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2010
THAILAND: THE PATH TOWARD RECONCILIATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-118
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, CONNIE MACK, Florida
FloridaAs of 5/6/ JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
10 deg. MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee TED POE, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN WOOLSEY, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
DIANE E. WATSON, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary and
Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 7
Ms. Catharin E. Dalpino, Visiting Associate Professor, Asian
Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University.......................................... 23
Karl Jackson, Ph.D., Director of Asian Studies and South East
Asia Studies, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies.......................................... 33
Mr. Richard Cronin, Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center 42
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress
from American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the
Pacific and the Global Environment: Prepared statement......... 4
The Honorable Scot Marciel: Prepared statement................... 10
Ms. Catharin E. Dalpino: Prepared statement...................... 27
Karl Jackson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................... 35
Mr. Richard Cronin: Prepared statement........................... 45
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 66
Hearing minutes.................................................. 67
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega: Material submitted for the
record......................................................... 68
THAILAND: THE PATH TOWARD RECONCILIATION
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific
and the Global Environment,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eni F.H.
Faleomavaega (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Faleomavaega. The Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment
will come to order. The hearing today is to review the current
crisis in Thailand. I know that my good friend, ranking member
of the subcommittee, Mr. Manzullo, will be here later, and I am
sure other members of the subcommittee will also join us. I am
very appreciative of our experts who will be testifying,
especially my good friend, Secretary Marciel, for taking time
from his busy schedule to participate in this hearing this
afternoon.
So I will proceed with my opening statement.
I had the privilege of meeting earlier this afternoon with
the Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of Thailand. He is
meeting with various officials in the administration and
Members of Congress. For the life of me, I have a very
difficult time pronouncing his name. I thought my name was bad.
I will learn to get the rest of his name for the record down
the line. I would like to proceed now with my opening statement
for this hearing this afternoon.
For over 5 years, the people of Thailand have seen their
country embroiled in political strife, principally, but not
exclusively, between two groups commonly referred to as the
Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts. The tension between the
previous government under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and
the Yellow Shirts led to a military coup in 2006 and the exile
of Prime Minister Thaksin.
After 1 year of rule by an interim government established
by the coup, control of the country reverted to a
democratically-elected government. But the political strife
continued, peaking with the recent Red Shirt antigovernment
demonstrations in Bangkok, which left over 80 people dead. The
bloodshed and ongoing instability is cause for concern for the
United States as well as for Thailand's many other friends in
the region and in the world.
Although relative calm has returned to Bangkok in recent
days, most of the contentious issues remain unresolved. Indeed,
the recent riots and crackdowns appear to have deepened
divisions within Thai society. The process of reconciliation
must be reinvigorated, hopefully, and properly, or tensions
will remain, and the risk of further violence and instability
will grow.
I honestly believe the five-point plan proposed by Prime
Minister Abhisit in early May of this year provided the right
starting point for such a process. The plan called for all
parties to uphold the monarchy, to resolve fundamental problems
of social justice, to ensure that the media could operate
freely and constructively, to create an independent committee
to investigate casualties of the recent crackdowns and to carry
out political reforms resulting in fresh elections that I
believe were to be called this November. The plan formed the
most pragmatic and plausible path toward an amicable return to
stability, democracy and the rule of law.
Just today, in a nationwide telecast, Prime Minister
Abhisit called on all Thais to participate in the five-point
plan for reconciliation. As a start, a religious ceremony
involving five religious faiths was held this morning. The
Prime Minister also asked leaders across the spectrum to gather
opinions over the next 2 weeks on how best to implement the
road map through meetings, which the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet would facilitate. In addition, he announced that a
committee to review the Constitution was being formed and next
week the government would organize an assembly of three
agencies--the National Economic and Social Development Board;
the National Health Insurance Board; and the Thai Health
Promotion Foundation--to gather opinions on how to solve the
problems of social disparities.
Thailand has gone through political crises in the past,
including the Black May crisis of 1992; student massacre at
Thammasat University in 1976; and the student uprising in 1973.
What we have witnessed over the past few months, however,
exceeds all of these in terms of those injured and killed, as
well as the depth of the social fissures underlying the crisis.
There is no doubt that Thailand has entered a critical period,
one that could determine the direction of the country for years
to come.
Clearly the conflict in Thailand is an internal issue, and
only the people and the leaders of Thailand can chart their way
toward a resolution. Yet, as a close friend of Thailand, we
should stand by the country during this difficult period and
encourage the Thai Government and the people of Thailand to
move toward reconciliation and the rule of law.
It was with those words in mind that I introduced House
Resolution 1321 last month expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives that the political situation in Thailand be
resolved peacefully and democratically. While that resolution
has yet to advance, on May 24, the Senate introduced and
adopted Senate Resolution 538, which was based on House
Resolution 1321, and which expressed precisely the same
position. I continue to believe the House should pass its own
resolution due to the importance of the bilateral relationship.
Our long history of friendship gained official sanction in 1833
when Thailand became the first treaty ally of the United States
in the Asia-Pacific region.
In recent decades we have strengthened our ties to the
military alliance we forged in 1954, through our designation of
Thailand as a major non-NATO ally in 2003 and Thailand's valued
contributions of troops in support of our U.S. military
operations in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and
Iraq.
I just want to note for the record that, in my service as a
Vietnam veteran, I will never forget the contributions and what
it means to have a friend in those days of the Vietnam War.
Thailand was one of our most important allies, and I will say
this publicly to my colleagues and to the people, on behalf of
our country, we are grateful for all that Thailand has done as
a close friend and ally of the United States.
Thailand has also been a major trading partner of the
United States, a regional leader, a force for stability in
Southeast Asia and a country with which we share common values
and interests. The United States has always appreciated
Thailand's many international contributions and we respect and
admire its unique culture.
Just prior to this hearing, His Excellency Mr. Kiat
Sitthiamorn, Special Envoy of the Prime Minister, met with the
members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and gave a first-hand
account of the issues confronting Thailand. The crisis is
complex and multidimensional, one that involves political
conflict, economic tensions, social strifes and personal
enmities. Fortunately, we have with us today our good friend
Deputy Assistant Secretary Marciel and a group of experts to
help us understand the things happening in Thailand, and they
will be sharing with us their testimony as well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]
Mr. Faleomavaega. And with that, I would like to begin the
hearing by having our Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs and Ambassador to ASEAN, Secretary Scot
Marciel, as our first witnesses this afternoon. Secretary
Marciel is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and
has served in posts in Vietnam, the Philippines, Hong Kong,
Brazil and Turkey, and as staff in the Economic Bureau's Office
of Monetary Affairs. He is a resident of California, a graduate
of the University of California at Davis--actually you should
have gone to Berkeley, but that is okay, I forgive you--and the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is married and has two
daughters.
Secretary Marciel.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR FOR ASEAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Marciel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Manzullo, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you
very much for inviting me here today to discuss recent events
in Thailand, our longtime friend and treaty ally in Southeast
Asia.
While the streets of Bangkok have returned to relative
calm, the situation remains fragile, and the issues that must
be addressed for calm to become stability are complex and
challenging. Thailand has just experienced the worst political
violence in a generation. The causes of the recent events are
complex, and the consequences are not easy to predict. We were
greatly saddened by the loss of life that resulted from the
clashes. One hopeful sign, however, is that the Thai political
debate now is once again taking place in the Parliament rather
than through violent street protests.
Our friendship with Thailand is based on a relationship
that spans over two centuries and a common set of values that
define our two peoples. Among these are a commitment to
democracy; an emphasis on good governance, accountability, and
transparency in the actions of government; and the rights of
peaceful freedom of assembly and expression. These values are
an integral part of the vibrant society that Thailand is today,
and they serve as important touchstones for all sides in
efforts to chart a path forward to national reconciliation.
The importance to the United States of our long-standing
friendship with Thailand cannot be overstated. As one of only
five U.S. treaty allies in Asia, Thailand remains crucial to
U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The U.S.
mission in Thailand, one of the largest in the world, affords
the United States a regional operating platform that would be
difficult to replace elsewhere. Our bilateral relationship
provides incalculable benefits in health, security, trade and
investment, in law enforcement cooperation, and humanitarian
assistance to refugees to both countries.
The last several years have been turbulent for Thailand.
The restoration of elected government in early 2008 ended the
short-lived post-2006 coup interim government, but left major
divisions in the Thai body politic. Court decisions forced two
Prime Ministers from office in 2008, and three times in the
past 2 years the normal patterns of political life took a back
seat to disruptive street protests. The yellow-shirted People's
Alliance for Democracy occupied Government House from August to
December 2008, shutting down Bangkok's airports for 8 days, to
protest governments led by the People's Power Party, the heir
to the Thai Rak Thai Party of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin.
The fall of the PPP-led coalition government in December
2008 and its replacement by the current coalition reversed the
previous political configuration. In April 2009, the red-
shirted United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, UDD,
disrupted a regional Asian summit, ASEAN summit, and sparked
riots in Bangkok after Mr. Thaksin, now a fugitive in the wake
of his conviction on abuse of power charges, called for
revolution to bring him home.
Neither of these earlier protest cycles, however,
approached the March 12 to May 19 crisis in terms of the human
and financial toll exacted. The crisis, which paralyzed the
government, left 88 people dead and caused an estimated $1.5
billion in arson-related property losses, accentuated major
political cleavages in the Thai population.
Throughout the recent turmoil, the United States has been
active in promoting dialogue, reconciliation, and the peaceful
settlement of political disputes. Secretary Clinton, for
example, released a video message to the Thai people on April
13 urging peaceful dialogue. Our embassy in Bangkok engaged
with Thai Government officials at all levels as well as leaders
of the opposition Red Shirt movement to underscore both the
value we place on our relationship with Thailand and the
importance of resolving political differences through
compromise rather than force or violence. We also worked to
ensure that we were doing everything possible to protect the
safety and well-being of American citizens in Thailand.
While the government succeeded in ending the protest and
restoring order, the fundamental divisions within Thai society
that lie at the root of the political tensions remain. We
welcome Prime Minister Abhisit's vow to follow through on the
reconciliation road map proposal he originally put forward with
the goal of ending the UDD protest peacefully. We support the
establishment of an independent fact-finding commission to
review the incidents of violence from March through May and
determine who is responsible.
