[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OVERSIGHT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 20, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-96
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, CONNIE MACK, Florida
FloridaAs of 5/6/ JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
10 deg. MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee TED POE, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN WOOLSEY, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Human Rights and Oversight
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri, Chairman
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts DANA ROHRABACHER, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota RON PAUL, Texas
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey TED POE, Texas
VACANTUntil 6/9/10 deg.
Jerry Haldeman, Subcommittee Staff Director
Paul Berkowitz, Republican Professional Staff Member
Mariana Maguire, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
Major General Arnold Fields (USMC-Retired), Inspector General,
Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction................................................. 7
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Missouri, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight:
Prepared statement............................................. 4
Major General Arnold Fields (USMC-Retired): Prepared statement... 10
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 42
Hearing minutes.................................................. 43
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OVERSIGHT
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THURSDAY, MAY 20, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on International Organizations,
Human Rights and Oversight,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Russ Carnahan
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Carnahan. Good morning. I want to call the Subcommittee
on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight to
order this morning.
I want to get started. We do have a time constraint this
morning, as the joint session is going to convene at 11
o'clock. And so we want to jump right into the hearing this
morning.
But before we get started, I would like to recognize some
distinguished visitors who are joining us. A delegation from
the Standing Committee on Defense from Pakistan is with us this
morning. If you would please stand, and let us acknowledge our
guests. Welcome.
[Applause.]
Mr. Carnahan. They are in Washington this week as guests of
the House Democracy Partnership. Welcome.
On Tuesday morning we marked a solemn occasion when a car
bomb intercepted a U.S. convoy, and five U.S. soldiers died.
The toll of America's dead in Afghanistan passed 1,000. With
1,000 Americans dead and thousands more wounded, we must
redouble our efforts to effectively utilize our resources, and
build up Afghan forces so that our brave American troops can
ultimately come home.
From May 1 to May 3 I traveled to Kabul, Kandahar, and
Islamabad as part of the House Foreign Affairs Committee trip
to review security and reconstruction efforts underway in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our delegation met with General
McChrystal. I also met with Afghan President Karzai, along with
American troops who are working hand-in-hand with the Afghan
people to rebuild their nation after years of Taliban control.
While I was away we were threatened on U.S. soil once
again. The Times Square bomb plot reminded us all of the
urgency and importance of our success in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. We must do everything in our power at home and abroad
to keep our citizens safe.
On February 24 I convened my first hearing as chair of this
subcommittee. The title: ``Hard Lessons Learned in Iraq, and
Benchmarks for Future Reconstruction Efforts,'' with Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stewart Bowen.
Mr. Bowen conveyed a series of hard lessons to this
committee. He estimated that $4 billion in waste had occurred
during the Iraq program because of weak planning, repeated
shifts in program direction, and poor management oversight. He
went on and highlighted a lack of contract oversight to protect
our tax dollars.
In one striking example, a $2.5 billion police training
contract, the largest ever in State Department's history, was
being managed by only three contract officer representatives.
Mr. Bowen described an ``adhocracy,'' with blurred chains
of command between DOD, State, and USAID. He emphasized the
lack of an institutional structure in human resources to
effectively perform stabilization and reconstruction
operations.
Today I want to ask Major General Arnold Fields, Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, a simple
question that has profound implications for protecting our
citizens and safeguarding our tax dollars: Have we learned
lessons? And if so, as we say in Missouri, show me.
Last December President Obama announced that 30,000
additional troops will be sent to Afghanistan. To accompany the
troop increase, the State Department announced that it will
immediately triple the number of civilian experts and advisors.
President Obama's new funding request would bring U.S.
support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan to $71 billion,
far surpassing what the United States provided to rebuild
Europe after World War II, and significantly more than what was
spent in Iraq over the last 8 years. We need to ensure that
these civilian resources are being spent effectively, and that
waste, fraud, and abuse are being rooted out.
The Government Accountability Office estimates that as of
2010, approximately 107,000 contractors support U.S. and allied
efforts in Afghanistan. Last month, General McChrystal
questioned our reliance on private contractors. And he said,
``I actually think we would be better to reduce the number of
contractors involved. I think it doesn't save money. We have
created in ourselves a dependency on contractors that I think
is greater than it ought to be.'' We need to reduce our
dependence on private contractors, and ensure there is adequate
oversight and contract management in place so that tax dollars
are not wasted.
In order to protect taxpayer resources, we must also
strengthen efforts to combat corruption. A recent U.N. survey
estimates that Afghans paid $2.5 billion in bribes to
government officials and members of the police force in 2009.
In 2009, Afghanistan was ranked 179th out of 180 nations on
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, a
step down from 117 out of 159 in 2005.
These are alarming numbers. The U.S. and other donors have
pledged to increase the proportion of development aid delivered
to the Afghan Government to 50 percent in the next 2 years.
If we are going to work in partnership with the Afghan
Government, we must ensure they are a reliable partner that
will seriously address corruption issues.
While we fight waste and corruption, we must also build
Afghanistan's capacity to provide for its own security and
training in equipping the Afghan National Security Forces.
Current requirements call for the Afghan National Army to grow
from 103,000, as of June 2009, to 171,000 by October 2011.
The Afghan National Police will be boosted from 94,000 to
134,000. We must ensure we are measuring not just the number of
troops and police being trained, but the effectiveness in
protecting Afghan civilians.
We must also develop Afghan's economy. According to the
U.N., about 80 percent of Afghanistan's population live in
rural areas. We must do more to promote alternative
development, build the Afghan agricultural sector, and reduce
the production of opium.
Missouri National Guard Agricultural Development teams,
from my home state, have been deployed to the Nangarhar
Province. Their work is being received well, pairing with
civilians. Their background in farming has been critical,
working with Afghan farmers to teach them sustainable farming
practices and techniques.
As we train the Afghan National Security Forces and develop
the Afghan economy, we must also focus on women, who make up 60
percent of the Afghanistan population. Under the Taliban's rule
in Afghanistan, women were subjected to harsh inequalities, and
were excluded from all forms of public life.
