[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
FISCAL YEAR 2010 NASA BUDGET
REQUEST AND RELATED ISSUES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 18, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-37
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
DAVID WU, Oregon LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
PAUL D. TONKO, New York BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JIM MATHESON, Utah BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE OLSON, Texas
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
VACANCY
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona, Chair
DAVID WU, Oregon PETE OLSON, Texas
DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio Wisconsin
PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
BARON P. HILL, Indiana MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director
PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member
ALLEN LI Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member
ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member
DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
June 18, 2009
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Gabrielle Giffords, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 16
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 17
Witnesses:
Mr. John C. Marshall, Member, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP)
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 19
Biography.................................................... 23
Dr. Kenneth M. Ford, Chair, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Advisory Council (NAC)
Oral Statement............................................... 24
Written Statement............................................ 25
Biography.................................................... 30
Mr. Robert M. Hanisee, Chair, Audit and Finance Committee, NASA
Advisory Council (NAC)
Oral Statement............................................... 31
Written Statement............................................ 33
Biography.................................................... 37
Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, Chair, National Academies' Aeronautics
and Space Engineering Board (ASEB)
Oral Statement............................................... 38
Written Statement............................................ 39
Biography.................................................... 41
Dr. Berrien Moore III, Member, National Academies' Space Studies
Board (SSB)
Oral Statement............................................... 42
Written Statement............................................ 43
Mr. J.P. Stevens, Vice President for Space Systems, Aerospace
Industries Association (AIA)
Oral Statement............................................... 57
Written Statement............................................ 58
Biography.................................................... 62
Discussion....................................................... 62
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. John C. Marshall, Member, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP)......................................................... 68
Dr. Kenneth M. Ford, Chair, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Advisory Council (NAC).......................... 75
Mr. Robert M. Hanisee, Chair, Audit and Finance Committee, NASA
Advisory Council (NAC)......................................... 83
Dr. Berrien Moore III, Member, National Academies' Space Studies
Board (SSB).................................................... 90
Mr. J.P. Stevens, Vice President for Space Systems, Aerospace
Industries Association (AIA)................................... 97
EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE FISCAL YEAR 2010 NASA BUDGET REQUEST AND
RELATED ISSUES
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Giffords
[Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
External Perspectives on the
Fiscal Year 2010 NASA Budget
Report and Related Issues
thursday, june 18, 2009
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
On Thursday, June 18, 2009 at 10:00 a.m., the Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics will hear from advisory and other stakeholder bodies on
issues relevant to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA).
Witnesses:
Mr. John C. Marshall, Member, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP)
Dr. Kenneth M. Ford, Chair, NASA Advisory Council (NAC)
Mr. Robert M. Hanisee, Chair, Audit and Finance Committee, NASA
Advisory Council (NAC)
Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, Chair, National Academies' Aeronautics and
Space Engineering Board (ASEB)
Dr. Berrien Moore III, Member, National Academies' Space Studies Board
(SSB)
Mr. J.P. Stevens, Vice President for Space Systems, Aerospace
Industries Association (AIA)
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Overview
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which was
established in 1958, is the Nation's primary civil space and
aeronautics R&D agency. The projected civil service workforce for FY09
is 17,900 employees. NASA has ten field Centers, including the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), a Federally Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC). NASA conducts research and development
activities in a wide range of disciplines including aeronautics,
astrophysics, heliophysics, planetary science, Earth science and
applications, microgravity research, and long-term technology
development. NASA also operates a fleet of three Space Shuttles and is
assembling and operating the International Space Station (ISS). NASA is
undertaking an exploration initiative with the goals of developing a
new human space transportation system for both low-Earth orbit and for
missions beyond low-Earth orbit, returning American astronauts to the
Moon by 2020, and carrying out a broad program of human and robotic
exploration of the solar system. NASA also maintains a space
communications network that supports both NASA missions and other
federal agency requirements. As of 2007, the most recent date for which
complete data are available, about 82 percent of NASA's budget was for
contracted work. In addition, a number of NASA's scientific and human
space flight activities involve collaboration with international
participants.
The Committee held a hearing on May 19, 2009 at which time the NASA
Acting Administrator, Mr. Christopher Scolese, presented NASA's FY 2010
budget request. Witnesses at today's hearing have been asked to
identify the top priorities and issues that the Committee on Science
and Technology should consider in upcoming multi-year NASA
authorization legislation and any other matters they believe merit
attention.
Budgetary Information
To put the FY10 budget request into context, NASA has been tasked
with flying the Shuttle safely until the end of the decade and then
retiring the Shuttle fleet; completing assembly of, operating, and
utilizing the International Space Station; completing the development
of a new Crew Exploration Vehicle/Crew Launch Vehicle by 2015;
returning American astronauts to the Moon by 2020; and conducting a
variety of challenging science and aeronautics programs. The NASA
Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L. 110-422] authorized an FY09 funding
level for NASA of $20.21 billion; the FY09 NASA budget request was
$17.61 billion and the appropriation for FY09 was $17.78 billion. In
addition, The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act [P.L. 111-5]
included $1 billion for NASA's Earth science, aeronautics, exploration
programs, cross-agency support, and Inspector General. Recovery Act
funds are to be expended by September 30, 2010. P.L. 110-422 is a one-
year authorization for NASA; the Science and Technology Committee is
planning to move a multi-year reauthorization of NASA later this year.
President's FY 2010 Request
NASA's proposed budget for FY10 is $18.7 billion, an increase of
5.1 percent over the enacted FY09 appropriation for NASA. The FY10
budget projection for NASA beyond FY10 is essentially flat through
FY13. Attachment 1 summarizes the FY10 budget request and its five-year
funding plan.
Attachment 2 compares the NASA budget plan that accompanied the
Vision for Space Exploration introduced by President Bush in 2004 with
the actual funds requested for NASA. As can be seen, previous budget
requests for NASA have been significantly less (i.e., typically on the
order of a half-billion dollars or more in the early years) than what
was projected as being needed to carry out the Exploration initiative
and NASA's other core missions. The cumulative shortfall over that
period is in excess of $4 billion. The additional funding provided in
the FY09 appropriation and the FY10 budget request help to redress that
shortfall. However the FY10 budget request does not project growth for
the NASA budget beyond FY10, and the disparity between the 2004 budget
projections for FY 2011-2014 that the Agency was planning against and
the budgets that are now being proposed through FY14 is shown in the
chart. In addition, the impact of the budgetary shortfalls since 2004
has been exacerbated by the requirement to absorb the cost of the
Shuttle's return-to-flight following the Columbia accident, the
additional cost associated with the under budgeting of Shuttle
transition and retirement that occurred in the FY05 budget plan, and
the under budgeting of ISS program support that also occurred in the
FY05 budget plan, which NASA indicates resulted in an unfunded lien
against the Agency's budgets of about $6.5 billion through FY10.
House Appropriations Committee's Approval of CJS Subcommittee
Recommendations
The Commerce, Justice, and Science (CJS) Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee held a markup of their fiscal year 2010
appropriations bill on June 4, 2009. The Subcommittee's funding
recommendations for NASA in the bill were as follows:
In terms of differences with the President's request, the markup
establishes a higher level of funding for Education and a new line item
for Construction and environmental compliance. Exploration was
recommended at a funding level approximately $670 million less than
requested (16.9 percent). In total, the markup is about $483 million
(2.6 percent) less than the FY10 request, but 2.4 percent higher than
the level enacted for FY09. The Chairman of the Commerce, Justice and
Science Subcommittee said in his statement releasing the Subcommittee's
FY10 recommendations:
``For NASA, the bill provides a total of $18.2 billion, an
increase of $421 million over last year's level. Investments
have been made in Earth science to further the decadal surveys.
The recommendation, however, acknowledges that the
Administration has established a blue ribbon panel, led by Dr.
Norm Augustine, to review the current vision for human space
flight. Funds are provided in the bill to continue investments
in human space flight at the same level as provided in fiscal
year 2009. Reductions from the budget request should not be
viewed as a diminution of my support or that of the
Subcommittee in NASA's human space flight activities. Rather,
the deferral is taken without prejudice; it is a pause, a time-
out, to allow the President to establish his vision for human
space exploration and to commit to realistic future funding
levels to realize this vision.
The Subcommittee looks forward to receiving the findings of
Dr. Augustine's panel and the recommendation of the
Administration on the way forward. I do believe, however, in
order to avoid continuing cost increases and further delays in
the initial operating capability of our nation's next
generation of human space flight architecture to follow the
Shuttle's successful and impressive run, it is imperative that
the Administration and Congress provide the necessary resources
to meet that policy directive--in the annual President's budget
and the annual Congressional budget process. When President
Kennedy said we would put a man on the moon, the Nation
followed--in spirit and with the resources to get the job done.
We collectively should do no differently today.''
The House Appropriations Committee approved the FY 2010 Commerce,
Justice and Science appropriations bill by voice vote with no changes
on June 9, 2009. A floor vote is scheduled for June 17, 2009.
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Since it was established in 1968 by Congress, the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (ASAP) has been evaluating NASA's safety performance and
advising the Agency on ways to improve that performance. The Panel,
which is a FACA-chartered advisory body, consists of a maximum of nine
members who are appointed by the NASA Administrator and is comprised of
recognized safety, management, and engineering experts from industry,
academia, and other government agencies.
The ASAP is a senior advisory committee that reports to the NASA
Administrator and Congress. The Panel was established by Congress in
the aftermath of the January 1967 Apollo 204 spacecraft fire. The
Panel's statutory duties, as prescribed in Section 6 of the NASA
Authorization Act of 1968, Public Law 90-67, 42 U.S.C. 2477 are as
follows:
``The Panel shall review safety studies and operations plans
that are referred to it and shall make reports thereon, shall
advise the Administrator with respect to the hazards of
proposed operations and with respect to the adequacy of
proposed or existing safety standards, and shall perform such
other duties as the Administrator may request.''
The Panel was reauthorized in Section 106, Safety Management,
Section 6, of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Authorization Act of 2005, [P.L. 109-155].
The ASAP bases its advice on direct observation of NASA operations
and decision-making. The Panel provides a report on an annual basis. In
addition to examining NASA's management and culture related to safety,
the report also examines NASA's compliance with the recommendations of
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). The former NASA
Administrator, Dr. Michael Griffin, also requested advice from the ASAP
on technical authority, workforce and risk management practices.
ASAP 2008 Annual Report
The transmittal letter accompanying the 2008 Annual Report issued
on April 15, 2009 stated that ``ASAP members believe that NASA and the
new Administration stand at a critical crossroads for the Nation.
Consequently, the ASAP decided to provide this brief, to-the-point
letter report in lieu of the normal lengthier annual report issued by
the Panel.'' While indicating that on balance, 2008 was a good year for
NASA and that the ASAP is optimistic about the future of the Agency and
its mission based on NASA's accomplishments in 2008, the Panel also
recognized that ``this is a crucial time for NASA, the new Obama
Administration, and the country. Important decisions lie ahead.''
Issues the Panel identified in the report as critical were:
Proposed extension of the Space Shuttle Program. The
ASAP said in its report: ``To maximize safety, minimize wasted
effort, and bolster employee morale, any further debate
regarding the future of the Shuttle should be undertaken
immediately and completed without further delay. From a safety
standpoint, the ASAP strongly endorses the NASA position on not
extending Shuttle operations beyond successful execution of the
December 2008 manifest, completing the ISS. Continuing to fly
the Shuttle not only would increase the risk to crews, but also
could jeopardize the future U.S. Exploration program by
squeezing available resources (and, in the worst case, support)
for the Constellation program.''
Acceleration of the Constellation Program. The ASAP
in its report that it ``is not convinced that the Ares I and
Orion initial operating capability (IOC) date can be improved
appreciably by additional resources.''
Use of commercial transportation sources. The report
stated that ``There is no evidence that Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) vehicles will be completed in
time to minimize the gap.''
Safety and reliability of Soyuz. At its 2008 Second
Quarterly meeting, the Panel expressed concern about the
``safety issues surrounding the Soyuz capsule and its
associated recovery module'' following re-entry difficulties
experienced by the Russian spacecraft. Although the ASAP said
in its annual report that it continues to be concerned about
the safety of the Russian Soyuz vehicle, the report also said
that the Panel ``is satisfied that NASA is aware of and
addressing the potential limitations involved in relying on
Soyuz during the gap between Shuttle retirement and
Constellation IOC.''
Direction of Exploration. The Panel suggested
``stability of policy and technical goals as particularly
crucial for complex, expensive, safe, long-term programs and
for cost-efficient, cost-effective, and safe mission plans and
workers.'' But the Panel also endorsed the standard management
and engineering practice of ``periodically reviewing
architecture and program plans (including design assumptions,
new developments, changing requirements, emerging technologies,
and their impact on decisions). Such reviews are particularly
useful for programs such as Constellation that extend over many
years and are subject to external reassessments of fundamental
goals.''
Safety hardwired into Constellation. The Panel's
report said that ``NASA has an important one-time opportunity
to better interweave safety as a consistent and more powerful
operating parameter by hardwiring safety into the fabric and
procedures of the new flagship exploration program,
Constellation. Accordingly, NASA should institutionalize safety
programs, systems, processes, and reporting.''
Upgrading of NASA facilities and equipment. The
report said that: ``During repeated visits to NASA Centers and
Headquarters to hold quarterly and insight meetings, the ASAP
has noted that deferred maintenance, modification, and
upgrading of basic NASA infrastructure deserve higher
priority.''
Funding consistent with tasks and schedules. The ASAP
said in its report that it ``cannot overemphasize the high-
priority need for Congress and the Administration to understand
the impact on NASA of the interrelationship among cost,
schedule, and risk (which is ignored only at great risk to
safety).''
Suitability of agency management approaches. The
Panel made observations on the governance structure, noting
positive evolution of the ``new strategic management and
governance model at Headquarters and at the NASA Centers'' and
a ``new management emphasis on institutional requirements for
safety, engineering, facilities, and personnel in the planning
process.'' However, the Panel expressed concern about the
substance, application, and standardization of Human-Rating
Requirements (HRR) across the Agency. The report said that
``The new HRR standards move from validating compliance with
mandatory failure tolerance requirements to an approach of
designing to acceptable risk, but without any apparent clear
and visible criteria for estimating ``how safe is safe enough''
for various mission categories.''
Workforce Development and Sustainment. The Panel said
that it supports ``continued attention to workforce planning,
development, and sustainment to ensure that technically
qualified personnel are available for NASA and its contractors
so that these people can identify, manage, and control the
complex safety risks of NASA programs.''
NASA culture that values the experience of safety and
mission assurance. While stating it was impressed with recent
developments in NASA's safety culture evolution over the years,
the Panel encouraged NASA to perform ``periodic internal and
external measurements based on meaningful metrics.''
Technical Standards Program focused on safety and
risks. The Panel stated that ``More robust technical
performance standards are necessary to fill the void created by
cancellation in the 1990s of numerous military standards and
specifications.'' Relative to the promulgation of lessons
learned, the panel stated that ``NASA should improve its
documentation and distribution system to capture and share
lessons learned with all NASA Centers, mission directorates at
NASA Headquarters, and, when appropriate, the private sector.''
CAIB Recommendations. As mandated by the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005, the ASAP is responsible for
evaluating and reporting annually on NASA compliance with CAIB
return-to-flight and continue-to-fly recommendations. The Panel
said in its report that it ``is pleased with NASA's overall
response'' and acknowledged that the Panel ``knows that the
remaining three CAIB recommendations cannot be completely
eliminated without major redesign. The Panel thus recommends
that NASA use its formal risk acceptance process to make a
decision on how to close out the remaining actions.''
Astronaut Health. The Panel said that it had ``made a
commitment to monitor the NASA Astronaut Health Care Systems
Review and is satisfied with NASA's progress in responding to
associated report recommendations.'' The Panel noted that since
its June 2007 report, NASA had undertaken several actions such
as incorporating psychological evaluations as part of the
future astronaut selection process.
In addition to its annual report, the Panel also submits Minutes
with recommendations resulting from its quarterly meetings. For
example, the Panel recommended, following its fourth quarter of 2008
meeting, that ``NASA obtain greater validation that the new Human-
Rating Requirements Standard meets the safety requirements of a broad
range of future human space flight programs by scheduling an external
review by an independent ``gray-beard'' assessment panel.''
NASA Advisory Council
NASA has had a long tradition of turning to knowledgeable experts
for advice and guidance on major program and policy issues facing the
agency. This tradition originated with NASA's predecessor organization,
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). With the
creation of NASA in 1958, the NACA was abolished, but the tradition of
turning to non-government sources for independent judgment and guidance
survived. NASA established the NASA Advisory Council (NAC) to assist it
with planning for its new and continuing responsibilities in
aeronautics, space technology, space science and applications, and
human space flight.
Today, the NAC, comprised of senior-level individuals from the
private sector (e.g., academia, business, and retired government
personnel), meets regularly to offer the NASA Administrator broad
perspectives on agency program issues that the Administrator might not
otherwise receive. The NAC consists of six committees, each chaired and
populated exclusively by Council members. The six committees are:
Aeronautics Committee
Audit and Finance Committee
Exploration Committee
Human Capital Committee
Science Committee
Space Operations Committee
The NAC is composed of members appointed by the NASA Administrator;
these members serve at the pleasure of the Administrator. The Council
consists of approximately 25 to 35 members, renewable at the discretion
of the NASA Administrator. Additionally, the National Academies' Chairs
of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board and the Space Studies
Board sit on the Council as ex-officio members.
The Council is considered ``internal'' in that it is chartered by
NASA, its members are chosen by the Agency, and it provides advice and
counsel directly to the NASA Administrator. The Council operates under
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) which allows access to
government decision-making processes, among other objectives. FACA sets
requirements for government-established groups that provide advice to
the government and that include non-government employees.
Recent NAC Recommendations and Concerns
The NASA Advisory Council (NAC) meets on a quarterly basis and
submits recommendations to the NASA Administrator shortly thereafter.
The Council also conducts fact-finding meetings at different NASA
facilities. Following its April 16, 2009 meeting, the Council made
eight recommendations to NASA that the Council believed would be of
assistance to NASA as the Agency continues its implementation of its
space exploration mission. The recommendations were:
Infusing new talent and knowledge into the NASA
workforce. The Council said that ``continued leadership in
space science and exploration requires the constant infusion of
new ideas and state-of-the-art knowledge provided by a vibrant
and creative workforce. Therefore, NASA is encouraged to pursue
avenues that will facilitate new hiring, particularly at the
entry-level.''
Assessing how NASA TV could be more effective and
what is required to accomplish that goal. The Council stated
that ``The outcome of this study should include recommendations
for the level and type of resources required to most
effectively engage the public and disseminate NASA content.''
Teaching and applying lessons learned to NASA's Human
Space Flight employees. The Council said that ``To effectively
transfer hard-won ``lessons learned'' to its human space flight
work force, NASA is encouraged to institute recurring training
for the workforce using a curriculum based on existing Safety
and Mission Assurance materials. The training program should
include lessons learned from the Apollo, Skylab, Mir, Shuttle,
and ISS accidents, incidents, and close calls.''
Documenting and Teaching of Human Space Flight
Lessons Learned. The Council recommended that ``A portion of
the NASA training program should focus on lessons learned from
the human space flight missions in order to retain historical
knowledge, as many older employees will be retiring. NASA
should document specific major operational lessons learned from
human space flight programs. These lessons learned should be
written/presented in a format to facilitate ease of training
for the next generation of space workers.''
Conducting a cost-benefit study of possible active
methods for orbital debris removal. The Council encouraged NASA
``to conduct an in-house study of the current and projected
orbital debris situation in order to evaluate the costs and
benefits of developing a form of debris removal technology. The
study should compare the costs of operating in the ever-
expanding debris population with those of developing a
selective debris removal method, and how those compare with
long-term savings from actively reducing the threat of future
collisions.''
Forming an Exoplanet Exploration Program Analysis
Group under the NAC's Astrophysics Subcommittee. NASA was
encouraged to form such a group to conduct analyses at the
request of the NAC's Science Committee, the NAC's Astrophysics
Subcommittee, and NASA's Science Mission Directorate.
Developing a process for identifying non-science
requirements and funding for Earth observations. The Council
encouraged NASA ``to work with OSTP and other agencies at the
highest levels to define responsibilities and secure funding
for Earth observations beyond those recommended by the NRC
Decadal Survey to advance Earth System Science.''
Conducting an independent study of space
communications--requirements, capabilities, and architecture.
The Council encouraged NASA ``to contract for an independent
study of space communications needs for science, exploration,
and space operations. The report resulting from this study
should include findings and recommendations that will assist
NASA in planning a communications architecture that will enable
the successful conduct of missions planned or conceivable
through 2030. This study should result in recommendations that
will assist NASA in development of more detailed, quantifiable
requirements.''
Prior year recommendations from the NAC dealt with diverse issues,
ranging from NASA's need to convene a workshop to provide external
community input to the Agency's formulation of the system-level program
on Environmentally Responsible Aviation (recently unveiled as part of
the FY 2010 budget request) to communicating lessons learned on large
mission cost drivers to decadal survey committees. On that last
recommendation, the Council was particularly concerned that ``in the
last round of NRC decadal surveys, some high priority mission(s) ranked
on the basis of an initial cost estimate turned out to be two to four
times as expensive to develop. This leads to questions of whether those
same rankings would have been assigned had more realistic cost
estimates been available, and whether some different mix of missions
might have been recommended to achieve the optimal science return
within available funding constraints.'' The Council concluded that
``the NRC decadal survey committees need to understand how early
choices in mission concept design lead to cost growth so they can
structure their recommendations to be more robust over time.''
The National Academies
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is a private, not-for-profit
society of elected scholars in the areas of scientific and engineering
research. The Academy is committed to science and technology research
and its application to society. The NAS was chartered by Congress in
1861 to ``advise the Federal Government on scientific and technical
matters.''
In 1964, the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), a body of
renown engineers who are elected to be members, was established under
the charter of the NAS, and shares the work with the NAS in advising
the Federal Government. In addition, the NAS, in 1970, established the
Institute of Medicine (IOM), which is a body of elected, distinguished
experts in medicine, health and health policy, to advise the government
and ``upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care,
research, and education.'' In 1916, the NAS organized the National
Research Council (NRC), ``to associate the broad community of science
and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and
advising the Federal Government.'' ``. . . the Council has become the
principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and
the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the
government, the public, and the scientific and engineering
communities.'' The NAS, NAE, IOM, and NRC are collectively referred to
as The National Academies. A primary function of the National Academies
is to convene ``committees of experts in all areas of scientific and
technological endeavor. These experts serve pro bono to address
critical national issues and to give advice to the Federal Government
and the public.''
The NRC is organized into thematic discipline areas. Within the
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, the Space Studies Board
(SSB) and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) oversee
ad-hoc committees of experts that prepare reports and provide other
information on research, technical and policy areas related to space
and aeronautics, and provide advice to the Federal Government in these
areas. The Federal Government funds approximately 85 percent of the
work of the NRC through individual contracts and grants, according to
the National Academies. Individuals representing the SSB and ASEB will
testify at the hearing.
Space Studies Board
The Space Studies Board (SSB) was established in 1958 and consists
of members from academia, private industry, and not-for-profit
organizations with expertise in space science, policy, engineering, and
other related fields. The Board ``oversees advisory studies and program
assessments, facilitates international research coordination, and
promotes communications on space science and science policy between the
research community, the Federal Government, and the interested
public.'' Among its consensus-based studies are the SSB-led ``decadal
surveys'' which provide recommendations, with extensive input from the
interested community, on priority missions and research activities to
be pursued in the areas of planetary science, solar and space physics,
and Earth science and other research objectives. The SSB is also the
U.S. national committee to the Committee on Space Research of the
International Council of Science, a multi-disciplinary scientific
entity that promotes the international exchange of scientific results,
information, and discussion on scientific research in space.
The Board is currently undertaking the following activities:
A decadal survey on biological and physical sciences
in space, in cooperation with the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board;
A planetary science decadal survey;
NASA's suborbital research capabilities;
Astro2010 astronomy and astrophysics decadal survey,
in cooperation with the Board on Physics and Astronomy;
A review of near-Earth object surveys and hazard
mitigation strategies, in cooperation with the Aeronautics and
Space Engineering Board;
Development of a workshop report on future
international space cooperation and competition in a
globalizing world;
A study of the role and scope of mission-enabling
activities in NASA's space and Earth science missions; and
A study on the rationale and goals of the U.S. civil
space program, in cooperation with the Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board.
Recently published SSB reports include:
An Assessment of Planetary Protection Requirements
for Mars Sample Return Missions
NASA requested that the NRC review the findings of an
earlier report on planetary protection for a Mars Sample Return
mission and to update the recommendations in light of
scientific understanding of Mars and advances in relevant
technologies.
A Performance Assessment of NASA's Heliophysics
Program
The 2005 NASA Authorization Act directed NASA to arrange for
the National Academies to review the performance of each of the
NASA Science Mission Directorate divisions every five years.
This Assessment of NASA's Heliophysics Program reviewed the
extent to which NASA's heliophysics division aligned with
previous NRC advice, especially the decadal survey report, The
Sun to the Earth--and Beyond: A Decadal Research Strategy in
Solar and Space Physics.
The report noted that ``Unfortunately, very little of the
recommended NASA program priorities from the decadal survey's
Integrated Research Strategy will be realized during the period
(2004-2013) covered by the survey. Mission cost growth,
reordering of survey mission priorities, and unrealized budget
assumptions have delayed or deferred nearly all of the NASA
spacecraft missions recommended in the survey. As a result, the
status of the Integrated Research Strategy going forward is in
jeopardy, and the loss of synergistic capabilities in space
will constitute a serious impediment to future progress.''
Severe Space Weather Events: Understanding Societal
and Economic Impacts Workshop Report
The report summarized a public workshop held in May 2008
that included presentations and discussions on the ``Nation's
current and future ability to manage the effects of space
weather events and their societal and economic impacts.''
Launching Science: Science Opportunities Provided by
NASA's Constellation System
The report was requested by NASA. The executive summary
notes: ``The committee was impressed with the scientific
potential of the many proposals that it evaluated. However, the
committee notes that the Constellation System has been
justified by NASA and selected in order to enable human
exploration beyond low-Earth orbit--not to enable science
missions. Virtually all of the science mission concepts that
could take advantage of Constellation's unique capabilities are
likely to be prohibitively expensive.''
Ensuring the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-
R Spacecraft: Elements of a Strategy to Recover Measurement
Capabilities Lost in Program Restructuring
The study was requested by NASA and NOAA to ``prioritize
capabilities, especially those related to climate research,
that were lost or placed at risk following recent changes to
NPOESS and the GOES-R series of polar and geostationary
environmental monitoring satellites.''
United States Civil Space Policy: Summary of a
Workshop
The workshop participants considered the goals, purposes and
priorities of U.S. civil space including ``key changes and
developments since 2003; how space exploration fits in a
broader national and international context; sustainability
factors, including affordability, public interest, and
political will; definitions, metrics, and decision criteria for
program portfolio mix and balance; roles of government in Earth
observations from space; and requirements and gaps in
capabilities and infrastructure.''
Opening New Frontiers in Space: Choices for the Next
New Frontiers Announcement of Opportunity
NASA requested that the NRC conduct a study ``to provide
criteria and guiding principles for determining the list of
candidate missions'' for the next competition for a New
Frontiers mission. The New Frontiers Program to compete
principal-investigator-led science missions to explore the
solar system with a cost cap of $750 million, according to the
report.
Space Science and the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations: Summary of a Workshop
NASA requested that the NRC ``organize a workshop on the
implications of ITAR for space science. The purpose of the
workshop was to reopen a discussion among State Department
regulators and policy-makers, academic researchers and faculty,
ITAR officials, NASA officials, and other interested parties to
explore concerns about ITAR's effects on space science
activities.''
The NRC summarized the workshop presentations and
discussions in a report. The workshop summary noted that ``Over
the long-term . . . many believe that a clean-slate approach is
needed to fix the fundamental disconnect between ITAR as it is
being applied to space science research and the needs of the
U.S. space science community as it endeavors to maintain world
leadership. The United States has many space-related policy
priorities in addition to national security, including space
leadership, university excellence, and international
partnerships. As emphasized at the workshop, all these national
goals need to be considered jointly in the development of a
system for controlling the export of space-related hardware and
technology that is effective at protecting national security,
but that does not inadvertently harm the other policy
priorities.''
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
Established in 1967, the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
(ASEB) is comprised of individuals from academia, private industry, and
not-for-profit organizations with expertise in aeronautics, aviation,
space systems and engineering, and policy. The ASEB ``oversees ad hoc
committees that recommend priorities and procedures for achieving
aerospace engineering objectives, and offers a way to bring engineering
and other related expertise to bear on aerospace issues of national
importance.''
The ASEB is currently undertaking the following activities:
A decadal survey on biological and physical sciences
in space, in cooperation with the Space Studies Board;
A review of Near-Earth Object Surveys and Hazard
Mitigation Strategies, in cooperation with the Space Studies
Board;
A study on the rationale and goals of the U.S. civil
space program, in cooperation with the Space Studies Board;
An independent assessment of NASA's National Aviation
Operations Monitoring Service (NAOMS) Project; and
A review of the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts.
Recently published ASEB reports include:
Radioisotope Power Systems: An Imperative for
Maintaining U.S. Leadership in Space Exploration
The study was conducted in response to House Report 110-240
of the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies
Appropriations Bill, 2008 and assessed NASA's program in
radioisotope power systems technology and its ability to meet
NASA's near-term and future mission needs and plans.
According to the report, ``Re-establishing domestic
production of 238Pu will be expensive (the cost will
likely exceed $150 million). Previous proposals to make this
investment have not been enacted, and cost seems to be the
major impediment. However, regardless of why these proposals
have been rejected, the day of reckoning has arrived. NASA is
already making mission-limiting decisions based on the short
supply of 238Pu.''
A Constrained Space Exploration Technology Program: A
Review of NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program
In response to Congressional direction in the report of the
Science, State, Justice, and Commerce fiscal year 2007
appropriations, NASA arranged for an NRC assessment of NASA's
Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) ``to
determine how well the program is aligned with the stated
objectives of the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), identify
gaps, and assess the quality of the research.'' Although the
bill did not become law, NASA proceeded with the request for
the study.
As noted in the executive summary, ``A fundamental concern .
. . is that the ETDP is currently focused on the short-term
challenges of the VSE and is addressing the near-term
technologies needed to meet these challenges. Although it is
clear that much of this focus results from the constraints on
the program, the committee is concerned that the short-term
approach characteristic of the current ETDP will have long-term
consequences and result in compromised long-term decisions.
Extensibility to longer lunar missions and to human exploration
of Mars is at risk in the current research portfolio.''
NASA Aeronautics Research: An Assessment
NASA requested the study in response to the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005, which directed that NASA arrange for
an NRC assessment of the NASA aeronautics research portfolio in
the context of the recommendations of the NRC Decadal Survey of
Civil Aeronautics, NASA's aeronautics research requirements,
and the ability of the Nation's research workforce and
facilities to address the priority research challenges and
requirements for civil aeronautics.
Managing Space Radiation Risk in the New Era of Space
Exploration
NASA requested that the NRC ``evaluate the radiation
shielding requirements for lunar missions and to recommend a
strategic plan for developing the radiation mitigation
capabilities needed to enable the planned lunar mission
architecture.''
As noted in the executive summary of the report, ``The
committee finds that the lack of knowledge about the biological
effects of and responses to space radiation is the single most
important factor limiting the prediction of radiation risk
associated with human space exploration.''
Assessing the Research and Development Plan for the
Next Generation Air Transportation System: A Workshop
Upon request by the Federal Aviation Administration's Joint
Planning and Development Office (JPDO), the National Academies
held a workshop ``to gather observations on the research and
development aspects of the baseline Integrated Work Plan for
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) being
prepared by JPDO . . ..''
Wake Turbulence: An Obstacle to Increased Air Traffic
Capacity
The study was conducted pursuant to direction in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2005 [P.L. 109-155] for NASA to enter into
an arrangement with the NRC to assess the issue of wake vortex
hazard, which has the potential to affect air traffic capacity.
The authoring committee of the report found ``that the wake
vortex problem does present a real impediment to increased
traffic capacity, something reflected in most of the
documentation that has been drafted to date by the JPDO [Joint
Planning and Development Office] . . .. However, although the
need to address wake vortex issues is clearly acknowledged, the
research required to provide the required solutions is not yet
underway.''
Aerospace Industries Association
The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), founded in 1919 as the
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, represents about 300 aerospace
manufacturing companies and suppliers across all segments of the
industry, including commercial aviation and avionics, manned and
unmanned defense systems, space technologies, and satellite
communications, and the 657,000 skilled workers who develop and
manufacture aerospace and aviation systems.
Over the last year, AIA has provided witness testimony on such
topics and issues as NextGen air transportation initiative, export
controls, NASA and NOAA programs, and STEM education and the aerospace
workforce to various House and Senate committees.
In January 2009, the AIA prepared a report, ``The Role of Space in
Addressing America's National Priorities'' to provide the new
administration and Congress with information on ``the major issues
facing our aerospace industry.'' The report recommended the development
of a national space strategy ``that links national policy with needs,
programs and resources'' and that coordinates space across national
security, civil and commercial domains.
In addition, the report provided the following recommendations
pertaining to civil and commercial space:
``Our space capabilities should be coordinated, at
the highest level, as a singular enterprise.''
``The Administration should provide and support a
national budget that reflects both robust and stable funding
across space functions to prevent disruptions to the planned
life cycle of critical, multi-year space programs.''
Workforce and the Economy
``The U.S. Government should work to create
opportunities for our current workforce, and make science and
education a national priority to ensure a strong future
workforce.''
``The Administration and Congress should work to
create a more favorable business environment for the U.S.
aerospace industry.''
Space Exploration
``Both the U.S. Space Exploration Policy and the
Constellation Program should be treated as national priorities
and given the funding and support needed to keep development on
its current schedule and to minimize the impending gap in U.S.
human space flight.''
``The International Space Station should be fully
utilized as a national laboratory.''
``The NASA science program should receive the funding
necessary to provide a wide suite of robotic missions and other
research.''
Earth Observation
``The U.S. Government should immediately address
existing and growing gaps in climate measurements and weather
satellite coverage.''
``The Administration should establish, fund and
implement a U.S. Earth Observation architecture as a national
priority.''
National Security Space (as it relates to civil and commercial areas)
``Space protection and space situational awareness
programs should become a funded national priority.''
``The U.S. Government should undergo a careful review
of critical space technologies to evaluate which technologies
should be controlled under the State Department ITAR process
and which are truly commercial and could be controlled under
the Commerce Department process. This review must be followed
with meaningful and careful legislation that would ensure the
right technologies are controlled the right way.''
Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee
The National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 2002 [P.L.
107-368] as amended, directed the National Science Foundation (NSF),
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the
Department of Energy (DOE) to establish the Astronomy and Astrophysics
Advisory Committee (AAAC) to
``assess, and make recommendations regarding, the coordination
of astronomy and astrophysics programs of the Foundation and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
Department of Energy'' and to
``assess, and make recommendations regarding, the status of
the activities of the Foundation and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, and the Department of Energy as they
relate to the recommendations contained in the National
Research Council's 2000 report, entitled ``Astronomy and
Astrophysics in the New Millennium'' and the recommendations
contained in subsequent National Research Council reports of a
similar nature.''
