[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: RESOURCING THE CIVILIAN SURGE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 19, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-56
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
----------
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JIM COOPER, Tennessee LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JIM JORDAN, Ohio
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
Columbia JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
JACKIE SPEIER, California
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
------ ------
Ron Stroman, Staff Director
Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire JOHN L. MICA, Florida
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
PETER WELCH, Vermont MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
BILL FOSTER, Illinois LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts JIM JORDAN, Ohio
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Andrew Wright, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 19, 2010..................................... 1
Statement of:
Jones, Paul, Deputy Assistant Secretary, South and Central
ASIA Bureau, U.S. Department of State; David S. Sedney,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central Asian
Affairs, and formerly Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy, Beijing (2004-2007) and Kabul (2003-2004); James
A. Bever, Deputy Assistant Administrator, ASIA and Near
East Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development,
former Mission Director to West Bank/Gaza (2004-2006) and
Afghanistan (2003-2004); Michael Michener, Administrator,
Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, former State Department Democracy and
Governance Advisor, Iraqi Policy Officer and Human Rights
Advisor; and Ambassador John Herbst, Coordinator, Office of
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department
of State, former Ambassador to Uzbekistan (2000-2003) and
Ukraine (2003-2006)........................................ 30
Bever, James A........................................... 43
Herbst, John............................................. 57
Jones, Paul.............................................. 30
Michener, Michael........................................ 51
Sedney, David S.......................................... 39
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Bever, James A., Deputy Assistant Administrator, ASIA and
Near East Bureau, U.S. Agency for International
Development, former Mission Director to West Bank/Gaza
(2004-2006) and Afghanistan (2003-2004), prepared statement
of......................................................... 45
Herbst, Ambassador John, Coordinator, Office of
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department
of State, former Ambassador to Uzbekistan (2000-2003) and
Ukraine (2003-2006), prepared statement of................. 60
Jones, Paul, Deputy Assistant Secretary, South and Central
ASIA Bureau, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement
of......................................................... 33
Michener, Michael, Administrator, Foreign Agricultural
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, former State
Department Democracy and Governance Advisor, Iraqi Policy
Officer and Human Rights Advisor, prepared statement of.... 53
Sedney, David S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Central Asian Affairs, and formerly Deputy Chief of
Mission, U.S. Embassy, Beijing (2004-2007) and Kabul (2003-
2004), prepared statement of............................... 41
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of Mr. Cronin... 2
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: RESOURCING THE CIVILIAN SURGE
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 19, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tierney, Maloney, Van Hollen,
Welch, Foster, Quigley, Flake, Duncan, and Jordan.
Staff present: Catherine Ribeiro, communications director;
Mariana Osorio, legislative director; Ken Cummings and Aaron
Wasserman, legislative assistants; Anne Bodine, Brendan Culley,
Steven Gale, fellows; Andy Wright, staff director; Elliot
Gillerman, clerk; Dan Blankenburg, minority director of
outreach and senior advisor; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk
and Member liaison; Dan Blankenburg, minority director of
outreach and senior advisor; Tom Alexander, minority senior
counsel; and Glenn Sanders, minority Defense fellow.
Mr. Tierney. Good morning. A quorum being present, the
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs' hearing
entitled, ``Afghanistan and Pakistan: Resourcing the Civilian
Surge,'' will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking
member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening
statements.
Without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that formal written testimony from
Dr. Patrick Cronin of National Defense University be accepted
for the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. And I ask unanimous consent that the hearing
record be kept open for 5 business days so that all members of
the subcommittee will be allowed to submit a written statement
for the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
I want to thank all of our panel for being here with us
this morning. Today, the Subcommittee on National Security and
Foreign Affairs will explore the civilian surge component of
the President's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The President has said that a campaign against extremism
will not succeed with bullets and bombs alone. As such, a
critical part of the administration's new strategy for the
region is to significantly increase civilian staffing.
