[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN MEXICO AND THE SOUTHWEST BORDER AS A RESULT OF
THE ILLICIT DRUG TRADE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 6, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
49-476 PDF WASHINGTON : 2009
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan, Chairman
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin
ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
MAXINE WATERS, California DARRELL E. ISSA, California
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida STEVE KING, Iowa
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Georgia JIM JORDAN, Ohio
PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico TED POE, Texas
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM ROONEY, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California GREGG HARPER, Mississippi
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
DANIEL MAFFEI, New York
Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Sean McLaughlin, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman
PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
JERROLD NADLER, New York TED POE, Texas
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
MAXINE WATERS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee TOM ROONEY, Florida
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
[Vacant]
Bobby Vassar, Chief Counsel
Caroline Lynch, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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MAY 6, 2009
Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
The Honorable Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security..................... 1
The Honorable Louie Gohmert, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security............................... 2
The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary. 4
WITNESSES
Mr. Stuart G. Nash, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and
Director, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces
(OCDETF), U.S. Department of Justice
Oral Testimony................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Salvador Nieto, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Intelligence and Operations Coordination, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Ms. Janice Ayala, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of
Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Testimony................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
Mr. Anthony P. Placido, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence,
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department
of Justice
Oral Testimony................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. William J. Hoover, Acting Deputy Director, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Department of Justice
Oral Testimony................................................. 49
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........ 6
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record........................ 67
ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN MEXICO AND THE SOUTHWEST BORDER AS A RESULT OF
THE ILLICIT DRUG TRADE
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:55 p.m., in
room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert
C. ``Bobby'' Scott (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Scott, Jackson Lee, Pierluisi,
Gohmert, Poe, Goodlatte, Rooney and Smith.
Staff Present: Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee Chief Counsel;
Mario Dispenza, Fellow, ATF Detailee; Karen Wilkinson, Fellow,
Federal Public Defender's Office Detailee; Veronica Eligan,
Professional Staff Member; Caroline Lynch, Minority Counsel;
Kimani Little, Minority Counsel; and Kelsey Whitlock, Minority
Staff Assistant.
Mr. Scott. Good afternoon.
I first want to apologize for the delay. We had crime bills
on the floor unexpectedly. We thought we were going to be there
at about 11 this morning, and did not get on until about 1:30,
so we appreciate your indulgence.
The Subcommittee will now come to order. Welcome to the
hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security on the escalating violence in Mexico and the
southwest border as a result of the illicit drug trade.
For several months, the media has reported horrific
violence occurring in Mexico and along the U.S. southwest
border, stemming from illegal drug trafficking. Traffickers
have been brazen enough to threaten police, government
officials and even their families because of stepped-up
government efforts into drug interdiction. The actual attacks
have been rampant and gruesome. Our hearing today will explore
the extent of the violence and the role of the U.S. law
enforcement agencies in combating it.
Of course, violence associated with drug trafficking and
organized crime is nothing new. Other nations, most notably
Colombia and Italy, experienced heightened violence when their
governments stepped up enforcement efforts in the late 1980's
and 1990's.
Similarly, the surge in violence Mexico is experiencing
seems to be related to Mexican President Calderon's targeted
and successful crackdown on illicit drug organizations. As
Mexican security forces have seized thousands of firearms and
tons of drugs, the trafficking has become more difficult. As a
result, the traffickers have become more violent as they fight
to control fewer trafficking routes. Because these routes flow
to and from the United States, our Border States are most
directly affected by the violence. In Phoenix alone, a special
task force of 10 investigators has dismantled 31 crime cells
and has made more than 220 arrests in response to over 350
kidnappings and other violence over the past 2 years.
But the violence is, by no means, limited to the border.
According to a December report by the Department of Justice's
National Drug Intelligence Center, Mexican drug trafficking
organizations have established a presence in 230 U.S. cities,
as far apart as Anchorage and Atlanta, further intertwining
Mexico and United States in the fight to control the violence
over firearm trafficking.
According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, approximately 90 percent of the weapons seized in
Mexico that are traced originate here and end up in the hands
of Mexican drug traffickers. Clearly we have a shared problem;
however, before we can solve the problem, we must assess it
accurately, focusing on reality and not sensationalism.
The violence has, indeed, been gruesome. However, according
to the Mexican Government, 64 percent of their drug-related
violence is mostly concentrated in three Northern and
Southwestern States where only 15 percent of their population
lives. Moreover, the murder rate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico's
hardest-hit city, is six times lower than was Colombia's murder
rate during the early 1990's. Since that time, Medellin's
homicide rate has dropped by 90 percent. Thus, the situation is
serious, but it is not as widespread as some reports would lead
us to believe, and neither is it insurmountable.
Mexico has initiated key steps to overcoming the latest
escalation of violence. In addition to increased enforcement
efforts, Mexico has made crucial institutional reforms in its
judicial system, police hiring, technology investment, and drug
abuse prevention and treatment efforts. These key changes
promise a more secure, long-term solution than enforcement
efforts alone could provide.
The United States' Federal law enforcement efforts have
been greatly enhanced. In March of this year, the Obama
administration announced a major increase in law enforcement
resources to partner with Mexico in combating drug and firearm
trafficking.
Today we will hear from representatives from the Department
of Justice to explain its role in combating the drug and
firearm trafficking and its resultant violence.
So I am pleased at this point to recognize the esteemed
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas,
Judge Gohmert.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing, and thank you for calling me ``esteemed.''
We are grateful to you for being here, our witnesses. I
know that this has been an inordinate delay, but thank you for
your patience.
For several months now, we have heard reports of escalating
violence by Mexican drug cartels, of violence targeted at rival
cartels and at officials of the Mexican Government; not just
violence, but gruesome acts intended to terrorize local
communities and to intimidate the Mexican Government into
abandoning its mission to rid Mexico of the scourge of illegal
drugs.
Mexico is the primary transit point in the U.S. for all
four major drugs of choice: marijuana, cocaine,
methamphetamine, and heroin. In fact, 91 percent of all cocaine
abuse in America is supposedly trafficked through Mexico. So it
comes as no surprise that these cartels would resort to such
tactics, given the Calderon government's efforts to shut down
their trafficking operations and to rid the government of the
corruption that has allowed these cartels to prosper for years,
and, I would submit, that has caused the country to not become
the power that it could be in the world.
In addition to dozens of extraditions of drug cartel
members from Mexico to the U.S. for prosecution, Mexican
authorities in recent weeks have arrested the suspected leader
of the violent Zeta gang in the border city of Matamoros,
across from Brownsville, Texas, as well as a top official in
the Juarez and Sinaloa Cartels.
In March, Forbes magazine listed Joaquin ``El Chapo''
Guzman-Loera, the head of the Sinaloa Cartel, as one of the
world's self-made billionaires. His inclusion on this list
brings the breadth of the illegal drug trade into stark
reality.
We simply cannot address the cartel violence in Mexico
without addressing both the supply and demand of illegal drugs
here in America. According to the Drug Enforcement
Administration, Mexico is the number one foreign supplier of
marijuana abuse in the United States. In fact, marijuana is
considered the cash crop that finances the cartel's drug trade,
corruption and violence. So it came as a shock to me when
Attorney General Holder announced in February that the D.A.
would no longer conduct raids on facilities that are operating
in compliance with State laws despite their violation of
Federal drug laws. This is an issue that still needs to be
addressed.
Another matter that has caused concern was when some of us
heard the Administration say that 90 percent--or even the
President say that 90 percent of all of the guns involved in
violence in Mexico are apparently from the United States, which
as it turns out--it sure appears from the numbers that I have
been able to get--that only 17 percent of the guns found at
Mexican crime scenes have been traced to the United States. A
large percentage of the guns recovered in Mexico are not sent
back to the United States for tracing because it is obvious
from their markings that they did not come from the U.S., but
the numbers that we have been provided say that, in 2007 to
2008, 6,000 guns were successfully traced, and of these, 90
percent--this is by the ATF--90 percent, or 5,114, were traced
to the U.S.; but in those same 2 years, according to the
Mexican Government, 29,000 guns were recovered at crime scenes.
So there is not 90 percent coming from the United States, but
17 percent.
Another issue that has just arisen today, as reported in
the press--the Chicago Tribune reported that the Sinaloa Cartel
is now authorizing the use of force and violence inside the
United States to protect their loads of illegal drugs. That
force is supposedly being authorized in the United States. Now,
that may be a testimony to the effectiveness in how they have
been hurt by the U.S.' curtailing the drugs being imported into
the United States. Whatever the reason, if this is true, and
they are authorizing violence against our people whom we are
paying to protect us, then we have got to have an appropriate
counterstrategy to that, and I hope we hear about that shortly.
Anyway, I do appreciate your patience, and look forward to
your testimony.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
We have the Ranking Member of the full Committee, the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith, who actually suggested the
hearing.
It is good to see you here.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, I was going
to give you credit and thank you for having this hearing, which
is both timely and appropriate. I do appreciate the
collaboration. It is a bipartisan subject, and I always
appreciate being able to work with you on items like this.
Also, Mr. Chairman, I think I heard you, as I walked in,
express your appreciation to the witnesses for waiting so long,
and I, too, was going to say to them that the debate and the
votes on some three judiciary bills that were on the House
floor took a lot longer than we thought. In fact, the vote
actually occurred about 1 hour longer than we were told when it
was going to occur, and I am afraid you all had to wait, but we
do appreciate that.
Mexico, our neighbor to the south, is experiencing a surge
in homicides and in other violent crimes. Drug cartels are to
blame. In a little more than a year, more than 7,000 people
have been murdered, many of them cartel members or associates.
These international crime syndicates are like any other
criminal organization that attempts to exercise its authority
through threats, fear and murder, but Mexican President Felipe
Calderon has vowed to take on the Mexican drug cartels and to
put an end to their reign.
We are seeing the results of this effort through better
cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies, through the
increased extraditions of cartel members to the U.S., and
through a campaign to rid the Mexican Government of the
corruption that has fostered the cartels' power for years.
Regrettably, though, some are using the violence along the
border as a justification for stricter gun laws. In recent
weeks both the news media and elected officials have repeated a
statistic that would be alarming if true, that 90 percent of
the firearms seized in Mexico come from the U.S. This is simply
false.
What is true is that 90 percent of those weapons that are
seized and traced are linked back to a point of sale in the
United States, but this accounts for only 17 percent of the
guns actually found at Mexican crime scenes. The remaining 83
percent come from Central and South America or as far away as
Russia, according to a recent report.
Regulating the ownership of firearms by law-abiding
citizens will do nothing to stop criminals from trafficking
guns into Mexico. There are those who suggest that the solution
to border violence is to legalize drugs. That is like saying
that the solution to our economic crisis is to legalize fraud.
If Congress is serious about addressing border violence in
Mexico, we should first eliminate the demand for illegal drugs
in the U.S. by cracking down on drug dealers. Unfortunately,
some want to significantly reduce the punishment for drug
crimes, but reducing the demand for drugs in the U.S. will help
prevent drug-related violence from spilling across the U.S.-
Mexico border.
In late March, the Administration announced that it planned
to redeploy personnel and resources along the border to help
curtail the violence. I support these actions, but remain
concerned that the redeployment of personnel and resources may
come at the expense of other critical law enforcement
activities. Border violence should not be used as an excuse to
reduce the interior enforcement of our immigration laws and to
enact gun restrictions.
Mr. Chairman, the threat of violence spilling across the
U.S. border would be much less if we would complete the
construction of the border fence. The Border Patrol has stated
that, where used, it has reduced apprehensions by 95 percent,
and when apprehensions are down, so is the amount of drugs
coming across the border--and the related violence.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
We have also been joined by the gentlelady from Texas Ms.
Jackson Lee. I ask that any other additional statements be made
part of the record.
Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and Member,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Scott. We will now go to our panel of witnesses.
Our first witness will be Stuart Nash, Associate Deputy
Attorney General and Director of the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces. Under that directorship, he oversees
the combined efforts of over 2,000 law enforcement agents and
over 600 prosecutors with the mission of investigating,
prosecuting and dismantling the world's largest drug-
trafficking, money-laundering organizations. He also serves as
Associate Deputy Attorney General with the responsibility for a
range of criminal justice issues, including drug enforcement,
money laundering and asset forfeiture. He has a law degree from
Harvard Law School and a bachelor's degree from Duke
University.
