine. Of course, I think both of you alluded to
Walter Reed, and Walter Reed, Building 18, has become a symbol.
Unfortunately, I think it's an erroneous symbol in many
respects. In terms of the housing, and the lack of maintenance
of that building, clearly there were problems that cannot be
excused. I think Senator Lieberman actually used the word
``embarrassing.'' Those revelations were embarrassing to all of
us, because I think all of our impression was that we were
doing everything humanly possible to provide optimal housing
conditions for our troops, and particularly in terms of
delivery of military medicine.
The statistics are very impressive. World War II, 30
percent of our troops who were injured, died of their wounds;
now it's less than 10 percent. That's very positive. I should
report to you that my last two visits to Brooke Army Medical
Center in San Antonio, excuse my State pride, perhaps, but----
Mr. Geren. I'll excuse it, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Cornyn. I know you will, Secretary Geren, being
from Fort Worth. [Laughter.]
If there is a crown jewel of military medicine, I think, if
it's not Brooke Army Medical Center, it has to be right there
at the top. I was concerned with some of the types of injuries
that our troops are receiving. They are surviving wounds that
previously would have taken their lives, particularly the
soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who are suffering from
burn wounds. I believe that we need to modify some of our
provisions with regard to housing allowances, vehicle
enhancements, and the like, when it comes to our burned wounded
warriors. Both of these things were brought to my attention by
a woman by the name of Rosie Babin, whose son was shot by a
sniper in 2003, and happens to now be recovering and living
with his family. There are restrictions on housing allowances
if you are living with your family, but we're actually
benefiting, and he's benefiting, from that arrangement. Then
there is a young woman named Christy Patton, whose son, Everett
Patton, was seriously burned by an IED, and she brought to my
attention there were some limitations on housing and other
grants and benefits available to people who are burned. It's
not intentional, it simply appears to be something that's
fallen through the gap.
I've introduced some legislation, along with Senator Akaka,
Senator Craig, and others, to try to address that, and I would
just invite your attention to that issue, and ask for any
feedback, advice, and support you can give us in trying to
address those concerns, and to make sure that there aren't
people who fall into gaps that we should fill.
Mr. Geren. I appreciate that input very much. I'd also like
to have an opportunity to follow up with the two individuals
whose names you mentioned.
We all were shocked about what happened at Walter Reed, and
we know it's an aberration. We know our military medical
professionals, all the way from the medic in the field to the
nurses and the technicians and the doctors in our hospitals,
perform miracles. You alluded to the results, the survival
rates. But we let some people down at Walter Reed. We did. As a
result of that, we are looking at putting a microscope to the
whole system. We're talking with patients, with people, and
with medical professionals. We're trying to take lessons
learned at different medical centers, and spread them across
the system. The Chief talked about how we have some programs
for families that are done one way at some facility, and
differently somewhere else. We are trying to spread the best
practices across the entire medical system, and make sure we do
it the best way we can everywhere we do it.
Your input today is very valuable. We have had some others
raise concerns about our treatment of burn victims. We'd like
to talk with those two individuals that you mentioned. We look
forward to working with you on that.
Senator Cornyn. As always, the response of the wounded
warriors is an inspiration. I remember one of my recent trips
to the burn center there at Brooke Army Medical Center, I
encountered a soldier, wearing his uniform, who had obviously
suffered serious burns. His first question was, ``When can I
get back to my unit?'' That's the statement I hear most often
from people I visit at our military hospitals.
Thank you. My time's expired.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Cornyn.
I think we've all had that same experience, and there's no
other word for it than inspirational, and, in some sense,
humbling.
Senator Sessions, you are entitled, now, to your second
round.
Senator Sessions. You're very generous.
We don't want to have an interservice fight, but I share
the concern about the UAV, and have expressed it at previous
hearings. Also at the hearing in which Generals Scales,
McCaffrey, Korb, and Krepinevich testified. They suggested that
we needed many more C-17s. One witness, I believe, questioned
even whether C-130s and C-5As should be kept. Of course, we're
doing a refueling tanker now that could have more or less cargo
capability, all of which is relevant to the warfighter. One or
more of them just flat stated that the Air Force is more
interested in their fighter, their primary missions, and
suggested there was a lack of attention for the combatant
commanders, which you were, and you had to get cargo constantly
by air. Will you be reviewing that? Do you feel like the
system, General Casey, will allow you sufficient input to make
sure that the cargo capacity and the lift capacity needed for
the warfighter is there?
General Casey. We always evaluate transportation
requirements, but I just happened to be talking with Nordie
Schwartz, the U.S. Transportation Command commander, the other
day, and I asked him the same question, ``Do we need more C-
17s?'' He generally said, ``To a point, we probably could use
some more, particularly with an aging C-5 fleet.'' He's working
his way through that right now, and I think he's probably the
right guy with the Air Force to give you a good recommendation
on that.
Senator Sessions. To what extent do the combatant
commanders' needs sufficiently move through the system to the
decisionmaking authority? Do you think we could do better on
that?
General Casey. There's an established process for the
combatant commander to submit joint requirements annually, and
it's a routine process. I think all the combatant commanders go
through their war plans, look at the timelines that forces can
deploy on, decide whether or not there's enough transportation
assets available, and that generates the requirement. So,
there's a process that exists to do that, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Sometimes those processes don't always
work. I assume it does work. I know that process exists.
I thank both of you for your service. Personally, I am
astounded, and so pleased, with the professionalism, the
dedication, and the courage of the American soldiers, who are
re-enlisting in remarkable numbers, even though they know that
re-enlistment means they're likely to go back into a combat
area. We've never really done that before; that recruitment
seems to be holding up. We must also make sure that we don't go
too far, and that we do everything possible to make sure that
this fabulous volunteer Army holds together. I think it will.
I'll just conclude by saying I urge you to keep us informed. If
you see problems that need to be addressed, I hope you'll not
hesitate to come to Congress and ask for support.
Mr. Geren. I can assure you we will, thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Sessions.
Mr. Secretary, General, you've been generous with your
time. I want to ask you two more questions, if I might.
I know Senator Sessions and I have talked about it.
Notwithstanding the substantial increase in the defense budget
for fiscal year 2008 that's recommended, the fact is that we
still are at a historic low on defense spending as a percentage
of gross domestic product at a time of war. We're actually
lower than the average, even in peacetime. This forces you to
spend the money most effectively, obviously, and to make some
tough choices that, in my opinion, you shouldn't have to make.
So, let me ask two questions that express both of those
concerns that I have.
First, I note that on the UPL we see some critical force
protection items such as the MRAP vehicles that Senator Cornyn
asked about before, aviation survivability equipment, and
counter-IED jammers. Those are immediate needs for force
protection in the conflict we're in now. On the other hand, and
I'm not opposed to it at all, understandably, upgrades for the
Abrams and Bradley vehicles are funded. So, it just seems to me
that it's hard to explain why we wouldn't fund those critical
force protection items. I'm certainly going to see if we can
find a way to do it within our process here. I want to ask you
if you could comment, Secretary Geren, about those judgments,
and if we can't raise the top line, what would you try to move
around to fund those force protection shortfalls?
Mr. Geren. I can't offer you specific examples right now,
but General Casey and I have discussed some of those force
protection issues; specifically, the MRAPs.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Geren. The recommendation that has come to us from the
staff is for the Army to buy 2,500 MRAPs; 700 of them are in
the supplemental request, the rest of them remain unfunded.
I'm not confident that the 2,500 number is the right
number. It perhaps should be more.
Senator Lieberman. We've heard much higher numbers.
Mr. Geren. The number that came from the field was 17,000,
total replacement of the Humvee fleet.
Senator Lieberman. That's the one I heard, yes.
Mr. Geren. The Marines are proceeding with the plan to
replace their entire fleet.
Senator Lieberman. So that the MRAPs are going to take the
place of the Humvees for the Marines.
Mr. Geren. For the Marines in theater.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. We are going to examine that
recommendation closely. We're also going to look within the
budget and see if we can move funds around to weigh this
priority against the other priorities. In spite of the size of
the budget, there are many competing priorities.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Geren. But it's an issue that is at the top of our list
to work through.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. So, let's work through that
together as we go through our process.
Final question. It's a big one, so you can begin to give me
an answer, but this goes back to the FCS. At the hearing, that
has been referred to, last week, there was quite a dialogue,
which was really a debate, between Dr. Krepinevich and retired
General Scales about FCS. Dr. Krepinevich thought that from now
to 2020, America's going to be in a persistent state of
conflict with this enemy, Islamist extremism and terrorism. Dr.
Krepinevich made the argument that too much of the DOD budget
overall, and particularly the Army, was still more focused on
conventional threats. He referred to Saddam's Republican Guards
as opposed to the irregular warfare threats that are
represented by al Qaeda and the extremists. He was suggesting,
particularly that this is true of the FCS, and that it wasn't
worth spending the projected $200 billion on that system for
that purpose, but if it was going to go forward, it ought to be
reoriented toward the kind of persistent conflict we're most
likely to face in the next decade-plus.
So, the full committee having heard that last week, I
wanted to give you a chance to respond to that critique of the
FCS.
General Casey. I fundamentally disagree with that.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
General Casey. In fact, if you think about what the
alternatives to FCS are, it's modernizing the tanks and
Bradleys that were designed to fight the Cold War.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
General Casey. What you're seeing here today is the
application of technology in, for example, a counterinsurgency
fight, which has always been a human-intelligence battle. Now,
with the type of technologies that we're developing for the
FCS, we have much better situational awareness, and we have the
ability to find and track individuals. It's happening in Iraq
today.
The FCS gives you greater mobility at the tactical,
operation, and strategic levels. It has better sustainability,
which reduces the footprint. It has actually allowed us to
reduce the overall size of the entire brigade, and at the same
time, double the number of infantry that are available to make
contact with the population, to do the kinds of things that
make you successful in the military operations we're going to
be facing in the middle of the 21st century. Survivability is
greatly improved, not only by the system itself, but by the
information systems and the intelligence systems that support
it. So, they can avoid being detected and avoid being hit, and
when they are hit, the vehicle is designed to prevent a kill.
So, I really disagree with the fact that this is a Cold War
system. I think this is exactly the kind of system that we
need. I think I saw a preview of what we're going to get out of
the FCS with the Stryker Brigades in Iraq. They were the most
capable and most effective unit in a counterinsurgency
environment, largely because of the way that they were linked
together.
So, I disagree with Mr. Krepinevich.
Senator Lieberman. Secretary, do you want to add anything?
Mr. Geren. I don't know that I could add to that. I agree
with General Casey. We are attempting to not only do the
spinouts, but build the system responsive to the needs of the
soldier in the field. It's an evolving concept. The FCS
continues to improve and be more responsive to the soldiers in
the field. You heard from soldiers that actually use this.
You've talked to the people that are developing it. Every step
of the way, we're getting input from soldiers in the field.
This is not a system that's being developed out of contact, out
of connection with the people that are going to be using it,
who are fighting this fight.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much.
Senator Sessions, do you have any other questions?
Senator Sessions. No, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to serve with you,
and thank you for your leadership.
Senator Lieberman. To you, too, Senator, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, General, thanks very much for your time.
General, thanks for coming in early in your tenure as the Chief
of Staff. I go back to what I said at the beginning. I think
most of us feel that the U.S. Army is the best in the world,
maybe the best ever in the world. It's not broken, but it is
under stress as a result of the enormous additional demands we
are placing on it as part of the global war on terrorism.
We have an obligation to do everything we can, together,
you, on your end of the table, and we, on our end, to remove
the sources of that stress as much as we possibly can. I know
that's a thought that's generally shared in Congress, but I do
want you to feel that this subcommittee wants to be as
aggressive an advocate as we can be for the Army. We want to
work together closely and depend on you for information as to
how to most effectively do that. I'm just thinking, I
appreciate, General Casey, what you're looking at, speeding up
the increase in end strength, and also, considering what the
unexpected, unbudgeted, unasked-for additional costs of the
surge will be, going into next fiscal year. I don't know
whether it's going to be possible, on your timetable, but if
you come to a plan, General, for getting that extra 65,000
earlier, and it, in your considered judgment, requires some
additional funding for next fiscal year, it happens not to come
out of this subcommittee, it comes out of the Personnel
Subcommittee, but please share it with us, and then we want to
help you do that as quickly as possible.
General Casey. I'll do that.
Senator Lieberman. I thank you very much.
Senator Cornyn, do you have any closing remarks you'd like
to offer?
Senator Cornyn. None, except to express my gratitude, and I
look forward to working with both of you. My appreciation to
the Chairman for calling this important hearing. We have a lot
of work ahead of us, and I look forward to working with you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to express my
appreciation to General Casey. He's come back from Iraq, and
taken over this Chief of Staff position, but one of his first
things to do was travel around the country to our military
bases, with his wife, to determine the morale, the family
situation, and what can be done to improve it. I think that's
good leadership, and something we appreciate.
Senator Lieberman. Amen.
General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cornyn. If I can also include these soldiers, over
here against the wall as part of our appreciation.
Senator Lieberman. We all join in thanking you. God bless
you in your service.
We're going to leave the record of this hearing open for an
additional 10 days, if either of you want to submit any
additional responses or we have any additional questions for
you.
In the meantime, you have our thanks and our prayers.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
CURRENT FIRE SCOUT UTILITY
1. Senator Clinton. Secretary Geren and General Casey, the Army
will have eight Fire Scout air frames available in 2007, however
because of fielding delays of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
Cluster 1 and the Future Combat Systems (FCS), these eight Fire Scout
air frames will be placed in storage until the JTRS Cluster 1 and FCS
systems come on line. As a result the Fire Scout is not expected to
conduct its first flight until 2011. Recent testimony and reports from
deployed commanders indicate that increased unmanned aerial vehicle
coverage, if available, could be employed to assist in improvised
explosive device detection though continuous aerial surveillance. Can
the U.S. Army deploy the eight Fire Scouts today as currently
configured to meet this critical combat surveillance requirement?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. The eight Class IV Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS) you reference are pre-production air frames only. Five of
the eight airframes have been delivered to date. When the vehicles are
delivered from the contractor, the air vehicles consist of an airframe,
engine, transmission, rotor, and blades. They contain no sensor,
communications equipment, avionics or survivability equipment, nor are
they cabled to receive this equipment.
The UAS Class IV Preliminary Design Review is July 2008, the
Critical Design Review is July 2009, and First Flight is November 2010.
These dates are synchronized with the current overall FCS integrated
schedule. FCS has been working with Northrop Grumman, developer of the
Class IV, to explore earlier flight opportunities, but 3 continuous
years of decrements to the FCS budget limit the Army's ability to
achieve these opportunities. The FCS Class IV is meeting cost,
schedule, and performance objectives. Following System Integration, the
Army will assess the technical performance of the Class IV to determine
any potential acceleration opportunities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
IMPACT OF ARMY END STRENGTH INCREASES ON GLOBAL BASING
2. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren and General Casey, recent press
accounts have hinted that the Department of the Army is reconsidering
the drawdown of Army forces in Europe originally announced by the
President in 2004 as part of the Global Basing Realignment process for
U.S. military forces. Can you provide the status of whether increases
in Army end strength will cause a reconsideration of the overseas base
closures and realignments? If so, why?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. Army goals and strategy remain
consistent with ongoing Department efforts to improve posture and
presence to meet the National Security Strategy. The Army continues to
evaluate the impacts of current operational demands and of increases to
and rebalancing of structure. Adjustments to implementation timelines
may be an option. The Army remains cognizant and considerate of the
evolving strategic landscape, and continuously assesses basing and
mobility options to best posture forces to meet the combatant
commander's needs.
3. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren and General Casey, if the
Department of the Army does reconsider overseas base closures and
realignments, should they also reconsider base closures and
realignments in the United States to accommodate the increase in
forces?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. The Army will follow BRAC law in its
execution of base closures and realignment of installations in the
continental United States.
4. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren and General Casey, what changes
in the Department of the Army's global basing strategy would justify a
review of overseas base closures and realignments?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. Army strategy for global basing
remains focused on improving responsiveness, supporting combatant
commander's needs without undo presence or vulnerability, and
increasing our opportunities to work with new partners in the war on
terrorism. Work continues in very real terms to better align assets in
Europe and in the Pacific, to include Korea. We have already returned
thousands of soldiers and family members and have significantly
consolidated overseas facilities. The Army remains cognizant of the
changes to the strategic landscape, and its requirement to maintain
flexibility in defending against emerging global threats.
5. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren and General Casey, does the
Department of the Army have available land on its military bases in the
United States to support the basing, training, and operations of
additional combat and support brigades? If not, what plans are underway
to satisfy the land requirement?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. Analysis being conducted to support
upcoming Grow the Army stationing decisions include evaluation of
installation facilities and training resources, particularly maneuver
land and range sustainability. The Army currently has available space
at multiple installations to build facilities for additional Army
growth combat and combat support brigades. From a training perspective,
the stationing analysis for the six brigade combat teams (BCTs) will
include consideration of training land and ranges as a significant
factor. However, while the Army's requirement for training land grows,
the capacity of, and accessibility to Army lands is decreasing. There
are significant challenges that must be actively addressed to sustain
Army training readiness. Urbanization and urban sprawl, endangered
species, and environmental restrictions are encroaching on military
lands at Army installations.
STATUS OF ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE GROUP
6. Senator Warner. Secretary Geren and General Casey, I have been
following with keen interest the Army's establishment of a new mission
to develop doctrine, training, and operations for asymmetrical warfare.
I understand that the Department of the Army is still in the process of
determining an ideal location for a new unit that will combine
operations and training in one complex. I believe that such an ideal
location exists at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia. Can you provide me an
update of the Department of the Army's deliberations and the way-ahead
for the permanent establishment of this important venture?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. The Army staff will present several
courses of action and make a recommendation to regarding the stationing
of the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) in July. We will personally
review, and carefully consider, all relevant factors in deciding where
to locate the AWG headquarters and the Asymmetric Battle Laboratory
(ABL), formerly known as the Operational Demonstration Center.
Our final decision will be based primarily on stationing criteria
and cost and operational considerations. Community and economic impact
will also be considered. We realize this issue is important, and assure
you that we will contact you without delay once there is an official
Army position and prior to making a final determination.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Ensign
SMALL ARMS IMPROVEMENTS
7. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, we have been
engaged in the war on terror for nearly 6 years. In that time we have
seen tremendous improvement in soldier equipment. The body armor,
helmets, sights, night vision devices, radios, and uniforms that have
been fielded to our soldiers are a generation ahead of what our
soldiers had only a few years ago. This is due to significant attention
and funding both from Capitol Hill, and from all levels of command
within the Army. I applaud the Army's success in these areas,
particularly the success of the rapid fielding initiatives of Program
Executive Office soldier.
However, what concerns me is that this revolution in soldier
equipment has not included any significant improvement in soldier
weapons. With minor modifications, and the addition of certain
accessories, today's Army has the same M-16s, M4 Carbines, and 9mm
Beretta pistols that they had in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In the last 5 years the Army made a genuine effort to transition to
a modular weapon system, the XM-8, which had the ability to replace the
M-16, M4 Carbine, Designated Marksman Rifle, and the M-249 Squad
Automatic Weapon (SAW) through the use of a modular system with the
ability to swap components and barrels.
Without going into the details of why this program was terminated,
it appears that in the time since the termination of this program there
has been little effort to move ahead in researching new spiral
improvements to our small arms or incorporating commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) technologies to improve our weapons reliability, accuracy,
or lethality. What is the Army's plan for fielding small arms with
improved reliability, functionality, and modularity in the next 5 years
and the next 10 years?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. You are correct that many of our small
arms weapon designs are long-standing, but they are battle proven and
have the confidence of the overwhelming majority of our soldiers. Many
of the weapons we see throughout the world are based on technology/
designs that have been around for many years. Even though the small
arms weapons in the field today are the weapons of choice for our
soldiers, the designs are by no means perfect and we constantly make
assessments of the weapon systems through U.S. Army Infantry Center
post-combat surveys, testing, and engineering change proposals as we
continuously seek to enhance the effectiveness of our small arms. As an
example, the Army has improved the buffer, extractor spring assembly,
bolt life, and barrel chamber to increase the reliability of the M4
Carbine. Another example is making improvements to the feed tray
retaining pawls and operating rod of the M249 to improve its
reliability.
The Army recently completed an extensive test to baseline the
existing reliability of the M4, M16, and M249 in a ``dirty''
environment to simulate, and in most cases, exceed the conditions our
soldiers face in Iraq and Afghanistan. The results are on the compact
disk included with this response. [Information retained in committee
files.]
The Center for Naval Analysis recently completed a comprehensive
survey of battle tested soldiers to assess their perspectives on the
reliability and durability of their weapon systems in combat. The Army
requested this survey to aid in decisions regarding current and future
small arms needs of the Army. The survey reinforced the fact that our
current weapons exceed the Army's reliability requirements and our
soldiers have shown a consistently high confidence in them. In addition
to making improvements to the weapons, we also, through the Rapid
Fielding Initiative, provide our soldiers numerous weapon accessories
such as optics, rail systems, tactical lights, bipods, improved
buttstocks, et cetera, to improve their ability to acquire and engage
targets at various ranges under all conditions.
The Infantry Center is conducting a capabilities based assessment
(CBA) to identify existing small arms capability gaps and to provide
the analysis that supports revising or establishing new small arms
requirements, as necessary. These new or revised requirements, if
necessary, should provide the basis for improved reliability,
functionality, and modularity, as well as possible leap-ahead
capabilities such as counter defilade target engagement. Results of the
CBA are expected to emerge over the next 6-18 months and will be the
impetus for revising or creating Joint Capability Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) compliant requirement documents. If the
revised or new small arms requirement documents are approved by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Army intends to meet
those small arms requirements through full and open performance-based
competitions.
M4 REQUIREMENT DOCUMENT
8. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, the M4
requirement document was drafted in 1990. It is 17 years old. The
performance requirements in this document have clearly been surpassed
by new technologies both from M4 manufacturer Colt, and from other
manufacturers. Why hasn't the Army generated a new requirement document
that demands better performance?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. The Army adopted the U.S. Marine Corps
Required Operational Capability (ROC) for a 5.56 mm Carbine in 1990.
Although the M4 requirement document has not been revised since
adoption, the M4 has matured and been improved via a series of
engineering modifications and product improvement initiatives. The M4's
effectiveness has also been significantly enhanced through improvements
such as the Modular Weapons System (MWS) and the Close Combat Optic
(CCO) and through meeting immediate wartime needs via the Rapid
Fielding Initiative (RFI). Only MWS and CCO required new requirements
documents.
In 1990, the 5.56mm Carbine ROC identified the weapon's Mean Rounds
Between Stoppage (MRBS) threshold requirement as 600 rounds and Mean
Rounds Between Failure (MRBF) as 3,800 rounds. Current 2006 reliability
data for the M4 enumerate MRBS at 3,592 and MBRF at 6,076 and is a
testament to subsequent M4 engineering improvements.
The M4 Carbine is a mature, reliable 21st century weapon system
with still to be determined potential for improvement. The Army is
currently executing a Capability Based Assessment (CBA) to be published
in July 2007. The CBA will identify current and future capability gaps
and help us define a Small Arms Strategy for future weapons.
9. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, why is the
Army planning to spend at least $300 million to procure roughly 400,000
rifles using a 17-year-old requirement document, instead of publishing
a new requirement?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. The Army is planning to procure
additional M4 Carbines because the M4 Required Operational Capability
(ROC) is the Army's existing approved carbine requirement and the Army
has not yet achieved its goal of pure-fleeting all of its BCTs with
carbines nor met the current total Army documented M4 requirement.
Additionally, the Army is continuing to review the need for carbines
throughout the total force to put more maneuverable 5.56mm caliber
weapons in the hands of our combat support and combat service support
personnel that work in confined spaces such as in convoy vehicles and
armored transports. The existing Army Acquisition Objective is for
406,276 carbines. The Army, as of April 2007, has approximately 253,019
carbines (both M4s and M4A1s) on hand. Regarding a new carbine
requirement, the Infantry Center is conducting a CBA to identify
potential small arms capability gaps. The CBA will provide the analysis
that supports revising or maintaining the current carbine requirement.
If the carbine requirement significantly changes, the Army will conduct
a performance-based open competition.
M4 COMPETITION
10. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, from the
early 1990s the M4 has been a sole-source contract to the original
manufacturer, Colt. A number of manufacturers produce weapons based on
the over 40-year-old M-16 design that are virtually identical in form
and function. Other manufacturers have competed and won contracts with
special operations, other Federal agencies, local law enforcement
agencies, and foreign countries with similar systems. Why has the Army
continued to sole-source this M4 contract to Colt?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. The M4 Carbine is contracted to a
technical data package (TDP) which provides detailed drawings,
specifications, quality assurance, and packaging requirements. The data
rights are defined in an addendum to the M16 license between Colt and
the government. Pursuant to the terms of the addendum, the M4 Carbine
(as defined by the TDP) and M4 Carbine unique parts not common to the
M16 must be sole sourced to Colt through June 2009. After that date,
the government will have the right to compete the M4 Carbine TDP within
the United States and its territories. The Army continues to procure M4
Carbines through sole source procurement because the M4 ROC is the only
existing approved requirement that allows the fielding of M4s to meet
the Army's requirement for carbines. The Army fully intends to compete
the M4 TDP in July 2009, or when a new requirement is approved. The
Infantry Center is currently conducting a CBA to determine small arms
capability gaps and provide the analysis that supports revising any
necessary carbine requirements. Should the analysis show that a
materiel solution is necessary because the carbine requirement has
changed significantly, the Army will conduct a performance-based
competition.
11. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, is the Army
in compliance with the Competition in Contracting Act in executing this
contract?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. Yes. The FAR 6.101(a) states 10 U.S.C.
2304 and 41 U.S.C. 253 require, with certain limited exceptions, that
contracting officers shall promote and provide for full and open
competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government contracts. The
exceptions for other than full and open competition are listed in FAR
Subpart 6.3. The exception used in the sole source Justification and
Approval (J&A) documents supporting a sole source award to Colt for M4
Carbines was FAR 6.302-1--Only One Responsible Source and No Other
Supplies or Services will Satisfy Agency Requirements as authorized by
Title 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1). A J&A was prepared and approved at the
appropriate approval level prior to the award of each sole source
contract award. Based on this information, the Army is in compliance
with the Competition in Contracting Act.
12. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, can you
provide the last 6 years' justifications for sole-source contracting on
all of your small arms accounts?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. [Information retained in committee
files.]
13. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, can you
provide the year-by-year unit price of the M4, and the price of the
added accessories that the Army has paid each year since inception, as
well as the total amount of funds contracted for the M4?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. Yes. See spreadsheet for the requested
unit prices. The total amount of funds the Army has obligated to date
for the M4 is $188 million.
14. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, are there
any plans to incorporate COTS improvements into the M4 weapon system?
Mr. Geren and General Casey. Yes, improvements have already been
incorporated. Specifically, the M4 Adapter Rail System is a COTS
procurement that is delivered installed on the M4 Carbine in lieu of
traditional handguards. This provides a standardized interface for
attachment of additional accessories. The Rapid Fielding Initiative
provides other COTS devices directly to soldiers to permit
configuration of the system to better meet specific mission
requirements. These devices include optical sights, improved
buttstocks, tactical lights, slings, bipods, a magazine holder, and an
improved cleaning kit, all of which add to the soldiers' combat
effectiveness.
M-16 AND 9MM STOPPING POWER
15. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, since the M-
16 was introduced in the 1960s there have been complaints concerning
the reliability of the weapon system and the stopping power of the
5.56mm round. There have also been complaints related to the stopping
power of the 9mm pistol round. Are there draft or pending reports on
the reliability and stopping power issues related to small arms? If so,
please provide them.
Mr. Geren and General Casey. Yes, there are reports on the
reliability and stopping power related to these weapons and the 5.56mm
cartridge. The M4 Carbine, the M16 Rifle, and the M249 SAW meet or
exceed their requirements when adequately maintained (see the attached
system assessment and survey on the reliability of the M4, M16, and
M249 and the Executive Summary for the Joint Services Wound Ballistics
Integrated Process Team on the enclosed compact disk). [Information
retained in committee files.]
The stopping power of the standard issue 5.56mm round (M855) has
been assessed by the Army. Related assessments and studies indicate
that shot placement far outweighs the minor terminal ballistic
performance differences among the 5.56mm rounds-both military and
commercial. The range of performance is broad largely due to striking
yaw angle, muzzle velocity, and other factors (see the Executive
Summary for the Joint Services Wound Ballistics Integrated Process
Team). [Information retained in committee files.] The stopping power of
the 9mm pistol cartridge has not been formally tested but will be
examined in a future effort.
16. Senator Ensign. Secretary Geren and General Casey, does the
Army have any plans to research, test, or procure new ammunition in the
same or other calibers as a replacement to the current 5.56, 9mm, and
7.62 ammunition? Please provide any research data and results.
Mr. Geren and General Casey. The Army has no current plans to
procure new caliber ammunition. We are testing a replacement to the
standard issue 5.56mm round (M855) that eliminates the environmentally
hazardous material lead, while maintaining or exceeding the current
round's performance. A follow-on program in 7.62mm with the same goals
is in the planning stages and will be based on the success of the
replacement 5.56mm round.
The Army is currently completing a Small Arms CBA to identify
current and future small arms needs. In the longer term a future family
of more effective and lighter weight weapons may be required. In order
to help advance technologies to lead into a future family of weapons,
several research and technology programs are planned and underway.
Under the Joint Service Small Arms Program, the Army and the other
Services are looking at technology to provide a 50 percent reduction in
ammunition weight and the potential of more effectiveness. Several
technologies are being matured that could offer this potential. Once
these technologies are matured and demonstrated in the fiscal year 2010
timeframe, the Army and the other Services will be in a position to
determine if they are desired in a future family of small arms systems.
As these technologies are matured and demonstrated over the next few
years, the impact on production costs and facilities must also be
determined. As these technologies require new and different weapon
mechanisms, the potential for caliber changes at the same time is
feasible. A study is currently underway to quantify and document the
trade-offs associated with other calibers. Research is underway to set
the base for new rounds of small caliber ammunition in either the same
or different calibers. No decisions to move in that direction will be
made until the completion of the CBA and the completion of the
supporting technology programs in 2010. In any event fielding would not
be likely before 2015-2020.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2008
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
AIR FORCE AND NAVY AVIATION PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:07 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Warner,
Sessions, and Cornyn.
Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; and Sean G. Stackley, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris and Jessica L.
Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Nadia Naviwala, assistant to
Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Todd
Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; and Clyde A. Taylor
IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Good afternoon. The subcommittee
will come to order.
I want to extend a welcome to our witnesses, and thank each
of you for appearing before the subcommittee today.
I want to take this occasion to note the service,
professionalism, and heroism of the coalition Armed Forces
presently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. All those who are
serving our country in the Middle East right now represent, in
my opinion, the best, brightest, and bravest that our country
has to offer. Our thoughts and prayers are with them and their
families, who are also called by our country to serve in this
noble effort, and we pray for their success.
It's against this backdrop of the war that was started
against us by the Islamist terrorists who attacked us on
September 11, and the backdrop of continued bravery and
exemplary service by the members of our Armed Forces, that we
convene this session of the Airland Subcommittee to discuss the
present status and the future of aviation programs throughout
our military.
Every year, we're faced with the challenge of balancing a
number of competing demands for resources, including, of
course, the demands of current operations, as well as the need
to continue to modernize. The decisions we make today are
important, because they may result in lives saved--that's our
hope, certainly--in the next few months, or many years down the
road.
I want to mention, at the beginning here, just a few of
those decisions in the jurisdiction of this subcommittee that I
hope we will be able to discuss with our witnesses.
First, last year Congress authorized the Air Force to enter
into a multiyear procurement contract for the F-22A aircraft
program. It would be helpful to the subcommittee to get an
update on the Air Force's progress in getting firmer estimates
of the savings that will be realized by using this contracting
approach.
Second, we'd also like an update on where the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) stands today. We all know how important JSF is to
the aviation modernization for all three services represented
here today.
