#### Union Calendar No. 131

111TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION

#### H. R. 3269

[Report No. 111-236]

To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation and to prevent perverse incentives in the compensation practices of financial institutions.

#### IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 21, 2009

Mr. Frank of Massachusetts (for himself, Mr. Peters, Ms. Kilroy, Mr. Watt, Mr. Capuano, Mr. Al Green of Texas, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Carson of Indiana, Mr. Gutierrez, Mr. Ellison, and Mr. Hinojosa) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

July 30, 2009 Additional sponsor: Ms. Waters

July 30, 2009

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on July 21, 2009]

#### A BILL

To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation and to prevent perverse incentives in the compensation practices of financial institutions.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Corporate and Financial
- 5 Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009".
- 6 SEC. 2. SHAREHOLDER VOTE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSA-
- 7 TION DISCLOSURES.
- 8 (a) Amendment.—Section 14 of the Securities Ex-
- 9 change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78n) is amended by adding
- 10 at the end the following new subsection:
- 11 "(i) Annual Shareholder Approval of Execu-
- 12 TIVE COMPENSATION.—
- 13 "(1) Annual vote.—Any proxy or consent or
- 14 authorization (the solicitation of which is subject to
- the rules of the Commission pursuant to subsection
- 16 (a)) for an annual meeting of the shareholders to elect
- directors (or a special meeting in lieu of such meet-
- ing) where proxies are solicited in respect of any secu-
- 19 rity registered under section 12 occurring on or after
- 20 the date that is 6 months after the date on which
- 21 final rules are issued under paragraph (4), shall pro-
- vide for a separate shareholder vote to approve the
- 23 compensation of executives as disclosed pursuant to
- 24 the Commission's compensation disclosure rules for
- 25 named executive officers (which disclosure shall in-

clude the compensation committee report, the compensation discussion and analysis, the compensation tables, and any related materials, to the extent required by such rules). The shareholder vote shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors and shall not be construed as overruling a decision by such board, nor to create or imply any additional fiduciary duty by such board, nor shall such vote be construed to restrict or limit the ability of shareholders to make proposals for inclusion in such proxy materials related to executive compensation.

### "(2) Shareholder approval of golden parachute compensation.—

"(A) DISCLOSURE.—In any proxy or consent solicitation material (the solicitation of which is subject to the rules of the Commission pursuant to subsection (a)) for a meeting of the shareholders occurring on or after the date that is 6 months after the date on which final rules are issued under paragraph (4), at which shareholders are asked to approve an acquisition, merger, consolidation, or proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all the assets of an issuer, the person making such solicitation shall disclose in the proxy or consent solicitation

material, in a clear and simple form in accordance with regulations to be promulgated by the Commission, any agreements or understandings that such person has with any named executive officers of such issuer (or of the acquiring issuer, if such issuer is not the acquiring issuer) concerning any type of compensation (whether present, deferred, or contingent) that is based on or otherwise relates to the acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the issuer and the aggregate total of all such compensation that may (and the conditions upon which it may) be paid or become payable to or on behalf of such executive officer.

"(B) Shareholder approval.—Any proxy or consent or authorization relating to the proxy or consent solicitation material containing the disclosure required by subparagraph (A) shall provide for a separate shareholder vote to approve such agreements or understandings and compensation as disclosed, unless such agreements or understandings have been subject to a shareholder vote under paragraph (1). A vote by the shareholders shall not be binding on the

- issuer or the board of directors of the issuer or
  the person making the solicitation and shall not
  be construed as overruling a decision by any
  such person or issuer, nor to create or imply any
  additional fiduciary duty by any such person or
  issuer.
  - "(3) DISCLOSURE OF VOTES.—Every institutional investment manager subject to section 13(f) shall report at least annually how it voted on any shareholder vote pursuant to paragraphs (1) or (2) of this section, unless such vote is otherwise required to be reported publicly by rule or regulation of the Commission.
  - "(4) RULEMAKING.—Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, the Commission shall issue final rules to implement this subsection.
  - "(5) Exemption authority.—The Commission may exempt certain categories of issuers from the requirements of this subsection, where appropriate in view of the purpose of this subsection. In determining appropriate exemptions, the Commission shall take into account, among other considerations, the potential impact on smaller reporting issuers."

