TERRORIST IDEOLOGY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

CONTENTS

TERRORIST IDEOLOGY

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TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Jay Rockefeller (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Rockefeller, Bayh, Feingold, Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse, Bond, Warner, Chambliss, Hatch, and Snowe.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. The Committee will come to order.

Today the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets in one of our rare open hearings—and they are fairly rare—to discuss violent religious extremism. I am very pleased to look out and see that there are so many people here, particularly young people, because this is an unbelievably deep, complicated, and powerful subject.

We're going to discuss the radicalization process that enables individuals to commit horrible acts against innocent men, women, and children. What is it that fuels them? What is it that holds them back, if it does?

Because of the sensitive and classified nature of our oversight, our Committee conducts virtually all of our hearings in private and in great secrecy, so that we're mostly out of view. That's the way we often tend to prefer it, and there is some distinction as to how people feel about that. At those times, we review and evaluate very sensitive intelligence, including efforts to thwart terrorism, both here and abroad. But occasionally there are aspects associated with the U.S. intelligence community's mission that I believe can and in this case, the Vice Chairman and I feel, must be discussed in public.

Unlike most other meetings of the Committee, we will not be receiving any hearing from the intelligence community. Rather, we're going to be hearing from a panel of experts outside of Government—I'll introduce them in time—who study and analyze violent Islamic extremism and the tenets of the terrorist ideology.

Defeating terrorism is America's top national security priority. The intelligence community devotes considerable manpower and resources to tracking terrorists and disrupting their plots. But, as we carry out these efforts, we cannot ignore the larger issue of radicalization. A successful counterterrorism strategy must include steps for preventing the spread of the violent extremism that at-

tempts to legitimize violence directed at civilians and fuels terrorist recruitment.

Nearly 6 years after the attack of 9/11, I am personally not convinced that the United States has a comprehensive and effective strategy in place to reverse the troubling spread of terrorist jihadism among Muslim and Arab communities around the world—not all, obviously. I'm deeply concerned that the progress that the United States and its allies have achieved in identifying, capturing, and killing terrorists has been eroded, if not offset, by our inability to deprive terrorists of the ideological inroads that they need to survive and to carry out their murderous attacks.

The terrorist threat has metastasized since America's invasion of Afghanistan, but have our efforts to combat its transformation evolved as well? In the past 6 weeks, two important reports were released that provide valuable snapshots—one global and one domestic. The first report is the State Department's annual country report on terrorism that was completed in conjunction with the National Counterterrorism Center and released on April 30 of this year. The second report is the first-ever nationwide survey of Muslim-Americans that was conducted by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, and that was released on May 22.

The State Department report gets to the question regarding whether or not we are capturing, killing, deterring and dissuading more terrorists than are being recruited, than are being radicalized, that are being trained and deployed. Are we doing these things, but the net effect is in fact net-negative and increases all of this? Sadly, the answer to this question is as indisputable today as it was nearly 4 years ago, when it was raised by then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in a memo to General Pace and other Administration officials.

According to the State Department, in 2006 there were more than 14,000 terrorist attacks worldwide that resulted in more than 20,000 deaths. This represents a 25 percent increase in attacks and a 40 percent rise in deaths from 2005, 1 year previous. Why? The report warns of "a steadfast al-Qa'ida that is planning attacks in northwest Pakistan as well as expanding its propaganda campaign to invigorate supporters, win converts, and gain recruits." They seem to be doing it.

The State Department report also reaffirms that achieving an end to mass casualty terrorist attacks will require more than eliminating terrorist safehavens and incarceration or killing terrorist leaders. On this point, it states that the underlying grievances and conflicts provide the fuel that powers the process of radicalization.

The sobering assessment offered by the State Department report is tempered somewhat by the Pew report, which, as I indicated, was the domestic side of this. It was a survey of Muslim-Americans. That study found a diverse Muslim-American community that is decidedly American in their outlook, values, and attitudes. In comparison to Muslim communities in Europe, Muslim-Americans are found to be mostly assimilated into American society, happy with their lives, and moderate with respect to so many of the issues that have divided Muslims and westerners around the rest of the world.

The fact that Muslim-Americans are generally happy with their lives, assimilated and successful in America is not surprising to me. We are a country of immigrants, with a rich history of welcoming people of different faces and cultures, which is one of the reasons that many of the people come from around the world and seek to make America their home.

Nonetheless, even in the Pew Center's mostly positive report there are areas of concern. Although the study found that Muslim-Americans reject Islamic extremism by larger margins than Muslims in western European countries, the study suggests there are certain segments of the U.S. Muslim public that are more accepting of violent Islamic extremism than others. For example, while 80 percent of Muslim-Americans say that suicide bombings of civilians to defend Islam cannot be justified, 13 percent of Muslim-Americans say that it can be justified, at least rarely. This sentiment is strongest—and this is important—amongst those who are 30 or below. That's called the future.

Additionally, a majority of Muslim-Americans, 53 percent, say it has been more difficult to be a Muslim in the United States since the September 11 terrorist attack, and they believe that the U.S. Government singles out Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring. Most worrisome, only 1 in 4 Muslim-Americans were found to believe that the U.S.-led war on terror is a sincere effort to reduce terrorism, and only 40 percent said that they believed that Arab men were responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

Do we understand the reasons for these sentiments and views? Are they early indications of susceptibility in Muslim-American communities to the terrorist message of hate and violence? To what extent has the invasion of Iraq and our prolonged military presence there shaped how Muslims view American efforts to combat terrorism?

Now, the Committee's report last month on intelligence assessments prior to the Iraq war—that is, what did intelligence predict before the war about what would happen after—revealed that the intelligence community accurately warned that the American invasion would bring about instability in Iraq that would be exploited by al-Qa'ida and other terrorists and lead to a worsening theat of anti-American extremism around the world.

The intelligence community's warnings that al-Qa'ida probably would try to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan while the United States was diverted with concerns in post-war Iraq has proven out as well. In my view, the Administration's unwillingness to heed these intelligence warnings or plan for those outcomes has further compounded the challenge before us.

So our Nation must act aggressively to counter terrorist plots such as those uncovered at Ft. Dix, New Jersey, and JFK Airport in New York, but to be effective, we must bring all forces and all expertise to bear, and all thinking to bear, which includes gaining a greater understanding of what triggers individuals to believe that taking the lives of innocent men, women, and children will somehow address their perceived grievances. We have to understand that.

We will look to our distinguished witnesses to provide us with their insights as to the scope and root causes of the radicalization

dynamic and what steps they would recommend taking to combat its spread.

Before introducing our witnesses, I now recognize Vice Chairman Bond for any comments that he might wish to make.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, because we both believe this is an extremely important topic, and I appreciate our willingness to hold this hearing to look into this issue.

I think we all know that the global war on terror is about 20 percent kinetic and about 80 percent ideological, with the ruthless, bloodthirsty terrorists who are totally committed to killing Americans. When they rear their heads, we should whack them. We're really good at whacking them, but as my friend the Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee has said, if all we do is whack people, then we end up playing a game of "whack-a-mole."

And while we are whacking those who are already committed to suicide attacks and devastating assaults against us, we first must need to make sure that we're getting out the right message of what we're doing. I was deeply disturbed when our office received an e-mail from one of our military men in Iraq, who outlined what had happened the previous weekend—two very successful operations, one setting up an embed operation with Iraqi police and the army, another taking down a suicide vehicle entity, which were done with killing some terrorists, but no Iraqi civilians. Yet when I got back to check the e-mails and the news wires, the American media was saying that 25 Iraqi police killed by suicide bomber, 50 civilians injured by U.S. actions. It was a total distortion of what they had done.

And he went on to say something that I believe: "Make no mistake; the one area in which we are absolutely, positively and without a doubt losing this war is in information operations. We're getting demolished, both by nefarious enemy media outlets, moles and reporters, either on insurgent payrolls or known sympathies with insurgent organizations, and by a collective western media that either fails to realize or fails to care that they are often being manipulated by enemy elements. What incredible economy of effort the enemy is afforded when U.S. media is their megaphone? Why spend precious resources on developing your own propaganda machine when you can make your opponent's own news outlets scream your message louder than you could ever have hoped to do it independently?"

Well, that's one part of it—getting the message out of what's happening. We are failing, and we are failing that badly. But we also must focus the weight of our effort on the ideological front, where we have to reach would-be terrorists. We have to reach the much broader Muslim community, whether it's in the Middle East, southeast Asia, or the United States, to let them know, through either what we would call public diplomacy or strategic influence, that we have good intentions toward them, and we need to back those intentions up with specifics—building schools and hospitals.

What we're doing in the southern Philippines, for example, is working very well. Unfortunately, we're not doing enough of it.

But we also need, in fighting the 80 percent of the war that's ideological effectively, to have a better understanding of the ideology we're confronting. And we need to have a much better way of understanding the role that ideology plays in motivating, radicalizing, and legitimizing violent extremism. We hear a great deal about the subject. Some of it, I fear, is wrong, and some of it is confusing.

But I look forward to the witnesses today to help us straighten it all out. Really, the subject of terror ideology needs further exploration and understanding. In so doing, we have to consult the best minds we find, and for this reason it's very helpful, I think, not only to us but I hope to our colleagues in having an open hearing where we will be able to establish a record that will be available to all of us.

All three of today's witnesses have conducted original research on the topic, and I can assure my colleagues that a careful study of their works is worth the time and effort. They have spent extensive time in the Arab and Muslims regions of the world. Two are fluent in Arabic and other relevant languages.

Stephen Ulph's work at the Jamestown Foundation has been an excellent source of insightful analysis for us. Kim Cragin of the RAND Corporation has done some very thoughtful monographs. Having not read all of them, but having read some, I commend them to my colleagues. And Mr. Daniel Kimmage of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has worked to complete a major study of the Iraq insurgency—I guess it's not shameful to put in a plug—called "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas" that will be released later this month.

But given the present situation in Iraq, it should be clear to all of us that we have a very long way to go before we become competitive in the conflict of ideas, and I am convinced that we do have a lot way to go.

That being said, I expect we will learn a great deal today from the witnesses before us. I join with the Chair and the rest of the Committee in welcoming our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. You've done my work. You've introduced the panel, and very well.

I'll just add this personal note before we turn it over to them. I will confess to you that I spend, as does Senator Bond and Senator Warner and Senator Bayh, Senator Nelson, an enormous amount of time on intelligence. And we read what's going on all over the world. A lot of it we can't talk about, but so what. What haunts me, what absolutely haunts me, is that we may be prosecuting the mission of suppressing terrorism in its most obvious embodiment and missing the whole point on what it is that makes people into terrorists who are willing to do these things.

It's a haunting thought, around the world and in this country, and that's why our witnesses are here.

Mr. Stephen Ulph, will you please lead off.

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN ULPH, SENIOR FELLOW, THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, AND RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT

Mr. ULPH. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee, I'd like to thank you——

Senator WARNER. Could you tell us about the Jamestown Foundation? Is that related to the Jamestown in Virginia and all of the things we're doing down there?

Mr. ULPH. I don't believe so. I hope not.

Senator WARNER. Well, your Queen was down there.

Mr. ULPH. I think you've hopefully recovered from that.

I would just like to thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing. On behalf of the Jamestown Foundation—not that one—we greatly appreciate this opportunity to be here today and address the Committee.

My research endeavor is entirely focused on an act of cartography—that is, to map out the range, the nature, and the purposes of the jihadist ideology from primary sources. The aim of this research ultimately is to provide a textbook, a textbook which is being supported and funded by the United States Institute of Peace. This textbook will be for future study and analysis—that is, one which will categorize and evaluate the enormous and, unfortunately, growing body of ideological works that is freely distributed on the Internet.

Just gauging the effort that the jihadis are putting into this endeavor, it becomes fairly clear pretty early on that the ideological struggle is where the center of gravity for the jihad lies. The point was very succinctly made by a sympathizer, writing in autumn of 2005 on a jihadi Internet forum. He argued, under an interesting title, "The al-Qa'ida organization is now finished," and went on to explain that the jihad is now entering on an interesting new phase "which the infidels are unaware of or do not wish to believe."

And it turns out that the infidels among us apparently are "still fixated on fighting individuals, oblivious to the fact that they are actually fighting an idea, one that has spread across the globe like fire and which is embraced even by those whose faith is a mustard seed."

Now it's true, the Internet is at present widely and freely distributing books on doctrine and culture for purposes specific to the jihad. None of this is being intercepted. In terms of quality and quantity, they amount to what is frankly an entire educational program. It's a curriculum of jihad, if you wish. And this curriculum shows us the sophistication of the process of radicalization.

They show how the Mujahidin attract the uncommitted broad armchair sympathizer, detach him from his social environment, undermine his self image hitherto as an observant Muslim, and centralize jihad as his true Islamic identity. Now here, in short, is an entire cultural engineering project. It's taking place in front of us on the Internet. We can see it daily. And few of us, if any, are choosing to look at this.

Please let me emphasize the study of these works is not some obscure academic exercise. These works have immediate relevance to strategy and tactical operations, since we have to keep in mind

that, whatever the jihadis do, in each case the argument has to be made doctrinally. This is something which not many people realize, not many people are aware of. The doctrinal propriety of jihadi activity must be maintained. Without this, they risk losing the propaganda war.

Now the study of these ideological works allows us to understand the priorities—and this is important—the priorities as perceived by the Mujahidin themselves, and it ensures that we don't rely on our own starting points—that is, what we think those priorities are. And, if nothing else, knowledge of the ideology teaches us not to underestimate the jihadis intellectually.

For it becomes clear fairly soon by even a cursory reading of the materials that the jihadis have painstakingly constructed over decades, a serious, cogently argued, doctrinally coherent intellectual infrastructure for the war—an intellectual infrastructure. They are engaged, as I said, in a massive education project. While our gaze, unfortunately, is fixed on other things, they are going about this unopposed, which begs the question. If they are investing in this ideological war so heavily, why aren't we? Aren't we involved in some way? It must be clear to everyone that there are direct implications for the United States on the domestic front, for there is a dimension of jihadist ideology whose threat is not so explicit where the threat is not to the physical structure of our nation states but to the horizontal infrastructure of our democracies—that is, those entirely uncodified, unenforceable relations—those habits, obligations and disciplines that underpin the interactions between citizens.

You could list them, obvious things that you and I would take for granted—respect for personal privacy, the open nature of society, multiformity, other ethical and ideological orientations, or the active will to promote social cohesion. These relations the jihadist ideology is painstakingly and explicitly attempting to destroy. And here is where they have located our Achilles heel. For the fact is, we lack understanding of the nature, causes and position of this jihadist culture within the broader Islamic tradition.

Because we lack this self-confidence, we have a reluctance to challenge the threat. But if we continue to overlook it, we are going to find ourselves, sooner or later, wrestling with an entire generation brought up in an alternative mental universe, different from our own and educated into a radicalized, aggressive form of religious absolutism.

In case you might feel that this still may be an obscure issue, this ideology—you can see it on the Internet—is now so prolific that a sympathizer can live an entire lifetime without ever having to stray from its cultural curriculum.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Can I just ask—I can hear you perfectly, but you are speaking fairly quickly and I just want to know that everybody in here can hear. You might move the microphone closer and maybe slow down just a little bit, because every word you are saying is important.

Mr. ULPH. Is that better? OK.

It has been said that jihad is someone else's intellectual civil war. But this civil war is not being fought, to quote a phrase, "in some faraway country between people of whom we know nothing."

It's being fought here, just beyond the walls of this building, in a war for the minds of Muslim youth. Do we not have the right to take sides, to decide what form of ideological spectrum is permitted in a society that values tolerance, diversity and the rights of the individual?

Clearly we do. But how do we take sides? Who are the ones with whom we should be associating? Who are our false friends? We don't know the answer because we haven't provided ourselves with the means to navigate this issue.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a difficult task. It's not beyond the capacities of the world's most powerful Nation, with its unparalleled concentration of intellectual and organizational skills, to set about the task methodically. I suppose if we have to engage in some advance work of detection, the fact is that all the raw materials are available. They're all open source. Part of the problem with intelligence analysis to date is the predilection for closed-source material. This is all open source.

These materials must be open source because what the jihadis are engaged in is a massive educational program, and by nature, an educational program must be public. It's a huge propaganda exercise to be shouted from the rooftops. And, believe me, shout from the rooftops they do. But so far we've not been listening.

