[Senate Hearing 110-682]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-682
THE CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE
AND PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2008
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
--------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Almquist, Hon. Katherine J., Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington,
DC............................................................. 11
Prepared statement......................................... 12
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator From Wisconsin........... 1
Frazer, Hon. Jendayi, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 4
Prepared statement......................................... 7
Gavin, Michelle D., Adjunct Fellow for Africa, Council on Foreign
Relations, New York, NY........................................ 36
Prepared statement......................................... 38
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator From Georgia.................. 4
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts............. 20
Melia, Thomas O., Deputy Executive Director, Freedom House,
Washington, DC................................................. 27
Prepared statement......................................... 30
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator From Florida..................... 22
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator From Illinois, prepared
statement...................................................... 48
(iii)
THE CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE
AND PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 15, 2008
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell
Feingold, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold, Kerry, Nelson, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. The hearing will come to order.
On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
African Affairs, I welcome all of you to this hearing on the
crisis in Zimbabwe and prospects for resolution.
I am pleased to be joined shortly by my colleague and
ranking member of this subcommittee, Senator Isakson, and I
will invite him to deliver some opening remarks when he
arrives.
I had hoped that today's hearing would not be necessary.
The March 29th elections offered a chance to turn the page on
what has become a very long and very tragic chapter in
Zimbabwe's history. Although it fell short of international
democratic standards, the African Union observer mission
reported that the first presidential election in Zimbabwe
expressed the general will of the people. But it took 5 weeks,
after significant bloodshed and violence, to learn that Morgan
Tsvangirai, leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic
Change, had won 47.9 percent of the vote, while the incumbent,
Robert Mugabe, won 43.2 percent.
And then rather than respecting the will of the people, the
Mugabe regime chose, as they have done time and time again, to
repress it. In the weeks after the election, the Mugabe regime
launched a deliberate campaign of state-sponsored violence
against the MDC's members, supporters, and the families in an
attempt to cling to power. Reports of killings, abductions,
torture, and sexual violence are staggering. The MDC reported
just last week that 129 of its supporters have been killed,
1,500 detained, and another 5,000 remain missing since the
March elections. It is no wonder that Mr. Tsvangirai decided to
withdraw from the runoff of the Presidential election on June
27 and take shelter in the Dutch Embassy. Unsurprisingly, in a
climate of fear and sheer terror, Mugabe reportedly won 90
percent of the vote.
Once considered a liberator of his people, Mugabe has
become increasingly despotic and his reign increasingly
disastrous. According to the best estimate, Zimbabwe's gross
domestic product has decreased over 40 percent in the last
decade. Unemployment has risen over 80 percent and inflation is
believed to be over 10.5 million percent. Yes; 10.5 million
percent. Food shortages, land grabs, and repression have led
more than 4 million people to flee into neighboring countries,
destabilizing the wider region. And as Secretary Rice said in
April, Mugabe has ``done more harm to his country than would
have been imaginable.''
There are some who suggest that now is the time for caution
to avoid escalating the violence and unleashing civil war.
However, Zimbabwe's descent has been underway for over a
decade, and such a wait and see approach has only allowed this
nightmare to grow. In the year 2000, I actually remarked on the
Senate floor that we must act before Zimbabwe's problems become
more complex and deeply entrenched. Eight years later, this
remains the case.
Now, I respect those who have been involved in genuine
efforts to mediate a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe. But open-
ended dialogue has largely been manipulated by Mugabe and his
inner circle. Any serious negotiation between Mugabe and the
opposition party will require a more robust mediation effort
backed by united international support and leverage. I believe
the current mediation team must be expanded beyond South
Africa, to include representation from regional and
international bodies. And I now call on the administration to
press strongly for this expansion.
The unwillingness of a few key regional leaders to
criticize the regime for its abuses or consider punitive
measures against those responsible has been deeply
disappointing. This has led some to speak of a divide between
the West and the rest, an unhelpful divide that Mugabe exploits
through his rhetoric. China and Russia's veto last Friday of a
robust U.N. Security Council resolution imposing international
arms embargo and multilateral sanctions exposed the poisonous
nature of this divide. And I am, of course, deeply disappointed
by their veto, especially considering China's increasing role
on the continent.
I also find it discouraging that this veto was one of the
new Russian President's first actions in Africa. Until we have
a comprehensive, coordinated action by both regional and
international leaders, including a combination of incentives
and punitive measures, I fear the situation will only get
worse.
I welcome the efforts of the Bush administration thus far,
but I think more has to be done to overcome this divide as we
press for tighter sanctions on those individuals responsible
for this crisis. Now is the time to scale up, not give up on
global action. We must not allow Zimbabwe to fall out of the
international spotlight as it has many times before.
On Friday, Senator Isakson, the ranking member, who just
joined us, and I, along with 16 of our colleagues introduced a
resolution encouraging the administration's continued efforts
and calling for more robust efforts by all regional
international actors to bolster efforts to achieve a peaceful
resolution to Zimbabwe's crisis. I am pleased that the Senate
has now passed this resolution, which occurred yesterday.
Today's hearing will assess the volatile situation there
and what is needed to resolve the crisis. It will explore how
U.S. policy can be strengthened to maximize leverage, and
expedite a negotiated agreement that respects the will of the
people.
Now I would like to introduce our two distinguished panels
so we can begin that discussion. First we will hear from
Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, who has been
actively and directly involved in trying to bring an end to
this crisis. We will also hear testimony from Katherine
Almquist, the Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S.
Agency for International Development, who will specifically
address the humanitarian and development challenges faced by
Zimbabwe.
With more than 4 million Zimbabweans having fled the
country, the humanitarian dynamic is directly linked to the
political concerns. And both of these witnesses have, of
course, testified before the Africa Subcommittee, and so it is
my pleasure to welcome you back. I appreciate your willingness
to testify today, as I know this is a particularly busy day at
the State Department. I look forward to a frank and productive
discussion.
Our second panel features two nongovernmental experts who
offer unique perspectives on the dynamics in Zimbabwe and
potential for transformation. Mr. Thomas Melia is the deputy
executive director of Freedom House, an organization that has
reported on political and human rights violations in Zimbabwe
for many years. Mr. Melia has long worked on issues of
democracy in Africa and will provide us with his analysis of
how the United States can best contribute to security,
stability, and democracy in Zimbabwe and the wider region.
We will also hear from Ms. Michelle Gavin, adjunct fellow
for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations. Most recently
Ms. Gavin authored the council's special report on Zimbabwe,
titled ``Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe,'' and has been a
leading analyst of U.S. policy in Zimbabwe. Prior to her work
with the Council on Foreign Relations, I was lucky enough to
have Ms. Gavin as my foreign policy advisor here in the Senate.
Ms. Gavin and I worked together for 6 years, and I am indebted
to her for her work and her analysis on a very broad range of
issues related to Africa and beyond.
And I can tell you that she and I met with President Mugabe
in December of 1999 in what had to be one of the most
surprising and difficult meetings I have ever experienced in my
career. This was before this all happened. And we were able to
come back and say something really bad is about to happen here,
and we have never forgotten it.
So it is particularly pleasing for me, of course, to have
her here to get her expert insights on how the United States
tools and leverage can best be used to address the situation in
Zimbabwe and to thank her again for her fabulous work for me.
Thank you to all our witnesses for being here. I look
forward to your testimony and our subsequent discussion.
And now before the panel begins, I would like to turn to
the distinguished ranking member, Senator Isakson for his
opening comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, I associate myself with every word of your statement. I
was pleased to join you in the resolution that passed the
Senate last night regarding Zimbabwe.
And I welcome our witnesses today. I have had the privilege
of hearing both of them testify before. They are a great asset
to our State Department and are experts in this region.
There is no more grave situation in my mind than what
exists in Zimbabwe, and I think your statement to encourage the
world community through both sanctions and leverage and
pressure to try and bring about free and fair elections and a
civilized society in that country is absolutely paramount. And
I look forward to joining you, Mr. Chairman, in every effort we
can make on this committee to make that happen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, sir, and thank you for being
so cooperative and helpful on this and other matters.
Just so you know, apparently we will be having a vote at 11
o'clock. I will simply recess the hearing for as long as it
takes me to get over there and come back and vote.
But subject to that, let us get started. Assistant
Secretary Frazer, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU
OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Chairman Feingold, Senator
Isakson, I am pleased to testify before you today on the
situation in Zimbabwe and the world's response. I thank you for
your sustained strong support that has been so important in
bringing this tragedy to the attention of a world that is
beginning to join together for action.
Our goals have been consistent to push for an end to the
violence, to achieve a democratic transition that is consistent
with the will of the people of Zimbabwe as expressed on March
29, and to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of
Zimbabwe.
To achieve these goals, we are pursuing several lines of
action, including seeking a strengthened negotiation
facilitated by the Southern African Development Community, the
African Union, and the United Nations, preparing for more
robust targeted sanctions if the regime refuses to negotiate
and continues its massive violations of human rights,
collaborating with international NGO's and African civil
society to ramp up humanitarian assistance to the population,
and cooperating with international financial institutions,
like-minded countries, and African leaders to isolate the
Mugabe regime and prepare for economic recovery and social
rebuilding once Zimbabwe is on a credible path of democratic
transition.
On June 27, the regime of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe
conducted an election that by any standard was neither free nor
fair. In a ruthless and methodical campaign of violence against
the opposition, the regime succeeded in creating conditions
that forced opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to withdraw his
candidacy. The United States does not and will not accept the
legitimacy of any process that does not reflect the will of the
Zimbabwean people.
The opposition Movement for Democratic Change, MDC, has
explained why a free and fair election was impossible, citing
state-sponsored violence and threats against MDC supporters and
their family members, the Mugabe regime's attempt to
circumscribe citizens' rights to express their views and freely
elect their government, the regime's unlawful arrest and
prohibition of MDC rallies making it impossible for the
opposition to organize and campaign and for voters to safely
and freely vote their conscience, partisanship of the Zimbabwe
Electoral Commission, and lack of MDC access to the media. In
addition, Mugabe's statements that an MDC victory would not be
accepted, ZANU-PF's planned election rigging, and other factors
all prevented a credible election.
Indeed, in order to ensure that Tsvangirai would not win
the runoff, the regime carried out a massive campaign of
murder, harassment, and intimidation to claim victory in the
June 27 runoff. We know that more than 100 people have been
murdered, more than 3,000 have sought medical treatment for
beatings and torture, and more than 30,000 have been driven
from their homes because of the violence. Many Zimbabweans fled
for their lives to neighboring states. At least two MDC
Parliamentarians, winners in the March 29 elections, are
missing and presumed dead. And a third MDC Parliamentarian's
whereabouts are unknown. MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti was
detained and charged with treason. Tsvangirai himself was
detained four times and forced to seek protection in safe
houses and the Dutch embassy.
The United States has responded with aggressive regional
and multilateral diplomacy, as well as targeted bilateral
sanctions. President Bush and Secretary Rice have encouraged
African leaders to take responsibility to prevent the further
collapse of Zimbabwe.
I attended the recent summit of the African Union 2 weeks
ago in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in which 53 African Member
States participated. The official theme of the summit was water
and sanitation, but discussion of Zimbabwe dominated the
agenda. Only a very few leaders publicly welcomed Mugabe.
Little was said about Zimbabwe in public sessions, but there
was substantial behind-the-scenes criticism of Mugabe and much
discussion of Zimbabwe.
The final AU statement on June 30 said that ``the election
process fell short of accepted AU standards.'' The AU summit
thus followed the statements of all the African observer
missions, the Southern African Development Community, the Pan-
African Parliament, and the AU observer missions, which all
made similar observations that the runoff election was not
free, fair, or credible and took place in an environment of
government-sponsored violence and intimidation. Importantly,
the African Union resolution expressed its concern about the
impact of the crisis in Zimbabwe on the stability of the
region, highlighting the ``urgent need to prevent further
worsening of the situation and with a view to avoid spread of
conflict with the consequential negative impact on the country
and the subregion.''
Individual African leaders have stood up against Mugabe as
well. Many have spoken out. These include Prime Minister Raila
Odinga of Kenya, Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa, also
chairman of the Southern African Development Community,
Botswana President Ian Khama, former South African President
Nelson Mandela, and Africa National Congress Party head Jacob
Zuma. Sierra Leone and Liberia cosponsored the U.N. Security
Council resolution in Zimbabwe, which regrettably did not pass
in the Security Council on July 11.
We commend them for their stance that reflects the views of
a vast majority of the continent.
On July 1, the United States circulated in the Security
Council capitals the text of a draft chapter VII resolution on
Zimbabwe that would have imposed a comprehensive arms embargo
and an annex of individuals who would be subject to an asset
freeze and a travel ban for having ordered, planned, or
participated in acts of politically motivated violence. The
resolution also called on the U.N. Secretary General to appoint
a dedicated special representative for the situation in
Zimbabwe who would support the negotiation process between the
regime and the opposition. The U.S. formally introduced the
draft resolution in the council on July 3 and held over four
rounds of discussions on the text.
Despite receiving nine votes to pass the resolution, it
failed due to China's and Russia's vetoes. Thus, the U.N.
Security Council missed the opportunity to support the
courageous efforts of the Zimbabwean people to change their
lives peacefully through elections and show the Mugabe regime
that the international community means what it says in
demanding an immediate end to the violence, reinstatement of
humanitarian assistance, and the start of serious negotiations
with the opposition leading to a solution that respects the
will of the Zimbabwean people.
This will not deter us since the U.N. action would have
been in addition to unilateral financial and travel sanctions
already applied by the United States against more than 150
Zimbabweans who have undermined the country's democratic
institutions and processes. We are adding to our list and will
increase our enforcement efforts. These targeted measures offer
a means of holding officials accountable for their actions
without inflicting further hardship on the general population.
What are the next steps? First, we will continue to isolate
the regime until there is a democratic transition. Africans are
starting to take a more public stance, criticizing Mugabe and
the electoral process. The United States will continue its own
sanctions and encourage others to impose additional sanctions
to increase pressure on the Mugabe regime. Second, we will
support and encourage expanded regional mediation. Finally, we
will prepare for the day when the will of the Zimbabwean people
is respected by supporting planning for economic recovery,
social reconciliation, and rebuilding.
As President Bush said to the United Nations, ``In
Zimbabwe, ordinary citizens suffer under a tyrannical regime.
The government has cracked down on peaceful calls for reform
and forced millions to flee their homeland. The behavior of the
Mugabe regime is an assault on its people.'' President Bush
reiterated at the G-8 Summit that he cares deeply about the
people of Zimbabwe and was extremely disappointed in the
election which he has labeled a ``sham'' election.
I will end by emphasizing that Mugabe's electoral sham has
had the positive effect of galvanizing the world to act. We
have witnessed in the past 3 weeks the United Nations, the G-8,
the African Union, the European Union, and SADC all condemning
the fraud and violence in Zimbabwe. Africans themselves are
acting. The world has a precious window of opportunity increase
the international pressure on this illegitimate government. I
ask for your support as we look for ways to help keep that
pressure on and end the nightmare that the proud and inspiring
people of Zimbabwe have suffered for too long.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Frazer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Feingold, Senator Isakson and members of the committee, I
am honored to testify before you today on the situation in Zimbabwe and
the world's response. I thank you for your sustained strong support
that has been so important in bringing this tragedy to the attention of
a world that is beginning to join together for action.
Our goals have been consistent to: (1) Push for an end to the
violence and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Zimbabwean
people, and (2) achieve a democratic transition that is consistent with
the will of the people of Zimbabwe as expressed on March 29. Ways to
achieve these goals include: (1) An expanded and inclusive negotiation
facilitated by the Southern African Development Community, the African
Union, and the United Nations; (2) more robust targeted sanctions
regime if the regime refuses to negotiate and continues its massive
violations of human rights; (3) collaboration with international NGOs
and African civil society, to ramp up humanitarian assistance to the
population; and (4) cooperation with international financial
institutions, like-minded countries, and African leaders to isolate the
Mugabe regime and prepare for economic recovery and social rebuilding
once Zimbabwe has achieved democratic transformation.
On June 27, the regime of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe conducted an
election that by any standard was neither free nor fair. In a ruthless
and methodical campaign of violence against the opposition, the regime
succeeded in creating conditions that forced opposition leader Morgan
Tsvangirai to withdraw his candidacy. The United States does not and
will not accept the legitimacy of any result that does not reflect the
will of the Zimbabwean people.
