[House Hearing, 111 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXPLORING THE BALANCE BETWEEN INCREASED CREDIT AVAILABILITY AND PRUDENT LENDING STANDARDS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ MARCH 25, 2009 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services Serial No. 111-21 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 48-874 WASHINGTON : 2009 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Chairman PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MAXINE WATERS, California MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York PETER T. KING, New York LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois EDWARD R. ROYCE, California NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina RON PAUL, Texas GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Carolina DENNIS MOORE, Kansas JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts GARY G. MILLER, California RUBEN HINOJOSA, Texas SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri Virginia CAROLYN McCARTHY, New York JEB HENSARLING, Texas JOE BACA, California SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina BRAD MILLER, North Carolina JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania DAVID SCOTT, Georgia RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas AL GREEN, Texas TOM PRICE, Georgia EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois JOHN CAMPBELL, California GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin ADAM PUTNAM, Florida PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota KENNY MARCHANT, Texas RON KLEIN, Florida THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio KEVIN McCARTHY, California ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado BILL POSEY, Florida JOE DONNELLY, Indiana LYNN JENKINS, Kansas BILL FOSTER, Illinois CHRISTOPHER LEE, New York ANDRE CARSON, Indiana ERIK PAULSEN, Minnesota JACKIE SPEIER, California LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey TRAVIS CHILDERS, Mississippi WALT MINNICK, Idaho JOHN ADLER, New Jersey MARY JO KILROY, Ohio STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio SUZANNE KOSMAS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida JIM HIMES, Connecticut GARY PETERS, Michigan DAN MAFFEI, New York Jeanne M. Roslanowick, Staff Director and Chief Counsel C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on: March 25, 2009............................................... 1 Appendix: March 25, 2009............................................... 57 WITNESSES Wednesday, March 25, 2009 Berg, Richard S., President and Chief Executive Officer, Performance Trust Capital Partners, LLC........................ 54 Duke, Hon. Elizabeth A., Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System......................................... 5 Gruenberg, Hon. Martin J., Vice Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)................................... 7 Hunkler, Bradley J., Vice President and Controller, Western & Southern Financial Group, on behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable..................................................... 47 Kroeker, James L., Acting Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission............................................ 12 Long, Timothy W., Senior Deputy Comptroller, Bank Supervision Policy, and Chief National Bank Examiner, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).............................. 10 Menzies, R. Michael S., Sr., President and Chief Executive Officer, Easton Bank and Trust Company, on behalf of the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA)................ 49 Polakoff, Scott M., Acting Director, Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).......................................................... 8 Truckenbrodt, Randall, American Equipment Rentals, on behalf of the National Federation of Independent Business................ 51 Wilson, Stephen, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, LCNB Corporation and LCNB National Bank, on behalf of the American Bankers Association (ABA)......................... 45 APPENDIX Prepared statements: Bachmann, Hon. Michele....................................... 58 Hinojosa, Hon. Ruben......................................... 59 Peters, Hon. Gary C.......................................... 62 Berg, Richard S.............................................. 63 Duke, Hon. Elizabeth A....................................... 82 Gruenberg, Hon. Martin J..................................... 97 Hunkler, Bradley J........................................... 112 Kroeker, James L............................................. 125 Long, Timothy W.............................................. 132 Menzies, R. Michael S., Sr................................... 151 Polakoff, Scott M............................................ 163 Truckenbrodt, Randall........................................ 172 Wilson, Stephen.............................................. 176 Additional Material Submitted for the Record Frank, Hon. Barney: Letter from the National Bankers Association................. 193 Bachus, Hon. Spencer: Letter to Hon. John C. Dugan from Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr., dated December 29, 2008.................................... 195 Letter from Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr., dated March 23, 2009... 197 Gruenberg, Hon. Martin J.: Responses to questions submitted by Hon. Alan Grayson........ 198 Responses to questions submitted by Hon. Erik Paulsen........ 205 Duke, Hon. Elizabeth A.: Letter providing further clarification to Hon. Bill Posey.... 206 EXPLORING THE BALANCE BETWEEN INCREASED CREDIT AVAILABILITY AND PRUDENT LENDING STANDARDS ---------- Wednesday, March 25, 2009 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Barney Frank [chairman of the committee] presiding. Members present: Representatives Frank, Gutierrez, Watt, Sherman, Moore of Kansas, Baca, Scott, Green, Cleaver, Ellison, Klein, Wilson, Perlmutter, Foster, Speier, Driehaus, Kosmas, Himes; Bachus, Castle, Manzullo, Jones, Biggert, Neugebauer, Bachmann, Marchant, Posey, Paulsen, and Lance. The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Members of this committee, as well as other Members of Congress, have been urging people in the banking system to increase the volume of loans. We hear from some of our constituents that they are not able to get loans that they think would be very helpful economically. And as obvious as we have said, the economy doesn't recover until the credit system does. Essentially, we have had a situation in which borrowers have complained about some of the banks. Banks have in turn complained about the regulators and we are here in one room sequentially. I would hope that our friends on the regulatory panel will be able to stay themselves, or through staff, hear what some of the bankers have said. And I assume they have read the testimony. You know, I don't think there's a matter of ill will. I call it the ``mixed message'' hearing, because I think it is. We do tell the regulators two things: one, tell people to make loans; and, two, tell people not to make loans. Now, they're not supposed to be the same loans, but there is this tension here. And it's a particularly exacerbated tension now, because I think in normal times, the role of regulators is to make sure that bad loans aren't made or to minimize the likelihood. But, we're not in a normal time now. We're in a time where there is a clear problem making good loans. So it is important that the ongoing important safety and soundness is the role of the regulators, and diminishing the number of imprudent loans coexists with the importance of making sure that loans are made that should be made. Now, part of the mixed message issue--and that is why Mr. Kroeker is here from the SEC--has to do with the effect of mark-to-market accounting. We do not want to be post-cyclical, but we also have that potential with regard, for instance, to assessments at the FDIC. Now, some of that is inevitable. If more banks fail, then the assessments go up. But if the assessments go up, some of the banks, small banks, have less ability to lend. It would be nice if we could simply abolish one or the other of the conflicting objectives. We can't. They are both important. So what we then have to do is to make sure they are done in coordination with each other, and in particular with regard to the question of lending standards, that we avoid the potential of there being compartmentalization, in which some parts of the agencies are urging people to lend, and other parts are urging them not to. We need to make sure that the same people are aware of the importance of both of those. We had a hearing in general on mark-to-market. It is of particular relevance, obviously, to banks, particularly to banks that are holding securities long-term. We had a special problem brought to our attention regarding mark-to-market with a couple of the Federal Home Loan Bank regents. So we want to be able to address that as well, and as I said, the purpose here is to make sure that we can increase loans in an atmosphere of security and soundness. And, I think, most importantly, demonstrate that those two objectives are not in fact in conflict, but that they go together, that we are capable of a sound banking system that produces an appropriate flow of credit without endangering the safety of the system. The Chairman. The gentleman from Alabama. Mr. Bachus. Thank you. I am going to yield to the gentleman from Delaware. The Chairman. The gentleman from Delaware is recognized for 1\1/2\ minutes. Mr. Castle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your opening statement, with which I agree. And, I agree that we need to be careful about giving mixed messages, especially to our smaller banks. I recently heard, in fact it was yesterday, from a bank in my State which has heard firsthand from leaders at the Federal Reserve encouraging them to continue lending, but they indicated in real practice as regulators come around, they are actually being discouraged from doing so for capital reasons, or whatever it may be. I am particularly interested in helping banks in my State-- I am from Delaware--get the word out that they are open for business and able to lend to responsible borrowers. I think a lot of this issue is local. We need to handle it that way. We need to be extremely careful in our efforts here in assisting these institutions on one hand, and then putting restrictions on their ability to conduct their business with the other hand. And I think that applies to some of the things we are doing in Congress as well, I might add. Ultimately, I believe that this committee, Congress, and the Administration share the goal of doing everything possible to restore economic health, and this cannot be done without our financial institutions. We are all in this together, and I think we need to work on it. I yield back the balance of my time. The Chairman. Next, I would take the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Posey, for 1\1/2\ minutes. Mr. Posey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And if you don't mind, I would just like to echo a little bit of your comments that you made when you opened. Many borrowers are having their credit severely restricted, not because of any past history they had or failure to repay it, and you know, really obvious apparent or greatly increased risk, we would see to the lender. We are talking about, you know, auto dealers throughout the country. We are talking about the attractions industry, which is very important in our part of the country. We are talking about people's personal lines of credit, not just business models that rely on these business loans, but personal lines of credit being apparently arbitrarily reduced that are putting people in an unintended lurch. And I understand there is an uncertainty in the market until we get this thing road-mapped out. And there is a way to measure and put accountability into recovery program. But, I hope in your remarks as you address here today that you will address these issues and what you think needs to be done to loosen that credit up. I have heard the numbers, that sitting on an extra $800 billion, a lot of bail-out money has not been used. It's sitting there, and I can understand that if I was on the sidelines and I was uncertain as to how I might be injured in this policy or by this policy, I might be just a little bit reluctant to be any less liquid than absolutely necessary. But, nonetheless, it's incumbent on us as the chairman mentioned, to do something to loosen that market up, because it exacerbates the problem. It doesn't help the economy. It doesn't help the problem; and, ultimately, it doesn't help the bankers. I mean, I know you don't make any money if you're not using it to make money. And so that goes for our businesses and our families back home. So I would appreciate it if when you make your presentations, you would each be kind of enough to touch on that so we don't need to ask for written responses from you later. Thank you. The Chairman. The gentleman from Alabama. Mr. Bachus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I think my major concern is the same as Mr. Castle and others have expressed, and that I have heard from many constituents who are current on their loans but have had their lines of credit cut or their fees increased, or their interest rates. Today's hearing, I hope, will help us understand why this is happening. Their bankers are on occasion saying that the regulators are encouraging them to pull these loans back. In one instance I have heard of a businessman in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, who had never defaulted on a loan, and had done business with a bank for 30 years. He was not behind on any of his payments, yet he was told that he was going to have to reduce his line of credit by either 10 or 20 percent. We hear this almost on a weekly basis. These people have not defaulted, and what that does is it causes further disruption, because they have to go out some time and liquidate properties or assets at a loss. And there is actually a growing anger from these same people; and, this is Main Street, that they see our Federal Government spending billions and hundreds of billions of dollars through the Fed and the Treasury to bail out or intervene on behalf of some of our too-large-to-fail institutions. And this really, I think, makes a lot of us angry and frustrated, that at the same time as we see our government and our Federal agencies intervening to prop up some of our too- big-to-fail institutions, because we are told there is a systemic threat to our economy--their having bank loans who are current or lines of credit who are current, or even interest rates increased when they are current--and they are not failing. And, let me tell you there is a systemic risk, because that is occurring every day across America in almost every town. There is also a growing perception, I think much of it justified, that the larger institutions are being favored over the smaller institutions. Chairman Frank and I were some of the first who proposed the capital injections. At the time we did that, we said we wanted it to go to healthy institutions. We wanted the focus to be on rewarding those institutions that had not endangered the economy, were not at risk. We wanted our healthy institutions to participate, not just failing institutions or institutions that were having extreme liquidity problems. The capital injection program, I think, has been tremendously biased against our smaller institutions. At the same time we are giving money to AIG, or giving money to a large institution because it's having solvency problems, we are telling our smaller institutions that they are not stable enough to receive money. Now, the large institutions get it because they are failing. The smaller institutions, which are better off and sometimes are being told that they cannot get the money, or small institutions which are not failing are still waiting in line. We started with the largest institutions and we are still moving down. And what I am hearing is that some of that money is still being kept back, because it may be needed on an ad hoc basis to save some large institution. When it seems to me like the regulators are finding reasons to say no to our smaller institutions and our regional banks, I believe it is time for the Federal regulators to turn a lot of their attention to helping our regional or small institutions when 95 percent of the effort is made on a few, too-big-to-fail institutions and also mark-to-market. I am very interested in that. That doesn't require government funding or government intervention. I hear every day from small, medium-sized, and large banks, and even executives of large insurance companies, the biggest insurance companies in this country, that it is a problem. And I hope the regulators will continue to work with us and the SEC to get FASB to give the relief that all of us have recommended to them. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you. And, like you said, they had one particular issue. Several of us were in Massachusetts on Monday on a similar-type hearing. We heard about it a couple of nights ago. It is in Massachusetts, New York, and some other places. We have the mutual savings bank form; and, to date, there is not even a term sheet for them to be able to get funding. And if you have seen this morning's ``Washington Post,'' Business Section, there is a picture of me showing something to Secretary Geithner. It is a memo saying that it really is important that the term sheet be out from mutual savings banks, and we believe that will be happening soon. With that, we will proceed now with our panel, and we will begin with a frequent and always welcome witness who has always been very cooperative, and someone who brings her own private banking experience to her current position as a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. And I think for fans of ``Doonesbury,'' it's always interesting when we introduce Governor Duke. [laughter] STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH A. DUKE, GOVERNOR, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Ms. Duke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss several issues related to the state of the banking system. As you are all well aware, the Federal Reserve is taking significant steps to improve financial market conditions and has worked with the Treasury and other bank and thrift supervisors to address issues at U.S. banking organizations. We remain attentive to the need for banks to remain in sound financial condition, while at the same time to continue lending prudently to creditworthy borrowers. Indeed, the shutdown of most securitization markets and the evaporation of many types of non-bank credit make it that much important right now for the U.S. banking system to be able to carry out the credit intermediation function. Recent data confirm severe strains on parts of the U.S. banking system. During 2008, profitability measures at U.S. commercial banks and bank holding companies deteriorated dramatically. Indeed, commercial banks posted a substantial, aggregate loss for the fourth quarter of 2008, the first time this has happened since the late 1980's. This loss in large part reflected write-downs on trading assets, high goodwill impairment charges, and, most significantly, increased loan loss provisions. With respect to overall credit conditions, past experience has shown that borrowing by households and nonfinancial businesses has tended to slow during economic downturns. However, in the current case, the slow down in private sector debt growth during the past year has been much more pronounced than in previous downturns, not just for high mortgage debt, but also consumer debt and debt of the business sector. In terms of direct lending by banks, Federal Reserve data show that total bank loans and leases increased modestly in 2008 below the higher pace of growth seen in both 2006 and 2007. Additionally, the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Banking Practices has shown that banks have been tightening lending standards over the past 18 months. The most recent survey data also show the demand for loans for businesses and households continue to weaken on balance. Despite the numerous changes to the financial landscape during the past half-century, such as the large increase in the flow of credit coming from non-bank sources, banks remain vital financial intermediaries. In addition to direct lending, banks supply credit indirectly by providing back-up liquidity and credit support to other financial institutions and conduits that also intermediate credit flows. In terms of direct bank lending, much of the increase last year likely reflected households and businesses drawing down existing lines of credit rather than extensions of loans to new customers. Some of these draw-downs by households and businesses were precipitated by the freeze-up of the securitization markets. The Federal Reserve has responded forcefully to the financial and economic crisis on many fronts. In addition to monetary policy easing, the Federal Reserve has initiated a number of lending programs to revive financial markets and to help banks play their important role as financial intermediaries. Among these initiatives are the purchase of large amounts of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities; plans to purchase long-term Treasury securities; other efforts including the Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility known as TALF to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses; and, the Federal Reserve's planned involvement in the Treasury's Public-Private Partnership Investment Program, announced on Monday. The Federal Reserve has also been active on the supervisory front to bring about improvements in banks' risk-management practices. Liquidity and capital have been given special attention. That said, we do realize that there must be an appropriate balance between our supervisory actions and the promotion of credit availability to assist in the economic recovery. The Federal Reserve has long-standing policies and procedures in place to help maintain such a balance. We have also reiterated this message of balance in recent interagency statements. We have directed our examiners to be mindful of the procyclical effects of excessive credit tightening and to encourage banks to make economically viable loans, provided that such lending is based on realistic asset valuations and a balanced assessment of borrowers' repayment capacities. The U.S. banking industry is facing serious challenges. The Federal Reserve, working with other banking agencies, has acted and will continue to act to ensure that the banking system remains safe and sound and is able to meet the credit needs of our economy. The challenge for regulators and other authorities is to support prudent bank intermediation that helps restore the health of the financial system and the economy as a whole. As we have communicated, we want banks to deploy capital and liquidity to make credit available, but in a responsible way that avoids past mistakes and does not create new ones. Accordingly, we thank the committee for holding this hearing to help clarify the U.S. banking agencies' message that both safety and soundness and credit availability are important in the current environment. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Governor Duke can be found on page 82 of the appendix.] The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gruenberg. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, VICE CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (FDIC) Mr. Gruenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the FDIC on the balance between increased credit availability and prudent lending standards. The FDIC is very aware of the challenges faced by financial institutions and their customers during these difficult economic times. Bankers and examiners know that prudent, responsible lending is good business and benefits everyone. Adverse credit conditions brought on by an ailing economy and stressed balance sheets, however, have created a difficult environment for both borrowers and lenders. Resolving the current economic crisis will depend heavily on creditworthy borrowers, both consumer and business, having access to lending. In response to these challenging circumstances, banks are clearly taking more care in evaluating applications for credit. While this more prudent approach to underwriting is appropriate, it should not mean that creditworthy borrowers are denied loans. As bank supervisors, we have a responsibility to assure our institutions, regularly and clearly, that soundly structured and underwritten loans are encouraged. While aggregate lending activity for FDIC-insured institutions fell in the fourth quarter of 2008, this decline was driven mostly by the largest banks, which reported a 3.4 percent fall in loan balances. In contrast, lending activity at community banks with assets under $1 billion actually increased by 1.5 percent. Community banks are playing an important role in the current stressful environment and appear to be benefiting from their reliance on traditional core deposit funding and relationship lending. Some have questioned whether bank supervisors are contributing to adverse credit conditions by overreacting to current problems in the economy and discouraging banks from making good loans. The FDIC understands the critical role that credit availability plays in the national economy and we balance these considerations with prudential safety and soundness requirements. Over the past year, through guidance, the examination process and other means, we have sought to encourage banks to maintain the availability of credit. We have also trained our examiners on how to properly apply this guidance at the institutions we supervise and how to conduct examinations and communicate their findings to bank management without infringing on bank management's day-to-day decisionmaking and relationships with customers. The FDIC has taken a number of recent actions specifically designed to address concerns about credit availability. On November 12th of last year, we joined with the other Federal banking agencies in issuing the ``Interagency Statement on Meeting the Needs of Creditworthy Borrowers.'' The statement encourages banks to continue making loans in their markets, work with borrowers who may be encountering difficulties, and pursue initiatives such as loan modifications to prevent unnecessary foreclosures. Recently, the FDIC hosted a roundtable discussion with banking industry representatives and Federal and State bank regulators focusing on how they can work together to improve credit availability. One of the important points that came out of the session was the need for ongoing dialogue between these groups as they work toward a solution to the current financial crisis. Toward this end, FDIC Chairman Bair announced last week that the FDIC is creating a new, senior level office to expand community bank outreach, and plans to establish an advisory committee to address the unique concerns of this segment of the banking community. On January 12th of this year, the FDIC issued a Financial Institution Letter advising insured institutions that they should track the use of their capital injections, liquidity support, and/or financing guarantees obtained through recent financial stability programs as part of a process for determining how these Federal programs improve the stability of the institution and contribute to lending to the community. Internally at the FDIC, we have issued guidance to our examiners for evaluating participating banks' use of funds received through the TARP Capital Purchase Program and the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. Examination guidelines for the new Public/Private Investment Fund will be forthcoming. Banks should be encouraged to make good loans, work with borrowers who are experiencing difficulties whenever possible, avoid unnecessary foreclosures, and continue to ensure that the credit needs of their communities are fulfilled. In concert with other agencies, the FDIC is employing a range of strategies to ensure that credit continues to flow on sound terms to creditworthy borrowers. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Vice Chairman Gruenberg can be found on page 97 of the appendix.] The Chairman. Next, Mr. Polakoff. STATEMENT OF SCOTT M. POLAKOFF, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION (OTS) Mr. Polakoff. Good morning, Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of OTS on finding the right balance between ensuring safety and soundness of U.S. financial institutions and ensuring that adequate credit is available to creditworthy consumers and businesses. Available credit and prudent lending are both critical to our Nation and its economic wellbeing. Neither one can be sacrificed at the expense of the other, so striking the proper balance is key. I understand why executives of financial institutions feel they are receiving mixed messages from regulators. We want our regulated institutions to lend, but we want them to lend in a safe and sound manner. I would like to make three points about why lending has declined: number one, the need for prudent underwriting. During the recent housing boom, credit was extended to too many borrowers who lacked the ability to repay their loans. For home mortgages, some consumers received loans based on introductory teaser rates, unfounded expectations that home prices would continue to skyrocket, inflated income figures, or other underwriting practices that were not as prudent as they should have been. Given this recent history, some tightening in credit is expected and needed. Number two, the need for additional capital and loan loss reserves. Financial institutions are adding to their loan loss reserves and augmenting capital to ensure an acceptable risk profile. These actions strain an institution's ability to lend, but they are necessary due to a deterioration in asset quality and increases in delinquencies and charge-offs for mortgages, credit cards, and other types of lending. Number three, declines in consumer confidence and demand for loans. Because of the recession, many consumers are reluctant to borrow for homes, cars, or other major purchases. In large part, they are hesitant to spend money on anything beyond daily necessities. Also, rising job losses are making some would-be borrowers unable to qualify for loans. Steep slides in the stock market have reduced many consumers' ability to make downpayments for home loans and drain consumers' financial strength. Dropping home prices are cutting into home equity. In reaction to their declining financial net worth, many consumers are trying to shore-up their finances by spending less and saving more. Given these forces, the challenges ensuring that the pendulum does not swing too far by restricting credit availability to an unhealthy level, I would like to offer four suggestions for easing the credit crunch: Number one: Prioritize Federal assistance. Government programs such as TARP could prioritize assistance for institutions that show a willingness to be active lenders. The OTS is already collecting information from thrifts applying for TARP money on how they plan to use the funds. As you know, the OTS makes TARP recommendations to the Treasury Department. The Treasury makes the final decision. Number two: Explore ways to meet institutions' liquidity needs. Credit availability is key to the lending operations of banks and thrifts. The Federal Government has already taken significant steps to bolster liquidity through programs such as the Capital Purchase Program under TARP, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, and the Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility. Number three: Use the power of supervisory guidance. For OTS-regulated thrifts, total loan originations and purchases declined about 11 percent from 2007 to 2008. However, several categories of loans, such as consumer and commercial business loans, and non-residential and multi-family mortgages increased during this period. The OTS and the other Federal banking regulators issued an ``Inter-agency Statement on Meeting the Needs of Creditworthy Borrowers'' in November 2008. It may be too soon to judge the effectiveness of the statement. And, number four: Employ countercyclical regulation. Regulators should consider issuing requirements that are countercyclical, such as lowering loan to value ratios during economic upswings. Conversely, in difficult economic times, when home prices are not appreciating, regulators could permit loan to value ratios to rise, thereby making home loans available. Also, regulators could require financial institutions to build their capital and loan lost reserve during good economic times, making them better positioned to make resources available for lending when times are tough. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Polakoff can be found on page 163 of the appendix.] The Chairman. Mr. Long? STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY W. LONG, SENIOR DEPUTY COMPTROLLER, BANK SUPERVISION POLICY, AND CHIEF NATIONAL BANK EXAMINER, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (OCC) Mr. Long. Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus and members of the committee, my name is Tim Long. I am the Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Policy at the OCC. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the OCC's role in ensuring banks remain safe and sound, while at the same time meet the credit needs of their communities and customers. The last few months have underscored the importance of credit availability and prudent lending to our Nation's economy. Recent actions to provide facilities and programs to help banks strengthen their balance sheets and restore liquidity to various credit segments are important steps in restoring our banking system and we support these initiatives. Nonetheless, the current economic environment poses significant challenges to banks and their loan customers that we and bankers must address. As a bank examiner for nearly 30 years, I have experienced firsthand the importance of the dynamics between bankers and examiners during periods of market and credit stress. One of the most important lessons I have learned is the need to effectively communicate with bankers about the problems facing their institutions and how we expect them to confront those problems without exacerbating the situation. Delay or denial about conditions by bankers or regulators is not an effective strategy. It only makes things worse. Against that backdrop, here are some facts that bankers and regulators are facing today: First, asset quality in many bank loan portfolios is deteriorating. Non-performing loan levels are increasing. Borrowers who could afford a loan when the economy is expanding are now having problems repaying their loans. Increased levels of non-performing loans will likely persist for some time before they work through the banking system. Second, bankers have appropriately become more selective in their underwriting criteria for some types of loans. Where markets are over-lent or borrowers overleveraged, this is both prudent and appropriate. Third, loan demand and loan growth have slowed. This is normal in a recession. Consumers cut back on spending; businesses cut back on capital expenditures. What is profoundly different in this cycle has been the complete shut-down of the securitization markets. Restoring these markets is a critical part of stabilizing and revitalizing our financial system. Despite these obstacles, bankers are making loans to creditworthy borrowers. The bankers I talk with are committed to meeting the credit needs of their communities, and they recognize the critical role they play in the wellbeing of our economy. Simply put, banks have to lend money to make money. The OCC's mission is to ensure that national banks meet these needs in a safe and sound manner. This requires a balance: supervise too lightly, and some banks will make unsafe loans that can ultimately cause them to fail; supervise too strictly, and some banks will become too conservative and not make loans to creditworthy borrowers. We strive to get this balance right through strong and consistent supervision. In the 1980's, we waited too long to warn the industry about excesses building up in the system which resulted in bankers and regulators slamming on the brakes once the economy turned down. Because of this lesson, we have taken a series of actions starting as early as 2003 to alert bankers to the risks we were seeing and to direct them when needed to take corrective actions. Today, our message to bankers is straightforward. Make loans that you believe will be repaid, don't make loans that are unlikely to be repaid, and work constructively with borrowers who may be facing difficulties with their obligations, but recognize repayment problems and loans when you see them. Contrary to some press reports, our examiners are not telling bankers which loans to approve and which to deny. Rather, our message to examiners is this: Take a balanced approach in your supervision. Communicate concerns and expectations clearly and consistently. Provide bankers a reasonable time to document and correct credit risk management weaknesses, but don't hesitate to require corrective action when needed. It is important to keep in mind that it is normal for our banks to experience an increase in problem loan levels during economic downturns. This should not preclude bankers from working with borrowers to restructure or modify loans so foreclosure is avoidable wherever possible. When a workout is not feasible, and the bank is unlikely to be repaid, examiners will direct bankers to have adequate reserves and capital to absorb their loan losses. Finally, the reality is that some community banks are so overextended in relation to capital and reserves, the management needs to reduce the bank's exposures and concentrations to ensure the long-term viability of the bank. In all of these cases, our goal is to work constructively with bankers so that they can have the financial strength to meet the credit needs of their communities and borrowers. Thank you, and I will be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Long can be found on page 132 of the appendix.] The Chairman. Next, Mr. Kroeker, thank you for coming back; probably to repeat yourself and answer the same questions, but we appreciate it. STATEMENT OF JAMES L. KROEKER, ACTING CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Mr. Kroeker. Thank you. Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and members of the committee, I am Jim Kroeker, acting Chief Accountant in the Office of the Chief Accountant, which advises the Commission on accounting and auditing matters. I am pleased to testify today on behalf of the Commission. There could be no doubt about the urgency of these issues as we work in the public interest to address the global economic crisis. Two weeks ago, I had the privilege of testifying in front of Chairman Kanjorski and Ranking Member Garrett, and other members of this committee's Capital Markets Subcommittee. Many of the members of the full committee also attended that very constructive and productive meeting herein. A good number of items that are the subject of your invitation today are best addressed by my knowledgeable fellow regulators with me at the table; however, I did wish to highlight a few items in my written testimony. First, the objective of financial reporting and its interaction with banking capital; and, second, to provide an update on the efforts to improve fair value accounting. As to the first, we reaffirmed in our study to you on mark- to-market accounting that the primary objective of general purpose financial reporting should be and is to provide information that is useful to investors and creditors. Well, this appears to be a fundamental principal. It is also important to reflect on why this has been the wise and longstanding practice and policy of Federal securities laws since their inception 75 years ago. First, investors generally can and do make decisions on a current basis, necessitating relevant and reliable information about financial values and their prospects. Second, investors generally do not have the ability to otherwise obtain information in a format specific to their own use. Therefore, in evaluating investment decisions, investors are dependent upon financial reporting provided by management. The securities law provides for this public good through the general purpose financial reporting that has long been considered a benefit to the economy and society. However, once this information is provided, users of this information can then process it as they deem fit for their own specific needs. For example, a credit investor may place less emphasis on short-term volatility than an equity investor needing to make an investment decision in the near future. Likewise, bank regulators have the similar ability to take GAAP-reported financial information and adjust it for determining how best to establish capital requirements for safety and soundness purposes. And they have done so where it's been deemed appropriate in the past. For example, unrealized gains and losses on debt securities held as available for sale, which are included in GAAP-based equity, generally do not impact regulatory capital. I give several additional examples in my written testimony. That being said, our study to you on mark-to-market accounting included recommendations to include but not suspend fair value accounting for financial reporting purposes. Consistent with our own efforts and what we heard from and what was reinforced by the members of this committee, the FASB has acted diligently to use their expertise as an independent standard setter to respond with two sets of proposed amendments. The amendments were proposed on March 17th, with a 15-day comment period. They are expected to be finalized in early April and effective for first quarter financial reporting. First quarter reporting would represent a timely response to two of our studies' most significant recommendations, and we are encouraged that the FASB has taken advantage of this opportunity to act. The first set of amendments would provide additional guidance on the measure of securities in illiquid markets, while the second would revise the accounting for what is referred to as other than temporary security impairments. These proposals are now an important public comment period, and I encourage every one affected to carefully consider them and whether they address the most pressing practice issues, while also maintaining and enhancing information available to investors. This has been and remains my number one priority. We have been proactively reaching out to investor groups, to the accounting profession, fellow regulators, and to industries most affected by the FASB's proposed amendments. And, of course, we are, as always, in constant contact with the FASB, whom I understand are also engaged in active dialogue with impacted market participants. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Kroeker can be found on page 125 of the appendix.] The Chairman. I will begin with Mr. Gruenberg. The assessment question is one, obviously, we are focused on. I hope I can reassure people to some extent. My understanding from the Chair, Ms. Bair, and with the concurrence I know of the Board, is if the Congress provides adequate additional lending authority so that the FDIC will be well-positioned in the case of any unforeseen, potential negatives, that the special assessment could be reduced from the proposed 20 cents. Is that accurate? Mr. Gruenberg. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Well, do we know what levels we are talking about? Mr. Gruenberg. We certainly can reduce them, we think perhaps down to 10 basis points. The Chairman. Secondly, then, and that's very reassuring, the other question about the assessments that comes particularly from some of the community banks is whether or not some risk-based factor should be included. Now, obviously, to the extent that we are increasing deposit insurance, which I hope we will do permanently, and I want to say now there has been some suggestion that the Senate wanted to increase the deposit insurance temporarily, I think that it is disruptive for planning. We ought to make it permanent. And I think everyone understands that requires some increase in insurance as you are getting insured for more. But, to the extent that we are talking about dealing with some of the problems that came from the financial crisis, what is the current thinking of the FDIC on some kind of variation of the assessment with the risk factor taken in? Mr. Gruenberg. Mr. Chairman, we do currently charge premiums on a risk basis. We are looking for ways, if possible, to respond, particularly to the community bank concerns. In the interim final rule that we issued on the special assessment, we actually asked for public comment on the possibility of imposing assessments based on the assets of the institution rather than the deposits of the institution. That would have a consequence of shifting some of the burden toward the larger institutions. We asked for comment on that. The Chairman. Let me go now to Mr. Gruenberg and to Mr. Polakoff and Mr. Long, in particular, and maybe Governor Duke. We have testimony that is going to come later, and sometimes I think we should reverse the order, but let me quote now from the American Banker's Association representative, Mr. Wilson, on page 5, subhead, ``In the face of a weak economy, it is critical that the regulators not make things worse by applying overly conservative standards.'' And, he says at the bottom of page five, ``We continue to hear from bankers around the country--and those particularly in areas where the economy is considerably stressed--that field examiners are being excessively hard on even the strongest banks in the area.'' From the community bankers, on page 3 of the testimony of Mr. Menzies, bottom of the page: ``Community bankers are saying that the field examiners are overzealous and unduly overreaching and are, in some cases, second guessing bankers and professional, independent appraisers, and demanding overly aggressive write-downs.'' And a letter from a leading minority bank--and I do want to put into the record a letter from the National Banker's Association--but a letter from a minority bank saying, ``What bank regulators will not tell the chairman in those hearings is that they have told their examiners all across the country to be tough on banks.'' The ``be tough'' problem started in Washington, was told to the regional staffs, and said, ``Marching orders to examiners in the field,'' and quotes a December article from ``The Wall Street Journal,'' with which some of you may be familiar, by Damian Potter: Headline, ``Bank Examiners Are Told To Step Up Sanctions.'' Let me ask you to respond, all three. Let's start with Mr. Long, Mr. Polakoff, and Mr. Gruenberg, to the assertion by the representative bankers, and they are hearing, obviously, from their own constituent members that there has been a toughening of the standards on the part of the examiners. Mr. Long? Mr. Long. Congressman, we hear those concerns, too. Over the past several years, beginning in 2003 at the OCC, we began to talk to our banks about a number of excessive risks that we were seeing in the system. The risk has built up. I don't think we have ever gone into an economic downturn with the kind of concentrations in commercial real estate-related credits in the community bank line of business that we have now. And they are in some parts of the country where the asset valuation has grown significantly. There are some very heavy concentrations, so naturally our examiners are focusing on that during examinations. You have a situation in the economy. The Chairman. Mr. Long, are you saying that people may have heard this but it's inaccurate? Mr. Long. We haven't ordered our examiners to crack down on banks, but they are obviously more sensitive to problem assets and loan portfolios. The Chairman. All right, but Mr. Polakoff, how would you respond to that? Mr. Polakoff. There is an element of truth in those statements. Examiners are human beings. They're going to react to the environment. They are going to react to bank failures. We have met with the National Association of Home Builders. We had that group meet with our regional directors. What we have to do here is improve our communication in this area. There are mixed messages on a number of different levels, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Mr. Gruenberg? Mr. Gruenberg. Mr. Chairman, we view this as a very serious issue. You mentioned in your opening remarks that you need to try to strike a balance between safety and soundness, and making credit available. And we have spent a lot of time with our examiners from the regional directors on down, trying to make clear the need to really act with sensitivity on this issue, trying to strike this balance and work closely with bankers. It is an ongoing challenge. The Chairman. All right. Let me just say, and I have gone over my time, but I assume that you are in regular contact; and, specifically I would hope that there would be, maybe even today, we get a break, some conversation about this. Because these are fairly specific assertions and finding out where they come from, there are a large number of people to control. Let me just close with this. To some extent, we have been part of the problem, and it is fair to say that public officials, public employees, are worried that maybe if a bad loan went through and they didn't catch it, they would be unduly criticized and more prone to that sometimes. We want to send a message that as far as the Congress is concerned, we think that while there is always a problem with bad loans, there is a very great problem with not enough good loans right now. And I do want to give people some reassurance, both your agencies and the employees who work for you, that this is not a time when, I think, you have to worry about excessive criticism if a certain number of the loans go bad. There will be more focus on getting good ones to go forward. Mr. Bachus. I'm sorry. Mr. Marchant? Mr. Marchant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think one of the big mixed messages that the public is getting is they're picking up the newspaper and they're reading that the Federal Reserve is putting a trillion dollars of liquidity into the system, into the banking system. And they're hearing that there's TARP money going into each of the banks. They're thinking that because of all this money that's going into the banks and the TARP money going into the banks, that there surely must be money available at the bank that they can borrow. I don't think they realize that most of this money is going to the loan loss reserve and to rebuild the capital reserves. And if anything, the TARP money, by paying 5 percent on the TARP money, money that costs 5 percent--5 percent is more than the bank's cost of funds right now. So their best customers, the customers that your examiners like to see when they come in and crack the books, actually are paying 3 to 3.5 percent on their loans. They are prime plus 1 or 2. So any TARP money used to make a loan to their absolute best customer will be made at a loan value that is less than the cost of funds. So obviously the TARP money, while I believe the Congress felt like that is what the money was going to do, to be put in the system to make more liquidity, it hasn't ended up doing that. And when that public reads that the Fed is putting liquidity into the system, I think the message they think is that there is more money available to borrow. But what the customers in my district are finding out is that they are facing rising interest rates. A lot of the prime borrowers are going back in to renegotiate a line of credit that they have done for 20 years, and they're finding out that instead of having a prime plus 1 or 2 now, there's a floor being put on the amount of the loan that can go down. And in most instances, that floor is now 5 percent. They are the best customers of the bank. And the reasons that are being given are: We have this special assessment coming. Our bank is not going to be profitable next year, because of these special assessments. The other thing that has happened is that there is a definite restriction in the amounts that these lines of credits can grow. So de facto, if a business is doing well and can expand, they're not going to be able to expand their credit line. And most bankers are not expanding credit lines. And then, of course, you have the customers who are going in and finding that their HELOC loans they're having, they're getting letters in the mail that say that their line has been cut; they're getting letters from the credit card companies that are saying the same things. I know that this hearing is not about that. And they're getting extra demands on their collateral. So there are mixed signals that are coming out. I believe sincerely that everyone at this panel today is doing exactly what you feel like is the best thing to do for the system. The borrower does not understand the interplay of all of these things. And frankly, this Congressman does not understand the interplay many times, and does not understand what the benefit to the system is if the headline is that a trillion dollars has been put into the system by the Fed, but my constituents don't find that to be of any benefit to them whatsoever, when they go to the bank and want to borrow money. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mrs. Maloney. [presiding] Thank you. The Chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes, and I welcome all the panelists. I would like to ask Governor Duke, whom I understand has experience as an online banker in commercial banking, do you believe that the Federal Government could or should have taken different actions in the fall or more recently to ensure that credit would be more available? I believe all of us are hearing the same story when we go to the caucus meetings, when we talk to our colleagues on both sides of the aisle, that the credit is just not out there; we need to get the liquidity moving. I'm hearing particularly commercial credit has absolutely dried up; it's very hard to get loans. How effective do you believe that the TALF program and the Public-Private Investment Program will be in opening up credit and allowing financial institutions to lend money? And also last night, I was reading a report where banks used to provide 60 percent of the credit in our country, and now are providing roughly 20 percent, and it has been picked up by other forms of credit. Just your comments in general on these questions. Thank you. Ms. Duke. Mrs. Maloney, thank you. As you know, I was a banker and a community banker for nearly 30 years, and so I'm well aware of the tension that exists between bankers and bank examiners, as well as lenders and borrowers. I think, to your first question, I do believe, I honestly believe that the Federal Government has made every response we can think of to make, in particularly the Federal Reserve, in order to ensure that lending is continuing to take place. And I think if we had not done that, that the circumstances would be substantially worse. Provision of liquidity to banks is critically important in order that they have the funds to lend. The capital that we put into the banks not only strengthens the banks, but also strengthens them in the minds of others who would provide liquidity. And it's the liquidity that really gets lent forward on to borrowers. In addition to that, you're right that the banking system percentage of the credit that was extended has dropped. It dropped to about 30-some percent, anyway below 40 percent, although if you add back the securitization that banks did, they were still probably facilitating more than 40 percent of the credit, going into this recent episode. And so the TALF is really designed to restart securitization markets. And what we have found in our Fed facilities, first with those that were directed at commercial paper, was that by creating a facility to support commercial paper, gradually that market improved. Now, the first version of the TALF is directed at consumer loans, student loans, and small business loans. And, we had the first issuance of TALF, which is $8 billion. It may not sound like a lot in the context of trillions and trillions of dollars, but that is more than had been done in the last 4 months. These are difficult times, they're difficult times for bank examiners, they're difficult times for bankers. I think at the end of the day, probably the best thing we can do is everything that we're doing to improve financial conditions. A lot of the reasons lines get cut is because collateral values have dropped. So if we could put a floor under housing, anything we can do to support mortgage lending and housing will tend to put a floor on the value of housing, and then that stops the value of the collateral from dropping. Same thing with commercial real estate, and we're hearing the same things that you hear on commercial real estate. The securitization market for commercial real estate loans has completely shut down. In addition to new commercial real estate, there are also a number of commercial real estate loans that are currently up for renewal. And, we need to provide for the renewal of those. So we are looking at commercial real estate as part of the TALF in the next version. But again, commercial real estate values are tied to the cash flows of the businesses that operate out of that commercial real estate, and so to the extent that business is down, that retail sales are down, that attendance is down in hospitality areas, that's going to tend to reduce the value of that collateral, and reduce the ability of those owners to borrow and to expand their businesses. Mrs. Maloney. Well, thank you. Could you comment briefly? My time is almost up on the first auction of the Public-Private Investment Program. I understand that took place last week. Is that-- Ms. Duke. It was the first issuance under the term asset-- the TALF, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which we had actually been working on for about 4 months I believe. And this one would cover student loans, credit card loans, small business loans, and auto loans, and $8 billion was issued that was TALF eligible. Mrs. Maloney. Okay. Thank you. My time has expired, and the Chair recognizes-- Mr. Bachus. I am sorry, Madam Chairwoman, we are going go on the order. I will give you the order. Mrs. Maloney. Okay. Mr. Bachus. Mr. Posey, and then I'll give you the list. Mrs. Maloney. Okay. Mr. Posey? Mr. Posey. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I hope that we would all agree that the best solution to the crisis would be more private capital into the market. And just to save time, can you shake your head ``yes'' if you agree? And so we all agree. Wonderful. Ms. Duke, are we still approving charters for anybody who wanted to start putting a new institution out there and putting more private capital into the marketplace? Ms. Duke. I'm frankly not aware of how many charters the Federal Reserve has approved recently, but we are still approving charters. Mr. Posey. Okay. What is the timeline on something like that? Ms. Duke. I believe we respond to all applications that come in within 60 days. Mr. Posey. Whether up or down? Ms. Duke. But, I would like to check that, if I could, and get back to you. Mr. Posey. If you would. And the reason I ask that, you know, we parlayed, our Nation did at one time have about 100 percent of the commercial launchers to satellites, to do our communications. And we parlayed that into about 5 percent of the world's commercial launches. That was a pretty staggering loss. And we did that basically with the help of, I think, one person, a range safety officer, who was there longer than he should have been, who thought the only safe launch was no launch. So we overregulated and drove business to other countries and we're suffering for it now. That was the reason for my question. I mean, I'm familiar with the instance of some business people who are successful bankers in other areas, and they decided that they wanted to open a new branch in a needy area of my district. And they have been approved by the State, but they can't get a yes or no from the Federal Government. And I'm not going to tell you who they are, because I don't want to say I'm pushing them or I'm not. But I'm puzzled by their inability to get a response, a timely response, what I would think would be a timely response from you: Yes or no? If you're going to do it, do it. I mean, they have done other banks. I don't think there's anything in their background that would be fuzzy. I think they meet the requirements. I will promise you the people in this community need another bank, and I don't know--I have never really met a banker in my life who wanted to make a bad loan. I know that they have been forced to make some bad loans by some external forces in the past--and I blame, you know, Congress to a large extent for that--but we heard earlier about our community banks. I think on a scale of a side-by-side comparison to the larger ones, they're in a lot better shape. And I don't think they have gotten any of the relief money or any significant amount of relief money. I would trust my community banks a whole lot better, just like I trust local government a whole lot better than I do higher government. You know, they're closer to the people, they're more responsive, they're better managed. I mean just-- Anyway, I would appreciate it if you could look into it and find out what the up and down time is, or the yes or no time. Because I think that just like we parlayed the commercial launch business into oblivion, we can do that with the financial market just as well. And I sure would hate to see us do that. Ms. Duke. Congressman, if I could. There are actually two steps to it: There is the charter, which could come through any agency; and then there is also the ability to get insurance through the FDIC. Mr. Posey. Yes, I understood it's hung up at the FDIC. Mr. Gruenberg. Congressman, let me say, if there's a particular institution that you believe has had difficulty and hasn't gotten a response, please let us know, and we'll look into it. Mr. Posey. Well, I don't want to interfere with the--I'm observing it and I'm puzzled by it, and I want to understand it a little bit better. Because it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me at this point. Thank you very much for your indulgence, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Watt. [presiding] I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. We seem to be playing musical chairs up here, but I think we will provide some continuity. Let me first thank the Chair in his absence for having this hearing, because it really, this situation has kind of put us in a real practical set of problems here, where we are on the one hand saying, ``Extend more credit,'' and on the other hand, saying, ``Be more prudent.'' And what it has done for Members of Congress is interesting, and that's where I want to address my question to Mr. Polakoff at the end of the description of the situation that I described, but I want everybody else to try to be helpful to me in knowing how we should be responding. I have been on this committee more than 18 years now; I am starting my 19th year. I can count on one hand the number of times in the first 17 years that I got calls from constituents, saying, ``Would you intervene in a financial lending decision with a bank?'' Hardly a week passes now that I don't get a call from somebody, saying, ``My loan was turned down, you all are putting all this money into banks, and would you intervene with the bank and tell them to approve my loan?'' That's the situation that Members of Congress find themselves in at this point. Two examples quickly. A university that had historically for years and years financed at the end of the year until the next tuition payments came in, had their line of credit pulled and was told in order to renew it, they had to pledge the entire campus, every piece of real estate that they owned, just for a 60-day loan until the next group of students came in and paid their tuition, so they could pay the loan back. Yesterday, I talked with a gentleman who had a commitment, or a verbal commitment from his S&L--that's why I'm addressing the question to Mr. Polakoff--for a $400,000 loan to do a business which would employ 25 people in my congressional district. And he said, ``Well, you know, maybe I can get away with $200,000.'' So he takes the $200,000, then he needs to go back and get the other $200,000. In the meantime, they have merged with a First Community Bank, he thinks out of West Virginia, nowhere close to North Carolina, and the line of credit, the money that they told him verbally he could get isn't even available any more. The problem we have is we can't tell lenders what a commercially prudent loan is, but they're expecting us to, because the Federal Government has put all this money into banks-- And then to make matters worse, they waltz with this guy for 4 or 5 months, so that he can't go and get a loan from anybody else. So by the time they make a final decision, the business opportunity is gone down the pike. Now the question I have is: Under those