[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONTINUED OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION'S
GEOSTATIONARY WEATHER SATELLITE SYSTEM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 23, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-19
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
48-734 WASHINGTON : 2009
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JIM MATHESON, Utah BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE OLSON, Texas
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment
HON. BRIAN BAIRD, Washington, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
PAUL D. TONKO, New York
JIM MATHESON, Utah
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
JEAN FRUCI Democratic Staff Director
JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member
TARA ROTHSCHILD Republican Professional Staff Member
STACEY STEEP Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
April 23, 2009
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Brian Baird, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 8
Written Statement............................................ 9
Statement by Representative Bob Inglis, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science
and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.................. 11
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 11
Witnesses:
Mr. David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 12
Written Statement............................................ 15
Biography.................................................... 21
Ms. Mary E. Kicza, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and
Information Services, National Environmental Satellite, Data,
and Information Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Oral Statement............................................... 21
Written Statement............................................ 23
Biography.................................................... 26
Mr. George W. Morrow, Jr., Director, Flight Projects, Goddard
Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 27
Written Statement............................................ 28
Biography.................................................... 31
Discussion
Budget Overruns................................................ 32
Program Expectations........................................... 35
Incorporating Recommendations and Preventing Future Problems... 37
The Need for Better Cost Estimates............................. 38
Meeting Budgets and Deadlines.................................. 41
The Partnership of NASA and NOAA............................... 42
Program Funding................................................ 43
Complying With Recommendations and the Responsibilities of NOAA
and NASA..................................................... 44
The Role of Congress........................................... 45
Benefits of GOES-R............................................. 46
Closing........................................................ 47
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Ms. Mary E. Kicza, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and
Information Services, National Environmental Satellite, Data,
and Information Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.................... 50
Mr. George W. Morrow, Jr., Director, Flight Projects, Goddard
Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).......................................... 56
CONTINUED OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION'S GEOSTATIONARY WEATHER SATELLITE SYSTEM
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THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian
Baird [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Continued Oversight of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
Geostationary Weather Satellite System
thursday, april 23, 2009
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), at the request of the
Committee, has submitted its latest report on the progress of the new
GOES-R series of geostationary weather satellites being developed by
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). On April
23, 2009, the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment will take
testimony from GAO, NOAA and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) on the status of the program and the GAO's
findings and recommendations.
Witnesses
Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues,
Government Accountability Office
Mr. Powner is the head of the GAO team that has supported the
Subcommittee's oversight of NOAA's major satellite programs for the
past five years. He will discuss the findings and recommendations on
NOAA's management of the GOES-R satellite program in the report it will
release at the hearing.
Ms. Mary Ellen Kicza, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and
Information Services, NOAA
Ms. Kicza leads the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and
Information Systems (NESDIS) at NOAA, operating the geostationary
weather satellites and leading the development of the new GOES-R
series. A former NASA official, Ms. Kicza assumed responsibility for
NOAA satellite development in November 2006. She will describe the
current status of the GOES-R program and give NOAA's response to the
GAO report.
Mr. George Morrow, Director of Flight Projects Directorate, Goddard
Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. Morrow's office is currently managing the development or
implementation of 40 space and Earth science missions at Goddard.
Before a short stint in the private sector, he oversaw technical
management of the Hubble Space Telescope and served as Project Manager
for the Aqua satellite. Morrow has held his current position since
September 2007.
Background
Western Hemisphere Weather Sentinels
NOAA depends on its GOES satellites to detect and track weather
systems affecting the Western Hemisphere. The satellites hold position
in geosynchronous orbit (22,300 miles above the Earth) where their
speed matches the Earth's rotational velocity. The Severe Storm Center
uses GOES to track tornadoes, hailstorms and other weather events
threatening life and property over land. For the Hurricane Center, GOES
shows developing storms in the areas of the oceans where there are no
other observational sensors.
A prototype satellite was launched in 1974; the first GOES
satellite went into orbit in 1975. Today, normal practice has two GOES
satellites in orbit simultaneously, with one focused on each of the
U.S. coasts (GOES-11 and GOES-12). A third (GOES-13) is also kept in
space as a spare to assure uninterrupted coverage.
GOES--The Recent Chronicle
The current GOES-R development program is the third major
procurement for GOES satellites since NOAA assumed responsibility for
funding its own geostationary operational satellites in 1982. In the
previous instances, NOAA purchased five GOES-Next satellites in the
period from 1985-2001, and then contracted for four GOES-N satellites
for the years 1998-2001. The first GOES-N model launched in May 2006 to
be the on-orbit spare,\1\ GOES-O is awaiting launch next month and
GOES-P has been completed and is in storage. GOES-Q was canceled in
2002 because the existing satellites were performing well past their
expected lifetimes.
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\1\ While on the ground, GOES satellites have a letter designation
based on the order in which they were built. After launch, checkout and
acceptance testing in orbit, it is changed to a number. Therefore,
GOES-N is now identified as GOES-13.
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In the original plan for the GOES-R program NOAA intended to spend
$6.2 billion for the life cycle period 2007-2020. This would purchase
four satellites. It would also fund development of two new major
instruments, the Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI) and the Hyperspectral
Environmental Suite (HES), as well as upgraded models of the space
weather sensors. The first satellite would be launched in 2012.
The Committee became concerned about the progress of the GOES
program when NOAA's other satellite development effort, the National
Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), was
forced to undergo a Nunn-McCurdy recertification. The GAO team studying
NPOESS was asked to determine if GOES was proceeding down a similar
path. By September 2006, as GAO made its first report, there were
important changes announced. Estimated cost grew to $11.4 billion. NOAA
reacted by eliminating two satellites and the HES instrument, and
pushing first launch back to December 2014. The President's FY 2008
budget request now listed the life cycle cost estimate reflected in the
President's FY 2008 budget request as $6.96 billion for the years 2003-
2028.
The Subcommittee heard from NOAA at its hearing in October 2007
that an independent review team (IRT) felt changes needed to be made in
the agency's plan for managing the program. NOAA had intended to assume
overall responsibility for procurement of the entire satellite system,
including the spacecraft, instruments, ground systems and integration.
The IRT questioned NOAA's ability to do this. Instead it recommended
that NOAA divide the program. NASA would manage the space segment
(which included the spacecraft bus and launch vehicle) and NOAA would
do the same for the ground segment (communications, satellite control
and data management). The IRT argued that this would allow NOAA to
benefit from the expertise in both agencies. To reflect these changes,
NOAA and NASA had signed a Memorandum of Understanding in June 2007,
and would agree on a Management Control Plan in December 2007.
For the instruments, NASA would manage their development for NOAA
and provide the finished devices as government equipment to the space
segment contractor. NASA would also handle the integration of the
instruments with the spacecraft. ABI was the first contract awarded
(September 2004), as it was expected to involve numerous technical
challenges. By the time of the hearing, the three space weather sensors
had been awarded. Selection of the contractor for the Geostationary
Lightning Mapper (GLM) followed in December 2007.
Since that hearing, there have been some additional significant
changes. In its FY 2009 budget request, NOAA said that launch of GOES-R
had slipped to April 2015 because the FY 2008 Omnibus Appropriation had
reduced funding below the level NOAA expected. In the Major Satellite
Program Annual Report for FY 2009, NOAA provided a new program baseline
cost estimate of $7.672 billion. The award for the space segment
contract was made to Lockheed Martin, in December 2008, but work came
to a halt when Boeing protested the award. Currently, NASA is
reconsidering the proposals. The ground system Request for Proposals
was released in May 2008, with NOAA hoping to make an award by June.
GAO's new report indicates that some of the expected performance
standards in the ground segment contract have been reduced. Further
discussion appears below.
GAO's GOES-R Snapshot
There are two major facets in GAO's new report on GOES-R. GAO
credits the program with progress in many areas listed as concerns in
previous reports. Even so, GAO identifies items of risk in program
controls and management of the instruments where the program continues
to fall short of best practices.
Over the course of the GOES-R program, the expected capabilities of
the satellites have been reduced as the increasing costs of the program
led to elimination of one major instrument (HES) and other changes in
scope. The Subcommittee asked GAO to evaluate the effect of these
changes on NOAA's ability to produce the products expected by its
users. In the second part of this report, GAO finds that the plan for
restoring the lost capability is stalled and that GOES-R may fall short
of user expectations.
I. Continuing Cost Risks
GAO, in its previous testimony, indicated that the GOES-R program
office was projecting the life cycle cost for the two-satellite program
was $6.9 billion, while an independent estimate projected it would
ultimately be $9.3 billion. By the time the estimates were reconciled,
GAO believed, there would be an increase in the estimate. This has
indeed occurred; NOAA completed reconciliation of the two estimates and
now states the baseline is $7.6 billion--very close to GAO's
prediction.
However, in Section 112(f) of the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations
Act, the Appropriations Committees established a statutory baseline for
the GOES-R program of $6.96 billion. Thus, there has been a ten percent
growth in the baseline, half of the growth necessary to trigger a
report to Congress and a set of reviews leading to an action plan
responding to the increased costs, a report on alternatives and their
associated costs and a report on the impact of the cost growth on other
NOAA programs. In such a situation, NOAA is likely to reduce the
capabilities of the satellites yet again.
GAO notes in its report that the primary instrument--the imager--is
only half-completed after five years, has been showing cost growth ($30
million) and a delay in some scheduled work. NOAA indicates that this
can be accommodated by the instrument project, as they had considered
the contractor's proposal optimistic and so provided an increased
budget in the program plan. In the three years since GAO first began
reporting these variances, the cost variance has grown by $24 million
and the schedule variance by $8 million. These are discouraging trends.
The ABI has already been re-baselined once for cost and schedule
(February 2007) and again for schedule in March 2008. Yet GAO's report
indicates that the ABI integrated baseline review failed to consider
significant items such as schedule milestones or the contractor's
management processes. In its first recommendation, GAO urges NOAA to
add these to future reviews before any subsequent re-baselinings. NOAA
agreed to do so. Again, GAO raised similar concerns on these program
control issues three years ago.
GAO goes on to fault NOAA for lack of documentation regarding the
cost and schedule variances reported on the imager and the lightning
mapper. NOAA responded that they were reviewing the variances with the
contractors, but not recording the information. Of course, the lack of
information on the decisions resulting from these conversations might
be crucial in resolving later technical problems. NOAA agreed with
GAO's second recommendation to be more diligent in documenting
information on variances.
GAO lists the ABI as a continuing cost risk, while it considers GLM
a high schedule risk.
II. The Boeing Protest and Schedule Risk
On December 2, 2008, the Lockheed Martin proposal won the contract
for the GOES-R space segment. Following agency debriefings, however,
the Boeing Company filed a protest with GAO, asserting that they had a
superior offer. Further action to finalize the contract, as well as
initial work, was suspended pending GAO's decision. On February 17,
2009, NASA informed GAO that it had decided to reconsider the proposals
and GAO dismissed the protest. The source evaluation board has reviewed
the bids to make a new recommendation, with the intent to issue an
award next month. Because this continues to be an active procurement,
NASA and NOAA will sometimes be limited in their responses in order to
shield ``source selection'' and other proprietary information protected
by law and regulation. GAO also placed a protective order on
information related to the protest, and it appears that elements of the
order remain in force. This may also affect what information the
agencies may provide.
However, the Subcommittee's immediate concern is the effect of the
protest on the GOES-R program schedule. In March 2008, the IRT was
already concerned that the lack of contracts for the space and ground
segment ``. . . has impacted potential schedule margins,'' and there
was a ``[n]eed to move forward without delay to get Flight and Ground
Segment procurements underway.'' \2\ NOAA noted in June that the
proposals for both segments had been issued and that the anticipated
award dates preserved adequate schedule margin, assuming no budget
problems.\3\ With the protest, however, the current first launch in
April 2015 now threatens to slip. Should a delay materialize, the risk
increases that NOAA will violate its current operational requirement
for a spare satellite in orbit around 2015.
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\2\ Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series-R
(GOES-R) Key Decision Point (KDP) C/D Readiness Report by GOES-R
Independent Review Team (IRT), March 18, 2008, p. 5.
\3\ Ibid., p. 20.
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The GOES-R program now has to assume that NASA's coming decision on
the space segment contract will face a new protest. Should the original
choice of Lockheed Martin be sustained, Boeing can be expected to renew
its challenge. Changing to Boeing will likely draw complaints from an
aggrieved Lockheed Martin. Risks of a protest after the ground segment
contract award may have also increased. This will create more pressure
on the program.
III. Disappearing Capabilities
As the GOES-R program has progressed, the improvements users
expected in its performance have been eroding. The 2006 decision to
drop the HES sensor to help restrain the projected $5 billion cost
growth in program estimates, contributed a great deal to the loss of 13
products (from 81 to 68) GOES-R was expected to produce. It also meant
that GOES-R would not retain at least the same level of atmospheric
sounding data now flying on the current satellites.
The Subcommittee asked GAO to evaluate NOAA's efforts to mitigate
these losses and to find alternate means to provide the reduced
capabilities. In this report, GAO describes the initial plan to use the
ABI--with other data sources--to supply sounding products equivalent to
the existing capability. This will require some tradeoffs; the ABI
should produce more data faster, but the readings in four product
categories will not be as precise as the current instrument.
Having developed the plan, NOAA briefed the proposal to parts of
its user community. According to GAO, these users were willing to
accept the alternative, but this appeared to rest on NOAA's assurance
that the data would be updated (``refreshed'') much more often than it
is today. Yet GAO also states that these ``refresh rates'' were among
the requirements that became optional requests as NOAA readied the
ground segment Request for Proposal in 2007. NOAA stated that the users
were informed as this change was made. It is unclear whether users
understand all the ramifications of the change.
GAO also notes that NOAA also has reduced the number of products
now expected from GOES-R by half, to 34. Despite declaring that the
lost products remain priorities for the agency, GAO reports ``. . .
NOAA has not defined plans or a timeline for implementing any of the
options or for addressing the requirements for advanced products.
Further, agency officials were unable to estimate when they would
establish plans to fulfill the requirements.'' As a result, the
report's third recommendation urges NOAA to establish such a plan and
process. Again, NOAA has agreed with the recommendation.
NOAA states that planning is underway to prepare some kind of
improved sounder that could be flown aboard two future satellites, the
GOES-T and -U satellites. However, these two satellites are not part of
the current procurement and budgets have not been developed or approved
for them within the GOES-R program. Preliminary steps to provide
resources for that development may be included in the FY 2011 budget
request. This was first offered as an option in April 2007 in the wake
of HES's cancellation. The competitors for the HES instrument at the
same time also argued that enough progress had been made to consider
flying a prototype of the next-generation sounder aboard GOES-S, but
NOAA declined.
This situation raises a question: just how well does NOAA work with
its user communities when setting priorities among the many competing
requirements that affect design of its satellite instruments? In his
2006 written statement to the Committee, former Administrator
Launtenbacher described:
``. . . a group consisting of the NOAA users of the satellite
data . . .. As we designed the original concept for GOES-R, the
user group developed the initial requirements and meets
regularly to assess the extent to which the preliminary designs
meet the requirements. This group is critical as we move
forward with finalizing sensors and the satellite system to
ensure GOES-R will meet NOAA's requirements for data and
products . . ..'' \4\
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\4\ U.S. Congress. House. GAO Report on NOAA's Weather Satellite
Program. Hearing Before the Committee on Science. 109th Congress;
Serial 109-66. September 29, 2006; p. 19.
GAO's discussion of NOAA's user interactions does not appear to be
referring to this group. Without the continuing contributions of users
knowledgeable about the evolution of the GOES-R space and ground
systems, it is possible that the increased investment in GOES-R may
produce satellites little advanced from current models. GAO hopes to
examine this in greater detail in its next assignment.
Chairman Baird. Good morning. Our hearing will come to
order.
We are pleased to have everybody here today on a topic
which we in the Committee think is of tremendous importance to
the country and we have some outstanding witnesses today to
give us information on the status of this program. Today we are
going to meet to receive GAO's latest report on the
Geostationary Operational Earth Satellite System, so-called
GOES. From their stations above the equator, the GOES system
tracks weather across the Western Hemisphere. It is one of two
major satellite programs now underway at NOAA.
Development of the satellite and instruments for this
series, the GOES-R, is a NASA responsibility. The GOES program
has from the outset depended on cooperation between the two
agencies, NASA and NOAA. It has not, however, always been a
happy partnership. The troubles in the polar satellite program
are a stark warning of the dangers of interagency friction, and
so the Subcommittee has asked NASA to participate today to
allow discussion of its critical contribution to the GOES-R
success.
While the GOES program has not suffered from the same
mismanagement and mistakes that have plagued the polar
satellite replacement program, it has not been a model of
excellence either. In our previous hearings we have learned
that the preliminary cost estimates for these satellites had
doubled and as a result NOAA found it necessary to cut the
number of satellites to be ordered by half. And so, or even so,
as GAO forecasted, the program cost has again gone up.
At the same time, the GOES satellites lost the new
instrument that would expand our ability to sample atmospheric
conditions at more levels. NOAA found the technical challenges
too great given the time and money it had. The Subcommittee
asked our GAO team to review NOAA's plan for providing these
lost capabilities, and they report today that ``NOAA has not
defined plans or a timeline for implementing any of the options
for addressing the requirements for advanced products.'' I look
forward to hearing both the GAO and NOAA's testimony on this
subject.
