[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AMERICA AND THE IRANIAN POLITICAL REFORM MOVEMENT: FIRST, DO NO HARM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 3, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-93
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee CONNIE MACK, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
LYNN WOOLSEY, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TED POE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
VACANT
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri DAN BURTON, Indiana
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM COSTA, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota DANA ROHRABACHER, California
RON KLEIN, Florida EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
VACANT
Howard Diamond, Subcommittee Staff Director
Mark Walker, Republican Professional Staff Member
Dalis Adler, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Mehdi Khalaji, Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 14
Ms. Geneive Abdo, Director, Iran Program, The Century Foundation. 19
Fariborz Ghadar, Ph.D., Distinguished Scholar and Senior Advisor,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 26
Mr. J. Scott Carpenter, Keston Family Fellow, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy................................. 37
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South Asia: Prepared statement........................ 4
Mr. Mehdi Khalaji: Prepared statement............................ 17
Ms. Geneive Abdo: Prepared statement............................. 21
Fariborz Ghadar, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 28
Mr. J. Scott Carpenter: Prepared statement....................... 39
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 60
Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 62
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Virginia: Prepared statement................. 64
AMERICA AND THE IRANIAN POLITICAL REFORM MOVEMENT: FIRST, DO NO HARM
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Ackerman. Our witnesses having come forward; the
committee is called to order.
Americans are not very good at sitting still. Patience is
not our strong suit historically; it has not been a very
prominent feature of our national character. The terms that
describe us best most often reflect our restless impatience for
progress, our natural inclination for pragmatism, and our
deeply ingrained tendency to focus most of all on getting the
job done. In foreign affairs, however, the world offers few
situations that lend themselves to neat, quick, and simple
solutions.
It is not that Americans are incapable of patience. We can
rise to the challenge when necessary, and especially when the
alternatives offer little hope of success. Following the Second
World War, a 40-year Cold War was not America's first choice
for a foreign policy. But the alternatives to slow, grinding,
vigilant containment of the Soviet Union, when honestly
examined, led both Democratic and Republican administrations
right back to containment. With more diplomacy, some with more
pressure, but all with the same deadly serious goal of
preventing the expansion of Soviet domination and all committed
to the eventual collapse of the Communist system under the
weight of its own failure and fallacies.
Iran, as I have stated in other hearings, is not the Soviet
Union. By every measure of size, wealth, capability, and
influence, it is a vastly smaller, though still a dangerous
challenge. And I would respectfully suggest that, though the
temptation is strong, reasoning in the Middle East, by
historical analogy in Europe, is an invitation to disaster.
Nevertheless, the situation in Iran today does resonate most
powerfully with Americans, recalling memories of the late 1980s
and the collapse of Communism.
Again a long policy of containment appears to be on the
cusp of an unexpected but remarkable success borne on the backs
of oppressed people struggling to be free from a vicious,
brutal, ideological regime. Moreover, there is a chance that
this wholly indigenous movement, by virtue of its own success
and entirely for its own reasons, could bring about an
incredibly positive shift in the global security environment.
I don't think anyone believes the current leadership of the
Islamic Republic of Iran will go quietly or easily into
retirement, and I think it would be foolish to assume that a
reformed Iranian Government would automatically be very
friendly to the United States or be less committed to the
pursuit of its own national interest. But there is good reason
to think that a different Iranian Government, one that was
truly answerable to the aspirations of the Iranian people,
would transform the politics of the Middle East, dramatically
change the global struggle against violent Islamic extremism,
and potentially salvage the global nonproliferation regime.
With stakes of this scale, American minds, my own included,
begin to race ahead. How can we help? How can we support the
green movement? How can we accelerate the demise of this awful
and irresponsible regime? And so on. The most essential thing,
I think, is to be patient. Not passive, not indifferent, but
instead of heeding the inner voice that yells, don't just stand
there do something, we need to turn this impulse on its head.
Rather than just doing something, we need to stop and think
things through.
Even if there were not a painful history of American
intervention in Iranian affairs, and even if the Iranian regime
was not desperate to smear its domestic opponents as American
lackeys and spies, we should at the very least have some
humility about the ability of our Government to competently
shape highly politicized and dynamic events in other nations. I
would submit as proof the entire previous decade.
It seems to me that our first obligation is to do no harm.
And our second obligation is to recognize that we are not a
doctor and Iran is not a patient. Iran is a sovereign state
whose people are struggling bravely for their own freedom. It
is natural and right for us to want to support their struggle.
The question is how. I would suggest that we start with a
healthy amount of skepticism about our ability to shape
political developments in other countries and a firm respect
for the sovereignty and independence of Iran.
With these caveats, I believe there are some important
things that we can and should do, all of which can be done
publicly and outside of Iran. First, I think it essential that
the President and the Secretary of State continue to regularly
comment on the situation within Iran. I think the President's
inclusion of Iran in his State of the Union Address was very
important, and I would want to highlight the very strong
remarks made by Secretary Clinton following the regime's
violence against protesters during the observance of Ashura in
December of last year.
Second, I think the White House and the State Department in
their daily briefings should draw attention to events in Iran
as they occur and make clear the views of the United States
when there is violence or reports of severe violations of human
rights. Third, the United States along with other nations must
assure that we are actually committed to the international
human rights, should press within the United Nations the issue
of Iran's repression of its own people, if possible in the
Security Council and at least within the Third Committee, and
in the Human Rights Council. Every nation should be given the
chance to stand with the people of Iran.
Finally, I am convinced that the United States must
continue to work with our international partners to apply
sanctions on the Government of Iran for its defiance of U.N.
Security Council resolutions and for its violations of its IAEA
Safeguards agreement. Both the House and the Senate have passed
gasoline sanctions, and I look forward to working with the
Obama administration to find a way forward on this legislation.
Our goal must be to ensure the maximum impact on the Iranian
Government with the minimum harm to our diplomatic efforts and
to the people of Iran who are struggling for their freedom.
What I hold to be essential is that we must act and that we
must act in concert with others if at all possible. The Iranian
regime is facing pressure from within unlike anything it has
ever felt before. To the extent that we can heighten that
pressure by political and economic sanctions, I believe we are
absolutely bound to do so.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman
follows:]Ackerman deg.
Mr. Ackerman. I would like to call on my distinguished
partner in these hearings, the ranking member, the
distinguished gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. You know, when you say those nice things, I
always wish, Mr. Chairman, my wife was here to hear it, she
doesn't appreciate me that much. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
convening today's hearing regarding the growing political
opposition movement in Iran and what this movement might mean
for U.S. relations with Iran in general, and specifically in
our efforts to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons
capability.
On June the 12th, 2009, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was ostensibly
reelected to his second term as President of Iran. Within 48
hours of Iranian officials announcing his landslide 62.6
percent victory in what outside observers widely expected to be
a close contest, Tehran and other cities throughout the country
were overwhelmed with protesters in response to what the people
of Iran knew to be a rigged election.
The immediate response by the Obama administration was, in
my opinion, weak. In a statement released to the media, the
President said he was ``deeply troubled by the violence that I
have seen and been seeing on television.'' He went on to say,
``I can't state definitively one way or another what happened
with respect to the election, but what I can say is that there
appears to be a sense on the part of the people who were so
hopeful and so engaged and so committed to democracy who now
feel betrayed.''
This, in my opinion, was a tepid and half-hearted
endorsement of freedom in Iran, whereas the President should
have immediately and forcefully denounced a sham
elections deg., indicated U.S. support for the
demonstrators, and called on other nations to do the same.
Furthermore, he should have used the crisis to rally additional
international support for sanctions aimed at stopping Iran's
quest for nuclear weapons. Instead, the administration, naive
in my opinion in its policy of engagement with Iran, more than
likely squandered the chance for real political change from
within by failing to speak out against a regime's brutal
oppression of its people when it mattered the most.
There are some, as evidenced in the title of this hearing,
``First, Do No Harm,'' who believe the President was right to
be measured in his response to the crisis, believing that an
excessive degree of interventionism from the United States
would have backfired and hardened Tehran's determination not to
negotiate with the United States and the international
community over its nuclear program. Again, I believe this
reasoning is flawed because Tehran has never wavered in its
nuclear ambition.
A year has now passed since the President first reached out
to Iran in a bid to engage the regime. In this time, Iran has
responded to President Obama's open hand by continually and
continuing to defiantly maintain its uranium enrichment
program, calling for the destruction of Israel, pursuing long
range missile weaponry, working to destabilize the peace
process in the region, and supplying weapons to terrorist
groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
Iran has no interest in resolving the dispute over its
nuclear program, and has skillfully outmaneuvered the Obama
administration into giving the regime 1 more year to go get
closer to acquiring an atomic bomb. The administration may
finally be getting wise to Iran's diplomatic shell game. As we
speak, the United States is dispatching patriot defensive
missiles to four Persian Gulf countries--Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait--and moving U.S. war ships into
the gulf which are capable of shooting down Iranian missiles.
In addition, the President's Ambassador to the United
Nations, Susan Rice, is preparing a new sanctions resolution,
the fourth in 4 years, for the United Nations Security Council
to consider. And finally, the Congressional leadership has also
lifted its block on the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act as
it recently passed both the House and Senate. And, Mr.
