[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 3, 2010
Printed for the use of the Committee
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PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas, Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan
ANNA G. ESHOO, California ELTON GALLEGLY, California
RUSH D. HOLT, New Jersey MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
MIKE THOMPSON, California ROY BLUNT, Missouri
JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois JEFF MILLER, Florida
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania PETER T. KING, New York
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Nancy Pelosi, California, Speaker, Ex Officio Member
John A. Boehner, Ohio, Minority Leader, Ex Officio Member
Michael Delaney, Staff Director
ANNUAL THREATS ASSESSMENT, PART I
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, the Honorable Silvestre Reyes
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Reyes, Eshoo, Holt, Ruppersberger,
Thompson, Schakowsky, Langevin, Schiff, Hoekstra, Gallegly,
Thornberry, Rogers, Myrick, Blunt, Miller, Conaway, and King.
The Chairman. Good morning. The committee will please come
to order.
And Director Blair, welcome again to our committee. As
always, we are happy to have you here and glad that you were
able to navigate through all the snow we got overnight, and I
see that we have some members and hopefully other members will
be able to come in. I don't know how many are affected by the
weather today.
Today marks the fourth annual threat assessment hearing
that I have chaired. It is one of the rare opportunities for
our committee to receive open and unclassified testimony on the
threats the Intelligence Community is working to address
throughout the world.
Our purpose here today is to address the threats we will
face in the future. It is not an effort to Monday-morning
quarterback. What has happened in the last year obviously is
not irrelevant. The challenges we have faced are in some ways
indications of what we will face in the near future.
We have seen in recent months the tragedy of self-
radicalization and home-grown threats, both in the attacks on
the soldiers and civilians at Fort Hood and the incident on
Christmas Day. We have seen, of course, the continued efforts
of al Qaeda to strike us. That was evident in the attempted
bombing on Christmas Day and in the conspiracy of Najibullah
Zazi in New York.
In the Christmas Day attempt, we saw that we still have a
ways to go to improve our defenses against terrorism. In the
Zazi case, frankly, we saw that, I believe, sometimes we get
this right. And, really, the times that we have gotten things
right and have not publicized it, are, for national security
reasons, are important to note today as well.
Finally, on December 30th, in Khost, Afghanistan, we saw
the grave risk faced by the men and women of the Intelligence
Community. They paid the ultimate price and made a sacrifice
that we as Americans must never forget.
The central lesson of all these things is clear. Today,
more than 8 years after September 11th, our principal challenge
is the same: Identify terrorist plots and stop them before they
harm American citizens and American interests.
Al Qaeda and its affiliates are as determined today as ever
to harm the United States. Addressing that threat, I think,
involves attacking the problem on three fronts: at home; in the
border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan; and, finally, in
emerging terrorist safe havens around the world.
On the home front, we have to address the threat of
terrorism within the United States and the problem of self-
radicalization. The shootings at Fort Hood were a devastating
reminder of the threat posed by self-radicalized extremists
that are inside the United States.
So this morning, Director Blair, one, among some of the
questions that I would like to have you address are, what steps
will you take to identify and address terrorist threats within
the United States? How will we strike the proper balance
between law enforcement and intelligence? I fully understand
and know that this issue has been hotly debated lately, but I
want to know what your plan is and what you will do going
forward.
In the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, our
efforts to fight extremists are greatly dependent on
cooperation from both governments. Those governments struggle
with the challenges of both internal threats and corruption.
Despite the best intentions of our allies, the Afghan Taliban
is gaining strength. This presents one of our biggest
challenges to date, fighting extremism in the nation that
continues to struggle to provide basic services to its own
citizens. Again, what are our plans for turning back the
Taliban and building stability in Afghanistan?
Over the past 7 years, the war in Iraq placed a huge burden
on the Intelligence Community's resources. While the IC
continues to support our warfighting operations in Iraq, today
I am particularly interested to hear how you are supporting the
President's strategy of increased operations in Afghanistan as
the United States continues to draw down its troops in Iraq.
In Pakistan, the government recently claimed that, due to a
strain on its military, Pakistan could not launch any new
offensives against extremists in North Waziristan for at least
6 months. What effects do Pakistan's limitations have on the
Intelligence Community's ability to counter extremism in that
volatile region?
A comprehensive approach to terrorism has to deal with
emerging terrorist safe havens. We only have to remember the
bombing of the USS Cole in October of 2000 to remind us that
the threat from terrorist activities in Yemen is not a new
threat. However, Yemen is not the only area of the world that
affords terrorists relative safety to plan, to train and to
launch potential attacks against the United States and our
allies.
In past years, this committee has taken particular interest
in Somalia and areas of North Africa. The Horn of Africa has
been a particular concern for many years because they have weak
central governments or experienced great instability that might
allow the creation of safe havens to develop. Our primary
concern in raising this issue is one of sufficient resources.
So the questions are, does the Intelligence Community have
sufficient collection and analytical resources directed at
understanding the political, the economic, the military and the
leadership dynamics of these nations in this conflictive part
of our word.
Terrorism, sadly, is not the only threat that we face. Iran
and North Korea still pose significant threats to U.S.
interests and to international security. I remain extremely
concerned about Iran's nuclear weapons program, especially in
light of the revelation of a second nuclear enrichment
facility, near Qom. It seems that the prospects for diplomatic
dialogue are diminishing as the Iranian government's crackdown
on its people becomes more violent.
Just overnight, the Iranians claim to have the ability to
launch satellites into space. Those are all daunting challenges
on many different fronts but certainly affect our ability to
have a clear understanding of the intelligence challenge that
it is to us.
I am also quite concerned about North Korea's nuclear and
missile program. In January, North Korea issued two statements
posing peace treaty talks and sanctions removal before it
returns to nuclear talks. However, just last week, North Korea
exchanged fire with South Korea, raising tensions on a regional
basis. What is the Intelligence Community's current assessment
of this program and this region, and have we seen any
willingness from North Korea to dismantle the program as a
precondition to negotiations?
China, a U.S. ally, still clearly poses a threat to our
national interest. Although the President has promised a more
conciliatory era in U.S.-China relations, we cannot ignore the
Chinese-oriented cyber attacks and the continued and
significant buildup of the Chinese navy. Despite reports to the
contrary, I hope that China remains a top priority for our
Intelligence Community.
The United States continues to be a victim of a disturbing
increase in the scope, virulence and potency of cyber attacks.
Whether the perpetrator is a terrorist organization or a state
actor, the threat to our energy, financial, communications and
security infrastructure remains the same. The Intelligence
Community has a critical role to play in understanding the
threat, securing our classified information technology systems
and working with the business community to secure our critical
infrastructures.
In the last year, we have stepped back from the brink of
financial ruin and even of a potential global financial
depression. While times are still hard and the greatest threat
has passed, we still have many challenges on those fronts. I
fear that one cyber attack could put us right back where we
were a year ago on the brink of potential economic disaster.
Finally, I am interested to hear your assessment of a
situation that I continue to monitor closely, and that is the
rampant violence in Mexico related to drug-trafficking
organizations and criminal gangs and the Calderon
administration's willingness to take those organizations on.
While Mexico has seen a number of encouraging successes
this year, including the arrests of Teodoro Eduardo Garcia
Simental and Carlos Beltran Leyva, and of course the death of
Arturo Beltran Leyva, a number of us still remain very
concerned about that situation.
As you know, Director Blair, right across the border from
my district is Ciudad Juarez, a city that has seen a staggering
number of murders, kidnappings and other violent crimes. Just
last Saturday, several gunmen brazenly murdered 16 people, most
of them below the age of 20. The brutality of this attack was
shocking even to the people of Juarez, who over the course of
the last 2 years have witnessed a tremendous amount of violence
and mass shootings, and that raises the level of concern to our
national security.
This is not just a matter of Mexico's national security.