I want to walk through the key events of the last 3 months. The
first round of voting in Zimbabwe took place on March 29, followed by
an extended period of 3 weeks of calculated delay before results were
released by the official electoral commission. When they were finally
released, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Presidential candidate
Morgan Tsvangirai was credited with over 48 percent of the vote
compared to Mugabe's 43 percent (there was a third independent
candidate as well). Since the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission announced
that neither candidate secured the required 50-percent-plus-one vote to
win the election outright, a runoff date was announced.
On June 22, Tsvangirai withdrew from the runoff election due to the
violence that had taken place against his party and its supporters that
began on March 29. The MDC enumerated why a free and fair election was
impossible, citing state-sponsored violence and threats against MDC
supporters family members, the Mugabe regime's attempts to circumscribe
citizens' right to express their views, and change the government, by
making it impossible for the opposition to organize and campaign and
for voters to safely and freely vote their consciences through unlawful
arrests and prohibition of MDC rallies, partisanship of the Zimbabwe
Electoral Commission, and lack of MDC access to the media. In addition,
Mugabe's statements that an MDC victory would not be accepted, planned
election rigging, and other factors also prevented a credible election.
Indeed, in order to ensure that Tsvangirai wouldn't win the runoff,
the regime carried out a massive campaign of murder, harassment, and
intimidation to claim ``victory'' in the June 27 runoff. We know that
at least 100 people have been murdered; over 3,000 have sought medical
treatment for beatings and torture; and over 30,000 have been driven
from their homes. Many Zimbabweans fled for their lives to neighboring
states. At least two MDC parliamentarians--winners in the March 29
elections--are missing, perhaps dead. And, a third MDC
parliamentarian's whereabouts are unknown. MDC Secretary General Tendai
Biti was detained and charged with treason. Tsvangirai himself was
detained four times and forced to seek protection in safe houses and
the Dutch Embassy.
The Government of Zimbabwe continues its reign of terror against
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). On June 26, several hundred IDPs
arrived at the South African Embassy in Harare seeking shelter and
assistance. On June 27, ``election day,'' following a reported
arrangement between some international agencies and Zimbabwean
authorities, the IDPs were relocated to a facility run by the Ministry
of Labor and Social Welfare outside Harare. On July 3, over 300
displaced MDC supporters arrived at U.S. Embassy Harare seeking
shelter, food, medical care, and supplies. Mission staff, through
considerable effort and despite the harassing presence of government
security officers, were able to provide initial help. With only a
limited Zimbabwean Government response and civil society and Western
and international organizations trying to fill the void with inadequate
resources, the situation with the IDPs continues to be bad.
ECONOMY
It wasn't so long ago that Zimbabwe was a model in Africa for
democracy and prosperity. This is a country that maintained steady
economic growth, was building a middle class, and was educating its
entire population to Africa's highest levels of literacy. It is a
country that was succeeding and now is in the process of
disintegrating.
The economic figures are staggering. Over 80 percent of the country
is unemployed. Inflation is the highest in the world by far. The
Zimbabwean Government's own Central Statistical Office's most recent
inflation estimate was 164,000 percent for February. There's an
indication that the June rate may have reached 9,000,000 percent--
unimaginable numbers. This spring, the IMF forecast a 2008 annual
growth rate of negative 4.5 percent. After close to 8 years of severe
economic decline, a quarter of the population has left the country to
seek better opportunities elsewhere, mostly in South Africa. The U.N.
Development Index shows that Zimbabwe's statistics are worse today than
in 1975, at the height of the country's war for independence.
While the current violence has uprooted thousands and turned them
into IDPs, this pattern of displacement is not new. In 2005, the
government has also purposely destroyed an entire community near
Harare. Operation Murambatsvina (Drive out the Trash), another brutally
executed well-planned and executed security scheme, wiped out thousands
of homes and made 700,000 homeless in one fell swoop. An additional
700,000 workers once employed and living on commercial farms no longer
have either jobs or homes.
A year ago, the government tried in its peculiar way to vanquish
hyperinflation by command. It ordered all stores to freeze prices
immediately. It came as no surprise that the shelves were emptied
quickly and many businesses were forced to close or go bankrupt. And it
resorted to printing bills for reserves it didn't possess.
Simply put, Zimbabwe has been and is collapsing. What is unusual,
however, about the Zimbabwean case, is that there is no outside factor
that has caused it--no natural disaster, no war, no international
economic or financial phenomenon that we can often point to elsewhere
in the world. Zimbabwe's collapse is entirely self-inflicted by the
government's misrule over the course of many years.
HOW ZIMBABWE GOT TO WHERE IT IS
How did Zimbabwe get to this point? Mugabe's economic policies in
the 1980s were auspicious, reflecting an understanding that markets and
trade-based growth were the country's foundation. A far-sighted
education policy of promoting mass literacy and schooling through high
school began to bear fruit. A new generation of Zimbabweans came into
the marketplace literate, politically aware, and technologically savvy.
They enjoyed a multitude of information sources, the Internet, domestic
radio, international radio beamed by satellite and aired on FM,
domestic and international television, and a healthy independent press.
Early on, however, Mugabe gave the world a glimpse of his capacity
for ruthlessness against his own people. Mugabe's base has always been
among the majority Shona-speakers. His rival for liberation leadership,
Joshua Nkomo, drew his support from the minority Ndbele speakers,
centered in the country's southwest. Determined not to brook any
serious opposition, the government's security forces planned and,
working with North Korean advisors, executed a calculated campaign
against the Ndbele, killing as many as 20,000.
By the 1990s, ZANU-PF was evolving from a people's liberation
movement into an entrenched and corrupt elite. The turning point came
in 2000, when the government lost a referendum on a constitutional
revision that would have substantially expanded the Presidential
authority. By all accounts, the rejection took the government and ZANU-
PF by complete surprise, so isolated had they become from ordinary
Zimbabweans.
The new generation of well-educated Zimbabweans promoted by
Mugabe's education policies was sophisticated, well-informed, and
hungry for new political leadership. They joined hands with labor,
churches, and civil society organizations to create the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC's initial success prompted the
government to respond forcefully to hold on to power.
ZANU-PF answered the MDC challenge with every weapon characteristic
of a police state. It passed new laws limiting political activity and
restricting the media. There was an organized campaign of intimidation
and violence against opposition leaders and supporters. So-called ``war
veterans'' led invasions of commercial agricultural lands, occupations
that would within a few years destroy most of the country's 4,000
highly productive farms that had been the backbone of the nation's
economy and had fed the entire region of southern Africa.
These brutal tactics succeeded in maintaining ZANU-PF in power.
ZANU-PF won parliamentary elections by a small margin in late 2000. In
2002, Mugabe would claim a highly disputed victory. But the political
victories came at a huge price as the economy went into a tailspin
where it has stayed ever since. The government's inability to reverse
the economic disaster has been its undoing and to this date, it has
shown no sign of taking serious, realistic measures to halt a decline
into chaos.
GOVERNMENT EXCUSES
When faced with criticism at home or abroad, the Mugabe regime has
a long habit of generating excuses. After the land seizure in 2000,
officials rejected claims of a steep decline in food production, then
later accepted them but blamed it on drought conditions. There actually
was a drought, so the partial truth made the excuse more plausible.
The government also has blamed foreign conspiracies for the
faltering economy. Targets have included the British Government, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and an alleged plot to bring down
the regime. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and U.K. governments,
although carefully targeted to affect only the regime's elite, have
provided fodder for the foreign conspiracy mindset, and been sold to
the people as evidence that the West is trying to bring down the regime
by wrecking the economy. All of these excuses indicate an isolated
regime cut off not only from most of the world, but from the reality of
the conditions affecting its own people as well as Zimbabweans'
expressed desire for change.
CURRENT U.S. RESPONSE
The United States has responded with aggressive regional and
multilateral diplomacy as well as targeted bilateral sanctions.
President Bush and Secretary Rice have encouraged African leaders to
take responsibility to develop African solutions to the collapse of
Zimbabwe. I attended the summit of the African Union 2 weeks ago in
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in which 53 African Member States participated.
The official theme of the summit was water and sanitation, but
discussion of Zimbabwe dominated the agenda. Only a very few leaders
publicly welcomed Mugabe. Little was said about Zimbabwe in public, but
there was substantial behind-the-scenes discussion.
The final AU statement on June 30 said that ``the election process
fell short of accepted AU standards.'' The Pan-African Parliament (PAP)
made a similar observation in its interim statement the same day,
saying that the elections were not free, fair, or credible.
Importantly, the African Union resolution expressed its concern about
the impact of the crisis in Zimbabwe on the stability of the region,
highlighting the ``urgent need to prevent further worsening of the
situation and with a view to avoid spread of conflict with the
consequential negative impact on the country and the subregion.''
Individual African leaders have spoken out as well. Prime Minister
Raila Odinga of Kenya has urged the AU to suspend Mugabe and send
peacekeeping forces to Zimbabwe. Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa,
chairman of the SADC, has called the situation in Zimbabwe an
embarrassment to southern Africa and said ``it is scandalous for the
SADC to remain silent.''
Former South African President Nelson Mandela called the situation
``a tragic failure of leadership.'' And ANC party head Zuma said after
the extended delay in announcing the March 29 results: ``It's not
acceptable. It's not helping the Zimbabwean people who have gone out to
. . . elect the kind of party and Presidential candidate they want,
exercising their constitutional right.''
On June 23, the Security Council unanimously adopted a Presidential
Statement (PRST) that condemned the preelection violence that made it
impossible for free and fair elections to take place. The statement
also expressed the Council's concern over the impact of the situation
in Zimbabwe on the wider region. It called on the Zimbabwean Government
to cooperate in regional mediation efforts that would allow a
government to be formed and to permit humanitarian organizations to
resume their services.
On June 27, after U.N. Security Council consultations on Zimbabwe,
members of the Council authorized Ambassador to the U.S. Mission
Khalilzad, in his capacity as President of the Security Council, to
make a statement to the press reaffirming the Council's June 23
statement and its intention to come back to the issue in the coming
days.
On July 1, the United States circulated in U.N. Security Council
capitals the text of a draft chapter VII resolution on Zimbabwe that
would impose a comprehensive arms embargo and an annex of 12
individuals who would be subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban
and asset freeze on those designated as having ordered, planned, or
participated in acts of politically motivated violence. The resolution
had an Annex of 14 individuals who would be designated upon adoption of
the resolution, with Robert Mugabe at the top of the list. The
resolution also called on the U.N. Secretary General to appoint a
dedicated Special Representative for the situation in Zimbabwe, who
would support the negotiation process between the regime and the
opposition. The U.S. formally introduced the draft resolution in the
Council on July 3 and held over four rounds of discussions on the text.
Despite receiving nine votes to pass the resolution, it failed due
to China's and Russia's vetoes. Thus, the U.N. Security Council missed
the opportunity to support the courageous efforts of the Zimbabwean
people to change their lives peacefully through elections and show the
Mugabe regime that the international community means what it says in
demanding an immediate end to the violence, reinstatement of
humanitarian assistance, and the start of serious negotiations with the
opposition leading to a solution that respects the will of the
Zimbabwean. This will not deter us, since the U.N. action would have
been in addition to unilateral financial and travel sanctions applied
by the U.S. against more than 150 Zimbabweans who have undermined the
country's democratic institutions and processes and entities they
control. These targeted measures offer a means of holding officials
accountable for their actions without inflicting further hardship to
the general population.
NEXT STEPS
What are the next steps?: (1) We will continue to isolate the
regime until there is a democratic transition; Africans are starting to
take a more public stance, criticizing Mugabe and the electoral
process; the United States will continue its own sanctions and
encourage others, especially the European Union, to impose additional
sanctions to increase pressure on the Mugabe regime; (3) we will
support and encourage regional mediation. Finally, we will prepare for
the day when the will of the Zimbabwean people is respected by
supporting planning for economic recovery, social reconciliation, and
rebuilding.
As President Bush said to the United Nations, ``In Zimbabwe,
ordinary citizens suffer under a tyrannical regime. The government has
cracked down on peaceful calls for reform and forced millions to fell
their homeland. The behavior of the Mugabe regime is an assault on its
people.'' President Bush reiterated at the G-8 summit that he cares
deeply about the people of Zimbabwe and was extremely disappointed in
the elections which he has labeled as ``a sham.''
I will end by emphasizing that Mugabe's electoral sham has had the
positive effect of galvanizing the world to act. We have witnessed in
the past 3 weeks the United Nations, G-8, African Union, European
Union, and SADC all condemning the fraud and violence in Zimbabwe.
Africans themselves are acting. The world has a precious window of
opportunity to increase the international pressure on this illegitimate
regime. I ask for your support as we look for ways to keep that
pressure on, and end the nightmare that the proud and inspiring people
of Zimbabwe have suffered for too long.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Assistant Secretary Frazer.
Ms. Almquist.
STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Almquist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Isakson,
and members of the committee for the opportunity to testify
today on the grave situation in Zimbabwe. I have submitted a
longer written statement that I would request be added to the
record.
Zimbabwe has reached a tipping point as the Mugabe regime
is faced with the daunting multifaceted socioeconomic and
political crisis. USAID is strengthening democratic forces and
institutions, contributing to heightening pressure on the
Mugabe regime, and providing humanitarian assistance to those
made vulnerable by a decade of government mismanagement and
abuse.
USAID engagement is more important than ever as the nation
sits on a knife's edge following the conclusive March 29
harmonized elections, the post-election violence, and the
widely discredited elections that illegitimately left Mugabe
holding power. Deep fissures in ZANU-PF, increasing pressure
from regional and international governments, and strengthening
civil society institutions will hopefully lead to a
transitional government for a populace hungry for a more
accountable and responsible government and a return to
prosperity.
The socioeconomic and political environment has
significantly deteriorated in the past several months. The food
security outlook, exacerbated by heavy rains and gross economic
mismanagement, is dismal. One-third of the population required
food aid this past year, and the need is likely to increase in
August and through the next hunger season.
The political environment remains highly restrictive and
polarized. ZANU-PF's campaign of intimidation and violence has
led to a growing number of displaced persons. In the past, the
regime targeted key activists and opposition leaders, but it is
now unleashing violence on anyone suspected to be an MDC
supporter as well.
At the same time, a politically controlled security and
justice system is conducting unlawful and arbitrary arrests and
indiscriminately applying the law. Freedom of speech, movement,
and assembly are severely curtailed.
Blatant disregard for economic tenets have resulted in an
inflation rate of now over 10 million percent as of July 2008,
a rapidly shrinking GDP, expected to decline by 7 percent this
year, and basic commodity shortages.
Out-migration of skilled professionals continues unabated,
hollowing out education and health care systems and capacity of
the government, the private sector, and NGO's to provide
essential services. Drugs and health care commodities are in
short supply and basic services are either unaffordable or
unavailable.
USAID assistance is pivotal to restore good governance and
economic prosperity and to provide for the needs of those most
adversely affected by the crisis. USAID programs support
prodemocracy forces, including the democratic opposition, to
pressure the regime for change and to enhance democratic
entities' ability to participate effectively in the transition
process and future governance. Restoration of rule of law and
democratic freedoms remain core program elements. Food and
nonfood humanitarian assistance, including livelihood support
and water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions, help meet the
critical needs of the most vulnerable.
In addition, the USAID program provides for the immediate
needs of those displaced or injured by political violence. HIV/
AIDS prevention, care and treatment initiatives, inclusive of
family planning and TB and coinfection interventions, are also
critical elements of the USAID program to address an HIV
prevalence rate of 16 percent and the needs of approximately
1.3 million orphans and vulnerable children.
In the event of political change, USAID would adjust its
program focus to rebuild tattered democratic institutions,
restore rule of law and good governance, and build national
consensus. The USAID program would also undertake economic
stabilization support as a complement to the work of the
international financial institutions and increase private
sector and agricultural productivity.
The social sector program would expand to better address
the devastating effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to more
ably respond to health care system weaknesses and to malaria
and maternal and child health needs.
USAID would continue to be the principal provider of
humanitarian assistance to help meet the food and nonfood needs
of those hardest hit by the economic stabilization programs.
To prepare to respond more fully, quickly, and
collaboratively, USAID is participating in the World Bank's
Multi-Donor Trust Fund to conduct sector-specific baseline
analyses and to develop and create public debate on policy
options and recommendations for a transition period.
I would be happy to take additional questions that you
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Almquist follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Katherine Almquist, Assistant Administrator,
Bureau for Africa, USAID, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to testify today about USAID's support for U.S. foreign policy goals
in Zimbabwe. We appreciate the strong bipartisan support in Congress
for improving the lives of people in this deeply troubled country.