It is, I think you will agree, simply unbelievable that we are now in our 6th year after the attacks on September 11 and still without a coherent map of the enemy and their cause. Yet we know that having this map will enable us to protect ourselves from the slow erosion of our commonly held values, which alone can safeguard our peace and our freedoms. It is my firm belief that investment in the study of this culture has been disastrously late and that we have given those who poison the minds of Muslim youth an unacceptable head start. We must hasten to close this gap and gear ourselves up for the long struggle ahead.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ulph follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT STEPHEN ULPH, SENIOR FELLOW, THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION,RESEARCH ASSOCIATE WITH THE COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT THE U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT

Mr. Chairman,

My research endeavor is entirely focused on an act of cartography. To map out the range, nature and purposes of the Jihadist ideology, from primary sources.

The aim of this research is to provide a text book for future study and analysis, one that will have categorized and evaluated the enormous—and growing—body of ideological works freely distributed on the net.

I began this endeavor for the simple reason that current commentary and analysis appeared to be re-circulating either the same limited number of source materials— often those which the jihadis had chosen for us as an audience—or analyses of those who had no access at all to the foundation texts, discussions and debates among the mujahideen.

Early on I was struck by one thing—that at least 60 percent (this is a conservative estimate) of the materials circulated on jihadist chat forums and specialist sites were not located in the sections devoted to news commentary or audio-visual propaganda. They populated instead the 'doctrinal' and 'cultural' sections.

Just gauging the effort put into this endeavor, it becomes clear that the ideological struggle is where the center of gravity for the jihad ties. The point was succinctly made by a sympathizer writing in autumn 2005 on a jihadi internet forum. In a posting bearing the extraordinary title: *"The al-Qaeda organization is now finished"* the writer went on to explain that the jihad is now entering on a new phase "which the infidels are unaware of, or do not wish to believe." It turns out that the infidels among us

"are still fixated on fighting individuals, oblivious to the fact that they are actually fighting an idea, one that has spread across the globe like fire and which is embraced even by those whose faith is a mustard seed."

It soon becomes obvious that these 'doctrinal' and 'cultural' works are meticulously composed and written for purposes specific to the jihad. They form its life-blood, its intellectual infrastructure. They are also in constant circulation. They amount to an entire educational program, a "curriculum of jihad" if you will, and with great skill illustrate to us the process of radicalization. They show how the mujahideen attract the uncommitted broad armchair sympathizer, detach him from his social and intellectual environment, undermine his self-image hitherto as an observant Muslim, introduce what the ideologues claims is 'real Islam', re-script history in terms of a perennial conflict, centralize jihad as his Islamic identity, train him not only militarily but also socially and psychologically for jihad and doctrinally defend the behavior of the mujahideen against criticism.

For the jihad is highly sensitive to public opinion. It depends on the mujahideen being able to maintain their claims to authenticity and the moral high ground. We see this particularly at times of crisis, when Muslims are caught in the crossfire, a bombing goes awry, or scholars cast doubt on the Islamic credentials of their actions. Productivity peaks at these moments. Here, in short, is an entire cultural engineering project that is taking place. And few, if any, are looking at it.

Let me emphasize: the study of these works is not an obscure academic exercise. They not only provide the ideological bedrock for recruitment, and the political validation and moral justification for violence, but have immediate relevance to strategy and tactical operations. From the classic strategy works such as *The Management of Barbarism* and the 1600-page Call to Global Islamic Resistance to works explaining the legality of executing prisoners and Ambassadors, the killing of women and children, and the use of human shields, the permissibility of suicide bombings, the propriety of mutilating dead bodies of American soldiers, to the use of weapons of mass destruction. In each case the case has to be made doctrinally if violence is not done to the mujahideen's claims to authenticity, and they thus start to lose the propaganda war.

Study of these ideological works allows us to understand priorities as perceived by the mujahideen themselves and counter our own false starting points on what we think these priorities are. If nothing else, knowledge of the ideology teaches us not to underestimate the jihadis intellectually, for it soon becomes clear that they have painstakingly constructed, over decades, a serious, cogently argued, academically and ideologically coherent intellectual infrastructure to their war. They are, in short, engaged in a massive re-education project, and they are going about this unopposed.

Which begs the question: if they are investing in this ideological war so heavily, why aren't we? Aren't we involved in some way? It must be clear to everyone that there are direct implications for the United States on the domestic front. For there is a dimension of Jihadist ideology whose threat is not so explicit, where the threat is not to the physical infrastructure of our nation states—which our efficient and dedicated security services have to date proved themselves successful in defending—but to the 'horizontal' infrastructure of our democracies. That is, those entirely un-codified and un-enforceable relations—habits, obligations and disciplines that underpin the interactions between citizens. Disciplines such as the respect for personal privacy, for the open nature of society, for multiformity, diverse interests and other ethical and ideological orientations, the active will to promote social cohesion, trust and the harmonization of interests, and the support of community-based organizations. That is, the ingredients that go to make up active citizenship.

These relations the jihadist ideology is painstakingly, explicitly attempting to destroy. The electronic library catalogue is filling up with works that deconstruct modern civic society, point for point. Here is where the jihadists have located our Achilles Heel. For standing in our way is the lack of understanding among our policy-makers as to the nature, causes and position of this jihadist culture within the broader Islamic tradition. This opacity generates not only an incapacity, but also a reluctance, to challenge the threat. Yet if we continue to overtook Jihadism's ideological program it will incur serious costs for the democratic system, which will find itself wrestling with an entire generation brought up in an alternative mental universe from our own, and educated into a radicalized, aggressive form of religious absolutism. This ideology is now of such prolific productivity that a sympathizer can live an entire lifetime without ever having to stray from its cultural 'curriculum.'

It has been said that the jihad is someone else's intellectual civil war. But this civil war is not being fought—to quote a phrase—"in some far-away country between people of whom we know nothing", but is being fought here, just beyond the walls of these buildings, in a war for the minds of Muslim youth. Do we not have the right

to take sides? To decide what form of ideological spectrum is permitted in a society that values tolerance, diversity and the rights of the individual? Clearly we do. But how do we take sides? Who are the ones with whom we should be associating? Who are our potential allies and who our false friends? We don't know the answer to these questions, because we haven't provided ourselves with the means to navigate.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a difficult task. It is not beyond the capacities of the world's most powerful nation, with its unparalleled concentration of intellectual and organizational skills, to set about the task methodically.

And it is not as if we have to engage in some advance work of detection. The fact is, all the raw materials are available, they are all open source. For there are no secrets to this ideology. There can't be, because what the jihadis are engaged in is a massive educational program, a huge propaganda exercise. By nature, that cannot be hidden, it must be shouted from the rooftops. And shout from the rooftops they do. But so far we have not been listening.

More than that, we do not even have to thrash around finding out how or where to start the task. A significant part of our work has already been done for us, by the jihadists themselves. Just dipping into the output of jihadi scholars throws up inward-focused analyses of the organizational and ideological problems faced by the mujahideen. The following treatises, for instance by the London-based jihadist scholar, Abu Baseer al-Tartousi: *'Reasons for the failure of Some Jihadist Movements in Transformation Operations,' This is a type of Jihad we do not want'and 'Jihad Groups—Between Recognition of Errors and Reconsideration of Principles'* provide unique insights into the ideological mechanisms of the jihad and how these impact on success on the ground. The famous al-Qaeda strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Surf has actually made a speciality of this kind of analysis, as illustrated by works such as *'Observations on the Jihadi experience in Syria'* and *'What I Witnessed on the Jihad in Algeria.'* All these works give clear and incisive diagnoses on the reasons for failure, the problems among the mujahideen and the effectiveness of counter-jihad policies, the failure to win over the scholars and preachers or communicate their ideological message. Most important of all, they lay out for us the internal points of tension between jihadism and traditional Islam—the areas where the jihadis themselves feel their weaknesses lie. We are looking here at the jihad's soft underbelly.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman:

1. We have been confronting and intercepting fully formed jihadists, but these are merely at the end of a long-term ideological training process that produces them;

2. We have yet to tackle this production process, which means that they will continue to replace themselves at a rate faster than we can intercept them;

3. We have underestimated the ideological training, which is of the magnitude of an entire education and indoctrination system, and we fail to understand its purpose;

4. We have failed to take the Jihadists seriously, intellectually and culturally, and as a result their corrosive influence is progressing *unopposed.*

It is, I think you will agree, simply unbelievable that we are now in our sixth year after the attacks on September 11th and still without a coherent map of the enemy, of their cause and their ideological methodology. And yet we know that having this proper orientation will enable us to know, in depth, our enemy, to pinpoint and exploit internal weaknesses in their ideology, to know who are our friends are and ally ourselves accordingly, to understand our own vulnerabilities at home and protect ourselves from the slow erosion of our commonly held values which alone can safeguard our peace and our freedoms.

It is my firm belief that investment in the study of this culture—on both the security and educational fronts—has been disastrously late, and that we have given those that poison the minds of Muslim youth an unacceptable head start.

We must hasten to rectify this deficit, and gear ourselves up for the long struggle ahead.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much. It is important for everybody to hear, and this is not a symphonic hall for hearing, so please speak strongly.

Kim Cragin, as the Vice Chairman has said, is the international policy analyst with RAND Corporation.

STATEMENT OF KIM CRAGIN, INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION

Ms. CRAGIN. I'd like to thank the Chair and Ranking Member and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for inviting me to testify on the subject of terrorist ideology.

My testimony today will address two basic questions—how have al-Qa'ida leaders and other like-minded ideologues reached out to individuals and communities and, second, how have individuals and communities responded to this appeal? As you know, the al-Qa'ida world view has its roots in Maktab al-Khidamat, which was begun in 1984 by the Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam, with financial support from Usama bin Ladin. MAK was created to support Arab fighters as they traveled to Afghanistan to evict the Soviet forces.

Beyond providing support, MAK also offered classes on political Islam in an attempt to indoctrinate recruits in the violent Salafi jihadi movement. Today, when people refer to terrorist ideology, they mostly mean ideas articulated by the violent Salafi jihadists. At the core of this movement is a rigid assertion of monotheism, a rigid interpretation of the Qur'an, and an opposition to innovation, which often leads to a discussion of attempts to establish a society or Caliphate built on Islamic law.

The misapplication or absence of Islamic law, in many minds, accounts for the problems in society, such as poverty, injustice, and corruption. Of course, not all Salafis are violent. Most Salafis emphasize Dawa or revival as a means of reform, while al-Qa'ida leaders advocate violence.

During the 1990s, al-Qa'ida often combined ideological appeals with political objectives. For example, al-Qa'ida documents captured by the U.S. military in Afghanistan and released by West Point reveal complaints by al-Qa'ida members in Somalia that local fighters refused to adopt al-Qa'ida's ideology. Al-Qa'ida leaders responded that repelling U.S. forces from Somalia was a sufficient objective in and of itself. This reply is interesting, because it demonstrates a willingness to pursue short-term political objectives. It also demonstrates a layer of al- Qa'ida rhetoric that emerged in the 1990s—anti-Americanism.

An examination of jihadi Web sites in a post-9/11 world, as was mentioned by my colleague, reveals some emerging trends in the Salafi jihadi movement. A new generation of strategic thinkers has emerged, including Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Bakr Naji. These thinkers appear even more willing now than in the past to make tactical concessions to win over audiences' hearts and minds.

In contrast, hard core al-Qa'ida leaders now evidence reticence to make concessions. For example, in March 2006 Ayman al-Zawahiri rebuked Hamas for its participation in democratic elections. Hamas leaders, in turn, responded with equal venom, asserting al-Qa'ida had wrongly used indiscriminate violence against innocents in Amman. These two examples, Somalia in the 1990s and Palestinians today, illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of al-Qa'ida's ideological appeal.

Al-Qa'ida leaders have had the greatest effect in translating ideology into action when they can marry their global world view with

anti-Americanism and local political objectives. Fissures have occurred when this marriage goes bad.

Up to this point I have focused on the evolution of al-Qa'ida's ideological arguments, but the most important question for U.S. national security, in my opinion, is how have audiences responded to this appeal? To answer this question, it's useful to explore the radicalization processes that individuals have gone through as they have progressed from being sympathetic to al-Qa'ida to being willing to pick up a gun.

Terrorist radicalization processes can be understood as having three basic phases. In the first phase, termed "availability," environmental factors make certain individuals susceptible to appeals from the terrorist groups, including being brought up in a family that articulates a violent Salafi world view, frustration with local government policies, peer group influences, or frustration with foreign policies.

The second phase, recruitment, occurs after initial contact between individuals and the clandestine group. Recruitment often occurs in nodes, including prayer groups, sports clubs, charitable organizations, or even criminal gangs.

The third phase of the radicalization process yields a commitment to action on the part of certain individuals. This final step is the most difficult to isolate because it seems to vary the most individual by individual. In some instances, a specific grievance appears to have acted as the final trigger. Another common factor, at least for Diaspora communities, appears to be the participation in a foreign jihad.

So I'm often asked, what motivates terrorism? Is it ideology, politics or poverty? And my answer is yes, all three, at least to varying degrees. The key analytical question then becomes, what role does ideology play in motivating terrorism, given that politics and economics also play a part? I'm not certain that we truly have the answer to that question.

Preliminary research suggests that extremist ideology shapes how individuals and communities view problems in the world, but political and economic grievances justify the use of violence to resolve these problems. Which brings me back to the initial question posed in this hearing: do we have an accurate understanding of the ideological dimensions of the global war on terrorism? I would have to say, probably not. Yet, as we move forward, I would encourage you not to divorce the ideological dimensions of the conflict from the political and economic.

Thank you for your attention.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Could you do us all a favor and describe Salafism?

Ms. CRAGIN. Right. Salafism, just to give you a basic breakdown, you have Sunnis, you have Shi'a. And within the Sunni community you have lots of different, let's call them denominations and strains of political thought, one of which is Salafism. There are disagreements within the theologians in this community, just like you would have disagreements within the Southern Baptists—I'm from Oklahoma, so that's what I'm familiar with—but there are some core components to it.

And these are the ones that I mentioned. The first one is this very strong assertion of monotheism. So if you talk to them, it means lot of different things, and I talk about it in the longer testimony that I submitted. But, for example, some of them don't believe in a democratic parliamentary system. The reason is that parliamentarians, like yourself, enact laws. And by enacting laws, you are putting yourself in God's position, to improve upon the Qur'an, which is not something that you should be doing in the Salafist world view. So that's one of these core components of this ideology.

Another one, as I mentioned, is an opposition to innovation, which would be there is this opposition to new thoughts in Islamic theology. Moderation, for example, would be one of those examples.

So these people then sometimes advocate the creation of a Caliphate that is based on this more narrow definition of the Qur'an and will enact Shari'a law. That's one of the manifestations of that, although there are others.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I thank my colleagues for their indulgence.

Vice Chairman BOND. Just one other comment. Salafists, I believe, can be political, fundamental, or radical. I've seen that breakdown. So not all Salafists are likely to be active jihadists.

Ms. CRAGIN. That's right. And I did say that. Not all Salafists are violent. And in fact, a number of them are very conservative and their idea of reform is a notion of revival. So it would be like a religious revival; so they work through a conversion process. And that is definitely a very important point to make.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cragin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KIM CRAGIN,[1] THE RAND CORPORATION[2]

I would like to thank the Chair and Ranking Member and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for inviting me to testify on the subject of terrorist ideology and also to take this opportunity to commend the Committee for recognizing the importance of understanding terrorist ideology as part of the global war on terrorism.

Over the past twelve years, during the course of my research on terrorism and insurgency, I have explored the topic of terrorist ideology as it relates to what motivates individuals to become terrorists, as well as what influences communities to sympathize with terrorist groups. This research can be found in a number of RAND publications, including *Terrorism and Development,* and more recently, *Dissuading Terror.*

Both issues—individual motivations and community support—are important to understanding the challenges that extremist ideologies pose to US national security. For example, potential exists for terrorist groups to use various ideological arguments to persuade individuals to 'pick up a gun' or become terrorists themselves. Potential also exists for terrorist groups to use ideological arguments to garner financial or other support from local communities. And yet, despite this potential, it remains uncertain to what degree *ideology* actually influences individual motivations or community support. Indeed, our research suggests that the impact of ideology tends to vary country by country, community by community and often individual by individual.