The AAAC is directed to submit a report every year to the NSF,
NASA, and DOE and to relevant Congressional committees. According to
its March 15, 2009 report, the AAAC found that interagency cooperation
among DOE, NASA, and NSF is strong at the scientist-to-scientist level,
the programmatic level, and among small and large projects and
facilities. The Committee also found that many of the high-priority
projects recommended in the 2000 National Academies Decadal Survey for
astronomy and astrophysics have not been implemented.
The Committee made the following recommendations in its March 15,
2009 report:
``In the interest of astronomical research, agencies
should be encouraged to continue coordinating activities where
the science or technology demands it, and furthermore, to map
out more clearly the scientific and technological
complementarities that might be the basis for future missions/
projects. We emphasize coordination, which may, but not
necessarily, take the form of joint projects. We emphasize
coordination, which may, but not necessarily, take the form of
joint projects. Taking advantage of unique skill sets amongst
agencies and throughout the world, coordinated access to
northern and southern hemispheres of the sky, ground and space
access--all important aspects of a vigorous science program.''
``Robust cost estimates, including full life cycle
costs and external analyses of the budgets, as well as
strategic planning for large facilities are a necessity, and
should be an integral part of any prioritization and
implementation process.''
``Assessment of the cooperation within projects
involving federal plus international and private partners is
now needed, in addition to that of inter-agency projects. Some
of these projects have started since the time the AAAC was
chartered.''
Attachment 1
Attachment 2
Chairwoman Giffords. Good morning. This hearing has now
come to order.
I would like to welcome our witnesses here this morning.
All of you have prepared very interesting testimony which is
going to be important to the Subcommittee Members, and we look
forward to hearing from you.
Because of time constraints, we are going to dispense with
our opening statements so that we can hear from you gentlemen.
We think that we are going to have votes probably around 10:30,
and we would like to get in your formal testimony before we go
to questions.
I would just like to do some quick introductions. We have
Mr. John Marshall who is testifying as the member of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel or the ASAP. We have Dr.
Kenneth Ford, the Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council. We
have Mr. Robert Hanisee who is the Chairman of the NASA Audit
and Finance Committee. Dr. Raymond Colladay, the Chairman of
the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, and Dr. Berrien
Moore who is testifying as a member of the Space Studies Board
of the National Academies. And finally, we have Mr. Stevens who
is Vice President of Space Systems at the Aerospace Industries
Association.
These are an incredible set of witnesses, very important
for the Congress as we are truly at a crossroads, our country,
in terms of NASA's future, and we are looking forward to
hearing from you.
I would like to turn it over to Mr. Olson for just a couple
of minutes. I am sorry, Mr. Hall.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Giffords follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Good morning. I'd like to welcome our witnesses to this morning's
hearing. You all have prepared very informative testimony, and I look
forward to hearing from you. This is an important hearing for the
Subcommittee.
I think that the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel--the ASAP--which
is represented at today's hearing, summed up the situation quite
succinctly in its April 15th letter to Speaker Pelosi transmitting its
annual report, namely: ``. . . NASA and the new Administration stand at
a critical crossroads for the Nation.''
I agree with the ASAP. NASA is at a critical crossroads, and
decisions made by Congress and the White House this year will have an
impact on NASA for years to come--for better or worse--and we need to
ensure that they are for the better.
We are going to be making a number of those key decisions as we
develop our NASA reauthorization bill later this year. I want those
decisions to be as informed as possible. Last month, we got NASA's
perspective on its FY 2010 budget request as well as on other issues
facing the Agency when Acting Administrator Scolese testified before
the Science and Technology Committee.
Today we are continuing our oversight by hearing from the advisory
bodies who monitor the NASA's activities and programs, as well as from
one of the key organizations representing the aerospace industry.
I welcome your testimony because we need to know, from your unique
perspectives, what's going well at NASA, what's not going so well, and
what obstacles may lie ahead for the Agency if appropriate corrective
actions are not taken. We invited the ASAP to testify because it was
established by Congress more than four decades ago to help ensure that
NASA's programs and activities are carried out safely--and safety is a
paramount concern of this subcommittee. We also wanted to hear from the
NASA Advisory Council because it is NASA's main advisory body, whose
purview extends over all of the programmatic and institutional issues
facing NASA. Among its areas of focus have been NASA's financial
management practices, which is why we have also asked the Chair of the
NAC's Audit and Finance Committee to testify today.
Good financial management practices are going to be a key factor in
ensuring that NASA is a responsible steward of the taxpayers' dollars,
and this subcommittee needs to know how NASA is doing in that regard.
The National Academies' Space Studies Board and Aeronautics and
Space Engineering Board have long been important sources of advice and
analysis for both the Executive Branch and Congress on issues related
to NASA's R&D initiatives in science and engineering.
Finally, I wanted to ensure that industry's perspective was also
presented at today's hearing, and I can think of no better
representative than the Aerospace Industries Association. You thus are
a diverse group of witnesses, but you and the organizations that you
represent share a common thread of competence and commitment. I hope
that each of you will let your colleagues know how much we value their
efforts.
We recognize that the members of these advisory bodies have many
competing demands on their time, so their willingness to serve is
deeply appreciated by all of us on the Subcommittee. And I want to make
it a regular practice of this subcommittee to hear from the advisory
bodies represented before us today. We need your insights to enable us
to carry out our legislative and oversight responsibilities as
effectively as possible. With that, I again want to welcome each of you
to this morning's hearings, and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Hall. That is all right. I would rather be Mr. Olson.
He is about 40 years younger than I am.
Well, I thank you, and I will be brief because I know time
is important. And I think it should be normal that we listen to
them before they have to listen to us, but that is not the way
it works here. But we are going to get to do that today, and
you can thank this Chairwoman for that, a great panel. And if
there is ever a time when NASA and the Space Station and
everybody involved needs advice, we need an advisory group like
this. Work hard, advise Norm every chance you get on what he
winds up with the final paper.
But I will yield back my time. Thank you.
Chairwoman Giffords. As our witnesses know, you will each
have five minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written
testimony will be included into the record for the hearing, and
when you have completed your spoken testimony, we will begin
questions. Each Member will have five minutes to question the
panel, and we are going to begin with Mr. Hall. Mr. Marshall, I
am sorry. You are on my brain.
Mr. Hall. I am Hall.
Chairwoman Giffords. I know, and I love you.
Mr. Hall. Excuse me. She can only say that when her
husband, he is an astronaut, she can only say that when he is
orbiting.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN C. MARSHALL, MEMBER, AEROSPACE SAFETY
ADVISORY PANEL (ASAP)
Mr. Marshall. Chairwoman Giffords and other distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, good
morning. Thank you for inviting the ASAP to testify before your
subcommittee today.
Unfortunately our panel Chair, Vice Admiral Joe Dyer, was
unable to participate in this morning's meeting, and he asked
me and my colleague, Ken Ford, to represent the ASAP in his
place.
Today, you asked us to comment on six specific areas, and
so let me go right to those. The first was to identify top
priorities in upcoming multi-year NASA authorizations. Without
question from the ASAP's perspective, the top priority for this
agency is the need to have and maintain a stable and sufficient
budget that allows NASA to safely execute an integrated space
program. Safety can be an unintended victim of reduced spending
if we are not careful. That should not be allowed to happen to
this agency.
Next, an irrevocable decision regarding extending the Space
Shuttle Program needs to be made quickly. If the decision is
made to extend the Shuttle, then that decision must be
accompanied with necessary resources. Without additional budget
allocation, all the responsible parties must realize that such
an action will seriously constrain available resources for the
development of any follow-on program and will only shift and
may actually expand the gap in America's flight capabilities.
This clearly will expose NASA to the risk of another Shuttle
loss and may jeopardize the future of the U.S. Space
Exploration Program.
The next priority is to ensure that cost, schedule and the
required performances are properly in balance with each other.
The ASAP feels strongly that the imbalance of any of these key
elements will lead to substantial increase in risk.
You next asked us to identify critical issues facing NASA.
We believe that there must be a reaffirmation or redefinition
of a set course for the exploration mission. Hopefully, the
Augustine Blue Ribbon Panel will do much of this. Even without
a change, it is the ASAP conclusion that the recent budget cut
of over $500 million makes the current schedule for the
Exploration Program unexecutable.
Third, you asked us to discuss NASA's compliance with
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommendations.
As you know, when the Return to Flight Task Group completed its
work in 2005, it had determined that NASA had met the intent of
all but three recommendations. The ASAP is pleased with NASA's
overall response to the CAIB recommendation yet believes the
risk associated with the remaining issues cannot be completely
eliminated without major redesign of the Shuttle. Accordingly,
the ASAP recommends that NASA use its formal risk acceptance
process to make a decision on how to close out the remaining
actions.
The CAIB also recommended recertification of the Shuttle if
it is to fly beyond 2010. The ASAP concurs with the need for
recertification if a significant extension of the current
program is directed. This said, NASA has not yet developed an
action plan to accomplish this.
Next, you asked us to discuss NASA's incorporation of
safety and risk mitigation in its design of a new crewed
transportation system. The ASAP has reviewed Orion and Ares
developments thus far, and we agree that the issues that have
been identified to date are properly being addressed, issues
that have come up like vibration and potential tower strikes
have been or are being thoroughly investigated.
NASA's role in the Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services (COTS) program thus far has been to not directly levy
NASA-restricting requirements. While we endorse and support
investing in the COTS program, we believe at this juncture that
NASA needs to take a more aggressive role articulating human
rating requirements for the COTS program since many new
commercial vehicles are already under development. To do so at
a later date may pressure NASA into accepting a system for
expediency that is below its normal standard for safety.
You also asked us to discuss NASA's progress in instilling
safety into the agency. The ASAP believes that NASA has
continued to improve its awareness and development of a
positive safety culture. However, we also believe that more
attention is required in the following areas: implement a more
robust incident investigation process, develop a standardized
way to proactively measure the safety culture at each center,
and improve the current technical standards program to better
capture and apply hard-won lessons learned and best practices.
Finally, you asked us to discuss other matters that merit
attention. We the ASAP believe that the Administration,
Congress, and NASA all need to be transparent with the public
on risk communication, that losses may occur in space
exploration, and the risk of this should be mutually
shouldered. The national message on the space program needs to
be that we are going to do it but that launching humans into
space can never be considered a completely safe endeavor.
I would be happy to answer any questions should you like at
a later time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marshall follows:]
Prepared Statement of John C. Marshall
Chairwoman Giffords and other distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, good morning. Thank you for
inviting the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) to testify before
your subcommittee today.
Unfortunately, our panel's Chairman, Vice Admiral Joe Dyer (USN),
Ret., is unable to participate in this morning's meeting, and he asked
me and my colleague, Mr. John Frost, to represent the ASAP in his
place, so I am fortunate to have Mr. Frost in attendance with me this
morning. I should state up front that while our panel has several
members that have an extensive background with NASA, including Major
General Charlie Bolden, President Obama's nominee to be the next NASA
administrator; Mr. Jim Bagian, a former mission specialist on two Space
Shuttle flights; Ms. Joyce McDevitt, a former system safety engineer
for NASA; and Mr. Randy Stone, the former Deputy Director of the
Johnson Space Center; neither Mr. Frost nor I bring the hands-on
technical expertise of having been either in space or directing daily
space activities. Nevertheless, Mr. Frost and I together have over 90
years of experience in aviation, engineering, and safety. Mr. Frost was
the Chief of Safety for the Army's Aviation and Missile Command, and I
was an Air Force fighter pilot and then the Chief of Safety for Delta
Air Lines. With Mr. Frost's valued assistance, I have prepared to talk
about issues addressed collectively by the ASAP, and will be pleased to
answer your questions.
As you know, the Panel's statutory duties are prescribed in Section
6 of the NASA Authorization Act of 1968. Included within this Act is
the need for the ASAP to ``review safety studies and operations plans
that are referred to it and . . . to make reports thereon, . . . advise
the Administrator with respect to the hazards of proposed operations
and with respect to the adequacy of proposed or existing safety
standards, and . . . to perform such other duties as the Administrator
may request.''
Additionally, the ASAP is required by the NASA Authorization Act of
2005 to keep the House Committee on Science and Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation fully informed of its activities.
Since it was established in 1968, the ASAP actively has been
fulfilling its charter by evaluating NASA's safety performance and
advising the Agency on ways to improve that performance. The ASAP bases
its advice on direct observation of NASA operations and decision-
making. In the aftermath of the Shuttle Columbia accident, Congress
required that the ASAP submit an Annual Report to the NASA
Administrator and to Congress. This Annual Report was to summarize our
major findings concerning the safety performance of NASA. It also is to
examine NASA's compliance with the recommendations of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), as well as NASA's management and
culture related to safety.
Consistent with our charter, on April 15, 2009, we issued our 2008
Annual Report. Today, I would like to formally submit that report to
you and your committee for the record. In addition, Admiral Dyer
earlier briefed this committee's senior staff, regarding our
observations and recommendations. Not surprisingly then, my responses
today to your questions identified in the letter of invitation to
testify before this subcommittee will be consistent with our report.
You asked us to comment on six specific areas:
1. Identify top priorities and issues to consider in upcoming multi-
year NASA authorization legislation.
A. Without question, from the ASAP's perspective, the top
priority for this agency is the need to have and to maintain a
stable and sufficient budget that allows NASA to safely execute
an integrated space program that follows the Administration's
and Congress' national space objectives. Safety always is an
unintended victim of reduced spending and any resultant
stretch-out of major programs if we are not careful. That
should not be allowed to happen for this agency!
B. Next, an immediate and irrevocable decision regarding
extending the Space Shuttle Program or not (as noted in our
annual report, the ASAP does not support extending the Shuttle
from a safety standpoint) needs to be made quickly. If the
decision is made to extend the Shuttle, then that decision must
be accompanied with necessary resources. Without additional
budget allocation, all the responsible parties must realize
that such an action will seriously constrain available
resources for development of any follow-on program, and will
only shift, and may actually extend, the gap of developing a
future vehicle. This clearly will further expose NASA to the
risk of another Shuttle loss and may jeopardize the future U.S.
exploration program.
C. The next priority is to ensure that cost, schedule, and
required performance are properly in balance with each other.
The ASAP feels strongly that the imbalance of any of these key
elements will lead to a substantial increase in risk. For
example, if NASA's performance is held constant in terms of
objectives that must be met, and cost is constrained by
budgetary authority, then the schedule must extend. If schedule
is constrained more than is required to meet more timely
milestones, then risk to the mission and crew can only
increase--perhaps beyond control with fatal results.
D. Finally, support for the Agency by expeditious confirmation
of those selected to lead NASA is critical. Expeditious
confirmation will lead to greater stability within NASA and
decrease safety risks throughout the Agency.
2. Identify critical issues facing NASA, the corresponding decisions
that are required, and the Agency's ability to address these issues
within the context of the budgetary outlook described in its FY 2010
request.
A. As noted, a critical issue facing NASA is resolution of the
issue of continuing to fly or to retire the Shuttle after
completion of the Space Station. If the Shuttle is continued
beyond the flights currently planned, the Agency must be given
the resources to restart the Shuttle program. Modification and
redesign work that was deferred due to the decision to retire
the Shuttle must be funded and completed. Again, this restart
must be properly funded and staffed with the knowledge that it
will now cost more to do this work. The ASAP believes that in
the absence of this additional effort, the Shuttle must be
retired.
B. Next, there must be a reaffirmation or redefinition of a
set course for the Exploration Mission Directorate. This means
confirming or developing goals, developing realistic time
tables, developing plans consistent with budget realities, and
developing the necessary systems to achieve the objectives.
Hopefully, the Augustine Blue-Ribbon Panel will do this. This
said, the ASAP believes that if Constellation is not the
optimum answer, then any other new design has to be
substantially superior to justify starting over. If a restart
is indeed necessary, no amount of resources will recover the
approximately four years of effort that have been expended. It
further is the ASAP's conclusion that the current budget cut of
approximately $500 million dollars make Constellation (or any
other program) unexecutable to meet the current schedule for
exploration. There is no such thing in this program as a
``pause.'' Contracts are canceled, teams are dismissed, test
windows missed, and industrial capability is shut down. Denying
the program funding in 2010 means at best a year to two year
interruption . . . and will be the same for any other program.
C. Deferred maintenance, modification, and upgrading of the
basic NASA infrastructure, which is more than 40-years-old,
deserve a higher priority. Aging facilities are in need of
timely repair and upgrades, and a prompt and thorough
assessment of NASA's fixed wing aircraft fleet and aircraft
support facilities should be funded.
D. The role of robotics in support of human exploration in the
NASA of the next decade requires clarification. While
optimization of this mix must come from NASA, the long range
missions assigned to NASA should not preclude use of robotics
when appropriate to minimize human risk and optimize
exploration efficiency. This committee should ask NASA for a
written strategy and plan, with defined parameters, for when
humans are necessary and when they are not.
E. Full funding of the NASA Safety Center is important and
necessary so that this new organization properly can begin to
serve as the Agency's focal point for developing and
integrating safety excellence further into the culture of the
Agency.
3. Discuss NASA's compliance with the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board's (CAIB) recommendation on ``Return to Flight'' and ``Continue to
Fly.''
A. As you know, 15 of the 29 CAIB recommendations were
designated ``Return to Flight.'' When the Return-to-Flight Task
Group completed its work in 2005 (when the monitoring function
was transferred to the ASAP), it had determined that NASA had
met the intent of all but three issues:
Dealing with External Tank Debris Shedding,
Orbiter hardening,
and, Thermal Protection System Inspection and
Repair.
B. The ASAP has received periodic updates regarding the status
and progress on the remaining three areas. We are pleased with
NASA's overall response and believe the residual risk
associated with the remaining recommendations cannot be
completely eliminated without a major redesign of the current
Shuttle. Accordingly, the ASAP recommended that NASA use its
formal risk acceptance process to make a decision on how to
close out the remaining actions.
C. As recommended by the CAIB, recertification of the Space
Shuttle materials, components, subsystem, and system levels
would be required to ``continue to fly'' the Shuttle beyond
2010. The ASAP concurs with that recommendation. This said,
NASA has not yet undertaken the development of an action plan
to accomplish this.
D. The ASAP will continue to monitor the remaining three CAIB
issues, as required by its mandate, and is prepared to
immediately engage the Agency if required.
4. NASA's incorporation of safety and risk mitigation in its design of
new crewed transportation systems:
A. Safety and risk mitigation for any future crewed systems
needs to continue to receive the highest level of support. We
have reviewed Orion's development, and we have agreed that
issues that have been identified to date are properly being
addressed with developmental mitigation plans and tests. Issues
that have come up like the ``vibration'' and the potential
tower strike have been or are being thoroughly investigated and
subjected to substantial multi-disciplinary technical reviews
using both government and industry teams, as well as outside
expertise.
B. The Constellation program offers a one-time opportunity for
safety to be better hard-wired into overall NASA processes.
Experience has shown that one of the best ways for a large
organization to advance the state-of-the-art of its processes
is to institutionalize the procedures developed by a major new
program that is highly motivated and staffed with the best and
brightest. Constellation provides such an opportunity to lead
NASA safety culture into the future. NASA must capitalize on
this opportunity to improve long-term safety improvements.
C. NASA's role in the COTS programs for manned transport
systems thus far has been to not directly levy NASA-restricting
requirements. This has been a subject of some debate between
NASA and the panel for several meetings. While we endorse and
support investing in a COTS program, we believe at this
juncture that NASA needs to take a more aggressive role
articulating human rating requirements for the COTS Program
since most programs are well underway. To do otherwise may, at
a later time, pressure NASA into accepting a system for
expediency that is below its normal standard for safety. This
said, we applaud NASA providing the COTS manufacturers with all
their lessons learned. As a separate, but like issue, the ASAP
has reviewed the Constellation/Orion systems engineering
process and how they are managing the human rating process. We
have not found any lack of attention or faulty process thus
far.
D. The ASAP has concerns about recently revised NASA Human
Rating requirements standard with regard to substance,
application, and standardization NASA-wide. Direct linkage to
current technical standards and engineering directives is
missing; NASA must integrate its technical requirements to its
new human rating requirements before new Constellation systems
are finalized.
5. Discuss NASA's progress in instilling and maintaining safety in the
Agency's culture, standards, and processes:
The ASAP believes that NASA has continued to improve its awareness
and development of a positive safety culture. Areas where improvements
have been made include:
A. Implementation of a new governance model and acceptance and
implementation throughout the agency of independent engineering
and safety Technical Authority policies.
B. Establishment of an agency-wide Safety Center.
C. Initial funding to support the use of a senior-level
leadership team within the Safety Center.
D. Endorsement that experience in the Safety and Mission
Assurance (S&MA) career field will be a strong requirement for
promotion into senior management positions.
E. Safe Shuttle and International Space Station operations
have been demonstrated successfully since the Columbia
accident. The recent Hubble rescue mission was a masterpiece
for safety. As a side note, NASA deserves significant
recognition for continuously operating manned the Space Station
safely in orbit for nine years without a major incident--quite
an accomplishment.
F. Development of an astronaut medical health Technical
Authority that establishes checks and balances among program
and institutional requirements.
G. Positive changes in workforce attitude towards safety,
continued awareness of safety and risk programs, and continued
management effort to create and nurture open dialogue and
discourse on technical differences.
However, there can be more attention put forth into the following:
A. Improve contractor safety management and communications at
all centers.
B. Implement a more robust incident investigation process that
not only identifies the root causes but then distributes the
lesson-learned information in a timely manner to those who need
to know.
C. Develop a standardized set of hard and soft, leading and
lagging safety metrics that are reviewed and analyzed by each
center's management team on a monthly basis; such an analysis
would then enable them to focus attention on the areas that
need more critical intervention and will stimulate comparisons
between centers.
D. Develop a standardized way to proactively measure the
safety culture at each center; then continue to foster the
required leadership behaviors to engender the openness.
Transparency and trust are needed to ensure that safety issues
are solved at the lowest possible level in the organization.
E. Improve the current technical standards program to better
capture and apply hard-won lessons learned and best practices.
6. Discuss any other matters that merit attention:
A. The Administration, Congress, and NASA all need to be
transparent with the public on risk communication--that losses
may occur in space exploration and the risk of this should be
mutually shouldered; the national message on the space program
needs to be that we're going to do it, but that launching
humans into space with today's technology can never be
considered a completely safe endeavor as judged by normal
standards; this message is complicated further by the tendency
of the media to communicate issues with an exaggerated
``spin.''
B. NASA is addressing the potential limitations involved in
relying on Soyuz during the gap between the Shuttle retirement
and Constellation initial operating capability (IOC). In the
meantime, a good, open working relationship with the Russians
at a high level is necessary for any period of dependence on
Soyuz.
C. NASA currently has a good plan for managing the workforce
transition from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation program.
The ASAP concerns involve retention of key technical,
engineering, and management leaders and include the need for
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to grant NASA authority to
reemploy retired NASA civil service annuitants without
financial penalty from the retirement compensation offset,
particularly at Marshall Space Flight Center where a large
influx of Department of Defense Base Realignment and Closure
positions provides unfair competition.
Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to offer the ASAP's
view on these issues and would be happy to respond to any questions you
or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Biography for John C. Marshall
Independent Aviation Consultant
Former Delta Airlines, Vice President Corporate Safety and
Compliance
Mr. John C. Marshall is an independent aviation consultant who
formerly was Vice President of Corporate Safety and Compliance for
Delta Air Lines. Mr. Marshall had responsibility for six departments at
Delta, including Flight Safety, Industrial Safety, Environmental
Services, Emergency Planning and Operations, Safety Analysis and
Quality Assurance, and Security. Inherent in these organizations are
FAA, DOT, DOD, OSHA, EPA, TSA, and DHS compliance-driven programs for
accident prevention, accident investigations, accident response, and a
wide range of security programs. He also has collateral
responsibilities for integrating safety, compliance, and security
programs for Delta's wholly-owned subsidiaries including Comair,
Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Delta Global Services, and Delta
Technologies, into Delta's mainstream programs. Under his leadership,
Delta routinely was recognized for industry-leading programs focused on
reducing aircraft mishaps, employee injuries, and aircraft ground
damages, while enhancing environmental compliance programs and
fostering the highest standards of security for world-wide commercial
airline operations.
Mr. Marshall recently served as the Industry Co-Chair of the
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST). CAST is a joint industry-
government program to develop and implement an integrated, data-driven
strategy to reduce the U.S. commercial aviation fatal accident rate by
80 percent by 2007. Participants include aircraft and engine
manufactures, passenger and cargo airlines, labor unions, Flight Safety
Foundation, Air Transport and Regional Airline Associations, NASA, DOD,
and the FAA. Mr. Marshall is also the past Chairman of the Air
Transport Association of America's Safety Council and the Society of
Automotive Engineer's Aerospace Symposium. He currently serves on
boards for the National Defense Transportation Association's Military
Subcommittee, Safe America (a nation-wide non-profit organization
focusing on safety awareness), the Flight Safety Foundation, and the
Nature Conservancy's International Leadership Council.
Mr. Marshall gained world-wide aviation experience through his 26-
year aviation career with the U.S. Air Force. His Air Force assignments
included duties as a fighter pilot, special assistant to the Air Force
Vice Chief of Staff, fighter squadron commander, base commander, and
fighter wing commander. During his career, he primarily flew F-4s, F-
15s, A-10s, and F-16s, but has experience in a variety of other
aircraft as well. Mr. Marshall later served as the Inspector General of
the Pacific Air Forces and then became the Director of Operations of
the Pacific Air Forces. While in the Pacific, he oversaw the safe and
efficient operations of over 400 combat aircraft, including developing
plans and policies used for executing his command's annual flying
program. In his last assignment, he served as the United State's
Director of Security Assistance for the Middle East where he was
responsible for all sales, marketing, training, and logistic support
between the United States and eleven countries in the Middle East,
Africa, and Southwest Asia during and immediately after the Gulf War.
Mr. Marshall received his Bachelor's degree in civil engineering
from the Air Force Academy in Colorado. He also is a graduate from the
National War College, holds a Master of Arts degree in personnel
management from Central Michigan University, and a Master of Science
degree in civil engineering (environmental) from the University of
Hawaii.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Marshall. Dr. Ford,
please.
STATEMENT OF DR. KENNETH M. FORD, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY COUNCIL (NAC)
Dr. Ford. Chairwoman Giffords and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the top priorities and challenges facing
NASA. I have submitted my complete testimony for the record,
but today I would like to identify and discuss what I believe
to be three of the highest priorities for your consideration
during this potentially pivotal moment in our nation's space
program.
Choices and decisions must be made that will determine what
we can and cannot accomplish in space for the next 40 years.
The three priorities include developing a capable and flexible
space transportation architecture, the need to reestablish a
robust technology R&D program, and the need for stability of
purpose, policy and funding. In the few minutes I have, I will
address each of these in turn.
It is very likely that the space transportation system now
under development will serve the nation for the next 30 to 50
years. We need to get it right. This will be the space flight
architecture that takes Americans beyond low-Earth orbit back
to the Moon to near-Earth objects and onto Mars. The key
element in the exploration architecture is the development of
the heavy-lift launch vehicle. I urge Congress to accelerate
and prioritize development of this capability as it is the
lynchpin to everything we will do in human space flight beyond
low-Earth orbit.
Accelerated development of the heavy-lift launch vehicle
would also help with retaining a skilled workforce, both in
production and in the processing that takes place at Kennedy
Space Center. The plan has been to apply the workforce coming
off Shuttle to development of the Shuttle-derived heavy lift
Ares-5.
Assuming that the International Space Station is to be
extended beyond 2015, serious thought must be given to the
means of support for both cargo and crew. The current space
transportation architecture is intended to provide government-
furnished crew access to the International Space Station. As
NASA has clearly stated from the outset, if commercial crew
access materializes, NASA will utilize that service. Although
commercial cargo transport may be available sooner, it seems
unlikely that commercial crew transport to the International
Space Station will be available before 2015 or 2016 and even
then only with a substantial infusion of additional government
funding. That said, unless the Constellation Program is funded
at or above the 2010 budget request, it seems equally unlikely
that Ares-1 will be available before 2016 or perhaps even early
2017. In fact, the latest House mark-up would likely further
increase the gap in U.S. Government-provided access to space to
the point where Ares-1 support of the International Space
Station may become irrelevant unless operation of the space
station is extended well into the future.
NASA has long enjoyed a reputation as a technology
innovator whose stressing applications in space and aeronautics
have led to an incredible range of broadly useful technologies.
Several years ago the decision was made to divert a large
fraction of the Agency's technology investment into the
Constellation Program with the goal of maintaining an early
initial operational capability. Unfortunately, technology
research programs are easily stopped and terribly hard to
restart. In a time of constrained budgets, it will take strong
and effective leadership at the agency and by Congress to
reestablish NASA as a technology leader. A large part of the
public's strong support for NASA derives from the perception
that NASA is a driver of innovation and technology.
Space exploration is an inherently challenging and
rewarding endeavor. Stability in planning requirements,
budgets, and programmatic execution are essential for
successful mission accomplishment. The current U.S. space
policy is the best one we have had for a very long time. It
meets existing commitments and then puts NASA on a new path in
an orderly, disciplined manner. The policy strategy was
strongly supported by both the 2005 and 2008 NASA Authorization
Acts in both a Republican and a Democratic Congress. It is
NASA's job to implement that policy. In my view, the most
important factor in NASA's future success will be stability in
purpose, strategy, requirements and funding. If our nation's
leadership cannot provide that stability, NASA's efforts to
implement the Nation's space policy will cost more and
accomplish less.
In most days, there is very little in the thousands of
items filling the 24-hour news cycle that will be regarded as
important and noteworthy in 500 years. However, the
accomplishments of this agency of the United States Government
are among the few human activities that will be regarded as
having mattered and been important and will be looked upon with
admiration centuries hence. They will marvel at the courage,
curiosity and audacity of a people who put the first human
footprint on a planet other than their own, who sent robotic
ambassadors deep into the solar system, not to conquer or for
financial gain, but just to know. They will wonder if they
could measure up to such people. I look back at the Apollo era
and wonder the same thing and hope that our generation will
also be included as worthy of their admiration. We will not
have to wait 500 years to know the answer. We are now at a
critical juncture in the future of U.S. human space flight.
I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other
Members of the Committee might have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth M. Ford
Chairwoman Giffords and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the top
priorities and challenges facing NASA, the corresponding decisions that
are required, and the Agency's ability to address these issues within
the context of the budgetary outlook described by its 2010 request.
The NASA Advisory Council (NAC) was also asked to discuss the
corrective actions NASA has taken to implement a solid financial
management foundation and merit an improved audit opinion. The NAC,
through our Audit and Finance Committee under the leadership of Mr.
Robert Hanisee, has worked closely with NASA on these areas. Mr.
Hanisee will provide you with a comprehensive account of the progress
that has been made and the issues remaining. We are pleased with the
tremendous improvements that NASA has made in its financial management.
Next month we will celebrate the 40th anniversary of the first
human footprint on a world other than our own. This is a time for our
nation to both look back with pride in our accomplishments and to look
forward with great expectations for the next 40 years in space. It is
also time to re-commit ourselves to taking those next steps.
I will identify what I believe to be a few of the highest
priorities for your consideration during this potentially pivotal
moment in our nation's space program. Choices and decisions will be
made that will determine what we can and cannot accomplish in space for
the next 40 years.
Flying the Shuttle Safely
NASA has developed a prudent and technically rigorous approach to
Shuttle operations. Human space flight remains one of the hardest
things humans do. When the inevitable technical problems have arisen,
NASA has consistently demonstrated the commitment to take whatever time
necessary to resolve the problem before proceeding in a safe,
deliberate manner. The challenge will be to maintain this level of
vigilance through the remaining seven flights of the Space Shuttle
program. Commendably, Congress and the Administration have laid the
foundation by directing NASA to focus on completing the remaining Space
Shuttle flights, rather than forcing the Agency to finish the Shuttle
flights by an arbitrary deadline. The Congress and Administration must
be prepared to act on this direction by providing additional funding in
the case that the flights need to be delayed. This strategy eliminates
the perception of schedule pressure that may cloud safety and technical
decision-making. It is equally important that NASA retains the critical
workforce skills and facilities that are needed to ensure the safe
completion of the Shuttle program. Congress and the Agency can help
provide a sense that the work that the Agency is doing in space is
recognized as being necessary and important to the country. This is
accomplished by providing stable funding and an unwavering vision for
the future. Such an approach will significantly help with workforce
retention. In summary, while NASA's current plans to complete the final
seven flights of the Space Shuttle program by the end of 2010 are
indeed ambitious, the Agency has the mechanisms in place to safely
complete the Shuttle missions. NASA must, however, remain vigilant,
taking one mission at a time, doing it right, and doing it safely.
Develop a Capable and Flexible Space Transportation Architecture
In the aftermath of the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia, Admiral Hal
Gehman, Chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, released
a remarkable report that pointed to the fact that NASA had operated for
more than three decades in the absence of a guiding vision for human
space flight as a root cause of the Columbia accident. In response, a
thoughtful and logical civil space policy was put forth. After
extensive and healthy debate, a Republican Congress approved this
policy as the guiding strategy for NASA, and three years later a
Democratic Congress did likewise. Both presidential candidates in 2008
issued specific statements supporting a strong human space program, and
President Obama's first budget request calls for lunar return by 2020.
Thus, in the last five years two presidents and two Congresses, each of
opposite parties, have affirmed the United States Vision for Space
Exploration.
It is NASA's responsibility to implement the vision within the
resources provided by Congress. It is very likely that the space
transportation system now under development will need to serve the
nation for the next 30-50 years. We need to get it right. This will be
the basic space flight architecture that takes Americans beyond low-
Earth orbit (LEO), back to the Moon, to Near-Earth Objects and on to
Mars.
The key element in the exploration architecture is the development
of a heavy lift launch vehicle. I urge Congress to accelerate and
prioritize development of this capability as it is the key to
everything we will do in human space flight beyond LEO. Accelerated
development of a heavy lift launch vehicle can also help with retaining
a skilled workforce both in production and the processing that takes
place at Kennedy Space Center. The plan has been to apply the work
force coming off Shuttle to development of the Shuttle-derived heavy
lift Ares-V. With the budget that would have funded early lunar work
now eliminated, the work force transition is further at risk. For the
Ares-V concept, the five-segment solid rocket booster and J2X upper
stage engine are already in development. The first five-segment booster
test firing is planned for August of this year. The J2X engine passed
its critical design review last fall. Although many technical
challenges lie ahead, substantial progress has been made.
As noted above, a heavy lift capability is mandatory for journeys
beyond LEO. The Ares-V and Orion are sized for missions to Mars. The
crew of six and Ares-V lift capabilities were originally derived from
Mars mission studies. These capabilities encompass all other human
missions that are feasible at this time, including the Moon, asteroids,
LaGrange points, and near-Earth objects.
Building a heavy lift launch capability and doing so on an
aggressive schedule is the right thing because not only does it provide
the ability to go beyond LEO, but it also enables a step-wise and
evolutionary building block to progressively longer and more demanding
science and exploration missions to explore the Moon, Mars, and other
locations. Making this choice and stepping up to it now is a wise
investment in our future that will undoubtedly yield untold benefits.
Assuming that the International Space Station (ISS) is to be
extended beyond 2015, serious thought must be given to the means of
support for both cargo and crew. The current Space Transportation
Architecture is intended to provide Government-furnished crew access to
the ISS. As NASA has clearly stated from the outset, if commercial crew
access materializes, NASA will utilize that service. Although
commercial cargo transport may be available sooner, it seems unlikely
that commercial crew transport to ISS will be available before 2015 or
2016--and even then only with a substantial infusion of additional
Government funding. That said, unless the Constellation Program is
funded at or above the 2010 budget request, it seems equally unlikely
that Ares-I will be available before 2016 or perhaps even early 2017.