Since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, USAID has partnered with the
people of Zimbabwe to overcome many obstacles on the path to democracy
and prosperity. Our commitment to this goal remains strong. Today, our
programs provide critical support for the people of Zimbabwe as they
pursue peaceful democratic change. USAID programs also provide crucial
legal, medical, health, food and other humanitarian assistance to the
millions of innocent victims of the regime's violence and
mismanagement.
Despite the current severe crisis facing the people and friends of
Zimbabwe, we remain optimistic about the country's long-term potential
and its prospects for positive change. When genuine reform does occur,
our mission and partners stand ready to work with this committee to
assist the new government and people in facilitating the country's
successful transformation to its former status as a constructive and
prosperous member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
Africa and the greater international community.
CURRENT SITUATION
Many difficult challenges confront Zimbabwe. The country faces what
experts call the worst harvest in decades due primarily to government
mismanagement. As a result, the survival of an estimated 5 million
people--more than a third of Zimbabwe's population--will depend on
imported food aid this year. At present, the next year looks equally
bleak as agricultural inputs are scarce and farmers have little
incentive to cultivate their land.
State-sponsored violence and torture continue as ruling party
militants systematically oppress the opposition party, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), and anyone else who does not comply with the
autocratic demands of the Mugabe regime. According to human rights
monitors, more than 100 MDC activists have been killed and thousands
more have been seriously injured since the March 29 elections.
Emergency care for many of these victims is provided by brave doctors
and nurses who are often beaten themselves for performing this critical
medical work.
The violence has forced tens of thousands of Zimbabweans to flee
their homes and villages. Most of these internally displaced persons
(IDPs) have found temporary shelter with relatives and friends. Some
IDPs have sought refuge in so-called ``safe areas,'' supposedly
protected by negotiated security arrangements with government and
United Nations (U.N.) agencies. However, state-sponsored militias are
now attacking even these ``safe havens,'' sending victims running for
their lives once again. With no one to turn to and no place to go, many
Zimbabweans are opting to join the millions of their countrymen who
have fled to an uncertain fate in neighboring lands.
Compounding the humanitarian crisis, the Government of Zimbabwe
(GOZ) suspended the operations of humanitarian NGOs in early June.
Rigidly enforced by local government authorities, military and
militias, this suspension means that NGO staff cannot even leave
offices to assess the conditions and needs in most parts of the
country. Actual aid provision is increasingly difficult. Even churches
and faith-based organizations are afraid to provide aid and sanctuary
to IDPs because of intimidation and fear of violent reprisals.
In short, Mugabe's regime has unleashed organized brutality on an
enormous scale, and largely prevented humanitarian aid from reaching
the bloodied, hungry, terrorized, and displaced people of the country.
USAID PROGRAM RESPONSES
USAID has aggressively responded to the deteriorating situation in
Zimbabwe through both humanitarian assistance as well as our ongoing
democracy and governance initiatives.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
USAID's Food for Peace program provided 175,000 metric tons of food
worth $171 million to millions of the country's most vulnerable people
in the past year. About half of this food was distributed through a
consortium of NGOs known as C-SAFE, consisting of World Vision, CARE,
and Catholic Relief Services. The other half was distributed by the
U.N. World Food Program. Over half of all the food distributed by the
U.N. World Food Program was given by USAID. In total, the U.S.
Government contributed 72 percent of all food assistance given to
Zimbabwe last year.
About $115 million for food aid is already in the funding pipeline
for this next hungry season. More is on the way, but we need GOZ
assurances that our partners will have access to freely distribute this
food to the most vulnerable communities. Since the beginning of
Zimbabwe's deterioration in the year 2000, the U.S. has provided this
country well over 1 million metric tons of food assistance.
USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has also provided
$5.9 million in FY08 through several partner organizations including
Mercy Corps, World Vision, OXFAM, FAO, OCHA, and IOM for nonfood relief
items such as blankets, feeding utensils, personal hygiene supplies,
water and sanitation improvements, emergency medical supplies,
logistics support, and protection and coordination mechanisms. We are
prepared to rapidly respond with more assistance if the situation
deteriorates further.
As part of its ongoing humanitarian effort, USAID also implements a
$26 million, HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment program to help
Zimbabwe fight one of the most severe HIV and AIDS epidemics in the
world. Even as the general health of the population declines progress
is being made, as HIV prevalence has declined from 24 percent in 2001
to 15.6 percent in 2007. Implemented through a variety of partner
organizations, USAID's program elements include:
Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission;
Behavior Change Promotion;
Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) Services;
Commodity Logistics and Drug Procurement;
Testing and Counseling;
Palliative Care;
Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children.
USAID efforts confront not only a huge disease burden, but also a
badly deteriorated public health system. Thus, our programs are
designed with intentional spillover effects to shore up overall systems
within the public health sector, while we address specific HIV/AIDS-
related needs.
Our NGO partners are the real heroes in the humanitarian sphere, as
they struggle to maintain critical, life-saving assistance in spite of
severe constraints. We want to express our deep appreciation and
admiration for their excellent, unstinting efforts in meeting the
critical needs of Zimbabweans, often at great risk of personal peril.
The restrictions on aid agency operations are prohibiting us from
responding in typical ways. Without permission to access displaced and
vulnerable populations, the humanitarian organizations are handicapped.
To create the ``humanitarian space'' necessary for aid operations, we
are working with other donors to encourage the U.N. to strengthen its
efforts to press the Government of Zimbabwe to put a stop to the
violence and open up humanitarian access. We are hopeful that these
U.N. interventions--on behalf of the donor and humanitarian community--
will soon bear fruit.
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES
The U.S. Government seeks the restoration of truly representative
democracy and responsible governance for Zimbabwe. To that end, USAID
programs have focused on restoring the rule of law, protecting human
rights, fostering good governance, enhancing citizen participation and
consensus-building, expanding media communication, strengthening civil
society and democratic institutions, promoting transparent elections
and supporting citizen oversight of the electoral process.
USAID partners and programs provide technical assistance and other
support to boost the capacity of nongovernmental actors and citizens to
more actively participate in the debate on the future direction of the
country. Within an extremely restrictive environment, these civil
society actors are working to shape and strengthen democratic
institutions in an effort to make them more responsive and accountable
to Zimbabwean society.
Although sometimes overshadowed by the country's continuing
turmoil, USAID programs have made significant gains with civil society
and the forces of democracy within Zimbabwe. In the historic March 29,
2008, poll--the first ever defeat for Mugabe and his ruling ZANU-PF--
prodemocracy groups mobilized millions of Zimbabweans to ``get out the
vote,'' leading to a remarkable expression of the people's choice under
the difficult conditions prevailing at that time in the country. The
ruling party was not able to rig the elections outright in part due to
a USAID-funded ``parallel vote tabulation'' (PVT) that released results
of sample-based counting in a rapid and transparent manner. Despite the
difficult country conditions, this initiative was one of the most
successful such undertakings of this PVT technology practiced anywhere
to date.
Legal and medical support to victims of state oppression, made
possible largely through USAID assistance, have encouraged activists to
continue pressing for democratic change. In addition, USAID supports
programs that document human rights abuses, torture, and other crimes
for future accountability and reconciliation.
Initiatives to inform and mobilize regional and international media
and civil society groups have resulted in increasing condemnation and
isolation of the discredited Mugabe regime. This pressure has garnered
increased room for engagement with SADC and the African Union, and
increased prospects for a negotiated solution to the crisis. These
gains need to be protected and advanced with continued USG support.
USAID'S CONTINGENCY PLANNING
USAID stands ready with other donors to provide substantive
development assistance to Zimbabwe once conditions permit. Such
assistance would be premised on a new government which respects and
demonstrates clear progress on the following common donor principles:
Full and equal access to humanitarian assistance;
Commitment to macroeconomic stabilization in accordance with
guidance from relevant international agencies;
Restoration of the rule of law, including enforcement of
contracts, an independent judiciary, and respect for property
rights;
Commitment to the democratic process and respect for
internationally accepted human rights standards, including a
commitment to freedom of expression, freedom of print and
broadcast media, freedom of assembly, and freedom of
association;
A commitment to timely elections held in accordance with
international standards, and in the presence of international
election observers.
With the support of Congress, upon the return of democracy, we will
seek to invest in Zimbabwe so that it can begin its process of
stabilization and recovery. Our staff and partners are ready to engage
with a new, reform-minded government and other donors to build a
comprehensive reconstruction program. A Multi-Donor Trust Fund,
administered by the World Bank, is already completing analyses on
various social and economic sectors to give us a collective,
coordinated roadmap for reconstruction to discuss with a new democratic
government.
However, if the violence does not stop, if aid organizations are
not allowed to resume life-saving assistance, if widespread fighting
escalates and forces mass population displacement, then the
international community will be faced with a humanitarian disaster on a
much larger scale than the serious situation which we already face.
With our partners and donors, USAID is simultaneously working to
both prevent a worst case scenario while responding to immediate needs.
We do not know which turn Zimbabwe will take in its tumultuous journey,
but USAID stands ready to support the people of Zimbabwe in realizing
their rightful aspirations for liberation from the current brutal and
despotic regime and in the transition to a new, more just and
prosperous society.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I welcome any questions
that you and other members of the committee may have.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ms. Almquist.
We will begin with a 7-minute round, and for all the
Senators here, if and when the vote starts, I will just briefly
recess the committee until I run over and vote and come back.
Assistant Secretary Frazer, with the unfortunate veto by
Russia and China of the U.N. Security Council resolution, how
do you intend to generate support for an international arms
embargo and multilateral sanctions against those responsible
for these recent abuses? And what is the strategy moving
forward to secure greater international pressure on Robert
Mugabe, the individuals who are listed in the U.N. resolution,
and more broadly, the relevant ZANU-PF?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Thank you, Senator.
Right now we are focused on the regional effort. We will
continue to work very closely with the European Union on
increasing our sanctions. We are looking at additional new
sanctions, both in terms of on individuals and also on
government entities as well, so moving beyond the targeted
sanctions. We are working with European countries to do the
same.
We are working with like-minded countries within Africa to
increase their engagement with their subregional bodies, as
well as with the African Union, to try to bring that additional
pressure.
We will have to work at the Foreign Minister and head of
state level in Asia. Right now we do not see a lot of interest
on the part of China and, of course, Russia, but in general, in
Asia or in the Middle East to have true international
sanctions, but we think that the Zimbabwe Government has been
oriented more toward the European Union economies. And so we--
Africa, the United States, and Europe--can probably bring
greater pressure.
Senator Feingold. And then can you say more specifically
about your particular efforts to engage African governments and
secure their support? I mean, this is an area where there are
some positive things, certainly the Zambian approach, Botswana
approach, others. I understand the Angolan approach is more
moderate and helpful than it used to be. And then there would
be other obvious relevant countries. But I fear that a
perceived divide again between the West and regional leaders
could undermine a coordinated response. So could you say a
little bit more about that?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Yes. I do believe that there
has been a bit of sea change in the attitudes of African
governments, especially in the southern Africa region, where
there are many more countries in SADC who are openly
criticizing President Mugabe. And that is critically important
to bring the necessary pressure. But across Africa, you have
many countries, especially those like Sierra Leone and Liberia
that have themselves gone through turmoil and civil war,
publicly calling for the Mugabe Government to stop the violence
and have a credible electoral process to prevent a decline into
civil war. And even Nigeria, which had its own flawed election,
is saying that they are trying to take responsibility for that
flawed election through their legal process.
So I do think that there have been significant voices, and
it matters for our policy because without the support,
especially of the subregion, but of Africa as a whole, it is
very difficult to mount the necessary pressure for a democratic
transition in Zimbabwe.
Senator Feingold. And I appreciate your reference to the
sea change, which is largely in words, but it also has to be
reflected, obviously, in actions. What actions do you think you
can expect from these countries?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Well, the immediate issue are
the transparency and the credibility of the negotiation
process. I think we have all heard from the MDC that they would
like that mediation to be broadened to include not only SADC,
as led by President Mbeke, but also to have an African Union
envoy included in the mediation. So I think that that is
critically important.
There is expected to be a SADC extraordinary session on
Thursday of this week. We will be watching with interest to see
what decisions are taken out of that SADC session. But I
believe that the mediation process is probably the focal point
at this point.
Senator Feingold. I understand that so-called talks about
talks, as they are called, between ZANU-PF and the opposition,
MDC, resumed in Pretoria last week and will continue in Harare
tomorrow. What role is the United States playing and what role
will we be playing in these talks in the weeks ahead? What
specific contributions can we make to the ongoing mediation
efforts?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Well, we certainly should play
a role and can be very constructive. We are playing a role on
the outside of the talks in the sense that, as I mentioned, we
have been pushing for greater transparency. We are clearly in
touch with the MDC. We are also in touch with the Foreign
Ministers and regional leaders of SADC and the African Union.
We have not been party to, or seen, any of the negotiating
documents, which is actually quite rare in Africa in conflict
mediation. Normally we would be more informed of the specifics
of what is taking place.
So we have only heard from one side that in fact they are
just talking about the conditions for holding talks. But we see
in the South African media often the impression that there are
more substantive discussions taking place, but we cannot
confirm that. We certainly hope for greater transparency and
for more engagement of the international community in general,
but most certainly of the United States.
Senator Feingold. What are the options for broadening the
current mediation to include SADC, AU, and/or U.N.
representation? And talk about the prospects for each of those
institutions to become more involved, what role they can best
play in a coordinated mediation effort.
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Well, the African Union in its
resolution took a decision that the mediation should be
strengthened, but they asked SADC to go back and look at how
they can strengthen it. So the meeting that is planned for
Thursday will be critical.
My expectation is it depends on the time line. If the South
Africans are truly brokering a real agreement, i.e.,
substantive talks, which I do not believe is happening, but if
that is happening, then there will not be an opportunity for
really strengthening that mediation process.
But I think the feeling of everyone at the African Union,
or as reflected in their resolution, is certainly the feeling
of the G-8 when they also called for a strengthened mediation,
and of the Security Council when it took its formal statement
on Zimbabwe. And that is the need for a more permanent presence
who can negotiate some type of transitional government or
coalition government. For example, there might be a secretariat
much like Kofi Annan's mediation in Zimbabwe where there is a
dedicated person who stays in Harare and works with the parties
through the negotiation. I think that that is the idea of both
a strengthened and expanded mediation.
Senator Feingold. I thank you very much.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Frazer, you were at the Sharm el-Sheikh meetings a
couple of weeks ago?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Yes.
Senator Isakson. In your printed testimony, you say that
although it was about water and sanitation, the most topic of
conversation was Mugabe. Was Mugabe there?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Yes; he was.
Senator Isakson. So these were backroom conversations,
not----
Assistant Secretary Frazer. In the hall, back room, in
their formal but closed door sessions, Zimbabwe featured very
prominently, as well as in many of the bilateral meetings which
were taking place.
Senator Isakson. What was the consensus of the comments?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Well, I think that the general
consensus was that the June 27 election could not be considered
credible, that it took place in an environment of intimidation
and violence, that there is a crisis in Zimbabwe of a
constitutional nature, and that there needed to be some type of
negotiated outcome. The formal statement of the AU called for a
government of national unity. People called it a government of
national unity, a coalition government, a transitional
government. So they did not define what the nature of that
government would look like.
But clearly, there was no one who accepted the legitimacy
that Robert Mugabe won the runoff election. There was no
congratulation. There was no acknowledgement. There was
rejection of his claim to having been a victor on June 27.
Senator Isakson. Actually the MDC candidate actually
withdrew before the runoff. Is that not correct?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. That is right.
Senator Isakson. And that was because of the fear and the
violence and intimidation.
Assistant Secretary Frazer. That is right. The violence
against his supporters, the dismantlement of his election
machinery.
Senator Isakson. They have a parliamentary form of
government?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Yes.
Senator Isakson. What percent of the Parliamentarians are
MDC?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. The MDC now enjoys a majority
of the members of Parliament after the March 29 election.
Senator Isakson. I notice Prime Minister Odinga of Kenya
spoke out publicly. Has Mugabe's intimidation gone beyond his
borders? Has there been any retribution against any of the
leaders that have spoken out outside of Zimbabwe?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. There was a bit of a diplomatic
fray between Zimbabwe and Botswana in particular, but Mugabe
made statements that were considered hostile to the neighboring
countries who spoke out against him at the AU summit--Zambia,
Botswana, and others. And so there is greater tension in the
region, especially among the heads of state.
Senator Isakson. Given the action of China and Russia in
the Security Council, is it fair to say they are enablers of
Mugabe?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Most certainly they enabled
Mugabe. By preventing us from putting an arms embargo on the
government when the government is using violence against the
population and when civil society across southern Africa
rejected the shipment of Chinese arms, you would have thought
that they would have learned a lesson.