This variation, by its very nature, makes it somewhat difficult to identify overarching patterns in how terrorist ideologies might motivate individuals and sympathetic communities on a global level. Having said that, I am going to attempt to generalize the findings from our research as much as possible, while still providing examples of nuances in the messages and appeal of terrorist ideology whenever appropriate.

For the remainder of my testimony, I will address two basic questions. First, how have al-Qa'ida leaders and other likeminded ideologues reached out to individuals and communities? And, second, how have individuals and communities responded to this appeal?

HOW HAVE AL-QA'IDA LEADERS AND OTHER LIKEMINDED IDEOLOGUES REACHED OUT TO INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES?

As you know, the al-Qa'ida worldview has its roots in Maktab al-Khidamat (Office of Services, MAK), which was begun in 1984 by the Palestinian scholar Abduallah Azzam with financial support from Osama bin Laden. MAK was created to support Arab fighters or mujahideen as they traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet forces there.[3] One aspect of this 'support' was the publication of *al Jihad* magazine. This magazine was distributed throughout the Muslim world in an effort to raise the awareness of jihad in the minds of Muslim youth.

In the early 1980s, Abdullah Azzam also published and distributed a leaflet entitled, Defense of Muslim Lands. This leaflet argued that it was an individual religious duty (fard ayn) for Muslims, as well as the Muslim community as a whole (fard kifaya), to support the Afghan jihad, because the Afghans were helpless in the face of invading forces. Often referred to as an argument for defensive jihad, Abdullah Azzam's ideas apparently influenced numerous mujahideen to travel to Afghanistan. Indeed, one of those fighters, Abdullah Anas, subsequently wrote of his experiences in an autobiographical book entitled *Birth of the Afghani Arabs*. In this book, Abdullah Anas testified that Azzam's religious argument played a significant role in his own decision to travel to Afghanistan.[4]

Beyond providing shelter and support to the Arab fighters, MAK also offered classes on political Islam to new recruits, essentially in an attempt to indoctrinate them in what some refer to as the violent Salafi jihadi movement. Today, when people refer to "terrorist ideology" or "extremist ideology," they mostly mean the ideas articulated by violent Salafi jihadists.

At the core of this movement is a rigid assertion of monotheism, a literalist reading of the Qu'ran, and an opposition to innovation, which often yields discussion of attempts to establish a society (or Caliphate) built on Islamic law. Too many Salafis, this view of monotheism means a non-democratic system of government, because legislatures enact laws, placing lawmakers in a position of improving upon God's laws, in their minds an impossible undertaking. Many Salafis also are critical of existing forms of government in the Arab world, arguing that leaders have succumbed to Western, secular, influences in their application of the law. This misapplication or absence of Shariah law, in many minds, accounts for the evident problems in society, such as poverty, injustice and corruption. Traditionally, most Salafis have eschewed nationalism in favor of a Caliphate that crosses national boundaries.

Of course, not all Salafis are violent, which is why scholars often distinguish between the wider Salafi movement and violent Salafi jihadists. The primary difference between al-Qa'ida and most Salafis is that al-Qa'ida leaders advocate the use of violence to bring about this Caliphate and a religious revival in the Muslim world. In this sense, al-Qa'ida and likeminded organizations hold a certain appeal, because sympathizers see them as at least doing something to resolve society's problems, even if they disagree with al-Qa'ida's violent methods.

Osama bin Laden split with Abdullah Azzam in the late 1980s to join with Egyptian fighters, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, now Osama bin Laden's second in command, to form al-Qa'ida. At this point, al-Qa'ida's attention strayed away from repelling the foreign invaders, such as in Afghanistan, toward overthrowing so-called corrupt Arab regimes. For example, al-Zawahiri published his own leaflet, Bitter Harvest, in 1991, in which he argued,

> "The Islamic movements must answer the questions: are the governments in the Muslim countries true Muslims or are they kuffar [infidels]? These rulers

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[3] For more information on the emergence of al-Qa'ida, see Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al-Qa'ida's Leader (New York: Free Press, 2006); see also The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, August 2006).

[4] Abdullah Anas, *The Birth of the Afghani Arabs: A Biography of Abdullah Anas with Mas'oud and Abdullah Azzam,* trans. Nadia Masid (2002).

are obviously *kuffar* and *murtaddeen* [apostates] because they rule with a law other than that of Allah. Therefore it is a *fard ayn* [individual duty] to wage jihad against them and remove them from their positions."[5]

In Bitter Harvest al-Zawahiri argued for an offensive jihad against what he felt were corrupt regimes in the Muslim world, in contrast to the defensive jihad articulated by Abdullah Azzam in 1984. And, in fact, this worldview appears to have guided al-Qa'ida's activities in Sudan during the 1990s, as they reached out to other militant groups to train and indoctrinate them on the al-Qa'ida worldview.

Indeed, during the 1990s, al-Qa'ida leaders often combined ideological appeals with political objectives.[6] For example, al-Qa'ida established the Advisory and Reformation Committee as its mouthpiece in London. This Committee issued a series of leaflets in addressing key political issues of concern to al-Qa'ida, including the presence of US forces in the Arabian Peninsula after the first Gulf War, the arrest of certain religious leaders in Saudi Arabia, civil war in Yemen, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.[7] The layering of ideological and political objectives in al-Qa'ida's rhetoric suggests that its leaders viewed the two as interconnected.

Internal al-Qa'ida documents reinforce this hypothesis. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point recently released a series of al-Qa'ida documents captured in Afghanistan by US forces under the title *Harmony and Disharmony.* Amongst these documents is a letter written in 1993 by an al-Qa'ida member in Somalia to the leadership in Sudan. The author complained that Somali fighters were caught up in tribal squabbles and could not be convinced to adopt the al-Qa'ida ideological worldview; thus, the author argued, al-Qa'ida's objective was not being achieved in Somalia.

Al-Qa'ida leaders responded to this complaint as follows,

"When you entered Somalia, the Somali arena was barren and futile. The situation changed, however, after the intervention by America and the Knights of the Cross. You most resembled a hunter aiming his rifle at the dead branch of a tree, with no leaves or birds on it. Suddenly, a bald eagle lands on the branch of the tree, directly in line with the rifle. Shouldn't the hunter pull the trigger to kill the eagle or at least bloody it?

The American bald eagle has landed within range of our rifles. You can kill it or leave it permanently disfigured. If you do that, you will have saved Sudan, Yemen, Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the waters of the Nile. Could you want more magnificent objectives of war than those?"[8]

This reply is particularly interesting, because it demonstrates that al-Qa'ida leaders were willing to accept short-term political objectives at a local level. In addition, it demonstrates another layer of al-Qa'ida rhetoric that emerged in the 1990s—anti-Americanism. Given the ascendancy of al-Qa'ida and its worldview in the 1990s, I think it is important not to underestimate the appeal of this entire package: violent Salafism, local political objectives and anti-Americanism. Indeed, the confluence of all three appeals laid the foundation for al-Qa'ida's war against 'Jews and Crusaders,' declared in 1998.[9]

In a post 9/11 world, al-Qa'ida leaders have attempted to position themselves at the forefront of the violent Salafi jihadi movement. This approach can be seen in statements issued over the past 6 years by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as other ideologues. While Abdullah Azzam mobilized the youth for jihad in the 1980s with leaflets distributed throughout the Muslim world, al-Qa'ida leaders and likeminded ideologues have used the internet, and to a certain extent mainstream media, to articulate their ideas.

An examination of jihadi websites reveals some emerging trends in the Salafi jihadi movement. For example, a new generation of strategic thinkers and ideologues has emerged in this movement, including Abu Musab al-Surf, Abu Bakr Naji, Yusuf al-Ayyiri, Saif al-Adl and Louis Atiyatallah. Indeed, Will McCants, from the West Point Combating Terrorism Center, recently published a report entitled

[5] Ayman al Zawahiri, *Bitter Harvest: The Muslim Brotherhood in Sixty Years,* trans. Nadia Masid, (Egypt, 1991).

[6] Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[7] Letters from bin Laden, al-Qa'ida Advice and Reform Committee, US military document number AFGP–2002–003345, available in *Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities,* (New York: West Point Combating Terrorism Center, 2006).

[8] Five Letters to the Africa Corps, September 1993—May 1994, US military document number AFGP–2002–600053, available in *Harmony and Disharmony.*

[9] Bruce Lawrence, ed., *A Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, Messages to the World" the Statements of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Verso, 2005), 23–30.

Militant Ideology Atlas. In this study, McCants observed that these thinkers are cited and referred to more often in jihadi chatrooms and on websites than Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. These thinkers appear more willing now than was evidenced in the past to make tactical concessions on the issues of local Muslim practices, tribal politics and even nationalism to win over the 'hearts and minds' of local communities.

It's worth noting, however, that hardcore al-Qa'ida leaders, such as al-Zawahiri, still evidence reticence to make tactical concessions. Moreover, it is possible that they feel threatened by the legitimacy garnered by other ideologues and terrorist groups. As an illustration of this point, al-Qa'ida leaders have criticized the leaders of other terrorist groups in their bid to remain at the forefront of this wider ideological movement. A recent example is the ongoing debate between al-Qa'ida and Hamas. Immediately following the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, al-Zawahiri rebuked Hams for participating in these elections, stating,

> "The leadership of the Hamas movement has trampled on the rights of the Muslim ummah [community] by accepting what it calls—in a mockery of the intelligence and feelings of the Muslims—respect for international accords. It is with regret that I confront the Muslim ummah with the truth, and tell it: my condolences to you over the loss of the leadership of Hamas, for it has sunk in the swamp of surrender." [10]

Hamas leaders, in turn, have responded to al-Zawahiri's statements quickly and with equal venom. For example, an initial response was posted by Hamas on the same night as al-Zawahiri's audio-taped release this past March. In this statement, Hamas asserted that al-Zawahiri had worked to undermine Palestinian jihadists for over 15 years in his attempt to take control over al-Qa'ida.[11] Hamas leaders continued on to argue that al-Qa'ida used indiscriminate and unjustifiable attacks against innocents and so was not in a position to pass moral judgment on Hamas,

> "The [Muslim] people loved al-Qa'ida because it declared war on the American enemy who supports the occupation of Palestine and is the occupier of Iraq and Afghanistan; however this love was taken out of people's chest when they hit the innocent. The victims of the Amman wedding and their families, of who we see and console them even today, are proof of the blind use of weapons which tainted al-Zawahiri and his group."[12]

The two examples that I have provided—Somalia in the early 1990s and the Palestinian Territories today—illustrate the diversity within the wider Salafi jihadi movement, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of al-Qa'ida's ideological appeal. Al-Qa'ida leaders have tried to harness mutual feelings of a shared ideology, anti-Americanism, and frustration with 'corruption' in the Muslim world in an effort to keep these diverse groups moving in the same direction. This strategy has succeeded to varying degrees over the years, but evidence suggests that other terrorist groups mostly pursue their own parochial interests.

Indeed, al-Qa'ida leaders have had the greatest effect in translating their ideological appeal into action when they can marry their global worldview with anti-Americanism and local political objectives. And fissures have occurred when this marriage goes bad.[13]

HOW HAVE INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES RESPONDED TO AL-QA'IDA'S APPEAL?

Up to this point, I have focused on the evolution of al-Qa'ida's ideological arguments, as well as how it has appealed to potential recruits and sympathizers. But the most important question for US national security, in my opinion, is how have audiences responded to al-Qa'ida's appeal? And, for the purposes of this hearing, to what degree has ideology contributed to the audiences' responses? To answer these questions, it is useful to explore the radicalization processes that individuals and clusters of individuals have gone through as they progressed from being sympathetic to the al-Qa'ida worldview to being willing to 'pick up a gun'.

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[10] Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Palestine is our Concern, the Concern of Every Muslim," translated by SITE Institute, 11 March 2007.

[11] "Hamas Issues Statement in Response to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri's Accusations of Abandoning the Jihadi Resistance for Palestine," translated by SITE Institute, 12 March 2007.

[12] General Manager of Hamas-Affiliated Forum Criticizes Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri for Comments Regarding Hamas, Prejudice Against Palestinians," translated by SITE Institute, 13 March 2007.

[13] Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism,* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG–184, 2005.

Note that most research suggests that one single pathway to terrorism does not exist.[14] And my comments should be taken in that context. Thus, when I discuss 'radicalization processes' I mean to imply multiple processes with variation along the way.

These processes can be understood as having three separate and distinct phases. In the first phase, termed 'availability,' environment factors make certain individuals susceptible to appeals from terrorist groups.[15] Of course, these factors are likely to vary according to location, but they might include being brought up in a family that articulates a violent Salafi worldview, frustration with local government policies, peer group influences, or frustration with foreign policies.

For example, in his research on suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories, Ami Pedahzur has noted that one particular cell played soccer together prior to their recruitment into Hamas.[16] Shazhad Tanweer, one of the 7 July 2005 London bombers, apparently had expressed frustration with UK foreign policy, particularly the conflict in Iraq.[17] Of course, that is not to say that all soccer players or individuals frustration with the conflict in Iraq are potential terrorist recruits, but rather, at the "availability" stage multiple factors can make al-Qa'ida's appeal attractive.

The second phase, termed 'recruitment and indoctrination,' occurs after initial contact between individuals and the clandestine groups. In examining the recruitment phase, it is useful to focus on 'nodes' or gateways through which individuals come into contact with terrorist leaders, members or recruiters.[18] Some potential recruitment 'nodes' include prayer groups, sports clubs, charitable organizations, or even criminal gangs. For example, in December 2001 Singaporean authorities disrupted a plot to attack Western as well as local targets in that country. According to a White Paper released by that government, some of the arrested individuals had been recruited through religious study groups in Singapore.[19]

Importantly, these nodes vary according to country and community. So it is difficult to identify a laundry list of potential recruitment nodes worldwide. If any commonalities exist in recruitment nodes, they appear to be best grouped into 'diaspora communities' versus 'majority Muslim communities.'[20] But al-Qa'ida and its affiliates have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to different recruiting environments, adjusting both message and method of recruitment.

The third phase of the radicalization process yields a commitment to action on the part of certain individuals. To be honest, this final step has been the most difficult to isolate during the course of our research, because it seems to vary the most individual by individual. In some instances, a specific grievance appears to have acted as a final trigger. So, for example, Galib Andang aka Commander Robot, a former member of the now defunct Moro Nationalist Liberation Front in the Philippines, was motivated in part by the death of his grandmother and the hands of the Filipino Army.[21] Another common factor, at least for diaspora communities, appears to be participation in a foreign jihad.[22] Somehow the process of fighting overseas seems to make individuals more willing to engage in terrorism back home as well.

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[14] Andrew Silke, ed., *Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2003.)

[15] Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002.

[16] Ami Pedahzur, "The Culture of Death: Terrorist Organizations and Suicide Bombings," presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC as part of the Eisenhower Speaker Series, 17 February 2005.

[17] Paul Temelty, "*An In-Depth Look at the London Bombers,*" Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 15, July 28, 2005.

[18] This concept also was used by Javed All, Senior Intelligence Office, Department of Homeland Security, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs entitled, "Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in US Cell Blocks?", 19 September 2006.

[19] "White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyya Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Singapore Government, 7 January 2003.

[20] For more information on recruitment trends in diaspora communities in Europe, see Michael Taarnby, *Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives,* Denmark: Centre for Cultural Research, January 2005; see also Petter Nesser, *Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in the Post-millennium Europe*, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004.

[21] MNLF leaders negotiated a peace agreement with the Philippines as part of the Davao Accords in 1996.

[22] Ibid, "White Paper;" for more information on recruitment trends in diaspora communities in Europe, see Michael Taarnby, *Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives*, Denmark: Centre for Cultural Research, January 2005; see also Petter Nesser, *Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in the Post-millennium Europe*, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004.

I should say, at this point, that my description of radicalization processes for individual terrorists and sympathizers is not particularly unique. That is, Philip Zimbardo, who is probably best known for his Stanford prison experiment, has observed similar processes with the recruitment of high school students into cults in the United States.[23] But I find it a useful construct to understanding all the various factors that motivate individuals to 'pick up a gun.'