Third, we need to explore the prospects for meeting future
force-structure requirements. For example, today we're facing
the prospect that the current Department of Navy program will
lead to potentially large gaps between the resources that the
Chief of Naval Operations has said he needs and the resources
that will actually be available to him and his successors,
particularly. Under current plans for Navy and Marine Corps
tactical aircraft acquisition, we are facing a shortfall of as
many as 150 tactical fighters needed to outfit our ten
aircraft-carrier air wings. With shortfalls that large, we
could be faced with drastically reduced numbers of aircraft
available on short notice to the combatant commanders, either
because we've deployed under-strength air wings or because we
did not deploy the carrier at all, because of those aircraft
shortages.
Fourth, I'm concerned about the Air Force's plan this year
to cancel the larger version of the Multi-Platform Radar
Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP). This program would have
outfitted a new aircraft with a larger electronically-scanned
antenna to conduct battlefield surveillance that would exceed
the capability of the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. I know that the Air Force
continues to pursue fielding of a smaller version of the MP-
RTIP radar on the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),
but that version will not provide the full capability that
would be available on a larger aircraft.
Fifth, we've been hearing about concerns within the
Department of Defense (DOD) about the process for managing
UAVs. At the risk of starting what could be an animated
conversation among the five gentlemen at the table, we need to
hear from our witnesses today about their views on this
question.
Finally, sixth, on the tanker modernization program, I
appreciate that the Air Force leadership has taken special
measures to ensure transparency in the tanker acquisition
process. I believe that this level of openness is an excellent
model for how the Air Force and all the components of the DOD
should deal with Congress, and I'd like to hear an update on
that.
Those are some of the issues I look forward to discussing
with our witnesses. I thank you very much for being here. I'm
honored now to yield to my distinguished friend and ranking
member, Senator John Cornyn of Texas.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN CORNYN
Senator Cornyn. Chairman Lieberman, thanks. It's a pleasure
to be here with you today.
Thanks to all the witnesses for being here.
While many of us focus on the contributions of U.S. ground
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so, the efforts of
U.S. aviators, on behalf of our Nation, are nothing short of
exceptional. Our aviators have been actively engaged in the
U.S. Central Command area of operations for 16 years--the first
Gulf war, enforcement of the Iraq no-fly zones, and now
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
Those deployments, in addition to operations in Bosnia,
Kosovo, and elsewhere throughout the world in support of
humanitarian efforts, have made maximum use of our Nation's air
forces. Allow me to express my gratitude to those men and
women, and their families, as they continue their selfless
sacrifice.
While we recognize the joint aviation team's invaluable
contribution to defense and security of our Nation, the
challenges with ongoing programs make it seem like we're
fighting the same budget and policy battles we did last year.
Given that most of these issues have been analyzed and debated
during the course of the past year, it's my hope that this
hearing will provide some clarity as we continue this year's
budget deliberations.
Last year, during an Airland Subcommittee hearing, Navy
witnesses testified of a potential gap in strike fighters that
might develop toward the end of the next decade. While the
uncertainties of the service life of the current F-18s and the
production schedules of the future F-35 were mentioned, the
potential gap now under discussion reaches more than 220 Navy
aircraft by the middle of the next decade. I hope our Navy
witnesses will address this troubling figure and the rationale
behind reducing the number of F-35 JSFs by 590 aircraft across
the Future Years Defense Program.
Similarly, I would expect the Air Force witnesses to
discuss their long-range strike-fighter requirements in current
funding plans. In the fiscal year 2008 President's budget
request, the F-35 JSF Program eliminates funding for the
development of a second engine production source. I note the
presence here of the ranking member of the committee, who I
know has a particular interest in that issue.
Last year, we held extensive hearings on the pros and cons
of maintaining a competitive environment for the production of
military aircraft engines. In the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress required that
three separate groups--the Government Accountability Office,
the Institute for Defense Analysis, and the Pentagon's Cost
Analysis Improvement Group--study the cost and benefits of
developing a second engine source. Yet, the fiscal year 2008
budget eliminated funding for a second engine source before the
analysis was complete. I hope our witnesses will discuss the
decisionmaking process that led to the decision to cancel the
second engine, and their thoughts on both of the three studies
and the way ahead.
Last year, the Air Force proffered a multiyear procurement
proposal for the F-22 aircraft, which the chairman mentioned,
in which ``substantial savings'' as defined in applicable law
were questioned by some. In the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress reiterated the need for the
Department to ensure the applicable requirements were met
before certifying the F-22 multiyear. I hope the witnesses will
address where we are on this certification.
These are a few of the issues I would expect to cover this
afternoon. Again, I thank the witnesses for appearing, and look
forward to your testimony.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Cornyn.
I note the presence of the--I'm going to give you a new
title today--the chairman emeritus of the full Armed Services
Committee. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman. Senator Warner, would you like to make
an opening statement?
Senator Warner. Let the record say that there's no pay that
comes with that title. [Laughter.]
We have before us an array of distinguished public
servants, and, notable, those in uniform, which are literally
the envy of all of their respective Services.
I know of no more driving excitement in young people than--
certainly in my generation, than that who was to succeed to
some sort of an aviation billet. My career was very
inauspicious. I became a ground officer with aviation units.
But I've always admired those that wear the Wings of Gold, or
the Air Force wings.
You're here today on a most important mission. I think it
was appropriate that you opened the session in honor of the men
and women who are flying, sailing, and ground-pounding today.
We just had a historic vote in the United States Senate a
short time ago, and I think the world is trying to study what
the significance is. But let me say that there's a great phrase
that I like--it's on the National Archives--``The Past is
Prologue.'' That vote is behind us, and the three of us, I'm
sure, are going to be quite active in the days and weeks to
come to see what we can do to reconcile the differences between
honest, conscientious viewpoints on both sides of the aisle,
and promptly get out a bill to fund the very programs that
you're seeking to support here today. Most important, to get a
good, steady funding profile for the men and women of the Armed
Forces, wherever they are in the world, most notably Iraq and
Afghanistan.
So, with that, thank you for the courtesy of letting me
make a few remarks here, Mr. Chairman. Let's hear from our
witnesses.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Warner.
Mr. Balderson, I'd be honored to have you speak first.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BALDERSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, AIR
PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Mr. Balderson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Cornyn, Senator Warner, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Navy/Marine
Corps aviation programs.
I do have a written statement that I will submit for the
record. Out of respect for the committee's time, I intend to
limit my opening remarks to just the following two points:
First, we believe the Navy's fiscal year 2008 budget
submission meets our Navy/Marine Corps warfighting requirements
for both near-term readiness and long-term recapitalization.
Second, the Department of the Navy's acquisition team
continues to work aggressively to identify efficiencies in the
development, testing, and procurement of the products and
services we provide to the fleet.
The fiscal year 2008 budget request reflects considerable
effort in identifying affordable solutions for the Department's
aviation programs, and we are striving to address the Navy/
Marine Corps warfighting needs in the most cost-effective way
possible.
Mr. Chairman, I'll conclude by thanking the members of this
subcommittee for your outstanding support. The great efforts of
our men and women in theater today will reflect a return on
your investment in them and the systems that they fight with.
Once again, thank you, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Balderson follows:]
Prepared Statement by William Balderson
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of your subcommittee, thank you
for providing us with this opportunity to appear before you to discuss
the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2008 aviation programs.
AVIATION PROGRAMS
The fiscal year 2008 President's budget request balances continued
recapitalization in obtaining new capabilities and reducing operating
costs while simultaneously sustaining the legacy fleet aircraft that
are performing magnificently in current operations. We continue to
execute numerous multiyear procurements (MYP) to achieve significant
savings in procurement accounts. The Department's fiscal year 2008
budget request continues MYP arrangements for the F/A-18 E/F (airframe
only), KC-130J, MH-60S (engines and airframe), MH-60R (airframe), and
the V-22. Our proposed plan will procure 48 tactical, fixed-wing
aircraft (6 F-35Bs, 24 F/A-18 E/Fs, and 18 EA-18Gs), as well as, 21 MV-
22s, 4 KC-130Js, 20 UH-1Y/AH-1Z helicopters, 18 MH-60S helicopters, and
27 MH-60R helicopters. This plan also continues the development of the
F-35, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, the EA-18G, the Presidential
Helicopter replacement aircraft (VH-71), the CH-53K Heavy Lift
Replacement aircraft and the P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft
(MMA).
F/A-18 E/F
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $2.1 billion in APN for 24 F/
A-18 E/F aircraft for the 4th year of the 5-year MYP contract (fiscal
years 2005 to 2009). The F/A-18 E/F continues to transition into the
fleet, improving the survivability and strike capability of the carrier
air wing. The Super Hornet provides a 40 percent increase in combat
radius, 50 percent increase in endurance, and 25 percent increase in
weapons payload over our older Hornets. Over 386 F/A-18 E/Fs will be
procured through fiscal year 2007, on track to complete procurement of
the program of record 490 aircraft in 2012. The Super Hornet has used a
spiral development approach to incorporate new technologies, such as
the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advanced Targeting Forward-
Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), Shared Reconnaissance Pod System and
Multifunctional Information Distribution System data link. The Active
Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system has completed
operational testing and the full rate production decision is scheduled
for spring 2007. The first tactical AESA equipped F/A-18F squadron has
now received all 12 of its allotted aircraft with full ILS support. The
FA-18E/F fiscal year 2008 budget request also includes $442 million to
implement commonality, maintain capabilities and improve reliability
and structural safety.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $1.7 billion research,
development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) for continuation of F-35
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) and $1.3 billion APN
(including spares) for the DoN Low Rate Initial Production lot two
(LRIP 2) for six Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft
with $120 million long-lead funding for eight STOVL aircraft as part of
LRIP 3. As a 5th generation weapon system, the JSF will enhance
precision strike capability with unprecedented stealth, range, sensor
fusion, improved radar performance, combat identification, and
electronic attack capabilities compared to legacy platforms. The
carrier variant (CV) JSF complements the F/A-18 E/F and EA-18G in
providing long-range strike capability and much improved persistence
over the battlefield. The STOVL JSF combines the multi-role versatility
of the F/A-18 and the basing flexibility of the AV-8B. The commonality
designed into the JSF program will reduce acquisition and operating
costs of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft, and allow enhanced
interoperability with our Allies and sister Services.
The JSF is mid-way through the 6th year of SDD, executing to the
approved replan that commenced 3 years ago. The program continues
detailed design work for all three variants, with the LRIP 1 contract
for two conventional take off and landing (CTOL) aircraft planned for
April 2007. The initial CTOL aircraft (AA-1) successfully completed
first flight on December 15, 2006; flew six times in January 2007, and
resumed flights in March following a planned maintenance period. AA-1
flights will continue over the next 2 years. Manufacture and assembly
of other flight test aircraft is well underway, with assembly times
much less than planned and exceptional quality demonstrated in
fabrication, assembly and mate. Eleven development aircraft are now in
various phases of assembly. STOVL first flight is projected in May 2008
reflecting a delay to incorporate lessons learned from the manufacture
of the first CTOL aircraft.
The JSF program has aggressively addressed earlier performance
issues associated with weight and airframe design. Weight control
remains a focus and priority of the program and weight reduction trades
continue to be investigated. The first test aircraft was completed with
unprecedented assembly fit and quality, problem-free power-on, rapid
execution of engine and secondary-power tests and actual weight within
0.1 percent of predicted. While the first test aircraft lacks some
design changes, demonstrated manufacturing processes and outcomes
justify high confidence in design and weight predictions for all
variants due to commonality of design, tools and manufacturing methods.
The F135 engine development is on track with performance meeting
expectations. Over 7,300 hours on 12 engines have been completed
through early April 2007. The JSF acquisition strategy, including
software development, continues to reflect a block approach. The CTOL/
STOVL Air System Critical Design Review was successfully completed in
March 2006. The CV Air System Critical Design Review is scheduled for
summer 2007, and will evaluate design maturity and performance against
requirements. The STOVL and CV variants are projected to meet their
respective Key Performance Parameters.
The DoN supports the President's budget request not to provide
funding for JSF alternate engine (F136) development. The DoN maintains
there are higher priority needs in the budget and that the risks
associated with a single engine supplier are acceptable. The National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 directed three
independent analyses of alternatives propulsion strategies including
various cost implications. The studies by the Institute for Defense
Analyses, Cost and Analysis Improvement Group, and Government
Accountability Office have been completed. The conclusions, while
supportive of competition in general, support the Department's initial
findings that the expected savings from competition do not outweigh the
investment costs. All three studies however, concluded that other
benefits might result from competition. The costs to establish an
alternative engine, however outweigh those potential benefits.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (AHE)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $809.0 million in RDT&E for
continuation of SDD and three pilot production aircraft. The E-2D
Advanced Hawkeye is a critical enabler of transformational
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, providing a robust
overland capability against current and future cruise missile-type
targets. The Advanced Hawkeye program modernizes the E-2 platform by
replacing the current radar and other system components to maintain
open ocean capability while adding transformational surveillance as
well as theater air and missile defense capabilities.
F/A-18 A/B/C/D
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $442 million for the
continuation of the systems upgrade programs for the F/A-18 platform.
As the F/A-18 program transitions to the F/A-18 E/F, the existing
inventory of over 662 F/A-18 A/B/C/Ds will continue to comprise half of
the Carrier Strike Group until 2012. Included in this request is the
continued procurement of recently fielded systems such as the Joint
Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advanced Targeting FLIR, Multi-Function
Information Distribution System, and Digital Communications System. The
Marine Corps continues to upgrade 61 Lot 7-11 F/A-18A models to Lot 17
F/A-18C avionics aircraft capability with digital communications and
tactical data link. The Marine Corps anticipates programmed upgrades to
enhance the current capabilities of the F/A-18 C/D with digital
communications, tactical data link and tactical reconnaissance systems.
This upgrade ensures that our F/A-18s remain viable and relevant in
support of Tactical Air Integration and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.
The Marines expect the F/A-18A+ to remain in the active inventory until
2018. The Marines are also employing the Litening targeting pod on the
F/A-18 C/D aircraft in expeditionary operations, to include OIF. When
combined with data link hardware, the Litening pod provides real time
video to ground forces engaged with the enemy through Remotely Operated
Video Enhanced Receiver workstations. Continued analysis on tactical
air inventories will continue throughout 2007 and beyond to determine
the health of the legacy fleet as the F/A-18 A-D is transitioned to the
F-35.
EA-6B
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $30.6 million in APN for
procurement of critical Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) products and
continuing EA-6B upgrades and readiness improvements that increase the
operational availability and reduce operating cost of this high demand
aircraft. Upgrades include procuring 10 Low Band Transmitters to
provide a new jamming capability as well as replace aging transmitters
and will be employed on EA-6B and EA-18G aircraft. The budget request
also provides for Operational Safety Improvement Program procurements
for avionics and structural equipment. The EA-6B is in near continuous
use in Iraq and Afghanistan today in support of our troops on the
ground as DOD's only tactical electronic attack aircraft performing
communications jamming and information operations missions. Program
priorities are current readiness, successful continued deployment of
ICAP III aircraft, and continued procurement of low-band transmitters.
EA-18G
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $273 million in RDT&E for
continuation of SDD and $1.32 billion in APN for 18 LRIP Lot 2
aircraft. The E/A-18G continues development as the Navy's replacement
for the EA-6B AEA aircraft. The EA-18G will replace carrier-based Navy
EA-6B aircraft by 2012. The Navy is using the F/A-18 E/F MYP contract
to buy the Lot 2 aircraft in fiscal year 2008. The SDD continues on
schedule with the two development aircraft having flown in 2006 and
currently in developmental test at NAWC Patuxent River. A total
quantity of 26 aircraft will be procured in LRIP with a planned fiscal
year 2009 initial operational capability (IOC) and fiscal year 2012
FOC.
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $131.4 million in aircraft
procurement for the procurement of 61 ALQ-214 on-board Radio Frequency
Countermeasure and $25.0 million in Ammunition Procurement for 581 ALE-
55 Fiber Optic Towed Decoys, pending a full-rate production decision.
The IDECM Block 3/ALE-55 Operational Test and Evaluation identified and
a full-rate production decision are expected to be completed in fiscal
year 2008.
Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) Onboard Jammer
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $8.2 million in RDT&E for
development of an onboard jammer that will employ state-of-the-art
Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) devices to replace the ALQ-126B
Jammer that was last produced in 1991. This effort will measurably
improve the survivability of naval tactical aircraft by delaying,
denying, and defeating threat air-to-air and surface-to-air missile
systems operating in the radio frequency spectrum. The lead platform
for the DRFM program is the F/A-18 C/D, followed by the AV-8B. An
Analysis of Alternatives has been initiated to investigate alternative
solutions, costs, and schedules. This developmental effort is late-to-
need and the capability is required to pace rapidly proliferating
threat systems.
Tactical Aircraft Directed Infrared Countermeasures (TADIRCM)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $27.6 million in RDT&E for
development of an improved Missile Warning System (MWS) and Infrared
Countermeasure (IRCM) for Navy and Marine Corps helicopters. This
system will provide aircrew protection against current and next
generation IR guided Manportable Air Defense System. The analysis of
alternatives for TADIRCM has been completed, and the program is working
towards a Milestone B in fiscal year 2008.
V-22
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $2.0 billion in APN for
procurement of 21 MV-22s and continued development of follow-on block
upgrades. Our acquisition strategy calls for commencing a MYP in fiscal
year 2008. Our MYP strategy supports a continued cost reduction and
affordability trend, provides a stable basis for industry, and best
supports the warfighter. The Advance Acquisition Contract funding
associated with the first year of the MYP and fiscal year 2007 Economic
Ordering Quantity and Cost Reduction Investments is planned for award
in spring 2007. The Air Force and Special Operations Command plan is to
procure five CV-22 aircraft in fiscal year 2008.
The Navy is the lead service in developing, testing, evaluating,
procuring, and fielding a tilt rotor, Vertical/Short Takeoff and
Landing (V/STOL) aircraft for Joint Service application. The V-22
Program is designed to provide an aircraft to meet the amphibious/
vertical assault needs of the Marine Corps, the strike rescue needs of
the Navy, and the special operations needs of the Air Force and Special
Operations Command. The MV-22 variant will replace the CH-46E and CH-
53D in the Marine Corps and supplement the H-60 in the Navy. The CV-22
variant provides a new capability and will augment the MC-130 in the
Air Force/Special Operations Command inventory for special operations
infiltration, extraction, and re-supply missions. The existing MH-53
fleet will be drawn down commensurate with the fielding of the CV-22.
V-22 capability is being increased and fielded over time via a
block upgrade acquisition strategy. MV-22 Block A provides a ``Safe and
Operational Test and Training Asset'' configuration that is supporting
developmental flight test, operational flight test and fleet training.
Block B provides for correction of previously identified deficiencies
and suitability improvements. Block C provides mission enhancements,
primarily in the areas of environmental control systems upgrades and
mission systems improvements. CV-22 Block 0/10 is a CV-unique
configuration for Special Operations capabilities to include radar and
electronic countermeasures upgrades. CV-22 Block 20 provides an
enhanced CV-unique configuration with planned communications and
aircraft system performance upgrades. Both Osprey variants continue
along their prescribed roadmaps for follow-on developmental and
operational test.
The V-22 program has successfully completed operational evaluation.
Follow-on Test and Evaluation activities continue on MV-22 aircraft in
support of envelope expansion and engineering change incorporation. The
MV-22 looks forward to an IOC decision in 2007. The CV-22 began Block
0/10 operational testing in the summer of 2006 with an Operational
Utility Evaluation to allow release of an initial training capability.
IOT&E, scheduled to begin in October 2007, will test the balance of the
CV-22 capabilities and support an IOC decision (2009) for worldwide
operations.
AH-1Z/UH-1Y
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $518.5 million in APN for 20
AH-1Z/UH-1Y aircraft and $3.6 million in RDT&E for continuation of H-1
Upgrades Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The H-1 Upgrades
Program will replace the Marine Corps' AH-1W and UH-1N helicopters with
state-of-the-art AH-1Z and UH-1Y models. The program is a key
modernization effort designed to resolve existing safety deficiencies,
enhance operational effectiveness, and extend the service life of both
aircraft. Additionally, the commonality gained between the AH-1Z and
UH-1Y (84 percent) will significantly reduce life-cycle costs and
logistical footprint, while increasing the maintainability and
deployability of both aircraft. The program will remanufacture 180 AH-
1W helicopters into AH-1Zs, remanufacture 10 UH-1N/HH-1N into UH-1Y
helicopters, and build 90 new UH-1Y models.
The first low-rate production aircraft was delivered in January
2007, and the final phase of OPEVAL will be completed in the second
quarter of fiscal year 2008. The program continues to seek
opportunities to reduce unit cost and minimize the negative impact the
remanufacture strategy could have on ongoing military operations. We
anticipate that some number of AH-1Z airframes will be newly fabricated
instead of remanufactured in order to reduce the amount of time
aircraft would otherwise be out of service. Funding to establish the
capability to build complete AH-1Z aircraft has been requested in the
fiscal year 2007 global war on terror supplemental. The optimum mix of
remanufactured and newly fabricated aircraft is being evaluated with
the results to be reflected in future budget requests.
AV-8B
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $17.4 million RDT&E funds to
support development of the Propulsion System Management Plan (PSMP)/
Accelerated Simulated Mission Endurance Testing (ASMET), Tactical
Moving Map Display, Litening Pod updates, and Aircraft Handling
initiatives (including the Readiness Management Plan). The fiscal year
2008 budget also requests $40.5 million procurement funding for Engine
Production Line Transition efforts, Open Systems Core Avionics
Requirement (OSCAR) installs, PSMP upgrades, engine accessory
obsolescence efforts, Day Attack Upgrade/Attrition Recovery efforts,
Trainer aircraft upgrade efforts, Litening Pod upgrades, and Litening
Pods on the aircraft centerline.
WEAPONS
In an era of uncertainty and shifting global threats, the
Department of the Navy is developing and deploying strike weapons to
enhance warfighter capabilities in an evolving threat environment. Our
proposed budget would provide resources for weapon system enhancements
to directly support troops deployed in the field, as well as continue
to plan for potential near-peer competitors. Our plans take into
account the lessons-learned from ongoing combat operations as well as
the results of our research and development efforts. The fiscal year
2008 weapons budget provides for affordable Strike and Precision Guided
Weapons programs to ensure that America is secure at home; sea and air
lanes are open for peaceful, productive commerce; and the capability
developed and delivered is large enough, agile enough, and lethal
enough to deter threats and defeat foes in support of joint and
coalition forces.
Tactical Tomahawk Cruise Missiles
The Tactical Tomahawk budget request supports the continued
procurement of this combat-proven, deep-attack weapon in order to
replenish inventories that were diminished during combat operations.
Tomahawk cruise missiles are currently being procured in a 5-year firm
fixed price, MYP contract that saves the taxpayers approximately 12
percent over annual procurement contacts. The fiscal year 2008 budget
request is $383.1 million for an additional 394 Block IV Tomahawk
missiles and associated support.
Hellfire Weapons
While the Department of the Navy awaits Department of Defense
direction on the development path for a next-generation forward firing
precision-guided munition capable of being launched from fixed-wing,
rotary-wing, and unmanned platforms, we are requesting continued
support for legacy Hellfire weapons. Hellfire continues to be one of
the priority weapons in the global war on terrorism and provides our
Navy/Marine Corps warfighters the ability to attack targets in the
caves of Afghanistan as well as the urban canyons of Baghdad. Our
fiscal year 2008 budget request is for $45.7 million for 439 weapons
with a mix of thermobaric blast/fragmentation and anti-armor warheads
that provide operational flexibility to the warfighter.
Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (DAMTC)
Based upon feedback from the combatant commanders in Iraq and
Afghanistan--and subsequently approved as a capability gap documented
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff--the Department of the Navy plans to
improve our ability to attack and strike moving targets. Our fiscal
year 2008 budget requests $29.1 million in fiscal year 2008 and $214.5
million across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for the DAMTC
program. The program seeks to modify the existing inventory of `Direct
Attack' Joint Direct Attack Munition and or Laser Guided Bomb weapons
as the foundation for a dual-mode weapon that is capable of prosecuting
moving targets. The acquisition will be conducted expeditiously to
respond to an urgent warfighter need for a fixed-wing aircraft moving
target weapon. Initial Operating Capability is planned to occur in
fiscal year 2009.
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
The combat-proven JSOW family of joint Navy and Air Force air-to-
ground weapons continues on cost and schedule to develop a JSOW C-1
variant. JSOW C-1 will provide a moving target capability to this
``Standoff Outside Area Defense'' weapon with the addition of a
datalink and guidance software improvements to the highly successful
JSOW-C variant. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $24.9 million to
allow for continued BLK III development and $131.3 million for
continued JSOW-C production totaling 421 all-up-rounds to fill
inventories that remain below our approved Non-Nuclear Ordnance
Requirements. Production of other JSOW variants remains deferred as we
continue to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and our
sister Services to resolve unexploded battlefield ordnance issues that
are of a concern to the Department and our Allies.
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)
The AARGM development program will deliver a multi-spectral
targeting capability, with supersonic fly-out, to destroy sophisticated
enemy air defenses and time-sensitive strike targets. The program has
completed all design reviews and will begin test firings this year. The
weapon system will utilize and leverage off of integrated networks, and
is scheduled to be deployed in fiscal year 2009 on the F/A-18 Hornet.
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $32.8 million for the development
and test program and requests $41.3 million for the first Low-Rate
Initial Production of tactical and training weapons.
Harpoon Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
The Department of the Navy is requesting upgrade of our surface-
launched and air-launched Harpoon cruise missiles to provide the all-
weather, anti-surface warfare capability needed to operate with
`improved selectivity' in the cluttered environment of the littoral
battlespace. Under the Harpoon BLK III Program, we plan on upgrading
this very capable system to improve selectivity and enhance our
standoff operations via integration of a two-way data-link for use
under stringent rules of engagement. The fiscal year 2008 budget
requests $43.5 million in RDT&E to develop this capability.
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) AIM-120
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $4.58 million in RDT&E to
complete development efforts and $87.5 million for production of 79
all-up rounds and associated hardware. AMRAAM is a Joint Navy/Air Force
(Air Force-led) advanced, medium-range missile that counters existing
aircraft and cruise missile threats with advanced electronic attack
capabilities operating at high/low altitudes from both beyond visual
range and within visual range. AMRAAM provides an Air-to-Air First
Look, First Shot, First Kill capability working within a networked
environment in support of Sea Power 21's Theater Air and Missile
Defense Mission Area.
Sidewinder AIM-9X Air-to-Air Missile
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $4.4 million RDT&E and $54.9
million for production of 184 all-up rounds, Captive Air Training
Missiles (CATMs), and associated hardware. The Joint Navy/Air Force
(Navy-led) Sidewinder missile is the only short-range infrared air-to-
air missile integrated on USN/USAF strike-fighter aircraft. The AIM-9X
is the newest variant in the Sidewinder family. This 5th Generation 9X
weapon incorporates high off-bore sight acquisition capability and
thrust vectoring to achieve superior maneuverability and provides
increased sensitivity through an imaging infrared focal plane array
seeker and advanced processing.
OTHER SIGNFICANT CAPABILITES
Presidential Helicopter Replacement Aircraft (VH-71)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $271 million in RDT&E for
continuation of SDD for the VH-71 program. The VH-71 program is
executing an evolutionary acquisition approach through a two-part
incremental development to deliver a safe, survivable and capable
Presidential Vertical Lift aircraft while providing uninterrupted
communications with all required agencies. The goal of Increment 1 is
to satisfy an urgent need to provide a replacement presidential
helicopter with capability equivalent to or better than the current
inventory of aircraft. Increment 2 will provide enhanced performance
and state-of-the-art communications capabilities to satisfy long-term
needs. During the last year, the program initiated a phased Critical
Design Review process for Increment 1 that will be completed later this
year. The program has also begun Increment 1 developmental test using
two commercial aircraft, and has five additional test aircraft in
various stages of production. Increment 2 development will begin this
year, and is currently undergoing a reassessment/replan to reduce test
and production concurrency risk with Increment 1. The Increment 2
replan will increase time allotted to the Systems Engineering Technical
Review cycle prior to CDR, procure/utilize an additional test vehicle,
and will reduce design/build concurrency by delaying the first LRIP
lot, thereby further reducing risks to the program. The Presidential
Helicopter Replacement Program continues to receive executive level
oversight and review in an effort to fully evaluate program progress
while mitigating risks wherever possible.
P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)/P-3C
The future of the Navy's maritime patrol force includes plans for
sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of the force. Results
of the P-3 Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) revealed the need for
an aggressive approach to P-3 airframe sustainment. Key elements of the
sustainment approach are strict management of requirements and flight
hour use, special structural inspections to keep the aircraft safely
flying, and increased use of simulators to satisfy training
requirements. The fiscal year 2008 budget request includes $156.3
million for Special Structural Inspections-Kits (SSI-K), which will
allow for airframe sustainment to support the CNO's P-3 Fleet Response
Plan (as well as supporting EP-3E requirements which are executed
within the P-3 SSI-K program). As the sustainment plan progresses, the
inventory may be reduced to a number approaching 130 aircraft by fiscal
year 2010. The fiscal year 2008 budget request also reflects a systems
sustainment and modernization budget of $106.3 million to continue to
address a multitude of mission essential efforts to replace obsolete
components, integrate open architecture technology, and leverage
commonality. To recapitalize these critical aircraft, the Navy is
developing the P-8A MMA, a 737 commercial-derivative aircraft. This
past year, the program began completing major subsystem Critical Design
Reviews (CDR) in preparation for the overall system CDR to be conducted
this summer. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $880.1 million in
RDT&E for continuation of P-8A System Development and Demonstration
(SDD) efforts. Program objectives for 2008 include executing a contract
for four Stage II test aircraft, and fabrication of the first ground
and flight test aircraft. Our comprehensive and balanced approach has
allowed for recapitalization of these critical assets.
MH-60R and MH-60S
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $997.6 million in APN and
$78.2 million in RDT&E for continued replacement of the Special
Structural Inspections-Kits (LAMPS) MK III SH-60B and carrier-based SH-
60F helicopters with the new configuration designated as the MH-60R.
This program reached full-rate production with the first operational
squadron standing up in 2006. The fiscal year 2008 budget also requests
$503.6 million in APN and $44.0 million in RDT&E funds for the MH-60S,
to continue development of the Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures
(Block II) and the Armed Helo (Block III) missions. The MH-60S is the
Navy's primary combat support helicopter designed to support Carrier
and Expeditionary Strike Groups. It will replace four legacy platforms
with a newly manufactured H-60 airframe. The Army and Navy are
executing a new platform multiyear contract in 2007 that will include
both the MH-60R and MH-60S. A second multiyear contract is also being
executed in 2007 for integration of mission systems into the MH-60R.
EP-3 Replacement/Sustainment
The Navy plans to recapitalize its aging EP-3E fleet with a land-
based, manned, airborne Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR)
platform, called EPX, to meet maritime requirements. The fiscal year
2008 budget requests $16.6 million in RDT&E funds for this effort to
support studies focused on capabilities, documentation, and technology
development. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $43.7 million in
RDT&E and $46.9 million in APN to address EP-3E SIGINT sensor and
communications equipment obsolescence issues that are necessary to keep
the EP-3E viable until the replacement platform is fielded. This
funding supports LRIP procurement for JMOD Common Configuration (JCC)
Spiral 2 data fusion capabilities, and engineering development for JCC
Spiral 3.
KC-130J
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $256.4 million in APN for four
KC-130J aircraft. These aircraft will be procured under an existing Air
Force MYP. The Marine Corps has taken delivery of 25 KC-130J aircraft
to date, with four more deliveries scheduled during 2007. Additionally,
two aircraft will be procured through fiscal year 2006 Supplemental
funding and one aircraft will be procured using the funds from the FAR
12 to FAR 15 contract conversion savings. (The FAR 12 to 15 procurment
of one aircraft is being reviewed by FMB counsel as to whether or not
the letters to Congress from the Commandant constitute congressional
notification, recommend removal of statement and adjustment of numbers
accordingly) The planned procurement of four aircraft in fiscal year
2008 will bring the total number of KC-130J aircraft to 36. The KC-130J
provides major enhancements to the current fleet of KC-130s, extending
its range, payload, and refueling capabilities. Additionally, we have
continued to ensure the tactical capability of our existing KC-130F,
R&T series aircraft by installing night vision kits and upgraded
aircraft survivability equipment.