Chairman, I hope we will talk to the chairman of the full
committee and make sure we get this bill through Congress as
quickly as possible and send it to the President without
further delay.
Unfortunately, the President's timing with regards to Iran
seems wrought with irony. As he begins to finally close his
open hand into a fist, we see that the regime that never once
attempted to unclench its own fist now seems to be gaining back
its footing. I more than anyone hope for the sake of national
and regional security and for the sake of the people of Iran
that we have not done too little too late. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. You are very welcome. And a copy of my
remarks will be sent to your wife.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Ellison.
Mr. Ellison. Mr. Chair, are these my opening remarks or my
questions?
Mr. Ackerman. Your opening remarks, and we will have your
questions after your opening remarks.
Mr. Ellison. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for this
hearing. I think that it is extremely well timed and well
titled. I think we should be trying to learn more about how we
can help improve the well being of the people of Iran without
exacerbating any problems that may be existing. For me, I think
we should avoid a ham-handed meat cleaver approach, and I think
we should use all deliberate information to be as most skillful
and effective as we can.
I think it is important that we have signal and are
beginning to broaden our portfolio and demonstrate not only
that we are concerned about nuclear proliferation but that we
are also concerned about the welfare and human rights and other
people of Iran. And so I am glad that we have embarked on this
path, and I think it is very important that we do so. I will
say that, you know, the United States and Iran have a long
history. We have a very long history and it is complicated, and
the fact is that those of us in the United States don't know
nearly enough about it.
But some of the things that have happened in the course of
this relationship people in Iran are very painfully aware of.
And so it is important that we put a premium on effectiveness
and that we build a international consensus as President
Obama's overtures have begun to do, and that we act decisively
to protect the world from nuclear proliferation and equally
promote the civil and human rights and well being of the people
of Iran, who have a long, long, long history of creativity and
contributions to the entire world. So with that, I thank you
again, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for holding this hearing. I want to identify myself
with Mr. Burton's remarks, I am very skeptical that our
President has had a policy that will in some way take advantage
of the opportunity we have in Iran. I think that what the
President has been doing unfortunately has actually hindered
the efforts of the free people of Iran from achieving their
goal, which is a mutual goal we should have, which is
displacing this repressive mullah regime that threatens the
peace of the world but also threatens each and every one of
their families in Iran.
Let me just note that I agree with the chairman that change
is absolutely necessary in that region for all of our sake. But
what I would disagree with, Mr. Chairman, is your call for
patience. The time for patience is over, it is long over. We
should have been engaged in a very active way a long time ago.
And we have had plenty of time to think about what our strategy
is. Let us just note that containment did not end the Cold War.
Mr. Chairman, I respectfully disagree with your assessment.
Containment didn't end the Cold War. Had we continued with
a containment strategy, the Soviet Union would still exist, it
would still have all its missiles aimed at us, and the world
would be a lot less safe. Ronald Reagan initiated a plan, a
strategy, of rolling back the Communist world, rolling them
back by supporting those elements within those Communist
countries which would fight tyranny in their countries and thus
accomplish the goal that was mutually beneficial to all free
people, which is expanding the realm of freedom and displacing
antidemocratic tyrants which then were in charge of the Soviet
Union.
We should have been doing the same with the people of Iran
all of these years, not just this administration but the last
administration. The people of Iran should have not only
unequivocally known that we were on their side, but that we
have actually provided them with the resources that they need
to succeed. A solidarity movement in Poland didn't just emerge
out of nowhere. We helped the solidarity movement, we helped
the mujahedin, we helped the Contras, we helped those fighting
the Cuban mercenaries in Africa. And the bottom line is,
Communism did disintegrate, but that was not containment.
We have contained radical elements in Iran for too long.
Containing them in power will lead us to a more dangerous
world. We should have an offensive strategy aimed at helping
the freedom loving people of Iran who are our greatest allies.
We should do it overtly if necessary. We must side with the
oppressed people in order to fight the oppressor, and that will
make it a more peaceful world and a more successful strategy.
I appreciate you holding this hearing so this type of
discussion can go on between us and these expert witnesses, and
perhaps we can send a message today to those brave people on
the streets of Tehran who are putting their lives on the line
to stand up for their own freedom and democracy. We are on
their side, no if or buts about it, we are on their side and
opposed to the mullah regime. It is time for the mullahs to go
back to the mosque.
Mr. Ackerman. Appreciate the gentleman's support for
separation of mosque and state, and I do appreciate your
conclusions, but I am reluctant to turn the hearing into a
debate over which President has had more patience, those who
had 8 years of patience including President Reagan and 8 years
of patience with President Bush without actually doing anything
provocative, and I don't know that we now have to run out of
patience after 1 year. But let us commit to work together to
try to encourage the things that we want to see accomplished by
our country, because our failure to do so is not our
President's failure but our nation's failure. Now Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
associate myself with those more recent remarks, because there
have been many Presidents of both parties since the 1940s who
opposed Communism in lots of different ways, and it just so
happened in 1989 under the first President Bush's watch that
system came down after many, many years. But, Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for holding this hearing today and I would
like to welcome our distinguished panel to the subcommittee.
Since last summer the political tension in Iran has
continued to capture the international community's attention.
Today we are here to discuss what the U.S. role should be as
the green movement continues to make its presence known. The
Obama administration is reportedly debating whether to
deemphasize or abandon outright engagement efforts with Iran
and help the green movement. Therefore, do you think these
protests offer an opportunity for the U.S. Government to ramp
up its democracy promotion efforts or should we step back and
let them address it internally?
Are we correct in even viewing the reform movement as
significant? I remember the 1990s when Iranian leaders entered
office with strong support from various pro-reform
constituencies, yet despite that public support for reform, the
Supreme Leader and key conservative allies successfully limited
their ability to carry out the reforms by tying up the key
legislations and the appointed legislative review bodies and
used their control over the key oversight bodies to shape the
election outcomes. It wasn't necessarily in the streets it was
being shaped, it was actually in the government. Therefore I am
interested in our panel's assessment for the prospects of the
opposition to bring on major changes.
Is the violent crackdown on the opposition a sign that the
current government is weak? That is another question. And if
the green movement is ultimately successful in acquiring a
leadership position or even concessions from the current
government, how would such an outcome affect Iran's foreign and
nuclear policies and therefore our interest in the Middle East?
As a strong supporter of H.R. 2194 The Iran Refined Petroleum
Sanctions Act, I am interested in whether our panel believes
these sanctions are consistent with the goals of the opposition
movement. And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate their testimony, I
yield back my time.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Green. Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today, and I welcome all of our distinguished panelists
as well. Mr. Chairman, as we have spoken of many times, I
believe that unless we improve our strategy the world is going
to awake very soon to the headline that Iran has a nuclear
bomb. For many years the United States and world powers have
tried various tactics to halt the nuclear ambitions of Tehran's
clerical elites. They have in essence litigated Iran's case in
the National Security Council, they have imposed several rounds
of economic sanctions, and they have tried to engage Iran with
diplomacy, most recently with a deal that could have begun the
long process of normalization of relations.
But through all of this, as we are very much aware, Iran's
leaders have not blinked as they move closer and closer to the
ability to make nuclear weapons on short notice. Tehran doubts
the collective resolve of world powers. And it is not difficult
to see why. European corporations continue to do business with
Iran, Russia exploits the international rile over Iran's
nuclear program for its own geopolitical gain, in maneuvering
China seeks to profit. And this international deadlock over
Iran's nuclear intransigence certainly seems bleak.
But in the last 6 months, Mr. Chairman, we have seen
something fairly remarkable and something that has stunned the
leaders in Iran, something that could help us eventually
transcend these international deadlocks. In June, everyday
Iranians started to take to the streets to protest the
Presidential election's controversial outcome. In Tehran alone,
crowds of demonstrators swelled up to the hundreds of
thousands. These protests were nothing short of remarkable.
Indeed, Iran has not seen such demonstrations since 1979,
the infamous year since the theocrats that reign in Tehran
today first seized power. Iran's leaders were initially caught
flat-footed by these protests, but they quickly mounted a
counteroffensive, and over the following days and months
Tehran's crackdown became ever more brutal. YouTube enabled the
world to witness some of this brutality and the barbaric
shooting in broad daylight of one female demonstrator whose
name is now chanted by crowds.
News networks broadcast in real time the violent clashes
between regime-sponsored militia and protesters. The
international media reported the shocking slayings of
opposition figures on the holy day of Ashura in late December.
And among those who were killed was Ali Mousavi, a nephew of
the man whom the opposition views as the rightful winner of the
contested Presidential election. Yet the Iranian regime's
escalating violence has seemed to embolden the Iranian people's
resolve.
What started out as a series of protests quickly became
something else, it became a movement. By year's end,
demonstrators throughout Iran were calling not for a mere
recount, they were challenging the legitimacy of Tehran's
clerical authoritarian regime. While we in Washington focus,
appropriately so, on a new round of sanctions, many Iranian
people continue to risk their lives in the country's growing
protest movement. They continue to brave the regime's fists,
clubs, water hoses, and bullets to take to the street. They
continue to defiantly hold signs and chant slogans, not just in
Farsi but in English, so that the whole world might know their
call for dignity and justice.