Senator Isakson. Given that and given what has happened
with the Chinese vis-a-vis Darfur, how do they talk about China
in these conversations when you are at these meetings?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. It is very mixed because many
of them enjoy the loans that the Chinese are providing. They
are seeking greater investment from China.
On the other hand, I think that many believe that they are
enabling authoritarian governments. Certainly African civil
society has expressed continuing concern about China's role.
I think that it is fair to say that China is finding its
way in Africa, and I would, if I were advising, caution them
that they should be on the side of the people of Africa.
Obviously, supporting governments is important and necessary in
their diplomatic relations, but they need to look at the
Zimbabwean Government as one in which the people have largely
rejected that leadership. A new day is coming in Zimbabwe, and
China would want to be on the right side of the forces of
democratic change.
Senator Isakson. What is Russia's interest? Is it economic?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Well, I would certainly say
that for those who opposed the U.N. Security Council
resolution, that we should follow the money. I would certainly
say that.
Senator Isakson. That usually works.
Assistant Secretary Frazer. But I am not sure of Russia
because at the G-8 summit, the Russian President indicated his
willingness to support further tougher measures against
Zimbabwe, and then for Russia to veto the UNSC resolution, it
was a bit of a whiplash for us. It is hard to explain.
Senator Isakson. Ms. Almquist, did I hear you correctly
that the infection rate is 16 percent of citizens with AIDS?
Ms. Almquist. There is a 16-percent prevalence rate, yes.
Senator Isakson. We are obviously talking about PEPFAR on
the floor of the Senate today and the African AIDS program. Has
our program been able to reach into Zimbabwe?
Ms. Almquist. Oh, very much so. We have about an $18-$20
million PEPFAR program there providing some level of care for
HIV-infected and AIDS population. And we are able to see some
success with that.
It is a difficult environment to work in because of the
general situation in the country and because we have to work
with the Ministry of Health in order to carry out our PEPFAR
programs. We work through partner organizations and we
coordinate with the Ministry of Health. We think that there is
much more that we can do, particularly if we succeed in getting
a transition to a more reform-minded government, and we would
hope very much to be able to scale up our assistance on HIV/
AIDS in that case.
Senator Isakson. So the overall governmental situation may
be somewhat of an inhibitor, but is Mugabe directly an
inhibitor of the AIDS assistance?
Ms. Almquist. In fact, the government suspended NGO
activity, you may have heard, on June 4, and then subsequently
clarified that they would permit NGO's to provide assistance
for school feeding and for HIV clinics. And so we have an
indication of support from Mugabe's government for those
activities to go forward. Unfortunately, our partners have not
felt that those instructions were communicated down through all
the systems of government and that the space has not been there
up till now to actually resume those activities.
We think that in the coming week or 2, some of our partners
will begin trying to resume HIV-related feeding programs and
school feeding programs and some of the activities in that
regard. So it will be tested very quickly here to see if, in
fact, there is space even now for those programs to go forward.
Senator Isakson. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
We generally go on the basis of seniority on the
subcommittee, but if you want to defer to Senator Kerry, it is
fine with me.
Senator Bill Nelson. I will defer to you and ask you to do
the same for me in future. [Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. I will try to minimize those opportunities.
Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
convening this hearing. I would also like to thank our witness
for coming here today.
Madam Secretary Frazer, it is great to see you again. I saw
you in Sharm el-Sheikh and we had a good dinner and an
opportunity to talk about all of these issues. I appreciate
your efforts that you were making there. I know you were
working hard to move toward a positive resolution with respect
to Zimbabwe.
But I have to tell you, first of all, and share with my
colleagues how disturbing it was to have Robert Mugabe at that
conference. And then to watch some of the continent's leaders,
including the host I might add regrettably, turn a kind of
blind eye to Zimbabwe's agony except for the discussions that
you described. And was there a lot of consternation? Yes. Was
there a lot of backroom chatter? Yes. But when it came time to
have the African Union respond, as I think and you think and
many of us believe it should have responded, it did not. And
that is the measure. That is the bottom-line test here.
I could not help but feel, as I thought about what is
happening on the continent there and in other places, that
there is a sense that the world has lost its capacity for
appropriate outrage. Darfur and Zimbabwe are two of many
widespread violations of the norms of decency across the globe.
And the words are beginning to fall flat, big-time flat. And
the actions are just not there.
For months now, Mugabe's thugs have been savaging
opposition politicians and members of the opposition party and
anyone else who dared to dream of a peaceful end to this reign
of terror.
I was in South Africa last November and I was particularly
surprised to hear the bitter comments from people in South
Africa about their own President's inaction with respect to
Zimbabwe and Mugabe.
During the last months, Zimbabwean villagers were literally
handed bullets and told to choose between their lives and
democracy. And in the process while the balloting was occuring,
MDC believes that 113 of its supporters were killed, about
10,000 were injured, more than 2,000 unlawfully detained and
over 200,000 fled their homes. And frankly, the details are
much more horrifying than those statistics convey because, as
we know, women were burned to death. Young men were tortured
and dismembered. The elderly were savagely beaten, and Mugabe
had the audacity to say to the world, ``what do I care about an
election? An `X' on a ballot means nothing against the power of
a gun.''
And against all of this, where are we? Where is the world?
I mean, where are we? China and Russia get to veto this and
sort of walk away, and there is no outrage and indignity even
at the U.N. I guess all of us would hope that Morgan
Tsvangirai's bold move to step back and not continue his
candidacy in order to save lives would have mobilized the
continent and the world. But it did not.
And indeed, a day and a half after the outrage of this
nonelection, Mugabe was allowed to walk in and walk around,
albeit there were comments about him. But that is the full
extent of it. A verbal tongue-lashing is simply not enough.
On the plus side, at least Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia,
Kenya, Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone's governments ended
the conspiracy of silence that has surrounded such activities
and they spoke out. But as you know, both SADC and the AU could
do more.
So let us lay on the table at this committee today the
administration's best judgments about exactly what it is going
to take here and what the possibilities are.
Do you really see mediation changing this?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Can I answer that?
Senator Kerry. Yes.
Assistant Secretary Frazer. It depends on the quality of
mediation and it depends on whether the March 29 result is
respected in terms of the nature of the government that would
come out of the mediation. I would believe that a mediation
that led to some type of transitional government that could
then prepare for elections so that we could get back to a
democratic path is the right way.
Senator Kerry. Why would mediation without adequate
sanction leverage be able to do what the last election failed
to do? Because Mugabe declared unequivocally that he will not
give up power. If the world sort of walked away at the African
Union and the world walked away on the election and he is
sitting there with all the levers of power, why mediate?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Senator, the way I view it is
that fundamentally we all agree that while the world has to
pressure the Mugabe Government, the Zimbabwean people have to
find a way ahead. And the fundamental problem here is that
there is a leadership challenge within ZANU-PF. There is a
succession problem. You have an old man clinging to power who
refuses to move aside. This is a problem for his own party. And
so part of it has to be his party has to deal with him.
Senator Kerry. Can you shed more light on that? I know
there is this struggle, and we have been hearing reports about
the divisions within ZANU-PF. How deepare those, and what are
you reading into that? If the world, particularly South Africa,
were to suddenly speak up and offer a bolder set of sanctions,
does that not encourage such divisions and perhaps isolate
Mugabe within his own party?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. It does, indeed. In fact, his
main base of support right now is with the security sector, his
army, his police, intelligence officers, the air force. Those
are the supporters of the status quo, not sort of more moderate
political civilian leadership. And so there is a fundamental
divide in the party.
The MDC itself is challenged with divisions. The MDC needs
to stand strong for the will of the people and not just a seat
in government.
Senator Kerry. My final question is, What are we able to do
to hasten that, encourage that, leverage it, and make it
happen?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. We will continue to lead on the
international stage, but we also have to push for greater
leadership within SADC itself. SADC is now divided, and the
balance of opinion in SADC is against the Mugabe government,
but there are many silent countries in SADC who are saying
nothing while a few are fighting, some who were shielding
Mugabe and others who were saying it is now time for him to be
expelled from their council until there is a return to
democracy. And so SADC's own house is problematic, but we are
trying to push for those silent majority to also speak out.
Senator Kerry. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary, and I want
to thank my good friend and colleague for his courtesy.
Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Bill Nelson. First of all, I want to compliment
both of you that you are giving straight answers and they are
to the point. That has not been the experience of this Senator
with a lot of the administration witnesses in this committee,
as well as my other committees. So, thank you.
Two weeks ago during the recess, in meeting with the
government leaders in four southern Africa countries, I was
struck, for example, with the President of Uganda and the
President of Rwanda both basically punting the issue of Mugabe
to the Southern African Development Community and basically
punting to the Government of South Africa, whose leader is
simply not putting the pressure on Mugabe.
So my question is they are about to have an election, and
if the leadership shifts to the one that we think is going to
be elected President, do we expect a change in tune of South
Africa toward how Mbeke, the present President, has been
coddling Mugabe in Zimbabwe? That is the question.
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Senator, I am optimist, and so
I am very hopeful that we can actually move toward a return to
democracy before early 2009 when that election in South Africa
happens. But you are quite right that the head of the ANC,
Jacob Zuma, who is expected to be the next President, if he
stands for election, has taken a tough stance on Mugabe. And
the ANC as a party has taken a tough stance against ZANU-PF and
has clearly said thatit is now siding with MDC because MDC is
siding with the people of Zimbabwe, and MDC is a party for
change. And the people of Zimbabwe tried to elect that party on
March 29. So, yes; we would expect a difference in policy
between Jacob Zuma and the current mediation efforts of
President Mbeke.
Senator Bill Nelson. I certainly hope so, and is it not
interesting that Nelson Mandela has been very critical of the
Zimbabwean regime, as has Bishop Tutu, and yet President Mbeke
takes a different tune?
So when do you think that election--when is there going to
be a change that Zuma possibly could take over, and do we have
to wait that long? Are we really looking at that?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. The South African election is
in March 2009.
As I said, I think that we can have a change in Zimbabwe
sooner than that, and I think that we need to expand the
mediation. I think that we can clearly get there. Part of it is
ZANU-PF, as I mentioned to Senator Kerry, dealing with its own
internal party struggles, their succession problems, but I
definitely think that expanded, more transparent, credible
mediation can bring Zimbabwe to a path of democratic change.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I hope so.
Now, let me point out another inconsistency. The Senator
from Georgia just mentioned this very strong statement by the
new Prime Minister of Kenya, Odinga. That occurred at the time
that I held a joint press conference with him. Rather, he held
the press conference and had me as part of it. And that was one
of the questions to both of us. And I am telling you he did not
spare anything. He let loose. And that was at the time that
this African Union meeting was going on in Sharm el-Sheikh, and
his President, lo and behold, did not say a word. So right
there in a coalition Government in Kenya, you would think that
there is a split on the idea of what to do with Zimbabwe. Tell
us about that.
Assistant Secretary Frazer. I am not sure that there is a
split in terms of the substance of a policy toward Zimbabwe. I
think the Kenyans are still working out the power-sharing
arrangement and who gives instructions to the Foreign Minister
between the President and the Prime Minister. So I think that
that is a bit of an internal process working its way out. I do
not think this is a substantive problem; I do not think anyone
has tried to roll back the Prime Minister's statements on
Zimbabwe. So I think that they are unified on policy.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is good to hear.
Did you see this Reuter's story, out right now,
``Zimbabwe's Christian Churches Reject Mugabe Victory''?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Yes, Senator; I did see the
story.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, they have got enough courage to
stand up and say that even with his goons running around.
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Well, I think that that is the
point. Civil society across Africa, in Zimbabwe, in the
southern African region, in South Africa itself, across the
entire continent are speaking out very clearly. There was a
petition, as such, in the Financial Times with former heads of
state, prominent civil society leaders across Africa, saying
that it is unacceptable what is taking place in Zimbabwe. And
so I do think that we are in a very different position than we
were just a year ago.
Senator Bill Nelson. Normally they would darken the lights
when my time was up, but I still have 37 seconds left to go.
Well, since the mike is still on, let me--let there be light.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kerry. It is the cost of fuel. [Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. My last comment is again a compliment
to you all. Well, interesting, the lights turn on when I am
ready to make a compliment to you. [Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. And that is, you know, I have been a
lot of places on Planet Earth and the Government policies of
the United States Government are not held in high esteem by the
peoples in other countries, but there is a notable exception in
Africa. And that is in large part because of the success of
PEPFAR and the success of USAID in the feeding program that has
to go hand in glove with the PEPFAR program.
As a matter of fact, in Kenya, representatives from across
the board, government and business, told me that they think
that America's favorability rating is upward in the 1980s, of
which I made a crack. If a certain person is elected President,
I expect it will probably be in Kenya 99.9 percent.
However, even in a country like Tanzania, our Ambassador,
who is a political appointee but is doing a very good job, said
that he thinks that the favorability because, in large part, of
PEPFAR is upward of 60 percent toward America in that country.
So I pass along that compliment to you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
We will start a second round.
Ms. Frazer, I would like to ask you to talk about the U.S.
sanctions on Zimbabwe. I had hoped we would hear from Treasury
on this, but they were apparently unable to send a
representative.
Give me your assessment of the effectiveness of our current
sanctions regime, how much money has been frozen, where are the
gaps, and how can these sanctions be more effective.
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Thank you, Senator.
I think that our sanctions regime is fairly robust. We have
two types of sanctions on Zimbabwe, financial restrictions
against individuals who are supporting the policies of Mugabe
to undermine democratic institutions and processes in Zimbabwe.
And those sanctions are against 135 people and 30 corporate
entities. We also have travel restrictions on individuals who
are undermining democracy in Zimbabwe. This includes members of
Mugabe's inner circle and broader members of the government and
some of their family members.
We are looking to expand the category of Zimbabweans who
are covered. We are also looking at sanctions on government
entities as well, not just individuals.
I cannot tell you how much money has been blocked. I think
Treasury really has that expertise, and OFAC in particular
would be able to answer that question. But I do know that any
individuals who were carrying out financial transactions with
Zimbabwe would be fined up to $500,000 for corporations and
$250,000 for individuals. So there are fairly hefty sanctions.
Also, it is a signal to international financial
institutions not to do business with those on OFAC's list. Our
banks are not allowed to do business with them, but other banks
also look at that same list and decide on their own not to do
so.
Senator Feingold. And specifically about investment in
mining in Zimbabwe, 2 weeks ago the media reported that some
British-based mining firms are actually increasing investment
in Zimbabwe which either directly or indirectly benefits the
Mugabe regime. What steps is the United States taking to
reverse this trend and will the proposed EU sanctions
effectively regulate this investment?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. OFAC and Treasury, under
Treasury's direction, are looking into this very issue, and we
are certainly considering in our next round of sanctions, which
we are preparing now, to have an impact on any such
investments.
Senator Feingold. State Department officials have said
publicly that we do not recognize the outcome of the June 27
runoff election and thereby do not recognize the Mugabe
government. What tools exist to formalize that nonrecognition,
and would they be helpful?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. We consider the outcome of that
election as illegitimate, and so we will not accept the
legitimacy of Robert Mugabe on the basis of that election. Our
lawyers, however, are looking at issues of recognition and
nonrecognition and the impact that nonrecognition would have on
our ability to carry out our policy in Zimbabwe. And so we have
not taken any decision as far as formal government recognition,
but we have been very clear that the election itself was
illegitimate and therefore has led to a constitutional crisis
within Zimbabwe that needs resolution in favor of democracy.
Senator Feingold. Now, when the Taliban came to power in
Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Clinton administration announced
that it would not recognize the regime. The State Department
even ordered the Afghan Embassy here in Washington, DC, to be
shut down in 1997.
Do you think such high-level statements from the White
House or diplomatic actions, such as revoking the credentials
of the Zimbabwean ambassador to the United States would be
helpful?
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Again, I think that we are
clearly looking at all of these options, but I think that we do
not want to do anything that prevents our ability to support
the people of Zimbabwe. So our direct engagement is going to be
necessary, and so we are trying to look very carefully at how
options of recognition, nonrecognition, recalling our
ambassador, revoking the Zimbabwe ambassador's credentials
would do on our ability to operate.
Senator Feingold. I hope it is understood that these
options are at least being considered.
Assistant Secretary Frazer. Yes.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Almquist, there has been substantial
increase in U.S. humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe in the
last 2 years. Can you tell me specifically where that increased
assistance is being directed and how would you assess its
effectiveness?
Ms. Almquist. Yes. Last year we provided 72 percent of all
food assistance to Zimbabwe. In years prior to that, we were
about 40 percent of the total food aid for the country. This
year already, in fiscal year 2008, we have provided $120
million in humanitarian assistance. Approximately $114 million
of that is food assistance, and about $6 million is in nonfood
assistance.