So, I am often asked, 'what motivates terrorism? Is it ideology, politics, or poverty?' And my answer is, 'yes, all three, at least to varying degrees.' The key analytical question then becomes what role does ideology play in motivating terrorism, given that politics and poverty also play a part? I am not certain that we truly have the answer to that question.

Preliminary research suggests that extremist ideology shapes how individuals and communities view problems in the world that need to be resolved, be that corruption or injustice or poor governance. But political and economic grievances justify the use of violence to resolve these problems. That is, individuals and communities understand the problems in their world through an ideological lens. But this disgruntlement does not, on its own, motivate violence. That motivation most often emerges in an environment of political and/or economic grievances, which then translate that worldview into action, be it picking up a gun or providing financial and other forms of support.

Which brings me back to the initial question posed in this hearing: do we have an accurate understanding of the ideological dimensions of the global war on terrorism? I would have to say, 'probably not.' But I believe that we have come a long way, especially as researchers have begun to account for debates within the wider Salafi movement, as well as how those debates get translated and applied on a local level.

As we move forward, I would encourage you not to divorce the ideological dimensions of the conflict from the political and economic. Just like it is impossible to divorce military from non-military activities in the GWOT, it is impossible to truly divorce ideological from political and economic motivations. In fact, doing so only addresses part of the problem.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Kimmage.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL KIMMAGE, REGIONAL ANALYST, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. KIMMAGE. If I might jump ahead of my testimony for 1 second to respond to the Salafist bait, I would just like to interject that Salafism is a bit like liberalism. It's a word that can mean many things to many people. And unless it's contextualized, it's hard to understand. But I think for the jihadis, we are talking about Salafism—it comes from the term "salah fisalah." It's the first three generations of Muslim, the righteous ancestors. And for them, it's the very simple idea that the solution to all of the world's problems can be found by returning to the model society of the first three generations of Muslims in the early seventh century, and that violence is the way to do that.

So, I think, that for the most violent wing, all of the complicated debates about Salafism, in a sense, reduce to this conservative, backward-looking utopia. That's how I would define it in the jihadist world view. It can mean many other things, but for the jihadists, it's this very simple, backward-looking ideal of a perfect society and a violent way of getting there.

To return to my testimony, I would like to thank the Committee Members for inviting me to appear at this hearing. I will limit my spoken remarks for 5 minutes, but I ask the Chairman that my full written statement be entered into the record.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. That is true with all three of you.

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[23] Philip Zimbardo and C. Hartley, "Cults Go to High School: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Initial Stage in the Recruitment Process," Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1985, pp. 91–147.

Mr. KIMMAGE. As the Vice Chairman was kind enough to note, my colleague Kathleen Ridolfo and I recently completed a substantial study on how Sunni insurgents in Iraq and their supporters are using the media to advance their agenda. The report is scheduled for publication on June 26. I will address the questions prepared by the Committee, with particular focus on al-Qa'ida in Iraq and the findings of our forthcoming report.

Again, the question of how well we understand terrorist ideology. I think at this point we have a good basic understanding. The core elements of this ideology, as seen by the jihadis, are the division of the world into two camps—faith and unbelief, the backward-looking Salafist utopia I mentioned based on a religious ideal taken from the seventh century; the legitimacy of violence to restore this ideal—in other words, jihad seen as holy war; the license to kill opponents, whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim; and the need to target the United States, Israel, and what they call the apostate rulers of the Muslim world. These are the core very basic elements. And I think that at this point there's a good understanding, certainly among our specialists, of these elements.

Now is this a global ideology? In theory, al-Qa'ida's ideology is global. It divides the world into two camps—faith and unbelief— and recognizes no other boundaries. In practice, however, the emergence of local franchises of al-Qa'ida points to the significance of regional factors. It is important to take these into account.

There are two reasons for this. First, the individual members of regional franchises are motivated by a combination of regional and global factors, and it's very important to understand how these interact. Second, the mere existence of these regional affiliates undermines the global pretensions of the group's ideology. In sum, if al-Qa'ida's current mantra is to think globally/act locally, we need to take this into account.

Now, are there fissures in al-Qa'ida's ideology? The answer is yes. The greatest fissure is internal. All affiliates of the group believe, as my colleague noted, that only God has ultimate authority. The concentration of authority in the divine, however, has made it almost impossible for al-Qa'ida's many theorists to explain how they would lead and legislate in the modern world. They do not have answers to the real questions facing ordinary people in the Arab Muslim world.

Is ideology a motivated, legitimizing or recruiting instrument? Of course, it performs all three functions. For people at the higher levels of the various parts of the al-Qa'ida network, ideology is a motivating factor. They are more likely to have a strong commitment to the global aspect of the struggle and think in terms of a larger worldwide conflict. Ideology serves to legitimize violence for all levels of the network. The individuals who commit violent acts use ideology to reassure themselves that they are doing the right things for the right reasons.

And finally, ideology is an effective instrument in the recruiter's tool box. Most recruits are young men with burning questions about the world around them. Al-Qa'ida's ideology may not provide real answers, but its slogans are simple, direct, and superficially convincing.

Now the report that my colleague Kathleen Ridolfo and I have just completed devotes considerable space to al-Qa'ida's ideology in the context of Iraq. I'd like to close with two findings that I feel have a direct bearing on this issue.

The first is that the majority of the Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq do not share al-Qa'ida's ideology, but the media products that are coming out of the insurgency are a boon to the global jihadist media. There are two reasons for this. First, the context of the conflict in Iraq fits in with jihadist ideology, which sees a struggle between the forces of unbelief, led by the United States, and the forces of faith, led by al-Qa'ida. Second, the images coming out of Iraq in the form of attack videos—videos of insurgents attacking the United States—are grist for the jihadist propaganda mill, which thrives on the sight of American soldiers targeted in the Arab world.

This is especially true in light of negative Muslim views on al-Qa'ida attacks against civilians. These evoke strong disapproval. But Arab respondents to a recent poll supported attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. Thus, insurgent media would show attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq reinforce an aspect of the jihadist message with images that are viewed positively in the Arab world.

Secondly, there is a growing rift between nationalist elements in the Sunni insurgency and al-Qa'ida in Iraq. Ideology lies at the root of this split. The nationalist insurgent groups limit their aims to Iraq. Al-Qa'ida views Iraq as part of a larger global struggle. This is a stark ideological difference and while nationalist insurgents in Iraq and global jihadists may share short-term goals, this ideological difference will not simply go away.

So, to close by summarizing two findings from our forthcoming report, first, the conflict in Iraq is providing the global jihadist media network with material and images it can exploit to spread its ideology. Second, there is, nevertheless, a split within the Sunni insurgency between nationalist groups and al-Qa'ida in Iraq, and ideology is an important part of this growing rift.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kimmage follows:]

DANIEL KIMMAGE, REGIONAL ANALYST, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, WASHINGTON, DC

I would like to thank the Committee for inviting me to appear at his hearing. I will limit my spoken remarks to 5 minutes, but I ask the Chairman that my full written statement be entered into the record.

My colleague, Kathleen Ridolfo, RFE/RL's Prague-based Iraq analyst, and I have recently completed a detailed report on how Sunni insurgents in Iraq and their supporters worldwide are pursuing a far-reaching media campaign to advance their agenda and influence perceptions of events in Iraq. The report, which devotes considerable space to al-Qa'ida in Iraq, is scheduled for public release on June 26, 2007. I will address the questions prepared by the Committee with a particular focus on al-Qa'ida in Iraq and the findings of our forthcoming report. The views expressed here are my own and do not represent an official position of my employer, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

HOW WELL DO WE UNDERSTAND TERRORIST IDEOLOGY?

In the years since September 11, 2001, a significant body of research has emerged to augment previous scholarship and broaden our understanding of terrorist ideology. While there is more work to be done, we now possess a good understanding of the overall ideology that underpins the various iterations of al-Qa'ida. AI-Qa'ida's

theorists and ideologues, through their prolific efforts to expound and disseminate their ideology, have provided us with abundant material to analyze.

Like other totalitarian ideologies, al-Qa'ida's ideology is based on a simplistic worldview that claims to offer a universally applicable and easily implemented solution to all problems. The "solution" is classically totalitarian in its attempt to regulate all spheres of human activity, encompassing personal life, domestic and international politics, the economy, and society.

Although the adherents of al-Qa'ida's ideology do not themselves accept any meaningful distinction between religion and politics, in practice their ideology focuses on what we in the West would define as religious and political issues. The core tenets of this ideology are as follows:

* *A global struggle between faith (iman) and unbelief (kufr):* The world is divided into two hostile camps, and all people must choose sides. On one side are the true believers, on the other the enemies of the faith. The opposition of faith and unbelief, or truth (haqq) and falsehood (batil), is absolute. Reconciliation is impossible, and the struggle will continue until faith triumphs over unbelief.

* *A backward-looking utopia (Salafism):* The first three generations of Muslims (al-salaf al-salih, lit., "the righteous ancestors") represent the model of a perfect society for al-Qa'ida, both in political organization and personal behavior. Using as primary sources a literal reading of the Qur'an and the recorded utterances of the Prophet Muhammad, adherents of al-Qa'ida's ideology fight for the restoration of this order.

* *Faith as the struggle for "make God's word supreme," and unbelief as a capital crime:* To be a true Muslim, one must go beyond the traditional "pillars of the faith" as those are currently understood in the Muslim world (the profession of faith, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage); one must actively strive to restore the society of the "righteous ancestors."[1] In practice, only those who accept and advance, all of the core tenets of the ideology are seen as true Muslims. All other so-called Muslims have strayed, either because they were misled, in which case they may yet return to the fold, or because they are the "stalking horses of unbelief," in which case their lives are forfeit.

* *The permissibility of killing Muslims who have knowingly strayed from the faith (takfir):* Muslims who knowingly violate the rules of the faith as defined by the ideology have committed the sin of apostasy and are no longer Muslims. The act of pronouncing a Muslim an unbeliever is called "takfir." In practice, the application of this principle gives adherents of the ideology a religious justification for killing political opponents. Al-Qa'ida in Iraq uses this principle to justify the killing of both Sunnis and Shi'a.

* *The legitimacy of violence (jihad): Jihad, which adherents of the ideology understand as "holy war," is the first and foremost obligation of Muslims in a world threatened everywhere by unbelief.[2] The legitimate means of fighting jihad include "martyrdom-seeking operations," or suicide attacks, against non-Muslims and Muslims alike.*

* *The need to target the United States, Israel and "apostate" rulers in the Muslim world:* The "Jews and crusaders"—Israel and the United States—are spearheading a charge to obliterate Muslim identity and subjugate Muslim lands to pillage their wealth. Their allies in this nefarious conspiracy are the quisling "apostate" rulers of the Muslim world. For truth to be victorious over falsehood, all of these enemies must be defeated.

While available evidence suggests that the total number of committed adherents of al-Qa'ida's ideology is small, quantitative criteria are not of the essence. Al-Qa'ida does not recognize electoral democracy as a valid political model and seeks instead to overthrow fragile, corrupt regimes by force. Moreover, a willingness to engage in suicide attacks against soft targets and the skillful exploitation of the media have given al-Qa'ida undue international prominence, and the group's ideology is exerting an outsize influence on mainstream political discourse in the Arab-Muslim world.

Poor social and economic conditions in and of themselves do not cause terrorist organizations to spring fully formed from a morass of societal decay. The Middle East is not the most repressive or impoverished place on earth, yet it has witnessed a proliferation of terrorist movements in recent decades. Fertile soil for extremism results from the confluence of festering social and economic problems,

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[1] For more on Salafism, see *Understanding Islamism,* March 2, 2005, International Crisis Group, *http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3301&1=1.* An informed discussion of jihadist Salafism can be found in Fu'ad Husayn, Al-Zarqawi: al-jil al-thani li-l-qa'idah [Al-Zarqawi: the second generation of al-Qa'ida], Dar al-Khayal, Beirut: 2005, pp. 53–59.

[2] The term "jihad" can have various meanings. For more, see "What Does Jihad Mean?" by Douglas E. Streusand, Middle East Quarterly, September 1997.

misgovernment, and an ideology that presents itself as a panacea. All three factors are present in today's aggrieved, undemocratic, and restive Middle East. Additionally, jihadist ideological treatises indicate that the United States has become a target in the region not because of its democratic tenets, but rather because of the perception that it supports and uses corrupt Arab regimes.

IS IT A GLOBAL IDEOLOGY?

In theory, al-Qa'ida's ideology is global—the division of the world into camps of faith and unbelief does not recognize other boundaries. The ultimate goal of "making God's word supreme" transcends national borders. In practice, however, the profusion of local "franchises" of al-Qa'ida—from al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq—points to the continued importance of regional factors and the implicit recognition of this fact by the ideology's various adherents.

We can and should take into account both the division of al-Qa'ida into regional "franchises" and the resulting distinctions between their ideological outlooks. While all of the "franchises" broadly accept the core tenets of the ideology as described above, they are embroiled in a variety of localized struggles. As all of these groups aim to seize power, their respective agendas are political, and their adherents are often motivated as much by local political factors as by the allure of a global struggle.

Overt U.S. involvement appears to exert a "globalizing" influence on jihadist motivations. The conflict in Iraq, for example, attracts volunteers from other Arab countries who openly state that they are drawn by the opportunity to take up arms against U.S. forces. There are no reports of equal numbers of foreign fighters traveling to participate in the struggles undertaken by the various al-Qa'ida "franchises" outside of Iraq.

We will not be able to reach an accommodation with any group driven by al-Qa'ida's ideology, but we can and should focus on local factors in each particular case. There are two reasons for this. First, it undermines the global pretensions of the group's ideology. And second, individual members of regional "franchises" are inevitably motivated by varying combinations of regional and global factors—the better we understand the interaction of regional and global motivations in each case, the more appropriately tailored our response will be. If al-Qa'ida's current mantra is to "think globally, act locally," we stand to benefit by factoring this into our efforts to counter it.

ARE THERE FISSURES IN AL-QA'IDA'S IDEOLOGY?

There are fissures in al-Qa'ida's ideology, as well as serious differences between the various al-Qa'ida "franchises" and other groups with similar agendas. This is particularly evident in Iraq, where the al-Qa'ida-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq has clashed with other Sunni insurgent groups, both in polemics over ideology and tactics and in fighting on the ground.

The greatest fissure in al-Qa'ida's ideology is internal, and shared by all regional affiliates. The doctrine of "tawhid," which all branches of the network accept, affirms the absolute singularity of God. The strict application of this doctrine holds that only God has ultimate authority. The concentration of all authority in the divine, to which humankind's only access comes through the text of the Qur'an and the recorded utterances of the Prophet Muhammad, has severely impeded the ability of al-Qa'ida's theorists to formulate convincing answers to modern political questions. Jihadist Salafists have written numerous books on the political implications of tawhid, but they have proved unable to present a coherent paradigm for leadership and legislation. In practical terms, the result has been a movement that is very clear on what it opposes but maddeningly obtuse about what it supports beyond violent opposition to the many things it condemns.

The profusion of regional affiliates reflects the crisis of temporal authority engendered by the doctrine of tawhid. A recent dispute between the Islamic Army in Iraq, a Sunni insurgent group with a religiously inflected but nationalist outlook, and the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qa'ida's latest iteration in that country, showed that al-Qa'ida's opponents in the Arab world are keenly aware of the jihadist Salafists' leadership problem.

In an April 5, 2007, statement, the Islamic Army in Iraq challenged the diffuse organizational model espoused by al-Qa'ida in its various iterations throughout the Arab world. After criticizing the Islamic State of Iraq for a variety of excesses and outrages in Iraq, including the murder of unarmed Muslims and attacks on soft targets, the Islamic Army in Iraq appealed directly to Usama bin Ladin:

"He and his brothers in the al-Qa'ida leadership are responsible on Judgment Day for what is happening on account of their followers. It is not enough to

wash one's hands of their actions; one must also correct them. In the two collections of utterances of the Prophet by Abdallah bin Umar, the Prophet said, "Is not each of you a shepherd, and is not each of you responsible for his flock? The imam must look after his people, for he is responsible for them." And Al-Farug[3] says, "If a beast of burden should stumble in the mountains of Iraq or the Sham,[4] then I feel that God would call me to account for it and ask, Why did you not pave the road?"