With this growing mass protest movement, everyday Iranians
have accomplished what sanctions and other forms of
multilateral pressure aim to do, create the conditions for
change in Tehran. Again, Mr. Chairman, while I support the new
sanction, I believe it is time, and you alluded to this as
well, for the White House and the Congress and the entire
international community to elevate the Iranian people's
struggle to the center of the world stage. The Iranian people
deserve a more moderate, reasonable, and just government in
Tehran, and the Iranian people may be the last and best hope
for halting Iran's drive for nuclear weapons capability, and it
may be the Iranian people who help avoid a nuclear arms race in
the Middle East. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. Mr. Crowley.
Mr. Crowley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
hearing from the expert witnesses this afternoon. And I would
just add, I don't have an opening statement, but I don't think
any human being who watches or listens to 24/7 news has missed
at least in passing even what has taken place in Iran over the
past year. Just some very moving, nonprofessional, everyday
human beings, and they are capturing on either cell phones or
iPods the images of brutality within the Ahmadinejad regime.
I also think we do disservice to that heroism by, at least
from this side of the world, trying to cast blame, and I think
time ought to be focused more on what can we do to make a
difference, to let the Iranian people know that we are
concerned about them? We know that their desire is to have a
healthy, respectful relationship with the West, and
particularly with the United States, and that there are people
suffering in that country today because of radicalism and
fundamentalism. And whatever we can do to help change that is
what I think the focus ought to be.
And respectfully say to my colleagues, I have been moved by
it, and what these people go through, the bravery that has been
demonstrated, by those who are on trial today even for their
protest, is remarkable and something that every American ought
to be made aware of. So, Mr. Chairman, with that, I don't want
to go on any more than I have, I am interested in hearing the
testimony of your witnesses. And with that I will yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A big problem we have
is that the Obama administration seems to act as if the June
election in Iran never happened. Not long ago, an Iran expert
noted that the administration views the democratic movement
inside Iran, to use his words, ``as a wrench in the works of
nuclear negotiations.'' I think that there is an inability here
to see things as they are right now in Iran.
After the brutal crackdown on the religious holiday of
Ashura, the President did speak out somewhat more forcibly. I
will grant that. With oppositionists denouncing the Supreme
Leader by name and demanding the dismantling of the Islamic
regime, he didn't have much choice at that point. Indeed, we
will hear testimony today that ``even staunch conservatives and
hardline clerics have now joined the opponents of
Ahmadinejad.'' We will also hear that the ``sanctity around
Supreme Leader Khamenei has been shattered.''
Despite some rhetoric on human rights in Iran, the Obama
administration hasn't committed the needed resources to
creatively encourage change. There is no full throttle support
for the Iranian democracy movement in the budget that landed in
Congress this week. Instead, the administration seems intent on
a regime-centered approach. But I would ask this, which is more
likely, what is the more likely thing we will see, a verifiable
nuclear deal with the current regime, or the opposition
movement's success?
The regime in Iran probably doesn't fear another round of
``least common denominator'' U.N. sanctions, and that is
increasingly what these are being termed. But it is downright
paranoid, that regime in Iran is downright paranoid, of a color
revolution. It is paranoid of the feelings of the people in
Iran that we have seen expressed on the street. Next week on
February 11th, large protests are being planned to coincide
with the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.
The year that the people of Iran as we watch
internationally and the media that is broadcast out of Iran,
they seem to indicate to us that if past protests are a guide,
many in the street will be asking again whether President Obama
is ``with them or against them.'' I hope he is ready to clarify
that answer to that question, because to be on the right side
of history is to be speaking out forcefully for the people who
are taking these risks and going to the streets in Iran. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this important hearing today, I am looking forward to the
witnesses. I will be brief. I think that the administration
does need to voice in a stronger fashion their support for what
is being heard around the world as these Iranians take
tremendous risks of their own lives and their families' lives
to protest the outrage in the election that was circumvented,
the results that were circumvented last year.
Clearly there is nothing more powerful than those within
the country that are being oppressed and are reacting to that
oppression. I will be looking for the witnesses to in their
testimony let us get a better sense of how widespread that is,
and how it is impacting what has been the formal opposition as
well as the informal opposition to the current regime, and how
it deals with the ruling body and what sense you have as to the
debate and the turmoil that may be taking place within that
structured element of the regime.
So it just seems to me that there is an opportunity to not
just focus on sanctions, which sadly have not seemed to have
much effect at this time, and we know where this regime is
headed if left to their own devices. So it seems to me that
this is a time to recalibrate the efforts that took place last
year that have not been successful and to focus on taking
advantage of the opportunities that are now before us, and I
would like the witnesses to tell us what you think those
opportunities are. So with that said, I will yield the balance
of my time and look forward to the witnesses.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. I will now introduce our
witnesses. Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. Mr. Khalaji focuses on Iranian
politics and the politics of Shia groups in the Middle East.
From 1986 to 2000, Mr. Khalaji trained in the Seminaries of Qom
studying theology and jurisprudence and earned his doctorate
researching intellectual and philosophical political
developments in Iran and the wider Islamic and Western worlds.
Mr. Khalaji pursued a career in journalism at two Iranian
publications, then working for BBC Persian as a political
analyst of Iranian affairs, and eventually becoming a
broadcaster for Radio Farda.
Geneive Abdo is a foreign policy fellow and director of the
Iran Program at the Century Foundation. Prior to joining the
Century Foundation Ms. Abdo, was the Liaison Officer for the
Alliance for Civilizations, a U.N. initiative under then
Secretary General Kofi Annan. Prior to her tenure with the
U.N., Ms. Abdo spent 20 years as a foreign correspondent for
The Guardian, The Economist, The Dallas Morning News, and
Reuters, and has contributed to many other publications
focusing on the Middle East and the Muslim world.
Fariborz Ghadar is a distinguished scholar and senior
advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Dr. Ghadar is a professor and founding director for the Center
of Global Business Studies at Penn State University. During his
career he has focused on global business, economics and
finance, and has worked as an investment banker at the World
Bank. He has been a consultant to a score of businesses and
governments, but served last in government as a Vice Minister
in the Shah of Iran's Government.
Finally, Scott Carpenter is the Keston Family fellow at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and director of
Project Fikra, which focuses on empowering Arab democrats--that
is with a small ``d''--in their struggle against extremism.
From 2004 to 2007, Mr. Carpenter served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and
in 2006 was named Coordinator for the State Department's
Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. Mr. Carpenter
also served in the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and
before coming to the State Department at the International
Republican--that is with a capital ``R''--Institute.
Without objection, each of our witnesses' full statements
will be entered into the record, and I would ask you each to
summarize your testimony in about 5 minutes. The lights are in
front of you, and we can move directly to questions after each
of our witnesses presents their testimony to us. Thank you very
much, we will begin with Mr. Khalaji. Press the button on your
microphone and move it a little bit closer, if you would.
STATEMENT OF MR. MEHDI KHALAJI, SENIOR FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Khalaji. Yes. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Mr. Burton,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for having
me here and giving me this opportunity to testify before you.
The current democratic movement in Iran, which began after the
big Presidential election in June 2009 is a nonviolent movement
which aims to rely on itself without asking for foreign help.
The people involved in this movement believe that democracy is
not a gift that can be received by others, but rather an
internal effort of a people to emancipate itself from tyranny
and realize its dream of justice, freedom, and national
sovereignty.
The Iranian people appreciate President Barak Obama's
policy of not intervening in Iranian political affairs and
allowing them to manage their way toward democracy. Therefore,
any policy toward Iran should be chosen in a prudent and
cautious way that would not affect the democratic movement in a
negative manner. My experience with political activists who are
involved in the green movement is that they do not expect any
direct help from the United States or any other foreign power,
but a close look at the Iranian situation reveals that in this
specifically historical moment, the interest of the
international community and the democratic interest of Iranians
are in confluence.
To be sure, the focus of international community is on the
Iranian nuclear program, while the main preoccupation of
Iranian people is securing basic political and human rights and
integrating the country into the international community.
However, peace in the region and democracy in Iran now seem to
be inseparable because the same forces that threaten the peace
are the same powers in Iran who threaten democracy and run the
repressive machinery against the Iranian people.
The threat to regional peace and Iranian democracy are the
same: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp, IRGC. IRGC is not
only the main body in charge of the Iranian nuclear program,
but also is the most effective means for political suppression
in the hands of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's leader and
commander in chief. The Islamic Republic is nothing but an
economic-religious-military complex that applies its coercive
power not through political institutions but through a military
and security apparatus under the direct supervision of
Ayatollah Khamenei.
His religious authority is contested by clerical
establishment. The only power base he has is within the
military and security community of the country. Khamenei has
lost much of his political and religious legitimacy, and
without the military, and especially IRGC, he would have no
real power. Since coming to power, Ayatollah Khamenei has never
given an interview to the media. He does not feel any sense of
responsibility to the people, driving his power from Iran's oil
income.