1	(b) Prohibition on Clawbacks.—
2	(1) Prohibition.—No compensation of any ex-
3	ecutive of an issuer, having been approved by a ma-
4	jority of shareholders pursuant to section 14(i) of the
5	Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as added by sub-
6	section (a)), may be subject to any clawback except—
7	(A) in accordance with any contract of such
8	executive providing for such a clawback; or
9	(B) in the case of fraud on the part of such
10	executive, to the extent provided by Federal or
11	$State\ law.$
12	(2) Regulations.—The Securities and Ex-
13	change Commission shall promulgate rules necessary
14	to implement and enforce paragraph (1).
15	SEC. 3. COMPENSATION COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE.
16	(a) Standards Relating to Compensation Com-
17	MITTEES.—The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
18	78a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 10A the
19	following new section:
20	"SEC. 10B. STANDARDS RELATING TO COMPENSATION COM-
21	MITTEES.
22	"(a) Commission Rules.—
23	"(1) In general.—Effective not later than 9
24	months after the date of enactment of the Corporate
25	and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act

- of 2009, the Commission shall, by rule, direct the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any class of equity security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the requirements of any portion of subsections (b) through (f).
  - "(2) Opportunity to cure defects.—The rules of the Commission under paragraph (1) shall provide for appropriate procedures for an issuer to have an opportunity to cure any defects that would be the basis for a prohibition under paragraph (1) before the imposition of such prohibition.
- "(3) EXEMPTION AUTHORITY.—The Commission
  may exempt certain categories of issuers from the requirements of subsections (b) through (f), where appropriate in view of the purpose of this section. In determining appropriate exemptions, the Commission
  shall take into account, among other considerations,
  the potential impact on smaller reporting issuers.
- 20 "(b) Independence of Compensation Commit-21 tees.—
- 22 "(1) In General.—Each member of the com-23 pensation committee of the board of directors of the 24 issuer shall be independent.

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1	"(2) Criteria.—In order to be considered to be
2	independent for purposes of this subsection, a member
3	of a compensation committee of an issuer may not,
4	other than in his or her capacity as a member of the
5	compensation committee, the board of directors, or
6	any other board committee accept any consulting, ad-
7	visory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer.
8	"(3) Exemption authority.—The Commission
9	may exempt from the requirements of paragraph (2)
10	a particular relationship with respect to compensa-
11	tion committee members, where appropriate in view
12	of the purpose of this section.
13	"(4) Definition.—As used in this section, the
14	term 'compensation committee' means—
15	"(A) a committee (or equivalent body) es-
16	tablished by and amongst the board of directors
17	of an issuer for the purpose of determining and
18	approving the compensation arrangements for
19	the executive officers of the issuer; and
20	"(B) if no such committee exists with re-
21	spect to an issuer, the independent members of
22	the entire board of directors.
23	"(c) Independence Standards for Compensation
24	CONCLUMANTIC AND OTHER COMMITTEE ADVISORS AM

25 compensation consultant or other similar adviser to the

1 compensation committee of any issuer shall meet standards

2 for independence established by the Commission by regula-

3 tion.

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4 "(d) Compensation Committee Authority Relat-

5 Ing to Compensation Consultants.—

"(1) In General.—The compensation committee of each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the board of directors, shall have the authority, in its sole discretion, to retain and obtain the advice of a compensation consultant meeting the standards for independence promulgated pursuant to subsection (c), and the compensation committee shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of such independent compensation consultant. This provision shall not be construed to require the compensation committee to implement or act consistently with the advice or recommendations of the compensation consultant, and shall not otherwise affect the compensation committee's ability or obligation to exercise its own judgment in fulfillment of its duties.