Continued schedule slippage could leave the ISS without a U.S.-provided
crew transportation capability for an extended period of time. If Ares-
I/Orion significantly slips schedule, the argument for their necessity
weakens dramatically. In fact, the latest House markup would likely
further increase the gap in U.S. Government-provided access to space to
the point where Ares-I support of ISS may become irrelevant unless ISS
operation is extended well beyond 2015.
There are, of course, other options for access to ISS. These
options will have budget impacts and may not be executable in time to
support ISS. The aforementioned options could include increased
reliance on international partners (Soyuz), more Shuttle flights, a
smaller capsule on a human-rated EELV, an Orion capsule on a human-
rated heavy lift launch vehicle--or some combination of the above.
There are significant challenges and difficulties associated with each
of these approaches. We, as a Nation, need to confirm our strategy and
then let NASA implement it with adequate and stable resources.
When a program such as Constellation has to re-plan, due to
significant budget cuts, it means that schedules are shifted and
contracts must be changed and renegotiated to a new baseline,
inevitably at higher cost. The schedule delays also impact the ability
to retain the highly skilled workforce currently working in support of
the Shuttle and ISS systems. As the schedule slips, workers are first
impacted in the hardware manufacturing facilities, and then as launch
and orbit operations are delayed, workers are impacted in launch
processing and operations. These workers have unique skills, and it is
important to retain much of this workforce for the new systems. This
unstable funding scenario is reminiscent of the instability in the
Space Station Freedom yearly budgets in the late 80's and early 90's
that resulted in annual re-planning, cost overruns, and delays. Large-
scale engineering development programs and the associated contracts
cannot be stopped and started without the inefficiency of re-planning,
loss of critical skills, additional significant costs, and loss of
schedule. I hope that this is a ``lesson learned,'' and that it will
not have to be relearned at great cost. The current budget environment
is jeopardizing the future of U.S. human space flight at a time when
NASA has made significant progress toward development of the new Space
Transportation Architecture.
On October 16, 2008 the NAC Exploration Committee offered the
following formal observation following their careful evaluation of
progress on the Ares Launch Vehicle,
``Given the quality of NASA's analysis and the project's
momentum, it is imperative to maintain stability and continuing
progress on execution of the current plan. The Ares project is
well underway with an established baseline and provides a solid
foundation for the Constellation Program. The current
Exploration Program has strong and accelerating international
support and participation.''
The NAC Exploration Committee will continue to monitor progress
toward development of the Space Transportation Architecture that will
serve this nation for decades to come and make recommendations as
merited.
Need for a Decision Regarding International Space Station (ISS)
I believe the International Space Station (ISS) to be among the
most ambitious engineering projects ever undertaken by humanity. It's
larger than a football field, weighs nearly a million pounds, and is
gracefully orbiting our planet at 7.7 kilometers per second. Perhaps
equally impressive has been the fifteen-nation partnership that
designed, built, and operates the ISS.
When it is finished, the ISS will be a laboratory unique in human
experience. Already, preliminary results look promising for progress
toward development of new vaccines and therapeutic drugs against
salmonella and MRSA. But more importantly, it affords an opportunity
for humans to learn to live and work in space for long durations. This
knowledge will be of great value when we are ready to send humans to
the Moon and eventually Mars. The lessons of long-duration space flight
are better learned when you are only hours away from the safety of
Earth, and not days away when on the Moon, or months away when
traveling to Mars.
Currently, there is no consistent direction for ISS utilization
past 2015 other than to take no action to preclude its continued
operation. A timely decision regarding the future of ISS is needed.
Uncertainty of purpose and plan is damaging for science utilization,
negotiation with our international partners, and development of a
stable commercial cargo market.
Space Station has cost us much in treasure ($50+ billion) and in
human life, but now it is nearly finished. It would seem imprudent to
have spent the last 25 years building this remarkable facility only to
abandon it shortly after completion.
Re-establish a Robust Technology R&D Program at NASA
NASA has long enjoyed a reputation as a technology innovator whose
stressing applications in space and aeronautics have led to an
incredible range of broadly useful technologies. Several years ago, the
decision was made to divert a large fraction of the Agency's technology
investment into the Constellation Program with the goal of maintaining
an early initial operational capability. As a result, NASA no longer
enjoys the benefits of a strong technology program and is very limited
in its ability to seek new ideas both internal and external.
Unfortunately, technology research programs are easily stopped and
terribly hard to restart. In a time of constrained budgets, it will
take strong and effective leadership at the Agency and by Congress to
reestablish NASA as a technology leader. The moral of this story is
that viable and productive research programs require stability.
A robust and useful technology program at NASA would be dedicated
to stimulating innovation and developing new capabilities not tied to
existing mission requirements. There are many negative consequences
associated with the loss of a technology research program, but one of
them is that missions, such as NASA's science missions, must carry all
the technology risk in the mission itself. Additionally, in the human
space flight side of the house, the lack of a robust technology program
has naturally driven program managers toward relatively conservative
and often low-tech designs.
A large part of the public's strong support for NASA derives from
the once accurate perception that NASA is a driver of innovation and
technology. The NASA Advisory Council is in the process of examining
NASA's current technology programs in terms of quality, scope, and
adequacy--and will make a recommendation as appropriate.
On the Need for Stability
Space Exploration is an inherently challenging and rewarding
endeavor--it takes courage, calculations, capital, choreography, and
consistency. Stability in planning, requirements, budgets, and
programmatic execution are essential for successful mission
accomplishment.
The current U.S. Space Policy is the best one we have had for a
very long time: it meets existing commitments, and then puts NASA on a
new path in an orderly, disciplined, manner. The policy strategy was
strongly supported by both the 2005 and 2008 NASA Authorization Acts in
both Republican and Democratic Congresses. It is NASA's job to
implement that policy.
In my view, the most important factor in NASA's future success will
be stability in purpose, strategy, requirements, and funding. If our
nation's leadership cannot provide that stability, NASA's efforts to
implement the nation's space policy will cost more and accomplish less.
NAC assessment of NASA responses to NAC recommendations on (a) human
capital and (b) science mission cost drivers:
Infusing new talent and knowledge into the NASA workforce
The NAC believes that continued leadership in aeronautics, space
science, and exploration requires the constant infusion of new ideas
and state-of-the-art technological knowledge provided by a vibrant and
creative workforce. As a result of very limited hiring at NASA over the
past 15 years, a large proportion of the new hires were those with a
higher level of experience and expertise. As a consequence, NASA's
current workforce consists primarily of mid-level and senior-level
professional scientists and engineers. Therefore, to ensure that NASA
has the talent needed to support current and future space and
aeronautics missions, the NAC has recommended that NASA focus on hiring
``fresh-out'' talent, which is defined as individuals who have obtained
a degree within the past three years.
NASA has already begun taking steps to address the issue raised by
the NAC. NASA has secured support from the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) to pursue increased hiring specifically for
the purpose of enhancing the workforce pipeline. As a result of this
support, NASA has made two substantive and strategic hiring commitments
to infuse new entry-level talent and knowledge into its workforce.
First, NASA has initiated a pilot program designed to target
approximately 200 additional hires in FY09 as a near-term infusion of
entry-level talent. To implement this program, the Office of Human
Capital Management is partnering with the Mission Directorates, the
Office of Diversity and Equal Opportunity, and the Office of Education
to provide guidance and direction to the Centers on a strategic hiring
plan that targets recruitment efforts that are consistent with merit
system principles. Second, NASA has committed to using a higher
proportion of its annual hiring opportunities created through natural
attrition on entry-level hires. The Centers have already been directed
to replenish losses with a higher number of entry-level hires.
The tasks we ask NASA to accomplish on behalf of the Nation are
some of the hardest things humans do. Thus, while the NAC is pleased
with NASA's efforts to balance its workforce, we hope that it will make
every effort to recruit the very best talent to the Agency. Our
nation's continued leadership in Space and Aeronautics will depend on
NASA's ability to hire the ``best and the brightest.''
Communicating lessons learned on large cost drivers in science missions
to inform the next round of decadal surveys
In general, NASA does a good job of estimating prices, as well as
managing schedules and costs for small (e.g., Explorer-class) and
medium size science missions. In these cases, the science scope and new
technology development are relatively modest, and so costs and risks
are better understood. In recent years, the problems with under-costing
and maintaining schedule have nearly all arisen from flagship class
missions. For these large science platforms, the required technology
advances have been very significant in order to meet bold new science
goals. Thus, it is not surprising for these one-of-a-kind missions that
costs or schedules are sometimes exceeded because extrapolation from
existing models is an inadequate predictor. This is NASA's dilemma for
large science missions and parallels problems experienced by other
federal agencies (e.g., NOAA, DOD space missions, and even recent NSF
large ground-based projects). Solutions to the cost estimation and cost
containment problems for large, unique missions are among NASA's (and
all federal agencies) greatest challenges. Maintaining realistic yet
ambitious science goals, leading to more incremental new technology
requirements, coupled with larger up-front mission reserves are likely
to be elements needed for successful large space science missions for
the future.
The NAC Science Committee has played an active role in monitoring,
reviewing, and suggesting changes regarding the management of costs for
science missions. The Committee reviews the status and expenditures of
NASA's major science missions (e.g., JWST, JDEM, MSL, MMS) quarterly at
each of its meetings. NASA managers present updates on technology,
engineering, and science goals for science missions to discipline
subcommittees who review, comment, and make recommendations to the NAC
Science Committee. The NAC compares previous expectations on design and
construction along with expenditures for major missions to the actual
progress in each quarter. Technical and budget problems are probed,
explanations are sought, and solutions are then reviewed by the NAC who
advise the Administrator on emerging mission issues.
Recently, the NAC recommended that NASA compile lessons learned on
the costing of science missions. The NAC believes the NRC decadal
survey committees need to understand how early choices in mission
concept design lead to cost growth so they can structure their
recommendations to be more robust over time. Therefore, the NAC
recommended that NASA compile lessons learned on pre-phase B cost
estimation for large missions, including influence of interactions
among the science community, the NRC, NASA Headquarters, and Centers.
Additionally, NASA was asked to provide an initial product to the NAC
Science Committee at its July 2009 meeting prior to provision to the
NRC committees initiating their new round of decadal surveys in the
space sciences.
The NRC decadal surveys establish community and stakeholder
expectations for science missions to be developed and launched in the
coming decade or beyond. Mission concepts are generally ranked in
priority order by cost class. In the last round of NRC decadal surveys,
some high priority mission(s) ranked on the basis of an initial cost
estimate turned out to be two to four times as expensive to develop.
This leads to questions of whether those same rankings would have been
assigned had more realistic cost estimates been available, and whether
some different mix of missions might have been recommended to achieve
the optimal science return within available funding constraints. Thus,
the current astronomy and astrophysics, and planetary science decadal
surveys are contracting for independent cost estimates for proposed new
missions.
NASA's response to the NAC recommendation noted that the Congress,
in the 2008 NASA Authorization Act, had a similar concern and required
NASA to arrange for ``an independent external assessment to identify
the primary causes of cost growth.'' To comply, NASA contracted with
the National Research Council of the National Academies to conduct this
study. The study will:
Review the body of existing studies related to NASA
space and Earth science missions and identify their key causes
of cost growth and strategies for mitigating cost growth;
Assess whether those key causes remain applicable in
the current environment and identify any new major causes; and
Evaluate effectiveness of current and planned NASA
cost growth mitigation strategies and, as appropriate,
recommend new strategies to ensure better cost containment and
success of future missions.
NASA intends for this study to achieve the NAC recommendation.
NASA's view is that tasking the NRC to do this study should facilitate
the use of its results by the decadal survey committees, which are also
NRC entities. The results of this study will be timely for the
planetary sciences decadal survey but may not be available in time to
impact the astronomy and astrophysics survey.
The NRC ``lessons learned'' study along with the Decadal Surveys
must wrestle with the trade-offs between ambitious science goals, new
technology requirements, and costs. The NAC will continue to be
vigilant in working with NASA to continuously review each flagship
science mission and to apply the lessons learned from the upcoming NRC
study.
Conclusion
My letter of invitation asked me what were the most important
issues and decisions that must be made regarding NASA. You will notice
that I did not talk much about the Space Science or Aeronautics Mission
Directorates. This is not because they are unimportant: to the
contrary, they are very important, but they are each on paths going
forward that seem more clear and less full of doubt than the path for
human space flight.
In most days, there is very little among the thousands of items
filling the 24-hour news cycle that will be regarded as important and
noteworthy in 500 years. However, the accomplishments of this Agency of
the U.S. Government are among the few human activities that will be
looked upon with admiration and, if humans are still capable of the
emotion, with awe. They will marvel at the courage, curiosity, and
audacity of a people who put the first human foot print on a planet
other than their own, who sent their robotic ambassadors deep into the
solar system . . . not to conquer . . . or for financial gain . . . but
just to know. They will wonder if they could measure up to such people.
I look back at the Apollo era and wonder the same thing . . . and
hope that our generation will also be included as worthy of their
admiration. We will not have to wait 500 years to know the answer.
I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the other
Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Biography for Kenneth M. Ford
Kenneth Ford is Founder and CEO of the Institute for Human &
Machine Cognition (IHMC)--a not-for-profit research institute located
in Pensacola, Florida. IHMC has grown into one of the Nation's premier
research organizations with world-class scientists and engineers
investigating a broad range of topics related to building technological
systems aimed at amplifying and extending human cognitive and
perceptual capacities. Richard Florida has described IHMC as ``a new
model for interdisciplinary research institutes that strive to be both
entrepreneurial and academic, firmly grounded and inspiringly
ambitious.'' IHMC headquarters are in Pensacola and a branch research
facility will soon open in Ocala, Florida.
Dr. Ford is the author or co-author of hundreds of scientific
papers and six books. Ford's research interests include: artificial
intelligence, cognitive science, human-centered computing, and
entrepreneurship in government and academia. He received a Ph.D. in
Computer Science from Tulane University. He is Emeritus Editor-in-Chief
of AAAI/MIT Press and has been involved in the editing of several
journals. Dr. Ford is a Fellow of the Association for the Advancement
of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), a member of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science, a member of the Association for
Computing Machinery (ACM), a member of the IEEE Computer Society, and a
member of the National Association of Scholars. Dr. Ford has received
many awards and honors including the Doctor Honoris Causas from the
University of Bordeaux in 2005 and the 2008 Robert S. Englemore
Memorial Award for his work in artificial intelligence (AI).
In January 1997, Dr. Ford was asked by NASA to develop and direct
its new Center of Excellence in Information Technology at the Ames
Research Center in Silicon Valley. He served as Associate Center
Director and Director of NASA's Center of Excellence in Information
Technology. In July 1999, Dr. Ford was awarded the NASA Outstanding
Leadership Medal. That same year, Dr. Ford returned to private life and
to the IHMC.
In October of 2002, President George W. Bush nominated Dr. Ford to
serve on the National Science Board and the United States Senate
confirmed his nomination in March of 2003. The National Science Board
(NSB) is the governing board of the National Science Foundation (NSF)
and plays an important role in advising the President and Congress on
science policy issues.
In 2004, Ford was the recipient of the Pensacola Area Chamber of
Commerce Business Leader of the Year Award for the growth of IHMC.
Also, in 2004 Florida Trend Magazine named Dr. Ford one of Florida's
four most influential citizens working in academia. In 2005, Dr. Ford
was appointed and sworn in as a member of the Air Force Science
Advisory Board.
In 2007, he became a member of the NASA Advisory Council and on
October 16, 2008, Dr. Ford was named as Chairman of the NASA Advisory
Council.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Dr. Ford. Very moving
comments. Thank you. Mr. Hanisee.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT M. HANISEE, CHAIRMAN, AUDIT AND FINANCE
COMMITTEE, NASA ADVISORY COUNCIL (NAC)
Mr. Hanisee. Madam Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity
to appear today to discuss the NASA Advisory Council's key
findings and observations related to NASA's financial
management activities. I will also touch briefly on the
perception of a proliferation of conflicting earned-value
management approaches within the Agency.
The fact that NASA has been plagued with financial problems
for several decades is well-documented. In 1990, the General
Accountability Office (GAO) placed NASA on its high-risk list,
and in 2005, the GAO issued a report in which it listed 45
recommendations aimed at improving NASA's overall management.
In a separate report, the Inspector General (IG) noted that the
Agency's problems were rooted in historic culture, to wit, NASA
Centers operated with a high degree of autonomy; across NASA
there were in use 10 different accounting systems with 120
subsystems; a very significant result of this accounting
anarchy was a legacy of unreliable historic data; and that
headquarters accounting personnel were inadequately trained. In
2000, well before the GAO report, NASA attempted to consolidate
these disparate accounting systems into a new, overarching
control system, the Integrated Enterprise Management Plan, and
two years later installed a commercially available core
accounting system. Both of these new control systems brought
forth a host of new problems that would take years and multiple
software patches to fix.
In 2006, the headquarters Chief Financial Officer's (CFO)
office prepared a corrective action plan to address the noted
deficiencies and specifically to remediate the four material
weaknesses and one reportable condition cited in both the 2003
and 2004 external audit reports. Those deficiencies were
financial systems analysis and oversight; property accounting;
funds balance with treasury; general controls, and estimating
environmental liabilities. Even though the agency's external
auditors continued to disclaim an opinion through and including
2008, the continued hard work of the agency's headquarters and
center finance staff has yielded results. In 2005, the number
of material weaknesses dropped to three, and in 2006 to only
two, and the reportable condition for environmental liabilities
dropped off the list.
In the 2008 audit report, Ernst & Young stated that,
``Significant progress has been made,'' even though they again
issued a disclaimer citing the remaining two material
weaknesses, financial systems, and property accounting.
With several software patches to the core accounting
system, a more stable, better-trained accounting staff and the
cooperative spirit of the centers, we believe that the first of
these two material weaknesses is close to earning a passing
grade. The intractable problem is property accounting,
particularly as it relates to legacy assets, Space Shuttle, and
the International Space Station.
The external auditing firm has stated that the agency
cannot earn a clean opinion until this accounting data is
cleaned up. The IG has opined that the cost to go back and
recreate a set of data that would be auditable is too high to
justify. Other than running out the clock on Shuttle and Space
Station, the only way off the horns of this dilemma would be a
change in accounting interpretation from the Financial
Accounting Standards Advisory Board permitting the Agency to
write off these assets as research and development. If this
accounting change comes forth, the door will be open for NASA
to merit an improved audit opinion.
Now to concerns about potential proliferation of
conflicting EVM management systems within NASA. Under the
leadership of the Chief Engineer's Office, the Earned Value
Management Working Group was created in partnership with the
Constellation Program with the objective of developing an
agency-wide Earned Value Management (EVM) system to be offered
to all mission and centers for single adoption. The NAC Audit
and Finance Committee suggested at the October 2008 NAC meeting
that the single solution being developed by the Working Group
be adopted agency-wide. Since the Office of Chief Engineer and
the Earned Value Management Working Group were already headed
in that direction, no formal recommendation was made at that
time.
In conclusion, the Audit and Finance Committee would like
the Subcommittee to know that when NASA earns an unqualified
audit opinion, hopefully within the next two years, that the
credit will belong to the hard-working accounting personnel at
headquarters and in the centers. A specific tip of the hat is
due to Terry Bowie, Deputy Headquarters CFO, who is largely
responsible for the progress that the Agency has achieved. We
also have a high degree of confidence in new headquarters CFO,
Ron Spoehel. NASA now has a great financial team in place to
address the problems in the future.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hanisee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Hanisee
Chairwoman Giffords and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear today to discuss the NASA Advisory Council's
key findings and observations related to NASA's financial management
activities.
NASA has well documented financial problems that have plagued the
Agency for almost all of this decade. Before describing the remediation
efforts and progress made over the last three and one-half years, it
would be helpful to begin with a brief explanation of the situation
that existed in late 2005. As background, the last year in which NASA
received an unqualified Audit Opinion was 2002, but even that opinion
is suspect because the opinion contained a Material Weakness which,
post Sarbanes-Oxley, would preclude a favorable opinion. In 2001 and in
every other year this decade, the Agency was given a Disclaimer which
is a statement by the Independent Auditor that the Financial Statements
are not auditable.
In 1990, the General Accountability Office (GAO) placed NASA on its
High Risk List for what it cited as NASA's failure to effectively
oversee its contracts, due in part to the Agency's lack of accurate and
reliable information on contract spending. The GAO cited four subject
areas:
Past award Contract Administration;
Financial Management Systems;
Program and Project Management; and
Cost Estimating and Analysis
In 2005, the House Science Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
tasked the GAO to investigate the long-standing financial management
challenges that threaten the Agency's ability to manage its programs.
In its report to the Subcommittee, GAO cited 45 recommendations aimed
at improving NASA's overall management and implementation of the
Integrated Enterprise Management Plan (IEMP) and core accounting
system, concluding that ``ineffective system and processes and
inadequately trained financial management personnel hamper the external
financial reporting efforts thereby threatening the Agency's ability to
manage its programs and produce auditable financial statements.''
In October 2005, at the start of Subcommittee hearings, the
Inspector General (IG), in its report, noted that the Agency's problems
are rooted in historic culture, to wit:
NASA Centers operated with a high degree of autonomy
and mission focus;
Across NASA, there were in use ten different
accounting systems and 120 sub systems, (none of which could
communicate with each other) that were consolidated into a new
control system, IEMP and a new common accounting module (widely
used in the U.S. and Europe) developed by a German Software
vendor, SAP;
A significant part of the recent problems are rooted
in unreliable historical data;
Not all Headquarters OCFO personnel were sufficiently
trained, especially on the new core accounting system;
At the various centers, there were weaknesses and
insufficient controls to catch mistakes early in the accounting
cycle.
In January 2006, the Office of the CFO prepared a Corrective Action
Plan (CAP) to address the deficiencies noted in the GAO and IG reports
and specifically to remediate the Material Weaknesses and Reportable
Conditions noted in the 2003 and 2004 audit report of the Independent
Auditors. This CAP defined NASA goals, objectives, strategies, due
dates, and assigned responsibility for remediation. In the audit
reports of 2003 and 2004, there were four Material Weaknesses and one
Reportable Condition:
Financial Systems, Analysis and Oversight;
Funds Balance with Treasury;
Property, Plant and Equipment accounting;
Estimating environmental liabilities;
General controls.
Other problems/issues raised by the various oversight entities
include:
Control and accounting for NASA-owned aircraft;
Control of Travel expenses, (disbursements and
reimbursements);
Grant accounting;
OCFO personnel shortfalls, turnover and morale.
In addition to the control deficiencies noted above, the
Administrator added a few, such as:
Unobligated Balances;
NASA Shared Service Center.
While the two above-noted issues are not a concern of any of the
oversight entities, they are reflective of the overall controls
environment within the Agency and, so, are worth reviewing.
The following examines each of these issues in more detail.
Financial Systems, Analysis, and Oversight
This area was cited as a Material Weakness in each of the last
seven years. Despite much progress, there continues to be problems with
data entry, system configuration, documentation and compliance with the
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA). In 2000,
NASA implemented a new IEMP and a new core accounting system. The core
accounting system, installed in a phased approach from October 2002 to
July 2003, proved to be complex and lacking in flexibility,
particularly in reversing mistaken entries into the bookkeeping system.
A major version update designed to correct some of the original
problems was installed in October 2006. This new update created some
new problems which were fixed with a patch implemented in February
2007. Most of the problems that have plagued the system have now been
cleaned up.
Funds Balance with U.S. Treasury
This area was cited as a Material Weakness in 2003, 2004 and 2005.
At 2002 year-end, the Agency was out of balance with Treasury by $1.7
billion. By 2005, this metric had been reduced to $46 million. In 2006,
with a non material unreconciled balance of $10.7 million the Material
Weakness was removed. In 2007, this balance was further reduced to only
$2 million and NASA received a ``green rating'' from the Treasury.
Property, Plant, and Equipment Accounting
This area was noted as a Material Weakness for each of the past
seven years. Furthermore, it is the last and most intractable
impediment to the Agency receiving a clean audit opinion. Prior to
1998, government agencies were not required to capitalize capital
assets. Thereafter, the accounting rules changed requiring
capitalization and subsequent depreciation. Recall the point made
earlier about unreliable historical data. This lack of good historic
data, particularly for the iconic legacy programs, such as Shuttle and
the International Space Station (ISS), has left NASA with property
accounts that NASA's external, independent auditor, Ernst & Young
(E&Y), says are not auditable; hence, the Material Weakness.
This problem is equally difficult for Agency-controlled assets or
contractor-held assets. With the latter, the periodic reports have
often been inaccurate, or not sufficiently timely. To address this
problem, NASA installed a software control package called Contractor-
Held Asset Tracking System (CHATS) in September 2004. A second problem
had to do with the property accounting system not tying into the core
accounting module. This was remedied in May of 2008 with the
installation of the Integrated Asset Management (IAM) tool, a SAP
furnished asset management module. These two programs should help the
Agency gain control of the issue on the new programs such as
Constellation (Ares and Orion) and Commercial Orbital Transportation
System (COTS), but it will not solve the legacy asset problem.
The Agency is stuck on the horns of a dilemma. The cost to go back
and reproduce accurate data for legacy programs is prohibitively high,
such that the IG will not authorize the effort. E&Y has stated that
NASA will not be able to obtain a clean opinion until the issue is
resolved. Time will fix the problem as the legacy assets will be
completely retired and of no significant value; the Space Shuttle is
currently scheduled for retirement in 2010 and the International Space
Station in 2016. At the end of 2008, these legacy assets were on the
books for $14.2 billion, of which ISS accounted for the preponderance,
$13.2 billion. However, to wait until 2016 or beyond to secure a clean
audit opinion would be a bitter pill, particularly in light of the
tremendous progress made by the Agency in dealing with all of the other
accounting problems. There is currently an effort underway to resolve
this problem. In 2006, NASA had a similar/related problem with
accounting for theme satellites (that were well beyond NASA control)
that the Agency was able to resolve. It did so by the CFO's office
petitioning Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) to
permit the Agency to treat these assets as research and development
(R&D) and write them off. The effort was successful. In 2007, the
Agency wrote off almost $13 billion, a move that significantly reduced
the amount of assets remaining on NASA's books. There is an exposure
draft (currently circulating) from FASAB that if implemented would let
NASA write off these legacy assets as R&D. If accepted, this would
solve the Agency's problem.
Environmental Liabilities
This was a Reportable Condition in 2004 and 2005. The
responsibility for estimating Environmental Liabilities cuts across
several NASA departments, including primarily accounting and
environmental administration. To resolve this Reportable Condition, the
Agency adopted a software package used by the U.S. Navy, the Integrated
Data Evaluation and Analysis Library (IDEAL) in 2004. At 2008 year-end,
NASA had an unfunded environmental liability of $943 million--some of
which will take 50 to 100 years to clean up. The individual projects
have liabilities ranging from as low as $12 thousand to $168 million.
Each year, NASA spends $45 million on environmental clean-up. Although,
in recent audits, Environmental Liabilities was dropped as a Reportable
Condition, interviews with the lead audit partner of E&Y indicate that
it still is a closely watched issue with them. First, they are not
comfortable that the IDEAL software produces stable, auditable
estimates and they want the software to undergo independent
verification and validation. Second, they want the Agency to produce an
estimate of environmental liability at the beginning of each new
program.
A new issue has recently arisen which is compliance with SFAS-6, an
accounting standard that would, beginning in 2010, require all
Government agencies to produce an estimate for asbestos remediation at
every one of its sites. A disagreement has arisen between E&Y and the
NASA Environmental Department over an acceptable methodology to
accomplish this. E&Y wants NASA to do a site-by-site survey to
establish these estimates. The Environmental Department believes that
it can do an Agency-wide estimate using the costs for already completed
remediations at several NASA sites. The Agency was recently informed
that is has some breathing room on this issue given that FASAB has
proposed a two-year delay in the requirement to estimate asbestos
related clean-up costs.
Grant Accounting
While not cited as a significant accounting issue in past audit
reports, this issue has been noted by E&Y as an issue that is on their
radar screen. NASA's Grant Portfolio consists of approximately 8000
active grants with 1000 institutions, aggregating $6.9 billion. The
concern expressed by the auditors is that there are a large number of
grants that are still open even though the money has been expended.
Also, there are numerous grants for which the documentation that the
`deliverable' was actually delivered is missing or inadequate. In
addition, there are grants for which money has been authorized with no
activity by the grantees. To address these issues, the Agency recently
switched from Block Grant accounting to Grant-by-Grant accounting. This
switch occurred in 2008 and was implemented by all Centers except
Goddard, which is pressing to close out completed grants. Goddard
expects to be compliant by 2009 year-end.
Unobligated Balances
Unobligated balances (money in the possession of the Agency that
has not yet been invested in a specific program, project, mission or
Center) have typically ranged from $1.5 billion to over $2.0 billion.
The previous Administrator was concerned that these unobligated funds
could be at risk. Accordingly, he challenged the Agency to get this
metric below $1.0 billion at year-end. In April 2008, Ron Spoehel, the
new CFO, undertook the development of a Phasing, Planning and Reporting
process to enable Agency resource managers to invest appropriated funds
more effectively. With the aid of this new tool, year-end unfunded
balances dropped from over $2.0 billion in 2007 to $535 million in
2008. In April 2009, the unfunded balance had been reduced to $343
million.
Summary of Current Status
In the 2008 year-end Audit Report, E&Y stated that ``significant
progress has been made'' in resolving accounting problems. That year
ended with there still being two Material Weaknesses, but the Funds
Balance with Treasury weakness was no longer a deficiency and the
reportable condition on estimating Environmental Liabilities had been
removed. On every issue discussed above, the Agency has made progress.
No longer mentioned in audit reports are concerns about the control
and accounting for the NASA aircraft fleet, control of Travel expenses,
and General Controls. Grant Accounting is well on its way to a
satisfactory resolution. And, while Unobligated Balances is an issue
that does not directly relate to Financial Controls, the success in
reducing the Unobligated Balances is noteworthy. This is also true as
to the resolution of the problem of under-staffing in the Headquarters
accounting. The NASA Shared Services Center (NSSC) is up and running
with performance metrics close to or above the goal levels.
Unfortunately, NSSC is unlikely to ever achieve the $100 million cost
savings that was the original justification for its creation because of
persistent low-transaction volumes.
The two remaining Material Weaknesses, Financial Systems, Analysis
and Oversight (FSA&O) and Property Accounting may also be on a path to
satisfactory resolution. Certainly, removal of the deficiency in FSA&O
is within reach, which leaves Property accounting as the long pole in
the tent. Even though E&Y has said that NASA will never receive an
unqualified Audit Opinion until this issue is resolved, either by
recreating an auditable data set, or by running out the clock on the
International Space Station we remain optimistic that the
aforementioned change in accounting permitting NASA to write off these
legacy assets as R&D will be implemented. If that happens, we believe
NASA may earn a clean audit opinion, if not this year then by 2010.
Addressing the proliferation of conflicting Earned Value Management
(EVM) approaches within the Agency
In 2008, then NAC Chairman, the Honorable Harrison Schmitt asked
the NAC Audit and Finance Committee to ``review and advise on how to
better monitor the cost buildup on new programs as measured against
their original budgets and estimated cost to complete.'' Subsequently,
in 2009, Dr. Kenneth Ford, the current NAC Chairman, made cost
estimation and containment a focus area for 2009. Pursuant to that
request, the A&F committee requested a fact finding session on the
Agency's approach to Earned Value Management (EVM).
EVM is a management tool used to track the performance of projects
and programs against the plan and captures the key elements of cost,
schedule and technical performance. The tool enables management to
assess the trade-offs between cost, schedule, and technical performance
and to project the likely future performance of those projects and
programs. EVM is a sophisticated attempt to compare the value of work
accomplished during a given period with the work scheduled for that
period. Its benefits far exceed the traditional two-dimensional
approach of comparing planned costs to actual costs. NASA policy
requires implementation of an EVM System (EVMS) on all contracted work.
It is the internal development of an EVMS for the program and project
work within NASA with which the Committee concerned itself.
In October 2008, the Committee was given a briefing on NASA's use
of EVM by Ms. Dorothy Tiffany from NASA's Office of the Chief Engineer.
Ms. Tiffany stated that NASA is committed to implementing an EVM System
that 1) complies with its program management policies in NASA
Procedural Requirement (NPR) 7120.5D and 2) that for all development
efforts, its EVMS would be compliant with ANSI/EIA-748, which is the
EVMS certification standard for Government contractors. While the
initial thrust was developing a partnership between the Constellation
program and the Agency's EVMS Working Group, the objective was to
develop an Agency-wide EVMS that was validated by DCMA. When this EVMS
is fully developed and validated, NASA's plan is to offer it to all
Missions and Centers for single adoption. To gain support for the EVMS,
NASA's strategy was to be a bottom-up approach to ``sell'' an
enterprise solution and to build EVM competency through a series of
training courses. Since October 2007, 1600 participants from all NASA
Centers have attended 62 tailored EVM, scheduling, and budget courses.
Based on the limited information briefed to the NAC on this topic
thus far, the NAC Audit and Finance Committee believes that the
Agency's work is on the right track. However, the Committee has some
concern that the adoption of the EVM System being developed was not
compulsory for all projects, programs, missions and Centers, even
though the stated goal of the Agency Working Group was universal
adoption. Having noted in our many ``fact finding'' sessions that
there's a cultural tendency within NASA to ``go our own way,'' the
Committee suggested in its report to the NAC at the October 2008
meeting that the single solution being developed by the Working Group
be adopted Agency-wide. Since the Office of the Chief Engineer and the
EVMS Working Group were already heading in that direction, no formal
recommendation was made at that time. The NAC will continue to monitor
NASA's progress on this topic and provide recommendations, as needed.
Biography for Robert M. Hanisee
Mr. Hanisee joined TCW in 1990. He has been a member of the Private
Client Services Group since 1997 where he served as Chief Investment
Officer and was in charge of Asset Allocation. From 1990 to 1996 he was
Director of Research; from 1992 to 1998 he was Manager of the $1.2BYN
Convertible Securities Group; from 1992 to 1996 he was Portfolio
Advisor of Large Cap Equities Investment strategy; from 1992 to 1997 he
was Chairman of the Equity Policy Committee; and from 1996 to 1998
Portfolio Manager of the $155MYN Global Telecom Trust where he was
responsible for conception, implementation and management.
In January, 2004, Mr. Hanisee retired from his full time duties,
but continues on a part time basis. His current TCW duties include
membership on the Comprehensive Asset Allocation Committee and he
continues to Chair various equity portfolio oversight committees. He
continues to serve as a member of the Equity Policy Committee.
Business experience prior to joining TCW: 1980-1990, President and
Director of Research, Seidler Amdec Securities, Los Angeles, CA; 1974-
1980, Director of Research and Partner, Crowell Weedon & Co., Los
Angeles, CA; 1971-1974, Director of Research, Stern Frank Meyer and
Fox, Los Angeles, CA; 1968-1971, Senior Analyst and Group Leader,
Merrill Lynch, Los Angeles, CA; 1966-1968, Trainee then analyst, JP
Morgan Bank, New York, NY; 1959-1962, U.S. Army, Europe.
Other financially related business experience: 1980-1990,
Investment Banking: Completed over 20 public financings, including
IPO's and secondary offerings, both equity and debt. Venture Capital:
Involved in initial round and follow-on financing of five defense and
technology VC startup's. Continued involvement with each through either
board membership or financial consulting.