In practice, he is accountable before nobody despite the
constitutional provision for an assembly of experts to
supervise his leadership. Because he bids who can run for this
assembly, he directly controls dozens of foundations that own
some of the wealthiest companies in Iran and is not accountable
before the Parliament or the government. The IRGC, whose
commanders he appoints, and its affiliates control one third of
Iran's national income, dominating construction, oil field
services, and telecommunications among other industries.
In order to stop Iran's suspicious nuclear activities, the
international community needs to apply pressure on the IRGC,
which not only threatens the region through a suspicious
nuclear program but is using the Quds force as symmetrical
warfare and support for extremist groups to try to weaken Sunni
allies of the United States and sabotage the Arab-Israeli peace
process and the budding democratic process in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
Democracy and peace can be achieved through weakening the
military government in Tehran and pressuring the IRGC. The two
parallel tracks, the international community's effort for peace
and the Iranian people's democratic movement, naturally
reinforce each other because they fight with the same enemy.
Therefore, the main mechanism for supporting the democratic
movement in Iran is to target the financial and military
capability of IRGC.
Mr. Ackerman. If you can begin to sum up.
Mr. Khalaji. Yes. A more powerful IRGC would result in a
more militarized government, and a more militarized government
is more likely to militarize the nuclear program for dangerous
purposes. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Khalaji
follows:]Mehdi Khalaji deg.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Ms. Abdo.
STATEMENT OF MS. GENEIVE ABDO, DIRECTOR, IRAN PROGRAM, THE
CENTURY FOUNDATION
Ms. Abdo. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I am extremely honored to have this opportunity to
discuss the opposition movement in Iran with you and policy
approaches the United States could take in order to encourage
the opposition movement. My perspective is based upon my first
hand experience with Iran's leaders and civil society when I
worked in Tehran as a correspondent for The Guardian newspaper
from 1998 to 2001.
The opposition protests have become an ever present force
in Iranian politics. It is apparent from the recent
demonstrations in December that the protesters have become more
determined and more radicalized. Perhaps the most significant
outcome of the protest movement is that the sanctity around
Supreme Leader Khamenei has been shattered. He no longer is
respected as a powerful political authority, nor is he
considered a religious leader with divine attributes.
Moreover, the concept of supreme clerical rule, viewed by
many now as a form of government that inevitably leads to
despotism, should be abolished. It is clear now that a country
which once aspired to be an Islamic state and a republic cannot
withstand all power concentrated in the hands of one Ayatollah.
As a result, in the eyes of many Iranians, the Islamic Republic
of Iran is no longer an Islamic state or a republic.
Seven months after the Presidential election, it is
impossible to determine the outcome of this conflict. However,
in the short term it is safe to assume that the state will
prevail through the use of excessive force and violence,
particularly through the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. The
strength of the opposition movement for this reason is of
supreme importance now, and the United States' action and
assistance to this movement is extremely important.
A strong opposition movement provides the West with
leverage against the regime. For these reasons and many others,
it is important for the United States to assist those people as
part of this movement who are trying to reform the system, even
if a reform state still means that a theocracy remains in
power. So who is the opposition movement? The movement is not
restricted only to street protesters. Increasingly the
opposition is gaining the support of traditional and religious
Iranians, and this is very important, who have historically
supported the hardliners around Supreme Leader Khamenei.
A groundbreaking survey was recently published that
provides evidence of this complete defection of the traditional
base that once supported President Ahmadinejad. Many Iranians
living in the provinces, which had been the base of his
support, now are part of the opposition movement. Another
important feature of this movement today is that it has
abandoned the ideological underpinnings of the Islamic
Revolution. They no longer believe in an Islamic state, at
least that part of the movement that is the younger generation.
Perhaps this is only the minority of the movement, we don't
know, it is difficult to assess the percentages. However, the
opposition generally is effectively depriving the regime of its
revolutionary ideology, and this is something that the United
States could certainly exploit. So regarding the expectations
that the opposition movement has from the United States, I have
made a short list. One of the primary, I think, avenues that
the opposition thinks that the United States could take would
be toward highlighting the human rights violations through the
United Nations.
The United States could pressure Iran's regime on its
abysmal human rights record somehow through the United Nations
if not through the Human Rights Commission that is part of the
U.N. The opposition believes that a U.N. tribunal could
investigate the torture and killings of demonstrators and other
dissidents. This would highlight their abysmal human rights
record before the international community, but more importantly
it could cause a lot of Iranians inside Iran who now still
support the system to understand that the Islamic Republic is
no longer behaving as an Islamic state.
The opposition movement is dependent upon the Internet and
social networking in order to communicate with Iranians inside
and outside the country and to organize protests.
Oppositionists want the United States to provide technical
assistance to run and maintain anti-government Web sites, and
also enable them to communicate when the regime blocks Internet
sites and social networks. They want, for example, anti-
filtering software that would be immune to government
interference.
The United States also should pressure foreign
telecommunications firms not to sell telecommunications
technology to Iran and to refuse to ship technology that has
already been purchased. The opposition also believes that the
United States should signal to Tehran that Washington does not
recognize the legitimacy of President Ahmadinejad's
administration due to the rigged election.
Mr. Ackerman. If you could begin to wrap up.
Ms. Abdo. Okay, thank you. Activists and NGOs, such as
Women and the Million Signature campaign, whose members have
been arrested and interrogated, believe that they would benefit
from the opportunity to network with other NGOs from the region
and from the United States. They believe that such workshops
and training could help them develop their strategies inside
the country. In conclusion, the green movement is not searching
for grand gestures from the United States. However, modest
steps, particularly those that would address the lack of human
rights and the absence of political liberalization would give
the opposition more legitimacy in Iranian society. This kind of
assistance, they believe, could come from the United States.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Abdo
follows:]Geneive Abdo deg.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Dr. Ghadar.
STATEMENT OF FARIBORZ GHADAR, PH.D., DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR AND
SENIOR ADVISOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Ghadar. Chairman Ackerman, Ranking Member Burton, and
distinguished members of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, I am honored to have been invited by the committee to
testify today about America and the Iranian political reform
movement. I will be testifying today in my capacity as
distinguished scholar and senior advisor at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies and a professor of business
at Smeal College of Penn State University.
Chairman Ackerman and the members of the committee
eloquently described the mess that Iran is in right now. The
latest events in Iran are symptoms of a tectonic shift in
Iran's political environment. The regime has been using the
Basij and the paramilitary guards to beat up on protesters. If
you look at last week, we had recent conciliatory movements by
both Karoubi and Mousavi to reconcile to a certain extent with
Khamenei. Khamenei did not respond to that.
The opposition has asked for participating on February 11th
in a massive demonstration but in a peaceful matter. We don't
know what the outcome will be, but there are three possible
outcomes. The Revolutionary Guards will beat down the
opposition into the underground for them to raise another day,
a compromise will finally be worked out among the different
factions of the regime, or the demise of the regime as we know
it will occur.
Given the uncertainty and the demand for freedom from
oppression by the public, but also for independence, we should
not take sides in the future nature of the regime. We should
not endorse a candidate or a party or even a constitution.
These matters are up to the Iranian public. A wise strategy is
one that informs the Iranian public and ensures that their
voices are heard. That we can do. The opposition, however,
needs to know that we will not use them as a chip that is
traded away to the Iranian regime.
A successful strategy is to respond to the aspiration of
the Iranian people, the aspirations that are ignored by their
own regime. The Iranian public, as many mentioned, is pro-
America. What Iranians want, freedom and independence. Various
surveys and polls show that zotsmosmd would like to promote
economic development, share technology, create employment, and
have a closer relationship with our country.
The great majority of the Iranian population, as was
mentioned, are young people, technologically advanced, unhappy
with the situation, the way they are being treated, and the
social restrictions. They are, however, at the same time
concerned about the U.S. Government. The fear is partially due
to the potential military attack or expanded sanctions. Neither
of these policies is going to be successful. Military action
would likely galvanize Iranian society against attackers, delay
the nuclear program by a limited lies, and encourage the
hardliners to go after nuclear bombs.
Sanctions can be broken down into three categories: Trade
sanctions, which have not been successful; investment sanctions
on foreign direct investments, which have been successful; and
fund flows, controlling the funds that go to the Revolutionary
Guard and target it and confiscate it. Based on the desire of
independence and at the same time freedom, I suggest the
following. Continue and expand our broadcasts highlighting the
mismanagement and corruption that exists in the system.
Ahmadinejad in his first election talked about corruption,
sat there piously in front of his house and showed that his
house is very small while his opposition lived in mansions. He
tried to do the same thing in the recent election on
television, but that did not sit well with everyone. Broadcast
Iran's economic performance. The economic performance has been
miserable. Corruption, nepotism, disregard for meritocracy, is
just rampant.
In fact, Iranians often compare themselves to the Turks. In
the past 30 years the GDP per capita in Iran has been
practically stagnant, while the Turks' GDP per capita has grown
four fold. Iranians visit Turkey, see that, but not only that,
the Azeris across the border are doing much better than the
Azeris in northern Iran, the Arabs are doing much better across
the Gulf than they are in Iran. Continue broadcasting the
brutality and the lack of human rights, which were mentioned
earlier. Show how the Revolutionary Guard and senior leaders
have pilfered the economy and show how they have passed the
money around.