The plan to surge upwards of 500 civilians over a short
time horizon into the Afghanistan and Pakistan centers enters
unchartered waters for civilian agencies such as the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, the State Department, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development.
The last time economists, city managers, agronomists, law
advisers, and accountants were recruited and deployed en mass
to a combat theater goes back at least four decades, in the
U.S. support for pacification programs during the Vietnam War
era.
This hearing examines what we have learned from more recent
civilian deployments in post-conflict states like Iraq and
failed states like Sudan. We have gathered this experienced
panel of administration officials to share with us their plans
to recruit, train, and deploy this new cadre of civilians. We
are counting on them to ensure that the best-trained staff will
be deployed to today's most challenging foreign theater,
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
As a subcommittee with interagency jurisdiction, we are
especially interested in the extent of collaborative planning
among the civilian agencies to support a whole-of-government
approach to reconstruction and development. The subcommittee is
also keenly interested in how the civilian agencies are
coordinating with the Department of Defense on predeployment
training so we are using existing resources and not reinventing
courses, curricula, and other educational materials for our
civilian surge recruits.
Some observers of recruitment programs have said that
finding additional qualified civilians has been hampered by the
ongoing heavy demand in Iraq for civilian and military
construction experts. In their view, those not working in Iraq
are already in Afghanistan. As such, there a risk that new
applicants responding to today's personnel recruitment ads will
not have the requisite skills and/or the overseas experience to
hit the ground running. If this is accurate, civilians
recruited for the surge will need considerable training and
country familiarization before deploying if they are to be
effective upon arrival. A scarcity of qualified civilians has
led to numerous media reports suggesting that the Department of
Defense, rather than the civilian agencies, is likely to fill
most of the billets.
Another issue that surge civilians will face in country is
how well they are integrated within and coordinated with the
military. Many surge recruits will likely be assigned to
provincial reconstruction teams led by military officers. The
PRTs will likely have a total of three or four diplomacy,
reconstruction, and aid development subject matter experts from
USAID, the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture,
and the Department of Justice.
The surge civilians working for ministries in Kabul or the
provinces will also need to coordinate with the military to
avoid duplication of effort and to strengthen local
capabilities.
While the military has worked hard to establish and
implement a unified military command, it seems desirable to
have an analogous, unified civilian command; and, ultimately,
both commands will need to be fully integrated to achieve long-
lasting positive results.
Frankly, the call for a civilian surge in Afghanistan is
not new. In late 2008, predating the new Afghanistan- Pakistan
strategy, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul requested a major increase
in government civilians in such areas as governance, rule of
law, development, and diplomacy to be deployed in provincial
and district levels. Regrettably, we are told that this request
was not fulfilled.
The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization created in 2004 was chartered
to lead U.S. efforts to respond to crisis in failing, failed,
and post-conflict situations like the present one in
Afghanistan. It is not clear to me what role SCRS can or will
play in Afghanistan and Pakistan in this critical moment. We
hope to have that addressed this morning.
I am pleased to have with us today administrative officials
from the State Department, USAID, USDA, and the Department of
Defense. We want to know how you are planning to staff the
Afghanistan-Pakistan civilian surge in regard to recruitment,
training, deployment, and retention. We want to know what
lessons you have learned in Iraq and elsewhere in terms of
utilizing civilians in complex operations.
Additionally, the subcommittee would like to hear how to
best expand and institutionalize a ready-to-deploy civilian
work force that keeps in step with increasing security
challenges for weak and failed states. I look forward to
hearing how each of your agencies intends to translate the
President's strategy into operational reality.
With that, I defer to Mr. Flake for his opening comments.
Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't have much to add. I think the chairman said it very
well.
We are looking to see some detail and to see how you plan
to implement it. I think all of us recognize the need for this
kind of civilian surge. It is just we don't have many details
about how it is going to be carried out and, obviously, as the
chairman mentioned, to see what lessons have been learned in
Iraq and already in Afghanistan.