While this would be a positive first step, it should not be
the last. Now more than ever it is critical for all Thai actors
to promote dialogue and reconciliation, to recognize the
legitimate grievance of Thai citizens, to support the equal and
impartial application of the law, and to foreswear the use of
violence to resolve political differences.
The Prime Minister's original proposal included a date in
November for early elections. He has since indicated that
conditions in Thailand do not allow for November elections. The
door to early balloting is not closed, however, and while it
will be up to the Thais to work out the date, the Prime
Minister's own plan acknowledged that democratic elections are
an important part of reconciliation.
The United States has stressed consistently that all sides
should work out differences within Thailand's democratic
framework and without resorting to violence. Assistant
Secretary Campbell reiterated this point on his recent visit to
Bangkok. The right to peaceful assembly is a key component of
Thai democracy, but Thais must also exercise their
responsibility not to let that peaceful assembly turn violent.
Responsible leaders across the Thai political spectrum and in
civil society need to emphasize to their supporters that in a
democracy, violence has no place in politics. Leaders who
refuse to condemn violent acts do a disservice to their cause,
to their supporters, and to their country.
Thailand remains one of our oldest treaty allies in Asia
and our close friends. The United States can be a source of
support as the Thai work to resolve the issues that still
divide them, but it is the Thai people themselves who must make
the difficult choices on how to proceed. For our part, the
United States will continue to do what we can to promote
reconciliation among the Thai people and to preserve and
strengthen this enduring friendship.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marciel follows:]
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you.
We are joined by the ranking member of the subcommittee, my
good friend from Illinois, for his opening statement.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
very important hearing.
America's relationship with Thailand dates back over 177
years to 1833, in the days of President Andrew Jackson.
Thailand remains an important friend of the United States, and
we value the relationship.
The Ambassador of Thailand to the United States recently
paid an official visit to the congressional district that I
represent and Rockford College, which I have the honor to
represent. We truly appreciate his visit. It was a rare
opportunity for college students to ask questions of an
ambassador, and he is a truly witty man, and we are absolutely
thrilled he took the time to come out and spend time with these
young people.
We urge the good people of Thailand to seek peaceful and
nonviolent ways in which to express their disagreement. We also
urge the Royal Thai Government to hold elections as soon as
feasible. Most importantly, elections resulting from a free and
fair process have to be respected. I understand that the
current crisis has many dimensions and goes beyond Red Shirts
and Yellow Shirts; however, our desire is to encourage a
genuine reconciliation amongst the good people of Thailand.
We look forward to hearing the second panel.
I appreciate, Mr. Marciel, your excellent testimony and the
number of years you spent working on this issue. I know it has
got to be very dear to your heart.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. Secretary, as I recall, in recent years when there was
a military coup in Thailand, we immediately imposed sanctions.
Are those sanctions still in place or have they been lifted?
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, you are right. After the coup in
2006, we did put in place sanctions as required by law because
we determined it was a military coup under the law. We lifted
those sanctions after the subsequent elections at the end of
2007, I believe it was. Early 2008.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Which raises another question. I wanted
to dialogue with you on the question of sanctions. I know our
law does stipulate that whenever there is a military coup, we
put on sanctions. But there was a tremendous sense of
disappointment as I met with the leaders of Thailand. They felt
betrayed. They felt that the United States should not have put
these sanctions in place for the simple reason that this is an
internal matter, and that the government and the people were
trying every way possible to reconcile and go back to a
democratic form of government.
Do you think this law still has merit? Because here is
another instance when there was a military coup that took place
in Pakistan, by I think a general named Musharraf. For 8 years
the coup was in place and we did not put any sanctions on
Pakistan. Somewhat of a contradiction, in my humble opinion.
Should there be a better way of measurement on how our
Government should react or respond to coups? Each country has
their own particular situation. As to why the coup took place
in Pakistan, which we didn't put any sanctions--in fact, we
gave Pakistan billions of dollars, and for our own reasons. But
when a friendly ally like Thailand had a coup for whatever
reasons, we put the same onus on them and make them feel like
they are a hostile and undemocratic country. And I wanted to
ask your opinion, do you think the law is good? Is it a good
law?
Mr. Marciel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A couple of
comments, if I could.
One, you are right that a number of people in the
government, the postcoup interim government, complained about
the imposition of sanctions, which was a cutoff of assistance,
certain types of assistance. It wasn't sanctions of the sense
of ending trade or banning investment; it was rather limited.
Others, I have to say, in Thailand criticized us for not being
tough enough and not responding harshly enough, asking were we
sending an adequately strong message about our democratic
values. So we kind of got it from both sides, to be perfectly
honest.
I think the key for me is that the sanctions are one piece
of the reaction, as you know, mandated by law. I think the
bigger picture, though, is how we tried to deal with that
government. We did not become an enemy or hostile to Thailand
at all. We made it clear throughout this period--and I remember
it well because it was a difficult period when a country that
is an ally and a close friend and is important to all of us was
going through a difficult period. We had to impose these
sanctions, but we also did work very carefully and very closely
with the government and others in Thailand to try to help them
move forward out of this situation.
So I think we played a positive role, despite the
requirement to impose those sanctions, in helping Thailand to
move on to the next step postcoup and back to democracy.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Do you think perhaps rather than just
immediately--because the law dictates as soon as a coup is
committed that we apply sanctions--do you think the law could
be revised, or amended at least, to give the administration or
Congress a little leeway or time to examine the given sanctions
so that we don't put sanctions automatically in the way that we
have done to Thailand and we have done to Fiji, and we don't do
it to Pakistan?
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, in all honesty I am not sure
that I can speak for the administration on this. Certainly I
think it is a worthwhile discussion to have certainly among
Congress and between the administration and Congress. But I
couldn't give you an authoritative statement from the
administration on that.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you.
The situation and the crisis in Thailand is a lot deeper
than the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. We know that. I
think there is also the question of the rise of the middle
class where they seem to place a very critical emphasis on this
Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt problem that we are faced with. I
just wanted to ask what is the current situation so far as who
really is pulling the strings, thereby causing the Red Shirts
to do what they are doing right now? According to media
reports, they say Thaksin is behind it, and other reports say
that a group of prominent middle-class businessmen might be
behind it. It seems every time the government tries to bring
everybody together to reconcile, they suddenly break off the
negotiations. Can you elaborate? Can you share with us why
there seems to be this uncertainty and--I shouldn't say
contradictions, but who is leading the Red Shirts in that
respect?
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, that is actually a very good and
very difficult question.
I have been working on Southeast Asia off and on for about
25 years. I am not sure I have encountered a situation as
complex as the one in Thailand right now in terms of trying to
understand the politics. It is extraordinarily complicated. And
as you pointed out, it is not as simple as one group against
another. There are very many layers and complexities involved.
Certainly we have seen a number of factors at play. One of
those is I think there is a general consensus that one of the
things that Prime Minister Thaksin did when he was Prime
Minister was, if you will--I don't know if it is the right
term--empowered a certain part of the population that
previously may not have been as active in politics as it was.
So you have certain elements of the population more active in
politics, which generally is a good thing in terms of
strengthening a democracy.
But as far as pulling strings, our view, if I could
simplify, would be to say that there are a lot of people out
there protesting who have legitimate grievances and complaints.
There are also people, including the former Prime Minister, who
are encouraging and supporting the protests. I think it would
be a mistake to say that it is all Prime Minister Thaksin or
anybody else pulling strings. I think our understanding is that
was one factor, but that there are thousands of people out
there who felt strongly about what they were protesting for. So
it is not someone pulling strings, although there are obviously
people who are working to support those protests.
Mr. Faleomavaega. In our meeting earlier with the Prime
Minister's Special Envoy, Mr. Kiat Sitthiamorn, he indicated
that the current crisis has resulted in a loss of some $50
billion, affecting the economy of Thailand. Their tourism
industry, in particular, has been severely affected by the
crisis.
My understanding is that when Prime Minister Thaksin became
Prime Minister, he made tremendous advancements in providing
help to the poor and destitute in the rural areas. Despite
problems that affected the Thai Government's operations,
somehow they helped people from the rural areas out in the
country, basically people who are low-income level, and this is
the reason why he is still so popular among the poor people.
Is he the first Prime Minister who has given substantive
attention to the needs of the poor in Thailand? Why does there
seem to be such a consistent support stream of people out of
the rural areas of the country?
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, I don't know that I would say
that he is the first Prime Minister to pay attention to the
poor, but he certainly made it a major part of his platform to
enact or expand programs that were designed to help rural
areas. I think, as I understand it, the current government of
Prime Minister Abhisit has actually continued a number of these
programs or adjusted them somewhat, recognizing that some of
them had value. So he certainly did play a role there.
Mr. Faleomavaega. As I recall, Prime Minister Thaksin was
taken to court for certain transactions as a businessman. Was
it some kind of a telecommunications company that he sold or he
purchased? I think he sold his company in Singapore for which
he did not pay taxes; is that a fact? Is that true?
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, I don't remember all of the
details of it. There was certainly an issue when he sold his
telecommunications company, and it got a lot of attention in
Thailand, and it was being looked at by the Thai authorities.
He was tried for corruption in the middle of 2008. I don't
remember exactly what the charges are, but we could get that
information to you if I can follow up.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Can you, please? I would like to make
that part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
Thaksin Shinawatra's sale of a telecommunications business to a
foreign firm in 2006 (during his tenure as Prime Minister) prompted
allegations of improper tax exemptions and abuse of power. The Thai
Securities and Exchange Commission investigation cleared Thaksin of all
wrongdoing that year.
In October 2008, after the coup and change of government, the Thai
Supreme Court issued an arrest warrant for Thaksin related to the 2006
sale.
In January 2007 the Royal Thai Government charged Thaksin for
allegedly improper land purchases, unlawful use of state funds, and
obstructing competition against his personal business by imposing an
excise tax on telecommunication firms.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Please, I am not pointing fingers; I am
not trying to declare the man guilty, I am simply saying this
is one of the problems that he encountered when he was Prime
Minister. If there were other issues--was there some kind of a
conspiracy or those who opposed him? Were there trumped up
charges? Was he basically banished from Thailand, or can he
return to Thailand at any time?