Continue to target and confiscate Iran's Revolutionary
investments, and at the same time while targeting them,
sanction it to prevent civilians, so for example civilian
airlines from being repaired. It may seem heartless, but
enhancing sanctions to prevent electronic gear that allows the
government to control what is going on would be very helpful. I
believe that we are at a critical point in dealing with the
Iranian regime. The Iranians are already ready to take major
action. They want independence, and at the same time they want
freedom. We can assist in both without interfering. Thank you,
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ghadar
follows:]Fariborz Ghadar deg.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Carpenter.
STATEMENT OF MR. J. SCOTT CARPENTER, KESTON FAMILY FELLOW, THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Burton, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the timely opportunity to testify
before you today. For most of its history, the United States
has sought to support freedom and opportunity abroad, knowing
that free peoples properly concerned with their own hopes and
dreams, to not to be enemies and indeed often become partners.
As we come together to apply this principle to Iran, the
subcommittee sounds a note of caution, urging us to first do no
harm.
In my experience, however, working on the inside at the
State Department, this seemingly appropriate, reasonable tone
often becomes an excuse for hand wringing and paralysis.
Creativity and a willingness to take a modicum of risk are
suborn by the simple phrase uttered all too often, we have to
be sure that whatever we do does not put them at greater risk,
whether the them is Zimbabwean labor activists, Egyptian
bloggers, Chinese civil rights lawyers, or others.
For this reason, I take my cue from the activists
themselves. Surely they know better than we the risks that they
are prepared to take for their freedom. The U.S. Government's
responsibility therefore should be to make a clear offer of
support for them to take up or not as they choose. In the case
of Iran's green movement, so much more. The green movement
represents the latest iteration of a century-long effort to
forge a constitutional republic based on pluralism and
democracy.
Since 1906 this strive has been thwarted, first by monarchs
and later by theocrats, often aided and abetted by outside
powers, including the U.S. Today, the Islamic regime has
unleashed increasingly brutal waves of violence against its own
people, as we have heard. Yet in the face of this violence,
people in the streets are calling on the Obama administration
to support them. Demonstrators in November chanted, Obama,
Obama, are you with us or are you with them? We would be
foolish to think that they were asking this rhetorically.
As several Iranian-Americans have noted, the goal of
protesters holding signs in English is not simply to show off
their linguistic ability. Given our principles and their calls
for support, it is critical that the U.S. avail itself of this
opportunity and responsibility to get it right. Too often when
it comes to the people of Iran we have come down on the wrong
side of history, as we did in 1953 and again in the lead up to
the revolution in 1979. As one green movement activist put it
to me recently in Brussels, if the United States thought
relations between it and Iran were strained after the Musaddeq
coup, just wait until Washington betrays the green movement.
So what should the U.S. do? In my view, it is time for the
Obama administration to launch a comprehensive offensive to
challenge the regime on human rights grounds. In my written
testimony I have made a number of recommendations but will
highlight just a few here. First, future policy actions must be
set squarely within the context of human rights. If the U.S.
imposes targeted even more broad-based sanctions, link it to
human rights violations of the IRGC and the Basij.
The administration should make it known publicly that it is
planning for the eventuality of a democratic government coming
to power in Iran by working with Congress to prepare the
necessary legal groundwork to lift sanctions and remove Iran
from a list of state sponsors of terrorism. It should
articulate the benefits that would flow from such steps while
also making clear the process will take time. This would have
the twin benefits of making clear the current regime is not
democratic while helping to set expectations in the event the
regime actually did collapse.
The administration in my view should publicly relaunch a
revitalized Iran democracy fund and/or bolster the National
Endowment for Democracy's ability to support democrats inside
and elsewhere. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the administration
has renamed the program the Near East Regional Democracy, or
NERD, fund, and has defunded a number of prominent grantees
including the Yale Human Rights Documentation Center.
Critical in the medium term is to do something dramatic to
improve the voice of America's Persian News Network. Poor
management and a lack of proper editorial board are currently
robbing PNN of most of its impact. The administration should
finally and expeditiously move forward on targeted sanctions
against IRGC leadership and companies, but not in an
incremental manner. Instead it should execute all prospective
targeted sanctions at the same time as a single tidal wave to
boost intended effectiveness and strengthen their political
impact inside Iran.
At this critical juncture of Iran's turbulent history, it
is clear that the regime is vulnerable, and the reason for that
vulnerability is the deepening legitimacy crisis spurred on by
the green movement. Expressing solidarity with the aspirations
of the Iranian people at this moment will reinforce the
regime's paranoia and may yet tip the balance in favor of those
committed to reshaping or even overthrowing this regime. A
change in regime provides the best safeguard against a nuclear
Iran and may even usher in a period of U.S.-Iranian partnership
that could radically impact U.S. efforts to stabilize both
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader Middle East. Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter
follows:]Scott Carpenter deg.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. I will yield myself 5
minutes. First do no harm, that was not made up by me, that was
Hippocrates' advice to physicians who had good intentions of
going out and helping people, that was the first rule of
advice. So I went and I saw this movie some time ago, it had a
lot of bad guys in it, I think it was called The Godfather. And
there was this guy there that, every time he kissed somebody
bad things happened to them.
The real question before us is, how do we, and I think we
have all agreed up here despite the fact that we have some
divergent views, agreed that we want to help the people in the
green movement and the people who want a democracy and the
people who love their country for all the right reasons. How do
we embrace them without it becoming the kiss of death? How does
that happen? We can say things, we can do things, we can spend
money, how do we do that?
We need to have some ideas to consider that do no harm.
Because it seems to me that the bad guys there are wiping out
the good guys as soon as they can get their hand on them. And
my good friend from California spoke to the issue of the
democracy movement in Poland, and I would remind us that it was
not the overt action of an American President--the leader of
the free world who had F-16s at his disposal, the world's
greatest superpower, with nuclear weapons, that really
triggered this--but it was a quiet man of peace who represented
millions and had no military division whatsoever whose plane
landed from Rome and got out and uttered the historic and
biblical words, ``Be not afraid.''
And it was that very inspirational statement from the Pope
at the time to a very Catholic nation that inspired them to
take the actions that they needed, knowing that they had world
opinion, and more importantly right, on their side. It would
have been a very different message if the chief rabbi of
Jerusalem delivered it or the imam of all imams, but it was
somebody with whom they could relate. Should there not be a
different messenger, possibly, of this message? Is there an
uber-imam that could come from somewhere and land in Tehran and
tell people not to be afraid? Are there things that we can--and
there were some suggestions here by the panel--specific action
that we can take without putting the sign of death on the very
people that we want to help? That is my question. Mr. Khalaji?
Mr. Khalaji. I think you are completely right, there are
some measures that if the United States take them it would harm
this movement significantly. I am against any sort of financial
support to political groups or any explicit support to the
political figures. These are sort of thing that hurt this
movement. But I think that many people who are involved in the
nuclear program and are threatening the peace in the region----
Mr. Ackerman. I have 1 minute left, and I want everybody to
answer, so if we could?
Mr. Khalaji. Yes. They are the same people who are cracking
down on people. And I think that putting pressure on these
people specifically, especially IRGC people, especially
Khamenei and people around him, will help a lot.
Mr. Ackerman. Ms. Abdo?
Ms. Abdo. Thank you. I would recommend two tangible things.
As we have said in this meeting, emphasis on human rights
violations, because this will cause the base perhaps that still
supports the regime to take a different position. And two,
anything that could be done to address Iranians' access to the
Internet and communications so that they can communicate with
each other in order to mobilize their movement. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Dr. Ghadar?
Mr. Ghadar. In addition to what has been said, I think the
corruption and the nepotism in the regime should be
highlighted. The Revolutionary Guards are raping the country.
In addition to the human rights, they are pilfering the
country. This should be highlighted, and this is the cause of
the Iranian economic malaise and desperate situation,
unemployment and inflation.
Mr. Ackerman. My time is up, but if I could be indulged?
Because I don't want to cut off the witness questioning by the
distinguished minority member.
Mr. Burton. You are the boss, whatever you say goes.
Mr. Ackerman. It doesn't mean I am not going to cut you
off, Dan.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I move to give the chairman 2 additional
minutes. Ask for unanimous consent.
Mr. Ackerman. Just 30 seconds, if you will, Mr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you. As I said, in my written
testimony I have included a number of suggestions, but I do
think it is important that the President and senior members of
the administration be able to speak out as indicated on the
human rights issues, putting us squarely on the side of the
human rights issues, while finding ways to create platforms for
the opposition themselves to be able to organize and speak to
one another to support them, whether on the Internet or
satellite radio or even satellite television. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much, and I thank the
committee for your indulgence. Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You know, I
was reading some of the information about what they have been
doing to these demonstrators, and as I understand it they have
killed two, they have executed two last week. There are 16 more
that are going on trial I guess Saturday, or this past
Saturday, and nine more have been announced for execution next
week. I just can't believe that we should stand by and see
these kinds of atrocities take place because people just want
freedom.