Those of us who live on the border know that our futures are
linked and that narco-related criminal activity is just as much
our problem as it is Mexico's. To that end, I am interested to
hear how the Intelligence Community is coordinating with the
Government of Mexico in the continued fight against narco
traffickers and criminal gangs.
Again, Director Blair, I thank you for being here this
morning. I know I have given you a lot to respond to. But, as
you know, we have many challenges coming at us from varied and
different areas globally, and so we appreciate your willingness
to come here and share your thoughts with the committee.
So I will close by noting that I have great respect for the
men and women of the Intelligence Community who are working
under your guidance throughout the world. I take great pride in
working on their behalf in Congress, and I am committed to
making sure that they have the resources that they need to
protect our Nation from the many threats that face us all
collectively.
With that, let me now recognize the ranking member for any
comments that he may wish to make in his opening statement.
[The statement of the Chairman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Hoekstra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Blair, it is good to have you here today.
Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement that I would like
to submit for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Hoekstra. Then I will just kind of speak for a couple
of minutes.
I want to kind of change the tone a little bit, and I want
to talk about accountability. I want to talk about inability of
the community to hold itself accountable for its performance
and what I see as an increasing, from my perspective, an
increasing demonstration that this community is unwilling to be
held accountable by Congress and this committee.
How do I come to this conclusion? You know, we are coming
to a close on a very painful chapter in the Intel Community.
The shoot down of Americans, the death of a mother and a
daughter in Peru almost 9 years ago. The accountability board
has recently finished its work. But if there is ever an example
of justice delayed, justice denied, this is it.
The justice or the accountability board was empaneled too
investigate the wrongful deaths of these two Americans,
misleading, and some might say lying, to Congress by the Intel
Community. And the result of this is, after 8 years, there has
been minimal accountability. I think the only reason that there
has been any accountability is because of the work of people on
this committee. Myself, Ms. Schakowsky, who has been a stalwart
in working with me, and Mr. Miller, in continuing to press the
issue forward.
You know, you go through this whole process, and then you
add what I consider insult to injury. You know, I have asked
the community, what information can be shared with the
surviving family members? And, again, Ms. Schakowsky is working
with us to get them a full accounting of exactly what happened
on that fateful day of 2001.
But the information that I have been told that I could
share with the family was, mistakes were made; people were held
accountable; and it won't happen again.
That is totally unacceptable, and I hope that, under your
leadership, the leadership of Director Panetta, this family
will get a much more complete accounting of what happened to
their wife, their daughter, and their grandchild on that day.
The community's performance in terms of accountability has
been unacceptable. From my perspective, you could almost say
that the bureaucracy won.
These were Americans that were killed with the help of
their government. The community covered it up. They delayed
investigating. It took 3 years--3 years--for the IG to complete
its report, so the accountability board really wasn't empaneled
until 7 years after the incident, and it took more than 8 years
before any sanctions were ever proposed and implemented.
From my perspective, it is a failure of all levels of
leadership within the community to hold itself accountable in
perhaps the most tragic of circumstances where people and
family members were killed by their own government or with the
help of their own government. Maybe you can explain today why
it took 8 years, more than 8 years, for there to be any type of
accountability.
My second point is, this committee can't do its job if you
don't share information with us. It was last week that we began
a hearing by holding up the Washington Post, because the
Washington Post had more information than this committee had
about what the Intel Community might be doing in regards to
targeting Americans.
Today, we get a story from the New York Times. The White
House hastily called a briefing on Tuesday evening to discuss
the new details of this case. I wish you would hastily call a
meeting or a conference call with this committee to share
information on terrorist cases. That might help, but it is
interesting that, you know, to get your best information on
what is going on in the Intel Community today, it appears you
go to the newspapers.
And these are not the only two instances. It also concerns
Fort Hood. It took us weeks to get information on Fort Hood. It
took us weeks to get information on the Christmas Day bomber.
Even you, yourself, admitted or said a couple of weeks ago
that, Congressman, that they played games with you when they
went to Yemen, when they wouldn't share information with you on
the specific instructions from people from the Intel Community
and the administration saying, you know, when Congressman
Hoekstra is in Yemen, and he asks questions about these areas
where he has oversight, tell him that you can't answer those
questions, and that information will be forthcoming when he
comes back to Michigan--or, excuse me, when he comes back to
Washington D.C.
What is the community unwilling to share with this
committee? What policies can't pass public scrutiny or pass the
scrutiny of this committee?
Finally, I do want to get back to the story, excuse me, I
want to get back to the story that was in the Washington Post
last week, targeting of Americans. It is a very sensitive
issue, but, again, there has been more information in the
public domain than what has been shared with this committee.
We know the spokesman for bin Laden, Godahn. He has been
the spokesperson for bin Laden for years. He is an American. He
has been charged with treason.
We know of, more recently, the Northern Virginia Five, the
people who are now under arrest in Pakistan for, again,
supposed terrorist connections.
We all know about Awlaki, the American-born radical cleric
who is connected in certain ways with Fort Hood and is
connected to the Christmas Day bomber in Detroit.
What is our policy towards them? They are terrorists. They
are traitors. You know, when we dealt with these kinds of
issues previously about how we deal with Americans, we went
through a painstaking process to develop that policy and
hopefully get by and by the administration and Congress.
You know, probably the best example of that is the
Terrorist Surveillance Program, about how tools could be used
against various targets, including Americans. But we went
through a very painstaking process, so that we all on this
committee kind of understood the rules and the Intel Community
understood what those rules were going to be and the box that
they had to operate within.
In other cases, we had congressional Gang of Eight
briefings on some of the most sensitive issues, but it was an
attempted partnership between the administration and this
committee or representatives of this committee on the most
sensitive of U.S. policies. I can't think of anything that is
more sensitive in this threat that we face today of this
emerging trend of them targeting Americans for recruitment and
sometimes being successful and how we will respond to those
Americans who are successfully recruited and have decided that
they are now part of a radical jihadist movement targeting
their fellow citizens.
We need to understand and develop that policy. We need to
understand it, because we need to do the oversight. We need to
know and understand and help shape the box that the Intel
Community and the U.S. Government has when it is dealing with
Americans.
It is obvious in the case, you know, in 2001, that the
rules may have been clear, but the policy was not implemented
very well when we shot down that plane in Peru. The concern
that I have today is that I am not sure that the box is very
clear or very well understood as to what you and the people in
your organizations can do when it comes to Americans who have
joined the enemy.
We have asked the questions. The chairman has indicated he
has a genuine interest in getting to the answers and
understanding this.
The question that I have, when will the answers be
forthcoming? When will the administration submit itself to
having that dialogue with this committee so that we can
understand and help shape that box, and then we will be in a
position to do the oversight that needs to be done?
I can't think of anything that is more important for this
committee to do at this point in time than to answer those
questions, because there is nothing more dangerous to this
country than Americans who have joined the enemy and have as
their goal to attack us, and we need to understand and
implement that policy.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Hoekstra follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Hoekstra.
And I just want to remind our members and witnesses that we
are in open session this morning.
Clearly, some of the questions that Mr. Hoekstra asked, you
can't respond to in open session.
I, too, if you have a magic formula on how to stop leaks to
the press, I am interested in hearing what you propose to do.
But, frankly, it has been something that we have wrestled with
for the last two administrations, the amount of information
that gets leaked.
And then I would remind all of us that, although
sensational, some of that information that gets reported in the
media, we have known and have heard from our experts in closed
session that a lot of that information is wrong; a lot of that
information is embellished; a lot of that information is
untrue. So while it is aggravating and irritating, let's make
sure we keep that in perspective.
The other thing I want to mention before I recognize
Director Blair is that when Mr. Hoekstra talks about lack of
information, I have, and I believe he has, been contacted by
members of the administration. I know on Christmas Day, when
that incident occurred, I got an extensive briefing from Mr.