circumstances, what are we supposed to do? You are monitoring this as loans on a global level. You say that loan volume is up, especially with community banks. But this is a problem for all of us, because everybody knows that they have pulled back on the credit. So, Mr. Polakoff, I have described my problem to you. I don't want to step over the line and start telling lenders when a loan is commercially prudent or not. I don't have that expertise. But I also have some obligation to try to be helpful to constituents in these situations. It's not like getting a social security check, where I can call up a governmental agent, and say, ``What am I supposed to do?'' Mr. Polakoff. Mr. Chairman, I don't know if I have a good answer for you on that one. It's a tough situation. Each institution has a loan policy, and it describes what sort of loans it will make under what terms for what sort of borrowers. I have yet to meet a banker who wants to turn down a good loan. That's the way they make money. Mr. Watt. I just described one to you. They said it was a good loan several weeks ago, and then all of a sudden they merged and the new owners say, ``Oh, no, no, we're not making this loan.'' Mr. Polakoff. Each situation is different, sir. I mean it could be that the merged institution has-- Mr. Watt. Does anybody else have any suggestions for me? Mr. Polakoff can't help me. What am I supposed to do in these situations? [no response] Who is next on your list? I guess nobody has a suggestion for me? Ms. Duke. I will take one stab at it. I have been in that situation, and, so you may not find this very satisfactory, but the one thing we are finding is that those that are increasing their loans are banks that are looking at each individual deal one at a time, and they are finding that they are increasing their business, not because there's a lot more loan demand, but they're doing it because there are banks that are pulling out of specific types of lending. And so they're finding that if they can go in and look at the deal on its merits, there are some banks that are out there making those loans. Mr. Watt. My time is expired. Well, I'll let Mr. Gruenberg respond. But maybe I should address it to the second panel, that has some bankers on it. Maybe they will be able to help me. Yes? Mr. Gruenberg. Just in regard to what you might say to a constituent, the FDIC does have a call center, where if individuals are having difficulties with their financial institution, and in some sense feel that they have been treated unfairly or haven't been given a fair hearing, they do have the ability to call, and we do try to follow-up on concerns that are raised. Mr. Watt. I thank you. Mr. Jones is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to be repetitive to many of the questions that you have been asked and many of the statements. But to piggyback on what the chairman just was asking about his situation, Mr. Long, I'm just going to read a subtitle to your comments, and then I'm going to get to your point, and then hopefully maybe a question. Regulators and examiners are taking a balanced approach, consistent with safe and sound banking practices. Well, I would expect that even in good times, but certainly in tough times, that makes a lot of sense. About 5 weeks ago, I had the president and a CEO of a bank--and I'm not going to say the name, because I think everybody would have an idea, know who it was--to say the problem is that the regulators, you're being told as Members of Congress, and certainly Mr. Obama, the new President, has said, you know, talk money, we want to get some money out into Main Street, we want to help businesses, we want to get them, you know, sound so that they can expand, or whatever to keep their business running--but this CEO and president said to me, ``They're telling us, the regulators, don't move so fast, hold back.'' And I think this is what some of the questions and concerns are today. I realize you have a tremendous responsibility, each and every one of you. But this country right now is suffering on Main Street. There's no two ways about it, it has been said 100 times by other people. And when I have a CEO and president of a well-known bank-- I'm not going to say community, regional, or national--but a well-known bank, come to a Member of Congress, and says, ``You're being told, yes we want to free up the credit, but when the regulators come in, they're saying, no, slow down.'' So therefore either--Mr. Long, you might have said it, or Mr. Polakoff might have said it--that you need to do a better job. Because I think there is a serious problem. Yesterday most of us in this Congress, not just the Banking Committee, but most of us had members from home builders associations from our States come to Members of Congress--and I had two or three, they're not even my constituents, they're from Raleigh, North Carolina, which is the capital of North Carolina--telling me that he has been told by his banker--and he said, ``I could get my banker to call you, Congressman, and tell you, that he is being told not to make the loans.'' Now I'm not going to question your integrity, because you're people of high integrity, but there's something missing in this program right now. And if the truth is that you expect things to get a heck of a lot worse before they get better, then say it. Let's be honest with these people, because they're coming to us, as Mr. Watt mentioned just a moment ago. The don't understand, they have been good stewards of their businesses, good stewards with the banks, they're paying back on time, and doing everything they were asked to do. But now they're caught in a situation where many of them will not be here a year from now, if the credit somehow does not get back to Main Street, as the President has said many times. I don't know if I'm asking you a question or not. I guess I want to comment, because I'm being repetitive, but I can't help it, that's what I'm hearing. And it's more frequent now than it was 4 months ago, and I'm afraid it's going to be even more frequent 6 months out than it is now. If this is your policy--and I believe it--if this is your policy, can you somehow--at least the bank examiners or the regulators understand that they are supposed to work with these people. And if it's a bad loan, say it's a bad loan. But I think some of these people who are crying out here in Main Street are pretty good customers who would meet the obligation. That's my statement. If you can figure a question out of that, and anybody wants to respond to it, that will be fine. Mr. Long. I will take a shot at it, Congressman. And they are concerns that we hear too. There are a couple of things. In terms of, do we think it's going to get worse? I would tell you, from the OCC's standpoint, where we are in the cycle, I believe for many community banks, it is going to get worse. So we are definitely asking our examiners to have good communications with bank management and make sure that they're vigilant, make sure that they have a good handle around the concentrations of credit, the amount of loans that they have to a certain--whether it be industry, developer or whatever. It may be that being told to slow down could be appropriate, but I would need some more information to address it specifically. It may be that the banker or the regulators feel like that concentration level in total on that balance sheet is getting a little heavy and they need to be a little more selective in terms of the risk. It may be in terms of their underwriting, given the credit quality of the borrowers and the stress that the borrowers are under, as you know, Congressman, over the last 3, 4, or 5 years underwriting standards got pretty loose. It was pretty easy to extend credit, and it wasn't that difficult to get a loan. What is happening in the industry right now is a normal occurrence. Bankers tighten up, underwriting standards tighten. Loan demand by good quality borrowers--as I said in my statement, businesses aren't expanding, they don't have capital expenditures--good quality loan demand is harder to come by. But the examiners and the bankers hopefully are having good robust conversations around risk management issues, concentration issues, underwriting issues, whether it be from an individual loan or from a portfolio loan. So the comments along those lines could very well be not: Slow down, we don't want you making good loans. It may be: Make sure you have a good handle around the risk profile of your portfolio, because certain concentration levels, no matter how good they get, when you get into an economic downturn, it doesn't take much to tip a bank over. Mr. Watt. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Sherman is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, we're all looking back nostalgically at this mythical 2007, when all worthy people got the credit they needed to realize their dreams. And we all are asking, why can't we return to that Shangri-La? I think we have to remember that back in 2007, I was getting plenty of complaints from people who weren't getting the loans they wanted. They didn't ask me to do anything about it, because back in 2007, we had a capitalist economic system. But also in 2007, the living standards were too loose, even though the banks were in relatively, or thought they were in reactively good shape. Today the banks are in bad shape, and every borrower is in worse shape than they were back in 2007. The solution, or one of the solutions is to allow banks to make loans even when the good bank examiner, a conservative bank examiner, says you need a 10 or 20 percent reserve against that loan by having the banks have more capital. I hope that you are pressing your banks to sell more stock, even though at today's depressed prices, they may not want to do it. I want to address the mark-to-market rule, which I think is depressing bank capital in just a second. But I also want to mention the credit unions, who aren't represented here. We as a Congress have prohibited almost all credit unions from issuing subordinated debt. That is the way they could have capital, where private investors could give the credit union money, and then if the credit union made a few risky loans and it didn't work out so well, the investors would lose money, instead of the taxpayer or the insurance system. But we have prohibited issuing that subordinated debt, and I think we should revisit that, maybe not as a permanent change in the way that credit unions are run, but for the life of this economic crisis. Because for every time somebody has to say no to a businessperson on a loan, hopefully there will be a credit union that's able to say yes, if it's a good loan. Governor Duke, I would like to ask you a question that's identical to the question I asked Chairman Bernanke yesterday, because I liked his answer and I'm hoping that you give me the same answer. You may be familiar with Section 13-3 of the Federal Reserve Act. That's the one that says the Federal Reserve can loan money in a time of economic exigency, but only on a fully secured basis. And your Chairman yesterday said that he figures that means no risk or as little risk as is possible in a financial situation, that was equivalent to triple-A paper, not double-A, not single-A--Triple-A--and that he would stand by that interpretation even if Wall Street came to you a year from now and said, ``My God, we need another trillion or the sky is going to fall, and those idiots and populists in Congress won't pass the bill. So you have to step forward, avoid all that democracy stuff, change your interpretation of Section 13-3, and give us the money Congress won't.'' Under that kind of pressure, would you give me the same answer as Chairman Bernanke, and say, ``13-3 is for triple-A paper?'' Ms. Duke. Yes, sir, I would. Mr. Sherman. That's a great answer. Mr. Kroeker, let's talk a little bit about mark-to-market, because my concern is that in the accounting standards that the standards are written to embrace the verifiable and the unassailable, rather than the relevant and the meaningful. You have probably heard me talk about FASB II, where we assume that all research programs are failures, because that's easier than figuring out which research programs were successful. Likewise, it's easier to look at computer screen and say that a group of assets is worth 10 cents on the dollar, because that was the last trade, rather than to evaluate what they're likely to yield to maturity, knowing that we're going to have a bad economy at least for a while. One of the principles of accounting is that two similar institutions are going to face the same standards. But one bank may make a bunch of loans for its own portfolio and not take the steps for them to be sold off into the market. And so they have a billion dollars of exposure to the widget industry, and you know, 22 different widget companies all in red buildings. And then another identical bank does a billion dollars worth of loans to the widget companies also in red buildings, 22 of them, and they take the steps to make those loans securitizable. As a matter of fact, they bought this package of loans from somebody across the country. Why should 2 banks, both of which have a billion dollars of exposure to 22 widget companies, be treated differently, based upon whether it's a securitized group or just a-- Mr. Watt. You have to wrap up your question, so he can answer it. Mr. Sherman. Yes. Mr. Watt. And your time has expired. Mr. Kroeker. We have recommended improvements in the mark- to-market accounting rules. And to get to the specific question, does it make sense, I think the FASB's proposal on other than temporary impairment seeks to at least in the income statement do just that, to replicate the losses, the credit losses you would have if these securities were in fact loans. That would be the credit loss and the impairment that you would take through the income statement. That being said, when loans are packaged up in securities, they often do differ from holding a whole loan; that is, they're tranched up. People take different risk portfolios out of the securitization, they add derivatives or other things to the securitization vehicle. So it is very difficult once you put the loans together and scramble the egg, if you will, to unscramble that in the accounting. Mr. Watt. If you need to elaborate on that, could you do it in writing? Did you get sufficient elaboration? Or not. You all can talk off the record. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Manzullo is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Manzullo. Thank you. I only wish that the first panel had been placed together with the second panel. I would hope that you gentlemen and gentlelady would stick around to listen to the second panel, because there is a huge disconnect that is going on. Mr. Polakoff, you said you have ``yet to meet a banker who turned down a good loan.'' Well, there are two of them sitting behind you. They're both community bankers. Steve Wilson, LCNB Bank, from Lebanon, Ohio; and Mike Menzies from Easton Bank & Trust Company. And you could take a look at their testimonies. Menzies says, ``The current bank regulatory climate is causing many community banks to unnecessarily restrict their lending activities. Left unaddressed, certain field examination practices to propose FDIC special assessment, mark-to-market, will prevent community banks from realizing their full potential as participants in the rebuilding of our economy.'' That's not only as to banks that receive TARP funds, but banks that are doing it on their own dollar. And then also the testimony of Steve Wilson from the LCNB Bank in Lebanon Ohio. Now, these are the guys on the streets. And they might as well be the bankers that I talk to back home. And you have to listen to them. Because they're under siege from the bank examiners. I mean really under siege. ``Banks hear the message to continue to lend''--this is Mr. Wilson--``to help stimulate the economy. Then they hear messages to pull back, from field examiners that may apply overly conservative standards, from FDIC premium assessment rules that penalize banks that use the Federal Home Loan Bank advances for short-term liquidity.'' I mean, you have to listen to them. And you have to, you know, obviously listen to the people who work for you in the field. And then, Mr. Long, you made the statement that businesses are not expanding. That's not true. I mean, I represent most of northern Illinois, and we have over 2,500 factories, and they have been hit. But you know what? A lot of those factories have some good orders. And banks are making the statement, they're hearing from the examiners, ``Don't loan to manufacturers.'' That's what your people are telling them. Because, oh, you can't trust the manufacturing climate. And you know what, you know what's going on with these guys that can't expand? Those jobs are going to China. I mean, this is--I guess--I'm not giving anybody heck. I mean, I did that yesterday on my birthday, and my blood pressure can't take that much. But what I'm saying is, there is so much disconnect that's going on here. Mr. Long, have you ever accompanied one of your examiners to the bank? Of course, that would be counterproductive because they would see you there. But did you do any bank examinations yourself? I think you have, haven't you? Mr. Long. I have been on this job for 30 years as a bank examiner, for the first 23 of if in the field. Yes-- Mr. Manzullo. Because I know that you have that experience and I know you're very-- Mr. Long. And I have gone on exams as recently as less than 12 months ago. Yes, I go on exams. Mr. Manzullo. But I mean, there are--I want you to know there are businesses that are expanding. I mean, really not a lot, but it is happening. Mr. Long. Congressman, my written statement reflects more of a general sense. During an economic recession-- Mr. Manzullo. Oh, I believe you 100 percent--yes, sir. Mr. Long. --businesses pull back. I don't mean that there aren't businesses that are expanding. Mr. Manzullo. Right-- Mr. Long. And I can tell you that at the OCC, our examiners are not telling our bankers to not lend to manufacturers. Mr. Manzullo. They are telling them. That's what my bankers are telling me. You need to get that out to them, because they may be--I mean everybody is acting honestly--I mean everybody-- with integrity. There's no dishonesty going on. There's a lot of disconnect that's going on. Because the examiners, you know, want to make sure they do the best job possible. And under the circumstances, they believe in their heart that they are doing that. But I'm just saying that this is what we're hearing from the banks and also from the manufacturers. Mr. Long. And Congressman, we hear that too, and I think it's a good point, and I think it's a good purpose of this hearing, and of the outreach that we do with the bankers. I know that there is a fine line of when underwriting standards get too loose and banks are taking on too much risk, and the line of-- Mr. Manzullo. But we know-- Mr. Long. Examiners tell bankers-- Mr. Manzullo. We know, Mr. Long, we know of business after business that has never had a problem with their line of credit, they're being cut off on lines of credit. They're throwing their arms up in the air, and suffering. But I know you're going to look at it, because I know where your heart is. And it is in the field with those people and the people who want to borrow the money. And I appreciate that. Thank you. The Chairman. The gentleman from California. Mr. Baca. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. All of us realize that we are at a crisis right now and people are losing their jobs. And you have to understand and put yourself in the place of the people who are losing their jobs. And why are a lot of them losing their jobs? A lot of them have not gotten the kind of loans for the occupations where they are working, whether it is a small business, whether it is even the State of California where I have just talked to the secretary who says, ``I'm going to have to borrow `X' amount of dollars just to exist in our area.'' You have to put yourself in the place of an individual who is losing their job. And right now it seems like there is a disconnect or a blaming that goes back. Who is really at fault, is it the regulators or is the bankers? I mean you guys are just throwing it back and forth to one another, but the problem is that the loans aren't going on in the area. We would see the economy changing. And in California, especially in my district where the majority of small businesses aren't getting their loans, and we are looking at automobile dealers and others that can't obtain a loan. Why is it? You have to put yourselves in the faces of people who have lost their jobs, people who aren't able to provide those kind of jobs for someone else. Put yourselves in that kind of situation and say, how the hell am I going to make sure that people get the kind of funding that will create the kind of job or how do we make the State of California solvent to assure that they don't have to continue to borrow the money? Unless you, both of you guys, the bankers and the regulators, do something. So whose fault is it? I want you to answer that. And more importantly, how do we fix it now? What is the remedy? What can we do? What can you do to expedite the process and stop this blaming one another? Any one of you want to tackle that? Mr. Polakoff. Congressman, I hope it is not coming across that we are blaming one another. I think the regulators and the bankers typically have a good, healthy relationship. There is no tension involved with that relationship. We all want the same thing, which is money to be lent. Mr. Baca. When someone loses their job and they are not getting a loan, that is tension where they are losing revenue, and we are not picking up revenue. That is tension. Mr. Polakoff. I'm not sure I'm understanding the question, but indeed, an examiner would be very uncomfortable, rightfully so, if money was lent to an unemployed individual who didn't have the capacity to repay the debt. Mr. Baca. Anybody else want to tackle this? Yes, we are at a crisis. Praise the Lord, we will say a prayer. Mr. Long. I don't have a lot to add. It is a natural tendency for banks during downturns, particularly coming out of a period of very loose credit, where they pull back, they protect the balance sheet, they protect liquidity, and they protect capital and they tighten the underwriting standards. And Scott is absolutely right. I mean the fact that somebody lost a job and they want to get a loan but the don't have the repayment ability, most bankers probably are not going to make that loan. Mr. Baca. But there are a lot of them who do, even on the minority small businesses or the automobile dealers. I mean, they are the last to get funded, first to get de-funded. It seems like here again, even among minority dealerships who have really helped the economy, are trying to get loans, can't even get loans. Mr. Long. I agree. I think the regulators and the bankers are doing a better job this time of communicating with each other and talking with each other, and I think it is important that we continue to do so. And I think the banks are struggling with this too. I mean, they do want to make good loans, but some of them have gone so far out on the risk curve that they currently have a balance sheet full of loans that are having problems, and they dont have a lot of capacity to-- Mr. Baca. But those loans weren't created here. It was those that were created because we did it with some foreign countries and others and all this money that has gone back there that we can't even recover because all of these bonuses that were there. I'm sorry. Ms. Duke. I just want to point out we are very aware of the problems with loans to small businesses in particular. One of the functions of the Fed facility that just started up last week is that it included floorplan loans for auto dealers in addition to auto loans to consumers. And then we added to it very recently loans for business equipment, and it also includes SBA loans. In addition, I am reminded from my days as a banker that most small business credit is frankly funded through home equity. A lot of those loans are based on home equity, which again brings me back to anything that we can do to improve mortgage lending in the housing market will also be helpful to small businesses. Mr. Baca. I hope we get an answer when, and hopefully we turn this economy around. And we are all working together and I know that we are all trying, but I think they need to say when is it going to happen and how is it going to happen because every day that we don't provide assistance, that means some job is lost somewhere because they are not able to attain the capital to operate. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. The Chairman. The gentleman from Delaware. Mr. Castle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As each of you knows, there has been a lot of discussion about a systemic risk regulator in some form or another, both from the Executive Branch and from within this committee. And I realize that is not something that you necessarily focus on, but you all are regulators, you are all familiar with the various financial institutions which are out there. I would be interested in your thoughts about a systemic risk regulator. And I'm not asking you to put together how it would be done precisely but as to the effect of it in terms of the decisionmaking that might have occurred in this case earlier in looking at financial institutions and perhaps any credit type institutions in this country, and what direction perhaps we should be looking. This is still in an infant stage as far as Congress is concerned. So I am interested in your views on the concept of a systemic risk regulator. Mr. Polakoff. Congressman, I will get started if it is acceptable. We at OTS would support the notion of a systemic risk regulator. We believe that term has three parts: One part of it is the receivership activity associated with that regulator; another part is the ability to provide temporary liquidity assistance; and then the third part is the functional regulation. The functional regulation can be done in a couple of different ways. It can be done in a prudential examination way, meaning the systemic regulator has the responsibility to actually understand the risk profile of individual institutions. It could be done in a macro way, which means the systemic regulator has the responsibility to assess the horizontal risk across a number of large institutions, or it could be done in a product way, which means a systemic regulator focuses instead on emerging products and what the systemic risk would be associated with those. So those are some critical issues for Congress to address, but the notion of a systemic regulator makes complete sense to OTS. Mr. Castle. Any other comments? Ms. Duke. I think we have talked a lot about systemic risk regulation and, again, I feel like it is important that there is a broad policy agenda. There should be oversight of the system as a whole, not just oversight of the individual components or individual firms. Some parts of it that we think are important are functional supervision and onsolidated supervision, such as we have for bank holding companies, and for companies that may not necessarily be bank holding companies, in addition to systemic risk regulation. There does need to be a resolution regime for systemically important financial institutions, but I don't know if that necessarily has to be held by the same entity that has responsibility for systemic risk supervision. We think it is important that systemically important payment systems, as well as firms, be supervised, that there be attention paid to consumer and investor protection, and that some authority have the express responsibility to monitor and address systemic risk wherever it happens. Places where this might have come to light would be places where individual exposures in firms were identical to individual exposures at other firms, so those two--if the risk of an event happened in one firm, it wouldn't necessarily spill over to all firms. It might also involve looking at particular products, and obviously the mortgage-backed securities and the more complex securities would be an example of that. A third example of a place where this might have come into play would be in credit default swaps. Mr. Castle. I think you said this, Governor Duke, but if we had a systemic risk regulator, should we be looking at things like hedge funds and investment banks and even corporations, insurance companies, other entities beyond the banks which are very involved in the credit markets today? Ms. Duke. I'm not certain--I think one of the things about systemic risk is we have to look beyond individual firms. And I think a systemic risk regulator would certainly want to gather information from all participants in the financial markets while they might not necessarily regulate specific firms and specific industries. Mr. Castle. Thank you. Anybody else on that subject? Let me ask you this question, Governor Duke. I mentioned this earlier in the opening, many hours ago, that I know of a major financial institution in my State that is told go out and extend credit, make loans, or whatever. And yet when they have had the various regulators come in, they have had a much tighter view of it saying, ``You have to watch your capital, you have to be careful,'' whatever, discouraging--in their minds, at least, discouraging loans to a degree. Is there a communication issue here? Are we hearing something different than is being said when these regulators are sent out on the street? Ms. Duke. It is possible that there are some differences between assessments of creditworthiness and factors that have to do with the firm itself. Does the firm itself have enough liquidity to make loans, does it have enough capital to make loans, does the firm have concentrations in areas such as commercial real estate that prevent it from expanding in that area in particular? But a lot of it is communication. So, in addition to the guidance that we put out there, I can tell you that I personally went back before this hearing and looked at my calendar, and in the last 2 weeks, I have met with our community bank examiners for the system as a whole, with our New York bank examiners, with two community groups, with two banker groups, with a construction industry group, and with the Conference of State Bank Supervisors. So we are trying to have these conversations and really find out what is happening on the ground and do what we can about it. Mr. Castle. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. The gentleman from Texas. Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding the hearing and I thank the witnesses for appearing. I ask that you provide some ocularity in one specific area, one area. The question is, are creditworthy borrowers being denied loans? Creditworthy. Now you define creditworthy in your minds, but it is creditworthy borrowers that we want to talk about. The empirical evidence as well as the anecdotal evidence seems to connote that they are not getting loans. Not all, but a good many, and possibly too many given the current circumstances. So let me start by finding or ascertaining whether or not you agree that there are creditworthy borrowers who are not acquiring loans. If you think that creditworthy borrowers are not acquiring loans, would you kindly extend a hand into the air? This will help me to know to whom I should speak. Okay, let's note that we have two persons, Ms. Duke and Mr. Polakoff, who have indicated that creditworthy borrowers are not getting loans. Let's start with you, Mr. Long. You are a banker. Is it your contention that all creditworthy borrowers are getting loans? Mr. Long. Well, I'm not a banker, I'm a bank examiner, Congressman. Mr. Green. Excuse the misstatement. Mr. Long. No, that is okay. I don't know the answer to it. I mean obviously with all the communications we have and in talking to bankers, I have made it a point over the last several months to talk to as many bankers as I can and ask them point blank, ``Are you making loans to creditworthy borrowers? Are you making credit available into the industry?'' And everybody I talk to is telling me, ``Yes, we are.'' However, there are some bankers, some banks, that as I said earlier have gone so far out on the risk curve and they are so loaded up on problem assets that they are maybe not able to lend into the market as much-- Mr. Green. Is it your opinion that in this circumstance, then, that some creditworthy borrowers may not be getting loans because of the circumstance with the bank? Mr. Long. Can I sit here and say that every creditworthy borrower is getting a loan? I obviously can't say that, but I don't-- Mr. Green. I don't want to talk about everyone. We are trying to ascertain whether or not we have a significant number such that it is becoming a part of the problem that we are trying to extricate ourselves from. Let me go on. If we conclude, as some have, that creditworthy borrowers, many are not getting loans--what I would like to do is get to the root of the problem. Is it because of capital requirements or is it because of money that is not available within the bank to lend? The capital requirements, the TARP money that the banks received, generally speaking, was to capitalize the banks. That was not money to lend, generally speaking. Is this a true statement? If you agree that it is a true statement, raise your hand. Alright, everybody has agreed. Now if that was not money to lend, the money that the bank would lend will come from either money that it gets from overnight circumstances or from various discount windows, true? If so, raise your hand. You are going to have to participate, everyone. Okay, good, everyone agrees. Or it can come from monies that the banks will have in their loan portfolios, which comes from deposits, true? So the question is this. Is the problem one of being undercapitalized such that they can't lend money from deposits or from the discount windows, or is one of being capitalized properly, fully capitalized, and not having the money available from deposits? Do you follow my question? If you do not, raise your hand and I will give it to you again. So if you would, Mr. Polakoff, give your commentary, please. Mr. Polakoff. Congressman, I think each situation is different, but I don't believe it is either a capital restriction nor do I believe that it is a liquidity problem. I think that these are day-to-day decisions that institutions are making as to where they want to be on the risk spectrum given a number of different variables. Mr. Green. Mr. Long. Mr. Long. The one thing I would add--and to agree with you in terms of where maybe creditworthy borrowers aren't getting credit--until we get that securitization market opened up, clearly credit is not flowing like it should. That is a huge problem that we have to get fixed. Mr. Green. So Mr. Long, you and I are having a kumbaya moment. We are in agreement with each other, because we agree that there are some creditworthy borrowers, too many probably, who are not getting loans, and we at least have one reason why. Mr. Long. I think that there are creditworthy sectors that are not getting access to credit because of the securitization market. Mr. Green. My time has expired. I would dearly like to continue, Mr. Long, but perhaps you and I can talk afterwards. The Chairman. I'm going to go to Mr. Neugebauer. Let me make an announcement. There are votes. We will probably be gone for about 40 minutes. When we return, the members who are now here, who have not questioned this panel, will be allowed to question this panel if they wish. We will then go to the second panel. So Mr. Neugebauer is going to go, and then we are going to break. Mr. Cleaver, Mr. Perlmutter, Mr. Foster, Ms. Kosmas, and Mr. Himes will be given priority to question this panel, and then we will go on to the next panel. The minority has concurred in that. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes, after which we will break. Mr. Neugebauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things--and I don't want to spend a lot of time on it because I think the point has been made--we are hearing from a lot of our constituents is that credit terms have changed. I have been a loan officer, been on a loan committee, been a bank director, I have borrowed a lot of money, and one of the things I know--and I'm hearing, I think, things haven't changed is when things are good, everybody runs to loans secured by real estate. When things go bad, everybody runs away from them. And a number of the loans that I am hearing are getting either renegotiated or are getting more scrutinized or in fact being asked to be paid off for loans having to do with real estate. I think fundamentally sometimes that has to do with maybe regulators pressing that button. I hope that is not the case, because most of the time when we look at losses that banks take on in real estate, it wasn't because of the real estate necessarily, it was the capacity of the borrowers. But I think sometimes real estate gets tainted as the poisoned pill, particularly when we have a downturn. But I want to go to the PPIP program. I guess that is what we are calling it, PPIP. We heard yesterday or this week that Mr. Geithner layed out that plan, and it puts FDIC as the 95 percent guarantor of those obligations that are created. Then we also know that the FDIC has issued a special assessment on banks, and it is costing Texas banks nearly a billion dollars, right off the bottom line, right off their capital structure, at a time when we are hearing that banks are cutting back on their lending. I guess the first question I have is, if the FDIC doesn't have the appropriate reserve funds now, why are we asking them to take on additional responsibility? Mr. Gruenberg. Well, Congressman, the program that was announced on Monday is an effort to deal with the troubled assets on the balance sheets of these institutions. Part of the purpose of the program is to take those troubled assets off the balance sheets and put those institutions in a better position to lend. So part of the objective here is to respond to this issue of credit availability. And that program is still in the process of development, but we are trying to structure it in a way to keep it separate from the Deposit Insurance Fund and have it separately supported by collateralizing those guarantees with the assets that are purchased. Also, fees will be charged for the guarantees, which will be an additional buffer. Furthermore, there will be private equity investment, which would be an additional buffer. So we believe we can structure the program in way to separate it from the Deposit Insurance Fund. Mr. Neugebauer. But you don't currently have any money in any fund for that purpose, so where are you going to get that money from? Mr. Gruenberg. The collateralization of these guarantees will come from the assets that would be purchased. That would be the first line of protection. Mr. Neugebauer. But you don't have a reserve for that currently? Mr. Gruenberg. Well no, once the purchase was made, the assets would be available for collateral. Mr. Neugebauer. I understand the assets, but in other words, if you are purchasing assets and you are making banks reserve for loan losses and you are saying that you are taking bad assets--those are your words, not mine--off of the books of banks with some potential loss, they may be securitized, but the question--and you said that you weren't going to use any of the funds from the other reserve--so where are you going to get money from this reserve? I mean, if you have losses, how would you pay them? Mr. Gruenberg. Well, if there was a default on the loan, we would have the assets placed as collateral. There would be a number of funds established. Each fund would charge fees for the guarantee. They would also have the ability to build up a reserve fund as an additional cushion, and there will be private equity investment in each of these funds as well. Mr. Neugebauer. I get that. I still don't see where you are going to have any cushion to absorb those losses should those securities-- The second piece of it. It says, I believe, in Treasury Secretary Geithner's plan is that FDIC or the regulating entities will go in, and I guess they will have to sit down with banks and maybe give them permission to participate in this plan. Do you foresee FDIC or any of the regulatory entities encouraging or making banks take certain assets off their books and participating in this program? Mr. Gruenberg. I think the program is designed to be voluntary. I think it will be done in conjunction with the primary Federal regulator as well as the institution. Mr. Neugebauer. I can see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. We will return probably about 12:40. [recess] The Chairman. The committee will reconvene. Mr. Perlmutter is here. I assumed he will be ready to go while we wait for Mr. Kroeker, because that is mark-to-market, which you have already been very explicit about. So, Mr. Perlmutter is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and when Mr. Kroeker returns I do have a question or two for him. But he and Mr. Polakoff had a chance to hear me the other day on mark-to- market and I appreciate both of you gentlemen returning. We have had a lot of hearings in this subject, but just, you know, sort of to summarize, we have lost a lot of capital from the securitization market. Chairman Volcker said, you know, it was at a point where it was 70 percent of credit was coming from the capital markets, 30 percent from the banking. We have lost a lot in the capital markets. I think we determined the other day that we have lost a lot of capital for lending and credit purposes because of mark-to- market, legitimately so or not, you know, there's been a lot of loss and Mr. Long, you have been very honest and I appreciate your testimony today that, you know, from a regulator, from an examiner's point of view, OCC is, you know, concerned about, you know, where we're going in the economy and wanting to make sure that the banks are strong, as strong as they can be. But, we really have had a dramatic contraction in capital. And it is hitting hard. It is not anecdotes anymore. You heard from Mr. Jones, you have heard from all of us, businesses, home builders, restaurants, car dealers, who have been good borrowers, good business people in the past, are being shut out of credit. They are. Whether you're hearing that from your examiners or not, they are. That is happening. And so, Governor Duke mentioned the Interagency Statement on Meeting the Needs of Creditworthy Borrowers of November 12th, and there is one sentence in here, I mean, a number of sentences about making sure that credit is extended. I am reading from the third or fourth paragraph, ``The agencies have directed supervisory staffs to be mindful of the procyclical affects of excessive tightening of credit and to encourage banking organizations to practice economically viable and appropriate lending activities.'' So, there are words in there that talk about prudence, but also about encouraging lending. I will start with you, Mr. Long, and then I want to go to Mr. Kroeker on sort of the mark-to-market situation. Did you guys get that memo? Mr. Long. Yes, Congressman, actually, we participated in writing it. Mr. Perlmutter. Okay. So, in Colorado-- The Chairman. If the gentleman would yield. I do want to note, for historical purposes, that a Member of Congress just asked people if they had gotten the memo and there really was a memo. Mr. Perlmutter. And this really does, back in November, recognize the need to maintain, you know, and extend credit because