Just to put this into context, I asked staff to give me a
list of some examples of where this satellite data has been
useful, and wherever you are virtually in the United States of
America we have examples of that. My own district was hit by
severe flooding in January of 2009. GOES satellite imagery was
relied upon heavily. Part of its monitoring of water vapor
imagery helped predict the amount of rainfall, and it was an
epic flood. I was in the middle of it and I can tell you we
lost property and it was a very difficult experience. It
continues to be so. I was just there last week dealing with the
aftereffects of the flood.
The Oklahoma-Texas wildfires of January 2006 and April
2009--Mr. Inglis will find this interesting as well. Here is a
GOES picture, a satellite photo from April 21, 2009, showing
the smoke from the fires in Texas just two days ago now; and
the Mount Redoubt volcano in Alaska March 2009, GOES satellite
imagery detected, monitored and tracked volcanic ash eruptions
critical for a variety of things, even aviation safety as we
try to understand where planes should or shouldn't fly.
Hurricane Katrina, we have heard of that. Mr. Jindal might take
note of this if he wants to attack earmarks in the future, but
we will just say that GOES satellite image was particularly
important in helping forecast Katrina. What many people don't
know is the Katrina forecast was pretty darn good. They hit its
magnitude, arrival and location very, very precisely. The
problem was on the ground, people didn't prepare, but you folks
did your job, those who were involved with this. But all of the
aforementioned and countless other uses could fall in jeopardy
if we don't get this right, and that is what today's hearing is
about. We are afraid we are not going to get it right and we
want to, we want to get it right, meaning on time, on budget,
which we are already off, but we don't want more cost overruns
and we certainly don't want a big gap in reliability, and I
think there is reason to question whether we are going to
achieve that goal. But I highlight all these applications, Mr.
Inglis and my friends on the panel, because I think the
American people need to understand, this is not small,
irrelevant, abstract issues that we are dealing with. This is
something very, very consequential to public health, life,
safety, economic benefits, et cetera.
So with that, I will again thank the witnesses and
recognize Mr. Inglis for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Baird follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Brian Baird
Good morning and welcome. The Subcommittee is meeting today to
receive GAO's latest report on the Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellite system (GOES). From their stations above the
equator, the GOES system tracks weather across the Western Hemisphere.
It is one of two major satellite programs now underway at NOAA.
Development of the satellites and instruments for this series,
GOES-R is a NASA responsibility. The GOES program has from the outset
depended on cooperation between the two agencies, NASA and NOAA. It has
not always been a happy partnership. The troubles in the polar
satellite program are a stark warning of the dangers of interagency
friction, and so the Subcommittee has asked NASA to participate today
to allow discussion of its critical contributions to GOES-R success.
While the GOES program has not suffered from the same mismanagement
and mistakes that have plagued the polar satellite replacement program,
it has not been a model of excellence either. In our previous hearings
we have learned that the preliminary cost estimate for these satellites
had doubled and as a result NOAA found it necessary to cut the number
of satellites to be ordered in half. Even so, as GAO forecasted, the
program cost has again gone up.
At the same time, the GOES satellites lost the new instrument that
would expand our ability to sample atmospheric conditions at more
levels. NOAA found the technical challenges too great given the time
and money it had. The Subcommittee asked our GAO team to review NOAA's
plan for providing those lost capabilities; they report today that ``.
. . NOAA has not defined plans or a timeline for implementing any of
the options or for addressing the requirements for advanced products.''
I look forward to hearing both GAO and NOAA's testimony on this
subject.
I would like to thank our witnesses for their testimony today, and
I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Inglis, for his remarks.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Getting it right is
very important in this case because it is very important that
we be able to take these pictures and the potential loss of
redundancy by not getting these satellites up in time could
mean that a significant part of our observation goes dark. I
mean, what if one of them goes out and it is all dark on that
side of the Earth and we are not able to see the hurricanes
coming, we are not able to predict weather for commerce. It is
just a--it is a very important matter, and I am sure that no
one on this panel wants to be here right now because what a
disaster have we got in the works.
So, you know, a year and a half ago we were here having a
hearing on this. In that hearing, the GAO told us that the
program was over budget, behind schedule and running the risk
of discontinuity, and that is the thing I am expressing great
concern about. Discontinuity here would be a huge practical
impact. So GAO made some recommendations how to proceed and how
to avoid further cost overruns while ensuring that the
technological development stays on schedule.
And now we are here with a GAO report in hand entitled
``Acquisition has increased cost, reduced capabilities and
delayed schedules.'' That is a pretty sorry title. I mean,
those are all bad things. The price tag is up from $670 million
since we last met, even though the program has now been down-
sized from 81 products on the satellites to 32. There is still
the threat of launch delays, and even if we get two new
satellites in the air, we are now not sure if there will be
orbit backup, so that means that one mishap with the new
instruments and we could lose our eyes on half the world or all
the world.
So the question for us today is, how do we fix this? I
thought we were learning about what was wrong here. Now we are
back in the same spot so I hope we can figure out how to fix it
from here. Is it a matter of poor management? Should NOAA
continue to be charged with supervision of this program or does
Congress need to give the reins to some other agency entirely?
How are we prioritizing the instruments we put on the
satellites to make sure we get what we really need on those
satellites? So those of us responsible for this program,
Congress, NOAA, NASA, cannot lightly risk delays and cost
overruns. GOES-R today is a $7.7 billion program for two
satellites. That is a lot of taxpayer money and we expect that
investment to provide a series of weather satellites that are
launched on time and that provide data to ensure the most
accurate possible weather forecasting and modeling.
So I look forward to hearing some solutions today and
hopefully not repeating this a year and a half from now. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inglis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bob Inglis
Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Baird, for holding this hearing
about the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R series
(GOES-R). This hearing continues close oversight of this vital weather
satellite program, oversight that started under Republican leadership
of this committee.
Exactly one year and a half ago, to the day, this subcommittee held
a hearing on the GOES-R program. In that hearing, GAO informed us that
the program was over budget, behind on schedule, and running a risk of
discontinuity in valuable forecasting data. GAO also made
recommendations on how to proceed so as to avoid any further cost
overruns while ensuring that technological development stays on
schedule.
Now we're here, with a GAO report in hand entitled, ``Acquisition
Has Increased Costs, Reduced Capabilities, and Delayed Schedules.'' The
price tag is up $670 million since we last met, even though the program
has now been down-sized from eighty one products on the satellites to
thirty-two. There is still a threat of launch delays, and even if we
still get two new satellites in the air, we're now not sure if there
will be an in orbit backup. That means that one mishap with the new
instruments, and we could lose our forecasting eyes on half the world.
So the question before us today is: What are we going to do to fix
this problem? We obviously can't go back, but we can't afford to show
up a year and half from now only to find that the future of our weather
forecasting is even more off track. Is this a matter of poor
management? Should NOAA continue to be charged with supervision over
this program, or does Congress need to give the reins to another agency
entirely? And how are we prioritizing the instruments we put on the
satellite to make sure we get the necessary equipment in place so that
we don't experience any discontinuity in valuable forecasting data?
Those of us responsible for this program, Congress, NOAA, and NASA,
cannot lightly risk delays and cost overruns. GOES-R today is a $7.7
billion program for two satellites. That is a lot of taxpayer money. We
expect that investment to provide a series of weather satellites that
are launched on time and provide data to ensure the most accurate
possible weather forecasting and modeling.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and yield back
the balance of my time.
Chairman Baird. Thank you, Mr. Inglis. We have been joined
by Ms. Edwards. Thank you for joining us, Mr. Neugebauer, as
well. As is the custom of this committee, we will proceed now.
If any other Members have opening remarks, they may submit them
for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good Morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing
on the oversight of the NOAA's geostationary weather satellite system.
Geostationary weather satellite systems are important in
identifying and anticipating extreme weather conditions before as they
approach the U.S. My Congressional District in Southern Illinois
frequently faces extreme weather conditions, including tornadoes and
ice storms that can destroy property, take out electricity for long
periods of time, and even take lives. I appreciate the efforts of NOAA
and NASA to continually update and improve the technology of these
satellite systems to increase warning times for extreme weather events.
However, I remain concerned about the continued delays and cost
increases associated with the GOES-R program. In the face of these
challenges, NOAA has reduced the capabilities of these satellites and
delayed their deployment. While I appreciate the efforts of NOAA and
NASA to adopt the recommendations of the GAO and remain transparent in
their contracting negotiations, I have concerns about the impact of
these delays and decreased capacities.
I would be interested in hearing from our witnesses today what
impact they see the GAO recommendations and the increasing cost of the
satellites having on their deployment date and capacity. Specifically,
if GOES-R will be able to achieve the goals set forth by NOAA,
including significant improvements in warning time for extreme weather
and if any further delays are expected leading to a gap in satellite
coverage?
I welcome our panel of witnesses, and I look forward to their
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
The ability to track the Earth's weather and to predict storms is
of great national importance. Weather satellites make that possible.
The American public relies on the Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellites (GOES) to accomplish this goal.
These satellites, which rotate around the Earth at a synchronous
velocity as the that of the Earth, are used to track tornadoes,
hailstorms and other weather events.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is
primarily responsible for developing the newest of these satellites, in
cooperation with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Today, the Committee will be interested to hear comments on a
recent report by the Government Accountability Office on the progress
of the new GOES-R satellites that are in development.
In summary, the GAO report recommends that the program take steps
to ``improve management and oversight and determine whether and how to
recover certain capabilities that were removed from the program.''
Our witnesses, from GAO, NOAA, and NASA will discuss why the
project has had continued escalating costs.
The Subcommittee will also want to know why a major instrument, the
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (HES), is planned be eliminated.
The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite is designed to provide high-
resolution hemispheric observations, large-scale examinations of severe
weather systems, and imaging of coastal waters.
It will also provide temperature and moisture measurements and can
be applied to examine cloud-top information, winds, and ozone.
The Science Committee has held hearings in the past to assess other
NOAA/NASA satellite development endeavors.
It is this committee's responsibility to provide oversight to
ensure the timely and appropriate development of this project.
Budget estimates that are substantially larger than first predicted
and delays in deliverables should be communicated to the Committee and
our citizens, who provide the funding for these endeavors.
Mr. Chairman, this project is very important and should be
supported by the Committee.
A first-rate weather satellite program will benefit every citizen
in this nation.
NOAA weather satellites provide pictures of weather from around the
United States or the world.
The data from these satellites are used to measure the temperature
of the ocean, which is a key indicator of climate change.
Satellite information is used to monitor coral reefs, harmful algal
blooms, fires, and volcanic ash.
Monitoring the Earth from space helps us understand how the Earth
works and affects much of our daily lives.
Again, I want to emphasize the importance of this project to the
American people.
Also, I would like to welcome today's witnesses.
We appreciate the work that you are doing and hope that we can
facilitate a smooth transition to new, high-quality satellites as soon
as possible.
Chairman Baird. We will now proceed to hear from the panel.
You will each be asked to speak for about five minutes and then
we will follow up with questions. Let me introduce the panel at
this point. Mr. David Powner is the Director of Information
Technology Management Issues at the Government Accountability
Office, Ms. Mary Ellen Kicza is the Assistant Administrator for
Satellite and Information Services at the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and Mr. George Morrow is the
Director of the Flight Projects Directorate at the Goddard
Space Flight Center at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. Thank you all for being here.
Mr. Powner, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Powner. Chairman Baird, Ranking Member Inglis and
Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to
testify this morning on our GOES-R report completed at your
request.
This subcommittee's early oversight, Mr. Chairman, has been
essential to ensure that NOAA is effectively planning for this
critical satellite acquisition. Since the Subcommittee's last
hearing, NOAA has made progress on this acquisition, awarding
development contracts for five instruments and plans to award
contracts for the spacecraft and ground segments this summer.
NOAA has also made good progress implementing our
recommendations, specifically has improved its risk management
processes and increased oversight of its contractors. Today, as
requested, I will provide an update on GOES-R's current cost
and schedule estimates and how this affects continuity of
satellite coverage, key reductions in satellite capability and
recommendations going forward.
Starting with cost and schedule, the new cost estimate is
nearly $7.7 billion, an increase of $670 million from the prior
estimate. Several key issues could affect this estimate. First,
the estimate will be revisited after the spacecraft and ground
segment contracts are awarded in May and June of this year. In
addition, the Imager and Lighting Mapper costs are reported as
high risk by the program and delivering these instruments could
cost more than originally estimated.
Turning to schedule and continuity of satellite coverage,
NOAA has delayed several GOES-R program milestones, including
issuing requests for proposals and contracts for the spacecraft
and ground segments by 12 and 10 months, respectively. In fact,
the spacecraft contract was already awarded and protested last
December which led to NASA deciding to reevaluate the
proposals. These delays have pushed the date when the first
satellite will be launched by four months and it is now
targeted for April 2015, as this chart throughout the hearing
room displays.
I would like to also note too that this date could be later
than April 2015. These delays in the launch of the first GOES-R
satellite run counter to NOAA's policy of having a backup
satellite in orbit at all times and could lead to gaps in
coverage as displayed by the portion of the graphic that is in
red throughout the hearing room. If NOAA experiences a problem
with these two operational satellites before GOES is in orbit,
it will need to rely on older satellites that are well beyond
their expected operational lives.
It is important to note, Mr. Chairman, that the cost
increases and schedule delays just discussed would be greater
if NOAA were not reducing program capabilities. Back in
September 2006, the GOES-R acquisition went from delivering 81
products to 68 when it dropped the technically complex sensor
HES, a state-of-the-art sounder, to control costs. More
recently to keep costs down, the program has once again
eliminated the number of products GOES-R is expected to deliver
from 68 to 34, a 50 percent reduction. These products include
those associated with aircraft icing and turbulence. Program
officials told us that the products dropped are not currently
being produced by legacy GOES satellites.
In addition to eliminating products from the program, NOAA
users will not get critical data as quickly as planned. Such
drastic reductions in functionality raise questions concerning
how much better the GOES-R program will be when compared to
legacy GOES products. Program officials claim as good or better
but our analysis of the capabilities expected after HES was
removed shows that some are less than GOES legacy capabilities.
These are clearly laid out in our detailed report and are tied
to product accuracy.
We are making several recommendations to NOAA to control
future costs and schedule growth including performing a
detailed review of the most critical and expensive instrument,
improving oversight of contractor performance and developing a
plan that articulates which dropped capabilities will be
restored since this could affect the program's cost and
schedule. In addition, given the magnitude of the capabilities
dropped from this program and the severity of the potential
gaps in satellite coverage, we also recommended that NOAA
inform this subcommittee of any further reductions in plan
capabilities and of contingency plans to address the potential
gaps in satellite coverage.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, it is important that these
recommendations be addressed to control future costs and
schedule growth to ensure that capabilities are not reduced to
a point that they are no longer meeting user needs and to
assure that our nation mitigates the potential gap in satellite
coverage.
This concludes my statement. Thank you for your oversight
of this important acquisition.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
Prepared Statement of David A. Powner
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on
our nation's Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-
R) series. The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of
satellites, which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful
lives in approximately 2014. This new series is expected to mark the
first major technological advance in GOES instrumentation since 1994.
It is also considered critical to the United States' ability to
maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting
through the year 2028. As requested, this statement summarizes our
report being released today that (1) determines the status of the
program, (2) evaluates whether plans for the GOES-R acquisition address
problems experienced on similar programs, and (3) determines whether
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) plan to
address the capabilities that were planned for the satellites, but then
removed, will be adequate to support current data requirements.\1\
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\1\ GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites:
Acquisition is Under Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and
Oversight, GAO-09-323 (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2009).
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In preparing this testimony, we relied on our work supporting the
accompanying report. That report contains a detailed overview of our
scope and methodology. In addition, we updated factual information on
satellite launch schedules as warranted. All of our work for this
report was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily
focused on the United States. These satellites are uniquely positioned
to provide timely environmental data about the Earth's atmosphere, its
surface, cloud cover, and the space environment to meteorologists and
their audiences. They also observe the development of hazardous
weather, such as hurricanes and severe thunderstorms, and track their
movement and intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of property and
life. Furthermore, the satellites' ability to provide broad,
continuously updated coverage of atmospheric conditions over land and
oceans is important to NOAA's weather forecasting operations.
To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several
satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites
every few years (see Table 1). NOAA's policy is to have two operational
satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times.
Four GOES satellites--GOES-10, GOES-11, GOES-12, and GOES-13--are
currently in orbit. Both GOES-11 and GOES-12 are operational
satellites, with GOES-12 covering the east and GOES-11 the west. GOES-
13 is currently in an on-orbit storage mode. It is a backup for the
other two satellites should they experience any degradation in service.
GOES-10 is at the end of its service life, but it is being used to
provide limited coverage of South America. The others in the series,
GOES-O and GOES-P, are planned for launch over the next two years.\2\
NOAA is also planning the next generation of satellites, known as the
GOES-R series, which are planned for launch beginning in 2015.
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\2\ Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the
alphabet when they are on the ground and by numbers once they are in
orbit.
GOES-R Program--An Overview
NOAA plans for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of
prior series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements. The
system improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user
requirements by updating the satellite data more often and providing
satellite products to users more quickly. The instrument improvements
are expected to significantly increase the clarity and precision of the
observed environmental data. NOAA originally planned to acquire six
different types of instruments.