Brennan on that night.
Then subsequent to that, we have had information. But I
also know, I guess it is based upon my law enforcement
experience, that we need to give our professionals that you
work with, Mr. Director, the time to fully investigate, to find
out what all the circumstances are, and then bring people in
and get the correct information rather than information that is
misreported and misconstrued and misused in some cases.
So, with that, I just want us to keep things in
perspective. We do have serious challenges that we have to
face. I think it is a legitimate issue, and I am awaiting the
subcommittee's report on the issue that Mr. Hoekstra brought up
about the shooting in Peru. I know that Director Panetta is
taking that issue very seriously.
I can remember back to the initial hearing that we held
where I raised some issues that, the circumstances of that
shooting really didn't make sense to me because you had a
dynamic in there where people were having to translate several
times before the action was taken.
So those are all things that we hope will come out in this
subcommittee investigation, and I look forward to those results
and then moving forward with, how do we make sure that that
never happens again?
With that, Director Blair, your written testimony will be
made part of the official record of this hearing, and now you
are recognized for any opening statement that you may wish to
make.
STATEMENT OF DENNIS C. BLAIR, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Admiral Blair. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Reyes,
Ranking Member Hoekstra.
There are two different sets of questions and issues that
have been raised in your opening statements, one having to do
with the overall threat assessment to the United States going
into the future; the second, these questions of accountability
and procedures, especially those involving the way the
Intelligence Community treats Americans.
I will be glad to go in more detail in questions and
especially in more detail in the closed session, and some of
the matters I think are best discussed there.
But before talking about the overall threat, let me just
say, Congressman Hoekstra, that in both the collecting of
intelligence and certainly in the use of force in direct action
by the Intelligence Community and in the support that we give
to the Department of Defense, which is the other branch of
government which blows stuff up and kills people, we follow a
set of defined policy and legal procedures that are very
carefully, carefully observed.
And when there are questions, they are raised, and we give
guidance down to the field so that we know that they are acting
towards Americans. That has been the experience in the year
that I have been director. Director Panetta and I have had
direct conversations about things going on now.
As far as the issues that you raise of the past, the Peru
shoot down, the grinding on of that process, I agree with you;
that is an awfully long time to do that, and I will take
another look at it.
I know Director Panetta has. I will look over his shoulder
and make sure that we are doing the right thing. But I just
want to share with everybody in open session that we take
American citizens' status and rights as Americans seriously. We
spend a lot of time making sure we are doing the right thing,
whether it is in collection or in direct action, and we can
discuss some details subsequently.
But let me turn to the overall threat assessment. You have
seen my extensive written report on it, but let me just
summarize some of the highlights and, first, by emphasizing
that it is the product of the work of the thousands of
patriotic, skilled brave professionals that I have the honor of
leading as the world's finest intelligence team. And the work
that they do, as I think particularly brought into relief by
the seven deaths that we have had recently of officers and the
dozen more who have been wounded in recent weeks who we are
caring for, it is a serious business that we are in.
All of these Intelligence Agencies, the 16 in the
Intelligence Community, participated in the statement that I
submitted for the record and in the remarks that we will make.
Let me start with the subject of information technology,
since we all know, on a personal and on a business basis, every
day there are new gadgets, there are new services, which make
our lives faster and more efficient. But I think what we don't
quite understand as seriously as we should is the extent of
malicious cyber activity that is growing now at unprecedented
rates, extraordinary sophistication.
The dynamic of cyberspace, when you look at the
technological balance, right now it favors those who want to
use the Internet for malicious purposes over those who want to
use it for legal and lawful purposes, and we have to deal with
that reality.
An additional important factor is the growth of
international companies in supplying both software and
hardware, not only to private companies in this country but
also for our sensitive U.S. Government networks. This increases
the potential for a subversion of the information in those
systems.
The recent intrusion of Google is yet another wake-up call
about just how seriously we have to take this program.
Cybercrime is on the rise. Global cyber bank and credit
card fraud has serious implications for economic and for
financial systems worldwide. Attacks against networks that
control the critical infrastructure in this country and in
others, energy, transportation, attacks on those
infrastructures could wreak havoc.
Cyber defenders, right now, it is simply the facts of the
matter, have to spend more and work harder than the attackers
do. And our efforts, frankly, are not strong enough to
recognize, deal with that reality. The United States Government
and the private sector--and we are deeply intertwined in this
matter--have to do more to ensure that adequate cyber defenses
are in place.
Let me turn to the global economy, where the trends are
more positive. A year ago, I was here warning about the dangers
of a global depression. But in that year, an unprecedented
policy response by both governments around the world and by
central banks has laid the foundation for a global recovery
that most forecasters expect will continue through this year,
although unemployment will persist.
Not all countries, however, have emerged from the slump,
and several of them are important to the United States.
Pakistan and the Ukraine are still struggling to put their
economic houses in order. Our allies, who have forces with us
in Afghanistan and elsewhere, are dealing with budget cuts,
which affect their ability to participate.
China is emerging from the events of the past year with
enhanced clout. Its economy will grow from being approximately
a third of America's to about half by 2015, faster than we had
previously forecast, if current trends continue. Last year,
Beijing contributed to the G-20's pledge to increase
International Monetary Fund resources. It deployed naval forces
to the international anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden,
and it supported new U.N. Security Council sanctions against
North Korea. That is all very positive.
Nonetheless, Beijing still believes that the United States
seeks to contain it, to transform its society, and that
reinforces their concerns about internal stability about
perceived challenges to their sovereignty claims. China
continues to increase its defense spending. Preparations for a
Taiwan conflict involving a U.S. intervention continues to
dominate their modernization and their contingency plans, and
they are also increasingly concerned about how to protect their
global interests.
Turning to violent extremism, we have been warning in the
past several years that al Qaeda itself--its affiliates and al
Qaeda-inspired terrorists remain committed to striking the
United States. And in the past year, we have some names that go
behind these warnings.
As the chairman mentioned, Najibullah Zazi, two
coconspirators were allegedly trained by al Qaeda in
Afghanistan. Umar Faouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian who
allegedly attempted to down a U.S. airliner on Christmas Day,
represents an al Qaeda-affiliated group. And Major Nidal Hasan
at Fort Hood, a homegrown, self-radicalized extremist.
The violent extremist threat is evolving. We have made
complex multi-team attacks very difficult for al Qaeda to pull
off. But as we saw with the recent rash of attacks last year,
both successful and unsuccessful, identifying individual
terrorists, small groups with short histories, using simple
attack methods is a much more difficult task.
We in the Intelligence Community did not identify Mr.
Abdulmutallab before he boarded Northwest Flight 253 on
Christmas Day for Detroit. We should have. And as we have
discussed with this committee, we are working hard to improve
so that we can.
On a more positive note, only a decreasing and ever smaller
minority of Muslims support violent extremism, and that is
according to a number of polls taken in many Muslim countries.
But still, al Qaeda's radical ideology seems to appeal strongly
to a disaffected group of young Muslims, and this is a pool of
potential suicide bombers, and this pool unfortunately includes
Americans.
Although we don't have the high-level home-grown threat
facing Europeans, we have to worry about the appeal that
figures like Anwar al-Awlaki exert on young American Muslims.
However much we improve, we cannot count on intelligence to
catch and identify every threat. Intensified counterterrorism
efforts in the Pakistan theatre, as well as around the world,
Yemen, Somalia, elsewhere are crucial to diminishing this
threat. So, too, is working with allies and partners, enhanced
law enforcement and other security measures, including
immigration and visa controls, aviation and border security.
All of these can disrupt terrorist plans. We need a
multilayered dynamic defense supported by good intelligence.
Let me then turn to the outlook in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, where the Intelligence Community is putting
extraordinary efforts forth in combination with both Department
of Defense deployments and with civil teams.