we have seen, you know, just a loss of demand, a loss of credit, at levels we have never seen before, or at least not for many, many decades. And so, to a degree, we proceed with the prudent lending practices, there still has to be a good look at the borrowers. And my bankers and my borrowers are saying, the examiners are questioning concentration levels. So, if you're a homebuilder, like Mr. Neugebauer was talking about, and you want a new loan, even though you've been a good customer, you're not going to get it because there's too much concentration in real estate. Too much concentration for auto dealers because that's a distressed industry. Restaurants, commercial facilities, you know, retail outlets, what do you say? And then, an increase of capital from 10 to 10 percent. So, they're giving me specific requirements, or at least suggestions, by the examiner. When an examiner makes a suggestion, you follow it. Am I wrong? Are my guys way off? Mr. Long. No, Congressman, they are not way off. But let me put in some context because you raise a number of issues that I want to address. First of all, in the memo, we periodically get all 1,800 of our examiners on the phone and we walk them through, very specifically, how we want them to treat various loan products, how we want them to treat concentrations, how we want them to treat real estate appraisals, all of that type of thing and what we do is try to use lessons learned from the last time we went through this. So, we do spend a lot of time with our examiners on the phone, in person, through outreach and through memos to them trying to strike that balance that I talk about in my written testimony. Secondly, the issues that you are hearing from your bankers, they are real issues. These are real issues. We have a number of banks with heavy concentrations of distressed assets and some of those banks are going-- Mr. Perlmutter. But I think they're in distressed sectors. They're not, sorry. The Chairman. We can be more lax, sir, go ahead. Mr. Perlmutter. As opposed to, I mean, these are performing assets in a distressed sector as determined by you guys. That's what I'm hearing. Mr. Long. Well, Congressman, if we have the time, I would like to address one thing, because I hear this a lot. I hear that examiners are looking at current loans and classifying current loans. And I-- Mr. Perlmutter. Or not allowing the extension of the line of credit. And with that, I'll shut up, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Mr. Long, do you want to finish for a bit, go ahead. Mr. Long, do you have any, do you want to conclude, you go ahead. Mr. Long. Well, I guess the one thing I would say, I won't take a lot of time. There is a lot to talk around this performing, non-performing issue and, if a loan is performing and it's under reasonable terms, an examiner will not classify that loan. But just because it's current does not mean it's performing and that's a whole long conversation and if you want to talk about that I would-- The Chairman. Well, I would ask you to elaborate a bit on that. What do you mean, just because it's current, it's not performing? Mr. Long. Well, if the loan is performing under reasonable repayment terms, an examiner won't classify that loan. But what I hear from bankers at times is, the loan was current but the examiner classified it. Well, it may have been current, but it's not necessarily performing. The Chairman. Well, yes, explain what would make a loan where the payments were being made not performing? Mr. Long. We run into this a lot with commercial real estate. It is normal practice in some sectors of commercial real estate lending for the bank to fund an interest carry. And that's simply to bridge the timing differences between the cash outflows and the cash inflows. So, what we run into in a lot in community banks right now in some parts of the country are these busted residential development loans. And technically, they're current because the bank's paying themselves interest and they're going to be current right up until the day they default and that loan has to be foreclosed. The Chairman. Oh. So by current, you mean the bank is paying itself? But not that the borrower is paying it. But if the, I think that's a term of art that I may not have been the only one who missed. But if the banker was, if the borrower was continuing to pay, making the payments, could that still be non-performing? Mr. Long. No, it needs to be under reasonable payment terms. I mean, every situation is-- The Chairman. Well, how about the terms that are in the contract? Mr. Long. Every situation is different. If you have a residential development loan, and it is not working and there is a big hole in that project, and the borrower is only able to step up and pay interest and the 2-year loan turns into 12-year loan, that is not acceptable repayment terms. The Chairman. Well, but that would, say if it was a 2-year loan, and it would take 12 years, then that wouldn't be, they wouldn't be making the payments. You may be using terms of art that, by ``current,'' I mean the laypeople, myself included, would think that it meant that they were making the payments they were legally obligated to pay. Is that not what you mean by current? Mr. Long. Per the contract, if it's interest only, which many of these are, they may be current, but the loan isn't performing. The loan is dead in the water. And many times our examiners will go in and-- The Chairman. All right, so you're talking, if it's interest only, even if you're making the interest payments, but no principal payments, that would be an example. Mr. Long. Right. If it were making principal payments and it was a reasonable, it was a reasonable repayment,-- The Chairman. But what do you mean, if they're making principal payments and it's a reasonable repayment, is that other than what the contract calls for? How do you, I mean, because I think that's some of what, at least, has been alleged to us is, well, I borrowed the money and I'm paying it back on the schedule I'm supposed to pay it back, but they still, you know, cut me off. What does ``reasonable'' mean, other than in the terms of the contract? Mr. Long. In many of these residential real estate development loans, per the terms of the contract, there are curtailments made as the lots are sold and as the houses are built and sold, and the interest reserve is built in. Technically, some of these loans can be contractually current, but they're not going to pay at renewal. The curtailments will not have taken place. There's a big hole in the project, so in some cases-- The Chairman. So, even if they are paying back the principal on schedule, they can be declared non-performing. Mr. Polakoff. Mr. Chairman, if I could jump in because I agree with what Tim is saying. If they are paying back principal and interest, it won't be determined to be non- performing, but indeed it could be classified and we could require reserve against it. So, we're probably mixing jargon a little bit. The Chairman. Yes, and I think-- Mr. Polakoff. It's agreed, it will not be delinquent but it indeed, could be adversely classified. Mr. Long. The point I want to make is, because I hear this a lot from legislators and bankers that examiners are classifying loans that are current. Current may not be performing-- The Chairman. You said that so, but do you not understand how confusing it is, your use of the term ``current?'' You may be making all the payments you're supposed to make-- Mr. Long. Congressman, I can be current on my 30-year car loan, but I'm not performing. That is not an acceptable performance. The Chairman. What does that mean? Mr. Long. That's not acceptable. The Chairman. How are you current but not performing? Mr. Long. Because the payments aren't at the, performance needs to-- The Chairman. Are you making the payments that you are contracted to? But what, you have a 30-year car loan, you said? That is a hell of a car. But, so you're paying on your, but you're making all the payments you're supposed to make. Mr. Long. Here's my point. You know, performance needs to relate to something-- The Chairman. No, don't-- Mr. Long. Performance needs to relate to something. And it's generally the source of repayment. The Chairman. And performance does not relate to the terms of the contract is what you're telling me. That when we say performance, some of us would think, well, you're performing according to the terms of the contract you signed under which you got the money. Then you're saying no, performance has more meaning than that-- Mr. Long. Yes, it does. The Chairman. Meeting the terms of the contract doesn't mean you are performing. Mr. Long. Congressman, in many cases, it means more. The Chairman. But I think you're using confusing terms and you need to re-work those terms. At least I, maybe I'm alone, but I would have assumed that if I were meeting all the terms of the contract, I was performing under the contract. Now, so there's a real-- Mr. Perlmutter. Would the gentleman yield? The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Perlmutter. I think what you're saying, because I did some of this work back in my old days, when they classify a loan, it's because at some point they have made the determination as a prudential regulator that it's being paid, but it isn't going to get paid off, or there ultimately is going to be trouble at the end of the loan. And that's a judgment call. And what I'm saying is, go back and read the memo on the judgment calls, please. The Chairman. And I would just add, I understand that, but don't call it non-performing. I believe you're confusing what, at least, people meeting the terms of the contract are performing. There may be other reasons for canceling it, but I think rather than saying it's not performing, you ought to say, in some cases, performance isn't enough. And you have to cancel it. I apologize for the extra time and the gentleman from Alabama is now recognized. Mr. Bachus. Maybe I can get a little extra time. I have a letter from Jimmy Duncan from Knoxville, one of the Congressmen that I have tremendous respect for and he wrote to all four of the Federal bank regulators. And on December 29th, and his letter was about the same thing we're talking about here. He said that as the president of one bank, with which I have no connection whatsoever said, holding one hand up much higher than the other, I guess he just said, ``Look, I swear this is happening. What they are saying at the top is not getting down to the bottom.'' In other words, it goes on to say, when the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, and other top officials are trying to unfreeze the credit market and urging banks to make loans, the bank examiners at the local level are making it almost impossible to do so. And here's, I think this is part of the essence of it. And I mean with all respect for all parties. The examiners, almost none of whom have ever been in the banking business and thus do not fully appreciate how difficult it is, are writing up the best, safest loans on the books. They are doing this even though all payments are current and even on loans people have, oh, loans to people who have more than sufficient income and assets to cover the loan. He goes on to say, and one of the things that I have talked to him about this letter and to numerous members and they say, the bankers don't want to say this publicly because they're actually, they fear, whether it's founded or not, that the examiners will crack down even more. But, he says, every bank in east Tennessee has told me over the last 3 months or so, that the examiners have just gotten ridiculous. Another banker said, banks cannot make even very good loans now, strictly because the examiners and their ``CYA'' attitude. I figured out what CYA meant. And he talks about the economy actually is strong in Knoxville, but one of the problems that they're having, and Chamber and other people have said to him, they're pulling lines of credit. Now, I think today's hearing has been very helpful, because there has been a lot of dialogue and communication. And I am seeing the other perspective. But, what I have tried to say to my colleagues and I issued a statement the week before last, saying to my colleagues that we're all in this together and we have to watch what we say and what we do. Because there's a lot of fear out there, there's a lot of uncertainty, and we ought to all be constructive and really realize that right now there are, just, these are really challenging times. And even though it may be prudent banking, it may actually, it may appear to be by the rule book but as Governor Duke said, you know, until there's a floor under the housing market, and how do you do that, you know, we're going to continue to have problems. And what people are seeing, they're seeing us pump hundreds of billions of dollars into some of these companies and saying, by the Secretary of Treasury, the Chairman of the Fed, and others, when the economy recovers, these institutions, we're going to give them some breathing room. We're going to give them some time, we're going to give them liquidity where there's none and when the economy comes back, we can get our investment back. You know, that what these customers are facing right now and some of our banks. I mean, they need time. That's what they need. And that's why mark-to-market is not giving people time to deal with illiquid assets. You know, before, in these downturns, they have had time to work through those and it has taken 4 or 5 years. I had a conversation with the Chairman of the Fed and he said, it is going to take years to work these things out. That's true of a developer. That's true of some of these manufacturers. They're going to need time. And if you sort of look ahead and particularly if you say, we're feeding into our calculations things are going to get worse, boy they will. Because you call in some of these loans or you increase the terms, you make them pay other than just interest instead of working with the customer, they'll dump a lot of inventory on the market. You'll have more fire sales. Everybody. It's just a downward cycle. And I really want to say to you, if you're sitting there and you have to make a choice between, I would make a choice of trying to give people time to work things out. You know, we're doing, we're spending trillions of dollars to give people breathing room. We're spending trillions of dollars understanding that if the economy doesn't come back, you know, that money then be gone. But you know, I think we have to all assume that we're going to all go through this together and things are going to get better. If we don't, they won't. And, I don't know. I really think, and let me say this, my father was a contractor, and there were times when he had to go to the bank to pay his men. But then, you know, they knew at that bank because this was a guy he'd worked with for years. They knew when times got better, he'd do better. Sometimes he had 20 guys working for him. One time he had 2,000. And he rode through the bad times, but his banker was his friend. And, you know, he needed that banker. And then, in good times, he was a friend of the bank. And I think we up here, particularly, we're on a fixed income. I mean, I'm going to make the same salary whether the market falls off next month or goes up. You know, we examiners, we that work for the Federal Government, our salary, but you know, that's not the way it is in these downturns for most people. I don't have to worry about my income dropping from $150,000 to $80,000, but you know if I did, and all of a sudden it dropped, for a year or two and somebody started looking at that and said, I'm not sure he can pay this loan, or I'm not sure he can pay that, I'm going to call in this line of credit, I would be in trouble. And, I mean, I think that's what we're facing. And finally, let me say this, and I usually ask questions, I usually don't talk, but sometimes it's not even prudent lending to, you know, if you go to a developer that has a million dollar line of credit, as one in Birmingham told me last week, he's paying the interest off, and you call in $200,000 of that, and he's going to have to liquidate, or put up for sale one of his two developments, you know, he's going to have to sell that really cheap and that's going to cause a domino effect. And you know, I think that actually worsens your chances. You might get that $200,000 back, but you may end up losing in the end. And I'm just going to say to you, my time is up. I wish you would communicate to your examiners, that if given a choice between calling in a loan and giving folks time, if you can do it within the regulations. You know, a lot of times, you have discretion. We have discretion up here. We make decisions every day whether to meet with people or whether not to, or whether to have, is use your discretion, number one with the attitude that times are tough out there and number two, I don't assume things are going to get worse. Because they will if you keep restricting credit or calling in these loans. So, thank you. The Chairman. The Congressman from Illinois, Mr. Foster. Mr. Bachus. I would like unanimous consent to introduce-- The Chairman. Without objection. Mr. Bachus. --Congressman Jimmy Duncan's statement. Mr. Foster. Yes. One of the most tragic slices of small businesses that, you know, come to my office, and I'm sure everyone else's, are healthy businesses that have good orders and a profitable business and everything else, and yet their credit line is being reduced because of the drop in the real estate value that was used to collateralize, you know, their loan. And I was wondering, are there any of the--any programs out there that could provide collateral support, if you understand what I mean, for businesses in this specific thing? That is, healthy businesses who are just being clobbered by the drop in real estate values. Mr. Polakoff. Congressman, I would offer that--well, first if you accept the notion that it's the bankers who make the decision what to do with the loans, not the examiners. So the examiners don't decide which loans get funded, which loans don't get funded, which loans get called. Having said that, though, I would submit that both bankers and examiners should be looking at the cashflow analysis of the underlying loan. The collateral is important, but the collateral really only comes into play if there's a cashflow crisis. So the cashflow of the loan should support whatever the line is. Mr. Foster. And do you believe that is the de facto policy? Because I have certainly heard from people who are being squeezed by their bank that part of the reason give is that, well, look, you know, your factory is not worth anything like what it was worth. Mr. Polakoff. Well, sir, there are over 8,000 banks, so I suspect that there are some bankers who maybe are doing things a little differently than what I just described. And I suspect there may be some examiners who are erring way too much on the aggressive side just to be sure that they don't make any mistakes. But as a general theme, I believe what I said would be accurate. Mr. Foster. Do you think if there was explicit collateral support, that might encourage some slice of lending? Governor? Ms. Duke. Congressman, you're right, and particularly a lot of small businesses that use their home equity to finance their businesses are being squeezed by that. I think some of the progress that we have made in talking about loan modifications and talking about refinance that are now allowing, in the GSE loans, refinances to take place, even when the loan to value might be up to 105 percent. I think that could have some help. On the commercial property side, there is a program under SBA, and I'm not quite sure what the funding necessary is. But SBA does have a program where the bank lends 50 percent of the value and then the SBA loan covers 40 percent and the businessman has 10 percent. That sometimes helps businesses who otherwise wouldn't have largedown payments or equity positions in their buildings. Mr. Foster. Okay. And those SBA programs are limited by the funds allocated to them? Are they limited by recent availability? Ms. Duke. I have to say I'm not quite sure I understand that, but I think that's a program that could be very valuable in the current environment. Mr. Foster. Okay. Mr. Polakoff, you mentioned that lowering the loan to value during economic upswings was--could be a crucial part of keeping from getting into this mess ahead of time. And do you imagine doing that by formula or by some political appointee or an independent entity with the wisdom of Greenspan or--who's going to make that decision? Mr. Polakoff. Well, I think the folks sitting up at this table in all likelihood through the FFIEC, which is that interagency body, need to be chatting about, things like that which is countercyclical, that the former Comptroller of the Currency, Gene Ludwig, has given a number of speeches about, countercyclical regulation and the importance of it. And it's something as simple as the LTV. It's something as important as building up the allowance for loan and lease loss in the good times without the outside accountants and auditors suggesting that it's inflated. So there are a number of issues I think we can touch on. Mr. Foster. Yes. But you could actually imagine that someone like you would be in a position where the economy is going and the bubble is going up, and, you know, half of this committee is asking you, why are you squeezing the bubble when it's bubbling up? It seems to me that if you could establish formulas that at least provided a basis level for what the loan to value ought to be, then--and established a very high political threshold for changing that formula, that you'd have a much better defense against political pressure to, you know, not rain on the parade. Mr. Polakoff. Yes, sir. Mr. Foster. I yield back. The Chairman. The panel--oh, the gentlewoman from Florida is here and she is the last member here who has the right from our prior discussions to ask questions. So I will recognize the gentlewoman from Florida. Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here today. I wanted to chat with you for just a moment about a very specific aspect of lending that I am hearing, and you've heard people sort of nipping around the edges of this all morning, I believe. But I'm dealing with a lot of people in my district, and people coming to me here in Washington who are currently operating their businesses, and it could be anything from, you know, $500,000 to $100 million a year business based on lines of credit that they rely on. These are commercial loans, which, as you know, generally have what I call a rollover, 3 years, 5 years, 7 years, whenever they become due to be renewed. And they, as you have heard others say, are being denied the opportunity to renew or rollover those loans. And I have been saying at every turn that I have an opportunity to say it, is that this is what I call, you know, Tier 2 of the economic problems that we're seeing in this country. Tier 1 may be the housing that you talked about, Governor Duke, but Tier 2 being those businesses, and I'm not talking about small businesses less than ten employees that were discussed this morning, but I'm talking about other businesses, whether it's shopping centers, hotels, leisure activities, cruise ships, time share businesses, or any other kind of business, and there are lots of them. I happen to be from Florida, so thus the tourist interest specifically. But I'm very, very concerned about this particular group of borrowers and their inability to renew their lines of credit that keep them in business, because I think if we think a neighborhood of empty homes is a problem, when we start to see shops and other things literally closing their doors, we're going to understand that we have a whole different problem on our hands. And, obviously, the ability for these businesses to continue to operate helps the employment statistics and helps the housing statistics, and it keeps some things at bay that would be significantly worse should they not be able to get the credit. So my question I guess to you is, what is it perhaps that you are regulating, or is it the banks and lenders that is putting this pressure on people who have completely performing, compliant loans and lines of credit that are unable to get them renewed or rolled over so that they can keep their businesses going? What do you think is at the root of that? And then what would you think would be some way that we can mitigate it or resolve it? Would anyone like to respond? Mr. Polakoff. Well, I'll take a stab, and my colleagues will help me. I think, as Tim said earlier, there are a number of institutions that want to diversify their loan portfolio. The two consistent problems within institutions that are distressed is either a concentration of risk or excessive growth. And I think we're finding more and more institutions that need to diversify their portfolio or believe they need to diversify their portfolio to better spread out the risk among various industries, various borrowers. Many times, it is simply a strategic decision by the board of directors or the executive management of the institution. Ms. Kosmas. Thank you. Did anyone else want to respond? I would only say in response to that, I'm wondering whether anybody is looking at the big picture. Because if what you're saying is that individual institutions or banks or lenders are making decisions based on their individual portfolio, that we could have a sort of a stealth crisis going on here that could explode and, as I said, turn into something much worse than what we're currently experiencing if what I'm hearing is as consistent across-the-board as I believe it to be, then how do we resolve it? Ms. Duke. I'll take a stab at it if you like. I think Congressman Bachus may have put his finger on the problem. It's not necessarily the most creditworthy borrowers or the healthiest banks. It's when you have banks that have some difficulties of their own, and they can't be as accommodating to long-term customers as they might have been otherwise. And so we have this whole chain of the government being more patient in working with the banks in order to--or working with the bank regulators so that they can work with the banks, so that they can then work with their customers. And in a lot of these cases, the customers are under stress themselves. Their sales are down and their collateral values are down. And so if at the same time the banks are in weak condition or concerned about criticism from examiners, then they are not as willing as they would have been otherwise to work with those borrowers until they get to better times. And I think that's the case that we really need to find a way to attack. I think you're exactly right. Ms. Kosmas. Again, I guess my question would be, is there anybody looking at the big picture of what the cumulative difficulty of this is, rather than to say each bank has its own problems. And, again, I refer back to the opening comment. I'm talking about completely compliant, performing loans, which have not seen any difficulty at all and the businesses have a business plan that is working, and there's no reason to suspect that they wouldn't continue to function in the same way that they have for as many--in some cases, many, many years. And the big picture question is one, and then, Mr. Polakoff, if you're going to address that, I was wondering whether your 4th suggestion as a solution which referred to countercyclical regulations might include anything that would allow lenders or banks to perhaps set aside these performing loans and have them counted in a different way or set aside from the other regulatory restrictions? Mr. Polakoff. Congresswoman, I have a number of thoughts. I think you touched on an interesting point that I had not thought about before, which is assessing in a horizontal way what industries may be finding themselves limited, limited access to capital. That's an interesting point. We hadn't thought about that. There are ways for us to do that, so, I think that's a takeaway for us we should consider. The countercyclical aspect, one area that we hadn't discussed, is literally the notion of capital. Right now, the regulators tend to look at institutions and have a standard. All institutions should be well capitalized. Is it rational for us to say all institutions should be well capitalized both in the good times and in the bad times, or are there ways for us to say, in the most distressed times, like what we're facing right now, maybe it's okay to be adequately capitalized. Now the reality is, there are some triggers that are impacted by an adequately capitalized institution. Maybe we need to look at those and make some determinations as to whether they're relevant in today's economic cycle. The Chairman. We're running out of time. If I could borrow 15 seconds from the gentlewoman, I would say that's exactly, the last point, where I think mark-to-market comes in. That is, are they inadequately capitalized because of some major failure, or are they inadequately capitalized because of a mark-to-market on some longer-term assets? And I certainly think the capital reaction ought to be different in those cases. That's very much what we have been trying to get at. I thank this panel. Mr. Bachus. Mr. Chairman? The Chairman. The gentleman from Alabama first, and then the gentleman from Colorado. Mr. Bachus. I have a mark-to-market question, and basically what it is, I'm not one who wants to suspend mark-to-market. I think the revisions are going to be good. But I also think maybe that we could rethink capital requirements or moving to capital requirements that are more countercyclical, that recognize the environment we're in, which is exactly what you have said. But I will submit that for the record for you all to make-- The Chairman. Yes. And I think on that last point, we have a lot of agreement on that. The gentleman from Colorado is the last-- Mr. Perlmutter. For the record, thank you, Mr. Chairman, on the mark-to-market issue, I want to introduce a letter dated March 23, 2009 from former FDIC Chair Isaac, written to you, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking member, on mark-to-market and the changes, and I would like to give a copy to you, Mr. Kroeker, so that you guys can continue to work on this. Thank you. The Chairman. And I reiterate, if there are any statutory changes that are needed for you to act in that way, we need to know them. The panel is thanked and excused, and the next panel will come forward. Let's move quickly, please. We will convene the second panel, and I want to begin by--but before we do, let me say this. And I'm going to call on my colleague, Mr. Wilson, but I have consulted with the ranking member. We have had a very long day. I think what we most want to hear is what this panel has to say about what you have just heard. So in consultation with the Ranking Member, I'm going to ask everyone to speak for 7 minutes rather than 5 minutes. We probably won't need a lot of questions. We do have a markup at 2:15, but I think we believe it is much more important for us to hear your comments on what we have just had the conversation about than to ask you further questions. So, with that, you'll each have 7 minutes if you want, and then there will be time for a couple of rounds of questions. And with that, I want to recognize my colleague from Ohio, Mr. Wilson, to make an introduction. Mr. Wilson of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to introduce a fellow Ohioan. Steve Wilson is here on behalf of the American Bankers Association. Steve is chairman of the board and chief executive officer at LCNB National Bank in Lebanon, Ohio, and past chairman of the Ohio Bankers League. He has been very active in the Ohio community, serving as board member of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, chairman of the Advisory Board for Miami University in Middletown, and current board member and treasurer of the AAA in Cincinnati, a board member of the Harmon Civic Trust, a trustee of Countryside WMCA in Lebanon, and a board member of the Warren County Foundation. He is a member of the Area Progress Council of Warren County, and he serves as the vice chairman of the Warren County Port Authority. I'm pleased to have an Ohioan here to testify, and I'm proud that he's a banker who is actively investing in our community. In January of 2009, LCNB National Bank approved $11,593,000 of loans to individuals, $6,892,000 in loans to businesses, and $18,353,000 in loans to municipal governments, including Salem Township in my district in southeastern Ohio. Steve, welcome to our committee and thank you for coming today. We look forward to hearing from you. The Chairman. Mr. Wilson, please go ahead for 7 minutes. STATEMENT OF STEPHEN WILSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, LCNB CORPORATION AND LCNB NATIONAL BANK, ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION (ABA) Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and members of the committee, as introduced, my name is Steve Wilson. I am chairman and CEO of LCNB National Bank. We have over $650 million in assets and have served our community for 131 years. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf of ABA. Everyone is frustrated about the current confused situation surrounding the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). We had hoped that by the time we were here today, the mixed messages and disincentives would have disappeared, but in fact they are worse today than they ever have been. If programs to stimulate the economy are to reach their full potential, the confusion must be clarified and the disincentives corrected Conflicting messages have characterized the Capital Purchase Program from the beginning. Banks were actively encouraged by Treasury and banking regulators to participate. Indeed, many healthy banks decided to participate even though they were already very well capitalized. And even though they were very nervous at the time, that already the program requirements could change dramatically, and unilaterally, at the will of Treasury or Congress. My bank, which is well capitalized, applied for and received $13.4 million of CPP in January. I am proud to point out that we were given that opportunity to receive these funds because of our past and current performance in providing loans to those in the communities we serve. We are strong and we are secure. The CPP funds enabled us to respond to our customers when they need credit. In fact, we continue to make loans, sticking to our traditional commitment of making responsible loans that make good economic sense for both the borrower and our bank. I would also note that we sent Treasury our first dividend check of $67,000 last month. The first dividend payment for all CPP banks totaled $2.4 billion, which shows that CPP is truly an investment by the government in health banks. Over the last few weeks, banks have received messages that discourage participation in the CPP. But it goes beyond banks that have received the capital injections. The entire industry is unfairly suffering from the perception of weakness perpetuated by government-created mixed messages. Banks hear the message to continue to lend, to help stimulate the economy. But they also hear messages that pull them back from lending, from field examiners that may apply overly conservative standards, requiring severe asset writedowns; from FDIC premium assessment rules that will take $15 billion out of the industry in the second quarter; and from misplaced accounting rules that overstate economic losses. Any one of these challenges could be handled on its own. But taken collectively, the impact is an absolute nightmare for banks. All of these forces work against lending, which is so critical to our economic recovery. Clarity is so important right now, particularly for CPP participants. The continued speculation of further government involvement continues to unnecessarily erode consumer confidence in the Nation's banking system. I cannot say strongly enough that the investment of private capital will not return until the fear of further government involvement or dilution of private equity investments in the banking system has been significantly abated. Private capital, rather than taxpayer money, is the foundation of our economic system. What the private capital markets are looking for is a steady hand and a predictable government. Wary investors will fear that the government will further change the rules that were in place when banks signed the contracts with the Treasury. That is why it is so critical that the role of government be clearly defined and limited. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I'll look forward to answering questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found on page 176 of the appendix.] Mr. Wilson of Ohio. [presiding] Sorry, Mr. Ranking Member, sir. Let me repeat that. We will now hear from Brad Hunkler, vice president and controller, Western & Southern Financial Group, on behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable. STATEMENT OF BRADLEY J. HUNKLER, VICE PRESIDENT AND CONTROLLER, WESTERN & SOUTHERN FINANCIAL GROUP, ON BEHALF OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ROUNDTABLE Mr. Hunkler. Thank you. I would like to express my gratitude to Chairman Frank and Ranking Member Bachus and the committee for the opportunity to be here today and to speak on behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable and Western & Southern Financial Group. The role of the financial services industry, including nonbanking institutions, needs to be a significant component of your work in expanding credit to consumers and commercial enterprises. The financial services industry invests in all types of consumer loans, including mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, student loans, and many others. The primary investment vehicle for these loans for nonbanking institutions is through securitization. The amount of consumer lending financed by nonbanking institutions is critically important to maintaining adequate lending capacity for the broader economy. Unfortunately, though, there have been many problems with these assets for the financial services industry as a whole. As such, the industry has been adversely impacted by a lack of regulation, oversight, and clarity of the securitization process. Certainly the economic conditions, such as high unemployment and falling housing prices, have adversely impacted the collateral of these assets, but other noneconomic factors that could have been avoided also have contributed to the losses. As noted in many media reports, this includes rampant fraud in the mortgage origination and underwriting process, poor underwriting standards that overemphasized rising housing prices and did not adequately consider borrower creditworthiness, monoline insurers whose risk exposures were too highly correlated, inadequate analysis and stress testing from the rating agencies resulted in over-inflated ratings, and a lack of transparency relating to the underwriting collateral--underlying collateral and deal structure which contributed to inefficient price discovery. In addition to the liquidity--I'm sorry. The issues are-- these issues are specific primarily to the nonagency mortgage markets. The industry has also been adversely impacted by lack of transparency and regulatory oversight of the student loan market, where investors who purchased auction rate preferred securities for short-term liquidity needs, are now stuck with illiquid long-term securities with uncertain payment provisions. Some of these issues have been resolved for consumers but not large institutions like insurance companies. In addition to the liquidity and valuation challenges, mark-to-market accounting has compounded the problems for the financial services industry. Some institutions generally hold whole loans that are not required to be fair valued, while others, including institutions companies, hold mostly securities which are required to be mark-to-market. These are the areas I ask Congress to focus on going forward so that when economic conditions improve, institutions will return to the securitization markets. The industry has raised the issue of mark-to-market accounting concerns since the first major application of market value accounting in FASB Statement Number 115. At the time of early deliberations on FAS 115 in the late 1980's, interest rates were at all time highs, primarily Treasury rates. The insurance industry had extraordinary unrealized losses on its investment portfolios, and most, if not all, insurance companies would have reflected negative book values at that time. The industry on the whole question of usefulness or the meaning of reflecting negative book values due to high interest rates having a long-term cashflow-oriented investing strategy allows insurers to manage through periods of interest rate volatility. Today, excessive speculation in the markets has made market prices potentially deceptive when reflected in the equity of financial statements. Market participants speculate more on assets--can speculate more on assets' ability to increase or decrease in value than on its inherent ability to provide future cashflows. This speculation has led to market bubbles and busts. Adding market values to financial statements in this environment can be misleading. During market bubbles, financial statements can illustrate a false wealth effect. This can lead to excessive risk-taking and over-leveraging nonexistent equity. During periods of market declines, the opposite is true. As the market values decline, reported losses in excess of real losses can lead to restricted risk-taking and capital preservation. This can lead to irrational exuberance in bubble periods, irrational fear during the bust. While markets can accommodate, potentially accommodate this type of volatility, the sanctity of the Nation's financial institutions needs to be immune to it. To address the issue of procyclicality, some would suggest providing a countercyclical regulatory capital model and retaining market values and other procyclical indicators in reported financial statements. I do not believe this represents a sound approach. Reported financial statements that show excessive volatility and potentially negative book values can fuel adverse consumer activity. If regulatory reporting shows strong financial strength through this reporting mechanism, it has the potential to be dismissed, or even worse, it can discredit the regulatory model altogether. Market prices do, though, provide beneficial information for financial statement users. They provide an objective source of value and can, during normal market cycles, be a proxy for value. Also, market prices are the value that can be exchange of assets or required to be liquidated. In addition, some assets are acquired for purposes of trading and should therefore reflect market prices in the financial statements. Investors have spoken clearly that fair value accounting does provide meaningful information. But the desire for objective financial data has led to the replacement of principles of prudence and conservatism in accounting with fair value accounting. Therefore, I believe the primary measurement should be cost for cashflow investors. Losses should be recorded when cashflows are impaired, up to the amount of the impaired cashflows. Then to accommodate the needs of investors and to provide transparent financial information, fair value supplements can be provided to investors that would accompany earnings releases and reported results. These fair values could represent exit values and reflect the impact of liquidating financial instruments if required. While the FASB may have a more than adequate due process in the exposure and issuance of new standards, the problem is that the preparer concerns have had little weight in the ultimate decision on the issuance of new standards. Investor concerns, primarily the voices of large investor organizations, have driven the FASB agenda in support of fair valuing all financial instruments, and other nonfinancial instruments. What is interesting, though, is as the FASB has continued to introduce new fair value measurement requirements, equity analysts continue to guide companies to exclude the results of these fair value changes from the core operating earnings they report in their earnings release. What equity analysts are interested in is understanding run- rate earnings and growthin earnings so that they can determine the fair value of the company, as opposed to reflecting the results on the balance sheet. Congress could potentially play a role in the oversight of the FASB due process, but I think we want to stress the importance of independence in the standard-setting model. We do believe that is critical, but we would welcome some oversight to ensure that preparer concerns are adequately reflected in the due process of FASB. It's a good due process but doesn't always result in all concerns being adequately addressed. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and welcome any questions you have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunkler can be found on page 112 of the appendix.] Mr. Perlmutter. [presiding] We will now hear from Michael S. Menzies, Sr., president and chief executive officer of Easton Bank and Trust Company on behalf of the Independent Community Bankers of America. Mr. Menzies? STATEMENT OF R. MICHAEL S. MENZIES, SR., PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, EASTON BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, ON BEHALF OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY BANKERS OF AMERICA (ICBA) Mr. Menzies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Bachus. It is certainly my honor to be here. As you said, I am president of Easton Bank and Trust from the beautiful Eastern Shore of Maryland. I am especially proud to be the new chairman of the Independent Community Bankers of America. We are a $170 million bank on the Eastern shore, a community bank, a Subchapter S bank. I am thrilled to represent some 8,000 banks from around this Nation and our 5,000 members in the ICBA to talk about exploring the balance between increased credit availability and prudent lending standards. Notwithstanding Mr. Long's concern that community banks are overextended, and community banks need to be prepared for a worse environment, the vast majority of community banks are well capitalized, well managed institutions, actively participating in the economic recovery by lending to small and medium-sized businesses and consumers in their communities. Community banks represent thousands of communities throughout the Nation and they make relationship-based decisions. We do not make decisions based solely on scoring models or rating agencies, algorithms or computer simulations. However, the community bank regulatory climate is causing many community banks to unnecessarily restrict lending activities. For one, there appears to be a disconnect between the banking regulators in Washington who are promoting lending, and we are hearing this, and the field examination staff who require overly aggressive write-down's and reclassifications of viable commercial real estate loans and other assets. Yes, Mr. Bachus, what they are saying at the top is not reaching the bottom. Community bankers report that examiners require write- down's or classifications of performing loans due to the value of collateral irrespective of the income or the cash flow or the liquidity of the borrower. By placing loans on non-accrual, even though the borrower is current on payments, discounting entirely the value of guarantors, substituting the examiner judgment for that of the appraiser, and de-valuing loans merely because it is lying in or close to an area of high foreclosure levels, this all reduces credit available to communities. What we expect is examiners to be more thorough and careful with their examinations during an economic downturn. Based on what we have heard from our members, we believe that in many cases, examiners have gone too far. Excessively through exams that result in potentially unnecessary losses of earnings and capital can have an adverse impact on the ability of community banks to lend, since community banks are the prime engine behind small business lending, any contraction of lending further exacerbates the current economic downturn and impedes the flow of loans to creditworthy borrowers. Community banks are not de-leveraging. We are leveraging up and we need to continue to leverage up. ICBA does appreciate the recent overtures from banking regulators to improve the examination environment for better communications between banks and regulators, and the education of agency field staffs on the consequences of overly restrictive examination practices on credit availability. We have several recommendations in our written testimony that would create a regulatory environment that promotes community bank lending. I would like to highlight a few. Number one, examiners must take a long-term view toward real estate held by banks as collateral on loans and not demand aggressive write-down's and reclassifications of loans because illiquid or dysfunctional markets have forced sales. Real estate assets are long-term assets, and should not be based upon the short-term business cycle valuations that we are facing today. Number two, unlike some large money center in regional banks, the hallmark of community bank loan underwriting is a personal relationship with the borrowers we lend to, and character does in fact count in community bank lending. During this economic crisis, regulators should allow a bank to hold a small basket of character loans from borrowers who have a strong record of meeting contractual obligations and where there are other indicators that support the repayment of that loan. Loans in the basket would be exempt from strict underwriting standards and could not be criticized by examiners as long as they are performing. The amount of loans that could be held in such a basket might be a percentage of capital. Three, the examination in the field process should be strengthened to make it easier for bankers to appeal without fear of examination retaliation. Agency ombudsman determinations should be strengthened and the ombudsman made more independent. Four, the FDIC should find an alternative, and we are pleased they are seeking an alternative, to the 20 basis points special assessment which would consume much of bank earnings in 2009 and further constrain lending. The special assessment should include a systematic risk premium and be based on assets. I have never lost based on deposits and liabilities. Five, OTTI accounting rules are distorting the true value of financial firms and needlessly exacerbating the credit crisis. This does not serve the best interest of investors or the economy. We appreciate the committee's efforts to resolve this accounting issue. We believe FASB's recent proposal could be a positive step in resolving mark-to-market problems. We will be providing further suggestions and clarifications to the FASB. If there is time later, I would be happy to comment about this subject to performing loans, I have strong opinions about the meaning of a ``performing loan'' in today's regulatory world. Thank you so much for this opportunity. [The prepared statement of Mr. Menzies can be found on page 151 of the appendix.] Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Menzies. Now, we will turn to Mr. Randall ``Truckenbrodt.'' Is that close? Mr. Truckenbrodt. Close. Mr. Perlmutter. American Equipment Rentals on behalf of the National Federation of Independent Business. Mr. Truckenbrodt? STATEMENT OF RANDALL TRUCKENBRODT, AMERICAN EQUIPMENT RENTALS, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS Mr. Truckenbrodt. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you for allowing me the chance to tell my story. My name is Randall Truckenbrodt. I am a small businessman and member of the National Federation of Independent Business. I am in the construction equipment rental business in Florida, Illinois, and Indiana. I and my employees have felt the economic downturn, and I am doing everything I can to stay in business and keep my employees working. While many policy leaders have talked about improving access to credit for small business, my problem, like most small businesses, has been just trying to keep the doors open and my employees on the payroll. Unfortunately, my experience with Bank of America has made that prospect more difficult. I started doing business with Bank of America about 7 years ago in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The relationship started with a small line of credit of $250,000, with a company that was in need of rebuilding. After accomplishing that feat, the lending officer was impressed and wanted to do more deals. Over the years, we have done quite a few mortgages with Bank of America. In August of 2008, I received a call from an executive at the bank's headquarters stating that I was in their work-out department. The work-out department of a bank is where they work on non-performing or underperforming loans. I asked why I would be in a work-out department since I had never missed a payment on any loan with Bank of America or any bank for that matter over 32 years that I had been in business. The executive stated I was in the work-out department because one of my companies, American Equipment Rental in Pompano Beach, Florida, was operating at a loss, to which I replied, ``So what.'' I reminded him that I had never missed a payment with the bank and have no intention of stopping payments going forward. We discussed the probability of the company making a profit going forward. I explained that forecasting a profit is difficult to predict in this credit market because it is holding up construction projects and the fact that the real estate market had been overcooked for years in Florida. I further explained that we were changing some things to help the recovery process and that I have a pretty good track record of fixing our businesses when they come under outside pressures. After several months, Bank of America advised me that it would be sending me terms for a waiver letter to be issued. I have had 25 to 30 waiver letters issued by banks through the years, and they have always been issued at no charge. Waiver letters protect the bank's rights while allowing a customer to work their way back into compliance. Since late November, Bank of America sent three proposals explaining their terms for issuing a waiver letter. In the first letter, the Bank of America executive indicated he would charge my company $59,000 in fees and require the company to re-appraise all the mortgaged properties at an estimated cost of $25,000. The bank was proposing to impose all these fees on an not profitable company that it used measuring profits against. I have never heard of anything so ridiculous. The rest of the conditions of the waiver terms included a statement that I would agree to release all claims against Bank of America. The natural question is, why would I be asked not to sue them if they are doing the things right? We received 4 of these demand letters over a period of 6 weeks, each one offered to lower the fees in order to get this waiver letter issued. The third letter indicated it would waive all fees and costs if we would agree to change the maturity of these long- term notes from 2025 to April of 2009. Of course, to sign a statement not to sue them. The final offer imposed on the last day of this past year a default interest rate of 12.95 percent, 6 points higher than the current rate. I refused to agree to their terms. One of my concerns was the difficulty in getting these small business loans placed elsewhere, and what it would cost the business to replace them. These tactics are very troubling especially since they are directed at a small business that has always paid its debts. It bothers me that these tactics might be directed at small business owners all over this country, some of whom might not put up a fight or even understand that they can fight back. Imagine if a bank were doing this to a homeowner who was granted a mortgage based on a certain income level but then lost his job. Would the bank then demand additional fees even though the homeowner continued paying his mortgage from savings? Would the bank start reappraising the property and charging the homeowner the cost? In my case, it feels as though Bank of America is doing everything in its power to drive my company towards bankruptcy. Over the past 6 weeks, the bank has initiated without consent the reappraisal of the properties and they have not communicated any information about these appraisals after numerous requests. I have never had an appraisal of real estate where a request for more capital was not the basis, such as a refinance. Finally, I was instructed last week that they intended to raid our accounts for the cost of the appraisals. I will fight these fees in court, if necessary, and have advised Bank of America of that fact. Bank of America has received billions of dollars in taxpayer bail-out money. It was my understanding that the money was supposed to be used to help individuals and businessmen through this rough economy. Instead, they have used it to fund a war against their customers. I have never asked for or expected help from the government, but I also was not expecting an attack on my business from a bank where all my bank loans are current. It seems to me that Bank of America is trying to pull cash out of my business to benefit theirs. I wonder if I am the only small business they are doing this to. If Congress treated Bank of America the way they have treated their customers, they would be out of business, and everything that has been said today applies to me. There is so much more to this story, but I appreciate the opportunity to tell it. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Truckenbrodt can be found on page 172 of the appendix.] Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Truckenbrodt. Those buzzers mean we have some votes. I think we can get through Mr. Berg, and probably Mr. Wilson, and then hopefully Mr. Manzullo before we take a break. Mr. Richard S. Berg will be our next witness. He is the president and chief executive officer of Performance Trust Capital Partners, LLC. Mr. Berg? STATEMENT OF RICHARD S. BERG, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PERFORMANCE TRUST CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC Mr. Berg. Thank you, Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and members of the committee for inviting me to speak today. My name is Richard Berg. I am the CEO of Performance Trust Capital Partners. We are a broker-dealer specializing in evaluating the risk rewards of fixed income cash flows, including mortgage backed securities. Our customer base consists of community banks throughout the United States who also lend. My written testimony obviously is beyond the 5-minute span, so I am going to summarize it in the following points, and really was interested in the discussion on the securitization market that no longer exists, because I will address that in this. Here is question number one. What is the definition of a ``toxic asset?'' We are spending trillions, we ought to know what that is. Number two, what makes an asset toxic? Number three, what are the automatic ramifications once an asset is considered toxic? Number four, are there assets called ``toxic'' that should not be called ``toxic?'' Number five, what can be done to de-toxify assets? One of the keys to understanding the toxic problem can be found in recognizing how the use of letter ratings hard coded into investment policies, regulations, collateral agreements, counterparty agreements, can become an automatic mechanism for labeling assets as ``toxic.'' For regulated institutions like banks and insurance companies, toxic assets are typically identified by the credit ratings provided by the rating agencies. As you may know, the rating agencies' scale typically goes from AAA to AA to A to BBB to BB to B, all the way down to the letter D. Most regulations for financial institutions and insurance companies set BBB as the lowest rung for investment grade. Corporate bonds below investment grade are called ``junk.'' Mortgages and other structured product below investment grade are called ``toxic.'' Let me give you a simplified example. Consider in 2006 that a lender sold 1,000 loans to good creditworthy borrowers and those loans were then sold in the marketplace, packaged as a normal mortgage backed security. Let us say there was a AAA tranche created off that mortgage backed security. Three years later in 2009, the housing market deteriorated. The economy deteriorated. More people are delinquent than were originally expected. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that we know enough loans will go bad so the investor of this AAA security will not receive the full 100 percent but will receive 99 percent of the contractual cash flows. The impact on the yield of the organization or the institution is minimal, maybe going from 6 percent down to 5.95 percent. I believe everybody in this room will agree that while this is not perfect, this asset is clearly not toxic, but rather remains a high quality one. I am not sure that everyone in this room is aware that this security, because it is expected to not receive 100 percent of its contractual cash flow but 99 percent, would be rated CCC. Stated another way, 100 percent of this asset backed by thousands of individual loans is considered toxic because of a very small percentage of loans that default. Now that the security is well below investment grade, what are the automatic ramifications hard coded into policies, accounting, collateral agreements, and regulatory standing, like the system? Your capital goes down. There are few buyers of CCC assets, so market prices go down. You have an increase in troubled assets, you are becoming a troubled bank. OTTI says you have an impairment problem, we are going to mark-to-market. Counterparty agreements are problematic, you have liquidity problems. You have ineligible collateral. You have more liquidity problems. What is the result of this? You are not going to have a lot of lending and you have a frozen securitization market. In essence, this security went from a AAA, high quality, liquid, pledgeable security, to 100 percent highly speculative, very illiquid, non-pledgeable security because of a CCC rating based on an expected 1 percent loss in cash flow. Although the economic difference between getting 100 percent of cash flows and 99 percent is insignificant, the ramifications to a financial institution is devastating because in most cases, the letter rating is hard coded into all the rules, and below investment grade becomes a cliff event. For decades, letter ratings made sense because all issuers were single obligor issuers, and the rating tried to describe the probability of default, because default was either zero or 100 percent. For a multiple obligor backed security, like most of the securities backed by loans, the letter scale makes no sense. We know there will be defaults. The question is how many. The rating scale for multiple obligor assets should be numerically based, because so many existing policies, agreements, collateral agreements, regulation, accounting, is hard coded into these letter ratings. Billions if not trillions of multiple obligor securities are now considered toxic because they are simply below investment grade, even though many of them will actually incur minimal loss. We need to change the letter ratings for multiple obligor securities immediately to a numerically based rating system, to more accurately reflect the structure and the risk of multiple obligor securities. Thank you in this late moment for allowing me to present my opinions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Berg can be found on page 63 of the appendix.] Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Berg. We really appreciate your testimony. Mr. Polakoff, I am glad you are still here to listen to this, and I hope that when you leave today, you will share with Mr. Long, Mr. Kroeker, Governor Duke, and Mr. Gruenberg what you are hearing. This is what we are hearing all the time. It is with justification that we are concerned about the actions that are being taken on behalf of the regulators, that it is just contracting credit at a tremendous rate. We are pouring money in at the top and it evaporates at the bottom. Mr. Manzullo, why do we not hear from Mr. Wilson and let him ask his questions. Do you want to take a break now, go vote, and the three of us will ask questions when we come back? Mr. Wilson of Ohio. Maybe we can explain to them what we are doing. Mr. Perlmutter. Since I do not often sit in the chair, I will apologize. We are voting now on a couple of matters. We will leave and run over to the Capitol. We have two votes. We will probably be back here in about half-an-hour. With your indulgence, gentlemen, let us take a recess, and when the votes are over, we will be back here to ask you some questions. Thank you very much. [recess] The Chairman. I apologize to the witnesses. The hearing is concluded. It was very helpful for us to have this, and I apologize for my oversight that you were kept here unnecessarily during the votes. I apologize. The hearing is concluded. We are going to start the mark- up. The witnesses are excused. Again, it is my error and I apologize for it. 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