In September 2006, however, NOAA decided to reduce the scope and
technical complexity of the GOES-R program because of expectations that
total costs, which were originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, could
reach $11.4 billion.\3\ Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum number
of satellites from four to two, canceled plans for developing a
critical instrument--the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (which
reduced the number of planned satellite products from 81 to 68), and
divided the Solar Imaging Suite into two separate acquisitions. The
agency estimated that the revised program would cost $7 billion. In
addition to the reductions in scope, NOAA also delayed the launch of
the first satellite from September 2012 to December 2014.
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\3\ GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites:
Additional Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other
Satellite Programs, GAO-06-1129T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006) and
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in
Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO-06-993
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
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NOAA is solely responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall
mission success. However, since it relies on the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration's (NASA) acquisition experience and technical
expertise to help ensure the success of its programs, NOAA implemented
an integrated program management structure with NASA for the GOES-R
program. Within the program office, there are two project offices that
manage key components of the GOES-R system--the flight and ground
segment project offices. The flight project office, managed by NASA, is
responsible for awarding and managing the spacecraft segment contract,
delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft segment
contractor for integration onto the satellites, and overseeing the
systems engineering and integration. The ground segment project office,
managed by NOAA, oversees the ground contract, satellite data product
development and distribution, and on-orbit operations of the
satellites.
GOES-R Is in Development, But Costs Have Increased, Envisioned
Functionality Has Been Reduced, and Schedules Have
Been Delayed
NOAA and NASA have made progress on the GOES-R program. In January
2008, NOAA approved the program's move from the preliminary design and
definition phase to the development phase of the acquisition life
cycle. This approval also gave the program the authority to issue the
requests for proposals for the spacecraft and ground segment projects--
which it did in January 2008 and May 2008, respectively. The program
office plans to award the prime contract for the spacecraft segment in
May 2009 and the contract for the ground segment in June 2009. In
addition, between September 2004 and December 2007, the GOES-R program
awarded contracts for the development of five key instruments.\4\ These
instruments are currently in varying stages of development. Figure 1
depicts the schedule for both the program and key instruments.
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\4\ A sixth instrument, the Magnetometer, is to be developed as
part of the space segment contract.
GOES-R Cost Estimate Has Increased, Envisioned Functionality Has Been
Reduced, and Key Milestones Have Slipped
NOAA has made several important decisions about the cost, scope,
and schedule of the GOES-R program. After reconciling the program
office's cost estimate with an independent cost estimate, the agency
established a new program cost estimate of $7.67 billion, an increase
of $670 million from the previous estimate. Agency officials plan to
revisit this cost estimate after the spacecraft and ground segment
contracts are awarded but stated that it was developed with a
relatively high level of confidence and that they believe that any
adjustments would be well within the $7.67 billion program budget.
To mitigate the risk that costs would rise, program officials
decided to remove selected program requirements from the baseline
program and treat them as options that could be exercised if funds
allow. These requirements include the number of products to be
distributed, the time to deliver the remaining products (product
latency), and how often these products are updated with new satellite
data (refresh rate). Specifically, program officials eliminated the
requirement to develop and distribute 34 of the 68 envisioned products,
including aircraft icing threat, turbulence, and visibility. Program
officials explained that these products are not currently being
produced by legacy GOES satellites; they are new products that could be
produced from the advanced GOES-R instruments. In addition, the program
slowed planned product latency on the remaining products by as much as
10 minutes for hurricane intensity and six minutes for volcanic ash
detection and height. It also reduced the refresh rates on these
products by as much as 55 minutes for sea surface temperatures, cloud
top observations, and vertical moisture profiles in the atmosphere.
Program officials included the restoration of the products, latency,
and refresh rates as options in the ground segment contract--items that
could be acquired at a later time.
NOAA also delayed GOES-R program milestones including the dates for
issuing the requests for proposals by up to six months and awarding the
contracts for the spacecraft and ground segments by 12 and 10 months,
respectively. The dates when the satellites would be available for
launch have also slipped by four months, with the first satellite
launch now scheduled for April 2015. Program officials attributed these
delays to providing more stringent oversight before releasing the
requests for proposals, additional time needed to evaluate the contract
proposals, and funding reductions in fiscal year 2008.
Recent events have raised doubts about the feasibility of the GOES-
R launch date. Specifically, after the spacecraft segment contract was
awarded and then protested in December 2008, NASA decided to re-
evaluate the proposals. NASA now plans to re-award the contract in May
2009. Because NASA has agreed to a 72-month development cycle for the
spacecraft segment (from contract award date to launch readiness), the
launch date of GOES-R will likely be delayed until at least May 2015.
Any delays in the launch of the first GOES-R satellite run counter
to NOAA's policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times and
could lead to gaps in satellite coverage. This policy proved useful in
December 2008, when NOAA lost communication with GOES-12, but was able
to use GOES-13 as an operational satellite until communication was
restored. However, beginning in November 2014, NOAA expects to have two
operational satellites in orbit (O and P), but it will not have a
backup satellite in place until GOES-R is launched. If NOAA experiences
a problem with either of its operational satellites before GOES-R is in
orbit, it will need to rely on older satellites that are beyond their
expected operational lives and therefore may not be fully functional.
The GOES-R Program Office Has Taken Steps to Address Lessons Learned
From Other Satellite Programs, But Important
Actions Remain
GOES-R has taken steps to address lessons from other satellite
programs. These actions include ensuring sufficient technical readiness
of the spacecraft and ground segments prior to awarding the contracts.
However, key risks remain and important actions remain to be completed
in selected areas. Specifically, key technology risks remain--affecting
both the ground segment and the instruments. While the hardware that is
to be used for the ground segment is mature, key components have not
previously been integrated. In addition, the program office has
identified the Advanced Baseline Imager and the Geostationary Lightning
Mapper instruments as having a high level of risk associated with cost
due in part to the technical challenges posed by each instrument.
Program officials reported that they have sufficient management
reserves to address these risks.
To manage such risks, NOAA uses earned value management,\5\ a
proven means for measuring progress against cost and schedule
commitments and thereby identifying potential cost overruns and
schedule delays early, when the impact can be minimized. Two key
aspects of this process are (1) conducting comprehensive integrated
baseline reviews to obtain agreement from stakeholders on the value of
planned work and validate the baseline against which variances are
calculated and (2) using monthly variance reports to provide
information on the current contract status, the reasons for any
deviations from cost or schedule plans, and any actions taken to
address these deviations.
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\5\ Earned value management is a project management approach that,
if implemented appropriately, provides objective reports of project
status, produces early warning signs of impending schedule delays and
cost overruns, and provides unbiased estimates of a program's total
costs.
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To its credit, the GOES-R program office is using earned value
management to oversee the key instrument contracts and plans to use it
on the spacecraft and ground segment contracts. To date, the program
office has performed integrated baseline reviews on the instruments and
obtains and reviews variance reports for each of the instruments.
However, the program's integrated baseline review for the Advanced
Baseline Imager did not include a review of schedule milestones, the
adequacy of how tasks are measured, and the contractor's management
processes. Further, the variance reports for two instruments--the
Advanced Baseline Imager and the Geostationary Lightning Mapper--do not
describe all of the significant variances. Program officials explained
that they meet with the contractor on a monthly basis to discuss all of
the variances, but they were unable to provide documentation of these
discussions or the reasons for, impact of, or mitigation plans for the
variances. As a result of these shortfalls, the program office has less
assurance that key instruments will be delivered on time and within
budget, and it is more difficult for program managers to identify risks
and take corrective actions.
NOAA Has Not Developed Plans for Meeting Requirements for Advanced
Products
Before it was canceled in September 2006, the Hyperspectral
Environmental Suite was originally planned as part of the GOES-R
satellite series to meet requirements for products that are currently
produced by GOES satellites as well as new technically-advanced
products not currently produced by GOES satellites. NOAA still
considers these requirements to be valid, and NOAA and the science
community still have a need for the advanced products.
NOAA had planned to use the new sounding products to improve its
performance goals, such as helping to increase the lead times
associated with severe thunderstorm warnings from an average of 18
minutes in 2000 to as much as two hours by 2025, and helping to
increase the lead times associated with tornado warnings from an
average of 13 minutes in 2007 to as much as one hour by 2025.\6\ In
addition, NOAA had planned to use the new coastal waters imaging
products to provide more accurate and quantitative understanding of
areas for which NOAA has management responsibilities.\7\ In particular,
the coastal water imaging products could have been used to predict and
monitor the growth, spread, severity and duration of harmful algal
blooms. Recent studies suggest that harmful algal blooms are occurring
more frequently because of climate change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ In addition to advanced sounding, other activities such as
improvements in radar technologies are expected to help improve lead
times.
\7\ While current and future satellite systems provide selected
coastal waters images, they lack the resolution, sampling frequency,
and spectral information (field of vision) needed to monitor coastal
areas and estuaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOAA, NASA, and the Department of Defense assessed alternatives for
obtaining advanced sounding and coastal water imaging products from a
geostationary orbit. The results of the analysis recommended that NOAA
work with NASA to develop a demonstration sounder to fly on an as-yet
undetermined satellite and to evaluate other options for coastal waters
imaging. NOAA plans to assess the technical feasibility of various
options and to have the National Research Council make recommendations
on long-term options for coastal water imaging.
However, NOAA has not defined plans or a timeline for addressing
the requirements for advanced products. Further, agency officials were
unable to estimate when they would establish plans to fulfill the
requirements. Until a decision is made on whether and how to provide
the advanced products, key system users will not be able to meet their
goals for improving the lead times or accuracy of severe weather
warnings, and climate research organizations will not obtain the data
they need to enhance the science of climate, coastal, environmental,
and oceanic observations.
Implementation of Recommendations Could Improve Management and
Oversight
In our report, we are making three recommendations that, if
implemented, could improve the management and oversight of the GOES-R
acquisition. These are: ensuring that any re-baselining of a key
instrument includes an assessment of milestones, adequacy of resources,
task and technical planning, and management processes; ensuring that
reasons for cost and schedule variances are fully disclosed and
documented; and, if feasible, developing a plan and timeline for
restoring the advanced capabilities removed from the program.
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Commerce agreed with our findings and recommendations and outlined
steps it is taking to implement them. The department also provided
technical comments on the report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
In summary, NOAA has made repeated and continuing efforts to learn
from problems experienced on other satellite programs. The GOES-R
satellite series is now in development, but program costs have
increased, the scope of the program has been reduced, and schedules
have been delayed. Further, unless the program exercises contract
options, key benefits in terms of new products and faster data updates
will not be realized. Of particular concern are the three years of
launch delays since 2006. In addition, recent events make it likely
that the launch of GOES-R will continue to slip, which increases the
risk of having gaps in satellite coverage. Until NOAA and NASA act to
address this risk, the United States' ability to maintain the
continuity of data required for weather forecasting is in jeopardy. In
addition, NOAA has not yet developed a plan or a timeline for
recovering the advanced capabilities that were removed. Until such
decisions and plans are made, the geostationary user community may not
be able to make significant improvements in their severe weather
forecasts, or their ability to monitor our coastal environments.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our
statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or
other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
Staff Acknowledgments
Other key contributors to this testimony include Colleen M.
Phillips, Assistant Director; Carol Cha; William Carrigg; Neil Doherty;
Franklin Jackson; Kaelin Kuhn; Lee McCracken; and Eric Winter.
Biography for David A. Powner
Dave is currently responsible for a large segment of GAO's
information technology (IT) work, including systems development, IT
investment management, and cyber critical infrastructure protection
reviews. He has nearly 20 years of both public and private information
technology-related experience. In the private sector, he held several
executive-level positions in the telecommunications industry, including
overseeing IT and financial internal audits, and software development
associated with digital subscriber lines (DSL). At GAO, he has led
reviews of major IT modernization efforts at Cheyenne Mountain Air
Force Station, the National Weather Service, the Federal Aviation
Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service. These reviews covered
many information technology areas including software development
maturity, information security, and enterprise architecture. Dave has
an undergraduate degree from the University of Denver in Business
Administration and is a graduate of the Senior Executive Fellows
program at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.
Chairman Baird. Thank you, Mr. Powner.
Ms. Kicza.
STATEMENT OF MS. MARY E. KICZA, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
SATELLITE AND INFORMATION SERVICES, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
SATELLITE, DATA, AND INFORMATION SERVICE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Ms. Kicza. Chairman Baird, Ranking Member Inglis,
distinguished Members and staff, I am pleased to join Mr.
Powner of GAO and Mr. Morrow of NASA to discuss the GOES-R
program, NOAA's next generation geostationary satellite system.
I am pleased to report that our current GOES satellites are
providing data 24 hours a day, seven days a week. We are
preparing the GOES-O satellite for launch later this year and
completing development of the GOES-P satellite.
As you said, NOAA's geostationary satellites are best known
for creating hurricane pictures that you see on television.
They provide data to help forecast the weather and are critical
to detecting and tracking severe weather. The value of GOES
data was recently demonstrated during the wildfires in Oklahoma
and Texas, as you have just shown.
I would like to review briefly the status of the GOES
program. We have made significant progress to address the cost,
schedule and technical risks the program faced. I addressed
this when I testified in front of this subcommittee nearly two
years ago. The program will certainly face further risks during
the course of this development, but we have established
rigorous processes and reporting thresholds to provide early
warning of risks so that we can promptly address them. In
collaboration with NASA, we have developed an acquisition
strategy that takes advantage of the strengths of each agency.
NOAA has program management and funding responsibilities for
the program. NASA manages the flight project which includes the
instruments, the spacecraft and procuring a launch vehicle.
NOAA manages the ground system project which includes ground
station and weather products development. This places the
government in direct oversight and control of each of the key
elements of the program. NASA plans to award the spacecraft
contract in May of this year. NOAA plans to award the ground
system contract in June of this year. Awarding these contracts
are important milestones for the program.
We have encountered some issues during instrument
development thus far. That is why we build prototype models of
the most complex sensors to resolve the issues before the final
flight instruments are built to fly in a satellite. We have
addressed all of these issues within the existing budget. The
current budget supports development and operations for the
GOES-R and -S satellites through 2028. Subject to availability
of funds in future fiscal years, we anticipate exercising
contract options to procure and operate two additional
satellites, GOES-T and -U.
I would like to turn to the GAO report. I want to say that
we value--we greatly value the insight provided by GAO. We are
pleased that the GAO has recognized the program's progress
since they began to review this program, especially recently
our strides implementing sound cost estimating methodologies.
I would like to address the report's recommendations. The
GOES-R program office recently modified the Advanced Baseline
Imager contract to more closely align its schedule with the
planned schedule for spacecraft development and we have
adjusted the earned value metrics accordingly. GAO's first
recommendation states that with the changes of this nature, the
program should conduct a formal integrated baseline review. We
agree with this recommendation and expect to complete one by
the end of this year. In the interim, the program will continue
to closely manage the ABI development.
The second recommendation directed the agency to improve
its ability to oversee contractor performance by ensuring the
reasons for cost and schedule variances are fully disclosed and
documented. We agree with this recommendation. The program has
been receiving information on all costs and schedule variances.
The practice has been for our major instrument development,
ABI, that the contractor submit detailed analysis on the top
five cost and schedule variances. The program then meets with
each of the contractors monthly to discuss any additional
variances that require additional clarification. From this
point forward we will formally document the results of those
meetings and track any resulting actions.
The next recommendation calls for a plan and timeline if
feasible and justified for recovering the advanced capabilities
that were removed from the program when the Hyperspectral
Environmental Suite was canceled. We agree with the
recommendation. The user requirements for the HES advanced
capabilities are documented. While the capabilities are not
currently a part of the GOES-R program, the ability to
accommodate them in the future has been retained. The
measurements which had originally been planned for HES remain
important to a wide range of users and my office is examining
how to best bring these capabilities to bear in the future. We
are seeking information on capabilities that the U.S. private
sector can contribute and we are actively exploring the
potential of international collaboration to bring the
capabilities to bear. As the efforts mature and given they are
deemed of high priority in comparison to other NOAA
observational needs, we will request funds to support the
capabilities on our satellite platforms.
I want to take the opportunity to once again thank Mr.
Powner and his staff for the recommendations offered. We agree
with them and we are responding to them. I want to thank Mr.
Morrow. We value the expertise that NASA provides for GOES-R.
We have a strong NOAA-NASA partnership in GOES-R and our team
is fully committed to its success.
I appreciate the Committee's interest in our satellite
programs and I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kicza follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mary E. Kicza
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Mary E. Kicza,
Assistant Administrator of the National Environmental Satellite, Data,
and Information Service (NESDIS). NESDIS is part of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), within the Department of
Commerce. NOAA's mission is to understand and predict changes in
Earth's environment and conserve and manage coastal and marine
resources to meet our nation's economic, social, and environmental
needs.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today NOAA's
environmental satellite programs and to highlight their importance to
our hurricane and other severe weather forecasting and warning
capabilities. NOAA has made significant progress in the development of
the next generation Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
R Series (GOES-R) program since the last hearing on this topic on
October 23, 2007.
NOAA's satellite acquisitions are complex and difficult development
efforts. I will be the first to acknowledge that it is a challenge to
build the complex satellites that are required to meet the requirements
of our customers and users. However, NOAA has implemented several
changes to strengthen the program control processes within our
satellite development programs in response to lessons learned from
programs including the National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite Systems (NPOESS) and from the recommendations
of outside reviewers, such as the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO).
What Are Geostationary Satellites?
NOAA has operated geostationary operational environmental
satellites (GOES) since the 1970s. These satellites are located more
than 22,000 miles above the equator and provide near continuous images
and data on atmospheric, oceanic, and climatic conditions over the
continental United States and Hawaii. These satellites are best known
for creating the hurricane pictures you see on television, but they
also provide the data to help forecast the weather and are critical to
detecting and tracking severe weather.