"(2) DISCLOSURE.—In any proxy or consent solicitation material for an annual meeting of the shareholders (or a special meeting in lieu of the annual meeting) occurring on or after the date that is 1 1 year after the date of enactment of the Corporate 2 and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, each issuer shall disclose in the proxy or con-3 4 sent material, in accordance with regulations to be 5 promulgated by the Commission whether the com-6 pensation committee of the issuer retained and ob-7 tained the advice of a compensation consultant meet-8 ing the standards for independence promulgated pursuant to subsection (c). 9

10 "(3) Regulations.—In promulgating regula-11 tions under this subsection or any other provision of 12 law with respect to compensation consultants, the 13 Commission shall ensure that such regulations are 14 competitively neutral among categories of consultants 15 and preserve the ability of compensation committees 16 to retain the services of members of any such category. 17 "(e) Authority To Engage Independent Counsel AND OTHER ADVISORS.—The compensation committee of 18 19 each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of the board of 20 directors, shall have the authority, in its sole discretion, to 21 retain and obtain the advice of independent counsel and 22 other advisers meeting the standards for independence pro-23 mulgated pursuant to subsection (c), and the compensation committee shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of such inde-

- 1 pendent counsel and other advisers. This provision shall not
- 2 be construed to require the compensation committee to im-
- 3 plement or act consistently with the advice or recommenda-
- 4 tions of such independent counsel and other advisers, and
- 5 shall not otherwise affect the compensation committee's abil-
- 6 ity or obligation to exercise its own judgment in fulfillment
- 7 of its duties.
- 8 "(f) Funding.—Each issuer shall provide for appro-
- 9 priate funding, as determined by the compensation com-
- 10 mittee, in its capacity as a committee of the board of direc-
- 11 tors, for payment of compensation—
- "(1) to any compensation consultant to the com-
- 13 pensation committee that meets the standards for
- independence promulgated pursuant to subsection (c),
- 15 *and*
- 16 "(2) to any independent counsel or other adviser
- 17 to the compensation committee.".
- 18 (b) Study and Review Required.—
- 19 (1) In General.—The Securities and Exchange
- 20 Commission shall conduct a study and review of the
- 21 use of compensation consultants meeting the stand-
- 22 ards for independence promulgated pursuant to sec-
- 23 tion 10B(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
- 24 (as added by subsection (a)), and the effects of such
- use.

1	(2) Report to congress.—Not later than 2
2	years after the rules required by the amendment made
3	by this section take effect, the Commission shall sub-
4	mit a report to the Congress on the results of the
5	study and review required by this paragraph.
6	SEC. 4. ENHANCED COMPENSATION STRUCTURE REPORT-
7	ING TO REDUCE PERVERSE INCENTIVES.
8	(a) Enhanced Disclosure and Reporting of Com-
9	PENSATION ARRANGEMENTS.—
10	(1) In General.—Not later than 9 months after
11	the date of enactment of this Act, the appropriate
12	Federal regulators jointly shall prescribe regulations
13	to require each covered financial institution to dis-
14	close to the appropriate Federal regulator the struc-
15	tures of all incentive-based compensation arrange-
16	ments offered by such covered financial institutions
17	sufficient to determine whether the compensation
18	structure—
19	(A) is aligned with sound risk management;
20	(B) is structured to account for the time ho-
21	rizon of risks; and
22	(C) meets such other criteria as the appro-
23	priate Federal regulators jointly may determine
24	to be appropriate to reduce unreasonable incen-

1	tives offered by such institutions for employees to
2	take undue risks that—
3	(i) could threaten the safety and
4	soundness of covered financial institutions;
5	or
6	(ii) could have serious adverse effects
7	on economic conditions or financial sta-
8	bility.
9	(2) Rules of construction.—Nothing in this
10	subsection shall be construed as requiring the report-
11	ing of the actual compensation of particular individ-
12	uals. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
13	require a covered financial institution that does not
14	have an incentive-based payment arrangement to
15	make the disclosures required under this subsection.
16	(b) Prohibition on Certain Compensation Ar-
17	RANGEMENTS.—Not later than 9 months after the date of
18	enactment of this Act, and taking into account the factors
19	described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subsection
20	(a)(1), the appropriate Federal regulators shall jointly pre-
21	scribe regulations that prohibit any incentive-based pay-
22	ment arrangement, or any feature of any such arrangement,
23	that the regulators determine encourages inappropriate
24	risks by covered financial institutions that—