Since January 2007, that is 3 years ago, the Taliban has
increased its influence and expanded its insurgency while
holding on to its strongholds in the Pashtun belt in
Afghanistan.
So the challenge is clear:
First, reversing this Taliban momentum while holding onto
security gains elsewhere.
Second, improving Afghan security forces, governance,
economic capability, so that as security gains are made, they
can endure, and responsibilities can be turned over to the
Afghans themselves.
Now, early successes in places like Helmand, where the
Marine units have been deployed for several months, where there
is an aggressive counter-drug program, economic programs in
place, where local governance is competent; these show us that
we can make valid progress, we can make solid progress. Even
where the threat is great.
The safe haven that the Afghan insurgents have in Pakistan
is the group's most important outside support. And disrupting
that safe haven won't be sufficient by itself to defeat the
insurgency in Afghanistan. But disrupting that presence in
Pakistan is necessary. It is a necessary condition for making
overall progress in Afghanistan.
The increase in terrorist attacks against their country has
made the Pakistani public more concerned about the threat from
Islamic extremists, including al Qaeda. Pakistanis continue to
support the use of military force against insurgents in their
country, and Islamabad has demonstrated determination and
persistence in combatting the militants that it perceives are
dangerous to its interests. But it has also continued to
provide some support to other Pakistani groups that operate in
Afghanistan.
Looking to the future, U.S. and coalition successes against
the insurgency in Afghanistan could provide new long-term
incentives for Pakistan to take steps against Afghan-focused
militants. Increased Pakistani cooperation is more likely if
Pakistan is persuaded that the United States is committed to
stabilizing Afghanistan and is capable to doing so.
Let me finally turn to Iran, where the available
intelligence indicates that Tehran is keeping open the option
to develop nuclear weapons. This is being done in part by
developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to
the ability to produce weapons.
One of the key capabilities Iran continues to develop is
its uranium enrichment program. Published information from the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, indicates that
Iran has significantly expanded the number of centrifuges in
its facility at Natanz. It also has had problems operating
these centrifuges, which has constrained the production of low-
enriched uranium.
The United States and other countries announced last
September that Iran for years had been building in secret a
second enrichment facility near the City of Qom. We assess that
Iran has the scientific, the technical, the industrial capacity
to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon in the
next few years and eventually to produce a nuclear weapon. The
central issue is a political decision by Iran to do so.
Meanwhile, Iran continues to improve its ballistic missile
force. The chairman mentioned another step it took recently,
and this enhances its power projection, provides Tehran the
means for delivering a possible nuclear payload.
We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build
nuclear weapons. We continue to judge that it takes a cost-
benefit approach to making decisions on nuclear weapons, and we
judge that this offers the international community
opportunities to influence Tehran's decision making.
Meanwhile, apart from these nuclear decisions, which are a
great concern to us, the Iran regime has found itself in a
weaker internal political situation following last June's
disputed presidential election and the ensuing crackdown on
protesters. Reacting to the stronger-than-expected opposition
in the regime's narrowing base of support, Supreme Leader
Khamenei, President Ahmadinejad and their hard line allies
appear determined to retain the upper hand by force.
They are moving around in a more authoritarian direction to
consolidate their power. However, they have not been successful
so far in suppressing the opposition.
Mr. Chairman, this is the top layer of threats. There are
other areas which you mentioned in your statement that continue
to demand our continued attention and focus including continued
security in Iraq, the Korean Peninsula, weapons of mass
destruction proliferation, and challenges right here in the
Western Hemisphere, as you have mentioned, working with Mexico
against the drug cartels and also other developments in Latin
America.
I am also prepared to discuss important transnational
issues like global health. Indeed, the very complexity and
number of these issues, the large number of actors, both
countries, nonstate actors, increasingly constitutes one of our
biggest challenges, as they all mix together in forming the
international environment in which the United States operates.
But I am very encouraged by what I have seen in the past year
on the job about how the Intelligence Community is organizing
both to collect intelligence and then to analyze this
complexity.
The 100,000 military and civilian intelligence
professionals I have the honor to lead work hard on these
problems. They produce good results, and I believe they are
providing a tremendous contribution to the security of the
country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer
questions.
[The statement of Admiral Blair follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Blair.
Just for the record, we have a hard stop for the director
at 1 o'clock. So we are going to--I would ask all members to
look at the clock in front of your station. When the amber
light comes on, know that you have got a minute to wrap up, so
please. In order for us to get every member the opportunity to
ask questions, everybody has got to respect that 5-minute
limit.
Director Blair, well, first of all, do you wish to comment
on the issue of leaks? I mean, do we have any plan to be able
to identify those that are leaking information to the media? Is
there anything that can be done to debunk the erroneous
information that inadvertently gets reported in those stories?
Admiral Blair. Mr. Chairman, we have talked about this
before. Starting last year, we have undertaken a new set of
initiatives to try to clamp down on it within the Intelligence
Community. This involves putting more emphasis on
administrative measures within the Intelligence Community than
in turning over a crimes report to the Department of Justice.
So far, the crimes report method has resulted in delayed
justice, if it has achieved justice at all, and the track
record is very, very disappointing in terms of actual
convictions.
So, we are emphasizing administrative measures which we can
take within each agency to investigate quickly, to check the
various ways we have of keeping track with what our people are
doing and to investigate administratively very, very quickly.
There are, we have seen some early results in the
Intelligence Community. There are several cases which I think
we can--which we can take care of pretty quickly, and I think
the example of being able to identify someone and take
appropriate action have a very salutary effect on others who
think they are smarter than the people who lead these agencies
and think that they want to pass them to the press.
As far as the Washington sport of using leaks for policy
posturing, I am less sanguine, frankly. My primary concern is
sources and methods and making sure that we don't leak things
that take us hundreds of millions of dollars to compensate for
since our adversaries then quickly change their ways of
operating.
The Chairman. In your statement, your written statement,
you make an observation that radicalization of groups and
individuals in the United States has done more to spread
jihadist ideology and to generate support for violent causes
overseas than it has produced terrorists targeting the
homeland.
However, given the incident of Fort Hood, as I see it, the
threat from home-grown terrorists, if anything, has increased,
the potential has increased, one of the big reasons being the
Internet and the availability of information that can lead to
radicalization, individual radicalization.
So I have a couple of questions. One is, what is the
community doing to better understand that threat of
radicalization? And, second, why does the Intelligence
Community think that radicalization has done more for efforts
overseas than for plots attacking the homeland, as you observed
in your statement?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, this use of the
Internet is, it is growing quickly, as you state. The use of
the Internet for foreign-based organizations trying to organize
attacks, give instructions, arrange logistics, arrange
financing, that, heretofore, has been the most dangerous use of
the Internet.
The home-grown radicalization of people in the United
States reading these Web sites, then corresponding with the
spokesmen of the organizations overseas, as happened with Major
Hasan, and so it is a relatively--as a significant force, is
relatively new. We might, as you suspect, be shooting behind
the rabbit here, and it is moving faster than we thought, and
we are spending a lot of additional effort on that now to try
to understand it. There are some technical things which are
making it more difficult with the use of social networking, as
opposed to simply looking at a Web site and responding by e-
mail.
So I think you are pointing at a threat which may be
increasing, we are taking it more and more seriously, and this
is something that is potentially very dangerous to us for all
of the reasons of the rights that American citizens have.
The Chairman. I know that the military is taking these
kinds of internal threats very seriously. Is there a strategy
between perhaps DOD and the Intelligence Community to address
these kinds of issues?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. Within the Intelligence Community,
we have taken measures so that intelligence information that is
gathered lawfully on Americans that indicates that a member of
the Department of Defense or someone who also works for other
national security agencies will be--that information will be
forwarded to the investigative branch of that service, whether
it be in DOD or elsewhere, so that it can be put together with
information within that agency, and we can bring together the
agency information plus intelligence information to identify
threats.