We operate two geostationary satellites, one over the east coast
and the other over the west coast. To protect against a loss of
satellite coverage, we maintain a spare satellite in space that can be
repositioned and brought out of storage to take the place of a failed
satellite. Given the importance of the data from these satellites,
continuity of operations remains our highest priority.
Status of the Current GOES Constellation (GOES I-M and GOES-N Series)
Individual GOES satellites have a letter designation through their
development until they are launched, placed in orbit, and have
completed a rigorous checkout procedure. They are then given numeric
designations for their operational lifetimes. The operational
satellites in space now, GOES-11 and GOES-12, are the last two
satellites of the GOES I-M series.
The next series of geostationary satellites is called GOES-N, and
this series consists of the same instruments as the GOES I-M series.
The first of the GOES-N series satellites was launched in May 2006 and
is currently serving as the on-orbit spare. The final two satellites
from this series are GOES-O and GOES-P, with GOES-O scheduled to launch
later this year.
What Is the GOES-R Series?
GOES-R is a joint development and acquisition effort between NOAA
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as
documented in a jointly signed Memorandum of Understanding and
Management Control Plan. The GOES-R series will replace the GOES-N
series and extend geostationary capabilities through FY 2028.
GOES-R will provide forecasters and scientists with a new suite of
improved instruments. These new instruments will enhance our current
capability to track and monitor severe weather on Earth with improved
imagery and scan rates. Additionally, solar environmental monitoring
instruments will provide advances for space weather forecasting. GOES-R
will provide more timely and accurate weather forecasts and improve the
detection and observations of severe weather events that directly
affect public safety, protect property, and, ultimately support the
country's economic health and development.
Under a multi-contract acquisition strategy, NASA will procure the
space segment (including spacecraft and instruments) and NOAA will
procure the ground segment (including the ground system that will
conduct satellite operations and environmental product generation and
distribution) for the GOES-R program. The GOES-R planned launch is
April 2015; however, delays in the spacecraft procurement may impact
the launch date. The GOES-R program will analyze the impact to planned
launch dates once the spacecraft and ground contracts are awarded and
underway.
The GOES-R program is budgeted for two satellites and a supporting
ground system and has unfunded options for two additional satellites.
GOES-R instruments include an Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI), the main
imaging sensor for the satellite; solar instruments, including the
Extreme Ultraviolet and X-ray Irradiance Suite (EXIS) and Solar
Ultraviolet Imager (SUVI); a Space Environment In-Situ Suite (SEISS);
and a new Geostationary Lightning Mapper (GLM), which will monitor
lightning strikes to enhance severe weather prediction. The spacecraft
will also host a magnetometer.
The imagery improvements provided by the ABI and the addition of
the GLM to the GOES instrument suite will lead to improved
observations, forecasts, and warnings for a host of environmental
hazards, including severe thunderstorms, tornadoes, hurricanes,
lightning, flash floods, winter storms, fog, forest fires, and poor air
quality.
The ABI Prototype Model (a model built to test the design of the
sensor before the first instrument for flight is assembled) is now
being integrated by the instrument contractor, ITT Corporation (ITT).
Testing of the prototype model will proceed through the end of the
year, while ITT begins development of the first flight model during the
next year.
The GLM instrument contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin Advanced
Technologies Corporation in December 2007. The instrument's Preliminary
Design Review was successfully conducted earlier this year, and the
instrument is now in its detailed design phase. The remaining
instruments have all had successful Preliminary Design Reviews and are
also in the detailed design phase. (Appendix 1 includes additional
information about instrument development.)
Status of GOES-R Spacecraft Acquisition
On December 4, 2008, the GOES-R program awarded the spacecraft
contract to Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company to build two
spacecraft for the GOES-R program. The total estimated value of the
basic contract including the two options is $1.09 billion. The basic
contract is for two spacecraft with two unfunded options that each
provide for one additional spacecraft.
On December 15, 2008, Boeing Satellite Systems filed a protest with
GAO against the GOES-R spacecraft contract award to Lockheed Martin
Space Systems Company. On February 17, 2009, NASA requested GAO dismiss
the protest based on NASA's decision to re-evaluate the proposals and
make a new award decision. On February 19, 2009, GAO dismissed the
protest. After the protest was dismissed, the Source Evaluation Board
(SEB) reconvened to re-evaluate the proposals of Lockheed Martin and
Boeing. The contract remains suspended until a new award decision is
announced, which is currently planned for May.
Status of GOES-R Ground Systems Acquisition
The GOES-R Program Office is working toward awarding the GOES-R
ground segment contract in June 2009. The ground segment will maximize
use of well proven technologies for its systems. Scientific algorithm
development to develop new environmental products from GOES-R series
satellite data will be performed by an experienced NOAA science team
partnered with university-based cooperative institutes and NASA
scientists.
Ongoing GAO Review of the GOES-R Program
GAO has provided regular reviews of our GOES-R Series acquisition
for many years and we appreciate the perspective the GAO professionals
provide. We have met with GAO and provided information and feedback on
its most recent report. I will summarize this information for you
today.
I am pleased the GAO report recognizes we have taken steps to apply
the lessons learned from other satellite programs to the procurement of
GOES-R. I understand we have more work to do to improve the overall
management of these complex and high risk programs, and the joint NOAA/
NASA team is fully committed to making these improvements.
Specifically, the GAO provided three recommendations:
Recommendation number one: As part of any effort to re-baseline the
cost and schedule of the Advanced Baseline Imager, perform an
integrated baseline review and ensure the review includes an assessment
of key schedule milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and
technical planning, and management processes.
NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will perform an
integrated baseline review on the Advanced Baseline Imager as part of
any effort to re-baseline its cost and schedule. The integrated
baseline review will include assessment of the technical scope of the
work, key schedule milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and
technical planning, and management processes. There is no near-term
plan to re-baseline ABI at this time.
Recommendation number two: Improve the agency's ability to oversee
contractor performance by ensuring the reasons for cost and schedule
variances are fully disclosed and documented.
NOAA agrees with this recommendation. GOES-R contractors submit
monthly Cost Performance Reports with itemization of all variances. The
GOES-R program office will ensure these cost and schedule variances
reported by the contractor are elaborated upon as needed for full
understanding and disclosure. Also, the GOES-R program office will
fully document the actions taken to address significant cost and
schedule variances, along with the reasons for and impact of those
actions.
Recommendation number three: If feasible and justified, develop a plan
and timeline of recovering the advanced capabilities that were removed
from the program when the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was
canceled.
NOAA agrees with this recommendation. NOAA will identify and
validate user requirements, evaluate the priority of addressing those
requirements against the technical feasibility of meeting those
requirements, and determine the most appropriate methods to meet them.
Conclusion
I appreciate the Committee's continued interest in NOAA's satellite
programs. It is widely acknowledged satellites are very complicated and
difficult systems to design, build, and operate. However, their
capabilities play a role in NOAA's mission to observe and predict the
Earth's environment and to provide critical information used in
protecting life and property.
We are making significant strides in developing a better process
for designing and acquiring our satellites. We have fully functioning
operational satellites with backup systems in place, and we are working
on the next generation that will provide significant improvements in
our ability to forecast the weather and other environmental phenomena.
I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Appendix 1
GOES-R Instrument Status
Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI)
-- Implementation phase
-- Contractor: ITT Corporation, Ft. Wayne, IN
Space Environmental In-Situ Suite (SEISS)
-- Implementation phase
-- Contractor: Assurance Technology Corporation, Carlisle, MA
Extreme Ultra Violet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor (EXIS)
-- Implementation phase
Contractor: Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space
Physics, Boulder, CO
Solar Ultra Violet Imager (SUVI)
Implementation phase
Contractor: Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Corp,
Palo Alto, CA
Magnetometer
-- To be procured as part of spacecraft contract
Geostationary Lightning Mapper (GLM)
Implementation phase
Contractor: Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Corp,
Palo Alto, CA
Biography for Mary E. Kicza
Mary E. Kicza is the NOAA Assistant Administrator for Satellite and
Information Services. NOAA Satellite and Information Service is
dedicated to providing timely access to global environmental data from
satellites and other sources to promote, protect, and enhance the
Nation's economy, security, environment, and quality of life. In this
role, Ms. Kicza leads the acquisition and operation of the Nation's
civil operational environmental satellite system. She also leads
efforts for research and development of products and programs to
archive and provide access to a variety of Earth observations via three
national data centers.
Ms. Kicza is a leader in the international Earth observation
community, serving as Chairman of the Committee on Earth Observation
Satellites Strategic Implementation Team. In this capacity, she leads
efforts to coordinate global satellite-based observations among
international space agency partners to further the development of a
Global Earth Observation System of Systems. In addition, Ms. Kicza
serves as the Co-Chairman of the NOAA Observing Systems Council, a
group which coordinates observing systems requirements and provides
resource recommendations for NOAA's observation platforms. She is also
a member of the NOAA Executive Council, NOAA's executive decision-
making body.
Before coming to NOAA, Ms. Kicza was the Associate Deputy
Administrator for Systems Integration at the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). As a senior leader within NASA, she was
responsible for assuring that the mission and mission support elements
were effectively aligned and integrated. She served previously as the
Associate Administrator for Biological/Physical Research, the Associate
Center Director for Goddard Space Flight Center, the Assistant
Associate Administrator for Space Science, and the Deputy Director of
the Solar System Exploration Division. Ms. Kicza began her career as an
engineer at McClellan Air Force Base in California, before joining NASA
in 1982 as a lead engineer supporting the Atlas Centaur and Shuttle
Centaur launch vehicles.
Ms. Kicza has served with distinction in a variety of technical,
managerial, and leadership posts, supporting the development, launch,
and operation of satellite systems as well as multi-faceted research
and development programs. She has significant experience in building
and maintaining effective relationships with the Office of Management
and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Defense
Department, Congress, the aerospace industry, and a diverse research
community. Ms. Kicza has earned two SES Meritorious Service Awards,
NASA's Distinguished Service and Scientific Achievement Medal, and
numerous other awards.
Ms. Kicza received her Bachelor's Degree in Electrical and
Electronics Engineering from California State University and a Master's
Degree in Business Administration from the Florida Institute of
Technology.
Chairman Baird. Thank you, Ms. Kicza.
Mr. Morrow.
STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE W. MORROW, JR., DIRECTOR, FLIGHT
PROJECTS, GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Morrow. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss
NASA's role in support of NOAA for the GOES-R series. NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland has a long
history in weather satellite development, having developed and
launched the world's first weather satellite in 1960 called the
Television Infrared Observation Satellite, or TIROS for short.
Today NASA and NOAA share a 39-year partnership in
designing, developing and launching GOES and POES environment
satellites. These spacecraft provide our nation with
meteorological data for the weather observations, research,
forecasting and storm warnings that we have all come to rely on
every day.
Today my testimony outlines the steps NOAA and NASA are
taking to minimize costs, schedule and performance risks on
GOES-R. In addition, I would like to highlight the ways NASA
continues to fill the Agency's commitment to providing complete
transparency to its program management activities to ensure the
successful and timely delivery of GOES-R. Effectively managing
costs, schedule and performance risks requires the up-front
identification of the most vulnerable program areas. For the
GOES-R program, NASA and NOAA identified the following areas
together: requirements definition, instrument development,
instrument interfaces and contract oversight. NOAA and NASA
took exceptional steps up front to fully define all the
requirements for GOES-R. We capitalized on the lessons learned
from other major similar satellite programs and employed
Goddard's own internal lessons learned and rules. As a result,
the GOES-R set of requirements represents the best-defined
requirement set of any previous GOES mission.
The GOES-R series spacecraft, as you know, includes six key
instruments. In 2001, NASA and NOAA issued preliminary design
contracts as an initial step to mitigating risk associated with
GOES-R instrument development activities. Implementing that
phased-type approach provided for an initial study period where
technology maturation and vulnerabilities were assessed and
rigorous requirements evaluations were completed before
contracting for the implementation and development phases for
the instruments. Interfaces between the instruments and the
spacecraft are another area and a development challenge for any
complex satellite acquisition. NASA engaged in a number of risk
reduction activities, including developing and qualifying the
instrument-to-spacecraft communications interface, and these
risk reduction activities are directly applicable to the GOES-R
mission and serve to reduce risk. Demonstrating responsible
cost and schedule performance demands that NASA and NOAA
develop a robust programmatic cost and schedule baseline and to
closely monitor contract performance, maintaining contract
oversight. All of the instrument and spacecraft contracts for
GOES-R are managed as separate entities within the GOES-R
flight project, not as one large prime contract, thereby
assuring that the government has authority to implement changes
necessary to ensure the success. For each of those contracts,
we have dedicated managers and contracting officers and
engineering oversight and each effort is afforded the attention
required to stay on top of developments, issues and risks. In
addition, as you well know, we have fully implemented our value
management and review the data with the GOES-R NOAA Program
Office on a monthly basis.
You are also aware that the GOES-R spacecraft contract is
in source selection process. Lockheed Martin was awarded the
GOES-R spacecraft contract in December of last year. December
15, Boeing Satellite Systems filed a bid protest with GAO. As a
result of the protest, the contract with Lockheed Martin was
suspended and on February 19, GAO dismissed the protest. NASA's
Source Evaluation Board reconvened to reevaluate the proposals
of Lockheed Martin and Boeing and a new contract award is
scheduled to be accomplished in May. Please note that the
government is not at liberty to provide details concerning the
GAO bid protest proceedings at this point since those are
subject to the protective order issued by GAO. In addition,
since new contract award has not yet been made, NASA is unable
to disclose information concerning the reevaluation as it is
source selection sensitive.
In the meantime, NASA is taking all possible steps to
minimize schedule risk. Instrument contracts are being held to
their original delivery dates and not being allowed to slip.
The delayed award of the spacecraft contract could also result
in instrument accommodation risk or interface risk and we at
the Goddard Space Flight Center are acting in that interface
role with the instrument contractors in the absence of a
spacecraft contractor.
NASA and NOAA took very great steps to be an integrated
program at the beginning of this. We have a NOAA program office
co-located at the Goddard Space Flight Center with the NASA
Flight Project and the NOAA ground project. There are over 100
NOAA civil servants and contractors located on site. We are
intimately involved with NOAA and the program office there, and
the NOAA program office and program folks have full access to
all contract deliverables and reporting requirements and we are
in lockstep with them. It is a very close partnership.
In closing, I am glad to be here. I want to answer any
further questions you have and I hope that you will become
confident that we are successfully managing this program. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Morrow follows:]
Prepared Statement of George W. Morrow, Jr.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA's role and support to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for the
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites R Series (GOES-R).
The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Greenbelt, Maryland
developed and launched the world's first weather satellite in 1960
called the Television Infrared Observation Satellite (TIROS). Designed
to test experimental television techniques that would lead to a
worldwide meteorological information system, TIROS demonstrated the
benefits of studying Earth's weather systems from space. Today, NASA
and NOAA share a 39-year partnership designing, developing and
launching the GOES weather satellites. The GOES and Polar Operational
Environmental Satellite (POES) series provide our Nation with the
meteorological data for the weather observations, research,
forecasting, and storm warnings that we have come to rely on. Through
this partnership, NOAA and NASA are now implementing plans for the
design, development and launch of the next generation geostationary
weather satellite, the GOES-R series. These next-generation spacecraft
will further improve our ability to observe and predict weather events
and provide a means for the identification of severe storm conditions
such as hurricanes and tornadoes.
NASA recognizes the importance of delivering missions on cost and
on schedule, and developing clear and stable baselines. Developing
scientific instruments, spacecraft, and new launch systems often
requires that the Agency redefine state-of-the-art. Often, NASA is
pushing the technology boundaries and must venture beyond our past
experience and into an environment of uncertainty and higher risk. The
GOES-R satellite series is a major improvement over the previous system
and therefore it does come with some risk. Today my testimony outlines
the steps NOAA and NASA are taking to minimize cost, schedule and
performance risk on the GOES-R program and how NASA continues to
fulfill the Agency's commitment to providing complete transparency to
its program management activities to ensure the successful and timely
delivery of the GOES-R series spacecraft.
Minimizing Cost, Schedule and Performance Risk
Effectively managing cost, schedule and performance risk requires
the identification of the most vulnerable program areas. For the GOES-R
program, NASA and NOAA identified the following areas: 1) requirements
definition; 2) instrument development; 3) instrument interfaces; and,
4) contract oversight.
Developing well-defined mission requirements is the critical first
step to any major system acquisition. NOAA and NASA took exceptional
steps to fully define all requirements for the GOES-R space and ground
segments. This included defining performance, interface, testing,
quality assurance, and deliverable requirements. During the formulation
phase, NASA worked with NOAA to define and refine the instrument
performance requirements. These requirements flow down to NASA from
NOAA through the Mission Requirements Document (MRD). NASA then
allocated the NOAA performance requirements to the individual
instruments within the GOES-R payload suite. During the Program
Definition and Risk Reduction phase (PDRR), NASA worked with the
prospective spacecraft and ground system providers to refine the
spacecraft specification. Capitalizing on lessons learned from other
major spacecraft programs, and employing the GSFC Goddard Open Learning
Design\1\ (GOLD) Rules, NOAA and NASA developed specifications, mission
assurance requirements, and statements of work to fully define the
mission requirements. Thus, the GOES-R set of requirements represents
the best defined requirements set of any previous GOES mission, and an
excellent baseline from which to proceed with development of the
Nation's next generation geostationary weather satellite.