The implication of this passage is that al-Qa'ida is out of control in Iraq, its parent organization is unwilling or unable to bring it to heel, and Usama bin Ladin is failing to live up to Islamic standards of leadership. It is a charge that the subsequent polemic, which has lasted for more than 2 months and included responses from the Islamic State of Iraq, failed to disprove, in large part because Usama bin Laden remained conspicuously silent throughout the debate.

IS IDEOLOGY A MOTIVATING, LEGITIMIZING, OR RECRUITING INSTRUMENT?

Ideology performs all three functions, albeit in different ways for different segments of al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. For regional leaderships and the al-Qa'ida core that fled Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, ideology is a motivating factor. Individuals who occupy higher levels in the organization(s) are more likely to have a strong commitment to the global aspect of al-Qa'ida's ideology and to think in terms of a larger, worldwide struggle.

Ideology serves to legitimize acts of violence for all levels of the network. Internally, the individuals who commit violent acts can reassure themselves that they are doing the right thing for the right reason. Externally, ideology underpins public statements taking responsibility and expressing support for violence. Both internally and externally, it is ideology that performs the function of proclaiming that the horrific violence perpetrated by al-Qa'ida is not terrorism, but rather legitimate warfare undertaken in the service of a divinely sanctioned cause.

Ideology is a particularly effective instrument in the recruiter's toolbox. While other tools, from financial incentives to the skillful exploitation of individual psychology, have their place, only ideology can answer questions. Most recruits are young men with burning questions about the world around them. Al-Qa'ida's ideology provides simple, direct answers to those questions, replacing doubt with surety and unformed striving with hardened purpose.

ARE THE COMPONENTS OF AL-QA'IDA MOTIVATED PRIMARILY BY IDEOLOGY, POWER POLITICS, OR CRIMINALITY?

While criminality may motivate many rank-and-file members of the al-Qa'ida terrorist network, leadership cadres are caught in a quandary, with some concerned primarily with ideological purity, and others power politics. This divergence has been evident in views of the Shi'a, with al-Qa'ida in Iraq choosing ideological purity while representatives of al-Qa'ida's original leadership opted for power politics.

With the emergence of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi as the leader of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, the organization adopted a viciously anti-Shi'ite line. Al-Qa'ida's unyielding ideology provides ample theological justification for such a position: Nevertheless, in a 2005 letter to Al-Zarqawi from Ayman al-Zawahiri, often termed the ideological leader of the original al-Qa'ida, the latter urged the Jordanian parvenu to soften his stance on the Shi'a for reasons of political expediency[5]. Al-Zawahiri wrote that

> ...many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the Shi'a. The sharpness of this questioning increases when the attacks are on one of their mosques, and it increases more when the attacks are on the mausoleum of Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib, may God honor him. My opinion is that this matter won't be acceptable to the Muslim populace however much you have tried to explain it, and aversion to this will continue.

CONCLUSIONS

The report my colleague, Kathleen Ridolfo, and I have just completed devotes considerable space to the issue of al-Qa'ida's ideology in the context of the ongoing

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[3] Umar ibn al-Khattab, the second of the four "rightly guided" caliphs (634–644).

[4] Roughly equivalent to present-day Lebanon, Jordan, Israel/Palestinian Territories, and Syria.

[5] For a discussion of the tension between ideological purity and power politics in al-Qa'ida's reaction to the war between Israel and Hizballah in the summer of 2006, see *Al-Qaeda Addresses The Jihad-Versus-Resistance Conflict,* by Daniel Kimmage, RFE/RL, July 31, 2006, *http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/96bd70d7–07bd–4862–8751–41 f30aal4028.html.*

struggle in Iraq. I close with two of the report's findings that have a direct bearing on this issue.

1. *While the majority of Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq do not espouse jihadist ideology, the media products they create are a boon to global jihadist media and advance the global jihadist ideological agenda.* There are two reasons for this. First, the general context of the conflict in Iraq fits in perfectly with jihadist ideology, which posits a titanic struggle between the forces of unbelief, led by the United States, and the forces of faith. Second, the images produced on a daily basis by the insurgency in the form of attack videos are grist for the jihadist propaganda mill, which relishes any and all depictions of "crusader" soldiers targeted in the Arab world.

This is especially true in light of negative Muslim views on al-Qa'ida attacks against civilians, which evoke strong disapproval.[6] Arab respondents to a recent poll overwhelmingly supported attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, however.[7] Thus, insurgent media products showcasing attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq reinforce an aspect of the jihadist message that is viewed positively in the Arab world. In this light, it seems entirely logical that jihadist forums, which are ideologically closer to Al-Qaeda than to most insurgent groups, are among the primary distribution channels for the text, audio, and video products created by virtually all insurgent groups across the ideological spectrum.

2. *There is a growing rift between nationalist elements in the Sunni insurgency and al-Qa'ida in Iraq.* Ideology lies at the root of this split, with nationalist insurgent groups limiting their aims to Iraq, while al-Qa'ida views Iraq as part of a larger, global struggle. A recent polemic between the Islamic Army in Iraq and al-Qa'ida in Iraq highlighted these ideological differences.

Ibrahim al-Shammari, the official spokesman of the Islamic Army in Iraq, defined his group's struggle in national terms in an April 11, 2007, interview with *Al-Jazeera.* Interviewer Ahmad Mansur asked, "Do your goals include causing America to fail abroad or does your goal relate only to Iraq?" Al-Shammari responded, "No, our goal is the liberation of Iraq from the occupation it is experiencing—the Iranian occupation and the American occupation. . . ."

By contrast, a mid-April 2007 address by Abu Umar al-Baghdad, leader of the al-Qa'ida-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq, advanced a starkly different vision. Summarizing gains and losses on the fourth anniversary of the fall of the Hussein regime, Al-Baghdadi stated, "Let everyone know that our aim is clear: the establishment of God's law, and the path to that is jihad in its wider sense." Earlier in the address, Al-Baghdadi made it clear that "the outlines of the gains and losses in the past 4 years" indicate that "jihad has been adopted as the primary solution to drive out the unbelievers and apostates from Muslim countries."

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much.

Just for the information of my colleagues, the order of questioning will be myself, Vice Chairman Bond, Senator Bayh, Senator Warner and Senator Nelson, Senator Chambliss, Senator Hatch, Senator Snowe.

Mr. Kimmage, in your testimony you state that while all of the al-Qa'ida franchises broadly accept the al-Qa'ida ideology, there are localized differences that can be exploited. Individual members of the regional franchises are motivated by varying combinations of regional and global factors. That is all very complicated very quickly. The better the U.S. Government understands the interaction of regional and global motivations, the more appropriately tailored our response can be. In other words, one counterterrorism policy does not fit all groups.

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[6] See *Muslim Public Opinion On US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda,* World Public Opinion.org, *http://www. worldpublicopinion. org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START__Apr07__rpt.pdf.*

[7] Ibid.: "Majorities in Egypt and Morocco expressed approval for attacks on US troops in Muslim countries. Egyptians were those most likely to support such actions. Nine out of ten Egyptians approved of attacks on US military troops in Iraq (91%) and in Afghanistan (91%). Four out of five Egyptians (83%) said they supported attacks on US forces based in Persian Gulf states. Substantial majorities of Moroccans were also in favor of attacks on US troops in Iraq (68%), in Afghanistan (61%) and slightly smaller majorities supported attacks on those based in Persian Gulf states (52%)."

I'd like your comment actually specifically on that. This is a long introduction and I have a question. Specifically, you address the growing rift between nationalist elements in the Sunni insurgency and al-Qa'ida in Iraq. An Associated Press article from this weekend complements this analysis and identifies roughly 30 groups in Iraq who regularly claim responsibility for attacks against U.S. and government targets, yet 9 out of 10 times the U.S. military names al-Qa'ida in Iraq as the group responsible.

Given your emphasis and advice on recognizing the differences between the multiple groups engaged in attacks in Iraq, what do you make of the fact that the U.S. military command news releases on U.S. operational focus overwhelmingly settles on al-Qa'ida in Iraq and not on the multitude of other groups and other sources? Ignorance? Lack of preparation? Lack of curiosity? Honest mistakes? Please give us your honest answer.

Mr. KIMMAGE. I'm not going to speculate on the reasons for the U.S. military citing this. What I would suggest is, in our research, when we looked at the media face of various Iraqi insurgent groups—meaning the press releases they issue, the statements they make—one of the things that's very striking is that al-Qa'ida in Iraq has perhaps the most sophisticated media machine. In other words, they're very, very good at getting their message out. They claim many, many attacks.

When you go and look at the Internet forums where insurgent groups release statements about attacks, al-Qa'ida always figures very prominently. So it's possible that we may simply be reflecting the efforts of their media machine.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. But that's assuming that we're just sitting back and watching television and making the assumption that 9 out of 10 are responsible. It doesn't fit understanding a culture, understanding tribalism, et cetera.

Mr. KIMMAGE. One of the things it might reflect is, it's not quite watching television, but let's say you're actually going through and looking for the statements released by insurgent groups in Iraq. The impression you would get from those statements—and in the report we are very specific that there's a difference between what's happening on the ground and the media image—when we look at their statements we have to bear in mind this is the image that they want to present to the world and we cannot assume that these attacks are actually taking place on the ground.

But what happens is, when you look at their statements, you do get the impression that al-Qa'ida is carrying out an enormous number of attacks—not the largest number of attacks but an enormous number of attacks.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. My time is coming to an end. Why is it, in your judgment, that we do not understand Iraq better? Sandra MacKie wrote a very good book—and my colleagues have heard me say this before, and I apologize to them—in which she says that—this was written before the war—that Americans are fascinated by names, particularly one-word names like Usama or Saddam. And you've got their full attention for at least 8 minutes. And the longer picture, the cultural underpinnings and all of that fades into the distance. It's all about personalities and conflict and not

the subtleties of tribalism, inter-geographic marsh politics and all the rest of it.

I understand that may be. I don't forgive it in terms of before we go into the war in Iraq, but I don't understand it this much later. I don't understand how that could be—how we do not understand better and what is your concept of what is being done to try to understand and, thus, lessen what you're talking about.

Mr. KIMMAGE. I think sometimes our greatest strengthens domestically are a little bit of a handicap abroad. As a society, we're a marvelously successful model of overcoming difference and turning it into strength, and we're always looking for the common elements, the things that make us all Americans despite all of our differences. This is sometimes not the right assumption or not the most helpful assumption when dealing with splintered societies and dealing with societies in conflict. It can make it difficult for us abroad.

I think we are exerting a lot of efforts today. I think my colleagues and myself are trying to figure out what is happening in the parts of Iraq and this global phenomenon that we're looking at, but there are limitations. There will always be limitations on our understanding. When you have an enormously complicated and conflict-ridden society like Iraq and when there are thousands of Americans involved there, it's never going to be realistic to expect them all to have a perfect understanding of everything from tribal dynamics to internal politics.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I'm talking about the soldiers, I'm talking about the policymakers.

Mr. KIMMAGE. After spending the last 3 months studying the internal dynamics of the Sunni insurgency, I think I will limit my remarks to the internal dynamics there and let some of the policymakers speak for themselves.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. But they don't.

Mr. KIMMAGE. Let's hope.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Vice Chairman Bond.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me follow up on a point you made about al-Qa'ida and the various radical Salafist groups, insurgents, whatever you call them. You say they get reinforcement and sustained by images from Iraq. Most of the things that I have read suggest that this hostility has been there since the State of Israel was created and our relationship with Israel is a major factor.

If we were not in Iraq, what would the view of the radical Salafists be about the United States? Would they continue to grow and recruit if, number one, we were not in Iraq and, number two, did not take appropriate actions and strategic influence to ameliorate the harsher views?

Mr. ULPH. The United States will always be an enemy for the radical jihadi Salafists. But you bring up an extremely relevant point in terms of what role the U.S. presence is playing in Iraq. I think that what they would lose is precisely this stream of images that reinforce one of the key messages, one of the key parts of their message.

So here you have people who are arguing that when you read their texts—and I try to imagine sometimes how does one boil all

of this down to an hour-long conversation in which someone is trying to convince a young man to dedicate his life to this cause. One part of that conversation is the United States is spearheading a drive to destroy Muslim identity and pillage the wealth of the Muslim world. And they point to the U.S. presence in Iraq, and this is something that fits in with their message. And then this stream of images that comes out of Iraq, showing attacks on U.S. forces acts to reinforce the message and it shows the violence in a way that, as unfortunately some of the poll results demonstrate, garner some approval in the Muslim world.

Now, the question you're asking is, what happens if that is not there?

Vice Chairman BOND. And you're saying that the attacks by the insurgents, al-Qa'ida on the U.S. forces are more powerful than images of us attacking Muslims?

Mr. KIMMAGE. I think that those images of their attacks against U.S. forces are quite powerful. One of the interesting parts of that message is, when we looked at these groups for our report, when you go down the line of the Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq, not all of them are jihadis, not all of them endorse al-Qa'ida's ideology. They don't want to associate themselves with al-Qa'ida's imagery. They don't put pictures of Usama bin Ladin on their Web sites.

But what's interesting is that global jihadists like al-Qa'ida can take the images that nationalist groups produce, can take footage from their attack videos of attacks on U.S. forces and it's grist for their propaganda mill. So one of my responses to your question would be that they would potentially lose that. There are other consequences, but that's one thing they would lose.

Vice Chairman BOND. Let me turn to Ms. Cragin for a comment on that and then Mr. Ulph.

Ms. CRAGIN. I do think one of the central questions is, what is the relationship between the ongoing conflict in Iraq with sort of this wider Salafi jihadi movement and what is the relationship between the two of them? I think my inclination is to answer that by breaking it down into different segments.

Clearly, as my colleague was saying, at the leadership and strategist level there is this concern in the Muslim world that the U.S. strategy is an attempt to divide Muslims and turn Muslims against each other. And if you saw the START surveys that just recently came out, they very clearly illustrated this. So anything that the ideologues and the strategists can point to to say, and look, here's an example of the United States turning Muslims against each other, and Iraq is one of those examples, then it does only reinforce their message.

The other example I've heard them use, actually, was the conflict in Lebanon this past summer, and those are two things that they point to.

On the other hand, when you're looking at radicalization processes at the individual level, what motivates people to become terrorists, I think that the Iraqi issue becomes much more complicated. It's very clear that the foreign jihadists that are traveling from places, for example, in Europe to Iraq to fight U.S. forces there are motivated by the conflict in Iraq. But when you start walking back from that, does the conflict in Iraq help to motivate

terrorists in Indonesia when they conducted the Bali bombings, for example, when they attacked the Australian embassy in Jakarta or the Marriott Hotel, that becomes a little bit more complicated. And my inclination is to say, based on our research, not as much, and it's local or regional issues that have more of a motivating factor at that level.

Mr. ULPH. Just something slightly counter-intuitive on this. Whilst I agree these images are very effective and very important, my reading of the ideology is that jihadism is a lot more robust than that. It won't be affected by the loss of the arena in Iraq because, after all, we can look back at the materials they are putting out. They are still recycling materials on Bosnia. They are still recycling materials from all sorts of areas. Even in part of their ideology they can extend it to say that the United States itself was founded specifically to outflank Islam. So they don't really need these images.

One of the points—and I hope I'm not being aggressive here and this is why I don't really focus in my work on al-Qa'ida or a specific group—is that jihadism is a lot larger than these recent events. I hope I'm not going to sound shocking in a sense, but if you spend your time, like the sad person I am, reading this material from dawn to dusk, you do get the very strong impression that we're not really part of their interest. Now this sounds very strange. We've been the subject of attacks. We've had airplanes in New York and had two trains blown up in London.

But in terms of statistics, we're not really the main part of their interest. The jihad is mainly organized and mainly directed against the Muslims, because, as I mentioned, it's a major reconfiguration of what Islam is. I'm not sure who came up with this phrase, this phrase that it's somebody else's civil war, but it's a very, very intelligent thing, because what it explains, it explains that, whether we like it or not, we were dragged into something and these last few years, which are less than 10 years, when we all got worked up in a lather about this, this ideological program and the jihad, this is actually the tail end of a very long war, a very long ideological war which at least you could date 30 years, and you can go back further to the beginning of the 20th century.

Al-Qa'ida, in that famous re-shifting of the strategy toward the foreign enemy, ourselves, come at the end of a very large and very broad jihadistic movement. It may be that they have, as you mentioned, the propaganda high ground, but actually in terms of real significance they are a detail. The jihad is much longer than that.