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, he was convicted, and he fled
Thailand, and so right now he is a fugitive. I don't want to
speak for the Thai Government on this. I assume he probably
could come back to Thailand, but he would face that conviction
and whatever sentence he had.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am going to withhold further questions
and yield to my good friend from Illinois for his questions.
Mr. Manzullo. Mr. Chairman, you asked two questions that I
wanted to ask. I think if I asked the same questions, I would
get the same answer, and I am satisfied with the answers that
you gave.
More of an observation than anything, and it doesn't
require any comment on your part, is the Thais' tremendous
loyalty to a democratic state, for lack of a better word. I
have talked to so many Thais, and they really love democracy.
And one Thai told me, we love it so much that sometimes the
military thinks it must enforce it. I thought that is an
interesting comment. And yet whenever there has been a coup,
the coup shortly thereafter talks about having elections, a
continuous return to democracy. That is what makes the Thai
situation so unique, so challenging, but so important that we
encourage the Thais to work through this process to become even
more established in their democratic values and ideals.
I don't know what more the American people or our
Government can do to encourage them to do that, because it is
really engrained into their spirit.
Did you want to comment on that? You don't have to.
Mr. Marciel. Well, thank you, Congressman.
Just briefly I would say that I agree that the Thai people
care about their democracy. They want it, and I think Secretary
Clinton has said all democracies are works in progress by
definition, and the Thai one clearly is, and it is going
through a difficult time now. I think there is a strong
commitment to democracy among the Thai people, and for that
reason I am confident over time they will be able to work it
out, but obviously one of the struggles right now is between
two--actually more than two, but fundamentally two different
visions on how to move ahead.
But I agree with you very much that the Thai are committed
to democracy, and that this is something that the American--our
role is to be as supportive of the nation and people of
Thailand as possible, and to give all possible encouragement
for them to work this out with the understanding that they are
the ones who will have to work it out.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I thank the gentleman from Illinois for
his questions. I was going to follow up with a question he had
alluded to earlier. What exactly is the role of the military
right now in the Government of Thailand? How much influence
does the military have in Thai society, be it business or
social?
Mr. Marciel. Well, the military certainly has influence in
the broader Thai body politic. It is a very respected
institution in Thailand. It doesn't play a direct role in
politics in the way in some countries military men are in
Parliament, that sort of thing.
Mr. Faleomavaega. How big is the Thai military?
Mr. Marciel. I don't know.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Can you provide that for the record?
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
The estimated size of the Royal Thai Army is approximately 200,000
personnel and consists of seven infantry divisions, one armored
division, one cavalry division, two special forces divisions, one field
artillery division, and one air defense artillery division.
According to Royal Thai Government figures, the 2009 Thai military
budget was 170 billion baht ($5.2 billion), or 8.2 percent of the total
national budget and 1.9 percent of Thailand's GDP. The RTG has budgeted
155 billion baht ($4.8 billion) for 2010, a decrease of approximately
nine percent.
The Thai military controls a few businesses but does not have a
major role in the Thai economy. The military supervises a battery
factory and tanning plant as well as small military-related production
of uniforms, small arms and other items for military personnel use. The
Thai military controls some media outlets, such as TV Channel 5 and
numerous radio stations. According to the Thai Ministry of Finance,
these businesses are taxed and their revenues are used mostly for
internal operations.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am also curious how much the Thai
Government pays into its military budget, and how it affects
the entire defense structure of Thailand. I would appreciate if
you can provide that for the record.
Mr. Marciel. I will be happy to do that.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Is the military also involved in
businesses like those other countries? I am curious.
Mr. Marciel. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, I am going to
have to get back to you on that. I think there is some
involvement, but it is not something that I have followed. I
will have to get you an answer on that.
My guess is one of the experts on the panel that follows me
will be able to give you an answer on that.
Mr. Faleomavaega. A good example of this is Indonesia. This
has been one of the most difficult problems in controlling
their military, because they are involved in business and a lot
of illegal business goes on in Indonesia. I was wondering if
the same is true of Thailand.
How much trade do we currently conduct with Thailand, in
terms of our investments?
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I am on a losing
streak here.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I think they should fire your political
staff behind you for not giving you this good information.
Mr. Marciel. I apologize. That is something I should have
at my fingertips, and I don't, but we will get that to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
For 2009, U.S. exports to Thailand amounted to $6.9 billion and
U.S. imports from Thailand totaled $19.1 billion.
According to the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Thailand on a historical cost
basis was $9.128 billion in 2008 (latest data available).
The U.S. goods and services trade with Thailand totaled $35 billion
in 2007 (latest data available). Exports totaled $10 billion; imports
totaled $25 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade deficit with
Thailand was $14 billion in 2007.
Thailand is currently the United States' 23rd largest goods trading
partner with $26 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2009.
Goods exports totaled $6.9 billion; goods imports totaled $19.1
billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Thailand was $12.2 billion
in 2008. Trade in services with Thailand (exports and imports) totaled
$3.4 billion in 2008 (latest data available). Services exports were
$1.7 billion; services imports were $1.7 billion. According to Thai
Government statistics, in 2009, Thai imports from ASEAN amounted to
$26.9 billion and Thai exports to ASEAN reached $32.4 billion.
Mr. Faleomavaega. What is the population of Thailand?
Mr. Marciel. It is about 65-70 million.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I will give you a gold star for that.
Mr. Marciel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me a
question I can answer.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I do want to thank you and I do want to
thank Secretary Clinton for her interest in making sure that
our involvement is constructive and positive, and in assuring
the people of Thailand that the United States stands ready to
help in any way.
I think my good friend from Illinois mentioned something
about democracy. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Secretary, but
there is no perfect democracy in this world today; am I wrong
on that?
Mr. Marciel. You are not wrong on that.
Mr. Faleomavaega. And I might add that democracy is nothing
but an experimentation. It is a process. It took us 200 years
to give African Americans the right to vote, or something like
that, and we are still not there yet. We would like to see
Mother Liberty with the blindfold and say that the Constitution
is color blind, and that we look to the character of the person
as the essence and not so much the color or ethnicity or
nationality. I suppose that is the essence of democracy for
which we strive, and I think we sometimes tend to forget that
we try to democratize all other countries based on our
application of democracy. Do you agree with that; do you think
Thailand should follow our democratic system? We don't have a
king, that is for sure.
Mr. Marciel. I guess I would put it this way, Mr. Chairman.
You are right, there is no perfect democracy. We are all
working to strengthen our democracies. I think democracies can
learn from each other. We all, and certainly you all, try to
strengthen our democracy, and that is the best we can do.
Others may chose to follow to some extent or take some lessons
from it, and we obviously follow what others do as well and
sometimes learn lessons from others.
Mr. Faleomavaega. What do you consider to be the most
critical issue for our country, in terms of our relationship
with Thailand that should never waiver or never be lessened in
any way? I guess the word ``security'' comes to my mind in
terms of our relationship with an important country like
Thailand. How is our security relationship currently working
with Thailand?
Mr. Marciel. Our security relationship with Thailand is
very good. Our military has worked together very well. Thailand
continues to host annually the Cobra Gold exercise, which, as
you know, is a very large, multilateral exercise. And overall
there is extremely good cooperation in many ways on the
military side as well as on the law enforcement side, including
with Thailand hosting a regional law enforcement academy which
plays a very positive role.
In my view, the most important thing for the United States,
important as the security relationship is, the most important
thing for the United States to keep in mind now as Thailand
goes through this period, we are, as I said earlier, friends
with the entire nation and all of the people of Thailand, and
that is something that we need to remember constantly as they
go through this crisis with different groups debating each
other.
Mr. Faleomavaega. It is very interesting to note with
interest Cambodia, Vietnam, I believe even Laos, their
principal trading partner right now is China. And I am just
curious, where does Thailand fall into this?
Mr. Marciel. Thailand is also a significant trading partner
for all of those countries. Trade among the ASEAN countries has
increased at a rapid rate, and with the advent of the ASEAN
Free Trade Agreement this year, we can expect that to continue
to increase. I can get you numbers on the trade, but it is
certainly important, as well as Thai investment in those
countries.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Please. And in your capacity also as
Ambassador to the ASEAN organization, I am just curious, there
have been recent reports of Myanmar's interest in developing a
nuclear weapon, and I was wondering if this would have serious
implications for those countries in Southeast Asia if Myanmar
seeks to do the same thing like in North Korea. North Korea now
has eight atom bombs, or something like that?
Mr. Marciel. We have certainly read with interest the
recent reports on a possible nuclear initiative by Burma. I
can't say too much about it in an open hearing, but obviously
we follow it very carefully.
I think there are two issues. One is whether there is some
kind of serious nuclear program in Burma, which certainly would
be tremendously destabilizing to the entire region. And second
is also the Burmese acquisition of other military equipment,
conventional, which also can affect regional stability. So we
are looking at both of those questions very closely.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Can you also provide for the record the
number of Thai Americans we have in our country? Besides Tiger
Woods.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
According to ``We the People: Asians in the United States,'' Census
2000 Special Reports, CENSR-17, issued in December 2004, page 1,
110,850 respondents reported to be of Thai origin. An additional 39,243
respondents identified themselves as being of mixed Thai heritage. If
both groups of respondents are included, there were 150,093 Asians with
Thai heritage in the U.S. in 2000. The 2010 Census figures are not
available yet.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Do you know that Tiger Woods is more Thai
than African American because his mother is from Thailand? I
don't know how many Americans know that.
I think we currently have 690,000 foreign students who
attend American colleges and universities. And the number one
country is China with 100,000; India with about 90,000. I am
curious, how many students from the ASEAN countries attend
American colleges and universities?
I have always firmly believed this is probably one of our
most important assets--allowing students from all over the
world to come and study in America and see America for what it
is, and to understand and appreciate the institutions and what
we are striving for. I am just curious if Thailand is also in
that light in terms of the number of students from Thailand who
are currently attending our American colleges and universities.
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely agree that it is
very much good for the United States, as well as for the
sending countries, to have students studying in the United
States. I can get you the numbers for all of ASEAN and for
individual countries. Thailand is a major--I have the numbers
here. Great.
We currently have almost 9,000 students from Thailand
studying in the United States. Sorry, this is actually from a
couple of years ago, a few years ago. Thailand, almost 9,000;
Indonesia, a little over 7,000; Vietnam, 6,000; and China at
this point 67,000. So that is extraordinarily high. But overall
for ASEAN, the numbers have been going up. Certainly from
Vietnam, they have been going up very rapidly. Indonesia, they
have gone down somewhat, which is a concern for us. And
Thailand, it is more stable. I can get you all of the numbers.