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The GOES-R series spacecraft includes five key instruments: the
Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI); the Space Environmental In-Situ Suite
(SEISS); the Extreme Ultra Violet and X-ray Irradiance Sensor (EXIS);
the Solar Ultra Violet Imager (SUVI); and, the Geostationary Lightning
Mapper (GLM). A sixth instrument, the magnetometer, will be developed
as part of the spacecraft contract. In 2001, NASA and NOAA issued
preliminary design (or formulation) contracts as an initial step to
mitigating risk associated with the GOES-R instrument development
activities. Implementing a ``phased-contract'' approach provided for an
initial study period where technology maturity and vulnerabilities were
assessed and rigorous requirements evaluations were completed before
contracting for the implementation and development phases. The first
instrument formulation contract awarded was for the ABI. Considered the
most complex instrument development activity, ABI will monitor and
track severe weather and provide images of clouds to support forecasts.
Awarding the ABI development effort early and employing the phased
contract approach allowed the GOES-R program sufficient time to work
through all of the issues that arise during the development of a state-
of-the-art instrument and ensures that the performance of the ABI
instrument meets our customer's requirements. Subsequently, study and
implementation contracts were awarded for each of the remaining four
GOES-R instruments. ABI has completed its critical design review (CDR)
and the prototype model instrument is currently being integrated. The
remaining four instruments have all completed their preliminary design
reviews (PDR) and are working towards their CDRs.
Interfaces between instruments and spacecraft present the next
greatest development challenge for the GOES-R program. NASA has engaged
in a number of risk reduction activities to reduce the risk on the
GOES-R program. These include developing and qualifying the instrument
to spacecraft communications interface (e.g., SpaceWire communications
protocol). Other risk reduction activities include Global Positioning
System (GPS) at Geostationary (GEO) receiver development, Field-
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) life testing, Electrical, Electronic,
and Electromechanical (EEE) parts radiation testing, loss-less
compression chip development, solar-blind detector development, dual
circular-polarization receiver testing, and thermal radiator (white
paint) coatings qualification. All of these activities are directly
applicable to the GOES-R mission and serve to reduce risk for flight
hardware contractors.
Demonstrating responsible cost and schedule performance demands
that NASA closely monitor contract performance, maintaining contract
oversight to ensure the delivery of quality and timely products. All
instrument and spacecraft contracts are managed as separate entities
within the GOES-R Flight Project--not as one large prime contract--
thereby assuring that the Government has the authority to implement any
actions necessary to ensure success. With dedicated managers,
contracting officers and engineering oversight, each effort is afforded
the attention required to stay on top of developments, issues, and
risks. NASA performs in-depth contract reviews and has implemented the
necessary insight and oversight into the contractors' efforts. NASA has
fully implemented earned value management on all flight hardware
contracts and reviews the data with the GOES-R Program Office on a
monthly basis. With GSFC's 50-year history in managing spacecraft
development efforts (with skills in engineering, procurement, mission
assurance, and mission management), NASA is in a position to apply all
necessary resources to the GOES-R Program to reduce risk and ensure
success.
Space Segment Contract Award
By way of background, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company (LMSSC)
was awarded the GOES-R spacecraft contract on December 4, 2008. On
December 15, 2008, Boeing Satellite Systems (BSS) filed a bid protest
with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) against the GOES-R
spacecraft contract award to LMSSC. As a result of the protest, the
contract and any associated work were suspended. On February 17, 2009,
NASA requested that the GAO dismiss the protest as a result of the
Agency's decision to re-evaluate the proposals of Lockheed Martin and
Boeing, and make a new selection decision. On February 19, 2009, the
GAO dismissed the protest. After the protest was dismissed, the NASA
Source Evaluation Board (SEB) reconvened to re-evaluate the proposals
of Lockheed Martin and Boeing. A new contract award is planned for May
2009. Please note that the Administration is not at liberty to provide
details concerning the GAO bid protest proceedings, since those are
subject to the protective order issued by GAO. In addition, since a new
contract award has not yet been made, the Administration is unable to
disclose information concerning the re-evaluation, as it is source
selection sensitive.
Once NASA has selected a spacecraft contractor and NOAA has
selected a ground system contractor, NOAA will establish a new launch
readiness date. In the meantime, NASA is taking all possible steps to
minimize schedule risk. Instrument contracts are being held to their
original delivery dates and not being allowed to slip.
The delayed award of the spacecraft contract may result in
additional instrument accommodations risk. This risk is defined as the
possibility of incompatible interfaces between the spacecraft and
instruments. However, to mitigate this risk NASA's Flight Project
Office continues to perform as the spacecraft integrator in the absence
of a spacecraft contractor. Overcoming this challenge is not new to
NASA, where frequently instrument development efforts are initiated
very early in the systems acquisition process given their long-lead
development requirements. NASA has established resource allocations on
the GOES-R program for the instruments and spacecraft, holding
sufficient margins against both. In addition, NASA has established and
documented firm interface requirements for the instruments and
spacecraft, which are on all contracts.
NASA Program Management Transparency
NASA continues to fulfill its commitment towards complete
transparency in the execution of the Flight Project within the GOES-R
Program. Starting early in the GOES-R program formulation, NASA and
NOAA made the decision to co-locate the GOES-R Program Office and
Ground Project at GSFC. Employing a centrally located GOES Program
Office is a first for the long-term NOAA/NASA relationship. The co-
located office enables daily interaction between the respective project
elements and fosters closer working relationships. Approximately 100
NOAA employees and contractors supporting GOES-R reside and work at
GSFC. Within the NASA Flight Project, the Deputy Project Manager (DPM)
is a NOAA employee and three of the Instrument Managers are NOAA
employees. Within the NOAA Ground Project, the DPM is a NASA employee
as is the Systems Manager. Within the NOAA Program Office, the
Assistant System Program Director is a NASA employee and within the
Program Systems Engineering Office, the lead Program Systems Engineer
is a NASA employee, and the Deputy is a NOAA employee. From a personnel
standpoint, the GOES-R Program is totally integrated.
The NASA Flight Project reports directly to the NOAA Program
Office. So, all of the typical staff meetings, board meetings, etc.
that occur on a routine basis within a Program Office are attended by
the Flight Project and reported to the NOAA Program Office. Conversely,
NOAA Program Office personnel attend all NASA flight hardware
contractor reviews and internal technical meetings. All deliverable
contractor data is stored electronically and the NOAA Program Office
has access to all data. Finally, all earned value analysis for the
Flight Project is performed by the NOAA Program Office.
External reporting is handled similarly. The GOES-R Management
Control Plan (MCP) outlines the overall reporting requirements. Both
GOES-R Projects engage in the standard reporting processes that are
implemented for Projects at GSFC. Both Projects report status on a
monthly basis to the Director of Flight Projects and then again to the
GSFC Center Management Council (CMC) at Monthly Status Review (MSR)
meetings. The GOES-R Program Office attends both of these reviews and
is invited to present status as well. Additionally, NOAA/National
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS)
personnel attend the MSR and sit at the table with the GSFC CMC in
review of the GOES-R Projects. The same is true with the NOAA Program
Management Council (PMC). The GOESR Program presents monthly to the
PMC, along with other NASA/NOAA Programs--GOES-N/P, POES, NPP, and
NPOESS. Sitting on the PMC, along side of NOAA, are representatives of
senior leadership from GSFC. These include the GSFC Deputy Center
Director and the NASA Chief Engineer. NOAA senior leadership hears
exactly the same thing as NASA management, sitting side-by-side at two
different monthly reviews of the GOES-R Program.
In summary, NOAA has access to all contract documentation and
attends all contract reviews. NOAA attends and participates in all
Flight Project reporting to NASA management, and NASA participates in
NOAA PMC meetings. NOAA performs all of the earned value analysis on
the Flight Project contracts, so there is no misunderstanding of any
cost or schedule performance issues. There is unprecedented
transparency between NASA and NOAA on the GOES-R Program.
Conclusion
In closing, NASA remains committed to minimizing cost, schedule and
performance risk on the GOES-R program and fulfilling our commitment to
providing transparency in our project management activities. Building
on the strength of our partnership with NOAA and its predecessor
organizations since 1958, along with NASA's successful history of
spacecraft and instrument development, we are looking forward to the
successful completion and launch of the GOES-R series.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or the other
Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Biography for George W. Morrow, Jr.
George Morrow is the Director of Flight Projects at NASA/Goddard
Space Flight Center and has served in this position since September
2007. He is responsible for the day-today management of the more than
40 Space and Earth Science missions in formulation or implementation at
Goddard as well as the coordination of the Earth Science Technology
Office and the Advanced Concepts and Technology Office.
Mr. Morrow began his career at Goddard in 1983 in the Space Power
Applications Branch as the Lead Spacecraft Battery Systems Engineer. He
led the design, fabrication, and test efforts for flight battery
systems for all Goddard projects including the Earth Radiation Budget
Satellite, LandSat, the Cosmic Background Explorer, the Gamma Ray
Observatory, the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite, and the Hubble
Space Telescope (HST).
From November 1988 to April 1994, Mr. Morrow served in various
increasingly responsible systems engineering and observatory management
positions in the HST program in support of the first HST Servicing
Mission. From April 1994 until May 1997, he was the Deputy Project
Manager of the HST Flight Systems and Servicing Project. He oversaw all
activities within or outside NASA which affected program cost,
technical reliability, and schedule. Mr. Morrow served as the Deputy
Associate Director of Flight Projects for HST from May 1997 until
January 1998.
In January 1998, Mr. Morrow was assigned as the Earth Observing
System (EOS) PM (later named Aqua) Project Manager. He was responsible
for all aspects of the development, test, and launch of the $900M EOS
PM Observatory, which included direct management of eight complex
science instruments--two of which were contributions from foreign
entities (Japan and Brazil).
In February 2001, Mr. Morrow left government service to become the
Vice President and Division Manager of the Aerospace Engineering
Division at Jackson and Tull, a privately held aerospace company in the
Washington metro area. He returned to Goddard in March 2003 as the
Deputy Director of Flight Projects but served until April 2004 as the
Acting Associate Director of Flight Programs and Projects for EOS. In
this acting capacity, he was responsible for the management of six
complex missions in development and 11 operating missions.
Mr. Morrow received the NASA Exceptional Service Medal in 1994 and
the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal in 2006. In addition, he is the
recipient of numerous NASA and Goddard Group Achievement and Special
Act awards. Mr. Morrow received a Bachelor of Science degree in
Chemical Engineering from the University of Virginia and a Masters of
Engineering Administration degree from George Washington University.
Discussion
Chairman Baird. Thank you very much. We have been joined by
Mr. Ehlers. Dr. Ehlers, thank you for joining us here. I will
recognize myself for five minutes and then we will proceed and
alternating with sides.
If one had not listened closely to Mr. Powner's testimony
or read the GAO report and one then listened to our friends
from NOAA and NASA, one might say it sounds like the program is
going pretty great. The problem seems to be that we are
substantially over budget. We have cut by more than half the
numbers of instruments that were expected to be placed up. The
data is to come to us slower and we are very much delayed and
at some significant risk of having a gap in coverage that my
colleague Mr. Inglis alluded to. I therefore feel sort of a
conundrum because on the one hand, I am inclined to say what
the heck happened, how did we get here, and I think someone
needs to ask that. At the same time, I also want to focus on
where we go from here, and my problem is, the second question,
I have lack of confidence in the answer because the first
question is so problematic, and I also am told by Committee
staff--as you know I am new to this committee, I served on it
before but not chaired it--that we tend to get this information
of things not going well only when the Committee asks GAO and
GAO reports, that it has not been the practice of NOAA and NASA
to come to the Committee proactively and say we are having some
troubles and here is what we are doing about it. I will tell
you, I would like that to change. If you were having
difficulties, we need to know about it, and if you are having
discussions about changes in direction of the partnership or
the mission, we want to know about it. We don't want to hear
about it secondhand. We don't want to have to send the GAO out
to follow up on this and we want to know about that, and I want
that to be for the record and I will insist on that.
Budget Overruns
Mr. Inglis said quite rightly, this is a lot of taxpayer
money. Taxpayers put it in common sense and they say look, if I
go to the car dealer and the car dealer says I am going to sell
you a car for a certain price and you can pick it up tomorrow
and these are the features and you come tomorrow and the car
dealer says it will be ready actually a year from now, maybe,
and the features we agreed on won't be there and the price has
doubled but write the check, the taxpayer says are you kidding
me, expletives left out purposefully. Why shouldn't the
taxpayer say that? Why shouldn't the taxpayer say how is it
that we keep writing checks for projects that come in late,
that cut the services and don't meet their expectations?
I want to start with that question because that is what I
think the taxpayer would want to know. That is not an easy
question. I acknowledge that.
Ms. Kicza. I would like to take that one on if I----
Chairman Baird. Good for you. I admire that.
Ms. Kicza. What I would like to start with is a discussion
of cost growth that is overruns and contracts versus changes in
cost estimates. Now, in the charter for the hearing you saw
three different cost estimates and I would like to talk about
at what time those cost estimates were made and what was the
status of the program at that time, you know, recognize at this
point, we don't even have the spacecraft or the ground system
contractor on board. In 2004, we had an initial estimate for
the GOES-R system of $6.2 billion. At that point we had just
completed 11 low-cost concept studies. We were looking at a
potential architecture of anywhere from three to eight
satellites so we were very early in the stages of formulating
the GOES-R architecture. In the NASA parlance, it is like phase
A concept studies. So at that point you have, 2004, a $6.2
billion estimate for the GOES-R program. We provided a second
estimate in 2006. At that point it was $6.96 billion, and by
that time we had completed three more in-depth studies with
three different contractors and we were solidifying what the
architecture would actually look like and we were beginning to
see more realistically what the costs of the architecture would
be, what the requirements of the system were and having a sense
of what kind of budget was affordable. So that is 2006 we were
at $6.96 billion.
When we came to the Congress with that number, we said this
is where we are right now and here is what we have yet to do.
We have to complete a program estimate and subject it to
independent cost analysis. In 2007, we came to the Congress
with an estimate of $7.67 billion. That was the estimate after
we had subjected the program to thorough independent review,
then a bottoms-up program estimate and subjected that to
independent analysis and did a reconciliation process. That was
in 2007 at $7.67 billion. That is where we currently are right
now and that cost estimate reflects the most probable cost. So
when you refer to cost overruns, when I think of cost overruns
I think of contracts awarded, cost overruns happening that we
had estimated and we were wrong on. For the GOES-R program, we
are still at the beginning and we are trying to solidify what
is the right cost estimate, and as----
Chairman Baird. Okay, but if you come to us and say we are
working on a package and we work with you and we say this is
what the package ought to entail, this is the instrumentation,
these are the dates, and you give an estimate and then you come
back--I understand estimates are not an easy business but if
the estimate is so far off, off in time, off in budget and off
in instrumentation, I mean, the problem is you are saying oh,
well, you know, yes, our estimate has gone up but so to your
capacity has gone vastly down and your timeframe----
Ms. Kicza. Yes, sir, yes, I acknowledge that, and when we
were doing that we were communicating it. We were communicating
the fact that we needed to----
Chairman Baird. But my question is, how does such stuff
happen? How do you miss it by so much? I want to say it is not
rocket science. It is rocket science. We have a rocket
scientist on this committee, two of them, but----
Ms. Kicza. I think what I am trying to explain is, it is a
normal process that you go through from early concept studies,
moving to more detailed concept studies and preliminary designs
and you begin to understand where the key risks are and you
begin to reduce risk, which is what we have done in order to
bring the program in at a cost which we believe is the most
probable cost and one which we can deliver in the timeframe
that we have indicated.
Chairman Baird. I am going to recognize my colleague, Mr.
Inglis. In a little bit I will get back to this issue and I
want to hear Mr. Powner's take on this and give Mr. Morrow a
chance to speak but I want to respect the time.
Mr. Inglis. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think it
is very interesting. Your question shows us where we are with
our constituents, doesn't it? On the whole financial mess we
are in. You want to pound on what happened but you also want to
pound on what is the solution so we are in the same spot,
aren't we? Ms. Kicza, you have just helped me to understand a
little bit better where we might be. It is sort of like, you
know, if you are building a building, once you have got a
contract, there are some costs that can change and usually
contracts will allow the contractor to get more money if there
is an unexpected increase in metal prices, let us say, or
something like that. Otherwise the contractor eats it and they
just lose profit and maybe lose their shirt on the building.
But in the concept phase, what I am trying to figure out is, so
we don't have a contract, I guess what I am hearing you say. We
really don't have--and using the analogy of building a
building, we don't have a contract yet.
Ms. Kicza. Right now we do not have the spacecraft
contractor selected and we do not have the ground system
contractor selected. That is to happen in May and June of this
year, respectively.
Mr. Inglis. So tell me how it works. I think this is all
affected by NPOESS, you know, I mean we are all sort of here
but we are thinking NPOESS and so therefore we are worried
about all that, and so you know, when you are building a
building and using that analogy, sometimes the architect comes
in with a dream building, unbelievably beautiful, and I guess
it is just the strategy of the architect can either do that or
show you the bare bones and then get you up basically sort of
bait and switch you up or get you down. How does it work in
government contracting? I mean, do people generally come and
say gee, listen, we can build this super-duper thing for X
billion dollars and then they walk you down from there or do
they walk you up? What I am concerned about is we typically get
walked up.