Outside Boards and other business related activities: EDO Corp.,
New York, NY, NYSE Listed 1991 to 2007 (Edo was acquired by ITT Corp.
in Dec., 2007): Chairman, Audit Committee; Member, Corporate Governance
and Nominating Committee; Member, Compensation Committee; Chairman of
the Board of Directors, 1994-1996. Orbital Sciences, Dullas, VA, NYSE
Listed 2002 to present: Chairman, Audit Committee; Member, Corporate
Governance and Nominating Committee. Titan Corp, San Diego, CA, NYSE
listed. 1998 to 2005. (Titan was acquired by LLL on July 29, 2005):
Chairman, Audit Committee. Space Computer Corp. Los Angeles, Privately
held. 2004 to present: Member, Audit Committee. Davidson Companies
(Privately held Investment Bank, Broker Dealer, headquartered in
Montana. Member, Audit and Finance Committee; Member, Corporate
Governance Committee; Chairman, Compensation Committee. Wavestream
Corp, San Dimas, CA (Investor and board observer) 2003 to 2008. Other
business and related activities: Jet Propulsion Laboratories, Pasadena,
CA: Member, Commercialization Council 1999 to 2001. Al Mann Institute
for Biomedical Engineering: Chairman, Commercialization Committee, 2001
to 2003. NASA Advisory Council, Appointed 2005. Los Angeles Master
Chorale: Member, Board of Directors, 2003 to present.
Mr. Hanisee holds a BA in Economics from California State
University at Northridge and an MA in Economics from the University of
California at Berkeley. He is a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) and a
member of the Los Angeles Society of Financial Analysts and the CFA
Institute. He has taught financial analysis for aspiring CFA
candidates. He is a member of the Dean's advisory council, Business and
Economics Dept, California State University at Northridge.
Mr. Hanisee is married to Denise Jamin Hanisee and is the father of
six adult children.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Hanisee. Dr. Colladay.
STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND S. COLLADAY, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
ACADEMIES' AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ENGINEERING BOARD (ASEB)
Dr. Colladay. Madam Chairwoman and Members of the
Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
this morning.
Mentioning many aspects of the extraordinary performance of
NASA in my formal testimony, I would like to concentrate and
focus my remarks here on a concern over the general lack of
attention being paid by NASA to technology development as a
priority mission area.
Because of budget pressures, NASA has largely backed away
from the development of space technology as a mission. Once the
decision was made to focus research and technology specifically
on major development program needs by moving the resources to
``mission areas'' it intended to serve, it became near-term
oriented as risk reduction backstopping the hardware
development. That isn't to say, of course, there isn't good
technology coming from space science and exploration driven by
known program needs, but that is not the opportunity-driven
type of research and technology development that I believe NASA
needs to pursue and has pursued in the past, that is, long-term
research driven and defined by anticipating what future program
managers will need well in front of requirements, and broad in
scope, supporting civil space, not just NASA, and commercial
space.
NASA has inspired us with bold missions and spectacular
accomplishments, and it needs to be investing in technology
that continually seeks to transform the state-of-the-art
capabilities and enable future missions that some day we know
we will want to do if we only know how.
NASA should revitalize advanced space technology
development as a priority mission area of the Agency. It should
engage the best science and engineering talent in the country
wherever it resides, in universities, industry, NASA centers,
other government labs, focused on world-class research and
innovation and not driven by the need to maintain core
competencies at the NASA centers. It should support not only
future NASA missions but other government agencies and
commercial space. So its customers are very similar to the
broad scope of customers that its aeronautics program serves by
enabling the broad aerospace community with advanced technology
and development.
That brings me briefly to aeronautics where there is
extraordinarily good news this year, and the restructured
program is pursuing fundamental research, stable, and providing
excellent results. I am particularly pleased with the new
emphasis on systems research in this year's request. The
environmentally responsible aviation program builds on the
progress of the base program and begins to address complex
systems interactions accompanying the integration of technology
to achieve lower fuel consumption, lower emissions, lower
noise, improved safety, and greater air traffic system
capacity, all extremely important to our country economically
and in moving goods and services across the country.
The bottom line I would say my concern is that there aren't
sufficient resources not only for technology development in
space and aeronautics, but the Agency has insufficient
resources to accomplish what they, and I think the public,
expect of them. I have looked--and every time I have looked at
the resources against the program that NASA has on the books
right now, I am led to the conclusion that they need
approximately $22 to $23 billion to accomplish what is before
them. And I think that is a--with that amount, it would compete
reasonably in discretionary resource expenditures of the
country.
I look forward to answering any questions you might have
later when we get to that part of the morning.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Colladay follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond S. Colladay
Madame Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Ray Colladay and the
personal views I express are shaped by my 40 years of experience in
aerospace, through positions I have held in government, industry, and
academia. I chair the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of
the National Research Council (NRC) and although I have insights into
NASA acquired through that position, my views are my own and do not
represent an official position of the NRC.
With your permission, I would like to submit my prepared testimony
for the record and summarize my views for you here this morning,
leaving sufficient time to answer any questions you may have.
Civil, commercial, and national security space and aviation affects
every part of our lives. It inspires, it facilitates a one-world
community, it encourages training and education in science and
engineering, it protects our future, and addresses the profound
questions of our place in the universe--how did we get here and are we
alone? NASA has demonstrated its ability to accomplish great things. It
has a vision for the future for which there is general consensus in
broad terms even as the finer details are debated. There are two
fundamental questions that are pertinent to the subject of this hearing
in dealing with NASA and its primary role of providing U.S. leadership
in space and aeronautics: are the programs and the goals of the Agency
the right ones for the nation to be pursuing?--which is to say is the
path and the destination right? And are there sufficient resources to
effectively implement the program and the vision being pursued? I would
like to address both of these questions in my remarks this morning.
There are a number of issues in the human space flight program that
need to be untangled like what to do with the ISS beyond 2016; is the
Constellation program headed in the right direction and does it have
the commitment and support of this administration; is the timing for
Shuttle retirement right; and are the replacement vehicles--Ares and
Orion--the best approach to move beyond low-Earth orbit? The recently
appointed Augustine Human Space Flight Review Committee will address
these issues and present options charting a clear way forward.
Until the disposition of the ISS is decided, there is a big hole in
mission planning with uncertain out-year budget implications. The issue
is not just are we going to keep the station beyond 2016, which seems
likely given how much we have spent finally getting it assembled and
ready for full occupancy, but more importantly, what are we going to
use it for? This is a remarkable facility and a significant
accomplishment in engineering design and on-orbit assembly. It is a
modern-day example of cooperative program management on an
international scale; not a simple feat. As we transition from the
assembly phase to utilization, we should take full advantage of its
utility for research to expand our knowledge of how to live and work in
space. Having said that, however, the vision and destination for human
space flight should be outward, beyond low-Earth orbit. The ISS is a
way-point in that journey outward and I believe it will prove to be
indispensable in learning to take the next steps.
The NASA science program continues to amaze the world with its
spectacular achievements. The science community has led the way in
providing consensus views on planning and roadmaps for the future
through its Decadal Surveys. We borrowed the technique on the
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board for the Decadal Survey of Civil
Aeronautics in 2006. Others will address the state of space science and
I will limit my remarks to a shared concern about cost growth in
ongoing programs and projects that put other projects at risk and crowd
out new-start opportunities.
There are a number of reasons for cost growth on projects--from
poor initial cost estimates to over-confidence in what can be done with
constrained budgets to years of inadequate attention paid to advance
space technology development. I would like to specifically address the
last point. Because of budget pressures, NASA has turned away from
putting a priority on advanced technology development, even though the
Space Act of 1958 and every subsequent amendment calls for NASA to be a
leader in R&D. Today the advanced technology base is so deficient it is
costing us in lost opportunities to do bold things with more capable
systems and is costing us valuable resources in overruns some of which
could be avoided with a more robust technology base.
Aeronautics is underfunded, but a broad-based, innovative advanced
space technology development program that is organizationally
independent of ongoing hardware development programs is nonexistent.
The downward trend started soon after aeronautics and space technology,
once logically managed together, were split apart. A decision soon
followed to focus technology specifically on major development program
needs by moving the resources to mission areas it intended to serve.
Predictably, once all technology development was placed with the major
development efforts it became near-term oriented as a risk reduction
effort back-stopping hardware development. The Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board sponsored study on the Exploration Technology
Development Program for Constellation done last year expressed concern
on just that point of the need for more emphasis on longer-term
research. With budget and schedule pressures as demanding as ever, the
situation has not improved. Clearly, there is a need for focused, risk-
reduction technology that is defined by explicit mission requirements
and funded by the mission office, but it does not fill the need for the
Agency on a broader level to pursue long-term technology ``push'' well
out in front of requirements and broad in scope supporting civil (not
just NASA) and commercial space. An agency that has inspired us with
bold missions and spectacular accomplishments needs to be investing in
technology that continually seeks to transform state-of-the-art
capabilities and enable future missions that some day we may want to
do, if we only knew how.
In DARPA, when I was Director, we sought to be disruptive with
technology that challenges or disrupts conventional thinking and it is
still doing that today. By setting up a healthy tension in an
organization between technology push focused on long-term research and
technology pull from programs, someone is always asking not only ``what
for?'', but also ``what if?'' and ``why not?'' An advanced research and
technology development mission of NASA would be exploring advanced
launch systems in pursuit of low cost access to space; compact nuclear
power systems; plasma-and other electric-propulsion concepts; energy
storage technology; highly energetic propellants; affordable space-
based solar power systems; multi-spectral sensors; advanced space-based
communications; closed-loop life-support systems; radiation shielding
concepts; highly intelligent and mobile robotics--the list could go on
with a host of other areas of research not being addressed in today's
constrained environment. And you will not see requirements for such
systems, because we do not write a requirement for something no one
knows how to do.
NASA should revitalize advanced space technology development as a
priority mission area of the Agency. It should engage the best science
and engineering talent in the country wherever it resides in
universities, industry, NASA centers or other government labs focused
on world-class research and innovation and not driven by the need to
maintain ten healthy centers. It should support not only future NASA
missions, but other government agencies and commercial space. The
``customers'' for its technology products would be industry, NASA
itself, other government agencies like NOAA, and military space where
dual-use technology is applicable. Having this broad mandate would make
it similar in the breadth of customers served to the NASA role in
aeronautics with its heritage in NACA going back almost a century.
That brings me to the aeronautics program where there is good news
and bad. Aviation has a major impact on U.S. economic competitiveness
and our leadership position in the world. No one questions that it is
vitally important particularly in the U.S. in moving people and goods
throughout the country and the world. The good news regarding the NASA
aeronautics program is the restructured program in fundamental research
is stable and providing excellent results. I am particularly pleased
with the new emphasis in systems research in this year's request. The
Environmental Responsible Aviation (ERA) program builds on the progress
in the base research program and begins to address the complex system
interactions accompanying the integration of technology to achieve
lower fuel consumption, lower emissions, lower noise, improved safety,
and greater air-traffic system capacity. These attributes, all
desirable in isolation, tend to work against each other when integrated
into a system. The newly formed category of Integrated Systems
Research, of which the ERA program is the first in the category,
enables NASA, in cooperation with industry and universities, to explore
the system advances that will make aviation more energy independent and
environmentally friendly. More resources in the out-years would be
helpful. The Recovery Act funding that the Congress was able to add to
the NASA aeronautics budget this year were very helpful in jump
starting this important area of research and it is also being put to
good use in facilitating the transition of NextGen focused technologies
to the FAA.
This year's budget request is very encouraging and a positive step.
However, NASA's investment in aeronautics is a fraction of what it was
just a short time ago, and that is the bad news. Ten years ago the
aeronautics budget was over three times what it is today in equivalent
full-cost accounting terms and today's dollars. Then, it was 10 percent
of the total NASA budget. The Congress has consistently recognized
inadequate funding for aeronautics by augmenting past administration
requests, but unless that level is reflected in the run-out budget
request by the administration, the research efforts at the higher level
cannot be sustained, year-to-year. More resources would be helpful in
areas of system-level testbeds and taking technology to higher
readiness levels for the advances in the Airspace Systems and Aviation
Safety programs in support of NextGen. Also, it would enable NASA to
shift the balance of R&D to be a better blend of in-house and out-of-
house research with universities and industry--something the NRC
Decadal Survey on Civil Aeronautics also recommended.
Taking aeronautics and space technology together, an investment of
at least ten percent of the total agency's budget for advanced
aerospace technology development focused on forward-looking innovation
is not unreasonable, in my view, for a government agency that has a
mandate to help maintain U.S. leadership in aerospace science,
engineering, research, and advanced technology development. One does
not need to go too far back to a time when it exceeded that level.
Coming full circle to my opening comment about having the right
program content and the right amount of resources to implement it, I
have touched on where I think some of the holes are in program content
and underfunded technology and of course the Augustine Committee will
untangle the big issues in human space flight. I must be perfectly
clear that the areas I mentioned needing more funding cannot and should
not be solved by transferring money from other parts of NASA. Every
time I look at the current scope of the NASA program and consider what
budget level it takes to do it right, I come up with a level of around
$22-23 billion for the Agency. This figure is not based on a rigorous,
detailed assessment, but a well-informed opinion. It would seem that at
this level, NASA's space and aeronautics mission should compete
favorably for discretionary resources against other priority national
needs, particularly given how it supports many of those needs of broad
national interest. Much less than that level of funding means something
has to give--some combination of mission scope, program content,
schedule, or institutional infrastructure. This subcommittee has taken
aggressive steps in the past to recognize the need for increased
funding for NASA. I hope the testimony given at this hearing is helpful
in your deliberations on the FY 2010 budget.
That completes the remarks I wanted to make and I would be pleased
to take questions if you have them. Thank you.
Biography for Raymond S. Colladay
RAYMOND S. COLLADAY is a retired corporate officer of the Lockheed
Martin Corporation and the former President of the Lockheed Martin
Astronautics company in Denver. Before entering the private sector, he
held positions of Director of DARPA--the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense and was Associate
Administrator of NASA where he had senior executive responsibility for
the Agency's aeronautics and space research and technology development
including operations oversight of Ames, Langley, Dryden, and Glenn
Research Centers. Dr. Colladay started his aerospace career at NASA
Glenn Research Center in propulsion R&D before moving to NASA
Headquarters where he held a number of leadership positions before
being appointed Associate Administrator of the Office of Aeronautics
and Space Technology. He has been a member of the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board and various Defense Science Board summer studies.
Currently, he owns an aerospace consulting company, RC Space
Enterprises, Inc.; teaches leadership and ethics for the Colorado
School of Mines; and serves on a number of boards, steering committees,
and commissions. He received his BS, MS, and Ph.D. degrees in
mechanical engineering from Michigan State University and attended the
Harvard Business School's Advanced Management Program. He is a fellow
of the AIAA and of the American Astronautical Society. Dr. Colladay is
Chairman of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the
National Academies. He has two daughters and four grandchildren and
resides in Golden, Colorado with his wife of 44 years.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you very much. Dr. Moore.
STATEMENT OF DR. BERRIEN MOORE III, MEMBER, NATIONAL ACADEMIES'
SPACE STUDIES BOARD (SSB)
Dr. Moore. Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of the
Space Studies Board of the National Research Council chaired by
Dr. Charlie Kennel. He regrets that he could not be here to
provide testimony.
In this verbal presentation, let me turn directly to your
questions. First, what are the top priorities and issues that
the House Committee on Science and Technology should consider
in the upcoming multi-year NASA authorization legislation? In a
word, balance. The convergence of pressures could significantly
destabilize the overall program. Among these pressures are to
complete and utilize the International Space Station, to retire
and replace the Shuttle, to define a rational and realizable
Moon-Mars exploration initiative, to execute a healthy science
program including meeting the scientific challenges of climate
change, and finally to restore and realize a healthy
aeronautics program.
All of these pressures gather in an overall NASA framework
of 10 healthy centers and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) 2011 level guidance on budget reductions. All of this
strikes me, reflecting my mathematical background, as an over-
determined problem. It cannot all be done. What will give and
how it will give is the central challenge facing the House
Committee on Science and Technology and facing us all.
Second, what are my perspectives on the key challenges and
opportunities for space science and to what extent does the
2010 budget address them? The 2010 budget is a significant
improvement on fiscal year 2009, but we face real challenges.
We simply must do more with less and/or do less with what is
available, to concentrate the resources. We need to reduce the
cost of doing business. Fewer managers managing managers. We
need to utilize innovative ideas with significantly lower cost
to obtain the needed observations. For instance, use
alternative platforms like autonomous aircraft or high-altitude
long-stay dirigibles. Use smaller spacecraft and simpler
instruments. Avoid the perfect, being the enemy of the good.
The opportunity is that with change and challenge, we might
find the new path that leads to a greater net good by doing
business differently but with honesty. No smoke and mirrors, no
cute phrases, but do it honestly and with simplicity.
Third, what are my perspectives on NASA's plans and
budgetary outlook for accelerating the implementation of Earth
Science Decadal missions, including the use of the Recovery Act
funds. Unfortunately as my written testimony details, the best
we can hope for is that the delays will be minimized. Almost
all of the monies went to pay for increased costs in the pre-
Decadal missions, Glory, Landsat Data Continuity Mission,
NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), the Global Precipitation
Mission. If there had been a systemic change such as making the
stimulus monies for Earth science a permanent rebudgeting, then
the 2011 and subsequent increases on top of this new base would
have provided the necessary profile to execute the Decadal
missions. And I would like to call the Subcommittee's attention
to Figure 1 in my written testimony.
Simply stated that the hole that was dug for Earth science
between 2000 and 2006 is simply too deep to crawl out of. It
needs a strategic fix.
Fourth, what are my perspectives on cost growth and
schedule slips in NASA's space science and Earth science
programs and their implications and NASA's approach to
mitigating future occurrences? I fear that the fixes are too
little and too late. We need to have the courage, political and
otherwise, to terminate programs that grow excessively, but
first we need to avoid these programs to start with. I believe
that with a vigorous pre-phase A, that is significant up-front
monies, for all of the missions, that that is essential. Then
if the technical base is not clearly in hand and very realistic
budgets available and agreed to, if those pieces are not there,
then the mission is parked until it is ready to start. We must
avoid doing something on quicksand or even sand itself. We need
a granite foundation, preferably from New Hampshire, reflecting
my previous life.
Are there any other matters that need attention? There are
two. NASA's monies must be multi-year on the commitment side.
To go to a one-year commitment process I think would not be
wise. And finally, there needs to be some consideration on the
reduction in the number of NASA centers. The same could apply
for National Laboratories. What was built in one era is not
always useful or needed in the next. We have recognized this
with military bases. Why not other national facilities?
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Moore follows:]
Prepared Statement of Berrien Moore III
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today on behalf of Space Studies Board (SSB) of
the National Research Council (NRC), chaired by Dr. Charles Kennel. Dr.
Kennel is also a member of the blue-ribbon Review of U.S. Human Space
Flight Plans Committee. Dr. Kennel regrets that he could not be here to
provide testimony today. I will try to cover most of the same key
priorities, issues, challenges and opportunities for NASA's science
programs that Dr. Kennel would have presented for you. Although I also
serve on the SSB with Dr. Kennel, my views are my own and do not
represent an official position of the NRC.
With your permission, I will submit my written testimony for the
record and recap briefly my views for you here this morning.
NASA's science programs have been called the Agency's ``crown
jewel'' and with good reason. They represent less than a quarter of
NASA's annual budget and only three percent of the annual federal
Research and Development (R&D) investment. For this relatively small
investment, in recent years, NASA's science programs have provided:
critical insights into global climate change and the management of
Earth's resources; helped us understand and anticipate the impact of
solar storms on our technological infrastructure; changed our views
about the potential habitability of other worlds in our solar system
and beyond; and revolutionized our understanding of the major
constituents of energy and matter in our universe and its eventual
fate. In a word, NASA's science programs have enriched our lives,
strengthened our societies, and expanded our horizons.
As you consider NASA authorization legislation for the coming
years, it is important to keep in mind the potential opportunities that
lie in front of the Agency's science programs. On the increasing
strength of Earth science, we know can state that global warming is
``unequivocal,'' \1\ but this simply sets the challenge. We need now to
develop the capability to monitor and thereby manage greenhouse gas
emissions through the this century and beyond, and concurrently, we
need the capability to project with a quantitative understanding of the
uncertainties the impact of climate change to at least the regional
level, and thereby, provide essential information to help decision-
makers mitigate the varying impacts of climate change on local
environments and populations.
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\1\ ``Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now
evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean
temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global
average sea level.'' Fourth Assessment Report (Working Group One) of
the intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
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In solar and space physics, joint observations from multiple
spacecraft orbiting in the wake of the Earth may allow predictive
models of space plasma and particle interactions to begin to unravel
the physics of ``magnetic reconnection'' and thereby advance our
understanding across a range of spatial scales and topics from fusion
reactors to black holes. In planetary science, we will have an
opportunity to follow-up on the discovery of liquid water environments
on Mars and the moons of the outer planets and search for organic
compounds and other past or present evidence of potentially life-
bearing environments beyond Earth. In astrophysics, we will have an
opportunity to follow up on the discovery over the past decade of more
than 300 planets outside our solar system and hence expand the search
for planets `more like' our own Earth. There is also an opportunity in
astronomy for NASA to cooperate with the physics community to build
upon discoveries about the accelerating expansion of our universe and
associated energy ``creation'' and thereby establish the necessary
extended observational platforms to understand the nature of the now-
termed ``dark energy,'' which apparently dominates the energy budget of
the universe and drives its expansion. And in life and microgravity
sciences, the International Space Station (ISS) could provide U.S.
researchers with their first permanent microgravity research platform.
These are each unique opportunities during our lifetimes for the
United States to demonstrate technical leadership, advance the state of
scientific knowledge for humanity's benefit, and leave important
legacies for future generations. In stating this, I clearly recognize
the significantly challenging economic environment, and I am well aware
of the out-year budget constraints and recent ``Guidelines.'' \2\ The
times call for careful setting of priorities; I present this testimony
in the knowledge of this necessity.
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\2\ OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET; June 11, 2009; MEMORANDUM FOR
THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: Planning for the President's
Fiscal Year 2011 Budget and Performance Plans.
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When considering authorization legislation for the Agency, it is
also important to keep in mind how NASA's science programs can be
employed as a tool to address national priorities outside the
scientific enterprise. For example, in foreign affairs, NASA's science
programs have a long history of international cooperation with partners
in Europe, Japan, Russia, and Canada. With a number of new space powers
emerging around the globe, NASA's science activities provide an
opportunity to engage countries like China and India in peaceful,
scientific pursuits that could encourage transparency in their space
programs. Because they are a demanding consumer of new technologies,
NASA's science programs also help address economic competitiveness by
driving new developments in critical technologies like instrumentation,
autonomy, communications, and data management. And the exciting
discoveries made in NASA's science programs are particularly
inspirational to youth and easily shared with the Internet and smart
phone generation, a potentially important source of new engineers and
scientists for our economy. In past legislation, Congress has
recognized the value of sharing the adventure of space research via new
virtual methods and should continue to do so.
To realize these opportunities, a number of critical issues must be
addressed and challenges met. Arguably the largest issue is restoring
or at least maintaining the balance of funding between NASA's science
and human space flight activities. Several years ago, over $3 billion
was eliminated from the Science Mission Directorate budget to help pay
for return-to-flight, Space Shuttle retirement, and the Constellation
Program. This eliminated the projected growth in NASA's Science Mission
Directorate and exacerbated what had already been dangerous downward
trends in portions of the science portfolio. For example, after
accounting for structural changes in how NASA categorized its budget,
the 2007 National Research Council Earth science and applications from
space ``decadal survey'' \3\ documented that support for the overall
effort for Earth observations and the associated science in NASA was
reduced by more than 30 percent between 2000 and 2006 (see discussion
below).
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\3\ National Research Council, Earth Science and Applications from
Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond (2007),
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record-id=11820#toc
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Across the Agency, reductions in science support led to the
deferment of multiple missions, painful program restructurings,
dramatic reductions in research grants, and the elimination of many
technology investments. A recent report by the Congressional Budget
Office warns that estimates of the cost of NASA's Constellation Program
through the first manned lunar landing have risen from $57 billion to
$92 billion, and may reach $110 billion. Although the Review of U.S.
Human Space Flight Plans Committee is tasked with developing an
affordable and sustainable human space flight program that fits within
the current budget profile for NASA's human exploration activities, it
is a very difficult task and does not guarantee that NASA's human space
flight programs will not encounter unanticipated problems and future
cost growth. To ensure the productivity of NASA's science programs, it
is important that any future growth in human space flight costs not
impact the already flat science budget. In the past, budgetary
``firewalls'' have been erected to protect other parts of the NASA
budget from cost growth in human space flight programs, and Congress
may want to consider such measures in the future. In doing so, Congress
may need to ensure that such firewalls are actually honored.
A related issue is the question of ISS utilization and NASA funding
for microgravity research. While a number of the long-promised ISS
research facilities are available or will become available in the next
year, the number of U.S. investigators currently in a position to
exploit the potential of these facilities is very limited. The NASA
programs that supported the development of investigations to use these
facilities were either canceled or severely cut in the middle of this
decade. From 2004 to 2008, the number of life and microgravity science
investigators supported by NASA fell from 769 to 230, a 70 percent drop
overall with physical sciences research dropping by 90 percent. Many of
the small number of U.S.-sponsored ISS investigations that remain were
preserved by congressional intervention. Although Congress has
designated the ISS as a national research laboratory to encourage its
utilization by other federal R&D agencies, Congress should keep in mind
that NASA's role, which has declined significantly, in supporting the
life and microgravity sciences community to make effective use of ISS
remains central and limited. As a consequence, the former research
community has largely dissipated, and there are many questions about
how high quality research can, or will be, solicited and supported
during the window of opportunity we are now entering for ISS
utilization.
Turning to the other science-related studies, per Congressional
request, the NRC is currently undertaking three decadal surveys--in
astronomy and astrophysics, planetary science, and biological and
physical science in space. Upon completion, these surveys will have
reached community consensus on research priorities that can inform
NASA's planning processes and congressional and White House decision-
makers. Each of these surveys incorporates inputs from hundreds of
researchers. I strongly encourage Members of Congress to closely review
these decadal survey reports when they are released, invite their
leadership to brief you and your staffs, and reflect their priorities
in your legislation wherever possible.
Within NASA's Science Mission Directorate, Earth science is
arguably one of its most critical functions and a source of some of
NASA's greatest contribution to the Nation. It is also an area where a
Decadal Survey had profound impact. As one of the co-leaders of the
Earth Science Decadal Survey,\4\ I applaud Congress's subsequent
increased support for NASA's Earth science program. This support was
and is needed.
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\4\ Ibid.
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As noted earlier, despite the wealth of information that NASA's
Earth observation research has supplied on understanding climate
change, much more is needed. The challenge is growing and will not go
away; climate change is not a problem de jour. Recognizing the need for
increased information, the 2009 Recovery Act was targeted to accelerate
implementation of the Earth science decadal missions. I believe that
NASA used this money primarily to pay for cost overruns and delays in
the existing program, (e.g., LDCM, GPM, and Glory), which could be
argued indirectly accelerates (or rather does not further delay) the
decadal missions. It could also argue that it rewards poor management.
The Earth science budget in the President's FY 2010 request is a
marked improvement over the early budgets. However, it remains
inadequate, particularly in the out-years and well below the
recommended profile from the Decadal Survey. The following Figure
highlights the difficulty (see also Attachment One).
On the current path only four (SMAP, ICESat-II, DESDynl and
CLARREO) of 15 missions recommended by the NRC's Earth Science decadal
survey will be launched before 2020. This mission backlog, which I
believe the Nation can ill afford, has been exacerbated by the recent
loss of the Orbiting Carbon Observatory mission and continuing delays
in NPP. Where funding can be added to the NASA science budget, Congress
should consider accelerating the remaining missions from the Earth
science decadal survey. Congress may also want to consider encouraging
NASA to explore more rapid means of obtaining key measurements from
space by utilizing smaller spacecraft wherever possible.
Finally, I note that Congressional add-ons can add further stress
to the budget:
An additional $9 million was marked to refurbish the
DSCOVR spacecraft's Earth science instruments, even though
DSCOVR did not rise to the very high bar set by the decadal
survey. (The survey did note that the space environment sensors
on DSCOVR would fulfill the pressing need for an operational
replacement of the instruments on the aging ACE spacecraft).
Last year Congress directed NASA to spend $10 million
to initiate development of the TIRS instrument. The FY10 budget
indicates the LDCM project is now carrying ``between $150-
175M'' to accommodate TIRS. Although very desirable, the cost
for TIRS comes at the expense of the recommended program.
In a separate area, I question the logic in this cost
environment of spending whay may eventually amount to $50
million to undertake the feasibility of the Constellation
architecture facilitating service missions to future
observatory-class science spacecraft.
In closing my extended discussion on Earth science, let me note
that there are major strategic issues in Earth science and the
associated observations which remain open as we consider how best to
provide the needed information to respond wisely to climate change. In
the decadal survey, we recommended that:
The Office of Science and Technology Policy, in
collaboration with the relevant agencies, and in consultation
with the scientific community, should develop and implement a
plan for achieving and sustaining global Earth observations.
This plan should recognize the complexity of differing agency
roles, responsibilities, and capabilities as well as the
lessons from implementation of the Landsat, EOS, and NPOESS
programs.\5\
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\5\ I note that Congress is seeking a similar report (See
Attachment One--Congressional Record).
The need for this overall Earth observing plan remains.
Returning to the many cross-cutting issues that affect NASA science
programs broadly, one of the most critical is mission cost growth. I
touched upon the issue of cost growth in my Earth science discussion
above, but it is hardly an issue for Earth science alone; it is an
issue that has plagued many of NASA's programs for a long time. It is
important to note the obvious: the problems induced by cost growth can
become acute within a flat budget environment. To pay for cost growth
on one mission, the funding for other missions is often deferred,
leading to schedule slippage and potential gaps in the overall research
enterprise. For example, a recent NRC mid-decade review of NASA's solar
and space physics programs found that very little of the recommended
priorities from the prior decadal survey will be realized during the
decade in question--threatening the status of the survey's integrated
research strategy--partly because cost growth on some missions has
delayed their launch as well as the development of other missions. The
effect can be and usually is cascading.
There are numerous different explanations for why cost growth
occurs, and the pathologies are different for each mission. Some
causes, such overly ambitious science measurements and technology
assumptions, are self-inflicted. NASA's Science Mission Directorate is
taking some steps to correct these issues. One of the long-standing
axioms of program management is that it is necessary to spend a
significant amount of money on a program in the early concept stages in
order to better understand the technology and engineering requirements
and tradeoffs.\6\ NASA is now doing this for some of its missions. NASA
and the NRC are also requiring independent cost estimates--as opposed
to estimates produced by a mission's advocates--in the current round of
decadal surveys to improve the overall planning process and help to
keep mission proposals honest. The NRC is also starting a
congressionally-mandated study of the causes of mission cost growth and
possible ways to remediate it that may inform future cost management
strategies.
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\6\ In the Earth Science Decadal Survey, we explicitly called for
extended and early Phase A studies to provide early understanding of
the technology readiness issues.
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However, it is important to also point out that some causes of cost
growth originate outside NASA. The engineering development of each
mission has a most efficient path to follow, and stable, adequate
funding is critical to keeping that efficient path in place. If
Congress and the White House do not provide stable, adequate funding
levels, the schedule for mission developments are often stretched out,
leading to increased mission costs. As discussed above, this has
occurred in the Earth science program; the NRC mid-decade review of
NASA's solar and space physics programs also found that instability in
the funding for NASA's Solar-Terrestrial Probes Program was a key cause
of mission cost growth. The budget resources that the White House and
Congress provide to NASA must match not only mission objectives, but
also how, where, and by whom a mission will be developed and carried
out.
An issue related to cost growth is the balance between different
sizes of missions. The NRC's decadal surveys universally recommend a
mix of small, medium, and large missions in each research area. This
allows a field to pursue difficult, long-term, but highly rewarding
research goals that usually require missions costing a billion dollars
or more, while still infusing the field with new data from regular
missions costing hundreds or even tens of millions of dollars.
Unfortunately, cost growth on large missions can reduce or eliminate
opportunities for frequent, innovative, and risk-taking research by
eliminating small mission opportunities, such as NASA's Discovery, Mars
Scout, Explorer, and sub-orbital programs. This problem is especially
acute where a single large mission development, like the James Webb
Space Telescope in astrophysics or the Mars Science Laboratory in the
Mars Exploration Program, dominates spending for a particular field or
program.
Congress should be vigilant about mission balance in NASA's science
programs, encourage NASA to take proactive steps to avert cost growth
on large missions as early as possible, protect funding for smaller
mission opportunities where possible, and restore funding for smaller
mission opportunities when they are temporarily reduced. The NRC is
currently undertaking two studies, on suborbital and mission-enabling
activities, that will provide additional advice on those NASA programs
that provide smaller, more frequent research opportunities.
Another cross-cutting issue that has emerged in several recent NRC
reports is the importance of investments in technology development
independent of science flight missions. NASA had such programs in the
past, but they were largely eliminated due to other budget demands. My
colleague, Ray Colladay, has covered this issue in detail in his
testimony, but its importance to NASA's science programs should be
noted. There are numerous technologies that are essential to
accomplishing the goals established by the decadal surveys that are
currently at relatively low technology readiness levels. Attempts to
develop these technologies within flight mission development projects
increase the chances that the missions will go dramatically over
budget. In addition, it limits the ability of these technologies to be
adapted to a broader set of missions. NASA managers are often reluctant
to create separate technology development programs because of concern
that they become unfocused and also because they are easy targets for
budget cuts when flight programs overrun. However, there is no reason
that a well-run and tightly focused technology development program will
not work. Congress should encourage NASA to make necessary technology
investments in advance of mission development starts and protect those
investments when they are well-managed and productive.
An issue that has repeatedly appeared in NRC reports on NASA's
science programs is the shrinking availability and affordability of
launch vehicles. This problem is most acute for medium-sized science
payloads that have relied in the past on the workhorse Delta II launch
vehicle. As the Air Force moves the Global Positioning System (GPS) to
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs), there may not be enough
business to maintain the Delta II line in an operational or affordable
state. NASA is encouraging the development of potentially affordable
alternatives to the Delta II through its Commercial Orbital
Transportation Systems (COTS) program, and these efforts should receive
Congress's support. If these efforts do not come to fruition, NASA will
either have to make potentially unacceptable technical compromises to
fit medium-sized missions on smaller launch vehicles, or pay
unnecessary and much higher costs to launch medium-sized missions on
larger launch vehicles.
Finally, NASA is both a research and advanced technology
development agency. As such, it must continue to have multi-year budget
authority (subject to the availability of funds). This is essential.
Like any cutting-edge, highly technical endeavor, NASA's science
programs face a number of issues, from both within and without, that
must be addressed in a forthright manner to maintain the high
productivity of the U.S. civil space program's ``crown jewel.'' I hope
my testimony provides you with useful advice on some of the important
steps that can be taken to meet these challenges. Given the remarkable
advances in NASA's science programs over the past decade, the
relatively small investment required, and the opportunities we
anticipate in the coming decade, such steps are well worth the effort.
This completes my prepared remarks and I am happy to answer any
questions the Subcommittee may have. Thank you.