[The information referred to follows:]
Written Response Received from the Honorable Scot Marciel to Question
Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
According to the 2009 Open Doors report, the numbers of ASEAN
students studying at U.S. universities and colleges during the 2008/
2009 academic year (the most recent available statistics) are as
follows:
Brunei 39
Burma 667
Cambodia 386
Indonesia 7,509
Laos 80
Malaysia 5,942
Philippines 4,226
Singapore 3,989
Thailand 8,736
Vietnam 12,823
ASEAN Total 44,397
Mr. Faleomavaega. This is a program that our Government
should engage in--to encourage and bring students from the
ASEAN countries to study in our colleges and universities.
Mr. Marciel. We do have a number of programs, Fulbright
obviously, but other programs that provide scholarships or
otherwise encourage students from ASEAN to study in the United
States. We are always talking about how we can do more. In the
President's planned trip to Indonesia, looking at how we can
encourage more Indonesian students here is a big priority for
us. So, yes, it is something that we should be doing.
Mr. Faleomavaega. It is my understanding that the
President's trip to Indonesia has been cancelled again. Is
there any indication when he might be doing this in the coming
months? This is three times now that he has cancelled the trip.
Mr. Marciel. He has postponed the trip, Mr. Chairman, I
believe, because of the environmental crisis in the Gulf of
Mexico, but still intends to go, but there is not a new date
set yet.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I note with interest during the
Presidential campaign there was a national blog that said that
I, humble me, was specially appointed as an agent of Barack
Obama to go to Indonesia, which I did. I went to Indonesia to
go to the school that he attended, to make sure that there was
no indication whatsoever that Barack Obama was born in
Indonesia. Say hello to the birthers for me on that.
But at any rate, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for
your patience and good humor in seeing this through. I do want
very much to do all we can, at least as Members of Congress, to
be as helpful as we can to the people and good leaders of
Thailand.
Did you want to add any more to your statement?
Mr. Marciel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Only that the administration view is exactly the same. The
United States wants to do all we can to help our friends in
Thailand get through this, and we hope the administration and
the Congress can work together in support of the Thai people
and----
Mr. Faleomavaega. And the administration is supportive of
the five points outlined by the Prime Minister in May?
Mr. Marciel. That is right, Mr. Chairman, we are.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you
for coming.
Mr. Faleomavaega. We have some good experts here on our
next panel. Our second panel includes Dr. Karl Jackson, Dr.
Richard Cronin and Ms. Catharin Dalpino.
Dr. Jackson is the director of the Asian Studies program at
the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University. A C.V. Starr distinguished professor of southeast
asian studies, he also serves as the director of the Southeast
Asia Studies program at the SAIS. Until 1991, he was professor
of political science at the University of California,
Berkeley--go, Bears--where he began teaching in 1972.
Dr. Jackson served as the National Security Adviser to the
Vice President from 1991 to 1993. Prior to that he was Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and
was also senior director for Asian affairs at the National
Security Council. Mr. Jackson served as a Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense of East Asian Affairs. He also was the
president of the U.S.-Thailand Business Council. He has written
several books and is very much up to date on the situation in
Thailand.
Professor Dalpino is a former diplomat, scholar,
international organizations professional staff member and
program manager of an NGO. She has been a university professor
for over 10 years, teaching courses in international relations,
human rights and democracy promotion, politics and security and
international relations in Southeast Asia.
Ms. Dalpino was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for 5 years, where she had
special responsibilities for U.S. policy in China, Indonesia,
Burma, Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda. She also led the U.S.
delegation to the Group of 24, which coordinates democracy
promotion assistance to Eastern Europe. Prior to joining the
State Department, Ms. Dalpino was a policy analyst for the
World Bank and an officer at the Asia Foundation, where she
served as the Foundation's resident representative for
Thailand, Laos and Cambodia.
In 1997, Ms. Dalpino became a fellow at the Brookings
Institution, where she researched and wrote on U.S.-Asian
relations for 7 years. During this time, she taught at
Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies and also George Washington
University. She has also directed projects on U.S. Relations in
Southeast Asia for the Stanley Foundation, on Agent Orange in
Vietnam for the Aspen Institute and on U.S.-Cambodian relations
for The Asia Society. She has written three books on U.S.
policy toward Asia.
Dr. Richard Cronin is a senior associate and director of
the Southeast Asia program at the Stimson Center, a nonprofit
organization dealing with foreign security policy, in
Washington, DC.
Dr. Cronin currently works on transboundary and
nontraditional security issues in the Mekong Basin and
Southeast Asia from a political economy perspective. He has
written and coauthored several articles on Thailand's regional
relations and the political crisis that culminated in the May
19 violence for the Stimson Foundation's home page. He is also
lead and coauthor of several books. My gosh, I can go on and on
here.
He has taught comparative Asian political economy at Johns
Hopkins and Chuo University in Tokyo, and was also a Vietnam
veteran intelligence officer in the U.S. Army 1st Infantry
Division in 1965 and 1966. I was there 1967 and 1968, so you
left before I came.
I want to thank you very much for your presence and coming
here to testify to the subcommittee.
If I may, I would like to give the honor to Professor
Dalpino for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MS. CATHARIN E. DALPINO, VISITING ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR, ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAM, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF
FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Ms. Dalpino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, my views on this topic today are informed by
living and working in Thailand over a span of three decades and
my present work as director of Thai studies at Georgetown
University, but I haven't focused my statement on the very rich
history of U.S.-Thailand relations. I would like to focus very
specifically on the current state of the reconciliation process
in Thailand and what it might take to put that process on
firmer ground.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Without objection, all of your statements
will be made part of the record. If you have any added
materials, things to add, we are happy to receive them.
Ms. Dalpino. Mr. Chairman, it has been frustrating to some
of us who follow Thai affairs to watch the coverage over the
past few years in Thailand, because I think in particular the
international community is sometimes given to what I would
describe as the myth of monoliths, of being able to parse this
crisis into Red Shirt versus Yellow Shirt, rural versus urban,
rich versus poor, even authoritarian versus democracy. I am
afraid that if this kind of dichotomy continues, it is going to
stigmatize a large group of people and lionize another large
group of people on any given occasion, and it is important in
the reconciliation process to move to a more nuanced view of
this crisis. So I thank you very much for these hearings and
for your interest in this topic.
I would say at the present time Thailand is suspended
somewhere between the crisis and normal political life. I share
your interest and your support for the five-point
reconciliation plan. I think, however, as that plan goes
forward, many Thais, particularly those who were in opposition,
will look at a number of other things as well to see if the
government is going to be able to forge a genuine
reconciliation. And they will look particularly at whether
treatment of several issues is evenhanded.
Here are some indicators. I think they will look at due
process for the UDD leaders and demonstrators under arrest.
This will be a good opportunity for the government not only to
show adherence to the rule of law, but also moving to a new
kind of political balance.
They will look at the length of the emergency rule period
which is currently in operation and this week was renewed for
another month. Certainly that is part of restoring order to
Thailand, but as that--but as the need for that begins to wane,
I think there will be attention to when emergency rule is
lifted and in what sequence, particularly when it is lifted in
the north and the northeast, which is where Thaksin had a great
deal of political strength.
I am heartened that the Prime Minister is committed to an
investigation of the casualties incurred on both sides during
the recent crisis. I think there will be close attention to who
is appointed to a commission and what kind of balance that
represents.
And lastly in the short term, I think the timing of
elections is a very, very difficult issue. Obviously, elections
in the shortest possible term would help to restore democracy.
But I have to say in all candor that there is a danger that if
elections are called too soon, and not sufficient
reconciliation has been achieved, that whatever the outcome is,
it could restart a cycle of violence if the losers are not
prepared to accept the outcome of the democratic process. And I
think in our own representations and recommendations to our
Thai colleagues, I think we have to remember how very, very
complicated even just the timing of the election will be at
this point in time.
Even if managed skillfully, I think the initial stage will
not automatically ensure long-term political stability in
Thailand, and I would like to point out three issues which have
been very much at the center of Thai political development. One
is addressing the center-province dynamic. It is true former
Prime Minister Thaksin brought to light many issues of rural
versus urban. In truth, the Thai system has been centralized
historically. It still is, but there have been attempts to
decentralize. I don't think just transferring funds to the
rural area is going to do it. I think there is also an issue of
transferring some degree of political power, and that will take
quite a long national discussion.
Also, adhering to the rules of the political game in a
democracy is something that the Thais will have to consider and
to work on quite a lot, particularly in a parliamentary form of
government. And again, what we have seen with the cycles of
violence and retribution with the Yellow Shirts versus Red
Shirts, when one side does not get an outcome they want, they
want to pull the whole system down. And working toward a
political culture that allows for loyal opposition and
acceptance of the democratic process will be very important.
Traditionally, Thai governments are coalition governments,
and I think there are some good reasons for doing that, but
that actually doesn't help this idea of accepting an outcome if
you can negotiate some of the aspects after election. That is
just to flag that issue.
Lastly, I think we will see another round of constitutional
revision and reform, and that is good. I think there are
particular issues in the current Constitution that Thailand
might look at, including the clause that abolishes the
political party if a party member is convicted of electoral
fraud.
When he came into office, Prime Minister Abhisit flagged
that and tried to get the parties to discuss either revising or
abolishing that, because it really is a nuclear option, and it
was behind a great deal of the discontent in the UDD with the
dissolution of Thai Rak Thai and the People's Power Party. But
beyond specific constitutional revisions, I think that
strengthening the Thai sense of Constitution will be important
as well. Thailand has had 17 Constitutions since it became a
constitutional monarchy in 1932. And forging a Constitution
that can be revised as need be but still remain will be
important.
There are two major wild cards that could affect the
reconciliation process. And one would be transitions in the
monarchy, both in the palace and in the Privy Council, which
might come naturally and might have been expected for some
time, and also the issue of Thaksin's continued impact on Thai
politics and the calculation of how much is gained or lost by
having him inside or outside of the country, inside or outside
of the tent, is something clearly that not only this government
but other parts of the Thai system will have to consider.