And so I was a little upset when Admiral Blair, who is the
National Director of Intelligence, indicated that the
protesters had little chance for success. He said
``Strengthened conservative control will limit opportunities
for reformers to participate in politics or organize
opposition.'' He went on to say ``The regime will work to
marginalize opposition elites, disrupt or intimidate efforts to
organize dissent, and use force to put down unrest.''
Now he may believe that, but I just think that is the wrong
message to send. I mean if we don't give money, if we don't
give any kind of tangible support to the people who are
demonstrating, we should at least in my opinion say, you know,
we wish you success, we want to see freedom reign, and we want
to do everything we can--without interfering in your process
over there directly--we want to do everything that we can to
encourage freedom, democracy, and the things that we believe
in. And that really concerned me that he said that.
Now, if the current regime were somehow to fall due to
internal pressure, who would be best situated to take power
there? And those currently pushing for reform, would they be
the best ones or would there be other hardline people waiting
in the wings to take over? And one other thing, some have
worried in the past that the imposition of sanctions would
drive the Iranian people toward their government. If we impose
sanctions, if we could get our friends around the world to
impose sanctions with us, would that drive the Iranian people
toward the regime, would they be neutral, or would this
encourage them to push harder for reform? And we can start at
either end. Start at this end this time.
Mr. Carpenter. Well, in terms of sanctions, what we have
heard, or I have heard from people in green movement, is what
they want are sanctions that are short and sharp and that shock
the system. And as we all know, the international community
does not tend to work in that way. As we have heard, sanctions
tend to be least common denominator, they are not designed to
shock, and that is what would be most helpful. They want to
avoid what happened in Iraq where there is this slow ratcheting
up of sanctions that end up hurting the Iraqi people and the
system within Iraq so desperately that it creates real
problems. So I think they are open to sanctions, but they have
to be short and sharp.
Mr. Burton. What do you mean by ``short and sharp''?
Mr. Carpenter. Well, the gasoline embargo that the Congress
has been considering and asking to put toward the President, I
think that is the type of thing that would have a potentially
huge impact. The second thing I would say, again, I want to
come back to the Iran Democracy Fund. And with deference to my
colleague, who I love like a brother, he is my marja, but I
have heard people in Europe who are working in the green
movement begging for more assistance as journalists are being
forced to flee Iran, journalists who had been operating inside.
And those funds have been cut off by the State Department. So
there are things we can do, we don't have to talk about it all
the time, I don't suggest that we talk about it. Sorry.
Mr. Burton. Go ahead, I am running out of time, I want to
make sure everybody gets the chance to give their opinion.
Mr. Ghadar. If we break down sanctions into three
categories, the most effective has certainly been going after
the money of the Revolutionary Guards, targeting them,
identifying them, taking them over. Furthermore, I think we
should highlight the pilferage that is occurring. Iranians are
very sensitive to corruption. We should highlight the
corruption over and over again, the system is corrupt, we
should take that to them. Foreign direct investment sanctions
have been effective but they are long term. In my opinion,
trade sanctions have not been effective, they won't be
effective, they will hurt the population. I constantly hear
that airplanes are falling from the sky, and they blame us for
not being able to get components from Boeing.
Mr. Burton. Can we do 30 seconds for each of the other
witnesses?
Ms. Abdo. There have been several meetings of people within
the green movement in Europe. And one thing, even though there
is a great debate among them, one recommendation they do make
is that there is some sort of funding for civil society
organizations that doesn't come from the U.S. Government
directly. This, they believe, will help their organizations
without tainting them with something like a democracy fund. So
their recommendation is that it come from unofficial or
nongovernmental organizations. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Dr. Khalaji?
Mr. Khalaji. Regarding to the potential scenario for the
end of this crisis, I think that the world, and especially
United States, plays an important role in shaping the future of
Iran. Because if the efforts we make now, it leads to the
weakening of the military body of the Iranian regime, the
possibility of establishment of a military government after
this crisis would be less. Because I think one of the scenarios
which is likely is, after the weakening of Khamenei and the
civilian politicians, Revolutionary Guard comes from behind the
scene to the front. So it is a big danger, but we can prevent
it by confronting this IRGC now.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Ellison.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very quickly, we have
heard terms in the press, terms like mullah government, but
isn't it true that one of the things going on now is that
members of the opposition are part of the clerical
establishment and the IRGC is starting to sort of take over and
militarize the government? So to describe the government now as
just a mullah government is sort of not accurate, am I right or
wrong? It looks like Ms. Abdo is nodding agreeably, do you want
to elaborate?
Ms. Abdo. Yes, you are absolutely right. One of the most
important results of what has happened is that even though much
of the clerical establishment had grown very, really in quiet I
guess opposition of the state, what has happened now is that
those internal private debates have become public. And
conservative clerics now are opposed to the system. In fact, I
don't know if some of you read some of the news reports, but
the Chief Justice of Iran now, Mr. Larijani, who is the brother
of the Speaker of Parliament, made statements this week that
politics should not enter the judicial system, that he will not
take orders to execute people anymore, that there has to be a
judicial process. So if someone who is a staunch hardliner,
such as Mr. Larijani, who is also a cleric, is now publicly
opposed to the state, this means that the cracks within the
system are pretty profound. And this has happened, as you point
out, Representative Ellison, that this has happened actually
throughout the clerical establishment.
Mr. Ellison. And in fact Mr. Karoubi is a religious leader
as well, isn't that right?
Ms. Abdo. Yes, he is a religious leader as well.
Mr. Ellison. And he is an opposition leader. Mr. Khalaji?
Mr. Khalaji. Yes, as a former seminarian and who has
studied in the clerical establishment for 14 years, I would say
that the clerical establishment in Islam, especially in Shiism,
is completely different than other religions like, you know,
Christianity and Catholicism. So when somebody wears robe and
turban, it doesn't mean that he is necessarily a religious
leader or religious authority.
Mr. Ellison. Okay.
Mr. Khalaji. So Karoubi is known in Iran not because of his
religious authority but because of his political record.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you for your inclusion. I only have 5
minutes, so please do forgive me. I appreciate your remarks
though. You know, you all have talked about sanctions and tried
to come up with smart sanctions, I have a question for you
hypothetical. If the people of the democracy movement believe
that all we care about is the nuclear issue, not their human
rights, and if our response to what they believe our concerns
are is to deprive the average Iranian of gasoline, what will be
the impact of that? And is that scenario a possibility? Dr.
Ghadar?
Mr. Ghadar. I absolutely agree with your comment. Let me
just briefly on the previous one, my fear is even more
exaggerated than you articulated. I am afraid that it is in
fact the Revolutionary Guards that are calling the shots and
Khamenei is afraid to do anything, but I don't have proof for
that, but just the fact that they are the instrument as holding
control. With regard to sanctions, I believe sanctions that
hurt the people will ultimately hurt us, okay?
I mentioned the airlines, I don't think gasoline is going
to be effective, I think that what the government will just
basically reduce, they have no smart cards, the smart cards
will basically the amount allocated was 100 liters a month,
last month they reduced it to 80, you can buy it on the black
market four times the price, the Revolutionary Guards have
cards that they can use, they can even sell it on the side.
Sanctions has allowed the Revolutionary Guards to basically
play a role in smuggling and profiting from the market, and
also on foreign direct investment making all the major
investments themselves.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Doctor, and please forgive my
abruptness, they only give you a few minutes. I actually
introduced a sanctions bill, and the bill I am introducing is
called the Stand With the Iranian People Act, I call it SWPA,
but what it does is that it prohibits procurement contracts
with persons or entities that provide censorship or
surveillance technology to the Government of Iran, it
encourages U.S. allies to deny visas to Iranian officials who
have carried out human rights abuses, it affirms the importance
of diplomacy with Iran in order to advance national security
interests of the United States, and it also encourages work
with the U.N. to investigate human rights abuses, and finally
it enables U.S. American NGOs to provide humanitarian
assistance directly to Iranian people. Now I know you haven't
read my bill, but just conceptually based on what I have shared
with you, what do you think in the last 4 seconds? Just if I
could ask for unanimous consent for 1 minute, maybe 2?
Mr. Ackerman. Let us give 30 seconds.
Mr. Ghadar. I think that is a great idea. I would also add
to that that allowing Iranian students to come to the United
States, allowing maybe a consulate to be opened so that
actually Iranians can see that we are open to them.
Mr. Ellison. Did you say consulate?
Mr. Ghadar. Consulate, yes.
Mr. Carpenter. Representative Ellison, I have read your
bill and I think it is a good bill. I think there have to be
some safeguards put in place on the humanitarian assistance
side, OFAC licensing, et cetera. And I also think you should go
further in terms of allowing certain communications equipment
and other things for NGOs to be able to distribute, again with
that oversight. In terms of the broad----
Mr. Ackerman. We are going to have to just keep moving.
Ms. Abdo. I think your bill is perfect. I mean I think that
those are practical recommendations that are practical and that
wouldn't necessarily taint the movement.