Last week I moderated a roundtable with female ministers
from the Afghan Government to discuss how the United States and
Afghanistan can work together to empower women politically,
economically, and socially.
I look forward to hearing the testimony today on all of
these critical areas from Major General Fields. We have a
responsibility to our men and women in uniform, to the
taxpayers of this country to make sure that we have a strict
accounting on how resources are being spent. We cannot waste
resources that our troops need to keep themselves safe and get
the job done.
I want to now recognize our ranking member, Representative
Rohrabacher, for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carnahan
follows:]Carnahan statement
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yesterday I had
the great honor to meet with our Inspector General, Major
General Fields, and I was deeply moved by his dedication and
understanding the magnitude of the challenge that he faces,
which you just outlined very well.
I do not see how we can expect any human being to meet this
challenge alone, even as a great leader as a Marine Major
General. He has demonstrated his leadership. This has got to be
a team effort, or we will fail.
We have failed in the past. We have failed in the past. And
I remember as a young person, when I was 19 years old--and
again, I was not in the military, but I found myself in
Vietnam, and found myself confronting enormous corruption,
beyond my imagination as a 19-year-old. And the sight of the
gore of war and this corruption was quite, left a lasting
imprint on me. And I left that country thinking that all those
young men that I saw, who were wounded and dying, that their
lives may have been spent in vain. But it was not because they
were not fighting the battle, but because we were unable to
control an out-of-control situation.
I went home, and my father, I talked to my father about it.
My father was a Marine, as General Fields. He wasn't quite
your, you weren't quite his commanding officer, because I think
he was out by the time you got in.
But I told him about it. I told him that I thought that the
chaotic situation and the incredible corruption that I saw
would prevent us from prevailing. And he had some very wise
words for me.
He just said look, Dana, what do you think it looked like
when I flew the first DC-3 into the Pusan Perimeter in Korea.
And what do you think it was like in World War II and Korea?
There is chaos in war; war comes with chaos. And those people,
like the General, who have taken it upon themselves to try to
bring some order to a situation in which people are losing
their lives in great numbers, and bombs are going off, and no
one knows if they are going to live to the next day, and
sometimes their morals then are obliterated along with their
bodies, it is an incredible job. But it is one that we need to
succeed in.
And we need--American people will lose faith in rebuilding
Afghanistan if they believe that all this money that we are
committing, or large chunks of it, are being siphoned off. And,
just as we lost faith in the war in Vietnam and eventually lost
that war, we could lose this conflict, as well.
Let me note, our enemy, then, is not necessarily religious
fanaticism, but the corruption of the human soul. And this is a
great challenge, and a great challenge in this context.
I am very honored that we have a man of integrity trying to
tackle this. But General, you can't do it on your own. We are
here to learn from you today about some of the successes, but
also perhaps some of the things we must overcome in order to
succeed.
And I appreciate your leadership, Mr. Chairman. You take
this issue very seriously; one can tell that by your opening
statement. And so let us get on with the hearing, and see if we
can come to some conclusions that will do some good.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. And now we would like to turn to
today's witness, Major General Arnold Fields. He is the special
inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, a position he
has held since July 2008. He is responsible for ensuring
effective oversight of funds appropriated for the
reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Previously General Fields served as deputy director of the
Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the Department of
Defense, and as chief of staff at the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office in the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, where he
assisted in coordinating over $18 billion of U.S. appropriated
funds for Iraq reconstruction.
Major General Fields retired from the U.S. Marine Corps in
January 2004, after 34 years of active military service. His
decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal and the
Defense Superior Service Medal.
General Fields holds a master of arts degree in human
resources management from Pepperdine University. He is also a
graduate of the Army War College, the Marine Corps Command and
Staff College, and the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School.
Again, welcome. We are honored to have you here, and very
much appreciate your many years of service.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD FIELDS (USMC-RETIRED),
INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Mr. Fields. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Rohrabacher, and the members of the committee. Thank you very
much for inviting me to discuss SIGIR's oversight mission, and
the issues we have identified that must be addressed to improve
the implementation of what is poised to become the largest
overseas reconstruction effort in American history.
In February of this year the President submitted a budget
request that, if approved, will add about $20 billion to the
$51 billion Congress has appropriated for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan since 2002. SIGIR was stood up to bring focused
oversight to this money. And we are doing so by providing a
broad range of oversight to the reconstruction activities that
are funded through, and implemented by, multiple agencies.
Over the last 12 months, SIGIR has produced 23 reports. We
have seven reports that are currently in their final stages,
and another 10 audits that are underway. Our work has
identified several issues that hamper the reconstruction effort
in Afghanistan. Let me talk about a few of them.
Reviews of infrastructure contracts have found serious
construction problems, due in part to a lack of quality
control. Agencies continue to suffer from a shortage of
qualified contracting officials, and U.S. agencies lack a full
picture of reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.
I am particularly concerned about three issues that our
auditors have identified over the last year: Inadequate
planning, inadequate sustainability, and inadequate
accountability. A couple of examples. SIGIR audits found
obsolete planning documents in the energy and security sectors.
We issued two audit reports of U.S.-funded construction
contracts to build Afghanistan National Army garrisons. The
United States has invested more than $25 billion, nearly half
of all reconstruction dollars appropriated to date, to train
and equip the Afghanistan security forces.
U.S. military officials were unable to provide us with an
updated master plan for the facilities to house and train the
forces representing the Afghanistan security sector.
And a bit about metrics. As part of the planning process,
implementing agencies must establish reliable metrics to
measure progress. SIGIR has been conducting an audit of the
capability milestones, or CM ratings system, the primary metric
used to monitor development progress of fielded Afghanistan
security forces and units.
The ability to accurately measure the abilities of the
Afghan Army and Police is absolutely critical to the U.S.
strategy in Afghanistan. Our audit will, it is yet to be
released, describe weaknesses that have affected the
reliability of the rating system. And certainly we will make
recommendations.
This audit has had an impact already, given the outbrief
that we have already provided to General McChrystal, as well as
to certain Members of Congress. It has caused the Defense
Department to acknowledge limitations of the rating system.