Attachment One
Issues in Earth Science
The Decadal Survey Committee concluded that the recommended NASA
program could be accomplished by restoring the Earth science budget in
real terms to where it was in the late 1990s. To track progress since
release of the decadal survey, we've continued to update the budget
figure shown in the report's Chapter 2. This graph shows--in constant
year (2006) dollars--how the NASA Earth science budget has fared over
time. It corrects for inflation and accounting changes that have been
made over the years, such as the switch to full-cost accounting and the
latest change to separately account for so-called ``cross-cutting
programs'' (which fund center operations). This has been done because
it puts the budget request in context, and this is needed to compare
budgets from different years in an apples-to-apples fashion. The gray
portion shows the previously enacted budgets and the FY09 request; the
President's FY10 request is shown in purple and includes the $325M that
Congress directed to Earth science in the Recovery. Even with this one-
time significant infusion of funds, the program is falling short of
what the Decadal Survey Committee recommended. The gap between the
recommended funding level and out-year projections is both large and
persistent. The NASA Earth science program requires an on-going
commitment of funding at a higher level if it is to make needed
progress on the decadal survey. The program is doing what it can with
the resources it has been given--however it has not been given enough
to accomplish all that is expected of it.
On accelerating decadal survey missions
The latest budget has the first decadal survey mission (SMAP)
launching in late 2013 or early 2014, with a second (ICESat-II)
launching in late 2014 or early 2015. In contrast, the decadal survey
had recommended launching four missions by 2013. It is my understanding
that CLARREO is to be launched in 2019 (12 years after the release of
the Decadal Survey). So, what happened? Put simply, the needed budget
increase did not happen and existing programs overran. To remain within
the allocated profile, NASA stretched out the program.
The Stimulus monies, even though it states an objective of
accelerating decadal survey missions, does not seem to be having the
intended effect, unless one argues that it prevented further delays.
Tracking NASA's weekly reports on its recovery act web site, it does
not appear any activity has occurred related to the decadal survey
missions; indeed the FY10 budget indicates SMAP and ICESat-II will
likely slip rather than accelerate. Perhaps there is more detail in the
operations plan that NASA has been preparing, but this is not yet
public.
Thoughts on Cost Growth & Schedule Slips
As noted in my testimony, schedule slips and cost growth go hand-
in-hand. Changes or increases in scope also tend to be associated with
both cost growth and schedule slips. Simply put, the NASA Earth Science
program cannot afford any of the above. As mentioned earlier, the
program does not have enough funding to accomplish all that is expected
of it in a reasonable time frame. When existing missions grow beyond
their allocated budgets, the situation becomes that much worse.
Glory's cost grew between the FY09 and FY10 requests as its launch
was delayed from March 2009 to January 2010. This brings its
development cost estimate to $296M, compared with $259M back in 2008.
In terms of life cycle cost, in the last two years it has grown ?$90M.
NPP's launch was delayed again from June 2010 until January 2011
due largely to the late delivery of the VIIRS instrument--the mission
was originally supposed to launch in late April 2008. So, instead of
NASA Earth science program costs for NPP decreasing as the mission
transitions into operations, they are increasing to cover the extended
development phase. The change between the baselines development
estimate (from 2008) to that reported in the FY10 budget is greater
than $130M.
GPM and LDCM are also slipping to the right. What is more troubling
is that these two missions are still in formulation. Each of these
missions, when you add up the appropriations lines projected through
2014 is at least on the order of $850M (each). It is important to note
that some of the cost growth for LDCM comes from unfunded and costly
Congressional mandates.
Cost growth in the existing program and early decadal missions
greatly imperils the decadal vision, which requires multiple
measurements covering all aspects of the Earth system. Allowing
individual missions to grow in scope at the expense of the program
means important missions and measurements will be lost or deferred and
intended synergies will be lost. In the decadal survey, we explicitly
recommended a firm triage: missions that grow significantly in budget
need to be parked in the breakdown lane until they can be placed
through descopes or other strong management actions on a more reasoned
and restrictive budget profile. If this is not done, the existing
program or early decadal missions will block the realization of the
overall program.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you very much, Dr. Moore. Mr.
Stevens.
STATEMENT OF MR. J.P. STEVENS, VICE PRESIDENT FOR SPACE
SYSTEMS, AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION (AIA)
Mr. Stevens. Thank you, Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member
Olson, and Members of the Committee. I really appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you today.
AIA is the largest aerospace association in the United
States. We represent nearly 300 manufacturers, over 660,000
highly skilled jobs, and we indirectly support over two million
middle-class jobs and 30,000 suppliers from all 50 States. Our
member companies also routinely post the Nation's largest
manufacture and trade surplus. We appreciate the efforts of
Congress to keep the U.S. Space Exploration policy on schedule.
This policy remains essential to reducing the U.S.-human space
flight gap between the retirement of the Shuttle and the launch
of Ares-1 and Orion.
NASA Science Directorate provides us a better understanding
of our Earth and universe and NASA's aeronautics research
development projects are crucial to the completion of the next
generation air transpiration system.
Additionally, NASA's endeavors remain an inspiration for
our youth to enter our workforce. We strongly support the
current proposed NASA budget of $18.7 billion. However, we are
concerned about the out years which are completely flat through
2013.
In addition to ensuring stable and robust funding, we make
the following observations and recommendations. In the area of
explorations, we believe the current policy should be given the
support it is needed to keep on schedule. Over the past five
years, the Constellation Program has moved forward, and a great
deal of progress has been made. It is now bending metal, it is
conducting critical tests, it has produced many jobs that are
not only shovel-ready, they are also brain ready.
While we are pleased with Constellation, we are concerned
about a couple of other programs. The budget request only
provides $25 million a year for Ares-5 and zero funding for the
lunar lander. Without moving forward on these vehicles, NASA
and industry run the risk of losing thousands of jobs forever.
Another important element to our Space Exploration policy
is the International Space Station which is almost complete and
could be conducting possibly ground-breaking research in the
very near future. It will also provide valuable lessons for our
future voyages as it functions much like a test lunar outpost
or a test long-duration spacecraft. Most importantly, the
International Space Station is a prime example of international
cooperation in space. We urge the Committee to maintain the
International Space Station at least through 2020 without
taking away from other critical NASA programs.
We also recommend Congress to continue to support NASA's
use of commercial launch services and on-orbit services to the
International Space Station when they are available.
In the area of NASA Science and Earth Observations
Programs, we believe NASA's Science Mission Directorate is
doing important work given the current concerns about global
climate change. A healthy science program provides valuable
information about the cosmos, and NASA's Science and climate
change research and development programs provide NOAA with
operational weather and climate monitoring satellites. We ask
Congress to provide stable funding required to sustain these
and our next generation systems.
In regards to aeronautics, AIA believes that NextGen is
critical to continuing the decrease in the environmental impact
of aviation. Innovative engine design, air frames, avionics,
and materials have resulted in a 75 percent reduction in noise
and a 70 percent improvement in civil aviation fuel efficiency.
These advances spurred by NASA-funded R&D have brought the
aerospace industries a long way, and the mission directorate
has been responsible for safety and efficiency initiatives that
have saved countless lives.
The fourth area I would like to address is workforce. AIA
member companies are investing an average of $10 million a year
on STEM education, including Team America Rocketry Challenge
which is the largest rocket contest in the world. Despite the
opportunities NASA's education programs aspire to inspire our
youth, we are disappointed with the President's request for
NASA education initiatives which is $43 million below the
fiscal year 2009 enacted funding level.
The last area is commercial space launch indemnification
which will expire at the end of this year. Over the past 20
years, competition from foreign providers who all benefit from
some sort of government indemnification has grown
significantly. We believe that elimination of U.S. Government
indemnification will drive even more launch business overseas.
We recommend Congress remove the current gap of $1.5 billion
and eliminate the sunset provision. At a minimum, we request
indemnification be extended another five years.
In conclusion, space technology has become an important
part of our economy, our national security, and our future.
NASA stands front and center as the most visible representation
of the U.S. Space Program. Its continued work deserves the
support from this Committee and Congress. And I thank the
Committee for their time and attention. I would be happy to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stevens follows:]
Prepared Statement of J.P. Stevens
Introduction
Good morning Madame Chairman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson and
Members of the Subcommittee. I am grateful for the opportunity to
testify before you today on such an important topic as the NASA
Reauthorization bill.
As the largest aerospace trade association in the United States,
the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) represents nearly 300
manufacturing companies with over 660,000 high-wage, highly skilled
aerospace employees across the three sectors: civil aviation, space
systems and national defense. This includes over 140,000 workers who
make the satellites, space sensors, spacecraft, launch vehicles and
ground support systems employed by NASA, DOD, NOAA, NRO and other
civil, military and intelligence space efforts. Our member companies
export 40 percent of their total output, and we routinely post the
nation's largest manufacturing trade surplus, which was over $57
billion in 2008. Aerospace indirectly supports two million middle class
jobs and 30,000 suppliers from all 50 states. The aerospace industry
continues to look to the future, investing heavily in research and
development, spending more than $100 billion over the last 15 years.
AIA appreciates the efforts of the Congress to keep the
requirements of the Nation's historic U.S. Space Exploration Policy on
schedule. The policy remains essential to reducing the U.S. human space
flight gap between the retirement of the Shuttle and the launch of the
Orion-Ares I, as well as completion of and access to the International
Space Station. NASA's Science Directorate provides a better
understanding of our Earth and the universe. NASA's Aeronautics
Research and Development endeavors are crucial to the completion of the
Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) and continued
efforts to reduce aviation's environmental impact. Additionally, NASA's
work remains an excellent inspiration for our youth to study science,
technology, engineering and mathematics and to enter our aerospace
workforce on which much of our nation's transportation, security and
satellite infrastructure depend.
Recommendations for the 2009 NASA Reauthorization Bill
AIA was extremely pleased with the 2008 NASA authorization bill and
the overwhelming bipartisan support it received. As this committee
works to shape NASA's policies moving forward, AIA would like to see
continued support across all of NASA's mission directorates. NASA's
budget must continue to reflect both adequate and stable.
We strongly support the current proposed NASA budget of $18.7
billion, as we believe this is an excellent starting point for NASA
funding over the next several years. However, going forward the
President's budget is completely flat through 2013. We ask for
Congressional support in communicating to the Administration the need
for a more robust NASA budget over the next several years. We urge the
committee to have policy drive the budget, rather than have the budget
drive policy.
We are also very concerned about the recent House Appropriations
Committee decision to withhold increased funding for human space
exploration pending the results of the Augustine Committee on the
future of the U.S. manned space flight missions. Given the implications
of delaying our space flight program further, AIA is concerned about
any delays that withholding this funding may cause. Our main question
is: from where will the additional funding come if the Augustine
Committee recommends that NASA continue to stay on course? We fear that
no additional dollars will be available from the appropriations
committee and progress on this important program will yet again be
delayed.
In addition to ensuring a strong and balanced budget, AIA makes the
following recommendations on specific areas that should be addressed in
the authorization bill.
Recommendation 1: Keep U.S. Space Exploration Policy a Priority
Both the U.S. Space Exploration Policy and the Constellation
Program should be treated as national priorities and given the support
needed to keep development on its current schedule and to minimize the
impending gap in U.S. human space flight.
In January 2004, NASA adopted new far-reaching goals that point
toward a next generation human spacecraft, returning humans to the moon
and looking toward Mars and destinations beyond. Our industry finds
these goals thoughtful, technically feasible and marked with reasonable
milestones. Over the last five years, the Constellation program has
steadily moved forward and a great deal of progress has been made. NASA
has weighed the options on how to best accomplish its goals, designed a
strategy and architecture, has awarded several major contracts, and
along with industry has lined up the talented individuals needed for
these tasks. The Constellation Program is ``bending metal'' and
conducting critical tests. This has produced jobs that are not only
``shovel ready'' but also ``brain ready.''
While AIA is pleased with the progress of Constellation so far, we
are deeply concerned about the budgetary implications for the future of
the program. The FY 2010 budget request for NASA provides only $25
million a year for the Ares V heavy-lift vehicle and zero funding for
the lunar lander. Even small delays to current plans may cause NASA and
the aerospace industry permanent loss of human capital and reduce
options for retaining the specially trained and skilled workforce from
the retiring Shuttle program. Without moving forward on these vehicles
NASA and the space industry face losing a workforce with vital and
unique skill sets to non-space projects or even to other industries.
Those taking jobs elsewhere may not return should future jobs in our
industry become available.
Another important element to our national space exploration policy
is the International Space Station. Final completion of the station is
approaching and its crew capacity is now at six. This U.S. National
Laboratory is ready to conduct unique and possibly ground-breaking
research. The ISS will provide valuable lessons for future voyages to
the Moon and beyond, as it functions much like a lunar outpost or a
spacecraft on a long duration flight. Most importantly, the ISS is a
prime example of international cooperation in space. Sharing expertise
and costs with other nations will be critical for future long-duration
space missions and the ISS provides a platform to continue to build
international cooperation.
We urge the Committee to maintain the ISS at least through 2020 by
authorizing the appropriate levels of funding without taking away from
other critical NASA mission objectives. We also recommend Congress
continue to support NASA's use of commercial launch services and on-
orbit services to the ISS when they are available.
Recommendation 2: A Robust NASA Science Program and Addressing the
Nation's Earth Science and Earth Observation Programs
The work being done in NASA's science mission directorate is
another critical mission area for NASA, particularly given the current
political and scientific concerns about global climate change. NASA's
science program is perhaps best known for its host of satellites and
robotic probes that have combed the outer limits of our solar system. A
host of early satellites preceded our human space flights. The Ranger
and Surveyor series preceded our Apollo astronauts to the Moon. And we
have rovers on Mars and probes that have visited or are en route to all
the planets in our solar system. These programs are a necessary
precursor to human space exploration and must be sustained.
A healthy science program at NASA not only provides valuable
information about the cosmos, but also crucial data on the Earth's
ecosystem. NASA's earth science and climate change research and
development programs provide NOAA with valuable operational weather and
climate monitoring satellites.
It is incumbent upon Congress to provide a stable level of funding
required to sustain robust, operational monitoring systems and
investing in next generation, R&D Earth observation systems. Further,
the NASA authorization bill should continue to provide the framework
for the transition of these R&D programs to operational status whenever
possible, and Congress should provide OSTP, NASA and NOAA every tool
necessary in developing a process to appropriately transition these
missions. Private sector capabilities should also be employed to the
maximum extent possible to enable improved delivery of observations and
decision support tools.
Recommendation 3: A Healthy NASA Aeronautics Program
Historically, AIA and academic research organizations have
expressed concern over the amount of focus placed on NextGen-related
research and development. While NASA is uniquely positioned to
undertake this crucial R&D work, the Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate (ARMD) has failed to keep pace with NextGen R&D
requirements to date, leaving FAA to fill the breach. NextGen is
critical to continuing the dramatic decrease in the environmental
impact of aviation by applying technology and operational improvements
that lower emissions. Federal R&D funding is the cornerstone of the
advancement of NextGen, with NASA doing work that is then directed to
FAA or to industry for further refinement.
Addressing climate change is high on everyone's agenda, including
those of us in aerospace. We at AIA see NextGen and environmental
improvement as inseparable. Delays in today's air traffic control
system result in millions of gallons of fuel wasted annually. For
instance, more than 4.3 million hours of delays in 2007 consumed an
additional 740 million gallons of jet fuel, costing carriers more than
$1.6 billion.\1\ This produced approximately 7.1 million metric tons of
carbon dioxide.\2\ Manufacturers are designing and building 21st
century aircraft. However, our air traffic system has not moved into
the 21st century--it is virtually the same system in which the noisier,
dirtier aircraft of the 1960s flew.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Your Flight Has been Delayed Again, Delay measurement excludes
padding of block times to increase on-time performance; p. 3.
\2\ Ibid., emissions during taxi and flight time, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NextGen transformation is key to amplifying aviation's progress in
reducing noise and emissions concerns, which are major issues in local
communities. Innovative engine design, airframes, avionics and
materials have all resulted in a 75 percent reduction of noise and 70
percent improvement in civil aviation fuel efficiency since the late
1960s. These technological advances, spurred by NASA-funded R&D, have
brought the aerospace industry a long way, and we are accelerating our
programs. NextGen will build on that progress, which is a particular
challenge given projected traffic growth and global concern about
aviation's effect on the environment.
AIA is pleased to see NASA directing effort towards Integrated
Systems Research, which should include modeling and simulation work.
This work will greatly expedite NextGen and its layered implementation,
including incorporating Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) into the civil
airspace. Once NASA and the implementation agencies identify the
development priorities, industry is committed to leverage its full
arsenal of expertise towards the development of the NextGen system.
Moving forward, AIA remains concerned with the Administration's FY
2010 budget request and is committed to working with NASA to pursue
mutually beneficial research initiatives. Dating back to the early days
of NASA aviation aeronautics R&D, the mission directorate has been
responsible for revolutionary safety and efficiency initiatives that
have saved countless lives. We appreciate this committee's
acknowledgment of this tradition of excellence in the FY 2009 NASA
Authorization.
Recommendation 4: Continue to support NASA's role in education and
workforce development
AIA members have identified that a ``lack of trained technical
workforce for the future'' is one of the most important long-term
issues facing our industry. Our companies are taking action to develop
the future workforce, each investing on average $10 million a year on
science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education
initiatives nationwide. NASA's programs are not only important for its
own workforce, but also our industry. As the National Research Council
(NRC) stated in 2008, ``NASA has a unique and important role to play in
motivating and inspiring students to consider STEM careers.''
We are encouraged by NASA's FY 2010 education priorities. In
particular, we support programs stimulating competitive research that
prepares young people for future employment with student activities
that are directly tied to real-world experiences (i.e., Constellation,
Mars Exploration; global climate change; aeronautics). It is also
important to provide opportunities for student flight projects to gain
access to space through partnerships with NASA Centers, universities
and industry.
Despite the tremendous opportunities NASA's education programs
provide towards inspiring our youth, we are disappointed that the
President's FY 2010 request for NASA education initiatives is only $126
million. This is particularly disappointing when you consider that just
one of AIA's companies spends $60 million on STEM programs. The funding
request for FY 2010 for NASA education initiatives is $43 million, or
25 percent, below the FY 2009 enacted funding level of $169 million.
Recommendation 5: Renewing the Commercial Space Launch Amendments
Since 1988, the U.S. Government has had a risk allocation regime
that has addressed the exposure of companies providing FAA-licensed
commercial launch services to third party liability resulting from
launch-related activities. While the U.S. launch industry is considered
mature, our launch providers--whether commercial or government--operate
within narrow margins of return on their endeavors. Over the last 20
years, competition from foreign launch systems and providers--all of
which benefit from some form of government indemnification--has grown
significantly. Elimination of U.S. Government indemnification would
drive even more launch business overseas. In a competitive market with
narrow returns, the loss of indemnification could cause U.S. companies
to reconsider the risks and benefits of staying in the commercial
launch business and suspend activities or even exit the market. This
could also impact launches of U.S. civil and national security
payloads. This regime has been extended by Congress four times, but it
will expire at the end of this year.
AIA recommends that Congress remove the amendment's tier two cap of
$1.5 billion and eliminate the sunset provision in advance of its
expiration on December 31, 2009. AIA believes that, at a minimum, the
amendment should be extended another five years.
Conclusion
Over the last 50 years, space technologies have increasingly become
an important part of our nation's economic, scientific and national
security capabilities. Over time, all sectors of the U.S. economy have
become inextricably reliant upon space systems. As other nations make
rapid advancements in acquiring or exploring space capabilities,
America's leadership in space is no longer guaranteed and the securing
of its space assets is no longer assured.
NASA stands front and center as the most visible representation of
the U.S. space program. It's continued work in space exploration,
aeronautics research and development, Earth and solar system
observation, scientific research, and manufacturing technology programs
remains of critical importance to America and deserves the utmost
support from Congress.
I thank the Committee for their time and attention and would be
happy to answer any questions.
Biography for J.P. Stevens
JP Stevens is Vice President, Space Systems at the Aerospace
Industries Association, which represents the Nation's manufacturers of
commercial, military, and business aircraft, helicopters, aircraft
engines, missiles, spacecraft, material, and related components and
equipment.
Mr. Stevens is in charge of all space policy for AIA, including
national security space, commercial space, and civil space. He also
serves as Co-Chair of AIA's Space Council with his corporate
counterpart.
Before assuming his present position in January 2005, Mr. Stevens
served in a number of leadership roles in AIA, including Director of
Space Operations, Assistant Vice President of Supplier Management, and
Vice President of Special Projects. He also created and served as
Executive Director of the world's largest rocket contest, the Team
America Rocketry Challenge, an important event to attract middle and
high school students to aerospace careers.
From 1994 to 1999, he was a congressional advisor to former U.S.
Senator John Glenn on defense, military space, and domestic issues.
Prior to that, Mr. Stevens was a career officer in the United States
Marine Corps, where he served in numerous aviation and acquisition
positions, including as a Naval Flight Officer in operational A-6E
squadrons, the Program Manager for Night Attack and Reconnaissance
Systems in the F/A-18 Program Office, and Requirements Officer for all
Marine fixed-wing ordnance.
He is a graduate of the University of California at Los Angeles,
the Marine Corps' Command and Staff College, and the Defense Systems
Management College. He resides in Alexandria, Virginia, with his wife
Holly Kinnamon, and sons, Henry and Graham.
Discussion
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Stevens, and thank all
of you. It is a very diverse group of witnesses, but there is
one common thread which is competence and also commitment.
It is always tough here in the Congress where you take
experts who have dedicated their careers and decades to a
certain area of interest and then to limit testimony to five
minutes and then have to even cut that a little bit short. But
we are glad that you are here and in particular these advisory
panels on which you serve are voluntary, and the fact that with
all the competing demands that you have on your time that you
and your colleagues are willing and able to commit the time is
vitally important to our nation and is something that this
subcommittee plans to continue to utilize your expertise and
your education to the commitment that we have toward future
exploration.
We do not have a lot of time. Just so everyone knows, the
plan is to get a couple of quick questions in, and then I
believe that most of our witnesses can reconvene at 1:30. And
Mr. Olson, you are okay at 1:30 as well, correct? Okay. So with
that, I am going to yield my five minutes to Mr. Griffith who
will not be able to come back at 1:30. So Mr. Griffith, five
minutes, please.
Mr. Griffith. Madam Chair, thank you, and panel, thank you.
We are obviously admirers of you all and human space flight,
and we recognize that my district, which we consider in my
district the birthplace of human space flight, Fifth of
Alabama, we have a great interest in it. We believe that the
Saturn V was the Eighth Wonder of the World. We think Ares-1
and Ares-5 will be another wonder.
Are we satisfied, Mr. Marshall, Dr. Ford, that NASA has
done all it can to minimize the human space flight gap within
its current budgetary constraints and mission requirements? And
the second part of that is do we have an inventory of
scientists who have worked on human space flight and where they
are and how difficult might it be to reassemble them in a
timely fashion?
Dr. Ford. I will take it. Yes, I do think that NASA has
done all that it can do given the budget environment that they
work in to eliminate or shorten the gap as much as possible.
There is going to be a gap, but I think they have done all that
could reasonably be asked to do.
In terms of an inventory of space scientists and rocket
scientists, I presume, I am not sure if there is such a thing.
I do know that folks that worked on earlier programs, including
Apollo, are engaged in advising NASA with respect to Ares-1 and
-5.
Mr. Marshall. Let me add from a safety perspective, I also
agree from a safety point of view they have done everything
that they can with the resources that they have to minimize the
gap. There is no question that there is a gap. It is a lengthy
gap. It appears to be getting bigger, not smaller, but there is
only so much that you can do with the resources that have been
allocated.
The second issue is on workforce management. I will take a
little bit of a different stand. I think that we have work to
do, the Agency has work to do to catalog and make sure that
there is clear understanding of where those resources will be
available if they need to be at a later date. While we think
the Agency has done a great job of putting time and effort into
there, we also think from a safety perspective that there is
more work to be done if the Shuttle program were to be extended
or expanded.
Mr. Griffith. Generally to the entire panel, do we as a
nation, believe that the Chinese would like to get to the Moon
before we do, and if so, do we believe as a nation that they
are working diligently to do that? Anyone like to take that
one?
Mr. Stevens. I will go ahead and take it. I believe they
definitely are, and I think if you take a look at their
progress so far and compare it to what we did in the Gemini and
Apollo missions, they are making significant progress, and they
are using technology that is obviously a lot better than we had
back in those days. And I think their goal is set on that, and
I think if we don't move along, fund our human space program,
we are going to be watching them land for us.
Mr. Griffith. I couldn't agree more, and I think that our
committee and those in the audience, our worst nightmare is to
be at home in our living room watching the evening news and as
the landing occurs, it occurs to everyone in the world that it
is the Chinese and not America. And we have an opportunity
here, but we have got to keep ourselves focused and we have got
to realize we cannot do this on the cheap. This is not
something we can do in an inexpensive way. But we appreciate
each and every one of you for being here. Thank you.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Griffith. Mr. Olson.
Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. And I
have got a question sort of like my colleague, Mr. Griffith,
just for all of you to answer, but later today, you heard the
buzzers, but we are expected to pass the fiscal year 2010
appropriations bill for NASA, and as you all know, that
proposes to cut funding $670 million for the Constellation
Program. And the sponsors of the bill, we have had numerous
discussions with them, and I appreciate the Chairwoman's role
in that as well, they have promised us that they will work to
restore that funding pending the decision of the Augustine
Commission. And my concern there, and what I would like to get
your opinion on from a program perspective, what management
challenges does this approach impose on the program and the
contractors and can we avoid layoffs if the report comes out in
the September, October timeframe? Anybody wants to fire up?
Dr. Ford. I think it is very unfortunate and is likely to
indeed lead to layoffs. The exact number is unclear. I would
hope that that provision would not stick, but if it did it
would be problematic. Also, the language about one-year money
is highly problematic.
Mr. Marshall. Let me----
Mr. Olson. Mr. Marshall, go ahead, sir.
Mr. Marshall. Let me add again from a safety perspective
when you see turbulence within the budget process that creates
an on-again, off-again, it always creates a threat to the
safety, stability. We have seen that in numerous programs
before. We have documented that repeatedly, and this particular
cut we believe will have significant consequences to the Agency
and being able to stabilize. And in fact, if there was any one
theme that I heard from this panel this morning, it was the
need to stabilize, to balance, and to provide financial
supportability to be able to do all of those things, and it
just can't fit right now.
Mr. Olson. Dr. Colladay, did you want to respond?
Dr. Colladay. I was actually going to say exactly the same
thing. Stability is----
Mr. Olson. Stole your thunder.
Dr. Colladay. Stability is so critical to the endeavors
that NASA pursues, and the turmoil caused in the workforce and
by schedules being disrupted by reductions when there aren't
enough resources in the first place to do what I think is on
NASA's plate is terribly disruptive. And I hope that it can be
restored and then some.
Mr. Olson. I share your optimism as well. Dr. Ford was kind
of reading my mind by getting ahead, but I just wanted to talk
to all of you about the conversion in the appropriation account
from a two-year account to a one-year account. I mean, do any
of you feel that that is going to be a positive development for
NASA, or do we need to stay on a two-year accounting? Everybody
is nodding their heads.
Dr. Ford. It is a very, very bad idea.
Dr. Colladay. Absolutely.
Mr. Marshall. I think that is essential.
Mr. Olson. I agree with that. And with that, those are all
my questions, Madam Chairwoman. I would like to yield the rest
of my time to my colleague from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and I would just like
to pose a question that I will be coming back to at 1:30, and I
would give you this time to think about it and then to answer
when I get back because it is a very simple question. When we
are trying to figure out what to do with the NASA budget, it is
always very easy to come in and say, well, we are lacking this
much money. We are $3 billion short of what we need. Maybe you
could give us some specific guidance. What are your areas in
the NASA budget that are of highest priority to you? What are
your areas of the NASA budget that are the least priority? And
I would expect an answer to both of those questions because it
is very easy to say what you want to spend the money on, but
where should we look, what areas of the NASA budget has your
least support? Should we be losing centers? What center should
be closed? Or what program should we bolster? But we need some
guidance on both of those issues, and if you could give me a
very quick answer when we return, that would be very helpful to
us. Thank you very much.
Chairwoman Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher and Ranking
Member Olson. We have two minutes and 23 seconds left to vote,
so we are going to run out of here. We are going to recess
until 1:30, and we look forward to the Members rejoining and
our witnesses as well. So until 1:30.
[Recess.]
Chairwoman Giffords. This hearing will come to order. We
will submit my opening statement and Mr. Olson's opening
statement for the record, and the record will remain open for
two weeks for any additional statements from the Members and
for any questions the Subcommittee may ask of the witnesses.
The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by John C. Marshall, Member, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. At the hearing, in response to a question regarding either staying
on a two-year accounting scheme or converting to a one-year account as
is being proposed by the House Appropriations Committee, you indicated
that it was essential that NASA stay on the two-year scheme. Please
elaborate on why you believe this is essential, especially as it
relates to safety.
A1. As noted previously, the ASAP believes that changing NASA's
accounting from a two-year scheme to a one-year scheme has the
possibility of causing financial turbulence, thereby challenging the
Agency's stability. Two-year accounting allows for a program to have
more continuity, year to year, than a one-year budget cycle. Research
and Development (R&D) programs need longer wavelength budget cycles in
order to be effective.
In an R&D environment, requirements are not sufficiently defined at
the beginning of each fiscal year to contract for all services in
advance, nor are development cycles uniform or predictable across
program elements. In this regard, it is critical to retain flexibility
to contract for new activities only after the requirements have been
fully identified and properly scoped, a process that occurs
incrementally throughout the year as projects develop. More
importantly, maintaining a critically robust and timely safety program
necessitates sufficient budget flexibility to provide for rapid
response to risks as they are identified and test failures as they
occur.
Maintaining the two-year appropriations accounts provides the
foundation for NASA to best manage costs, while successfully executing
its programs and projects to achieve mission success.
Q2. Two consecutive Soyuz off-nominal re-entries prompted your annual
report to indicate that the Panel remains concerned about the safety of
Russian Soyuz spacecraft. NASA has acknowledged that the separation
failures ``are still unexplained anomalies.'' Since we plan to use the
Soyuz spacecraft until 2015, do we need closure on these anomalies?
A2. Even though the root cause for these anomalies cannot be proven,
the Russians have instituted several changes to correct the known
potential causes of the observed failures. These changes include:
adding pyro wire separation; additional grounding and electromagnetic
interference protection; additional instrumentation to try to isolate
the failure; and installing improved pyrotechnic bolts. These new bolts
are a more modern design and have improved electrical performance. Just
as important, the Soyuz design is inherently stable during reentry,
even with anomalies such as were experienced.
NASA has participated in many of the investigations and performed
analysis that supports the general approach that the Russians are using
to mitigate concerns from these anomalies. Likewise, the Russians have
approached this problem in a similar manner to which NASA would
approach such an unexplained anomaly. Based on NASA reports on the
Russian corrective actions, the ASAP believes that the mitigation
efforts, plus the robust design margins built into the Soyuz vehicle,
can support safe recovery operations.
Q3. In his response to ASAP questions, Mr. Scolese, commented that
``ISS--NASA's best kept secret is just how hard it is, and will be, to
keep station operating safely for the long run without a major adverse
event.'' What, from a safety standpoint, is needed to ensure long-term
safe operations and utilization of the ISS?
A3. Safety is a unique combination of good equipment, good training,
and good execution. NASA and its ISS partners need to be constantly
vigilant that all the equipment in the ISS works per design and any
unusual incidents are investigated, studied fully, and adjustments are
made quickly. The training of the ISS crews is also ongoing, and this
is a strength. Lastly, it is important to never become complacent. The
primary constraint for executing such a balanced approach is having
sufficient budget flexibility to maintain a robust response capability.
Q4. The ASAP report identifies the need for NASA facility maintenance
and upgrading as a critical issue for the Agency. How serious is the
problem of aging NASA infrastructure and what is needed to address the
issue? What are the implications of not addressing these issues with
NASA's infrastructure?
A4. The agenda for each ASAP meeting held at NASA Centers includes a
walk-around to view first hand activities provided by the Center.
During these walk-grounds we are seeing facilities of the Apollo and
NACA era used in the early days of Shuttle testing again being used for
Constellation projects. Evidence of years of neglect in water main
breaks, burst pipes, roof leaks, HVAC system failures, electrical
substation or other feeder system failures are common. There likewise
is a very serious problem associated with maintenance of supporting
institutional facilities and the infrastructure for utility systems,
including high pressure gases, steam, water, electrical systems and
high voltage, etc. The impact of such failures can range from short-
term work disruption and delay to damage to flight hardware and threats
to safety.
Reacting to unplanned, emergency repairs is very expensive, and
further depletes NASA's ability to perform preventive maintenance and
facility renewal. Direct programmatic funds are being expended to take
care of major maintenance and upgrades needed in facilities where
flight hardware may be at risk.
The ASAP's visit to Glenn Research Center (GRC) provides an
excellent example of the implications of not addressing the maintenance
and upgrading issues with NASA's infrastructure. Glenn is one of NASA's
older centers, and there had been plans, not long ago, to close the
facility. As a result, maintenance programs were dropped. Therefore,
the challenge now is to rejuvenate aging buildings and roadways, while
at the same time undertaking new construction. An example of older
equipment now in need of attention and for which there are safety-of-
personnel issues are pressure vessels at the Center, some of which
require engineering for proper maintenance and pressure re-
certification. Further complicating these efforts is that engineering
documentation for a large portion of the pressure system infrastructure
has been lost over the years, and it needs to be re-developed. Another
example of the institutional infrastructure problem at GRC was a break
in a major water main that caused the entire Center to be closed down
because of the loss of fire protection systems. This shutdown resulted
in considerable loss of productivity and a significant cost to the
Center.
Since most of NASA facilities are more than 40 years old, they are
becoming increasingly more expensive to operate as well as maintain.
Also, NASA's initiative to remove unneeded and aged facilities is one
that the ASAP supports, but to reduce operating costs in the long term,
incurred demolition costs can be very expensive. The result is that
deferred facility maintenance associated with the institutional
infrastructure continues to increase to offset increasing costs in
facility operation and demolition in NASA's operating budget. In lieu
of a budget increase to fund these deferred costs, NASA personnel,
valued facilities, and productivity may be placed in jeopardy without
careful scrutiny of the overall risks.
Significant additional resources are needed to address this serious
problem. The implication of not addressing the issue is a steadily
increasing risk of failure of major facility systems.
Q5. The FY 2010 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
spending bill recommends the consolidation of all institutional and
programmatic construction. In your opinion, is that a good idea or
would it have unintended consequences. What impact would the proposed
funding account consolidation have on the ability to ensure that
facilities receive needed improvements in an expeditious manner? Is
there a need for a targeted agency initiative on facility maintenance
and modernization?
A5. The ASAP has no basis on which to provide counsel on this question
as it is outside the panel's focus.
Q6. The Panel's annual report lists, among NASA accomplishments in
2008, ``the emergence of more cohesive and cooperative relationships
among Centers.'' Was it the Panel's assessment that NASA's policy of 10
Healthy Centers is working well? Can you provide examples of such
improvement and what NASA is doing to maintain that level of
cooperation? Do you have any concerns that need to be addressed?
A6. It is the panel's opinion that NASA has made substantive, positive
progress in the direction of 10 healthy centers. Work being performed
by the NESC at Langley for all Centers and better cooperation between
Marshall and Johnson are just two examples. The ongoing effort around
technical authority is keeping the communication flowing, so the new
NASA structure and work processes are helping to promote the ``10
Healthy Center Concept.''
The panel has raised the question--``Could NASA more efficiently
and economically operate with fewer centers?'' We appreciate the
political and public challenges of rationalizing government facilities;
however, fewer, stronger centers could possibly relieve ongoing funding
shortfalls and ease needed improvements to infrastructure.