Heavy Lift Replacement Program (HLR, CH-53K)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $417.2 million RDT&E to
continue SDD of the CH-53K, which will replace the Marine Corps'
current heavy-lift helicopter, the CH-53E ``Super Stallion.'' Built for
sustained shipboard operations and first flown in 1974, the CH-53E
continues to demonstrate its value as an expeditionary heavy-lift
platform. This aging but very relevant helicopter is in high demand,
making significant contributions to missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
the Horn of Africa; noncombatant evacuation operations in Lebanon; and
disaster relief operations around the world. Expeditionary heavy-lift
capabilities will continue to be critical to successful sea-based
operations in future anti-access, area-denial environments, enabling
sea basing and the joint operating concepts of force application and
focused logistics.
As a design evolution of the CH-53E, the new-build CH-53K will
fulfill sea-based, heavy-lift requirements not resident in any of
today's platforms, and directly contribute to the increased agility,
lethality, and persistent presence of Joint Task Forces and Marine Air-
Ground Task Forces. The CH-53K will include significant enhancements to
extend range and payload performance; expand survivability and force
protection capabilities; improve inter-modal cargo handling and turn-
around; and meet interoperability requirements while reducing heavy-
lift operations and support costs.
The CH-53K will be capable of transporting 27,000 pounds to austere
landing sites at distances of 110 nautical miles under challenging
environmental conditions. Task Force commanders of 2015 and beyond will
then have the option to rapidly insert, to the far sides of the
littorals, a force equipped with armored combat vehicles and heavy
weapons at a rate equivalent to two up-armored High Mobility Multi-
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) per sortie. To sustain that force, the CH-53K
will be the critical air connector to sea-based logistics, transporting
up to three independent loads per sortie, with each load tailored to
individual receiving units. This efficient, reliable, cost-effective,
heavy-lift capability will also address critical challenges in
maintainability, reliability, and affordability found in present-day
operations.
T-6B Joint Primary Air Training System (JPATS)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $295.3 million to procure 44
aircraft under an Air Force MYP contract. The T-6 is the primary flight
training aircraft for Navy and Marine Corps pilots, and Naval flight
officers. It replaces the T-34C. The current requirement is for 315
aircraft, of which 54 aircraft have been procured to date.
T-45
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $32.5 million in APN for costs
associated with the shutdown of aircraft production. The request also
includes funding to continue both the Required Avionics Modernization
Program and Synthetic Radar installations for Undergraduate Military
Flight Officer training.
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS)
The global war on terrorism continues to place emphasis on the
importance of UASs. The fiscal year 2008 budget request reflects our
commitment to a focused array of UASs that will support and enhance
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions with
persistent, distributed, and netted sensors.
Fire Scout UAS
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $33.0 million RDT&E to
continue development of the Fire Scout UAV and $37.7 million APN for
the production of the Fire Scout MQ-8B aircraft. The Fire Scout is a
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical UAV (VTUAV) designed to operate
from all air-capable ships, carry modular mission payloads, and operate
using the Tactical Control System and Tactical Common Data Link. The
Fire Scout UAS will provide day/night real time ISR and targeting as
well as communication-relay and battlefield management capabilities to
support core Littoral Combat Ship mission areas of ASW, MIW, and ASUW
for the naval forces. The Fire Scout MQ-8B capability will achieve
initial operational capability in fiscal year 2008.
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $116.7 million RDT&E for
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) of the BAMS UAS. The
Milestone B decision for the BAMS UAS program will be in the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2007 followed by a competitive award of the SDD
contract for development of the BAMS UAS in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2008. The BAMS UAS program will meet the Navy requirement for a
persistent ISR capability as well as address the growing ISR gap and
the shortfall in maritime surveillance capability. The BAMS UAS will be
a force multiplier for the Fleet Commander, enhancing situational
awareness of the battle-space and shortening the sensor-to-shooter kill
chain. BAMS UAS will work as an adjunct to the new P-8A MMA to provide
a more affordable, effective and supportable maritime ISR option than
current ISR aircraft provide.
Marine Corps Tactical UAS (MCTUAS)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $90.3 million WPN to procure
the Army's Shadow RQ-7B UAS as an interim replacement for the currently
fielded Pioneer UAS. Pioneer has been in operational service by the
Navy and Marine Corps since 1986, and is currently supporting Marine
Corps operations as part of the global war on terrorism. Sustainability
and obsolescence issues are increasing, making Pioneer both difficult
and costly to maintain, which in turn threatens mission readiness. The
Shadow UAS provides rapid fielding of a capability that meets urgent
Marine Corps operational requirements and brings immediate
interoperability and commonality between Army and Marine Corps units
operating side by side in Iraq. We are also requesting the
congressional committees approve a Prior Approval Reprogramming and New
Start to allow procurement of the Shadow UAS with the Pioneer fiscal
year 2007 funds.
Small Tactical UAS/Tier II (STUAS/Tier II UAS)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $11.9 million in RDT&E ($6.14
million Navy, $5.74 million Marine Corps) for a new STUAS/Tier II UAS
program that will address Marine Corps and Navy ISR capability
shortfalls identified in the global war on terrorism and currently
supported by costly service contracts. The STUAS/Tier II UAS program
will provide persistent, ship and land-based ISR support for tactical
level maneuver decisions and unit level force defense/force protection.
It will provide day/night (electro-optical/infrared) sensor capability
in a small UAS that will have a minimal visual/acoustic signature at
planned operating ranges. This program is planned to be an ISR asset
that will be used to complement other high-demand, low-density manned
and unmanned platforms, and be available to operate in scenarios where
those assets may not be available to ship or other Navy/Marine Corps
unit commanders. IOC is planned in 2010, with the initial system
fielding focused on utilization of mature technologies.
Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS)
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $161.7 million RDT&E for the
Navy unmanned combat aircraft system (N-UCAS) program to conduct a
carrier demonstration of a low-observable unmanned combat aircraft
planform. The N-UCAS will develop and demonstrate an aircraft carrier
suitable, low observable unmanned air vehicle to support carrier-based
persistent and penetrating ISR missions, with strike capability, in
high threat areas. The N-UCAS program will evolve and demonstrate
technologies required for conducting launch, recovery, and carrier-
controlled airspace operations of an unmanned low observable planform.
By fiscal year 2013, the Navy plans to achieve a CV demonstration and
evaluation to identify technologies supporting future naval ISR and
strike capability requirements.
SUMMARY
The fiscal year 2008 Presidential budget request reflects
considerable effort in identifying affordable solutions for the
Department's aviation programs through a balance between sustaining
fielded capabilities, as they are employed in the global war on
terrorism and continued forward presence worldwide, and a substantive
recapitalization effort that will deliver significantly better
capabilities to the war fighter. The Department's aviation acquisition
team continues to work aggressively to identify efficiencies in the
development, testing and subsequent procurement of platforms,
components, and weapons systems in order to ensure investments made
result in quality products and services provided to the fleet.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before your subcommittee regarding the Department of the Navy aviation
programs.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Balderson. We're not
accustomed to that kind of brevity here in the Senate.
[Laughter.]
Particularly not by Senators. But I thank you.
Mr. Balderson. Oh, that's okay, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. General Chandler, welcome. I look
forward to your testimony now.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CARROL H. CHANDLER, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR AIR, SPACE, AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, PLANS AND
REQUIREMENTS, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Chandler. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Cornyn, Senator Warner, it's a
pleasure for me to be here, too, as well, representing the some
700,000 Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilians of your
United States Air Force.
I would ask, if I could, that my written statement be
entered for the record.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection, so ordered.
General Chandler. I have a few main points that I would
like to make, as well.
As was noted earlier, your Air Force has been at war for 16
years. Our aircraft and its inventory is older than it's been
in our 60 years as a service, yet our people continue their
exemplary performance to ensure we can fly, fight, and win
across air, space, and cyberspace.
America depends on air power more today than ever before,
whether in contingencies, humanitarian assistance, strategic
deterrence, or strategic defense, global vigilance, reach, and
power are America's asymmetrical advantage.
Our first priority is winning the global war on terror.
That said, we must continue to ensure our warfighting future.
Modernizing and recapitalizing our aging equipment will
significantly enhance what we bring to the joint fight. At the
same time, fiscal constraints challenge our ability to
guarantee that global vigilance, reach, and power for the 21st
century without increasing risk.
We appreciate the committee's steadfast support of the Air
Force and our airmen, and look forward to partnering with you
further to ensure that the Air Force has full ability to manage
its inventory.
Around 15 percent of our aircraft inventory is restricted
from being retired, by congressional language. Those are
aircraft that are generally among the oldest, least reliable,
and least useful. We need to retire them and replace them with
fewer, but newer, more reliable, easier to maintain, and more
effective combat aircraft. Our dominance tomorrow depends on
our investment today.
Today, we provide global power, directing and conducting
strikes 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, and
we've made continuous improvements in how we rapidly deliver
air power and precise effects. The typical global war on terror
air mission has evolved from a preplanned, fixed target to a
highly flexible on-call asset ready for a rapidly-changing
battlefield.
Today, we provide global reach in a number of ways. The C-
130 and the C-17 precision air drop and conventional cargo
missions are saving lives by taking convoys off Iraqi roads.
Air Force C-17s and C-5s are fulfilling vital aeromedical
evacuation missions, which dramatically increase the changes of
survival for critically-wounded soldiers, sailors, marines, and
airmen.
Despite averaging over 40 years old, our tankers continue
to extend global reach, not only for Air Force aircraft, but
for our joint and coalition partners, as well. Today, we
provide global vigilance through manned and unmanned aircraft
and space systems. Satellites, Predator, U-2, Global Hawk,
JSTARS, and the like, track and survey and identify targets.
Many of these Air Force assets also provide vital
communications, navigation, and sensor capabilities for the
joint team and other users.
Your Air Force is meeting our Armed Forces strategic
requirement to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major
combat operations. However, wear and tear, and loss of buying
power, result in future risk to readiness, capacity, and
capability. Emerging threats, particularly through
proliferation of advanced technology, threaten our future
dominance. Therefore, it's imperative that we adjust and
modernize our inventories for the new century.
We have five acquisition priorities that would allow us to
step towards future dominance:
KC-X is our top priority. The Air Force is a global
business, and, simply put, the single point of failure is the
tanker.
Combat search-and-rescue (CSAR-X) is our second priority.
We consider it a moral and ethical imperative to provide CSAR-X
anywhere, anytime, to any one of our joint or coalition
partners. The Air Force is the only service organized, trained,
and equipped for the CSAR mission.
Our third priority, space systems, incorporate a number of
improvements, including missile warning, space, imagery support
requirement (ISR), and communications.
Priority four is the F-35, a multi-role stealth precision-
strike fighter. Coupled with our stated requirement of 381 F-
22, the F-35 will be the workhorse air-to-ground fighter for
your Air Force, the Navy, Marines, and our coalition partners.
Finally, our fifth priority, the next-generation long-range
strike, will provide a new bomber by 2018, the critical system
to ensure range, payload, and persistent access. We must build
a 21st century Air Force that is prepared to succeed
tactically, operationally, and strategically. By funding and
fielding these priorities, we can assure this future.
Senator Lieberman. Excuse me a second, General.
I want to say to my friends in pink, you're welcome here,
but please do not say anything, because, if you do, and that
interrupts the hearing, I'm going to have to ask the Capitol
Police to remove you.
Go ahead, General.
General Chandler. Sir, our Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, and
civilian airmen ensure that we are the world's dominant, air,
space, and cyberspace force. These incredibly capable
individuals, through long hours and ingenuity, are keeping our
legacy systems viable for current contingencies. However, we
owe these airmen, and future airmen, to transform into a more
agile, capable, and technologically- advanced force.
Again, sirs, I thank you for your time and look forward to
your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Chandler and
General Hoffman follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Carrol H. Chandler, USAF, and Lt.
Gen. Donald Hoffman, USAF
I. INTRODUCTION
Senator Lieberman, Senator Cornyn, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss Air Force Tactical Aviation and other matters that are
important to our Air Force and the Nation.
Your Air Force is fully engaged around the world, fighting the war
against terror while fulfilling our roles as airmen for the joint team.
Simultaneously, we stand prepared to rapidly respond to conflicts
around the globe. Air forces succeed when they anticipate and shape the
future strategic environment and develop capabilities for the next
fight. Air forces succeed when they remain focused on their primary
mission as an independent force that is part of an interdependent joint
team. We fly, fight and dominate in three warfighting domains--air,
space, and cyberspace--providing our Nation sovereign options to employ
military force like no other nation.
II. WE ARE AT WAR
The missions your Air Force is flying today are the latest in a
string of 16 continuous years of Air Force combat in the Central
Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), beginning with our
initial deployments to Operation Desert Shield in August 1990 through
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
To date your Air Force has flown over 82 percent of the coalition's
353,373 sorties in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 78 percent of the
coalition's 211,427 sorties in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). On a
typical day, the Air Force flies more than 430 sorties in support of
OIF and OEF.
In addition to our daily operations, the Air Force has also seen
several surge periods over the past 16 years, resulting in higher than
projected wear and tear on our people and platforms. The Air Force has
responded to or has been prepared to respond across the spectrum of
conflict--from rapid humanitarian aid to major combat operations (MCO).
We have flown over 47,285 sorties in support of Operation Noble Eagle
and over 3,411 counterdrug sorties, while also supporting operations in
the Horn of Africa and the Philippine Islands. Currently, your Air
Force has over 30,000 Total Force airmen deployed in support of global
operations, while over 200,000 are supporting daily combatant command
(COCOM) operations from other than deployed locations. We have airmen
manning Intercontinental Ballistic Missile facilities, flying strategic
bombers and performing special operations as well as search and rescue
missions. Airmen continue to stand watch around the clock to protect
and defend our national security and respond to any adversary should
deterrence fail.
While the global war on terror is the obvious and appropriate
priority for the near-term, the United States Air Force (USAF) must
prepare for emerging global threats. We expect to be engaged in the
CENTCOM AOR for many years; yet at the same time we must continue to be
able to detect, deter and dissuade other potential enemies, both
traditional and nontraditional. The future security environment will be
different from today, and a full range of military capabilities and
advanced technologies will be needed to maintain relevance and
advantage. We must not fail to anticipate increasingly lethal enemies
or how they will conduct war in the future. The last time an American
soldier was shot at by enemy aircraft was 1953. The ability to look up
in the sky and know there's nothing to fear is priceless, but
guaranteeing that precondition is costly. Today, America depends on air
power to an unprecedented extent. The Air Force underwrites the
national strategy of reassuring allies, while deterring, dissuading and
decisively defeating enemies--this is not a luxury.
III. THREAT AND DETERRENCE
We are a Nation at war; however, it would be incorrect to assume
that recent combat operations represent the high-bar of what the future
may hold. Our ability to sustain the long-term focus required to
ultimately prevail in this global war depends in large part on the
decisions of certain other Nations to forgo reckless adventurism--the
kind of reckless behavior that could drag the United States and her
Allies into a protracted, costly, and large-scale war. For all their
costs and successes, operations like Operation Desert Storm, Kosovo,
and even the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were at the very low intensity
end of MCOs. None of our adversaries had a viable air force, and the
air defenses they did have were precisely the systems our F-117 and B-2
aircraft were designed to defeat.
We must not confuse the present lack of large-scale, regional,
state-on-state violence with an absence of conflict between nations.
Disputed territory and natural resource competition are very real
problems throughout the world and so is the risk that they will worsen
under future demographic and energy stresses. We must not take comfort
in the belief that our Nation will never enter a costly, large-scale
war, especially in light of our experience in Iraq. Our interests,
alliances, and sense of moral obligation could lead us into war in
response to many predictable adversary actions, even if our existence
or survival were not seriously threatened. Therefore our strategic
requirement to win two, nearly simultaneous, MCOs is better viewed as
the bare minimum for America's Armed Forces. It would be far better to
deter the types of behavior that could make such costly warfare
inevitable.
Perhaps more so than any other capability of the joint force, the
ability of U.S. airpower to respond quickly and violently, throughout
the depth and breadth of their territory keeps potentially rogue
regimes from following their worst instincts. Most importantly, this
deterrence works even in the midst of a multiyear commitment of over
100,000 U.S. ground forces in Iraq. If we do not replace our aging
combat aircraft with sufficient numbers of advanced, modern platforms,
we will surrender a deterrent of immeasurable value.
Our potential adversaries understand that through continued
development of anti-access systems, they can deny large-scale military
responses. Many of them are developing or acquiring air defenses that
would make a replay of the overwhelming success of Operation Desert
Storm unlikely, and they seek systems that would make a replay of
Kosovo impossible, in large part because they understand and fear U.S.
airpower.
We make no claim that our Nation can rely solely on airpower to
execute our military strategy. However, as we look to the future and
seek to posture ourselves for the evolving challenges of the war on
terror, we must not undermine the very force structure and capabilities
that have for so long deterred regional, state-on-state warfare. At the
same time, if deterrence fails, it is the Air Force that sets the
conditions necessary for successful joint operations. Our joint and
coalition partners have enjoyed unmatched freedom of operational access
due to Air Force capabilities and it is our responsibility to deliver
that capability in current and future conflicts as well. From a
national perspective, aircraft are some of the best military
investments the United States can make for its future security. Both
Air Force and independent studies and analysis support this assertion.
A decision to seriously curtail essential aircraft procurement
programs, especially in response to today's war in Afghanistan and
Iraq, would be extremely shortsighted and costly to the Nation in the
next 20 years.
Fifth generation fighters like the F-22A and the F-35 are key
elements to our Nation's defense and deterrence. As long as hostile
Nations recognize the ability of U.S. airpower to strike their vital
centers with impunity, all other U.S. Government efforts are enhanced,
which reduces the need for military confrontation. This is the timeless
paradox of deterrence; the best way to avoid war is to demonstrate to
your enemies, and potential enemies, that you have the ability, the
will, and the resolve to defeat them.
IV. FLEET MANAGEMENT
The duration and tempo of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
accelerated service life consumption for numerous USAF platforms.
Additionally, our aircraft inventory is the oldest it has ever been, at
an average age of more than 24 years. Our 5-year trend in mission
capable and aircraft availability rates has declined in certain low-
density, high-demand platforms and remained steady only through the
incredible efforts of our dedicated personnel. Our recapitalization
challenge is meeting the near-term needs of our Nation, while at the
same time ensuring that airmen inherit an Air Force that is relevant,
capable and sustainable. We must recapitalize our aging fleet to ensure
our continued advantage over future adversaries. We must also have the
authority to manage our existing fleets including the retirement of our
oldest aircraft.
a. Legacy Aircraft
1. F-117--The F-117 was the first aircraft in the DOD inventory to
provide critical stealth capability and it has been in service for over
20 years. Advances in technology and demonstrated capabilities of other
systems such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, F-22A, and
B-2 have mitigated the need to rely upon this aging and expensive-to-
maintain aircraft. As a result, the Air Force intends to retire the F-
117. Congress approved retiring 10 aircraft in fiscal year 2007. The
fiscal year 2008 President's budget requests authorization to retire
the remaining 42 aircraft. Cost savings realized from retiring these
outdated aircraft will allow us the flexibility to better sustain our
remaining fleets.
2. Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)--The E-8C
JSTARS is an airborne battle management, command and control,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform. Its primary
mission is to provide theater ground and air commanders with surface
moving target indications (SMTI) and tailored surveillance in support
of operations and targeting. Joint STARS has been a significant
contributor to U.S. Air Force fighting effectiveness in Operations
Desert Storm, Joint Endeavor, Allied Force, OEF, and OIF. Continuing
modifications and enhancements will sustain JSTARS viability beyond
2034.
E-8 JSTARS has been heavily deployed since September 11,
maintaining above steady state surge operations tempo. Combined with
recently approved crew ratio increases, this has created a significant
backlog of students awaiting training. For example, Air Battle Manager
training is approximately 1 year behind. To mitigate some of the
training backlog, we have maximized the use of simulators and conducted
some training while in deployed status. We have also reduced or
cancelled major exercise events in order to surge programmed flying
training, as well as doubled training aircraft from two to four. The
training backlog has now been reduced enough to adjust training
aircraft down to three aircraft.
JSTARS' current engines are unable to meet a number of performance
requirements. Re-engining the Joint STARS fleet will increase range and
time on station, improve fuel efficiency, and reduce dependence on
tankers. It will also improve reliability and maintainability,
significantly decrease operating and maintenance expenses, increase
available power and cooling for aircraft systems, improve take-off
performance, increase maximum altitude, and comply with international
noise and emission requirements.
3. C-130--Changes in military force structure, including the
President's proposed troop strength increase and the Integrated Global
Presence and Basing Strategy reset, could increase airlift requirements
and subsequently create the need for additional lift capacity. In the
case of the aging C-130, the combination of vanishing vendors, obsolete
parts, costly structural repairs, non-compliance with air traffic
management requirements, Secretary of Defense-directed safety
modifications, and decreased access to international airspace limit the
overall effectiveness of this workhorse. Although strategic lift is
vitally important for moving personnel and equipment, the lynchpin to
the warfighter is the ability to go the last tactical mile. A
synchronized intra-theater airlift system empowers the combatant
commander with the ability to employ the Air Force's unique core
competencies in their AOR. The active duty Air Force possesses 75
percent of the oldest C-130 aircraft in the DOD fleet--at an average
age of 42 years. The most pressing challenges today are un-programmed
repair costs associated with cracks in the center wing box (CWB) and
modernizing a portion of the fleet to meet the needs of the Nation in
the future.
As of April 2007, 53 Air Force C-130 aircraft are grounded or
restricted due to surpassing equivalent baseline hour (EBH) milestones.
All but one of those aircraft resides in the active duty. At 38,000
EBHs, restricted aircraft are deemed combat ineffective due to flight
maneuver and cargo capacity limitations. At 45,000 EBHs, aircraft are
unworthy of safe flight and are grounded. Maintaining these aircraft
adds an unnecessary expense while increasing workloads on our
maintenance personnel. Only through innovative management and great
cooperation with our Reserve and Guard Total Force partners have we
been able to meet the needs of the warfighter to fill the airlift
shortfall gap produced by the grounding of our oldest C-130s. To
mitigate the immediate effects, we have implemented both short-term and
long-term strategies to maintain a combat effective intra-theater
airlift fleet, which meets warfighter requirements. The Air Force is
retiring 24 of its oldest and least capable C-130E aircraft as allowed
by Congress, we need to retire more as they reach the end of their
useful service life.
The Center Wing Box (CWB) inspect-and-repair program provided the
short-term fix to keep C-130 aircraft operational while awaiting CWB
replacement. Aircraft inspected and repaired can operate up to 7,000
EBHs beyond the unrestricted limit. We have had near-term success in
repairing 27 of the CWBs and plan to repair up to 62 C-130E/H aircraft
at an estimated average cost of $700,000 per aircraft. However, not all
aircraft inspected will be repairable. Recently, three C-130E aircraft
were inspected and found to have substantial damage; repair estimates
exceeded $2 millions per aircraft and were not considered fiscally
prudent given their limited life expectancy.
The Air Force is using the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program
(AMP) to upgrade the fleet. The purpose of the C-130 AMP is to lower
the cost of ownership while complying with the Air Force Navigation and
Safety (Nav/Safety) Master Plan and applicable Communications,
Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) mandates. AMP
is a cockpit modernization program that replaces aging, unreliable
equipment and adds equipment necessary to meet Nav/Safety and CNS/ATM
requirements. The new equipment will lower the cost of ownership by
reducing cockpit crew manning, increasing aircraft reliability,
maintainability, and sustainability as well as reducing the number of
different aircraft configurations. The C-130 AMP includes improved
precision airdrop capability, Night Vision Imaging System, and
improvements to the precision approach and landing capability. The
standardized cockpit will allow crewmembers to be trained to fly in one
aircraft type and require only one mission qualification flight,
thereby reducing training cost.
The Air Force supports the C-130 AMP and considers it a ``must do''
program. The Air Force must start equipping the C-130 fleet with a more
modern, more capable, and more cost effective cockpit to meet current
and future warfighter requirements.
C-130J--The C-130J is a completely modernized version of the
workhorse C-130 that has served us admirably for over 50 years. The C-
130J will climb higher more quickly, and fly faster and longer than its
predecessors. Its ability to takeoff and land in shorter distances will
allow use of more locations. Improved reliability and maintainability
will mean longer time between scheduled maintenance, reducing cost.
The Air Force is currently funded to complete Multiyear Procurement
#1 (MYP1) in fiscal year 2008, delivering 79 USAF C-130J aircraft (62
Combat Delivery, 10 WC-130J, and 7 EC-130J). Three aircraft were added
in the fiscal year 2006 Supplemental budget with delivery expected in
fiscal year 2010, bringing the total to 82 aircraft. Global war on
terrorism supplemental for fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 added
5 and 15 aircraft respectively.
The Commander of Air Mobility Command declared IOC for the C-130J
on 5 October 2006.
4. Tankers (KC-135)--It is noteworthy that the Air Force is
providing vital air refueling capability via the oldest aircraft in the
Air Force inventory. The average age of aircraft in our tanker fleet is
43.3 years. Fifteen percent of our current air refueling fleet consists
of the KC-135E model aircraft, which has an average age of 49.4 years.
Fourteen of our KC-135 fleet will be grounded this fiscal year due to
Expanded Interim Repair (EIR) expiration, followed by 16 aircraft in
fiscal year 2008, 44 aircraft in fiscal year 2009 and the remaining 11
aircraft in fiscal year 2010. All 85 of our KC-135E model aircraft will
be grounded by the end of fiscal year 2010 due to EIR expiration.
The Air Force has programmed all 85 of the remaining KC-135E
aircraft to retire by the end of fiscal year 2008 and asks that
Congress not restrict our ability to do so. The projected cost to keep
a KC-135E flying with no additional warfighting capability (i.e. a
basic KC-135E) after EIR expiration is $17.3 million per aircraft (85
$17.3 million per aircraft = $1.4 billion for the entire
fleet). The projected cost to maintain these obsolete tanker aircraft
on the ramp after EIR expiration (referred to as XJ status) is
approximately $11.7 million (85 $138,000 per aircraft) in
fiscal year 2008.
b. Fifth Generation Fighters
Both the F-22A and the F-35 represent our latest generation of
fighter aircraft. We need both to replace capabilities inherent in our
aging legacy platforms. The F-22A and F-35 present complementary
capabilities--together they provide synergistic effects across the
spectrum of conflict. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-led
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Joint Air Dominance study
revealed two key points. The first was that our Nation has a critical
requirement to re-capitalize tactical air forces. The second was that
with sufficient 5th generation fighters, the F-35 and F-22A, joint air
forces could win a MCO with forces remaining to win the next MCO. The
study determined attrition would be higher with a legacy-heavy, 4th
generation, force.
1. F-22A--The F-22A Raptor is the Air Force's primary air
superiority fighter, providing unmatched capabilities for operational
access, homeland defense, cruise missile defense, and force protection
for the Joint Team. The F-22A's combination of speed, stealth,
maneuverability, and integrated avionics gives this remarkable aircraft
the ability to penetrate denied, anti-access environments. Its
unparalleled ability to find, fix, and destroy enemy air- and surface-
based threats ensures air dominance and freedom of maneuver for all
Joint forces.
A world-class production line produces Raptors at a rate of about
two per month delivering unrivaled combat capability that ensures
freedom of maneuver for all joint and coalition forces. The Air Force
has accepted 92 F-22A aircraft to date and is currently negotiating the
congressionally-approved multiyear contract for delivery of Lots 7, 8,
and 9. The Air Force expects to award this contract in 2007. Currently
we have 12 F-22A aircraft deployed to the Western Pacific in support of
the Pacific Command Commander's area of operations.
The F-22A force also optimizes capability return on investment.
Fewer mobility assets are required to provide logistic support for the
aircraft with smaller force packaging, and lower combat attrition. The
average procurement unit cost continues to decline as we mature our
production learning curve.
2. F-35--The F-35 program will develop and deploy a family of
highly common, affordable, next-generation, stealthy, multi-role,
strike fighter aircraft meeting operational needs of the Air Force,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Allies. The F-35 provides our Nation the strike
capability necessary to defeat an adversary with large-scale,
integrated anti-access capabilities. Studies including the OSD/Joint
Study: Joint Air Dominance--2006 and Air Force studies have
demonstrated the requirement for both the payload and survivability of
the F-35 in the face of these new threats. Legacy 4th generation
aircraft simply cannot survive to operate and achieve the effects
necessary to win in an integrated, anti-access environment. Failure to
recapitalize the fighter force with the F-35 will result in
significantly increased risk both to our air and ground forces.
Conventional take-off and landing test aircraft, AA-1, successfully
conducted its first flight on 15 Dec 06. Since then it has flown
thirteen times and its flying qualities are reported as excellent. The
program is on track to meet all Low Rate Initial Production Lot I
funding decision criteria and contract award by May 2007. The fiscal
year 2008 President's budget did not support the General Electric/Rolls
Royce F136 engine effort because the Defense Department concluded that
a single engine supplier provided the best balance of risk and cost.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), Cost Analysis Improvement
Group (CAIG) and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) have
conducted studies that re-examine the costs and benefits associated
with an alternate engine program. CAIG and IDA final reports are
expected in June 2007, however CAIG has indicated their study will
likely support a single engine supplier, while IDA has not yet
indicated which alternative their study will support. The GAO study
supported an alternate engine program.
c. Emerging Capabilities/Platforms
1. KC-X--Since aerial refueling tankers are one of the single
points of failure in modern, joint warfare, our Secretary and Chief of
Staff made tanker replacement and recapitalization your Air Force's #1
acquisition priority. Our vision is a tanker born joint and able to
refuel Air Force, Navy, and Allied aircraft on every mission using both
boom and hose/drogue refueling capabilities.
For the past 50 years, the Air Force's primary tanker platform has
been the KC-135, and it has served with distinction. However, we are
carrying great risk operating this aircraft beyond expected service
life. Some of the oldest models already operate well beyond the point
of cost-effective repair. Tanker recapitalization is not a new idea. In
1999, a GAO report presaged the declining operational utility of our
aging tankers and underscored the need for immediate investments in
recapitalization. Given the increased operational requirements of our
current operations around the globe, procurement of a new tanker
aircraft--the KC-X--has become both an operational necessity and the
most fiscally prudent option to maintain America's global presence and
expeditionary capabilities.
KC-X tankers will provide increased aircraft availability, more
adaptable technology, and greater overall capability than the current
inventory of KC-135E tankers they will replace. Enhancements to every
aspect of aircraft operation will provide the Joint warfighter with
more flexible employment options. It is imperative that we begin a
program of smart, steady reinvestment in a new tanker--coupled with
measured, timely retirements of the oldest, least capable tankers.
Recapitalizing our tankers will ensure the viability of this vital
national capability. Tankers make the air bridge possible and are
essential to the success of joint and coalition military operations.
Tankers are critical to the deployment and employment of joint combat
power, and are crucial to rapid response to combat and humanitarian
relief operations.
Retiring operationally cost-prohibitive and less capable aircraft
allows the Air Force to focus on recapitalization and invest in
transformational capabilities. The KC-135E is a good example. It is
significantly less capable than the KC-135R with less fuel offload
capability and fails to meet world-wide airspace and noise
restrictions.
Operations in the 21st century mandate continuous modernization of
our mobility platforms. To that end, the KC-X replacing the KC-135
``will revolutionize the way we do business''. The KC-X will be able to
multi-point refuel joint and coalition aircraft, carry cargo or
passengers and self-deploy.