The International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, Joint
Command is replacing the rating system with a new unit, a new
units level assessment system.
One of the most serious development challenges anywhere is
creating sustainable programs. Our audits in the energy and
security sectors have found that the Afghan Government does not
have the financial resources to operate and maintain new
infrastructure. Therefore, the United States has funded
operations and maintenance contracts for the next several
years.
While this solves a short-term problem, it does not address
the long-term issue of sustainability.
Under the new strategy, the international community, in
partnership with the Afghan Government, is committed to
increasing both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan
National Police forces. An important question will be how these
forces can be sustained over time.
The United States and international donor community are
planning to provide more development funding through Afghan
institutions. SIGIR certainly supports giving Afghans a greater
say in how money is spent. But we also believe it is vital that
Afghans be held accountable for U.S. funds channeled through
the Afghan institutions.
Therefore, SIGIR has begun assessing, one, what the United
States and other donors are doing to build the capacity of
Afghanistan institutions to deter corruption and strengthen the
rule of law. And the extent to which various national and local
institutions have the systems in place to exert internal
control, and demonstrate accountability for donor funds.
This work is having an impact. For example, the
international community and the Afghan Government have taken
steps to implement many of SIGIR's, our organization's,
recommendations to strengthen the principal Afghanistan agency
responsible for combating corruption. SIGIR is reviewing the
salary support that the U.S. Government is providing for Afghan
civil servants.
We have also begun an assessment of the Afghanistan
National Solidarity Program, which has received more than $900
million in donor assistance to fund small infrastructure
programs. SIGIR's legislation gives it a special responsibility
to provide independent and objective assessments of every
aspect of the reconstruction effort to Congress and to the
Secretaries of State and Defense.
Last month SIGIR began a review of the implementation of
the inter-agency civilian surge. This audit seeks to identify
the number and types of personnel provided to implement the
civilian surge. It will also evaluate the extent to which
civilians in the field are being effectively utilized to
achieve strategic goals.
Now a bit about SIGIR. We are steadily building our staff,
and are prepared to provide the expanded oversight necessary to
detect and deter waste, fraud, and abuse of the increasing U.S.
funding for this reconstruction effort.
We currently have 79 employees, and plan to reach our goal
of 132 during Fiscal Year 2011. We are in negotiations with the
U.S. Embassy to increase the number of auditors and
investigators present at the Embassy. Currently we have 20
full-time, for a year, investigators and auditors, with a small
support staff, located at the Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.
The United States, together with the international
community, is committed to a strategy that will put Afghans in
control of their future. The President is asking for a nearly
40 percent increase in U.S. funding.
However, the success of this strategy depends not only on
how the United States implements its reconstruction program; it
also depends on the actions of the Afghan Government.
Afghanistan must do its part to make sure that the human and
financial resources provided for its reconstruction are not
wasted.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fields
follows:]Arnold Fields
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. I want to recognize myself for 5
minutes. And I guess I want to start with a look back.
No special IG was created for Afghanistan until 2008. That
was $38 billion and 7 years into the program. And given the
massive level of waste, fraud, and abuse, and incredible levels
of corruption in Afghanistan, I guess, can you assess the time
before the special IG got up and running in terms of evaluating
that time period?
And then, of course, we want to talk about from that time
forward. But can you assess that time before the Inspector
General's Office got up and running?
Mr. Fields. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I will say that
it was a mistake; that we took too long to stand up this office
of Special Inspector General.
I applaud, however, my counterpart, SIGIR, under the
current leadership of Mr. Stuart Bowen, who largely, almost
from the start, was stood up to provide the same oversight over
Iraq spending that my office is providing for Afghanistan. So
it took us almost 8 years into this very expensive and very
serious and pivotal operation in Afghanistan to bring about the
organization that I am currently privileged to represent.
So we are going back, however, commensurate with our
legislation and we are looking at what did, in fact, in
retrospect, took place between 2002 and actually the point at
which we stood our office up.
In so doing, we are conducting forensic investigations to
determine who may have wasted, frauded, or abused the American
taxpayer dollar during this period during which this office was
not stood up.
Meanwhile, the offices of the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and USAID were,
in fact, expected to provide the oversight in the absence of
such an organization as a Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. And I guess to drill down more
specifically, have you evaluated that time period, looking
back, in terms of the amount of money that was wasted? I guess,
is number one.
And number two, if you could address some of the criminal
prosecutions for fraud that were mentioned in your report.
Mr. Fields. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are, by way of the
forensic effort, going back and determining the extent to which
funds were wasted during the period in advance of this office
having been stood up. We don't have figures, sir, at this time
to provide to this subcommittee. But we will determine that
over time.
Initial indications are, though, that we have wasted money.
I am not prepared today to put a figure on it, in the millions
or billions, but I would hazard, sir, that it is in the
millions, and perhaps even in the billions, that we have wasted
and/or frauded the American taxpayer out of money during the
period between 2002 and 2008.
Mr. Carnahan. In the process to come to a more precise
number on that, tell me what that process is, and when you
think we could get some better numbers.
Mr. Fields. Yes, sir. We are, as I mentioned, conducting
the forensics. This essentially means we are boring down into
various documents and procedures and spending that took place
over about an 8-year period.
We will review the contractual arrangements of folks
involved in that spending for that period of time. And as a
result of that, we hope that we will be able to determine if
there was, in fact, waste, fraud and abuse, and indeed, who
was----
Mr. Carnahan. Excuse me for interrupting. Just really
quickly, because my time is about to expire, if you could
briefly mention the criminal prosecutions and some of the
monies that have been recovered.
Mr. Fields. Yes, sir. Thus far, we have been a part of the
joint community responsible for finding criminal activity. And
as part of that mechanism, which is ongoing, and of which we
are members, we have at least sent two folks to jail, or been a
part of the process that in fact has resulted in two
Afghanistan-Americans having been sent to jail. As a part of
that, we have identified about $2 million associated with their
activity.
Mr. Carnahan. I am going to have to cut you off there. I am
sorry, but my time is up, and I am going to yield 5 minutes to
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. Well, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, you face quite a challenge. And your
testimony today has only underscored that point.