Our next witness will be Mr. Salvador Nieto, the Deputy
Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence and Operations
Coordination for the United States Customs and Border
Protection. As Deputy Assistant Commissioner, he is the chief
executive officer responsible for leveraging the skills of
intelligence operations professionals and targeting experts to
maximize the CBP's enforcement efforts. He began his career in
1988 with the U.S. Border Patrol, served in the United States
Air Force and attended the Air Force Community College and
Florida State University.
Our next witness will be Janice Ayala, Deputy Assistant
Director of Financial, Narcotics and Public Safety Division
within the Office of Investigations, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. In this position she has direct oversight
of the financial, narcotics and national gang programs
conducted by ICE officers throughout the United States. She
served for 4 years in the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Squadron,
and holds a bachelor of science degree in business
administration.
Our fourth witness will be Mr. Anthony Placido, Assistant
Administrator for Intelligence for the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, or DEA. As a leader of DEA's
intelligence program, he is DEA's senior officer for the U.S.
Intelligence Community, and his duties include the development
of the agency's global intelligence collection enterprise. He
holds a bachelor's degree from Northeastern University and a
master's degree from Golden Gate University.
Our final witness is Mr. William J. Hoover, Acting Deputy
Director for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives. As Deputy Director, he is the ATF's second highest
official and oversees all ATF operations, including criminal
investigations, intelligence and the regulation of Federal
firearm licensees. He has a bachelor's degree from Shepherd
College in Shepherdstown, West Virginia.
I thank all of our witnesses for joining us. I will ask you
to summarize your testimony within 5 minutes or less. There is
a timing device at the table, which will go from green to
yellow with 1 minute left, to red after your 5 minutes are up.
We have also been joined by the gentleman from Texas Mr.
Poe.
We will begin with Mr. Nash.
TESTIMONY OF STUART G. NASH, ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
AND DIRECTOR, ORGANIZED CRIME DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCES
(OCDETF), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Nash. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I cannot help but notice--it may be a bad omen for me--that
the last vote--you mentioned my degree from Duke University.
The last vote the House took before this hearing was convened
was to congratulate the North Carolina Tar Heels for their
victory in the National Basketball Championship, but I will try
to soldier on.
My thanks to you and to Ranking Member Gohmert and to all
of the Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss the alarming rise of
violence in Mexico and to share with you the Department of
Justice's strategy for dismantling the Mexican drug cartels
that are responsible for that violence.
Drug-related violence has skyrocketed in recent years in
Mexico, especially along the border with the United States.
When Mexico's President Calderon and Attorney General Medina-
Mora took office in December 2006, the Mexican Government, with
the support of the United States, undertook a comprehensive
program to break the power of the narcotraffickers. The
unprecedented pressure caused the cartels to escalate fighting
among themselves for control of the lucrative smuggling
corridors along the southwest border. It also led to
retaliatory violence directed at Mexican law enforcement
personnel.
The violence in Mexico has had direct and serious effects
in the United States. Firearms trafficking from the United
States to Mexico contributes to escalating levels of violence
on both sides of the border. As for the cartels and the U.S.-
based gangs affiliated with the cartels, they arm themselves
with high-caliber firearms. These criminal groups are very well
financed. Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations
annually generate between $18 billion and $39 billion in drug
proceeds in the United States, a large portion of which is
believed to be smuggled in bulk cash shipments back into
Mexico.
For decades, U.S. law enforcement agencies have recognized
that the best way to fight the most powerful criminal
organizations is through intelligence-based, prosecutor-led
task forces. It was this approach, for example, that fueled the
groundbreaking Mafia prosecutions in the late 1980's and
1990's. The DOJ is currently applying the same intelligence-
driven tactics that broke the back of the mob to fighting the
Mexican drug cartels.
The Department's strategy to dismantle the Mexican drug
cartels has several key elements. First, the strategy employs
extensive intelligence capabilities. The Department pools
information generated by Federal, State and local law
enforcement agencies, and it uses that intelligence to direct
resources against the most powerful cartels.
Second, through prosecutor-led, multiagency task forces,
the Department focuses its efforts on the investigation,
extradition, prosecution, and incarceration of key cartel
leaders. As the Department has demonstrated in attacking other
major criminal enterprises, destroying the leadership and
seizing the financial infrastructure of the cartels undermines
their very existence.
Third, the Department of Justice, in concerted efforts with
the Department of Homeland Security, pursues investigations and
prosecutions related to the trafficking of guns and to the
smuggling of cash from the United States into Mexico. Much of
the violence in Mexico is fueled by weapons and resources that
come from our side of the border.
Finally, the Department confronts the secondary threats in
the United States flowing from the cartel activity. These
threats include the widespread distribution of drugs on our
streets and gang activities in our neighborhoods.
The Department's strategy has already had some spectacular
successes. Just a couple of months ago, Attorney General Holder
announced the arrest of more than 750 individuals in connection
with Operation Xcellerator, which targeted the Mexican drug
trafficking organization known as the Sinaloa Cartel. Through
Operation Xcellerator, Federal law enforcement agencies, along
with the law enforcement officials from the Governments of
Mexico and Canada and State and local authorities in the United
States, delivered a significant blow against the Sinaloa
Cartel. In addition to the 750 arrests, authorities seized over
$61 million in U.S. currency and more than 12,000 kilos of
cocaine.
Project Reckoning, announced in September 2008, was a 15-
month operation that severely damaged the Gulf Cartel. It was
one of the largest and most successful joint law enforcement
efforts ever undertaken between the United States and Mexico.
Project Reckoning resulted in over 600 arrests in the U.S. and
Mexico, plus the seizure of $76 million in currency and nearly
20,000 kilos of cocaine. Most importantly, Project Reckoning
led to the indictment of the three principal leaders of the
Gulf Cartel.
Operation Xcellerator and Project Reckoning were tremendous
successes in the U.S. Government's battle against the Mexican
cartels, and they illustrate the strengths of the Department's
strategy. Neither would have been possible without the
development and effective sharing of intelligence between and
among Federal agencies, our State and local partners and the
Government of Mexico.
The operations were each coordinated by the DEA-led Special
Operations Division and were handled by prosecutors and
investigators from the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Forces--a program that coordinates elements of the Federal
Government, including the DEA, FBI, ATF, the Marshal Service,
prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney's offices, and the DOJ's
Criminal Division, as well as agents from ICE, CBP, the Coast
Guard, and the IRS.
In sum, we believe that the Administration has the right
strategy for stopping the violence spawned by the cartels. We
also recognized that there is much work still to be done. The
cartels remain powerful, and they continue to move drugs into
the United States, but the strategy we are pursuing is the
correct one, and ultimately we will prevail against these
cartels.
The Department of Justice remains committed to working in
conjunction with our partners to address these serious threats.
I welcome any questions that you may have.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of the Department of Justice
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Stuart Nash, William Hoover,
and Anthony P. Placido
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Scott. We have been joined by the gentleman from
Florida Mr. Rooney.
We will continue with Mr. Nieto.
TESTIMONY OF SALVADOR NIETO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATION, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Nieto. Thank you, and good afternoon.
Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, Members of the
Subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before
you today to discuss the work of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. CBP is the largest uniformed Federal law
enforcement agency in the country. We station over 20,000 CBP
officers at access points around the Nation at air, land and
sea ports. By the end of fiscal year 2009, we will have
deployed over 20,000 Border Patrol agents between the ports of
entry. These forces are supplemented with 980 Air and Marine
agents, with 2,260 agricultural specialists and with other
professionals. These personnel are key to the implementation of
Secretary Napolitano's Southwest Border Initiative that she
announced in March.
A key and growing area of emphasis for CBP involves the
interdiction of weapons and currency. Escalating violence in
the border regions and in the interior of Mexico poses a
significant threat to both the United States and Mexico.
Secretary Napolitano has tasked all DHS components, including
CBP, to examine how we can increase our enforcement activities
in an effort to mitigate southbound weapon and currency
smuggling to the extent that resources and infrastructure
allow.
We have ongoing initiatives by way of short-term plus-ups
and operations plans that call for enhanced resources to
include State and local law enforcement agencies, the mobility
of CBP resources from outside the immediate area and the
national level tactical teams, such as the Border Patrol
Tactical Unit and Field Operations Special Response Teams. We
continue enhancing our plans to address all threats and all
hazards at the borders.
A majority of the illegal drugs consumed in the United
States originate from or pass through Mexican territory or
territorial seas. Huge illicit trafficking profits flow back
into Mexican drug trafficking organizations across our common
border. The Mexican Government's ability to confront its drug-
trafficking industry and its willingness to cooperate with U.S.
efforts directly affect the impact of any Southwest Border
Initiative.
CBP has established positions at the El Paso Intelligence
Center, otherwise known EPIC, at the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center and at the DEA Special
Operations Division. These initiatives enhance interaction with
the Intelligence Community and with law enforcement agencies.
Additionally, CBP's Office of Intelligence and Operations
Coordination established a National Post-Seizure Analysis Team,
and is in the process of establishing Intelligence Operations
Coordination Centers, known as IOCCs, in the field. The IOCCs
will make CBP a more fully integrated, intelligence-driven
organization by linking intelligence efforts and products to
operations and interdictions.
CBP works with other agencies to provide actionable
intelligence to the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, JIATF-
S. This intelligence is used to interdict the flow of cocaine
from northern South America to the United States.
The detection of U.S.-Mexican border air intrusions is
essential to effective interdiction operations along our border
with Mexico. The primary means of detection is a large radar
network, monitored at the Air and Marine Operations Center, or
the AMOC, in Riverside, California. Personnel at the AMOC
detect aircraft, short landings and border penetrations, and
they coordinate CBP assets and Mexican interdiction assets to
intercept, track and apprehend smugglers as they traverse the
U.S.-Mexico border.
CBP continues its evolution to become a more integrated,
intelligence-driven organization, and we are in the process of
establishing a robust field organization. Intelligence
gathering and predictive analysis require new collection and
processing capabilities. CBP is also developing the analytical
framework for intelligence and a set of data-processing tools
that will improve the effectiveness of CBP and of other DHS
analysts in detecting, locating and in analyzing terrorist
networks, drug-trafficking networks and similar threats. These
intelligence and operational coordination initiatives
complement the Secure Border Initiative's technology programs.
Thank you for the opportunity to describe our plans for
border security and to highlight some of our progress to date.
With your continued support of DHS, CBP and ICE, I am confident
that we will continue to make tremendous strides in increasing
the control of our borders. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nieto follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sal Nieto
Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, Members of the
Subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today
to discuss the work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
particularly the tremendous dedication of our men and women in the
field both at and between our ports of entry.
CBP is the largest uniformed federal law enforcement agency in the
country with over 20,000 CBP officers; 18,800 Border Patrol agents;over
1,000 Air and Marine agents; 2,280 agricultural specialists; and other
professionals. These personnel are key players to the implementation of
Secretary Napolitano's Southwest Border Security Initiative announced
in March.
I am pleased to report that CBP continues to achieve success in
performing our traditional missions, which include stemming the flow of
illegal drugs and contraband, protecting our agricultural and economic
interests from harmful pests and diseases, protecting American
businesses from theft of their intellectual property, enforcing textile
agreements, tracking import safety violations, protecting the economy
from monopolistic practices, regulating and facilitating international
trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing United States trade
laws. At the same time, our employees maintain a vigilant watch for
terrorist threats. In FY 2008, CBP processed more than 396 million
pedestrians and passengers, 122 million conveyances, 29 million trade
entries, examined 5.6 million sea, rail, and truck containers,
performed over 25 million agriculture inspections, apprehended over 720
thousand illegal aliens between our ports of entry, encountered over
220 thousand inadmissible aliens at the ports of entry, and seized more
than 2.8 million pounds of illegal drugs.
We must perform our important security and trade enforcement work
without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so
important to our nation's economy. These are our twin goals: border
security and facilitation of legitimate trade and travel.
support of u.s./mexican counter-drug and counter-terrorism initiatives
A key and growing area of emphasis involves DHS's role in
interdicting the illegal flow of weapons and currency into Mexico. The
recent surge in violence in the interior and border cities of Mexico
poses a significant threat in Mexico and is a serious concern of the
United States. Secretary Napolitano has tasked all DHS components,
including CBP, to examine how we can reasonably increase our
enforcement activities in an effort to identify and interrupt efforts
to smuggle weapons and bulk cash shipments into Mexico.
A majority of the illegal drugs consumed in the United States
originate from or pass through Mexican territory and territorial seas.
Illicit trafficking profits flow back to Mexican drug trafficking
organizations across our common border. The Mexican government's
ability to confront its drug trafficking industry and its willingness
to cooperate with U.S. efforts directly affect the impact of any
southwest border activities.