The investigation by Admiral Clark and Secretary West had
some internal DOD recommendations for our part. We are going to
make sure that we don't set a high threshold on sharing of that
information so that we can catch these people.
The Chairman. Finally, what is the status of the HIG, the
High Value Interrogation Group, and the policy? Where are we in
implementing that group for interrogation purposes? Also, is
the FBI also part of that group?
Admiral Blair. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. Last week, the
charter for the High Value Interrogation Group was signed. It
sets out the procedures. The FBI has the lead for it. There are
deputy directors; one from CIA, and one from the Department of
Defense.
The principles of it are to bring together the best
interrogators with the best intelligence backup professionals
to interrogate important detainees. We haven't completed all of
the training and the setup, but even as we do, we have sent
teams to, actually, to interview some high-value detainees who
exist now. And we are using those principles in all
interrogations, including that of Mr. Abdulmutallab, although
the formal HIG is not being used in his case.
So I am encouraged now by the speed with which that is
coming online, and I think it represents the best practice that
we want to achieve.
And I should mention, the other part of the HIG's charter,
right now it operates under Army Field Manual, both guidance
and restrictions, but we have given it the responsibility of
doing a scientific research to determine if there are better
ways to get information from people that are consistent with
our values. So it has a research budget. It is going to do
scientific research on that long-neglected area.
The Chairman. And who will take the lead in training the
interrogators?
Admiral Blair. The head of the HIG, who is an FBI official,
will have the responsibility for certification. Those of us who
oversee it will have to make sure that we approve of the
procedures that he sets up.
The Chairman. So the FBI has the lead on training?
Admiral Blair. The FBI has the lead on training, but it
will be using best practices from DOD interrogators as well as
from the FBI.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Hoekstra.
Mr. Hoekstra. Just answer a couple of questions following
up on that. Has that FBI person been appointed who is heading
it up?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir, he has been; Andrew McCabe his
name is.
Mr. Hoekstra. And the procedures have been approved and
outlined? There was some confusion, I think, a couple of weeks
ago as to whether the HIG actually existed or not with the
Detroit case. I think some people said, and I think it might
have been you that said the HIG should have been used with
Farouk, and others said it is not up and running yet. And
listening to you answer, I am not sure if we captured someone
else today, whether you could call the HIG and somebody would
be there in a few hours. Is that the case?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. You now can. You couldn't have
done back in late December. It was forming, but not formed. It
has formed now.
Mr. Hoekstra. All right. Thank you.
I appreciate the discussion on the leaks. I think it is
kind of interesting. You know, the briefing last night was not
a leak, all right? I mean, this was an administration, you
know, it was at the White House, speaking to reporters at the
White House on the condition of anonymity, and the White House
hastily called a briefing on Tuesday night to talk about what
was going on with the Christmas Day bomber.
I do find it an interesting strategy that we hastily call a
briefing to let America and our friends and our enemies in the
Middle East know that he is now singing like a canary. Someone
will someday have to explain that to me from an intelligence
standpoint, why we would communicate that. And if we believe it
is so important to communicate that, I am assuming we invited
Al Jazeera to be there last night to get that information out
there quickly.
Also, the Washington Post, you know, sources, senior
administration officials, these are not low-level people that
are necessarily sensationalizing those types of things.
I want to go back to the issue of targeting Americans. You
said, hey, there is a--your comments were along the lines of,
we have a framework, and we have a legal framework that we
follow. I can tell you that when we have asked people from the
Intel Community about these types of questions and types of
issues, the one thing that is consistent, there is no clarity
as to how they operate, what their box is that they operate
within, or they have a great inability to articulate that with
any type of clarity. If it is there, it may be there, but they
are not able to communicate it with any clarity.
And so what clarity can you add in terms of, you know,
exactly what is the legal framework? What are the laws that
govern this?
Admiral Blair. We take direct action against terrorists in
the Intelligence Community. If that direct action--we think
that direct action will involve killing an American, we get
specific permission to do that.
Mr. Hoekstra. And what goes into factoring that decision,
the parameters?
Admiral Blair. Primarily it has to do with the ones that
you outlined in your statement, whether that American is
involved in a group that is trying to attack us, whether that
American is a threat to other Americans. Those are the factors
involved.
Mr. Hoekstra. So there is a framework and a policy for a,
hypothetically, a radical-born cleric who is living outside of
the United States; there is a clear path as to when this person
may be engaging in free speech overseas and when he may have
moved into recruitment or when he may have moved into actual
coordinating and carrying out or coordinating attacks against
the United States?
There is a relative clear path as to where that person
hypothetically will have crossed the line and then will be
targeted?
Admiral Blair. I would rather go into details in closed
session, Mr. Chairman, but we don't target people for free
speech.
Mr. Hoekstra. Okay.
Admiral Blair. We target them for taking action that
threatens Americans or has resulted in it.
Mr. Hoekstra. Yes. I am actually a little bit surprised you
went this far in open session. But I do hope that in the next
hour, or when we get into closed session, you can provide that
clarity. Because other people in the community have not been
able to provide us with that transparency or that clarity that
I think that at least I would like to have.
Admiral Blair. The reason I went this far in open session
is, I just don't want other Americans who are watching to think
that we are careless about endangering--in fact, we are not
careless about endangering lives at all, but we especially are
not careless about endangering American lives as we carry out
the policies to protect most of the country, and I think we
ought to go into details in closed session.
Mr. Hoekstra. I believe that to be true 99 percent of the
time. The reason that I believe that it needs this kind of
stringent oversight in discussion and dialogue is that, it is
one thing to say that, you know, we are not careless.
That is why I started talking about Peru, because, in Peru,
we were careless, and we were reckless. I want to make sure
that this committee does everything that it can and within its
power that it does not allow the community to be reckless and
careless again.
Admiral Blair. Okay. I absolutely share the committee's
determination that while I am in charge, we will not be
careless and reckless, and I look forward to supervision from
the committee on that score. We have got to get this right.
Mr. Hoekstra. All right, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Eshoo.
Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Director, it is good to see you. There are so
many issues to talk about, and there is an overarching hearing
on threat assessments. I just want to raise two, and then I
have some other questions when we go into closed session.
I think that we are all very concerned, obviously, yourself
and the entire community, about archaic computer systems and
the disconnect between our computer systems and the attempted
attack on Northwest Airlines 253.
We know that Google uses what is called a fuzzy logic to
match names that aren't spelled exactly the same way. I can't
help but think that if we had some kind of system in place,
that Abdulmutallab's name might have been flagged despite the
spelling.
So can you tell us, in the upcoming, in the new budget that
has been submitted, the President's budget, what you have
included in that budget that will address the disparities that
we have in what I think is a disconnected system? I think it is
a key issue that we have to look at. If you might take a moment
to describe exactly what progress you expect to make through
the fiscal year 2011 budget under the information integration
plan, that is number one.
Number two, there have been reports in the last few days
about moonlighting in the Intelligence Community. I think that
this is a bad policy for many reasons. Why there would be CIA
agents that are working with reportedly hedge funds to teach
them the art of deception, I think we have had enough deception
on the part of the financial community that has brought so much
down around our ears in the country.
But this is a troubling policy. We have had a reliance on
contractors. If we are not paying people adequately, then I
think that it is the responsibility of the community to come
forward. But I think that this is a policy that needs to be
revisited. I would like to hear what you think of it.
As I said, I think that the reports that have come out in
the last couple of days, I find them disturbing. I really find
them disturbing, and it is my understanding that employees in
your office, you know, the DNI's office, may moonlight with
permission. I don't know ``with permission,'' I don't know what
that policy is, but I think that we need to discuss it. I think
we need to review it, and I would also like you to comment on
it.
So those are the two things that I would like to raise.