Our support is for the most vulnerable and affected by the
current political crisis and the economic deterioration in the
country. We are concerned with mobile and vulnerable
populations. We are concerned with school feeding with programs
that complement our HIV/AIDS programs, et cetera.
So when our partners can work, we think our assistance is
very effective. It does not go through the government. It is
handled by NGO partners and U.N. agencies. And so we have a
high degree of confidence, when they can work, that it gets to
needy populations. Right now, they cannot work, and so our
concern for the humanitarian situation is growing daily.
Senator Feingold. The State Department congressional budget
justification has said that if a change in government does not
take place in 2008, increased aid resources should be directed
towards supporting opposition efforts to press for reforms. I
would like to know what would this increase consist of and how
is USAID currently working with the opposition, MDC, to
strengthen that political party.
Ms. Almquist. We have our democracy and governance program
that is outside of humanitarian assistance, and PEPFAR, our
largest sector of support, in Zimbabwe. In fact, we feel that
most other areas of development assistance are too problematic
at this point to engage. If we had a transition to a reform-
minded government of some sort, we would further strengthen our
democracy and governance programs.
We are working right now on democratic political processes.
We are supporting democratic political parties, which is
primarily the MDC, of course, and institutions of governance.
We have provided critical support to the elections for March 29
in particular, the Zimbabwe Elections Support Network and the
parallel vote tabulation, which allowed us and the world to
know that Morgan Tsvangirai did outstrip Mr. Mugabe in that
election.
We have U.S. support for civil society organizations. Right
now, we have been supporting about 25 organizations. We will
probably move to narrow our focus a bit on those organizations
which can particularly work and operate in rural areas because
we think that is the most critical going forward, to increase
the demand for accountability for responsible governance, to
work on civic participation in legislative processes.
We are also working on parliamentary strengthening. As the
Assistant Secretary mentioned, the MDC did win a majority of
seats in the Parliament. So there are many new Parliamentarians
for training, as well as the engagement of civil society in
parliament.
And then last, we are working on free and independent
media. USAID provides support to VOA programming and
broadcasts, which are critical for transmitting independently
information about what is happening in the country, as well as
supporting local township-level newspapers and training for
journalists.
We are also providing support for victims of the
politically motivated violence in terms of legal assistance,
psychosocial support, and medical care, and also for
documenting the human rights abuses that are taking place.
So we will continue to do those activities in the current
environment. If there is a move and a transitional government
that we can engage with much more broadly, then we will work on
the issues of constitutional reform, electoral reform,
restoring democratic institutions of governance in terms of our
democracy and governance program, and we will also focus on
economic stabilization and recovery with complementary
humanitarian support in the meantime, and then expanding our
health programs to complement the current HIV/AIDS work but
much more broadly work on the health care system which is
literally falling apart right now.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
A vote has started. So to allow Senators to vote, we will
briefly recess and return to this panel.
[Recess.]
Senator Feingold. We will call the committee back to order,
and since the Senators were satisfied with the opportunity to
ask questions, I want to thank the first panel again for all
their responses and their testimony.
And now we will go to the second panel. Thank you for
joining us. Let us begin with Mr. Melia.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. MELIA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Melia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Feingold. Thank you for
asking Freedom House to testify today.
My remarks are based on my personal observations from a
recent visit to Harare just before the March 29 elections and
frequent communication that my colleagues and I have had with
civil society partners in Zimbabwe over the last 2 and a half
years
When Ms. Almquist was talking about the large USAID-
supported effort to strengthen civil society in Zimbabwe, she
was talking largely about a program that we have been
implementing these last 2 and a half years. In fact, in the
month leading up to the March 29 election, we transferred about
$750,000 worth of grants and material assistance to an array of
25 or so civic groups that were mobilizing people to get out
the vote and to monitor those elections. That assistance
included things like satellite phones to communicate results
from polling stations and bicycles for the observers to get out
to those polling stations.
I also want to begin by thanking you, Senator, for your
leadership on the Zimbabwe issue. A lot of us in human rights
community appreciate your efforts in this regard. And I want to
thank you especially for meeting recently with several
Zimbabweans that were in town with us and you took time out of
your schedule to meet with them and listen to their story from
Zimbabwe.
With all that is going on in the world, Sudan and
elsewhere, the subcommittee is correct to focus special
attention on Zimbabwe today for at least these four reasons.
The humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe is catastrophic and
deteriorating daily. We have recited some of those statistics
already today. I will not review them again. But it is clear
that every day that Robert Mugabe remains at the helm is a day
that Zimbabwe sinks noticeably deeper into the quagmire of
hunger, disease, economic collapse, and the ruination of future
generations.
Second, the violent assault on the people of Zimbabwe, the
country's constitution, and its electoral process by the Joint
Operations Command in the implementation of the June 27 runoff
constitutes a coup d'etat. This should already have led to
Zimbabwe's suspension from the African Union and the invocation
by the U.S. of section 608, as it is now called, in the foreign
aid appropriation, the standard provision in U.S. foreign aid
law that requires a cutoff of aid to any government installed
by a coup.
We all read the story in the Washington Post on July 5 by
Craig Timberg describing the Joint Operations Command's
military style plan to extinguish the opposition, code named
CIBD for coercion, intimidation, beating, displacement.
Now, the African Union's Charter on Democracy, Elections
and Governance, adopted just last year in January 2007, makes
clear that--and I am quoting now--``any refusal by an incumbent
government to relinquish power to the winning party or
candidate after free, fair and regular elections'' belongs in
the same category as a ``putsche or coup d'etat'' or
intervention by ``mercenaries, armed rebels or dissidents.'' In
consequence, according to the AU's own charter, as soon as the
Peace and Security Council of the AU would observe that there
has been such a change in government in a state party, it shall
suspend the state party immediately.
While one can discuss how fair and regular were the
elections in Zimbabwe, due to the behavior of the government,
it is clear that the will of the people was expressed on March
29 and is well known to the world. Neither Robert Mugabe nor
ZANU-PF speaks any longer for the majority of the people of
Zimbabwe.
Third, the established institutions of the global
international order are being directly challenged at present by
this coup d'etat and the acquiescence in that coup by key
global actors, including the Governments of South Africa,
China, and Russia. Last Friday's double veto of a U.N. Security
Council resolution reflects the growing antidemocratic
assertiveness that we have seen on the part of the Governments
of both Russia and China and the increasingly active global
campaign they wage to lower the standards on human rights and
democracy in international forums.
Senator Isakson asked earlier about the Russian
Government's motivation in all this. The Russian Foreign
Ministry made it clear in a statement it issued on Saturday
that Moscow's veto on Friday should be understood not only as a
``principled position on Zimbabwe,'' but that it was also
intended to be read much more broadly. The Russian statement
said that ``the adoption of this document by the U.N. Security
Council would have set a dangerous precedent, opening the way
to the Security Council interfering in countries' internal
affairs over various political events, including elections.''
Now, while Friday's failure of the Security Council to act
is an indicator of the deterioration of the ability of the U.N.
to serve as a bulwark of democracy and human rights, we think
that there are some other hopeful signs at present related to
this situation.
The decline in U.S. influence in these global institutions
stems in equal measure from the present administration's policy
of estrangement from the U.N., which has dissipated our
country's ability to shape outcomes, also by the fecklessness
of too many other democratic states who are not willing to
confront bad behavior by their neighbors, and by the growing
confidence and effectiveness of the world's dictators in
seizing control of these bodies. So that while the American
posture on Zimbabwe has generally been quite admirable, as
President Bush and the Congress alike have stepped up to the
challenge with unequivocal statements, making plans for the
massive infusion of aid immediately upon the establishment of a
legitimate government in Harare, it is clear that the U.S. has
lost its ability to lead the Security Council to adopt even
minimal sanctions against a regime as odious as the now
illegitimate Government of Zimbabwe.
Now, at the same time, the disarray on Zimbabwe within the
African Union and SADC is a promising development. Just as
inaction in one body at the global level is a bad sign,
inaction in the regional and subregional institutions is
actually a promising development because it marks an end to
that conspiracy of silence that Senator Kerry spoke about a
little while ago.
Important African voices have been speaking out on the
problem in Zimbabwe. For the first time ever, a SADC election
observer delegation concluded that the elections did not
represent the will of the people. And led by the President of
Zambia, Dr. Mwanawasa, a growing chorus of African heads of
state have spoken out in more and more compelling terms over
the last few weeks. This is important and significant.
The rising tide of African support for a democratic outcome
in Zimbabwe, along with the rejection of the results of June
27, should be as unsurprising as it is significant, and it is
significant. It has implications beyond the present moment in
Zimbabwe and may signal a renewed and genuine commitment to
democratic norms in sub-Saharan Africa, a region that has, at
least in its formal multilateral politics, hitherto rarely been
outspoken on such matters.
In the back of the printed testimony that you have before
you, you will see two charts. There is a table that shows the
overall average score of freedom in Africa rising gradually and
steadily over the last 25 years, which contrasts with the
decline during much of the same period by Zimbabwe where the
scores have declined from a high of 3 on political rights and a
4 on civil liberties to the point where in the last year
Zimbabwe has joined the ranks of the world's most repressive
regimes.
What can we do? I will just say very briefly in conclusion
that I would recommend six steps.
Support a transition government in Zimbabwe rather than a
government of national unity.
No. 2, support the MDC for as long as they speak for the
people of Zimbabwe. As Michelle Gavin, who is sitting next to
me, has written recently, focus on Zimbabwe's people and not
merely on the prominent political actors of the day.
Third, support Zimbabwean civil society. Both Secretary
Frazer and Ms. Almquist spoke to this in their presentations.
Today in Harare there is being convened a national civil
society consultative conference with a score or more of major
Zimbabwean civic groups discussing how they can play a
constructive role in effecting a transition arrangement to move
toward a democratic regime in Zimbabwe, and USAID and the State
Department should continue to support those efforts as they
have up to this point.
The United States should be poised to assist the transition
government. You noted this earlier, Chairman Feingold. The
administration has done well to request $45 million in funding
to assist in the rehabilitation of Zimbabwe once a legitimate
government comes into office. It is not too soon to convene
expert groups to begin planning that transition, and that does
not need to wait for the transition itself.
Finally, I would say support and reward the African
leadership on this transition. A lot has been discussed here
already about those brave African leaders who are stepping
forward. The State Department and even the Congress in its
dealings with African counterparts can provide tangible and
intangible rewards for the African leadership on these issues,
meeting with them, bringing them to the White House, bringing
them to the Capitol Building, making them welcome, treating
them like friends and democratic allies, as well as by
providing additional aid and cooperation to those governments
that are stepping up and trying to change the tenor of intra-
African politics.
I will be glad to respond to other questions. Thank you for
this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Melia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas O. Melia, Deputy Executive Director,
Freedom House, Washington, DC
Chairman Feingold, Senator Isakson, other distinguished members of
the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, thank you for inviting
Freedom House to testify at today's hearing on the ``Crisis in Zimbabwe
and Prospects for Resolution.''
I am pleased to represent Freedom House here today. My remarks are
based on personal observations from a recent visit to Harare, in the
week prior to the March 29 elections; the frequent communication my
colleagues and I have had on a near-daily basis with Zimbabwean civil
society activists with whom we have partnered for 2\1/2\ years in
efforts to enable the people of Zimbabwe to use peaceful political
processes to effect positive change in the governance of the country;
and the historical perspective provided by Freedom House's annual
assessments of the state of political rights and civil liberties since
prior to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. While our analytic work on
Zimbabwe is funded from private sources, I would note that our program
work in Zimbabwe has been funded since 2005 by grants from the U.S.
Agency for International Development, and by complementary grants from
the Australian Agency for International Assistance (AUSAID) and the
British Government.
Senator Feingold, I want to begin by commending you for your
leadership in seeking to foster democratic change for the people of
Zimbabwe. Your tireless efforts, particularly in strategically
communicating to countries throughout the AU, have helped to chip away
at this considerable problem. The sense-of-the-Senate resolution that
you and Senator Isakson shepherded to passage yesterday makes clear
that the United States should support the Zimbabwean people and African
diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe, while also making
clear that the U.S. should play a proactive role in facilitating. I am
sure I speak for many colleagues in the human rights community when I
say we appreciate very much your leadership on Zimbabwe.
There are certainly other important, compelling crises in the world
that cry out for our attention, even in Africa (as we are reminded by
the arrest warrant that was requested yesterday by the chief prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court against President Umar al-Bashir of
Sudan, for the genocidal atrocities being waged by his government
against the people of Dafur).
Yet the subcommittee is correct to focus special attention on
Zimbabwe today for at least these four reasons:
The humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe is catastrophic and is
deteriorating daily. Three socio-political indicators sum up the
devastation wrought by the ZANU-PF government led by Robert Mugabe: The
nation's currency has become worthless, with inflation now running at
an annual rate of 10 million percent and banknotes legally expire 6
months after they are printed; more than one-fifth of the country's
population has fled to neighboring countries in the past 3 years; and
the current life-expectancy of a male born in Zimbabwe is 33 years, one
of the shortest in the world today (and down from 57 years in 1990).
These are horrific statistics that speak to the urgent need for a new
direction for this once prosperous nation of 12 million people.
Last weekend brought an additional, telling data point: According
to Saturday's edition of The Standard (of Zimbabwe), ``more than 80
percent of the country's bakers have temporarily closed shop as flour
shortages take a toll on the battered industry.'' International
humanitarian assistance has been disrupted and blocked by the
government in Harare, which last month has banned most international
aid organizations from fulfilling their missions in Zimbabwe, leading
to the destruction of millions of tons of food aid and the cutoff of
medical assistance to as many as one-third of the country's population.
Every day Robert Mugabe remains at the helm is a day Zimbabwe sinks
noticeably deeper into the quagmire of hunger, spreading disease,
economic collapse and the ruination of future generations.
The violent assault on the people of Zimbabwe, the country's
constitution and its electoral process by the Joint Operations Command
in the implementation of the June 27 runoff election for the Presidency
constitutes a coup d'etat. This should already have led to Zimbabwe's
suspension from the African Union and the invocation by the U.S. of
section 608 of P.L. 110-161, the standard provision in U.S. foreign aid
appropriations requiring a cutoff of aid to any government installed by
a coup. As reported in the Washington Post by Craig Timberg on July 5,
the leadership of the Joint Operations Command designed and implemented
a military-style plan to extinguish the opposition, code named ``CIBD''
for ``Coercion, Intimidation, Beating, Displacement.'' While the U.S.
is not currently providing any assistance to the Government of
Zimbabwe, the formal invocation would make clear the American view of
the illegality of Mugabe's hasty inauguration on June 28. The African
Union's Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, adopted in
January 2007, makes clear--in Chapter 8, concerning ``Sanctions in Case
of Unconstitutional Changes in Government,'' in Article 23--that
``[a]ny refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the
winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections,''
belongs in the same category as a ``putsche or coup d'etat'' or
intervention by ``mercenaries, . . . armed rebels or dissidents . . .''
In consequence, according to the AU's Charter on Democracy, Elections
and Governance, as soon as the Peace and Security Council of the AU
``observes'' that there has been an unconstitutional change in
government in a State Party, it shall suspend the State Party
``immediately.'' While one can discuss how ``free, fair and regular''
were the elections in Zimbabwe, due to the depredations of the
government, the will of the people was expressed on March 29 and is
well known to the world. Neither Robert Mugabe nor ZANU-PF speaks any
longer for the majority of the people of Zimbabwe.
The established institutions of the global international order are
being directly challenged by this coup d'etat and the acquiescence in
that coup by key global actors, including the Governments of South
Africa, China, and Russia. Last Friday's double veto of a U.N. Security
Council resolution made clear that the international community is
simply not able to respond in a serious manner to one of the crudest
campaigns against the will of a nation's people the world has seen in
some time. The resolution would have imposed global arms sanctions on
Zimbabwe, and travel and financial restrictions on 14 senior regime
officials with the bloodiest hands. The resolution secured the
necessary majority of 9 out of 15 states to be adopted, but was
defeated by vetoes from China and Russia, while Libya and Vietnam also
voted with South Africa against the measure. These vetoes reflect the
growing antidemocratic assertiveness that we have seen on the part of
the governments of both Russia and China, and the increasingly active
global campaign they wage to lower the standards on human rights and
democracy as addressed in international forums.
The Russian Foreign Ministry made it clear that Moscow's veto on
Friday should be understood not only as a ``principled position on
Zimbabwe,'' but that it was also intended to be read much more broadly.