In looking back, it is a little breathtaking to understand
that when we rushed into Iraq, how unprepared we were to handle
the specific things that needed to be done in order for us to
succeed. And here we are still in Iraq.
And then to understand, as it appears now from what you are
saying and what we have heard, and what our gut told us at the
time, was that going into Iraq took our focus away from
Afghanistan. And so for all of those years, we have not been
doing the job we needed to do there, either.
So one area of where we were not able to competently do
what is necessary to be done, actually the magnitude of that
challenge drew away from what we could do in Afghanistan. Let
me note that in the 1990s, I was somewhat of a lone voice here,
talking about Afghanistan.
As you know, I spent time in Afghanistan with the
Mujahideen when they were fighting the Russians. And also that
I spent considerable time and effort during the Reagan White
House years, when I worked in Reagan's White House, to make
sure that we were supporting people who were fighting the
Soviet Empire, as the strategy to eliminate that.
Well, the Afghans, more than anyone else, they gave us a
victory in the Cold War. And a victory in the Cold War simply
meant that the Soviet Communism disappeared from the planet.
And I realized, because I had spent time in Afghanistan, how
much we owed to the Afghan people. And they bore the brunt of
that effort. And yet, we abandoned them. After the Soviet Union
dissolved, we abandoned them, and did not help them rebuild
their country, as we should have. And they ended up with these
radical forces at play.
And then with 9/11, and I might add during the time period
of the 1990s, I was here calling for us to make sure that we
did right by them, and that it would hurt us if we did not. And
here, it did.
But here again, what happened? After 9/11, with 200
American soldiers on the ground, and several, perhaps 20,000,
30,000 members of the Northern Alliance, we drove the Taliban
and al Qaeda out of Afghanistan. And at one point, when they
had been driven out, 90 percent of the people in the country
were positive toward us.
Again, it was our, it was, the ball was in our court. And
again, we dropped the ball. And your testimony today is just
underscoring that.
That does not mean that we should not move forward now, and
see what we can do, to the best of our ability, as a team, to
try to see if we can, number one, repay that debt to the Afghan
people. And by doing so, undercut this religious fanaticism on
the part of Islamic extremists that have targeted the United
States.
General, I am going to read your report. I have not read it
yet. Let me just ask, when you talk about corruption, are we
talking about Americans or Afghans who are basically
responsible for the corruption level we are talking about?
Mr. Fields. Thank you, sir. When we look at corruption, we
are looking at the whole enchilada. We are looking at both
sides, the American side as well as the Afghan side.
Currently, given that most of the money, probably as much
as 80 percent of it, that we have invested or are investing in
Afghanistan is not channeled through the Government of
Afghanistan, it is channeled through the implementing agencies
of the United States; principally, the Department of Defense
and the Department of State. And then from there to various
contractors and other entities who help to make use of this
money for the purposes for which it was, in fact, appropriated.
So the work of our audit, as well as our investigations,
considers both sides. With some degree of emphasis, of course,
on the U.S. side and what we are doing to properly prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, I think this subject
actually deserves a lot more time than we are going to be able
to give it today. And I would suggest to you that we bring the
General back some time soon, after we have studied your
reports, and be able to--there are some areas that I would
really like to get into very deeply here. And we do not have
the time to do it today.
There is a major address before Congress, before the
President of Mexico, I believe, that we are going to. And it
would seem to me that we should--for example, I would like to
ask the General's analysis of whether the military teams, the
PRTs, whether that is the way that we should focus on
delivering aid, and what we have found are the effectiveness of
those teams, as compared to the contractors at the local level.
And there are a number of questions specifically like that,
that need to be addressed. And I would hope that we can bring
him back.
Mr. Carnahan. I concur. And our point today is I think to
give us an overview of the work that the Inspector General is
doing. And certainly I expect there is going to be a number of
specific issues we are going to want to dig into. So I look
forward to working with you on that.
Now I want to recognize Mr. Ellison for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ellison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
General, for being here and sharing your illuminating insights
about these issues we are facing here in reconstruction of
Afghanistan.
Last month General McChrystal questioned our reliance on
private contractors in Afghanistan. In fact, he is quoted to
have said the following. This is him. ``I actually think we
would be better to reduce the number of contractors involved.''
He went on to say, ``I think it doesn't save money.'' And then
he further elaborated by saying, ``We have created in ourselves
a dependency on contractors that I think is greater than it
ought to be.''
According to the GAO, in early 2010 there was approximately
107,000 contractors supporting the United States and allied
efforts in Afghanistan.
I guess my question is, do you share General McChrystal's
concerns expressed in these quotes? Or how do you react to
them?
Mr. Fields. Thank you very much, sir. I think what General
McChrystal is saying is generally true, from the standpoint of
our dependence on the contracting community.
But we also have been engaged with contractors for quite
some time. This is not the first time, in a conflict, in the
interest of the strategic direction of the United States, that
we have had such a dependence on contractors. We did it during
World War II, Korea, certainly Vietnam, and now Afghanistan.
And of course, in Iraq, as well.
But I do feel, and agree with General McChrystal, that we
have come to depend too much on contractors. But there is a
liability to this.
We either build the resources that are now being provided
by the contracting community within the defense mechanism and
structure, or we continue to depend upon contractors.
Mr. Ellison. Could I follow up on that, general?
Mr. Fields. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Ellison. Well, I mean, we are paying these contractors
quite a bit of money. So if the U.S. military developed
capacity to perform these same functions internally, isn't it
likely that we could do it cheaper?
Mr. Fields. I would say, sir, that some aspects of what we
are currently doing could be done cheaper if the resources
were, in fact, a part of the uniform defense establishment. But
I am not inclined to say that that would necessarily, in the
long run, be in the best interest of the American taxpayer.
I do feel, though, that we could perhaps reduce our
dependency on contractors by taking more full advantage of
resources that we could have within the more conventional
establishment of the U.S. military environment.
