[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY FOR NUCLEAR FUEL
RECYCLING: WHAT SHOULD OUR RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION
STRATEGY BE?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 17, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-35
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JIM MATHESON, Utah BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE OLSON, Texas
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
June 17, 2009
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Chairman, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 6
Written Statement............................................ 6
Statement by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers, Acting Minority
Ranking Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives............................................. 7
Written Statement............................................ 8
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 9
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 9
Prepared Statement by Representative Lincoln Davis, Member,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 10
Prepared Statement by Representative Harry E. Mitchell, Member,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 10
Witnesses:
Dr. Mark T. Peters, Deputy Associate Laboratory Director, Argonne
National Laboratory
Oral Statement............................................... 12
Written Statement............................................ 14
Biography.................................................... 18
Dr. Alan S. Hanson, Executive Vice President, Technology and Used
Fuel Management, AREVA NC Inc.
Oral Statement............................................... 18
Written Statement............................................ 20
Biography.................................................... 26
Ms. Lisa M. Price, Senior Vice President, GE Hitachi Nuclear
Energy Americas LLC; Chief Executive Officer, Global Nuclear
Fuel, LLC
Oral Statement............................................... 26
Written Statement............................................ 27
Biography.................................................... 34
Dr. Charles D. Ferguson, Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science
and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36
Biography.................................................... 43
Discussion
Discouraging Weapons Proliferation in Nuclear Processing....... 43
Existing Versus Next Generation Technologies................... 44
Time Frames for Storage and Recycling.......................... 46
The Merits of Different Reactor Types.......................... 46
Fuel Reprocessing Costs........................................ 47
More Proliferation Concerns.................................... 48
Financial Costs................................................ 49
High-temperature Gas-cooled Reactors........................... 50
Costs of Nuclear Waste Management Today........................ 52
The Navajo Nation's Uranium Supply............................. 53
GNEP and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative.................... 54
Time Issues and MOX Fuel....................................... 55
Clarification on Reprocessing, Recycling, and Fast Reactors.... 56
Nuclear Materials Transport.................................... 58
Safety Risks................................................... 59
More on Fast Reactors.......................................... 62
Specific Research and Development Needs........................ 63
Economic Issues................................................ 64
The MOX Process and on More Fast Reactors...................... 66
Closing........................................................ 68
Appendix: Additional Material for the Record
Letter to Representative Dana Rohrabacher from Nikolay Ponomarev-
Stepnoy, dated June 16, 2009................................... 70
Letter to Chairman Bart Gordon from Alan S. Hanson, dated June
17, 2009....................................................... 72
ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY FOR NUCLEAR FUEL RECYCLING: WHAT SHOULD OUR
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION STRATEGY BE?
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2009
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Gordon
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Advancing Technology for Nuclear Fuel
Recycling: What Should Our Research,
Development, and Demonstration
Strategy Be?
wednesday, june 17, 2009
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
On Wednesday, June 17, 2009 the House Committee on Science and
Technology will hold a hearing entitled: ``Advancing Technology for
Nuclear Fuel Recycling: What Should Our Research, Development, and
Demonstration Strategy Be?''
The Committee's hearing will explore the benefits and risks
associated with nuclear waste recycling and the research development
and demonstration needed to address the technical challenges and policy
objectives of a nuclear waste management strategy that could include
recycling spent nuclear fuel. If nuclear power is going to expand in
this country the government needs to have a strategy to manage the
growing volumes of spent nuclear fuel. The Committee will hear from
expert witnesses who will discuss the issues relevant to deployment of
advanced technologies for nuclear waste recycling.
Witnesses
Dr. Mark Peters is the Deputy Associate Laboratory
Director at Argonne National Laboratory. Dr. Peters will
testify on the current research, development, and demonstration
programs at the Department of Energy to advance technologies
for recycling spent nuclear fuel. He will also discuss future
RD&D needs.
Dr. Alan S. Hanson, Executive Vice President for
Technology and Used Fuel Management at Areva, Inc. Areva has
worldwide operations that encompass the entire nuclear power
cycle, including uranium exploration and mining, fuel
fabrication, design and construction of nuclear reactors, and
treatment and recycling of spent fuel. Dr. Hanson will provide
information regarding Areva's technology for reprocessing
nuclear waste and the company's technology development
underway.
Ms. Lisa Price is the Senior Vice President, GE
Hitachi Nuclear Energy and Chief Executive Office of Global
Nuclear Fuel. GE Hitachi develops advanced light water nuclear
reactors and provides products and services for improving
output and efficiency of existing nuclear power plants. Ms.
Price will testify about General Electric's technology
development for recycling spent nuclear fuel and GE's work with
the Federal Government in this area.
Dr. Charles D. Ferguson is a Philip D. Reed Senior
Fellow for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign
Relations. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent,
non-partisan organization established in 1921 to explore
foreign policy issues and promote an understanding of the U.S.
role in the world. Dr. Ferguson will provide testimony about
the various technology options available for management of
spent nuclear fuel and the benefits and risks associated with
those technologies.
Background
According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as of August
2008 there are 104 commercial nuclear power reactors licensed to
operate in thirty-one states providing approximately 20 percent of our
nation's electricity supply. The approximate 58,000 metric tons of
spent nuclear fuel already existing at these reactor sites continues to
accumulate at a rate of 2,000 metric tons per year. In 1987, Congress
designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the Nation's sole candidate site
for a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository. The Department of
Energy submitted a license application to the NRC for the proposed
Yucca Mountain site in June 2008. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
targeted 1998 as the year to start loading waste into the repository.
That date has been pushed back repeatedly.
The Obama Administration is taking a very different approach to
Yucca Mountain and nuclear waste management. President Obama is
proposing to cut funding for the Yucca Mountain project by
approximately $100 million and to convene a blue ribbon panel to look
for alternative solutions for managing the Nation's nuclear waste. The
President's 2010 budget request appears to continue the Yucca Mountain
licensing process, but the significant funding cut certainly would
delay the planned 2020 opening of the repository.
Alternatives to Yucca Mountain
Current law provides no alternative repository site to Yucca
Mountain, and it does not authorize DOE to open temporary storage
facilities without a permanent repository in operation. In the past,
there have been discussions about the Department of Energy taking title
of the commercial spent nuclear fuel and paying for the cost of storing
the waste at the private utility sites. In the early 1980s the NRC
determined that waste can be safely stored at these reactor sites for
at least thirty years after a reactor shuts down. More recently, the
NRC is proposing a further revision to its Waste Confidence Decision to
find reasonable assurance that spent fuel can be stored safely for at
least sixty years after a reactor's licensed operating life. In
addition, under current law a private storage facility could be
licensed by the NRC. Such a facility has been licensed in Utah, but its
operation has been blocked because it cannot obtain a permit from the
Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management.
Recycling Spent Nuclear Fuel
With the Obama Administration poised to delay the Yucca Mountain
project and initiate a major program review, recycling spent nuclear
fuel is likely to be considered in part because there is another long-
term concern that uranium supplies for nuclear fuel may become scarce
if it cannot be reused. Along with consideration of a recycling
alternative for nuclear waste management, it is essential to examine
the research, development and demonstration needed at the federal level
to ensure that we understand the safety, environmental, security and
economic issues associated with a decision to adopt a nuclear waste
recycling program in this country.
Since the 1970s, U.S. nuclear waste policy has been based on the
``once through'' fuel cycle in which nuclear fuel is used once in a
reactor and then permanently disposed of in long-term storage. The
major alternative is the ``closed'' fuel cycle, in which spent nuclear
fuel would be reprocessed into new fuel. The goal is to extract more
energy from a given supply of uranium, reduce the amount of waste going
to a permanent waste repository and do this in a manner that is
proliferation-resistant.
Fuel for U.S. nuclear reactors currently consists of uranium in
which the fissile isotope U-235 has been enriched to three to five
percent--the remainder being the non-fissile isotope U-238. During use
in the reactor most of the U-235 splits, or fissions, releasing energy.
Some of the U-238 is transmuted into fissile isotopes of plutonium,
some of which also fissions. In reprocessing, the uranium and plutonium
are chemically separated to be made into new fuel while the lighter
elements resulting from the fission process are stored for disposal.
There are a number of different fuel options for recycling nuclear
waste. One process, used primarily in France, mixes plutonium with
uranium to form fresh fuel known as MOX fuel which can be reused once
in most existing light water reactors. For multiple recycling of spent
fuel, advanced reactors would be necessary. These fast reactors could
create new fuel from spent fuel repeatedly in a manner that would allow
it to be fed back into the reactor until it is entirely fissioned.
These fast reactors also would destroy the longest-lived radioactive
components for the fuel, leaving only relatively short-lived
radioactive isotopes which would decay to background levels within
approximately 1,000 years. Ultimately, these short-lived isotopes would
be sent to permanent storage.
Depending on the exact technologies chosen to close the nuclear
fuel cycle, there are a number of issues to consider. The National
Academy of Sciences, the General Accountability Office, and the Council
on Foreign Relations have raised questions about using an approach such
as the process used to form MOX fuel. This involves separating a pure
stream of plutonium from the spent fuel, prompting concerns about
proliferation of weapons-grade materials. Although still debated, spent
fuel recycling could save space in an underground repository by
reducing the near-term heat load, which is the primary limit on
repository capacity. However, the closed fuel cycle is generally
considered to be substantially more expensive than the once-through
cycle and there is a broad scientific consensus that long-term
isolation of nuclear waste from the environment will still be required.
There is also widespread agreement that a more robust long-term
research and development program is needed to address these outstanding
issues.
Chairman Gordon. Good morning, and this hearing will come
to order.
I want to welcome everyone to today's hearing to explore
the policy questions and the research, development, and
demonstration needs associated with recycling of spent nuclear
fuel. I would like to welcome our expert panelists who will
discuss the ongoing R&D activities in the Federal Government,
private sector and around the globe and help us to understand
the safety, environmental, security and economic issues related
to the adoption of a nuclear reprocessing strategy.
I am supportive of nuclear power as I believe it is part of
the solution to the daunting challenge of climate change and
energy independence and I also recognize that our 104 operating
reactors provide very reliable baseload power.
To me, the best reason to consider reprocessing is that an
expansion of nuclear power may make the once-through fuel cycle
inadequate for maintaining our nuclear power supply as uranium
sources eventually become scarce. There are near-term
technologies available for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel that
could be deployed in the United States relatively quickly, but
there are some well-documented concerns raised about this
strategy. I am also aware of ongoing research in more advanced
technologies that could address nuclear fuel cycle issues that
we face today, and while reprocessing of spent fuel allows us
to extract more energy from a given supply of natural uranium,
it raises concern about increased costs for waste management
and proliferation of weapons-grade materials.
I am hopeful that today's discussion will shed some light
on the various benefits, challenges and risks that we must
address before adopting a long-term nuclear recycling strategy.
As I told our witnesses earlier, we have a variety of
hearings going on simultaneously. The bells are ringing, we may
have votes, and we want to have as much of the hearing as we
can. If it gets to a point where there is going to be a long
lapse, we will try to be respectful of your time. I know you
have prepared statements, and as you go through that, as much
as you can I would hope that you later in the questions and
answers try to help me with what I think is sort of my
threshold question, at least one of the threshold questions,
and that is, do we move forward with existing technologies to
reprocess or do we skip that and wait for the next generation
to come along? So part of that is, do we have storage now to
wait for that next generation? Is that next generation really,
you know, feasible, and what are going to be the cost
consequences of that? So if you can in your materials, you
might try to work that in.
Now I would like to recognize Dr. Ehlers for an opening
statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Bart Gordon
Good morning and welcome to today's hearing to explore the policy
questions and the research, development, and demonstration needs
associated with recycling our spent nuclear fuel.
I would like to welcome our expert panelists who will discuss the
ongoing RD&D activities in the Federal Government, private sector and
around the globe, and help us understand the safety, environmental,
security and economic issues related to the adoption of a nuclear
reprocessing strategy.
I am supportive of nuclear power, as I believe it is part of the
solution to the daunting challenge of climate change, and I also
recognize that our 104 operating reactors provide very reliable
baseload power.
To me, the best reason to consider reprocessing is that an
expansion of nuclear power may make the once-through fuel cycle
inadequate for maintaining our nuclear power supply as uranium
resources eventually become scarce.
There are near-term technologies available for reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel that could be deployed in the United States relatively
quickly, but there are some well-documented concerns raised about this
strategy. I am also aware of ongoing research in more advanced
technologies that could address the nuclear fuel cycle issues we face
today.
While reprocessing of spent fuel allows us to extract more energy
from the given supply of natural uranium, it raises concerns about
increased costs for waste management and the proliferation of weapons-
grade materials.
I am hopeful that today's discussion will shed some light on the
various benefits, challenges, and risks that we must address before
adopting a long-term nuclear recycling strategy.
Again, I would like to thank the witnesses for their participation
today and I look forward to your testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today on nuclear fuel recycling. I am sitting in for
the real Ranking Member, Mr. Hall from Texas, who is
temporarily detained on the Floor and I am sure he will return
shortly and spice up the reading with his inimitable sense of
humor.
I am very pleased that you are holding this hearing, Mr.
Chairman. I think it is a very important issue for this
committee to be looking into as nuclear energy is a clean and
reliable source of baseload power in the United States. Now,
not everyone has agreed with that statement over the years, but
back when nuclear power began to run into trouble in the United
States with the environmentalists--and I am a staunch and
always was a staunch environmentalist--I argued strenuously for
nuclear power on the basis that it was the only method
available then which would not contribute to greenhouse gases.
Back in 1970, not too many people were worried about greenhouse
gases. Today we worry a great deal about them.
But we all know the basic facts. There are currently 104
nuclear power plants in 31 States in the United States
generating approximately 20 percent of the electricity
produced. Nuclear plants in 2008 were at a capacity factor of
91.5 percent compared to 73.6 percent for coal, 42 percent for
natural gas and 40 percent for renewables, and I understand
Michigan has four nuclear plants and another one under
construction. They currently generate 26.2 percent of the
state's electricity, one of the highest of any states, I
believe.
As the industry is facing resurgence and the interest to
build new nuclear plants, the issue of nuclear waste is
prevalent. That has always been one of the great deterrents to
using nuclear energy. What is even more troubling is a decision
by the Obama Administration to abandon a permanent repository
at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, after over 20 years of research and
billions of dollars of carefully planned and reviewed
scientific fieldwork.
So we are here to receive testimony from our four expert
witnesses on the facts and on the pros and cons of reprocessing
and recycling used nuclear fuel. I believe that finding some
sort of solution to how to handle our used nuclear fuel is
critical to the continued successful contribution of nuclear
energy to our country's electric generation and I look forward
to hearing from today's witnesses on this important and timely
topic.
I do regret, Mr. Chairman, that this committee has not had
much to say about handling nuclear waste in the past. This in
one of many issues which should be in our jurisdiction but has
been in another committee. I think we may have written a better
bill regarding Yucca Mountain, and I think the biggest problem
is the way the bill was written. It was impossible to meet the
requirements. No one could predict or prove that for 10,000
years there would be no leakage, whereas if we had taken the
road of monitored retrievable storage with the ability to
repair any casks that might leak, we would have been much
further along at much less cost. That may or may not have been
the best solution but certainly should have been examined. I
have mixed feelings about the reprocessing approach. The cost
is, as we know, very high, and won't really solve the problem
in any better way than other things that we could do. I am very
eager to hear the comments from the experts this morning and to
find out just what we can do in terms of dealing with nuclear
waste, what is proper and what is best, what is most economical
and what other approaches might be available and useful.
With that, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ehlers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Vernon J. Ehlers
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on nuclear
fuel recycling. I think this is a very important issue for this
committee to be looking into as nuclear energy is a clean and reliable
source of baseload power in the United States.
We all know the basic facts. There are currently 104 nuclear power
plants in 31 states operating in our country generating approximately
20 percent of the electricity produced. Nuclear plants in 2008 ran at a
capacity factor of 91.5 percent compared to 73.6 percent for coal, 42
percent for natural gas and 40 percent for renewables. My home State of
Michigan has four nuclear plants that generate 26.2 percent of the
state's electricity.
As the industry is facing resurgence in the interest to build new
nuclear plants, the issue of nuclear waste is prevalent--even more so
with the decision by the Obama Administration to abandon a permanent
repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada after over 20 years of research
and billions of dollars of carefully planned and reviewed scientific
field work. So we're here today to receive testimony from our four
expert witnesses on the facts and on the pros and cons of reprocessing
and recycling used nuclear fuel. I believe that finding some sort of a
solution to how to handle our used nuclear fuel is critical to the
continued successful contribution of nuclear energy to our country's
electric generation and I look forward to hearing from today's
witnesses on this important and timely topic.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Ehlers. I will point out
that I think that we are the only Committee on the House side
and maybe the Senate too in the last several years that has had
any type of hearings on nuclear energy. We are going to
continue with that. We have had a variety as well as
roundtables. I think that you are absolutely correct, that we
need to play a strong role in making sure that decisions are
made on a scientific basis and not just an emotional basis, and
I think we can play a good role there. You will also be pleased
to know that the Administration has not abandoned the Yucca
Mountain site but rather put it on hold, continuing their--they
are continuing with all the various paperwork moving forward.
They are putting it on hold while they have a council group
that is going to make recommendations on that in the future. So
hopefully--and Secretary Chu and Speaker Pelosi both spoke
before this committee saying that it was part of the overall
solution.
Now, if there are Members who wish to submit additional
opening statements, your statements will be added to the
record, and I think Mr. Rohrabacher would like to do that.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good Morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing
to examine nuclear fuel recycling and to hear testimony on the research
and development programs to address the challenges and opportunities of
fuel recycling.
In order to develop a sustainable energy policy we must consider
all available sources of energy that will reduce our dependence on
foreign oil, improve our greenhouse gas emissions, and satisfy our
energy needs. Nuclear energy is an integral part of this new energy
plan. However, questions remain about the safety and security of using
nuclear energy.
Currently, the U.S. uses nuclear energy to provide approximately 20
percent of electricity. However, we do not reprocess the spent fuel
from these reactors, which accumulates at a rate of 2,000 metric tons
per year. Our current nuclear waste laws only allow for the disposal of
waste at the Yucca Mountain site, but the proposed Fiscal Year 2010
budget cut funding to Yucca Mountain by $100 million, further delaying
the site's proposed 2020 opening. The time has come to consider new
ways to dispose of and reprocess used nuclear fuels.
Within my home State of Illinois, the only nuclear engineering
department is at the University of Illinois. This is particularly
alarming because our state has 11 operating nuclear power reactors,
Argonne National Laboratory, and other nuclear facilities. Illinois
residents have paid more than $2.4 billion on the federal Nuclear Waste
Fund. My state has a large stake in nuclear power and technology and
under-supported programs and initiatives that could improve upon our
nuclear capabilities are quite troubling.
I am interested to hear from our witnesses today how we can change
and update our research and development program to ensure that we are
using cutting-edge technology and providing appropriate levels of
funding. In particular, I would like to know how we can ensure that our
fuel reprocessing will not create a national security risk by isolating
pure plutonium and how we can work through this committee and through
Congress to ensure that these programs receive appropriate funding.
I welcome our panel of witnesses, and I look forward to their
testimony. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to see that the Committee is
studying the issue of nuclear fuel reprocessing.
It is my belief that nuclear energy has an undeserved negative
reputation.
The fact is that nearly any energy generation method comes with
risks for personal and environmental harms.
Nuclear power has the capacity to generate a lot of electricity.
France utilizes it almost exclusively. Twenty percent of our
nation's power comes from nuclear.
The House Committee on Science and Technology has held hearings in
the past on this issue. The consensus from expert witnesses from the
past has been that the storage of spent fuel is the most bedeviling
issue.
In the past, witnesses have added that reprocessing can be done,
but current methods expend more energy to accomplish the reprocessing
to really make it worth the effort.
However, I am glad that this committee is willing to revisit the
issue.
As you all know, Texas is the Nation's largest energy-producing
state.
It is rich in natural resources such as natural gas, oil, wind, and
solar.
Nearly 40 percent of Texas' electricity output relies on coal, and
nearly all of that comes from mines that are owned by the utilities
they supply.
The unfortunate news is that Texas ranks highest in the Nation in
carbon dioxide emissions.
Greater diversification of its energy source mix could help Texas
do better, when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions.
Texas ranks 7th among the 31 States with nuclear capacity. It is my
understanding that nuclear energy produces relatively less pollutants
per unit of energy generated.
I have mixed feelings about the continuing delays in finding a
repository for nuclear waste. The ``not in my backyard'' argument is
strong, and I can understand that sentiment.
Today's hearing will be helpful to understand whether technology
developments have made it more feasible to move toward nuclear power.
Although we as Members of Congress should not be in the business of
picking winners and losers in the energy debate, I believe that it is
important to study the issues and provide a broad base of federal
support.
I thank the witness for appearing today and for providing
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I yield back the
remainder of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Lincoln Davis
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, I'd like to thank you both for
holding today's hearing to discuss nuclear waste recycling, a nuclear
waste management strategy that includes utilizing recycled spent
nuclear fuel, and how this strategy could support our nation's goal of
energy independence. My home State of Tennessee has long supported the
technological expansion of America's energy portfolio. From rural
electrification under the Tennessee Valley Authority to the great
investments being made in solar energy today, Tennessee has contributed
significantly to America's efforts. Biofuels, wind, coal, natural gas
and other sources of energy will all have their part to play in
America's future, and the search for cleaner, more efficient
alternative fuels is an admirable goal that we should continue to
support, but we simply cannot meet our needs or fulfill our obligations
without making nuclear energy a part of the mission.
Roughly thirty percent of the energy used to produce electricity in
Tennessee comes from the six nuclear reactors in our area. This energy
is and always has been emissions free, is delivered to rate payers at a
fraction of the cost associated with coal, natural gas, or oil, and it
has a far better safety record. We have a considerable stockpile of
enriched, processed uranium that could and should go into commercial
use by our energy sector, not to mention the amount of weapons-grade
uranium that could be used as a nuclear power source. In this economy,
with our energy independence at stake and a national commitment to
cleaner, more efficient power on the line, we must make nuclear energy
a part of our nation's future.
The Babcock & Wilcox Company is currently working on a design for a
new nuclear reactor that could be the practical, affordable, near-term
answer we are looking for to meet our growing demand for clean, zero
emissions, power generation. The Tennessee Valley Authority has shown
interest in this project as an attractive energy solution for many
nuclear operating companies.
Putting to use recycled nuclear fuel, when it is appropriate to do
so, could prove to be a major player in an energy strategy that
incorporates nuclear as a source. In order to realize fully the long-
term benefits of nuclear energy, the United States and other nations
need to develop these advanced fuel-cycle technologies. Additionally,
we must remember that any decision to pursue advanced fuel cycles in
the United States needs to consider economic and nonproliferation
challenges associated with recycling uranium fuel.