This said, the ASAP believes there is more work yet to be done on
this, particularly in standardizing practices common among the centers,
and the ASAP will be looking for continued efforts in this area. One
current example is that we are asking for safety data from all centers
be reviewed in public at our meetings for leanings that can be
leveraged.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. During our June 18 hearing, witnesses were in general agreement
that converting NASA's spending authority to one-year money would
create new hardships for the Agency. Could you elaborate on the
consequences of such a change, and perhaps provide an illustrative
example?
A1. As noted in the response to Chairwoman Giffords first question, the
ASAP does not agree that this proposed change helps NASA, but in fact
will cause financial turbulence at a time when stability is required.
Q2. Re-establishing Advanced Technology Development as an
independently funded and managed program has been cited as an important
reform if NASA is to enhance its capability to develop new and perhaps
paradigm-shifting technologies. What caused the Agency to abandon this
approach? Was it simply budget; was the return on investment in
question? How much annual funding would be required to re-establish a
credible program?
A2. The ASAP has no basis to provide counsel on this question as it is
outside the panel's focus.
Q3. The International Space Station will, in all likelihood, be
utilized by NASA for some years beyond 2015 but at present the Agency
appears unwilling to make such a commitment. Our international partner
space-agencies have been looking for a firm signal from NASA for such a
commitment, as it helps them deal with their governments to lie in
long-term funding programs. What's preventing NASA from making such a
commitment now?
A3. The ASAP has no basis to provide counsel on this question as it is
outside the panel's focus.
Q4. What are your thoughts and concerns about engaging more
intensively with international partners to fly joint missions? What are
the primary disadvantages against joint international missions, and in
your view, would U.S. science research priorities likely be jeopardized
if we were to aggressively engage in joint missions? To what degree do
export control restrictions make joint missions unwieldy and difficult
to manage?
A4. The ASAP has no basis to provide counsel on this question as it is
outside the panel's focus.
Q5. Re-invigorating NASA's workforce is especially critical given the
average age of the Agency's employees. How would you describe the
attractiveness of NASA as a prospective employer, especially from the
perspective of a young `fresh-out'? Would they tend to look at NASA as
a career choice? How can NASA best ensure that the knowledge and
`lessons learned' will be passed from the current generation of
scientists and engineers to the next?
A5. From all indications, NASA still is successful at attracting co-op
students, interns, fresh-outs, and other early-career individuals when
vacancies are available. During the past year the Agency has been
receiving, on average, over fifty applications for every advertised
position; that number has risen to almost 120 during each of the past
two months. The ASAP has thus far not heard of indications from hiring
managers that sufficiently skilled candidates are missing from those
applicant pools. We believe that this stems from several factors,
including:
NASA's unique programs and associated facilities that
provide opportunities in aeronautics, science and engineering
that are not found (or rarely found) in any other parts of the
government--or even the private sector;
The opportunity to be part of an organization that
has a focus on the future, as well as contributing to improving
the quality of life on our planet right now;
Working in an agency recognized across the government
as an employer-of-choice (as demonstrated in successive Federal
Human Capital Surveys), with particular focus on recognizing
and rewarding talent and establishing an excellent work-life
balance; and, more recently,
The security of government service during an
uncertain economic period.
That said, the ASAP believes there are several factors at work that
potentially discourage qualified candidates from seeking NASA
positions, including: relatively few positions are available given
constrained civil servant ceilings and low rates of attrition among the
current workforce; concern about adequate opportunities for meaningful,
hands-on work early in their careers (a combination of a relatively
small number of new programs and low attrition); and uncertainty over
the sustainability of major programs across multiple administrations.
We concur that passing along knowledge to the next generation of
NASA employees is a critical concern. There are multiple mechanisms for
doing so, and from our observations NASA is taking advantage of many of
those. For example, the Agency has taken steps to increase formal and
informal mentoring programs throughout the Agency. Although focused
primarily on enhancing leadership skills, such programs also serve to
pass along technical knowledge. A recent ``career pathing'' program has
also been successful in capturing and documenting the developmental
experiences of senior Agency personnel from multiple disciplines in
order to guide newer employees along similar (or different) paths. One
of the most successful mechanisms, however, is working side-by-side
with more experienced personnel, and one of the objectives of the
Agency's new Early Career Hiring Initiative is to bring substantial
numbers of new employees into the Agency far enough in advance of
anticipated retirements so that a period of overlap is available for
the more experienced employees to pass along what they know before
leaving.
Another NASA activity that focuses on knowledge sharing and lessons
learned is the Office of the Chief Engineer's Academy for Program/
Project/Engineering Leadership (APPEL) program. APPEL places a great
deal of emphasis on lessons-learned and mentoring programs designed to
pass knowledge to successive generations of engineers and program/
project managers. This is done with two primary training activities:
courses and performance enhancement. For example, APPEL has recently
added a two-day ``Space Systems Development: Lessons Learned'' course
to the curriculum that reviews numerous NASA case studies involving
designing and building space flight hardware.
Q6. Over the last decade, NASA has employed several different
financial management schemes that directly affect managers and the
manner in which they account for--and control--costs within their
programs and missions. How effective, and how transparent, is the
current system, especially from the perspective of program and mission
managers?
A6. The ASAP has no basis to provide counsel on this question as it is
outside the panel's focus.
Q7. You recommend that NASA needs to take a more aggressive role
articulating human rating requirements for the COTS (Commercial Orbital
Transportation System) program. Could you elaborate? Has NASA not yet
developed a set of specific standards for potential commercial
providers? Will commercial providers be held to a lesser standard than
exists today for Orion/Ares?
A7. No, NASA has not yet developed any specific information for COTS
providers for human rating requirements, other than those required
while delivering and docking with the ISS during cargo missions. In
this regard, the ASAP believes NASA is late in developing these
important requirements.
The scope of the COTS project and demonstrations involve the
development and operation of an end-to-end space transportation system
of services including ground operations and integration, launch,
rendezvous, proximity operations, docking or berthing, orbital
operations, reentry, and safe disposal or return. For the Phase 1,
Technical Development/Demonstration funded Space Act Agreements (SAAs),
the objective has focused on the qualification of the launch vehicle
for cargo delivery and return, including rendezvous and berthing with
the International Space Station (ISS). As part of these demonstrations,
NASA's approach has been to review Safety and Mission Assurance
products, including the safety and mission assurance plan, hazard
analysis, safety assessments, risk assessments, probabilistic risk
assessments, software assurance and the human-rating plan, during
partner design reviews to assure that safety is build into the design
and development process--all for the cargo mission.
With respect to a set of specific NASA standards for the potential
commercial providers, at the present time the agreements only impose
the applicable ISS visiting vehicle requirements as a condition for
using the ISS as an orbital destination and active test bed. Space
Station Safety Review Panel's (SRP) phased safety reviews will address
rendezvous, approach, docking, undocking, and separation, and
compliance with ISS safety requirements. The SRP's approval will be
required before being allowed to rendezvous and berth or dock with the
ISS--again for the cargo mission.
Launch and re-entry requirements are imposed by the Federal
Aviation Administration's Office of Commercial Space Transportation
(FAA/AST), through their licensing of all of the COTS demonstration
missions. The FAA/AST licensing and regulatory authority does not
extend to orbital operations. FAA/AST has the authority to issue
licenses for launch and re-entry operations with humans aboard with the
licensee responsible for crew and space flight participants' safety to
assure the safety of the public and the protection of property.
The FAA licensing involving human space flight will proceed in a
multi-step process, starting with experimental operations handled on a
case-by-case basis, thus allowing for the regulation to mature as the
industry gains relevant flight experience. As directed by Congress, the
FAA's final rule for Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space
Flight Participants, which became effective on February 13, 2007
expressly addresses requirements for space flight participants (SFP)
(the presumed role of an NASA astronaut) to be one of written consent
and oral questioning of the operator so as to achieve some type of
``affirmation that the space flight participant understands what he or
she is getting into before embarking on a mission.'' The rule indicates
that the operator must inform each SFP in writing about the risks of
the launch and reentry vehicle type; the known hazards and risk that
could result in death, serious injury, or total or partial loss of
physical or mental function; and also that there are unknown hazards.
The rule indicates that an operator must inform each SFP that the
``United States Government has not certified the launch vehicle and any
re-entry vehicle as safe for carrying crew or space flight
participant.''
Therefore, in order to assure that the level of safety for the NASA
astronaut on a COTS vehicle be equivalent to that for a NASA astronaut
on a NASA-developed vehicle (which NASA has indicated to the ASAP to be
their objective), NASA acknowledges its responsibility to define human
rating requirements that are required to certify the COTS vehicle as
``human-rated,'' but thus far NASA has not done so. Because the Phase 1
SAAB include an option for crew transportation demonstrations pending
successful cargo demonstrations and additional funding, there has been
no delineation of the specific human-rating requirements in the SAAB to
date.
In addition, in further questioning by the ASAP, NASA had given
little thought as to what their approach will be in establishing human
rating requirements for the COTS program and how they will accept
alternative designs, testing, or concepts of operation, etc. This then
provided the rationale for the ASAP to press NASA to take a more
aggressive role in articulating human rating requirements for the COTS
program early on. As a minimum, the ASAP believes that NASA should
begin a dialogue with the funded COTS partners now to address this
issue. Further impetus for this action has been provided recently by
plans to spend economic stimulus package funding for COTS D to provide,
among other things, better definition of what it will take to human-
rate a vehicle originally built to deliver cargo to the ISS.
The ASAP concern to some extent has been exacerbated further by
media reports about the funded COTS partners' and other commercial
launch providers' ease or readiness in being able to comply with the
NASA human-rating requirements when the ASAP has several
recommendations relating to the new standard NPR 8705.2B, Human Rating
Requirements for Space Systems, issued May 2008, and our perceived
problems associated with its implementation within NASA.
Q8. You recommend that the Office of Personnel Management grant NASA
the authority to re-employ retired NASA civil servants without penalty,
and you specifically cite Marshall Space Flight Center as compelling
case where such a change would be welcomed. Why Marshall, and why not
other NASA centers?
A8. The ASAP believes that the ability to re-employ retired NASA civil
servants would be of benefit to all NASA Centers in cases where they
are experiencing difficulty with recruitment and retention, or meeting
an unusual temporary hiring need.
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) was used as an example only
because of the large numbers of Department of Defense (DOD) components
scheduled to move (or that have already moved) to the Huntsville area
as a result of recent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) activities.
The DOD currently enjoys its own specific authority to re-employ
federal retirees without penalty; the concern is that this gives them
an edge over MSFC when competing for local talent. Additionally,
retirement eligible NASA employees can retire and be hired by DOD
without losing a significant portion of their retirement pay. This puts
centers like Marshall at a disadvantage. This is especially troubling
during the early stages of a new, major program.
NASA like most other federal agencies has to seek OPM approval to
waive the salary offset. Thus far, their experience has been that this
is an arduous and time consuming process and puts the Agency at risk of
failing to obtain critical personnel on a timely basis.
NASA is using the legislative process to seek NASA-specific
authority to reemploy retired NASA civil servants without penalty. If
adopted, the legislation would authorize the Administrator to set the
pay of re-employed annuitants throughout the Agency without a reduction
in their federal salary. Such authority would provide the Administrator
the ability to hire annuitants with expertise and corporate knowledge
to address short-term critical program needs and mentor the next
generation of NASA employees in support of the transition of the
Shuttle to Constellation program. If received, such authority would be
Agency-wide.
Questions submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. It is always easy to advocate for more money for NASA. Assuming
however, a relatively flat budget, especially for the years following
2010, what guidance can you offer regarding areas in NASA's budget:
what areas are of highest priority to you, and what areas are the
lowest priorities? What can NASA or Congress do to maximize the science
return on its budget? For instance, do you believe it would be prudent
to consider closing one or more Centers? If so, which ones? Are there
programs that need bolstering? Please offer your best guidance.
A1. The ASAP has no basis to provide counsel on this question as it is
outside the panel's focus.
Q2. We're all familiar with the large and growing threat that orbital
debris poses to our people and assets in space. This subcommittee
recently held a hearing on the topic. AIA recently hosted a briefing on
this critical issue. And I think we would all agree that it is critical
for us to get working on some form of remediation effort.
a. First--do you all agree on that?
b. Second--is NASA the right agency to head this up?
c. Third--what are the hurdles we need to overcome to create
an international effort to get rid of all this debris up there?
d. Fourth--what are the proper roles for commercial entities
to play in this?
A2. The ASAP agrees that the space debris issue is a matter of growing
concern for all space-faring nations, both in terms of current space
operations and future planning exercises. The threat posed by orbital
debris to the reliable operation of space systems will continue to grow
unless the sources of debris are mitigated. NASA clearly has a role to
play in protecting its operations from orbital debris and in not
contributing to the orbital debris problem. It is beyond the scope of
the ASAP to evaluate the roles and missions that might be assigned to
the various federal agencies involved.
Q3. The recent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual report
stated: ``From a safety standpoint, the ASAP strongly endorses the NASA
position on not extending Shuttle operations beyond successful
execution of the December 2008 manifest, completing the ISS.'' As you
know, this leaves us with a significant gap in our domestic access to
space. The ASAP report goes on to say ``[we] are not convinced that the
Ares I and Orion initial operating capability (IOC) date can be
improved appreciably by additional resources.'' So if we can't extend
the Shuttle for safety reasons, and we can't move up the Ares I/Orion
date, how could we best spend resources in trying to minimize this gap
in space access?
a. The report also states ``There is no evidence that
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) vehicles will
be completed in time to minimize the gap.'' Except for the fact
that there is inadequate funding to fulfill COTS-D, is there
evidence that COTS couldn't be available in time to minimize
this space gap? Or reduce it? If NASA were to immediately fund
these commercial efforts to modify existing launch vehicles
and/or develop new ones, what is the best case scenario for
their availability?
A3. The difficulty of safely and reliably placing humans into earth
orbit and returning them is an immense challenge that is not fully
appreciated by many. While the future is bright and our hopes are high
for the potential of COTS providers, based on the data available to us
at this time the ASAP believes that the chances of COTS being able to
advance its own schedule, develop its methodologies, and have
successful launches and missions to prove its ``space worthiness'' in
the short time frame before Shuttle shutdown are remote. Further, NASA
has not yet provided COTS contractors with the requirements that must
be met to enable transport of Government Astronauts.
Q4. There is a renewed focus on NASA looking back at planet Earth,
either for climate change research, or weather patterns, or other
important roles. But I have always thought NASA did its best work when
it was looking outward--when it was a team of true explorers. It's
impossible to go over the next hill if you refuse to leave the front
porch. Isn't it time that we shifted some of these roles over to other
agencies more fully so that NASA can focus on looking out, rather than
looking in?
A4. The ASAP has no basis to provide counsel on this question as it is
outside the panel's focus.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Kenneth M. Ford, Chairman, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Advisory Council (NAC)
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. At the hearing, in response to a question regarding either staying
on a two-year accounting scheme or converting to a one-year account as
is being proposed by the House Appropriations Committee, you indicated
that it was a very bad idea to change to a one-year account. Please
elaborate on why you believe this is such a bad idea.
A1. NASA is predominately a research and development (R&D)
organization. Due to the duration and complexity of R&D programs,
virtually all federal R&D is subject to a two-year period of
availability. It is hard to understand why NASA should be different and
enjoy less flexibility than other R&D agencies given that its programs
are among the most challenging tasks assigned to any federal agency.
If aimed at correcting perceived shortfalls in obligation
performance, the House Appropriations Committee proposal would not
rectify any shortfalls in NASA budget planning or execution. As Mr.
Robert Hanisee, Chairman of the Audit & Finance Committee of the NASA
Advisory Council, stressed in his testimony--NASA has greatly improved
its financial performance. In FY 2008, NASA obligated 98 percent of its
funds in their first year of availability and is on track for similar
performance in FY 2009. As noted here and elsewhere, NASA does an
excellent job in obligating its funding within the first 12 months of
the period of availability. However, the nature of NASA's programs
(including the development of unique and extremely complex systems)
requires flexibility and funding stability. For example, by late summer
in 2006, NASA had committed to Lockheed to build the Orion crew
exploration vehicle. NASA had two-year money from '05 and was able to
use that money to put Orion on contract, once definitized. If NASA had
been restricted to one-year money, the '05 appropriation would have
vanished, and more would have been necessary in '06. It is important to
appreciate that reducing NASA's already limited flexibility will have
no positive effects and will in fact reduce its ability to effectively
manage its programs.
The House Appropriations recommendation to allow 10 percent of
NASA's R&D appropriations to have two-year availability, on an ad hoc
basis, would create an exceptional level of complexity and only
increase costs. As with other federal R&D agencies, the longstanding
policy of two-year R&D appropriations for NASA should be continued.
Q2. NASA now estimates that Shuttle transition and retirement costs
will total about $400 million, a far cry from the $2-$3 billion
initially projected. How much confidence do you have in NASA's new
estimate?
A2. Although the NAC has not reviewed this issue, I would have more
confidence in the current projections of Shuttle transition and
retirement (T&R) costs than in previous preliminary estimates, as they
represent a higher fidelity assessment of the T&R process than did the
earlier estimates.
Q3. Following its February 2009 meeting, the NAC recommended that NASA
``Communicate lessons learned on large mission cost drivers to the
Science Committee and to decadal survey committees.'' Could you
elaborate on why the NAC made this recommendation? What is your
reaction to NASA's efforts to manage cost growth through the use of
independent cost estimates and budgeting at a 70 percent confidence
level?
A3. The NAC is concerned by cost growth in NASA's large missions and
believes that this issue should be examined at all stages of a
project's life cycle, starting with a mission's inclusion in one of the
National Research Council's (NRC's) decadal surveys. In the past, the
estimated costs for missions referenced in past decadal surveys have
often turned out to be unrealistically low.
NASA has conducted a number of internal studies and has
commissioned outside groups (including the NRC) to do independent
analyses of cost growth in large programs. The NAC believes that the
consolidated results of these studies should be shared with the NAC
members, as well as the decadal survey committees convened by the NRC,
to ensure the proper dissemination of the lessons learned.
The decadal survey committees need this information to better
inform their future reports (two of which are now underway--Planetary
Science, Astronomy & Astrophysics--and a third on Heliophysics should
start next year) and to ensure that their cost estimates for future
missions are as realistic as possible. The NAC's Science Committee
needs this information to better inform its recommendations to NASA on
how to deal with cost growth to date and how to reduce cost growth on
future missions.
NASA has made a number of relatively recent changes in its cost
estimation and cost containment activities. Budgeting at the 70 percent
confidence level makes sense, and the NAC endorses this change;
however, these reforms need time to work, and it will be a number of
years before we can fully assess the impact of these recent changes on
NASA's cost performance.
At our most recent NAC meeting, we were presented with a detailed
history and potentially important lessons learned from the Planetary
Science Division on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) program. This
presentation is being converted into a white paper that will be
publicly available in the next few months.
Q4. The NAC makes formal recommendations to the NASA Administrator
based on its evaluations of the Agency's activities and operations. How
satisfied are you with NASA's responsiveness to and implementation of
the NAC's recommendations?
A4. We on the NAC are generally very satisfied with NASA's
responsiveness to our recommendations. In most cases, NASA concurs with
the recommendations and acts on them. In the instances where they have
not concurred, a thoughtful explanation has been provided. I have
served on several other FACA advisory committees, and I can say with
confidence that NASA has been the most responsive agency that I have
had the pleasure to serve.
Q5. From your perspective, what are the pros and cons of NASA's 10
Healthy Centers policy? What changes, if any, are needed in that
policy? What would improve the interactions among NASA centers?
A5. It is my sense that this policy is generally a good one and has had
more positive impacts than negative. It is a useful step toward NASA
acting more like a single agency. In recent times, NASA has
consistently had more facilities than budget to support them. Another
way to say this is that the Agency is ``over-facilitized'' but not
over-staffed. In the past, financially stronger centers were not
required to place work, whenever possible, at those centers with
unfunded civil servants. As result, in 2005 more than 2,500 FTE-
equivalents were charging to overhead, while at the same time JSC, KSC,
and MSFC were clamoring for people. Requiring program managers at
strong centers to ``call NASA'' first, before hiring support contracts,
essentially solved this problem. By 2008, NASA had only 300 FTE on
overhead. Requiring program managers to place work outside their host
center also brings in an enormously healthy diversity of views and
affords the programs access to the best relevant talent no matter where
it is located.
Another advantage of this policy is that it utilizes, supports, and
reaffirms the matrix management structure, wherein the chain of command
for program work and the chain of command for institutional work and
technical authority are different. When ``lead centers'' did everything
internally, the Center Director often thought, with some justification,
that he was the ``Program Manager-in-Chief'' of all programs at that
center. With program managers not only allowed but required to place
work where it can best be done, individual Center Directors are not
under the impression that they are ``in charge'' of programs, and
technical authority is maintained separate from programmatic authority.
When program managers of large programs are required to work across the
Agency, more decisions are made on a ``what's good for the program'' or
``what's good for the Agency'' basis, rather than ``what's good for my
center.'' Of course, another approach to alleviating the center centric
perspective is to locate the top-level program management of the
largest programs at Headquarters rather than at specific field centers.
Although the ``ten healthy centers'' policy is sound and sensible,
there have reportedly (and not surprisingly) been difficulties in its
execution. Current implementation of ``10 healthy centers'' has divided
the field centers into two major classes: the large operations centers
which receive the lion's share of program leadership (and resources),
while the smaller centers (mostly the research centers) are relegated
to a lesser status scrambling to compete for work apportioned by the
large centers with the resources. The research centers are at risk of
becoming, at least partially, job shops for the large centers. This
arrangement can cause a situation where a less financially healthy
center must place otherwise uncovered people on projects to which they
are at best marginally suited. Program managers also sometimes feel
they are not getting the best product for their money under these
circumstances. It is also the case that geographically distributed work
is harder to manage: however, this is a relatively minor weakness.
Some centers have embraced the ``ten healthy centers policy,'' some
have only tolerated it, and some remain unreconstructed. In my opinion,
under the current funding framework, the pros probably outweigh the
cons. Perhaps a better approach would be to provide adequate funding to
the underfunded research centers . . . or to consider down-sizing some
centers to fit the existing funding profile. Stability of funding,
mission, and policies are critically important in making the right
decisions about staffing and facility needs.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. During our June 18 hearing, witnesses were in general agreement
that converting NASA's spending authority to one-year money would
create new hardships for the Agency. Could you elaborate on the
consequences of such a change, and perhaps provide an illustrative
example?
A1. NASA is predominately a research and development (R&D)
organization. Due to the duration and complexity of R&D programs,
virtually all federal R&D is subject to a two-year period of
availability. It is hard to understand why NASA should be different and
enjoy less flexibility than other R&D agencies given that its programs
are among the most challenging tasks assigned to any federal agency.
If aimed at correcting perceived shortfalls in obligation
performance, the House Appropriations Committee proposal would not
rectify any shortfalls in NASA budget planning or execution. As Mr.
Robert Hanisee, Chairman of the Audit & Finance Committee of the NASA
Advisory Council, stressed in his testimony--NASA has greatly improved
its financial performance. In FY 2008, NASA obligated 98 percent of its
funds in their first year of availability, and is on track for similar
performance in FY 2009. As noted here and elsewhere, NASA does an
excellent job in obligating its funding within the first 12 months of
the period of availability. However, the nature of NASA's programs
(including the development of unique and extremely complex systems)
requires flexibility and funding stability. For example, by late summer
in 2006, NASA had committed to Lockheed to build the Orion crew
exploration vehicle. NASA had two-year money from '05 and was able to
use that money to put Orion on contract, once definitized. If NASA had
been restricted to one-year money, the '05 appropriation would have
vanished, and more would have been necessary in '06. It is important to
appreciate that reducing NASA's already limited flexibility will have
no positive effects and will in fact reduce its ability to effectively
manage its programs.
The House Appropriations recommendation to allow 10 percent of
NASA's R&D appropriations to have two-year availability, on an ad hoc
basis, would create an exceptional level of complexity and only
increase costs. As with other federal R&D agencies, the longstanding
policy of two-year R&D appropriations for NASA should be continued.
Q2. Re-establishing Advanced Technology Development as an
independently funded and managed program has been cited as an important
reform if NASA is to enhance its capability to develop new and perhaps
paradigm-shifting technologies. What caused the Agency to abandon this
approach? Was it simply budget: was the return on investment in
question? How much annual funding would be required to re-establish a
credible program?
A2. NASA has long enjoyed a reputation as a technology innovator whose
stressing applications in space and aeronautics have led to an
incredible range of broadly useful technologies. Several years ago, the
decision was made to divert a large fraction of the Agency's technology
investment into the Constellation Program. Unfortunately, technology
research programs are easily stopped and terribly hard to restart.
Technology research programs often serve as ``the bank'' or
``reserves'' to be sacrificed when more visible and near-term
objectives are short on funding. Also, in the past some of NASA's
technology programs were accused of looking like ``sandboxes'' not
clearly tied to the most critical Agency needs.
A robust and useful technology program at NASA would be dedicated
to stimulating innovation and developing new capabilities not tied to
existing mission requirements. Currently, for example, NASA's science
missions must carry all the technology risk in the program itself. This
makes missions such as MSL particularly vulnerable to the uncertainties
and risks associated with the development of fundamentally new
technology within the mission itself. Additionally, in the human space
flight side of the house, the lack of a robust technology program has
naturally driven program managers toward relatively conservative
designs and limited technology infusion. A much broader technology
focus would likely enable game-changing solutions that could open up
entirely new opportunities.
In addition to advanced technology programs in the mission
directorates, NASA would be well served by the establishment of a more
independent technology R&D organization, perhaps modeled loosely after
DARPA. It has been estimated that NASA could re-establish a credible
technology program with approximately $500M-$800M in additional
funding. This level of funding would restore NASA's technology research
efforts to rough equivalence with its previous level of effort.
At the July meeting of the NASA Advisory Council, NASA briefed the
Council on the activities of its Innovation and Technology Initiative.
This internal working group is in the process of conducting an
assessment of advanced technology development at NASA and will soon
produce a report on this topic. The Council was very pleased by this
initiative and will discuss the forthcoming report at our next meeting
(October).
Q3. The International Space Station will, in all likelihood, be
utilized by NASA for some years beyond 2015 but at present the Agency
appears unwilling to make such a commitment. Our international partner
space agencies have been looking for a firm signal from NASA for such a
commitment, as it helps them deal with their governments to lay in
long-term funding programs. What's preventing NASA from making such a
commitment now?
A3. NASA is not taking any action that would preclude a decision to
extend ISS operations and utilization beyond 2015. The Administration
will have to determine whether to continue U.S. participation in the
International Space Station (ISS) Program beyond 2015, and that issue
is one of those currently being examined by the Review of U.S. Human
Space Flight Plans Committee (Augustine Committee). The Augustine
Committee is scheduled to report out options to NASA and to the Office
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) this August. I would anticipate
that the Administration's decision would follow soon thereafter, and
NASA would then be able to provide the clarity and commitment that its
international partners are seeking.
Q4. What are your thoughts and concerns about engaging more
intensively with international partners to fly joint missions? What are
the primary disadvantages against joint international missions, and in
your view, would U.S. science research priorities likely be jeopardized
if we were to aggressively engage in joint missions? To what degree do
export control restrictions make joint missions unwieldy and difficult
to manage?
A4. International cooperation has long played an important role in
NASA's exploration and science activities. In spite of the many obvious
potential advantages of pursuing joint international missions, there
are also some significant disadvantages, including increased management
complexity, technical and programmatic risk, and political risk. One
particularly notable disadvantage that hinders the pursuit of joint
international missions is that various export control restrictions make
such international collaborations unnecessarily cumbersome. It has
become evident that improvements in export control policies are
necessary to ensure that our foreign partners remain interested in
working with NASA and our contractors on future joint programs. Any
assistance that this committee could give to reduce the barriers to
effective collaboration while maintaining the intended goals of export
control regulations would greatly enhance the productivity of
international partnerships in space exploration and science.
With specific regard to U.S. science priorities, working more
closely with international partners offers a mix of advantages and
challenges. As noted above, close cooperation with international
partners does indeed add complexity to some missions, including
difficulties arising from the aforementioned export control
regulations. However, the benefits of increased international
cooperation, especially in an era of tightened budgets, will likely
outweigh the potential disadvantages. NASA's Science Mission
Directorate (SMD) is working closely with the European Space Agency
(ESA) to forge a new joint Mars architecture that will likely enable
more science than either space agency could achieve on its own given
available budgets. That potential cooperation is driven by shared
science research priorities. This suggests that a joint NASA-ESA Mars
architecture incorporating shared access to the scientific data may
actually quicken the pace at which our national science priorities in
planetary science are achieved. At our most recent meeting (July 2009),
the NAC recommended that SMD build on the progress to date and expand
its relationship with ESA to include cooperative Earth science
missions.
Q5. Re-invigorating NASA's workforce is especially critical given the
average age of the Agency's employees. How would you describe the
attractiveness of NASA as a prospective employer, especially from the
perspective of a young `fresh-out'? Would they tend to look at NASA as
a career choice? How can NASA best ensure that the knowledge and
`lessons learned' will be passed from the current generation of
scientists and engineers to the next?
A5. From all indications, NASA is still successful at attracting co-op
students, interns, fresh-outs, and other early-career individuals.
Every year the research firm, Universum, ranks the most desirable
employers in the world, based on where undergraduate students say
they'd most like to work. NASA was ranked as the #1 ideal employer by
engineering students. Additionally, NASA was ranked as #2 by Natural
Science students, #5 by Information Technology students, and #12 by
Liberal Arts students. In my view there is little doubt that NASA is
generally considered a desirable place to work. That said, I do hope
that NASA will focus on hiring the very best fresh-outs that our great
country can produce rather than settling for less.
Passing along knowledge to the next generation of NASA employees is
a critical concern. NASA is involved in several efforts specifically
aimed at enhancing knowledge management and transfer. The Office of the
Chief Engineer's Academy for Program/Project/Engineering Leadership
(APPEL) program places a great deal of emphasis on lessons-learned and
mentoring programs designed to pass knowledge to successive generations
of engineers and program/project managers. For example, APPEL has
recently added a two-day ``Space Systems Development: Lessons Learned''
course to the curriculum that reviews numerous NASA case studies
involving designing and building space flight hardware. APPEL is also
collaborating with the Lessons Learned organizations at each center to
develop similar offerings. APPEL offers several other courses that
similarly focus on lessons learned. APPEL also employs numerous former
NASA ``grey beards'' from past projects such as Hubble Space Telescope,
Shuttle, and Viking to bring their experience and knowledge to a new
generation of managers in order to develop strong program teams. NASA
also encourages knowledge transfer through formal and informal
mentoring programs.
However, the success of such efforts rests heavily on NASA's
ability to hire adequate numbers of new employees of the highest
caliber. I understand that NASA is developing a hiring initiative
focused on securing the ``best and brightest'' talent for the future.
Although this initiative is still in the early stages, I am confident
that the Agency is progressing toward securing the ``next generation''
of scientists and engineers who will ensure NASA's success in the
future. Close attention must be paid to not just the number of new
hires but to their quality. If NASA is to inspire the Nation . . . it
must be staffed by the best our country has to offer.
Q6. Over the last decade, NASA has employed several different
financial management schemes that directly affect managers and the
manner in which the account for--and control--costs within their
programs and missions. How effective, and how transparent, is the
current system, especially from the perspective of program and mission
managers?
A6. The NAC Audit & Finance Committee has assessed the many financial
systems NASA has employed over recent years, so I defer to Mr. Bob
Hanisee's response, as follows: Over the past decade, NASA has
implemented many financial control systems; many of these were
ineffective. The current suite of controls, which include the
Integrated Enterprise Management System (IEMP), the Core Accounting
System, the Continuous Monitoring System, the Phasing and Planning
System and the Enterprise Value Management System are all working
effectively now. There are still issues that come up with these
systems, but it is fair to say that they are working effectively . . .
and with transparency. We will of course have a better read on their
efficacy following the conclusion of the 2009 financial audit. The
Audit and Finance Committee believes that the timeliness and accuracy
of financial information provided to Program Managers, Center Directors
and to the Administrator are much improved which should result in more
effective program management.
Questions submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. It is always easy to advocate for more money for NASA. Assuming,
however, a relatively flat budget, especially for the years following
2010, what guidance can you offer regarding areas in NASA's budget:
what areas are of highest priority to you, and what areas are the
lowest priority? What can NASA or Congress do to maximize the science
return on its budget? For instance, do you believe it would be prudent
to consider closing one or more centers? If so, which ones? Are there
programs that need bolstering? Please offer your best guidance.
A1. In my view, the highest budget priority is to develop a capable and
flexible space transportation architecture as quickly as feasible. In
particular, the key element in the exploration architecture is the
development of a heavy lift launch vehicle. I urge Congress to
accelerate and prioritize development of this capability as it is the
lynchpin to everything we will do in human space flight beyond low-
Earth orbit.
Maximizing the science return of NASA's budget requires a number of
coordinated steps. First, NASA needs to retain scientific peer review
and the National Research Council's decadal surveys as important
components of its decision-making processes. The use of scientific peer
review and the priority-setting processes of the decadal surveys are
crucial to ensuring that the highest priority science remains at the
forefront of NASA planning. Second, NASA's science portfolio needs to
maintain a balance among small, medium, and large programs. Each class
of mission contributes to the advance of science and to the health of
America's scientific and technological base in different ways.
Maintaining a balance among the size of missions helps to smooth out
science opportunities over time and allows the larger scientific
community to plan appropriately. Third, NASA needs to continue to
involve the larger scientific community in decisions on how to control
cost growth. The steps underway to improve the cost estimates
associated with the decadal surveys (especially the use of independent
cost reviews) and budgeting at the 70 percent confidence level are
important first steps. Finally, NASA would benefit from greater
stability in its funding, including funding for science. Funding
stability from year to year and receiving appropriated funds at the
beginning of each fiscal year would reduce the cost of changes to
programs and their industrial contracts and the uncertainty of the
annual planning and implementation cycle, freeing up more funds earlier
for scientific research. Further, it is important that NASA not be
shifted to one-year funding--which would be unique amongst U.S. R&D
agencies.
The NAC has not reviewed the question of whether it would be
prudent to consider closing one or more centers. With respect to
programs needing bolstering, I would advocate re-establishing a robust
technology research program at NASA.
Q2. We're all familiar with the large and growing threat that orbital
debris poses to our people and assets in space. This subcommittee
recently held a hearing on the topic. AIA recently hosted a briefing on
this critical issue. And I think we would all agree that it is critical
for us to get working on some form of remediation effort.
Q2a. First--do you all agree on that?
A2a. I absolutely agree that the space debris issue is a matter of
significant concern that will only worsen if nothing is done to address
the problem.
Q2b. Second--is NASA the right agency to head this up?
A2b. As I understand it, NASA does not have the authority to head up a
space debris removal effort and that the United States Air Force would
likely lead any such effort. NASA can provide technical assistance, and
the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has evaluated a wide range of
concepts for the removal of orbital debris. Also the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is playing an important role in the
search for a cost-effective means of removing hazardous orbital debris.
Q2c. Third--what are the hurdles we need to overcome to create an
international effort to get rid of all this debris up there?
A2c. Although there are economic and legal hurdles, the primary
challenges associated with creating an international debris remediation
effort remain technical in nature. That is, a practical and affordable
means of removing orbital debris has yet to be identified.