Admiral Blair. Congresswoman Eshoo, let me in closed
session talk about some of the specifics of the technical
upgrades to both the search engines and the database, databases
and the algorithms, like the fuzzy logic, to catch different
spellings of transcribed Arab names that we have, because there
are some good things happening, and we are speeding them up.
But, in general, we are allocating additional--additional
money, and we are going--we had a plan of gradual increases of
technology, and we are speeding up that plan and putting more
resources into it and putting more people onto the problem. I
will talk about those in closed session.
On the issue of moonlighting, sometimes I, too, am
surprised by what I read in the press about my own
organization, I will tell you. And this was a case of that.
When I went into it, I found that we do have rules within all
of the Intelligence Community branches, which comply with the
overall government rules.
The main activity of which I am personally aware, I know
some of our officials on the ODNI staff do, is teaching, and,
frankly, I favor that. Some of them teach evening classes on
national security matters.
Ms. Eshoo. Well, I think the teaching is different than
moonlighting with other jobs relative to security, because
people have security backgrounds. I think you know what I am
driving at.
If people go out and teach, that is one thing. But what I
have read--maybe it is not accurate, but that is why I think we
need to have a full review of it. We have people going out and
working for hedge funds and other places so that they can make
more money, but they are government employees.
I think that there is a real potential for conflict. So I
think we need to know what the policy is across the
Intelligence Community; not only in your office but the CIA and
any other part of the Intelligence Community. We have 16
agencies. I don't know how many people are moonlighting or what
they are doing.
But I was stunned to read about it, I have to tell you. It
sounded more like fiction to me than fact, and that is why I
raise it, and that is why I think we need to take a good strong
look at it.
Admiral Blair. I certainly shall. But I do know that the
rules are that you have to have approval from your supervisor;
it can involve no conflict of interest; can't use classified
information; and they are very strict on it. But I will make
sure that we will get a report to you.
The Chairman. We will do some follow up.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, I want to get back to this White House briefing
for a second because I think it is really extraordinary that we
have a situation where there was a leak that the Christmas Day
bomber was giving us information. He was read his rights, and
then he quit talking. Political controversy developed about
reading the rights to non-Americans in those situations, enemy
combatants and the rest.
And to help squash the political controversy, the White
House hastily calls a briefing with a senior administration
official to say, oh, no, he is singing his guts out. I can't
figure out a reason that would happen other than political
cover.
Can you tell me a national security reason that it would be
helpful to the people in the Intelligence Community to have it
broadcast from the White House, basically, that, yes, he is
telling us everything he knows? Is there any way that could be
a helpful thing?
Admiral Blair. Let me just say, Congressman Thornberry,
that I have been surprised by the combination of reality and
politics having to do with this issue. I just try to do the
job, to do the right thing for the country, and I just can't
control all of the politics. I just want to protect the
country.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I appreciate the position you are in.
I just think it is extraordinary to use something like this
for political cover.
And then I have got exhibit 2. Two days ago, Mr. John
Brennan sent a letter to the Speaker talking about recidivism
at Guantanamo. Now, much of the last year, some of us on this
committee have been arguing that we should give more
information to the public about recidivism rates at Guantanamo,
and so the people could more accurately assess the dangers of
closing that facility.
But this letter, which he--is unclassified, and he says at
the end that he invites the Speaker to make the contents
available to any Member who has an interest. This letter talks
about a 20 percent recidivism rate. It gets rather specific on
some of these things. It tries to argue, oh, it was all stuff
the Bush people did; we are doing it better. Of course, the
Obama administration hadn't been in long enough to know whether
we have recidivism or not from people they may have let loose.
But my real point on this is, isn't this another example of
declassifying things for political advantage? It is kind of
like the memos that were declassified last year, despite the
objections of five CIA Directors, of bringing things out into
the open just for the political argument, not considering the
national security implications?
Admiral Blair. I think that the recidivism rates should be
available so that people can judge what the stakes are that are
involved in dealing with these Guantanamo detainees. So I am
basically in favor of doing it, and I think we need to. I think
this ought to be a joint decision between the--that should be
something that those of you in the Intelligence Community, the
Intelligence Committees know a lot about, and we are partners
in these tough decisions.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I agree, sir, that is the way it
should be, but the timing of some of these disclosures leads me
to question some of that.
Let me turn to one last question I have got for you. It is
clear, from recent events, that terrorists are spreading out in
various places around the world, some of which get a lot of
attention like Yemen, some of which do not get as much
attention.
We had to concentrate a tremendous amount of resources in
Afghanistan and Iraq in the past few years, but as terrorists
spread out over the world, it seems to me that there is a
danger of United States, particularly human intelligence
collectors, being relatively thin in many places where
terrorists may spread out to.
Can you comment about whether we have adequate coverage all
over the world to make sure that, wherever they go, we can stay
on top of those developments and not be caught some day wishing
that we had had more coverage in a particular area after an
event occurs?
Admiral Blair. I can assure you, Congressman Thornberry,
that what we do is specifically focused on what other places we
don't have covered and then do something about it.
For example, Yemen, which on Christmas Day popped into our
consciousness, was something I would say 6 months earlier we
had identified as a place that needed attention, and we, in
fact, flowed both intelligence resources and other government
attention onto that. We keep that running list to try to be
ahead of the rabbit.
So although I can't assure you that we will catch every
single new country in which it came up, I think that we devote
the right attention to that problem, and we push resources. And
I will be back if we don't have enough resources to do it.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And just for the record, that letter to the Speaker was in
response to a question that Congressman Wolf asked Mr.
Brennan--remember when we had the joint classified session
here. And as I understand it from the staff, there is a
classified annex to that letter. But that is the response that
Mr. Brennan agreed to make because of the questions that he was
asking.
Mr. Thornberry. Unclassified.
The Chairman. But there is a classified annex part to it.
Mr. Holt.
Mr. Holt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Director, for coming, and for trying to
keep us informed all along the way.
I would like to turn to Afghanistan. With all of the many
things on your plate, this could consume everything, and there
are clearly problems; Kabul's, as you say, inability to build
an effective, honest and loyal institution or set of
institutions. Afghans perceive the police to be corrupt and
more dangerous than the Taliban. In short, you say that the
Taliban has increased its influence. In other words, it sounds
like we are not succeeding.
Where you come in is, help us understand to what extent we
are or are not succeeding. And I am trying to understand just
how good the intelligence coordination is with Afghan coalition
and Pakistan forces. I want to understand how, whether you
think our intelligence is structured to support the surge that
is under way for our forces. Well, let me ask you those two
questions first.
Admiral Blair. Congressman Holt, I would say that we have
it almost all right. But there are a couple of areas that I
still think we need to increase, and I will be glad to talk in
closed session specifically, but in the area of supporting not
military but civil units who have important responsibilities,
provincial reconstruction teams, the agricultural development,
governance development, increasing the, increasing the military
intelligence skills of the Afghan national army, I think we
have a good plan, but we are not quite where we want to be.
I am quite satisfied with the understanding of what
intelligence is needed. The resources are adequate, I would
say, to do that job right. We just haven't quite finished
putting all the pieces into place.
Mr. Holt. To understand just where we stand with respect to
the Taliban, we have to have a good presence and a good
understanding out in the hinterlands. We have frequently been
disappointed in the level of our language capabilities. It is
not just, you know, it is not just Pashtu. It is not just Dari.
Where are we in this? Can we reasonably claim to know what is
going on outside of Kabul?
Admiral Blair. Yes.
Mr. Holt. Okay. Now, going on, in Afghanistan, how do you
determine the balance between the resources devoted to what I
will call traditional intelligence activities, collection and
analysis, and the other activities that seem more military than
paramilitary? I am not sure they are mutually supportive. In
fact, I think they at times tend to be contradictory, and I
also think that perhaps one can grow so large as to take
resources and attention from the other. How do you--how are you
determining that balance?