Mr. Ellison. But General, if we are spending, say, $1 to
hire a contractor to do any given task, and if that task is
necessary to be done; and given some of the concerns we have
had about the expense of contractors and the difficulty of
imposing accountability; I mean, the dollar to the contractor
and a dollar spent internally is the same dollar, isn't it?
I mean, isn't it conceivable that we could do better by--I
mean, where would we not do better if we were to do, to build
capacity internally? Because we are spending the same money
anyway, either way.
Mr. Fields. Well, let me say, sir, that the resources that
the contracting community brings to a very complex environment,
such as Afghanistan, is good. I do not wish to characterize all
contractors as out to take advantage of the American taxpayer.
Yes, they are businesses; and certainly there is a profit
margin that they seek to find. But having done this work now
for the past coming up on 2 years, I have considerable respect
for the contracting community. They are operating in a very
dangerous environment, and folks are not necessarily lining up
to go to the edge of the battlefield, if you will, such as our
contractors. Even folks that I would wish to hire into my
organization, with the intent to spend quite a bit of time in
dangerous places in corners of Afghanistan, it is difficult for
me, as well.
There are contractors being killed on the battlefield out
there. And so it is very complex.
Mr. Ellison. General, certainly we want to thank any, all
the contractors for their meritorious service. But this is not
really a question of are contractors good people or are they
bad people. It is a question of how do we get the most out of
our dollars spent as American taxpayers, and might we do these
things more cost-effectively internally? And might we also have
a better ability to demand accountability if they are done
internally? So those are the points.
And I just want to agree with you that people who have gone
over and serve as contractors have done good work, and
certainly we don't want to denigrate their work. But I think
some of these issues remain important. And I thank you for your
testimony today.
Mr. Fields. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Carnahan. I want to thank the gentleman. And while we
still have additional time, I think we are just going to do a
second round of questions.
And I want to follow up where I left off. We really didn't
get time to get your full answer, I think, in terms of the look
back, before the Special Inspector General's Office was stood
up.
Again, give me a description of the process that is in
place to evaluate that, and a timeframe when you think we will
have some better answers. Because as we evaluate these
additional investments going forward, that is the kind of
information that we need.
Mr. Fields. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have
with me at the table today, and in the room, two of my
principal staff: My assistant inspector general and acting
deputy inspector general for audits, Mr. John Brummet. He is a
career member, or former career member of the Government
Accountability Office, GAO.
And I also have with me the assistant inspector general for
investigations, a career member of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations, Mr. Ray DiNunzio.
I would like to respectfully ask if Mr. John Brummet will
roll in on that question of looking back, particularly with
emphasis on the forensic work that he and his auditors are
doing at this time.
Mr. Carnahan. I recognize him to do so. And again, if you
could give us a description of the process and the timeline,
again as we look at these substantial new investments going
forward. I think that is a very critical part of understanding
what we have done in the past.
Mr. Brummet. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is very hard to look
back. It would have been much easier if we had been set up a
long time ago. When we look back, it is hard to find the
documentation. It is hard to find the people responsible for
the various programs because of the length of tour in
Afghanistan. So looking back is a difficult thing.
What we are trying to do is gather transaction data from
all the reconstruction programs, and use some data-mining
techniques to identify potential anomalies, like duplicate
payments, or instances where the person that approved the
payment is the same person that received the payment, to get
suspect transactions. And then, through audit and through
investigations, try to track those down.
But it is a difficult process. And getting precision in
terms of the amount of wasted or funds subject to fraud will be
a very, very difficult task.
Mr. Carnahan. I think that I cannot even imagine how
difficult that would be. But having all of us acknowledge that
it is difficult, you know, when do you think we could have--
again, I know we are not going to get precision on this. But
when do you think we could get some even ballpark ideas on
where that stands, looking back?
Mr. Brummet. I would think that over the course of the next
6 months, as we complete another 10 to 12 audit reports, we
will be in a much better position to make estimates along the
lines that Mr. Bowen was able to make after he had spent 5
years of doing audits. And I think the figure on our estimate
of waste will be considerable.
Mr. Carnahan. Well, that will be very important, again,
going forward. Now I want to flip to the present. And in your
report you talk about the new funding that has been requested;
three fourths of this new budget request is going for training
the Afghan National Army and Police.
And I think everyone, from our military leaders on the
ground to people here on the Hill, believe that the success on
the ground is critical, that military and police in Afghanistan
be stood up. But it is also critical to being able to get our
troops home.
And so I would like you to address the police training,
military training aspect. And in particular, you mentioned the
Afghanistan Contract and Audit Office and problems there with
their having insufficient independence, authority, and
qualified staff to actually do their job.
If we are spending these large amounts of money on
something when clearly there is a consensus that this is
something that has to be done, and done well, we need to be
able to track how that is going. And again, part of that is
money, as you mentioned, but I would also like you to address
the capability milestone rating system, which can really talk
about the effectiveness, and when you expect that report to be
prepared.
Because again, I think going forward, for considering these
new budget requests, that is going to be critical.
Mr. Fields. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me address the
capability milestones report. That, to answer part of your
question, sir, we hope to have completed that report and
released it publicly by this June. So next month that report
should be posted on our Web site and briefed, as appropriate to
the leadership here in the Congress.
That report will identify some serious issues. The most
serious is that we have been using for years now this
capability milestone, or CM, ratings process to determine where
it was, where it is that the Afghanistan Security Forces stand,
particularly and specifically Afghanistan National Army, as
well as the Afghanistan National Police, and their ability to
do what they are being stood up to do, and for which the
American taxpayer has thus far essentially spent about $27
billion, with another $14.2 billion to come as a part of the
President's most recent request for additional funds to train
the security apparatus of Afghanistan.
We found flaws in this CM rating or capability milestone
rating scheme. As I mentioned in my opening statement, this
flaw or these flaws have been recognized by the most senior
leadership of our military forces and trainers in Afghanistan,
and they are taking corrective action to remedy this.
But I am amazed that really, over the period that we have
been spending so much money training and equipping this force,
that we have just come to realize that we had an inadequate
system of measuring their progress.
In terms of the CAO, that is the Control and Audit Office,
very similar to our Government Accountability Office here in
the United States, and the High Office of Oversight, or the
HOO. Those are two mechanisms within the Government of
Afghanistan designed to fight corruption.