1	(1) could threaten the safety and soundness of
2	covered financial institutions; or
3	(2) could have serious adverse effects on economic
4	conditions or financial stability.
5	(c) Enforcement.—The provisions of this section
6	shall be enforced under section 505 of the Gramm-Leach-
7	Bliley Act and, for purposes of such section, a violation of
8	this section shall be treated as a violation of subtitle A of
9	title V of such Act.
10	(d) Definitions.—As used in this section—
11	(1) the term "appropriate Federal regulator"
12	means—
13	(A) the Board of Governors of the Federal
14	Reserve System;
15	(B) the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
16	rency;
17	(C) the Board of Directors of the Federal
18	Deposit Insurance Corporation;
19	(D) the Director of the Office of Thrift Su-
20	pervision;
21	(E) the National Credit Union Administra-
22	$tion\ Board;$
23	(F) the Securities and Exchange Commis-
24	sion; and

1	(G) the Federal Housing Finance Agency;
2	and
3	(2) the term "covered financial institution"
4	means—
5	(A) a depository institution or depository
6	institution holding company, as such terms are
7	defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insur-
8	ance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813);
9	(B) a broker-dealer registered under section
10	15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
11	U.S.C. 780);
12	(C) a credit union, as described in section
13	19(b)(1)(A)(iv) of the Federal Reserve Act;
14	(D) an investment advisor, as such term is
15	defined in section 202(a)(11) of the Investment
16	Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11));
17	(E) the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
18	tion;
19	(F) the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
20	poration; and
21	(G) any other financial institution that the
22	appropriate Federal regulators, jointly, by rule,
23	determine should be treated as a covered finan-
24	cial institution for purposes of this section.

1	(e) Exemption for Certain Financial Institu-
2	TIONS.—The requirements of this section shall not apply
3	to covered financial institutions with assets of less than
4	\$1,000,000,000.
5	(f) GAO STUDY.—
6	(1) Study required.—
7	(A) In General.—The Comptroller General
8	of the United States shall carry out a study to
9	determine whether there is a correlation between
10	compensation structures and excessive risk tak-
11	ing.
12	(B) Factors to consider.—In carrying
13	out the study required under subparagraph (A),
14	the Comptroller General shall—
15	(i) consider compensation structures
16	used by companies from 2000 to 2008; and
17	(ii) compare companies that failed, or
18	nearly failed but for government assistance,
19	to companies that remained viable through-
20	out the housing and credit market crisis of
21	2007 and 2008, including the compensation
22	practices of all such companies.
23	(C) Determining companies that failed
24	OR NEARLY FAILED.—In determining whether a
25	company failed, or nearly failed but for govern-

1	ment assistance, for purposes of subparagraph
2	(B)(ii), the Comptroller General shall focus on—
3	(i) companies that received exceptional
4	assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief
5	Program under title I of the Emergency
6	Economic Stabilization Act of 2009 (12
7	U.S.C. 5211 et seq.) or other forms of sig-
8	nificant government assistance, including
9	under the Automotive Industry Financing
10	Program, the Targeted Investment Program,
11	the Asset Guarantee Program, and the Sys-
12	temically Significant Failing Institutions
13	Program;
14	(ii) the Federal National Mortgage As-
15	sociation;
16	(iii) the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
17	Corporation; and
18	(iv) companies that participated in the
19	Security and Exchange Commission's Con-
20	solidated Supervised Entities Program as of
21	January 2008.
22	(2) Report.—Not later than the end of the 1-
23	year period beginning on the date of the enactment of
24	this Act, the Comptroller General shall issue a report

- 1 to the Congress containing the results of the study re-
- 2 quired under paragraph (1).

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111 TH CONGRESS H. R. 3269

[Report No. 111-236]

## A BILL

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