Release of the KC-X request for proposal (RFP) on 30 January 2007
set the stage for a fair, full, and open competition that will lead to
the fielding of a flexible and versatile platform. The resultant tanker
will possess numerous advantages over the current KC-135 fleet. In
today's dynamic political-military environment, and with fiscal
constraints in mind, the Air Force must maximize the abilities of each
platform.
The KC-X RFP defines an integrated, capability-based, best-value
approach and is the first third of the fleet-wide tanker replacement
program that will leverage new technologies and industry best
practices. The RFP includes specific factors for assessing the
capability contribution of each offeror. Along with cost and
assessments of past performance and proposal risk, these factors
provide the source selection authority with excellent means to
determine the best value between proposals of significantly differing
capabilities and cost.
The RFP stipulates nine primary key performance parameters:
1) Air refueling capability (same sortie boom and drogue
capable)
2) Fuel offload and range at least as great as the KC-135
3) Compliant CNS/ATM equipment
4) Airlift capability
5) Ability to take on fuel while airborne
6) Sufficient force protection measures
7) Ability to network into the information available in the
battle space
8) Survivability measures (defensive systems, EMP hardening,
chem/bio protection, etc.)
9) Provisioning for a multi-point refueling system to support
Navy and Allied aircraft
The Air Force has gone through a rigorous review process for KC-X
and has validated that the RFP accurately reflects the requirements as
laid out by the warfighter. The Air Force remains committed to a full
and open competition that will continue to be conducted in a
transparent and deliberate manner. The Air Force expects to award the
KC-X contract in 2007.
2. CSAR-X--The Air Force is the only Service with dedicated forces
organized, trained, and equipped to perform combat search and rescue
(CSAR). Air Force CSAR forces recover downed aircrew and other isolated
personnel and conduct rescue operations across the spectrum of military
operations including humanitarian relief, emergency evacuation,
disaster relief, and civil support operations. Our average CSAR
helicopter is 21 years old, is a low-density, high-demand asset and is
limited in range, payload and high-altitude capability. This is our
Service's number two acquisition priority behind a new tanker aircraft.
The Air Force has a moral and ethical imperative to our airmen, fellow
servicemembers, and coalition partners to provide combat search and
rescue anytime and anywhere required.
In November 2006, the Air Force awarded a System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) contract to Boeing Integrated Defense Systems.
Following this decision, Lockheed-Martin and Sikorsky filed source
selection protests with the GAO, and the GAO sustained the protests
concerning CSAR-X source selection on 26 Feb 07. The Air Force is
currently reviewing the GAO's findings to ensure complete understanding
of the conclusions and recommendations, while determining the way
ahead. The Air Force remains committed to the timely acquisition of a
helicopter that best meets the warfighter's requirements.
3. Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)--The final piece to the intra-theater
mix is the JCA. The JCA will supplement the C-130 fleet by delivering
smaller payloads more effectively. In December 2005, PDM-III directed
merging the Army Future Cargo Aircraft and the Air Force Light Cargo
Aircraft programs into the JCA with acquisition under the Joint Program
Office. In June 2006, the Army Vice Chief of Staff and the Air Force
Vice Chief of Staff signed a JCA Memorandum of Agreement. The USA/USAF
will conduct business case analyses to determine the most cost
effective methods for implementing the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)-directed single supply chain,
single training base, and single maintenance process.
In October 2006 the JCA Joint Program JPO stood up at Redstone
Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, which was a huge milestone for the joint
program, and a testament to the progress both services have made. Both
Services are working to ensure a successful Milestone C at the end of
May 2007. Assuming a successful MS C decision, Army production (two
aircraft) will begin in fiscal year 2007 with Air Force production
beginning in fiscal year 2010.\1\
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\1\ RAND is currently completing the Intra-theater Airlift
Capabilities Based Assessment (F-Studies) and will also provide a fleet
mix analysis by December 2007. These studies will analyze the intra-
theater airlift capability determining the right mix (C-130 and JCA) to
meet COCOM requirements.
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4. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Executive Agency--The Chief of
Staff of the Air Force recently sent a memo to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Service Chiefs, and
COCOM commanders articulating the benefits of designating the Air Force
as the DOD executive agent for medium- and high-altitude UAVs. The
intent of the Chief's UAV executive agent proposal is to improve
delivery of ISR information to America's joint warriors on the ground,
at sea, and in the air while increasing jointness and achieving
resource efficiencies. Specifically, the benefits of designating the
Air Force as executive agent for medium- and high-altitude UAVs fall in
three major categories: 1) Achieving efficiencies in acquisition and
sustainment; 2) Increasing warfighting effectiveness in designing an
optimal medium- and high-altitude UAV concept of operations; and 3)
Enhancing UAV interoperability by directing common, synchronized
architectures, data links, radios, etc.
The 2006 QDR recognizes that an executive agent definition may
vary, but the universal intent is to ensure joint efforts are
efficiently managed and resourced. In the case of medium- and high-
altitude UAVs, the executive agent would integrate the development,
acquisition, procurement and sustainment of jointly designed,
standardized UAVs and their associated equipment and ground-control
stations.
The primary focus of the executive agent would be on programs where
the majority of DOD's near-term investments are being made--MQ-1
Predator, MQ-1C Warrior, RQ-4 Global Hawk, Broad Area Maritime
Surveillance, and MQ-9 Reaper. It is reasonable to expect that the
present medium- and high-altitude UAV investment budget could be
reduced. Additional efficiencies could be achieved through common
basing, training, sustainment, and employment.
Without an executive agent, the Services will likely continue their
separate design and procurement efforts, and the DOD will have
forfeited the considerable savings it could have realized.
Additionally, the DOD will have lost an opportunity to create and
harness the inter-Service synergies that would result from building
upon--rather than duplicating--each Service's strengths. The Services
need to be moving toward increased interdependency, vice resourcing to
achieve self-sufficiency.
V. CLOSING
We are building a 21st century Air Force prepared to succeed--
strategically, operationally, and tactically. Our highly capable and
lethal aviation programs provide Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and
Global Power. These capabilities are critical today and for the future
Joint force.
But air forces do not succeed--or fail--on their own. We request
Congress' help, in particular, to fix a strategic ends-means gap
between the roles and missions we're expected to fulfill for the Nation
and the funding we're being given to accomplish the mission. We
respectfully request relief from existing congressional language
preventing us from divesting our inventories of obsolete aircraft and
those grounded or restricted due to surpassing their EBHs. The freedom
to divest our inventories of these aircraft will provide us the
flexibility to recapitalize your Air Force with more current and
relevant capabilities, to maintain an Air Force that is second to none,
to continue to provide a deterrent to potential adversaries, and to
soundly defeat adversaries should deterrence fail.
The Air Force is committed to advancing our tactical and strategic
aircraft programs and capabilities to fully support the joint and
coalition team. We appreciate your continued support in turning our
vision into an operational reality. Our nation must invest today to
ensure tomorrow's air, space, and cyberspace dominance.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, General.
I think it's quite a powerful statistic, in terms of what
your needs are, that the inventory of the Air Force is older
than it's been in the 60 years that the Air Force has been a
service.
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. General Hoffman, thank you for being
here.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DONALD J. HOFFMAN, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY,
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR
ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
General Hoffman. Mr. Chairman, I thank the committee for
the opportunity to discuss our Air Force programs.
In addition to support for the requested amounts in the
President's budget, there are two areas that I would ask this
committee for support. The first is on the Berry Amendment.
Last year's authorization language allowed integrated
circuits with diminished amounts of specialty metals to be
exempt from Berry compliance. We very much appreciate this
relief, but ask that this logic be extended to fasteners and
small parts, or that we incorporate a market basket approach to
the actual production facility.
We spend an enormous amount of government and industry time
validating information to waive the Berry Amendment. As an
example, for the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile
(AMRAAM), we spent over 2,200 man-hours to review 4,000 parts
and produce an 8-inch document to waive items worth $1,400 on a
half-a-million- dollar missile.
The V-22 program just completed 6 months of work on the
waiver package for 1,751 noncompliant parts that represent only
0.14 percent of the value of that system. One example is a 13
cent nut that meets military standards, but is noncompliant. To
produce an equivalent nut that is compliant would take 48 weeks
and cost 40 times as much.
Commercial buying practices have the potential to save the
Government significant amounts of money, but buying commercial
items in compliance with Berry are not compatible, as the
global supply system does not track the original metal source
for small parts.
The second area we could use relief is in simulator
training. Last year's authorization language restricted our
ability to use operations and maintenance dollars to purchase
simulator training, and requires us to develop and procure the
simulators. We would like the flexibility to evaluate both
approaches to determine the best value to meet the warfighter's
needs. We have very successful examples of simulator services
for our F-15 and Airborne Warning and Control System
crewmembers, and we would like to keep that avenue as an
option.
I look forward to your comments and questions. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General.
General--is it Castellaw?
General Castellaw. That's good, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Was it good enough? [Laughter.]
General Castellaw. More than good enough.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Thanks very much for being here.
We welcome your testimony now.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHN G. CASTELLAW, USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
General Castellaw. Yes, sir. I ask that my written
statement be put in the record, and a short opening .
Senator Lieberman. Without objection.
General Castellaw. Senator Lieberman, Senator Cornyn, and I
see we have the old Virginia country lawyer here. It's always
good to have you, Senator Warner. I appreciate the opportunity
to represent the Marine Corps in talking about our 2008
tactical air (TACAIR) programs.
The Marine Corps is operating at the highest operational
tempo in over 40 years. It is imperative that we sustain our
legacy systems while transitioning to new platforms and
preparing for the long struggle.
Marine aviation comprises about 15 percent of tactical jet
aviation, but I submit to you that this is the most capable,
flexible, and cheapest 15 percent of America's TACAIR. On any
given day, Marine TACAIR is operating from our Navy carriers
integrated in their air wings, operating as a part of our
Marine amphibious units, the aviation elements that are
embarked aboard amphibious shipping, and also operating ashore
from expeditionary sites supporting our joint forces in combat.
I say to you that there's no other TACAIR force that has this
flexibility and capability.
This year's submission contains funding to keep our legacy
aircraft operating, relevant, and ready. It also includes the
procurement of Marine tactical jet aircraft, the first
procurement in 10 years. This year, we are taking two Hornet
squadrons to cadre status and reinvesting the equipment into
the remaining aircraft squadrons. There are only three types of
Marine squadrons, those that are deployed, those that are
fixing to be deployed, and those that are just getting back. It
is our intent that we will keep our aircraft squadrons fully
capable of deploying, and because the strike fighter shortfall
for the Marine Corps is now, we are doing that.
Our focus from the birth of Marine aviation has been to
support our Mud Marine brethren. Our operational concept is
pretty simple. We call it Grunt-Based Operations. Our marines,
whether in the streets of Ramadi or in the Western Pacific,
deserve our best effort.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much for
allowing me to be here.
[The prepared statement of General Castellaw follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. John G. Castellaw, USMC
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Cornyn, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss Marine Corps Aviation. Today, over 30 percent of Marine
Aviation is deployed overseas afloat and ashore. This past year we have
flown over 80,000 combat hours in both rotary and fixed wing aircraft.
This significant achievement is due to the tireless efforts of our
Aviation Marines and the consistent support of Marine Aviation by this
subcommittee. Thank you for your dedication and oversight.
The primary focus of Marine Aviation is ``Grunt'' Based Operations.
In the same tradition of Marine aviators that flew over Guadalcanal in
World War II and the skies of Korea providing support to Marine and
Army infantry units, your Marine Corps is adding to its rich tradition
of providing the best aviation support to the Joint Force available in
the world today. To that end, Marine Aviation has three priorities that
guide all of our actions: Sustain the Current Fight, Modernize the
Force, and Prepare for the Long War. Execution of any one of these
priorities is a formidable challenge. Today, we are executing all three
concurrently in order to win the battle while preserving our current
warfighting capabilities to ensure we are ready to respond. Our goal is
not only to preserve but also to expand upon our expeditionary nature
so that when called, Marine Aviation can quickly and effectively defend
our critical national interests. There is no greater calling and Marine
Aviation will always remain ``On Call in a Dangerous World''.
SUSTAIN THE CURRENT FIGHT
The fiscal year 2008 President's budget request balances
sustainment of legacy aircraft operating at surge rates with continued
recapitalization of our force. United States Marine Corps Aviation is
focused on a capabilities-based approach to provide the Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and Joint Force with the ability to conduct
full spectrum combat operations.
RESET
Increased wartime utilization rates for our legacy aircraft has
demanded innovative solutions to ensure our aviation fleet remains
ready and capable of supporting our most important asset--the
individual marine. The Corps' Reset Combat Sustainment in Theater
Program in the past 12 months has repaired over 7,000 aircraft
discrepancies and provided the Marine Corps over 126,000 direct
maintenance man-hours. In the continental United States, the Reset
Program has funded approximately 1 million direct maintenance man-
hours. Funding of the Reset Program has allowed this maintenance to be
completed, which, considering operational tempo, would have been
deferred. Additionally, the Reset program in fiscal year 2006 and 2007
has supported depot repair of over 250 Marine aircraft and is intended
to support depot repair of approximately 170 aircraft in fiscal year
2008.
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT (ASE)
We are operating against a highly adaptive and motivated enemy who
continues to introduce advanced weapons systems to mitigate our
aviation assets in theater. The Marine Corps has lost eight aircraft to
direct enemy action in combat operations since September 11. In order
to pace ourselves ahead of proliferation of advanced anti-air
technologies, we continue to mitigate threats to rotary wing aviation
in global war on terrorism theaters through a combination of tactics,
techniques, procedures, and upgraded Aircraft Survivability Equipment
(ASE). To prevent current technology lagging behind the threat,
increased DOD science and technology (S&T) community focus and funding
on developing the next generation helicopter survivability equipment
are required to counter emerging threats. We need an improved
capability to operate against advanced technology Man-Portable Air
Defense Systems, and in degraded visibility environments. Marine
Aviation has invested $390 million on rotary wing ASE development and
procurement in the last 7 years. We have requested an additional $66.4
million in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budgets for continued
RDT&E and procurement of the latest available ASE technology for our
helicopters. For fiscal year 2008 the Department of the Navy has
requested $29.7 million for continued Directed Infrared Countermeasures
(DIRCM) development, a state of the art ASE system that will enable
Marine Aviation to pace the threat of advanced anti-aircraft systems
proliferation. Your continued support is required to ensure our pilots
and aircrews have the most current survivability technology available
to them.
AVIATION TRAINING SYSTEMS
Aviation Training Systems (ATS) is a holistic, measurable approach
to achieving optimum combat readiness for the fleet while
simultaneously ensuring we are husbanding our resources through an
increased focus on safety and standardization. The mission of ATS is to
plan, execute, and manage Marine Aviation training to achieve
individual and unit capability across all aviation core competencies to
support full spectrum combat operations. Marine Aviation, through ATS,
is pursuing the development of fully integrated training systems for
both new and legacy aircraft to greatly enhance operational readiness,
to improve safety through greater standardization, and to significantly
reduce the life cycle cost of maintaining and sustaining aircraft. ATS
will integrate all post-accession Officer and Enlisted training,
operational safety programs, and standardize our training curriculums,
simulation devices, and evaluation processes through three core
elements. These include: training device configuration and
standardization; Systems Approach to Training derived curriculum;
Standardization and Evaluation of Flight Leadership, Instrument and
Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS)
programs, and standardized operating procedures among like units. Our
way forward includes the stand-up of the Marine Aviation Training
Systems Squadron (MATSS) at each Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
beginning this fall. Currently, there is one functional MATSS located
onboard MCAS New River, North Carolina. MATSS New River has been highly
successful with its responsive management of training systems for our
tilt-rotor and rotary wing assets.
AV-8B
As the primary expeditionary TACAIR jet in the Marine Corps, our
legacy AV-8B fleet must be maintained at a high level of readiness to
support current combat operations in global war on terrorism theaters.
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $17.4 million RDT&E funds to
support development of the Engine Life Management Plan (ELMP)/
Accelerated Simulated Mission Endurance Testing, Tactical Moving Map
Display, the Readiness Management Plan (RMP), and moving the LITENING
targeting pod to the centerline station. This effort will increase the
ordnance carriage capability of the Harrier to better support combat
operations. The fiscal year 2008 budget also requests $40.5 million
procurement funding for procurement of Open Systems Core Avionics
Requirement, TAV-8B Upgrade, ELMP upgrades, and the RMP, which
addresses aircraft obsolescence and deficiency issues associated with
sustaining the current AV-8B fleet. The AV-8B program is additionally
transitioning to a Fatigue Life Experienced Analysis program to more
accurately track the useful life remaining on our legacy fleet. This
program will commence in fiscal year 2009 and will help to manage our
legacy inventory of AV-8Bs until transition to the F-35B.
F/A-18 A+/C/D
The backbone of Marine TACAIR capability resides in the F/A-18.
Increased wartime utilizations rates, particularly in our F/A-18D
fleet, demand that we continue to modernize the Hornet to maintain our
combat capability in global war on terrorism theaters. The fiscal year
2008 budget request contains $73.6 million for the continuation of the
systems upgrade programs for legacy F/A-18 platforms. Included in this
request is the continued procurement of recently fielded systems such
as Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Multi-Function Information
Distribution System, and Digital Communications System. The Marine
Corps continues to upgrade 56 Lot 7-9 F/A-18A to Lot 17 F/A-18C
aircraft capability with digital communications and tactical data link.
The Marine Corps is upgrading the current capabilities of the F/A-18C/D
with digital communications, tactical data link and tactical
reconnaissance systems. This upgrade ensures that our F/A-18s remain
viable and relevant in support of Department of the Navy (DoN) Tactical
Air Integration and supports our Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
concept. When combined with data link hardware and the Rover Ground
Station, the LITENING pod provides real time video to ground forces
engaged with the enemy, adding a new dimension to precision fires and
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Our fleet of
legacy F/A-18D's is currently flying at four times their programmed
rate. The fiscal year 2008 budget also requests $112 million allowing
for procurement of center barrel replacements to extend the service
life of F/A-18 A+/C/Ds 7 years to meet fleet inventory requirements
until 2022. This initiative is critical to ensure we have adequate
numbers of F/A-18's to meet National Military Strategy requirements
until we transition to the F-35B.
EA-6B AND FUTURE MAGTF ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Control and manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum in global
war on terrorism theaters has and will continue to play an important
role in our success on the battlefield. Multiple initiatives are
underway to expand and better integrate the capabilities of electronic
warfare to achieve our objectives. The Marine Corps remains fully
committed to flying the EA-6B Prowler past 2015 as we look to enhance
our legacy capabilities and posture for our future MAGTF Electronic
Warfare Network. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget requests
$113.5 million for RDT&E and procurement for continuing EA-6B upgrades
and readiness improvements, which increase the operational availability
of this low-density, high-demand aircraft and reduce operating costs.
These requests include $97.7 million for purchase and installation of
seven Improved Capability (ICAP) III aircraft systems for USMC EA-6Bs.
Also included in our $113.5 million request are Multifunction
Information Distribution System kits, which will provide dramatically
improved emitter identification and location information, Link-16
connectivity for shared situational awareness, as well as Blue Force
Tracker capability. We are also conducting close coordination with the
Air Force to leverage joint development of the Next Generation Jammer,
the Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) program, and the Adapted
Joint C\4\ISR Node program.
Beyond the Prowler, the Future Electronic Warfare Network for the
Marine Corps will comprise a ``system of systems''. The constituent
components of this network include; the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter,
with its embedded array of electronic warfare capabilities; Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) capable of carrying scalable and specifically
tailored electronic warfare suites; ISR payloads, and ground systems
already fielded and under development. This system will possess both
offensive and defensive capabilities. A key tenet of our future vision
is an array of electronic warfare capabilities, not just a single
electronic warfare platform. The individual pieces of hardware used to
conduct future electronic warfare will comprise the tentacles of the
distributed network. This network will serve as the backbone for our
electronic warfare capability. This is a critical and important
distinction for the Corps and is what will make future USMC electronic
warfare capabilities so useful to the MAGTF and the Department of
Defense.
WEAPONS PROGRAMS
Since 2003, Marine TACAIR have employed 691 Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAMs), 2,710 Guided Bomb Units, and 268 Maverick missiles
during combat operations. The fiscal year 2008 Budget supports
precision-guided munition (PGM) programs that continue to support
combat operations.
DUAL-MODE DIRECT ATTACK WEAPONS
In combat, our aviators need weapons systems that can respond to
the changing, dynamic conditions of today's battlefield to support
ground operations. Based on an urgent needs statement and feedback from
the combatant commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoN determined
that improved responsiveness and flexibility was required for close air
support (CAS) missions in support of Marine and Army ground forces. To
address these shortcomings, the Department leveraged congressionally
directed funding in the research of dual-mode laser-guided weapons and
successfully developed and integrated Global Positioning System and
laser guided technologies into a single direct-attack weapon. This
capability will be fielded on Marine Corps F/A-18 A+/C/D and AV-8B
aircraft this summer to reduce the number of sorties needed to destroy
intended targets, while providing the warfighter with increased
flexibility in adverse weather against all classes of targets. 7000
Dual Mode Direct Attack Weapons were procured and will be delivered by
the end of fiscal year 2008. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $29
million to develop the Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (DMTC).
In January, testing was completed on a Low Collateral Damage Bomb
(LCDB), in response to a CENTCOM requirement for our legacy aircraft.
The LCDB can be used with existing Direct Attack Laser Guided Bomb
(DMLGB) or JDAM kits and will be available to our warfighters before
June.
JOINT AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILE (JAGM) (FORMERLY JOINT COMMON MISSILE
(JCM))
Marine Aviation needs a flexible, all-weather, common air-to-ground
weapon system to replace the TOW, Hellfire, and Maverick missiles that
can be employed against both stationary and moving ground targets by
fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The Marine Corps has expended 1,155
Hellfire and 991 TOW air-to-ground missiles in support of ground forces
engaged in combat since 2003. A JROC Memorandum called for a RDT&E
effort, beginning in fiscal year 2007, to mitigate JROC-validated
capability gaps in precision munitions by developing the next
generation Air-to-Ground CAS weapon for fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and
UAV aircraft. The Marine Corps is participating, with the Joint Staff,
in an OSD-led Concept Decision Review. The Concept Decision Review will
obtain a Tri-Chair strategic investment decision on JAGM in the first
half of this calendar year. A low collateral damage PGM for moving
targets is critical for Marine Aviation as a replacement for our aging
stockpiles of TOW, Hellfire and Laser Maverick family of weapons. The
Services have put $68.5 million in the fiscal year 2008 budget for JAGM
risk reduction and seeker technology RDT&E.
Modernize the Force
F-35B
The F-35B Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) is critical for maintaining our preeminence in
expeditionary operations, exemplified by our legacy AV-8B Harrier jump
jets during the march to Baghdad during OIF I. The fiscal year 2008
budget requests $1.7 billion RDT&E for continuation of F-35 System
Development and Demonstration (SDD) and $1.3 billion APN (including
spares) for the initial DoN low rate production lot (LRIP 2) for six
STOVL aircraft with $120 million for long lead funding for eight STOVL
aircraft as part of LRIP 3. This budget request contains the first
TACAIR jets procured for the Marine Corps in 10 years. We continue to
provide the least expensive and most flexible component of our Nation's
tactical air capability. On any given day, Marine TACAIR is aboard
carriers, flying from amphibious shipping and operating ashore at
expeditionary sites, all simultaneously. However, our legacy platforms
are rapidly dwindling as we operate them at several times the normal
peace time rates. In order to meet our future operational commitments
we must maintain a procurement profile supporting a 2012 F-35B Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) along with quantities to rapidly refill
our depleted squadrons at an economical rate. The mature, thoughtful
design of the F-35B and technological advances to replace many
individual stovepipe capabilities into a single platform will provide
the Marine Corps with a highly advanced, persistent, and enduring
tactical aircraft for the next 50 years; the F-35B will act as an
integrated flying combat system in support of our ground forces and
will aid in providing full spectrum dominance of the battle space. We
are managing our current strike fighter shortfall through reinvestment
of existing squadrons in the rest of our fleet. If IOC of the F-35B is
deferred past 2012 and the procurement ramp rate is shallowed out, the
Marine Corps will be unable to fill its future operational commitments.
V-22 Osprey
As the Commandant of the Marine Corps announced on 13 April, VMM-
263, our first operational MV-22 squadron, will deploy to Iraq in
September of this year. This deployment directly supports our Corps'
number one priority--our marines and sailors in combat. With thousands
of flight hours of testing and training, in environments ranging from
shipboard to the desert, the MV-22 is a mature technology that Osprey
crews are eager to employ. The decision to send this aircraft to combat
in Iraq underscores our confidence in it. The quantum leap in
capability represented by the Osprey will give the Joint Force
significantly increased flexibility and reach.
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $2 billion of procurement
funding for 21 MV-22s, associated spares, aircraft retrofit, and
Economic Ordering Quantity investments supporting fiscal years 2008-
2013 multiyear procurement, and $118 million of RDT&E for continued
development, testing and evaluation. The V-22 Program will deliver a
total of 13 aircraft in fiscal year 2008. Recent contractor performance
has met expectations with on-time deliveries of block B aircraft and
timely contractor support.
To date, 29 Block A and 16 Block B aircraft have been delivered to
support developmental testing, Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL),
training and initial fleet fielding. The MV-22 completed OPEVAL in 2005
and fielding is underway at MCAS New River, North Carolina. Three
squadrons have commenced the transition from the 40-year-old CH-46E to
Block B MV-22Bs. The first of these two squadrons will provide an IOC
in fiscal year 2007. In full rate production, the aircraft procurement
rate will ramp up to 30 aircraft per year. The program of record
includes 360 MV-22s for the Marine Corps.
The demands of global war on terrorism and modernization of our
Expeditionary Warfare capabilities have increased the urgency to
rapidly field the MV-22 Osprey as a replacement for the 40 year old CH-
46. Its design incorporates advanced technologies in composite
materials, survivability, airfoil design, fly-by-wire controls, digital
avionics and manufacturing. The MV-22 is capable of carrying 24 combat-
equipped marines or a 10,000-pound external load, and has a strategic
self-deployment capability of 2,100 nautical miles with a single aerial
refueling. It is vastly superior to the CH-46E it replaces, with twice
the speed, three times the payload, five times the range, and six times
the survivability. The V-22 Osprey is a joint platform for the Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force. It is providing significant opportunities
for joint training, tactics development, and mission execution.
KC-130J
Aerial refueling and assault support are key warfighting tasks
assigned to the KC-130J in global war on terrorism theaters. The KC-
130J extends the operational flexibility of the MAGTF commander by
providing increased persistence over the battlefield of our TACAIR
fleet and critical supplies for our ground forces when and where they
are needed. Simply put, the Marine Corps KC-130J is the work horse of
Marine Aviation in OIF. Six aircraft have been continuously deployed in
support of OIF since IOC and have provided the warfighter state of the
art, multi-mission, tactical aerial refueling, and fixed wing assault
support assets that have exceeded expectations. This year's deployment
of the in-flight refueling capable MV-22 significantly increases the
tanking requirement of the KC-130J community. The fiscal year 2008
budget requests $270 million for procurement of four aircraft,
associated spares, and advanced procurement. The Marine Corps is
currently in a multiyear procurement program with the Air Force to
procure a total of 35 aircraft by the end of fiscal year 2008. The
program calls for the continued procurement of two aircraft per year.
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS)
Knowledge is power on the battlefield and the Corps' family of UAS
aircraft provides critical, persistent ISR capabilities to our
commanders on the ground in support of combat operations. Marine
Aviation has the lead for Tier III of the USMC UAS Family of Systems
that is designed primarily to support a MEF or Joint Task Force-level
commander. The Pioneer UAS has served us well since 1986 in this role;
it has proven its worth in the fight against insurgent forces and
terrorists in Iraq. However, due to the Pioneer's age and obsolescence,
it has become a logistical challenge for our operational forces. Based
on these challenges, the Marine Corps decided it will begin to
transition to the Army Shadow UAS during the fourth quarter of fiscal
year 2007. The Shadow's capabilities are similar to the Pioneer and
have been upgraded over the past few years. It will provide commanders
with a day/night ISR and target acquisition capability. This year's
Presidential Budget contains a request for $90.3 million for
procurement for five of 13 required Shadow systems. We envision the
Shadow serving as an interim system until a Vertical UAS (VUAS) is
developed and fielded in the 2015 timeframe.
The VUAS will provide a capability that can be either land or sea-
based. It will provide the future MAGTF with organic, responsive and
real-time ISR as well as electronic attack, fires, and command and
control capabilities, operating in concert with all MAGTF assets.
CH-53K PROGRAM
Heavy lift requirements for Marine Aviation are primarily filled by
the CH-53E. Delivery of critical supplies and equipment to austere
sites in support of our ground combat element ensures that we remain
flexible and responsive to needs of the ground commander. Marine Corps
CH-53E legacy helicopters continue to make significant contributions in
the Horn of Africa and Iraq, however, these aircraft are in need of
replacement in the next decade. Vertical heavy-lift capability will
continue to be critical to successful global operations in future anti-
access, area-denial environments, enabling the joint concepts of Force
Application and Focused Logistics within the Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $417 million of RDT&E
funds to support development of the CH-53K helicopter that will replace
the current U.S. Marine Corps' heavy-lift aviation platform, the
venerable but aging CH-53E Super Stallion.
The CH-53E, first fielded in 1981, continues to demonstrate its
strategic value as a fully marinized, expeditionary, heavy-lift
platform. But the CH-53E is reaching service-life and performance
limits as the global war on terrorism drives operations from sea level
to higher altitudes and into hostile environments and austere operating
sites. The CH-53E cannot support our future operational concepts of Sea
Basing and Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM). To keep Fleet Marine
Forces operationally effective well into the future, the Marine Corps
is developing the CH-53K, a near-term and cost-effective replacement
for the CH-53E that remains within the CH-53E shipboard footprint, and
avoids L-class ship alteration or new ship construction costs.
Addressing lessons learned from recent operations, the new-build CH-53K
helicopter will be capable of externally lifting 27,000 pounds on a
Sea-Level Hot day (103 degrees Fahrenheit (F)) to an unrefueled range
of 110 nautical miles (NM). This capability is more than double the
current CH-53E envelope under the same conditions. Additionally, CH-53K
helicopters will each be capable of routinely carrying 30 combat-loaded
troops. Major systems improvements which will significantly reduce
Operations and Support (O&S) costs include: interoperable avionics,
improved cargo-handling systems, and expanded survivability and force
protection capabilities.
A Service Life Assessment completed in 1999 identified a CH-53E
fatigue life limit of 6,120 airframe hours, which a significant number
of CH-53E platforms will attain by fiscal year 2011. While the Marine
Corps is also seeking short-term solutions to diminish the effects of
this and other CH-53E issues in the fiscal year 2007 budget, these
solutions will not arrest accelerating attrition, continuing escalation
of O&S costs, and the ever-increasing maintenance burden on an aircraft
that is 24 years old. In addition, due to the abnormally high global
war on terrorism operational tempo, the CH-53E fleet is expending
service life at a much faster rate than planned.
Requirements for the CH-53K were developed in consonance with STOM
concepts from Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare in Marine Corps Strategy
21, the Naval concept of Sea Basing in Sea Power 21, and with lessons
learned from recent operational experience. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council approved the Operational Requirements Document that
defines the necessary CH-53K capabilities in December 2004. We intend
to achieve IOC with the CH-53K, a heavy-lift helicopter with vastly
enhanced performance capability, survivability and reliability, in
2015. The CH-53K will be the most capable, marinized, heavy-lift
helicopter in the world, a truly transformational asset.
H-1 UPGRADES PROGRAM
Our H-1 fleet fills flexible and persistent attack and utility
requirements for the ground combat element. Each and every day our
Cobra and Huey crews are flying over the heads of our ground forces
providing immediate support and security in support of Marine combat
operations. To ensure continued support to the MAGTF, our H-1 aircraft
are in need of modernization. The UH-1N, for example, has not received
any major modifications to its rotor and drive train systems since its
delivery to the Marine Corps in 1971. This situation has led to a
decline in the aircraft's power available since its introduction.