Mr. Khalaji. I think they are excellent. Just one thing,
along with banning visa for Iranian officials we have to
facilitate the visa for ordinary Iranians. This is the
nightmare of Ayatollah Khamenei to see Iranian people connected
to the world outside.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me be the
contrarian that I guess I have been designated to be on this
committee. And let me just say while I have great respect for
my very creative and I wouldn't mind saying a new force here in
Congress, and we certainly appreciate his ideas, but let us
take a look at where is the pivotal spot over there. What is
going to make the change? We are not talking about the
Revolutionary Guard, we are talking about the factor that gives
the mullahs the right to determine who will run in the
election.
It is the mullah's power to determine who will get on the
ballot and respect for that power that keeps that regime in
place. Take away that, and have anyone who wants to run on the
ballot be free to get on the ballot, that regime would
disappear. So it is the mullah regime that is the enemy. The
Revolutionary Guard, where does their power come from? It comes
from the fact that no one can run on the ballot unless they are
approved by the mullahs and they are not going to let anybody
in who is against the establishment.
The changes that happened in Poland and the disintegration
of the Soviet Union happened for a number of reasons. Yes, the
Pope played a major role, that was great. But let us note it
wasn't just the Pope. Ronald Reagan had meetings in the White
House with people who were resisting the Communist dictatorship
in Poland and elsewhere, he participated in rallies in which
the people who were struggling for freedom in Poland
participated. That type of endorsement we do not have today by
this administration, and we need that kind of endorsement.
The President of the United States and all of us should
identify and embrace people who are struggling for freedom in
Tehran, and we have not done that. And the chairman is
absolutely right when he says this isn't the only
administration that has held off from that type of approach,
you are absolutely right in that, Mr. Chairman, and I am not
just leveling criticism at Obama who has been in the presidency
now for just 1 year, but for the entire administration that
preceded him.
I am going to be asking Mr. Chairman and the subcommittee
in which I am a member to hold hearings into broadcasting and
what quality of broadcasting we have going into Iran and
elsewhere. I am sitting next to one of the heroes of freedom
broadcasting, and Ed will certainly have some comments on that
in a moment I am sure. Finally, about what we can do, go after
the money. These mullahs are corrupt.
They are not only repressive, they are not only part of a
repressive regime, they are part of a corrupt regime that is,
as you say, just robbing the people of Iran blind. They are
sucking the wealth away from that society, and much of it goes
into banks in the West. We should make it our job, and Mr.
Chairman, I would suggest that we in the Congress call on this
administration to identify and locate those funds that have
been taken from the people of Iran by the mullah leadership and
to seek to have those funds frozen and perhaps even put into a
freedom fund that could be used by those people struggling for
democracy in that country.
Those things would be seen as real, not only by the people
in the streets but also of course by the people in power. We
need to do more than just every now and then reconfirm that
supposedly we are on their side but we are going to have
patience and think about what actions we should take. We have
heard some great suggestions today, I think we should follow up
on those suggestions, we should be powerful in our advocacy of
democracy, and we should be courageous in aligning with those
people who are struggling for democracy in Tehran and
elsewhere.
That is the way to build a more peaceful world, and if we
had people here talking about China I would be saying exactly
the same thing. People around the world who want democracy are
our greatest allies, whatever country they come from. Iran is
not our enemy, the Iranian people are not our enemy. The
Chinese people, the Iranian people, all of those people are our
greatest allies in this struggle. We recognize that, Ronald
Reagan recognized that, and that is how we defeated Communism.
We need to have that same type of identification of our allies
now as we face radical Islam in the future. So thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman, for this. Unfortunately there is 3 seconds
left. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would ask that
my opening statement be entered into the record at this point.
Mr. Ackerman. Without objection, all members' statements.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair. You know, picking up on my
friend from California's last comments, I am certainly totally
sympathetic with his point of view, but something that concerns
me about U.S. identification with what seems to be clearly a
truly indigenous mass movement in Iran is that we are between
the rock and the hard place. Too much identification, public
identification, by the United States with such a movement could
put in jeopardy such a movement and play into the hands of the
hardliners who want to make the argument that dissent is in
fact an import from foreigners who are up to no good like ``the
great Satan America.''
And on the other hand, you know, we don't want to be silent
in the face of human rights violations by the current regime,
and we certainly want to hold out some lifeline that is
meaningful to those who have the courage to go to the streets,
the barricades, to speak up for human rights and freedom in
Iran. So I guess I would ask the panelists to comment briefly,
keeping in mind our time, but would you comment on the
indigenous nature of this mass movement and maybe its prospects
of success, and your guidance to us and to the United States
Government about where is that fine line that we not have
unintended consequences? Mr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you. Dissent as an import, that is the
accusation the government is already making, they are already
saying that this is a United States, British effort to
undermine the regime and anybody who participates is a traitor
to the regime. So the fact that we stand back and dissociate
ourselves with it doesn't change anything, they continue to do
it. So we might as well help in the way we can by associating
ourselves strongly with them on the ground in terms of support
on the human rights basis. No one buys it in Iran that the
British and the United States are at the base of this movement.
Mr. Ghadar. Congressman, I think two things. One, we need
to make sure that we inform the Iranians of what is going on so
they know what is going on. And then we need to take steps for
their voices to be heard, whether it is on TV or Internet. I
don't think neither of those are going to put us between a rock
and a hard place. However, the critical issue is, the Iranians
on one hand want freedom, which we support completely, but on
the other hand want independence. And it is that battle where
the opposition is asking for freedom and the regime is saying,
you are stooges of the opposition. So it is a fine line we
can't cross. But informing them and making sure their voices
are heard is not going to cause problems for us.
Ms. Abdo. Congressman, you raise an important issue which
we haven't touched upon so much today, and that is, what is a
realistic scenario and how can the opposition really make a
difference? And I think that at least in the short term the
most realistic scenario is not the opposition in retreat,
neither is it regime change. But it is a compromise, some sort
of unity government that has been discussed in Iran.
And that is why it is necessary to empower the opposition,
so that they can be well placed politically to extract
concessions from the regime, such as perhaps President
Ahmadinejad will remain in power but perhaps their own
representatives might be allowed to enter government in some
way. There are parliamentary elections coming up as well.
Ordinarily, historically, reformists are often barred from
running in these elections. It would be important to have more
reformists in the Parliament. So there are many things that
could happen within the political structure if the opposition
movement were in a better position than it is today.
Mr. Khalaji. I think that, we don't know what happens, but
what we are certain about is that Khamenei as the Supreme
Leader would not have any strong place in the future of Iran.
Whether green leaders reach to some sort of agreement with the
government, whether Revolutionary Guard takes power, whether
regime changes, in any possible and likely scenario, Khamenei
would not be there. Second is that I don't believe that green
leaders can compromise with the government. Or it is better to
say that I don't think that the government accept to compromise
with the green movement. What I expect is two extreme sides of
this spectrum, either the collapse of the regime or a more
militarized regime in Iran.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, my time is up. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well thank you for your excellent
testimony and for unpacking some of the delicate dilemmas that
present itself in trying to stand with something that is very
important without interfering with its eventual positive
outcome. In that regard, I want to tell you all that many of us
discussed behind the scenes when the opposition movement first
appeared as to what the proper response would be, trying to
determine this line between prudence and risk taking, not
trying to do something in support of the opposition that would
actually undermine it by giving a pretext for its crackdown by
the government.
And so I chose prudence, I chose to remain quiet, because I
thought until we had a better understanding of the resiliency,
the depth, the passion, the willingness to sacrifice, the
continuity of this potential movement, that given the past
history with the United States we could inadvertently lead to
its crushing. It is different now. I think that we as an
international community with one collective voice need to shout
from the hills the Iranian people's right for autonomy and
their right to protest and their right to seek a more just form
of governance.
And so I think this hearing is part of that speaking out,
Mr. Chairman. And with that said, that touches upon some of
what your concerns were, Mr. Carpenter, in trying to determine
when is the appropriate time to speak and speak loudly. And
even if it gave further pretext as you are suggesting, we are
already being blamed, I have heard that, so what harm can come
from it? But with that said, Dr. Ghadar, you said there is
three possible outcomes.
I want you to assign a probability to those possible
outcomes, one, that the movement is crushed, two, that it finds
some common ground, some compromise for its accommodation with
the current governmental structures, or three, it results in a
paradigm shift in the form of governance in Iran. Because this
comes back to that point as to what to do as well as when to do
it. Assign a probably.
Mr. Ghadar. That is a very difficult thing to do, but I
will be glad to give you my biased point of view.
Mr. Fortenberry. I would prefer you do it than me.
Mr. Ghadar. Okay. I think the likelihood of the
Revolutionary Guard's beating up on everybody is quite high on
February 11th, but that is not going to basically dissipate the
problem. So I would give that a low probability of 10, 15, 20
percent. I think the probability of the demise of the regime is
highly optimistic, I don't think they are going to just walk
away. So the bulk of the probability, maybe 60-65, 70 percent,
is going to some kind of compromise. These guys are all in
cahoots together, with all due respect, Mousavi, Karoubi,
Khamenei, Rafsanjani, they all basically have the same roots.