Let me talk very briefly about U.S.-Thailand relations and
what the United States might do at this point in time. I agree
with everything that Secretary Marciel said about the
importance and the salience of U.S.-Thai relations and I think
that the United States has a stake in helping to strengthen
Thai democracy and supporting the return to stability. But it
has to do so with some thought and restraint. And in contrast
to some countries in the post-Cold-War world that had
significant international involvement in the democratic process
of their democratization Thailand's democratization is very
much of its own making. And it has welcomed support from the
international community as a support, not as a leading factor.
I have no reason to believe that they would not welcome
support, but I think it has to be very skillful and somewhat
indirect. I also do think that it is very important that any
democracy assistance that the United States or U.S.
organizations that are not governmental that be rendered at
this point in time be perceived as being nonpartisan in terms
of the Thai political factions.
A second thing that I think the United States could help,
if Thailand so desires this assistance, is helping to break the
cycle of impunity that we have seen not only with the Red
Shirts but with the Yellow Shirts--going back to the time in
August 2008 when people broke into the Prime Minister's
residence and chased him to the airport the VIP lounge of the
airport--that both the Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts have
conducted themselves as they have because they believe that
they could, and that developing a strong, accountable,
effective security force is actually part of a democracy,
because you will have public demonstrations. You should expect
to have them, even welcome them as part of democracy and not
see them as a crisis every time they are brewing.
Our relationship on the security side has obviously focused
on military, has not focused on police reform, but I think that
there might be an opportunity to do so if Thailand believes
that that is desirable.
Lastly I think that we can help our Thai interlocutors by
engaging them in what I would call ``beyond the crisis
thinking'' and drawing them out in terms of our security,
economic and cultural relations, and not waiting for that to
happen automatically but reaching out to them. That will help
to restore a sense of normalcy and help to regain, help
Thailand regain momentum in the international community.
Let me end with a regional postscript. I find it very
interesting that Vietnam, in its capacity as chairman of ASEAN,
2 weeks ago issued a statement on the situation in Thailand
that was supportive of Prime Minister Abhisit's government, but
also commented that Thai stability is very important to
Southeast Asian regional stability and offered, as a group,
ASEAN to help Thailand. That is fairly unprecedented. ASEAN has
issued some statements on Burma under international pressure,
but I think that this is an encouraging sign for ASEAN as well,
and might be followed up on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalpino follows:]
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you Professor Dalpino.
We are also joined here by another distinguished member of
our subcommittee, the gentlelady from California, Dr. Watson,
former Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia, and we
welcome her.
Diane, did you have an opening statement you wanted to----
Ms. Watson. I did. I might be a little late because I think
that the professor probably has mentioned all those things. But
let me just reiterate some of what was said. I would like to
really thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the
situation in Thailand. And in my experiences in the Far East, I
was very, very upset over the situation in Thailand. I remember
going there in the early sixties, and it was such a historical
trip for me and such a peaceful, wonderful trip back to the
``King and I.''
By the way, I ended up doing that whole presentation when I
was teaching in Okinawa because I love the culture so much and
I trained my students--I had a gifted class and I trained them
to play those roles. And so I just really fell in love with the
Thai culture.
So I have been very concerned, with what happened this past
March with the red-shirt protesters occupying the streets of
Bangkok for all of 9 weeks, and probably more, and at first
these protests seemed to be peaceful; however, as the weeks
progressed, clashes between the Red Shirts and the security
forces escalated into urban warfare and by mid-May, 88 people
had been killed and thousands wounded.
The Red Shirts took to the streets in support of their
ousted leader, Thaksin, and to demand an earlier election.
Though the current Prime Minister offered a plan that would
allow for early elections in return for an end to the protests,
reconciliation still seems elusive.
This morning the full Committee on Foreign Affairs led a
hearing about human rights and democracy. Thailand is an
important lesson in democracy building. Thailand has long been
one of the brightest stars in Asia and one that saw economic
and democratic progress throughout the nineties. However, since
the military coup in 2006, which ousted the PM, tensions
between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts have been
increasing.
The fundamental divide between the two groups centers on
the electoral process, with the Yellow Shirts arguing that
ethical imperatives trump the polls, while the Red Shirts
believe that governance should be determined entirely by the
population's vote.
Many Thais are looking to the reigning monarch for support
and a decision that will reduce the division between these two
groups. The King, however, has been been ill and has not
offered guidance in the situation as he has in the past. His
son, the Crown Prince, is not seen as the leader his father
once was, causing increased discomfort among the Thai populace.
Thailand is standing at a crossroads, one whose road signs
are confused by the political environment. And I don't know if
reconciliation is necessary. We can't let the people of
Thailand fall into a civil war without offering our help.
And I missed most of the testimony. I understand we were on
the second panel, Mr. Chairman, but I certainly want to learn
more about what you would suggest our best action should be.
And as I mentioned our hearing that we had in International
Relations, we are looking at all of our foreign policy programs
and how best to assist these countries. And I always have to
remind our side of things, is that these are sovereign nations
and that what we do is we build from the ground up. We cannot
go in there and tell the people, but we can encourage them to
look at democratic policies.
So I would like to hear from the panelists. And I did hear
what the professor was saying when I came in, as how you would
direct our country, our USAID programs, millennium programs and
so on, to assist the Thais and particularly those who are not
comfortable with their government the way it is, and just how
we can best assist in these circumstances.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I will say to the gentlelady that she has
a very formidable understanding of the situation in Thailand.
We had Secretary Marciel testify earlier, who pretty much
corroborated your testimony. So you did not miss much.
Ms. Watson. Well if I had time, Mr. Chairman, if we could
just hear--start with Dr. Jackson, and then the professor and
Dr. Cronin.
Mr. Faleomavaega. All right, Dr. Jackson would you proceed,
please?
STATEMENT OF KARL JACKSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF ASIAN STUDIES AND
SOUTH EAST ASIA STUDIES, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Jackson. Yes. First of all it is a great pleasure to be
back in front of the committee. Twenty years ago I used to
testify in front of this committee when I was in government,
Steve Solarz would really regularly give me a thrashing, and we
both became good friends and colleagues as a result and remain
so until this day.
Given that my statement is already part of the written
record, I would make only three or four short points given the
hour and the fact that there may be some votes.
The first point I would make is that the demonstrations we
have witnessed in Bangkok over the last several months are a
by-product of an ongoing set of socioeconomic and political
changes that been taking place for the last 30 years.
The rise of upcountry political movements really began in
the 1970s and the 1980s. Thaksin didn't cause this movement of
upcountry. He simply sensed it better and rode it more
competently than anyone else had before.
Thaksin's money and his political savvy mattered, and his
personal charisma helped, but the upcountry movement to obtain
a larger slice of the pie is here to stay in Thailand.
The second point I would make is that a large number of
upcountry people, especially from the lower part of the
socioeconomic structure, have developed an emotional
identification with this man, Thaksin Shinawatra, which will
not wear off simply because the Government of Thailand puts in
place Thaksin-like policies.
Many people seem to feel that one of their own was
illegally displaced by a military coup and that their votes
have been repeatedly nullified by a Bangkok-dominated court
system.
Now it does not matter whether these perceptions are
factually accurate. What really matters is that these feelings
of alienation exist, are widespread, and constitute the
fundamental political problem facing Thailand at this time.
The third point I would make concerns reconciliation, the
process about which the chairman, Scott Marciel, and Professor
Dalpino have spoken. Reconciliation will take time. But it must
involve a genuine willingness on the part of the government to
collaborate with the opposition. Meetings with academics, with
journalists, with thinkers, all of these being representatives
of Bangkok domination, are not the same as seeking
reconciliation directly with the leaders of the red-shirt
movement.
Jailing and labeling the Red Shirts as terrorists will
drive this mass movement underground, I fear. Like the chairman
I am a member of the Vietnam generation which saw many
insurgencies around Southeast Asia. This is the last thing that
any of us want and I'm sure it is the last thing that the
Government of Thailand would want, but it is something we must
be concerned with.
The fourth point I would make echoes very much the comments
of Catherin Dalpino, even though we didn't actually talk about
this ahead of time. Elections alone, even early elections, are
not enough. A complex of series of political deals needs to be
worked out among competing elites to reestablish trust and
legitimacy for whatever government results from the next
election. The parliaments of the streets, represented by the
Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts, must somehow be brought back
into the legal Parliament itself. The critical imperative is to
get politics off of the street and back into legal
institutions.
The best of all possible outcomes might well turn out to be
a government of national unity involving all the major
political parties.
And lastly, and again echoing my colleague, Professor
Dalpino, the legitimacy of Thai judicial and law enforcement
institutions depends on making them even-handed and apolitical
and perceived as such by most of the people of Thailand.
Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you Dr. Jackson.
Dr. Cronin.
STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD CRONIN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER
Mr. Cronin. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Dr.
Watson.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to testify at what
I think is a very well-named titled hearing, this emphasis on
reconciliation, path to reconciliation, that my colleagues have
already been discussing. And to echo both of them, I mean this
is really a major challenge and we have already heard some
reasons why that is so.
I am going to take a slightly different tack in my
presentation, and that is that I am going to come at this issue
somewhat from a more political economy way, if you would; that
is, some underlying reasons that go even deeper than political
developments. And one of these really is fundamentally the
inability of the political system, which has been changing and
adapting over time, to adapt to the impact of globalization and
rapid economic growth that left some parts of the country
behind.
I would make the point that Thailand has trebled its GDP in
the last 20, 30 years; and its poverty index, rate of poverty
has dropped from the thirties and forties to under 10 percent
recently. Things are a little tougher now because of the
financial crisis. And so all the boats have been rising, but
they haven't all been rising as fast. So that is one, I think,
important point.
And on the other hand, Thailand--so Thailand has really
benefited from globalization in many ways. It has got a key
geographic location, it has enjoyed large-scale manufacturing
investment by Japanese, American, European companies, and has a
relatively well-educated population. I mentioned national
income tripled in the past two decades.
But on the other hand, Thailand was really the cause and
the poster child, if you will, of the 1997 financial crisis. It
was when Thailand's balance of payments got too far out of
whack, that they could not sustain the value of the baht, that
they were established against the dollar. And that led not only
to collapse and great chaos in financial and economic chaos and
even social chaos in Thailand, but it also created a deep
resentment against some aspects of globalization and
particularly against the IMF's prescription, which is quite
wrong, of belt-tightening rather than actually measures to
stimulate the economy to keep the GDP from falling too fast.