I think those of us who have traveled to Afghanistan have
seen the need for better coordination with the military
counterparts and the civilians that are there, and I am anxious
to here how you plan to do that.
With that, thank you all. I look forward to the testimony.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Flake.
The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the
witnesses before us today. Let me introduce them briefly, if I
might.
Mr. Paul W. Jones currently serves as the Deputy Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. A member of the
Senior Foreign Service, Mr. Jones previously served as Deputy
Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassies in the Philippines and
in Macedonia. Mr. Jones has also served as Director of the
Executive Secretariat Staff, supporting the Secretary of State,
and Director of the Office of South Central Europe responsible
for U.S. policy in the Balkans. Mr. Jones holds a BA from
Cornell University, an MPA from the University of Virginia, and
an MA from the Naval War College. Welcome, Mr. Jones.
Mr. David Sedney currently serves as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central
Asia. Most recently, Mr. Sedney was Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for East Asia and prior to that served as Deputy
Chief of Mission to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. After
reopening the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in 2002, Mr. Sedney served
there as Deputy Chief of Mission, a post that he again served
in from 2003 to 2004. He later served as Director for
Afghanistan at the National Security Council. Mr. Sedney holds
a BA from Princeton University and a JD from Suffolk University
Law School, a good school, I might add.
Mr. James Bever currently serves as Director of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force at the U.S. Agency for
International Development where he oversees more than $4
billion in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. A
member of the Senior Foreign Service, Mr. Bever previously
served as Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Middle
East, providing leadership for $2.5 billion in U.S. assistance
to the Middle East and North Africa. Mr. Bever holds a BA from
Cornell University and an MS from Georgetown University.
Mr. Michael Michener currently serves as the Administrator
for the Foreign Agricultural Service at the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. Prior to that, he served as a Senior Democracy and
Governance Adviser and lead Planning Officer for the State
Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization. Mr. Michener also previously worked for the
State Department as the lead Iraq Policy Officer for Democracy
and Human Rights Assistance Programs. Mr. Michener holds a BA
from the University of Maryland.
Ambassador John E. Herbst currently serves as the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S.
Department of State. A member of the Senior Foreign Service,
Ambassador Herbst previously served as U.S. Ambassador to
Ukraine and Uzbekistan and has held other postings in
Jerusalem, Moscow and Riyadh. Ambassador Herbst holds a BS from
Georgetown University, a Master of Law and Diplomacy from the
Fletcher School of Tufts University.
I want to thank all of you for making yourselves available
today. It is the practice of this subcommittee to have members
of a panel sworn in before you testify. I ask you to please
stand and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Tierney. You may be seated. The record will reflect
that all the members of the panel answered in the affirmative.
Your written comments, which you were kind enough to submit
in advance to the panel, will already be on record and accepted
as that. We ask you to please give us a statement of 5 minutes
or less, if you can, and from that we will ask some questions
and proceed accordingly.
Mr. Jones, if you would be kind enough to begin.
STATEMENTS OF PAUL JONES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, SOUTH AND
CENTRAL ASIA BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; DAVID S. SEDNEY,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CENTRAL ASIAN
AFFAIRS, AND FORMERLY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, U.S. EMBASSY,
BEIJING (2004-2007) AND KABUL (2003-2004); JAMES A. BEVER,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, ASIA AND NEAR EAST BUREAU, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FORMER MISSION DIRECTOR
TO WEST BANK/GAZA (2004-2006) AND AFGHANISTAN (2003-2004);
MICHAEL MICHENER, ADMINISTRATOR, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FORMER STATE DEPARTMENT
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, IRAQI POLICY OFFICER AND
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVISOR; AND AMBASSADOR JOHN HERBST, COORDINATOR,
OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION (S/CRS), U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO UZBEKISTAN (2000-
2003) AND UKRAINE (2003-2006)
STATEMENT OF PAUL JONES
Mr. Jones. Thank you so much, Chairman Tierney and Ranking
Member Flake, distinguished members of the subcommittee, for
inviting me here today. It is a real privilege to appear before
you.