I want to thank the witnesses for coming today, and I look forward
to hearing your testimonies and what you see as the benefits and risks
associated with this technology.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Harry E. Mitchell
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Nuclear power provides a significant portion of our nation's
electricity supply. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
there are commercial nuclear power reactors licensed to operate in 31
states. These reactors provide approximately 20 percent of our nation's
electricity supply.
Nuclear power is a critical electricity source in Arizona where we
have the largest nuclear generation facility in the Nation, the Palo
Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
However, as these nuclear power reactors continue to operate, spent
nuclear fuel continues to accumulate without a clear strategy of how to
store this waste.
Today we will explore the benefits and risks of nuclear waste
recycling. We will also discuss the research development and
demonstration needed to address the technical challenges and policy
objectives of recycling spent nuclear fuel.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses on what advanced
technologies may be developed to make nuclear waste recycling possible.
I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
first of all, let me commend you for this hearing and your
fairness. If there is a--I have a letter that I have received
from Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy, who is a senior member, a Vice
President of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, and he is a
highly respected Russian physicist, and I would like if
possible to submit this letter from him to the record but read
a small portion of it as we begin.
Chairman Gordon. You know, it might be best to wait. Let us
make--we will make the letter a part of the record if there is
no objection, and with your opening statement----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Opening statement or----
Chairman Gordon. Or when your question time--I think that
might be a better----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, sir.
Chairman Gordon. If that is okay?
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is a good idea.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you. Any other Members now or that
aren't present here will have two weeks to submit an opening
statement.
At this time I would like to introduce our panel of expert
witnesses. Dr. Alan Hanson is the Executive Vice President for
Technology and Used Fuel Management at Areva International, or
Incorporated, rather. Ms. Lisa Price is the Senior Vice
President of GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy and Chief Executive
Officer of Global Nuclear Fuel. And Dr. Charles Ferguson is the
Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow for Science and Technology at the
Council for Foreign Relations. And I now yield to my colleague
from Illinois, Ms. Biggert, to introduce a witness from her
home state.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you, Chairman Gordon. I would like to
welcome Dr. Mark Peters from Argonne National Laboratory as one
of today's witnesses. I am very pleased that he could be here
to enlighten the Committee on the important work done in my
District on reprocessing research. Dr. Peters is currently the
Deputy Associate Lab Director for the Energy Sciences and
Engineering Directorate. He juggles the responsibility for
management and integration of the lab's energy research and
development portfolio and also provides technical support to
the DOE's Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative where he was recently
appointed AFCI National Campaign Director for spent fuel
disposition.
As most of you can see from his bio, Dr. Peters has
extensive nuclear research and repository experience as a
former Yucca Mountain project science and engineering manager
at Los Alamos and at the DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste, so I have had the pleasure of working with Dr. Peters
over the years and know that his perspective will be very
informative. So I look forward, Dr. Peters, to your testimony
and appreciate you being here today. I yield back.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, and Ms. Biggert, you will be
glad to know that Chuck Atkins, our Chief of Staff, was there
Monday, went through, had a tour of Argonne and was very
impressed with the operation there.
The witnesses will have five minutes for your spoken
testimony. Your written testimony will be included in the
record for the hearing. When you have completed your spoken
testimony, we will begin with questions. Each Member will then
have five minutes, and we will begin with Dr. Mark Peters. Dr.
Peters, you may begin.
STATEMENT OF DR. MARK T. PETERS, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE LABORATORY
DIRECTOR, ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Dr. Peters. Chairman Gordon, Dr. Ehlers, Mrs. Biggert and
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you on advanced technology for nuclear fuel
recycling. My name is Mark Peters and I am the Deputy Associate
Lab Director for Energy Sciences and Engineering at the Argonne
National Laboratory. Mr. Chairman, I ask that my full written
testimony be entered into the record and I will summarize it
here.
So I want to talk about--summarize my testimony going over
three general areas. First, provide an introduction and some
context and then a bit about spent nuclear fuel management and
the fuel cycle, and then finally talk about the advanced
nuclear fuel cycle research and development program and needs
going forward.
So by way of introduction, world energy demand is
increasing at a rapid pace. In order to satisfy the demand to
protect the environment for future generations including
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, future energy sources
must evolve from the current dominance of fossil fuels to a
more balanced, sustainable approach to energy production that
is based on abundant, clean and economical energy sources.
Nuclear energy is already a reliable, abundant and carbon-free
source of electricity in the United States and the world. In
addition to contributing to future electricity production, it
could also be a critical resource for fueling the
transportation sector. However, nuclear energy must experience
significant growth to achieve the goals of reliable, affordable
energy in a carbon-constrained world.
There are a number of challenges associated with the global
expansion of nuclear power. Any advanced nuclear fuel cycle
aimed at meeting these challenges must simultaneously address
issues of economics, uranium resource utilization, nuclear
waste minimization and a strengthened nonproliferation regime,
all of which require systems analysis and investment in new
technologies.
In the end, the comprehensive and long-term vision for
expanded sustainable nuclear energy must include safe and
secure fuel cycle technologies, cost-effective technologies for
the overall fuel cycle system, and ultimately a closed fuel
cycle for waste and resources management. Related to spent
nuclear fuel management, the nuclear fuel cycle is a cradle-to-
grave framework that includes uranium mining, fuel fabrication,
energy production and nuclear waste management.
There are two basic nuclear fuel cycle approaches. An open
or once-through fuel cycle as currently planned by the United
States involves treating spent nuclear fuel as waste with
ultimate disposition of material in a geologic repository. In
contrast, a closed or recycle fuel cycle, as currently planned
by other countries, for example, France, Russia and Japan,
involves treating spent nuclear fuel as a resource whereby
separations and actinide recycling and reactors work with
geologic disposal.
For reprocessing to be beneficial as opposed to
counterproductive, it must be followed by recycling,
transmutation and fission destruction of the ultra-long-lived
radiotoxic constituents. Reprocessing by the so-called PUREX
method, which is plutonium and uranium covered by extraction
followed by plutonium recycling using mixed oxide fuel in light
water reactors, is a well-established technology but is only a
partial solution.
It is not at all clear that we should embark on this path,
especially since the United States has not made a massive
investment in a PUREX/MOX infrastructure, although the United
States is proceeding with a plan to reduce its excess weapons
plutonium inventory using MOX in LWRs. In contrast, advancement
of fast reactor technology for transuranic recycling
consumption would maximize the benefits of waste management and
also allow essential progress toward the longer-term goal of
sustainable use of uranium and subsequently thorium with fast
reactors.
There is no urgent need to deploy recycling today, but as
nuclear expands, a once-through fuel cycle will not be
sustainable. To maximize the benefits of nuclear energy in an
expanded nuclear energy future, it will ultimately be necessary
to close the fuel cycle. Fortuitously, it is conceivable that
the decades-long hiatus in the United States investment
circumvents the need to rely on a dated recycling
infrastructure. Rather, we have the option to develop and build
new technologies and develop business models using advanced
systems.
Related to the R&D program, to reduce cost, ensure
sustainability and improve efficiency, safety and security,
significant investments on the order of several hundred million
dollars per year in a sustained nuclear energy R&D program are
needed. Such a program must effectively support and integrate
both basic and applied research and use modeling and simulation
capabilities to address both near-long evolutionary activities,
such as life extensions of the current nuclear fleet, and long-
term solutions, for example, advanced reactors and fuel cycle
technologies and facilities.
As the nuclear industry pursues evolutionary R&D to further
improve efficiencies along each step of the current fuel cycle,
it is incumbent upon the government to implement long-term,
science-based R&D programs for developing transformational
technologies and options for the advanced fuel cycle. In the
very near-term we recommend that the United States' advanced
fuel cycle program develop a science and technology roadmap.
This would involve national labs, universities and industry and
be a--start with a comprehensive set of options for fuel cycle
technologies and overall systems. The roadmap should describe
the technical readiness, risks and potential benefits of each
option and the required R&D for each. This would be followed by
implementation of a robust science-based R&D program to address
all the challenges related to the fuel cycle.
Finally, there is sufficient time to analyze the technology
options, choose the paths to investigate and conduct the
science-based R&D and technology demonstrations that would be
needed in the future for making decisions about the nuclear
fuel cycle in the United States. However, it is imperative to
begin now to build the R&D infrastructure that is needed for
science and technology development, which must include advances
in theory, modeling and simulation, new separation, fuel and
waste management technologies, and advanced reactor concepts.
With that, I thank you and would be pleased to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Peters follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark T. Peters
Introduction and Context
World energy demand is increasing at a rapid pace. In order to
satisfy the demand and protect the environment for future generations,
including reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, future energy sources
must evolve from the current dominance of fossil fuels to a more
balanced, sustainable approach to energy production that is based on
abundant, clean, and economical energy sources. Therefore, there is a
vital and urgent need to establish safe, clean, and secure energy
sources for the future on a worldwide basis. Nuclear energy is already
a reliable, abundant, and ``carbon-free'' source of electricity for the
United States and the world. In addition to contributing to future
electricity production, nuclear energy could also be a critical
resource for ``fueling'' the transportation sector (e.g., electricity
for plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles and process heat for hydrogen
and synthetic fuels production) and for desalinating water. However,
nuclear energy must experience significant growth to achieve the goals
of reliable and affordable energy in a carbon-constrained world.
There are a number of challenges associated with the global
expansion of nuclear power. Such a global expansion will create
potential competition for uranium resources for fuel, the need for
increased industrial capacity for construction, the need for integrated
waste management, and the need to control proliferation risks
associated with the expansion of sensitive nuclear technologies.
Moreover, domestic expansion of nuclear energy will increase the need
for effective nuclear waste management in the United States.
Any advanced nuclear fuel cycle aimed at meeting these challenges
must simultaneously address issues of economics, uranium resource
utilization, nuclear waste minimization, and a strengthened
nonproliferation regime, all of which require systems analysis and
investment in new technologies. In the end, a comprehensive and long-
term vision for expanded, sustainable nuclear energy must include:
Safe and secure fuel-cycle technologies;
Cost-effective technologies for an overall fuel-cycle
system; and
Closed fuel cycle for waste and resource management.
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
The nuclear fuel cycle is a cradle-to-grave framework that includes
uranium mining, fuel fabrication, energy production, and nuclear waste
management. There are two basic nuclear fuel-cycle approaches. An open
(or once-through) fuel cycle, as currently planned by the United
States, involves treating spent nuclear fuel as waste, with ultimate
disposition of the material in a geologic repository (see Figure 1). In
contrast, a closed (or recycle) fuel cycle, as currently planned by
other countries (e.g., France, Russia, and Japan), involves treating
spent nuclear fuel as a resource whereby separations and actinide
recycling in reactors work with geologic disposal (see Figure 2).
One of the key challenges associated with the choice of either
option is spent nuclear fuel management. For example, current United
States policy calls for the development of a geologic repository for
the direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The decision to take this
path was made decades ago, when the initial growth in nuclear energy
had stopped, and the expectation was that the existing nuclear power
plants would operate until reaching the end of their design lifetime,
at which point, all of the plants would be decommissioned and no new
reactors would be built. While it may be argued that direct disposal is
adequate for such a scenario, the recent domestic and international
proposals for significant nuclear energy expansion call for a
reevaluation of this option for future spent fuel management (see
Figure 3). While geologic repositories will be needed for any type of
nuclear fuel cycle, the use of a repository would be quite different
for closed fuel-cycle scenarios.
For reprocessing to be beneficial (as opposed to
counterproductive), it must be followed by recycling, transmutation,
and fission destruction of the ultra-long-lived radiotoxic constituents
(for example, plutonium [Pu], neptunium [Np], americium [Am]; the Pu-
241 to Am-241 to Np-237 chain is the dominant one). Reprocessing (with
Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by Extraction [PUREX]) followed by Pu
mono-recycling (mixedoxide [MOX] fuel in light water reactors [LWRs])
is well established, but is only a partial solution. It is not at all
clear that we should embark on this path, especially since the United
States has not made a massive investment in a PUREX/MOX infrastructure.
(Although, the United States is proceeding with a plan to reduce
excess-weapons Pu inventory using MOX in LWRs.) In contrast,
advancement of fast reactor technology for transuranic [TRU] recycling
and consumption would maximize the benefits of waste management and
also allow essential progress toward the longer-term goal of
sustainable use of uranium (and subsequently thorium) with fast
reactors.
There is no urgent need to deploy recycling today, but as nuclear
energy expands, a once-through fuel cycle will not be sustainable. To
maximize the benefits of nuclear energy in an expanding nuclear energy
future, it will ultimately be necessary to close the fuel cycle.
Fortuitously, it is conceivable that the decades-long hiatus in United
States investment circumvents the need to rely on a dated recycling
infrastructure. Rather, we have the option to develop and build new
technologies and develop business models using advanced systems.
Advanced Fuel-Cycle R&D Program
To reduce cost, ensure sustainability, and improve efficiency,
safety, and security, significant investments (several hundred million
dollars per year) in a sustained nuclear energy research and
development (R&D) program are needed. Such a program must effectively
support and integrate both basic and applied research and use modeling
and simulation capabilities to address both near-term evolutionary
activities (e.g., life extensions of the current nuclear fleet) and
long-term solutions (e.g., advanced reactors and fuel-cycle
technologies and facilities). As the nuclear industry pursues
evolutionary R&D to further improve efficiencies along each step of the
current fuel cycle, it is incumbent upon the government to implement
long-term, science-based R&D programs for developing transformational
technologies and options for advanced nuclear fuel cycles. Including
nuclear regulators in the research and evaluation of results will
facilitate the licensing and regulation of future nuclear facilities
and technologies.
The growth of the scientific basis for nuclear energy and its
translation into design concepts and technology advances will enable
expanded, sustainable use of nuclear energy to meet energy needs
worldwide in a safe, secure, and cost-effective manner through:
Discovery and understanding of relevant phenomena;
Creation of innovative concepts;
Science-based approaches involving theory,
experimentation, and modeling and simulation followed by
demonstrations of new technologies; and
Optimization of future nuclear energy systems in the
context of technological, environmental, nonproliferation,
security, and socioeconomic factors.
Planning the R&D required to support future implementation requires
consideration of not only domestic nuclear energy development needs,
but also an understanding of the global context in which nuclear energy
will continue to grow. This requires a forward-looking program to
conduct R&D defined by consideration of a broad range of planning
assumptions for future nuclear energy use and effective approaches for
improving waste management, nuclear nonproliferation, resource
utilization, and economics. In summary, an advanced fuel-cycle R&D
program, including fundamental R&D and technology development, is
needed to examine a range of possibilities to determine the most
important aspects, identify what the risks may be, and define what
steps may be needed to successfully leapfrog existing technologies.
An essential part of the overall program supporting nuclear energy
is the fundamental R&D that addresses long-range development issues.
These include:
Timelines for potential nuclear energy deployment
strategies to identify possible nuclear energy infrastructures,
both global and domestic, and the science and technology
development needs and timing of availability;
Understanding the current technical status (including
industry, the national laboratory complex, and universities)
and planning for a reasoned development;
Fundamental development of key technologies to
resolve existing or anticipated issues related to waste
management, nonproliferation, resource utilization, and
economics; and
Identify the need for research and development
facilities, including utilization of existing infrastructure,
for development and testing of the key technologies, including
determining the deployment times for these facilities.
In the very near-term, we recommend that the United States advanced
fuel-cycle program develop a Science and Technology Development
Roadmap. Based on a comprehensive set of options for fuel-cycle
technologies and overall systems, the roadmap should describe the
technical readiness, risks, and potential benefits of each option and
the required R&D plan for each. This should be followed by
implementation of a robust, science-based R&D program involving
advanced reactors, separations, transmutation fuel, and waste
management to enable timely identification of the technology options
for a sustainable closed fuel cycle, identify what the risks may be,
and define what steps are needed to successfully leapfrog existing
recycling technologies.
In the long-term, the required basic and applied R&D includes:
Science and discovery contributions to technology/
design;
Increased role of modeling and simulation in nuclear
energy R&D and design of nuclear energy systems;
Improved systems analysis of nuclear energy
deployment strategies;
Advances in separations and fuel technologies to
close the fuel cycle, e.g.,
-- Develop and demonstrate aqueous-based technologies;
-- Develop and demonstrate pyroprocessing
technologies; and
-- Develop and demonstrate transmutation fuels.
Advances in nuclear reactor technology and design to
generate electricity and close the fuel cycle, e.g.,
-- Develop advanced reactor concepts;
-- Develop advanced reactor component testing
facilities; and
-- Develop a demonstration fast reactor.
Advancement of safe and secure use of nuclear energy
on an international basis, e.g.,
-- Enhance safety assurance capabilities in countries
newly adopting nuclear power; and
-- Improve safeguard technologies and practices.
Education and training of future nuclear energy
professionals; and
University programs and partnering with institutions
that have nuclear energy programs.
Finally, there is sufficient time to analyze the technology
options, choose the paths to investigate, and conduct the science-based
R&D and technology demonstrations that would be needed in the future
for making decisions about the nuclear fuel-cycle infrastructure in the
United States. However, it is imperative to begin now to build the R&D
infrastructure that is needed for science and technology development,
which must include advances in theory; modeling and simulation; new
separations, fuel, and waste management technologies; and advanced
reactor concepts.
Biography for Mark T. Peters
Dr. Mark Peters is the Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for the
Energy Sciences and Engineering Directorate at Argonne National
Laboratory (ANL). Responsibilities of his position include the
management and integration of the Laboratory's energy R&D portfolio
coupled with development of new program opportunities at the
Laboratory, and management of the energy-related Laboratory Directed
Research and Development program (LDRD). Dr. Peters also provides
technical support to the DOE Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) and
was recently appointed AFCI National Campaign Director for Spent Fuel
Disposition.
Selected to serve on a two-year detail to DOE Headquarters in
Washington, D.C., Dr. Peters worked as a senior technical advisor to
the Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. In
a prior position, Dr. Peters was with Los Alamos National Laboratory,
where he served as the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) Science and
Engineering Testing Project Manager. In that role, he was responsible
for the technical management and integration of science and engineering
testing in the laboratory and field on the YMP.
Before joining Los Alamos National Laboratory and the YMP in 1995,
Dr. Peters had a research fellowship in geochemistry at the California
Institute of Technology where his research focused on trace-element
geochemistry. He has authored over 60 scientific publications, and has
presented his findings at national and international meetings. Dr.
Peters is a member of several professional organizations including the
Geological Society of America, where he served as a member of the
Committee on Geology and Public Policy. In addition, he is a member of
the American Geophysical Union, the Geochemical Society, the
Mineralogical Society of America, and the American Nuclear Society. Dr.
Peters' professional achievements have resulted in his election to
Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Society, as well as Sigma Gamma
Epsilon, the Earth Sciences Honorary Society.
Dr. Peters received his Ph.D. in Geophysical Sciences from the
University of Chicago and his B.S. in Geology from Auburn University.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Peters.
Dr. Hanson, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. ALAN S. HANSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
TECHNOLOGY AND USED FUEL MANAGEMENT, AREVA NC INC.
Dr. Hanson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. My name is Alan Hanson. I am an Executive Vice
President at Areva. On behalf of Areva's 6,000 U.S. employees,
I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today.
Relevant to today's testimony is the fact that Areva operates
the largest and most successful recycling facilities in the
world. I am going to focus first on some of the benefits and
criticisms associated with recycling.
The main benefits I think are reasonably well known. There
is a conservation of uranium resources that occurs because of
the recovery of material and its reuse. Recycling makes waste
management easier by reducing the volumes, the heat loads and
changing the waste form which is to be disposed of, and
importantly, recycling is a path to burning plutonium and
removing it from proliferation concern. Recycling as we perform
it today destroys about 30 percent of the plutonium and it
alters the composition of the uranium and plutonium so that it
is no longer very attractive for weapons purposes.
Now, in contrast to these benefits, the criticisms are in
three areas, first, nonproliferation, then cost, then the
volume of waste. I want to focus on this nonproliferation issue
because this is the reason we are not doing reprocessing in the
United States today. In recent years many countries have
embarked on a nuclear weapons program for reasons of national
prestige and power but they have not done it using the
commercial fuel cycle. They have done it in a dedicated
program. The vast majority of countries seek only peaceful uses
of nuclear power and they rely upon the industry to provide
them with enriched material and recycling services rather than
build their own facilities. This is one way to control the
spread of the nuclear facilities, by having a robust industry
providing services. A fundamental question is, would a decision
by the United States to recycle and close the fuel cycle, would
this contribute to proliferation or would it do the opposite
and contribute to nonproliferation? I have a strong belief that
it would do the latter, that it would contribute to
nonproliferation.
Let us examine the case for proliferation, and I will start
with diversion. The United States has for a long time had a
plutonium economy in the military complex. They have
demonstrated a wonderful ability to control the material and to
keep it from diversion. There is no reason in my mind that the
same techniques that are used for our weapons program cannot be
used for commercial recycling to make sure that there is not a
diversion. What about theft? The same argument holds true. We
have not had thefts of sensitive nuclear material in the United
States. It is very well protected, and I don't see any reason
again that we can't protect commercial material in the same
way. This leaves only one reason to forego recycling, and that
is the issue of setting an example for the rest of the world.
This is the ostensible reason that we are not recycling. But
that policy has not stopped France, the U.K., Russia and Japan
from doing recycling and it will not stop China and India from
doing it. Those are the next two nations which are going to
embark on recycling programs. I would strongly recommend, as an
individual and as a representative of Areva, that the United
States step to the forefront and build a recycling complex
which can provide a service to other countries to make it
unnecessary and uneconomical for them to pursue their own
recycling, and this would be a step forward on
nonproliferation.
I am not going to spend a lot of time on cost. This can be
an expensive proposition. It can be done in an economical
fashion as we are doing in Europe. The cost of the fuel cycle
for nuclear power is such a small fraction of the total cost of
electricity produced that if we were to double the costs of
handling the back end of the fuel cycle, the consumer would see
a few pennies a month, so it is not economically unattractive.
On waste, the volume reduction is enormous. It is at least
a factor of four for the repository for the high-level
materials. You do end up with a little bit more of the low-
level materials which need to go into surface burial, but our
calculations show that this would increase low-level waste only
by about two and a half percent, which is certainly not an
onerous price to pay.
With regard to R&D, we are very supportive of R&D in the
federal complex. There are things that industry will not do
because they are too long-term or too speculative. We are very
supportive of the AFCI initiative which Mark Peters referred
to. We believe this should go forward, that work should
continue to be done on advanced aqueous separations and also on
electro-metallurgical separations, which are not as advanced as
aqueous processing, and I think that Lisa Price will have more
to say about that. We should not be seeking a proliferation-
proof fuel cycle. It doesn't exist. We can't find it. We can
make it proliferation resistant and that is what we need to do.
I would end my testimony here by trying to answer very
quickly your question. I would personally vote for proceeding
in a rather determined and in a near-term basis to implement
recycling in the United States. I think waiting for Generation
IV technologies would be another mistake for this country.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hanson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alan S. Hanson
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
My name is Alan Hanson, and I am Executive Vice President,
Technology and Used Fuel Management, of AREVA NC Inc.