And in some ways the democrats in Thailand have been
associated with that IMF medicine, and the Prime Minister,
Thaksin, and the past former Prime Minister never left them or
the other people forget it.
There is also an issue that both my colleagues have raised
one way or another, and that is an attitudinal problem between
Bangkok and the rural areas, or upcountry, as Karl Jackson put
it. And that mindset is evident in many ways. It is certainly
greatly perceived by Thais outside Bangkok, particularly in the
north and northeast, as a kind of sophisticated-urbanites-
versus-country-bumpkins kind of attitude. And this has come out
in ways that have been harmful to Thailand.
For instance, we have heard reference to the 1977, sorry,
1997 Constitution, and that Constitution aimed in a number of
ways to eliminate revolving Cabinets but also to put
educational requirements in place for membership, for running
for legislature. It tried to create a strong Cabinet, a strong
Prime Minister, and in many ways you could say it was a little
bit of an elitist approach or an academic approach to
Constitution making. And it backfired in a way.
Prime minister Thaksin came in and took advantage of all
those provisions and, as we already heard, was able to mobilize
a huge electoral base in the north and northeast of Thailand,
and particularly the issue of this emotional connection that
Karl has mentioned is very important.
Just a couple of points I would make. One is that much has
been made of the fact that the army overthrew the democratic
elected Thaksin government, but not enough attention has been
given to the fact that constitutional changes practically made
it impossible for Thaksin to be dislodged by constitutional
means. So once he won the second election in 2005 by a huge
margin, and then got in trouble over this Shin Corporation sale
to Singapore's Temasak Holdings Company, a sovereign holding
company, he called for a snap election. The whole business of
Shin had been a little too much for the population to take,
even going beyond his enemy, his core supporters.
And so he called a snap election in which members could
not, you could not form a party less than 90 days before the
election. He called it in a shorter period than 90 days, and it
wasn't possible for them to rename their party, to form
coalitions, or even to attract members from Thaksin's party
into a different opposition party.
And that is why they took to the streets, first the Yellow
Shirts; and then, of course, eventually the Red Shirts emulated
the Yellow Shirts for some of the same reasons, although the
government had changed.
So I am trying to emphasize that there are some structural
issues and some accidents that are partly substantially
connected to rapid economic change, globalization, et cetera,
but also rooted in some attitudes between Bangkok people and
the rest of the country, particularly the northeast.
I think in terms of looking to the future, Prime Minister
Abhisit had already made a number of I think very successful
moves, and one is that he survived an attempted censure and no-
confidence vote in the lower house of Parliament.
And one of the interesting things about that is that there
were fewer votes against him than the total number of
opposition members in the Parliament. So it would appear that
he has made some inroads there, and he also has a very high
approval rating, around 70 percent right now. And that has
taken over most of the provinces, and it would seem that it
would include a number of the provinces where the Red Shirts
are prominent as well.
He has promised to hold new elections and this has actually
been postponed until next year. And the main reason, as we
already heard I think, is that if we had another election,
Thailand had another election marred by violence, it would be
kind of even a bigger disaster than where we are right now. But
at the same time, there has to be an election and there has to
be the perception of legitimacy of whatever government is
installed following that.
To pile on in a way, but one thing that will not likely
achieve reconciliation is demonizing Thaksin. Thaksin is a
force to be reckoned with. He is a crook. He not only was a
crook but he was a human rights abuser. He conducted this anti-
narcotics campaign war on drugs for 3 months in 2003 where more
than 1,000 people allegedly were killed, either in shootings on
the streets, by the police and other security authorities, or
died in jail having been beaten to death. And this is pretty
well-documented in the human rights report that the State
Department prepares every year--for that year, in which case
was 2003.
Reconciliation is very important to the United States.
Thailand is very important to the United States. And Thailand
is a middle power with whom the United States has robust
relations and a broad agenda. A treaty ally, Thailand provides
important cooperation against terrorism and posts the annual
Cobra Gold gold multinational combined joint military
exercises, as we have heard. And those were held, actually, as
recently as February of this year.
Bangkok is also a regional hub for USAID. We have a
regional office there for our activities, our aid programs, and
of course a major center for U.S. corporate investment.
To conclude, what I would like to say is that the main
thing the United States can do now is to promote reconciliation
or to help promote reconciliation is to maintain constructive
relations with the Abhisit government and support appropriate
efforts to rebalance the economy in ways to promote more
equitable development.
This is a tough assignment right now because of the global
financial crisis which is requiring a kind of unwanted
rebalancing of economy in favor of domestic growth rather than
export-led growth.
In this context, though, probably the single most important
thing the administration and Congress can do is to reject
overly simplified explanations for the crisis and recognize
that given Thailand's constitutional complications, moral
support for the Abhisit government does not represent a
compromise with U.S. democratic values and ideals. I think that
is a very important point.
Thailand has had a tumultuous political history, as we have
heard already. But it is also a very resilient country, and it
is a country that values its long, sometimes interrupted, path
toward a more participatory and more democratic system. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Dr. Cronin.
Congresswoman Watson for her questions.
Ms. Watson. I really want to thank this panel for the
insight you share with us. And I am wondering, what is the
impact of the turmoil in Bangkok? What does it mean to that
entire ASEAN region? What impact will that have? And look at
it, too, in terms of tourism. That was a place that was a
destination for a lot of us, and now when you see the pictures
on TV, it certainly wouldn't attract a whole lot of tourists
probably anytime soon.
So can you comment on the political impact in the region
and what you see in terms of business trade tourism?
Mr. Jackson. I would say that what is remarkable about
tourism is that it seems to be extraordinarily resilient. Even
given the events of this past May, apparently occupancy is back
in the high thirties already in the Bangkok hotel system, and,
of course, it is quite large and robust in places like Phuket.
Obviously Thailand has been hurt and its tourism image has been
hurt. But I guess Thailand is such an attractive place--as you
found, and I did approximately at the same time--it seems to be
slowly rebounding.
Now, the second thing you asked was about the political
impact regionally. I think ASEAN has as its absolute
fundamental starting principle, noninterference in the domestic
affairs of other countries, other members of ASEAN. And I think
ASEAN will maintain this principle.
However, ASEAN as an organization functions mostly behind
closed doors and at dinner parties and on golf courses, and I
am sure that there will be quite frank talks and expressions of
concern by almost all of the ASEAN countries about Thailand
becoming, not the rock of stability, but a source of
uncertainty in the region. And so I am sure Prime Minister
Abhisit and Foreign Minister Kasit will hear this from their
colleagues, and I am sure each of those gentlemen is doing as
much as they possibly can to try and get Thailand beyond this
very difficult juncture in history.
Ms. Watson. Thank you. Professor.
Ms. Dalpino. First, Congresswoman, let me tell you that my
first direct experience with Thailand was also in the early
sixties and I understand completely why you fell in love with
it then. I did too.
Let me address a couple of points. Thailand is a regional
hub logistically in terms of transportation, and that is very
important. Had that really been withheld for any significant
amount of time, I think the whole region would have suffered,
not just Thailand.
Thailand has been important to our relationship to ASEAN.
The Thais have tended to be very much a promoter of more U.S.
involvement in the region and regional organizations. They will
be very forward-leaning about supporting more of an Asia
Pacific community and looking for ways to include the United
States in the regional framework. And so that is a very
important partnership.
I agree that I think that the ASEAN states were somewhat
dismayed by the events. What I worry about is that there are
two ASEAN states, well three, but the two oldest democracies in
ASEAN are the Philippines and Thailand. And both of them in
their different ways are struggling with the process of
consolidation, which is much more difficult than just entering
into a democratic transition. Indonesia's democracy is still a
little too young to make these sorts of generalizations, and my
fear is that what Thailand and the Philippines have gone
through in recent years, different experiences, will slow down
the democratic processes in other countries in the region.
But lastly, let me also say that I think there is an
opportunity here, and I ended my statement, my testimony, by
talking about this statement that ASEAN did issue about
Thailand, which is fairly unprecedented, and one of the reasons
they were able to issue that is that the ASEAN Secretary
General is former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan. He was
Foreign Minister in the late nineties when he tried to persuade
ASEAN to move to something called ``flexible engagement'' which
would give ASEAN more involvement in the internal affairs of a
member state if it affected the whole group. And it is sort of
exquisitely ironic that this situation is going to pass, and
that I think that Secretary General Surin is probably
encouraging ASEAN to step up to the plate on Thailand and
hoping perhaps to change the paradigm of the group just a
little bit.
Mr. Cronin. If I could add just something to that, more
from the geopolitical point of view, and that is that one of
the things we haven't talked about--because it is not a hearing
on China--is that China is a big factor here in the region. And
the United States, particularly the Obama administration, has
made a decision to reengage with Southeast Asia, with ASEAN,
and particularly in the Mekong region of which Thailand is a
hub.
Thailand has welcomed and facilitated our efforts at
reentry into the region. A senior Thai official told my
colleague Tim Hamlin and me last summer that Thais recognize
the move is geopolitical and they welcomed it. And this is, I
think, a good indication of the political relationship. And at
the same time Thailand doesn't want to be nor do its neighbors
want to be caught in any kind of struggle for influence between
the United States and China.
But that is really not what it is about. I think it is a
question of how the regional economies will develop, what their
core will be, and what the relationships--political
relationships that will come out of that.
So Thailand is a very important country. In ASEAN there are
two countries that are kind of the poles of strongest
influence. One is Thailand and the other is Indonesia; and
presently, they are on the same page, if you will, with most of
the issues that concern the United States.
Ms. Watson. Thank you so much and I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you.
Professor Dalpino, I note with interest in your statement
you noted that Thailand has had 17 Constitutions. My gosh. And
it seems that every time there is a coup they change their
Constitution. So the Constitution is not taken in the same
perspective as we have. We still have only one Constitution and
rarely amend it in terms of whatever the--however the pendulum
swings in terms of our own political development and all of
that.
And I also note with interest is that maybe this is the
reality. You said that the road to reconciliation in Thailand
is not likely to be smooth in either the short or long term.
That is about as realistic as you can get. So does this mean
also, in your best opinion, that the future of Thailand right
now is, at a very, very serious crossroad where it could go
either way?