Reduced power margins in the Huey have decreased safety margins for our
pilots and aircrew. Our AH-1W attack helicopters have been performing
magnificently in combat operations. In order to maintain this high
level of performance we need to upgrade the ``W'' to streamline pilot
workload, increase ordnance carriage, and improve sensor capabilities.
The H-1 Upgrades Program will replace the Marine Corps' AH-1W and
UH-1N helicopters with state-of-the-art AH-1Z and UH-1Y models. The
program is a key modernization effort designed to improve upon existing
capabilities, enhance operational effectiveness, and extend the service
life of both aircraft. The UH-1Y, for example, expands utility mission
capabilities with its improvements in range, speed, endurance, and
useful payload. Additionally, the commonality gained between the AH-1Z
and UH-1Y (84 percent) will significantly reduce life-cycle costs and
logistical footprint, while increasing the maintainability and
deployability of both aircraft.
The H-1 Upgrades Program, through a combination of remanufacture
and build new, will upgrade our current legacy fleet to 100 UH-1Ys and
180 AH-1Zs. The Defense Acquisition Board will convene in May 2007 to
authorize a program restructure, approve a fourth LRIP lot, and lay the
foundation to ``grow the force'' in support of plans for a balanced
202,000 Marine Corps.
The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $580 million APN funds to
procure 20 (15 UH-1Ys and 5 AH-1Zs) aircraft and spares and $3.6
million RDT&E funds to complete the H-1 Upgrades Engineering and
Manufacturing Development phase. Production continues on the first
three LRIP lots, awarded to Bell Helicopter. To date, three aircraft
(two UH-1Ys and one AH-1Z) have been delivered to the Marines. One
additional UH-1Y will be delivered by the end of next month. The
program completed OPEVAL Phase I successfully in November 2006, and
will enter Phase II later this year.
The program continues to seek opportunities to reduce unit cost and
minimize the impact on current and future operational readiness. In
support of maintaining readiness, the optimum mix of remanufactured and
newly fabricated aircraft is currently being evaluated; the results
will be reflected in future budget requests. We are encouraged by
recent steps Bell has taken to arrest recent cost growth to include
leadership change and program quality assurance measures. Bell
Helicopter needs to continue to meet scheduled aircraft deliveries to
ensure we have the best attack and utility helicopters available to our
Corps as well as phase out our legacy inventory.
Prepare for the Long War
NAVAL AVIATION ENTERPRISE (NAE)
In order to provide consistent, timely aviation support to the
ground force when and where it is needed, we must maintain our
readiness. Marine Aviation's current readiness process is sub-optimized
to link and relate the various elements of readiness in a way that
enables us to accurately define requirements. Therefore, Marine
Aviation is integrating into the NAE and Naval Aviation Readiness
Integrated Improvement Program to achieve optimal readiness now, but
also to sustain the health of Marine Aviation into the future. The
integration strategy has three main phases and stages, and the goals of
the integration are: increase in-reporting rates; decrease out-of-
reporting rates; improve depot turn-around times; reduce direct
maintenance man-hours per flight hour; reduce flight hour costs; extend
airframe service life for legacy platforms; achieve programmed service
life for new platforms; and increase the core competency of
organizational and intermediate-level maintenance departments.
AVIATION SAFETY
The Marine Corps is committed to the continued reduction of our
aviation safety mishap rate. We do not accept the loss of marines or
aircraft during any type of flight operations, particularly during
training. In fiscal year 2005, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
directed 21 operational safety initiatives to address day-to-day flight
and ground operations. We continue to look for new and innovative
measures to reduce our aviation mishap rate. We feel confident that our
most recent internal initiative, ATS, will continue to arrest our
mishap rate as we strive to reach the Secretary of Defense goal of 50
percent mishap reduction. The Marine Corps fiscal year 2006 Class A
flight mishap rate was 1.58 per 100,000 flight hours, a drop from 2.26
and 5.17 from the previous 2 years.
SUMMARY
The Marine Corps has a heritage of fighting battles and winning
wars on the sea, on the ground, and in the air. We do so while
supporting routine deployment cycles and transforming the force. Today
is no different. My pride in the accomplishments of Marine Aviation
past and present is only exceeded by my confidence that we are poised
to meet our future challenges. Our focus remains on the lance corporal
and ensuring that when he calls for Marine Air, we are there. Thank you
for your consideration.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, General. You made me a little
nostalgic for Senator McCain, who's off on a mission now,
because he refers to our colleague from Virginia, fondly and
respectfully, as ``The Squire.'' [Laughter.]
Admiral Clingan, thank you.
STATEMENT OF RADM BRUCE W. CLINGAN, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE,
VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Clingan. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cornyn, and Senator
Warner, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
I've prepared a written statement, and ask that it be read
into the record.
Senator Lieberman. Will do.
Admiral Clingan. Naval aviation continues to provide
tailored effects in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Operation Enduring Freedom, and the greater global war on
terrorism. The fiscal year 2008 President's budget balances
conventional and irregular warfare aviation capabilities,
reduces excess capacity, and achieves technological superiority
through costwise investments in recapitalization, sustainment,
and modernization programs.
To reserve as much time as possible for your questions,
I'll forego any additional comments.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Clingan follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Bruce W. Clingan, USN
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department
of the Navy's (DoN) fiscal year 2008 tactical aviation programs. I am
delighted to share this time with my colleagues from the DoN, U.S.
Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force to convey the critical needs of
tactical aviation in our Armed Forces.
Naval Aviation continues to play a major role in providing tailored
effects in support of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi
Freedom (OIF), as well as the broader global war on terrorism. The
ability of naval aviation to shape strategic, operational, and tactical
environments is reflective of the substantive return on your investment
in our people, our combat readiness, and our refined spectrum of
critical warfighting capabilities. These investments--in surveillance,
command and control, and persistent strike, among others--ensure our
tactical aircraft can operate effectively from aircraft carriers that
exploit the vast maneuver space provided by the sea.
The Navy's aviation programs; comprised of manned aircraft,
unmanned aerial systems, and weapons; directly support the Sea Strike,
Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and ForceNet pillars that underpin our Navy
Strategic Plan and Naval Power 21 strategy. The fiscal year 2008
President's budget balances conventional and irregular warfare aviation
capabilities, reduces excess capacity, and achieves technological
superiority through cost-wise investments in recapitalization,
sustainment and modernization programs. The adjustments reflected in
the budget maintain sufficient capacity to meet global presence and
warfighting requirements, manage overlap with joint capabilities, and
preserve warfighting relevance through 2024.
From fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2013, the Department's fiscal
year 2008 budget request procures 1,295 aircraft, reduces the average
aircraft age from 74 percent to 61 percent of expected service life,
and concentrates on resourcing capabilities that generate critical
maritime and joint effects.
CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)--At the core of our tactical air
(TACAIR) recapitalization plan is the JSF, a stealthy, multi-role
fighter aircraft that will enhance precision strike capability with
unprecedented range, sensor fusion, radar performance, combat
identification and electronic attack capabilities. The carrier variant
(CV) JSF complements the F/A-18E/F Block II and EA-18G in providing
long-range strike capability and much improved persistence over the
battlefield. The short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) JSF
combines the multi-role versatility of the F/A-18 and the basing
flexibility of the AV-8B with the 5th generation attributes required to
be effective against emerging peer rivals. The DoN fiscal year 2008
budget requests $1.7 billion research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) to continue JSF System Development and Demonstration
(SDD) and $1.3 billion APN to procure six STOVL aircraft (including
spares) in fiscal year 2008 and the long lead requirements for eight
STOVL aircraft in fiscal year 2009.
The JSF is executing its 6th year of SDD, with 11 SDD aircraft in
various stages of assembly. AA-1, the first conventional take-off and
landing (CTOL) production flight test article, is conducting test
flights to validate design, fabrication, and flight performance
parameters. With over approximately 7,300 engine test hours completed
through early March 2007, engine performance is meeting expectations.
The progress of the CTOL to date, and the significant commonality
between the three JSF variants, warrant confidence in the STOVL and CV
developmental efforts.
Final detailed design work on the STOVL is nearing completion.
STOVL weight has remained within requirements since the Critical Design
Review (CDR) last year, and BF-1, the first STOVL test aircraft, is
meeting its critical path metrics for a May 2008 first flight. STOVL
weight control efforts have been effectively leveraged to manage CV
weight growth over the last 3 months. The bulk of the ongoing
engineering effort is now focused on the drawing packages required for
the CV JSF CDR this summer. The JSF program is executing in accordance
with the approved replan that commenced 2 years ago, and the STOVL and
CV variants are projected to meet their respective Key Performance
Parameters.
JSF Alternate Engine (F-136)--The DoN maintains that developing and
procuring the F-136 alternate engine for the JSF is undesirable for a
variety of reasons--Pratt and Whitney F-135 engine development is
progressing satisfactorily, the form/fit/function parity requirement
between the F-135 and F-136 engines undermines any competitive
incentive to improve engine performance, and the business case
indicates the cost of developing the second engine will not be recouped
for more than two decades. These factors make the very limited risk
associated with a single engine manufacturer, commonplace among
tactical aircraft, an appropriate one to take. Within the context of
the fiscal constraints and competing investment priorities that
characterize the Future Years Defense Program (FDYP), the considerable
resources necessary to develop the F-136 are best applied to the core,
essential elements of the JSF program and other critical DoN
capabilities.
Super Hornets (F/A-18 E/F)--The F/A-18 E/F continues to replace
retired F-14 and legacy F/A-18 A/B/C/D aircraft, measurably improving
the strike capability and survivability of the Carrier Air Wing. The
Super Hornet provides a 40 percent increase in combat radius, 50
percent increase in endurance, and 25 percent increase in weapons
payload over legacy Hornets. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $2.1
billion to procure 24 F/A-18 E/F aircraft in the 4th year of a 5-year
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract (fiscal years 2005 to 2009). The
Super Hornet uses a spiral acquisition approach to develop and
incorporate new capabilities, such as the Active Electronically Scanned
Array (AESA) radar system. The AESA radar has completed Initial
Operational Test and Evaluation and is awaiting a full rate production
decision. All critical OT deficiencies are expected to be resolved with
the release of software upgrades in summer 2007. The first F/A-18F
squadron with AESA radar is scheduled to deploy summer 2008.
Legacy Hornets (F/A-18 A/B/C/D)--Inventory reductions stemming from
USN/USMC TACAIR Integration, F/A-18 A/B/C/D service life limits, the
JSF program replan and lowered JSF procurement ramp have combined to
create a DoN strike-fighter shortfall that exists today and will extend
through the transition to JSF. The shortfall is derived from the
projected DoN TACAIR inventory compared to the USN Carrier Air Wing and
USMC expeditionary TACAIR requirement for 35 USN and 19 USMC active
strike-fighter squadrons. This lean force structure is essential to
meet DoN rotational deployment and major combat operations surge
requirements. Fiscal year 2008 President's budget based projections
show legacy strike-fighter shortfalls ranging from about 50 aircraft to
more than 200, depending on the service life extension for F/A-18 A/B/
C/D aircraft (10,000 or 9,000 hours) and the JSF buy rate (50 or 35 per
year beginning in fiscal year 2014). Fully funding the strike-fighter
procurement programs of record through full operational capability
(FOC) and the legacy aircraft service life extension programs are
critical first steps in managing this shortfall.
To begin mitigating the shortfall, the fiscal year 2008 budget
procures 28 additional F/A-18 E/F above the fiscal year 2007
Appropriations Bill in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. When the legacy
Hornet service life assessment program is completed in December 2007,
the F/A-18 E/F and JSF procurement plans will be adjusted to ensure DoN
recapitalizes the capacity necessary to deliver the effects expected of
Naval TACAIR.
Hornet Sustainment (F/A-18 A-F)--The fiscal year 2008 budget
requests $442 million to continue replacing the center barrels on up to
421 legacy Hornets and to procure critical F/A-18 A-F aircraft system
upgrades. The center barrel replacements will extend the service life
of the F/A-18 A/C/D aircraft approximately 7 years and are essential to
help mitigate the strike-fighter shortfall through 2023, when the last
legacy Hornet is scheduled to retire. Procurement of capability
enhancements such as the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advanced
Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared Radar, Multi-Function Information
Distribution System, and Digital Communications System are required to
ensure that our F/A-18s remain relevant in the rapidly advancing threat
environment that will characterize the remainder of their service life.
Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)--The Navy continues to develop the
EA-18G as the replacement for the EA-6B AEA aircraft. The fiscal year
2008 budget requests $273 million for RDT&E and $1.3 billion for the
procurement of 18 LRIP aircraft. The Navy is leveraging the F/A-18E/F
and EA-18G MYP contract to buy 18 aircraft in fiscal year 2008. These
aircraft will support EA-18G Fleet Replacement Squadron stand-up and
the transition of three EA-6B squadrons to EA-18G, leading to an
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2009 and Full
Operational Capability (FOC) in fiscal year 2012.
The Office of Naval Research is working to develop adaptable,
modular, and open architecture hardware, firmware and software for a
next generation jamming capability that will be hosted on the EA-18G.
In this regard, the Navy is working with the Air Force on jamming
transmitters, and has leveraged previous work completed as part of
their B-52 Stand-Off Jammer program that has since been cancelled. The
Navy and Air Force technology teams continue to meet quarterly to
ensure their efforts are coordinated and duplication does not occur.
The EA-6B, Department of Defense's (DOD) only tactical electronic
attack aircraft with full spectrum jamming capabilities, has been in
high demand to provide direct support to counter-improvised explosive
device, Special Operating Force and time-sensitive targeting operations
in OIF/OEF. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $24.2 million in RDT&E
and $30.6 million in procurement to field critical EA-6B capability
enhancements and readiness improvements required to increase the
operational availability of this low-density, high-demand aircraft.
This funding also procures ten Low Band Transmitters that will replace
the aging transmitters that are employed nearly continuously today in
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as provide new jamming capability. In
addition, the budget procures essential avionics and structural
equipment in support of the EA-6B Operational Safety Improvement
Program.
Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D)--The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $809
million to procure three E-2D Pilot Production aircraft and supporting
systems for Operational Test and standup of the first operational
squadron in 2011. The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye provides essential battle
management command and control, and is a key enabler for maritime
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Its significantly
upgraded radar provides unparalleled overland capability against
current and future cruise missile targets, in addition to
transformational surveillance that meets theater air and missile
defense requirements. The E-2D, with its ability to meet the current
threat and pace the emerging threat posed by potential peer rivals, is
programmed to replace the legacy E-2C fleet over the next decade.
WEAPONS
The fiscal year 2008 budget procures and develops a mix of legacy,
advanced and next generation weapons that are lethal throughout the
entire range of military operations. The demands of irregular warfare
and counterinsurgency operations require adaptation of our legacy
weapons to a wide variety of tactical environments.
Hellfire missile (AGM-114) improvements are being implemented in
response to urban warfare requirements that mandate minimal collateral
damage. Thermobaric warhead improvements that contain blast effects
were deemed operationally effective in 2006, and will be complemented
by trajectory shaping--which allows flight crews to select the missile
flight profile most effective for the particular engagement. The fiscal
year 2008 budget request includes $45.7 million to procure 439 weapons
and components to address these requirements.
The BLU-126/B warhead, otherwise known as the low-collateral-damage
bomb (LCDB) bridges a capability gap identified by CENTCOM. The LCDB is
a low cost solution identified by the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE)
that has been approved for use with the Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM) and Laser Guided Bomb (LGB) precision guidance kits. It will be
fielded in March 2007 using General Purpose Bomb funds.
The Navy continues to pursue a Network Enabled Weapon Strategy with
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded
Response (SLAM-ER), Harpoon, and Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II)
capabilities. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests technical risk
reduction funding for SDB II leading to IOC on JSF in fiscal year 2016.
SDB II moving target, through-the-weather capability is a key future
capability for the JSF.
Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (DAMTC)--The fiscal year
2008 budget requests $29.1 million in fiscal year 2008 and $214.6
million across the FDYP for the DAMTC program, which seeks to use JDAM
and/or LGB weapons as the foundation for a dual mode weapon that is
capable of prosecuting targets moving at speeds up to 70 mph. An open
competition will be expeditiously conducted in response to the urgent
need for a fixed wing aircraft moving target weapon that will culminate
in a fielded solution following operational testing in fiscal year
2009.
This low cost, rapid integration program adds significant
capability while leveraging the existing industrial base to procure
17,720 DAMTC weapons.
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)--The combat-proven JSOW family of Navy
and Air Force air-to-ground weapons has achieved on-time deliveries for
5 consecutive years and delivered its 2,000th weapon in 2006. Cost
reduction initiatives and Foreign Military Sales have resulted in a 6-
percent reduction in JSOW-C Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC)
compared to the Fiscal Year 2007 Appropriations Bill. The fiscal year
2008 budget requests $131.3 million to procure 421 JSOW-Cs, a highly
lethal precision weapon that employs an imaging infrared seeker, GPS/
INS, and an augmenting charge with a follow-through penetrator bomb for
use against hardened targets. Production of other JSOW variants remains
deferred as we continue to work with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and our sister Services to resolve unexploded battlefield
ordnance issues that are of concern to the DoN and our Allies. The
fiscal year 2008 budget also includes $24.9 million to continue
development of a network enabled weapon, termed JSOW-C-1, in order to
fill a critical mission capability gap against moving ships at
tactically significant ranges.
Harpoon Block III (AGM-84M)--The Navy requires an upgrade to the
air-launched Harpoon cruise missile to provide an all-weather, over the
horizon, anti-surface warfare capability with `improved selectivity' in
the cluttered littoral environment. This initiative is in direct
support of the most recent Pacific Command Integrated Priorities List.
The Harpoon BLK III Program will integrate a two-way data-link and GPS
to achieve the enhanced selectivity that will facilitate employment
under stringent rules of engagement. This program will leverage the
surface Harpoon program's efforts already started with fiscal year 2007
RDT&E funds. Data-link development and NSA certification costs are
being shared with the Navy JSOW program. The fiscal year 2008 budget
requests $3.3 million in RDT&E to initiate the air launched Harpoon
Block III effort. Procurement of 300 Harpoon III missile kits and
associated systems in the outyears requires $58.0 million in fiscal
year 2011 through fiscal year 2013.
Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM)--The fiscal year
2008 budget requests $32.8 million for finalization of the AARGM SDD,
and requests $41.3 million for the first increment of LRIP tactical and
training weapons. AARGM utilizes legacy High-Speed Anti-Radiation
Missile (HARM) weapon components with advanced multi-spectral/multi-
sensor technologies to transform the AGM-88 weapon system from a
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) capability to a Destruction of
Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) capability. The program is expected to reach
Milestone C and begin Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) in fiscal year
2008. AARGM's high speed and extended stand-off capability to engage
long-range threats with GPS precision; coupled with the geolocation
precision resident in the EA-18G or F/A-18 E/F with AESA; will provide
the Navy a critical time sensitive strike capability. AARGM is
scheduled to reach IOC in fiscal year 2009 on the F/A-18 C/D Hornet,
followed by the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler in fiscal
year 2011.
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM/AIM-120)--AMRAAM
is a Joint Navy/Air Force (Air Force-led) advanced, medium range
missile that counters existing aircraft and cruise missile threats.
AMRAAM incorporates advanced electronic attack capabilities and is
effective against a broad spectrum of targets operating at high/low
altitudes beyond and within visual range. AMRAAM provides an essential
air-to-air first look, first shot, first kill capability that exploits
the networked environment supporting Sea Power 21's Theater Air and
Missile Defense mission area. The AIM-120D missile is currently in SDD
with a planned first live shot in June 2007. The fiscal year 2008
budget requests $4.6 million in RDT&E to complete AIM-120D
developmental efforts and $87.5 million for production of 79 AIM-120D
all-up rounds and associated hardware. This procurement is critical to
begin building an inventory of air-to-air weapons effective against
emerging threats.
Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile (AIM-9X)--The Joint Navy/Air Force
(Navy-led) Sidewinder missile is the only short-range infrared air-to-
air missile integrated on USN/USAF strike-fighter aircraft. The AIM-9X
is the newest variant in the Sidewinder family and is a 5th Generation
weapon that incorporates high off-bore sight acquisition capability,
thrust vectoring to achieve superior maneuverability, and increased
seeker sensitivity through imaging infrared focal plane array
technology and advanced processing. The fiscal year 2008 budget
requests $54.9 million for production of 110 all-up round missiles, 74
Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs), and the associated hardware
required to make the capability available to our strike-fighter
squadrons.
SELF PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM)--The fiscal
year 2008 budget requests $131.4 million in aircraft procurement
funding for 61 ALQ-214 on-board Radio Frequency Countermeasures systems
and $24.4 million Ammunition Procurement funding for 581 ALE-55 Fiber
Optic Towed Decoys, pending a full rate production decision. IDECM
Block 3/ALE-55 Operational Testing and Evaluation identified a number
of deficiencies that are being expeditiously corrected. A full rate
production decision is expected in fiscal year 2008.
Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) Onboard Jammer--The fiscal
year 2008 budget requests $8.2 million in RDT&E for development of an
onboard jammer that will employ state-of-the-art Digital Radio
Frequency Memory devices to replace the ALQ-126B Jammer that was last
produced in 1991. This effort will measurably improve the survivability
of Naval tactical aircraft by delaying, denying, and defeating threat
air-to-air and surface-to-air missile systems operating in the radio
frequency spectrum. The lead platform for the DRFM program is the F/A-
18 C/D, followed by the AV-8B. An Analysis of Alternatives has been
initiated to investigate alternative solutions, costs, and schedules.
This developmental effort and the resulting capability is required to
pace rapidly proliferating threat systems.
Tactical Aircraft Directed Infrared Countermeasures (TADIRCM)--The
fiscal year 2008 budget requests $27.6 million in RDT&E for development
of an improved Missile Warning System (MWS) and Infrared Countermeasure
(IRCM) system for Navy and Marine Corps helicopters. This system will
provide aircrew protection against current and next generation IR
guided man-portable air defense systems. The Analysis of Alternatives
for TADIRCM has been completed and the program is working toward a
Milestone B in fiscal year 2008.
NAVY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS)
Since its initial experience with UAS during Operation Desert
Storm, operating Pioneer from the sea, the Navy has pursued a strategy
of developing a family of maritime intelligence surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) UAS that supports our Navy Strategic Plan and
Naval Power 21 strategy.
This family of systems encompasses small tactical, tactical,
persistent, and penetrating platforms that are being developed to
provide maritime domain awareness across the Sea Shield, Base, and
Strike pillars that embody naval power in the 21st century.
Scan Eagle--During the past year, Scan Eagle ISR fee-for-service
contracts provided persistent ISR coverage for deployed Expeditionary
Strike Groups (ESG), Expeditionary Action Groups (EAG), and independent
naval ships, as well as land-based operations in the Central Command
area of responsibility. There are currently three contracts (two ship-
based and one shore-based) in use, with a follow-on contract in work.
To date Scan Eagle UAS have completed in excess of 925 sorties/7,700
hours. A typical contract provides 10 hours of ISR coverage per day/300
hours per month. Reliability data is not directly tracked, but mishap
rates for the Scan Eagle system have averaged 1 air vehicle loss per
214 hours historically. The mishap rate for recent shipboard operations
has improved to 1 per 500 hours (or one to two lost air vehicles per 6
month deployment). A loss in this case is categorized as an air vehicle
that is no longer in an airworthy status. This rate is not atypical for
this size/class of ``expendable'' air vehicle. Scan Eagle video has
been linked to its Ground Control Station, Toughbook-based Remote Video
Terminal (RVT), and Rover III RVTs.
Small Tactical UAS (STUAS)--The fiscal year 2008 budget includes a
request for $6.1 million in RDT&E that will be used to begin SDD
efforts for a small tactical UAS akin to Scan Eagle. This funding will
support a combined Navy and Marine Corps acquisition program (an
additional $5.7 million RDT&E is funded by USMC) that will field a
small, persistent ISR platform in fiscal year 2010 that can be operated
from both ships and land facilities.
Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff UAV (VTUAV)--The fiscal year 2008
budget requests $33.0 million in RDT&E and $37.7 million in APN for the
Fire Scout program. Fire Scout is on track to complete test and
evaluation in 2008 and reach IOC in 4Q fiscal year 2008 onboard the
Littoral Combat Ship. Procurement funds will be used to buy 3 Low Rate
Initial Production (LRIP) air vehicles, plus associated Ground Control
Stations (GCS) and equipment. Analysis supporting the Navy's employment
of Fire Scout VTUAV includes an LCS aviation warfighting requirements
analysis, LCS and draft VTUAV concept of operations (CONOPs), the
campaign analysis completed in support of the DoN fiscal year 2008
budget submission, and the applicable Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System documents. The procurement profile in fiscal
year 2008 begins the process of fielding VTUAV systems aligned to meet
LCS mission module deliveries in the FYDP and beyond.
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS--The fiscal year 2008
budget requests $116.7 million to continue development of the BAMS UAS.
BAMS UAS will provide a persistent, multi-sensor, maritime
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability and
communications relay in support of major combat operations and the
global war on terrorism. BAMS is a key component of the Navy's future
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, which includes the P-8A
Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) and the EPX Information
Operations aircraft. The BAMS UAS program is now scheduled for
Milestone B in fourth quarter fiscal year 2007, leading to an IOC in
late fiscal year 2014. A competitive request for proposal was issued to
industry on 14 February 2007. Responses are due in April and the source
selection results will be part of the MS B decision process.
Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration System (GHMD)--The fiscal year
2008 budget requests $17.7 million in O&M,N funding to support CONOPS
development, fleet battle experiments, and BAMS risk reduction
initiatives with the two Global Hawk UAS the Navy procured in concert
with Air Force production. As part of the GHMD program, the Global Hawk
Integrated Sensor System radar software has been modified to provide
the wide area search, maritime moving target indicator (MMTI), and
inverse synthetic aperture radar modes that are required in the high
clutter maritime environment. The fiscal year 2008 budget includes $5.9
million in APN to procure needed spares to support continued GHMD
operations.
Navy Unmanned Combat Air System--The fiscal year 2008 budget
requests $161.7 million to continue development of the Navy's carrier-
suitable, Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS). Navy is committed to a
carrier-based, penetrating, persistent UCAS to provide the Joint
warfighter with a responsive ISR and time-sensitive strike capability
that fills the gap identified in the Joint Strike Enabler Initial
Capability Document. To field that capability, the Navy is conducting a
risk reduction carrier suitability demonstration of a relevant low
observable platform air vehicle. This carrier demonstration, scheduled
to complete in fiscal year 2013, will inform UCAS development in a
program that will leverage the technology maturation initiatives of all
the Services' manned and unmanned programs.
Tactical Control System (TCS)--The fiscal year 2008 budget requests
$9.4 million to continue TCS development. TCS provides mission
planning, command and control, and C\4\I interface commonality for
tactical and medium altitude unmanned UAS. The TCS program incorporates
a standards-based architecture compliant with North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Standardization Agreement 4586 that integrates Fire Scout
functionality with LCS, and facilitates future interoperability and
payload capability enhancements. TCS will IOC in fiscal year 2008 as
part of the Fire Scout VTUAV system. With the help of $1.0 million
provided by Congress in fiscal year 2007, the TCS program is also
transitioning to open architecture and open source software.
Other UAS Initiatives--The Navy, as the lead service for Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (EOD), is sponsoring the demonstration of small UAS
capabilities in support of EOD forces deployed in the global war on
terrorism. This in-theater demonstration, scheduled during 3Q fiscal
year 2007, will employ 3 Silver Fox UAS and 10 Micro Air Vehicle (MAV)
systems in response to a validated joint urgent operational need.
Additionally, the Navy continues to support the Marine Corps'
Pioneer program. Program management, testing, and training support for
its currently fielded systems is programmed through fiscal year 2008.
MARITIME PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
Aerial Common Sensor (ACS)--Since the ACS contract with Lockheed
Martin was cancelled by the Army in January 2006, an OSD-directed Joint
ISR (JISR) study co-led by Army and Navy has been completed. This study
reexamined the multi-intelligence requirements that were the core of
the ACS program, and considered potential manned and unmanned
solutions. The JISR study validated the need for a manned, multi-Int
platform to meet the tactical commander's direct support ISR needs and
highlighted the specific attributes required to be effective in this
regard.
Additionally, Navy campaign analysis for POM-08 refined the
electronic warfare capabilities required to meet the threat posed by
emerging peer rivals. Specifically, the Navy requires a platform with
an unrefueled on station time of 4 hours at a combat radius of 1,200
NM. While collaboration on the mission system continues with our sister
Services, the significant difference in range and endurance
requirements for the Army and Navy have prompted both Services to
pursue separate platform solutions. In the case of the Navy, the
follow-on to the EP-3E is being called the EPX, pending development of
the acquisition strategy. The EPX will be an integral part of the
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force family of systems that
includes the MMA and BAMS UAS and is planned to reach IOC in 2019.
EP-3E--The EP-3E flew more than 8,700 mission hours in support of
Maritime Component Commanders and Combatant Commander global war on
terrorism missions worldwide in 2006. The details of those missions are
classified, but can be provided upon request. The Navy is fully
committed to sustaining the EP-3E airframe and keeping its mission
systems effective until the EPX is fielded. Three spiral upgrades to
the mission system and installation of Special Structural Inspection
Kits similar to the P-3 are programmed to sustain the EP-3E through
2019. Of note, the EPX will incorporate the EP-3E Spiral 3 capabilities
as the baseline for EPX Block 0, plus additional capabilities that will
result in a true multi-intelligence platform.
P-8A Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)--The P-8A will replace
the P-3C Orion on a less than 1:1 basis. It will significantly enhance
naval lethality in the broad area maritime and littoral armed Anti-
Submarine Warfare and Anti-Surface Warfare mission areas. The P-8A
fills combatant commander requirements in major combat and shaping
operations, as well as the war on terror and homeland defense. The
program is in the detailed design phase and has been executing on time
and on budget. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $880 million in
research and development funds to keep the program on track to achieve
IOC in fiscal year 2013.
MH-60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter--The MH-60R is a cornerstone of
the Navy's helicopter CONOPs, which reduces the number of variants in
service from six to two. The MH-60R Multi-Mission helicopter will
replace the surface combatant-based SH-60B, carrier-based SH-60F, and
anti-surface capabilities of the S-3 with a newly manufactured airframe
and enhanced mission system. Sea control missions include Undersea and
Surface Warfare. The MH-60R provides forward-deployed capabilities to
defeat area-denial strategies, allowing Joint forces to project and
sustain power. Full rate production was approved in March 2006. The
fiscal year 2008 budget requests $998 million to procure 27 aircraft.
The MH-60S is designed to support Carrier and Expeditionary Strike
Groups in Combat Logistics, Search and Rescue, Vertical Replenishment,
Anti-Surface Warfare, Airborne Mine Countermeasures, Combat Search and
Rescue, and Naval Special Warfare mission areas. This program is in
production. In fiscal year 2007 the first of five Organic Airborne Mine
Countermeasures systems (AQS-20) will reach IOC. The remaining four
airborne mine countermeasure systems will reach IOC between fiscal
years 2008-2010.
An Armed Helicopter capability is also expected to enter service in
2007. The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $504 million to procure 18
aircraft.
SUMMARY
Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I
would like to thank you for your continued support of naval aviation
and Navy TACAIR in particular. This budget submission--balanced with
other Naval aviation budget priorities--ensures our young men and
women, who fight daily with courage and commitment, have what it takes
to win. Our budget submission makes sound investments in capabilities
that make relevant contributions to irregular warfare, pace the threat
posed by potential adversaries, and ensure Navy Aviation remains an
effective anti-access force in major combat operations. Thank you again
for this opportunity to appear today to speak on behalf of Navy
aviation.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Admiral.
Thank you all. A good beginning.
I'd like to start with you, Admiral.
I say to my colleagues that I think we'll start with 8-
minute rounds, then we can keep it going as long as we have
questions.
I want to ask you about this projected shortfall of the F-
18 aircraft. We've heard that during the next decade, it could
be as large as 150 less than the number required to support the
10 aircraft carrier wings. I also understand that the shortfall
assumes that we will be able to operate the F-18s for up to
10,000 flight hours. So, this raises a couple of questions.