I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today on
advanced technology for nuclear fuel recycling.
AREVA Inc. is an American corporation headquartered in Maryland
with more than 6,000 employees in over 40 locations across 20 U.S.
states. Last year, our U.S. operations generated revenues of $2.5
billion--12 percent of which was derived from U.S. exports. We are part
of a global family of AREVA companies with 75,000 employees worldwide
offering proven energy solutions for emissions-free power generation
and electricity transmission and distribution. We are proud to be the
leading supplier of products and services to the worldwide nuclear
industry, and we are the only company in the world to operate in all
aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.
AREVA designs, engineers and builds the newest generation of
commercial nuclear plants and provides reactor services, replacement
components and fuel to the world's nuclear utilities. We offer our
expertise to help meet America's environmental management needs and
have been a longtime partner with the U.S. Department of Energy on
numerous important projects. Relevant to today's testimony is the fact
that AREVA operates the largest and most successful used fuel treatment
and recycling plants in the world.
As I read the Committee invitation, you have requested information
in five subject areas:
(1) Explore the risks and benefits associated with the
recycling of used nuclear fuel;
(2) Discuss the research, development and demonstration needs
at the federal level as the U.S. reviews its nuclear waste
management strategy;
(3) Describe AREVA's strategy for management of used nuclear
fuel, including the technologies deployed for establishing a
closed fuel cycle;
(4) Discuss the environmental impacts of recycling and the
safety measures AREVA has adopted to address concerns about
nuclear proliferation; and
(5) Recommend any research, development and demonstration
needs that could make nuclear waste recycling safer, more
efficient and/or cost effective.
What I hope to accomplish today is to address each of these
requests in the testimony that follows.
Benefits and Criticisms Associated With Recycling
The main benefits associated with the recycling of used nuclear
fuel can be summarized as follows:
Recycling makes waste management easier.
Recycling provides strategic flexibility and
confidence for the long-term.
Recycling saves natural resources.
Recycling is a path to burning plutonium, thereby
reducing proliferation concerns.
Recycling makes waste management easier. Recycling used nuclear
fuel reduces the volume of high-level waste to be disposed of in a
final repository.
Only four percent of used fuel content is high-level waste. When
such waste is vitrified, or specially-packed into a highly compact
glass-like waste form for final storage, and added to the volume of
compacted structural waste and high-level process waste, the total
volume necessary for final disposal is 75 percent less than the volume
required if the used fuel is disposed directly in a repository.
The volume required in the repository is further reduced if the
vitrified waste is allowed to ``cool'' in interim storage for some
decades before actual emplacement in a repository. This is due to the
thermal load issue. For example, if vitrified waste is stored for 70
years of cooling before emplacement, the volume reduction factor would
double. And volume requirements could be even further reduced when
future technologies such as transmutation are available for deployment.
High-level waste volume reduction is a crucial benefit of recycling
as it allows maximum use of a geological repository, a rare and
precious asset. When a high-level waste repository eventually opens in
the U.S., one would want to make optimal use of every cubic unit of
emplacement. Licensing of such a facility is long, and public
acceptance is very sensitive. It is difficult to envisage today an
attempt to license multiple geological repositories in the U.S. It is
already difficult enough just to license the first one.
It is worth noticing that today the quantity of used fuel already
discharged from U.S. reactors is very significant, approximately 60,000
metric tons. If Yucca Mountain were to open in the next decade, the
amount of fuel available for emplacement would already completely fill
the repository's legal capacity, leaving no place to dispose newly-
generated waste. Furthermore, about 2,000 metric tons of used fuel is
discharged every year by the U.S. commercial nuclear reactor fleet of
104 reactors. Even if no more reactors were to be built in the U.S., an
additional 20,000 metric tons of used fuel would accumulate every
decade the U.S. waits.
The main contributor to the long-term radioactive toxicity of used
nuclear fuel is plutonium for the first several hundreds of thousands
of years, then minor actinides and uranium become predominant.
Consequently, extracting plutonium and uranium from the waste for final
disposal significantly reduces the waste's toxicity, by a factor of
about 90 percent.
Recycling provides a highly safe, resistant and well-characterized
waste form. Vitrified waste is a very robust matrix against dissolution
by water, as strong as volcanic rock. It has been proven scientifically
that after 100,000 years only one percent of its mass would be lost by
leaching in water, and it would require more than 10 million years to
completely dissolve in water. It is important to recognize that after
10,000 years, the radioactivity of a vitrified waste package is reduced
down to that of natural uranium ore due to the natural decay of the
radioactive atoms contained therein. Such robust characteristics of the
waste form facilitate the long-term safety demonstration of the
repository and consequently simplify the licensing process.
Recycling provides strategic flexibility and confidence for the
long-term. Vitrified waste packages are no longer subject to
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, as almost all of the
fissile material, uranium and plutonium, has been removed to
manufacture recycled fuel. Consequently waste from recycling can be
safely and cost-effectively interim-stored in simple, compact and low-
cost facilities.
Recycling provides a credible and reliable nuclear waste management
option consisting of storing the vitrified waste for an extended period
of time waiting for a geological repository to be ready and approved.
Long-term interim storage of waste from recycling is easier and safer
than interim storage of used fuel without recycling. Vitrified waste
from 40 years of operation of the French nuclear reactor fleet,
currently 54 power reactors, resides in a single building with a
footprint that is less than two American football fields.
Recycling saves natural resources. Uranium recovered from
recycling, also known as ``RepU,'' represents about 95 percent of the
mass of light water reactor used fuel with a residual U235
enrichment level of 0.8 percent to 0.9 percent, higher than natural
uranium ore.
Re-enrichment and recycling of RepU is performed by several
utilities throughout the world. With the current and forecasted costs
of nuclear fuel sourced from natural uranium, RepU becomes a secondary
source that is quite attractive. Today, customers are asking AREVA to
provide them with 100 percent recycling of their RepU. AREVA is making
investments to ensure 100 percent RepU re-enrichment and RepU fuel
fabrication by 2015.
Recycling RepU allows savings of 15 percent of natural uranium
resources. Recycling plutonium into mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel allows
about 12 percent of natural uranium savings. Recycling both recovered
uranium and plutonium leads to a total savings of at least 27 percent
of natural uranium resources.
The amount of U.S. commercial used nuclear fuel accumulated by
2010, 60,000 metric tons, if recycled represents the energy equivalent
of eight years of nuclear fuel supply for today's entire U.S. nuclear
reactor fleet. Energy recovery potential is, therefore, significant and
enhances energy security.
Recycling is a path to burning plutonium, thereby reducing
proliferation concerns. Recycling plutonium in MOX fuel consumes
roughly one-third of the plutonium through single recycling and
significantly alters the isotopic composition of the remaining
plutonium, thus severely degrading its potential weapons
attractiveness.
Burning plutonium in MOX fuel is the path that has been selected by
the National Nuclear Security Administration to dispose U.S. weapons-
grade plutonium declared in excess. With the assistance of AREVA, a MOX
fuel fabrication facility is currently being constructed at the DOE
Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and it is on track to start
production of the first MOX fuel by 2016.
In contrast to the benefits described above, the criticisms of
spent fuel recycling focus mainly on the following points:
Non-proliferation
Cost
Volume of waste generated
Non-proliferation. In recent years, a few countries have sought to
acquire nuclear weapons for reasons of national security, national
power or national prestige. Their basic motivations were political. It
is very important to note such countries never intended to use nuclear
technology to produce a single kilowatt-hour of electricity. Meanwhile,
the vast majority of countries in the world continue to seek ways to
produce electricity on an efficient, competitive, sustainable, peaceful
and responsible basis. They have no interest in developing or accessing
sensitive nuclear technologies when it does not make economic sense for
them and as long as security of supply is guaranteed for them.
There are ways and means to control the spread of material and
technologies, mainly through the limitation of the number of facilities
in the world and providing strong guarantees of supply to dissuade most
countries from developing their own uranium enrichment or reprocessing
capabilities.
There is a fundamental question of policy which should be important
to this committee:
Would a decision by the U.S. to recycle its used fuel and
close the nuclear fuel cycle contribute to proliferation, or
would it do the opposite and contribute to nonproliferation?
Let us examine the case for proliferation by diversion. Today we do
not know if recycling in the U.S. would be carried out by a government
entity or a commercial firm. If by a government entity, the diversion
scenario is not relevant since the Federal Government already has a
stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium and, therefore, has no use for
less-effective reactor-grade plutonium. Since the U.S. Government has
demonstrated an ability to prevent diversion of its weapons material,
there is no reason to believe it could not prevent diversion of
material recovered from used fuel by the same means. If recycling is
done by a commercial entity, the government could impose its own
safeguards in addition to IAEA safeguards to prevent diversion.
What about theft of weapons-usable material? The same logic applies
as for diversion. The Federal Government has been successful at
protecting its own stockpile of weapons-grade material, so there is no
reason to believe that it cannot adequately protect less attractive
reactor-grade materials.
If diversion or theft of plutonium can be prevented by extensive
national and international safeguards and physical protection, then
there remains only one reason for the U.S. to forego recycling and that
is to avoid setting an example that might be followed by the rest of
the world. This is the ostensible reason why the U.S. turned its back
on recycling three decades ago. But that U.S. policy did not prevent
Britain, France, Japan or Russia from building domestic recycling
facilities, nor will it prevent China from following suit.
Notice that the only countries to build such facilities are those
with a sizable amount of used fuel that makes it economically
justifiable to do so. Other countries which chose to recycle elected to
purchase the service rather than build their own facilities. This is
similar to the model for enrichment espoused by U.S. policy, i.e.,
there is sufficient capacity and robust supply assurances that can make
proliferation of expensive enrichment facilities unattractive. I would
argue that the same logic can be applied to recycling and that a U.S.
decision to offer such a service could prevent many countries from
building indigenous facilities, thereby enhancing the nonproliferation
regime.
Cost. In 2006, The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) performed a study
with input from AREVA that showed that the economics of recycling as
compared to direct disposal are comparable, within 10 percent
difference. The reasons are the following:
The cost of uranium has significantly increased in
the past years, which increases the value of recycled fuel.
The projected total life cycle cost of a geological
repository is high, which provides high value for each cubic
unit of emplacement saved due to recycling.
A large recycling facility, about 2,500 metric tons
per year capacity, provides significant cost savings through
economies of scale.
Today, the conclusions of the BCG report are even truer as the
long-term forecast for uranium cost is going up and the cost of the
Yucca Mountain repository has also significantly increased.
Of course, any study depends upon the assumptions made, and other
studies using different assumptions have produced results different
from those of BCG. Of note, however, is a respectable study by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) which concluded that costs for
recycling would be somewhat higher then projected by BCG. However, the
cost for management of the back-end of the fuel cycle is such a small
part of the total cost of electricity produced that nuclear power would
remain competitive even using the CBO estimates. The impact of
recycling on the cost of electricity is between 0.1 and 0.2 cents per
kilowatt-hour when the production cost of nuclear electricity is around
two cents per kilowatt-hour.
Volume of waste generated. Recycling used fuel generates two types
of waste streams classified according to their ultimate disposal
pathway: surface disposal and underground, or geologic, disposal, the
latter being orders of magnitude more complex, more expensive and more
sensitive to implement as the focus of public acceptance issues is
concerned. When comparing solid waste figures between the option to
directly dispose used fuel or to recycle it, it is therefore
fundamental to distinguish between those two types of waste.
As pointed out previously, the volume of material destined for the
high-level waste repository is reduced by at least 75 percent through
recycling. Some critics of recycling point out that there is a price to
be paid for recycling which is an increased volume of low-level waste
destined for near-surface disposal. Based on AREVA's experience, the
projected increase in low-level waste to be disposed in near-surface
facilities were the U.S. to recycle would approximate only 2.5 percent
of the volume of such waste that is disposed annually in the U.S.
Federal Research, Development and Demonstration
While industry can be relied on to carry out research and
development on topics that are of near-term commercial interest, it is
unrealistic to expect any industry to expend research funds on basic
science or on topics with a very uncertain or a long-term payoff. It is
these latter types of research which must be primarily a federal
priority.
To its credit, the U.S. Department of Energy has for years devoted
resources to the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI). Such research
should continue, but it should not focus solely on unattainable goals.
AFCI has often seemed to be a search for the non-existent
``proliferation-proof'' fuel cycle. It is important to understand that
the laws of chemistry and physics preclude the existence of such a
utopian fuel cycle. Any technology that allows the separation and/or
the concentration of fissionable atoms has the potential for misuse.
That is why the sensitive fuel cycle activities associated with
enrichment and recycling must be adequately safeguarded and physically
protected.
Even the search for a so-called ``proliferation-resistant'' fuel
cycle may be a fruitless effort. To date, it appears that there is not
a great deal of difference in proliferation resistance between any of
the conceivable, realistic fuel cycles. An undue focus on self-
protecting fuel forms could well lead to a nuclear fuel type which does
not meet necessary standards for safety and economic efficiency. In
this case, we should not expect to find a technological solution, a
proliferation-resistant fuel cycle, for an inherently political
problem, the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This problem demands
political solutions, and technology should focus on giving political
leaders the tools to accomplish their objectives, primarily enhanced
safeguards systems and physical protection measures.
AREVA's Used Fuel Management Strategy
When nuclear fuel is discharged from a commercial reactor, it is
actually not ``spent.'' There is still a significant amount of fissile
material remaining in used fuel--we call it used fuel instead of spent
fuel for this very reason--still capable of providing at least 25
percent more energy. But this energy cannot be delivered in the
conventional nuclear reactor because the fuel is progressively
accumulating fission products; it is polluted by the ``ashes''
resulting from the fission reaction. Many byproducts of the fission of
uranium atoms are neutron absorbers. And such absorptions reduce the
population of neutrons available to induce new fission reactions. Then
the fission reaction can no longer be sustained appropriately or cost-
effectively.
This is when recycling comes into play. Recycling consists of
separating the ``ashes'' from the reusable material, recovering the
valuable material, uranium and plutonium, and manufacturing fresh new
fuel out of it.
In terms of mass, 95 percent of used fuel contents is composed of
reusable uranium, one percent is reusable plutonium, and the remaining
four percent is actual waste which contains practically no remaining
fissile material nor any energy value for the current and near-future
generation of reactors. Recovered uranium is re-enriched and used to
fabricate fresh new fuel, where the fissile material is
U235. Recovered plutonium is blended with depleted uranium
to fabricate MOX, or mixed oxide, fuel, where the fissile materials are
Pu239 and Pu241.
The four percent of actual waste is then specially packed through
vitrification in order to provide a safe waste form with a very long-
term stability. The vitrified waste is the package that is bound for
disposal in a geological repository, together with the metallic
structures of the fuel bundle.
AREVA today uses an aqueous process to recover the uranium and
plutonium. It is an updated version of the PUREX process invented in
the U.S. Future AREVA facilities will benefit from lessons learned and
continuous improvement of our technology. The main features of new
plants would be:
Implementation of the new enhanced COEXTM process
where no pure plutonium is separated anywhere in the facility,
as a replacement for today's PUREX process.
Co-location of treatment and fuel fabrication plants
to avoid transportation of intermediate nuclear material
outside of the facilities.
Overall enhanced safeguards systems and ``safeguards
by design'' approaches.
This is what is available and possible today and in the near to
medium future. Current research is focusing on future processes capable
to further extract material from the ``ashes'' that could be burned in
a new generation of fast neutron spectrum reactors. In such next
generation, Generation IV reactors, more atoms and more isotopes become
fissionable because the fast neutrons produced are of much higher
energy. Moreover, the long-lived actinides, which heavily drive the
requirements for confinement in geological disposal, could be broken
into shorter live atoms which, in theory, could lead to a dramatic
reduction of the volume required to dispose remaining waste in a
geological repository.
This is a very long-term story, probably 50 to 60 years before the
first commercial operation. Of course, one could choose to wait for
Generation IV recycling technologies, but the price to be paid for
waiting is an enormous increase in world inventories of plutonium in
used fuel and an enormous waste of energy potential if the used fuel is
irretrievably disposed. It is also contrary to sustainable development
principles under which we promise our children not to burden them with
the legacy of our consumption.
Environmental Impacts and Nuclear Security
Protection of workers and of the environment is at the highest of
AREVA's priorities. The environmental impact of our La Hague treatment
operations remains below the natural background radiation level. The
maximum potential impact on the most highly-exposed sectors of the
public remains 100 times less than the natural radioactivity level. The
natural background exposure at La Hague is about 2.4 millisieverts per
year. The highest local exposure to farmers or fishermen is less than
0.02 millisieverts per year, which is equivalent to the exposure
received by a passenger during one New York to Paris trans-Atlantic
flight.
AREVA La Hague performs systematic and in-depth monitoring of the
environment in the air, on land (e.g., surface water, grass and milk)
and at sea (e.g., coastal waters, fish and seaweed) around the site. A
host of measurements are taken; around 23,000 samples are taken every
year, and 70,000 analyses are made every year under the scrutiny of
independent authorities who also perform their own sampling and
analyses.
AREVA takes very seriously its responsibility to minimize the risk
of proliferation of sensitive nuclear facilities and materials. We
believe that the spread of recycling and uranium enrichment
technologies should be limited. At the recent Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace meeting held in Washington, AREVA Chief Executive
Officer Anne Lauvergeon stated emphatically that at this time there are
only two countries to which AREVA would export its recycling
technologies: the U.S. and China.
Strong guarantees of supply should dissuade the vast majority of
countries from developing their own capabilities for recycling and
enrichment. Industry support and a commercial model ensuring
competition, profitability and reliability are necessary in this
regard. Existence of a few competitors will provide the guarantee of
continuous supplies at reasonable prices. Large-scale profitable
facilities and industries are therefore an important asset. Long-term
contracts can ensure credibility and sustainability of commitments.
France has developed a model under which it can accept used fuel to
recycle in its domestic facilities, burn recovered plutonium in its
reactors and return the waste to the country where the fuel was used to
produce energy. Other countries may choose to retain the high-level
waste and dispose of it along with their domestic waste in the future.
In either case, there is no proliferation threat from the vitrified
products of recycling.
New recycling plants in the world should incorporate enhanced
nonproliferation and security features such as the COEXTM process with
no pure separated plutonium, co-location of treatment and fuel
fabrication plants to avoid intermediate nuclear material
transportation, and robust safeguards systems and ``safeguards by
design'' approaches.
The Future of Safe and Efficient Recycling
While AREVA takes pride in the successful operation of its
recycling complex centered at the La Hague and MELOX facilities, we are
convinced that further improvements can be made. In fact, continuous
improvements have been made in France over the previous three decades
based on research and development. Much of what has been learned was
incorporated into the design of the Japanese recycling treatment plant
at Rokkasho-mura. Future plants wherever they are located should take
advantage of the advanced safeguards procedures built into the
Rokkasho-mura facility and should also implement advanced technology
such as COEXTM, which does not separate pure plutonium.
In addition, AREVA believes that there are other areas for
research, development and demonstration. Off-site doses are highly
dependent on specific locations, as are the allowable levels of gaseous
and liquid discharges. Research, development and demonstration should
be concentrated on reducing the minimal gaseous and liquid discharges
that arise from current processing technologies. The capture, packaging
and disposal of gases and liquids are areas ripe for research. At the
same time, such research should focus on the cost-benefit analysis of
limiting discharges while assuring that worker dose rates are not
inappropriately increased.
In the long-term, and especially in conjunction with the future
implementation of Generation IV reactor technologies, electro-
metallurgical separations may become a useful technology. Such
separations technology has not yet reached the level of maturity found
today with aqueous processing. This is another area suitable for
research at the U.S. national laboratories because of the long-term
time horizon for widespread commercial implementation.
Finally, further federal research, development and demonstration
should be devoted to advanced safeguards technologies such as advanced
instrumentation that will allow near-real time material accountancy.
The development of that technology would contribute significantly to
enhancing the assurance that sensitive materials are not being
diverted.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate having this
opportunity to join you today. I am delighted that our lawmakers have
taken an interest in advanced technology for nuclear fuel recycling. A
used fuel recycling facility should be built in the U.S. in the near
future in order not to postpone the waste management issue once again
and for America to regain global leadership.
A nuclear renaissance is undeniably happening around the world.
Britain, France, China, Japan and Russia have already built or are
developing recycling capabilities. America was the first to develop
this technology, we were the first to send a man to the Moon, and it is
time for America to take the lead again. AREVA would be pleased to
cooperate with the U.S. Department of Energy to further research,
development and demonstration on recycling.
Biography for Alan S. Hanson
Alan Hanson was appointed Executive Vice President, Technology and
Used Fuel Management, of AREVA NC Inc. in 2005. He was formerly
President and Chief Executive Officer of AREVA subsidiary Transnuclear,
Inc., which he first joined in 1985. He continues his responsibilities
there as a Director of the company.
Dr. Hanson began his career in 1975 with the Nuclear Services
Division of Yankee Atomic Electric Company. In 1979, he joined the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, where he served
first as Coordinator of the International Spent Fuel Management Program
and later as Policy Analyst with responsibilities for safeguards and
nonproliferation policies.
Dr. Hanson completed his undergraduate studies in mechanical
engineering at Stanford University and earned a Ph.D. in nuclear
engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a
member of the American Nuclear Society and the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Hanson.
And now Ms. Price, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF MS. LISA M. PRICE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, GE
HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY AMERICAS LLC; CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL, LLC
Ms. Price. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Ehlers and Members of the
Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today
on a suggested approach for research, development and
demonstration for nuclear fuel recycling.
GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy developed this approach based on
technology originally funded by the Department of Energy. The
options for dealing with the nuclear waste problem can really
be categorized in three ways, in the three Rs: repository,
reprocess or recycle. However, the differences between those
three Rs drive the way you think about the opportunities and
how to proceed. Long-term storage would be required in any of
these scenarios. However, the amount of time that waste would
have to be isolated in a repository depends on which R is
selected. Now, why is that? It is because the most significant
factor impacting long-term storage is the amount of heat that
is generated principally by four elements in the used nuclear
fuel called transuranics. The three Rs differ in how these
transuranics are handled. So let us look at the three Rs
briefly.
Repository refers to sequestering the used nuclear fuel in
a permanent repository. A typical spent fuel bundle will see
significant heat reduction after hundreds of thousands of
years. Reprocessing, which extracts plutonium, one of the
transuranics, and incorporates that plutonium into mixed oxide
fuel which is burned in light water reactors, is improved over
a repository because it extracts plutonium. However,
reprocessing will see significant heat reduction after
thousands of years. Recycling, on the other hand, fuels a
sodium-cooled reactor with all of the transuranics. Because the
transuranics are almost completely burned up and consumed as
power is generated by the reactor, they are not part of the
waste stream and that significantly reduces the heat load on
the repository to hundreds of years rather than thousands or
hundreds of thousands of years.
With that, I have four recommendations for the Committee.