And I also note that the situation with the Royal Family is
a big factor. It is my understanding that the Crown Prince is
not exactly well-loved by the people of Thailand, but his
sister, I think the oldest of the princesses, seems to be very
well loved by the Thai people. The Crown Prince is likely to be
the heir to the throne if something happens to His Majesty.
Could that be a critical factor in the future of Thailand's
situation, politically?
Ms. Dalpino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I don't
really think there will be a succession crisis. Thailand
follows primogeniture in the monarchy. And so from the very
beginning the Crown Prince, the only male, was the heir
apparent.
It is true that--and some of my colleagues might want to
correct me on the exact history--that in the Privy Council
there was a provision that would enable Princess Sirinhorn to
take the throne if her brother could not serve. That regulation
went into effect before the Crown Prince had a legal male heir.
So I don't know what the status of that would be.
But I think that whatever the next generation would hold
for Thailand, I think it would be a shock to have the world's
longest reigning monarch, who was in many ways a modernizer,
pass from the scene. And I think even among the best of times,
that would be a major adjustment for Thailand.
To answer the first part of your question, I have a lot of
faith in Thai resilience and the Thai ability to compromise. I
am a little alarmed that the situation has almost gotten beyond
that. But my wanting to point out that there are both short-
and long-term dangers is to sort of alert the committee to the
fact that things could take a sharp turn for the negative at
any point. And I think it will be many years before Thais feel
that politics are on firmer ground.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Jackson, I note with interest your
very broad stroke of the brush in terms of how Thai society has
evolved. And basically there seems to be the Bangkok urban rich
people versus the rural areas. How does that relate to the
population? Do the majority of people in Thailand live in urban
areas; are they in urban city areas like Bangkok?
Mr. Jackson. The fundamental problem of Thai politics is
that most of the money is in Bangkok and most of the votes are
outside. And that is a fundamental tension in the political
system that has grown more intensive over the last 20 years.
Several of the constitutional changes have really been designed
to try to modulate this but it will continue to be a source of
difficulty unless and until--in my opinion--and this is only my
opinion--unless and until some pretty fundamental
decentralization takes place whereby if people were
dissatisfied upcountry, they might petition their local
government or their provincial government rather than going to
the streets of Bangkok.
And so in my own view, one of the things that might
conceivably help with long-term reconciliation would be
decentralization because the Bangkok system, that is, the Thai
system, has always been a very centralized kingdom, and the
whole thrust of modernization in the 20th century was to
centralize and bring power to the center. And it seems to me
one way to buy political space is to reverse this process at
least partially.
Other big cities like Chiang Mai could conceivably have
their own elected Governor as Bangkok now does. This is one
possibility.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Is it your view that one reason why
former Prime Minister Thaksin identified so well with the
lower-income class people in the rural areas is because he
probably did more than any previous Prime Minister to really
help the lower-income people in the rural areas? Does that seem
to be why there was such a close relationship between the
people of the rural areas and Thaksin, despite the fact that he
is a rich person?
Mr. Jackson. An enormously rich person. There are two
aspects of it. One is that his government did do more for
upcountry Thailand than other previous governments had done.
Mr. Faleomavaega. That is a fact.
Mr. Jackson. That is a fact. He not only promised to do
something, he did the unforgivable. He delivered on his
promises after he was elected.
But the second aspect is the one that I think is the more
critical; that is, he turned his own personal narrative of rags
to riches into something with which many people who are poor in
Thailand identify. This is a guy who, when his father died, had
no inheritance; his family lived upstairs from the family
coffee shop. When he came to the States he worked in a Kentucky
Fried Chicken place to pick up money. Not only are there
certain facts to this story, I am sure that on the stump,
although I have never heard him on the stump, he can embellish
this story in quite remarkable ways. And a lot of people
identify with that rags-to-riches story, and Thaksin's goal was
that he was going to abolish poverty in Thailand. That is what
he said his goal was.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I note with interest, Dr. Cronin, you
said the problem with Thailand is this fundamental attitudinal
issue, to which Dr. Jackson has alluded. Here is a fellow who
goes from rags to riches to becoming Prime Minister. He reached
out to the lower-income people and gave them hope. They think,
if he can do it, I can do it too. And, as Dr. Jackson said, he
delivered on his promise to help the people in the rural areas.
He mentioned that it seems that the government has
demonized Prime Minister Thaksin's problems, his human rights
abuses and drug trafficking. Does that really go over well in
the rural areas, the people that seem to have such a strong
affinity or devotion to him because he was able to identify
with them more so than the rich and the people of means, of
affluence, living in Bangkok?
Mr. Cronin. Yes. That is a very good point, an interesting
point. I think that those of us who look at Thailand and try to
figure out what is going on shouldn't lose sight of the fact
that Thaksin's sins were not as criticized in the rural areas
as in the cities. But there is also this contradiction that
everybody in Thailand, including Bangkok people, many, many
people anyway, supported his anti-narcotics campaign. It just
got a little sticky when, say, if you are a middle-class
professional Thai and you look over the balcony from your
apartment or your condominium and you see a corpse lying in a
pool of blood in the street who is alleged to have been
involved in drugs.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Would you say that those people involved
with drug trafficking could have been from affluent
backgrounds?
Mr. Cronin. Probably not. Maybe the users, like here, are
from a more affluent society, but drugs have permeated much of
Thai society.
Mr. Faleomavaega. We have got a similar problem here with
Latin America. The Latin American leaders complained to us that
if there wasn't such a tremendous demand for drugs in America,
maybe we wouldn't have drug problems. Not so much those who are
using the drugs, but rather those who are trafficking it.
Mr. Cronin. The real point is one you mentioned at the
beginning of this particular exchange, and that is that, again,
whatever Thaksin's flaws and failings, which are widely
recognized, there was still this attitudinal issue that for
whatever reason, personality, background--hardscrabble-to-
riches background, the people did identify with him in a way
they don't in Bangkok.
And I mentioned earlier this issue with the Constitution
and efforts to write a Constitution that was more academic and
squeaky clean and would basically, if you will, keep them away
from the government.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Let me ask all three of you, did you
think his trial was impartial and fair as far as the judiciary
is concerned in Thailand? I am talking about Prime Minister
Thaksin's.
Mr. Jackson. I wish I could say that I was really familiar
with the trial itself. I am familiar with the charges, which
had to do with a particular piece of property that was
purchased by his wife; and the charge, if I remember correctly,
was that she was allowed to purchase this at below market price
when she was married to the Prime Minister of Thailand at the
time. I don't think anyone really challenged the facts in the
case.
The question was, is this offense sufficient to convict and
send to jail a person who by then was a former Prime Minister?
The Thai court decided yes.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Is this an every day thing that goes on
anyway? I mean this is just Prime Minister Thaksin. It happens
to other government leaders who have these kinds of business
transactions? To us it is a conflict of interest, but to them,
carrying on to the benefits.
Mr. Jackson. I think your colleague outlined the two
democracies problem of Thailand; that is, there is one
democracy that thinks only in terms of who can get the most
votes and therefore control Parliament. This is the upcountry
democracy that Thaksin cultivated and utilized.
There is the Bangkok democracy which says ethics are all
important; we are trying to clean up the swamp, and the
conflict that we have watched in Bangkok in the streets is the
outgrowth of this underlying struggle.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Professor Dalpino.
Ms. Dalpino. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to turn
to this issue of Thaksin in the rural areas. He is not
universally loved in the rural areas. He was not at the time.
And I think we need to break down the monolith of rural areas.
He was popular in the north, he was from Chiang Mai. He was
popular in the northeast for a number of complex reasons, the
relative poverty and the fact that the political dynamic in the
northeast makes it all too easy to deliver the northeast en
bloc, unfortunately. He is very unpopular in the rural south.
And here I think we need to bring in the forgotten conflict
which is the deep south conflict and the insurgency that has
been going on since 2004. I do not think it is fair to
attribute the restart of that conflict entirely to Thaksin, but
he did not make it any easier with his approach which is a very
ham-fisted, very heavy-handed, very assimilative approach. And
here, ironically, he demonstrated all of the qualities that
people are complaining about that so-called Bangkok leads with.
It shows he is a very complex person, obviously, but he does
also come from that class as well in many ways. So I think when
we think about the rural areas, we need to remember the rural
areas themselves in Thailand are much more diverse than some
people would understandably----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Cronin.
Mr. Cronin. If I could add to that as well, the issue that
you have raised of ``doesn't everybody do it'' is certainly a
valid issue. But in Thaksin's case, of course, you have scale
which was very, very large. The other thing is that--and really
the problem isn't one of perceptions. So he was a crook, yes.
Was he persecuted? That is a matter of perception, and
disagreement. And one of the problems for the Thai Government
is, for instance, they are having a hard time getting
international banks, Interpol, et cetera, to help them deal
with him and the money that he has stashed abroad. And the
problem is that the more they demonize him, the more it conveys
an impression that, well, he may have been a bad guy, but this
is a political thing and therefore we don't want to have
anything to do with it.
And the real problem, I think, is that the system as it is
set up cannot deal with a situation in which Thaksin came back.
And so this is a huge challenge because in a new election his
supporters could, if not gain a majority, lead a coalition
where they could pass laws that would allow him to come back
under amnesty or something like that. And that would be a
nightmare. It is a nightmare scenario.
So I really have to sympathize and empathize with the
political establishment in Thailand. It is presented with this
dilemma that is very, very difficult. And it again goes back to
the issue then of perceptions and attitudes, so that what the
government should be doing and what it is doing in terms of
programs and funding, et cetera, does Thaksin one better in
terms of providing more development and more services to the
rural areas. But at the same time, if that is not done with the
right psychological element to it, if it is done by bureaucrats
who are kind of giving it down rather than involved in a
cooperative venture, then it still leaves an opening for
trouble in the future.
Mr. Faleomavaega. What would be all three of your
perspectives if, let's say there is a point of reconciliation,
and I am sure that it would be agreeable to the Red Shirts that
Thaksin is allowed to come back and allowed to run for Prime
Minister. Will that reconcile a lot of the current humbug and
the situation of the crisis the way it stands right now?
Ms. Dalpino. Mr. Chairman, I think in the short term that
probably would just restart the cycle of conflict and violence.