Vice Chairman BOND. Mr. Ulph, thank you.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. You must continue on that line, but we've got to stick with our time.

Senator Bayh.

Senator BAYH. Thank you all for being here. This has been a very interesting discussion and I wish we had more time for it than the panel is going to have time for today.

I'd like to start off with two sort of fact-specific questions. Ms. Cragin, I'd like to start with you. If you took the Islamic world as a whole, and Islamic youth in particular, what percentage go through the three stages of indoctrination and actually embrace violent jihad?

Mr. KIMMAGE. Clearly it's a very small fraction.

Senator BAYH. One percent?

Mr. KIMMAGE. We just don't know. We just don't know.

Senator BAYH. So a small fraction could be 30 percent, 40 percent? Give us some ballpark.

Mr. KIMMAGE. I would be misleading this Committee if I said that we have any sort of a number that I could give you. But it is fractions of a percent.

Senator BAYH. Thank you.

Mr. Kimmage, I'd like to turn to you. I'd like to follow up on what Senator Bond was saying and, I think, Mr. Ulph, you were saying as well very directly. This movement existed a long time before the Iraq war. Clearly, we were attacked before the Iraq was, and you've talked about its antecedents going back possibly to the beginning of last century. Regrettably, this struggle will be with us a long time after Iraq has decided one way or the other because of the underlying forces you described.

And yet we have to answer for ourselves the question are our present activities in Iraq the most intelligent way to deal with this phenomenon. Mr. Kimmage, you described it as a boon, I think, in terms of recruiting and that sort of thing. Can you give us your opinion? Is our presence there creating more individuals who ultimately embrace violent jihad than we are eliminating in Iraq on a net basis? Are we creating more terrorists by our presence there or are we eliminating more terrorists?

Mr. KIMMAGE. The terrible quandary we face is that there's no simple answer, for what I think are two reasons. You have one aspect, which is of course the propaganda mileage that these movements can get out of Iraq. One of the points I brought up, I believe, in my written testimony is that there is, if we look at the regional franchises, as my colleagues said, you find a focus on regional issues. A U.S. presence on the ground seems to exert a globalizing influence. So what you see is that you don't find many young Arabs streaming to Indonesia to fight the jihad, but you do find them traveling to Iraq.

So on that level you do see that our presence there is acting as a magnet and a propaganda boon. By the same token, no one can give a guarantee that a U.S. withdrawal and the complete descent of Iraq into chaos would not be an even greater boon to them. This, I think, is the quandary that goes beyond our report and some of the research that we've done. But one of the things confronting us is that we do face this terrible question. We can see some of the propaganda dividends, but I certainly don't have enough information about what's exactly happening on the ground to say. So this, I think, is the downside.

Senator BAYH. Many of us struggle with exactly that. There is a downside to almost any course of action that we contemplate.

Mr. Ulph, maybe I could get back to you. I take my hat off to you if your job is reading this kind of stuff 24/7. It reminds me of a saying in the intel world: they define the word "optimist" as someone who does not yet possess all the necessary facts. So you possess a lot of facts reading this sort of material.

My question to you is, all three of you have touched upon the ideological underpinnings and the world view that animates this

movement. Do you have any opinion about what the most effective countervailing world view might be, the most effective way to express our ideology to try and deter some of these individuals who go through the three steps of radicalization? What would resonate and we authentic within the context of the Islamic world and these various societies? Clearly, we can't impose our own ideology, but what would resonate with them?

And I guess my subsidiary question to the most effective countervailing ideology would be is it possible to offer an alternative in these countries between what too often they view as being the illegitimate or bankrupt or corrupt regimes on the one hand and the radical Islamic view on the other? Is there some effective third way we can encourage?

Mr. ULPH. This may actually be a bit of an irritating answer for you, but one word which groups such as al-Qa'ida and jihad are terrified of is simply "liberalism," "civic society." We may say, well, first of all, what has that got to do with these groups. Surely they're way beyond that. They're way beyond this ambit of civic society and democracy. Why should they worry about this?

But they worry about it all the time. Looking at the ideological works dealing with jihad and the failure of jihad—this is the interesting point about a lot of the literature—a lot of the work has been done for us by people like Abu Wasab al-Suri and shaykhs such as al- Tartuzi in London. I've done a lot of analysis as to why a jihad goes wrong. Quite handily, looking at the details, what you find is, aside from the usual types of problems in any revolutionary movement such as communism, is that you have bickering infights between the purity of the ideology, the usual problems.

The one thing which they have huge trouble with is the fact that it's damn difficult to keep kids on message, because it's very attractive. America is a very attractive place, and the ideology behind America is very attractive. These things we regard as self-evident. A lot of the problem about the analysis of jihadism is that they think that somehow they must be immune from "we hold these things to be self-evident." They're not. They're very, very, very worried by this, and they're spending overtime, they're burning the midnight oil and writing tomes trying to aggressively undermine that basic position.

It's a painful point for them. And if you look at where they're putting most of their efforts, we should put most of our efforts into watching it. It's the problem of trying to isolate and trying to take out this natural human instinct toward individual freedom.

Jihadism, in a nutshell, is a pre-enlightenment ideology.

Senator BAYH. My time is up, but I would condense your answer into individual freedom.

Mr. ULPH. Yes.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I'd like to thank the Chair and Ranking Member. This is an excellent hearing. I loved your phrase, Mr. Ulph, "we are starting this study too late and we're trying to rush to close the gap." Unfortunately, I and my colleagues don't have from dawn to dusk to do the serious study that you're doing, and therefore we are grateful you are doing it.

My first question follows on my colleague from Indiana. He posed it about what percentage of the Muslim world could be in this group that's so antagonistic. Ms. Cragin handled it. I'd like to have the answer from each of the others. Can we quantify?

Mr. ULPH. To be honest, when you think of a figure, the obvious word you can come up with is we know that this is not a majority interest in the Muslim world. That is our sense of hope.

But, to extend that, we discussed very early about the meaning of Salafism, Salafi jihadism and why this is the nub of the question. The nub of the question is that one of the problems of this corner aspect of Islamic culture of Islamic culture called Salafism is that it is a leap-frogging back over centuries to where the model is a pristine Islamic community, as my colleague suggested.

The problem about where we quantify how many people are involved in jihadism is that, unfortunately, there is a rather fuzzy gray area borderline between Salafi jihadists and Salafis.

Senator WARNER. My time is going to disappear. So you don't have a figure that you can give us?

Mr. ULPH. I don't have a figure, but if I had a figure for jihadis I would then, in the next sentence, have to say oh, but that's not really the point, because there's a whole area of which they form a part which is important.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Kimmage.

Mr. KIMMAGE. If we assume, which I think is relatively accurate, that it's some fraction of 1 percent, let me try to put it in a very short, concise answer why I don't think that is the key point. I don't think that quantitative criteria here are of the essence. Al-Qa'ida doesn't recognize and jihadists don't recognize electoral democracies. So this would be an electorally insignificant group.

But that doesn't matter, for two reasons. Number one, they don't recognize that as a model for coming to power. If they want to come to power, they're going to seize it through force of arms.

Senator WARNER. I've got to keep going or I won't finish what I want to ask. What puzzles me is, assuming that some relatively small fraction to the totality, why isn't the balance of that Muslim world trying to help put down this fighting, where you see Muslim killing Muslim in Iraq. That makes no sense. Why aren't they coming forward with a more constructive framework of suggestions to the free world, be it the United States or the other coalition partners? Can anybody try that one?

Mr. ULPH. Could I just very briefly say that the Muslim communities, much as ourselves, suffer from conceptual insecurity. That is because the Salafists—and I'm extending the jihadists to the broader Salafist community—are very adept at claiming authenticity. The key word is "authenticity." We are more authentic than thou.

And if you press this authenticity button everybody recoils back in fear. That's how they do it. They have the arguments—very simplistic, very simple, and very easy to express arguments. It's very difficult to oppose that with broad post-enlightenment rather less easily expressed or encapsulated arguments. It's simply because it's easier to use the sloganic approach than the broader approach.

Senator WARNER. Let me try another question. I visited England. I frequently go over and do some lecturing myself. The Ditchley

Foundation—I don't know whether you've ever been to the Ditchley Foundation or not, but it's a wonderful group coming together from all over the world to discuss the problem in Iraq and how best to address it.

At the end we had our symposium studies and a number of persons from Great Britain came up to the American delegation—I guess I was the titular leader of it—and they said you've got to stop using this term "global war on terrorism," which we have freely used here today, because it is inciting and injuring any possibility we have of hoping to get the Muslim world which is not in the jihadist business to help us.

Can you help me with that? Is that a term we should not use? Over in the House of Representatives, Mr. Chairman, the House Armed Services Committee has decided to take out any reference using that term in their reports.

Ms. CRAGIN. I'll answer that in this way. I think that I don't want to leave the impression that there aren't Muslim activists that are out there that are fighting against this ideology, because there are those who are out there and who are writing. But we are making their lives more difficult because it is so persuasive for al-Qa'ida to get people on board in their anti-Americanism rhetoric.

So if one of the things that we choose to do to try and make the theologians who are out there combating al-Qa'ida on an ideological level, we can make their lives easier. If not using the term GWOT is one of those things that can accomplish that, then I think we should be doing that.

Senator WARNER. Should we try and perhaps select another terminology or continue to use it? Yes or no.

Mr. KIMMAGE. We should select another terminology. I think that the battle here in the Muslim world, there are many alternatives and many debates. One of the problems we're going to have is some of the most committed opponents of al-Qa'ida are not going to automatically be friends of the United States. They're going to be anti-American, they're going to be unfamiliar. But they are committed opponents of al-Qa'ida. They do exist, and that's part of the debate as well.

Senator WARNER. My last point—and I'll conclude, Mr. Chairman—in the annals of military history the suicide bomber is a relatively rare use of weaponry. We saw it at the concluding phases of World War II. We saw it in the Israeli conflict with its neighbors from time to time. But now we see it as a very effective use of weaponry.

What are the parameters of growth of that weaponry in this struggle we're now witnessing in Iraq and, to some extent, in Afghanistan?

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. And answer briefly, please.

Senator WARNER. It is so lethal that there is no defense against it.

Ms. CRAGIN. Suicide bombing, the reason why it's being used increasingly well is because it's effective. Actually, if you read the documents and interviews with these leaders, this is what they'll say. We don't have F–16s. We don't have helicopters. So we use suicide bombings to get at the target we need to. And it's a very effective tactic. That's why terrorist leaders are using them.

So as long as they can get recruits, I can't imagine that they would divert from that particular line.

Senator WARNER. The pool of recruits, is it unlimited? Is it going to grow? This is an important question.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. They're all important, Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. All right. I'll stop.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Ulph, you have mentioned that there was a turnaround in the United Kingdom's approach to terrorism after the bombing in 2005. What lessons did the United Kingdom learn that we can learn, and is a part of that among the imams telling what the truth is about the Qur'an and its teachings instead of this bastardization that is being used by the extremists?

Mr. ULPH. I think you're referring to engaging with the Islamic World Group Foreign Office initiative. I was discussing this with them not long ago. One of the issues that they have got with this—what it is, it's a radical middle way program, using the word "radical" for the youth, as it were. What they are doing is to have a scholars road show. They go around the United Kingdom telling it as it is theologically, which is very, very, very valuable.

But who's going to go to this road show? The only people who are going to go to it are the converted anyway. So, in other words, there isn't much.

The answer to your question is, I wish that the United Kingdom could demonstrate that they had made amazing strides in their attitudes and in their interpretations, but I'm afraid they haven't. There are still a lot of question marks. It has confused the United Kingdom greatly because of this problem, and here it comes down to this point again. The problem is, how does somebody brought up in the United Kingdom, with all the privileges and freedoms of the United Kingdom, how do they end up becoming a jihadi terrorist.

Senator NELSON. Is there a huge difference between the United Kingdom and the United States in that the Muslim community here is more assimilated as opposed to the situation in Europe?

Mr. ULPH. I think that is definitely the case. This was brought home to me once when an American visitor came to London and said, there's a lot of people wearing hijabs in London. And I didn't notice that. I said, well, it must be the same in the United States. And she said, no, I don't often see it.

Senator NELSON. Let me just stop you and go on. To what degree, in all of your opinions, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict utilized? I heard the testimony of all of you, saying that it is primarily utilization of the fact that the United States is attacking Muslims. What about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Mr. ULPH. Well, they would simply assume that the Israeli approach to this is simply an extension of the United States. Again, on the issue——

Senator NELSON. So that's the assumption. It's used interchangeably.

Mr. ULPH. They have a word for it. It's called (Arabic), "Zionist crusadism." In their view, their spectacles, it's simply another manifestation of the ancient struggle.

If, behind that question is to say, if this issue were cleared up, would the jihadism go away? Well, clearly not.

Senator NELSON. OK. I was recently in Algeria and a group called the GSPC has morphed into a group called AQIM—al- Qa'ida in the Islamic Magreb. They broke through the barriers and got next to the prime minister's palace and fired rockets into the palace. This local version of al-Qa'ida in North Africa, does it differ in other versions? What are we seeing as this transitions out of Arabia into Africa?

Mr. KIMMAGE. One of the things we're seeing is, you have Algerian veterans of a conflict that's been going on there for a long time buying into and adopting the symbolism of the global struggle. So clearly they think it's a winning brand, if you want to put it that way. They see it as positive to affiliate themselves with it.

This is relatively new in the last few years, that these regional franchises have begun springing up, and we should get a sense, I think, relatively soon are they just brand names where it's really being driven from the regional level, being driven by regional conflict, or is there any central coordination. My impression from the research I've done, particularly on Iraq, is that there is not a lot of central coordination. It seems to be more regionally driven.

Senator NELSON. What about our foreign language illiteracy? Is that of a significance hindrance?

Mr. ULPH. Well, it can't help. I read a figure—and it may be out of date—that out of 12,000 FBI there were 33 that were able to read in Arabic. That can't help. It certainly does make a problem because it means you're dependent upon the type of material that groups such as al-Qa'ida would be happy for us to read.

There's a lot of material that they circulate amongst themselves which perhaps puts a different complexion on their broader jihadist ideology than the materials which they do for a western audience. Yes, it does affect things.

Senator NELSON. So, back to the United Kingdom, how does a Muslim raised in the United Kingdom with all the privileges thereto appertaining, how do they become a jihadist?

Mr. ULPH. I think it's a self-generating and highly rich culture, because one of the problems that underlies these questions—and I tend to get a little bit exasperated about it—is that we're all the time fixated. What is it that's pushing these guys into becoming jihadis? Why don't we rephrase that question? What's pulling them into it? Because by pushing them into it we are getting into this old chestnut that it's their economic conditions or sociological conditions and maybe these groups are not integrated into society in the United Kingdom or France, and that somehow it's our fault.

Whereas I don't see any reflection of that in the jihadist literary material. All I see is stuff which is about themselves. Could I just in a nutshell point out where the problem is? This is to do with western narcissism. We assume that everything that happens, not only physically, militarily but ideologically, must have something to do with us. Whatever happens around the world, we are responsible.

The fact is, we're going to have to get used to the fact that these guys have a very, very low literary intellectual tradition of their own, which takes no pointers from us and which glories in the fact that it deliberately does not follow our intellectual growth and tradition. So the sooner we understand that the starting point is their

own, self-generated, we'll stop this, to put it politely, this merry-go-round of trying to scratch our heads and find out where we went wrong.

They're not interested in us. Their focus isn't about us. They've got their own self-generating ideological starting points.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Hatch.

Senator HATCH. Well, I certainly want to thank you for being here, all three of you, and for the enlightenment that you're giving to us. But let me just ask a question that any of you can answer.

In what parts of the world is al-Qa'ida's ideological message strongest and what parts is it weakest, and why?

Mr. ULPH. Anecdotally, the phrase that comes up is Indonesia being weakest. The indication there is that if you have a highly diverse society with highly diverse intellectual currents, this is a protection against jihadism. Jihadism, again, it's basic feature is that it wants to re- fence Islamic culture into a certain direction. If you have a society where it still remains too diverse to do that, then you're going to have jihadism at a very weak state.