Ms. Kicza. Okay. I am going to try to answer that although
I am not quite sure. I think that when we laid out the
requirements for GOES-R, we laid out a pretty aggressive scope
for the program, and the contractors in their analysis designed
and did preliminary costs on the scope that we asked for. At
the same time, we were all learning the lessons of NPOESS and
understanding where we were seeing significant cost growth in
complex instruments. So it was a combination of understanding
how much the scope that we were asking for actually would cost,
given more detailed studies, and understanding how painful it
can be if your technology is not mature enough to be moving
towards flight. So both of those things were occurring. We
reduced our scope, although I will tell you in nearly every
case the GOES-R system that we are developing is superior to
the GOES-N/O/P system that is current in terms of the
resolution, in terms of the scope of view and in terms of how
fast the products are going to be made available to our user
community, how fast the data is coming down, much superior to
the current systems of today. So I don't want to lead you to
that it is just the same thing. It is actually vastly improved,
and in fact, there are some geostationary lightning
capabilities planned for GOES-R that we have not yet had which
will provide significant advances in our ability to forecast
extreme weather events. So it is a combination of recognizing
how much the scope we were asking for cost and recognizing how
much risk was involved in some of the more complex instruments
that caused us to say we have to--we can't afford that much
scope, we are going to reduce scope in order to make it
affordable and we are going to reduce capabilities because it
is too high risk and we cannot afford to not deliver these
satellites on time.
Program Expectations
Mr. Inglis. Our church recently built a building and the
guy that was in charge of it said don't show a picture because
once you show a picture, everybody is going to have in mind
that that is what it looks like, and then what you realize is,
you can't afford that and so then you reduce it and everybody
has in mind that architect's rendering of the building and then
they are disappointed. Is that what we are dealing with here,
that you can have----
Ms. Kicza. Yes, I think that----
Mr. Inglis.--a really beautiful picture. I mean----
Ms. Kicza. I think that we are very good at creating
expectations and then when we realize, you know, what we can
actually afford and what we actually build, it is less than
what we had set out in terms of expectations, but I will again
say it is more, it is more than what we are currently providing
today with the GOES-N/O/P series.
Mr. Inglis. Mr. Powner, do you agree with that kind of line
that basically we are getting a lot better than what we have
got now, we maybe showed the pictures too soon?
Mr. Powner. I think clearly there is some information that
will be quicker, that we are getting products quicker and there
is some capabilities that it is better, but however, if we step
back, we have reduced a lot here, okay, and let us start with
the HES instrument, okay? And this is, the original scope of
this thing was too large and that was flawed to start with that
approach. HES, for instance, was going to provide things like
this: Tornado warning lead time is very important. Currently it
is 13 minutes on average. We were going to then have warning
lead times up to an hour. That was the leap that we were going
to take with GOES-R. Well, then HES went away, okay, to control
costs, it was complex and all that so we are not going to get
those warning lead times. So although there are some
improvements, we have reduced a lot of capability here. That
was the one sensor going away. Then we went from 68 products
down to 34. There is a fundamental question, you know, how much
better is it than legacy GOES and I think you are approaching
legacy GOES capability in order to control costs. So the bottom
line here is, we are spending $7.6 billion for two satellites,
for something that is better than what we currently have but
likely not much better, and we haven't awarded contracts yet so
the key here going forward, there is still a lot of schedule
and cost risk without having awarded the space and ground
contracts.
Mr. Inglis. Ms. Kicza, do you want to respond to that?
Ms. Kicza. Yeah, what I would like to do is talk about the
improvements with this imager capability with GOES-R. In terms
of the imager, the Advanced Baseline Imager, four times the
resolution, five times the coverage, twice the number of bands
that we have with the current imaging capability and more
coverage simultaneously. That is, we can look at the full disc
and look at a picture of the disc, a smaller portion. With
lightning detection, we now will--we will have continuous
coverage of total lightning flash over land and water from the
space looking down as opposed to from a single spot on the
ground looking up. In solar and space monitoring, we will have
a better imager and improved heavy ion detection and we are
also adding low-energy electrons and protons, both very
important for space weather prediction, and also for unique
payload services of bent pipe services, getting information
from buoys and tracked animals and such, higher data rates for
environmental data relay and also to support search and rescue
capabilities. So across the board our instrument capability is
more robust. Yes, we have reduced capability in order to reduce
risk and to bring the project in on time. I don't deny that.
But in terms of the capability that we are bringing to bear, it
is improved. Now, for the demanifested HES instrument, we
worked very closely with the community to examine whether or
not we should put a legacy sounder on versus using the ABI, and
in fact, we brought over 50 representatives from a broad range
of the community to discuss that and the various benefits or
disadvantages of that and we collectively came to the
conclusion that delivering the sounding products from the ABI
was the better way to go. It did reduce some capabilities in
some areas but the consensus of the community was that it more
than made up in other areas because we were getting higher
temporal sampling rates. So the decisions were made in order to
be able to reduce risk, to deliver the system within the
projected budget that I have discussed previously and to bring
that to bear as rapidly as we can.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Baird. Ms. Edwards.
Incorporating Recommendations and Preventing Future Problems
Ms. Edwards. I think what I would like to focus on is not
just kind of where we are but what prevents us from doing this
all over again. I mean, we have essentially a doubling, almost
a doubling in the projected cost of these satellites, and so in
addition to knowing what the improved capabilities are with the
reduced system, I want to know what are the capabilities that
we lose because it seems to me that at some period of time we
are going to need those capabilities and then we are not
getting them in this next phase. I also--I am also very
interested in looking at the lessons learned in the contracting
process because essentially cost plus contracts have been
awarded, were awarded for the instrumentalities and yet the
technology that we get suggests that we could have done a fixed
price contract and gotten more bang for the buck, and so for me
that is perhaps a lesson learned. In terms of the GAO
recommendations, I want to know the three key recommendations,
where the two agencies are in terms of meeting those
recommendations going forward because I think it is tough to
argue--not to argue to the public about the great benefit of
the work that you do and the need because I think there is no
one on this panel that doesn't believe that we need the kind of
satellite coverage for weather projection and prediction that
is important to saving lives and preserving commercial
interests and protecting communities. But we can't do it at any
cost and especially in this kind of environment. And so if you
could please address those concerns, and I am going to be one
on this panel who says we understand that with science there is
a lot out there that we don't know and that with technology
development that things can happen but, you know, $7 billion to
$11 billion, that is a lot of stuff happening, and so it raises
a concern for this Member that we have to get better at
communicating along the way so that it doesn't feel like a
surprise attack when we have gone to such severe cost overruns,
and I do think that there are cost overruns and it may have to
do with the way that these contracts are broken up and the
stages at which you evaluate so that you are essentially not--
you know, you don't think that you are buying the Cadillac when
in turns out that you are getting a Ford. The Ford is going to
run, it will be just fine but not when you thought you were
buying a Cadillac and the price is reasonable.
Ms. Kicza. I am going to address the responses to the
recommendations and I will hand it to George to talk about
fixed price versus cost plus. In terms of the recommendations,
the GAO recommended that we conduct an integrated baseline
review when we make significant changes to our instrument
development. In particular, they were concerned that we had not
done an IBR on the ABI when we moved a segment of the work to
the right. In fact, we have done two integrated baseline
reviews on this instrument in the past in 2004 and 2007 and we
expect to do another one this fall and have it completed before
the end of the year. The GAO was concerned about our formal
evaluation of cost variances against the instrument contracts,
and I discussed the process we have had to date and the fact
that we will be changing that process. So we see all the
variances, both cost and schedule. We talk specifically about
those that need further clarification and going forward we will
document the results of those regularly scheduled monthly
discussions as well as any actions going out of it so that we
see the long-term trends relative to the variances that are
occurring. And then the third one was with respect to plans for
reinstating the advanced capabilities, and as I have discussed
for the HES activities, we are actively going through a request
for quote process to solicit private industry on what
capabilities they can bring to bear and we are exploring the
possibility of international collaboration with our partners in
Europe who are also looking at advanced sounding capabilities.
We may be bringing their capabilities to bear, and what we will
be doing is documenting our plans in a formal transition
planning document to transition that new capability into an
operational capability. So I hope that answers the questions
relative to your concerns about the GAO recommendations and I
will turn it over to Mr. Morrow to talk about fixed price
contracts versus cost plus.
Mr. Morrow. I think as you know, we have used fixed price
contracting in many areas where the complexity of the system
allowed that to occur or where we were rebuilding sensors or
spacecraft bus requirements that were very similar to what we
had done on a previous mission and those types of things. Also,
we use fixed price contracting where the instrument-to-
spacecraft interfaces are very well known and aren't
technologically pushing the state-of-the-art. GOES-R is a case
where the instruments, the primary instrument, ABI, is very
much advanced beyond the imager that was on the legacy GOES-N/
O/P series. The detector systems, the optic systems are much
advanced and there was a lot of technical development that
needed to be done there, and that is why on ABI, and in fact,
the other instruments on GOES-R, we have prototype model
development as part of the basic contract. Also, because the
instrument capability and the instrument data rates and the
communication data rates between GOES-R and the ground and the
ground and GOES-R are much greater than what had been there in
the previous series. The spacecraft bus was, while many
components were like what we would fly on another mission, the
spacecraft bus architecture was a very much new development and
the interface to the instruments was a new development.
Ms. Edwards. My time has expired, and so Mr. Chairman, I
don't know if our panelists would please put the responses to
those questions in the record and respond to the Committee. I
would appreciate it.
Chairman Baird. We will probably have another round as
well, Ms. Edwards. If you can stay for that, we will certainly
give you an opportunity to follow up.
Mr. Neugebauer would be next but he is not here, so Dr.
Ehlers is recognized.
The Need for Better Cost Estimates
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sitting here, I
developed a bad case of deja vu, largely because I used to
chair the rough equivalent of this committee, subcommittee, and
we went through much the same thing as NPOESS to the point
where the Chairman of the Committee called a number of
Committee Members in and we ended up with a rather marvelous
shouting match. But we saw the danger signs far before NOAA did
and eventually it ended up that it got so bad that there had to
be a recertification process which slowed everything down but
should never have happened. But what really concerns me first
of all, we are hearing essentially the same thing and I had
hoped that NOAA would have learned something from that and not
made the same mistakes.
Secondly, the satellites are marvelous, they are wonderful
and I deeply appreciate all the information we get. I almost
get addicted to the Weather Channel. I look at it every time I
go to fly somewhere and correlate the weather with my trip in
deciding whether I want to move a day ahead or a day back or
whatever. They are all very good stuff. But what really
concerns me, in NPOESS they had a number of detectors which I
thought were outstanding and they were removed because we could
no longer afford them, and I think the capability of NPOESS is
severely hindered or hampered by removing those. Now I see us
doing the same thing and I wondered in the case of NPOESS and I
wonder about this, can't we come up with better cost estimates?
Can't we as a Congress come up with a better method of funding
projects such as this so that we keep tabs on it? If we are
going to have to spend more money, we put that in the next
year's budget as rapidly as we can and so forth. I think it is
a shared fault here. I don't think NOAA has handled it properly
but I also think we do not handle the appropriation process
properly for these major projects. If this were part of the
military budget, of course, there is no problem because
everyone votes for more money for the military. Not everyone
will vote for more money for the weather satellites,
unfortunately. So this--I have got to get this deja vu off my
chest. What is wrong with NOAA? Why can't they get it right the
first time? Why remove systems? You should have known what they
cost to begin with? And why go through this charade of going to
all the trouble of saying we are going to put this on, then
designing it and part-way through you just say sorry, we can't
afford it, jerk it out. Comments from anyone?
Mr. Powner. Congressman Ehlers, I think we can start with
both NPOESS and GOES that were too optimistic with the leap
forward. If you look at NPOESS and the one instrument there
that is still causing all the problems is VIIRS. That thing is
still in testing. That is why schedules are being pushed out.
It is still the major driver of NPOESS. You know, here I think
what the NOAA folks are attempting to do is to reduce that
complexity so we don't have another VIIRS issue on GOES, okay,
and that is probably a good thing to reduce the complexity but
we just need to be realistic too with now what we are
delivering at what cost.
Mr. Ehlers. Well, I guess as a scientist I would respond
and say I was always delighted when I had complex experiments
to do because it meant I was going to learn more, and I don't
think you should be afraid of complexity. It seems to me that
any good engineering program would take care of that and give
you the same reliability as a less complex system if you built
it right and use it right.
Ms. Kicza.
Ms. Kicza. Yeah, I am afraid I have to take issue with you
because you are saying GOES-R is NPOESS all over again and it
most certainly is not. What we have done is, we have
incorporated the lessons learned from NPOESS. We took stock of
the effort, and you have to realize, NPOESS is several years
down the line from where GOES-R is now and we are making the
tough decisions now, and the work that has been done in the
last two years to not only put in a rigorous cost estimate to
make scope and budget align with one another, that is done
before we ever start the major contract efforts. That was not
done with NPOESS, okay? It is very different.
And then secondly, over the course of GOES-R we have
maintained a rigorous independent review process that are
outside of the program who are coming in on an annual basis to
evaluate where we are and whether or not we are doing the right
thing and challenging us. With GOES-R, we have established a
budget reserve that is the most probable cost--again, before we
ever start the major contracts. We have completely restructured
the acquisition strategy for GOES-R. We were on a track to have
it much like NPOESS where we would have a prime contractor who
would be doing the instruments. We completely restructured that
and have put the government in charge of every major element in
the system, the spacecraft, the ground system, all of the
instruments and in fact the government is doing the systems
integration. It is very different from NPOESS and I challenge
the fact that we are saying that it is NPOESS all over again.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. Well, I am pleased for that clarification but
the point I was trying to make is that removing functionality
after investing quite a bit of money in it is, I don't think,
good. First of all, you build expectations in the user
community and the scientific community about what they are
going to be able to do with the information, and secondly, it
is the wasted effort at NOAA, and perhaps at some other
agencies. I am basically trying to make the same point Mrs.
Edwards made about that we are deeply concerned about the loss
of functionality. If we are going to spend that much money
sending something out there, let us make sure what we send up
there is really going to do the job that we wanted done in the
first place.
Ms. Kicza. I respect that, sir, and what I had indicated is
that in developing the spacecraft, we are designing it in such
a way that we can add capability if and when we think we are
ready to and so the ability to put an advanced sounder on the
GOES-R system when we are convinced that the technology is
ready and we have the funding to do so, then we will be able to
do that.
Mr. Ehlers. I yield back.
Chairman Baird. Thanks, Mr. Ehlers--Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Powner, there has been a number of comments made and I
wonder if you have a desire to respond. One particular question
is that it sounded like an earlier statement made about the
willingness of the review group to suggest that while we will
sacrifice one instrument in favor of another in exchange for
more rapid download rates, and yet we are also hearing that the
download rates may themselves also be compromised. Is that of
concern?
Mr. Powner. Yes, there is several concerns that I think our
report laid out. There was some concerns about the accuracy of
products not being comparable to legacy but I do acknowledge
what Ms. Kicza is saying. There is certain products that will
be better. A couple things going back to your original question
on, you know, whether we have a contract or whether we have a
cost estimate and whether we are overrunning or whether we are
changing estimates. This is all semantics. I mean, what we are
getting into here is whether you have got an active contract
and you overrun, it costs the government more money, where you
have an estimate and you are increasing it. We are not going to
spend less than that estimate. That has never happened. So the
bottom line is, we are spending more money so let us just
acknowledge that. I think the key thing going forward on the
fixes is that we get better estimates. I mean, that was the
basis of some of our recommendations where we have very
detailed reviews of the baselines of these programs because
that is your basis for your estimate going forward. Now, we are
dealing with the instruments right now and we hope that that
discipline that the program is instilling on some of those
instruments, following some of our recommendations, will then
be applied to the larger spacecraft and ground segments. That
is what we really need going forward. We need that discipline
where we have sound estimates and then on top of that many of
our recommendations, we are in the weeds here on some of these,
but what it is all about is, it is really staying on top of the
contractor. So when we see a slip on cost and schedule, we are
on them and we are effectively managing those risks. So that is
really where we are trying to go to be helpful with this
program moving forward.
Chairman Baird. Do you feel like the kind of changes Ms.
Kicza has acknowledged in response to Mr. Ehlers' question
addressed those issues you just raised?
Mr. Powner. Yes, I think her--the way they are planning to
address those recommendations, if in fact there is follow-
through on that, we feel comfortable with that.
Chairman Baird. I should say parenthetically, Mr. Ehlers, I
serve in the Coast Guard Committee as well and we have the
Deepwater program there which was certainly not a model of
procurement, to say the least.
Meeting Budgets and Deadlines
So we have talked a little bit about how we got here maybe.
The next question is, where do we go, and the two fundamental
questions is, how are we going to afford this, where does it
fit into the budget, the NASA budget and the NOAA budget, and
two, are we going to hit the mark in terms of time? Because we
are in a bit precarious situation.
Ms. Kicza. Okay. In terms of the budget, the budget that
the Congress has approved is the budget that we believe is the
most probable cost and so we have confidence in our ability to
bring the system in within that budget. In terms of the planned
launch date, with the spacecraft protest it does have
implications for our launch. Nominally--I should let George
answer this. Nominally, it is 72 months for a spacecraft
development of this complexity. If we stick to that nominal
timeline as we move to the right from a planned April award, we
move to the right on the projected launch date and so we are
definitely concerned about that. Both NOAA and NASA are aware
of the implications and are working to address that as
effectively as we can through the contract award process.