We believe, of course, that in order to be successful, both
in terms of standing up the security forces, we have to have
good systems, institutions in place in Afghanistan. The CAO and
the HOO are very significant in that regard.
Our audit recently released both for the CAO and the HOO
suggest that those offices are currently inadequate to do that
for which they have been put in place. And the Embassy in Kabul
is working with the Government of Afghanistan, as well as with
other representatives of the international community, to remedy
this.
And I want to point out that President Karzai has taken
some action himself to help remedy this, by decreeing that this
office, specifically the High Office of Oversight, be provided
more independence, so that it can really do its work.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. Now I want to yield 5 minutes to
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
again, I think we are going to have to, in the weeks ahead, we
might have to have the General back. In the months ahead we
might have to have the General back. And I am very happy that
you are there, General.
If we are going to talk about contractors, I just thought I
would go on the record, because it seems to be a lot of focus
on contractors here, a lot of people want to vilify contractors
because of a natural inclination to suggest that, well, if
there is a problem, we are going to blame it on somebody. We
don't want to blame it on the uniformed military people; we
will blame it on the contractors.
I think they, by and large, the contractors have done a
good job. But we must make sure that they are not corrupt, and
they are not going there and just exploiting a situation for
profit.
But let me just say that there are people who deserve our
thanks, and deserve to be honored, among these contractors.
Blackwater, for example, has been a contractor that has been
vilified. And I would say the vilification of Blackwater and
contractors like Blackwater is a black mark on a lot of people
in this town. Blackwater has lost a lot of men in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Just several months ago, when a CIA post was blown up, and
we said that we lost, it was reported that six CIA operatives
were lost in that explosion. Well, in fact, there weren't eight
operatives lost; there were six Blackwater contractors who were
lost, along with two CIA operatives. And that didn't happen to
get reported.
And they have done a good job. Blackwater has done a
terrific job. Yet we see that organization targeted to try to
find any little thing that they have done, to try to bring them
down. That is outrageous, and I think the American people need
to know the sacrifices that these, almost all the Blackwater
people are former Special Forces, and I might add Marines, who
are retired, and who are now using their expertise to try to
accomplish our goals.
So I think the vilification of the contractors is
misplaced, and something that we should really think about. And
these people, most of them, most of them deserve our praise.
Now, why do we use contractors? Just to note, if a
contractor can cook food for our troops, it is actually more
cost-effective to have a cook, who is not in uniform and is not
a military person, to be there cooking for our troops and
providing food services for our troops. Because it costs us $1
million per person, and per uniformed military personnel in
that combat area, it is costing $1 million a year.
Well, it shouldn't cost us $1 million a year in order to
provide a cook. But perhaps putting someone, someone who is
willing to go into harm's way, and our soldiers and Marines,
that is the type of expenditure that we have to have.
General, I want to get back to--okay, there is my defense
of the contractors. I think it is necessary. I think that they
are being abused, and people should be ashamed that they are
abusing some of these heroic people, like Blackwater, who have
done great jobs for us.
Now, with that said, I would like to go back to this
initial question about comparing when the military itself is
able to involve itself in economy-building operations, versus
having aid, USAID and other agencies, and contractors coming in
to do that job.
I am just requesting you now--I don't want you to do this
off the top of your head--I would like you to prepare a report
for this committee comparing the effectiveness and letting us
know the effectiveness of the PRTs, which are military units,
in Afghanistan, as compared to perhaps the way, the operation
of non, of contractors and other elements of our Government, in
terms of building up local economy, and the success they have
had.
So I am going to ask you to do that for this committee. And
it wouldn't have to be an extensive report, but just a general
analysis of how that is working.
And I see that my time is up now, Mr. Chairman. I hope that
if we have time for another round, I do have a couple more
questions. Thank you.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. And I wanted to, in my next round
of questions, get into, again looking forward with some of the
activities you mentioned. Of course, the Donor Conference in
London. We have the upcoming peace jirga on the 29th of this
month, and the Kabul conference in July.
Can you address for the committee some of your expectations
from those conferences? And in particular, the importance of
having really a broad-base involvement of men and women in
those conferences, and how that is going to improve the
effectiveness of what we are able to do on the ground?
Mr. Fields. Sir, I applaud the fact that these conferences
are, in fact, taking place. Much of the work that will be done
at these forthcoming conferences really is really borne out of
the 28 January conference hosted in London in support of the
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
There were certain decisions made at that conference, and
now the international community is coming together to assist
the Government of Afghanistan in making sure that those
recommendations agreed upon are, in fact, put in place.
In terms of the involvement of women, I don't anticipate
that the level of involvement of women will be at the level at
which I think the American people would be pleased to see. We
can reflect on audit work that we have done, which I think is
an example of what I am trying to say here, regarding women in
Afghanistan. We conducted an audit associated with the recent
elections, and while not completely disenfranchised,
nonetheless, the women did not fare well in terms of the basic
rights for voting, and expectations as would otherwise be
expected among the male population of Afghanistan.
We are also conducting an audit to determine what has
happened to about three quarters of a billion dollars, Mr.
Chairman, that this Congress has made available for women and
girls in Afghanistan during the course of the past several
years. We are looking to find if there is evidence that the
money was, first of all, used for the purposes for which it was
made available; and to what extent has it helped to advance
women and girls in Afghanistan.
The extent to which that money, perhaps, and other donor
contributions have been effective will certainly be reflected
in the extent to which women participate, to any influential
level, in these forthcoming conferences.
Mr. Carnahan. Let me ask about the development of the
agricultural sector. During our visits a few weeks ago, it was
one of the things that was highlighted, that 80 percent of the
country is rural and agriculturally driven. They have great
opportunities in developing pomegranates, fruits, nuts, grapes,
and that that is going to be critical to their economic growth.
We heard some good success stories about the way some of
our civilian teams were partnering with farmers. Also that the
farm income in the areas that we visited, in Kandahar, had
tripled in the last year. So there is some good progress being
made.