In a spirit of cooperation, CBP has established positions at the El
Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center, and the DEA Special Operations
Division. These initiatives enhance interaction with the Intelligence
Community (IC) and law enforcement agencies to more effectively
facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable
drug-related intelligence as well as two full-time positions at the
National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), and has also partnered with
the National Gang Targeting, Enforcement and Coordination Center
(GangTECC).
EPIC, originally established in an effort to improve drug and
border enforcement operations along the Southwest Border, has broadened
its mission becoming international in scope. Centrally located in El
Paso, it also has the following representation: the Department of
Homeland Security; CBP; Immigration & Customs Enforcement; U.S. Coast
Guard; U.S. Secret Service; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal
Bureau of Investigation; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives; U.S. Marshals Service; National Drug Intelligence Center;
Internal Revenue Service; Department of the Interior; National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; Department of Defense; Joint Task
Force--North; Joint Interagency Task Force--South; Texas Department of
Public Safety; and other state and local agencies. The multi-agency
environment of EPIC makes it ideal for the exchange of information and
intelligence.
Additionally, CBP's Office of Intelligence and Operations
Coordination established a National Post Seizure Analysis Team (PSAT)
at the National Targeting Center-Cargo and is in the process of
establishing Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (IOCC) with
the first one under construction in Tucson, Arizona. The IOCCs will
make CBP a more fully integrated, intelligence driven organization by
linking intelligence efforts and products to operations and
interdictions.
Operation Panama Express is an OCDETF initiative, executed through
OCDETF Co-located Strike Forces, in which CBP participates with the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Internal Revenue
Service--Criminal Investigations Division, the U.S. Coast Guard, and
multiple state and local law enforcement agencies in a multi-agency
international drug flow investigation that combines detection and
monitoring, investigative, and intelligence resources to provide
actionable intelligence to Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-
S) operations to interdict the flow of cocaine from northern South
America to the United States. JIATF-S interdiction operations in the
transit zone supported by CBP P-3 Airborne Early Warning, Coast Guard
HC-130, Coast Guard vessels, and CBP P-3 Tracker aircraft interdict
large, sometimes multi-ton, shipments before they can be split into
smaller loads for movement across the southwest border over multiple
routes and distributed to U.S. cities, towns, and small communities.
CBP is also responsible for detecting and preventing unauthorized
incursions into the United States. Toward this end, CBP continues to
work with the Mexican Government in the development of increased law
enforcement surveillance and interdiction capabilities. Detection of
U.S./Mexican border air intrusions is essential to effective
interdiction operations along our borders with Mexico. The primary
means of detection is a large radar network, monitored at the Air and
Marine Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside, California. Information
is fed to the AMOC through a network of airborne early warning,
aerostat, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and ground based radar
systems. Personnel at the AMOC detect aircraft ``short landings'' and
border penetrations and coordinate CBP and Mexican interdiction assets
to intercept, track, and apprehend smugglers as they transverse the
U.S./Mexico border.
The Government of Mexico maintains a strong commitment to
interdiction. CBP will continue to assist the Government of Mexico in
its counterdrug effort, including Command, Control, Communications, and
Information support.
intelligence and operational coordination
CBP continues to evolve into a more integrated, intelligence-driven
organization and we are in the process of establishing a robust field
organization. The CBP Office Intelligence and Operations Coordination
is in the process of developing capabilities which will integrate CBP
intelligence and operational elements for more effective command and
control, mission deployment, and allocation of resources.
Intelligence gathering and predictive analysis require new
collection and processing capabilities. CBP is also developing the
Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI), a set of data processing
tools that will improve the effectiveness of CBP and other DHS analysts
in detecting, locating, and analyzing terrorist networks, drug
trafficking networks, and other threats. These intelligence and
operational coordination initiatives complement the Secure Border
Initiative's (SBI) technology programs.
southwest border initiative
In March, Secretary Napolitano announced a far-reaching Southwest
Border Initiative to crack down on Mexican drug cartels through
enhanced border security, including the deployment of hundreds of new
personnel, enhanced intelligence technology that will maximize
capabilities and better coordination with other federal law enforcement
entities such as the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, DEA, and FBI as well as state, local, and Mexican
law enforcement authorities. The Secretary's initiative calls for a
number of CBP actions:
Initiates 100 percent southbound rail scanning--Customs and Border
Protection formerly did not screen any of the cargo traveling by rail
from the United States into Mexico; it is now scanning all of rail
cargo for weapons, ammunition, and currency. Existing non-intrusive
inspection equipment is being used to detect contraband in cargo on
each of the eight rail crossings on the southwest border.
Adds Border Patrol Agents--CBP is placing 100 more Border Patrol
agents at southwestern ports of entry to bolster outbound inspections
from the U.S. into Mexico in order to detect arms and bulk-cash
smuggling. In the past, the Border Patrol has not ordinarily served in
this capacity.
Adds Mobile Response Teams--Three Mobile Response Teams of 25 CBP
officers each are periodically deploying to the southwest border to
participate in focused operations developed to combat arms and bulk
cash smuggling.
Augments Search Technologies--An additional nine Z-Backscatter
mobile X-ray units have been moved to the southwest border to help CBP
identify anomalies in passenger vehicles.
Engages Canine Teams--A total of twelve teams of ``cross-trained''
canines--trained to identify both weapons and currency--have been
deployed to the southwest border.
Adds License Plate Readers--Outbound lanes currently equipped with
license plate readers will receive upgraded license plate reader
technology to improve CBP's ability to identify the vehicles of known
or suspected smugglers of cash, weapons, drugs, or persons. This
information is shared with other law enforcement agencies through EPIC
and the OCDETF Fusion Center.
Enhances Operation Stonegarden Grant Funding on the Border--Grant
guidance for the remaining balances in Operation Stonegarden from FY
2006 to FY 2008 will be modified to enhance current state, local, and
tribal law enforcement operations on the southwest border. The new
guidelines will expand the scope of what the funds can be used for,
freeing up to $59 million for state, local, and tribal law enforcement
on the border to pay for additional law enforcement personnel,
operational overtime expenses, and travel or lodging for deployment to
the southwest border.
Actively Engages State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement--DHS is
aggressively reaching out to law enforcement in border communities,
recently conducting a firsthand tour of state and local law enforcement
operations along the southwest border and leading bi-monthly conference
calls with chiefs of police and sheriffs in a classified setting.
conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to describe our plans for border
security and to highlight some of our progress to date. With your
continued support of CBP, I am confident that we will continue to make
tremendous strides in increasing control of our borders.
I look forward to your questions.
__________
Mr. Scott. Ms. Ayala.
TESTIMONY OF JANICE AYALA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Ayala. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of
Secretary Napolitano and Acting Assistant Secretary Torres, I
thank you for the opportunity to discuss ICE's efforts to
combat cross-border violence and crime and related violence.
ICE has the most expansive investigative authority and the
largest force of investigators within DHS, but this challenge
cannot be addressed by any one agency. Partnerships are
essential, and ICE works closely with foreign, Federal, tribal,
State, and local agencies to secure our borders, including the
agencies that my colleagues here today represent.
DHS recognizes that southbound weapons smuggling is of
grave concern amid growing violence along our border with
Mexico. This violence requires a comprehensive bilateral
effort. On January 30, Secretary Napolitano responded by
issuing a Border Security Action Directive, which focused the
wide-ranging authorities of the Department on the violence
along our southern border. The Secretary emphasized the
necessity of a broad, multiagency response to attack the flow
of weapons and money that continues to fuel the violence.
ICE contributes to the spike principally through two
bilateral initiatives: Operation Firewall, to counter bulk cash
smuggling, as well as Operation Armas Cruzadas, to counter
weapons smuggling. The ICE-led Border Enforcement Security Task
Forces provide a comprehensive, multiagency platform to fight
these particular threats.
Under Armas Cruzadas, U.S. and Mexican investigators
synchronize bilateral law enforcement and intelligence-sharing
activities in order to detect, disrupt and dismantle these
weapons-smuggling networks. Key supporting actions include use
of ICE's longstanding authorities under the Arms Export Control
Act, as well as newly acquired export authority that is
particularly useful in targeting these weapons-smuggling
networks.
To more seamlessly investigate these networks that span our
common border, BEST, ICE attache offices, a U.S.-vetted Mexican
arms trafficking group, and the ICE Border Violence
Intelligence Cell exchange weapons-related intelligence. For
example, in August of last year, an ICE investigation developed
information that was rapidly shared with Mexican investigators
regarding a safe house in Nogales, Sonora, used by cartel
hitmen. A subsequent search resulted in 6 arrests, a seizure of
police uniforms, a large amount of U.S. currency, 12 weapons,
and 4 stolen U.S. vehicles.
Intelligence stemming from single actions like this is
analyzed by the BVIC, who, in conjunction with other DHS
intelligence components, produce a strategic assessment focused
on southbound weapons smuggling.
Let me show you another example of how ICE partners with
others in combating weapons smuggling. ICE, ATF and the San
Antonio Police Department initiated an investigation of Ernesto
Olvera-Garza, a Mexican national at the time of his arrest in
October 2007, trafficking high-powered, high-capacity handguns
and assault rifles. He led a gun-smuggling conspiracy that
purchased and smuggled more than 50 weapons into Mexico. One of
these weapons was recovered after it was used in a gun battle
where two Mexican soldiers were killed. Olvera-Garza pleaded
guilty to violations of Title XVIII, U.S.C. 554, 922 and 371,
and he has been sentenced to 144 months incarceration.
Since the initiation of Armas Cruzadas, over 1,440 weapons
and over 122,000 rounds of ammunition have been seized and over
329 individuals arrested.
One of the most effective methods in dealing with violent,
transnational, criminal organizations is to track the criminal
proceeds that fund their operations. As we have hardened formal
financial systems throughout the United States, the smuggling
of bulk currency out of the country has been on the rise. ICE
investigates bulk-cash smuggling as part of its border crime
portfolio.
ICE and CBP conduct Operation Firewall interdiction
operations, investigations with Mexican Customs, and ICE trains
Mexican money-laundering vetted units. Since its inception,
Firewall has seized over $195 million, including $64 million
seized overseas in more than 452 arrests.
The principal investigative platform for both Armas
Cruzadas and Firewall are the 10 multiagency BESTs located
along high-threat smuggling corridors along the southwest
border. Created to specifically address border violence, these
BESTs concentrate on top threats within their geographic areas,
including weapons, bulk cash, narcotics and alien smuggling.
Through BEST, we have dismantled arms trafficking, human
trafficking, bulk cash, alien and narcotics smuggling
organizations, and their hostage-taking and murder-kidnapping
cells in the United States and in Mexico.
Since July of 2005, BESTs have been responsible for more
than 5,100 arrests and for the seizure of about 190,000 pounds
of narcotics, of thousands of weapons, and of almost $25
million in U.S. currency.
ICE is committed to effective cross-border communication
and information sharing to stem binational criminal activity
and its associated violence through the deployment of BESTs,
Operation Armas Cruzadas and Operation Firewall. By partnering
with other law-enforcement agencies, we are able to use a broad
range of authorities, including the most sophisticated
investigative tools, to respond to and to conduct our
investigations.
Once again, I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its
continued support of ICE in our law-enforcement mission, and I
would be happy to answer any questions that you may have at
this time.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ayala follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janice Ayala
introduction
Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee:
On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Acting Assistant Secretary
Torres, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) efforts to combat cross-
border smuggling organizations and the violence related to their
enterprises. ICE has the most expansive investigative authority and
largest force of investigators in the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and we protect national security and uphold public safety by
targeting transnational criminal networks and terrorist organizations
that seek to exploit vulnerabilities at our borders. Recognizing that
partnerships are essential, ICE works closely across agency and
international boundaries with our law enforcement partners at the
foreign, federal, tribal, state and local level creating a transparent
border and united front to disrupt and dismantle criminal
organizations.
ICE's expertise in combating smuggling organizations that exploit
vulnerabilities in the sea, air, and land environments has proven
essential in countering the bi-lateral smuggling of narcotics, illicit
money, and other dangerous goods, people, and materials that threaten
the well-being of the United States. Our law enforcement presence
extends beyond our borders. ICE has agents in attache offices in
embassies and consulates worldwide. I am proud of these agents who work
with their foreign counterparts to combat crime that originates
overseas but may eventually cross the Nation's borders.