Chairman Baird. Let me drill down a little bit on the
nominally question. There is a bunch of research in countless
areas of engineering that people are overly optimistic and set
dates. We have seen this obviously with the budget on this
project to some extent with the timeline. Does ``nominal'' mean
based on real-world actual practice experience, we are within
somewhere in the middle of the normal curve there, that is our
most probable estimate or is it some optimistic thing that we
are then going to hear?
Mr. Morrow. So let me comment on that. Mary mentioned the
nominal 72 months for a spacecraft development of this type, so
we at NASA have gone back into our actual, you know, what it
actually took database on similar projects, and the 72-month
agreement between NASA and NOAA on the spacecraft development
comes from that database. We may find when we actually award
the spacecraft contract and go to an integrated baseline review
that the spacecraft contractor and the contract schedule may be
somewhat less than 72 months and this goes to the point of
creating baseline--adequate baselines. What we want to do at
NASA and in conjunction with NOAA on GOES-R is to conduct
integrated baseline reviews for each of our contracted efforts
that are not optimistic but hold the contractor's feet to the
fire to perform efficiently. In addition to that, we want to
come back using our historical database and independent cost
estimates from outside entities outside of NASA and NOAA to
develop a program baseline that allows us the latitude for
unforeseen things that occur in the contract development, and
so that part of what we have really worked closely together on
GOES-R to do, is to develop that program baseline that allows
that margin between, you know, what we actually are signing up
to deliver the system for and on what schedule and the margin
between that and what the contractors have signed up to do so
we can hold their feet to the fire, monitor their performance
and keep things moving.
The Partnership of NASA and NOAA
Chairman Baird. Two more very quick questions. One, is it
your feeling that the partnership now as it exists between NASA
and NOAA on this project is now functioning properly and is
likely to continue in a constructive manner?
Ms. Kicza. From a NOAA perspective, absolutely yes.
Mr. Morrow. And from my perspective, yes, that is--some of
my points were that we have a lot of NOAA people on site at
Goddard and we are working arm and arm with each other.
Chairman Baird. I have had a lot of relatives in my house
before. That doesn't mean it is always----
Mr. Morrow. No, no, no, it is not the same thing here.
Chairman Baird. Mr. Powner.
Mr. Powner. You know, last--October of 2007 was the last
hearing the Subcommittee held and I think we raised that issue
about the working relationship. We see that improved based on
our attendance at certain meetings and those things.
Chairman Baird. Finally, I don't have enough time to have
you answer it but I do not understand why Moore's Law doesn't
apply here. I mean, I can get a 20-megabyte digital camera now
whereas three years ago it was about a two-megabyte camera. The
capacity of a Nikon D3 blows your mind in terms of what it can
do. Anyway, it is a separate issue. But I understand it is a
different--it is a bit apples and oranges but the capacity of
what we can do electronically and in imaging systems in the
commercial realm is remarkably improving, and what we are
saying here is that we don't seem to have much comparable. You
are tempted to send a Canon G9 into space and say send us back
the pictures and you get some pretty good resolution.
Mr. Inglis, is he coming right back or--okay. Then I will
recognize Dr. Ehlers and then we will----
Program Funding
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you. I just want to pursue one thing
here. As we are pointing fingers, I am interested in how many
fingers should be pointed at the U.S. Congress. Did Congress
provide sufficient funding in that 2009 Omnibus bill for you to
continue your work on this at the appropriate pace? Is lack of
funding going to slow down the project and create other
problems? And I am interested in--well, I think you have
already answered that question. I was curious about some of the
details of the original GOES-R program and how it is being
proposed now. So if you an answer the first part and then say a
few words about the last.
Ms. Kicza. I will say that for the 2009 budget, we are very
appreciative and that will allow us to proceed on the pace that
we had anticipated proceeding on and so we are very thankful
for the Congress's support for the 2009 budget.
Mr. Ehlers. Let me just interrupt you there. Do you think
it would be beneficial if we changed our budgeting system for
these major projects, and it is not just satellites, it is not
just rockets, it is things such as the new accelerators that we
built, particle accelerators we build occasionally. Wouldn't it
be better if we----
Ms. Kicza. If it wasn't year to year as more of a----
Mr. Ehlers. Continuing budget.
Ms. Kicza. The stability would be beneficial, yes, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. I have always felt that way but it is pretty
hard to persuade people around here.
Ms. Kicza. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. Okay.
Ms. Kicza. And in terms of the second request and that is
sort of a chronology of the changes in the GOES-R program, I
would be happy to take that question for the record and provide
you a brief synopsis of what has occurred over the last two to
three years and the rationale for the changes that were made.
Mr. Ehlers. Okay. And jumping back to the first question,
what about for fiscal year 2008?
Ms. Kicza. In fiscal year 2008, we sustained a budget cut
of about $44 million, if I recall, and we as a result of that
delayed the planned launch date for the GOES-R, the first GOES-
R by approximately three months.
Mr. Ehlers. And when you delay that way, do you really save
a lot of money or is there----
Ms. Kicza. No, it does not save money in the long run
because when you move everything to the right, your life cycle
cost increases.
Mr. Ehlers. Yeah, that is what I thought. So it doesn't
help you at all when we mess up the budget process?
Ms. Kicza. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. Maybe I can get that in writing and show it to
my colleagues. I will yield back at this point. Thank you.
Chairman Baird. Mr. Ehlers, I will think out loud in a
dangerous way here but there might be some merit to pursuing
precisely that in a joint hearing with the Appropriation
Committee and the Science Committee at some point where we talk
about this. There are these major projects that span decades in
some cases and we give you this incredible uncertainty and then
when we miss our appropriations date, as we do almost always
now, it is fun for us to sit here and hammer you guys because
you don't make your dates but unfortunately you are not able to
ask us why we didn't make our dates, but that is another topic.
But we might want to pursue that very issue of some form of
more reliable and longer term project appropriations. I think
it makes an awful lot of sense.
Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Well, Mr. Chairman and Dr. Ehlers, I certainly
share that view.
Complying With Recommendations and the Responsibilities of NOAA
and NASA
Let me just follow up again, Mr. Powner, just to be clear
that you are in agreement that NOAA and NASA Goddard are on the
process now in terms of complying with some of the
recommendations that have been made by GAO?
Mr. Powner. Yes, I believe they have agreed to address the
recommendations. I think a couple things here. One are these
baseline reviews. The more rigor we can get in the baseline
reviews where they are very detailed, they will ultimately
result in better estimates so it is not only just on the ABI
instrument that we are interested in but that is something we
will be looking forward to ensure that these detailed baseline
reviews are done on the, you know, overall spacecraft and
ground segment contracts. So we are hopeful. I mean, they need
to still follow through on that.
The other item is, we have seen much improvement with the
use of earned value metrics to oversee contractors' performance
so that we see variances where they are not--you know, what is
delivered isn't matching up to what we are paying for, you
know, those types of metrics. And the more we can really stay
on the contractors with those metrics, you are going to be able
to monitor performance and hopefully stay closer within those
estimated costs and schedules.
Ms. Edwards. Great. Thank you. And then I am just--I am
curious as to whether given where we are right now and what I
think is, you know, sort of improved kind of management
oversight relationship between NOAA and NASA that we shouldn't
have concerns--I guess I am asking, we shouldn't have concerns
about the relative split between NOAA and NASA in terms of its
management functions for the project?
Ms. Kicza. I don't think so. I think that what we have done
is, we are capitalizing on each others' strengths and so we are
applying our competencies to what we do best, and that is
reflected in the organizational construct for the GOES-R
program.
Mr. Morrow. And I fully agree. I mean, I think we have done
that very well here.
Ms. Edwards. And then let me just inquire as to what will
then be a gap in coverage that has been identified by GAO. What
is the work-around plan for that?
Ms. Kicza. Actually there are a couple of work-arounds in
the event that we do have a gap. Recognize that right now, you
know, it may turn out that the operational satellites last
longer than they are designed for so we could have continued
operation there. If we didn't, we can fall back to the older
satellites because we eke out of the older satellites every bit
of instrument capability that we can, and then we have beyond
that a contingency plan where we can call on European
capabilities in the event that we have a gap and then can apply
their own orbit spare to help support our gap issues.
Ms. Edwards. And is there ongoing work in terms of
developing and refining this contingency plan? Because it
does--I mean, we should be realistic here. You know, there is
probably going to be a gap.
Ms. Kicza. There is--there are existing agreements in place
and in fact just last week the Director of EUMETSAT\1\ and I
spoke to this about this--the fact that these agreements are in
place and used, so they are active.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ EUMETSAT: European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. And then lastly, without going into
the details of the spacecraft contract, have these contractors
been asked to take--potential contractors asked to take into
consideration the fact that they are going to get the award,
the award is going to be made in April and what does that mean
to their projections about the timeline?
Mr. Morrow. In our reevaluation process, we went back
through the contractors' proposals. The contractors themselves
have not yet been engaged in that process by the way the
process is designed and so once we get to the point of making
that selection and award, then we will go into those
discussions with the contractors. Now, the contractors have
extended their proposals. They have been asked to extend their
proposals to accommodate the process that we are in and they
have done that.
Ms. Edwards. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Baird. Thank you, Ms. Edwards.
The Role of Congress
I want to give you the opportunity to follow up on the line
of questioning that Dr. Ehlers was pursuing, and that is, what
does Congress or the Administration need to do differently to
help make this a success? We want this mission to succeed. We
don't want to have a hearing some time from now with a huge gap
and significant risks and costs and that is no fun. I mean, it
gets you press coverage but who cares. What I want to hear is
what we can do to make this work. How do we do that? What can
we do better?
Mr. Powner. Even more frequent oversight hearings such as
this. There was a comment made that there is action on GAO
reports. I will tell you, there is a lot more action when there
is an accompanying hearing with the GAO report, a lot more.
Ms. Kicza. I will say that my immediate thought when you
asked the question was simply do the job that you have been
entrusted to do and that is to provide oversight, to work with
the Congress to appropriate funds in a timely manner.
Mr. Morrow. I really agree with Mary. I think that is the
most important. That stable baseline to us is very important.
Chairman Baird. Ms. Kicza, you mentioned earlier, I think,
or maybe Mr. Morrow about an annual review of, it sounded like
an independent board of advisors, if I remember. Is annual
enough, given the complexity of it and how things----
Ms. Kicza. Well, it is actually more than that. We employ
independent review at all levels of the program, at the
technical level, at the mid-management level and at the most
senior level.
Chairman Baird. So that is ongoing?
Ms. Kicza. That is ongoing. At the most senior levels, we
tag up annually and in advance of major decision milestones.
Benefits of GOES-R
Chairman Baird. One last question for me and then I will
recognize Dr. Ehlers and Mr. Inglis if he returns. It is a
substantial cost to the public. What is the benefit of having
this instrument?
Ms. Kicza. Well, I think you said it most effectively in
your opening remarks. It literally impacts every American every
day. It is critical to predicting severe weather, oftentimes
rapid onset of severe weather. It is absolutely essential to
predicting hurricane tracks. So it is an essential element in
our observational suite of capabilities.
Chairman Baird. Has anyone put a dollar estimate on the
value of this?
Ms. Kicza. Yes, sir, we do have analyses about the economic
impact that the geostationary capability brings to bear and I
can take that question for the record and provide you
additional information.
Chairman Baird. I think that is really essential because at
some point on the one hand we want to do everything we can to
stop cost overruns or inaccurate estimates. We will quibble
about the semantics separately but we want to hit the mark in
terms of what our budget is. But we also need to understand
that there is benefit to the public from this instrument, not
just abstract academic benefit but practical, real world. Is
your loved one going to arrive safely on the airplane, will
your crops be pelted by hailstones or not, will your home be
flooded, will you be safe taking that camping trip, you know,
all of that comes from this. I am told that a Member of
Congress was--maybe this story applies to you, Dr. Ehlers, and
I should let you hear this. The Accu-Weather story, is that
your story? I was told that someone was asking about why we
need to put these weather satellites up, can't we just rely on
Accu-Weather. The joke, of course, is that Accu-Weather gets
its information from these weather satellites, and we don't
want to go back to the Farmer's Almanac and that's what a dark
period in the lack of these--I mean, we will obviously have
better stuff than that, but the point is, this is very
important. We want to work with you to solve this.
Does Mr. Inglis or Mr. Ehlers have any further questions or
comments? I will recognize Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, in light
of your comments, as an addict of the Weather Channel, I
certainly agree with your comments about the value of what we
do, but for me it is just my convenience in traveling and
settling traveling plans. There are a lot of other people who
use this for many very important reasons, industries,
businesses, et cetera. So there is no question about the value.
I am just curious, what other nations put up weather satellites
and what capability do they engineer into theirs?
Ms. Kicza. Well, the Europeans put up weather satellites,
the Japanese put up weather satellites, the Chinese have
weather satellites. It is fairly prevalent. Our capabilities
are roughly comparable, and in fact, for the European satellite
system, we in fact deliver many instruments that they employ on
their satellite capabilities. So yes, there is a very prevalent
weather satellite capability throughout the world and the
community is very closely linked.
Mr. Baird, I would also like to provide an additional
comment relative to the return on investment. One of my staff
provided me a note. One-third of the U.S. GDP is impacted by
the weather and climate sensors that NOAA brings to bear.
Chairman Baird. So we need to get this right, and we
appreciate your work on that.
Mr. Ehlers. Maybe that is the third that I have investments
in. There is some reason it is going down.
Closing
Chairman Baird. With that, I want to thank our witnesses
and my colleagues on the Committee. The record will remain open
for the customary two weeks so that people can offer additional
comments and I thank the witnesses for their expertise and
their hard work. We will have further oversight hearings of
this to monitor your progress and the achievements and look
forward to watching this bird launch on schedule with the most
capable package possible at the moment.
Thank you very much, and the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mary E. Kicza, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and
Information Services, National Environmental Satellite, Data,
and Information Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Questions submitted by Chairman Brian Baird
Q1. During the hearing, we discussed the importance of identifying a
monetary value of the GOES-R program in light of its substantial cost
to the taxpayer. Please provide these analyses of economic impact that
the GOES-R capabilities will provide.
A1. A number of studies have been conducted to identify the economic
benefits of GOES and GOES-R. Summaries of the economic benefits and
links to the supporting studies are available at http://
www.economics.noaa.gov/?goal= weather&file=obs/satellite/goes. Two
reports that address the benefits associated with improvements from
GOES-R are:
``An Investigation of the Economic and Societal Value
of Selected NOAA Data and Products for Geostationary
Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES)'' conducted by
Centrec Consulting Group LLC, available on-line at: http://
www.centrec.com/climate-weather.htm
Economic Statistics for NOAA, April 2006, Fifth
edition, available on-line at: http://
www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/pdf/economic-statistics-may2006.pdf
The GOES-R series of satellites will provide a greater range of
data at a higher resolution than NOAA's current geostationary
satellites. GOES-R will also provide additional societal and economic
benefits including:
enhanced hurricane predictions to mitigate disaster
losses;
lightning mapping to predict conditions that may lead
to severe storms, providing earlier warnings to the public;
improved monitoring of thunderstorm and fog
development to augment the safety of surface, air and marine
transportation;
more frequent and accurate information for commercial
transportation to enable them to avoid adverse weather
conditions resulting in reduced energy consumption;
improved precipitation forecasts to enable more
efficient water management and agricultural decision-making;
and
enhanced monitoring of climate change and variability
in the oceans, atmosphere, and on land.
The 2007 Centrec study presented the following about the value of
the GOES-R satellite system:
In 2015, the combined annual value added from the
information from GOES-R series satellites for the aviation,
energy and agriculture industries, as well as recreational
boating, is expected to exceed $1.2 billion. Since GOES-R is
expected to be in operation from 2015-2027, the value of the
estimated combined benefits approaches $7 billion over the on-
orbit life of the program's satellites.
In addition, the enhanced information from GOES-R
satellite observations is expected to improve NOAA tropical
cyclone forecasting. This will enable more efficient evacuation
and protection of property in advance of storms, which is
expected to be valued at $450 million in 2015 (average of
$130,000 per U.S. coastline mile from Maine to Texas), for a
total of $2.4 billion from 2015 to 2027 (average of $690,000
per U.S. coastline mile from Maine to Texas).
These valuations do not capture all of the sectors in society that
would receive direct and indirect benefits of enhanced GOES-R data, but
provides examples of how the GOES-R series of satellites is both
important and beneficial to the Nation's social welfare, scientific
advancement, and economic efficiency.
The study, titled Opportunities and priorities in a new era for
weather and climate services, by John Dutton\1\ and cited in the 2006
NOAA Economic Statistics report identified that weather and climate
sensitive industries, both directly and indirectly, account for about
one-third of the Nation's GDP, $4 trillion in 2005 dollars, ranging
from finance, insurance, and real estate to services, retail and
wholesale trade and manufacturing. GOES-R will continue and enhance the
current GOES capabilities for weather forecasting, storm detection and
tracking, and warning by providing over twenty times more environmental
information; a two-fold increase in image clarity; and, a fourfold
increase in frequency of new observation data of the constantly
changing atmosphere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dutton, John A., Opportunities and priorities in a new era for
weather and climate services, Bulletin of the American Meteorological
Society, September 2002, volume 83, no. 9, pp. 1303-1311.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GOES-R Geostationary Lighting Mapper (GLM) instrument is the
first ever operational satellite lighting detection system aboard a
geostationary satellite. The GLM detects severe weather by mapping
lighting strikes, both cloud to ground and for the first time, cloud-
to-cloud. Mapping cloud-to-cloud lighting strikes can be helpful in
early prediction of severe weather systems. The 2006 NOAA Economic
Statistics report indicates that lightning activity causes $4 to $5
billion in losses each year in the civilian sector and that lightning
has consistently been one of the top three causes of weather-related
deaths in the country. Lightning kills between 50 and 70 people and
injures hundreds more each year. By having the GLM capability on GOES-
R, NOAA will be able to provide warnings that will save lives from
lightning hazards.