One, will the Navy be able to maintain its Fleet Response Plan,
being able to surge 5 or 6 carriers within 30 days of
notification, followed by another carrier within 90 days, if
you end up 150 aircraft below requirements?
Admiral Clingan. Thank you for the opportunity, Mr.
Chairman, to address this question.
Senator Lieberman. Sure.
Admiral Clingan. Over the course of the preparation of the
budget, and in our work to support Congress's efforts as they
explore the budget, we have discussed a strike-fighter
shortfall that ranges from approximately 50 aircraft to over
200. Those numbers stem from excursions that we ran to
understand how sensitive our potential shortfall is to the
differences in the flight hours that we could sustain our
legacy Hornets to, and the buy rate of the JSF. The program of
record depicted in the President's budget 2008 assumes 10,000
flight hours for the legacy Hornets, and a buy rate which
reaches 50 outside this Future Years Defense Program. In that
program of record, we project that the strike-fighter shortfall
for carrier-based aircraft will be approximately 50 in 2018.
Over the course of our preparation of the fiscal year 2009
budget, we'll be making sure that we refine the model which has
informed the discussion to date, and in preparation of the
fiscal year 2010 budget, with a Service Life Assessment Program
which is scheduled to complete in December 2007. We'll make
further adjustments, potentially, to mitigate a shortfall to
guarantee we can meet the combatant commanders' requirements
and the surge requirements that you alluded to.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. So, at this point you continue to
feel that you can fulfill your responsibilities under the Fleet
Response Plan, and the Navy's prepared to take action to make
sure that that will continue to be so.
Admiral Clingan. Yes, sir, we are.
Senator Lieberman. Are we exposing ourselves, or those who
are in the planes, particularly, to excessive risk by assuming
that this aircraft can go the 10,000 hours, even though I know
it was designed originally for 8,000?
Admiral Clingan. We have an ongoing Service Life Assessment
Program which is putting that airplane through a rigorous
fatigue analysis, and we are about 63 percent complete. We are
increasingly confident that we'll be able to extend the life
beyond its current 8,000-hour limit, to 10,000 hours. That will
involve an intrusive repair cycle, but our experience in doing
service life extensions of other aircraft gives us confidence
that we're learning what we need to do. We'll be able to
develop the engineering packages to accomplish that service
life.
Senator Lieberman. Good. Thanks.
General Castellaw, since the Marine Corps is also flying
the F-18s, and is contributing squadrons to some carrier air
wings, how, if at all, is this potential gap likely to affect
the Marine Corps' ability to meet its commitments?
General Castellaw. Sir, as I indicated, our strike- fighter
shortfall is now.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
General Castellaw. We're taking down two squadrons to cadre
status, with the intention of bringing them back when we start
bringing in the F-35. It is exceedingly important to us to
address the attrition and the shortfall in aircraft that we
keep the F-35 Bravo on schedule. We're right at the cutting
edge now, in terms of the numbers that are in the procurement
plan. We are planning to initialize operational capability on
this aircraft in 2012, and in order to do that, we need to
stick to the schedule that we are now. It's on the bare edge.
Admiral Clingan and I are cooperating very closely in
managing the Hornets, the legacy Hornets, as one entity.
Senator Lieberman. Right
General Castellaw. We do not manage Marine Hornets and Navy
Hornets. For instance, we have Navy Hornets that are tapped
out, that have so many carrier landings they are no longer able
to go aboard the carrier, and we're moving aircraft into the
Navy, painting over the word ``Marines'' and putting ``Navy''
on it, so we can continue to meet those requirements.
So, right now, we are working with them by doing the
draconian measure that we are, and taking down squadrons to
cadre status by working with the Navy. We are managing by
continuing to get the funding for center-barrel replacements,
and continuing to do the life assessments. We are doing
everything we can to continue the life of these legacy aircraft
and squeeze every bit of juice we can out of them.
Senator Lieberman. General Chandler, is the Air Force
facing any fighter shortages comparable to the ones that we
just talked about for the F-18?
General Chandler. Mr. Chairman, I would tell you that any
potential ``fighter bathtub'' that we would have is directly
dependent on the numbers, but, more importantly, how quickly we
bring the F-35 online.
Senator Lieberman. The JSF, yes.
General Chandler. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Because we bought the F-16 in large numbers, we bought as
many as 180 a year in its beginning, obviously, those aircraft
are going to age out in fairly large numbers. Now, we've done
the Service Life Extension Program to take the F-16 to 8,000
hours, as well as Avionics Improvements Programs too. I
personally feel that's about as far as we're going to be able
to take that aircraft. So, our program of record buys us the
1,763 fighters that we've said we need to continue to do the
job we're being asked to do.
Senator Lieberman. I was just thinking, I remember, at a
hearing last year, General Magnus, from the Marine Corps,
talked about how important the JSF program was, and if it
didn't come online in time he would really feel he'd be putting
some marines in jeopardy, that that's how important it was. I'm
not inviting a comment, but I just remembered it as we talked
about it.
This reminds us of another thing; although the size of the
DOD budget is obviously large, some of it has to do with
ongoing activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. There's a lot of
stress on the force, both to carry out the responsibilities of
today and to prepare for the continued role of America as a
world power and a guarantor of our security, and the security
of a lot of our allies.
So, I want to ask one more question about the MP-RTIP as I
mentioned it briefly in my introduction. General Chandler, let
me ask you, why did the Air Force terminate the E-10 program?
General Chandler. Sir, I would tell you, quite honestly, it
was a matter of budget and other priorities.
Senator Lieberman. Understood. So, if you had your
druthers, you wouldn't have done it.
General Chandler. No.
Senator Lieberman. If you had the money, let's put that,
rather than ``your druthers,'' if you had the dollars, you
wouldn't have done it.
General Chandler. Yes, sir. In a perfect world, with the
right amount of money, from an operational perspective, we love
the technology.
Senator Lieberman. Yes. That's the next point I wanted to
raise. There's a lot of satisfaction in the Air Force, and
across the services, I gather, with the MP-RTIP technology.
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
General Hoffman. Mr. Chairman, if I could add, from an
acquisitions standpoint it's one program that is green-green-
green, cost-schedule-performance was doing very well. We just
could not afford it. It is going on the Global Hawk, but from a
cruise-missile-defense-mission standpoint, as you alluded to,
it doesn't satisfy that role. We'd very much like to graft it
onto the JSTARS aircraft, if we could afford that.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Take just a minute, because my
time's about up, and just briefly describe what the MP-RTIP
does, what capabilities it gives you.
General Hoffman. It's an active electronically scanned
array, so instead of a mechanically scanned antenna, it has all
these little subtiles in there that can be electronically
scanned, so it very rapidly can search its field of regard, it
can get very precise pictures of the ground, and discern very
small and slow-moving ground-moving targets and air-moving
targets.
Senator Lieberman. So, I appreciate that. Is it fair to say
that the Department and the Air Force intends to keep the MP-
RTIP technology moving forward?
General Hoffman. We are using our 2007 dollars to go as far
as we can with the 2007 funding to keep the technology and keep
the workforce actively engaged, so if we do transition and have
to put it on the shelf, that we've garnered as much knowledge
as we can from that.
Senator Lieberman. Does the plan potentially include
backfitting some number of existing JSTARS aircraft with this
radar?
General Hoffman. There's no funding support for going on
the JSTARS at this time. That would take several billions of
dollars.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, understood.
Thank you. My time's up.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The reason why I wrote down 60 years of service for the Air
Force is my dad started in the Army Air Corps and then
continued on in the United States Air Force for 31 years.
I want to talk a little bit about the JSF, as you might
imagine. I know Senator Warner has questions about this, as
well, but let me get it started off.
Congress acted last year to restore funding for the
development of a second engine production source, and required
several reports on the acquisition strategy for the JSF engine
program. The Department has, once again, eliminated funding for
a second source before the required reports have been
evaluated, and I'd like to get your explanation, if you can, of
the rationale for overturning the statutory guidance from
Congress, providing for the JSF engine procurement before the
results of the required studies were performed. I'd like to
find out whether the Navy and Air Force both support the
Department's decision, and why, or why not?
General Hoffman?
General Hoffman. Senator, Mr. Balderson and I were both at
the House testimony, where the three reports were actually
briefed, and only one report has actually come out in report
format, and that is the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report. The other two were verbally briefed, and, as I
understand it, they have not yet physically delivered the
reports.
All three reports talk about the goodness of a second
engine, and there are good elements to having a second engine,
for risk reduction and so forth, competitive nature of a dual
source, industrial-based concerns, and so forth. The three
reports vary on the amount of money it would take to complete a
second engine, and to sustain a second engine through a life-
cycle cost standpoint. They all vary somewhat on how much
competitive advantage you would have to have to recoup those
costs.
From a Department standpoint, this was not a service
decision, this was a collective Department position that the
risks that are involved in a single engine are balanced by the
reliability and the track record we have right now on both the
F-22 engine and the JSF engine, that has over 7,000 test hours
on it, that those risks are balanced and prudent with respect
to the cost, and it's simply a fiscally-driven decision
requiring $2 billion if we want to continue on with the second
engine procurement.
Senator Cornyn. I have to be honest with you that my
instincts are always for competition, because it usually makes
us all better, improves our performance, and usually the
quality of the product. Why? What's overridden that principle
that competition would ordinarily provide better-quality
service and a better-quality product?
Senator Warner. Would you yield for clarification?
Senator Cornyn. Sure.
Senator Warner. You used the term ``Department'' three
times. Is that the Department of the Air Force or the DOD?
General Hoffman. The DOD, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Senator Cornyn. Mr. Balderson, were you going to respond?
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir. If I could just make a couple of
comments.
As General Hoffman mentioned, we had this discussion
recently with the House Armed Services Committee. From the
Navy's standpoint, we would put this in the same category that
the General put MP-RTIP. This is a decision we wish we had not
had to make. We're not opposed to an F-136 engine, and we do
see benefits. As all three of the reports that were directed
from the National Defense Authorization Act last year
indicated, there are benefits to the competition, and we
certainly concur with that. The problem that we have, Senator,
is that we believe, based on our analysis within the Navy, I
think the analysis within the Department that the Cost and
Analysis Improvement Group did, and then the other assessments
that GAO and the Institute for Defense Analyse did, the
additional investment, which would be in excess of $1.5 billion
to continue development of the second source, that it is not at
all likely that we would recoup this investment.
In addition to that, we also feel that, from the Navy's
standpoint, the norm is one engine supplier per aircraft.
Although in a less fiscally-constrained environment there
certainly are benefits to having a second source, we feel very
comfortable with the F-119 core engine that is the F-135; I
think it has in excess of 50,000 flight hours, high reliability
and performing very well.
The distinction I would make is, it's not so much being
opposed to competition, because we're absolutely not, it's the
cost of carrying a second source. That's the distinction that I
would make. It is costly to carry a second source, and what you
do when you split a competition like this, of course, if you
were to carry the two sources, you end up with lower
procurement quantities for each vendor, which increases the
per-unit cost. The Navy's experience--and I harken back to my
Tomahawk days, where, for industrial surge reasons, we carried
two Tomahawk sources; usually, one source or the other, very
early on, gets in a position where they're not as competitive
and forces you to pay a great premium for those units. Our
assessment within the Navy, and, I think, within the
Department, is that even some of the reports that have assumed
a viable competition and a competitive environment for both
sources may be overstated, and it may be more difficult than
those reports stated to recoup that investment in the two-
source environment.
Senator Cornyn. What I worry about is that most Government
studies and reports are invariably wrong; you just don't know
if they're going to be too high or too low. So, it's hard to
read into the future. But I trust there'll be some more
questions on that in a moment.
Let me ask you about medium- and high-altitude UAVs. We had
a chance to ask the Army, yesterday, about this subject, and I
want to get the take of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
on it.
General Moseley spelled out the case for the Air Force
becoming executive agent for all medium- and high-altitude
UAVs. He stated his desire to follow up with a comprehensive
plan to optimize the Nation's intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance assets. This committee has long supported
jointness over parochial interests when it comes to acquisition
of military capabilities; however, previous joint programs have
not been very successful.
Why does the Air Force think their role as the executive
agent would be more successful than previous joint procurement
efforts?
General Chandler. Senator, if I may, I'll start.
That question, to the Air Force, revolves around three
issues that I'll try to describe briefly.
First is, very simply, acquisition efficiencies. We think
if the Department approaches this from a joint perspective led
by an executive agent, we can gain some efficiencies in the
process.
The second would be interoperability. Bandwidth, radio
frequencies, radios, the ability to work together is something
that an executive agent could pull together, and do that for
the Department in a fashion that would make warfighting, I
think, easier for all of us.
Then, the third issue is a related issue that has to do
with operational control. Today, in every theater, there's
what's called a coordination altitude. Above that altitude,
every manned aircraft that flies in that airspace has certain
capabilities. That allows the commander to control that
airspace and defend that airspace for the joint force
commander. What our Chief is asking for, in terms of executive
agency, is only to apply that same rule to medium- and high-
altitude UAVs that would be flying in that airspace, and, in
that way, allow the joint force to be more effective, if you
will, for the joint force commander.
Senator Cornyn. Okay, I want to pitch you a nice soft one
to the Navy and the Marine Corps. What do you think of the Air
Force's proposal?
General Castellaw. Sir, in terms of jointness, the Marine
Corps, right now, is benefitting from working with the Army,
for example, on Shadows. We're going to sundown our Pioneer,
which is a unique system that only the Marine Corps has been
operating, so we are going to jump in on that. The Army has
been very good to us and is going to let us get into the
production line so that we can equip our squadron that's going
to make the next deployment to Iraq. We're working with the
Special Operations Command, the Army, and others, also, for
instance, on what we call our Tier II, which is the Raven that
we're operating. So, there is no separation, I think, between
us when we talk about: we want to have uniform, we want to
eliminate duplication. The issue is, how do we go about that?
Quite frankly, I think the Commandant--and, of course, I
believe in what the Commandant says--is that this is a
discussion that ought to go on within the Services, outside the
media, and away from the Hill until we come up with a common
position before we come over here to you. I think that's pretty
much where we are on it, sir.
Senator Cornyn. Sounds like the Commandant has a good idea.
We look forward to hearing that joint report and
recommendation.
I recognize that the C-5 and the C-17 aircraft actually
fall under the Seapower Subcommittee purview, but I'm going to
take advantage of the opportunity of having two senior Air
Force acquisition officials before us and discuss, briefly, the
Air Force's plans for the future of the C-5 and C-17 fleets.
Committee staff has been made aware of the recent Air Force
initiative to retire up to 30 C-5s and acquire 30 additional C-
17 aircraft. Would you care to comment on that?
General Hoffman. Senator, if I could, first of all, program
of record on C-17 is 190, with last year's add. The
manufacturer has already started the shutdown process at the
sub-tier levels, because the orders are being fulfilled. C-5 is
going through a midlife upgrade. There's the Avionics
Modernization Program. Over two dozen aircraft were modified.
That updates all the wiring in the cockpit to comply with new
navigational standards and safety standards. That's going very
well. The other major program is the Reliability Enhancement
and Re-engining Program. That's what really gives it the muscle
that allows the capability rate to increase by, we think, 10
percent in mission capability rate. All three of those aircraft
that have been modified are in the test program now. We think,
technically, it'll be successful, and gives us tremendous
capability to the C-5 to get heavier loads up to altitude
faster and so forth.
The big question on C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-
engineering Program will be the cost. We've had previous
business-case analysis that says it'll pay for itself in
reduced operating cost. We know we have program cost growth. We
don't know how much yet. We won't know until later this summer,
when we get our costing studies in. So, at this point, right
now, any comparison between old and new, from a dollar
standpoint, is probably premature. But we know it's going to
cost more than what the previous studies have indicated as a
business-case solution.
That leaves Congress in the dilemma, right now, with
imperfect information, to have to make an industrial-based
decision, reference C-17, because if no decision is made, that,
in fact, is a decision, and the C-17 factory will start to shut
down, which becomes very costly to reopen at a later date.
So, that's where we are in those two strategic airlift
programs.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, General Hoffman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Cornyn.
Senator Warner?
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Castellaw, I thank you very much for your personal
reference about my background, so let me return the favor to
you. I noticed that you were commissioned from the University
of Tennessee-Martin, in 1972. That's when our career began
together. I was Secretary of the Navy. That must make you, if I
may say--and it's quite an honor to have it--one of the last
serving Active Duty marines from the Vietnam era. Is that
correct?
General Castellaw. Yes, sir. There's a few more of them out
there, sir.
Senator Warner. You can almost count them on your fingers,
though, can't you?
General Castellaw. Yes, sir. I think I have your name on my
commissioning document, as well, so I'm afraid we're going to
be connected for a long time. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Well, that's fine. I hope you proudly
display that on your wall. [Laughter.]
General Castellaw. I do, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Which brings me to a very important part of
your testimony. There are no page numbers, but it's entitled V-
22 Osprey. As the Commandant of the Marine Corps announced, on
13 April, a VMM-263, our first operational MV-22 squadron,
deployed to Iraq in September this year. What were some of the
factors that drove that decision? Because this aircraft has
gone through a very historic chapter of development, with a lot
of courage and dedication shown by marines. Many times I, and
other colleagues on this committee, in my 29 years, have had
hearings on it, and more than once it looked like it was going
to go over the horizon and disappear, but the courage of the
Corps kept it going, and now it appears to be working.
But I must say, based on some trips that I've had, and all
of us have had a number of trips into that environment in Iraq,
it is becoming a more ground-to-air hostile environment. To
what extent were all of the considerations weighed as that
deployment decision was made?
General Castellaw. Well, sir, the first one, and the most
important one, is the one that many of you have already
indicated here today, is what your goal and what our goal is,
is to provide marines, sailors, airmen, soldiers, coast
guardsmen with the most capable and survivable equipment
possible. The MV-22 is the most capable and survivable aircraft
that we can fly our most valuable weapons system in, and that's
the marine rifleman. It has the airspeed, it has the built-in
survivability, it has the defensive systems, and it has the
capability for us to improve the ability of our marines,
primarily, and the sailors that serve with us, to survive in
that environment. Let me just talk about this; you can be at
over 200 knots in 18 seconds, and you can be climbing through
altitude outside the heart of the envelope of groundfire, and
that includes Man-portable Air Defense System. We expect to
operate this aircraft in what has hereto been known as the
fixed-wing sanctuary, up around 13,000 feet. We can fly ground
personnel around for about 3 hours at 13,000 feet above it. We
can get just about anywhere in Iraq or any of these other
locations in that period of time, and we can arrange, as we
always do in our planning, for escorts to be available when
they come down into their zone. I said in 18 seconds we can be
at 200-plus. In 18 seconds, we can go from 200-plus down to
hovering. It is an extremely agile, powerful aircraft that is
giving us the best survivability for the marines that we're
going to haul.
Now, we have carefully looked at the logistics support,
we've carefully looked at the training, we established metrics
to be met so that we are assured that this aircraft, when it
goes, is going to have the people flying it that are prepared
and the logistical support that's necessary for it to achieve
the readiness that we have to have. So, we're quite confident
that we're doing what needs to be done to support our forces.
Senator Warner. That's very encouraging, and I'm delighted
to hear that our record will contain a specific reference to
the very careful preparation that the Corps went through to
make that recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. I assume
he chopped on that one personally.
General Castellaw. Senior leadership, yes, sir. Secretary
of Defense.
Senator Warner. Moving on, on that question, are you at
liberty, in this unclassified forum, to say about how many
units could become operational over what period of time?
General Castellaw. The V-22?
Senator Warner. Yes.
General Castellaw. We currently have five squadrons. We
have test squadron----
Senator Warner. No, in-country, in Iraq, how many are
likely to be operational in the timeframe projected?
General Castellaw. Right now, over the next year we plan to
deploy two in rotation.
Senator Warner. Two in rotation. That answers the question.
General Castellaw. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. There will just be two aircraft squadrons
in country.
To our Air Force witnesses, have you all taken a look at
this aircraft, in terms of your mission to do ground support
for the Army? Is there any thought about getting into the
program?
General Chandler. Senator, the Air Force Special Operations
Command will buy 50 of these aircraft.
Senator Warner. Under the Department of the Air Force, the
contracting officer?
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. That's quite interesting. When does that
begin?
General Hoffman. We have our first three aircraft in right
now for training and test. We are buying our aircraft behind
the Marine Corps aircraft.
Senator Warner. Good. That's fine.
General Castellaw. Sir, can I jump in on that? We are in
close cooperation with the Air Force Special Operations Command
on this. We intend to have Air Force personnel who will go with
that squadron when it deploys so they can gain experience and
roll it back into their squadrons when they deploy.
Senator Warner. On-the-job training. That's a very wise
decision.
Gentlemen, I appreciate, very much, the deference that you
proceed with in addressing this dual-engine question. We have
honest differences of opinion, perhaps, on this panel. But I
just want to ask some basic questions, which, after reading the
testimony, I'm not sure are covered fully.
I respect that, when I asked the question of General
Hoffman, it was a DOD decision. The old phrase says, ``salute
and march off,'' and I think you've done a credible job on it.
But, nevertheless, the job falls to Congress to take a look at
an independent assessment of this.
Clearly, it's budget-driven, all odds being, and all
options being, if it weren't for the budget pressures, I think
we'd take a good long look at this. For this reason, and that
is, in my own history of studying procurement, which goes back
a good period of time, both here in Congress and in the
building, I cannot think of anything using real-term dollars or
any other dollars, that would approach the magnitude of this
engine contract over the life of the JSF. We're talking about a
potential of $100 billion for one single contractor, and their
partners, in this engine. Is that about right, gentlemen?
General Hoffman. Sir, it's 4,000 engines.
Senator Warner. That translates into a figure of that
amount, making it difficult to grasp. The competition, which,
historically, has generated savings and has, through the
intensity, particularly in the engineering departments,
resulted in some technological advances over the life of the
engine, because both of them are fiercely competing to get
sequential contracts. So, I just don't know. I find it
staggering; one contractor with $100 billion just on an engine.
Then we have the question of our foreign partners. They
have expressed an interest in having the two engines for the
same reason that many of us have advocated. I, frankly, think
there's cost savings there, and engineering advantages. But,
putting aside that, it's the reliability issue. What has been
the attitude? Did you consult with the foreign partners in
making this decision, or was that above your paygrade in DOD?
Because last time, I have to tell you, there was an abysmal
failure by the Department to timely inform the foreign partners
of the decision, and they learned it, in many instances,
through the media. Now, I hope this time they at least were
consulted before the decision was made. Is there anyone before
us today that can testify to that?
Mr. Balderson. Senator, as a part of JSF oversight, we have
several boards. The one that we have that includes all of the
international partners, including the U.S. executives, is
called a Configuration Steering Board. It meets quarterly, and
it's the forum where these sorts of things are vetted, any
sorts of significant program decisions----
Senator Warner. I'm fully familiar with all the tiers.
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. The question was, were they consulted
fully?
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir. This was vetted at the
Configuration Steering Board. That's generally at the two- and
three-star level with these various international partners.
Senator Warner. We have a couple of three-stars here. I
mean, you need a couple more? We'll go get them. Where are the
people who sat down and did the consultation with the foreign
partners?
Mr. Balderson. This was vetted in that forum, and all of
the foreign partners were aware of the decision that the
Department had made. I'm not in a position to say what sort of
communication within the partner countries occurred, but, at
the two- and three-star level, prior to this decision being
made, this was vetted in that----
Senator Warner. Let me go to my last point very quickly,
and I thank the indulgence of the chair.
From the Marine Corps and the certain tactical maneuvers
that you hope to take in the vertical/short takeoff and
landing-type mode, liftoff and things of that nature, are you
ready to say that the F135 engines will give as much
performance as projected by the F136 in added lift to perform
that rather critical envelope for the plane's flight pattern?
General Castellaw. First of all, sir, we're very fortunate
that we have two engines that would serve the F-35 well. In
terms of what the Marine Corps sees, right now the F135, it's
matched with both the lift fan and the push you get out of the
rear end of the aircraft. What it comes down to is this, quite
frankly, as I indicated before, it is absolutely essential that
we IOC this aircraft in 2012, that we start replacing the
attrition that we're having in our squadrons----
Senator Warner. We're kind of drifting off a little bit,
General. I respect that you want to make your IOC, but look at
those Gold Wings. We're talking about pilot safety. We're
talking about mission safety. Now, press reports say that on
that aircraft iteration is going to be somewhat heavier,
overall, than the other aircraft. Is that correct?
General Castellaw. Sir, I think all of them are going to be
about the same. The difference is that we, in the short
takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL), carry less gas than the
others, because we have the lift fan in there. So, the range is
not as great with a STOVL as with the other aircraft, but
they're approximately the same, in terms of gross weight.
Senator Warner. So, you think both engines will have about
the same lift performance in the vertical mode. Is that
correct?
General Castellaw. Yes, sir. When you match the engine with
the lift fan--and right now the characteristics of the engine
and the characteristics of the lift fan are balanced. So we
have an engine that, with the F135, can do that.
But, again, sir, if you'll let me finish up on the other,
the deal for us is this, quite frankly--why I was making the
point about the IOC, it takes money to buy the second engine.
That money has to come from somewhere. It's an affordability
issue for us. Admiral Clingan and others can talk very lucidly
about the logistical and the other, and Bill can talk about the
competition element of it. But, for us, when you take the money
away, then you slide the IOC, and that is a tremendous issue
for the Marine Corps.
Senator Warner. We'll give further attention.
I'd like to ask that I may place some questions in for the
record on the engine and other issues.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection.
Senator Warner. I thank the chair.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd just like to follow up on the UAV question. I really
got interested in this several years ago, General Castellaw.
Our escort officer was a Navy P-3 pilot. He was flying in
support of downed marines. He told me some of the work that he
had done with the Forward-Looking Infrared Radar and other
capabilities they had to help the ground people. Then we
discovered, after the battle of Fallujah--I was there--you used
a different aircraft UAV, as you just mentioned. It always
seemed to me, two things--one, we needed more intensive unity
in developing the best optics and the best capabilities, and
buying enough numbers to get the cost down as low as possible
so that those marines and soldiers on the ground have the
protection that they need.
Right now, I mean, there are a lot of ideas for UAVs,
important parts and capabilities for strategic issues, and
they're very expensive. But, for me, right now, going back,
again, soon to Iraq, for the sixth time, I'm worried about
those guys on the ground, and I want to be sure that, when this
is done, General Chandler, that the ground forces are involved
in this. I've been working on it for some years now. I just
think we can do better to make sure that they are fully taken
care of. I know there must been an agreement. General Casey
said, yesterday, we ought to just talk about it within the
building. So, maybe you all should talk about it within the
building, but we have a concern.
How about the question of a joint cargo aircraft? I
understand some progress has been made in working out the joint
requirements on that. I guess, General Chandler, maybe you're
the person to respond to that. But we're kind of getting to the
point where we need to be moving forward, as I understand.
General Cody told us, several years ago, that that was, he
felt, critical to his people in Iraq, that they needed this
capability.
General Chandler. Yes, sir, I was in a meeting with both
Vice Chiefs. I believe it was about 2 weeks ago now. I will
tell you that we're in agreement to reach a Milestone C
decision by the end of May. I think the program's come together
very well, in terms of the Joint Program Office and what
they've been able to do.
There are some minor differences between the two aircraft.
It's the same basic airframe. But, again, we're on track for a
Milestone C decision, and those differences are going to be so
minor that whatever we need to do with those, we'll have plenty
of time to make adjustments as we work the program through.
Senator Sessions. Well, this is somewhat behind your
original projections of reaching that agreement, is it not?
General Chandler. Sir, earlier, the Milestone C decision
was going to be in the first part of May. That has been pushed
back to the end of May.
Senator Sessions. Okay. I was thinking it was earlier than
that. That's good.
We had a very interesting hearing with some opinions
expressed by some well-known military people last week. General
McCaffrey was there, General Scales, Lawrence Korb. They talked
a lot about the combatant commanders' need for lift in the
theater, and talked about the need for more C-17s, whether 130s
should be kept in the fleet, and whether C-5s should be
maintained out there. They had a lot of opinions. I'm sure they
are of some value. But I'm sure they may not be as attuned to
the latest developments, as each of you are.
But I guess I've been thinking about the refueling tanker
and how those assets, as we replace existing KC-135 with the
KC-X, and that process that goes along, these old heads
expressed real concern about lift capability.
General Chandler, would you think that we are giving the
capability of a refueling tanker to also carry cargo and
personnel? Is that being considered in your evaluation process?
General Chandler. Yes, sir, it has. In fact, ever since the
early days of the KC-97, we've used the ability of that tanker
to carry personnel and equipment. In some cases, we've used
them for aeromedical evacuation, as well. We've counted on that
residual capability. Quite frankly, if the capability is there,
we think we should take advantage of it. It provides a
versatility in that aircraft so that we don't have a single-
trick pony, if you will. That doesn't do any of us much good.
It's good to have an aircraft that has a certain amount of
versatility.
So, I would tell you that we count on having that
capability, to some degree, and have had, in the history of
tankers in the United States Air Force.
Senator Sessions. We're talking about a large number of
them in that capacity. I think it would be important.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership, and Senator
Cornyn, and I'm pleased to work with you. That takes care of
me.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Sessions. Thanks for all
you contribute to this committee. It's always a pleasure to
work with you.
I have a few more questions, and I'm happy to stay through
part of a second round, with anyone else who does.
I want to come back to the JSF and the alternate-engine
question, which is the question, in popular language, about
whether we're going to have one engine or two engines built for
this extraordinary program. My point of view on this is clear.
We argued it out last year. I accept, as compelling, the
conclusion of the relevant parts of the DOD here, which is that
this one engine, which is a Pratt & Whitney engine, has
performed very well. It's always good to have a second engine,
but this one will cost $1.5 billion to have a second--$1.5
billion to $2 billion. The money will come out of the JSF
program. This is actually where the circumstances, as it comes
back to me, when General Magnus made this statement, because
the four Vice Chiefs were before us, all quite strong about
both how it would be great to have a second engine, but it just
wasn't needed, and it would cost too much. I just want to set
it in context, because, Mr. Balderson, you said--and I know
that's true--that the Navy norm is for a one-engine requirement
on aviation programs?
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. On the F/A-18, therefore, there is a
single-engine program.
Mr. Balderson. General Electric (GE) engine, yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, that's the irony I was going to
point out here. That's the way these things work. Life is based
on your perspective, I guess. So, it happens to be GE, which is
the single source. Just give us a sense of the range of the
scope of this buy at this point for the engines for the F/A-18.
How many?
Mr. Balderson. Of the F-18? Yes, sir. There is some
uncertainty, at this point, because the F-18 is participating
in some potential foreign military sales coming up.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Balderson. You're probably aware that it's not a done
deal yet, but the Australians have signed up for an additional
24. Of course, as Admiral Clingan commented, we do have to
balance both sides of the equation, and we're very committed to
JSF but there may be needs and opportunities to buy additional
Super Hornets through that.
Having said all of that, with that uncertainty, the current
program of record, the current Multiyear 2 runs out in fiscal
year 2009, so we will continue to buy through fiscal year 2009
at a rate of 42 Hornets a year, a combination of the E/A-18G
Growler and the E&F Super Hornet. Then, there is a smaller buy
in 2010 and 2011, and, at that point, the current run of F-18
would end.
Senator Lieberman. So, the ballpark range for the total
number of aircraft and engines required?
Mr. Balderson. Seven, 8, 9, 10--I would say, at this point,
probably a couple hundred additional. But that----
Senator Lieberman. You don't know----
Mr. Balderson. I can take that for the record, if you----
Senator Lieberman. Well, we'll get it. I'm just making a
point that there's a lot of engines over the total life of the
program, a lot of engines have been purchased on a single-
source basis.