Let me share with you an example of the mutual security benefits we
continue to derive through our partnerships with Mexican law
enforcement agencies such as Secretaria de Seguridad Publica (SSP). In
August 2008, ICE agents provided confidential information to SSP
through our Assistant Attache in Hermosillo, Mexico about a residence
allegedly used to store weapons and narcotics and which was believed to
be a safe house for security personnel (``hit men'') for the Vicente
Carrillo Fuentes drug trafficking organization (DTO) operating in
Nogales, Sonora. SSP executed a search warrant at this residence that
resulted in six arrests, the seizure of police uniforms, a large amount
of U.S. currency, 12 weapons, and four stolen U.S. vehicles. The six
people arrested are suspected of being involved in two separate crimes:
first, an armed confrontation on August 5, 2008, in Nogales, Sonora
where a civilian was injured after a grenade was detonated during a
shootout between two DTOs, and second, the murder of two Mexican
nationals whose bodies were found with threatening messages from rival
narcotics traffickers.
DHS recognizes that southbound weapons smuggling is a grave concern
amid the growing violence along our border with Mexico. This violence
requires a comprehensive, bilateral effort and on January 30, 2009,
Secretary Napolitano responded by issuing a Border Security Action
Directive which focused the wide-ranging authorities of the Department
on the rampant violence along our Southwest Border. On March 24, she
announced several Southwest Border initiatives designed to crack down
on Mexican drug cartels through enhanced border security. The plan
calls for additional personnel, increased intelligence capability and
better coordination with state, local and Mexican law enforcement
authorities. With violence escalating across the border, DHS will
increase personnel and improve screening and technology to help Mexico
target illegal guns, drugs and cash.
The Secretary emphasized the necessity of a broad, multi-agency
response to attack the flow of weapons and money that continues to fuel
the violence. ICE contributes to that fight through two principal
bilateral initiatives: Operation Firewall to address bulk cash
smuggling; and Operation Armas Cruzadas, to detect, disrupt and
dismantle weapons smuggling networks. Particularly in Armas Cruzadas,
ICE-led Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs) function as
critical enablers in coordinating a comprehensive, multi-agency
approach to fighting weapons smuggling. These DHS task forces include
important partners such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and other foreign,
federal, state and local task force officers. When it comes to
countering the illicit weapons trade in particular, we closely
coordinate our efforts with ATF, as they possess long-standing
expertise in gun trafficking investigations and in engagement with
Federal Firearms Licensees.
Armas Cruzadas:
The rampant border violence along the United States/Mexico border
is a direct result of criminal organizations attempting to exert their
control over not only the democratically elected officials of the
Mexican government but also rival criminal organizations. For instance,
many of the instruments of this violence are weapons smuggled from the
United States into Mexico.
Criminal organizations commonly use straw purchasers with clean
criminal histories to purchase firearms and turn them over to
smugglers. The challenge in countering the smuggling activity is
compounded by the reliance on the technique called ``ant trafficking,''
where small numbers of weapons are smuggled through multiple ports-of-
entry, on a continued basis.
In June 2008, ICE formally launched Operation Armas Cruzadas to
combat transnational criminal networks smuggling weapons into Mexico
from the United States. As part of this initiative, the United States
and the Government of Mexico (GoM) synchronize bilateral interdiction,
investigation and intelligence-sharing activities to identify, disrupt,
and dismantle these networks engaged in weapons smuggling. Key
components of Armas Cruzadas include training for BEST task force
officers and our partners in ICE's long-standing authorities under the
Arms Export Control Act, as well as newly-acquired export authority
under Title 18, United States Code, Section 554 (Smuggling goods from
the United States). This statute augments the broad arsenal of cross-
border criminal authorities available to ICE investigators, and is
particularly useful in targeting weapons smuggling. Another important
Armas Cruzadas component is industry outreach, including presentations
to groups involved in the manufacture, sale, or shipment of firearms
and ammunition along the southwest border. This industry outreach
includes a collaborative initiative between ICE and Mexico's
Procuraduria General de La Republica (PGR) prosecutors to produce
bilingual posters identifying potential penalties for weapons smugglers
under U.S. export and Mexican gun trafficking laws. The posters solicit
the public for information related to these schemes, and are displayed
in shops and agencies in the border region, including ports-of-entry.
The Government of Mexico has also distributed these posters within
Mexico.
In addition to outreach, more rapid exchange of information is
essential to success in confronting the southbound weapons flow. Armas
Cruzadas strengthens bilateral communication through deployment of ICE
Border Liaisons to sustain cooperative working relationships with
foreign and domestic government entities; and also through a Weapons
Virtual Task Force, comprised of a virtual online community where U.S.
and Mexican investigators can share intelligence and communicate in a
secure environment. In order to more seamlessly investigate the
networks that span our common border, BESTs, ICE attache offices, a
U.S.-vetted GoM Arms Trafficking Group, and the Border Violence
Intelligence Cell exchange cross-border weapons-related intelligence.
The Border Violence Intelligence Cell, housed at the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), along with the ATF weapons desk, serves as
ICE's central point for analyzing all-source intelligence and trends in
firearms smuggling. In December of last year, this cell, in conjunction
with DHS intelligence components, produced a strategic assessment of
southbound weapons smuggling that guided increased weapons
investigation and interdiction operations along the Southwest Border.
Let me share an example of how ICE partners with others, such as
ATF and local investigators, in combating weapons smuggling. ICE, ATF,
and the San Antonio Police Department initiated an investigation of
Ernesto Tornel Olvera-Garza of Monterrey, Mexico who first began
trafficking in hunting rifles in June 2005. During the course of the
investigation, agents learned that between 2006 and the time of his
arrest in October 2007, he trafficked in high-powered, high-capacity
handguns and assault rifles. Since his temporary visa did not allow him
to legally buy guns in the United States,
Mr. Olvera-Garza instead paid people in the United States to buy
guns for him and lied about who the guns were for. Mr. Olvera-Garza
organized and led the gun-smuggling conspiracy, which included at least
nine ``straw purchasers'' who purchased firearms on his behalf. More
than 50 weapons were purchased and smuggled to Mexico as part of this
ring. One of Mr. Olvera-Garza's smuggled pistols was recovered in
Mexico after it was used in a running gun battle where two Mexican
soldiers were killed. Mr. Olvera-Garza has pleaded guilty and is
pending sentencing.
Since the initiation of Operations Armas Cruzadas, DHS has seized
1,440 weapons, 122,410 rounds of ammunition and arrested 329
individuals on criminal charges, resulting in 94 criminal indictments
and 51 convictions to date.
Operation Firewall:
Another, and one of the most effective methods to deal with
violent, transnational criminal organizations is to attack the criminal
proceeds that fund their operations. ICE targets those individuals and
organizations exploiting vulnerabilities in financial systems to
launder illicit proceeds and pursue the financial component of every
cross-border criminal investigation. The combination of successful
financial investigations, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) reporting
requirements, and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) compliance efforts by
traditional and non-traditional financial institutions has forced
criminal organizations to seek other means to transport illicit funds
across our borders. As we have hardened these formal financial systems,
the smuggling of bulk currency out of the United States, especially
along the Southwest Border, has continued to rise. ICE, as the
investigative agency with jurisdiction over all border crimes, can
investigate bulk cash smuggling (BCS) crimes, which are predicated on
the failure to file a Currency and Monetary Instrument Report (CMIR).
The ICE Office of Investigations (OI), along with the ICE Office of
International Affairs (OIA) and CBP, coordinates with our state, local,
and foreign partners on BCS operations. These operations disrupt the
flow of bulk cash that can be used by terrorist groups, drug
traffickers, and other criminal organizations. ICE, in concert with
CBP, also provides money laundering training and BCS interdiction
equipment to our law enforcement partners in the United States and
abroad.
ICE has a number of initiatives to address BCS. Operation Firewall
focuses on the threat of BCS via commercial and private passenger
vehicles, commercial airline shipments, airline passengers, and
pedestrians. Since 2005, Operation Firewall efforts have been enhanced
to include jump team surge operations targeting the movement of bulk
cash destined for the southwest border for smuggling into Mexico. ICE
and CBP have conducted various Operation Firewall operations with
Mexican customs and the ICE-trained Mexican Money Laundering Vetted
Unit. Many Operation Firewall seizures result in criminal
investigations to identify the source of the funds and the responsible
organizations.
ICE's experience in conducting international money laundering
investigations has identified numerous smuggling routes and
methodologies used by criminal organizations to launder illicit
proceeds. This experience enables ICE, CBP, and our domestic and
international partners to concentrate resources. Initially, Firewall
operations in Mexico focused on the targeting of commercial flights
from Mexico City to Central and South America. In 2008, based on our
experience, we expanded Mexico Firewall operations to target shipments
in containers departing from the seaport of Manzanillo and the airports
of Tuluca, Mexicali, Cancun, and Guadalajara. Throughout operations in
Mexico, ICE and CBP personnel have trained our Mexican law enforcement
partners on passenger analysis and investigative techniques proven
effective in the United States.
Operation Firewall produced immediate results. On the first day of
operations in 2005 at the Benito Juarez International Airport in Mexico
City, Mexican authorities seized $7.8 million en route to Cali,
Colombia concealed inside deep fryers, rotisseries, and voltage
regulators. Other notable seizures include $7.3 million seized inside
rolls of fabric and plastic and $4.7 million concealed inside air
conditioning equipment and metal piping destined for Colombia.
Since its inception, Operation Firewall has resulted in the seizure
of over $195 million including over $64 million seized overseas, and
452 arrests.
On June 26, 2008, Rafael Ravelo, a member of a Mexican based
narcotics trafficking organization, was sentenced to 126 months of
incarceration and the forfeiture of $1,147,000. This sentence was the
result of the ICE-led Operation Doughboy, an investigation that was
initiated prior to Operation Firewall, based on a bulk cash smuggling
interdiction. This joint U.S./Mexico investigation involved the
monitoring of 18 phone lines of the heads of a Mexican narcotics
trafficking organization and began when ICE agents in 2003 successfully
linked a $149,000 bulk cash seizure by the Texas Department of Public
Safety to the narcotics trafficking organization.
Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST):
As I mentioned before, the principal investigative platform for
both Operations Armas Cruzadas and Firewall are the Border Enforcement
Security Task Forces (BESTs). These task forces were specifically
created to address border violence.
In July 2005, in response to increased violence in Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico and Laredo, Texas, ICE, CBP and other federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies, including Mexican agencies, expanded the
ongoing Border Crimes Initiative by creating an international, multi-
agency initiative, Operation Black Jack. This initiative used the
respective authorities and resources of its members to dismantle cross-
border criminal organizations. In its first six months, its target-
driven focus led to the dismantling of a murder/kidnapping cell
operating on both sides of the border, including the seizure of high-
powered fully automatic weapons and live grenades; the components to
make over 100 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), such as pipe bombs
and grenades; and over $1 million in U.S. currency.
Based on the success of Operation Black Jack, DHS established the
first BEST in Laredo, Texas in January 2006. Since that time, we have
established 12 BESTs: eight on the Southwest Border; two on the
Northern Border; and two at seaports. BEST participants include: ICE
(as the lead agency); CBP; ATF; the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the U.S. Coast Guard;
the U.S. Attorney's Office; and other federal, state, local and foreign
law enforcement.
The BESTs are arrayed along the Southwest Border in high-threat
smuggling corridors in: Arizona--Tucson (March 2006), Phoenix (March
2008), and Yuma (March 2008); Texas--El Paso (October 2006) and Rio
Grande Valley (March 2007); California--San Diego (November 2006) and
Imperial Valley (June 2008); and New Mexico--Deming (March 2009) and
Las Cruces (March 2009). In early 2008, the first Northern Border BESTs
initiated operations in Blaine, Washington (February 2008) and Buffalo,
New York (March 2008). Each BEST concentrates on the prevalent threat
in its geographic area, including: cross-border violence; weapons
smuggling and trafficking; illegal drug and other contraband smuggling;
money laundering and bulk cash smuggling; human smuggling and
trafficking; transnational criminal gangs; and tunnel detection.
Recently, we established BESTs at the seaports of Los Angeles,
California (October 2008), and Miami, Florida (November 2008) to focus
on maritime threats including the importation of contraband; commercial
fraud; cargo theft; unlawful exportation of controlled commodities and
munitions; stolen property; alien smuggling; and exportation of illicit
proceeds. These BESTs will target internal conspiracies of corrupt
transportation employees who participate in the smuggling of contraband
and humans. Crucial to our success is the cooperation of our
international partners. At BESTs on the Southwest Border, we have the
participation of the Mexican law enforcement agency, SSP. On the
Northern Border and in the northern BESTs, we have Canadian law
enforcement agencies such as the Canada Border Services Agency, the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, the
Niagara Regional Police Service, and the Toronto Metropolitan Police
Service. In addition, we have the participation of the Argentinean
customs agency at our Miami BEST. Through the interaction and
coordination of all the member agencies, BESTs provide for immediate
and international enhanced information sharing on border violence due
to geographic proximity to the U.S. borders.