``[T]he adoption of this document by the U.N. Security Council would
have set a dangerous precedent,'' said the statement released by the
Russian Foreign Ministry on July 12, ``opening the way to the Security
Council interfering in countries' internal affairs over various
political events, including elections . . .'' China is the principal
supplier of military equipment to Zimbabwe's Government, and so may
have cast its veto as much to sustain its export position as to make a
comparable statement of diplomatic philosophy. The Government of South
Africa, on the other hand, added another sordid act to its dismal
record on the suffering of Zimbabwe's people--and presumably has made
its peace with the fact that it clearly does not deserve to be
considered a permanent member of the Security Council.
Friday's failure of the Security Council to act is an indicator of
the deterioration in the ability of United Nations institutions to
serve as bulwarks of democratic ideals and human rights standards in
the present age of authoritarian assertiveness. The U.N.'s Human Rights
Council has similarly declined to take up Zimbabwe's deteriorating
situation. We at Freedom House believe that the decline in U.S.
influence in these global institutions stems in equal measure from the
present administration's policy of estrangement from the U.N., which
has dissipated our country's ability to shape outcomes; the
fecklessness of too many other democratic states who are not willing to
confront bad behavior by their neighbors (especially in the absence of
the United States from these battles); and the growing confidence and
effectiveness of the world's dictatorships in seizing control of these
bodies.
The American posture on Zimbabwe has generally been quite
admirable, as President Bush and the U.S. Congress have stepped up to
the challenge with unequivocal statements and by making plans for a
massive infusion of aid immediately upon the establishment of a
legitimate government in Harare, and by proposing to tighten the
targeted sanctions against key members of the regime. But it is clear
that the U.S. has lost its ability to lead the Security Council to
adopt even minimal sanctions against a regime as odious as the
illegitimate Government of Zimbabwe, whose policies are clearly
destabilizing the southern African region through the displacement of
millions and the impoverishment of an entire nation.
Disarray on Zimbabwe in the African Union and the Southern African
Development Community is a promising development. While the double veto
in the Security Council underscored the demise of democratic
sensibilities in that venue, the fracturing of consensus in African
regional and subregional organizations is a positive and hopeful sign.
Even though Mr. Mugabe was permitted to attend the recent African Union
summit in Egypt in the immediate aftermath of the coup on June 27, the
cold welcome and the numerous critical statements that were made by
African heads of state and government, both in private and public,
speaks to the emergence of a stronger democratic sensibility in sub-
Saharan Africa. Important African voices have been speaking out, with
clarity and forcefulness, on the problem in Zimbabwe and the need for
the region to respect the will of that country's people, rather than to
tolerate the descent into darkness of Mugabe's Zimbabwe.
For the first time ever, a SADC election observer delegation
concluded, following Zimbabwe's June 27 debacle, that ``the elections
did not represent the will of the people.'' Led by the courageous
President of Zambia, Dr. Levy Mwanawasa, a growing chorus of African
heads of government has over the course of the past few weeks spoken
out in ever more vociferous terms. Dr. Mwanawasa, the SADC chairman,
said before the June 27 runoff, ``What is happening in Zimbabwe is a
matter of serious embarrassment to all of us. It is scandalous for the
SADC to remain silent in the light of what is happening.'' U.N. Deputy
Secretary General Asha-Rose Migiro, the former Foreign Minster of
Tanzania, said ``When an election is conducted in an atmosphere of fear
and violence, its outcome cannot have a legitimacy that is built on the
will of the people.'' She told the Security Council, as she briefed the
15-member body on the recent African Union summit in Sharm el-Sheikh,
``the principle of democracy is at stake,'' and that, in the case of
Zimbabwe, ``flawed elections produced illegitimate results.'' The
President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the President of Ghana,
John Kufuor, and leaders in Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Senegal, have all made clear that the political process in Zimbabwe is
not acceptable.
Leading voices in South Africa, from Nelson Mandela to ANC chair
Jacob Zuma, have distanced themselves from the approach being pursued
by the current President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. The leadership
demonstrated by respected African figures outside of governing circles,
such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who said that South Africa had
``failed its Apartheid-era friends,'' has inspired others to speak out
forcefully. Reverend Mpho Moruakgomo of the Botswana Council of
Churches stated, ``What has happened in Zimbabwe is a slap in the face
to all humanity. It is regrettable that a democracy so hard won, for
which so many died, has been allowed to be desecrated by one egotist
and his military junta.''
Note in contrast, outlying statements such as that of the head of
state of The Gambia, President Alhaji Dr Yahya Jammeh, who has given
the June 27 Presidential election runoff in Zimbabwe a clean bill of
health, saying ``Zimbabwe's election is valid.'' President Jammeh, of
course, came to power in July 1994, at the age of 29, as the leader of
a coup that ended three decades of peaceful and largely fair elections
in his country. Though still a young man, Jammeh's is the view of the
``old Africa,'' now being replaced in more and more countries by the
``new Africa'' that is based increasingly, if not yet entirely, on
respect for the rule of law and the will of the people.
While headlines about misrule in Sudan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe may
obscure the truth, the fact is that Africa is becoming more democratic
over time, more respectful of civil liberties and political rights. The
rising tide of African support for a democratic outcome in Zimbabwe,
along with rejection of the results of June 27, is therefore as
unsurprising as it is significant. It has implications beyond the
present moment in Zimbabwe, and may signal a renewed and genuine
commitment to democratic norms in sub-Saharan Africa--a region that, at
least in its formal multilateral politics, has hitherto rarely been
outspoken on such matters. It is not only because the situation in
Zimbabwe is so egregious that so many African leaders are speaking out
and calling for international action. It is because the democratic
character of sub-Saharan Africa is improving. Even as Zimbabwe's
freedom scores have steadily declined over the past two and one-half
decades, the continental average has gradually moved upward.
I enclose two charts summarizing data from the Freedom House annual
survey, Freedom in the World. Note (in Figure 1) that the overall
average score for Africa has moved, since 1990, from a rather low score
of 6 (on a scale from 1 to 7, where 7 is the lowest) in political
rights, to 4.2 in 2008. Civil liberties scores have improved in the
same period overall from 5.3 to 4. This is not only hopeful; it
constitutes significant change that affects the quality of life for
ordinary men and women across the continent.
Zimbabwe, on the other hand, achieved its highest levels of freedom
in 1981, receiving a 3 for political rights and a 4 for civil
liberties. Since that year (as Figure 2 conveys), freedom in Zimbabwe
has steadily declined and finally fell into the ``Not Free'' category
of our rankings in 2001 following the fundamentally flawed elections in
June 2000 and the initiation of government seizures of white-owned
farmland. Zimbabwe then joined the ranks of ``The World's Most
Repressive Regimes'' in 2005.
The ruling party, ZANU-PF, has made a mockery of every election
since the Movement for Democratic Change was created in 1999 and waged
a successful campaign to reject the 2000 draft constitution that aimed
to expand executive power.
In fact, Zimbabweans today are denied just about every single
fundamental political and civil right:
Freedom of expression is severely curtailed through a Draconian
legal framework that includes the Access to Information and Protection
of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Official Secrets Act, the Public Order and
Security Act (POSA), and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform)
Act. Journalists are routinely subjected to verbal intimidation,
physical attacks, arrest and detention, and financial pressure by the
police and supporters of the ruling party. Foreign journalists are
rarely granted visas, and local correspondents for foreign publications
have been refused accreditation or threatened with lawsuits and
deportation.
Academic freedom is limited. All schools are under state control,
and education aid is often distributed based on parents' political
loyalties. Security forces and ZANU-PF thugs harass dissident
university students, who have been arrested or expelled for protesting
against government policy. In 2007, several protests by university
students resulted in arrests and beatings; police closed the University
of Zimbabwe in July.
Freedom of Association is strongly impeded. The 2004 Non-
Governmental Organizations Act explicitly prohibits groups that
``promote and protect human rights'' from receiving foreign funding.
Public demonstrations and protests are severely restricted under the
2002 Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which requires police
permission to hold public meetings and demonstrations. Such meetings
are often deemed illegal and broken up, and participants are subject to
arbitrary arrest by security forces (including intelligence officers)
and attacks by ZANU-PF militias. The POSA also allows police to impose
arbitrary curfews and forbids criticism of the President. The right to
collective labor action is limited under the Labor Relations Act, which
allows the government to veto collective bargaining agreements that it
deems harmful to the economy.
Rule of Law does not function. While some courts, thanks to
courageous and clear-minded magistrates and judges, have struck down or
disputed government actions, increasing pressure by the regime has
substantially eroded the judiciary's capacity to act independently. The
government has repeatedly refused to enforce court orders and has
replaced senior judges or pressured them to resign by stating that it
could not guarantee their security. Security and military forces abuse
citizens with impunity. War veterans and ZANU-PF militias--including
the youth militia--operate as de facto enforcers of government policies
and have committed human rights abuses such as assault, torture, rape,
extralegal evictions, and extralegal executions without fear of
punishment.
And the list goes on and on.
The levels of violence and intimidation reached new heights of
barbarity leading up to the June 27 runoff election, with nearly 90
opposition members and supporters dead and thousands harassed,
tortured, and displaced. Techniques used to terrorize supporters of the
opposition have included dismemberment and mutilation of limbs and
genitals. This was done to a population already reeling from massive
food shortages and a collapse of the health care system that has left
one in four Zimbabweans HIV positive. Moreover, now that Mugabe has
once again falsely claimed the Presidency, the violence against
opposition has continued unabated with over 1,500 MDC supporters still
in detention around the country.
So, what is to be done by the United States? What can be done?
There are six things I would suggest to inform U.S. policy in the
period immediately ahead.
1. Support a transition government in Zimbabwe rather than a
government of national unity. While the distinction may seem merely
semantic, it is critical in the present context. To oblige the people
of the MDC to enter into a forced marriage with those who have so
severely abused them would be to prolong the agony of Zimbabwe's
suffering. A coalition based upon a genuine national election would be
something for political leaders to negotiate later. But until that
moment arrives, the international community would be better advised to
work toward the installation of an interim government focused on a real
transition to democracy than to paper over differences.
2. Support the MDC, for as long as they speak for Zimbabwe. As
Michelle Gavin of the Council on Foreign Relations has memorably
written recently, in the Christian Science Monitor of July 9, ``focus
on Zimbabwe's people,'' and not merely on the prominent political
actors of the moment. Without meaning any disrespect for the brave men
and women of the MDC, and their courageous leaders, Morgan Tsvangirai
and Tendai Biti, who have endured arrest, harassment, and beatings, the
focus should be less on their installation in office than on the
fundamental rights of the people of Zimbabwe to choose who shall
govern. At present, the closest gauge we have of the sentiments of the
people of Zimbabwe is that Mr. Tsvangarai and his allies in the
parliamentary elections secured the largest number of votes and should
be considered the legitimate spokespersons for the people of Zimbabwe.
But as the people of Zimbabwe know so well, a popular mandate can be
dissipated if leaders fail to perform in the best interests of their
community. So, support for the MDC at this moment should be fulsome--
and conditional.
3. Support Zimbabwean civil society. Today, July 15, a ``National
Civil Society Consultative Conference'' has been convened in Harare.
Scores of civic group leaders have come together upon the initiative of
the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations to discuss
how to further consolidate consensus on the way forward for the
country. Many of the groups meeting today played important roles in
educating voters, and implementing get-out-the-vote programs in March,
and in monitoring the election process and the vote count. Many also
have ongoing nonpolitical mandates and service delivery functions and
so are well connected to the people of Zimbabwe. These are important
voices and the international community should take heed of their
deliberations and be inclined to be responsive to well-formulated
requests for assistance in advancing toward accountable governance.
USAID and other donors have supported such efforts in the past, and an
attentive, supportive posture toward civil society should be sustained.
4. Be poised to assist the transition government. As noted earlier,
the administration has done well to request $45 million in funding to
assist in the rehabilitation of Zimbabwe once a legitimate government
comes into office. It is vital that, in the truncated appropriations
legislative process that seems likely this year, Senators and
Representatives stay focused on ensuring that this funding is available
in the coming weeks or months to have maximum impact. It is also not
too soon to convene working groups of international experts, from the
U.S., Africa, and the world to advise Zimbabweans--for the lead must be
taken by qualified Zimbabweans--to plan for the reconstruction of
Zimbabwe when circumstances permit. These planning efforts should draw
on the immense pool of talented Zimbabwean men and women available in-
country or in the growing diaspora outside the country. At the same
time, Freedom House calls upon Europe to match the U.S. commitment,
either through the EU or bilateral assistance packages. Funding
priorities should include feeding Zimbabweans, providing relief for
HIV/AIDS patients, stabilizing the currency, and rewriting the
constitution.
5. Support and reward African leadership toward the transition.
While the U.S. should appreciate that the scenario in Zimbabwe is
playing out on a global stage--autocratic states (such as those who
thwarted the July 11 initiative to impose U.N. sanction) are watching
to see how well the democratic world can handle their challenge--it is
also a scenario in which African states will play the leading roles.
United States diplomatic efforts therefore should be focused on
reinforcing the emerging leaders in the region, by rewarding--through
political and economic and other means--those governments whose leaders
have led on the Zimbabwe crisis. It may well be the case that not all
states can do the same things, but an array of complementary actions,
in sanctions and political initiatives, should result in commensurate
and tangible recognition in the form of political rewards from the
United States. The U.S. Government could, for instance, start by
expressing its appreciation to governments such as Botswana and Zambia
and Liberia for their forward-leaning posture to date--appreciation in
the form of having their Presidents invited to the White House, not
necessarily for a joint statement on Zimbabwe, but to talk about
whatever those other Presidents have on their agendas.
6. Do not give up on the United Nations and other diplomatic
venues. Notwithstanding the rationales offered for their stands by the
Russian Government and others, the crisis in Zimbabwe does indeed
constitute a threat to international peace and security--one for which
U.N. Security Council action would be entirely appropriate. The U.S.
ought therefore to reinvigorate its multilateral diplomacy, not least
because this is but the first in a series of efforts by the
dictatorships to undermine the institutions of international order.
Basic human rights principles are being vigorously contested by world
and regional powers alike on the basis of ``national sovereignty,''
despite the evident horrors in Zimbabwe. It is vital that the U.S. not
be deterred.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the present crisis in
Zimbabwe. I look forward to your reactions and the discussion.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Melia, for your
testimony.
Ms. Gavin.
STATEMENT OF MICHELLE D. GAVIN, ADJUNCT FELLOW FOR AFRICA,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY
Ms. Gavin. Thank you so much, Chairman Feingold and Senator
Isakson. It is a real honor to be here. I have tremendous
respect for this subcommittee and have spent a lot of time
thinking about the work of this subcommittee, and I am so
pleased to be here. I think it is wonderful that you are
focusing on this important issue today. I want to thank the
staff as well because I know how much work goes into these
hearings, and particularly, Mr. Chairman, to thank you for your
kind words. I really have so much admiration for your
commitment and knowledge, and I think that you have been
quietly a hero for Africans for quite some time.
I would request that my full written statement be included
in the record.
Senator Feingold. Without objection.
Ms. Gavin. And I will just briefly summarize because there
are mostly points of agreement between Mr. Melia and I and
frankly with the first panel as well.
The current state of play with regard to Zimbabwe is
characterized, as we have heard, by a desperate internal
situation, a divided and at this point fairly ineffective set
of international responses, and a troubling lack of clarity and
consensus about the most promising way forward. And the truth
is the United States has very limited options and limited
leverage, but that is not an excuse for inaction.
Zimbabwe today, as you know, is a country held hostage by
an illegitimate government. As the international community
fails to come to consensus on a strategy for resolving the
crisis, civilians continue to suffer terribly. We have heard
the litany of statistics. I will not go through them again
But this is an important time to be talking about this
because last week's failed attempt to pass a United Nations
Security Council resolution applying additional international
pressure on those most responsible for Zimbabwe's suffering was
deeply disappointing. It was a real illustration of the risks
that still exist in the international community with regard to
the crisis and it dramatically slowed multilateral momentum.
And it is important to find ways to ramp that back up.
In the first panel, I believe that Secretary Frazer talked
about how important it is that we not lose focus. I think this
was in the chairman's opening statement as well. And I do think
that is a critical point.
The motives driving those who have acted to protect
Zimbabwe's repressive and illegitimate government are varied.
But undoubtedly they include the following, in addition to
others.
There is just a glass houses element here. Governments that
are themselves autocratic to some degree are uncomfortable with
the idea of multilateral pressure on a despotic regime. There
is not a whole lot we can do about that right now, but some of
the others are things that we might be able to do something
about.