First, work with industry to drive research, development and
demonstration for recycling. GE Hitachi has developed a
framework for research on closing the fuel cycle and we have
actually submitted that to Michelle\1\ in advance of this
testimony. We recognize the critical importance of working with
our national labs and our universities in advancing research
and development work in support of this effort. Number two,
fund research that leads to logical development in areas like
licensing, manufacturing and design validation and advanced
separation technologies. Three, we should continue to fund
basic research in advanced technologies for closing the fuel
cycle. And lastly, we should fund demonstrations that will
provide the data that will support an informed decision on
commercially deploying potential back-end fuel cycle solutions.
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\1\ Energy and Environment Majority Professional Staff Michelle
Dallafior
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The Nation has an opportunity today to lead a
transformation to a new, safer and more secure approach to
nuclear energy and recycling with a sodium-cooled reactor and
electro-metallurgical processing can close the fuel cycle. Our
technology and our solution approach meets the government's
goals. It generates additional incremental carbon-free
electricity. It provides enhanced energy security. It provides
additional options for geologic storage greater than that which
exists today. It can reduce proliferation concerns and nuclear
waste volumes, and importantly, it positions the United States
to be in a unique position to exert its leadership once again
in nuclear science and technology.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Price follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lisa M. Price
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hall, and Members of the Committee, I
appreciate this opportunity to provide you with a description of a
suggested approach to managing Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF) from our
nation's fleet of nuclear power reactors. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
(GEH) has developed this approach based on technology originally
developed with funding from the Department of Energy. We believe that
with well-focused research and development and timely demonstrations,
the United States can move toward closing the nuclear fuel cycle.
Closing the fuel cycle would mean changing our nuclear fuel management
philosophy from ``once through'' with repository management to near
total consumption of the fuel's energy and considerably reduced
repository management of the waste. Our current (and growing) inventory
of ``once through'' used nuclear fuel is an energy asset. We can
realize maximum value of this asset by:
1. utilizing established processes--which importantly do not
separate pure plutonium, thus markedly reducing proliferation
concerns--to recycle the fuel into a usable form;
2. refissioning the recycled fuel in a sodium-cooled reactor
to produce electricity, which helps meet growing demand for
electricity; and
3. producing final waste by this process that has
significantly reduced radiological toxicity, which allows for
improved repository characteristics and shorter management time
as compared to ``once through'' and reprocessing technologies
currently in use today.
Abundant, reliable and sustainable energy is essential for the
health, safety and productivity of society. Nuclear power supplies
approximately 20 percent of the electricity generated in the United
States, and many other countries are pursuing nuclear power as to meet
growing energy needs. The United States needs to strengthen our
research and development to participate in and lead in this growth. GEH
supports the Committee's evaluation of recycling approaches to closing
the nuclear fuel cycle as foundational to realizing the benefits of
increased nuclear power production to meet our own demand for
electricity. In so doing, we will be positioned to make real and
significant contributions to meeting international energy security
needs as well.
In my previous roles as GE's General Manager of Global Business
Development at GE Corporate and GE Energy, I developed an understanding
of the complex financing issues facing new approaches in the market
place. In my current roles as Senior Vice President, GEH and Chief
Executive Officer of Global Nuclear Fuel, LLC, I am working to
integrate the Advanced Recycling Center, comprised of a sodium-cooled
reactor with an electro-metallurgical nuclear fuel recycling facility,
into our nation's energy mix. I will describe the Advanced Recycling
Center later in my testimony. Recently GEH has been working with our
nation's national laboratories, universities, and some of our allies
abroad in advancing this technology to close the fuel cycle.
Mr. Chairman, based on the focus of this session, I have divided my
testimony into two broad areas: First, why should the U.S. pursue
Nuclear Fuel Recycling? Then, what reasoned Research, Development, and
Demonstration strategies could be properly formulated to advance the
technology? Within these broad areas I will provide a detailed summary
of mutually supportive transformational technologies to recycling
nuclear fuel. We believe this approach presents a different and
compelling option for the Committee to consider as a viable solution
for managing used nuclear fuel in the United States, and advancing the
nuclear renaissance.
Why Consider Recycling?
The U.S. position on nuclear energy and the potential for PRISM
technology was articulated earlier this year:
``Looking towards the future, our Department of Energy is
currently restructuring its fuel cycle activities, which were
previously focused on the near-term deployment of recycling
processes and advanced reactor designs, into a long-term,
science-based, research and development program focused on the
technical challenges associated with managing the back end of
the fuel cycle. These challenges will be thoroughly vetted and
resolved as we explore long-term solutions for management and
disposition of our spent nuclear fuel.''
Ambassador Schulte's Remarks on Behalf of Energy Secretary
Chu, IAEA international Ministerial Conference, Beijing, April
2022, 2009.
We can continue down the same path for used nuclear fuel that we
have been on for the last thirty years, or we can lead a transformation
to a new, safer, and more secure approach to nuclear energy. We need an
approach that brings the benefits of nuclear energy to the world while
reducing proliferation concerns and nuclear waste. But first I would
like to share how we define recycling.
In response to recent interest in increasing the use of nuclear
power to produce electricity, the options for solving the nuclear waste
problem boil down into what I call the three Rs: Repository, Reprocess,
Recycle. Ideally, government policy should accelerate the most
comprehensive science-based solution.
The three policy choices available for managing nuclear waste are:
Repository--sequestering used fuel in a permanent Repository.
Reprocess--placing the plutonium from the used nuclear fuel
into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel for use in existing light water
reactors. Reprocessing places the fission products and high-
heat-load transuranics (also known as actinides) in a permanent
Repository.
Recycle--fueling a sodium-cooled reactor with the long half-
life transuranics from used fuel. Recycling places a much
smaller heat-generating load (predominantly fission products)
in a Repository. These shorter-lived elements only require that
the repository be managed as a high level waste facility for a
few hundred years.
Our efforts have led us to conclude that the Recycling approach is
the best science-based solution, whereas Reprocessing is only
considered a temporary or intermediate solution, even in the countries
where it is used today (UK, France, and Japan). These countries
continue to pursue a long-term option of recycling using sodium-cooled
reactors, though over a much longer time frame than we believe would be
needed by leveraging U.S. technology.
It is important to understand the basic science to better
understand the three Rs. Two questions must be answered for a full
understanding of the three Rs: 1) what is the composition of nuclear
waste and 2) what is the proper metric for making policy choices
regarding Repository, Reprocess, or Recycle?
Composition of nuclear waste: Uranium is a naturally occurring
metal mined from the Earth. The raw uranium commodity has value added
by conversion from ore to near-pure uranium, by enrichment to raise the
concentration of U235 from 0.7 percent to approximately 5.0
percent, and by fabrication into fuel rods that are packaged into a
fuel bundle that is sold to the utility to be fissioned in the core of
a nuclear power reactor. In the reactor, the nuclear fuel bundle
produces heat for several years until most of the U235 is
consumed, taking it from an initial five percent down to less than one
percent. It is then a used fuel bundle to be removed from the reactor,
defined by law as ``high level nuclear waste.'' The composition of this
``high level nuclear waste'' is still 95 percent uranium dioxide, with
new fission products (about four percent), and new transuranics (about
one percent). This one percent of transuranics (elements bigger than
uranium such as neptunium (Np), plutonium (Pu), americium (Am) and
curium (Cm)) generates ``99.9'' percent of the public policy concerns.
Correct science metric for evaluation: In the public mind, and even
in the legislation providing for the Yucca Mountain Repository, the
terms ``mass'' and ``volume'' are used. However, mass and volume are
not the most important concerns in managing nuclear waste; heat is--a
reality that has implications for this public policy.
Nuclear fuel is unique in that its radioactivity heats the used
fuel and its surroundings. The heat generated--the energy released--
over the long-term by the radioactive components that have a long-half
life is the limiting factor. The four principal transuranics in the
nuclear spent fuel--Np, Pu, Am, and Cm, produce the majority of the
long-term heat. Reducing transuranics in waste to be sent to a
repository reduces long-term heat generation from 100,000s of years to
hundreds of years, so processes that provide the opportunity to
consider broader geological characteristics of a repository will need
to reduce long-term heat from transuranics. This means that, although
mass and volume are important considerations, they are not the most
significant issues for a repository, heat is.
Recognizing the significance of long-term heat generation, let's
compare the three Rs. Figure 1 shows the reduction in heat over time
for each of the three Rs:
The line labeled ``Repository'' shows how the long-term heat
generation--the radioactivity--of a typical used nuclear fuel bundle
from a contemporary commercial nuclear power reactor decreases over
time in an underground Repository. A typical used fuel bundle has
significant heat reduction after hundreds of thousands of years.
The ``Reprocessing'' line shows the long-term decline in the heat
generated by vitrified waste, the waste product of the currently
established aqueous reprocessing of Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuel that
would be placed into a Repository. Reprocessing has significant heat
reduction after a thousand years.
The line labeled ``Recycling'' shows the long-term heat generation
of the ``real'' waste--the metallic and ceramic waste from used nuclear
fuel. The impacts from the Recycling option are markedly reduced
because almost all of the transuranics--the producers of significant
long-term heat loading--are separated and consumed (or fissioned) in
the sodium-cooled reactor as it generates power so they are not part of
the waste stream that goes to the Repository.
Note that each of the three Rs do produce waste that must be
isolated. We need to be clear that long-term storage--a repository--for
nuclear waste will be needed for any of these options. The required
isolation time, however, depends on the strategy selected--hundreds of
thousands of years for the direct Repository option, thousands of years
for the Reprocessing option, versus hundreds of years for the Recycling
option.
Each ``R'' encompasses niche processes that have some variations--
such as composition of Repository host rock; choice of aqueous MOX
Reprocessing technology (PUREX, UREX, NUEC, COEX); separations
technology for Recycling (aqueous or electro-metallurgy); kind of
sodium-cooled reactor (loop versus pool); consumption ratios--but these
variations have only minor effects on the conclusion that can be drawn
from the data presented above.
Further, light water reactors cannot operate at the high burn up
rates to consume transuranics, so the comparison of Reprocessing and
Recycling are fundamental. Thus, general conclusions for each of the
three scenarios can be improved by optimizing its contributing
variables, but prior to optimization a path to the solution needs to be
identified. My staff can provide more details if the Committee desires.
PRISM, a Gen IV solution
The Department of Energy is seeking ``. . . a long-term, science-
based research and development program focuses on the technical
challenges associated with managing the back end of the fuel cycle.''
We think we can sharpen that focus by leveraging from past lessons from
the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor Program (ALMR). The ALMR program was
started in 1984 to develop sodium-cooled reactors for a variety of
missions including: better utilization of energy in uranium,
minimization of proliferation concerns by consuming weapons grade
plutonium, and consumption of (via fission) long half-life transuranics
in used nuclear fuel, thus reducing the long-term heat loading in a
geologic repository. This program was on track to deploy a sodium-
cooled reactor to consume used LWR fuel while producing electricity.
Unfortunately, the ALMR project ended in 1995. Subsequently, the DOE
shut down EBR-II (in Idaho) and the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF--a
sodium reactor in Washington State), two outstanding sodium-cooled
reactors. These actions cast the U.S. advanced nuclear reactor programs
adrift and diminished the leadership role the U.S. had played in
nuclear power research and development.
With the growing recognition that a portion of our future energy
needs should be met using nuclear power, resurrecting, improving and
implementing the R&D path set by ALMR program would be a prudent
starting point. By conducting research and development of sodium-cooled
reactor technology, the U.S. can regain technology leadership and
create thousands of good, high quality long-term jobs.
The ALMR program coupled two technologies together in a balanced
system: 1) the sodium-cool reactor, and 2) separations technology based
on a dry process (without water) using molten salts. Again my staff and
the previous work by the GEH team can provide numerous details about
these two technologies and the science behind them. Briefly, the
environmental impetus for sodium-cooled reactor development is three
fold: 1) reduce mineral resource extraction (the mining of uranium), 2)
significantly decrease radiotoxicity (half-life) of long-lived
constituents in LWR used fuel (transuranics) from millions of years to
a few hundred years; and 3) produce large amounts of carbon-emission
free power.
Figure 2 illustrates the closed fuel cycle. Fuel from existing
plants is transported to a facility that separates the fuel into three
constituents. The three constituents are 1) uranium that is recycled
for use in LWR reactors, 2) transuranics (Pu, Np, Cm and others) that
are used to fuel a sodium-cooled reactor and 3) fission product wastes
that are to be placed in a geological repository.
To understand the transformational shift the sodium-cooled reactor
coupled with dry processing in our Advanced Recycling Center would
establish within the nuclear power arena, it is helpful to consider an
analogy to internal combustion engine development. In 1892 the gas
combustion engine was patented using gasoline, a waste product from
crude oil processing. Diesel engine development, started in 1898, used
another portion of crude oil. Both gas and diesel engines release
energy from combustion, but the methods to initiate combustion are
fundamentally different. Which internal combustion engine is better?
Neither--both are functional, are not detrimental to the other, and
improve the total fuel cycle use from a single petroleum energy source.
Shifting to nuclear power, the current commercial market is
approximately $30 billion based on one technology--water moderated
reactors (grouping light water & heavy water reactors together).
Sodium-cooled reactors are transformational and add a new functional
market segment and technology. Which reactor type is better? Neither--
both are functional, are not detrimental to the other, and improve the
total fuel cycle from the nuclear energy source. Energy from Earth's
uranium is better utilized by the symbiotic combination of water and
sodium reactors. The long-lived radioactive transuranics elements (Np,
Pu, Am, and Cm) from used water-cooled reactor fuel are now fuel in the
sodium-cooled reactor. Additionally, excess plutonium from this
nation's weapons program can be used as start-up fuel for initial
demonstrations.
GEH ideas for Research, Development, and Demonstration of the
transformational solutions are presented in the next section. Each step
is critical to advancing technology for nuclear fuel recycling. Policy
decisions about paths to take in dealing with nuclear waste can be made
now.
Advancing Technology for Nuclear Fuel Recycling
As this Committee searches for policy options for ``Advancing
Technology for Nuclear Fuel Recycling,'' please consider the merits of
more integrated science-based solutions. Funding to advance sodium-
cooled reactors would provide the foundation for science-based R&D for
cross-cutting solutions to challenges facing the Nation in a variety of
areas, including:
Nuclear Waste Disposal: What is the best solution for nuclear waste
disposal? Solution: Through science, prove that transuranics (Np, Pu,
Am, and Cm) contained in used nuclear fuel can fuel a sodium-cooled
reactor. The ``waste,'' or fission products, from such a reactor has
significantly reduced long-term radiotoxicity. As discussed above this
strategy significantly reduces the time frame for safe and secure waste
management within a geologic repository.
Nuclear Energy: What is the spark to build advanced light water reactor
technology, and focus Generation IV & Fuel Cycle R&D? Solution: A bold
leadership move to support advanced sodium-cooled technology would
lower Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from power generation, supply
clean secure energy, improve economic prosperity through job creation
and enhance national security through initial plutonium consumption.
Starting this work now would improve market confidence that there is a
future for nuclear power.
NNSA: Fissile Materials Disposition alternatives? Solution: Disposition
of five metric tons of plutonium (melting classified shapes with the
correct amount of uranium and zirconium, producing the metallic alloy
UPuZr) to start up the PRISM. This would eliminate the costly plutonium
purification step needed when weapons plutonium is used as LWR fuel and
support the re-establishment of U.S. international leadership.
Many technologists and industry participants globally agree that
the sodium-cooled reactor is needed; however, some claim that further
research is needed and that this technology can wait until 2050. In
contrast, GEH is pleased to share ideas that should be pursued in
Research, Development and Demonstration in the near-term.
. . . Our Ideas for Research
GEH published ``GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Technology Development
Roadmap: Facilities for Closing the Fuel Cycle,'' which outlines the
framework for focused research.
While GE has Global Research centers that tackle the pure basic
research issues, our Fuel Cycle Business does not actively perform
basic science research. That is not our role, nor is it our domain
expertise. That said, we recognize that we must partner with the
experts at our national laboratories and universities.
Recently GEH has been working with several national laboratories,
including, Argonne, Idaho, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge and Savannah River, on
the research that is needed to close the nuclear fuel cycle. Further,
we have been working with select universities in basic research
activities to close the nuclear fuel cycle. Lastly GEH has supported
universities in Nuclear Energy Research Initiatives-Consortium (NERI-C)
in science research needed to close the fuel cycle.
We cannot emphasize enough our support for the strong science role
of our nation's national laboratories and universities in this area.
However, we must accompany basic research with applied research. By
combining basic and applied research, we will explore new frontiers
while developing solutions to our pressing problems.
. . . Our Ideas for Development
GEH continues to be a leader in nuclear science and technology
through our ability to bring products to market. We have expertise and
internal processes for quality, new product introduction, risk
assessments, environmental, health & safety, licensing and regulatory
programs. We are looking into broad areas of isotope development, and
next-generation laser enrichment technologies, in addition to our work
on closing the nuclear fuel cycle.
We see such Development as a key area where industry (GEH) can work
with the national labs and the DOE in support of this committee's goal
of coming up with science-based solutions to nuclear waste issues.
Specifically, I'd like to offer these suggestions:
1) Licensing: A sodium-cooled reactor that produces power requires
(among other things) a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Therefore, a development path similar to Congress' Energy
Policy Act (EPACT) 2005 Nuclear Title on Next Generation Nuclear Plant
(NGNP) licensing activities would produce the required Tier 1 and Tier
2 Design Control Documents for preliminary submittal to the NRC.
Developing the Design Control Documents will help focus research while
clarifying the feasibility and timeframe for sodium cooled reactor
development.
2) Manufacturing & Design Validation: U.S.-based fabrication,
transportation, and placement of a full-sized PRISM reactor vessel at a
U.S. university (as a user facility). The vessel would be filled with
water (to simulate sodium) to improve component and system technology
readiness levels of the reactor system. This R&D platform would offer
several benefits: reduced risk, shortened time for licensing
activities, expanded U.S. manufacturing base, and availability of an
advanced R&D platform for U.S. universities and national laboratories.
After the manufacturing and design validation phase, the next step
would be fabrication of a second PRISM reactor vessel to be located at
a U.S. national laboratory, which would be filled with sodium to
further the development process (as discussed below).
3) Separation Technology Advancement: While basic research is needed in
transuranic separations, dry, electro-metallurgical, processing can be
advanced by demonstrations using excess uranium. Commercial and
government facilities have uranium that is too contaminated to use in
commercial reactors. By developing an electro-metallurgical processing
demonstration facility, the uranium can be unlocked while advancing the
science needed to perform advanced separations on used fuel.
. . . Our Ideas for Demonstration
Future technology performance can be difficult to establish.
Therefore, GEH regularly assesses the future potential of a tool,
technology, and reactor concept improvement through a Demonstration.
Demonstration is an integral part of the Research and Development
process. A future demonstration of the sodium-cooled reactor and
separations processes will allow us to gather important technical
information that will position the technology for success. Two
demonstrations are needed:
1. Fabricate (in the U.S.), transport, and place a full-sized
PRISM reactor vessel at a U.S. national laboratory (as a user-
demonstration facility). Fill this vessel with sodium to
improve component and system technology readiness levels of the
reactor system, through large-scale demonstration of
technologies proved in the Research and Development component.
After this is completed this Science and Technology Committee
and other key decision-makers will be in a position to evaluate
the data and performance to make an informed choice about cost
and schedule to implement the Recycling solution.
2. Operate an electro-metallurgical demonstration of used
nuclear fuel at one of the following locations: INL (leveraging
previous EBR-II facilities), or PNNL (leveraging the previously
built, but never used Fuels Materials Examination Facility
(FMEF) ), or potentially GEH's Morris, IL facility. This
demonstration would help transition Research & Development
activities on uranium recovery to the more difficult
demonstration with used nuclear fuel, with its inherent high
radiation issues.
Summary of Recommendations
My recommendations for the Committee when developing a strategy to
``Advance Technology for Nuclear Fuel Recycling'' in the area of
Research, Development and Demonstration are:
1) Work with industry to drive the Research, Development and
Demonstration of Recycling--the most comprehensive solution for
used nuclear fuel
2) Fund Research that builds to logical Development and is
followed by meaningful Demonstrations
3) Continue to fund basic Research activities to look for
advanced solutions on closing the nuclear fuel cycle with input
from industry and others
4) Fund Demonstrations to provide meaningful data on
economics, operating performance and risks, and schedule risks
that will support informed decisions regarding future
commercial activities.
Our nation has already made much of the necessary investment in
facilities, analysis, study, research and experimentation on the
foundation necessary to support the design and deployment of sodium-
cooled reactors. The national laboratories have amassed extensive
documentation and proof of the PRISM concept, its safety, and its
viability. We should take advantage of that wealth of knowledge and
expertise, and move ahead with a comprehensive Research, Development
and Demonstration program. As the last U.S. majority owned reactor
vendor, GEH is ready to partner with the Federal Government in this
important effort.
The Nation faces a choice today: We can continue down the same path
that we have been on for the last thirty years or we can lead a
transformation to a new, safer, and more secure approach to nuclear
energy, an approach that brings the benefits of nuclear energy to the
world while reducing proliferation concerns and nuclear waste.
PRISM coupled with electro-metallurgical processing is a technology
solution that can close the nuclear fuel cycle using the energy
contained in our nation's spent nuclear fuel. PRISM can generate stable
base load electricity to help meet our growing electricity needs and
enhance our energy security. As we do so, we expand the options for
geologic storage. A choice to go down the path of Recycling will
provide a unique opportunity to regain the historical U.S. leadership
position in nuclear science and technology.
Thank you. This concludes my formal statement. I would be pleased
to answer any questions you may have at this time.
Biography for Lisa M. Price
Lisa was named Senior Vice President, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
(GEH) and Chief Executive Officer of Global Nuclear Fuel, LLC, the
legal entity that manages the Global Nuclear Fuel joint venture of GE,
Hitachi and Toshiba, headquartered in Wilmington, North Carolina in
April 2008. In her role Lisa leads all nuclear fuel cycle activities
for GEH, including the global BWR fuel business, advanced programs and
the recently formed laser enrichment business.
Lisa joined GEH from her most recent role as General Manager,
Business Development for GE Energy, an prior to that for GE Corporate.
In these roles she and her team successfully completed numerous
transactions that added to the inorganic growth of GE and GE Energy.
Lisa earned a BS in Chemical Engineering from Virginia Polytechnic
Institute & State University and an MBA from Tulane University. After
earning her MBA, Lisa spent nearly eight years at Goldman, Sachs & Co.
and two years at Deutsche Bank, where she focused on mergers and
acquisitions in the energy, utility and oil & gas industries. Prior to
that, Lisa served in a variety of operating and environmental positions
with FreeportMcMoRan, Inc., including power plant operating roles with
Freeport Sulphur Company, Corporate Environmental Auditing program
leader and Environmental Manager for Agrico Chemical Company's
Louisiana Chemical Operations. Lisa joined GE in 2005.