Through BESTs, we have dismantled arms trafficking, bulk-cash,
alien and narcotics smuggling organizations and their hostage-taking
and murder/kidnapping cells in the United States and Mexico. Since July
2005, the BESTs have been responsible for 2,238 criminal arrests, 2,924
administrative arrests, 1,014 indictments, and 846 convictions. In
addition, BESTs have seized approximately 9,070 pounds of cocaine,
179,739 pounds of marijuana, 702 pounds of methamphetamine, 99 pounds
of crystal methamphetamine, 1,161 pounds of ecstasy, 243 pounds of
heroin, 97 pounds of hashish, 22 pounds of opium, 2,075 weapons, 820
vehicles, seven properties, and $24.7 million in U.S. currency and
monetary instruments.
I would like to share a few of our successes with you: the
discovery and repatriation by the El Paso BEST of one of Mexico's top
ten most wanted fugitives; the arrest by the Laredo BEST of a weapons
trafficker supplying cartels with assault rifles used to murder Mexican
police officer Navarro Rincon and others; the arrest by the Laredo BEST
of a member of the Mexican Mafia in possession of approximately 897
pounds of smuggled marijuana after he attempted to run over a Texas
Department of Public Safety officer; and the arrest by the Los Angeles
Seaport BEST of an arms trafficker and seizure of 38 military style
weapons.
conclusion
In conclusion, ICE is committed to stemming the cross-border
criminal activity and associated violence through the deployment of the
BESTs, Operation Armas Cruzadas, and Operation Firewall. Partnering
with others, we are using a broad range of authorities, including the
most sophisticated investigative tools available, such as certified
undercover operations and electronic surveillance operations, to
disrupt and dismantle these networks.
I thank the Subcommittee Members for their support of ICE, CBP, DHS
and our law enforcement mission. I would be happy to answer any
questions that you may have at this time.
__________
Mr. Scott. Mr. Placido.
TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY P. PLACIDO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Placido. Good afternoon.
Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to
discuss the Drug Enforcement Administration's views addressing
the violence that is being generated by entrenched criminal
organizations based in Mexico, as well as the potential impact
of this violence on Americans and on our regional partners. It
is vitally important that we accurately describe this problem
before we invest taxpayer funds or craft programmatic solutions
to deal with it.
Mexico-based drug-trafficking organizations have, over a
period of many years, become so powerful that they represent a
significant threat to the very authority of the Mexican state.
Through the use of corruption, intimidation and violence, these
organizations have for far too long been able to act with
virtual impunity and to use Mexico as a base of operations from
which to run a global criminal enterprise that has adverse
consequences for the United States, for Mexico and, indeed, for
the world.
Mexican drug-trafficking organizations now dominate
wholesale and retail drug distribution throughout the United
States. Their impact is felt far beyond our southwest border.
The contraband drugs entering the United States from Mexico,
the drug proceeds and the weapons entering Mexico from the
United States, and the related violence are but symptoms of the
larger disease. In fact, it is a mistake, in our view at DEA,
to geographically limit this problem or to characterize it as a
``border problem'' per se.
The task in responding to this pervasive threat is to build
a comprehensive, whole-of-government response that is fully
integrated with Mexico and our regional partners to attack the
problem--the disease--rather than merely mitigating the
symptoms. This will require the better coordination of the U.S.
interagency effort, not just better coordination between the
United States and Mexico.
The importance of focusing on the criminal organizations
rather than overemphasizing geography can best be made by
examining the supply chain for cocaine. The U.S. interagency
estimates, I think, that were quoted here earlier indicate that
approximately 91 percent of the cocaine abused in the United
States actually transits Mexico before it arrives. The seizure
of that cocaine in the transit zone, by which I mean the area
from the north coast of Colombia up to Mexico, is measured by
the metric ton. For seizures of cocaine at our southwest
border, the average seizure is only 47 pounds.
This tells us two important things, at least, from an
intelligence perspective. First, we can be far more effective
extending our operations south of the border and seizing the
contraband in larger quantities, but probably much more
important for our purposes is that the organizations--the
people who organize, finance, direct, and control this
enterprise--have for far too long operated, at least prior to
the Calderon administration, with impunity, and have used
Mexico as a base of operations. These criminal power brokers do
not personally handle the drugs. They are not the individuals
who are smuggling drugs across their border, but they must be
dealt with if we are going to make America safer.
While I have no intention of downplaying the important work
done at our borders, we did not need an historic opportunity
for engagement with Mexico to buttress security at the border.
The strategic opening that we now have with Mexico offers an
unprecedented opportunity to achieve defense in depth by
denying safe haven to criminal organizations that previously
operated with impunity from Mexico. Denying safe haven to these
traffickers in Mexico will, over time, reduce the flow of
contraband and violence from Mexico.
The Merida Initiative is a strategy that is focused on
attacking criminal organizations, not geography. The goal of
the Merida Initiative is to assist the Calderon administration
in breaking the power and impunity to the cartels, while
simultaneously fortifying Mexican Government institutions and
infrastructure, essentially transforming what has become a
national security crisis that has required Mexico to engage
tens of thousands of military troops to maintain order into a
problem that can be adequately managed with an enhanced Mexican
criminal justice system.
This is the problem we face, and it is the problem that we
can solve in the next 4 years if we can maintain our focus. We
are fortunate to have willing and increasingly capable partners
in the Calderon administration to address such a formidable
task. With our help, President Calderon and his administration
are relentlessly attacking the criminal organizations that have
caused so much violence and destruction.
They have made arrests of important leaders from all of
Mexico's cartels. These are the people who are responsible for
systematically corrupting public institutions and officials,
for undermining the rule of law and democratic governance and
for challenging regional stability. These are the kingpins who
organize, finance, direct, and control the criminal activity
that affects us in the form of contraband, drugs and violence.
The Calderon administration has extradited more than 178
defendants to face U.S. justice, and it is reforming its own
institutions to better address these criminals in Mexico. We
are already seeing indications of success here at home. For the
2-year period from January of 2007 to December of 2008, which
essentially corresponds directly with the tenure of President
Calderon, we have seen the price per pure gram of cocaine more
than double, up 104 percent in the United States, while the
purity of that drug has plummeted almost 35 percent.
We have listened to judicially authorized intercepts of
conversations between Mexican cartel members in which they
describe the unprecedented stress being placed against them by
the Calderon administration. Unfortunately, as the Government
of Mexico's offensive has dramatically increased the pressure
against these criminal organizations, the cartels have
responded violently in a desperate attempt to preserve their
illegal enterprise. As unfortunate as this violence is, it is
not a harbinger of failure, but, rather, a signpost of success.
Mexico must stay the course, and it is in America's best
interest to help them in that endeavor.
While intra- and intercartel violence has always been
associated with the Mexican drug trade, the cartels are now
intentionally targeting Mexican Government officials and
innocent civilians. This violence, including the brutal murder
of public officials in Mexico, is intended--these mutilated
bodies and signs warning of even more graphic violence if they
do not break the attack against these organizations is intended
to break the public's will to support President Calderon's
offensive. President Calderon's determination and resolve to
press forward in spite of the sustained wave of brutal violence
is commendable, but it has prompted many to examine the
potential for spillover effects here in the United States.
Mr. Scott. Sir, could you begin wrapping it up?
Mr. Placido. I will wrap it up, sir, by saying that we must
seize this unprecedented opportunity to help Mexico take the
fight to the criminal organizations, and that helping them play
offense is the best way for us to defend America.
Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Hoover.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM J. HOOVER, ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
Mr. Hoover. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Smith and other
distinguished Members of the Committee, I am William Hoover,
the Acting Deputy Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives. On behalf of Acting Director Ken
Melson, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss
ATF's ongoing role in preventing firearms from being illegally
trafficked from the United States into Mexico and in working to
reduce the associated violence along the border.
For over 30 years, the ATF has been protecting our citizens
and communities from violent criminals and criminal
organizations by safeguarding them from the illegal use of
firearms and explosives. We are responsible for both regulating
the firearms and explosives industries and for enforcing
criminal laws relating to those commodities. ATF has the
experience, expertise, tools, and commitment to investigate and
to disrupt groups and individuals who obtain guns in the United
States and illegally traffic them into Mexico.
The combination of ATF's crime-fighting expertise, specific
statutory and regulatory authority, analytical capability, and
strategic partnerships is used to combat firearms trafficking
both along the U.S. borders and throughout the Nation. For
instance, from fiscal year 2004 through February 17 of this
year, Project Gunrunner, which is ATF's strategy for disrupting
the flow of firearms to Mexico, has referred over 790 cases for
prosecution involving 1,658 defendants. Those cases include 382
for firearms trafficking, which involve 1,035 defendants and an
estimate of almost 13,000 firearms.
While the greatest proportion of firearms traffic to Mexico
originates out of the States along the southwest border, ATF
trace data has established that traffickers are also acquiring
firearms from other States as far east as Florida and as far
north and west as Washington State. A case from April 2008
involving a violent shootout that resulted in 13 deaths
illustrates this point. ATF traced 60 firearms recovered at a
crime scene in Tijuana. As a result, leads have been forwarded
to ATF field divisions in Denver, Houston, Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Francisco, and Seattle to interview
the first known purchasers of these firearms. These
investigations continue.
Additionally, drug traffickers are known to supplement
their firearms cash with explosives. Our expertise with
explosives has proven to be another valuable tool to use in the
fight against drug cartels. In fact, in the past 6 months, we
have noted a troubling increase in the number of grenades
seized from or used by drug traffickers. We are concerned about
the possibility of explosives-related violence materializing in
our U.S. border towns. We have had at least one such incident
in San Juan, Texas, when a hand grenade was thrown into a crowd
of 20 patrons. ATF was able to identify that grenade and
believes it was linked to a Mexican drug cartel. We believe
these devices were from the same source as those used during an
attack on our U.S. consulate in Monterrey, Mexico.
Along the southwest border, ATF's Project Gunrunner
includes approximately 148 special agents dedicated to
investigating firearms trafficking. Fifty-nine industry
operation investigators are responsible for conducting
regulatory inspections of federally licensed gun dealers, known
as Federal Firearms Licensees, or FFLs. Just last week we sent
over 100 additional personnel to the Houston field division to
support our push against the trafficking of firearms to Mexico.
As the sole agency that regulates the FFLs, roughly 7,000
of whom are along the southwest border, the ATF has the
statutory authority to inspect and examine the records and the
inventory of licensees for firearms trafficking trends and
patterns and to revoke the licenses of those who are complicit
in firearms trafficking.
For instance, ATF used its regulatory authority to review
the records of an FFL who received close to 2,000 firearms, who
removed their serial numbers, and who then trafficked them to
Mexico with the aid of a coconspirator who resided in Mexico.
ATF recovered over $120,000 in cash and 89 firearms, 8 of which
had obliterated serial numbers, from the FFL. The ATF conducted
a buy-bust operation with the Mexican contact, at which time he
was also arrested. A review of records from the wholesalers
confirmed that the FFL had received 1,869 firearms.
An essential component of ATF's strategy to curtail
firearms trafficking to Mexico is the tracing of firearms
seized in both countries. Using this information, ATF can
establish the identity of the first retail purchaser of the
firearm and possibly learn pertinent information, such as how
the gun came to be used in the furtherance of a crime or how it
came to be located in Mexico. Furthermore, analysis of
aggregate trace data can reveal trafficking trends and
networks, showing where the guns are being purchased, who is
purchasing them and how they flow across the border.
Let me share an example of how trace data can identify a
firearms trafficker. ATF's analysis of trace data linked a man
living in a U.S. city along the border to three crime guns
recovered at three different crime scenes in Mexico. Further
investigation uncovered that he was the purchaser of a fourth
firearm recovered at yet another crime scene in Mexico, and
that he had purchased over 100 AR-15-type receivers and 7
additional firearms within a short time span, using 9 different
FFL wholesale distributors as the sources for his firearms. In
April 2008, ATF seized 80 firearms from the suspect, and
learned that he was manufacturing guns in his home. He sold
over 100 guns alone to an individual who was suspected of being
linked to a cartel. These investigative leads are also being
pursued.