Q2d. Fourth--what are the proper roles for commercial entities to play
in this?
A2d. As major operators of orbital space systems, commercial users
certainly have a significant stake in development of a method for space
debris remediation. I understand that NASA and DARPA are in dialogue
with commercial entities as they investigate various means of removing
hazardous orbital debris.
Q3. The recent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual report
stated: ``From a safety standpoint, the ASAP strongly endorses the NASA
position on not extending Shuttle operations beyond successful
execution of the December 2008 manifest, completing the ISS.'' As you
know, this leaves us with a significant gap in our domestic access to
space. The ASAP report goes on to say ``[we] are not convinced that the
Ares I and Orion initial operating capability (lOC) date can be
improved appreciably by additional resources.'' So if we can't extend
the Shuttle for safety reasons, and we can't move up the Ares I/Orion
date, how could we best spend resources in trying to minimize this gap
in space access?
A3. NASA believes that the best way forward is to remain focused on
flying out the remaining seven Space Shuttle missions safely, even if
the manifest slips and continuing the development of the Orion and Ares
I vehicles. Meanwhile, the U.S. Human Space Flight Review Committee is
reviewing options to address the gap as part of their broader mandate.
NASA is promoting the commercial space economy by relying on
industry to provide cargo resupply services to the International Space
Station (ISS) through the two Commercial Resupply Services contracts
signed last December. It is important that NASA's industry partners
concentrate on developing the technologies and techniques required to
deliver uncrewed vehicles to orbit and conduct proximity operations and
docking maneuvers with the Station before they move on to developing
crew transportation systems. The need for commercial resupply is
critical to the continued operation and conduct of research aboard ISS,
and lessons learned in the development and operation of the cargo
vehicles will help the development of later crewed systems. The
approach of demonstrating cargo first and then stepping up to crew
transportation is the best way forward. It is also important to note
that NASA is planning to codify human space flight vehicle requirements
in order to assist in the development of those capabilities.
At this point, there is not any viable option that will eliminate
the gap in U.S. crew transportation to space. That said, by providing
NASA with adequate funding and allowing it the freedom to manage these
projects without extensive external guidance and constraints this gap
could be minimized. There will be issues with the technical
development, and these issues will need to be worked by the technical
experts. Continuing to change plans will only delay the development
process.
Q3a. The report also states ``There is no evidence that Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) vehicles will be completed in
time to minimize the gap.'' Except for the fact that there is
inadequate funding to fulfill COTS-D, is there evidence that COTS
couldn't be available in time to minimize this space gap? Or reduce it?
If NASA were to immediately fund these commercial efforts to modify
existing launch vehicles and/or develop new ones, what is the best case
scenario for their availability?
A3a. As noted in the question, NASA currently does not have funding to
initiate crew transportation demonstrations and, therefore, cannot
accelerate COTS Capability D, nor is funding currently identified in
the FY 2010 budget. Therefore, if NASA was to be directed to conduct a
competition for a crew transportation capability, additional funds
beyond the President's budget submit would be required to avoid impacts
to other critical programs.
Even if funding were to be received in FY 2010, NASA does not
believe that providing additional Government funds to the COTS
partners--SpaceX and Orbital--would significantly advance the current
development plans for either partner prior to their currently
negotiated operational dates for commercial cargo transportation of
late 2010 and early 2011, respectively. It is important to remember
that from the beginning, NASA was only intended to be an investor in
these commercial efforts and that the commercial entities were required
to provide the remaining funding themselves or through other financing
efforts.
Finally, in the event that NASA were to receive substantial new
funding or be directed to shift funding from other critical programs to
the development of commercial crew transportation, it would likely take
vendors from three to four years to develop and qualify a crew
transportation system.
Q4. There is a renewed focus on NASA looking back at planet Earth,
either for climate change research, or weather patterns, or other
important roles. But I have always thought NASA did its best work when
it was looking outward--when it was a team of true explorers. It's
impossible to go over the next hill if you refuse to leave the front
porch. Isn't it time that we shifted some of these roles over to other
agencies more fully so that NASA can focus on looking out, rather than
looking in?
A4. The NAC believes that NASA's leadership role in Earth science
research should be maintained. Since its establishment 50 years ago,
NASA has been at the forefront of Earth science research and
maintaining that expertise should be a national priority. NASA's Earth
science research program should be strengthened, and its cooperation
and coordination with other nations, as well as other domestic agencies
and departments, should be increased.
A better scientific understanding of the Earth enhances our
understanding of the solar system and of extra-solar planets . . . and
vice versa. Earth science and space science have important symmetries
that argue against moving Earth science research out of NASA. Likewise,
NASA should continue its traditional role in the development and
initial on-orbit check-out of operational satellites for other
agencies.
NASA is working with domestic agencies to transition operational
responsibilities where it makes sense. Finding ways to reduce the
administrative and budgetary complications will likely increase the
number of successful transitions from research to operations.
NASA is the Nation's civil space agency, and recent experience has
shown that other agencies requiring the view from space need the
expertise of NASA's space systems development centers to achieve their
goals.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Robert M. Hanisee, Chairman, Audit and Finance Committee,
NASA Advisory Council (NAC)
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. What would be the impact of the one-year funding limitation
proposed in the House Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Committee bill for FY 2010 on the ability of NASA to
effectively manage its programs within budget?
A1. NASA is predominately a research and development (R&D)
organization, and due to the duration and complexity of R&D programs,
virtually all federal R&D is subject to a two-year period of
availability. It is hard to understand why NASA should be different and
enjoy less flexibility than other R&D agencies given that its programs
are among the most challenging tasks assigned to any federal agency.
If aimed at correcting perceived shortfalls in obligation
performance, the House Appropriations Committee proposal would not
rectify any shortfalls in NASA budget planning or execution. As I
stressed in my testimony--NASA has greatly improved its financial
performance. In FY 2008, NASA obligated 98 percent of its funds in
their first year of availability and is on track for similar
performance in FY 2009. As noted here and elsewhere, NASA does an
excellent job in obligating its funding within the first 12 months of
the period of availability. However, the nature of NASA's programs
(including the development of unique and extremely complex systems)
requires flexibility and funding stability. For example, by late summer
of 2006, NASA had committed to Lockheed to build the Orion crew
exploration vehicle. NASA had two-year money from '05 and was able to
use that money to put Orion on contract, once definitized. If NASA had
been restricted to one-year money, the '05 appropriation would have
vanished, and more would have been necessary in '06. It is important to
appreciate that reducing NASA's already limited flexibility will have
no positive effects and will in fact reduce its ability to effectively
manage its programs.
As with other federal R&D agencies, the longstanding policy of two-
year R&D appropriations for NASA should be continued.
Q2. That same one-year funding limitation provides an allowance of ten
percent in each operational account as two-year funding. Is that
proposed allowance of ten percent sufficient, based on your knowledge
of the Agency's obligation rates and the uncertainty surrounding
research?
A2. No, ten percent is not sufficient. The House Appropriations
recommendation to allow ten percent of NASA's R&D appropriations to
have two-year availability, on an ad hoc basis, would create an
exceptional level of complexity and only increase costs. As with other
federal R&D agencies, the longstanding policy of two-year R&D
appropriations for NASA should be continued.
Q3. Your prepared statement identifies several steps that NASA has
taken to address the financial problems that have ``plagued the Agency
for almost all of this decade.'' Are there any issues in the FY 2010
budget request and agency plans for the five-year planning horizon that
could interfere with NASA's progress on financial management?
A3. I do not see any issues in the FY 2010 budget request or Agency
plans for the five-year planning horizon that would interfere with
NASA's progress on financial management. That said, however, if
budgetary constraints necessitated a significant cutback in finance
department personnel, the result would likely have a negative impact on
the financial management progress. Aside from such a cutback, the major
issues keeping the Agency from obtaining a clean external audit opinion
are technical issues having to do with property accounting and Unfunded
Environmental Liabilities. We believe that each of these issues will
yield to time and efforts already underway.
Q4. While I understand from your testimony that NASA has instituted
several software packages to facilitate effective financial management,
I am interested in your perspectives on the role the workforce plays in
NASA's financial management practices. To what extent has NASA engaged
its workforce in facilitating effective financial management through
training, awareness, or other measures?
A4. NASA's workforce does play a key role in facilitating effective
financial management. Under the direction of the Office of the Chief
Financial Officer (OCFO), the Agency has undertaken a number of
training programs for accounting and financial personnel at both
Headquarters and at the centers. This included training in the use of
the Integrated Enterprise Management System (IEMP), the Core Accounting
System, and the Continuous Monitoring Program. Within the Environmental
Department, training in the use of the IDEAL software package has been
required, and under the guidance of the Office of the Chief Engineer,
over 1,600 participants from all NASA Centers have attended 62 NASA-
tailored courses on Earned Value Management to improve program/project
cost, schedule and performance management.
Q5. The Subcommittee held a hearing in March to examine cost
management issues in NASA's acquisitions and programs. To what extent
does the financial management system enable effective cost management
of NASA programs?
A5. In addition to the regular financial reports provided to the
Administrator and to Center and Mission Directors, the Phasing Plan
developed by the OCFO provides regular input on costs incurred versus
budget for Themes, Centers, Mission Directorates, and Full Cost
Elements. The newest tool, which is being deployed by the Office of the
Chief Engineer, is the Earned Value Management system which integrates
budgeted costs, incurred costs, time, and progress to date on each
project. As this system is proliferated throughout the Agency, program
cost management should improve.
Q6. In your prepared remarks, you state that ``The NASA Shared
Services Center (NSSC) is up and running with performance metrics close
to or above the goal levels. Unfortunately, NSSC is unlikely to ever
achieve the $100 million cost savings that was the original
justification for its creation because of persistent low-transaction
volumes.'' Could you elaborate on the purpose of the Shared Services
Center and your concerns about low-transaction volumes? What needs to
be done to address those concerns?
A6. Concerns about a loss of control as financial and other functions
(travel, grants, etc.) were transferred from the various centers to the
NASA Shared Service Center (NSSC) at Stennis Space Center, the OCFO
decided to stage the transfer of these function over time. The Wave 4
transfers occurred in August of 2008. In early 2009, accounting for
grants was transferred in. The original justification for establishment
of the NSSC was that, by relieving the centers of most of their high-
volume accounting and financial systems to a central location, cost
savings could be realized at the centers. Now, having already
transferred most of the high-transaction volume functions into the
NSSC, there is not enough volume flowing through the center to realize
the cost savings originally projected. To address these concerns, NASA
will need to find even more high-volume transactions to transfer to
Stennis or, alternatively, Stennis will need to offer its transaction
processing services to other (non-NASA) agencies of the U.S.
Government.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. During our June 18 hearing, witnesses were in general agreement
that converting NASA's spending authority to one-year money would
create new hardships for the Agency. Could you elaborate on the
consequences of such a change and perhaps provide an illustrative
example?
A1. NASA is predominately a research and development (R&D)
organization, and due to the duration and complexity of R&D programs,
virtually all federal R&D is subject to a two-year period of
availability. It is hard to understand why NASA should be different and
enjoy less flexibility than other R&D agencies given that its programs
are among the most challenging tasks assigned to any federal agency.
If aimed at correcting perceived shortfalls in obligation
performance, the House Appropriations Committee proposal would not
rectify any shortfalls in NASA budget planning or execution. As Mr.
Robert Hanisee, Chairman of the Audit & Finance Committee of the NASA
Advisory Council (NAC or Council), stressed in his testimony--NASA has
greatly improved its financial performance. In FY 2008, NASA obligated
98 percent of its funds in their first year of availability, and is on
track for similar performance in FY 2009. As noted here and elsewhere,
NASA does an excellent job in obligating its funding within the first
12 months of the period of availability. However, the nature of NASA's
programs (including the development of unique and extremely complex
systems) requires flexibility and funding stability. For example, by
late summer in 2006, NASA had committed to Lockheed to build the Orion
crew exploration vehicle. NASA had two-year money from '05 and was able
to use that money to put Orion on contract, once definitized. If NASA
had been restricted to one-year money, the '05 appropriation would have
vanished, and more would have been necessary in '06. It is important to
appreciate that reducing NASA's already limited flexibility will have
no positive effects and will in fact reduce its ability to effectively
manage its programs.
The House Appropriations recommendation to allow 10 percent of
NASA's R&D appropriations to have a two-year availability, on an ad hoc
basis, would create an exceptional level of complexity and only
increase costs. As with other federal R&D agencies, the longstanding
policy of two-year R&D appropriations for NASA should be continued.
Mr. Hanisee defers to the expertise and insights of the NAC
Chairman, Dr. Kenneth Ford, to provide the responses to questions 2
through 5.
Q2. Re-establishing Advanced Technology Development as an
independently funded and managed program has been cited as an important
reform if NASA is to enhance its capability to develop new and perhaps
paradigm-shifting technologies. What caused the Agency to abandon this
approach? Was it simply budget: was the return on investment in
question? How much annual funding would be required to re-establish a
credible program?
A2. NASA has long enjoyed a reputation as a technology innovator whose
stressing applications in space and aeronautics have led to an
incredible range of broadly useful technologies. Several years ago, the
decision was made to divert a large fraction of the Agency's technology
investment into the Constellation Program. Unfortunately, technology
research programs are easily stopped and terribly hard to restart.
Technology research programs often serve as ``the bank'' or
``reserves'' to be sacrificed when more visible and near-term
objectives are short on funding. Also, in the past some of NASA's
technology programs were accused of looking like ``sandboxes'' not
clearly tied to the most critical Agency needs.
A robust and useful technology program at NASA would be dedicated
to stimulating innovation and developing new capabilities not tied to
existing mission requirements. Currently, for example, NASA's science
missions must carry all the technology risk in the program itself. This
makes missions such as MSL particularly vulnerable to the uncertainties
and risks associated with the development of fundamentally new
technology within the mission itself. Additionally, in the human space
flight side of the house, the lack of a robust technology program has
naturally driven program managers toward relatively conservative
designs and limited technology infusion. A much broader technology
focus would likely enable game-changing solutions that could open up
entirely new opportunities.
In addition to advanced technology programs in the mission
directorates, NASA would be well served by the establishment of a more
independent technology R&D organization, perhaps modeled loosely after
DARPA. It has been estimated that NASA could re-establish a credible
technology program with approximately $500M-$800M in additional
funding. This level of funding would restore NASA's technology research
efforts to rough equivalence with its previous level of effort.
At the July meeting of the NASA Advisory Council, NASA briefed the
Council on the activities of its Innovation and Technology Initiative.
This internal working group is in the process of conducting an
assessment of advanced technology development at NASA and will soon
produce a report on this topic. The Council was very pleased by this
initiative and will discuss the forthcoming report at our next meeting
(October).
Q3. The International Space Station will, in all likelihood, be
utilized by NASA for some years beyond 2015 but at present the Agency
appears unwilling to make such a commitment. Our international partner
space agencies have been looking for a firm signal from NASA for such a
commitment, as it helps them deal with their governments to lay in
long-term funding programs. What's preventing NASA from making such a
commitment now?
A3. NASA is not taking any action that would preclude a decision to
extend ISS operations and utilization beyond 2015. The Administration
will have to determine whether to continue U.S. participation in the
International Space Station (ISS) Program beyond 2015, and that issue
is one of those currently being examined by the Review of U.S. Human
Space Flight Plans Committee (Augustine Committee). The Augustine
Committee is scheduled to report out options to NASA and to the Office
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) this August. I would anticipate
that the Administration's decision would follow soon thereafter, and
NASA would then be able to provide the clarity and commitment that its
international partners are seeking.
Q4. What are your thoughts and concerns about engaging more
intensively with international partners to fly joint missions? What are
the primary disadvantages against joint international missions, and in
your view, would U.S. science research priorities likely be jeopardized
if we were to aggressively engage in joint missions? To what degree do
export control restrictions make joint missions unwieldy and difficult
to manage?
A4. International cooperation has long played an important role in
NASA's exploration and science activities. In spite of the many obvious
potential advantages of pursuing joint international missions, there
are also some significant disadvantages, including increased management
complexity, technical and programmatic risk, and political risk. One
particularly notable disadvantage that hinders the pursuit of joint
international missions is that various export control restrictions make
such international collaborations unnecessarily cumbersome. It has
become evident that improvements in export control policies are
necessary to ensure that our foreign partners remain interested in
working with NASA and our contractors on future joint programs. Any
assistance that this committee could give to reduce the barriers to
effective collaboration while maintaining the intended goals of export
control regulations would greatly enhance the productivity of
international partnerships in space exploration and science.
With specific regard to U.S. science priorities, working more
closely with international partners offers a mix of advantages and
challenges. As noted above, close cooperation with international
partners does indeed add complexity to some missions, including
difficulties arising from the aforementioned export control
regulations. However, the benefits of increased international
cooperation, especially in an era of tightened budgets, will likely
outweigh the potential disadvantages. NASA's Science Mission
Directorate (SMD) is working closely with the European Space Agency
(ESA) to forge a new joint Mars architecture that will likely enable
more science than either space agency could achieve on its own given
available budgets. That potential cooperation is driven by shared
science research priorities. This suggests that a joint NASA-ESA Mars
architecture incorporating shared access to the scientific data may
actually quicken the pace at which our national science priorities in
planetary science are achieved. At our most recent meeting (July 2009),
the NAC recommended that SMD build on the progress to date and expand
its relationship with ESA to include cooperative Earth science
missions.
Q5. Re-invigorating NASA's workforce is especially critical given the
average age of the Agency's employees. How would you describe the
attractiveness of NASA as a prospective employer, especially from the
perspective of a young `fresh-out'? Would they tend to look at NASA as
a career choice? How can NASA best ensure that the knowledge and
`lessons learned' will be passed from the current generation of
scientists and engineers to the next?
A5. From all indications, NASA is still successful at attracting co-op
students, interns, fresh-outs, and other early-career individuals.
Every year the research firm, Universum, ranks the most desirable
employers in the world, based on where undergraduate students say
they'd most like to work. NASA was ranked as the #1 ideal employer by
engineering students. Additionally, NASA was ranked as #2 by Natural
Science students, #5 by Information Technology students, and #12 by
Liberal Arts students. In my view there is little doubt that NASA is
generally considered a desirable place to work. That said, I do hope
that NASA will focus on hiring the very best fresh-outs that our great
country can produce rather than settling for less.
Passing along knowledge to the next generation of NASA employees is
a critical concern. NASA is involved in several efforts specifically
aimed at enhancing knowledge management and transfer. The Office of the
Chief Engineer's Academy for Program/Project/Engineering Leadership
(APPEL) program places a great deal of emphasis on lessons-learned and
mentoring programs designed to pass knowledge to successive generations
of engineers and program/project managers. For example, APPEL has
recently added a two-day ``Space Systems Development: Lessons Learned''
course to the curriculum that reviews numerous NASA case studies
involving designing and building space flight hardware. APPEL is also
collaborating with the Lessons Learned organizations at each center to
develop similar offerings. APPEL offers several other courses that
similarly focus on lessons learned. APPEL also employs numerous former
NASA ``grey beards'' from past projects such as Hubble Space Telescope,
Shuttle, and Viking to bring their experience and knowledge to a new
generation of managers in order to develop strong program teams. NASA
also encourages knowledge transfer through formal and informal
mentoring programs.
However, the success of such efforts rests heavily on NASA's
ability to hire adequate numbers of new employees of the highest
caliber. I understand that NASA is developing a hiring initiative
focused on securing the ``best and brightest'' talent for the future.
Although this initiative is still in the early stages, I am confident
that the Agency is progressing toward securing the ``next generation''
of scientists and engineers who will ensure NASA's success in the
future. Close attention must be paid to not just the number of new
hires but to their quality. If NASA is to inspire the Nation . . . it
must be staffed by the best our country has to offer.
Q6. Over the last decade, NASA has employed several different
financial management schemes that directly affect managers and the
manner in which the account for--and control--costs within their
programs and missions. How effective, and how transparent, is the
current system, especially from the perspective of program and mission
managers?
A6. Over the past decade, NASA has implemented many financial control
systems; many of these were ineffective. The current suite of controls,
which include the Integrated Enterprise Management System (IEMP), the
Core Accounting System, the Continuous Monitoring System, the Phasing
and Planning System, and the Enterprise Value Management System are all
working effectively now. There are still issues that come up with these
systems, but it is fair to say that they are working effectively . . .
and with transparency. We will, of course, have a better read on their
efficacy following the conclusion of the 2009 financial audit. The NAC
Audit and Finance Committee believes that the timeliness and accuracy
of financial information provided to Program Managers, Center
Directors, and to the Administrator are much improved which should
result in more effective program management.
Q7. You state that NASA's environmental liability is estimated to be
$943 million. What are the largest sources of this liability, and at
$45 million a year, is NASA prudently managing its environmental
obligations in the communities in which it operates?
A7. As noted in my testimony, at the end of FY 2008, the total unfunded
environmental liability was $943 million. Within this number were 134
different projects at 15 NASA sites. The projects range from $12
thousand to $168 million. The largest of these is the White Sands Test
Facility (39% of the total) which will take 50 years to complete. There
are two other sites that could take as long as 100 years to complete.
The current spend rate on remediation is $45 million per year. The NAC
Audit and Finance committee does not have an opinion as to whether this
amount is adequate to manage its environmental obligations in the
communities in which it operates.
Questions submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. It is always easy to advocate for more money for NASA. Assuming,
however, a relatively flat budget, especially for the years following
2010, what guidance can you offer regarding areas in NASA's budget:
what areas are of highest priority to you, and what areas are the
lowest priority? What can NASA or Congress do to maximize the science
return on its budget? For instance, do you believe it would be prudent
to consider closing one or more centers? If so, which ones? Are there
programs that need bolstering? Please offer your best guidance.
A1. In my view, the highest budget priority is to develop a capable and
flexible space transportation architecture as quickly as feasible. In
particular, the key element in the exploration architecture is the
development of a heavy lift launch vehicle. I urge Congress to
accelerate and prioritize development of this capability as it is the
lynchpin to everything we will do in human space flight beyond low-
Earth orbit.
Maximizing the science return of NASA's budget requires a number of
coordinated steps. First, NASA needs to retain scientific peer review
and the National Research Council's decadal surveys as important
components of its decision-making processes. The use of scientific peer
review and the priority-setting processes of the decadal surveys are
crucial to ensuring that the highest priority science remains at the
forefront of NASA planning. Second, NASA's science portfolio needs to
maintain a balance among small, medium, and large programs. Each class
of mission contributes to the advance of science and to the health of
American's scientific and technological base in different ways.
Maintaining a balance among the size of missions helps to smooth out
science opportunities over time and allows the larger scientific
community to plan appropriately. Third, NASA needs to continue to
involve the larger scientific community in decisions on how to control
cost growth. The steps underway to improve the cost estimates
associated with the decadal surveys (especially the use of independent
cost reviews) and budgeting at the 70 percent confidence level are
important first steps. Finally, NASA would benefit from greater
stability in its funding, including funding for science. Funding
stability from year to year and receiving appropriated funds at the
beginning of each fiscal year would reduce the cost of changes to
programs and their industrial contracts and the uncertainty of the
annual planning and implementation cycle, freeing up more funds earlier
for scientific research. Further, it is important that NASA not be
shifted to one-year funding--which would be unique amongst U.S. R&D
agencies.
The NAC has not reviewed the question of whether it would be
prudent to consider closing one or more centers. With respect to
programs needing bolstering, I would advocate re-establishing a robust
technology research program at NASA.
Q2. We're all familiar with the large and growing threat that orbital
debris poses to our people and assets in space. This subcommittee
recently held a hearing on the topic. AIA recently hosted a briefing on
this critical issue. And I think we would all agree that it is critical
for us to get working on some form of remediation effort.
Q2a. First--do you all agree on that?
A2a. I absolutely agree that the space debris issue is a matter of
significant concern that will only worsen if nothing is done to address
the problem.
Q2b. Second--is NASA the right agency to head this up?
A2b. As I understand it, NASA does not have the authority to head up a
space debris removal effort and that the United States Air Force would
likely lead any such effort. NASA can provide technical assistance, and
the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office has evaluated a wide range of
concepts for the removal of orbital debris. Also the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is playing an important role in the
search for a cost-effective means of removing hazardous orbital debris.
Q2c. Third--what are the hurdles we need to overcome to create an
international effort to get rid of all this debris up there?
A2c. Although there are economic and legal hurdles, the primary
challenges associated with creating an international debris remediation
effort remain technical in nature. That is, a practical and affordable
means of removing orbital debris has yet to be identified.
Q2d. Fourth--what are the proper roles for commercial entities to play
in this?
A2d. As major operators of orbital space systems, commercial users
certainly have a significant stake in development of a method for space
debris remediation. I understand that NASA and DARPA are in dialogue
with commercial entities as they investigate various means of removing
hazardous orbital debris.
Q3. The recent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual report
stated: ``From a safety standpoint, the ASAP strongly endorses the NASA
position on not extending Shuttle operations beyond successful
execution of the December 2008 manifest, completing the ISS.'' As you
know, this leaves us with a significant gap in our domestic access to
space. The ASAP report goes on to say ``[we] are not convinced that the
Ares I and Orion initial operating capability (lOC) date can be
improved appreciably by additional resources.'' So if we can't extend
the Shuttle for safety reasons, and we can't move up the Ares I/Orion
date, how could we best spend resources in trying to minimize this gap
in space access?
A3. NASA believes that the best way forward is to remain focused on
flying out the remaining seven Space Shuttle missions safely, even if
the manifest slips--and continuing the development of the NASA is
promoting the commercial space economy by relying on industry to
provide cargo resupply services to the International Space Station
(ISS) through the two Commercial Resupply Services contracts signed
last December. It is important that NASA's industry partners
concentrate on developing the technologies and techniques required to
deliver uncrewed vehicles to orbit and conduct proximity operations and
docking maneuvers with the Station before they move on to developing
crew transportation systems. The need for commercial resupply is
critical to the continued operation and conduct of research aboard ISS,
and lessons learned in the development and operation of the cargo
vehicles will help the development of later crewed systems. The
approach of demonstrating cargo first and then stepping up to crew
transportation is the best way forward. It is also important to note
that NASA is planning to codify human space flight vehicle requirements
in order to assist in the development of those capabilities.
At this point, there is not any viable option that will eliminate
the gap in U.S. crew transportation to space. That said, by providing
NASA with adequate funding and allowing it the freedom to manage these
projects without extensive external guidance and constraints this gap
could be minimized. There will be issues with the technical
development, and these issues will need to be worked by the technical
experts. Continuing to change plans will only delay the development
process.
Q3a. The report also states ``There is no evidence that Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) vehicles will be completed in
time to minimize the gap.'' Except for the fact that there is
inadequate funding to fulfill COTS-D, is there evidence that COTS
couldn't be available in time to minimize this space gap? Or reduce it?
If NASA were to immediately fund these commercial efforts to modify
existing launch vehicles and/or develop new ones, what is the best case
scenario for their availability?
A3a. As noted in the question, NASA currently does not have funding to
initiate crew transportation demonstrations and, therefore, cannot
accelerate COTS Capability D, nor is funding currently identified in
the FY 2010 budget. Therefore, if NASA was to be directed to conduct a
competition for a crew transportation capability, additional funds
beyond the President's budget submit would be required to avoid impacts
to other critical programs.
Even if funding were to be received in FY 2010, NASA does not
believe that providing additional government funds to the COTS
partners--SpaceX and Orbital--would significantly advance the current
development plans for either partner prior to their currently
negotiated operational dates for commercial cargo transportation of
late 2010 and early 2011, respectively. It is important to remember
that from the beginning, NASA was only intended to be an investor in
these commercial efforts and that the commercial entities were required
to provide the remaining funding themselves or through other financing
efforts.
Finally, in the event that NASA were to receive substantial new
funding or be directed to shift funding from other critical programs to
the development of commercial crew transportation, it would likely take
vendors from three to four years to develop and qualify a crew
transportation system.
Q4. There is a renewed focus on NASA looking back at planet Earth,
either for climate change research, or weather patterns, or other
important roles. But I have always thought NASA did its best work when
it was looking outward--when it was a team of true explorers. It's
impossible to go over the next hill if you refuse to leave the front
porch. Isn't it time that we shifted some of these roles over to other
agencies more fully so that NASA can focus on looking out, rather than
looking in?
A4. The NAC believes that NASA's leadership role in Earth science
research should be maintained. Since its establishment 50 years ago,
NASA has been at the forefront of Earth science research and
maintaining that expertise should be a national priority. NASA's Earth
science research program should be strengthened, and its cooperation
and coordination with other nations, as well as other domestic agencies
and departments, should be increased.
A better scientific understanding of the Earth enhances our
understanding of the solar system and of extra-solar planets . . . and
vice versa. Earth science and space science have important symmetries
that argue against moving Earth science research out of NASA. Likewise,
NASA should continue its traditional role in the development and
initial on-orbit check-out of operational satellites for other
agencies.
NASA is working with domestic agencies to transition operational
responsibilities where it makes sense. Finding ways to reduce the
administrative and budgetary complications will likely increase the
number of successful transitions from research to operations.
NASA is the Nation's civil space agency, and recent experience has
shown that other agencies requiring the view from space need the
expertise of NASA's space systems development centers to achieve their
goals.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Berrien Moore III, Member, National Academies' Space
Studies Board (SSB)
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. While the Administration has requested increases for NASA in the
FY10 budget and Congress has provided additional funding through the
Recovery Act, the outyear projections for NASA's budget are essentially
flat. What are your biggest concerns about the projected budget for
NASA over the next five years?
A1. I share the concerns, which are well understood by this committee,
that NASA is being tasked to do too much with too little. The ``Review
of United States Human Space Flight Plans Committee'' (also known as
the HSF Committee or the Augustine Commission) concluded that the
United States could conduct a ``meaningful'' human space flight program
only by adding at least $3 billion annually to NASA's budget. Our
ability to execute the high priority Earth observation programs
recommended in the 2007 NRC decadal survey that I co-chaired, ``Earth
Science and Application from Space,'' also requires a budget
enhancement. The funding needs that the Decadal Study projected were to
return the Earth science budget to the dollar equivalent that was
available in FY 2000. Unfortunately, this budget growth has not
materialized and mission costs have exceeded assumptions. With a flat
top line budget and tremendous pressures coming from the human space
flight side of the agency, I am greatly concerned about the viability
of the Earth observation programs in general and our ability to provide
decision-makers with critical data related to the pace, magnitude, and
impacts of climate change in particular. In a recent (December 14 2009)
issue of Space News, I also set forth the important role of space
observation in improving climate models.
Q2. Global climate change is one of the major issues facing the Nation
and the world, and NASA's Earth observation data and research have
contributed significantly to the understanding of climate change.
However, there are other nations with Earth observation systems that
are also collecting climate change data and information. What is the
status of international cooperation on global climate change
monitoring? What, if anything, is needed to ensure that effective
mechanisms are in place to facilitate international collaboration on
global climate research and monitoring?
A2. The Group on Earth Observations is a reasonably effective
international coordination mechanism; however, it does not bring
``new'' money to the table. NASA actively pursues collaborations with
other space-faring nations. However, the budgets of many space agencies
are under pressure, and as a consequence, there is both a national and
an international inadequacy of Earth observing capabilities. The one
additional element that I could foresee as making a fundamental
difference would be, in effect, a U.S.-led international initiative on
climate monitoring and research. In this regards, let me note that in
July 2009 the National Research Council released a new report,
``America's Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program with
National Needs,'' which set forth six strategic goals for guiding
program choices and resource planning for U.S. civil space activities.
The first of these is: ``To re-establish leadership for the protection
of Earth and its inhabitants through the use of space research and
technology.''
Q3. As a Co-Chair of the National Academies' Earth science decadal
survey study, what is your perspective on the difference between the
decadal survey committee's cost estimate and NASA's current estimate to
develop the first two decadal missions--SMAP and ICESat-II?
A3. Absent the resources to contract for rigorous independent cost
estimates, the Decadal Survey relied mostly on scientists and engineers
at various NASA centers to validate internally-derived estimates, or
more typically to provide a NASA-derived cost estimate. For missions
that did not have strong traceability to past development, the
estimates were understandably very rough; further, cost estimates for
these comparatively immature missions were more likely to suffer from
overly optimistic views on the technical challenges for implementation.
In contrast, we believed our estimates of the cost of SMAP and ICESat-
II would be on firmer ground.
SMAP was effectively the reincarnation of Hydros, a mission first
proposed in response to NASA's third solicitation for the cost-capped
Earth System Science Pathfinder Program (ESSP). Hydros was selected as
an alternate ESSP mission in 2002, and selected for mission formulation
in December 2003. However, in 2005, as part of NASA's response to a
$3.1 billion shortfall in flight-related programs, Hydros was not
funded and the mission was effectively canceled. With an identical
instrument suite to Hydros, SMAP cost estimates were thought to be well
understood. ICESat-II was envisioned by the survey as effectively a re-
flight of the existing ICESat mission; again, the survey team believed
it understood its costs very well.
Estimates for the cost of both of these missions have risen
dramatically. In February 2007, NASA presented cost estimates for the
SMAP mission that were $350-$400 million,\1\ which are consistent with
the Decadal Survey's estimate of $300 million 30 percent (FY 2006
dollars). Estimates for SMAP are reportedly now closer to $700 million.
Some of this increase is the result of recent changes in launch vehicle
costs, new requirements for NASA to budget missions with higher
reserves (so that target costs will not be exceeded to a 70 percent
confidence level), and a stretching of the schedule for mission
completion.
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\1\ Stephen Volz, Associate Director, Flight Projects, NASA Earth
Science Division, ``New Mission Concepts for the Future, February 7,
2008. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/y8sjjsv
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However, I believe a significant fraction of the cost increase is
associated with the mission being executed ``in-house'' at the NASA Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, versus execution in the ``Principal-Investigator
Mode'' envisioned by the Decadal Survey. Executing missions in-house
has proven to incur several penalties: 1) it eliminates any competition
and cost controlling mechanisms; 2) it eliminates any programmatic view
of the importance of the whole rather than of a particular missions,
which has lead to increasing the mission requirements of each mission
at a penalty to our ability to accomplish the whole, and 3) it
eliminates the potential innovation of the university or private sector
communities. Finally, in missions executed in-house by NASA are
incurring higher costs as a result of supposedly revenue neutral change
to ``full-cost'' accounting. The Decadal Survey missions SMAP, ICESat-
II and CLARREO are being developed in-house at NASA's Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, Goddard Space Flight Center, and Langley Research Center,
respectively.
Estimates for the cost of ICESat-II have also increased
dramatically from survey estimates. Some of the increases are the
result of the mission being executed in-house at NASA's Goddard Space
Flight Center as well as the accounting and budgetary changes noted
above. In addition, ICESat-II is now being designed with a longer
lifetime (five years vs. the survey's estimate of three years), which
has significant impact on the cost of the laser and other components.
In addition, the collection optics for ICESat-II are larger than ICESat
and the resulting instrument package has had to move to a larger, more
expensive launch vehicle.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Decadal Survey assumed availability of Delta-II class
launch vehicles for medium-lift needs. It should also be noted that the
Delta-II line, first introduced some 20 years ago, is being
discontinued. Until replacements are developed (Falcon 9 and Taurus 2),
missions requiring only medium-class launchers may be forced to use
more expensive, larger-class launch vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICESat-II will also carry a multi-beam laser versus the single beam
on ICESat to meet science requirements of annually and seasonally
resolved elevation and mass changes, particularly in areas with larger
surface slopes or with slopes changing with time.