Lisa serves on the Virginia Tech College of Engineering Advisory
Board and is a member of the Committee of 100. Lisa is also a member of
Women in Nuclear.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Ms. Price.
Dr. Ferguson, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES D. FERGUSON, PHILIP D. REED SENIOR
FELLOW FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Dr. Ferguson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Ehlers and
Members of the Committee for inviting me to testify. I request
that my written comments be entered into the official record.
In the following remarks I briefly discuss major findings and
recommendations based on the written testimony.
The United States has sought to prevent the spread of
reprocessing facilities to other countries and to encourage
countries with existing stockpiles to separate plutonium from
reprocessing facilities to draw down those stockpiles. The
United States should reaffirm and strengthen this policy.
Reprocessing of the type currently practiced in a handful of
countries poses a significant proliferation threat because the
separation of plutonium from highly radioactive fission
products separates it from a protected barrier against theft. A
thief, if he had access, could easily carry away separated
plutonium. Fortunately, this reprocessing is confined to
nuclear arms states except for Japan. If this practice spreads
to other non-nuclear weapons states, the consequences for
national and international security could be dire.
Presently, the vast majority of the 31 states with nuclear
power programs do not have reprocessing plants. U.S. policy has
been effective in setting an example in limiting the spread of
reprocessing. Japan, France and Russia launched their
reprocessing programs before U.S. policy that was set in the
Ford Administration in 1976 and reaffirmed in the Carter
Administration in 1977, but we see that two countries in
particular are of concern. The Republic of Korea is renewing
its 123 agreement with the United States. As I point out in my
written testimony, they are interested in reprocessing. We need
to reaffirm that reprocessing is not something that should be
done on the Korean Peninsula, especially when we are dealing
with a nuclear-armed North Korea. The United Arab Emirates in
its 123 agreement has a clause at the very end of the agreement
on equal terms and conditions that could open the door to the
UAE engaging in reprocessing or uranium enrichment in the
future, depending on what other countries in the Middle East
do, especially Jordan. I was just in Jordan two months ago and
found out their plans.
Global stockpiles of civilian plutonium are growing at
about 250 metric tons, equivalent to tens of thousands nuclear
bombs or comparable to the global stockpile of military
plutonium, and more than 1,000 metric tons of plutonium is
contained in spent nuclear fuel in about 30 countries. The
types of reprocessing that were examined under the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, do not appear to offer
substantial proliferation-resistant benefits according to
research sponsored by the Department of Energy. Moreover, the
DOE assessment points out that these techniques pose additional
safeguard challenges. For example, it is difficult to do an
accurate accounting of the amount of plutonium in a bulk
handling reprocessing facility that produces plutonium mixed
with other transuranic elements. This challenge raises the
probability of diversion of plutonium by insiders. However,
more research is needed to determine what additional safeguards
could provide greater assurances that reprocessing methods are
not misused in weapons programs and whether it is possible to
have assurances of timely detection of a diversion of a
significant quantity of plutonium or other fissile material.
Time is on the side of the United States. There is no need
to rush toward development and deployment of recycling of spent
nuclear fuel. Based on the foreseeable price for uranium and
uranium enrichment services and the known reserves of uranium,
this practice is presently far more expensive than the once-
through uranium fuel cycle. Nonetheless, more research is
needed to determine the cost and benefits of recycling
techniques coupled with fast neutron reactors or other types of
reactor technologies. This cost-versus-benefit analysis would
concentrate on the capability of these technologies to help
alleviate the nuclear waste management challenge.
In related research, there is a need to better understand
the safeguards challenges in the use of fast reactors. Such
reactors are dual use in the sense that they can burn
transuranic material or can breed new plutonium. In the former
operation, they could provide a needed nuclear waste management
benefit but they are expensive. In the latter operation, they
can pose a significant proliferation threat because they
obviously breed more plutonium.
Concerning lessons the United States can learn from other
countries' nuclear waste management experience, the first
lesson is that a fair political and sound scientific process is
essential for selecting a permanent repository. The second
lesson is that reprocessing as currently practiced does not
substantially alleviate the nuclear waste management problem.
Any type of reprocessing will require safe and secure
repositories.
I will also add another recommendation from my written
remarks, is that we need better estimates on the remaining
global reserves of uranium. It is believed based on current
demand we have probably another 80 years worth of supply and
maybe much greater than that. The MIT study that was just
updated a few weeks ago makes this one of their major
recommendations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ferguson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles D. Ferguson
An Assessment of the Proliferation Risks
of Spent Fuel Reprocessing and Alternative
Nuclear Waste Management Strategies
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify on the nuclear
proliferation challenges of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and
effective ways for reducing those proliferation risks through federal
research, development, and demonstration initiatives. In this
testimony, I also discuss nuclear waste management programs deployed by
other nations and examine whether those programs represent alternative
management strategies that the U.S. Federal Government should consider.
U.S. leadership is essential for charting a constructive and
cooperative international course to prevent nuclear proliferation. An
essential aspect of that leadership involves U.S. policy on
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. The United States has sought to
prevent the spread of reprocessing facilities to other countries and to
encourage countries with existing stockpiles of separated plutonium
from reprocessing facilities to draw down those stockpiles. The
previous administration launched the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP), which proposed offering complete nuclear fuel services,
including provision of fuel and waste management, from fuel service
states to client states in order to discourage the latter group from
enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel--activities that
would contribute to giving these countries latent nuclear weapons
programs. The current administration and the Congress seek to determine
the best course for U.S. nuclear energy policy with the focus of this
hearing on recycling or reprocessing of spent fuel and nuclear waste
management strategies.
Here at the start, I give a brief summary of the testimony's
salient points:
Reprocessing of the type currently practiced in a
handful of countries poses a significant proliferation threat
because of the separation of plutonium from highly radioactive
fission products. A thief, if he had access, could easily carry
away separated plutonium. Fortunately, this reprocessing is
confined to nuclear-armed states except for Japan. If this
practice spreads to other non-nuclear-weapon states the
consequences for national and international security could be
dire. Presently, the vast majority of the 31 states with
nuclear power programs do not have reprocessing plants.
The types of reprocessing examined under GNEP do not
appear to offer substantial proliferation-resistant benefits,
according to research sponsored by the Department of Energy.
However, more research is needed to determine what additional
safeguards, if any, could provide greater assurances that
reprocessing methods are not misused in weapons programs and
whether it is possible to have assurances of timely detection
of a diversion of a significant quantity of plutonium or other
fissile material.
Time is on the side of the United States. There is no
need to rush toward development and deployment of recycling of
spent nuclear fuel. Based on the foreseeable price for uranium
and uranium enrichment services, this practice is presently far
more expensive than the once-through uranium fuel cycle.
Nonetheless, more research is needed to determine the costs and
benefits of recycling techniques coupled with fast-neutron
reactors or other types of reactor technologies. This cost
versus benefit analysis would concentrate on the capability of
these technologies to help alleviate the nuclear waste
management challenge.
In related research, there is a need to better
understand the safeguards challenges in the use of fast
reactors. Such reactors are dual-use in the sense that they can
burn transuranic material and can breed new plutonium. In the
former operation, they could provide a needed nuclear waste
management benefit. In the latter operation, they can pose a
serious proliferation threat.
Proliferation Risks
Reprocessing involves extraction of plutonium and/or other fissile
materials from spent nuclear fuel in order to recycle these materials
into new fuel for nuclear reactors. As discussed below, many
reprocessing techniques are available for use. Regardless of the
particular technique, fissile material is removed from all or almost
all of the highly radioactive fission products, which provide a
protective barrier against theft or diversion of plutonium in spent
nuclear fuel. Plutonium-239 is the most prevalent fissile isotope of
plutonium in spent nuclear fuel. The greater the concentration of this
isotope the more weapons-usable is the plutonium mixture. Weapons-grade
plutonium typically contains greater than 90 percent plutonium-239
whereas reactor-grade plutonium from commercial thermal-neutron
reactors has usually less than 60 percent plutonium-239, depending on
the characteristics of the reactor that produced the plutonium. The
presence of non-plutonium-239 isotopes complicates production of
nuclear weapons from the plutonium mixture, but the challenges are
surmountable.\1\ According to an unclassified U.S. Department of Energy
report, reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Richard L. Garwin, ``Reactor-Grade Plutonium can be used to
Make Powerful and Reliable Nuclear Weapons,'' Paper for the Council on
Foreign Relations, August 26, 1998, available at: http://www.fas.org/
rlg/980826-pu.htm. J. Carson Mark, ``Explosive Properties of Reactor-
Grade Plutonium,'' Science and Global Security, 4, 111-128, 1993.
\2\ Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable
Fissile Material and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, DOE/NN-
0007 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, January 1997), pp. 38-
39.
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The potential proliferation threats from reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel are twofold. First, a state operating a reprocessing plant
could use that technology to divert weapons-usable fissile material
into a nuclear weapons program or alternatively it could use the skills
learned in operating that plant to build a clandestine reprocessing
plant to extract fissile material. Second, a non-state actor such as a
terrorist group could seize enough fissile material produced by a
reprocessing facility in order to make an improvised nuclear device--a
crude, but devastating, nuclear weapon. Such a non-State group may
obtain help from insiders at the facility. While commercial
reprocessing facilities have typically been well-guarded, some
facilities such as those at Sellafield in the United Kingdom and Tokai-
mura in Japan have not been able to account for several weapons' worth
of plutonium. This lack of accountability does not mean that the
fissile material was diverted into a State or non-State weapons
program. The discrepancy was most likely due to plutonium caked on
piping. But an insider could exploit such a discrepancy. For commercial
bulk handing facilities, several tons of plutonium can be processed
annually. Thus, if even one tenth of one percent of this material were
accounted for, an insider could conceivably divert about one weapon's
worth of plutonium every year.
Location matters when determining the proliferation risk of a
reprocessing program. That is, a commercial reprocessing plant in a
nuclear-armed state such as France, Russia, or the United Kingdom poses
no risk of State diversion (but could pose a risk of non-state access)
because this type of state, by definition, already has a weapons
program. Notably, Japan is the only non-nuclear-armed state that has
reprocessing facilities. Japan has applied the Additional Protocol to
its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, but its large
stockpile of reactor-grade plutonium could provide a significant
breakout capability for a weapons program. (Chinese officials and
analysts occasionally express concern about Japan's plutonium
stockpile.) Since the Ford and Carter Administrations, when the United
States decided against reprocessing on proliferation and economic
grounds, the United States has made stopping the spread of further
reprocessing facilities especially to non-nuclear weapon states a top
priority.
Another top priority of U.S. policy on reprocessing is to encourage
countries with stockpiles of separated plutonium to draw down these
stockpiles quickly. This draw-down can be done either through consuming
the plutonium as fuel or surrounding it with highly radioactive fission
products. Global stockpiles of civilian plutonium are growing and now
at about 250 metric tons--equivalent to tens of thousands of nuclear
bombs--are comparable to the global stockpile of military plutonium.
More than 1,000 metric tons of plutonium is contained in spent nuclear
fuel in about thirty countries.
While no country has used a commercial nuclear power program to
make plutonium for nuclear weapons, certain countries have used
research reactor programs to produce plutonium. India, notably, used a
research reactor supplied by Canada to produce plutonium for its first
nuclear explosive test in 1974. North Korea, similarly, has employed a
research-type reactor to produce plutonium for its weapons program.
Although nonproliferation efforts with Iran has focused on its uranium
enrichment program, which could make fissile material for weapons, its
construction of a heavy water research reactor, which when operational
(perhaps early next decade) could produce at least one weapon's worth
of plutonium annually, poses a latent proliferation threat. To date,
Iran is not known to have constructed a reprocessing facility that
would be needed to extract plutonium from this reactor's spent fuel.
Further activities could take place in the Middle East and other
regions. For instance, according to the U.S. Government, Syria received
assistance from North Korea in building a plutonium production reactor.
In September 2009, Israel bombed this construction site.
The United States has been trying to balance the perceived need by
many states in the Middle East for nuclear power plants versus
restricting these states' access to enrichment and reprocessing
technologies. Presently, as an outstanding example, the U.S.-UAE
bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement is before the U.S. Congress.
Proponents of this agreement tout the commitment made by the UAE to
refrain from acquiring enrichment and reprocessing technologies and to
rely on market mechanisms to purchase nuclear fuel. However, the last
clause in the agreement appears to open the door for the UAE to engage
in such activities in the future:
Equal Terms and Conditions for Cooperation
The Government of the United States of America confirms that
the fields of cooperation, terms and conditions accorded by the
United States of America to the United Arab Emirates for
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be no
less favorable in scope and effect than those which may be
accorded, from time to time, to any other non-nuclear-weapon
State in the Middle East in a peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreement. If this is, at any time, not the case, at the
request of the Government of the United Arab Emirates the
Government of the United States of America will provide full
details of the improved terms agreed with another non-nuclear-
weapon State in the Middle East, to the extent consistent with
its national legislation and regulations and any relevant
agreements with such other non-nuclear-weapon State, and if
requested by the Government of the United Arab Emirates, will
consult with the Government of the United Arab Emirates
regarding the possibility of amending this Agreement so that
the position described above is restored.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, May 21, 2009.
Such a request for amendment could be around the corner because
Jordan is seeking to conclude a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement
with the United States, and it has expressed interest in keeping open
the option to enrich uranium. Jordan has discovered large quantities of
indigenous uranium and may want to ``add value'' to that uranium
through enrichment. Jordan or any other Middle Eastern state has not
yet expressed interest in reprocessing. U.S. leadership and practice in
this issue will serve as an example for other states interested in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
acquiring new nuclear power programs.
Proliferation-Resistant Reprocessing
Can reprocessing be made more proliferation-resistant?
``Proliferation resistance is that characteristic of a nuclear energy
system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear
material or misuse of technology by the host state seeking to acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'' \4\ No nuclear
energy system is proliferation proof because nuclear technologies are
dual-use. Enrichment and reprocessing can be used either for peaceful
or military purposes. However, through a defense-in-depth approach,
greater proliferation-resistance may be achieved. Both intrinsic
features (for example, physical and engineering characteristics of a
nuclear technology) and extrinsic features (for example, safeguards and
physical barriers) complement each other to deter misuse of nuclear
technologies and materials in weapons programs. The potential threats
that proliferation-resistance tries to guard against are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, A
Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global Nuclear Energy
Programmatic Alternatives, National Nuclear Security Administration,
U.S. Department of Energy, Draft, December 2008, p. 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Concealed diversion of declared materials;
Concealed misuse of declared facilities;
Overt misuse of facilities or diversion of declared
materials; and
Clandestine declared facilities.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ibid, p. 28.
For each of these threats, a detailed proliferation pathway
analysis can be done in order to measure the proliferation risk and to
determine the needed, if any, additional safeguards. The U.S.
Department of Energy has sponsored such analysis for proposed
reprocessing techniques considered under GNEP.\6\ These techniques
include UREX+, COEX, NUEX, and Pyroprocessing, and they have been
compared to the PUREX technique, which is the commercially used method.
PUREX separates plutonium and uranium from highly radioactive fission
products. It is an aqueous separations process and thus generates
sizable amounts of liquid radioactive waste. UREX+, COEX, and NUEX are
also aqueous processes. UREX+ is a suite of chemical processes in which
pure plutonium is not separated but different product streams can be
produced depending on the reactor fuel requirements. COEX and NUEX are
related processes. COEX co-extracts uranium and plutonium (and possibly
neptunium) into one recycling stream; another stream contains pure
uranium, which can be recycled; and a final stream contains fission
products. NUEX separates into three streams: uranium, transuranics
(including plutonium), and fission products. Pyroprocessing uses
electro-refining techniques to extract plutonium in combination with
other transuranic elements, some of the rare Earth fission products,
and uranium. This fuel mixture would be intended for use in fast-
neutron reactors, which have yet to be proven commercially viable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See, for example, many of the references cited in Office of
Nonproliferation and International Security, A Nonproliferation Impact
Assessment for the Global Nuclear Energy Programmatic Alternatives,
National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy,
Draft, December 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Can these reprocessing techniques meet the highest proliferation-
resistance standard of the ``spent fuel standard'' in which plutonium
in its final form should be as hard to acquire, process, and use in
weapons as is plutonium embedded in spent fuel?\7\ The brief answer is
``no'' because the act of separating most or all of the highly
radioactive fission products makes the fuel product less protected than
the intrinsic protection provided by spent fuel. In fact, Dr. E.D.
Collins of Oak Ridge National Laboratory has shown that the radiation
emission from these reprocessed products is 100 times less than the
spent fuel standard.\8\ In other words, a thief could carry these
products and not suffer a lethal radiation dose whereas the same thief
would experience a lethal dose in less than one hour of exposure to
plutonium surrounded by highly radioactive fission products. But these
methods may still be worth pursuing depending on a detailed systems
analysis factoring in security risks on site and during transportation,
the final disposition of the material once it has been recycled as
fuel, as well as the costs and benefits of nuclear waste management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National
Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994.
\8\ E.D. Collins, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ``Closing the Fuel
Cycle Can Extend the Lifetime of the High-Level Waste Repository,''
American Nuclear Society 2005 Winter Meeting, November 17, 2005, p. 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to DOE's draft nonproliferation assessment of GNEP, ``for
a state with pre-existing PUREX or equivalent capability (or more
broadly the capability to design and operate a reprocessing plant of
this complexity), there is minimal proliferation resistance to be found
by [using the examined reprocessing techniques] considering the
potential for diversion, misuse, and breakout scenarios.'' \9\
Moreover, the DOE assessment points out that these techniques pose
additional safeguards challenges. For example, it is difficult to do an
accurate accounting of the amount of plutonium in a bulk handling
reprocessing facility that produces plutonium mixed with other
transuranic elements.\10\ This challenge raises the probability of
diversion of plutonium by insiders.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ A Nonproliferation Impact Assessment for the Global Nuclear
Energy Programmatic Alternatives, p. 69.
\10\ J.E. Stewart et al., ``Measurement and Accounting of the Minor
Actinides Produced in Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Los Alamos National
Laboratory, LA-13054-MS, January 1996, p. 21.
\11\ Ed Lyman, ``U.S. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Initiative: DOE
Research Shows Technology Does Not Reduce Risks of Nuclear
Proliferation and Terrorism,'' Fact Sheet, Union of Concerned
Scientists, February 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another set of considerations is the choice of reactors to burn up
the transuranic elements. The DOE draft assessment examined several
choices including light water reactors, heavy water reactors, high
temperature gas reactors, and fast-neutron reactors. Only the fast-
neutron reactors offered the most benefits in terms of net consumption
of transuranic material. This material would have to be recycled
multiple times in fast reactors to consume almost all of it. This is
called a full actinide recycle in contrast to a partial actinide
recycle with the other reactor methods. The benefit from a waste
management perspective is that the amount of time required for spent
fuel's radiotoxicity to reduce to that of natural uranium goes from
more than tens of thousands of years for partial actinide recycle to
about 400 years for the full actinide recycle.
The challenge of the full actinide route, however, is that fast
reactors can relatively easily be changed from a burner mode to a
breeder mode. That is, these reactors can breed more plutonium by the
insertion of uranium target material. The perceived need for breeder
reactors has driven a few countries such as France, India, Japan, and
Russia to develop reprocessing programs.
Alternative Nuclear Waste Management Programs of Other Nations
Has reprocessing programs, to date, helped certain nations solve
their nuclear waste problems? The short answer is, ``no.'' Before
explicating that further, it is worth briefly examining why these
countries began these programs. About fifty years ago, when the
commercial nuclear industry was just starting, concerns were raised
about the availability of enough natural uranium to fuel the thousands
of reactors that were anticipated. Natural uranium contains 0.71
percent uranium-235, 99.28 percent uranium-238, and less than 0.1
percent uranium-234. Uranium-235 is the fissile isotope and thus is
needed for sustaining a chain reaction. However, uranium-238 is a
fertile isotope and can be used to breed plutonium-239, a fissile
isotope that does not occur naturally. Thus, if uranium-238 can be
transformed into plutonium-239, the available fissile material could be
expanded by more than one hundred times, in principle. This observation
motivated several countries, including the United States, to pursue
reprocessing.
A related motivation was the desire for better energy security and
thus less dependence on outside supplies of uranium. France and Japan,
in particular, as countries with limited uranium resources, developed
reprocessing plants in order to try to alleviate their dependency on
external sources of uranium. They had invested in these plants before
the realization that the world would not run out of uranium soon. By
the late 1970s, two developments happened that alleviated the perceived
pending shortfall. First, the pace of proposed nuclear power plant
deployments dramatically slowed. There were plans at that time for more
than 1,000 large reactors (of about 1,000 MWe power rating) by 2000,
but even before the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the number of
reactor orders in the United States and other countries slackened off
although France and Japan launched a reactor building boom in the 1970s
that lasted through the 1980s. By 2000, there was only the equivalent
of about 400 reactors of 1,000 MWe size. Second, uranium prospecting
identified enough proven reserves to supply the present nuclear power
demand for several decades to come.
Because there is plentiful uranium at relatively low prices and the
cost of uranium enrichment has decreased, the cost of the once-through
uranium cycle is significantly less than the cost of reprocessing.
However, because fuel costs are a relatively small portion of the total
costs of a nuclear power plant, reprocessing adds a relatively small
amount to the total cost of electricity. In France, the added cost is
almost six percent, and in Japan about ten percent. Nonetheless, in
competitive utility markets in which consumers have choices, most
countries have not chosen the reprocessing route because of the
significantly greater fuel costs. France and Japan have adopted
government policies in favor of reprocessing and also have sunk many
billions of dollars into their reprocessing facilities. The French
government owns and controls the electric utility Electricite de France
(EDF) and the nuclear industry Areva. Despite this extensive government
control, a 2000 French government study determined that if France stops
reprocessing, it would save $4 to $5 billion over the remaining life of
its reactor fleet.\12\ EDF assigns a negative value to recycled
plutonium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Option (Planning
Commission, Government of France, 2000), section 3.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While France's La Hague plant is operating, Japan is still
struggling to start up its Rokkasho plant, which is largely based on
the French design. Thus, the costs of the Japanese plant keep climbing
and will likely be more than $20 billion. While the Japanese government
wants to fuel up to one-third of its more than 50 reactors with
plutonium-based mixed oxide fuel, local governments tend to look
unfavorably on this proposal.
Only a few other nations are involved with reprocessing. Russia and
the United Kingdom operate commercial-scale facilities. China and India
are interested in heading down this path. But the United Kingdom is
moving toward imminent shut down of its reprocessing mainly due to lack
of customers. Moreover, the clean up and decommissioning costs are
projected to be many billions of dollars. Russia and France also lack
enough customers to keep their reprocessing plants at full capacity. In
early April, I visited the French La Hague plant and was told that it
is only operating at about half capacity. France only uses mixed oxide
fuel in 20 of its 58 light water reactors. Presently, less than 10
percent of the world's commercial nuclear power plants burn MOX fuel.