Lastly, I would like to mention ATF's operational presence
at the El Paso Intelligence Center, or EPIC, located in El
Paso, Texas. EPIC is certainly one of the most valuable tools
for intelligence sharing and for the coordination and
multiagency efforts to curb violence and firearms trafficking
activities along the southwest border.
At EPIC we operate what is known as the ATF gun desk. The
mission of the n desk is to identify and analyze all firearms-
and explosives-related data acquired and collected from law
enforcement and open sources. This would include Mexican
military and law enforcement, along with U.S. law enforcement
assets operating on both sides of the border.
Chairman Scott and the other distinguished Members of this
Committee, on behalf of the men and women of ATF, I thank you
and your staffs for your continued support of our crucial work.
With the backing of this Committee, ATF can continue to fight
violent crime in the Nation's cities and on our borders, making
our Nation even more secure.
Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
We will recognize ourselves for 5 minutes for questions.
I will recognize the presence of the gentleman, our
colleague from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte, who has come in.
I recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Hoover, you indicated that you used firearm records to
trace many of these. Can you indicate the impact of the Tiahrt
amendment on sharing trace data and on the requirement that
records not be kept more than--what is it--90 days? What impact
has that had on your ability to investigate crimes?
Mr. Hoover. The Tiahrt amendment allows us to share
information with the agency that provided the trace data. It
does not allow us to share information with anyone other than
that agency. If the other agencies would like to request to use
that data, then they have to go through the agency that
submitted it to ATF for the trace.
Mr. Scott. How does that affect the ability to investigate
crimes?
Mr. Hoover. It does not impact our ability to investigate
crimes. It would simply cause those agencies, other than the
requesting agency, to use that agency's information to
investigate that specific firearm trafficking.
Mr. Scott. So we should not be concerned about that?
Mr. Hoover. It has not been an issue at this point with law
enforcement, no, sir.
Mr. Scott. What about the length of time licensees have to
keep the records?
Mr. Hoover. The licensees keep their records forever, and
when they go out of business, they give the information to ATF,
to our out-of-business records, and we maintain the record on
that sale if that licensee goes out of business.
Mr. Scott. What is the provision that some records are only
kept for----
Mr. Hoover. That is part of the NICS Improvement Act, sir,
I believe, where NICS records are only allowed to be kept for a
certain portion of the time.
Mr. Scott. For about 90 days?
Mr. Hoover. I am not sure. I would have to get that answer
for you, sir.
Mr. Scott. Does anybody know?
But that is not----
Mr. Hoover. It is the Brady check, sir, that is kept for 90
days, and then those records are destroyed.
Mr. Scott. That would not be helpful to keep those records
longer?
Mr. Hoover. It may be, sir. I would have to check into that
and get the information back to you.
Mr. Scott. But that is not anything that you are asking?
Mr. Hoover. No, sir.
Mr. Scott. Okay. You said you had 1,035 people who were
caught. Did I understand that right?
Mr. Hoover. One thousand thirty-five defendants with those
trafficking investigations, yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. What happened to them? What was the disposition
of those cases?
Mr. Hoover. They would have been sentenced for various
lengths of time through our judicial proceedings. I do not have
the exact sentences for each and every one of those.
Mr. Scott. Do you have an idea? Did they get much time; 6
months, 8 years?
Mr. Hoover. It varies. If it is an (a)(6) violation for
lying and buying, it is somewhere between 12 months to 2 years,
something in that area.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Mr. Nash, you indicated that you had 750
arrests.
Mr. Nash. That was in connection with a single operation.
That was Operation Xcellerator, which came down in March of
this year.
Mr. Scott. What happened to them?
Mr. Nash. The arrests were only made in March of this year.
There are prosecutions that are going forward in at least 30
jurisdictions as a result of that operation. It will take some
time to get the final dispositions. I can represent that none
of those people have been sentenced as of yet.
Mr. Scott. Okay. You indicated that 12,000 pounds of meth
had been captured.
Mr. Nash. That is accurate with respect to Operation
Xcellerator, yes.
Mr. Scott. Do you know how much meth gets through?
Mr. Nash. We do not have a firm estimate on that.
Mr. Scott. Of over 1 million Ecstasy pills, do you know how
many get through?
Mr. Nash. No, sir.
Mr. Scott. Do you know whether you are capturing a
significant portion of what is being shipped?
Mr. Nash. Sir, I think the best indicators as to our
effectiveness are the statistics that were cited by Mr. Placido
in his testimony, which indicate that, with respect to cocaine,
which are the numbers for which we have the firmest and best
statistics, we have right now experienced, for 2 years now, a
sustained increase in both the price that you pay on the street
for a gram of cocaine and a decline in the purity of that
product on the street. As Mr. Placido testified, the price of
that gram has almost doubled in the span of the last 2 years--
or it has more than doubled in the last 2 years. The purity
during that period has declined by 30 percent. We use that as
at least one data point to suggest that our efforts are having
a considerable effect on the availability of drugs on the
streets of the United States.
Mr. Scott. Well, that affects the price. Does it affect the
availability? I mean, has anybody gone to a drug dealer and
been told, ``I just cannot get any today. You have got to wait
until tomorrow or next week to see if we can get a shipment''?
Mr. Nash. Again, as Mr. Placido mentioned, we do have
anecdotal evidence, from listening in through judicialized wire
intercepts to dealers, that people have complained about
shortages; but again, this is a market, and markets operate as
a rationing device. Certainly when we were experiencing
shortages of gasoline, it was not that people could not get
gasoline; it was that the price at the pump went from $2 to $4.
A consequence of that is that people were driving less. The
market for drugs, I would suggest, works similarly to that, and
when the price goes up----
Mr. Scott. Let me give the only couple of seconds I have
left to Mr. Placido to comment on availability.
Mr. Placido. Certainly, sir.
What I can tell you is that on certain drugs such as
cocaine, which is produced from a plant, marijuana or heroin,
we have got estimates about total production. It becomes more
difficult with synthetic drugs of abuse, like methamphetamine
or MDMA.
Just to give you an example that may be responsive to your
question, in 2008, the U.S. Interagency estimated a range of
production between 901 and 1,082 metric tons of cocaine
actually produced. Seizures worldwide were about 528 metric
tons or, roughly, anywhere from 49 to 59 percent of the total
amount of cocaine produced having been seized. So it is a
significant amount. We showed, just by reference in terms of
Mexican heroin, approximately 15 percent of the estimated 18
metric tons produced having been seized, and in terms of
Mexican marijuana, between seizures and eradications, about 21
percent of seizures. So there is some significant work being
done on the enforcement side.
With regard to shifts in price and purity, one of the
things that is particularly important when you talk about
cocaine in particular is as scarcity occurs, that is where you
see the fluctuations in purity. They add adulterants: lactose,
sugar, other commodities. So, not only does the price go up,
but as to the purity of the drug that is being sold, we have
seen a 35 percent drop as well.
So it is an indicator of decreased availability.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
The gentleman from Texas, Judge Poe.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for being here. The purpose of this
hearing is to determine the problem; that is any of the
violence on the border, especially American side. We have
heard, and I have heard personally, from people on the border,
usually politicians, mayors, chambers of commerce; it is not
really a problem on the American side.
I would like for you to look at a chart that is over here.
Can we have the chart please?
I spent a lot of time on the Texas Mexico border talking to
folks like the Border Patrol, the DEA, but also the Texas
border sheriffs. And I asked them to tell me the percentage of
people in their jailhouse that are foreign nationals, that are
not there being held by the Feds on immigration violations
only, but being held with felonies or misdemeanors where they
have been charged in the county.
And you see, starting in El Paso, the statistics vary from,
the El Paso jail has 18 percent foreign nationals; Hudspeth
County, which is the size of Connecticut, vast area, has 90
percent according to Sheriff Arvin West; Culberson County, 22
percent according to Oscar Correo. The next four counties, they
don't keep those records.
Moving on down to Bulverde Count, 93 percent; Kenny County,
71 percent are foreign nationals; Maverick County, 65 percent;
Dimmitt County, 45 percent; Webb County, which is Laredo area,
45 percent; Zapata County, 65 percent; Starr, 53 percent;
Hidalgo, 23 percent; and then the last county that touches the
Gulf of Mexico, Cameron County, with 28 percent.
It seems to me, that is a lot of folks that are from
foreign countries that are in American jails charged with
crimes in the United States, and most of those, no question
about it, are charged with some form of drug crime or carrying
a weapon, according to the sheriffs themselves.
Here are my questions. Regarding, first, Mr. Placido, do
you think the use of the Air National Guard should be increased
or decreased? I rode with the Air National Guard up and down
the Rio Grande river, working with the Border Patrol and
capturing at least one drug interdiction coming across from the
border. Do you think that is something that can work with you
or not?
Mr. Placido. Well, I think there are others at the table
who are probably better qualified to talk about interdiction
than I am. My focus is really investigations. But if the, if
the genesis of your question as I understand it is, could we do
better with additional support to interdict drugs and other
contraband before it enters the country, I think the answer to
that is, yes, sir, I think we could.
Mr. Poe. Let me refer you to a Los Angeles Times article
from last month that said, there is a turf battle going on with
the different Federal agencies and that the effort to stop the
drug cartels and the smugglers has stumbled in part because
Homeland Security and various Justice Department agencies have
overlapping responsibilities and are engaged in turf battles.
The vast majority of ICE agents cannot make drug arrests, even
though the same smugglers are often illegal immigrants. The
reason, the DEA has not authorized the required cross-
designation authority for them.
Is that correct.
Mr. Placido. No, sir. No, sir, and let me begin by telling
you that I think there is good news on the horizon. The
Attorney General of the United States and the Secretary of
Homeland Security have met on this very subject already, and I
believe, I don't want to get out in front of my bosses, but I
believe that a successful resolution is in the offing.
But let me clarify a couple of facts. First of all, every
ICE agent can already make arrests or seize contraband drugs at
the border. The issue is not making arrests or seizures; it is
conducting investigations after that seizure is made and
carrying it forward. There are currently 1,475 or approximately
25 percent of all of the ICE agents that are currently on the
job are cross-designated to conduct those investigations
anywhere in the country they go.
I think what you have heard most recently is a request that
goes beyond that and is a request for concurrent unilateral
authority to investigate drug crimes by ICE. And the issue here
is not whether we can protect America better but how we
coordinate the activity of these different agencies as we move
forward, and I have got a very detailed response if you would
like me to give it here.
Mr. Poe. I am limited on time, but let me cut to the chase;
do you think that ICE should have more responsibility in drug
investigation? I want your opinion.
Mr. Placido. I think if ICE works within the existing
coordination mechanisms that all other Federal agencies use to
coordinate drug investigations, we would welcome their
assistance.
Mr. Poe. All right.
Mr. Hoover, some questions for you at the ATF. I understand
that the Mexican military, Mexican Federal police, the drug
cartels, those are primary the folks that have guns. Regular
citizens, they can't have guns like they do in the United
States. And it seems to me Mexico has a responsibility to
protect their border from guns coming in just like we have a
responsibility from protecting criminals and drugs coming into
the United States. A hundred thousand Mexican soldiers
apparently have deserted with their weapons, weapons made in
Belgium. What is the government of Mexico doing to protect
their border against firearms coming in to their country? And I
am out of time, so this is the last question.
Mr. Hoover. All right, sir. I know that the Mexican
government under Attorney General Medina-Mora has made great
strides, especially in working with the ATF to trace the
firearms that they recover. The vast majority of those traced
are being used in Federal prosecutions and in Mexico, and they
trace those weapons.
I will tell you that we don't know the entire universe of
firearms that are recovered in Mexico. We continue to work with
Mexican authorities to do that, to get that information, so
that we can give better data back to them regarding the where
these firearms are coming from.
I will say that the 90 percent figure came from those
weapons that have been recovered and traced by the officials in
Mexico. The vast majority of that has come through CENAPI,
which is the intelligence branch under PGR, and that is where
we get the vast majority of our information regarding the
weapons recovered in Mexico.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Scott. Gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
holding this hearing.
And I want to thank all of our witnesses for their
participation.
Mr. Nash, I wonder if you could comment on your thoughts on
how we keep this violence from crossing our borders and how we
prevent U.S. Law enforcement and citizens from becoming
targets.
Mr. Nash. Yes, sir. I do think that the appropriate
paradigm to view this through is the fact that these are not
isolated incidents, that these are criminal organizations, a
relatively limited number of criminal organizations, and they
are reacting to the stress that is being placed upon them by
the very heroic efforts of our Mexican partners south of the
border.
We talk about the war on drugs, and to us, it is a
metaphor. In Mexico, it is a reality, and they are experiencing
casualties in connection with that war amongst their law
enforcement, their very heroic law enforcement officers, every
day.