Ambassador Holbrooke and his interagency team are committed
to working closely with Congress as we implement a new strategy
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we appreciate the deep
interest and knowledge among the members of this subcommittee.
Congressional support for the President's strategy and the
resources needed to implement it are critical to our success,
and we look forward to continuing this fruitful dialog.
I am here today to discuss the significant civilian
increase, particularly for Afghanistan, that the President
announced in late March. At that time he noted that, ``to
advance security, opportunity, and justice--not just in Kabul,
but from the bottom up in the provinces--we need agricultural
specialists, educators, engineers, and lawyers.''
We are working with 10 other U.S. departments and agencies
to identify and deploy civilian personnel to work alongside not
only U.S. military personnel but also our Afghan and
international partners. This civilian increase is one of
several significant elements of the administration's new
strategy, and it underscores our conviction that achieving
counterinsurgency objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan will
require enhanced civilian-military coordination at all levels.
You have the details of the plan in my written statement,
but let me highlight just a couple of key components.
U.S. civilians will help build Afghan government capacity
in the most dangerous, insurgent-afflicted parts of the country
and will also expand programs to create jobs and build local
economies. The U.S. Embassy and U.S. forces Afghanistan, in
coordination with the International Security Assistance Force,
ISAF, determined that approximately 420 more U.S. civilian
specialists were needed in specific locations between July
2009, and March 2010, to work closely with our military to
focus on the hold-and-build phases in contested parts of the
country.
The new personnel also have a multiplier effect as they
hire additional Afghan staff and expand NGO partnerships. A
joint U.S. Embassy-U.S. forces Afghanistan team is constantly
reevaluating the civilian increase; and if more civilian
capacity is required, we will provide it.
We adopted a whole-of-government approach to meet the
civilian requirements. Experts from the Department of State,
USAID, and the Department of Agriculture constitute the core of
the civilian teams that will deploy outside Kabul to the
provinces and districts with our military. Personnel from the
State Department's Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization
are helping to integrate civilian and military activities, and
we expect they will also fill some civilian increase priorities
in the field.
Despite the risks of deploying to an active conflict zone,
I am pleased to report that there has been a tremendous
response to the call to duty. As a result, we are on track and
on schedule to staff the entire civilian increase with highly
qualified State, USAID, and USDA permanent and temporary hire
personnel in the field. A new service recognition package will
provide those serving in Afghanistan with the same benefits as
those serving in Iraq.
Many applicants have prior experience in Afghanistan or
Iraq and are eager once again to serve on the front lines. If
staffing gaps develop, we will immediately turn to other hiring
streams, including the Department of Defense's Civilian
Expeditionary Workforce, and, if needed, examine the
possibility of utilizing military reservists in civilian attire
and under chief of mission authority.
To ensure the civilians are fully prepared, we are
upgrading an integrated civilian-military training program that
all civilians will attend. To ensure that civilians are well
led and coordinated, we are upgrading our leadership at Embassy
Kabul and in the field. Four U.S. Ambassadors will lead
civilian efforts at our Embassy in Kabul and coordinate
directly with our military.
To illustrate how the civilian increase will work, let me
give as an example just one Afghan province. In Helmand
Province in the south, where significant new U.S. military
personnel will deploy, we currently have one State Department
representative, one USAID development expert, and three Afghan
staff on the British-led provisional reconstruction team
located in the capital.
The civilian increase will add 11 additional State
Department representatives, four USAID development experts, one
USDA agricultural specialist, and six Afghan staff. They will
work with the new military units to establish three new
district support teams.
At the same time, USAID's implementing partner staff will
increase from approximately 30 to 35 international personnel
and from approximately 400 to 450 Afghan specialists working
for NGO's which are funded by U.S. Government development
projects.
This influx of additional United States and Afghan civilian
personnel will add significantly to our ability to build local
Afghan government capacity and oversee assistance projects
while teaming up with military colleagues to stabilize this
conflicted province.