The opposition in the streets are ahead of all of them.
Therefore, the compromise will be made among them behind closed
doors. How it will be done, I don't know.
Mr. Fortenberry. If you agree to that level of probably for
that outcome, what will these compromise structure look like,
would anybody have any insight into that?
Mr. Ghadar. I think there is going to be a reduction in the
influence of the Supreme Leader, I think there will be
additional opposition members in the Parliament, and I think
that Mr. Rafsanjani will play a more active role as a mediator.
Mr. Fortenberry. Go ahead, Mr. Khalaji.
Mr. Khalaji. For the same reason Dr. Ghadar mentioned, I
think that the compromise won't happen. The relationship
between green leaders and the government is like the
relationship between Iran and United States, there is a mutual
distrust. When Iran is powerful it doesn't want to compromise,
when they are weak they don't want to compromise. That is the
situation exactly now with the green movement and government.
Mr. Fortenberry. I understood this point as well that what
started out as opposition to what was considered to be a
fraudulent election has now matured and moved way beyond that.
Mr. Khalaji. Exactly.
Mr. Fortenberry. Tapping into a root of opposition that has
been festering--not festering, organically growing--for a long
time because of all of the abuses. I think I am done, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. There are votes that are being
called momentarily on the floor. If we all keep to or under our
5 minutes I think we can get the last two members and the
witnesses' response. Mr. Crowley.
Mr. Crowley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Many have looked to
history, and particularly in Indonesia and the demise of
Suharto, the exposure of his corruption that led to the demise
of that regime. Some news reports have suggested that the
Supreme Leader Khamenei has up to $30 billion in assets. And
even if that is not true, it still appears that there may very
well be serious corruption that exists within his own personal
life.
Some of the reports say that he owns over 200 walking
sticks or canes, one of which has an encrusted diamond in it,
also that he may have ownership of eight airplanes. One, how do
we confirm or how are we confirming that those statistics are
true or not? How widely known or suspected is the level of
corruption of Khamenei, does the public know about it? And what
else is being done to bring attention to the corruption that
exists within the mullah regime? Obviously, as I think what I
heard from the testimony, that everyone here believes that the
shine is off the apple, but to what degree is that the case and
what is being done to further expose that? And if anyone
politely would like to respond?
Mr. Ghadar. Congressman, it is difficult to say how much
money he has got, but I will give you some examples. There are
reports that around $250-300 billion of Iranian money is
invested via Dubai. Okay, where does this money come from? Who
makes $250 billion? That is not the salary of the Supreme
Leader, okay? We can track that down, we can put pressure via
UAE on Dubai to find out what is going on. Much of this
transaction has to go outside of Western banks, but we do have
some pressure on those institutions to find out what is going
on.
Right after the election, the foreign exchange reserves of
Iran dropped dramatically. There was clearly money flowing out
very rapidly. Where did it go? I don't know, but I am sure that
our Treasury can play a very active role in identifying that.
There were reports that a truck was found in Turkey with
billions of dollars of gold and currency, where did that go?
The Turks confiscated it and I don't know where the
negotiations are going on. There are numerous examples of this,
the question is do we have the will to go after it? That is not
going to step on the Iranian opposition, the Iranian opposition
will support this move. Talking about it, broadcasting about it
will be positive.
Mr. Crowley. I appreciate that in terms of adding
additional suspicions, but really more to my question, is it
believed, what is the level of credibility within the Iranian
people that that is the case and what is being done to expose
more of that?
Mr. Ghadar. I believe the Revolutionary Guard members who
have won all the contracts are highly suspect. After the
foreign direct investment was held out, the major contracts,
anything over $1 billion was given to the Revolutionary Guard,
the Tehran metro, the gas biplane goes to Pakistan, the gas
operation Qatar. I think the Iranian population questions the
Revolutionary Guards. I don't know to what extent they will
question the Supreme Leader.
Ms. Abdo. Yes, I would agree, I think that there is a great
difference in how the public views the Supreme Leader versus
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, and very little is known
about Khamenei and his wealth. But I would also like to just
add quickly to a suggestion that was made earlier. Even though,
as you mentioned, Congressman, the legitimacy around Khamenei
has certainly been damaged, I think that if we are talking
about restructuring, you know, the government, I think that we
can assume that he will remain in power until he dies.
I mean even though his power might be diminished and there
is much more of a move now to rule by consensus within the
power structure, I don't foresee any time in the near future
when, even though his legitimacy has certainly been affected by
this crisis, that he will step down from power or that he
still, you know, won't have a primary decision making role.
Thank you.
Mr. Khalaji. It depends what we mean by the economic
corruption. As far as I know, there is no evidence that
Khamenei collects money for himself. He has a very simple life.
But he controls the wealthiest organizations and companies in
Iran, which are actually in charge of financially supporting
Hezbollah, Hamas, extremist groups, and other dangerous group
in the region. And they are in charge of actually expanding the
power of Khamenei inside the country. Khamenei has lost his
religious and political legitimacy, but it is not known in Iran
as a symbol of the corruption.
Mr. Crowley. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
Final five.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going to ask a
question of Ms. Abdo. And you and your colleagues have all
raised this issue of human rights abuses of the Iranian regime.
Has the Obama administration shown any inclination to raise
that issue at the U.N. in order to try to broadcast that out
across the international community?
Ms. Abdo. So your question is?
Mr. Royce. Has it been brought before the U.N.? In the past
I have been involved in human rights issues where we have tried
to get different countries, we have inquired as to why not
raise these issues, human rights issues, at the U.N. level. And
my question, is there the inclination by this administration to
raise it at the U.N.?
Ms. Abdo. To my knowledge, this administration has not
raised it. And I think that one suggestion that has been made
is, rather than try to get, say, the U.N. General Assembly to
pursue any sort of investigation, that it might be more wise to
have the Human Rights Commission within the U.N. pursue such an
initiative. I know that in the past a body of the U.N. has had
negotiations with Iran and European diplomats over human rights
issues, and what the Iranians tried to do at that time was to
tie the nuclear issue to the human rights issue. So, you know,
we will make compromises on this issue if you are going to, and
that didn't really work.
Mr. Royce. And you concur with me, I mean our whole problem
here is that we are not focusing on human rights, and it seems
to me the ghoulish show trials that we are seeing there and the
rapes of people in detention and the deaths on the streets and
in the universities, all of this, all of these human rights
abuses, which in terms of the atrocities, the photographs that
we see, we have the documentary evidence here, it seems that
the key issue here is, can the West get these facts out so that
the entire international community and everyone in Iran are
confronted with the facts?
Can we assist on that or are we going to be preoccupied on
other questions and not engaged on what needs to be broadcast?
And then the second question I would ask you, ma'am, is there a
way to guarantee that we do a better job? I have been involved
with legislation, authoring legislation for broadcasting into
Yugoslavia, too late, into Afghanistan, too late. But here we
have an opportunity to do what we did too late into Burma, and
that is establish the facts for people on the ground in terms
of what is actually happening. And in the past we haven't
always done such a good job in terms of how we have delivered
that message. I would like your critique on that too and how we
could help.
Ms. Abdo. Well, as a former journalist, I can tell you that
media is very powerful. And as we have seen with these
demonstrations the BBC Farsi Service has made an enormous
impact in providing exactly the kind of information that you
are talking about. Now, having said that, I think that that
kind of sort of example or paradigm can't really apply to Voice
of America, primarily because Voice of America is associated in
a way with the U.S. Government that BBC is not. And so I think
that for a lot of reasons, in addition to the fact that BBC
Farsi Service is just a superb, superb news organization, it
has had a great effect, but it has been very powerful.
Mr. Royce. Your critique on all of these other issues is
very helpful, and we will try to implement them to the greatest
extent possible. We don't have a critique from you, and we get
a lot of advice in terms of what we ought to do in terms of
public diplomacy. If you would ever feel inclined, given your
background, to write up some suggestions based upon your
observations, I would like to see them and I think probably
some of the other members of this committee would look forward
to those observations.
Ms. Abdo. Thank you, I am happy to do that.
Mr. Royce. Thank you. I think I have a few more minutes.
Anyone else want to make a comment on this?
Mr. Khalaji. I think that one of the way that United States
can support human rights in Iran is to use its channels to
religious leaders of the world and have them put pressure on
Iran, especially on the Supreme Leader, because the Iranian
leader, he consider himself as the religious leader and the
leader of Muslim World. So for example we have seven Baha'is in
prison, they are held without any reason, and they are at risk.
And we have many other people, if you have dozens of Sunni
religious activists, they are in prison. So we can use these
channels and ask different religious leaders in the world,
write a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei publicly and criticize him
or respectfully ask him to end this human rights abuse in Iran.
Mr. Ackerman. And that will have to be the last word.
Mr. Royce. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Mr. Ackerman. The gentleman's time is expired, the
committee's time is expired. Let me thank the panel for their
indeed expert testimony, you have been a great help to this
committee. I am very proud of the committee's number of people
who participated today, the great questions and the thinking
that went into them and the responses by our witnesses who have
been a great help to the process. Thank you all very much. The
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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