Mr. Goodlatte. Do we prevent it coming into our side of the
border by helping them with their effort?
Mr. Nash. I think that is part of it, and I think that it
has been spoken about by some of the other witnesses already
today, that we have a historic opportunity to work with the
Mexicans and help with the Mexicans because of the orientation
of the current administration down there that has gotten
serious about taking care of this problem.
Mr. Goodlatte. Is most of the violence one drug cartel
fighting one another or drug cartels fighting against law
enforcement?
Mr. Nash. I think the majority is cartel on cartel or also
within cartels. Drug debts that go unsatisfied within a cartel
will often be a reason for violence as well.
I think, right now, the numbers are running at about 10
percent of the homicides south of the border are homicides in
which a victim is a law enforcement representative of Mexico.
But I think there are things we can do on our side of the
border. I think, as I said, our strategy is to put together
task forces that bring the statutory authorities and the
diverse expertise of all of the law enforcement agencies that
you see represented here before you today in a concerted action
to use our intelligence resources to identify where the real
threats are, identify the leadership of those cartels, and then
bring down the organizations in a concerted fashion like the
operation.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you.
I have a couple of other questions. I do appreciate that
answer.
Mr. Nieto, the increase in CBP personnel between 2001 and
2008 should show a reduction of border violence, but instead,
there is an increase. I wonder if you would explain that or
comment on that.
Mr. Nieto. Well, sir, we expect that initially we will have
an increase because we will have more officers and agents out
there. Until we get to the point where we pretty much overtake
that territory again, if you want to call it that, then that
trend starts coming back down. So that is what we attribute it
to.
Mr. Goodlatte. And Ms. Ayala, from what ICE enforcement
activities are agents being--where agents will be redeployed to
the southwest border in order to combat the rising border
violence? Where are they coming from?
Ms. Ayala. Yes. We deployed 95 additional agents to the
southwest border area to backfill agents, and we increased our
attache personnel by 50 percent. We have increased our border
liaison officers who are assigned to border offices and
increased our intelligence commitment to the border by tripling
it.
Mr. Goodlatte. Where are those new agents coming from? Are
they new agents, or are they being reassigned from other areas?
Ms. Ayala. Most of them are temporarily reassigned from
other areas throughout the Nation, and therefore, a certain
period of time. We are waiting to see what resource commitments
permanently we will be making here in the future.
Mr. Goodlatte. Obviously, we are concerned about what is
going on on the border, but I happen to share the belief of
many, including many of my constituents, that not enough is
done by ICE to deal with immigration violations in the interior
of the country and communities like the Shenandoah valley and
the Roanoke Valley and central Virginia, that I represent,
where there is a great deal of activity.
I am not sure we share the same percentages of people in
the jails that Congressman Poe showed along the Texas-Mexico
border, but I do believe you would find a very disproportionate
percentage of the occupants of both State and Federal
facilities in my area and the number of cases going through our
U.S. District Court as well as our State court would show a
disproportionate number of people who are not lawfully in the
United States. So I want to express my concern that, while we
divert people to address this problem, we are neglecting
another problem, and I wonder if you would comment on what is
being done to enhance your enforcement of the immigration laws
in the interior of the country.
Ms. Ayala. Well, typically--this isn't the first time that
we have redeployed assets to the southwest border to address
issues like this. We did send, in 2005, in the same manner to
address the increased violence in the Laredo area, and we were
successful, along with our Mexican partners, in reducing the
murder rate and border violence on both sides of the border.
And we typically assess our needs during the year to decide if
we need to plus up in certain areas based on upcoming large-
scale law enforcement operations, and so forth.
As far as our commitment to smuggling issues or
immigration, as far as our commitment to the southwest border,
most focus on human smuggling and trafficking aspects and
organizations, transnational organizations, that are violent
there, specifically in the Phoenix area, and when we are
looking to pull resources from anywhere within the United
States, we make sure that we pull resources from offices that
are large enough to sustain the loss. It is not like we are
pulling one agent from a two-man office. And if we see a need
to redeploy during that time period, then we do, again,
reassess our needs and redeploy to those areas.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
I would like to inform the gentleman from Florida that I
should have recognized you first. You had gotten here before my
colleague from Virginia, so I apologize. I recognize you at
this time.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am just glad the gentleman from Virginia didn't ask my
question.
I believe this is for Mr. Nieto, but anybody on the panel,
it is a basically straightforward question with regard to
something you have all heard of, the Security Fence Act, and
you know that is 800 miles of--required 800 miles of fencing
across the border. And I am wondering just basically, obviously
the fence is not complete. In your opinion, would the
completion of the border fence as required by the act have an
effect on the decrease in flow of drugs, and therefore possibly
the decrease in violence as a result of that, if the fence was
actually completed.
Mr. Nieto. Absolutely, sir, but the answer is not the fence
by itself. It has to be that combination of fencing or what we
consider tactical infrastructure, technology, and the right
amount of personnel. If we were to fence the whole border and
no one was out there to watch it and we wouldn't know what was
happening on it, it would prove useless.
So with that amount of fence, which is what the field
commander said that was the right amount, with that combination
of, we call it the three-legged stool, with the technology and
resources or personnel, yes, it would prove effective in
affecting all types of traffic out there because we look at it
in all threats, all hazards, as an address to it.
Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Gohmert.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I do appreciate the testimony.
I had longstanding commitments, but I was monitoring from
C-SPAN. That is a good thing, too. It helps.
But as some are proposing more laws regarding U.S. Weapons
to try to help Mexico, but as I understand it, most of the
weapons that are purchased by Mexico, people in Mexico that
come from the United States are already being purchased
illegally. So, rather than add new laws, and this is open for
anyone, what do you see that could be done to better enforce
existing laws to stop illegal purchases, even without any new
additional laws?
Mr. Nieto?
Mr. Nieto. Sir, not to answer the law question, but one of
the things we have to do, especially with the Merida
initiative, where we are providing money to Mexico and
training, is to allow them or help them build the capacity in
Mexico to inspect vehicles and people and cargo going into
their country. I think that would, it is almost like teaching
them how to fish instead of giving them the fish to eat. That,
at their northern border, with the United States, at the same
time a thorough assessment and the same type of training and
capacity building on the southern border with Guatemala, I
think that would really have a greater effect than any laws,
any changing of any laws in the U.S., in Mexico, or elsewhere.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you.
Does anybody else have comment on that?
Ms. Ayala. I just want to say that, as far as our approach
to the entire arms-smuggling effort, we look at it not just in
a vacuum but all of its associated and ongoing crimes. So in
stepping up our efforts related to narcotics smuggling, weapons
smuggling, bulk-cash smuggling, and human smuggling
trafficking, more and more we are seeing that many of these
activities are directly related to weapons coming back and
related to money also going back.
So by taking a comprehensive approach and utilizing
existing task forces, such as The Border Enforcement Security
Task Force, which is international, it is multi agency, and it
is a task force that really brings to bear all of the Federal
agencies that are here and State and locals, we are able to
share more information and really target to disrupt and
dismantle these organizations.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay.
I have a particular issue that has come up with a
constituent who was down fishing in southern Mexico just a few
miles from Belize, and he disappeared. I don't know if you
heard about Mr. Scheepstra's situation, but I met with his wife
Sunday for a couple of hours. And she had been down there, and
apparently, there is drug activity, from my trips, from
visiting with people in Colombia previously about our drug work
there with the British, with the Colombians, and Uribe is doing
a fantastic job apparently. But it looks about two-thirds of
the boats that bring cocaine, for example, up apparently come
into Mexico and then go up through Mexico.
Anyway, Mr. Scheepstra was fly fishing, card there, wallet,
passport, everything at the motel in the safe. He has
disappeared. Mexico says all they can do is list him as
missing. Some people went out and looked. They had some Mexican
soldiers look, but you have an issue of corruption there. And
that type of situation, we know there are other kidnappings,
what can be done to work with the Mexican government to try to
find someone like that? What allows us to go in and help?
And number two, since we know there is corruption and that
is one of the most difficult issues Calderon is facing, how do
you know who to trust with information we have?
Mr. Placido. Well, first of all, I am very sorry to hear
about Mr. Scheepstra and his problem down there, and perhaps we
can get together after and do something to help you with this
problem.
What I can tell you is that, while corruption is a problem
in Mexico as it is in the United States or elsewhere, we have a
number of what we believe to be honest, courageous counterparts
in Mexico that we work with. There are a number of vetted units
that have been trained and polygraphed and given the same kind
of background investigation we would give to a DEA agent, for
example, and the Minister of Public Security, Genaro Garca
Luna, and the Attorney General, Eduardo Medina Mora, are both
men of high quality, and I am sure that something can be done
to try and further investigate it.
We need to know some more details, whether ransom was asked
for.
Mr. Gohmert. No, no ransom, but it also touches on what Mr.
Nieto was pointing out as far as training. They decided,
because he was American, they would do a full forensic
examination of his car. He never got back to it. They don't
know if he was in there. And so the police got in the car and
drove it 45 miles so they could check for fingerprints, you
know, for DNA testing, whatever. But anyway, they could,
apparently, either watch CSI, or maybe we could help them to
know, you don't drive a car 45 miles with people in it before
you do your testing. So did you have a comment?
Mr. Nieto. Sir, in relation to the corruption issues and
the vetting, they are working. CISEN is working with our
internal affairs to allow them to build that capacity as well
where they can vet their officers, their operatives in Mexico
to make sure that they keep them clean.
Mr. Gohmert. Any other comments on that?
Well, let me just add and thank you, Mr. Chairman, again.
But it seems to me that Mexico could be one of the top 5 or
10 economic power houses in the world. When you look at the
resources they have, and we know they have got some of the best
workers in the world in that country. And it just seems that
corruption is the thing that keeps them from being one of the
greatest nations in the world. So I appreciate any efforts that
can help bring that neighbor alongside of us effectively. Thank
you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you gentlelady from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman and the Ranking
Member for holding a vital hearing in the face of the calamity
just a few hundreds of miles away from the fourth largest city
in the Nation.
In speaking to my colleagues who live near or in another
border State, Arizona, it is amazing to hear of the litany of
kidnappings and missing persons. We have just heard my
colleague speak of an American citizen missing. Over the years,
before this intensity of drug and gun smuggling and dastardly
deeds have occurred, a former colleague of mine, the now
Secretary of Labor, Hilda Solis, was a huge force in the murder
of women along the border, particularly on the Mexican side.
And many, I just say, just frankly, almost all have been, if
you will, not resolved.
This calamity is not in any way a reflection on the
friendship that we have with the people of Mexico. In fact, it
should be stated on the record that the numbers of law
enforcement and leadership in Mexico, sheriffs and others who
have lost their lives, is to be recognized and to acknowledge
the deep sympathy that we have for the families of those who
have lost their lives actually in this battle, in this war.
So I lay that ground work and would like to just offer into
the record some data that I have that may have already been
noted. In 2008, the violence between Mexican drug gangs
fighting for trafficking routes to the United States killed
approximately 6,000 people in Mexico, including one more than
500 police officers and soldiers. In the first 8 weeks of 2009,
more than 1,000 people were killed as a result of the drug war.
I am certainly grateful to the Administration for the
appointment of the drug czar or the border czar and the
dispatch of the numbers of individuals that have gone to the
border.
But I want to be honest, and I am I guess filled up to my
cup or my cup runneth over with the conflict between the second
amendment, of which I have great respect for, because I do
believe the people should have the right to protect themselves
as the underlying premise of that legislation, and my good
friends who believe that there should be nothing in this world
regulated having to do with guns.
I don't know, frankly, how many officers will have to be
killed, how many Mexican law enforcement will have to be
killed, and how many movies will have to be made showing that
the guns come from the United States. Much of it comes from
Houston. I am aware, as a Member of this Committee and also a
Member of the Committee that lives in Houston of the surge of
officers coming in to assist us. Let me first of all indicate
to both, I believe, Mr. Placido and Mr. Hoover that I would
like to meet with your leadership in Houston, and if you would
make note of that and be in touch with my office, I would like
to do that as quickly as possible.
But I would like to refer you to H.R. 1900, because until
we wake up about the gun smuggling, we know that two of our
colleagues have offered legislation in the last 24 hours to
close the gun show loophole. But I want to specifically focus
on the intertwining of guns and drugs and how that is a problem
coming from this direction and refer you to my legislation,
H.R. 1900, which is I think a simple premise. It allows
Governors to declare emergencies and seek, from both the
Department of Homeland Security and the DOJ, an emergency
increase in Border Patrol agents, an emergency increase in DEA
agents, an emergency increase in ATF agents.