Admiral Blair. I think, again, we need to talk in closed
session more about that. But it is something that I and the
other leadership of the Intelligence Community are very
conscious of, and we need to do both. And we make adjustments
as we go along. Although you can always tweak it, I think we
have the balance about right, and I don't think we are giving
short shrift to the support for the various components that we
need to be successful in Afghanistan.
I think that all of us realize that the ultimate solution
in Afghanistan is not either a military or an intelligence
solution, but it is fundamentally an Afghan solution of that
country having the governance, the economic development and the
security forces. For most Afghans, I think it is a good deal
for them to be in charge rather than for the Taliban to be in
charge. So nobody is thinking that either support for military
intelligence or support for paramilitary activities is the end
state.
The end state we know has a lot more to do with Afghan
governance and economic development, and that very much
influences our intelligence support to reach that final goal.
Mr. Holt. Thank you.
I do appreciate your conscientious attention to your job
and your commitment to do a better job to keep us informed.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Director, for coming.
Given the risks of the Pakistan Government being unduly
impacted or failing as a result of pushing from Taliban
otherwise, do you still assess that the Pakistan military
adequately controls their nuclear weapons and the use of those
weapons in any event that the civil government has struggles?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. The Pakistan army takes very
seriously the security of its weapons, and they know the
catastrophic consequences--primarily for Pakistan--if they were
to get loose. So it is correctly incentivized, and from what we
see of the measures that they take, they are keeping them safe.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. Can you help me understand what
Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan are that would be different
from ours that would incent either their intelligence service
and/or their military to continue to support Taliban and
Haqqani network activities and mischief in Afghanistan? Why is
there a difference of interest there that we aren't, in effect,
on the same side?
Admiral Blair. I think one of the main things affecting
Pakistani thinking is the events of the early 1990s when, after
the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, the United States left
Afghanistan, and then the Taliban came back and took it over in
1993. The Pakistanis, I think, understandably feel that they do
not want an unfriendly country on their western border that is
hostile to them. And so they, having felt that the United
States left once before, they are concerned that we might not
be as serious again.
Mr. Conaway. So they are playing both ends against the
middle?
Admiral Blair. They have got a backup plan, and I think our
job is to work together so that their plan and our plan is the
same one. But it has its roots in historical memories and in
the geographic strategic position of Pakistan.
Mr. Conaway. Right. Language is important, starting with, I
think, the State of the Union assessment of threats to that day
here in Washington. The first time I had seen it was the
reference to a lone offender. Offender seems to be an awfully
gentle term to apply to someone like a Hasan or like the
Christmas Day bomber.
Was that a phrase you are familiar with? I prefer to use
Islamic jihadists or terrorists or other things that more
accurately describes the intent than someone that might offend
me. Any comment about the phraseology?
Admiral Blair. I am not sure about that word, sir. We have
used words like lone wolf to describe their motives, the way
they operate, but violent extremist is the word that using
terrorist tactics is what----
Mr. Conaway. Okay. I think we have run the risk of gently--
using words like lone offender, I think, lessens the intensity
with which we ought to go after these guys.
One final thing, in terms of the radicalization processes,
do we have programs in place--the point I want to get to is
madrassas and hate that is taught there, can be taught there.
None of us would put up with hate being taught in any of our
public schools. We wouldn't look to the Federal Government to
stop that. We, as parents, would take that on.
How do we incentivize moderate Muslims to address things
that are being taught in madrassas either in the United States
or other places that incents radicalization? Do we have any
kind of way, any insight into how--because it is not our
problem. We can't go into a madrassa and have any impact
whatsoever, but a parent who sends their child there, I think,
would have great incentive to stop that. Is there any way to
incentivize that?
Admiral Blair. I think you grabbed exactly the right end of
the stick there, sir. It is the working with Muslim parents who
want their children to be----
Mr. Conaway. Educated.
Admiral Blair. Educated is the right way to do it.
I am not familiar with either U.S. Government or private or
international programs that do that. But in the conversations
that I have had with some Muslim officials, parents,
influential officials in other areas, they would see it exactly
the way you do, and I think we ought to support them.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Schiff.
Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Director, I wanted to ask you about Yemen and Somalia.
And starting with Yemen, are there plans to establish a mission
manager for Yemen with a focus on Yemen? Are there equivalent
plans to put that kind of focus on Somalia? I am concerned,
have been some time, with the problem in Somalia, and I worry
that we don't wait to have an attack originate from Somalia to
give Somalia the kind of attention we are paying to Yemen right
now.
So can you comment on how the focus on Yemen has
intensified and whether we are paralleling that in Somalia; how
you view the comparative threat emanating from both countries?
In your open, written statement, you mention that Al
Shabab, which maintains ties to the small number of al Qaeda
members who continue to operate in East Africa, is certain to
continue planning attacks. How do you estimate the comparative
number of al Qaeda in Somalia to Yemen? So if you could start
with those questions?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir, and I would like to talk a little
bit longer when we get to closed session.
But in general, the Intelligence Community focus on Yemen
has intensified, as I mentioned to Congressman Thornberry, not
just now, but had been previously. It is a mission, and we are
organizing to give it the focus that it deserves; similarly for
Somalia.
Right now, I would rate the al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula operating out of Yemen as a better developed and more
direct threat against the United States and against the
American interests in that part of the world than Al Shabab. Al
Shabab has a--it has both a Somali ambition. It wants to be the
Government of Somalia. It also has a jihadist ambition which
involves attacking the United States.
And for the reasons I can go into more in closed session, I
would rank Yemen as somewhat a more concern. But that is not to
say we are spending any less attention to both of them. It is
just that is how I would rank them right now.
Mr. Schiff. Aren't there problems of a different scale in
Somalia in the sense that, as you point out, you have Al Shabab
poised, potentially, to take control of that country, I think,
unlike the situation in Yemen, where the Yemeni Government is
at least not presently at risk of falling to al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula? We also have a much more limited opportunity
for cooperation in Somalia or for a physical presence in
Somalia. So, in that respect, aren't the risks greater and our
ability to address them less than in Somalia?
Admiral Blair. You are absolutely right. President Salih is
seized with the threat to his country, as is the United States.
So we have a good partner there who wants to work with us,
whereas in Somalia, the TFG is just barely hanging on and
trying to work its own process. So both the intelligence and
the support job is much more difficult in Somalia; you are
right.
Mr. Schiff. I just worry we sometimes focus on fighting the
last battle. And we do it--we did it after 9/11, focusing on
aircraft and the same kind of aircraft plans and then
confront--we were confronted with other kinds of challenges. I
worry that we are going to focus right now on Yemen, and then
there is going to be an attack emanating out of Somalia. And
then we are going to put our focus on Somalia, but I look
forward to exploring it further with you in closed session.
I think that is all the time that I have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Schiff.
Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Director Blair, for your service.
I would like to go back to the Christmas Day bombing,
because, to me, of the questions it raises about the
coordination of the Intelligence Community, looking at it at
the time and looking at it now, it was not clear to me who was
in charge during those days. For instance, we have learned that
apparently it was the Attorney General or the Attorney
General's Office which made the decision on Miranda, without
asking advice from DNI, CIA, NCTC, the Homeland Security.
Then, I don't know who was briefing the President, but when
the President did appear on the fourth day, December 28, I
believe it was, to discuss it, he referred to Abdulmutallab as
an isolated extremist. As Congressman Hoekstra and Congressman
Thornberry have referenced, last night, there was a briefing at
the White House on the status of the investigation.
So for the purpose of clarifying who does what or who is in
charge, could I ask, were you involved in briefing the
President between Christmas Day and when he made his statement
from Hawaii on Monday the 28th?
Admiral Blair. Yesterday, Director Mueller and I and
Director Panetta briefed the Intelligence Committee in the
other Chamber on the events of this day. And Director Mueller
gave a pretty good account of what went on in those fast-moving
days of--I know, those fast-moving hours of Christmas Day and
then in subsequent days.