As stated earlier, the demand for MOX fuel has not kept up with the
stockpiled quantities of plutonium.
With respect to nuclear waste management, an important point is
that reprocessing, as currently practiced, does little or nothing to
alleviate this management problem. For example, France practices a
once-through recycling in which plutonium is separated once, made into
MOX fuel, and the spent fuel containing this MOX is not usually
recycled once (although France has done some limited recycling of MOX
spent fuel). The MOX spent fuel is stored pending the further
development and commercialization of fast reactors. But France admits
that this full deployment of a fleet of fast reactors is projected to
take place at the earliest by mid-century. France will shut down later
this year its only fast reactor, the prototype Phenix. Perhaps around
2020, France may have constructed another fast reactor, but the high
costs of these reactors have been prohibitive. In effect, France has
shifted its nuclear waste problem from the power plants to the
reprocessing plant.
France's practice of transporting plutonium hundreds of miles from
the La Hague to the MOX plant at Marcoule poses a security risk. While
there has never been a theft of plutonium or a major accident during
the hundreds of trips to date, each shipment contains many weapons'
worth of plutonium. Thus, just one theft of a shipment could be an
international disaster.
No country has yet to open a permanent repository. But the country
with the most promising record of accomplishment in this area is
Sweden. A couple of weeks ago, Sweden announced the selection of its
repository site but admits that the earliest the site will accept spent
fuel is 2023. Sweden had carefully evaluated three different sites and
obtained widespread community and local government involvement in the
decision-making process. France touts the benefits of the volume
reduction of recycling in which highly radioactive fission products are
formed into a glass-like compound, which is now stored at an interim
storage site. By weight percentage, spent fuel typically consists of
95.6 percent uranium (with most of that being uranium-238), three
percent stable or short-lived radioactive fission products, 0.3 percent
cesium and strontium (the primary sources of high-level radioactive
waste over a few hundred years), 0.1 percent long-lived iodine and
technetium, 0.1 percent long-lived actinides (heavy radioactive
elements), and 0.9 percent plutonium. But the critical physical factor
for a repository is the heat load. For the first several hundred years
of a repository the most heat emitting elements are the highly
radioactive fission products. The benefit of a fast reactor recycling
program could be the reduction or near elimination of the longer-lived
transuranic elements that are the major heat producing elements beyond
several hundred years.
Other countries may venture into reprocessing. Therefore, it is
imperative for the United States to re-evaluate its policies and
redouble its efforts to prevent the further spread of reprocessing
plants to non-nuclear-weapon states. In particular, the Republic of
Korea is facing a crisis in the overcrowded conditions in the spent
fuel pools at its power plants. One option is to remove older spent
fuel and place it in dry storage casks, but the ROK government believes
this option may cost too much because of the precedent set by the
exorbitantly high price paid for a low level waste disposal facility.
Another option is for the ROK to reprocess spent fuel. While this will
provide significant volume reduction in the waste, it will only defer
the problem to storage of MOX spent fuel, similar to the problem faced
by France. This option will run counter to the agreement the ROK signed
with North Korea in the early 1990s for both states to prohibit
reprocessing or enrichment on the Korean Peninsula. A related option is
to ship spent fuel to La Hague, but a security question is whether to
ship plutonium back to the ROK. France would require shipment of the
high level waste back to the ROK. Thus, the ROK will need a high level
waste disposal facility. The main reason I raise this ROK issue at
length is that the ROK and the United States have recently begun talks
on the renewal of their peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, which
will expire in 2014. The United States has consent rights on ROK spent
fuel because either it was produced with U.S.-supplied fresh fuel or
U.S.-origin reactor systems. The ROK is seeking to have future spent
fuel not subject to such consent rights by purchasing fresh fuel from
other suppliers and by developing reactor systems that do not have
critical components that are U.S.-origin or derived from U.S.-origin
systems. The bottom line is that the United States is steadily losing
its leverage with the ROK and other countries because of declining U.S.
leadership in nuclear power plant systems and nuclear waste management.
Concerning lessons the United States can learn from other
countries' nuclear waste management experience, the first lesson is
that a fair political and sound scientific process is essential for
selecting a permanent repository. Sweden demonstrates the effectiveness
of examining multiple sites and gaining buy-in from the public and
local governments. The second lesson is that reprocessing, as currently
practiced, does not substantially alleviate the nuclear waste
management problem. However, more research is needed to determine the
costs and benefits of fast reactors for reducing transuranic waste. Any
type of reprocessing will require safe and secure waste repositories.
While the United States investigates the costs and benefits of
various recycling proposals through a research program, it has an
opportunity now to exercise leadership in two waste management areas.
First, as envisioned in GNEP, the United States should offer fuel
leasing services. As part of those services, it should offer to take
back spent fuel from the client countries. (Russia is offering this
service to Iran's Bushehr reactor.) This spent fuel does not
necessarily have to be sent to the United States. It could be sent to a
third party country or location that could earn money for the spent
fuel storage rental service. Spent fuel can be safely and securely
stored in dry storage casks for up to 100 years. Long before this time
ends, a research program will most likely determine effective means of
waste management. The spent fuel leasing could be coupled to the second
area where the United States can play a leadership role. That is, the
United States can offer technical expertise and political support in
helping to establish regional spent fuel repositories. A regional
storage system would be especially helpful for countries with smaller
nuclear power programs.
Recommendations
Continue to discourage separation of plutonium from
spent nuclear fuel.
Limit the spread of reprocessing technologies to non-
nuclear weapon states.
Draw down the massive stockpile of civilian
plutonium.
Support a research program to assess the costs and
benefits of various reprocessing technologies with attention
focused on proliferation-resistance, safeguards, and nuclear
waste management. Compare the costs and benefits of
reprocessing to enrichment, factoring in the proliferation
risks of both technologies.
Increase funding for safeguards research.
Promote safe and secure storage of spent fuel until
the time when reprocessing may become economically attractive.
Evaluate multiple sites for permanent waste
repositories based on political fairness and sound scientific
assessments. Obtain buy-in from the public and local
governments.
Use secure interim spent fuel storage employing dry
storage casks to relieve build up on spent fuel pools.
Provide fuel leasing services that would include take
back of spent fuel to either the fuel supplier state or a third
party.
Develop regional spent fuel storage facilities.
Obtain better estimates on the remaining global
reserves of uranium.
Provide research support for developing more
efficient nuclear power plants that would produce more
electrical power per thermal power than today's fleet of
reactors. Similarly, research more effective ways to make more
efficient use of uranium fuel and reduce the amounts of
plutonium-239 produced.
Biography for Charles D. Ferguson
Dr. Charles D. Ferguson is the Philip D. Reed senior fellow for
science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is
also an adjunct professor in the security studies program at Georgetown
University, where he teaches a graduate-level course titled ``Nuclear
Technologies and Security,'' and an adjunct lecturer in the national
security studies program at the Johns Hopkins University, where he
teaches a graduate-level course titled ``Weapons of Mass Destruction
Technologies.'' His areas of expertise include arms control, climate
change, energy policy, and nuclear and radiological terrorism. At CFR,
he specializes in analyzing nuclear energy, nuclear nonproliferation,
and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. He has written the Council
Special Report Nuclear Energy: Balancing Benefits and Risks, published
in April 2007. Most recently, he served as the project director for the
CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,
chaired by William Perry and Brent Scowcroft. The task force report was
published in April 2009.
Prior to arriving at CFR in September 2004, Dr. Ferguson worked as
the scientist-in-residence at the Monterey Institute's Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). At CNS, he co-authored (with William
Potter) the book The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Routledge, 2005).
He was also the lead author of the award-winning report Commercial
Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks, which was published
in January 2003 and was one of the first post-9/11 reports to assess
the radiological dispersal device, or ``dirty bomb,'' threat. This
report won the 2003 Robert S. Landauer Lecture Award from the Health
Physics Society.
Dr. Ferguson has consulted with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National
Laboratories and the National Nuclear Security Administration. He
served as a physical scientist in the Office of the Senior Coordinator
for Nuclear Safety at the U.S. Department of State, where he helped
develop U.S. Government policies on nuclear safety and security issues.
He has also worked on nuclear proliferation and arms control issues as
a senior research analyst and director of the nuclear policy project at
the Federation of American Scientists.
After graduating with distinction from the United States Naval
Academy, he served as an officer on a fleet ballistic missile submarine
and studied nuclear engineering at the Naval Nuclear Power School. Dr.
Ferguson has written numerous articles on energy policy, missile
defense, nuclear arms control, nuclear energy, nuclear proliferation,
and nuclear terrorism. These publications have appeared in the Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, the Christian Science Monitor, Issues in
Science and Technology, the International Herald Tribune, the Los
Angeles Times, the National Interest online, the Wall Street Journal,
and the Washington Post. He has also authored or co-authored several
peer-reviewed scientific articles and published in top physics
journals. He holds a Ph.D. in physics from Boston University.
Discussion
Chairman Gordon. Thank you. There were lots of good points
made. The survey of the available uranium really is something
we should try to do.
Discouraging Weapons Proliferation in Nuclear Processing
Well, first let me thank the witnesses for speaking in
English. I was a little concerned that some of us wouldn't
understand what you were talking about but you dumbed it down
for us, and I thank you for that. I would like to also ask if
you would submit to the Committee your suggestions for an R&D
roadmap. I know it was somewhat mentioned but I would like what
we should be recommending to the Department of Energy, and
while you are doing that, what you think should be the federal
role versus the private role, and before I get into my question
that I posed earlier, I would like to not start a fist fight
but I would like to see whether there is anyone who disagrees
with Dr. Hanson's, you know, very specific statement that there
is no such thing or will be no such thing as a proliferation-
proof reprocessing. Does anyone disagree with that? Okay, Ms.
Price.
Ms. Price. I guess what I would say to put it into context
is the question, and I think Dr. Ferguson touched on it, is how
you safeguard the treatment of plutonium through the process.
And I would submit that the sodium-cooled reactor with the
electro-metallurgical processing doesn't separate plutonium.
All of the transuranics are burned in the reactor, and that is
one way to help safeguard. Now, an absolute statement that
there is no absolutely no chance may be an impossible standard,
but it is not the same type of concern, if you will, if the
plutonium is not separated out on its own and there are other
methods where in fact it is consumed without that separation
feature.
Chairman Gordon. Yes, sir.
Dr. Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, very briefly. I think it was
four years ago in 2005 that the American Physical Society--and
Dr. Ehlers and I are members of APS--they published a study on
safeguard challenges and they recommended we devote more to R&D
on safeguards, and they clearly stated in the beginning of the
report there is no such thing as proliferation-proof
technologies. These things are dual use. You can make them ever
more proliferation resistant if we are willing to spend the
resources to do it.
Chairman Gordon. So it can be significantly reduced. Would
that be fair to say, but not eliminated?
Dr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. That is true. We can't eliminate
them.
Existing Versus Next Generation Technologies
Chairman Gordon. Okay. So let us get back to my earlier
question. In terms of something we should be doing in this
country, do we move forward with existing reprocessing
technologies or should we wait for that next generation, and do
we have the storage capacity to wait, which is somewhat--how
long does it take us to get there, and the cost differentials.
Who would like to start with that? Yes, sir.
Dr. Peters. I can start.
Chairman Gordon. Dr. Peters.
Dr. Peters. So as I said in my opening statement, I don't
think we should proceed with existing technologies, and let me
expand on why I think that. The DOE program over the course of
the last 10 years has done a lot of analysis, systems analysis,
I will call it, of the fuel cycle and thinking about whether we
should go with recycling in LWRs or bypass that and go directly
to fast reactors. So we have looked at the options, and in the
end I am going to tell you that we need to continue to evaluate
the options, but as we have done that we have seen there is
some benefit, as Alan alluded to, with going to existing
technologies and recycling and thermal reactors. You get volume
reduction. You do get reduction in some of the radiotoxic
constituents as well as the heat-generating radionuclides. But
it is only part of the way there, and if you want to go to the
full benefit you need to go to full closure of the fuel cycle.
And even the countries that are currently doing like France,
Japan, Russia that are currently practicing aqueous
reprocessing using PUREX-like technologies and perhaps
recycling and thermal reactors, ultimately their plan is to go
to fast reactors and full closure of the fuel cycle. So the
question really on the table is, do we leapfrog or do we take a
more evolutionary path? And I would put to you that because we
have not currently put significant investment in the United
States that we should seriously consider the leapfrog approach,
meaning that we develop advanced technologies as we do that in
the lab. We have done a lot of that in the lab already, do some
additional science-based work, demonstrate those at a
reasonable engineering scale and then go build them at the
commercial scale.
One other point I will make about storage, so the current
spent fuel inventory is stored, spread across multiple sites.
One hundred and twenty-one sites, 39 states have currently
stored spent fuel at reactor sites. I won't get into whether it
is better to have centralized storage or storage at different
sites but it is safe and secure as it sits right now. It is not
a permanent solution, so we need to move in a measured path.
Chairman Gordon. I don't have much time left, so is there
anyone else that wants to address that? I thought you probably
would, Dr. Hanson.
Dr. Hanson. We have at Areva over 40 years of research
built into our existing processes and we have developed a
future process we call COEX, which does not separate out pure
plutonium. It is a step in the right direction.
With regard to the leapfrog or evolution, I would like to
use an analogy. We are embarking on a nuclear renaissance, and
the reactors that are being built around the world and are
going to be built in the United States are called Generation
Three Plus. They are evolutionary reactors. I cannot find a
single utility anywhere in the world that is prepared to
leapfrog to a fast reactor today. The situation is identical
with recycling. We have evolutionary technologies which we can
use today and we need to research a lot more before we can do
the leapfrog. The problem with leaping is you don't know where
you are going to land, and instead of landing on the lily pad
you may end up in the water and drown because your technology
doesn't survive.
Chairman Gordon. I don't want to abuse my time, so do you
want to have a rebuttal there, Ms. Price?
Ms. Price. I guess I would echo Dr. Peters' comments first
and the money that we would have to invest to build the
infrastructure for reprocessing could be better spent in
working on the technology roadmap for developing the recycling.
The roadmap that we developed, and this has been developed in
conjunction with many of the national labs, would say that you
could develop recycling over the course of 15 to 20 years, and
there is programmatic research that is laid out there.
One of the big advantages we haven't talked about but Dr.
Ferguson mentioned on the uranium supply balance is, recycling,
full recycling allows you to extract about 90 percent of the
available energy that is inherent in uranium and reduce the
waste volumes by about 98 percent, so not only are you having a
better overall conservation with respect to an important
natural resource, you have got completely different
characteristics that you can then consider in evaluating your
long-term storage.
Time Frames for Storage and Recycling
Chairman Gordon. Thank you. You know, one of the
unfortunate things about this format is that we don't get to go
deeper, and we have some roundtables, and I think we will
probably have more of these, where we can really talk. So just
in conclusion, very quickly, I want each of you to give me two
numbers. The first number is how do you think that we can
continue to store at existing locations with dry casks wherever
it might be, and the second is, how long do you think it would
take to get that next generation recycling? Dr. Peters, just
two numbers real quickly across everybody.
Dr. Peters. We can store until the end of the century if
you want to but I would argue commercial by 2050.
Chairman Gordon. Dr. Hanson?
Dr. Hanson. We can continue to store virtually
indefinitely. It is safe and secure and there are no
restrictions on the ability to supply storage, so that is not a
concern.
Chairman Gordon. On site. I am talking about on site.
Dr. Hanson. On site, yes, even on site. I wouldn't
recommend doing that but nonetheless it is possible. Your
second request with regard to the number of years, to do a
change in the nuclear industry, 40 years----
Chairman Gordon. Just two numbers. We just need two
numbers.
Dr. Hanson. Forty years.
Chairman Gordon. Okay. Ms. Price?
Ms. Price. There is sufficient capacity on the nuclear
sites to store them for as long as the nuclear plants are
running, so I don't have any issues with that. And I would say
15 to 20 years and you can have a sodium-cooled reactor in
service.
Chairman Gordon. And----
Dr. Ferguson. And I echo Dr. Peters' comments. I think end
of the century on site with dry cask storage and you can
probably get this up and running mid century in terms of
commercial processes if we need to.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you for your indulgence. Dr. Ehlers
is recognized.
The Merits of Different Reactor Types
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, we will go to you, Ms. Price. You talked
about sodium-cooled reactors, and I have just been out of the
field for too long. Where does that stand now? The last time I
looked at it, they didn't look very promising. What has
developed there? Are they going to be available commercially?
Are they really an answer or not?
Ms. Price. Well, to start off, as you know, the sodium-
cooled reactor has been around since the 1950s. More recently
in about 1983, we began developing a sodium-cooled reactor and
it, in fact, continued with development with government funding
through the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor Program that was
funded through 1995, and so in fact there have been quite a few
developments in the fast reactor technology since the early
1950s when it was first introduced. At that time in between the
1995 and the 2001 time frame, the NRC actually reviewed the
conceptual design work for the advanced--for the sodium-cooled
reactor and found that there were no significant safety
concerns that would prevent moving ahead to taking the next
step. There is still quite a bit of research and development
work and demonstration work to be done, but we believe that the
proof of concept is there and that in fact the reactor with the
development path would be successful.
Mr. Ehlers. You also mentioned water-moderated reactors and
that they are both functional and not detrimental to the other.
They improve the total fuel cycle. I am just curious, are there
certain areas of our country or certain areas of the world that
are better for either or both of these reactors or are they
universally applicable?
Ms. Price. The way we sort of think about it is like the
analogy, to borrow from my testimony, of oil and how do you
extract all of the value in a barrel of oil. A lot of the oil
is going to be used to fund the gasoline engine but there is
going to be some oil that is going to be used to make diesel
for use in diesel cars, and the question is, which is better,
an internal combustion engine or a diesel engine? And the
answer is, they have their own applicability and so there are
going to be situations where they are very complementary to
each other and they are not at all substitutes. What I would
say in the context of an overall nuclear balance is that the
view of using a fast reactor to address the transuranics would
require about a third of your nuclear installed base, 30
percent of the megawatts that you would generate via fast
reactor and the balance of it be a light water reactor and that
would be sort of a system that would be in balance. All of the
transuranics and all of the waste product in the used fuel then
could be sent over to the fast reactor and then you would not
be building up any more spent fuel.
Mr. Ehlers. Okay. Thank you.
Fuel Reprocessing Costs
Dr. Hanson, in Dr. Ferguson's testimony he states that most
countries have not chosen the reprocessing route because of the
significantly greater fuel cost. That doesn't seem quite to
jive with what you said. What do you think about that
statement, or what is your reaction?
Dr. Hanson. Our experience in Europe is that the additional
cost for doing recycling approximates five to six percent of
the costs of producing electricity. It is not a large amount. I
don't think people have foregone recycling because of the cost
issue. You need to have a fairly significant, sizable industry
in order to justify doing recycling. If you have a small
situation with only a few reactors, it is very hard to justify
it. And most countries are not going to be prepared to make the
massive up-front investment in building a facility as long as
they can provide the service from somebody else like Areva or
some day, the United States.
Mr. Ehlers. Are you suggesting that Areva or someone else
would provide the service in various parts of the world and all
the waste would be shipped to those areas?
Dr. Hanson. That is in fact what we are doing today. We are
doing recycling for Japan, for Switzerland, for Belgium, a
number of other countries, Italy now, and we provide the
service. We either return the plutonium to them as MOX fuel or
else we give it to another reactor, and only the high-level
waste goes back to the country from which the fuel came.
Mr. Ehlers. And are you encountering any problems from
people who are objecting to a plant being in the area or waste
being transported through their particular country or their
part of the country?
Dr. Hanson. The only place where that has been presented a
significant problem has been in Germany, where the step away
from nuclear and the Green Party has made it a big issue, and
they have tried to impede transports, but the transports are
continuing as we speak, mainly of returning waste today.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Ehlers, right on time, and
the prompt Ms. Brooks is recognized, or did she--Ms. Edwards.
I'm sorry. There she is. Ms. Edwards.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you know, when
you were asking earlier, Mr. Chairman, whether there were any
folks who might disagree, I thought you were talking about up
here on the panel.
More Proliferation Concerns
I want to ask you a couple of questions, and one has to do
with a letter, and I don't know if you are aware of it, that
was sent to President Obama in December from about 35
organizations from around this country raising serious concerns
about both reprocessing and recycling, and in particular they
point to the reprocessing that is done in France, the U.K.,
Japan and Russia, 250 metric tons of separated plutonium, which
they say is enough to make about 30,000 nuclear weapons. And
according to a GAO report in 2008, reprocessing irradiated fuel
would pose a greater risk of proliferation in comparison with
direct disposal in a geologic repository, and so I wonder if
you have some of those same concerns. And I understand that the
Council on Foreign Relations has raised exactly that concern,
and yet Dr. Hanson, I think that you have dismissed that as
both a proliferation concern and a security concern.
Dr. Hanson. I think that question is directed to me. I
would like to go back to what I said in my testimony. Areva
does not believe nor do I personally believe, I don't think
anybody on this panel believes that we ought to have
reprocessing and recycling taking place in every country on the
face of the Earth. This would not be a good thing to do.
However, the proliferation risk if we do it in the United
States is vanishingly small, vanishingly small. If we can
protect all of the nuclear weapons and all the nuclear material
we have in this country, then we can easily protect the
material that would be in commerce from doing recycling. So I
don't think it is a risk in the United States at all. Around
the world in other places, yes, it could be a risk.
Ms. Edwards. And is Areva interested in building a
reprocessing plant here in the United States?
Dr. Hanson. At the Carnegie Endowment conference held
earlier this year, our Chairwoman, Anne Lauvergeon, made a
statement to that nonproliferation conference. She said there
were only two countries in the world to which Areva would be
prepared to export our technology. One of them is the United
States and the second one is China.
Financial Costs
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. And then to any of our other
panelists, some concerns have been raised by the Union of
Concerned Scientists with regard to reprocessing spent nuclear
waste, and among them they cite an increased volume of
radioactive waste by a factor of seven, significantly increased
by more than a factor of six the volume of low-level waste
requiring disposal in a licensed low-level waste facility, and
a great increase by a factor of 160 in the volume of greater
than class C low-level waste which contains significant amounts
of long-lived and highly radiotoxic isotopes such as plutonium
and americium. There is no U.S. facility currently as we know
licensed to accept this waste. And they also cite the reduction
in the volume of high-level waste requiring disposal in a deep
geologic repository which we also don't have, less than 25
percent. And so I guess my question is, is the investment that
we are talking about, literally hundreds of billions of dollars
that would be required for reprocessing, given the security
questions, given the lack of a geologic repository for the
fuel, is this really worth our investment or should we be
making more investments particularly in sources of energy that
actually are going to get us someplace else without the
attendant costs? I will just leave that open to the panel.