When you have areas, in certain areas of the Middle East, where there isn't a lot of alternative cultural patterns, then you find it stronger.

Senator HATCH. Mr. Ulph, in your testimony you state that "jihad is highly sensitive to public opinion and depends upon the mujahidin being able to maintain their claims to authenticity and the moral high ground." What are examples of where they have lost the moral high ground in the eyes of their supporters—killing innocents, killing Shi'a?

Mr. ULPH. Very much so. They are so paranoid about this issue—and this is, by the way, our opportunity—they are so paranoid about the idea of losing the moral high ground that they are spending their time putting up on the Internet something which I didn't know existed before—a thing called an e-book. Apparently what this is, this is a constantly expanded encyclopedia, and it's an encyclopedia—we're used to hearing an encyclopedia of jihad, but this is an encyclopedia of doctrine.

What they're doing is, every time there is a problem, such as the killing of Muslims in Saudi Arabia in bomb attacks, the Amman bombings, when there is a PR disaster, they get the scholars to re-fence the whole issue and to explain away why the jihadis, why the mujahidin were doing what they did. But they don't simply content themselves with answering a problem that occurred. This is something that should be a lesson for us. They actually predict future problems.

So this e-book actually now has chapters on theoretical problems which might occur in the future due to the behavior of the mujahidin, and how we can answer those questions. It would be not a bad idea to have that entire thing translated just to look at their methodology, because all we'd have to do is concentrate on the area where they are getting more lathered about it—the largest chapters—and say, well, that's a painful point, but let's look into that more carefully.

Senator HATCH. Mr. Kimmage, in your open source studies, what fissures exist in al-Qa'ida's ideological support for the various Iraqi

Sunni insurgencies? Are the fissures significant in comparison to the tactical alliances?

Mr. KIMMAGE. I think the fissures are significant. There is a large and widening fissure between al-Qa'ida in Iraq and the other Sunni insurgent groups, and in April of this year one of the major Sunni insurgent nationalist groups, the Islamic Army in Iraq, on April 5 released a 4,500-word statement criticizing al-Qa'ida in Iraq. And the two groups a few days ago signed, I believe, a make-up, a sort of temporary truce or something, but this polemic has gone on now for months.

It is substantial. There were many statements, allegations, counter-charges, and what emerged from this is that there are significant fissures between the Sunni insurgent groups that are more nationalist in their outlook and between al-Qa'ida. And there was a formation of a group called the Front for Jihad and Reform which brings together three groups that are basically against al-Qa'ida. I think when we look at this polemic over the last few months, we see significant fissures.

They are ideological fissures. The most basic one is that these nationalist groups say our fight is in Iraq. For al-Qa'ida, it is part of a larger global struggle. That's a very significant ideological fissure.

Senator HATCH. For all three of you, how involved is al-Qa'ida in the current Lebanese conflict, if you know?

Mr. KIMMAGE. Without hazarding a guess on how operationally involved it is, one of the interesting things we are seeing is that this is increasingly a part of political discourse in the Arab world. This is one of the areas where you see a worrisome sign, in that people watching al-Jazeera or reading the newspapers, this might be a very small group of fighters, but what you're seeing now is the association of al-Qa'ida ideology and Lebanon. It's new.

Senator HATCH. One other part of that I'd like you to just continue with is, is there an effort being made to obliterate the Christian community in Lebanon. Do you think that's part of it?

Mr. ULPH. Obliterate the Christian community in Lebanon? I would think that would be a bit of an ambitious task, but if you were to ask——

Senator HATCH. I don't see why.

Mr. ULPH. On the grounds of its magnitude. But if you were to ask what is the ideology of al-Qa'ida and jihad generally on the subject, then it certainly wouldn't be counted to their general purpose. But in Lebanon, I've not seen evidence that this is part of their program.

I think also one of their main preoccupations—and this is a constant fact, by the way, if you look at history—one thing that's worse than an infidel is a heretic. So al-Qa'ida, when it comes to Lebanon, is probably much more worked up about Hizballah than it is about Christians. Christians are just the end of the limit; they don't know any better. But Shi'a, these people should know better because they're Muslims and therefore they are worse than the infidel.

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Senator Whitehouse very much for his courtesy.

I welcome this hearing and appreciate the participation of the witnesses. Obviously terrorism is brutal, inhuman and inexcusable, but it is largely a tactic employed by individuals and groups and movements with a broad range of nationalist, ethnic, sectarian, economic as well as religious motivation. I think our national interests are best served when we seek to understand the differences between al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and the communities in which they seek to operate and then develop policies accordingly.

Al-Qa'ida may have an ideology and we need to address it, as we are today. But I think there's been far too much talk of Islamo-fascism, as well as other suggestions that are facing a global, monolithic enemy. We heard this before the war in Iraq, when a secular Muslim dictator, Saddam Hussein, was equated with al-Qa'ida. We hear this now whenever the sectarian nature of the conflict in Iraq, confirmed by the declassified assessments of our own intelligence community, is ignored. And we hear it whenever our Government fails to recognize and address the unique grievances of a particular region or country, the resolution of which could determine whether or not al-Qa'ida actually finds a safe haven there.

Last year I traveled to several such regions. In Aceh, the tsunami provided the impetus to resolve a longstanding civil conflict, but to its credit, the international community was able to broker a peace agreement in part because it resisted the temptation to see a Muslim separatist movement as necessarily an extension of al-Qa'ida. In southern Thailand the jury is still out. There have been horrible acts of terrorism, and the perpetrators must be brought to justice, but we have an opportunity to address the local grievances fueling the violence before al-Qa'ida is able to capitalize on them.

I also visited the Horn of Africa last year—Senator Nelson was talking a little bit about the broader region there—where al-Qa'ida operatives, including those who attacked our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, do enjoy safe haven. But my concern with regard to Somalia is that we have failed to adequately recognize that while al-Qa'ida may operate in the context of the civil conflict, its motives and agendas are not necessarily those of the local population. But that's not the way people talk about it.

The result has been broad-brush oversimplified assertions about the spread of what is called extremism and far too little understanding of the clan-based conflict that is also central to the conflict, not to mention the economic and other factors that contribute to the general instability and vulnerability of Somalia.

I tell you, this is such an important hearing, Mr. Chairman, because after 6 years after 9/11, we are still oversimplifying things in this way, to the detriment of the national security of the American people.

Mr. Chairman, I am deeply concerned about al-Qa'ida's operations in recent years. The recent terrorist attack in Algeria and the emergence of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb indicate that our enemy has found new ways to threaten us and our interests around the world. We need more focus, more attention, and more resources directed at this threat, and we need to understand that fighting al-Qa'ida requires separating the terrorists from popu-

lations whose grievances are often local and whose loyalties are still fluid.

Ms. Cragin, in your testimony you describe a letter written in 1993 by an al-Qa'ida member in Somalia in which he complained that Somali fighters were caught up in tribal squabbles and could not be convinced to adopt the al-Qa'ida ideological world view. You then describe how al-Qa'ida seeks to take advantage of local grievances and politics in countries like Somalia while exploiting anti-Americanism.

How, in your view, can the United States and the international community move a country like Somalia back to a place where, to quote that same letter, Somalia is a "barren and futile" arena for al-Qa'ida. What kinds of diplomatic initiatives, foreign assistance and other policies might help us achieve that goal?

Ms. CRAGIN. I think that your assumption going in is in fact correct, and that you have this somewhat simplistic al-Qa'ida rhetoric that comes out. But then the question of how it is applied at a local level by groups and in local insurgencies, or in local conflicts then changes, and that's where the complication and the nuance comes.

So the first inclination is, should we decide that it's national security interest to be engaged in a conflict like Somalia, or, for example, as was mentioned earlier, in the southern Philippines, the first step is to understand those nuances—how much the global appeal is trickling down at a local level and how much it's not. And that's definitely the first step in confronting that sort of complex situation.

Senator FEINGOLD. What does the current situation in Somalia, with the unresolved clan disputes and the extended Ethiopian presence, mean for al-Qa'ida, in your view?

Ms. CRAGIN. Well, I think that a number of people have written and have talked about this, but you have the attractiveness of a potential safehaven in an area where it could move its operatives in and out. That is the potential threat that Somalia posed in the nineties to a certain extent, and that's what it's posing now.

What you can do about the small fractions of people that we've been talking about moving in and out is a very complex intelligence problem and a complex operational problem. That's the problem of terrorism. So whether massive reforms in Somalia will be able to resolve the problem in the short or medium or long term is a much more complex policy question.

Senator FEINGOLD. So the Ethiopian invasion by itself did not take out Somalia as a potential al-Qa'ida safehaven, did it?

Ms. CRAGIN. The problem with East Africa and the Horn of Africa is you have massive amounts of spaces of relatively ungoverned territories. And when you're dealing with small numbers of operatives, that just poses a problem.

Senator FEINGOLD. How can the United States and its allies seek to exploit cultural and other differences between people in places like Somalia and an al-Qa'ida ideology that is ultimately a foreign concept for a country like that? How can public diplomacy, backed up with diplomatic and economic outreach serve this purpose?

Ms. CRAGIN. I'm going to be a little bit controversial and say that my inclination, based on my research, is not to ask what can we do, but what should we do. There is a lot we can do that could suf-

fer backlash, and I think that has been alluded to by some of my colleagues earlier. So when you start to talk about public diplomacy or strategic influence type efforts, there is a broader context.

Again, when I mentioned before this impression that the United States is trying and seeking to divide the Muslim world is something that we need to just be a little bit cautious about.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, my thanks to Senator Whitehouse.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Senator Whitehouse.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to follow up on Senator Warner's question from a moment ago on the utility of the phrase "global war on terror" and, Ms. Cragin, your description of that, as a phrase, that is making their lives more difficult for those who are resisting al-Qa'ida's rhetoric.

In that context, on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 meaning ill-advised and 10 meaning wise and prudent, where on that scale would you put the Administration's use of the word "crusade?"

Ms. CRAGIN. Wow. That's just one of those buzzwords that's probably ill-advised.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Somewhere down around 1, then. And the use of the phrase "global war on terror," how charged would that be by comparison on that same 1 to 10 scale?

Ms. CRAGIN. I think just to not want to do 1 to 10 because I'm a researcher and we generally tend not to like to do that, with the term "terrorism" and the reason why it's problematic is most of these groups and their sympathizers, in particular, don't see the fighters as terrorists. They are resistance fighters. So that's the problem with that sort of term.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I have a friend who is a former undercover FBI counterterrorism agent who has written that language is crucial to a terrorist movement and concluded that the term "global war on terrorism" gives "jihadists the warrior status they crave." Is that accurate?

Mr. KIMMAGE. I think that one of the things we do when we use that terminology is we play into some of their self-aggrandizing dreams. They want to see themselves as fighting this global struggle. They embrace the idea of a clash of civilizations and a war. We don't have to give that to them.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But we do.

Mr. KIMMAGE. We don't have to.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. In that context, nobody gets into the highest levels of the Executive branch or to our side of this table without having had some experience framing issues in order to assist public debate, if you will. Setting aside the sort of Karl Rove effort to frame this debate for sale to the American public, where in the Executive branch is an ongoing effort to frame this issue in a way that is effective for our soldiers and our national security located?

Ms. CRAGIN. I'm just going to answer that in this way. There's one thing about doing public diplomacy which clearly resides in the Department of State, but there's another thing about making sure that the behaviors and the actions, as the Vice Chairman reflected in his statements, match what we're saying. And both of those

work in tandem. You can't do one without the other. It just doesn't make any sense.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Are you aware of any place in the Executive branch of government where strategizing, the framing of this issue in a way that is helpful to our soldiers and to our national security and to our effort is being done? Is there a central place where they say—we know that Karl Rove is at the central place on the political side; are you aware of a central place in the Executive branch on the substantive or international side?

Mr. ULPH. Sorry to be slightly counter on this, but if I can pick up this global war on terrorism issue problem, once again, this is an example of unease of western commentators about a word such as "terrorism," because that might give a bad impression.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Actually, my unease is about the word "war."

Mr. ULPH. Oh, I see. The point I was going to make about terrorism——

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Calling them terrorists and criminals actually probably helps. Calling them warriors I think is probably what feeds into their ethos, if you will.

Mr. ULPH. Very much so. In terms of the loaded word "terrorism," which is morally loaded for us, it depends what constituency you're worried about. If it's people who may sympathize with the acts of the mujahidin, yes, that is an issue. If you're talking about the mujahidin themselves, don't worry about them, because nothing you do or say or think will be of an interest to them. In fact, they quite happily pick up words that we use, like terrorism, and they run with them because they are proud of the word.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Let me try to pop in one more question in my 25 seconds. As a prosecutor, I prosecuted people who called themselves the Latin Kings—terrible people, multiple murders, extremely dangerous. But if you had gone to Chicago or to Los Angeles and found real Latin Kings and asked them about that crowd in Providence, nobody would have ever heard of them. It was a local initiative that had popped up and had used that phraseology in order to give itself more status and cast a little cloud of fear around its activities and so forth.

To what extent, by emphasizing the phrase "al-Qa'ida," "al-Qa'ida," "al-Qa'ida," which seems to have internal political dynamics and rewards as well, are we creating a similar kind of atmosphere in which people who are simply generally terrorists or antithetical to the local power structure, of a view, for one reason or another, to blow things up, as people have since back before World War I, that they would then latch onto the al-Qa'ida phrase because we've empowered it? And is there a way to deal with that without compromising the underlying effort to get rid of the folks who are engaged in the actual acts of terror that we want to root out and punish?

Mr. KIMMAGE. We have to maintain a global perspective, but a local focus, so that we don't feed into what you're talking about, we don't give them a brand; we don't give them a banner to run their crusade under. So we have to maintain a local focus on what may be simply bands of criminals running around and they want to put

a statement on the Internet. We don't have to make them feel as though they are warriors in this just cause.

At the same time, we do have to, I think, maintain a global perspective, because that's the world we live in and we have to keep that. But I think you're right. We can gain from framing these things in a local way, precisely, using words like "criminal," et cetera.

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse.

Now Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Cragin, if I understood what you were talking about earlier, you were talking about these different denominations within Salafists. It's my understanding that Wahhabism fits in here somehow. Can all of you just address how the ideology of Wahhabism plays into this overall issue of violence among Islamists, particularly Salafists?

Mr. ULPH. In a nutshell, if we were to state the spectrum of Islamic belief, you will have, obviously, at one end moderates. Down at the other end you could split it up into three broad areas. You could say Islamism, of which a part you could say Salafism. And inside that you can say jihadi Salafists. Unfortunately, they are like concentric circles.

The Islamists are not specifically automatically a problem because it depends on whether the Islamic agenda is about going back and trying to reintroduce Islamic elements in the vertical structure, in the social structures. There's no problem with this.

Where you have a problem—and this is where I don't think the problem is just the Salafi jihadists—the problem is with Salafism. Wahhabism is, if you like, a state Salafism. It's a Salafism which goes back a bit earlier. It's had a long foundation and it underpins the Saudi ideology. No one can really honestly say, well, the Saudis are working mischief in the United States. That's not true.

The point is, they have an ideology, they believe in it, and it's second nature to them. That's fine. Nobody would dispute that. The problem is that if you have a support of a Salafist mindset in a western context, then it comes up against a different context, which is our own political culture. So to support Salafism, such as the Wahhabis do throughout the Muslim world, you may or may not agree with whether they should be doing this, but you can have a standpoint on whether, if what they're doing is educating Salafists—Salafists educating Muslims in the West, whether that causes greater isolation of the Muslim community in the West.

That is the problem where the Wahhabist influence has to be looked at carefully. It may be, and it's entirely reasonable to suggest, that their focus is not really on causing trouble; we focus is on simply a pietistic focus upon improving, in their view, the Islamic behavior of Muslims.

The other side of this is whether in fact—the flip side of it is whether that is going to conflict with a different conception of citizenship, which underpins the United States and western countries. This is the problem.

Now one final issue about the spectrum. To ask any Salafist scholar, he'll answer very candidly and truthfully that he's not in-

terested in violence. He's not interested in causing trouble. The problem is, because of the paradigm for what constitutes authenticity and real Islam is a pristine community of the early Muslims, because of that paradigm, they don't stand a chance against the jihadis, because all the jihadis have to say is, well, you believe that a true Muslim society should be a society modeled on that of the Prophet and we agree with you. And guess what? What were they doing? They are fighting jihad. They haven't got an argument against that.