But in the long term, I think that the ideal under that
scenario of his returning would be that he would be allowed to
return, contest for power, that the outcome of the election
would be respected, but that there would be sufficient checks
and balances on the system so that he could not subvert the
Constitution and that if he does indeed have any--as there
should be on any Thai politician, and I have long maintained
that Thaksin is not a throwback, a genetic throwback to the
average politician in Thailand, but that the system could deal
with him.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Let's say that by a court of law he has
been found guilty. Let's say, and I am making a big assumption
here, that he is pardoned. As a point of reconciliation, that
would be satisfactory to the Red Shirts, and say, our leader is
back now, let's leave it now to the people of Thailand to make
that decision of whether or not he is capable or has the
ability to sway the majority of the people of Thailand to have
him as the Prime Minister.
I don't know, this is another point that they--I am sure
the government is trying to figure out exactly where the Red
Shirts are coming from and where the Yellow Shirts are coming
from.
At what point do you think there will be some point of
reconciliation that we can see something more positive than
what it is now? Dr. Jackson.
Mr. Jackson. I would go back to Thai history to 1973-76.
The military dictator of Thailand was a man named Marshal
Thanom Kittikachorn, and in 1973 he was forced to leave the
country after a student uprising in which people were killed on
the streets. He subsequently returned to the country, shaved
his head, became a Buddhist monk, and then after a time period
slid seamlessly back into Thai society and into private life
and lived out his entire existence in Thailand.
I think that it would be very difficult for the forces in
Bangkok, that is, the Bangkok dominated courts, the people
around the monarchy, the people around the Democrat Party, to
accept the idea of Thaksin Shinawatra being allowed to return
and to run in politics. However, I think it is not impossible
that he might be allowed to return quietly to Thai society. And
I think that that is something that is terribly important to
him as an individual. So there is some quid pro quo here that
could conceivably be worked on.
I think the people who are in power now in Bangkok would
want to extract a promise, an enforceable promise, that he
would never again directly participate in politics. So that is
where I see the possibility of a deal; but I would add, I have
no relevance to either side of this deal.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Professor Dalpino.
Ms. Dalpino. I think that the immediate issue is what would
happen if his successor party to Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party,
the Puea Thai party, should get a plurality in the next
election? Thaksin himself is a wild card. What he actually
wants is not something that is entirely clear.
So I am not sure that even the Puea Thai would want to
stake a whole policy on his return. And one scenario might be
that he just diminishes in importance as some of these issues,
particularly having to do with discrepancies between center and
provinces and economic discrepancies are addressed, I think it
is very important to decouple Thaksin from those issues,
because those issues are very longstanding. They have been
existing in Thailand for decades and decades and decades.
But I think that you don't even need to think about a
return. I think that some parts of the--many of Thaksin's
detractors believe that if Puea Thai party were to come into
power, then Thaksin would be able to manipulate power through
them. And that is a very immediate issue, and I think probably
the crux, in the short term, of reconciliation.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Cronin.
Mr. Cronin. Well I would fall, I think, in the same line of
argument; that is, I would distinguish between Thaksinites and
Thaksin. And definitely Thaksinites must have a share of
political power in the future, and that could well come in the
form of plurality in the next election. I don't know. But it is
a challenge I think for the democrats and their ruling parties
to compete in the rural areas with the Thaksinites.
Eventually, I think that Thaksin is going to turn up again
one way or the other, and the question is can he be contained
in the sense of being forced to stay out of politics as a
bargain, at the price of coming back and doing his business and
other things that he does. But he will always be there behind
the scenes.
And so ultimately I think you go back to Karl Jackson
talking about decentralization, talking about the kind of
political change which would minimize or reduce the importance
of single figures, you know, charismatic figures, getting back
to a kind of politics that is more multipolar and consensual,
and I think that that is the best way Thailand should try to go
anyway.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I have not had a chance to field any
critical editorials or commentaries made about the result of
Prime Minister Thaksin's court trial. And I get the impression
that perhaps as quoted in his opinion, he wasn't treated
fairly. And for reasons, as you say, that he no longer comes
back to the country, I suspect that he will immediately be put
in jail, which is something that will cause even greater
problems to the society or to the people in Thailand.
And I raise the question--I am sorry I couldn't get him to
come and testify to this subcommittee. I would love to have
him. I don't even know if he is allowed to come to our country
in terms of we would probably send him by way of reciprocity to
Thailand if he ever was to come to the United States.
But I just, as I am sure you are concerned, as are my
colleagues, he is a very colorful leader. As you said, he went
from rags to riches, becoming a billionaire by being a
successful businessman, seemingly, and wanting to help Thai
society in that respect by giving some of the wealth or
whatever it is that the government can provide to those who are
less fortunate.
How serious is this idea that the middle class, and I am
very vague on this, and I really want to understand, is there
really a middle class in Thailand that seems to be one of
critical influence, whether it be with the Red Shirts or the
Yellow Shirts in the crisis? And then the problem is you can't
point exactly who is the leader of this so-called middle class
that seems to have a lot of influence. How did they get the
tires? How did they get all of these things to allow them to
cause this demonstration that is now turning violent? Is there
really a middle class that is bringing out this sense of
frustration through these factions that we see causing the
crisis we have in Thailand?
Mr. Jackson. First of all, there certainly is a Bangkok
middle class. There is also an urban middle class up in Chiang
Mai. It is one of the great products of the kind of economic
development that we have seen in the last 50 years in Thailand.
However, the middle class and its involvement in politics
is somewhat episodic. In 1973, it very much sided with the
students. By 1976, it didn't support the very nascent democracy
because the democracy and in the perceptions of the middle
class had gone off the track. If you look across Thai history,
you see the middle class coming in and coming out.
In the latest series of conflicts, I don't know that anyone
ever did any real polling, or at least I am not aware of any,
my colleagues may be, but if anything, civil society forces and
the Bangkok middle class probably had their hearts, not with
Thaksin but with the Yellow Shirts because they saw Thaksin
absorbing all of the enterprises around Bangkok. He was
becoming so overly powerful that he was almost strangling
future opportunities for them.
So I don't think anyone knows exactly how the middle class
of Bangkok splits at any given time, but it was at least my
impression that, if anything, they tended to be on the side of
anti-Thaksin forces.
One footnote. In 2005, there was an election in Thailand.
It was at the end of a regular term of Parliament, Thaksin's
first term. At the end of that term of Parliament, there was
this election, and it was the highest turnout in the history of
Thailand. And the Thai Rak Thai Party of Thaksin took 61
percent of the vote nationally. TRT took 56 percent of the vote
in Bangkok. So my colleague, Professor Dalpino's caution that
this is always complex and it is always moving is well taken.
Thank you.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Professor Dalpino?
Ms. Dalpino. Thailand has always had a middle class, but it
has grown exponentially in the last several decades. In fact,
in 1957, the public uprising in the middle class forced a very
prominent political figure to be thrown out of the country.
That has always been there.
I would actually dissent a little bit from the idea that
the middle classes were inherently against Thaksin. They
actually were for him in the beginning. The Bangkok middle
class, too. He represented something different to them than
Thaksin represented to the rural areas. He represented
globalization. He was the head of a very well known
international telecommunications firm. He represented national
pride. Thai Rak Thai means Thais loving Thais. He specifically
targeted Thailand's loss of face during the 1997 financial
crisis and promised that Thailand would pay back the IMF
bailout funds early, and he represented a kind of
sophistication that went down very well with the younger
generations.
Usually when a prime minister is inaugurated, he goes to
the temple and prays for guidance. When Thaksin was
inaugurated, he put his wife into the family Porsche and went
to Starbucks. That to the Bangkok middle classes was cool. It
is just that they had more of a frontrow seat for some of his
governance style after that, and they became disillusioned with
him in many ways, and the rural areas, for one reason or
another, were less quick to become disillusioned with him while
he was in power.
Mr. Cronin. I think Catharin has put it very well. It is a
very complex situation, and I tend by nature to look for
structure or more general explanations for things. I think one
of them is that Thaksin was a modern man, and Thaksin was going
against----
Mr. Faleomavaega. Was he a maverick?
Mr. Cronin. Maverick, yes. Also, in terms of his
globalization orientation, his business interests, the way he
did things, he was a CEO with all of the good and bad of that
kind of a personality. And he was going against a political
order which, as I said at the beginning in my statement, wasn't
changing as fast as the economic situation was changing. So
that is one important element.
The other is this issue to talk about not oversimplifying
things, a lot of the Red Shirts came to Bangkok with pickup
trucks, and they had all of the appliances and here you are
talking almost more of a rising expectations issue than abject
poverty. So those rising expectations came from people who want
to become part of the political process, and if they find
themselves regarded as bumpkins and somebody to somehow be kept
out of the center of power, that creates some real problems.
And there was a kind of heady sense of power and empowerment
that Thaksin generated and that these Red Shirts brought them
with them to Bangkok for the demonstrations.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I know I have taken so much of your time
already this afternoon, and I want to thank all of you for the
excellent testimony you have provided the subcommittee. We may
be holding another subcommittee hearing on the issue, but I
understand that my good friend, the chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Asia Pacific, Senator
Webb, has just returned from Thailand, and hopefully, we can be
of help to the good people of Thailand in resolving this crisis
that they are faced with right now.
All of your statements will be made part of the record, and
if you have any additional materials to be added, they will be
made part of the record as well.
I sincerely thank you for coming this afternoon. I learned
a lot. I certainly got an education myself. I have visited
Thailand a couple of times, and it is a very, very beautiful
country with a rich culture. And something that I always sense
that we have to be mindful of ourselves, that sometimes our
tendency to tell other people how they should conduct
themselves by way of using our form of democracy as the end all
and be all for other countries to follow, I don't think that is
a very good way of helping the good people of Thailand.
I do want to keep in touch with you. We may have perhaps a
reunion when we find out what is going to happen in the next 5
or 6 months.
As you mentioned, Ms. Dalpino, the timing of the election
is going to be so critical, and exactly how the negotiations,
how it is going to come about and whether or not the people of
Thailand are going to accept whatever the government is going
to be able to negotiate with the leaders and the members of the
Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. And our friend, former Prime
Minister Thaksin, in my own humble opinion, will have a
critical role to play. I hope he does it in a positive and
constructive way for the sake of the people of Thailand.
Thank you so much. The hearing is hereby adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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