We know from experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that lack
of security can inhibit civilian effectiveness by limiting the
ability of civilians to travel outside of military bases. We
very much welcome General Petraeus' strong commitment to ensure
maximum freedom of movement for civilians, and we will work
closely with his team to make that operational.
Civilian field presence is, of course, not simply a U.S.
job. Our coalition partners are playing an important role.
Some, like Canada and the United Kingdom, have had significant
civilian field presence in southern Afghanistan for some time.
We encourage our partners to augment their civilian field
footprint and are actively coordinating in Kabul with the help
of the United Nations.
Significantly, I might add that subject was explored among
the special representatives that just met in Istanbul.
Ambassador Holbrooke and his colleagues were talking about the
very subject yesterday.
Significantly, the Afghan government recently presented a
plan for some 650 international and Afghan technical experts.
We are discussing actively with the Afghans and our partners
how much of that need is being met by planned civilian
increases and what more may need to be done.
Finally, I would like to cite the important work of the
Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR].
Ambassador Holbrooke and his team strongly support the role of
General Fields in closely monitoring the disbursement of
assistance. The Afghan government has specifically asked SIGAR
to advance its own anti-corruption efforts.
SIGAR is Congress' representative on the ground, and we
would like to see them deployed in every province. We value
SIGAR and respect their independence. To the extent that
Congress is willing to expand its mandate and responsibilities,
Ambassador Holbrooke has made clear we would very strongly
support that.
Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Jones. We appreciate your
testimony.
Mr. Sedney.
STATEMENT OF DAVID S. SEDNEY
Mr. Sedney. Mr. Chairman, thank you and the members of the
committee for this opportunity to testify. I can confirm that
this is the first time that I have appeared before Congress to
a fellow Suffolk University alumni.
The appearance here with my interagency colleagues is, I
think, a very accurate reflection of exactly what my colleague
Mr. Jones said about the interagency approach here. The
Department of Defense in this civilian effort is playing very
much a supporting role.
As you know, the strategic review that the President
ordered and that the administration carried out came to the
conclusion--after extensive consultation, I might stress, with
our allies and friends and looking at the experiences not just
in Afghanistan but also in Iraq--of the importance of a need
for expanded civilian presence.
We are currently implementing, as Mr. Jones said, a request
for over 400. General Petraeus has made very clear he has
pledged that we will--the Department of Defense, CENTCOM, the
U.S. forces on the ground--provide the necessary support for
additional civilians, to include the security issue that Mr.
Jones mentioned as well as other areas of support that are
necessary. If there are additional personnel beyond the current
request, we will be prepared to support those as well.
And it hasn't happened yet, but if the State Department
were to ask us for additional help, as Mr. Jones said, the
Department is prepared to respond. That request hasn't happened
yet, but if it does happen, we are prepared to respond.
On May 11th, Secretary Gates signed a memorandum directing
the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness to
identify civilian employees capable of deploying in Afghanistan
in support of U.S. Government initiatives. This initiative is
to identify potential candidates if a request is made.
But I want to again say we are supporting the State
Department, as the Defense Department is not in the lead. There
is no plan for the Department of Defense to take over this
activity. We are in support of the Department of State.
The planning to integrate the civilian-military effort that
you mentioned in your statement, Mr. Chairman, is very much
under way. The Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group at the
Embassy and the interagency team, which includes the U.S.
Forces Afghanistan as an integral part, is coordinating our
lines of effort in this area.
We are, of course, continually reviewing how to do this
better, how to make sure that we are able to carry out the
requirements of the President's policy. We will not get
everything right at the beginning, I am sure. We will have to
review how things are going, and if there are areas where we
need to make improvements, we will. But I will say, given the
level of interagency cooperation here, the level of interagency
attention to this, I am very optimistic that we will be able to
succeed.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I am ready for any questions you
may have later.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Bever.