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The total inventory for the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G programs is 490 F/
A-18E/Fs and 84 EA-18Gs for a total of 574 aircraft at 2 engines per
aircraft. As of fiscal year 2007, a total of 398 aircraft have been
procured, 386 F/A-18E/Fs and 12 E/A-18Gs. Between fiscal year 2008 and
fiscal year 2012, the remaining 176 aircraft will be procured, 104 F/A-
18E/F and 72 EA-18Gs. In addition to production engines, the program
has procured spare engines with a total of 61 planned to be procured or
approximately 6 percent. The engine can be broken down into six modules
and the program has/will procure spare modules based on planned
estimated usage of the modules that varies from 3 percent to 15
percent.
Senator Lieberman. Am I right, General Hoffman, this falls
under your area, acquisitions generally speaking, with the
exception, I think, of the F-16, that the Air Force has had a
single source of engines for its aircraft?
General Hoffman. Both our F-15s and F-16s, we have the
option for either engine to go in there. They're not
interchangeable, like on the JSF program. We have to pull out
one, put the other one in. From an operator's standpoint, it's
exactly the same. So within the Air Force, we generally have
wings that operate one flavor of engine or the other, so all
the sustainers are trained up on that one engine, and the
pilots operate within the limitations of that one engine. But
we've had an experience, throughout our several decades of
operating the 15 and 16, of having two engines available.
Senator Lieberman. Am I right, that their reason for that
was that there were, at that point, some failures in engine
performance?
General Hoffman. In the first decade of our experience with
the single-engine vendor we had both responsiveness issues from
the vendor, and we had performance issues, and so forth. That's
why a second qualified vendor was brought in.
Senator Lieberman. But that has not been the case with the
Pratt & Whitney engine that's being set for the JSF.
General Hoffman. Both our experiences on the F-22 and our
history to date on the JSF have been solid.
Senator Lieberman. Good.
Mr. Balderson, let me go at this from another point of
view, just for assurance of public interest here. How will the
Department ensure quality and performance of the Pratt &
Whitney F-135 engine if it is the sole engine and, therefore,
in the absence of competition?
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chairman, if I could make one comment as a lead-in, and
it gets a little bit to what Senator Cornyn was saying earlier,
and, I believe, Senator Warner was getting at, too. We're not
opposed to competition. What we believe is that we have
effectively had a competition between the F135 and F136, since
the inception of the program.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Balderson. Both from the standpoint of technological
advancement, corporate investments, and price, we believe we
have seen the primary benefits of competition.
We're in the process, right now, as we speak, of
negotiating the first limited-rate production lot for the first
two Air Force conventional take-off and landing aircraft, and
the engines to support that buy. Both for the aircraft and the
engine, these are critical negotiations, because they will
establish what we call T1, the unit price of the first system,
where you would normally expect the learning curve to come down
from there. So, establishing the baseline from which the rest
of the aircraft and the engines will be procured is very, very
critical.
So, there are two things. We believe that we've achieved
the benefits of competition, and it has put us in a very good
position now to negotiate a solid unit price for T1 of that
first limited/low-rate initial production buy. From that point
on, we will continue to incentivize the contractor through
reliability investments and through cost incentives in our
contracting process, but we also have that baseline for the
first year, that it would be very difficult, at this point, I
think, for Pratt & Whitney. I would have no expectation that
they would try to put us in a position where they would take
advantage of the sole-source buy, because we will have had that
cost history as a backup.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. I appreciate that answer.
Let me move to another subject, and that is the readiness
of nondeployed forces. As you probably know, there's a lot of
concern on the committee, I know there's a lot of concern in
the Pentagon, about the stress that the Army and the Marine
Corps are under as a result of our dependence on the ground
forces of the Army and the Marine Corps in the war on
terrorism, and the fact that we have not given those two
Services the support to meet the demands on them. We were
focused, in these hearings, particularly, on some Army and
Marine Corps units that are not deployed which have experienced
declining levels of readiness due to personnel and equipment
shortages. So, I want to ask you today. What is the situation,
in this regard, with Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aviation
units? Specifically, are these units fully staffed? Do they
have the equipment, munitions, and spare parts that they need
to keep up their levels of readiness?
General Chandler, why don't we start with you and go across
the table.
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
Senator, if I may, to stay at the unclassified level--I'm
not trying to be evasive but I can say that, since 2001, the C
status, C1 and C2, the top two readiness levels of our major
combat units, has come down about 17 percent across the board.
Now, that is typically driven by a few pockets of those systems
that have been used very, very heavily since the beginning of
the global war on terror, those units that have not had an
opportunity to reconstitute, things like Predator, Global Hawk,
some of our Air Force Special Operations Command aircraft,
JSTARS. Without going any deeper into that, I can tell you that
there are shortages in some of those areas across the board,
simply because of how hard those systems have been used over
the last few years.
Senator Lieberman. General Hoffman, you want to add
anything to that?
General Hoffman. No, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Balderson?
Mr. Balderson. No, sir. I'll defer to my operational
friends here.
Senator Lieberman. General Castellaw?
General Castellaw. Sir, in Marine aviation, with our rotary
wing aircraft, we are at less than 1-to-2 dwell. That means
that for every day deployed, they're at home less than 2 days.
In fact, we have some units that are less than 1 to 1,
particularly the Cobras and the unit activation schedule (UAS)
units. So, what we're seeing is a reduction in the overall C
rating. We're seeing it in a migration of readiness to deploy
moving closer to the time they actually deploy. We're seeing
stress on the ordnance, particularly such weapons as Mavericks.
Laser Mavericks are in short supply. We're trying to work to
get a replacement for that.
So, those items--training, ordnance support, the
operational deployment--are all stress indicators on our
forces; and, just like the ground units, the aviation units,
particularly the rotary wing, are in about the same level of
readiness.
Senator Lieberman. Admiral?
Admiral Clingan. Mr. Chairman, as an air wing makes its way
through its cycle--and we call it the Fleet Response Plan,
which has a number of phases; a maintenance phase, a basic
training phase, an advanced training phase, in which case it's
prepared to emergency sortie, deployed phase, and a post-
deployment sustainment phase--we make our way through that
process with tiered readiness that reflects where it is in that
cycle. The air wings that are deploying are going forward fully
manned and equipped and trained to meet the combatant
commanders' requirements. Similarly, the equipment is provided
by entitlements, so our emergency deployed and postdeployed
forces are fully equipped.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
I want to say that this subcommittee would like to work
with the Marine Corps and the Air Force to see if we can do
something to alleviate some of that stress that you've just
testified to. I thank you for that.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Admiral Clingan, General Chandler, General
Hoffman, let me explore the delays in the emergency
supplemental appropriation. Specifically, Secretary Gates and I
believe that General Pace have noted that because of the delay
in Congress passing an emergency war supplemental, that the
Army and Marine Corps are having to reprogram funds from Air
Force and Navy accounts. I'd just like for you to tell me, if
you can, what you know about the impact that's having on your
branches of the Service.
General Chandler. Sir, if I understand the question
correctly, the money that we're talking about would come
principally from personnel accounts. That would affect moving
people--permanent change of station, for example--other types
of things like that.
We are counting on, obviously, getting those funds back.
The Chief has said that, and we have no indication that we will
not be reimbursed so that we can continue to meet the bills
further into the fiscal year. At this point, I would tell you,
there is no impact.
Now, having said that, should it require more reprogramming
from the Air Force top line, we will have to make some fairly
draconian decisions about some of the things we will be
required to do regarding flying aircraft, continuing to train
people, for example, and other areas where we'll have to look
to harvest money.
Senator Cornyn. When would those kinds of decisions have to
be made?
General Chandler. Sir, we have already started to look at
where we go do that.
Senator Cornyn. Not knowing when the money's coming you've
made contingency plans.
General Chandler. Yes, sir. That's correct.
Senator Cornyn. Yes.
Admiral Clingan.
Admiral Clingan. Senator, I have a perception, but I think
the subcommittee will be best served if I take that one for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Supplemental funding is required for the incremental costs of war.
Title IX funding has been key in avoiding substantial ``cash flowing''
of war costs from our baseline readiness accounts in fiscal year 2007
and previous years. However, these advance funds do not satisfy the
full-year request. Any significant delay in the enactment of the full-
year supplemental request will have detrimental effects on our
readiness.
If supplemental funds are not received, Navy will reduce non-war
related flying and steaming hours, defer weapons/systems and depot
maintenance, and eliminate non-readiness training and infrastructure
support. Specifically, non-global war on terror training exercises will
have to be cancelled; contracted services for base operations such as
trash collection and mess hall services will have to be scaled back or
curtailed; Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
projects will be placed on hold or deferred, which will cause higher
costs and potential services disruption and attendant costs.
Additionally, planned depot maintenance will have to be deferred as
funds are reapplied to higher priority requirements. These delays,
deferments and cancellations will force the Department to accept more
risk for future deployed forces. In addition, to the extent that
investment accounts are needed to finance current operations, the
resulting cancellations will increase costs and delay delivery of much
needed weapon systems.
These costs are associated with personnel, personnel support and
operations (including steaming days, flying hours, ground equipment and
transportation). In addition, funds are required for depot maintenance
of aircraft, ships, and ground equipment.
Senator Cornyn. By ``personnel costs,'' General Chandler,
are you talking about moving families?
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
Senator Cornyn. In other words, we're not just talking
about uniformed servicemembers, impacts on them, you're talking
about the families, as well.
General Chandler. Yes, sir.
Senator Cornyn. As I alluded earlier, growing up in a
military family, I can identify with the importance of making
sure that families are taken care of, because, of course,
they're an all-volunteer military; it's very important, in
terms of ability to retain good people, that we take care of
their families.
General Castellaw and General Chandler, I wanted to ask
just a brief question about the V-22. I've been on the assembly
line in Amarillo, and I'm acquainted with the early history and
the tragedy associated with the early development of the V-22.
I've heard various people comment on their confidence in the
capability of that particular aircraft and with the significant
investment we're making with the human cargo it's going to be
holding. I'd like to get your comments on the record as to your
level of confidence in the capability and functioning of that
aircraft.
General Castellaw. Sir, I'm an H-46 pilot, a helicopter
pilot, and the V-22 is replacing the 46. It's 40 years old.
It's time that we retired that old warhorse. We couldn't find a
better aircraft than what we have now with the V-22. It's twice
as fast, carries three times the payload, goes five times as
far, and is, more importantly, six to seven times more
survivable. So, what we have is an aircraft that carries our
most important weapons system, as I said before, the marine
rifleman, and having flown both aircraft, the V-22 is much more
powerful, much more agile, much more responsive than the old
aircraft that it's replacing. I'm proud to be able to support
and testify to the capabilities of that aircraft.
Senator Cornyn. Well, just having seen it in production,
it's a miracle of engineering science. I'm glad to hear you say
what you just said.
General Chandler, do you have anything to add?
General Chandler. Sir, I would tell you that our feelings
are much the same. The HH-53 has been with us in about the same
numbers that the H-46 has been with the Marine Corps. It's been
a good aircraft, but it's a tired aircraft. Special Operations
is looking forward to getting their hands on the V-22. Based on
the speed, the range, the payload, and just the capability of
the aircraft, we feel like the aircraft is safe, and it's ready
to fly.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Mr. Balderson, let me ask you just one quick question about
the Pratt & Whitney engine, and make sure I understood you
correctly. I have a document in my hand here that appears to
indicate that the contract for this engine, for the F135, was
not competitively procured. There's a date here, if I'm reading
this correctly, January 23, 1997; another date, October 26,
2001. Am I misreading this, or is there some variance between
what this document appears to say and your earlier statement
about competitive----
Mr. Balderson. I think I probably wasn't clear. To be very
honest with you----
Senator Cornyn. Well, it may not have been your fault. I
may not have understood, but I can give you a chance to
clarify.
Mr. Balderson. I'll take the specific question for the
record, because that far precedes my time on the program, and I
should know, but I don't know, whether the F135 was initially
procured competitively through the Government or whether it was
a Lockheed Martin decision or what.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department submitted a report to the Congressional Defense
Committees on the engine development strategy for the demonstrator
aircraft in the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program dated January
27, 1996. Contracts were awarded to Pratt & Whitney (P&W) and General
Electric for Concept Exploration Phase and Concept Development Phase
efforts. Subsequently, all three Program Weapon System Contractors
independently selected either the basic, or a derivative of, the P&W
F119 as the cruise engine for their preferred weapons system concepts
and demonstrator aircraft. A follow-on contract was awarded to P&W in
fiscal year 1996 to provide hardware and engineering support as
government furnished equipment for the weapon system concept
demonstration efforts commencing in fiscal year 1997.
Mr. Balderson. But that notwithstanding, the fact is, we
did proceed sole-source with the F135. What I meant, in
response to Chairman Lieberman's question, is that as we were
developing the F135, and then the Department made the decision,
a number of years ago, to bring along the second source, the
F136, at that point in time. As we went through dual
development and both contractors anticipated dual production,
all of the forces of competition that we would normally see, I
believe, were, in effect, on both contractors. Normally what we
do in a competition is, we would bring along two contractors,
and, at a point prior to production, we would do a winner-take-
all, and we would establish a source to continue with the
program. Of course, in this case, the difference, as I
mentioned, is, the plan had been, we would not do a winner-
take-all, we would continue those two sources through
production.
All I was trying to say is that I believe GE clearly felt
the pressure of the F135 as they developed and moved toward
production of their engine. But I also believe--and there's no
question in my mind--that Pratt & Whitney felt the competitive
effects of our funding the F136 engine, and that that drilled
decisions they made, in terms of reliability, investment in
technology, and cost-reduction initiatives. My point was, as we
now are at the point of negotiating the price of those first
production aircraft of the F135, I believe we've gained most of
the competitive advantage that we would get. At this point,
continuing to split the buy, I think, would offer us little
opportunity to reduce or recoup those costs. I don't know if
that's clear. It's a little confusing. I may not be explaining
it well.
Senator Cornyn. That helps. If, on further review, you have
any additional comments or clarifications, if you'll supplement
the record with that, I would appreciate that.
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir.
Senator Cornyn. I'd like to ask our Air Force witnesses--
we've been notified that the C-130 aircraft modernization
program has suffered a Nunn-McCurdy breach, and is awaiting
recertification by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition. Would you care to comment on where we are with the
program? In your view, are there reasonable alternatives that
will provide for equal, or greater, capability at lower cost,
going forward?
General Hoffman. Senator, that's exactly the second
question that has to be certified to. The first is; is it
essential to national security? The second question that has to
be answered during a Nunn-McCurdy process is; are there
alternatives? That's exactly what the DOD is doing right now,
and the other two questions are, are their production costs
reasonable? Is there a management structure that's going to
control costs in future success of the program? So, those four
questions have to be answered for the Secretary of Defense to
certify the Nunn-McCurdy process. If we can't certify it, the
program stops. If we can satisfactorily answer those questions,
then the program continues on in a rebaseline form.
So, we owe you, Congress, that answer by the first week of
June, and we're on track to answer those questions.
[Additional information follows:]
On 4 June, Kenneth Krieg, Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, signed the C-130 AMP Nunn-McCurdy
certification letters to the Congressional Defense Committees, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House--in compliance
with title 10, U.S.C., section 2433. The letters were delivered June 5
to meet the statutory Nunn-McCurdy certification deadline.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, sir.
My time's expired. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Cornyn.
I want to thank our witnesses.
We're going to keep the record of the hearing open for 10
days, in case you want to add anything, and in case we want to
ask any more.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, I want to thank the five of you
for your testimony today. In my opinion, you've been a very
impressive group of witnesses. You know your stuff and you've
spoken responsively to us. I think we're very fortunate to have
people of your quality serving our country, particularly at
this time, when our security is so directly threatened.
So, I end with admiration and gratitude for what you're
doing.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling the
hearing. It's been very edifying, and I know there's additional
dialogue we want to undertake on this important matter. I look
forward to continuing to work with you and the subcommittee as
we report our conclusions to the full committee and debate some
of these important issues.
Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
NEXT GENERATION COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER PROGRAM
1. Senator Clinton. General Hoffman, the April 27, 2007 Air Force
press release identified that the Air Force will be providing ``fair
and open competition'' with the amended request for proposals (RFPs) in
regard to the next generation combat search and rescue helicopter
(CSAR-X) program. However, the statement also denotes that ``offerors
will only be given an opportunity to substantive manpower efficiencies
based on reliability and maintainability characteristics of the
proposed aircraft,'' signifying limited options to rectify this
acquisition. Will this process meet timetables for the original program
schedule and be the most efficient?
General Hoffman. The Air Force's desire is to minimize the impacts
the protests will have on the program, including schedule. The March
29, 2007, Government Accountability Office (GAO) decision regarding the
Air Force's request for reconsideration validated the Air Force's
evaluation regarding three of the four CSAR-X stated evaluation
factors. The single area where the GAO found an inconsistency in our
stated approach versus our actual evaluation was in the Operations and
Support (O&S) cost portion of the Price/Cost factor, and this is where
the Air Force's corrective action is aimed. Additionally, the Air Force
is going beyond just clarifying our stated evaluation approach and has
developed a way for the offerors to quantify and substantiate potential
manpower efficiencies based on the reliability and maintainability
characteristics of their proposed aircraft. This allows the Air Force
to conduct a new best value assessment based on integration of the new
maintenance manpower information along with the results of the original
evaluation in the areas where the GAO found no problems.
VH-71 PROGRAM
2. Senator Clinton. Mr. Balderson, the Navy recently announced that
the VH-71 program will be accelerated and operational by the proposed
2009 initial operational capability (IOC) target date. Will all testing
and safety requirements be met under this accelerated schedule?
Mr. Balderson. Yes, all testing and safety requirements will be met
before any IOC is declared.
3. Senator Clinton. Mr. Balderson, as the 2009 launch draws closer
for the VH-71, how would you summarize the progress of the program?
Mr. Balderson. The Increment 1 strategy purposely acknowledged a
high schedule risk to meet urgent needs for safe and reliable
Presidential transport. The Increment 1 program schedule has been
affected by slow progress in requirements definition, design
completion, and lack of coordination of the proposed design between
Lockheed Martin System Integrator--Owego and their subcontractors, all
of which resulted in a 10-month slip to the Increment 1 Critical Design
Review. The program continues execution to an aggressive schedule to
meet Increment 1 IOC.
Increment 2 serves as the long-term solution and follows a more
traditional acquisition approach. Program of Record challenges include
budget phasing, schedule perturbations due to Increment 1 delays,
concurrency among Increment 1 and Increment 2 testing, and full
definition of a design solution that meets the requirements. The
program is in the process of reassessing Increment 2, culminating with
a system requirements review and revised schedule and government cost
estimate.
4. Senator Clinton. Mr. Balderson, has the Navy made a decision on
the location of the future VH-71 aircraft production facility?
Mr. Balderson. Final assembly for Increment 2 Low Rate Initial
Production and Full Rate Production aircraft will be carried out in the
United States. A specific United States location is still being
determined.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
NEXT GENERATION COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER
5. Senator Cornyn. General Chandler and General Hoffman, after
Boeing won the contract for development of the CSAR-X for the Air
Force, I understand both Lockheed and Sikorsky protested to the GAO. In
a rare decision, GAO upheld the protest on a technical point of
lifecycle costs. Now the ball is in the Air Force's court, so to speak.
What is the Air Force's way ahead on the CSAR-X program?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The Air Force released an
amendment to the CSAR-X RFPs. The amendment will clarify the Air
Force's evaluation of O&S costs and also give the offerors an
opportunity to quantify and substantiate potential manpower
efficiencies based on the reliability and maintainability
characteristics of the proposed aircraft.
Once the Air Force receives revised proposals from the offerors,
Air Force officials will review and evaluate the offerors' proposed O&S
efficiencies, and will conduct a new best value assessment based on an
integration of the new O&S information along with the results of the
original evaluation in the areas where the GAO found no problems.
6. Senator Cornyn. General Chandler and General Hoffman, does the
Air Force still think they can make their target of IOC by 2012?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The Air Force will take
appropriate steps to mitigate the impacts caused by protests in order
to get this capability into the hands of the warfighter as soon as
possible. Schedule impacts to CSAR-X are unknown until the Air Force is
able to award the contract.
AIR POWER IN THE NEW COUNTERINSURGENCY ERA
7. Senator Cornyn. General Chandler, General Hoffman, Mr.
Balderson, General Castellaw, and Admiral Clingan, yesterday, the
acting Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army
testified before this subcommittee on their ongoing efforts to shape
and restructure the Army for the new counterinsurgency era that we find
ourselves in. Coincidentally, RAND has just released a new book, titled
``Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era.'' Please provide comments
on the recommendations made. Please briefly discuss ongoing efforts to
restructure or reshape our Nation's aviation assets to be more
responsive to the counterinsurgency threat we are facing.
General Chandler and General Hoffman. RAND made five
recommendations in ``Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era:''
(1) Make counterinsurgency an institutional priority
a. USAF is participating fully in the Irregular
Warfare (IW) roadmap mandated by Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) 06.
b. Air Force Doctrine Center is in final coordination
for publishing a brand new doctrine document titled IR
(AFDD 2-3). This document will complement the recently
published Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency
(COIN).
c. AF Doctrine Center is also in final coordination
for publication of updated AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal
Defense (FID).
(2) Create organizations and processes to oversee USAF
counterinsurgency efforts
a. USAF has formally stood up a coalition and
Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence (CIWC) at Nellis
AFB. Final staffing should be complete by fall 2007.
CIWC's mission it to facilitate the development of
relevant airpower capabilities, capacities and
relationships in partner nations in the global war on
terror.
(3) Develop and nurture counterinsurgency expertise
throughout USAF
a. COIN and FID are not new missions for the Air
Force. The 6th SOS at Hurlburt has been performing this
mission since 1962. This has been a small effort
though, relative to the rest of the Air Force. Recently
the squadron nearly doubled in size, to meet the
growing demand in COIN and FID.
b. Recently the Air Force initiated the
Transformational Aircrew Management Initiative for the
21st Century (TAMI-21). This program will move 80
fighter pilots and 40 bomber pilots into Air Force
Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and Unmanned
Aircraft System (UAS) growth areas.
(4) Create a wing-level organization for aviation advising
a. AFSOC recently published a white paper outlining a
concept for an IW wing. The paper was signed by the
AFSOC Commander, Lieutenant General Wooley. Full
development of the concept awaits CSAF approval/
guidance.
(5) Enhance U.S. Air Force combat capabilities for
counterinsurgencies.
a. While AFSOC has always focused on
counterinsurgency operations, other Air Force units
have had to adapt to the counterinsurgency fight in
Iraq and Afghanistan, as we did in Vietnam.
Enhancements to adapt these capabilities and platforms
for COIN operations include, but are not limited to:
i. Introduction of Remotely Operated Video
Enhanced Receiver transmitters and receivers-
greatly enhanced ability to perform COIN/CAS in
urban environment
ii. Use of targeting pods and other electro-
optical devices in a nontraditional ISR role to
support ground units in COIN ops
iii. Various counter IED measures
iv. Introduction of Small Diameter Bomb-
provides a lower collateral damage weapon for
COIN ops.
v. Integration of Hellfire on Predator UAS.
vi. Use of Fighters and Bombers in non-lethal
show of force maneuvers
vii. Use of a variety of air mobility
platforms to support ground forces conducting
COIN/FID operations, reducing overland convoys'
exposure to enemy IEDs and ambushes.
RAND has several other on-going studies that further investigate
the role of the Air Force and Airpower in a counterinsurgency/IW
environment. Preliminary findings indicate that a focus on COIN and IW
is needed. One of the CSAF's ``2007 initiatives'' is an evaluation of
COIN aircraft and AFSOC has published a concept for an IW wing. As an
Air Force we continue to study this issue with an eye towards balancing
a force with an appropriate focus on both IW and major combat
operations.
AFSOC's IW wing would be equipped (notionally) with light attack
aircraft, light utility aircraft, medium lift, heavy lift, manned ISR
and helos. While the missions these aircraft would perform can be done
by our current frontline aircraft, many of our existing and future
allies in the global war on terrorism can not afford such platforms. An
IW wing would provide the Air Force a useful capability in COIN
operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan, while at the same time
providing a direct means of supporting FID operations with nations
unable to procure or sustain expensive frontline weapons systems.
The speed, range, flexibility, versatility, and persistence of
airpower capabilities allow the Air Force to operate over vast denied
areas and provide a critical portfolio of options for dealing with a
myriad of challenges. As we look to the future we face the very real
possibility of major theater war as well as increased COIN and IW
operations. We are evaluating our force posture to maximize our
contributions across the spectrum of conflict.
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan. The RAND Corporation Project Air
Force monograph series referenced, titled ``Air Power in the New
Counterinsurgency Era,'' is an Air Force study in which the
recommendations address USAF force structure and mission. It would be
inappropriate for me to comment on those specific recommendations.
Naval Aviation continues to play a major role in providing tailored
effects in support of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi
Freedom (OIF), as well as the broader global war on terrorism. The Navy
carefully balances investments across the aviation portfolio to
guarantee it can deliver the effects required by maritime and Joint
commanders in both major combat operations and IW. The 2008 President's
budget and Navy supplemental requests continue procurement and
sustainment of platforms, systems and weapons that enhance
counterinsurgency operations by improving speed, range, persistence,
flexibility, and lethality--all ``unique advantages of air power'' as
noted in the RAND study. In many cases, the investments are the direct
result of combatant commander requests for capabilities related to
counterinsurgency operations, as highlighted below.
Weapons
The RAND Study observes (page 74): ``The intermingling of
insurgents with civilian populations presents severe challenges for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and makes
it desirable to have a variety of munitions with very limited
effects.'' The President's budget 2008 procures and develops a mix of
legacy, advanced and next generation weapons that are lethal throughout
the entire range of military operations, including urban warfare:
Hellfire missile (AGM-114)--Thermobaric warhead improvements that
contain blast effects to minimize collateral damage in an urban
environment were deemed operationally effective in 2006. This
capability will be complemented by trajectory shaping, which will allow
flight crews to select the missile flight profile most effective for
the particular engagement. The President's budget 2008 request includes
$45.7 million to procure 439 weapons and the components to address
these requirements.
BLU-126/B--Low-collateral-damage bomb (LCDB) bridges a capability
gap identified by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The LCDB is a low
cost solution identified by the Naval Aviation Enterprise for use with
the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and Laser Guided Bomb (LGB)
precision guidance kits. It uses 20 percent of the explosive fill of a
standard 500 pound MK82 to create a precise, air-delivered weapon
effect when limited collateral damage is paramount. The BLU-126/B is
currently in production and approximately 1,500 LCD bomb bodies are
available to the Joint Force Commander.
Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (DAMTC)--The President's
budget 2008 requests $29.1 million in fiscal year 2008 and $214.5
million across the FDYP for the DAMTC program, which seeks to use JDAM
and/or LGB weapons as the foundation for a dual mode weapon that is
capable of prosecuting targets moving at speeds up to 70 mph. An open
competition will be expeditiously conducted in response to the urgent
need for a fixed wing aircraft moving target weapon that will culminate
in a fielded solution following operational testing in fiscal year
2009. This low cost, rapid integration program adds significant
capability while leveraging the existing industrial base to procure
17,720 DAMTC weapons.
Future Naval Strike Weapon plans continue to address the importance
of supporting the warfighter in the global war on terrorism and
counterinsurgency operations. The Navy and Marine Corp have studied the
utility and feasibility of transforming the current inventory of
unguided 2.75 and 5 rockets into precise weapons using laser and IR
seekers. The potential precision and flexibility of a guided rocket
system exemplifies how naval aviation continues to transform air power
to meet the challenges of counterinsurgency operations.
Self Protection Systems
Tactical Aircraft Directed Infrared Countermeasures (TADIRCM)--The
President's budget 2008 requests $27.6 million in research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) for development of an
improved Missile Warning System (MWS) and Infrared CounterMeasure
(IRCM) system for Navy and Marine Corps helicopters. This system will
provide aircrew protection against current and next generation IR
guided man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). The Analysis of
Alternatives for TADIRCM has been completed and the program is working
toward a Milestone B in fiscal year 2008.
Countermeasure Dispensing System capacity is being added to rotary
winged aircraft to increase the number of flare dispensing events per
mission and to provide forward firing flares for advanced threats.
Additionally, the existing AAR-47A(V)2 Missile Warning System is being
upgraded to the AAR-47B(V)2 to enhance survivability in background
clutter environments.
Large Aircraft InfraRed CounterMeasures (USAF LAIRCM) system is
being installed on CH-53E/D, CH-46E, and MV-22 aircraft through the
Rapid Deployment Capability process, to get the best IRCM capability to
the fleet as soon as possible, while the TADIRCM system is developed
for smaller aircraft that cannot take the LAIRCM.
Aircraft and Aircraft Systems
F/A-18E/F (Distributed Targeting and Sensor Integration)--The
President's budget 2008 requests $12.7 million to continue RDT&E and
capitalize on the $9.7 million previously funded by Congress to develop
quicker reaction time on the battlefield for strike platforms.
Distributed Targeting and Sensor Integration provide autonomous
identification and all weather precision strike capability on surface
targets. These systems will allow the F/A-18E/F to identify ground
targets, provide precision target coordinates from onboard imagery
(ATFLIR and AESA), and generate templates for reactive JSOW-C usage and
for future weapons including dual mode JDAM and JAGM.
SHARP--In addition, the SHAred Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP) carried
on the F/A-18E/F is a dual mode (electro-optical/Infrared) pod being
heavily employed by CENTCOM. SHARP is currently evaluating a
hyperspectral sensor which will support automatic detection,
classification and identification of camouflaged and concealed targets,
in all weather conditions. Concurrently, efforts are underway to
improve in-cockpit viewing and selection of imagery which will then be
data-linked to other aircraft and/or ground forces for strike or
situational awareness.
EA-6B/EA-18G--Navy is directly supporting the ground warfighter
with EA-6Bs deployed from carriers and in the expeditionary role that
provide on-call nonkinetic fires critical to counterinsurgency
operations. Significant investments in the capabilities of this
platform's weapons system are in direct response to combatant commander
requirements in past years and again the President's budget 2008. The
details of these capabilities are available if desired in the
classified format. Enhanced capabilities, resident in the EA-18G, will
begin to generate battlefield effects as the Navy begins to transition
its carrier-based EA-6Bs to the EA-18G in 2009. The Navy has requested
$1,318.8 million of APN in the fiscal year 2008 budget to procure 18
aircraft. These aircraft will be configured with the AN/ALQ-227
Communications Countermeasures Set receiver system. The EA-18G ALQ-227
system will use the AN/ALQ-99 Low Band Transmitter for communications
jamming. The fiscal year 2008 budget also contains $21.8 million of APN
to procure 10 Low Band Transmitters and to sustain the EA-6B Prowler's
counterinsurgency capabilities. Both of these investments are in direct
response to requirements stemming from the global war on terror and
counterinsurgency operations.
EP-3E/EP-X--Today the EP-3E is deployed globally and fully supports
all combatant commander counterinsurgency tasking by collecting signals
of interest and passing the identification and/or location to the
supported commanders. In the next decade, the EP-3E will be replaced by
the EPX aircraft, currently in the requirements development phase. The
EPX will be a multi-intelligence collection platform with a more robust
capability to collect, process, fuse and target IW signals of interest.
MH-60S/MH-60R--The Navy's Helicopter Master Plan introduces
significantly improved major combat operation and IW capabilities that
support insertion and extraction, crew served weapons support, sniper
platform and C2 of Special Operation Forces; Maritime/Leadership
Interdiction Operations; Maritime Domain Awareness; ISR and Combat
Search and Rescue. Helicopter detachments can deploy worldwide on any
naval combatant and possess the ability to operate in austere
environments with only limited support. These aircraft can conduct
missions in all weather, day or night, taking advantage or night vision
devices, EO/IR systems and precision laser guided munitions.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
UAS play a key role in providing intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) support to counterinsurgency operations. Navy
investments are focused on fielding unmanned systems tailored for
single units and striking forces that will be effective in both
permissive and non-permissive environments. Specific examples include:
Small Tactical UAS/Tier II UAS--The Navy and Marine Corps will
begin a combined program of record in fiscal year 2008, leading to
development of an organic, persistent ISR platform that will support
Navy ship/small unit commanders and Marine Regiment/Battalion/
Expeditionary Unit commanders with a planned IOC in fiscal year 2010.