Can you talk about your evaluation of how the agricultural
sector is developing? And in particular, as was mentioned by
Mr. Rohrabacher, about the success of some of the PRTs? But
also, the National Guard Agricultural Development Teams.
Mr. Fields. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The agriculture sector
is a very important part of the strategy that the United
States, in conjunction with the international community, is
implementing in Afghanistan. And you may know, sir, and the
committee members may know that it consists basically of two
principal elements, one of which is to help shore up the
Ministry of Agriculture in Afghanistan. And the other component
is to shore up agriculture itself among the 34 provinces so
that they help to encourage or expand job opportunities which
our Government feels is important to helping to bring this
reconstruction effort and this conflict to closure.
We are poised to do some work in this area. And I would
like to ask Mr. Brummet if he would comment on that, sir.
Mr. Carnahan. I recognize you to do so.
Mr. Brummet. We have not done any audit work on the ag
sector. However, I do have a team that has been in Jalalabad in
Nangarhar Province, and they met with the Agricultural
Development Team there. And we will be going in I believe next
month to do work at the provincial level.
I would say that looking at the ag sector, in a
comprehensive way, is something that needs to be done because
we have USAID spending a lot of money. We have the U.S.
military with the Agricultural Development Team spending a lot
of money. We have USDA, Department of Agriculture, with about
40 advisors, throughout the country. And we have the State
Department that is working on counter-drug activities, which
involve things like alternative crops and that type of thing.
What we found, looking at other sectors--namely, the energy
sector--is it is very, very difficult, when you have so many
U.S. agencies involved, and also the international donor
community, to have a coordinated effort. And what we found in
the energy sector was lack of coordination, lack of planning,
lack of common standards. And I suspect we might find some of
the same problems in looking at the agriculture sector.
So we will be starting that work probably within 6 to 8
weeks. And we will have a report out on the ag sector I hope by
the end of the year.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Amazing we are talking about this 8 years
into the war. It is unbelievable.
Let me just note, Mr. Chairman, that quite often people
will take a look at projects, and suggest that there might be
waste involved in it because they are unsuccessful.
The lack of success in this particular situation, as in
other overseas conflicts, is usually not traced back just to
corruption, and not just to waste, but to a flawed strategy.
And you cannot have a strategy or a policy that is
fundamentally in conflict with the tradition or culture of the
country that you are in, and expect that it will succeed.
And it may look like waste or fraud from a distance. For
example, when we are talking about creating the, standing up
the Army of Afghanistan, and standing up the National Police in
Afghanistan.
Now, correct me if I am wrong, General, you may know about
this, but there has been a huge desertion rate among the people
that we have already trained. Now, what does that reflect? Does
it reflect waste? It doesn't reflect waste.
What it reflects is the fact that Afghanistan has the most
decentralized tribal and provincial and ethnic culture of any
other country in the world. And trying to create an Afghanistan
that is controlled or dominated by Kabul, and governed by
Kabul, the capitol city, isn't going to happen. It isn't going
to happen. It is totally contrary to their whole tradition.
There has never been an Afghanistan that was dominated by
the capitol cities. Zahirshah, the King, there for 40 years,
basically didn't rule the country. He simply was the godfather
or the father figure of the country. But the governance was
going down at the tribal level, at the village level, at the
family level, at the provincial level. And as we try to create
this image of a modern country which has a central army, we
will not succeed. And it may look like waste, but it isn't.
And let me just note, the great State Department planners
who forced the current constitution on Afghanistan, after the
Taliban were driven out, created and developed a constitution
that is the most centralized-power constitution of any country
that I know of.
Mr. Chairman, the constitution in Afghanistan does not have
the power to the people, so to speak. I mean, down at the
village level. In fact, the police are the National Police
Force. Does that sound like it is consistent with a
decentralized society? A national police force? That may be
good in France, but it is not good in Afghanistan. And if you
appoint the heads of police from Kabul, you are asking for
corruption. All right?
So we have a flawed policy that looks like corruption, but
it is a flawed policy. We aren't going to have--and the
provincial leaders, I believe, are appointed by Kabul, under
their constitution. How is that going to succeed in a country
that prides itself on ethnic lines and in tribal lines, and has
a decentralized culture? It won't work.
So General, you have got your job cut out for you. And I
would hope that we can, as we discuss the waste that is going
on, that we can try to delineate where that fraud and that
waste is that is actual fraud and waste, but not just the
result of a flawed policy.
You, General, are not going to be able to correct the
flawed policy. You are going to be able to point out to us and
to everybody else how things aren't working, or there is
corruption involved. And we are going to pay a lot of attention
to that.
But Mr. Chairman, we need to realize that there are some
fundamental structures that have been put in place that will
not work. And I think that, as a result also of a lack of
attention, as you have already brought out in this hearing, Mr.
Chairman, the lack of attention to exactly what was going on in
Afghanistan. And I believe that the incompetence level of what
we have been trying to do in Iraq and Afghanistan is a major
issue. But especially in Afghanistan, the basic policy and
foundation that we have been working with is something that
also needs to be looked at, and needs to be corrected if we
can.
Mr. Rohrabacher. General, I am looking forward to your
report. When I was, over the years as I visited Afghanistan, I
have noted the good work of the various PRT groups that are not
totally military, but at least the military officers I think
are playing the dominant role in the PRTs. So I am looking
forward to that report from you.
And with that said, I guess I didn't ask a question.
General, my question is, what do you think about that?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Fields. Thank you, sir. We comment on policy issues
when requested. And as we see a policy issue having an impact
on our principal work, providing oversight of that 51, and to
be more exact, $51.5 billion that the U.S. taxpayer has already
invested in Afghanistan.
The issues that you mentioned, sir, are certainly issues
that need to be addressed. And I am confident that, in this
Congress and within the administration, those matters will be
sufficiently addressed. And wherever it is that our work, in
terms of providing the oversight, crosses those issues, then we
will certainly provide our advice and counsel as we see them
from our vantage point.
In reference to the PRTs, sir, and their impact, I am
pleased to say that I have thus far visited about half of the
PRTs, representing about 15 countries, rather, 15 provinces of
Afghanistan.