GOES-R will also carry a number of the solar/space monitoring
instruments that will provide significantly improved images and
detection of approaching space weather hazards. These space storms
endanger billions of dollars worth of commercial and government
satellite systems by causing power surges in sensitive electronics that
can impact system performance (e.g., degrade communication
capabilities) or even end the life of the satellite, or threaten the
lives of astronauts space walking. These storms also impact ground-
based power grids. Geomagnetic storms caused by energetic streams of
particles and fields that originate from the sun impact the Earth's
magnetic field, interact with the long wires of the power grid, and
cause electrical currents to flow in the grid. These currents cause
imbalances in electrical equipment, reducing its performance and
leading to dangerous overheating. The power grid operators respond to
warning by modifying the way the power grid is operated to maintain
adequate power quality for customers and reserve capacity to counteract
the effects of space weather. A geomagnetic storm in 1989 caused a
``black out'' of the power distribution system for Quebec, Canada, and
left six million people without electricity for nine hours at a cost of
$300 million. With these solar/space monitoring instruments on GOES-R,
NOAA's Space Weather Prediction Center will be able to significantly
improve space weather forecasts for government and commercial satellite
operators and for the communications and power generation industries.
Questions submitted by Representative Donna F. Edwards
Q1. In response to program difficulties as identified in the 2006 GAO
report, including a near doubling of projected program costs, NOAA made
several key changes to the program as a whole. The newest GAO report
identifies several program improvements since that time, but NOAA also
eliminated two satellites and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite
(HES) program and pushed back the first launch date to December 2014.
Q1a. What are the key improved capabilities the GOES-R program has
with reduced system?
A1a. The restructured GOES-R system represents a significant
improvement in technical capabilities over the GOES-I/M and GOES-N
series satellites. GOES-R will enhance our ability to advance weather
forecasting, storm detection, tracking, and warnings.
The GOES-R Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI) will:
Improve the current GOES geographic coverage rate by
five times. A GOES-R full-Earth disk (the Earth as seen from a
geosynchronous orbiting satellite) can be imaged in five
minutes, compared to a 26 minute duration for the current GOES-
I/M and GOES-N Series Imagers. This will improve the timeliness
of the data being used for weather detection and forecasting.
For regions facing severe weather, new images of key
areas will be available every 30 seconds, as opposed to four
minutes, 43 seconds with the current GOES rapid scan
operations. This will improve not only the timeliness of the
data for areas being impacted by severe weather, but also the
fidelity of the data, which helps improve forecasting accuracy.
Improve horizontal resolution by four times (0.5 km
resolution for GOES-R vs. one km for the current GOES for
visible wavelengths), which improves the accuracy of forecasts
and warnings.
Increase spectral resolution by three times (16 GOES-
R ABI channels vs. five channels for the current GOES imager)
which provides added information to support more accurate
forecasts.
The GOES-R Geostationary Lighting Mapper (GLM) instrument is the
first ever operational satellite lighting detection system aboard a
geostationary satellite. The GLM detects severe weather by mapping both
cloud to ground and cloud-to-cloud lighting strikes. Lightning activity
causes $4 to $5 billion in losses each year in the civilian sector and
lightning has consistently been one of the top three causes of weather-
related deaths in the country. It kills between 50 and 70 people each
year and injures hundreds more. By having the GLM capability on GOES-R,
NOAA will be able to provide more accurate severe weather warnings that
save lives. In addition, research has shown that cloud-to-cloud
lightning typically begins before cloud-to-ground lightning (which can
be more dangerous) as severe weather systems first develop. Monitoring
this information closely will allow for longer lead times for severe
weather warnings.
GOES-R will also carry solar/space monitoring instruments that will
provide significantly improved images and detection of approaching
space weather hazards. These space storms endanger billions of dollars
worth of commercial and government satellite systems by causing power
surges in sensitive electronics, which can impact system performance
(e.g., degrade communication capabilities) or even end the life of the
satellite. These storms also impact ground-based power grids.
Geomagnetic storms caused by energetic streams of particles and fields
that originate from the sun impact the Earth's magnetic field, interact
with the long wires of the power grid, and cause electrical currents to
flow in the grid. These currents cause imbalances in electrical
equipment, reducing its performance and leading to dangerous
overheating. The power grid operators respond to warning by modifying
the way the power grid is operated in order to maintain adequate power
quality for customers and reserve capacity to counteract the effects of
space weather. With these solar/space monitoring instruments on GOES-R,
NOAA's Space Weather Prediction Center will be able to significantly
improve space weather forecasts for government and commercial satellite
operators and for the communications and power generation industries.
Q1b. What specific capabilities will we lose with the two satellites
and the HES program?
A1b. Two satellites: No specific capabilities would be lost, but having
two instead of four satellites means that the overall expected life of
the series will be shorter.
To meet the Nation's weather data needs, the GOES system requires
two operational satellites and a spare satellite on-orbit at all times.
Two GOES satellites in orbit, one in the East and one in the West are
required to maintain visual coverage of the entire Nation and the
adjacent ocean areas where weather activity, especially storms, often
originates. A single GOES spacecraft cannot simultaneously monitor a
hurricane in the Atlantic and wildfires in Southern California and can
do neither mission while closely monitoring tornado and thunderstorm
activity in Texas. Having only one operational GOES satellite would
greatly hinder weather forecasting for the United States. To ensure
this continuity, a backup GOES needs to be available on orbit in case
one of the operational GOES fails.
By the GOES-R system having only two satellites, rather than the
originally planned four, the overall expected life of the series will
be shorter, requiring a new series of satellites to be developed
earlier. The originally planned GOES-R four-satellite constellation
would be expected to provide coverage through 2036. The current two-
satellite GOES-R series constellation will provide coverage through
2028.
The GOES-R spacecraft and instrument contracts have options to
support the acquisition of two additional satellites (GOES-T and GOES-
U) beyond the initial two satellites. The decision to exercise the
contract options for the additional satellites will be addressed
through the NOAA budget process. The initial GOES-R contract enables
the purchasing of key parts for all four satellites as well as spares,
which may eliminate some future costs associated with purchasing
duplicates of parts in the future.
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (HES): From initial planning and
development of HES, it became clear that HES would be a highly capable
sensor, but very complex and expensive to develop. Although the HES
capabilities (hyperspectral sounder and coastal waters imaging) would
greatly improve NOAA's ability to characterize the atmosphere and the
coastal environment, NOAA had to weigh the advantages of an improved
sounder against the risk that the sensor development would delay the
launch of the GOES-R series, creating risk to continuity of operations.
After careful consideration by NOAA and its users, informed by
independent assessment, the technical and cost risk associated with a
complex new instrument was considered too high for an operational
mission such as GOES-R. NOAA will continue to provide products similar
to the sounding based products currently provided by the GOES-N Series
sounder with data from the Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI) instrument.
The HES had promised the ability to measure fine disturbances in
the atmosphere that can occur hours before severe storms develop. These
measurements could have extended the lead times for severe weather
warnings. The HES also could have provided fine scale observations of
the oceans and coastal waters allowing coastal zone managers to monitor
changes in the surface of those environments.
The restructure of the GOES-R architecture allowed NOAA to ensure
uninterrupted GOES data availability while incrementally achieving
technological advances.
Q1c. How will the additional delay impact costs and satellite
services?
A1c. With respect to costs, the projected life cycle costs of $7.7
billion for the GOES-R system has remained constant through the last
two Administration budget requests. The additional schedule delay
reduces the probability of having two operational satellites in orbit
in April 2015 by a few percent. The GOES-R program is monitoring this
risk closely.
Q1d. Please expound on the potential gap in service coverage as
identified by GAO.
A1d. To meet the Nation's weather data needs, the GOES system requires
two operational satellites and a spare satellite on-orbit at all times.
Two GOES satellites in orbit, one in the East and one in the West are
required to maintain visual coverage of the entire Nation and the
adjacent ocean areas where severe weather activity, especially storms,
often originates. A single GOES spacecraft cannot simultaneously
monitor a hurricane in the Atlantic and wildfires in Southern
California and can do neither mission while closely monitoring tornado
and thunderstorm activity in Texas. Having only one operational GOES
satellite would greatly hinder weather forecasting for the United
States. To ensure this continuity, a backup GOES needs to be available
on orbit in case one of the operational GOES fails.
In April 2015 when the first GOES-R satellite is scheduled to
launch, internal projections indicate a 65 percent probability that
NOAA will have both a GOES-West and GOES-East satellite in operations.
Both NOAA and GAO have noted this as a concern since a 35 percent risk
of only one operational GOES at that time could put forecasts at risk.
To mitigate this risk, NOAA is planning ahead to maximize the use
and lifetime of all existing NOAA GOES satellites by carefully
monitoring the performance of GOES-14 and GOES-P (once on orbit as
GOES-15). As a further risk reduction measure, NOAA has in place
existing agreements with European and Japanese governments that also
operate GOES-type satellites. If necessary, NOAA would borrow or
request re-positioning of one or more foreign satellites, contingent on
availability, to assist NOAA in meeting U.S. data needs.
Q2. During the hearing, Mr. Morrow described his perspectives on
funding project contracts. Please discuss any of your own lessons
learned from the contracting process thus far. What are the appropriate
occasions for fixed-price contracting versus cost-plus?
A2. In general, a fixed price contract provides for a set price for
goods or services including profit. A cost plus contract provides for
the reimbursement of the contractor's costs and an amount of fees. For
both types of contracts, the profit and fees can vary. The principal
determinate for picking fixed price or cost plus is the customer's
ability to specify what goods and services are required and what level
of risk will be involved in delivering the goods and services.
If the customer can describe the goods or services required with
sufficient implementation detail to allow a good estimate of the effort
and materials required and their costs, and there is little technology,
schedule, or other risk involved in accomplishing the effort, then a
fixed price contract is the best option. A good example of an
appropriate fixed price contract is a later satellite in a series with
limited changes from the early satellites and where the risks of
manufacturing are very well known based on prior experience.
However, if there are substantial uncertainties associated with the
effort related to development and engineering issues, availability of
properly skilled and experienced staff, and schedule challenges, then a
cost-plus contract is more appropriate. A good example of this is the
development of a new satellite or ground system like GOES-R. The
uncertainties and risks related to engineering and schedule translate
into uncertainties and risks associated with the budget that both
government and contractor are willing to commit to the contract.
The cost-plus contracts NOAA has in place, through ongoing
partnership with NASA, have been effective contract vehicles to work
through the design of the GOES-R instruments to date.
Question submitted by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers
Q1. Please provide a chronology of the changes in the GOES-R program
over the last two to three years including a rationale for the changes
that were made.
A1. The following is a chronology of the changes to the GOES-R Program
from January 2004 to the present.
FY 2004 (January 2004-October 2004): NOAA developed the first
working estimate for GOES-R of $6.2 billion.
Estimate was derived from 11 concept studies,
including architecture options that ranged in size from three
to nine spacecraft.
Cost estimate was used at the beginning of the
Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase of the
program.
FY 2006 to FY 2007 (October 2005-April 2007): Program Definition
and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Phase, consisting of three firm-fixed-price
contracts to three different contractors.
The GOES-R PDRR phase included the following steps:
Defined an end-to-end system architecture, including
more detailed concept designs and cost estimates.
Conducted system and subsystem level trade studies to
identify and mitigate risk.
PDRR ended with each contractor presenting a System
Concept Review (SCR).
Based on the information in the SCR, NOAA developed
the second working cost estimate of $6.96 billion, which
consisted of two satellites and the removal of the
Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (HES). Internal studies
concluded that the HES instrument (including hyperspectral
sounder and coastal waters imaging) was too technologically
challenging to build within the available budget and schedule.
NOAA demanifested the HES from GOES-R.
FY 2007 to FY 2008 (May 2007-December 2007): NOAA acquisition
planning period.
June 2007: The NOAA/NASA Memorandum of Agreement for
management and acquisition of the GOES-R system was signed.
Based on the recommendations of a high-level
Independent Review Team (IRT), NOAA changed the management and
contract structure from a single prime contract to separate
space and ground systems contracts with the government
responsible for systems engineering and integration of the
system.
December 2007: The Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere certified readiness to proceed into the
acquisition and operations phase of the program. The components
of the program approved included:
The $7.58 billion budget;
The two-contract acquisition strategy: NASA
responsible for space segment and NOAA responsible for
the ground segment and operations; and
Deliverables consisting of two spacecraft with an
option for two additional spacecraft.
FY 2008 Omnibus Appropriations Act--Reduced funding for the program
by $44 million.
Funding reduction forced an adjustment to the
acquisition schedule.
Launch readiness date changed from December 2014 to
April 2015.
FY 2009 President's Budget request based on $7.67 billion cost
estimate.
Spacecraft program provides two spacecraft with an
option for two additional spacecraft, which are unfunded.
NOAA developed a program office cost estimate,
conducted an independent cost estimate, and resolved
differences between the two cost estimates. The resulting
budget and schedule was at the 80 percent confidence level (to
allow for sufficient reserves to address potential technical
problems during development, per the recommendation of the
IRT).
October 2008: Pursuant to Public Law 110-161, the
Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere certified
readiness to Congress to proceed into the acquisition and
operations phase of the program. The components of the program
approved included:
The $7.67 billion budget;
The two-contract acquisition strategy: NASA
responsible for space segment and NOAA responsible for
the ground segment and operations; and
Deliverables consisting of two spacecraft with an
option for two additional spacecraft.
FY 2010 President's Budget request retained the $7.67 billion cost
estimate.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by George W. Morrow, Jr., Director, Flight Projects, Goddard
Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)
Question submitted by Chairman Brian Baird
Q1. During the hearing, we discussed the importance of identifying a
monetary value of the GOES-R Program in light of the substantial cost
to the taxpayer. Please provide these analyses of economic impact that
the GOES-R capabilities will provide.
A1. NASA and NOAA share a 39-year partnership designing, developing and
launching the GOES and Polar Operational Environmental Satellite
series. While NASA is implementing the flight segment of the GOES-R
Program, program responsibility resides with NOAA. This question is
best answered by NOAA in their role as the program manager.
Questions submitted by Representative Donna F. Edwards
Q1. In response to the program difficulties as identified in the 2006
GAO report, including a near doubling of projected program costs, NOAA
made several key changes to the program as a whole. The newest GAO
report identifies several improvements since that time, but NOAA also
eliminated two satellites and the Hyperspectral Suite (HES) program and
pushed back the first launch date to December 2014. What are the key
improved capabilities the GOES-R program has with the reduced system?
What specific capabilities will we lose with the two satellites and the
HES program? How will the additional delay impact costs and satellite
services? Please expound upon the potential gap in service coverage as
identified by GAO.
A1. NASA and NOAA share a 39-year partnership designing, developing and
launching the GOES and Polar Operational Environmental Satellite
series. While NASA is implementing the flight segment of the GOES-R
Program, program responsibility resides with NOAA. This question is
best answered by NOAA in their role as the program manager.
Q2. During the hearing, Ms. Kicza described NOAA's progress toward
implementation of GAO's three major recommendations for GOES-R. Please
explain how NASA is approaching these goals and what progress has been
made so far at reaching them.
A2. GAO Recommendation (1): As part of any effort to re-baseline the
cost and schedule of the Advanced Baseline Imager, perform an
integrated baseline review and ensure the review includes an assessment
of key schedule milestones, the adequacy of resources, task and
technical planning, and management processes.
NASA expects to complete the re-baselining of the ABI instrument
contract later this year. As part of that re-baseline activity, we will
conduct a comprehensive Integrated Baseline Review (IBR). The ABI
contractor is currently updating their new program management baseline.
Once that is complete, NASA and NOAA will conduct the IBR.
GAO Recommendation (2): Improve the agency's ability to oversee
contractor performance by ensuring the reasons for cost and schedule
variances are fully disclosed and documented.
All five NASA GOES-R instrument contractors submit monthly Cost
Performance Reports that includes cost and schedule earned value
metrics and the itemization of all related variances. These cost
variances are reviewed by both NASA and NOAA personnel within the GOES-
R program office on a monthly basis to ensure that the cost and
schedule variances reported by the contractor are fully understood. All
cost and schedule metrics, variances, impacts and mitigation plans (as
appropriate) are reported on a monthly basis to the GOES-R program,
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center staff, as well as NOAA and the
Department of Commerce. Once the spacecraft contract is awarded,
identical cost and schedule reporting processes will be utilized for
reporting and documentation.
GAO Recommendation (3): If feasible and justified, develop a plan
and timeline of recovering the advanced capabilities that were removed
from the program when the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was
canceled.
As NOAA's flight hardware implementing partner, NASA continues to
provide NOAA with the requisite engineering support necessary to
evaluate options. In the event that NOAA elects to pursue an advanced
sounding instrument to meet their user needs, then NASA will ensure
that the proper systems engineering is performed to ensure GOES-R
mission success.