Finally, I note that the CLARREO mission has experienced a larger
percentage growth in cost than either SMAP or ICESat-II. In addition to
being executed in-house and being subject to the budgetary and
accounting changes already noted, NASA concluded that the baseline
mission envisioned by the survey would not meet mission objectives.
Changes in the number of spacecraft and instrument capabilities account
for a sizable fraction of the increase in CLARREO's estimated costs,
which are now some $800 million.
Q3a. What is your reaction to NASA's efforts to manage cost growth
through the use of independent cost estimates and budgeting at a 70
percent confidence level?
A3a. I support both approaches; however, I am not certain that they
would prevent the problems of ``assignment to Centers'' (noted above).
Q3b. What are the most critical issues on cost management that this
Subcommittee should consider as it prepares to reauthorize NASA?
A3b. Mission cost caps might be of use to control a science
requirements generation process that otherwise has a natural tendency
to push capabilities beyond what might be analogous to a ``sweet spot''
in cost versus capabilities. We should recognize that even with
improved cost management, the NASA budget is not adequate to support
implementation of the Decadal Survey in anything like that envisioned
and, more importantly, what is needed. I believe that the ``wedge''
that is described in the Decadal Study was adequate, but under current
cost estimates and performance, this wedge (even though aggressive)
falls far short of being adequate to meet current and future NASA costs
for vitally-needed Earth observing missions.
Q4. The Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) satellite was unfortunately
lost in a launch failure earlier this year. NASA's budget request does
not include funds for a replacement satellite yet NASA has indicated
that it is looking at options for re-flying OCO or a similar sensor.
How important is an OCO-like satellite for climate change research and
for verification and validation of potential climate policies and/or
agreements?
A4. I begin by noting that the specific measurements needed to support
a treaty monitoring/verification regime, or notional market-based
carbon dioxide (CO2) trading schemes, will vary according to
the specific mechanism proposed (e.g., sectors covered, time scale for
compliance, size of projects/sources considered). Most proposed
mechanisms require knowledge of how much is being emitted and by whom
(i.e., magnitude and attribution). Some require knowledge of where the
carbon is going or where it is stored (e.g., offset mechanisms). The
degree of acceptable uncertainty in any of these factors will determine
which specific measurements are needed.
A National Research Council committee is conducting a study on how
well greenhouse gas emissions can be measured for treaty monitoring and
verification. The committee's initial analysis suggested that NASA's
Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO), which failed on launch in February
2009, would have provided proof of concept for space-borne technologies
to monitor greenhouse gas emissions, as well as some baseline emissions
data. However, it is important to recognize that OCO was designed to
meet science requirements that called for the capability to measure
atmospheric carbon dioxide with the precision, resolution, and coverage
needed to characterize regional scale CO2 sources and sinks
and quantify their variability over the seasonal cycle. The orbital
path, viewing geometry, and observing strategy that results from
consideration of these requirements is less than ideal from that
desired for treaty monitoring and verification. It is especially
important to recognize that the instrument on OCO that detects CO2
makes measurements using reflected sunlight (more precisely, an
instrument on OCO detects changes in reflected sunlight in known near-
infrared absorption bands of CO2); therefore, OCO can only
operate in the daytime. Further, in the wintertime at high latitudes,
there is too little sunlight to make these measurements.
Nevertheless, as clearly explained in a letter report on OCO dated
July 28, 2009 (http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record-id=12723&page=1), the currently deployed
suite of ground and space-based sensors--both U.S. and foreign--are not
adequate for monitoring of prospective treaties. A re-flight of OCO is
also advantageous as it could occur relatively quickly and at lower
cost compared to alternatives.
For the issues of verification and validation of potential climate
policies and/or agreements, we will eventually need a separate carbon
monitoring system that employs multiple platforms deployed on the
ground, from aircraft, over the oceans, and in space. The ASCENDS
mission that was recommended in the Decadal Study could play an
important role in the space-based component of an overall system.
ASCENDS would use an active sensor (lidar), which would allow
measurements at night and at very high latitudes, where reflected
sunlight techniques cannot make observations. (Over areas with
reflected sunlight, passive techniques are currently more precise and
have higher down-track spatial resolution.)
Q4a. What is the impact to the overall Earth science program if NASA
launches an OCO-like replacement without receiving additional funds?
A4a. It will simply be a tax on an inadequate budget, and therefore
will result in further delay of the missions in the Decadal Study
queue. It is important to note that NASA's Earth Science programs are
already being impacted by a large unfunded mandate of some $140 million
to incorporate a thermal infrared sensor on the Landsat Data Continuity
Mission.
Q5. You have been involved, in some way, in science and engineering
education and with developing the workforce of America's space program.
What are your thoughts on the most critical issues and priorities that
NASA should address as part of its educational activities and workforce
programs going forward? What, if anything, in NASA's education programs
and portfolio would you change, and why?
A5. NASA should become a focal point for creativity and innovation. It
must become again an agent that embraces and accelerates change. It has
lost touch with young people because it is seen as being backward
focused (going back to the Moon is hardly a step-forward).
I would expand significantly the educational programs and
responsibilities within the science and exploration lines and not leave
education to an Education Office. This said, there must be
accountability for these educational programs within the exploration
and science lines and these programs must not be allowed to be ``slush
funds'' to use against cost overruns.
Q6. What, in your view, should be the criteria for determining whether
technology, instruments, or other project activities should be
developed at NASA Centers or externally through competitive bidding?
What, if anything, does Congress need to consider regarding the balance
and diversity of institutions supporting NASA's programs?
A6. The primary criterion for any activity for a NASA Center is the
issue of national capability vs. industrial and/or university
capabilities. NASA should be doing tasks that are primarily tasks that
no university or industry (or collections thereof) can do.
Regarding the balance and diversity of institutions supporting NASA
programs: There are many aspects to this question, but a key issue is
finding the appropriate balance between programs executed inside or
outside of the NASA Centers. As I noted in my response to Question 3,
above, executing missions in-house has proven to incur several
penalties; I believe competition from industry and university-based
researchers is both fiscally responsible and desirable from a
scientific perspective.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. During our June 18 hearing, witnesses were in general agreement
that converting NASA's spending authority to one-year money would
create new hardships for the agency. Could you elaborate on the
consequences of such a change, and perhaps provide an illustrative
example?
A1. Most of NASA's research and development activities are inherently
multi-year. To force-fit annual commitments on what is fundamentally
multi-year will only lead to ineffective (or worse) actions. By way of
examples: Consider the very simple task of granting a fellowship for
graduate education, or the complicated contractual efforts to build a
Shuttle replacement, and assume that you can only make a commitment
(even if monies are available) for one year. Clearly, such an
arrangement would be cumbersome at best.
Q2. Re-establishing Advanced Technology Development as an
independently funded and managed program has been cited as an important
reform if NASA is to enhance its capability to develop new and perhaps
paradigm-shifting technologies. What caused the agency to abandon this
approach? Was it simply budget; was the return on investment in
question? How much annual funding would be required to re-establish a
credible program?
A2. Although my knowledge of this area is limited, it should be noted
that the Space Studies Board recently completed a report, ``Fostering
Visions for the Future: A Review of the NASA Institute for Advanced
Concepts,'' that addresses aspects of these questions. The report is
available from the Board, or it can be download at: http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record-id=12702
Q3. The International Space Station will, in all likelihood, be
utilized by NASA for some years beyond 2015 but at present the agency
appears unwilling to make such a commitment. Our international partner
space agencies have been looking for a firm signal from NASA for such a
commitment, as it helps them deal with their governments to lay in
long-term funding programs. What's preventing NASA from making such a
commitment now?
A3. My assumption is that NASA is still ``digesting'' the report from
the Augustine Commission, but clearly this digestion needs to be
accomplished soon.
Q4. What are your thoughts and concerns about engaging more
intensively with international partners to fly joint missions? What are
the primary disadvantages against joint international missions, and in
your view, would U.S. science research priorities likely be jeopardized
if we were to aggressively engage in joint missions? To what degree do
export control restrictions make joint missions unwieldy and difficult
to manage?
A4. I am a strong supporter of international collaboration as a way to
leverage scarce resources and to advance non-scientific national
objectives. The obvious disadvantages of working with international
partners include the additional complexity of mission management and an
increased vulnerability to ``failure'' should one of the partners fail
to provide promised resources. It should be noted, however, that in the
past we have found our partners to be highly reliable. Collaboration
also ensures that often knotty problems related to data availability
and compatibility are worked out in advance.
The U.S. Government mechanism for controlling dual-use items--items
in commerce that have potential military use--is the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) administered by the Department of
Commerce; items defined in law as defense articles fall under the
jurisdiction of the Department of State and the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of the potential military
implications of the export of defense articles, the ITAR regime imposes
much greater burdens (on both the applicant and the government) than
does the EAR regime during the process of applying for, and
implementing the provisions of, licenses and technical assistance
agreements.
Until the early 1990s export control activity related to all space
satellites (commercial and scientific) was handled under ITAR. Between
1992 and 1996 the George H.W. Bush and the Clinton Administrations
transferred jurisdiction over the licensing of civilian communications
satellites to the Commerce Department under EAR. In 1999, however, in
response to broad concerns about Chinese attempts to acquire U.S. high
technology, the U.S. House of Representatives convened the Select
Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns
with the People's Republic of China, also known as the Cox Committee.
One of the many consequences of the Cox Committee's report was
Congress's mandate that jurisdiction over export and licensing of
satellites and related equipment and services, irrespective of military
utility, be transferred from the Department of Commerce to the State
Department and that such equipment and services be covered as defense
articles under ITAR. Scientific satellites were explicitly included
despite their use for decades in peaceful internationally conducted
cooperative scientific research. It is widely recognized that the shift
in regulatory regime from EAR to ITAR has had major deleterious effects
on international scientific research activities that depend on
satellites, space flight hardware, and other items that are now
controlled by ITAR. Furthermore, contravening U.S. interests in
attracting foreign students to U.S. universities, the capture of space
technology by ITAR has caused serious problems in the teaching of
university space science and engineering classes, virtually all of
which include non-U.S. students.
Q5. Reinvigorating NASA's workforce is especially critical given the
average age of the Agency's employees. How would you describe the
attractiveness of NASA as a prospective employer, especially from the
perspective of a young `fresh-out'? Would they tend to look at NASA as
a career choice? How can NASA best ensure that the knowledge and
`lessons learned' will be passed from the current generation of
scientists and engineers to the next?
A5. I find NASA to still be an exciting and inviting place to work and
its post-Apollo achievements from the Hubble Space Telescope to
planetary probes to the Earth Observing System demonstrate that the
Agency is more than capable of carrying out world-class and
transformative research. Regrettably, NASA is now being asked to do
``too much with too little'' and its capabilities across the board are
suffering. Regarding specific workforce issues, I recommend to the
Committee the recent Space Studies Board report, ``Building a Better
NASA Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision for
Space Exploration'' (available at: http://books.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record-id=11916). Although this report focuses
on the needs of the human space flight program, much of its discussion
to the broader questions that are posed above.
Q6. Over the last decade, NASA has employed several different
financial management schemes that directly affect managers and the
manner in which the account for--and control--costs within their
programs and missions. How effective, and how transparent, is the
current system, especially from the perspective of program and mission
managers?
A6. In my view, the current system (including ``full cost accounting'')
is neither effective or transparent, but I am not a ``program and
mission manager.''
Questions submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. It is always easy to advocate for more money for NASA. Assuming
however, a relatively flat budget, especially for the years following
2010, what guidance can you offer regarding areas in NASA's budget,
what areas are of highest priority to you, and what areas are the
lowest priority? What can NASA or Congress do to maximize the science
return on its budget? For instance, do you believe it would be prudent
to consider closing one or more Centers? If so, which ones? Are there
programs that need bolstering? Please offer your best guidance.
A1. I believe that NASA's highest priorities are in the areas of Earth
observations and the support of science and exploration. In order to
rank the lowest priorities, I would need additional information
regarding the parts of NASA with which I am less familiar.
To maximize our science return, we must begin by increasing our
ability to control costs--this will free up precious dollars that are
required to support research and analysis programs.
Closing Centers: The previous NASA Administrator committed the
agency to a strategy to maintain, ``10 healthy centers.'' I believe the
consolidation of one or more NASA Centers could be accomplished without
a deleterious impact on NASA's core capabilities.
Which one? I would recommend that the Committee consider an
approach similar to that adopted by DOD (the Brac Commission: (http://
www.brac.gov/).
What programs need bolstering? My view is well know: The Decadal
Survey, Earth Science and Applications from Space, presented an
integrated program to advance Earth system science and deliver
information and data products of vital importance to the health of our
nation. Especially as we confront a multitude of rapidly changing
environmental forces, there can be no higher priority within NASA than
robust support for these programs.
Q2. Cost growth in missions, especially flagship, is seriously
challenging the Agency's ability to sustain a broad portfolio of
science missions. No matter recent efforts to use more realistic
estimates, there continues to be evidence that the phenomenon exists
today among missions now going through the earliest stages of pre-
formulation planning. What is the largest source of cost growth, and
going forward, what structural changes would you recommend to guard
against exorbitant, unanticipated increases?
A2. I do not know the largest ``source of cost growth,'' but among the
problems are: a) maintaining the size of the Agency and full cost
accounting, b) selling missions at a low cost when the reality is
otherwise, and c) using (and being forced to use) an inefficient cost
profile; for example, by stretching out missions as they encounter
funding or technical delays.
A National Research Council study, ``Cost Growth in NASA Earth and
Space Science Missions,'' is nearing completion. This study is charged
with identifying the primary causes of cost growth in NASA Earth and
space science missions involving large, medium, and small spacecraft.
The study will also recommend what changes, if any, should be made to
contain costs and ensure frequent mission opportunities in NASA's Earth
and space science programs. In particular, the committee was asked to:
Review existing cost growth studies related to NASA
space and Earth science missions and identify their key causes
of cost growth and strategies for mitigating cost growth.
Assess whether those key causes remain applicable in
the current environment and identify any new major causes.
Evaluate the effectiveness of current and planned
NASA cost growth mitigation strategies and, as appropriate,
recommend new strategies to ensure frequent mission
opportunities.
Q3. We're all familiar with the large and growing threat that orbital
debris poses to our people and assets in space. This subcommittee
recently held a hearing on the topic. AIA recently hosted a briefing on
this critical issue. And I think we would all agree that it is critical
for us to get working on some form of remediation effort.
a. First--do you all agree on that?
b. Second--is NASA the right agency to head this up?
c. Third--what are the hurdles we need to overcome to create
an international effort to get rid of all this debris up there?
d. Fourth--what are the proper roles for commercial entities
to play in this?
A3. The problem of orbital debris is indeed one that is growing in
importance. I am not sufficiently expert to usefully comment on the
questions raised here. I do note that a number of authoritative reports
on the technical issues are available (including a 1995 report from the
NRC: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record-id=4765).
Q4. The recent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual report
stated: ``From a safety standpoint, the ASAP strongly endorses the NASA
position on not extending Shuttle operations beyond successful
execution of the December 2008 manifest, completing the ISS.'' As you
know, this leaves us with a significant gap in our domestic access to
space. The ASAP report goes on to say ``[we] are not convinced that the
Ares I and Orion initial operating capability (IOC) date can be
improved appreciably by additional resources.'' So if we can't extend
the Shuttle for safety reasons, and we can't move up the Ares I/Orion
date, how could we best spend resources in trying to minimize this gap
in space access?
a. (Follow-up): The report also states ``There is no evidence
that Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) vehicles
will be completed in time to minimize the gap.'' Except for the
fact that there is inadequate funding to fulfill COTS-D, is
there evidence that COTS couldn't be available in time to
minimize this space gap? Or reduce it? If NASA were to
immediately fund these commercial efforts to modify existing
launch vehicles and/or develop new ones, what is the best case
scenario for their availability?
A4. I do not believe that I can offer any advice that is better than
what the Augustine Commission provided.
Q5. There is a renewed focus on NASA looking back at planet Earth,
either for climate change research, or weather patterns, or other
important roles. But I have always thought NASA did its best work when
it was looking outward--when it was a team of true explorers. It's
impossible to go over the next hill if you refuse to leave the front
porch. Isn't it time that we shifted some of these roles over to other
agencies more fully so that NASA can focus on looking out, rather than
looking in?
A5. ``Looking back'' at planet Earth is one of the best ways to look
forward into the nature of tomorrow's climate, which will have profound
implications that range from the availability of fresh water in the
western regions of the United States to the agricultural productivity
of the Midwest to the vulnerability of our coastal regions to sea-level
rise and potentially more intense severe weather events. Indeed, the
entire U.S. economy and our national security will be affected by
changes in global climate. The question of whether NASA is engaged in
activities that are better suited to other agencies is embedded in a
larger problem: The Nation lacks a coherent strategy for Earth
observations that provides for operational climate monitoring and
prediction, scientific advances, and the continuation of long-term
measurements.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by J.P. Stevens, Vice President for Space Systems, Aerospace
Industries Association (AIA)
Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords
Q1. While the Administration has requested increases for NASA in the
FY10 budget and Congress has provided additional funding through the
Recovery Act, the out year projections for NASA's budget are
essentially flat. What are your biggest concerns about the projected
budget for NASA over the next five years?
A1. Inadequate funding could lead to the postponement of projects in
the Constellation Program and other programs which would harm our
aerospace workforce. Our civil and contractor space Shuttle workforce
has unique skills and history at NASA that will be valuable to later
projects. If they cannot transition to new projects as the Shuttle
retires, we are in danger of losing those workers to other jobs outside
of the space community from which they may not return.
A second concern is the need for additional funding to operate the
International Space Station through 2020. (In April the CBO projected
these costs at $1.4B annually.) These funds should be in addition to
current funding projections so ISS operation does not impact other NASA
projects.
Q2. Now that the ISS is nearly complete, there is ongoing dialogue
about the need to fully utilize the ISS laboratory. What is the
significance of the ISS for NASA's future research and exploration
activities and for society? What is needed, and when, to make full use
of the ISS asset? Aside from the results of the Augustine committee's
review, what are the decisions that will determine the extent and
longevity of ISS utilization?
A2. The ISS is the only system in place to study long-term effects on
humans in space. It also is a good model or test bed for understanding
the demands of critical systems crew will need for longer journeys
beyond low-Earth orbit.
For full use of the ISS there will need to be appropriate
transportation to take equipment up to the ISS and to return samples to
Earth. There are several options for delivery to the ISS during the
gap, such as Soyuz, Progress, ATV, HTV, and Commercial Resupply
Services (CRS). However, the only solutions for down-mass needs are
Soyuz--which has very limited space--and a CRS system capable of re-
entry that is currently under development.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the ISS will need funding to
operate through 2020. These funds should be in addition to current NASA
funding projections so ISS operation does not impact other NASA
projects.
Q3. The AIA report, ``The Role of Space in Addressing America's
National Priorities,'' recommends that ``The Administration should
establish, fund, and implement a U.S. Earth Observation architecture as
a national priority.'' Has AIA given any guidance on what such an
architecture should look like. What questions need to be asked and what
decisions need to be made in planning an Earth Observation
architecture?
A3. The U.S. needs a robust Earth Observation capability to sustain our
collection of critical global data. Currently, there is no overarching
architecture to serve as the basis for research, development,
applications and integration plans. A national long-range architecture
is needed to guide plans that cross federal agency boundaries and
leverage the contributions of academia and industry for effectively
collecting and managing this important information.
The national Earth Observation systems architecture should be
developed with input provided by experts from government, academia,
industry, and the private sector and should reflect the interests and
needs of the supply and demand sides of the market architectural
blueprint should take a long view, with horizons out for at least two
generations, as well as provide guidance in transitioning new
technology research sensors and systems into the next generation of
operational observing systems.
The Office of Science & Technology Policy (OSTP) is currently
working on a policy related to this subject (United States Group on
Earth Observations policy). AIA supplied approximately 25 pages of
input to the OSTP which can be accessed at: http://www.aia-
aerospace.org/industry-information/
reports-white-papers/.
Q4. The AIA and its members have been active in science and
engineering education and with developing the workforce of America's
space program. What are your thoughts on the most critical issues and
priorities that NASA should address as part of its educational
activities and workforce programs going forward? What, if anything, in
NASA's educational programs and portfolio would you change, and why?
A4. AIA is a strong supporter of NASA's education efforts and looks to
NASA in a spirit of collaboration to help address critical issues that
we share: an aging workforce and a sparse selection of domestic
students who are well-prepared and interested in science and
engineering careers, particularly in the aerospace sector.
Three suggestions AIA would contribute to NASA's K-12 education
program and portfolio are: 1) make career ``pathways'' more obvious to
young people, including the involvement of school counselors and on-
line social networking; 2) formal involvement and collaboration with
local school districts/communities where NASA facilities are present;
and 3) place more emphasis on teacher development. All three of these
suggestions aim to make a ``larger impact.''
1) NASA's overall education framework very thoughtfully organizes
its education programs into four categories: inspire, engage, educate,
and employ, with each category referring to a different point in the
``pipeline'' (i.e., informal education, elementary and secondary
education and higher education, respectively). However, the programs
themselves are not executed in a way that is holistic. For example, a
young person may participate in a NASA program in eighth grade, but
when she gets to high school that support may not longer be there
resulting in: a) the student losing interest or b) the student not
having the right support for her career path. Thus suggestion one aims
to have these support systems in place for young people at each stage
of their educational journey. A further evolution of this suggestion is
for NASA to develop a system where there is a NASA educational
component throughout a young person's education from K through post-
secondary.
2) Since education happens at the local level, each NASA education
office should have strong relationships with their school districts,
local industry and other stakeholders. Throughout the nation such
``innovation networks'' are already taking place and having an
`Education Community Liaison' at each center would take existing
partnerships and elevate them to a level where centers aren't just
doing a field trip here, or a classroom program there, but are really
part of the local dialogue with the goal of using their very finite
government resources as effectively as possible.
3) Research points to well-trained teachers as the single most
important factor in a student's success in STEM. We support and stress
that NASA emphasize efforts on professional development for current and
aspiring teachers.
For post-secondary education (two- and four-year institutions) AIA
suggests: 1) increase money/in-kind support for hands-on/R&D projects
for students and teachers, 2) develop cohort programs that make career
paths obvious and include pathways into federal service or into private
industry. Both of these suggestions aim to develop young people who
have actual work experience and have the propensity for a career in
aerospace.
Q5. The AIA's report, ``Launch into Aerospace: Industry's Response to
the Workforce Challenge,'' discussed the goal of pursuing ``legislative
incentives to encourage skilled retirees to become STEM teachers.''
Could you elaborate on what legislative approach the AIA believes would
be effective?
A5. As we face the need for over 200,000 STEM teachers within the next
decade, employing the skills of our nation's retiring STEM workforce is
obvious and logical.
A major barrier for an individual to work as a teacher after
retirement is the penalty on their retirement benefits. Consequently,
legislation that would reduce the burden on retirees who elect to go
back as science and math teachers should be explored. Right now, social
security benefits are such that if a retiree goes back to work as a
teacher, they may no longer receive retirement benefits because of
their teaching income.
One suggestion is a federal program that would not penalize
retirees who become math and science teachers, similar to a loan
forgiveness program for service, but in reverse. Criteria for
participants could include: degree in STEM discipline, 10 years of work
in a STEM field, successfully completion of state-approved requirements
to become a teacher, and service in a high-need school for at least
three years.
A model that this program could be based on is the U.S. Department
of Education's ``Transition to Teaching'' program that supports the
recruitment and retention of mid-career professionals. In addition to
supporting alternative routes for credentialing for professionals to
become teachers, this program provides grants and other financial
incentives. Financial support for teaching training may be another way
the Federal Government can help retirees into the classroom.
A private effort worth mentioning is the IBM Transition to Teaching
program. The government could help to replicate that model by providing
tax breaks and other financial incentives for a company to implement a
similar program.
Q6. What, in your view, should be the criteria for determining whether
technology, instruments, or other project activities should be
developed at NASA Centers or externally through competitive bidding?
A6. NASA Centers should focus upon technology that is of high value to
NASA, but is too risky for industry to develop or of little or no
commercial value. Much of this work will be for early development
stages of a technology or instrument--low Technology Readiness Levels
(TRLs)--where the focus is the development of the technology's basic
capabilities (i.e., long before any set of requirements can be
produced). Even at this stage collaboration with industry should be
strongly encouraged. Once past this early stage, further development
(mid-TRLs) is best accomplished through a fully integrated government/
industry team where needs and requirements can be balanced with the
ability of industry to build the product at a known and affordable
cost. The final stage of development and the transition to a flight
system (higher TRLs) is best accomplished by an industry led effort
with government oversight.
Questions submitted by Representative Pete Olson
Q1. During our June 18 hearing, witnesses were in general agreement
that converting NASA's spending authority to one-year money would
create new hardships for the Agency. Could you elaborate on the
consequences of such a change, and perhaps provide an illustrative
example?
A1. One-year funds are not a cost-effective approach to the planning or
implementation of multi-year programs. Limiting these funds leaves
doubt regarding program continuation and provides little flexibility
for the most efficient planning of program resources. The unintended
effect of such a change would likely result in higher costs due to
unknowns associated with program continuation.
Q2. Re-establishing Advanced Technology Development as an
independently funded and managed program has been cited as an important
reform if NASA is to enhance its capability to develop new and perhaps
paradigm-shifting technologies. What caused the Agency to abandon this
approach? Was it simply budget; was the return on investment in
question? How much annual funding would be required to re-establish a
credible program?
A2. An important part of NASA's charter has been to perform aerospace
research which benefits its own future programs and the needs of
industry. It would appear that the constraints on the Agency's budget
caused more funds to be diverted and restricted the dollars available
for basic research. This is a mistake and diminishes long-term research
benefits. ATD is very important as it funds low-TRL technologies
focused on NASA's needs, which are essential to the success of future
missions. In addition, with regard to NASA aviation aeronautics, we
believe that NASA should address the R&D needs of NextGen Air Traffic
Modernization which involves both fundamental and higher-level in-close
coordination with FAA.
Q3. The International Space Station will, in all likelihood, be
utilized by NASA for some years beyond 2015 but at present the Agency
appears unwilling to make such a commitment. Our international partner
space-agencies have been looking for a firm signal from NASA for such a
commitment, as it helps them deal with their governments to lay in
long-term funding programs. What's preventing NASA from making such a
commitment now?
A3. For NASA to commit to the ISS, the Agency needs presidential
direction to continue the program. Later this summer the report by the
Augustine Committee is expected to make recommendations on the
extension of the ISS. It is likely that the White House will be able to
confirm the extension of the ISS after the Augustine report is issued.
It would be helpful to have Congressional support for both an ISS
extension to at least 2020 and additional ISS funding in a 2009 NASA
Authorization bill.
Q4. What are your thoughts and concerns about engaging more
intensively with international partners to fly joint missions? What are
the primary disadvantages against joint missions, and in your view,
would US science priorities likely be jeopardized if we aggressively
engage in joint missions? To what degree do export control restrictions
make joint missions unwieldy and difficult to manage?
A4. Joint missions would allow us to share costs and benefit from the
talent of other nations. Such missions also allow for sharing of data
and increased information sharing between nations and partners. Joint
missions are also a valuable tool for maintaining or improving
international relations. The disadvantage is that portions of missions
that go overseas will not benefit our domestic industrial capacity,
which in turn provides no benefit to our domestic industrial base in
terms of workforce employed or R&D performed. This is a critical issue
now for the United States if we want to sustain and lead in aerospace
technology and capability. However, having additional partners does not
preclude the potential for additional missions and ultimately more
industrial and scientific productivity. Joint projects will have to be
carefully planned, ideally with public-private-partnership approaches,
and funded so that American tax dollars can stimulate the American
economy and our domestic industrial base.
ITAR continues to complicate joint missions. Even when the U.S. and
other nations have signed government to government agreements of
cooperation, ITAR regulations still impact and delay support activities
contracted to U.S. industry by NASA involving our foreign partners.
Q5. Re-invigorating NASA's workforce is especially critical given the
average age of the Agency's employees. How would you describe the
attractiveness of NASA as a prospective employer, especially from the
perspective of a young `fresh-out'? Would they tend to look at NASA as
a career choice? How can NASA best ensure that the knowledge and
`lessons learned' will be passed from the current generation of
scientists and engineers to the next?
A5. Public perception surveys of NASA (for example, see Dittmar
Associates, ``The Market Study for Space Exploration,'' 2004 report)
have found that young people, between ages 18-25, find very little
excitement or interest in NASA or its activities--citing reasons such
as general confusion about NASA's purpose and lack of relevancy.
Our industry also faces similar challenges with ``fresh-outs.''
Recent surveys conducted by Aviation Week find that those with zero to
five years experience are leaving our companies at higher rates than
any other experience groups--especially those with an engineering or
production laborer function.
The National Academies reported in 2006 that other factors in the
near future will complicate NASA's workforce challenges, such as
uncertainties about the future pace and scope of some program areas,
program volatility and NASA's immediate needs for workers who already
have significant experience, rather than more junior people who require
training. These issues will very likely affect the perceptions of young
people seeking careers at NASA and the industry.
With respect to `passing knowledge down,' the aerospace industry
does incorporate different knowledge management practices that NASA may
consider. These tools include: apprenticeships, intranet portals,
knowledge and content management systems, knowledge blogs, mentoring,
information sharing events and aligning employee goals to knowledge
management goals.
Additionally, many companies keep track of alumni--NASA may
consider tracking an alumni's personal contact information, areas of
expertise, work competencies, work history and current activities. NASA
may also consider programs to connect with alumni such as: alumni
association events, retiree consulting and extended work with reduced
hours for alumni.
One thing that NASA appears to be doing well is in the area of
social-networking. Use of these tools may be an effective way to
communicate and pass knowledge to younger workers.
Q6. Over the last decade, NASA has employed several different
financial management schemes that directly affect managers and the
manner in which they account for and control--costs within their
programs and missions. How effective, and how transparent, is the
current system, especially from the perspective of program and mission
managers?
A6. This question falls outside AIA's area of expertise.
Q7. NASA's aeronautics research and development program has beet
severely reduced over the last decade, today only accounting for about
three percent of the Agency's total budget. I find this alarming,
considering NASA's origins as an outgrowth of NACA existed for more
than 40 years prior to NASA's establishment. Two questions: (1) is the
FY10 budget request sufficient to meet NASA's commitment to NextGen;
and (2) if given an additional dollar for aeronautics R&D how would you
spend it--what new activity or research would you pursue?
A7. Funding for NASA aeronautics R&D at the higher TRLs--4, 5, 6--has
been in decline for years and that is exactly the kind of funding
NextGen R&D needs. Now that President Obama has identified the fielding
of NextGen as a national priority and Secretary LaHood and Presidential
economic advisor Larry Summers have both asked government and industry
to accelerate NextGen implementation by ten years, we really need
additional research funding for key NextGen initiatives like aircraft
self-separation and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) integration. If we
had an additional dollar to spend on aeronautics R&D, we would
recommend spending 33 cents on aircraft self-separation, 33 cents on
UAS integration and 34 cents on sustainable aviation biofuels.
Questions submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
Q1. It is always easy to advocate for money for NASA. Assuming
however, a relatively flat budget, especially for the years following
2010, what guidance can you offer regarding areas in NASA's budget:
What areas are the highest priority to you, and what areas are the
lowest priority? What can NASA or Congress do to maximize the science
return on its budget?
A1. AIA represents almost all the companies that provide products or
services to NASA, including all the mission directorates, making it
difficult, if not impossible, for AIA to provide specific priorities.
Clearly the work that NASA does is extremely important, difficult to
categorize and. vital to our economy, national security and our future.
AIA does believe, as stated in our recent report, ``The Role of Space
in Addressing America's National Priorities'' that space should be
coordinated at the highest level as a singular enterprise. Such a
coordination body could help identify areas of overlap among all the
federal agencies that deal with space issues, leading to significant
cost savings. To help NASA in its critical projects, our nation should
ensure that policy choices drive the budget rather than allowing the
budget to shape and limit the scope of important policies.
Q2. We're all familiar with the large and growing threat that orbital
debris poses to our people and assets in space. This subcommittee
recently held a hearing on the topic. AIA recently hosted a briefing on
this critical issue. I think you all would agree that it is critical
for us to get working on some form of remediation effort.
Q2a. First--do you all agree on that?
A2a. AIA agrees that space debris is a serious issue that needs to be
addressed.
Q2b. Second--is NASA the right agency to head this up?
A2b. NASA certainly has many of the critical skills needed to be a
participant in solving this problem, but DOD currently tracks debris.
Who takes the lead on this effort is a decision for the Administration
and Congress. Industry is ready to work with the government on
mitigating the impact of debris.
Q2c. Third--what are the hurdles we need to overcome to create an
international effort to get rid of all this debris up there?
A2c. First, we need to improve the fidelity of our own space
situational awareness to prevent conjunctions. We also need to work
with our friends and allies in sharing information. Currently, the U.S.
Government does not have the ability to remove debris from our space
environment, although industry is investing in ways to ``clean up''
space. Additional support should be provided to the joint Air Force and
National Reconnaissance Office Space Protection Program to assist their
efforts to not only prevent the creation of additional space debris,
but also look into ways to remove debris.
Q2d. Fourth--what are the proper roles for commercial entities to play
in this?
A2d. We believe the aerospace industry has existing tools that can be
employed in managing the data needed to mitigate space debris
conjunctions and can also be a leader in future efforts to mitigate the
effects of debris. We encourage government to include industry in
discussions and plans for debris mitigation.
Q3. The recent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual report
stated ``From a safety standpoint the ASAP endorses the NASA position
on not extending Shuttle operations . . . completing the ISS.'' This
leaves us with a gap in our domestic access to space. The ASAP report
goes on to say ``we are not convinced that the Ares-I and Orion initial
Operating Capacity date can be improved appreciably by additional
resources. If we can't extend the Shuttle or move up Ares I how can we
best spend resources trying to minimize this gap?'' The report also
states ``There is no evidence that COTS vehicles will be completed in
time to minimize the gap. Except for inadequate funding is there
evidence that COTS-D couldn't be available in time to reduce the gap?''
If NASA were to immediately fund these commercial efforts to modify
existing launch vehicles and/or develop new ones what is the best case
scenario for their availability?
A3. Its clear NASA has a great deal of confidence in its Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, as it should, and we're
very glad it is moving forward. However, only NASA can say when those
systems will be ready to start human transport.
Q4. There is a renewed focus on NASA looking back at planet Earth. I
have always thought that NASA did its best work looking outward. Isn't
it time to shift some of these roles over to other agencies more fully
so NASA can focus on looking out rather than looking in?
A4. The U.S. needs a robust Earth Observation capability to sustain our
collection of critical global data. However, while Earth Observations
are implemented through many agencies across the government, there is
no overarching architecture to serve as the basis for research,
development, applications and integration plans. A national long-range
architecture is needed to guide plans that cross federal agency
boundaries and leverage the contributions of academia and industry for
effectively collecting and managing this important information.
Development of a national Earth Observation systems architecture
can benefit from high-level directives with input provided by experts
from government, academia, industry, and the private sector and reflect
the interests and needs of the supply and demand sides of the market.
The architectural blueprint should take a long view, with horizons out
for at least two generations, as well as provide guidance in
transitioning new technology research sensors and systems into the next
generation of operational observing systems.
The Office of Science & Technology Policy (OSTP) is currently
working on a policy related to this subject (United States Group on
Earth Observations policy). AIA supplied approximately 25 pages of
input to the OSTP which can be accessed at:
http://www.aia-aerospace.org/industry-information/
reports-white-papers/.