Dr. Peters. Well, I guess first I would say it seems to me
like we need to be investing in a lot of different energy
sources, but to me nuclear is inescapable in terms of
contribution to baseload. I will say that first. Second, as you
well know, to the comments by Union of Concerned Scientists,
all the waste that they are referring to exists. We have to
deal with greater than class C low-level waste and high-level
waste already. Is there increase--the high-level waste volume
reduction is actually a bit more than significant than they
say, and I think Alan alluded to that in his testimony. There
would be an increase in low-level waste, small increase, and
also probably a small increase in greater than class C, but it
is a tradeoff, and I would argue when you put all this together
and think about sustainability, reducing the overall burden on
high-level waste, which is the most toxic, and all the other
components, particularly in an era where we are hoping nuclear
will grow, it makes sense to go to recycling because we are
going to have to develop the sites anyway. The nice thing about
recycling also is you can tailor the waste streams and perhaps
look at different disposal settings for the different waste
streams, which is much different than the way we think about
the problem right now.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. My time has expired, and I probably
will have some questions----
Chairman Gordon. Well, I think Dr. Ferguson wants to
probably----
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
Chairman Gordon. Let Dr. Ferguson finish.
Dr. Ferguson. Thank you, Congresswoman Edwards, for raising
those important points. And if we look at what Ms. Price said
about the number of fast reactors we would need under closing
the fuel cycle scheme that would really burn up these heavier
elements, these transuranic elements to really reduce the
burden on a nuclear waste repository, it is basically a 2:1
ratio so you need basically one fast reactor for every two
light water reactors you have. So we have 104 light water
reactors right now in the United States. If we just keep that
constant, which I think all four of us--one point is that it is
not a question about being for or against nuclear power. All
four of us on the panel are for nuclear energy, and I think we
all want to see it continue to grow. But let us assume we have
roughly 100 light water reactors. We will need 50 fast
reactors. How much are they going to cost? And they cost a lot
more than a light water reactor. What we really need to hear
from--it would have been great if we had a fifth panelist from
the utility company and ask that person whether they would be
willing to invest in a fast reactor. We are having a hard
enough time in this country getting utilities to invest in
light water reactors that get the next generation of nuclear
reactors being built in this country and here we are trying to
think about something that is maybe 50 years in the future.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Ferguson. There are very
serious issues that go along with nuclear power, and I think
this committee, the diversity of thought is going to help us
get there better and so keep up the good work. We need you, Ms.
Edwards and Ms. Woolsey, to ask the tough questions so that we
can get better thoughts.
And speaking of diversity, we recognize Mr. Rohrabacher.
High-temperature Gas-cooled Reactors
Mr. Rohrabacher. And this may fit right in with the
comments on our alternative reactors in terms of the
traditional reactors that we have been dealing with and the
fast reactors that you just mentioned. But back to the letter
that I submitted for the record, just for the sake of my
colleagues, it is a letter that I received from Nikolay--sorry
about mispronouncing the name--Stepnoy from Kurchatov Institute
in Moscow, and I would like to read a portion of that letter
[see Appendix: Additional Material for the Record] at this time
and then follow up with a couple questions that I have for the
panel. This is addressed to me: ``Dear Congressman: It is time
to upgrade the relations between the United States and Russia,
particularly in the area of nuclear power. It is time to move
from a relationship where the U.S. provides technical
assistance to Russia to a real partnership for improving global
energy and economic, environment and nonproliferation. I
believe that the best developed and most fruitful area where
the United States and Russia can perform nuclear cooperation is
in the joint development of a high-temperature gas-cooled
reactor. The United States and Russia must work together to not
only bring the benefits of this reactor to both our countries
but to provide this same proliferation-resistant and secure
type of reactor to other less-developed countries who are
moving quickly to harness the benefits of nuclear energy. In
this way we can make great progress in nonproliferation
economic development without harming our environment.''
Let me just note that if 20 years ago one would think that
I was reading a letter about cooperation with Russia in this
area, I would tell you you were nuts. But the fact is, I think
today some of the greatest, the most important avenue we have
to succeed in some of the issues that are being discussed here
today is our cooperation with other countries in particular
with the former Soviet Union, with Russia, who is reaching out
to us for this type of cooperation. Now, with that said, the
letter mentions the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor. I
would like to ask the panel if that is a technology that would
significantly reduce the waste that has to be dealt with in the
recycling and reprocessing process that is being discussed
today. I am not sure what the panel knows about the high-
temperature gas-cooled reactor but if--yes, sir.
Dr. Ferguson. Well, I heartily endorse your comments about
a U.S.-Russia cooperation, and just to briefly plug something I
recently directed, the Council on Foreign Relations task force
report on nuclear weapons policy, chaired by Brent Scowcroft
and Bill Perry, and I was the Project Director, we just
published it a couple of weeks ago and we have made a
recommendation in there that we need greater cooperation with
Russia on peaceful nuclear energy. The particular point you
make about high-temperature gas reactors I think is an
important one. The Department of Energy itself has looked at
these reactors--not enough, in my opinion--but what they have
seen is that there are some benefits to be derived from them,
maybe not a huge benefit in terms of waste reduction, but one
benefit is that if they are more efficient, then you can get a
lot more electrical energy produced for the amount of heat you
produce from nuclear fission. If we had to do it all over
again, you know, go back 50 years into the past, 1950s when we
started commercial nuclear power, it probably would have been a
wise decision to have stronger development of these type of
reactors. Right now the light water reactors are getting about
a third efficiency so we are wasting about two-thirds of the
energy. With the HTGR, you can get about 45 percent or so
efficiency out of these, so that is one thing that----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So more efficiency, you actually have less
waste to have to deal with.
Dr. Ferguson. Less waste to deal with, and in terms of the
proliferation risk, if you look at the plutonium 239 content
coming out, the isotope that is a proliferation concern, it is
actually a lower percentage ratio than you would see from a
light water reactor, depending on how those reactors typically
operate.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, I would just draw attention
to that testimony, and this is an issue we should be pushing
our experts to look at as an alternative if it provides those
kind of benefits. Any other reaction from the panel?
Dr. Peters. Let me say, so the high-temperature gas reactor
is one of the concepts, as Dr. Ferguson alluded to, that is
part of the Gen IV international forum, so we are looking at
it. General Atomics, which is a U.S.-based company, has been
thinking a lot about the high-temperature gas reactor, and so
there is a lot of thinking about it. As far as international
cooperation, I can't agree more, especially in R&D.
Mr. Rohrabacher. One last note before--we have the person,
the scientist who wrote me that letter from Russia, with us
today, and his nickname is Nick Nick, and I wonder if we could
just say hello. Thank you very much for indulging me, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Gordon. Welcome, Dr. Nick Nick, and I have to say
that listening to Mr. Rohrabacher advocate cooperation with
Russia makes me feel much better about our success in the
Middle East.
Mr. Baird. Mr. Chairman, on that point, we want to point
out that it is not just the icecaps that are melting off.
Chairman Gordon. Mr. Lujan is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Lujan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you,
Chairman Baird. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased today that we are
here today talking about this because as the debate continues
about the future of energy generation in our country and the
role that nuclear power has, it is critical that we as a nation
invest in the necessary research and development to talk about
the waste, to talk about what needs to be done with spent fuel
and how we can break it down, how we as a nation have fallen
behind other nations and how simply sticking it in the ground
without attempting to break it down or attempting to solve this
problem is blissful ignorance. And I am really happy that we
are here today to talk about this and, Mr. Chairman, to really
be excited about the fact that in the hearing charter today
that there is widespread agreement that a more robust long-term
research and development program is needed to address these
outstanding issues and to truly look to see how we can focus a
lot of our energy and investment leaning upon the expertise
that we have around the country, around the world, to help
accelerate this, and to have the distinguished panelists that
we have today that have expertise in each of these areas is
something that is real important to me.
Costs of Nuclear Waste Management Today
Mr. Chairman, I would be anxious to hear from Ms. Price. Do
you think that the way that we are handling waste today is
adequate or can we be doing it better?
Ms. Price. Well, I think in terms of the way the utilities
handle it today, it is very safely stored and appropriately
stored in the utility sites either in pools or in dry cask
storage, and so I think we all four agreed that there is
sufficient ability to store it at the utility sites today. Does
that mean that we need to not look ahead to the fact that we
really do need to have some sort of repository and the nature
of the repository and the size and the characteristics of it
are dependent upon what solution we choose for managing the
waste? So today, are we fine? Yes. Can new plants be built with
sufficient capacity on their sites to be able to handle the
used nuclear fuel when it comes out of the reactors? Yes. But
we do need to be looking ahead to a long-term solution that is
going to help us address and really maximize the value of what
is an asset that we have in used nuclear fuel.
Mr. Lujan. Ms. Price, is utilizing the repository, simply
storing it, less expensive than recycling it?
Ms. Price. It is not clear that it is going to be less
expensive in the long run because the characteristics of the
repository could be quite different. If you have to isolate the
fuel for hundreds of thousands of years, you have different
considerations than if you have to isolate it for thousands or
hundreds of years. And so if you can isolate and store the fuel
for hundreds of years and then have the heat reduction, the
radiotoxicity reduced to a level where it is no longer
considered high-level waste, then you have got different
characteristics and you might be able to utilize the repository
in a different fashion. So the cost of the repository and the
management of that over the long run compared to the cost for
the recycling program is something that needs to be evaluated.
Mr. Lujan. Then why aren't we recycling today and we are
just talking about storing it?
Ms. Price. Recycling is one of those things that is, as far
as I know from a history standpoint, was not considered, or we
didn't move ahead with it in sort of the late 1970s, early
1980s.
Mr. Lujan. Could the argument be made that it is cheaper,
less expensive to store in a facility like Yucca Mountain as
opposed to engaging in the necessary means to be able to invest
in the technology to adequately break down to be able to
utilize recycled spent fuel or waste?
Ms. Price. My last comment, and I will turn it over to my
colleagues on the panel, I would say that that wasn't the
decision that drove storing it on site in a repository solution
versus recycling opportunities. That was driven by other
factors including proliferation concerns and risks at the time,
and I think this is the time to look at--if we are going to
move ahead with the nuclear renaissance, we need to have an
all-enclosed fuel cycle opportunity that really allows us to
safely manage nuclear fuel in a more safe, more secure way
going forward.
Mr. Lujan. Thank you.
The Navajo Nation's Uranium Supply
If I could, Dr. Ferguson, you mentioned the MIT study that
is taking into consideration how much uranium is out there and
the inventories. Are you aware if the Navajo Nation's uranium
supply was included in the MIT study?
Dr. Ferguson. No, I am not, but that is an important
question, you know, how does uranium mining, prospecting affect
certain groups of people, and I know this has been a big
environmental concern with that group of people.
Mr. Lujan. And Mr. Chairman, the reason I bring that
question up is, as we look towards the debate about how, the
role nuclear energy will have in the future of our nation's
energy needs, that we not forget about many of the abandoned
uranium mines around the country, at current count, over 500 in
the Navajo Nation alone, that need to be addressed as we talk
about this as well. And so as we talk about the importance of
recycling and R&D to being able to break down waste that we not
forget about some of the responsibilities that we have also
with some of the abandoned mines and the people that are being
impacted. To date, there have been 113 structures that are in
process of being demolished, 27 radiation-contaminated
structures and 10 residential yards. People are living in these
contaminated areas, and I think that we need to make sure that
we talk about that at some point as well.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this important
hearing.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you for bringing that up. Again, I
think one of the things we have learned today is that we do
need to again have that type of survey. We need to be reviewing
the things you just talked about. We will have--you know, this
kind of discussion is not off limits to this committee and
again, there are hard questions that need to be asked too and
we will try to do that.
Ms. Biggert, you are recognized for five minutes.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
all for being here. This is, I think, a really good hearing.
GNEP and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative
About 11 years ago when I first came here and the first
month that I was here, I got a call that the President had cut
$20 million from the electro-metallurgical program at Argonne.
I didn't even know how to pronounce it at the time but I was
very concerned and worked to get that money back, so this is
how long, at least when I have been here, that we really have
been working on reprocessing and now we are talking recycling
but it is very frustrating, I think, that we really haven't
moved the goal posts very far, and in fact there were six
reprocessing plants that were built in this country and one
opened and then the rest were shut down without even opening by
President Carter and still we sit, you know, waiting for
something to happen.
I know, Dr. Peters, you said that you don't think that it
is really urgent that we move ahead right now but I am
frustrated that we are not making enough progress, and
particularly if we are going to face something like cap and
trade and, you know, all the things that we are going to have
to do because of the carbon, you know, because of the carbon
issue and I think that is very important, but I think that
nuclear really has to be at the forefront of moving ahead if we
are going to be able to have--reduce the carbon in this country
and reprocessing, recycling, I guess we are calling it
recycling now, is so important but we have to move ahead, and I
think the research and development and the demonstration is so
important. When we had GNEP in the last few years, we have
talked about what that means, and I would like to ask Dr.
Peters, what are the--what research aspects of GNEP and the
advanced fuel cycle initiative, which of those, or what aspects
of those should be continued?
Dr. Peters. So what should continue is, we should continue
to develop advanced reprocessing technologies both aqueous and
electro-metallurgical, electrochemical, pyro, whatever you want
to call it at the lab scale for sure. That is work that, as you
are aware, has been going on for a decade or more. There also
needs to continue to be work on advanced fuels, developing
advanced fuels for ultimate recycling. There needs to be work
on the waste management aspects of the problem, so other
concepts, say, in addition to say, Yucca Mountain repository,
thinking about certain streams going down bore holes versus
salt disposal versus alternative disposal concepts, all this
has to be brought together through a very robust analysis of
the overall system so that you think about the economics, the
nonproliferation and all that. So the advanced fuel cycle
initiative program that existed before GNEP really is where we
are going back to quite frankly, but the component that we need
to add to it is the demonstration component, and that gets back
to needing to think very carefully over the long-term about the
R&D needs for the science and engineering at the lab scale but
thinking about ultimately going to demonstration, and that
needs to be laid out.
Time Issues and MOX Fuel
Ms. Biggert. I think the problem that we had with the GNEP
was that there was--some wanted to move right from the research
and development to the commercialization rather than doing the
demonstration or the system analysis but how long is this going
to take? And Dr. Hanson, you talked about--and I have been to
France to see what you do there, and it seems like you are
moving and everyone talks about the proliferation and yet I
think we were so worried about that 30 years ago and yet most
of the--and unfortunately, most of the countries that we
worried about already have some capabilities in that area, so
we need to move ahead faster to find, you know, maybe something
resistant but at least to go forward on our own with our
development. I guess the MOX facility that is being built at
Savannah River site is scheduled to produce MOX fuel by 2016.
Who will be using this MOX fuel that is being developed?
Dr. Hanson. To your question with regard to who will use
the MOX fuel, it will be any of the U.S. utilities who choose
to purchase this fuel from the MOX project. At the moment there
are discussions ongoing with three or four U.S. utilities who
have a strong interest in purchasing that material for their
reactors.
Ms. Biggert. Do you think we are moving fast enough for
development of the----
Dr. Hanson. No, absolutely not. We are sitting now on
60,000 metric tons of spent fuel. We are discharging 2,000
every single year, and that is before we build any new
reactors. If it takes us 20 years to start up recycling, we
will have 100,000 metric tons of fuel in storage. The largest
plant in the world, which we operate in France, reprocesses and
recycles about 1,700 metric tons a year. That means if we
replicated that plant in the United States, it will take 60
years just to get rid of the inventory without touching the
material that is being discharged. I think we have waited too
long. I think we need to start as soon as we can while
continuing the R&D on advanced technologies to do it even more
efficiently, and I applaud the Committee's support of the AFCI
program in that regard. I think that is very, very important.
But I don't think we can wait for revolutionary changes which
may never actually come to fruition.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Gordon. Ms. Kosmas is recognized for five minutes.
Clarification on Reprocessing, Recycling, and Fast Reactors
Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
opportunity and I thank you all for being here and I appreciate
that the Chairman said this had been dumbed down to us, but I
think I need to go one level lower for the technological part
of it. But in terms of our--I state for the record that I am a
proponent of nuclear energy as one of the alternative supplies
that we need in order to move forward, and so I very much am
interested and enlightened by what you have said, what I was
able to grasp from it. Perhaps my comment would be that I think
we all--you all said that the recognizable problems are
nonproliferation, cost and waste, and those are things that
would have to be considered no matter what course of action we
took. As I understood you, Dr. Peters said fast track the
advanced fuel cycle program. Dr. Hanson said recycle and bring
it home, and if I understood correctly, Dr. Price said we could
be doing both. Did you say that is possible to create a
situation in which 70 percent is based on recycling and 30
percent uses the recycled, or did I misunderstand you?
Ms. Price. I would like to clarify that a little bit. Dr.
Hanson and I advocate different ways to handle the used nuclear
fuel. The technique he uses in reprocessing does extract some
of the incremental energy and burns the plutonium. The
technology that I am advocating actually burns up all of the
high heat-bearing constituents in the used nuclear fuel and so
it is a different technology. I do think we should continue to
do research, as Dr. Peters suggests, focused on the recycling
side of things because I think we can drive that and have a
better all-in solution in the back end.
Ms. Kosmas. Thank you. I think that was clarified, but I
appreciate it very much.
So Dr. Peters, if you are recommending that the United
States advanced cycle program develop a roadmap, in your
opinion, what is the reasonable timetable and the budget for
the development of that roadmap? In other words, where should
we be going now, and would you agree that continuing the
recycling while working on the advanced is a good parallel
track?
Dr. Peters. So first on the roadmap, to cost estimate on
the fly here, I am not speaking for the Department, but we
wouldn't reinvent the wheel. There has been a tremendous amount
of work done already. That is the first thing. So I am
imagining a group of lab, university and industry people
getting together over the course of the next six months to a
year that could put together, I think, a very robust roadmap,
you know. It would not be--it would not break the bank. It
would be, you know, a few million dollars kind of thing,
because we have thought about this very deeply. I think we just
need to come together and lay out the right path forward.
Your other question, should we--what I was trying--I think
you articulated my position correctly in your introductory
remarks. I think we should continue the advanced fuel cycle
program but I would argue for a bump in the investment once we
have the right roadmap, and I think the outcome of that road-
mapping exercise ultimately is going to be a policy decision to
leapfrog, I hope.
Ms. Kosmas. Okay. Dr. Hanson, would you restate what I
thought I heard you say about the leapfrog?
Dr. Hanson. Yes. In my long career in the nuclear industry,
I have never seen a leapfrog that was successful in this
industry. I started in the fast reactor world when I got out of
school and it was just around the corner and we were going to
be turning out fast reactors and they were going to replace
light water reactors. The fast reactor is a little bit like
fusion. It is always 20, 30 years into the future and it just
keeps on receding there. I would like to have the optimism that
Dr. Price has with regard to fast reactors but my own
experience is that they are not yet proven to be commercially
acceptable. We are only having a nuclear renaissance because
the utilities have driven capacity factors in excess of 90
percent and they are running the plants very efficiently. There
is not a single fast reactor anywhere in the world that has
even achieved a 50 percent capacity factor. There is a lot of
proof of principle which needs to be done before any utility
will purchase a fast reactor. So if we are talking about
leapfrogging, that leap may take us a very, very long time
before we land.
Ms. Kosmas. Thank you very much.
Then Dr. Ferguson, would you reiterate what you said about
the utilities needing to be at the table?
Dr. Ferguson. Absolutely, and I think on the fast reactor
question, I think to narrow down a specific question relevant
to your committee is, what is the role of the U.S. Government.
Should you be putting money into developing a demonstration
project for a fast reactor? I know there has been a big debate
in a related area that is a demo capture, carbon capture and
storage from coal-fired plants. We have been back and forth on
this and it looks like Secretary Chu is now willing to put
about a billion dollars toward that. In my opinion, it is a
step in the right direction.
So the question comes, and I think Dr. Hanson has framed it
in an interesting way. We have looked at France, we look at
Japan, we even look at Russia and we look at India, the few
countries that have some experience with fast reactors. When I
was in France just two months ago, I spent a week there
touring, and I visited the Phoenix reactor site. They are
shutting it down this year. I talked to the director. He is a
very sad man because they are shutting it down all the time and
it is, you know, uncertain when France is even going to get its
next fast reactor built, maybe 2020 or beyond. So that is part
of--to fully close the fuel cycle. That is what Ms. Price is
saying. Basically you have two choices here. You would have the
choice of what the French are doing now, which is a once-
through recycle, and they are storing the MOX spent nuclear
fuel so they still have to pay for those storage costs and the
view is that they are going to eventually mine that plutonium
and that spent fuel to feed fast reactors in the future, but we
don't know if these fast reactors are going to work or not or
whether they are economically feasible. Maybe it does make
sense to put some federal money into one demonstration project
and see if this works or not.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Ferguson.
Ms. Kosmas, your questions certainly demonstrate that we
need to dig more and learn more about this. Thank you.
Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
roundtable discussion. Thank you.
Chairman Gordon. Mr. Bilbray is recognized for five
minutes.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to stop a second and really congratulate
you at having this hearing, and I just want to say that I
appreciate the fact that you have been brave enough to openly
discuss these issues. Political orthodoxy basically says there
is a lot of discussion that this committee has been doing that
shouldn't be done if you want to, you know, be a political
might in American politics, but just having this discussion
really I think does credit to this committee and shows how
essential this committee is to not just Congress but this
nation, and so I just really want to congratulate you on that
because the fact is that when it comes to anything nuclear, we
have seen prejudice and ignorance stand in the way of science
and just as much as history has damned people in the past for
allowing their prejudices and their phobias to stand in the way
of intellectual decision and discussion, I think that time is
going to show that you led the charge on opening the door,
pulling the curtain back and being frankly looking at the facts
rather than misperceptions of the past.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray, and your time has
extended another 10 minutes.
Mr. Ehlers. I think he is going nuclear.
Nuclear Materials Transport
Mr. Bilbray. It is not a melt-down. Look, my question is,
one of the things--we will get into this. One of the great
obstructions of working at--first of all, I totally agree that
we ought to be looking not at disposal but at storage based on
either short-term or long-term reprocessing in some way, and we
can talk about that. But let us be frank about it. One of the
great oppositions to the Yucca Mountain project was not based
on on-site location issues, it was based on transport. Now, how
in the world will we be able to face the political heat, and I
know you are probably the wrong ones, but your comments about
the issue that we need to address the issue of transport,
especially what is kind of interesting because from the
military point of view, there is a lot of related issues that
don't seem to be standing in the way of the United States
government doing what it needs to be able to take care of the
problem. Comments on the transport issue?
Dr. Ferguson. So in France, they are transporting plutonium
several hundred miles from the la Hague reprocessing facility
in Normandy down to the Melox facility in the south of France.