I have yet to find a PRT commander who is inadequate or
incompetent. I have been impressed by the leadership, both on
the U.S. side, as well as on the internationally led PRT side.
What we have found, though, is that the PRTs have been
insufficiently staffed, not so much by the uniform military,
but the institutions, Federal institutions of our Government.
Department of Agriculture, Department of State, USAID have not,
in the past, consistently provided the personnel resources and
expertise that was, were determined on the front end of the PRT
arrangement.
I am pleased to say, though, I have now been able to see
some evidence that the institutions are providing a better
response. We are not there yet. A part of that response is, in
fact, the civilian surge, or civilian uplift, as we say.
We are conducting an audit of the civilian uplift to
determine if, in fact, the policy under which the civilian
uplift and surge have been implemented measures up to the
effect that we expect that instrument of support to
reconstruction should have.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, General, I appreciate that. And
if you can provide some specifics in writing to me on the PRTs
that you just stated. See, I happen to believe that is where
the progress is going to come from. Because PRTs go right down
to the local level, and you have direct interaction, and you
have a disbursement of funds by a military officer, rather than
contractors or non-military officers. Or at least a military
officer overseeing it in that local area.
So I am very interested in that. And thank you for that
answer. I am looking forward to, as I say, working with you in
the years ahead, or months ahead at least.
Mr. Fields. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. And I just wanted to close up with
a couple of questions, one really following up on the
corruption discussion that you had, and also about staffing.
The survey that was put out earlier this year by the U.N.
said that 60 percent of Afghans thought that corruption was
their biggest concern. That one Afghan out of every two had to
pay at least one kickback to a public official. The average
bribe was $160, and that the one quarter of the, this was one
quarter of the country's GDP, they paid out over $2.5 billion
in bribes in the last 12 months. That is equivalent to the
revenue accrued by the poppy trade, of about $2.8 billion.
So the magnitude of this is staggering. And, you know, your
job is staggering, in terms of trying to get a handle on that
and assess that. But, you know, your job I think is to shine a
light on the problems there, to arm us with information, to
help make the best policy and funding decisions we can from
where we sit. And we absolutely want and need you to succeed.
And so I guess I would like you to comment on addressing
the corruption issue that seems endemic, and also address the
staffing levels for the Inspector General's Office, efforts to
be sure that we are not duplicating what other agencies are
doing.
But the bottom-line question: Do you have the staffing and
resources you need to provide the information that Congress was
looking for going forward?
Mr. Fields. Thank you, sir. Let me say that the Congress
has been forthcoming in providing resources for my office.
While on the front end of the stand-up of this SIGIR
office, we did not have really a penny. When I was appointed on
the 22nd, when I was sworn in on the 22nd of July in 2008, this
organization had absolutely no money.
But by October/November of that same year, Congress did
make available $2 million in one instance, in another, $5
million, followed up by another $9 million. So we essentially
worked for 1 year building this organization from scratch with
about $16 million.
But I am pleased to say that for this year, as well as for
year 2011, we have about $35 million to build this organization
to 132, primarily of investigators and auditors, about a third
of whom will be stationed in Afghanistan. So we are poised to,
I think, conduct the work that we have been designed to do.
We are being asked to do more than we really have a
capability. We have been asked to participate in the provincial
oversight issue or mechanism of the Government of Afghanistan.
To this extent we have made a request for an additional $14
million to help in that regard. That would increase by almost
twice the current number of auditors that we have.
We don't know whether or not this measure will find its way
completely through the Congress, but I do bring that to your
attention as a measure of funding for which we have made a
request. And we would certainly put to good use, were the
Congress to find that it should be appropriated on behalf of
SIGIR.
In terms of corruption, I honestly will tell this Congress
that I don't believe that in advance of year 2009, that we paid
very much attention to the, an anti-corruption program in
Afghanistan as a part of our reconstruction effort. But I am
pleased to say that over the last year, and especially in the
past 6 months, after seeing considerable activity in that
regard, I am inclined to say that some of that activity has
been generated by the very audits that SIGIR has conducted.
Specifically, the audit of the Control and Audit Office, as
well as the audit of the High Office of Oversight.
So the Embassy is working with the Government of
Afghanistan, the international community is working with the
Government of Afghanistan, both in providing expertise, as well
as monetary resources, to raise this country up from 179 or so
in terms of where it stands on the hierarchy, if you will, of
anti-corruption, or corruption, to something much, much better
than that.
I am very disappointed, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Rohrabacher, that after we have spent essentially $50 billion,
we still have a country that is almost at the bottom of the
list in terms of corruption.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you. And we have just a few minutes
left, and I am going to yield to Mr. Ellison for the last
questions.
Mr. Ellison. General, I just have a very brief, and even
simple, question, and even a simplistic question. But I would
just like to ask you your views on, as we approach this issue
of addressing corruption, what are some of the key things you
think that the United States Government could do to help? I
mean some of the key things to really promote a greater
environment of transparency and accountability on behalf of our
Afghan partners?
Mr. Fields. Thank you for your question, sir. What is it
that the United States can do? I think we are already doing a
lot. But I am disappointed to say that in terms of our
financial investment in Afghanistan in shoring up the
institutions of Afghanistan, where I think much of the future
of fighting anti-corruption begins.
We must have strong institutions. We must have systems and
controls in place at the highest level of any government,
particularly the one about which we are concerned at this point
in time, and that is Afghanistan. We must have those mechanisms
at the top of the government.
We are working with the Control and Audit Office, and with
the High Office of Oversight. We have spent $27 billion
associated with the Afghanistan Security Forces. All of these
mechanisms I feel come together to I think, sir, answer your
question as to where are we helping to take Afghanistan when it
comes to fighting this corruption that exists in their
institutions and among their populace.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Inspector General. And we are
going to have to wrap up. And Mr. Rohrabacher, you had a quick
closing?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. That is it.
Mr. Carnahan. Okay. Thank you. We will certainly follow up.
We appreciate your service. We want you to succeed in what you
are doing, so that we can make the best decisions possible.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Fields. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 10:54 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.