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. BEVER
Mr. Bever. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney and
Ranking Member Flake and other members of the committee.
I would like to start, if I could, with a short little
story of the time when David Sedney and I served together in
Afghanistan 5 to 6 years ago. We had the task of rebuilding the
Kabul-Kandahar highway through an extremely dangerous part of
Afghanistan at the time. This was in Zabul Province in the
southeast.
We were invited to lunch with the Governor at the time in
Zabul Province. He was later assassinated, sadly. But at the
end of this lunch, which was with tribal leaders, as I was
leaving with my convoy, one of the large Pashtun tribal leaders
came up to me and pulled my arm and reached out and pointed to
my watch and said, remember one thing. You Americans have all
the watches. Taliban have all the time.
That made a very lasting impression on me. It was in fact
an epiphany in my own career. Because I was eligible to retire
at that time; and I thought, no, this struggle is too important
for all of us. This is a long struggle and one that requires
input on the development side as well to help evolve people's
minds and attitudes.
As a result, here we are a number of years later. USAID
still takes Afghanistan and Pakistan extremely seriously. We
take the staffing up of our involvement very seriously. We have
cooperated very actively with the members here at this table,
interagency, and at the National Security Council. We look
forward to a new partnership with Michael Michener and the
Foreign Agriculture Service at the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, and we have formed a whole-of-agency task force at
USAID since Thanksgiving to oversee a combined Afghanistan-
Pakistan effort within AID. We meet at the assistant
administrator level every week with our acting administrator to
review staffing progress, the progress on buildings, security,
and everything else we need.
Second, continued needs. We have the continued need for
support for incentives to allow our people to be the most
effective on the ground and to stay even longer at post,
because, as you know, most assignments are 1 year in duration.
We need secure and timely mobility on the ground and in the
air in Afghanistan, especially in cooperation with our PRTs,
our military, and State colleagues.
We need the closest of coordination with U.S. military,
NATO, ISAF military, and with State Department. We have that,
and we are continuing to work on that through coordination
mechanisms which we can talk about later. That goes all the way
from training to implementation and planning.
We need closer cooperation with our fellow donors, not just
UNAMA but especially, I think, the bilateral donors such as the
Dutch, the British, and the Canadians that operate in the south
in Helmand, in Oruzgan, and in Kahdahar Provinces. And, we have
begun in earnest discussions with them about how to coordinate
better at all levels of our organizations in all these
countries.
We need more resourceful monitoring mechanisms on the
ground, creative, flexible, and trustworthy; not only foreign
service nationals but also other additional third-party
mechanisms and technologically creative mechanisms to oversee
what we are doing.
On oversight, we value, as Paul Jones just said, having the
continued partnership of the Inspector General for USAID, the
Government Accountability Office, and the Special Inspector
General for Afghan Reconstruction, General Fields, in
Afghanistan, in particular in the latter case. What we do urge
is that all of them work in close synchrony and harmony in
sequencing the time of their audit and their investigation work
to get the job done to protect our people's money. We can't be
at all places at all times, and our inspectors general and
others are very good at assisting us in this, but we have to be
careful that our already strained staff are not overwhelmed as
a result.
In that regard, I would like to just say that we have
worked very closely with Stuart Bowen and the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction. We have invited Stuart Bowen,
Ginger, his deputy, General Fields, the Government
Accountability Office, our IG, and others to meet with our task
force at USAID. They have done that together. They have done it
individually.
We have required reading of this book to everyone we are
sending out to Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of the lessons in
here, for example, has to do with lessons learned from Iraq--
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience--is the
importance of listening at the local level and developing from
the bottom up. That is the new approach for us in Afghanistan.
I will close by saying two things. One is, we appreciate
Congress' continuing support for USAID's development leadership
initiative. This is our initiative to double the number of
USAID Foreign Service Officers over the next couple of years,
so that when David Sedney and I sit down again together 5 or 6
years from now, we will have more USAID officers available to
serve in these kinds of places, whatever situation we are in 5
or 6 years from now.