And during that day, the FBI agent said the Joint Terrorism
Task Force were the people on the scene who were dealing with
this developing situation. They were in touch with a team back
here in Washington----
Mr. King. Mr. Director, if I could jump ahead, really what
I am talking about was the statement the President made on
Monday the 28th. Who was in charge of briefing him for that
day, and who signed off on the term isolated extremist? Would
that have been you?
Admiral Blair. The staff----
Mr. King [continuing]. Places.
Admiral Blair [continuing]. Was an interagency team,
representatives of the Intelligence Community who worked for me
were on that team that fed the information to the President. So
we had an input on that.
Mr. King. The actual statement the President made to the
world, did you sign off on that statement?
Admiral Blair. I am not going to talk about those internal
processes, Representative King.
Mr. King. At the meeting last night at the White House, the
briefing that was given, as I see, some of the information that
has been made public is, we are told that two family members
convinced the terrorists to cooperate. Was that cleared with
you as to whether or not it is appropriate to discuss publicly
that two family members are cooperating or urged them to
cooperate?
And, also, I would ask, the fact that they did speak to a
number of family members in Nigeria, that was made public. Is
that much the type of information that should be made public?
And if so, was it cleared with you or Director Panetta?
Admiral Blair. Again, Congressman King, I am not going to
comment on the internal processes for this investigation right
now.
Mr. King. Director, I can understand your position. I am
really asking these questions to get them on the record,
because I have a concern, from talking to various people in the
Intelligence Community, that, number one, the Attorney General
may have a disproportionate influence. But beyond that, the
White House is very much involved in the weeds of policy. I
don't know whether it is John Brennan or someone else, but the
fact is that a lot of policy has been directed from the White
House, which is cutting into what should be done by the DNI, by
the CIA, the NCTC, and Homeland Security.
I think we should look at that especially since, obviously,
we do not have jurisdiction over Mr. Brennan, being a White
House employee.
And this does seem to be a marked difference from the
previous administration. It might be the right thing to do, but
if so, I think we should be consulted on that. Because it just
seems to me that there were a number of decisions made, leaving
aside the Mirandizing, just statements by the President, who
was doing the actual briefing of the President, and the
decision made last night at the White House to the releasing of
what I would consider to be--could be considered as classified
information or damaging information. And I just wonder if the
entire Intelligence Community was consulted on that before
these political decisions were made to release that
information?
Admiral Blair. I understand your question, sir.
As I said before, the political dimension of what to me
ought to be a national security issue has been quite, quite
high. I don't think it has been very particularly good, I will
tell you, from the inside, and in terms of us trying to get the
right job done to protect the United States.
And we are just trying to bring intelligence and law
enforcement to bear to get the right information to make sure
that those who threaten our country get behind bars. And I just
don't want to go into the political side of it.
Mr. King. Again, thank you for your service.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Director, just to be clear and to make it part of our
record, the briefing that occurred last night that has been
referred to this morning, was that in response to a leak that
occurred that the information was going to come out about
Farouk talking to the FBI, the FBI getting the information, and
so the decision was made to brief members of the media? Is that
correct? Is that how it happened?
Admiral Blair. I don't know exactly what the origins of
that event were, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Can you check on that and have somebody get
back to us?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Because I am curious myself.
Apparently, there was a leak, and they decided to do this
briefing. Just based on the words that we used, hastily called,
leads me to believe that they are reacting to some kind of
information that was leaked out there and wanted to mitigate
the damage, perhaps.
Admiral Blair. Let me not make it up here but try to get
back to you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. Good morning, Director Blair. Thank you for
being here.
I have been concerned that the United States has been too
prone to outsourcing our security in various ways to
contractors. And I wanted to ask you about this, what do we
call it, the HIG, the High-Value Interrogation Group and
wonder, to what extent this group is using contractors, if at
all?
Admiral Blair. The use of contractors by the HIG will be
absolutely minimal. The only circumstances that we have
discussed in internal deliberations where it might be used is
if there is some language capability, which is, some
interpretation, interpreting capability that is required that
we don't have a government employee who has the level of skill
required. We then would look to contracting. That is the one
area in which we have talked about using contractors, but the
High-Value Interrogation Group will be government employees.
Ms. Schakowsky. But we have also talked about, for years it
seems, increasing internally our language capacity. Is that
still happening?
Admiral Blair. Yes. That is a very aggressive program. I
just don't like to say that there will never be some obscure
dialect that we don't have the best, that we don't have a 3-3
person available to do, that we might want to go outside to get
someone so we get the nuance.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
We have been told in the past that the CIA is out of the
interrogation business. Will the CIA help or be part in any way
of the HIG program in doing interrogations?
Admiral Blair. The CIA is a part of the team that has an
interrogation and an intelligence support. As Director Panetta
had said, the CIA as a body independently is out of the
interrogation business, but they are part of this team under
the direction of the structure we set up.
Ms. Schakowsky. Will the CIA be conducting interrogations?
Admiral Blair. They may be participating in interrogations,
yes. As I said, all interrogations are guided by the Army Field
Manual. There will be a uniform level of training, so we have
not ruled out CIA officials with the right experience being
part of the team.
Ms. Schakowsky. But this is new. We were told that the CIA
is out of the interrogation business, that the CIA is not doing
interrogations, so this is a change in policy?
Admiral Blair. I think it is the distinction between the
CIA being the--running these sites that we had in the past, and
being a member of the team. And they are members of the team.
They are not running any kind of an independent interrogation
capability.
Ms. Schakowsky. Has the Intelligence Community determined
or considered whether interrogations would be videotaped?
Admiral Blair. I don't know the answer to that question. I
will get back to you.
Ms. Schakowsky. Would you?
General Alexander and the NSA, I had questioned issues of
preventing in advance situations where they had to come to us
and say, mea culpa, certain databases shouldn't have been
touched, et cetera.
In the issue of reporting to Congress, have you considered
someone being in charge, a compliance officer who watches to
make sure that there are situations so that you as Director of
National Intelligence, that it is not you that is responsible
but that someone is preventing a situation where you have to
come back and talk to us about why it didn't happen?
Admiral Blair. Right. I don't enjoy those sessions any more
than you do----
Ms. Schakowsky. Sure.
Admiral Blair. Congresswoman Schakowsky, and we have
established a compliance official within the NSA directly in
the chain of command of that program whose job it is to ensure
that we are doing it right ahead of time when at all possible,
and then certainly fixing it.
Ms. Schakowsky. Well, that is just one. That is the NSA.
But I am just wondering if there are any others, so that we
don't continually--and it does seem to be continually--ask, how
come we read it in the paper? How come Congress wasn't
informed? And there are a number of things we can't even talk
about here where we say, why weren't we told in a timely way?
Admiral Blair. Right, let's talk some more about specifics
in closed session, but the emphasis on compliance and on not
saying oops is much greater than it was, and we will continue
to pursue that. I just cited that one example within NSA, since
that has been the source, as you know, of several of the things
we have had to fix later.
Ms. Schakowsky. I think that is an important improvement.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Blunt is not here.
Mr. Rogers. No.
Mrs. Myrick.
Mrs. Myrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
But we have got votes coming up. And since the Director has
to leave at 1 o'clock, I would like to be able to go into
closed session, so I am not going to ask anything here.
The Chairman. Great. Well, I was just conferring with the
ranking member.
It looks like we are going to be voting at 12:15. We will
have five votes, one 15-minute and four 5-minute votes, which
will effectively close out the time that we have the Director
here.
So what I propose to do is close this session, close the
open session, reconvene in our hearing room. It is now 16 till
12 p.m., and reconvene there 10 minutes to 12 p.m. and then go
into closed session so that members can follow up with some of
the issues.
With that, we are recessed and will reconvene in our own
hearing room. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]