There is the sense of discomfort of appearing to be at odds
with South Africa and with South African President Mbeke, but
as change comes in South Africa, as not just civil society but
other elements of the South African Government find their
voice, it might be less difficult to address that issue.
There certainly had been for a long time the sense of
discomfort with criticizing President Mugabe, as you pointed
out, long known as a liberation hero, and his legacy is indeed
complex. I think that we can address that in some ways by, as
my colleague has said, spending more time talking about the
civil and political rights of the Zimbabwean people and a
little less time framing this crisis as one about a power
struggle between political elites. We have to tell it like it
is certainly about the Mugabe regime and be very
straightforward about just how repressive it is. But I think
for many African states, it would be a much more comfortable
way to frame the issue to talk about restoring the rights of
the Zimbabwean people--after all, that is what a liberation
struggle was about--than to constantly be framing it as an
issue about targeting a specific leader.
And finally, I think that there is this misperception out
there, and I think this speaks to this West and the rest
divide, Mr. Chairman, that you identified. There is a
misperception that Africans want to move forward on some kind
of negotiated political process that will map out a path out of
this crisis and that the United States and others want only to
move forward on sanctions, and that there is some idea out
there that these are mutually exclusive paths instead of
complementary paths. And I do think by talking more about why
these are routes that should be taken simultaneously could help
in terms of framing the issues and restoring some multilateral
momentum as well.
And let me just explain a bit about what I mean. At this
point, the opposition is basically being asked to negotiate at
the point of a gun. Their supporters continue to be harassed
and beaten and tortured, and yet they are supposed to walk into
a negotiating room and assume some kind of good faith. They
have very limited leverage in any negotiation without increased
international pressure. It is essentially political extortion,
not a negotiation, and it would be absurd for the international
community to support that.
But with additional pressure, I think that Secretary Frazer
is right. A political process very well may be the way forward.
ZANU-PF is certainly not going to simply disappear from the
scene. A negotiation that can make the most of some of the
riffs within the ruling party that she identified and
critically that stresses what we need is a transitional
government where there is some degree of power-sharing but
there is a fixed timeframe leading to a new free and fair
election, not some endless situation of power-sharing where
political elites all get a seat at a table and the Zimbabwean
people get forgotten. That does seem to be the most likely way
forward.
So in terms of recommendations, that leads to what I have
already discussed, these framing issues, that it is important
to talk about the complementarity between increased pressure
and negotiations, that it is important to emphasize the dignity
and rights of the Zimbabwean people and emphasize efforts to
improve their future prospects, not simply to condemn Robert
Mugabe and his cronies.
I would say it is critical to pay attention to Parliament
and what is happening there or, rather, what is not happening
when it is not being convened. And there are some very alarming
reports about what the Government of Zimbabwe's plans might be
for undermining the results of the March Parliamentary
elections. Any kind of recovery in Zimbabwe, any kind of
negotiated deal is going to depend on an effective Parliament,
and that is an issue that should be watched more closely, be
spoken about a great deal more in our dialogue with African
leaders.
It makes sense to do what Secretary Frazer talked about,
which is to keep working on these unilateral sanctions, trying
to tighten up our own sanctions regime, but we have to be
honest with ourselves. Those have limited efficacy, and they
cannot be a substitute for trying to broaden the community of
actors that are putting pressure on those most responsible for
repression in Zimbabwe.
Obviously, there has to be some supplement to President
Mbeke's mediation efforts. They are insufficient. And the
United States can help not only by supporting that by ensuring
that international actors and the mediation team are in a
dialogue with Zimbabwean civil society. So again, this does not
become just a process for political elites, but we are keeping
that focus on Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean citizens.
We should keep working on those in ZANU-PF who recognize
that they do not have a very bright future if the status quo
persists. They are working on a different time frame than
President Mugabe is, and it is important to have quiet
conversations with some of those actors.
Finally, as Mr. Melia said, as the administration witnesses
said, it is important to keep talking about Zimbabwe's
recovery. Laying out clear, concrete incentives for reform can
help change the calculus of actors on the ground. It should not
be abstract. It should not be theoretical. This is important
for the region as well, for South Africans, and other Southern
Africans to believe that there is a constructive project here
that is going to benefit all of them if only we can get to that
place. So I do think that it is not pie in the sky and it is
critical to keep talking about Zimbabwe's recovery.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gavin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michelle D. Gavin, Adjunct Fellow for Africa,
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY
I am grateful to Chairman Feingold and Senator Isakson for this
opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, and
I thank the subcommittee for its consistent and thoughtful efforts on
the issue of Zimbabwe.
The current state of play with regard to Zimbabwe is characterized
by a desperate internal situation, a divided and ineffective set of
international responses, and a troubling lack of clarity and consensus
regarding the most promising way forward. The United States has limited
options, but there are steps that can and should be taken to improve
the prospects for a peaceful and swift resolution to the crisis.
A MANMADE DISASTER
This subcommittee is more than familiar with Zimbabwe's recent
history. By the late 1990s, economic mismanagement, official
corruption, and the dominance of the ruling ZANU-PF party had stoked
significant frustration within the country. A referendum on
constitutional change that would have strengthened President Mugabe
considerably catalyzed the forces opposed to the status quo and led to
the emergence of a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC), with roots in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. When
the electorate rejected the government-backed draft constitution in
February 2000, the ruling party embarked on an increasingly costly
campaign to shore up its power and guarantee its continued dominance.
Over the course of parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2005 and
Presidential elections in 2002, ZANU-PF continued a campaign of
intimidation aimed at the MDC, its supporters, independent journalists,
civil society activists, and ordinary Zimbabweans (especially the
700,000 Zimbabweans displaced in 2005's Operation Murambatsvina). The
ruling party employed youth militia forces and ``war veterans'' in
addition to using the regular security services to further its agenda.
Senior security officers came to have a decisive role in all government
decisions. Over time, the MDC was weakened to the point of splitting in
2005, with one faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai and another by Arthur
Mutambara. Meanwhile, as the economy went into freefall, lucrative
opportunities were provided to ZANU-PF elites to ensure their continued
loyalty.
The most recent round of elections demonstrated just how deep
dissatisfaction with the ruling party has become within Zimbabwe--and
just how far the Mugabe regime is willing to go to cling to power. The
extraordinary nature of the MDC's victories in the March 29, 2008,
parliamentary and Presidential elections can only be understood when
combined with a full appreciation for just how unfair the preelection
conditions were in the runup to the balloting. Voting day itself was
peaceful, but the campaigning period featured incidents of state
harassment of opposition candidates, an extraordinarily strong state
media bias in favor of the ruling party, manipulation of subsidized
food to favor ZANU-PF, and widely publicized statements from senior
security officials indicating that they would not recognize any victor
but President Mugabe. Even with the deck stacked steeply against them,
the official tallies, which the ZANU-PF-dominated electoral commission
took 5 weeks to announce, revealed that opposition candidates fared
extremely well with voters, winning a narrow majority in the House of
Assembly and a plurality of the votes for President, though not enough
to avoid the need for a runoff.
In the weeks before the runoff election, preelection conditions
went from problematic to terrifying. The Government of Zimbabwe banned
many humanitarian and development NGOs from operating in the country
and launched a vicious and far-reaching campaign of brutality and
violence targeting MDC leaders and supporters as well as everyday
citizens. Mugabe and members of his inner circle also made it clear
that they would not respect any election result other than victory. In
response, Tsvangirai withdrew from the June 27 sham exercise, which
Mugabe won in a meaningless landslide.
Zimbabwe today is a country held hostage by an illegitimate
government. As the international community fails to come to consensus
on a strategy for resolving the crisis, civilians suffer in the midst
of a man-made economic catastrophe characterized by stratospheric
hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and food shortages so severe that
the World Food Program anticipates that some 5 million Zimbabweans will
be in need of food aid by September. This humanitarian crisis is all
the more alarming in light of the Government of Zimbabwe's refusal to
allow NGOs full access to populations in need. On top of this grim
outlook, brutal political repression continues in Zimbabwe, as
hardliners in ZANU-PF seek to continue punishing Zimbabweans for
supporting democratic change and to decimate the organizational
capacity of the opposition party and of independent civil society
organizations. The ruling party continues to keep the press on a tight
leash and takes deliberate steps to isolate and misinform the
Zimbabwean people.
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The international community's response to these developments has
been disjointed for years, and unfortunately it remains incoherent
today. Over the course of the past 8 years, the United States, EU,
Australia, and others condemned the repression in Zimbabwe and in many
cases pursued targeted sanctions policies while still trying to provide
humanitarian support to the population. In 2004, Zimbabwe withdrew from
the Commonwealth rather than face expulsion. But many African states
have long been reluctant to condemn Mugabe, and South African President
Thabo Mbeki's efforts to mediate between the MDC and ZANU-PF on behalf
of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have produced very
little in the way of results. Mugabe has exploited these different
reactions, and often characterizes the crisis in Zimbabwe as a new
liberation struggle against neocolonial Western powers.
The events of the past several months have focused renewed
international attention on Zimbabwe's crisis. Teams from the African
Union, SADC, and the Pan-African Parliament all issued statements
regarding the June 27 election indicating that it did not meet any
appropriate standards. Several African governments, including those of
Zambia, Botswana, Liberia, Senegal, Tanzania, and even Angola have, in
one form or another, denounced the Zimbabwean Government's actions.
Powerful voices from within South Africa have spoken out as well. But
at the recent AU summit, African leaders could come to consensus only
around language expressing concern about the situation and encouraging
negotiations aimed at forming a Government of National Unity.
Despite resistance from some African leaders, the G-8 issued a
strong statement on Zimbabwe on July 8, rejecting the legitimacy of the
current Government of Zimbabwe, urging a negotiated resolution to the
crisis that respects the results of the March 29 election, recommending
the appointment of a U.N. envoy to report on the crisis and facilitate
mediation, and pledging to take further action against those
responsible for political violence. But last week's failed attempt to
pass a United Nations Security Council resolution applying additional
international pressure on those most responsible for Zimbabwe's
suffering was a deeply disappointing illustration of the rifts that
still exist in the international community with regard to Zimbabwe's
crisis that dramatically slowed multilateral momentum. Though the
resolution had nine votes of support, Russia and China both exercised
their vetoes to defeat the resolution, and South Africa, Libya, and
Vietnam voted against it.
The motives driving those who have acted to protect Zimbabwe's
repressive and illegitimate government are varied, but they undoubtedly
include the following concerns:
--A desire on the part of repressive governments to shield similarly
autocratic and illegitimate regimes from international
approbation;
--A fundamental discomfort with the prospect of condemning a leader
of a historic liberation struggle;
--An unwillingness to publicly acknowledge the inadequacy of
President Mbeki's mediation efforts; and
--A misguided belief that increased international pressure and an
internationally supported political solution to the current
crisis are mutually exclusive goals.
THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION
While the international community is in disarray regarding the
issue of sanctions, there is widespread international consensus on the
desirability of negotiating the formation of some new government that
includes elements of both ZANU-PF and the MDC. However, the form such a
government would take is unclear. All indicators suggest that ZANU-PF
wishes to retain its power and simply co-opt the MDC. The opposition
points out that it was the winner of the March 29 elections, which had
some real legitimacy, and therefore should lead any new governing
arrangement.
While the MDC has participated in talks (which currently appear to
be stalled) on the modalities for such a negotiation, the party
continues to insist that it will not actually negotiate until political
prisoners in Zimbabwe are released and the violent repression within
the country stops. In short, the opposition does not wish to be forced
to negotiate at gunpoint. Without the leverage of increased
international pressure, however, this request for fundamental fairness
is unlikely to be met. The MDC has also called for a new mediator from
the AU to take the lead in facilitating negotiations, but despite
having completely lost the confidence of one of the parties, President
Mbeki is clearly reluctant to relinquish his exclusive role.
Whatever the specifics of the process, one should be wary of too
many glib calls for a ``Kenyan solution.'' Some actors, including
Robert Mugabe, will have to exit the political stage, and only an
enforceable transitional arrangement that guides the country to
genuinely free and fair elections within a specified timeframe makes
sense. To view power-sharing as an end in itself is to ignore the
Zimbabwean people and to discount the decisive role that they should
play in determining the future of governance in their country. The
problem in Zimbabwe is not that Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai are
locked in a struggle for executive power. The problem is that the
Zimbabwean people have been denied their fundamental rights. Keeping
the population rather than political elites at the forefront of the
international debate can help to ensure that political solutions
actually create space for more accountable governance in the future.
NEXT STEPS
The hard truth is that this international landscape leaves the
United States without many promising options, but this is not an
argument for inaction or for empty gestures. A combination of public
signaling, private communication, and concrete action can help to
influence Zimbabwean and other African actors with more direct leverage
than the United States possesses.
With regard to public messages, it is vital that the United States
underscore that increased international pressure on the current,
illegitimate Government of Zimbabwe is not intended to be an
alternative to a political negotiation leading to a transitional
government. Instead, increased pressure is needed to make such a
negotiated process possible, by compelling ZANU-PF to abandon its
current strategy of trying to beat the opposition into bending to its
will. That's not a negotiation; that's political extortion, and for the
international community to rely upon such a process is absurd.
As suggested above, the United States should make plain that the
fundamental aim of its policy is to respect the dignity and rights of
the Zimbabwean people and to improve their future prospects, not simply
to condemn Robert Mugabe and his cronies. Certainly there is nothing
wrong with speaking the truth about the appalling regime currently in
power, and it is important to continue to note that this government has
no claim to legitimacy. But efforts to encourage more effective African
policies stumble when we overemphasize the role of individual political
elites and underemphasize the point that the citizens of Zimbabwe, more
than any political leader or group, deserve international support for
their basic rights. They also deserve basic protections and assistance.
The United States must continue to work with others to push for full
humanitarian access in Zimbabwe, and this issue should be raised in
regional and international organizations constantly until it is
resolved.
The United States should avoid focusing on the problems with the
Zimbabwean Presidency to the neglect of the Parliament. Extremely
worrying indications suggest that ZANU-PF will try to wrest the
majority of seats in the House of Assembly back from the MDC before
allowing the Parliament to function at all. By threatening elected
opposition officials or arresting them, ZANU-PF is again thwarting the
democratically expressed will of the citizens and doing further damage
to the country's governing institutions. The United States must keep a
close watch on parliamentary developments, and should be discussing
these alarming trends regularly with African leaders to ensure that the
integrity of the parliamentary election results remains on the
international agenda.
Of course, the United States should act quickly and decisively to
tighten targeted sanctions on individuals and institutions directing,
perpetrating, or financing political violence and undermining democracy
in Zimbabwe, but we must recognize that these actions, while they help
to increase the costs of repression and lend themselves to satisfyingly
tough announcements, cannot stand alone. Hard diplomatic work must
accompany unilateral action to significantly broaden the community of
countries taking meaningful steps to pressure the most problematic
actors in Zimbabwe. That means that despite last week's disappointment
in the Security Council, the United States should keep working at the
highest levels to encourage international and regional bodies to take
stronger action that can set the stage for genuine political
negotiations.
President Mbeki cannot be effective as the sole mediator in talks
between the MDC and ZANU-PF. Another mediator with a mandate from the
African Union must be brought in to facilitate negotiations, and the
United States should work closely with the AU to expedite the
deployment of such an additional actor and to ensure that he has all of
the resources required to succeed, including the capacity to call on
members of the international community to provide vital guarantees and
lay out clear consequences for bad faith. The United States can also
work to ensure that international actors supporting an effective
negotiation regularly consult with Zimbabwean civil society.
The United States should recognize that Zimbabwe's ruling party is
not monolithic. Ultimately, actors within ZANU-PF who recognize that
the country's economy must be stabilized and that this will not happen
if the political status quo persists, can be persuaded to abandon the
hardliners who aim to cling to power at all costs. Where the United
States has access to some of these actors, it should not miss
opportunities to encourage them to act on what they know to be true:
Mugabe must go, and the era of unaccountable ZANU-PF-dominance must
end.
In this vein, it is still useful to speak publicly and clearly
about the recovery efforts that the United States and other members of
the international community are prepared to support once sound
governance mechanisms are in place in Zimbabwe. Moreover, the United
States should continue efforts to establish sound reconstruction plans
and to marshal international resources toward this end. By making sure
that incentives for supporting a change in governance are concrete
rather than theoretical, the United States, working with others, can
help to garner more ZANU-PF support for real reform, and to isolate
those currently wielding the most influence within the party.
Ideally, the Zimbabwean people will be able to make final decisions
about accountability for crimes committed to date. But the United
States and others can support efforts to establish the basic facts of
the matter by backing a United Nations investigation of the human
rights abuses that have occurred thus far.