Now, they haven't had any security incidents that I am aware of
and they have been doing this for many years. So, so far so
good. But it only takes one incident. They are, you know,
transporting several bombs' worth of plutonium in each
shipment. So it is not that--the proliferation threat in
countries like France, it is not that France would then use
that commercial program to make its own nuclear weapons, it is
that insiders might be able to sneak out some quantities of
that material. As I point out in my testimony, only one-tenth
of one percent of the material going through a bulk handling
facility annually could be enough to make a nuclear bomb. Now,
you pointed out the U.S. military. I used to be in the U.S.
military, and I was in the U.S. nuclear Navy. We have a very
good safety record, but we had a problem a couple of years ago
in the U.S. Air Force. There was a bent spear incident in which
some nuclear-armed cruise missiles were unaccounted for for 36
hours. Now, there wasn't an insider threat there, it was really
just a bad mistake, accountability, but it does point out that
even in organizations with high security standards, things can
go missing. There is an opportunity for diversion.
Dr. Peters. As you noted, it is not really a technical
issue per se. The technologies exist. We do it safely and
securely now domestically. It is all about public trust and
confidence, and it is a social science issue if there is
science in it and so it is about communication and people
understanding the risks and whatnot at a level that they can
understand and also talking to them very carefully about what
the plans are and making it very transparent, and that is
something that needs to be done. I mean, we have had success in
the United States with shipments to the waste isolation pilot
plant in New Mexico. I would say in general the transportation
program there has been--has gone very well. So we have some
experience domestically but it would be a long process of
developing public trust and confidence.
Dr. Hanson. I would just like to echo what Mark Peters has
just said. We have transported tens of thousands of casks of
used fuel to our facilities in France without any incident. The
containers which are used are, for all practical purposes,
indestructible. There is a need to get public acceptance and
that is a social science issue, not a technology issue. I think
we have had a phobia in this regard for many, many years and we
need to get over that phobia because we have to eventually move
the material somewhere.
Mr. Bilbray. Well, my time has expired but I just want to
say I think that maybe I am suspicious of intention here but
the phobia was almost promulgated by people based on the fact
that they saw it as a way to destroy an energy source based on
misperception and they use it as an excuse for an agenda that
wasn't up front.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank you for
holding this hearing. I hope to see us continue this. There may
be one committee that wants to handle only the pieces of
legislation that are marked H.R. that may not want to address
the nuclear power issue but I am glad to see that we have been
able to reserve this, mostly because they have been willing to
avoid it, and I hope that you continue your leadership on the
issue. Thank you.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Bilbray.
Dr. Hanson, if you want to confirm the indestructibility of
those casks, I will loan you my daughter. That is the ultimate
test.
Now, I would suggest that the Committee buckle their
seatbelt and we recognize Ms. Woolsey for five minutes.
Safety Risks
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I echo what
Congressman Bilbray just said about you and how open you are
and how good you are to all of us, even though I can't remember
what Mr. Bilbray because it hurt my feelings so much, all those
words about people like me that absolutely do not support
nuclear energy, and it isn't because it is not a decent energy,
it is because of human error and our lack of being able to
handle waste and have a place for waste and transporting, and
you know, it is a good energy until it isn't, and then look
what we have got. We have another Hiroshima. I absolutely
believe we should be using these same millions of dollars for
other kinds of energy research until--I don't think it will
ever be safe enough, and I just wanted to be up front with
that, and I would--you know, there is solar, there is wind,
there is waves, there is geothermal, there is all kinds of
things we haven't even thought about because we are putting
millions and millions of dollars into something that people
really don't want to have in their neighborhood. So we have
gone on and on about Yucca Mountain. Imagine, Dr. Hanson, if we
tried to build a recycling plant in the United States of
America to handle all of the nuclear waste worldwide. I can
imagine trying to get through that argument in maybe 20, 30,
40, 50 years from now but I don't think that can happen now.
Maybe some other country, maybe we could convince some poor
country to take our waste and handle it, you know, on some
island where we could just turn our backs on it, which I
wouldn't support at all, but I am not--I mean, I know I am not
going to convince you, you are not going to convince me. This
is very good because I learned what all of you folks think is
so important and why it is okay to invest in doing all of this
when indeed we could have quite an accident here in the United
States of America, and that is why we don't have new nuclear
sites. How long has it been since we have had a new nuclear
plant in the United States? Yes, Dr. Ferguson.
Dr. Ferguson. In 1996, Watts Bar Unit 1 was the last plant
to really come on operation.
Ms. Woolsey. And that is South Carolina?
Dr. Ferguson. Tennessee, or TVA.
Ms. Woolsey. Oh, sorry.
Dr. Ferguson. But that plant was ordered back in----
Chairman Gordon. Alabama, actually.
Dr. Ferguson. I thought it was Tennessee, Tennessee
Authority. But that was ordered back in 1970. So we haven't had
a plant that has been ordered since about 1973 and gone
completely to construction.
Ms. Woolsey. And what are the arguments against these
plants that you are having to surmount?
Dr. Ferguson. Well, I think it really boils down mostly to
economics. I mean, there has been some public opposition, but
if you look at the communities where nuclear power is being
generated, they tend to be overwhelmingly supportive of nuclear
power plants for jobs and the plants have become very safe
compared to where we are with Three Mile Island. I grew up in
Pennsylvania not too far from where the accident happened, so I
remember what happened there 30 years ago, and I mentioned to
Congressman Bilbray, I was in the U.S. nuclear Navy so I know
what a safety program is like that meets high standards of
excellence. What happened immediately after Three Mile Island
was, the industry formed what is called INPO, the Institute for
Nuclear Power Operations. It has been a self-policing
organization that has been an industry watchdog. Now, it
doesn't mean we don't need a Nuclear Regulatory Commission, we
do. We need a strong, independent regulator but INPO has served
an important purpose in keeping the industry accountable, in a
way kind of shaming them and doing peer reviews and making sure
that they are living up to high standards, not that we haven't
had problems. If you look at a plant in Ohio a few years ago at
Davis-Besse, there was a potential accident in the making
there.
Ms. Woolsey. So unless you want to----
Dr. Peters. Well, I guess a little bit more. So the last
one was brought on. Then there was another one brought online
so we are currently operating 104 reactors, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has 17 combined construction/operating
licenses that they are in the process of evaluating right now
that could lead up to 26 new units. So right now what they are
saying is, there could be new plants online by 2015, 2016. So
they are moving forward. A lot of it is about the economics.
Ms. Woolsey. And for the same amount of investment, are
there not safer ways to provide energy in the United States of
America?
Dr. Peters. In terms of cost per kilowatt-hour, it is
competitive with coal.
Ms. Woolsey. How about risk?
Dr. Peters. Well, they are all going to have their
challenges. It is hard for me to put a price on risk, first of
all, so I probably can't give you a clear answer to that. But
what I will say right now is that we should be investing in all
the things that you are talking about but those just aren't
cost-competitive. More importantly, it is the reliability and
the ability to produce a lot of electricity that you don't get
from some things like solar and wind yet.
Dr. Hanson. If I may, I would like to correct one thing in
your statement. There is no energy technology that is risk-
free. That is certainly true, and nuclear has some unique
hazards associated with it, but it has a very, very high safety
record worldwide. There is no conceivable accident in the
civilian nuclear power cycle that can get anywhere near the
consequences of a Hiroshima. That is physically impossible. You
mentioned who would want it. During the GNEP studies, 15
communities raised their hand and said we want to study putting
a recycling facility in our community because of the economic
benefits that would come with it. Finally, just to make the
case for the fact that there is no such thing as a perfectly
safe industry, the wind industry is--by the way, we make
windmills too. But the wind industry is growing pretty fast in
the U.K. and there is a very interesting company there that is
making windmills and they are keeping track of the deaths
caused by windmills, which at last count had reached 41
worldwide, and we haven't killed that many people with the
nuclear industry in over 50 years of operation.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Hanson.
Ms. Woolsey, we need you to continue to ask the hard
questions. Thanks for being here. Do you have a closing?
Ms. Woolsey. Well, my closing was my Chairman here from our
subcommittee. What about Chernobyl?
Dr. Hanson. Chernobyl was a bad example with a bad reactor
with no containment and poorly operated. The direct
consequences in terms of death was exactly 31.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, and Mr. Hall is recognized for
five minutes.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I want to yield maybe a minute of
my time to Mr. Bilbray to expound a little further.
Mr. Bilbray. Dr. Ferguson, you served in the United States
Navy. What is the last reactor put online in this country?
Dr. Ferguson. Well, in the U.S. Navy.
Mr. Bilbray. Right.
Dr. Ferguson. I don't know exactly what the reactor was.
Mr. Bilbray. George Bush?
Dr. Ferguson. Right.
Mr. Bilbray. Ronald Reagan?
Dr. Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bilbray. How many nuclear power units--who in the last
30 years have been the only purchasers of nuclear power in this
country?
Dr. Ferguson. Well that brings--well, the U.S. Navy, and it
brings up a very important point about our workforce, and part
of the work I am doing at the Council on Foreign Relations is
analyzing the nuclear workforce and the shortages we have. If
we really want to expand nuclear energy use, where are we going
to get the skilled people to run these plants? We have been
drawing them from the U.S. Navy but the Navy obviously needs
these people as well. So our workforce is shrinking. The
workforce is aging. They are nearing retirement age very
rapidly.
Mr. Bilbray. And the fact is, not only has the Federal
Government continued to purchase and invest in nuclear power as
its preferred source for large craft, but it also places it in
the middle of high urban areas like San Diego Bay where you
have multiple, multiple nuclear reactors right in the urban
core, right?
Dr. Ferguson. That is correct, and it also the submarine
reactors are designed to go very deep. I can't tell you how
deep, that is classified, but very deep and still operate very
effectively.
Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I just
wanted to point out how safe it was.
Mr. Hall. I will reclaim my time, and I would like to use
my time to point out that this is the first difference I have
ever had with Ms. Woolsey, I believe, is on nuclear energy.
Ms. Woolsey. Except you don't know how to pronounce my name
yet.
Mr. Hall. I always call you Lynn. Okay. Let me use my time.
More on Fast Reactors
Dr. Ferguson, a real quick answer from you on this if you
would. You talked about fast reactors in your testimony, and I
think you talked some more about them a little bit ago about
reactors being able to breed new plutonium and how they were
designed to do this. I think you covered that, but I didn't
hear an answer as to why is France turning--why are they
shutting down their fast reactor? I think it is Phoenix, isn't
it, the prototype Phoenix?
Dr. Ferguson. That is correct. They are shutting that down
this year. They----
Mr. Hall. Why? Just give me a short answer to that.
Dr. Ferguson. One very brief reason is, it is a political
opposition to--their Super Phoenix was the big fast reactor.
They shut that down in the mid-1990s, mainly for political
reasons, but they were also having problems. I think one of the
panelists mentioned or maybe one of the Congressmen mentioned
about fast reactors. The history of fast reactors, we haven't
really had a fast reactor ever operate even at 50 percent power
capacity, so it is still an unproven technology. Phoenix,
though, was designed to be a prototype, to be a test reactor,
and it has served its purpose very well over a number of
decades.
Mr. Hall. I thank you.
Specific Research and Development Needs
Dr. Hanson, I didn't hear your testimony at the beginning.
I was at another Committee meeting. But at end of your
testimony, your written testimony, you talked about areas for
research, development and demonstration and in particular you
mentioned reducing the minimal gaseous and liquid discharges
that might arise from the current processing technologies,
electromagnetic separation and advanced instrumentation. Give
us a little explanation of each of these, not that you can make
me understand it but we would have it on the record.
Dr. Hanson. Thank you. I will try very briefly. When you
shear and dissolve nuclear materials, you release some of the
gases that are included in the fuel, and you can deal with it
in a number of ways. One is by discharging them into the
atmosphere as long as you stay within regulatory limits and the
other thing that you can do is capture, package and dispose of
them. We haven't done much research in that capture and
control. Basically it is like carbon sequestration. We haven't
done it because we haven't needed to do it. But if we are going
to locate a recycling facility in the United States, I think we
are going to have to meet some very strict limitations on the
discharges and so we need research in that particular area. We
have already talked about research on electro-metallurgical
separations. That should continue in advance of the fast
reactors. With regard to the safeguards, there is no doubt that
you have to have safeguards and security associated with these
types of facilities. In order to do that, you have to have
very, very sophisticated instrumentation to measure the flows
of material and to make sure that material is not
surreptitiously removed from the facilities. There is a lot
that can be done in this particular area and I think we can
learn a lot from what the U.S. military has done and at the
national labs in order to make the next-generation facility
that is built even more proliferation resistant than the ones
that are in existence today.
Mr. Hall. I thank you. I think my time is up. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Hall. We will have a test
at the end of this hearing.
Dr. Baird is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Baird. I thank the Chairman. I thank our witnesses, a
fascinating topic. If I applaud you and praise you, Mr.
Chairman, can I have an extra six minutes? It is a worthwhile
hearing and we are grateful for your expertise.
Economic Issues
I want to talk a little bit about the economics. You know,
we do have a difficult choice before us. I happen to be
absolutely convinced that the evidence is clear that the
climate is changing, that the Earth is overheating and that the
oceans are becoming acidified. So reducing CO2
output makes a lot of sense. On the other hand, it is not just
nukes or CO2, there are a host of other technologies
available. Talk to us a little bit about--I want to raise two
quick issues. One, when people say carbon zero, there ain't no
such thing. I mean, the net cost to extract uranium, transport
the uranium, process uranium, build the concrete containment
vessels, et cetera, there is a large carbon cost to that. So
talk a little bit about that, but also talk to us a little bit
about subsidies. When we talk about the relative economics of
nukes versus alternatives, what kind of subsidies, government
subsidies, go into the nuclear industry from front to back
including insurance, including waste reprocessing, et cetera?
And on the research side. Can you share that with us?
Dr. Hanson. If I may, I will try and address your first
question and leave the second one to the panel. You are
absolutely right. When you are trying to compare technologies,
you need to look at life cycle carbon footprints and not just
the emissions from the facility. The nuclear power plants
basically are zero-emission plants. There is a carbon footprint
associated with enrichment and building the plant and doing the
mining. However, it is very small. If you look at the carbon
footprint of the available technologies to produce electricity,
what you will find is the lowest carbon footprint is nuclear
and wind. They are almost identical. The carbon footprint of
solar photovoltaics is very large, so much so that if you
replace all the nuclear power plants with solar photovoltaics,
you would increase carbon emissions by a factor of five. You
need to look at these things. There are some very good studies
that have been done in the U.K. and in the international
community to make the comparison, and I would submit that
nuclear energy is very, very carbon friendly.
Mr. Baird. Let us talk a little bit about subsidies then.
Dr. Peters. So maybe I will speak to the R&D part perhaps
is the place where I should start. So in the past there was
significant investment in R&D in the old breeder reactor days
back in the, you know, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s.
Mr. Baird. Let us include fusion in the----
Dr. Peters. Right. So since the mid-1990s, then R&D went
away for quite a while, and in the mid-1990s it started to ramp
back up. So in a combination of the advanced fuel cycle
initiative and Generation IV, you are looking at about $300
million a year going into R&D in nuclear energy.
Dr. Ferguson. Two points I would like to make is that how
many nuclear power plants do we need to build to really take a
further bite out of climate change. If you look at a study from
2004, two Princeton researchers, Dr. Steven Pacala and Robert
Socolow, they looked at the so-called wedge model and they
break up the greenhouse gas emissions increases into seven
equal wedges and asked, so if nuclear were going to fill one of
those seven wedges, how many nuclear power plants would you
need to have online by mid-century. You would need to have
equivalent of about 1,000 1,000-megawatt electric power
reactors on line by mid-century. Right now we have about the
equivalent, just a little bit less than 400, the amount of
plants online. That is an aging fleet. We are going to have to
replace those reactors by mid-century so we are going to have
to build that number of reactors, roughly 400, and build about
another 600 in addition. Now, I know Areva is building the EPR,
which is about a 1,600-megawatt electric plant. But the
ballpark figure is that you have to build one new 1,000-
megawatt electric plant, have it come on line every two weeks
between now and mid-century to have a further significant
reduction in greenhouse gases from nuclear power. It is a
very--it is not impossible to do but it is very challenging.
The last time we came close to that in the world was in the
early 1980s when France and Japan were building nuclear
reactors rapidly. So I just want to put that out there.
And in terms of subsidies, the question of, can we learn
from other countries' experience? As I mentioned, I have been
studying the French experience. Is the French model applicable
to us? Well, they have very central government control. The
French government owns Areva. They have a controlling stake in
Areva. They own Electricite de France. We don't have that kind
of situation in the United States. The French government was
able to offer a loan structure to allow France to build now
about 58 nuclear reactors that are now operating. We have 104
reactors operating, more than France, but in terms of
proportional use, the French are ahead of us, about 80 percent
to 20 percent. So the question is, does it make sense for us,
what are the opportunity costs for us in giving the nuclear
industry here in the United States, which is a relatively
mature industry, billions of dollars, maybe even hundreds of
billions of dollars, worth of loans to further stimulate
nuclear power expansion.
Mr. Baird. And my main point would be that that cost needs
to be factored into the per-kilowatt-hour, per-megawatt-hour
cost, the subsidy, as we say. One technology superior to
another on a cost perspective, there are a host of subsidies
that ought to factor in that.
Dr. Ferguson. You are right. We shouldn't be in the
business of picking winners and losers. Two years ago I
published a report that said that if you want to be supportive
of nuclear power, you need to get the carbon pricing right,
either through a carbon tax or cap and trade, set the right
price. Nuclear would be on an equal playing field with coal and
natural gas.
Ms. Price. If you take a look at the current price of
commodities in the market today, what you would see is that
nuclear with its subsidies and wind and solar with their
subsidies, and even with natural gas in the $3 to $4 range
where it has been in the $8 to $10 range, nuclear is straight
up competitive with natural gas, and if you put a carbon tax on
it, then it is more attractive and it is more attractive than
wind and solar including the subsidies that they currently have
today.
Mr. Baird. It is a grave shame that some of our colleagues
are not here to have heard those prior statements. I thank the
panelists.
Dr. Hanson. If I may, I would like to make one correction
to what my friend Charles said. The nuclear industry, to my
understanding, is not asking for billions of dollars of loans
from the government, they are asking for loan guarantees for
which they will pay, and so unless projects default, the net
cash flow will be to the government and not from the
government.
Mr. Baird. Coming from the state with WPPSS, I would be a
little bit cautious about that last statement.
Dr. Hanson. Yes, no doubt.
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Dr. Baird. As usual, very good
and thoughtful line of questioning.
Mr. Inglis is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Ferguson, that was music to my ears, and I agree with
Dr. Baird that I wish that a lot of our colleagues could have
heard some of that last little bit. If you change the--if you
internalize the externalities, negative externalities
associated with some of these fuels that are the incumbent
fuels, suddenly technology takes off and we start doing
exciting things as clean nuclear power with no emissions and it
is very, very exciting.
The MOX Process and on More Fast Reactors
Dr. Hanson, I think I am right about this, I am not sure,
so it is dangerous to ask a question if you don't know, but our
former colleague from Ohio used to tell me all the time--Dave
Hobson used to be critical of the MOX process, as I recall, and
can you tell me what the--his objection, as I recall, was that
what we are doing at Savannah River site, he says, he charges,
it is old technology, we should be moving on to the new
technology. I am wondering what your reaction to that is. Is he
right? Is he wrong?
Dr. Hanson. It would be very dangerous of me to try and
paraphrase Representative Hobson's position, but as I do
understand it, he was supportive of the concept of recycling.
He was not supportive of the MOX project in South Carolina for
a number of reasons. In particular, he was very skeptical of
the fact that the Russians would do their share which was to
demilitarize at the same pace that we were doing it, and as the
Russians slowed down, he became skeptical of the whole program.
However, we have very important nonproliferation concerns and
obligations under the NPT. We need to start destroying military
plutonium, and that facility is going to do it. I never heard
any criticism from him with regard to the technology. I did
hear a lot of criticism of the Department of Energy and its
seeming inability to control and bring projects to completion.
Mr. Inglis. Ms. Price, is that your understanding what Dave
Hobson's objection was, or do you remember?
Ms. Price. I am sorry. I don't know what his objections
were.
Mr. Inglis. What I heard him, Dr. Hanson, I think, is that
he didn't like the technology. He thought that it was old. Is
that--anybody want to comment about whether it is old or is in
fact----
Dr. Hanson. It is not old, it is state-of-the-art and I
never heard him make that comment.
Dr. Peters. But I would say that, back to what the Russians
are doing, so what the Russians have considered doing is
actually taking care of the plutonium in a fast reactor as
opposed to going to MOX and thermal recycle. And this gives me
an opportunity. The fast reactor discussion by the panel, I
encourage the Committee to look more deeply into fast reactor
experience because there is--it is extensive experience in the
United States and worldwide and there is currently
demonstration fast reactors being constructed in other
countries. So I wouldn't want to say that--it is not an
unproven technology. So I think it would behoove us to look at
that much more carefully before we just dismiss it as an
unproven technology. I think it needs to be developed further.
Mr. Inglis. A quick explanation of that technology. How
does that work?
Dr. Peters. Well, there are different ways of cooling it.
As opposing to being moderated by water, it is moderated by
perhaps liquid metal like liquid lead or liquid sodium, and the
difference is how fast the neutrons travel inside the core. So
instead of building up a lot of isotopes higher than uranium,
you can actually configure the core such that you can burn it
down. So it is slow neutrons versus fast neutrons. So in the
case of a fast reactor, you can use it to actually burn down
material and also perhaps breed material.
Mr. Inglis. Got you.
Ms. Price. One point I would like to add to that in the
context of whether there is better technology than MOX for
addressing plutonium, if you do bring the plutonium and if you
do use the plutonium in a MOX context, you still end up with
spent nuclear fuel on the back end that you actually have to
then turn around and handle. If you burn it in a fast reactor,
you are actually consuming the plutonium and so that is the
basis. I would assume that he would say look, there are
technologies that can more completely consume it and reduce the
waste that you have to deal with on the back end.
Mr. Inglis. Dr. Ferguson.
Dr. Ferguson. I have been to Japan. I was there a couple of
years ago, visited Monju, their fast reactor site. They had an
accident on the secondary, sort of the non-nuclear side of
their fast reactor. They used liquid sodium for the coolant,
and the property of sodium--remember your high school chemistry
class where you take some sodium and you strip it and you put
it in some water and what happens? It goes like crazy. It
catches on fire. So they had a sodium fire at that facility and
the Japanese are being very cautious in bringing that facility
back up again. They have had some public opposition about that
fast reactor. They are trying to educate the public about
trying to re-operate that reactor, so that is Japan's
experience. I mentioned France's experience earlier to Mr.
Hall. But it is a mixed record. I think, you know, Dr. Peters
is making a good point here. We need to take a fresh look at
fast reactor technology, and Ms. Price also makes a good point.
It can offer some significant benefits if it is economically
effective, if we can handle some of the safety problems we have
had in the past with some of these reactors.
Mr. Inglis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Closing
Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Inglis. And once again, let
me thank the panel for a very thought-provoking discussion and
helping to raise our understanding of these issues. We want to
continue this dialogue. We thank you for that. The record will
remain open for two weeks for additional statements from
Members and for answers to any follow-up questions the
Committee may ask of the witnesses.
The witnesses are excused.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Additional Material for the Record