On that, I would like to introduce three Americans behind
me who are currently serving or are about to go out to theater.
One is James Berscheit. If you could stand up, James.
He is executive officer, currently serving in Kabul. He has
been there almost a year. He hails from Minnesota.
The other is Brian Kurtz. If you could stand, Brian.
Brian is an example of a Foreign Service Officer, recently
retired, who has agreed to re-up, come back and serve us,
deploying out to Afghanistan in one of the PRTs. He is
Chappaqua, NY.
And Gene Gibson, who is a democracy governance officer
currently serving in Islamabad for about 7 months, hails from
Florida.
We are very proud of these officers.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bever follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. You should be, Mr. Bever.
I want to thank you for bringing these officers with you
here today and just to briefly address the three of you.
We all understand and appreciate your service and how
critical and important it is, every bit as much as the men and
women in uniform with armor, with helmets, with guns, with
things that you don't have. I think the American public
sometimes doesn't hear about the risks that you take, the
separation from family and just how involved your commitment
is.
So I know I speak for all of my fellow panelists up here.
We thank you, we pay tribute to what do, and it is greatly
appreciated. Thank you.
Mr. Michener.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MICHENER
Mr. Michener. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am
pleased to appear before you today.
Agriculture plays a critical role in the economy and lives
of the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. With the
agricultural expertise we bring, USDA is committed to
supporting President Obama's efforts to increase governmental
effectiveness and enhance economic capacity in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Agriculture will play a pivotal role in implementing the
President's counterinsurgency strategy, and USDA is prepared to
significantly increase the number of highly skilled
agricultural experts serving on provincial reconstruction teams
and working at regional and national levels in Afghanistan.
I recently traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan at the
behest of Special Representative Holbrooke to explore
additional ways USDA can contribute to this effort.
Since 2003, over 50 USDA volunteers have served in
Afghanistan. USDA PRT members offer expertise in agricultural
extension and education, crop production, plant protection,
animal health and livestock management, agricultural marketing,
irrigation, and natural resources management. They build the
capacity of provincial-level host country nationals to enable
them to manage their own agricultural reconstruction and
development. Working at the Ministries of Agriculture and
Education, they strengthen the effectiveness the government.
I would like to provide two examples of the work carried
out by USDA experts serving on PRTs in Afghanistan.
A Farm Service Agency employee from Nevada worked with his
Afghan counterparts to install six windmill-powered water
pumps. These pumps revitalized a centuries-old irrigation
system in the south of Afghanistan that now provides water to
livestock, vegetable crops, and fruit trees, replacing the
poppies which thrive in dry rocky soil.
Another USDA employee from the Natural Resources
Conservation Service in Maryland worked with his Afghan
counterparts to rebuild the nation's only functioning soil
testing laboratory at the Agricultural University at Nangarhar
Province.
Our advisers display a great deal of satisfaction in their
work. Nearly all have helped to recruit other employees to
serve on PRTs. Over a dozen USDA advisers have volunteered for
extended or additional tours. There remains a high amount of
interest and enthusiasm in the Department, as we receive about
four applications for each vacancy on a PRT.
The Department stands behind those who volunteer. We
provide incentives and benefits based on those provided by the
U.S. Department of State and USAID. PRT advisers undergo 3
weeks of predeployment training at the U.S. Army's Camp
Adaberry in Indiana. This training covers medical combat
lifesaving, force protection, military-civilian coordination,
mentoring and partnering with the government of Afghanistan and
general simulation exercises.
USDA also provides a Washington-based orientation for new
advisers. Our lessons learned are reflected in standard
operating procedures and PRT handbooks that employees use
throughout their service. The new advisers also undergo an
intensive orientation program upon arrival in Afghanistan. Our
program managers in Washington are in frequent contact with the
advisers to help with technical issues, provide support with
adjustment issues, or just to let them know that their
sacrifices and hard work are appreciated.