This program will fill capability gaps currently addressed through ISR
service contracts, which will be continued to meet capability
shortfalls in the short term. A Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL)
demonstration is also planned to examine the feasibility of operating
these UASs with ground units.
VTUAV--The Navy's Fire Scout UAS will reach IOC in fourth quarter
fiscal year 2008 onboard LCS. This UAS system will provide baseline EO/
IR/Laser Designator and communications relay support for all LCS
mission modules, and will be very valuable during littoral
counterinsurgency operations.
During fiscal year 2007, as the lead service for Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD), the Navy will sponsor the demonstration of small UAS
capabilities in support of EOD forces deployed in the global war on
terrorism. This in-theater demonstration, scheduled during 3Q fiscal
year 2007, will employ 3 Silver Fox UAS and 10 Micro Air Vehicle (MAV)
systems in response to a validated Joint Urgent Operational Need
(JUON).
The President's budget 2008 requests funding for a broad spectrum
of capabilities that are relevant and essential to both IW and major
combat operations. It strikes a thoughtful balance between legitimately
competing imperatives, and ensures naval aviation will be capable of
delivering timely, precisely tailored effects in support of IW
throughout the world. The persistence of naval forces, conducting
counterinsurgency operations from international waters with speed and
precision, is a hallmark of the United States Navy.
Genral Castellaw. The Rand Corporation Project Air Force monograph
series titled, ``Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era,''
referenced is an Air Force Centric study and the recommendations
concern primarily USAF force structure and mission. It would be
inappropriate for me to comment on those specific recommendations. The
Naval Aviation fiscal year 2008 budget procures and develops a mix of
legacy, advanced and next generation weapons that are effective
throughout the entire range of military operations, including IW.
Weapon Systems
Hellfire missile (AGM-114) improvements are being implemented in
response to urban warfare requirements that mandate minimal collateral
damage. Thermobaric warhead improvements that contain blast effects
were deemed operationally effective in 2006. The fiscal year 2008
budget request includes $45.7 million to procure 439 weapons and
components to address these requirements. The LCDB bridges a capability
gap identified by CENTCOM. The LCDB is a low cost solution identified
by the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) that has been approved for use
with the JDAMs and LGB precision guidance kits. It was fielded in March
2007 using General Purpose Bomb funds.
DAMTC--The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $29.1 million in fiscal
year 2008 and $214.6 million across the FDYP for the DAMTC program,
which seeks to use JDAM and/or LGB weapons as the foundation for a dual
mode weapon that is capable of prosecuting targets moving at speeds up
to 70 mph. This low cost, rapid integration program adds significant
capability while leveraging the existing industrial base to procure
17,720 DAMTC weapons.
Self Protection Systems
TADIRCM--The fiscal year 2008 budget requests $27.6 million in
RDT&E for development of an improved Missile Warning System (MWS) and
Infrared Countermeasure (IRCM) system for Navy and Marine Corps
helicopters. This system will provide aircrew protection against
current and next generation IR guided MANPADS. The Analysis of
Alternatives for TADIRCM has been completed and the program is working
toward a Milestone B in fiscal year 2008.
Aircraft
Specific to counterinsurgency efforts, the MV-22 and F-35B will
fill critical roles for the U.S. Marine Corps as early as this fiscal
year with the deployment of the Corps' first MV-22 tactical squadron,
VMM-263. Counterinsurgency efforts must be supported by aircraft that
possess capabilities across the spectrum of conflict; from humanitarian
assistance to kinetic fires, the MV-22 and F-35B will provide vastly
greater operational reach, persistence on the battlefield, and
connectivity across all lines of effort. The MV-22 can reach anywhere
within 500,000 square miles from its point of origin on a single refuel
that will allow the ground commander to deploy and resupply troops at
the time and place of his choosing. Likewise, the F-35B, due to its
unique and flexible basing characteristics, will provide persistent
fires as well as ISR and connectively to forward deployed troops in
support of mission objectives.
Command and Control
The ability to swiftly and decisively act upon time sensitive
intelligence in support of counterinsurgency efforts requires a high
degree of coordination and control of aviation assets. Coupled with the
capabilities of manned and unmanned aircraft in the U.S. Marine Corps
inventory, effective command and control ensures that the right
aviation assets are where they need to be when they are needed. To this
end the Marine Corps is heavily investing in our next generation
aviation command and control system (CAC2S). CAC2S will provide crucial
linkages within the MAGTF to ensure a high degree of shared situational
awareness and the efficient tasking of high-demand, low-density assets.
COMMERCIAL TANKERS
8. Senator Cornyn. General Chandler and General Hoffman, the
original proposal to replace the aging KC-135 tanker fleet had a Part B
section which called for developing a plan for the Government to use
commercial tanker aircraft to fulfill some of the military's tanking
needs. The committee understands that a pilot project is in
development; when can we expect to see something from it?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The Air Force has completed
the initial strategy development for a commercial tanker ``fee-for-
service'' demonstration. Briefings on Capitol Hill are in progress. The
Senate Armed Services Committee has been briefed (31 May 2007) with
briefing to the House Armed Services Committee anticipated during the
week of 5-8 June 2007.
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
9. Senator Cornyn. General Chandler, General Hoffman, Mr.
Balderson, General Castellaw, and Admiral Clingan, what technology
strategy and level of investment is being proposed in the Air Force and
Navy budgets to support our ability to get on top of and ahead of the
improvised explosive device (IED) threat?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. In response to April 2006
direction to the Services, the Air Force programmed approximately $9.9
million per year through fiscal year 2013 ($59.443 million total) for
procurement and sustainment costs directly associated with Counter-
Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) equipment/systems. This funding is
specifically for Specialized Search Dogs (the Air Force is the
Department of Defense Executive Agency for Military Working Dogs),
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robots, and Air Force funded requirements
for up-armor modification kits for the Service's fleet of High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in the theater of operations.
[In millions of dollars]
Specialized Search Dogs.................................... $5.843
Robotics................................................... 19.6
Up-Armored HUMMWVs......................................... 34.0
------------
Total programmed:........................................ $59.443
The Air Force does not have any other dedicated or independent
funding lines for C-IED initiatives. However, the Air Force also makes
significant contributions to C-IED efforts with a variety of
initiatives that are corporately vetted through the Air Force's Rapid
Response Process--the most promising of these initiatives are
championed by the Service for potential Joint IED Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) funding. To date JIEDDO has funded 14 Air Force initiatives
for $87.035M.
Regarding strategy, the Air Combat Command (ACC), acting as the Air
Force's lead Major Command (MAJCOM) warfighter force provider, recently
signed a C-IED Operating Concept to ensure Air Force efforts are
synchronized and cohesive in the campaign to overcome the threat and
loss of personnel/resources posed by adversary use of IEDs. This
operating concept provides a standardized approach with the JIEDDO,
U.S. CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF), and ACC C-IED
efforts by using common constructs and terminologies. The ACC's C-IED
Concept directly supports and is congruent with CENTCOM's C-IED
Campaign plan through mutual focus on defeating the IED system. To
execute this framework, ACC, with assistance from the Army and CENTCOM,
recently completed a draft Concept of Employment (CONEMP) that is
written from an airman's perspective taking a constrained and
unconstrained approach to interdicting the IED system. Following CONEMP
execution, ACC will look to identify capability and tactics, techniques
and procedures (TTP) gaps permitting sound analysis/actions for
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) improvements.
There are also a number of technologies within the Air Force
Science and Technology (S&T) Program that could be applicable to
countering the IED threat; however, S&T efforts are typically non-
system specific and support a wide range of potential applications--as
such, there is not a dedicated S&T investment line in this area. For
example, one of the Air Force S&T Program's Focused Long-Term
Challenges is to Dominate Difficult Surface Target Engagement/Defeat,
which includes technologies that could be used to find, identify,
track, and engage IEDs, such as: adversarial modeling; improved
operator interfaces for enhanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and a
wide range of command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies.
Beyond S&T, the Air Force continues to improve existing platforms
like Compass Call and Predator, which have proven useful in C-IED
missions. Compass Call improvements provide a very effective C-IED
classified capability, while planned Fiscal Year 2008 Predator
improvements enhance Predator support to C-IED missions. In addition,
the Air Force requested global war on terrorism Supplemental funding in
both fiscal years 2007 and 2008 to field a net-centric beyond line-of-
sight (BLOS) secure communications capability across the Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) fleet. This
improvement, combined with a future Network Centric Collaborative
Targeting (NCCT) capability, will enable Joint STARS to rapidly
collaborate with other sensors and intelligence sources to produce
actionable intelligence. CENTCOM has recently identified BLOS secure
communications as an Urgent Operational Need and this funding will
enable the Air Force to achieve an IOC for Joint STARS BLOS
communications by March 2008. The Air Force will consider funding for
NCCT in its fiscal year 2010 budget request.
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan. IEDs are a significant threat to
U.S. forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are the primary
source of U.S. casualties. The JIEDDO, together with the military
Services and all of the Department of Defense, is working to win the
IED fight in a holistic way, using a balance of intelligence, training
and technology. This counter-IED effort is a combined Joint Service,
interagency, multi-national program designed to leverage all available
resources and technologies in a coordinated campaign to eliminate IEDs
as weapons of strategic influence.
The Office of Naval Research (ONR), acting in its role as the
Science and Technology (S&T) provider for the Navy, invites JIEDDO
participation in semi-annual program reviews for the ONR CIED Basic
Research initiatives (Basic Research is a name for S&T that addresses
phenomenology, versus applied research or engineering). ONR has also
brought JIEDDO into discussions that have involved new or innovative
technical discussions such as a preliminary outbriefing at the National
Academies for Science, and ONR participates in JIEDDO sponsored events
such as their Technology Outreach Conference). Our relationship is
collaborative where collaboration is possible and practical. ONR's
basic research is intended for future application into applied research
programs or R&D/engineering as performed by Naval entities or by
JIEDDO. JIEDDO does not perform or fund S&T; JIEDDO is focused on
addressing immediate (6-18 month time horizon) warfighter requirements.
So, in terms of coordination, ONR and JIEDDO pursue inherently
different but complementary technology goals--ONR the long-term S&T,
and JIEDDO the near-term R&D and engineering. There is virtually no
overlap between the two organizations, nor should any overlap exist.
The Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (CG
MCWL) represents U.S. Marine Corps within the JIEDDO Integrated Process
Team (JIPT), the top-level decision-making body. The MCWL-led U.S.
Marine Corps IED Working Group supports CG MCWL through daily
engagement with various JIEDDO sub-IPTs, developing and delivering
technology to the warfighter and eliminating redundancy.
As to RDT&E,N funding requested in fiscal year 2008 for counter IED
efforts (in all lines), $104.351 million. As for that which has been
executed in fiscal year 2006 and in fiscal year 2007 (to date), $36.032
million was executed in fiscal year 2006 and $26.769 million is
allocated for execution in fiscal year 2007 in support of CIED efforts.
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
-----------------------------------
2006 2007 2008
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6.1................................. 22.755 15.659 24.001
6.2................................. 8.164 5.118 4.400
6.3................................. * 5.113 * 5.492 * 14.550
6.4................................. 0.5 61.400
-----------------------------------
Total............................. 36.032 26.769 104.351
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Includes 2.023 in fiscal year 2006, 3.515 in fiscal year 2007, and
12.000 in fiscal year 2008 for MCWL
General Castellaw. Aerial reconnaissance is provided by all fixed
and rotary wing platforms visually (naked eye), as well as with
Litening equipped F/A-18, AV-8B and EA-6B aircraft, in order to
identify and warn ground forces of potential IED locations or tracking
triggermen after an event. The Litening ISR pod is used to spot
potential IED emplacement areas, warn ground forces, and track fleeing
insurgents after an IED attack. The U.S. Marine Corps is adding the
Litening capability to the EA-6B aircraft, which will be introduced as
a global war on terrorism TAC DEMO in fiscal year 2007. Using the
Change Detection Workstation (CDWS), Advanced Tactical Air
Reconnaissance System (ATARS) equipped F/A-18s have identified changes
in the environment that would indicate potential IED emplacements.
CDWS is a Windows-based desktop PC with imagery comparison
software designed to create imagery mosaics of areas of
interest. These mosaics are compared to a baseline mosaic and
changes are identified through an automated comparison
processing and manual comparison.
CDWS compares existing F/A-18D ATARS Electro-optical (EO)
imagery, exporting imagery from the solid state digital
recorder at the squadron ground station (SGS) or MEF G-2
Tactical Exploitation Group (TEG) to CDWS.
Recent funding will allow ATARS to incorporate CDWS into
SHARC, for multi-service compatibility, as well as providing an
automatic functionality.
TTPs continue to evolve to identify likely IED emplacements,
suspicious vehicles and activities as well as to track and
report movement of suspicious vehicles and personnel after IED
attacks. The U.S. Marine Corps is introducing an Electronic
Attack (EA) payload for the Pioneer UAV.
Pioneer EA Payload is a U.S. Marine Corps fiscal year 2007
TAC DEMO leveraging the successes of the Iron Nail program
initially created for the Army.
JIEDDO has funded the effort. Specific capabilities and
operational concepts are classified.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
STUDIES ON THE SECOND ENGINE SOURCE FOR THE F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
10. Senator Warner. General Chandler, General Hoffman, Mr.
Balderson, General Castellaw, and Admiral Clingan, in the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress
required that three separate studies be conducted on the cost and
benefits of having a second engine production source for the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF). Two of the studies, from the Institute for
Defense Analyses and the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, cite a
potential problem with the F135 engine inlet temperature versus the
F136 engine. Given this condition, are you satisfied with the level of
risk associated with solely using the F135 engine?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. With 7,300+ test hours on 12
engines through early April 2007, engine performance is meeting
expectations. Recent experience with engine development indicates there
is low operational risk to the warfighter with a single engine
supplier. The Department's decision to cancel the F136 program provides
the best balance of risk and cost. The conclusions of the studies
required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, while supportive of competition in general, support the
Department's initial findings that the expected savings from
competition do not outweigh the investment costs. The Department
considered the intangible benefits and determined they were not
sufficient to warrant the production of a second engine for the F-35.
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan. With approximately 7,300+ engine
test hours on 12 engines completed through early April 2007, engine
performance is meeting expectations. Recent experience with engine
development indicates there is low operational risk to the warfighter
with a single engine supplier. The Department's decision to cancel the
F136 program is strictly based on affordability, providing the best
balance of risk and cost. The conclusions of the studies required by
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, while
supportive of competition in general, support the Department's initial
findings that the expected savings from competition do not outweigh the
investment costs. The studies also concluded that other benefits might
result from competition. The Department believes the cost of
competition outweighs the benefits. The Department considered all of
the intangible benefits and determined that the other benefits were not
sufficient to warrant an engine competition for the F-35.
General Castellaw. We are satisfied the risk associated with the
F135 engine is acceptable. The Marine Corps does not support any action
that delays or otherwise negatively impacts the delivery and IOC of the
F-35B. While there is goodness in having a second F-35 engine
competition, it simply does not outweigh the operational impacts of
delaying F-35B introduction and additional program cost.
CONSTRUCTION OF OUTLYING LANDING FIELD, WASHINGTON COUNTY, NC
11. Senator Warner. Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan, the
Department of the Navy has a requirement to acquire land and to
construct an outlying landing field (OLF) on the East Coast of the
United States to support aircraft operations at Naval Air Station (NAS)
Oceana, VA, and Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, North
Carolina. For the past 4 years, the Department of the Navy has studied
an area in Washington County, North Carolina, as the preferred location
as it is approximately half-way between NAS Oceana and MCAS Cherry
Point by air. As required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared by the
Department of the Navy to study the impact of a new OLF on the local
environment and nearby nature preserves in North Carolina. This study
has been the subject of intense scrutiny and lawsuits, which eventually
resulted in a Federal court order to the Department of the Navy to
expand its scope of the environmental study.
The Department of the Navy has included in the budget request for
fiscal year 2008 military construction funds totaling $10.0 million to
be used to acquire land and initiate construction activities. This is
the fourth year in which the Department of the Navy has requested funds
for this project, and in each of those years, Congress has rescinded
funds due to the inability of the Department of the Navy to obligate
them in a timely manner. This background, coupled with the reported
opposition by certain segments of the local community, suggests that it
may be prudent to examine other locations for the OLF. Has the
Department of the Navy given consideration to a reassessment of the
final location of the OLF? If so, would this reassessment include
reconsideration of the 2003 decision by the Department of the Navy to
base eight squadrons of F-18 Superhornets at NAS Oceana and another two
squadrons at MCAS Cherry Point?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan. While the Washington County,
North Carolina location remains the Navy's preferred site among the
five OLF alternative sites in Northeastern North Carolina considered in
the Final Environmental Impact Statement and the draft Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS), the views that have been
expressed about those alternatives by the citizens of North Carolina
and their elected leaders deserve our most careful consideration before
final decisions are made. If the Navy receives new information about
additional sites that potentially meet our OLF siting requirements, the
Navy will consider and evaluate that new information and determine
whether adjustments in the current SEIS process are warranted to enable
formal analysis and consideration of additional sites under the
National Environmental Policy Act.
There is no plan at this time to reconsider the aircraft homebasing
decision.
12. Senator Warner. Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan, what is the
current status of the Navy's supplemental EIS actions?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan. The Draft SEIS was released for
public comment on 23 Feb 07. Public hearings have been conducted in
each of the six counties in Northeastern North Carolina that could be
impacted by a final decision on the OLF site. At the request of Senator
Dole, a seventh public hearing was held in Charlotte, North Carolina on
17 April. The public comment period is scheduled to end on May 9, 2007.
The Navy is collating and cataloguing the public comments which will be
included in the Final SEIS along with the Navy's response where
appropriate.
13. Senator Warner. Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan, what is the
estimated date for the release of a record of decision?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan. The Final SEIS is expected in
fall 2007, to be followed by a Record of Decision in late 2007.
14. Senator Warner. Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan, what further
actions are required by the U.S. Government to satisfy the Federal
court order and to be able to proceed unencumbered with the land
acquisition and construction of the OLF?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan. The Navy must complete and
publish the Final SEIS and the Record of Decision to satisfy the
Federal court order. At Record of Decision the Navy can advertise for a
construction contract and can begin to acquire the necessary property
interests at the selected OLF site unless there is further litigation
and an injunction that prevents us from proceeding.
5. Senator Warner. Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan, does NAS
Oceana have the capability in terms of aircraft parking ramps, hangars,
and support facilities to be able to accommodate the basing of all 10
F-18 squadrons? If so, would a revised decision to base all 10
squadrons at NAS Oceana expand the range of potential locations for
construction of a new OLF to meet the training requirements for carrier
pilots?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan. The two F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet
squadrons scheduled to be homebased at MCAS Cherry Point could be based
at NAS Oceana in currently available facilities (and will be while
facilities at MCAS Cherry Point are being upgraded to support these two
squadrons), but permanent stationing would require additions to two
hangars to meet recommended Facilities Planning Criteria.
Siting all 10 F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet squadrons and the Fleet
Replacement Squadron at NAS Oceana does not expand the range of
potential locations for construction of a new OLF based on current OLF
siting criteria. The study area radius around a homebase is based
primarily upon fuel consumption rates for flights to and from the OLF
and performing field carrier landing practice, and the required safety
margin.
16. Senator Warner. Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan, in your
judgment, might an OLF located at Ft. Pickett, Virginia, meet the needs
of the naval aviation community?
Mr. Balderson and Admiral Clingan. The Navy is continuing to review
information regarding Fort Pickett.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
F-22 MULTIYEAR CONTRACT
17. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, in the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress provided the Air Force authority to
enter a multiyear contract for the F-22. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007
also required that the Secretary of the Air Force certify that the
proposed multiyear contract satisfies the conditions in title 10, 2306b
for multiyear contracting. Where is the Air Force in the process of
providing that certification?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The SECDEF is plans to
deliver the required certifications and final RAND report to Congress
in July to support a planned MYP contract award in August.
F-22 Multiyear Procurement (MYP) negotiations are nearly finished.
Once negotiations are complete, RAND will finalize their report on the
estimate of savings.
18. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, what,
in your opinion, are the benefits of multiyear contracting?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. Multiyear contracting allows
the contractor to plan a more efficient production; such a contract can
reduce the cost of an acquisition compared with buying the items
through a series of annual procurement contracts. Savings can come from
several sources, such as investments in equipment and facilities,
investments in the contractor's workforce, and orders for component
parts in economically efficient quantities. With stable program
funding, the contractor will be able to focus on long-term program and
performance expectations.
19. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, do you
believe that any changes to the statute governing multiyear
contracting, 10 U.S.C. 2306b, are necessary or would be appropriate at
this time?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. We have no legislative
initiatives governing multiyear contracting to offer at this time.
20. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, how
are deliveries of the F-22 aircraft to operational units progressing?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. Combat capable F-22s are
delivering on time to operational units. Raptors are delivering on time
at a rate of two per month. Langley AFB has two operational combat
squadrons. Additionally, F-22s for Elmendorf AFB are being delivered to
Langley now and will transition to Alaska this summer.
21. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, what
in your opinion is the number of F-22s the Nation needs?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. Both Air Force and
independent analyses have substantiated that 381 is the minimum
requirement to meet the National Military Strategy (NMS). The OSD-led
2006 QDR Joint Air Dominance study revealed two key points: The U.S.
has a critical requirement to re-capitalize TACAIR force, and with
sufficient 5th generation fighters, especially F-22, joint air forces
win the first MCO with enough forces left to win the next MCO. Without
sufficient F-22s, attrition is unacceptably high using a legacy-heavy
force and jeopardizes the follow-on win. Meeting the requirement of 381
F-22s means fewer mobility assets are required for smaller force
packaging and lower combat attrition. The Average Procurement Unit Cost
(APUC) is reduced as we build to our requirement. Finally, 381 Raptors
meets the National Defense Strategy requirements with reasonable risk
and provides a sustainable ops tempo.
AIRCRAFT RETIREMENTS AND RECAPITALIZATION
22. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, can
you explain how aircraft retirement restrictions are hindering your
ability to recapitalize your fleet?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. Additional relief from
legislative restrictions would allow for flexibility and increased
options for fleet management. For example, if we were able to retire
the older C-5s, we could recapitalize the airlift capability with C-17
platforms off a production line that is still open. It we wait, we may
not have that option. Restrictions translate into costs to modify,
operate and support aircraft with funds that could otherwise be spent
on newer platforms that would be sustainable for a longer period of
time. Once retired, we also need the flexibility to harvest parts so
that we can increase the mission readiness of the remaining fleet.
Present language that says store in a ``recallable'' status precludes
us from doing that.
23. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, can
you characterize the current state of the C-130 fleet and the need to
recapitalize due to Iraq and Afghanistan related ``wear and tear?''
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The Global War on Terrorism
continues to place very high demands on the Air Force combat delivery
and special mission C-130 fleets. As a result, C-130 structural
fatigue, especially on the Center Wing Box (CWB), has accelerated
aircraft restrictions, groundings and cracks.
To address increased wear and tear and substantial modernization/
sustainability costs, the Air Force needs to continue retiring C-130Es
and invest in fleet recapitalization efforts. The 2005 Mobility
Capabilities Study identified a range of 395-674 combat delivery C-130s
to support National Military Strategy objectives with acceptable risk.
The approval of 20 additional C-130Js via fiscal years 2007 and 2008
supplementals is a start. In the low-density and high-demand (LD/HD)
special mission fleet, 37 MC-130Ps and Es and 37 HC-130Ps and Ns need
to be replaced while addressing LD/HD issues. At this time, the number
and type of replacement aircraft for special missions has not been
determined.
24. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, can
you quantity the approximate number of C-130s the Air Force needs to
buy to meet the requirements of Air Combat Command, Air Mobility
Command, and AFSOC?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. For Air Mobility Command, the
2005 Mobility Capabilities Study identified a range of 395 to 674
combat delivery C-130s to support National Military Strategy objectives
with acceptable risk. As the Air Force retires legacy C-130s, they need
to be replaced to ensure a minimum of 395 combat delivery C-130s. As a
start, the Air Force requested 20 more C-130Js in the fiscal year 2007
and 2008 supplemental.
In the global war on terror, the special mission C-130 fleet is in
low-density and high-demand (LD/HD). Air Combat Command needs to
replace its 37 HC-130Ps and Ns while addressing LD/HD for Combat Search
and Rescue assets. AFSOC also needs to replace its 37 MC-130Ps and Es
while addressing Special Operations Force growth. At this time, the
quantity and type of replacement aircraft for these special mission C-
130s has not been determined.
25. Senator Chambliss. General Castellaw, can you quantity the
current U.S. Marine Corps' requirement for additional KC-130Js?
General Castellaw. The U.S. Marine Corps is currently funded for 31
KC-130J aircraft. This is 20 aircraft short of its program requirement.
The requirement is based on a Mobility Capability Study which
determined a KC-130 operational requirement range of 77 (high risk) to
129 (low risk). The legacy KC-130 F and R model aircraft are being
retired due to service life and fatigue due to age and over-utilization
during the early stages of OEF and OIF. These aircraft flew more than
twice their programmed flight hours which resulted in accelerated
retirement/replacement. The last legacy aircraft are scheduled to be
retired in December 2008.
The U.S. Marine Corps's KC-130 fleet comprises 45 percent of DOD's
helicopter refueling assets. The U.S. Marine Corps's aerial refueling
requirement will increase greatly as 360 MV-22s replace non-aerial
refuelable CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters. The KC-130 is the only
aircraft capable of refueling the MV-22 in flight, and the MV-22 relies
on the KC-130J to self-deploy. In addition, a reduction in operating
costs and an increase in reliability have been realized as the U.S.
Marine Corps transitions from its 46 and 29 year-old legacy KC-130F/Rs
to the new and more capable KC-130J.
26. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Castellaw,
given the total number of aircraft required for both Services, would it
make sense to have another joint multiyear procurement contract for C-
130Js?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The Air Force and Marine
Corps are currently procuring aircraft under the existing C 130J
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract ending in fiscal year 2008. At
this time the Air Force does not have any C-130J procurements
programmed beyond fiscal year 2008 to justify a second MYP contract for
C-130Js.
E-10 TERMINATION AND RADAR OPTIONS
27. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, in the
fiscal year 2008 President's budget the Air Force stopped the
development of the E-10 program including the development of the large
radar. Is there still an operational requirement for this program?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The operational requirement
for the capability has not changed. The Air Force is mitigating what
the Multi Platform--Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) Wide
Area Surveillance (WAS) radar would have provided by procuring three
additional Global Hawk (GH) Block 40 for a total of 15 GH Block 40s.
The GH Block 40 will provide some of the E-10's ground moving target
indicator (GMTI) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability, but
with reduced coverage and resolution. The cruise missile defense
capability the E-10 was bringing to the warfighter will be an unfilled
capability gap.
On 13 December 2006, OSD directed ``United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) and USD (AT&L), in coordination with the services, to lead
a study to assess the likely effectiveness of the United States air and
cruise missile defense architecture and systems in fiscal year 2015.''
Additionally, USSTRATCOM will leverage the results completed on the
Sensor Weapon Pairing Task Force Study and the ongoing integrated Air
and Missile Evaluation of Alternatives to provide more complete
coverage for air and missile defense. If warranted, USSTRATCOM will
provide recommendations for suggested improvement in capabilities and
present the results by August 15, 2007 to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense.
28. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, do you
believe the large radar is still needed for force protection, including
against cruise missiles? If so, how will you meet this operational
requirement?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. Yes, the Air Force still
believes the large radar is needed for force protection including the
capability to defend against cruise missiles. Component commanders
still have a valid requirement to see low-observable low-altitude
activities, today and in the future. Although Joint STARS doesn't
provide cruise missile defense, Joint STARS is providing GMTI and SAR
for the warfighter. The capability that Global Hawk Block 40 will bring
in 2011 will add to the GMTI and SAR range/coverage beyond Joint STARS'
capability. For cruise missile defense, there will be a capability gap
that will not be met and the Air Force is accepting the risk based on
fiscal constraints.
29. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, have
you considered moving the large radar to the Joint STARS aircraft by
installing the new radar on the fleet of already operational aircraft?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. Yes, the Air Force has
assessed the value to migrate the Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) mission
to Joint STARS. However, in light of budget considerations, the ongoing
Air and Cruise Missile Defense architecture study, and the assessed CMD
capability with MP-RTIP on Joint STARS, it was not deemed critical to
replace the Joint STARS radar at this time. However, if the decision
was made to replace the Joint STARS radar, it could be replaced with
the MP-RTIP.
30. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, the
Air Force placed the MP-RTIP radar in their top 20 programs on the
unfunded requirements list. If funded, does the Air Force have an
intended platform on which to integrate the MP-RTIP radar?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The Unfunded Priority List
(UPL) request for MP-RTIP would be applied to continue the development
activity on the Wide Area Surveillance (WAS) large radar variant
associated with a wide body platform. This funding would only provide
for 1 additional year of development headed towards a flight test.
Additional funding would be required to reach a flight test.
31. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, in the
fiscal year 2008 global war on terror supplemental request, the Air
Force requested funding for upgrading the back end of Joint STARS to
handle MP-RTIP data, as well as funding for further development of the
large MP-RTIP; however, the Air Force also requested funding for the E-
10. If the Air Force already cancelled the E-10, could this additional
funding have been used to move the radar to the Joint STARS platform
instead of continuing E-10 funding?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The fiscal year 2008
President's budget funding requested under the E-10 program is not for
continuing the E-10 development, but rather to complete the development
and flight testing of the MP-RTIP variant for Global Hawk Block 40.
This activity is on schedule to be operational in 2011. We evaluated
transitioning the MP-RTIP technology to Joint STARS. However, the
global war on terrorism funding requested to address the diminishing
manufacturing sources related to the Joint STARS mission equipment is
only a small fraction of the funding required to transition the MP-RTIP
to Joint STARS. The notion of keeping the large radar technology alive
and perhaps to put it on the Joint STARS in the future is why it was
placed on the UPL as the # 15 priority.
32. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, can
you quantity the improved performance, operational capability, and
additional support to the warfighter that will result from a re-engined
Joint STARS fleet?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. Current Joint STARS engines
do not meet the performance requirements. Based on the analysis
conducted during source selection, the new engines will meet or exceed
the increased range and time-on-station, improve efficiency, and reduce
dependence on tankers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Engine Pratt and Whitney
TF33-102C JT8D-219
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Altitude (Ft) (ORD: 34-42K)..... 25-31K............ 34-42K
Mission Time (Hrs) (ORD: 10).... 8 Hours Avg....... 12.1
Fuel Efficiency................. Baseline.......... 17 percent
Improvement
Noise/Emission.................. Non-Compliant..... Compliant
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The warfighter will see improved support in multiple areas.
Increased operating altitudes translate into more effective GMTI,
improved tracking of targets of interest, and better communications
with tasked fighter and helicopter assets. Overall, this means far
improved mission support to ground units.
CSAR-X
33. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, in
relation to CSAR-X source selection, did the Air Force place any value
on an aircraft's performance in brownout conditions?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The CSAR-X evaluation
included the requirement for aircraft to provide sufficient situational
awareness for the aircrew to permit safe and effective completion of
the CSAR mission, which included the capability to manage, monitor and
control aircraft drift in all three axes while in zero visibility.
34. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, did
the source selection consider an aircraft's landing footprint for
landing in a terminal area?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. An aircraft ``footprint'' was
not a CSAR-X requirement; the CSAR-X requirements specified a
capability not a design.
35. Senator Chambliss. General Chandler and General Hoffman, did
the Air Force evaluate acoustic signatures and an aircraft's ability to
enter a terminal area quietly?
General Chandler and General Hoffman. The CSAR-X capability-based
requirements included the reduction of aircraft signature (including
acoustic). The CSAR-X solicitation required that all offered aircraft
meet all CSAR-X minimum capability-based requirements to be eligible
for contract award.
[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]