Most Salafist scholars are entirely genuine in their opposition to violence, but they don't have an ideological argument to stop this seepage from Salafism into jihadi Salafism. That is the tragedy of it all.

Senator CHAMBLISS. So, do Salafists versus jihadist Salafists believe that it's OK, that the Qur'an says it's OK to kill somebody?

Mr. ULPH. Their starting point is, shall we say—I don't want to keep on using this phrase—their starting point is pre-enlightenment, and they are happy about this. In other words, they will take their model for what constitutes morality from obviously internal to the Islamic tradition. We, since the enlightenment, have questioned even our own Christian morality on the grounds that—the idea that very few Christians now believe that outside the church there is no salvation, and therefore, you should not worry about these people.

The problem is, in a pre-enlightenment culture they are at home with this culture. They are at home with the idea that that which adds to the interest of the Islamic state is, as such, moral and that which detracts from it is immoral. That is the fundamental difference.

It should be no problem in a pluralistic society like ourselves until it has the effect of increasing isolationism amongst the Muslim community, until it has the effect of making them feel that they are under siege. Unfortunately, this is very much the by-product of Salafist education.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. I'm going to be a little bit like Ms. Cragin and offer up something controversial.

What you've all been discussing is the enormous variety of cultures, counter-cultures, different points of view, not just with respect to Iraq, but with respect to the entire world. That was a deal, wasn't it, between the Saud family and Saudi Arabia. This is my point. What you're calling for, it seems to me—and I was actually rather surprised by your tepid response to the question about language; I just go berserk over a lack of language, and you only went semi-berserk.

Our whole approach in the Government and our whole approach since 9/11 has been to do—I'm positing and you will enlighten me, all of you, hopefully, that in fact this is all about America, and therefore we have arranged ourselves, as indeed we already had, through our intelligence system, through our military, through our policymaking, through the nature of our hearings—both public and private—to take this on as a problem that has a solution. We went to considerable lengths to create a Director of National Intelligence so that we could take 18 intelligence agencies, some of which, like

the INR, DOE and some others, were giving us very different intelligence, and then bring them all together by having a Director of National Intelligence and then another Director of National Intelligence, who is very good.

The military speaks for itself. There is no dissent. We understand now that there are a lot of retired generals who are coming out with a much more subtle approach, and what we talk about but don't necessarily speak about is there are a lot of in-service senior folks who do exactly the same thing.

Now, my question to you is, are we answering what you have all raised, and that is the multiple difficult of this, that is it not necessarily all based upon us, but jihadists trying to go after each other and everything else that you said, and doing just about the worst job of trying to counter it by treating it as one problem?

Mr. ULPH. In a nutshell, one of the problems and one of the irritating aspects of the problem that lies before us is that we have to get to grips with the fact that there isn't, shall we say, a strategy, a quick-fix strategy. We're talking about, really, we're going to have to reconfigure. We're going to have to understand an entire educational process, because what we really risk, as I mentioned earlier, is an entire generation of Muslim youth who are being educated in an alternative universe.

As soon as we get to that understanding, the sooner we'll begin to start to impact upon it. Unfortunately, we don't have a map. Ask anybody in the Administration. I'm sure they'll say the same in the United Kingdom. Very few people will have or will have even thought that it would be important to have an idea about the nature, the richness and the sophistication of the ideology.

As soon as that is understood and as soon as we start publishing furiously on the nature of the ideology and understanding it, the sooner we can actually do something, which may sound very dull and may sound very undramatic. But we will then have to start an entire new reeducation process.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Could I have the advantage of one more at least?

Ms. CRAGIN. I was just going to add onto that. It's not just there's not just one solution at an ideological level. There's not one solution at the grassroots level where we're having a second generation of recruits coming in as well.

Mr. KIMMAGE. I'd like to add a slightly contradictory note to that, which is that I think as we develop specialists with the language skills to look at the open sources—to say something heretical before the intelligence committee, most of this is out in the open. As we look at it, I'd like to slightly disagree with my colleague that this ideology is not quite so rich, not quite so deep, and not quite so powerful. It's actually secured very few adherents. They've garnered a lot of attention through use of media and violence.

But as we become more familiar with the debates in that part of the world, we'll be better able to understand and encourage the people who ridicule it in that part of the world, because it is not terribly rich or intelligent or insightful and does not have answers. I think that's one of the things we'll learn.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Are any of the three of you or your institutions looking at this question of a change in approach? I'm not

saying it could be done. The United States Government turns very slowly. But the truth is the truth, or as close to the truth is as close to the truth as you can get. Are any of you working on this or are your institutions?

Mr. ULPH. At the risk of sort of banging on my own particular bee in the bonnet, I'm working on a book which is going to be, shall we say, a curriculum, a full curriculum of the literature, almost like a literary guide to jihad, as it were. The idea of this is the map—the map issue. If we know what we're dealing with, we know the breadth of what we're dealing with; then we know to go on from there.

And I'm also working on a project on bringing a curriculum the other way around—that is, to try to establish within the American educational system a curriculum which will introduce the jihad culture as part of, for instance, political studies or Arabic studies.

One of the problems is, in a nutshell again, that it is quite odd—this would not have occurred during the cold war—that there is a dearth of instruction and educational programs on the subject of jihadist Islam, possibly because of a natural tendency for scholars to want to flag out the positive aspects of a culture, and therefore not to wish to flag up something which may cast a negative pall upon it.

So yes, one is the curriculum work. The other one is the educational programs.

Ms. CRAGIN. I'll just speak for RAND and say, absolutely. At a strategic level we're doing a lot of reassessing, rethinking our strategic approach to the global war on terrorism that people seem to have decided is not necessarily the right term, but also, at a micro level and at a grassroots level in different communities, targeting how our policy is impacting different communities, just, even just different countries. And that's something that we would be more than happy to share with your staffers any time you are interested in it.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much.

Vice Chairman Bond.

Vice Chairman BOND. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. A couple of thoughts. Number one, you were talking about the admiration they have for the United States. A good friend of mine with whom I'm working is a journalist who was in Indonesia and managed to worm himself in or get himself into Abu Bukar Bashir's Passandran, the heart of the most violent radical jihadist movement. And he listened to Abu Bukar Bashir make his pronouncements and had a round table and addressed the students there. They all committed to jihad and they have been recruited. They were in training.

And at end of it he said, no, if I gave you the opportunity, how many of you would like to go to America. And every single one of them held up his hands and said we would love to do it.

Now we are trying to figure out a way to get through this, and I know it's very complicated and sometimes we seek simple answers. There's no simple answer. We've got to find a better term. I think everybody can agree "Islamofascism" was a disastrous term. I don't know whether we call them radical vermin or something

that's not flattering. There has to be some way to determine who we need to fight.

On the other hand, there's a broad uma that we have to influence positively, and we mentioned what was going on in the Philippines. That's foreign aid combined with effective kinetic force. I've heard from Muslims in that region that they want more educational exchanges; they want more U.S. visitors there. We ought to be putting more volunteers there, whether it's Peace Corps or the volunteers in Asia.

I believe that we are missing out because we have downgraded and taken resources away from the Voice of America/Radio Free Asia, Mr. Kimmage's area. The broadcast medium that we have on doesn't seem to be doing much of a job in putting out our story. We don't want to get involved, as I guess Ms. Cragin said, in trying to pit Muslims against each other. But there are fissures.

What I would like for you all to give me just in a minute is, what are the things that we can be doing to appeal to the broad Muslim world to show that we are not the ogres that that narrow groups seeks to paint us as?

Mr. KIMMAGE. One thing we can do, I think all of us as researchers can do, is as we learn more about this and transmit our knowledge within our society, is we can reveal the poverty of jihadist ideology and we can have a dialog with people in the Arab and Muslim world, who also feel that it's impoverished. I think that's one very important thing we can do as researchers.

To answer the Chairman's question, my colleague Kathleen Ridolfo and I at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—which also includes Radio Free Iraq, incidently—we just finished this study look at jihadist and insurgent media in Iraq, and we're very eager to do similar research in the future.

Mr. ULPH. Quite simply, the first argument is, well, why would we be doing anything, because it would be the kiss of death or something, like involving ourselves in an ideology, because we wouldn't be qualified. But there's a very simple answer to that. We simply fund, we promote the moderates and let them do the argument for us. There's plenty of people out there. The problem is, unlike the radicals, they don't have the funding, and they don't have the networking.

The United States, particularly, is a very experienced country in networking and networking moderates. It happened in the cold war. There's no reason why we can't do this again.

Vice Chairman BOND. But if we are funding them, do they not become our lackeys?

Mr. ULPH. Well, there's two answers to that. One is, already as regards to the jihadis, we're zero anyway, so anybody who supports that United States type of culture, if he's a moderate, he's zero; so the moderates themselves, they're not going to bother to try and dissociate themselves from liberalism because they believe it.

The other thing is, if it comes to funding a group, you can do exactly what we did in the cold war. We maintained a distance. We allowed people to join these groups even if they disagreed with U.S. policy. In other words, it gains it credibility. In other words, it's more than the United States; it's more than the policy of the United States in the Middle East. It's about ideas.

We simply fund, we promote, we invite, we up the profile and the visibility of the considerably and very brave moderate Muslim intellectuals who at the moment are cowed because, again, of the lack of funding and the lack of networking and the lack of our support.

Vice Chairman BOND. Ms. Cragin.

Ms. CRAGIN. Based on our research—and I'll separate the hard core jihadis, which I agree with my colleague that you're really not going to get at—focusing on the people who are potentially sympathetic to the al-Qa'ida ideology.

You can confront them on an ideological level by funding these sorts of groups, but I'd also like to see us talking more and more about political decisions that we can make on a more political level and, of course, as you mentioned, there are things that can be done at an economic level too. I'm just going to refer you to a report called "Terrorism Development" that talks about what we can do in development at the political, social and economic level to try and mitigate or erode some of this support for these groups.

Vice Chairman BOND. Would be published by the RAND Corporation, by any chance?

Ms. CRAGIN. I'll hold it up here.

Vice Chairman BOND. That's one I hadn't read.

Ms. CRAGIN. I'm happy to provide you with this copy.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Actually, you have two copies, I think.

Ms. CRAGIN. Yes, I do. I have multiple copies here.

Vice Chairman BOND. Mr. Chairman, this has been a very informative hearing. I think we've all learned a lot. I was just going to say I think there are several questions for the record. I don't want to continue. I want to be able to turn to our friend from Indiana and ask if I may submit some questions for the record.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Of course.

Senator Bayh.

Senator BAYH. I just had two very brief final questions. One of you had previously mentioned that there were voices in the Islamic world that spoke out against the violence against other Muslims, the use of suicide bombers and that kind of thing. So you said you didn't want us to think they weren't out there. But then you made the comment that we weren't making things any easier on them. What did you mean by that, and what could we do to make it easier on the voices of moderation in the Islamic world that are speaking out against these kinds of activities?

Ms. CRAGIN. That would be me. I do think that, like he was saying, there are people who are out there speaking against the use of whether it be suicide bombings, whether it be the use of violence against civilians. The problem is the anti-Americanism aspect that's out there. And if you believe the public opinion polls that have been taken in the Muslim world, this view that the United States—as I've been saying, is trying to divide the Muslim world—is so prevalent that it's hard for the moderates to put their voices out there in favor of anything that might be pro-U.S.

So it's really easy for the jihadist ideologues——

Senator BAYH. They can't even speak about their own interpretation of the Qur'an?

Ms. CRAGIN. Some of them can and some of them can't. Anything that sort of bleeds into being sympathetic to the global war on terrorism they get criticized so harshly that sometimes it's very hard for them. They get personally threatened in many cases, and this is very difficult.

I just want to make one other somewhat controversial statement which I said a little bit earlier, which is that Hamas has been very vocal against al-Qa'ida. Now we might consider them as radical, but they have a lot of credibility in the Muslim world and yet they have been vocally criticizing al-Qa'ida. So there are other options out there besides just the moderates as well for us to take into account.

Mr. KIMMAGE. I think we really need to grapple with the issue that some of the most credible, vocal and authoritative critics of al-Qa'ida and suicide bombing are also very anti-American. This is an issue we're going to have to come to terms with. We might want to find people who are going to say I'm against al-Qa'ida and your friend, but in the real world we're going to have to look at this. I think we have to confront this.

Senator BAYH. They don't need to love us, as long as they do what they can to try and stop violence directed at us or anybody else.

Mr. KIMMAGE. Fair enough.

Senator BAYH. So that's my first question.

I apologize; I had to step out to make a phone call, but I did over-hear one of you saying that if there's one thing that they hated more than an infidel it was a heretic. I'd like to ask you why there have not been—now, of course, it's taking place in Iraq today, but before that there really wasn't much violence, I don't believe, by the Sunnis directed at the Shia. Why not, and what are the implications going forward of this split between Sunni and Shia that you read about possibly gathering some momentum?

Mr. KIMMAGE. In Iraq one of the things we found in doing the research for our report is that there is agreement across the board right now in the Sunni insurgent groups that Iran is up to something terribly nefarious in Iraq. So what you find is the nationalist groups say that Iraq is under two occupations—an American and an Iranian one.

Senator BAYH. More nefarious than what they think we're up to?

Mr. KIMMAGE. More nefarious. They even say Iran is a more dangerous enemy than the United States, yes. I can show you the quotes.

They, however, do not have the same view as al-Qa'ida, which is the Shiites are heretics and one must go out and simply slaughter them. That is a view that, speaking regionally in Iraq, became prevalent with Zarqawi's assent, and there was disagreement between Zarqawi and the people from the old central al-Qa'ida leadership about how expedient or wise this was.

It's one of the things that illustrates, I think, the differences within the organization, the ideological fissures, if you will. It's an element that has metastasized, unfortunately, in Iraq in the conditions of the conflict there, but it's very, very prevalent.

Senator BAYH. Do you think it has the potential to spread more widely? There are some—I take back my previous statement—some

instances of attacks in Pakistan, I believe, Sunni-Shia and so forth. Does this have the potential to spread more widely across the Islamic world?

Mr. KIMMAGE. It certainly has the potential where there are Shiite minorities, and some of them are close to Iraq, that conflict continues to metastasize, then yes, it could. Right now, though, the focus of this in the Arab world is certainly in Iraq. One of the things that we found in the media, the insurgent media, is a rising level of Sunni-Shiite hate speech. And this media is not contained within the borders; it goes through the Internet everywhere. So the danger is definitely there.

Senator BAYH. I'd like to thank you all. And, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank you and just follow up on something that Senator Bond was saying. You can't beat something with nothing, and we've got to try and figure out what the most effective countervailing ideological positioning is and come up with effective ways to deliver that.

Mr. Ulph, I think you mentioned that individual freedom isn't a bad place to begin. Apparently they feel threatened by that. So in ways that are authentic and indigenous to these cultures, we have to come up with mechanisms to promote that.

I'm very grateful to you, Mr. Chairman. This was a very significant hearing today.

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I agree. Just a final point, not for you to answer, but you didn't answer it when I asked it before. That is, we can fret about languages. We can fret about people under 30—Muslim Americans—what they might be thinking, how many of them felt there were no Arabs involved in 9/11 and all the rest of it. And you talked about education and starting at the bottom.

It was a very grassroots answer, I thought. My question was more or less the role of Government. Now it is absurd for me to sit here and ask you to postulate on the role of Government in all this. My point was that it strikes me, through our elimination of stovepipes, which I can defend with thirty different reasons, and sort of the consolidation of effort as you look out over the coming generations with some 60 countries with al-Qa'ida presence, homeland security.

We have galvanized ourselves more than I've ever seen into a one coherent effort of Government, effectively. I'm not saying that's wrong, but I'm also not saying it's the answer to what you think needs to be done. I don't ask for an answer now, but I want to know that you're thinking about it, because it's the impossible equation. Nobody can reform Government. We have and there's never been a greater urgency than this.

Having said that, I, along with the Vice Chairman, completely thank you, all of you, for your honesty, your intellect, your willingness to talk. These are the kinds of hearings which we so desperately need, where you get people actually from outside of Government who are willing to comment and are therefore freer to do so and who have an obligation to do so. It's been one of the better hearings that I can remember.

So I thank all of you very much, and this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]