Finally, it is worth noting that the limits of U.S. leverage in
this situation point toward the need for effective multilateral
institutions and diplomatic credibility in order to address pressing
foreign policy concerns. Not only does the United States have a clear
interest in averting violent conflict and costly state collapse, it
also has an obvious interest in promoting democracy and development in
a region that should be an economic engine for the continent. None of
these concerns will be addressed in Zimbabwe simply through unilateral
action. Halting the decline of U.S. soft power, and doing the often-
frustrating work of building consensus internationally, are
indispensable building blocks of a policy response to Zimbabwe's
crisis, and to others that may emerge in the future.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Gavin, thanks for your excellent
testimony. And your comments remind me of the meeting you and I
attended of Zimbabwean civil society with people with enormous
courage and ability and how critical it is that they be central
to the future.
I will start with a 7-minute round.
Mr. Melia, your organization, Freedom House, works
extensively with civil society in countries throughout Africa,
and I know that domestic electoral observers, such as the
Zimbabwean Electoral Support Network, played a courageous role
in reporting on the March 29 elections and subsequent events.
Is there still a need to protect domestic observers? And if
so, what steps should be taken to do that?
Mr. Melia. Yes. The brave people of ZESN, that election
network, which was itself a coalition of a number of
preexisting civil society groups, went into the March elections
with a fair amount of trepidation. They were afraid of being
beaten and abused and losing jobs, et cetera.
What was interesting--and that was the period when I was in
Zimbabwe just before the March 29 election--was that they were
out doing their thing. They were out educating people on how to
vote because there was some reapportionment of districts that
made it a little bit complicated on knowing where to vote on
election day. And there were a lot of people in church groups,
and civic groups, and women's groups, et cetera that were out
there telling people how to vote properly to make sure they got
their vote cast and counted. And that made a big difference on
election day and the fact that they were present in those
places. And we and others supported those efforts with money,
training, the provision of material goods.
But they were waiting every day for the other shoe to drop,
and what people told me, MDC leaders told me, civil society
leaders were waiting for the other shoe to drop. They said the
surge in violence that we were expecting from the regime has
not arrived yet. And that was in those days before March 29.
The surge in violence did not really come until 3 or 4 days
after March 29. In June, it was all about the surge in violence
by the regime against these people. So their efforts were
severely disrupted. There were some efforts at monitoring, but
mostly they were not able to implement their monitoring
program. The voter education groups mostly did not implement
the plans they had in June, and ZESN did not issue a statement
after the election.
So those people are at the ready. They took it on the chin,
quite literally, from the Joint Operations Command and the
militias, the veterans, the groups that were out beating people
who were supporting a legitimate process. So efforts by the
international community to provide some protection to them
would be very important.
Senator Feingold. What role does the Zimbabwean diaspora
play in the current situation? How can they best contribute to
a negotiated agreement, Mr. Melia?
Mr. Melia. Well, as you know, 2 million to 3 million
Zimbabweans have left the country in recent years. The
Zimbabwean diaspora is a huge, significant portion of the
population, only recently departed from Zimbabwe. Most of them
are in South Africa.
A lot of talent is in that community. A lot of the people
who would be necessary to rebuild Zimbabwe are present in that
diaspora community in southern Africa and worldwide, but mostly
in South Africa and the region. Those are among the people that
could be brought together for planning the transition
arrangement to put together the plans for the future of
Zimbabwe, and the international community could play a role in
convening these Zimbabweans both those in country and those out
of country to work together to plan for the reconstruction of
their country.
Senator Feingold. There is some concern. We have heard that
the opposition MDC is facing internal strains largely as a
result of the overwhelming repression by the security forces.
What can be done, Mr. Melia, by the United States and others to
ensure the cohesion of the MDC and its ability to negotiate
effectively?
Mr. Melia. A lot of effort has been invested over the last
8 or 10 years in working with the MDC to develop strategies and
organizational coherence. In a democratic movement, people are
going to disagree. It will not always be possible to have
everybody on the same page. But I think that the consultative
process that the National Democratic Institute and the
International Republican Institute has embarked on, working
with the MDC and its different factions to keep venues for
dialogue alive and working has been important in this process,
just as the work that we have been doing on a parallel track
with civil society to keep them talking with each other, to
realize that they are fundamentally on the same side and on the
same page.
I think international groups have a role to play in
convening meetings where they can discuss and strategize
together. But I think if we overfocus on a particular result--
it is consistent with what Ms. Gavin said in that if we
overfocus on particular outcomes or particular leaders getting
into a particular position, we may lose our focus which should
be on the broader population of Zimbabwe and a broader process
in which Zimbabwean voices can be heard.
So I think there is a degree of modesty we should retain in
going into these kinds of consultative efforts. It is not up to
us to direct them to come to a predetermined plan or a plan of
action, but to facilitate their learning process and their
consultative process.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Gavin, you mentioned in your
testimony that international pressure on the Mugabe regime
should aim to give leverage to political negotiations and a
negotiated agreement.
How can the U.S. Government maximize its leverage to
bolster current mediation efforts?
Ms. Gavin. Well, unfortunately, the answer is doing the
very hard slog of diplomatic work to ensure that we do not
stand alone and that we do not just stand with a cast of
characters that Robert Mugabe has in some ways effectively
painted as neo-colonial or neo-imperialists. So we cannot sort
of give up despite the frustration, and I understand the
frustration--I feel the frustration--with the failure of the AU
to take a more decisive stand with SADC's insistence thus far
on sort of clinging to President Mbeke's mediation effort,
which is simply inadequate. One does not have to criticize
President Mbeke to acknowledge that you cannot have an
effective mediation if you have lost the confidence in one of
the parties. Well, there is no question that he does not have
the confidence of the MDC.
So we have to keep working to ensure that we do not stand
alone. We cannot sort of comfort ourselves with a coalition of
the willing approach and march forward with sanctions and
advice regarding a political negotiation that does not include
these other actors.
Senator Feingold. And do you believe that the current
mediation can be strengthened or is there a need to make this
happen for a new mediation team and initiative?
Ms. Gavin. I think that either is a possibility. I think it
might be easier to finesse perhaps by simply supplementing the
mediation that exists. That way no one has to reject anyone's
good efforts and good offices. But certainly I think the
Secretary was using ``expansion'' as her preferred phrase, and
I think that makes some sense.
Clearly, there needs to be a new actor in the mix, ideally
one with a mandate from perhaps the AU, perhaps the U.N.,
although that may be difficult. And I think it makes sense to
talk about needing a presence on the ground, a secretariat. The
United States can play an important role in providing resources
to such a temporary institution to ensure that that can be as
effective a process as possible.
But if I may just very quickly say I do think it is
important not to make too many close parallels to the Kenyan
situation. Zimbabwe is different. We are not dealing with this
closely elected contest where the integrity of the process
largely fell apart in the coalition and counting of ballots.
This is a situation where we had one election that despite
completely unfair preelection conditions where the deck was
stacked against the opposition, voting day went pretty well,
and the opposition emerged largely victorious and then a
complete sham of a runoff. So it is a different kind of
process. It requires a different sort of strategy.
But where the parallel with Kenya I think does make some
sense is to point out that it was international pressure and
leverage that forced Kenyan actors to the table making
concessions. It did not simply spring up of its own accord.
Senator Feingold. And what steps should the United States
take to increase pressure on South African President Mbeke to
address the crisis in Zimbabwe in a strong, just, and efficient
manner?
Ms. Gavin. I am not sure that there things that we can do
to change President Mbeke's mind about his approach and
certainly on other bilateral irritants. I do not think that we
have had much success when President Mbeke has dug into a
position in resolving any kind of antagonistic relationship
with him on specific issues. But I do think what we can do is
make the most of the other South African voices that are making
themselves heard. It is very important to recognize that South
Africa is not monolithic, the ANC is not monolithic. And to
talk about supplementing his efforts perhaps rather than
rejecting them just might be more constructive.
Senator Feingold. Finally--and then I will turn to Senator
Isakson--Ms. Gavin, you have effectively said that any serious
resolution of the current crisis must include Mugabe's exit and
an end to ZANU-PF dominance. Under what circumstances do you
believe Mugabe would exit, and how can the United States
contribute to fostering those circumstances?
Ms. Gavin. Here is where I do think quiet conversations
with other parts of ZANU-PF come in because, obviously,
President Mugabe would want some guarantees regarding his
future. Ultimately decisions about accountability should be
left in the hands of the Zimbabwean people. Ideally they will
be able to make them. But in terms of the negotiation process,
it seems reasonable to assume that some kind of arrangement to
ensure his future security might be set up.
But what would it take to get him to step aside? I think it
would take pressure from within the ruling party. It would
essentially take an act in which those in ZANU-PF who know that
they have got no lasting future, that their investments are not
secure--I am not pretending these people are terribly committed
to good governance and democracy, but there is an enlightened
self-interest that can be appealed to here. And I do think that
it is going to take a decision within the party to take a
different course and to isolate the hard-liners who right now
are calling the shots. And that means some quiet conversations
where we have access to important actors within ZANU-PF to try
and encourage them to act.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
I apologize, Senator Isakson, for going over time, but
please proceed.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize, Mr. Melia. When I walked in and sat down, you
were in the middle of a thought, and so I am going to ask you a
question about what I think I remember I heard.
You were talking about the inability of the U.N. to get the
resolution through, and you made a reference to this
administration's estrangement from the U.N. Is that correct?
Did I hear that right?
Mr. Melia. Yes; you did.
Senator Isakson. Would you elaborate on that estrangement?
Mr. Melia. Well, for instance--and it relates directly to
these discussions of human rights and democracy. The U.N.'s
Human Rights Council in Geneva--the administration has chosen
not to present itself as a candidate, not to be active in the
workings of the newly reorganized council. And it has left the
field to the enemies of freedom and democracy. The Russians and
the Egyptians and the Chinese and the Cubans are very active in
these U.N. forums. It matters a lot to them that they be able
to thwart efforts to pass resolutions, conduct investigations,
develop reports. And as long as we are absent from these
forums, the side of the democracies is weaker for that.
So there has been--I do not need to revisit all of the
rhetorical fireworks of the early part of the Bush
administration in approaching the U.N. under Ambassador
Bolton's leadership, et cetera. But it has left the United
States not as present and engaged in the U.N. system generally
and specifically on matters of human rights and democracy as it
could have been.
Senator Isakson. Ms. Gavin made a comment about--where is
my note here? Motives are varied in the reasons to vote against
the resolution, but you referred to the autocratic glass house
theory where sometimes autocrats just do not want to vote
against somebody who is pretty autocratic themselves. Did I
hear it that way?
Ms. Gavin. That is right.
Senator Isakson. So really, I do not have a secret motive
here. So really, what you are saying is, Mr. Melia, if we had
been a better participant, for example, in the human rights
negotiation or committee, whatever, we might have had more
leverage on the Security Council to keep that from happening?
Mr. Melia. It is not clear that we would have been able to
avoid the Russian and Chinese vetoes by any means. And if you
look at the Security Council vote, the people that voted with
the Russians and the Chinese were Libya and Vietnam, along with
South Africa. All the rest of the Security Council voted for
the sanctions.
But my point is that there is an active campaign by those
nondemocracies to seize control of these institutions and to
use them to thwart the adoption of measures that reflect what
we would see as fair standards on human rights and democracy.
Senator Isakson. Sort of a self-preservation motivation.
Mr. Melia. Absolutely. Now, Michelle Gavin is right. Look
at the voting both in the AU and in SADC and at the Security
Council. It is clear it is not so much of a regional
distinction or a left/right distinction. It is a democracy
versus nondemocracy distinction. And that is the point I was
making earlier about the sub-Saharan Africa more generally, is
that over the last 10 and 20 years, there has emerged a
democratic character in sub-Saharan Africa's governance that
was not there previously. It is still nascent. It is still
fragile, but it is emerging. And that is what we saw in the
outspokenness by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, President
Kufour of Ghana.
You talked about the apparent split in Kenyan leadership
between Prime Minister Odinga and President Kibaki. Well, that
is a difference between people that like elections where they
count the votes and people who do not like elections where they
count the votes fairly. And that comes through again and again
in the treatment of Zimbabwe.
That is why I said that American diplomacy should be
engaged much more assiduously in cultivating this emerging
sensibility among African governments so that it has a broader
consequence than just the way we look at the Zimbabwe crisis.
The Russians and the Chinese do not think this is just about
Zimbabwe. They think this is about the way the U.N. system will
operate more generally, and we should see it that way too. We
should be building coalitions with like-minded allies.
Senator Isakson. Ms. Gavin, you made a comment about we
should frame our efforts at mediation in the interest of
restoration of rights of the people versus getting rid of
Mugabe. I think that is kind of how I heard it. And you also
said sanctions should be a means to an end, meaning mediation.
It should be effective to bring about mediation.
If, in fact, mediation could take place and if, in fact,
there was some negotiation to get Mugabe to withdraw or to
accede from power, would the army support a freely elected
government, or is their loyalty so strong to him ideologically
that they would try and keep it from happening?
Ms. Gavin. That is a very important question I think,
Senator Isakson. My sense, from talking to people on the
ground, is that the security forces are not any more monolithic
than the ruling party is. Certainly at the very top you have a
set of hard-liners who see their fates as inextricably linked
to that of President Mugabe, and to some degree these actors
are sort of hostage to each other at this point.
But if you look at the middle level and certainly the lower
level of the security forces, you are dealing with masses of
actors who have been struggling with the same economic
circumstances as the rest of the Zimbabwean people and in many
cases not getting paid, getting paid so little, given the
stratospheric hyperinflation that they cannot feed their
families. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that the MDC
got quite a few votes from people who work in the security
sector in the March elections.
So while I think that there are actors besides President
Mugabe whose futures would probably have to be part of any
negotiation who would be concerned about various guarantees for
themselves, et cetera, I do not think it is necessarily the
case that the entirety of the security forces would necessarily
be a problem.
Senator Isakson. So the loyalty is kind of at the top, and
if in fact, you did have a restoration of rights for the people
and a transitional way, the lower end of the security system
could possibly help support a new government rather than
actually trying to overthrow it.
Ms. Gavin. I think that is true, and I think they would
like a chance to see some economic stabilization just like any
other Zimbabwean citizen so that they could have some security
for their families. And they probably would like a chance to
see their work reprofessionalized and be able to function like
a professional and capable security service again.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize but I
have got to run to a meeting.
Senator Feingold. I understand.
Senator Isakson. I thank both of you very much.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
I thank the panel. I regret that we have to conclude this,
but I have to proceed to yet another task Ms. Gavin sent me 2
years ago--the CSIS HIV/AIDS Task Force. So your legacy
continues. But this was an excellent panel.
This concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator From Illinois
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on the
crisis in Zimbabwe and the prospects for resolution.
I find the recent events in Zimbabwe to be deeply disturbing and
condemn the actions of President Robert Mugabe in the strongest
possible terms. The United States and the international community must
be clear, unequivocal, and united about the Government of Zimbabwe's
illegitimacy and lack of credibility.
For far too long, the people of Zimbabwe have suffered, living in
fear and struggling to survive. Opposition supporters and leaders,
civil society activists, and ordinary citizens are subject to
harassment, torture, and murder. The economic catastrophe brought about
by the Government of Zimbabwe has led to hyperinflation and shortages
of food and fuel. The deliberate disruption of humanitarian operations
by the regime has caused misery for the Zimbabwean people. The entire
Southern African region is affected by the crisis, which is ruining the
vision of a more prosperous, just, and stable continent.
I am encouraged by the growing support of African leaders for the
civil and political rights of the Zimbabwean people. The Governments of
Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Angola, Senegal, Kenya, and South Africa's
African National Congress (ANC), civil society leaders and trade unions
have all denounced the Zimbabwean Government's repression. However,
these parties must do much more to help prevent the crisis in Zimbabwe
from escalating out of control. The Government of South Africa and the
ANC, in particular, must recognize the need and call for the kind of
diplomatic action that is necessary to pressure the Zimbabwean
Government to stop its repressive actions.
With the support of the international community, regional leaders
should work toward an enforceable, negotiated political transition in
Zimbabwe that would end repressive rule and enable genuine democracy to
take hold. The United States, for its part, must tighten its existing
sanctions, just as the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
the African Union (AU), and the U.N. should take concrete steps to
isolate Zimbabwean officials who continue to thwart democracy and
undermine the rule of law.
I will continue to call for an end to the repressive and divisive
actions of the Mugabe regime so the people of Zimbabwe can pursue their
hopes for legitimate political change and opportunity. I look forward
to working with the committee to address this important issue.