My colleague, Mr. Poe, has joined me on this.
It also goes to the increase in equipment. I am not sure if
the czar is working on the increase in helicopters, power
boats, other Border Patrol assets, motor vehicles, which can be
used by overlapping jurisdictions, and handheld computers and
radio communications, GPSs, et cetera, night vision equipment,
because believe it or not, even today I don't think we have
enough, and certainly if our ATF officers and DEA officers are
on the border, they need some equipment as well.
This legislation also funds a task force of ATF, DEA, and
Border Patrol, whose members would be appointed by the
Administration, and you would meet every 2 months, and you
would have a report, so that we could show that we meant
business, and you would collaborate with the local law
enforcement.
If the Chairman would indulge me, I would like to be able
to have my questions answered by Mr. Placido and Mr. Hoover to
speak to the interlink of guns of all kinds, AK-47s, that are
loosely smuggled through Houston, how much of a role do they
play in where are today? And I realize that there has been some
good news in your testimony. I apologize, I had several
meetings that were detaining me from that, but I am aware of
your testimony. But I want to know where we are in terms of
that basic cause of what the crisis at the border is at this
time.
Mr. Placido.
Mr. Placido. Thank you, ma'am.
First of all, Ms. Jackson Lee, we would be delighted to
meet with you and your staff regarding this legislation and
regarding the broader problem, be glad to that arrange that
after this meeting.
The thrust of my oral statement as I began this hearing was
to dispel what we believe is an unfortunate mischaracterization
of the problem. Unfortunately, the violence that we are seeing,
the problems emanating from Mexico, really don't, cannot be
geographically bounded and described as a border problem.
Unfortunately, the criminal organizations that should be our
focus have impact well beyond our borders, in cities like
Atlanta and Lawrence, Massachusetts, and really throughout the
country.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Making it a much larger problem.
Mr. Placido. It is a much larger problem, and while I
certainly appreciate the fact that border Governors and people
who are on the front lines of the border with Mexico need
resources, I will speak only for the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the immediate deployment of 500 DEA special
agents would detract from other things that we are doing, and I
don't believe that that geographic kind of deployment would be
the best way for us to negatively impact those organizations.
We believe that a focused attack on the criminal organizations
themselves rather than one that is geographically based is
likely to have the best impact, and I would be glad to take
that up with you in more detail at a different time, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, obviously, many of us disagree with
that, and certainly it is not an automatic. It is a declaration
that would be made, and I did ask you to comment on the
interaction with the drugs and guns, and you did not comment on
that.
Mr. Placido. Certainly, drugs and guns go together. Guns
are tools of the trade. It is historic, for the 30 years that I
have been operating in this business, drug traffickers' use of
weapons both to intimidate and to cause violence has been a
problem. It certainly seems to be exacerbated and at a new
fevered pitch, if you will, in our relationship with Mexico.
We characterize that violence in three broad categories
analytically: Inter-cartel violence, with members in the same
cartel doing battle with one another; intercartel violence with
rival cartels doing war. Those have been around for a long
time. What is new and disturbing and I believe what is causing
much of the angst is the extent to which the cartels are now
lashing out against the government itself, attacking the
government of Mexico and attacking innocent civilians.
And one of the things that we are very careful of, we have
got an interagency group looking at this, is, to what extent
will that kind of violence be directed against U.S. Government
personnel or interests or innocent civilians on U.S. Soil spill
over our borders?
Ms. Jackson Lee. When they engage in violence, they have
guns, right?
Mr. Placido. Yes, they do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. So your basic sentence on the
question of the impact of guns that kill.
Mr. Placido. Absolutely, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right and many of these guns are
smuggled guns illegally secured from the United States.
Mr. Placido. That is my understanding, but I will defer to
my colleagues from ATF and ICE to describe that. They have got
the portfolio better under control I believe.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Hoover.
Mr. Hoover. Yes, ma'am the reason we plussed up our
resources in the Houston Field Division, which covers Houston
and south Texas, was because of the trace information that we
had regarding the number of firearms recovered in Mexico and
traced and then those that were purchased in the Houston area
and in south Texas. They lead any other part of the country by
two or three times the amount of firearms being purchased.
You know, the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Two or three times.
Mr. Hoover. Yes, ma'am.
What is happening in Mexico is the, you know, with the
violence, as has been stated by others, is a couple of things.
They are either using the firearms to protect their shipments.
They are using their firearms to protect their routes where
they are moving the drugs from Mexico into the U.S.
Drug cartels are coming in and trading drugs for firearms,
or we have individuals in the United States capitalizing on the
need for firearms by the Mexican cartels by purchasing those
firearms illegally and then taking them to Mexico and selling
them. So those are the ways that we see the firearms involved
in the narcotics trafficking trade.
Ms. Jackson Lee. These are illegal firearms, or are they
purchasing them legally or illegally?
Mr. Hoover. In some cases, they are purchased legally and
then moved into the illegal market. In some cases, they are
illegal from the jump because individuals are purchasing them
illegally, knowingly purchasing them for the drug cartels or
for someone else who they know will then traffic those guns to
Mexico.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And are you meeting and collaborating with
local law enforcement, like the sheriff's department and
Houston Police Department and others?
Mr. Hoover. Yes, ma'am, our folks in Houston, Texas, are
collaborating with individuals from all over Houston and south
Texas. We collaborate with all the folks you see sitting at
this table. We have an OCDETF strike force in Texas. We have
one group assigned to that strike force to ensure we get on top
of this problem.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will look forward to heating with Mr. Hoover and Placido,
but specifically in Houston, I want to meet with the team in
Houston. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Gentlelady's time has expired.
Gentleman from Texas had an additional question.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just one. I alluded to the Chicago Tribune article about
the Sinaloa cartel and apparently Guzman or, supposedly,
according to the story that they are now authorizing or
encouraging the use of violence to protect drug loads within
the United States. I mentioned that, but I am curious, does
anybody know, is this true what is being reported that now we
can expect more violence from inside of our borders? Does
anybody know?
Mr. Placido. I can personally address the answer for you,
Mr. Gohmert.
The fact is that we have hard empirical evidence indicating
that the traffickers consistently have said they do not want to
engage in violence on the United States--on U.S. Soil. There
are repeated instances of that that we could provide, in a
different setting, to document that for you.
The problem is, we never know what we don't know, and I am
not going to sit here and tell you or anybody else that there
hasn't been a decision made or that there won't be a decision
made to attack U.S. Law enforcement. What wWe can say is, after
extensive analytic research by 14 agencies of the U.S.
Government, we have not yet seen an effort to systematically
attack U.S. Government employees or interests or innocent
civilians on U.S. Soil at a rate that is above what we had
normally seen prior to this outbreak of violence in Mexico.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, and that is why this story said that
that such a move by Guzman, Mexico's most wanted fugitive,
would mark a turn from the cartel's previous position of
largely avoiding violent confrontation. So the empirical data
may be that they have up to this, but the story today is that
Guzman is now saying, and they report, that police and Federal
agents--I just didn't know if it was some of yours or you--said
they had recently received at least two law enforcement alerts
focused on Guzman's reported orders that his smugglers should,
quote, use their weapons to defend their loads at all costs,
unquote. And so that would have been recent, reported today,
brand new, and this would be a turn from all the empirical data
we have had up to this point. I just didn't know.
Mr. Placido. I do not have information on that at this
point.
Mr. Gohmert. Anybody else?
Mr. Nash. I would back Mr. Placido's comments and just
suggest that our collective experience until now is that there
has been a very firm conviction on the part of the cartel
leaders that engaging in violence of the nature that is
mentioned in that article would be bad for business for the
cartels, and for that reason alone, they have decided that that
is not a road that they want to go down.
I agree completely with your characterization that if, in
fact, this statement is something the cartels decide that they
are going to go forward with, it would be a turn from past
practice and something that we certainly----
Mr. Gohmert. Hasn't the price of cocaine gone up? For less
cocaine----
Mr. Nash. It has, and I think the sentiment that might have
motivated Mr. Guzman's comments certainly is an accurate one
and one that----
Mr. Gohmert. It would mean you all are doing a good job,
being effective, and so if this were true, it would actually be
a, wow, you are doing a good job. You are hurting them. So
anyway, thank you for all your work. I know it is a profession
that requires great dedication, so we appreciate yours.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
This has been an oversight hearing, and one of the things
we usually expect at an oversight hearing is witnesses to tell
us what we should be doing more, more resources, change laws or
what not, and it gives witnesses an opportunity to recommend
legislative changes. Best I can ascertain, no one availed
themselves of that opportunity. You didn't say we needed new
gun laws. You didn't say you needed a whole lot more money. If
I got you wrong, does anybody want to take one more shot?
Mr. Nash. One that I will raise, Mr. Scott, which is, we
have talked a good bit about drugs. We have talked a good bit
about guns. The third leg to that stool that we haven't talked
quite a bit as much on is we do feel very strongly that cutting
off the money flow to these organizations is an essential part
of our strategy. There were two Supreme Court decisions at the
end of the term last summer that significantly affected our
ability to bring successful prosecutions against those involved
in bulk-cash smuggling in connection with the drug trade.
One of the those decisions was the Santos decision. I
understand that, within the last 30 minutes prior to the
convocation of this hearing, the Santos fix was passed in
connection with your efforts, Mr. Scott, and those of yours,
Mr. Gohmert, and this Committee, and we appreciate that.
The second decision is the Cuellar decision, and there is
proposed legislation that would return the interpretation of
that statute to the interpretation that was generally accepted
prior to the decision of the court in Cuellar, and so we would
ask that you take a look at what we have termed the Cuellar
fix. We have proposed legislation, and we would ask that you
take a look at that, which would increase our ability to bring
successful money-laundering charges against those who engage in
bulk-cash smuggling across the southwest border.
Mr. Scott. I think the second case you mentioned had a
problem because it didn't require an intent as part of, as an
element of the crime, which is obviously problematic.
The Santos case, I think we fixed that while you were
waiting for us to come back. It was one of the bills on the
floor.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, you had an inquiry, I would
just wish to comment. These are very, very fine public
servants, and I do appreciate their leadership.
I think, short of doing no harm on the United States
Congress, we have an obligation, Mr. Chairman, to fix things
where necessary. We certainly don't want to make things worse.
Not putting words in Mr. Hoover's mouth, he has indicated
that, out of our community, two or three times--two or three
times the sale of weapons; we are in essence the epicenter of
these weapons going into Mexico. Frankly, I believe that if
they have not offered legislative suggestions, and I am willing
certainly to modify my legislation, but one, I think it needs
to be targeted. Two, I think there needs to be immediate
response in terms of gun legislation that addresses the
question of smuggling and the loopholes. And there is some
legislation being put forward. And I can't I can't imagine--
there are many witnesses who came here in years past and said,
we don't need anymore Border Patrol agents, and it was
incorrect.
So I appreciate the fiscal responsibility and the
discreetness of the witnesses, but frankly, I believe it is the
responsibility of the Congress to address glaring issues, and I
do think more DEA agents, whether they are shared with Atlanta
or elsewhere, are needed. I think more ATF officers are needed.
And one of the issue is being able to make the case, being able
to have the necessary U.S. Attorneys and assistant U.S.
Attorneys in these high-target areas that can make the case.
So I thank the Chairman for yielding, and I would like to
pursue the legislation that I have written with corrections or
modifications, and I think that we have an obligation because
of what is going on, on the border and in Atlanta and Chicago
and New York, on these drugs and guns to really act and give
more tools to these very fine public servants.
I yield back to the Chairman.
Mr. Scott. I thank the gentlelady for her comments.
If the witnesses have any other comments, the hearing
record will remain open for 1 week for submission of additional
materials.
Members may have written questions which we will forward to
you and ask you to respond as quickly as possible so that the
answers can be made a part of the record.
Mr. Nieto.
Mr. Nieto. Sir, if I can make one last comment.
We spoke of border violence along our borders there, and I
just want to make sure that I mention this. El Paso, Texas,
which is just north of Ciudad Juarez, which has been the
epicenter of the violence here the last few months, is the
third safest large city in the United States. San Diego is the
fourth, two cities right along the U.S.-Mexico border, and I
think a big part of that is the organizations that my
colleagues here at the table belong to and, obviously, the
State and locals in those areas and their efforts.
I just wanted to thank them for the record.
Mr. Scott. Well, thank you. And if you have other
recommendations that we can do to help you do your job, we
appreciate hearing them.
And without objection, the Committee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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