During service, the USDA advisers receive medical care
through the State Department medical program or from the
Department of Defense, depending upon location, timing, and the
critical nature of the need. We facilitate communication with
the families of the advisers and provide evacuation in case of
critical family emergencies.
A USDA PRT liaison based in U.S. Embassy in Kabul provides
overall management of the program in country. The liaison works
closely with counterparts in other civilian and military
agencies and ensures smooth interagency coordination for
planning and program operations.
After serving in PRTs, employees return to their home
agencies and the position they held prior to their assignments.
In addition to PRT experts, USDA advisers have provided
technical assistance to Afghanistan's Ministries of Agriculture
and Higher Education. Their efforts include providing oversight
for about $16 million under our Food for Progress program that
was used to construct provincial agricultural extension offices
and teaching laboratories in Kabul University.
During the recent trilateral meetings, USDA made three
commitments to further support our counterinsurgency efforts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. We committed to form working groups
in the areas of food security, trade corridors, and water
management and watershed rehabilitation. We also committed to
increase our Food for Progress programs for both countries.
Finally, we committed to expand the training under our Cochran
Fellowship, Borlaug Fellowship and Faculty Exchange Programs.
USDA is prepared to provide a sustained level of skilled
and highly motivated experts in PRTs and in government
ministries in Afghanistan. Congressional support for the
administration's budget and supplemental appropriations is
critical to ensure that we can effectively stand up the
civilian side of the counterinsurgency strategy.
Thank you for allowing me to testify today. I look forward
to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Michener follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
I couldn't help but keep watching you. You looked over at
that light like you thought the floor was going to go out
beneath you if it got to red.
Mr. Michener. This is my first time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
You are recognized, sir.
STATEMENT OF JOHN HERBST
Mr. Herbst. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Flake, members of
the subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to testify.
In today's tightly interconnected world, there is a growing
challenge posed by failed or failing states and ungoverned
spaces. Such areas can become breeding grounds for terrorism,
weapons proliferation, narco-trafficking, and piracy.
Afghanistan is the subject at hand, but it is not the only
country whose instability may affect our national interests.
The steps to successfully meet this challenge on the civilian
side are not unlike how the military prepares. We need to build
the necessary human capacity, we need to develop planning and
management systems, we need to train our experts and equip them
with the necessary skills for the situations they will
encounter, we need to develop teams, and we need to repeatedly
exercise those teams to make sure they are ready for the
challenge at hand.
At the center of this preparation is development of a
whole-of-government civilian response capability, the Civilian
Response Corps [CRC].
As we conceive it, the CRC is to be composed of three
components: an active component of 250 full-time first
responders from across eight civilian Federal departments and
agencies; a standby component of 2,000 across those same eight
agencies; and a 2,000 member reserve component drawn from the
private sector, State, and local government.
To date, $140 million has been appropriated to establish,
train, and equip a 250-member active component and a 1,000-
member standby component. The first funds, $65 million, came to
us about 7 months ago. The remaining funds, $75 million, were
appropriated 2 months ago in the omnibus bill. In the 2010
budget, President Obama has requested for the civilian
stabilization issue $323 million to allow all three of the CRC
components to be realized as intended and needed.
My office, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization [SCRS], operates under the Reconstruction and
Stabilization Management Act of 2008, which calls on the
civilian elements of the Federal Government to work together to
promote the security of the United States to improve
coordination, planning, and implementation. The job of SCRS is
to support the Secretary of State, leading the way on dealing
with reconstruction and stabilization crises.
The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is the critical first
step to ensure that we have the right people with the right
skills at the right time. However, making sure that these
experts are doing the right things on the ground according to
one strategic plan with full synchronization between civilians
and military continues to be the most complex and challenging
task for SCRS.
But the benefits of undertaking this challenge are
worthwhile, as demonstrated by SCRS's thus far still limited
work in Afghanistan. Over 30 of our initial first responders
and planners that make up our new expeditionary capability have
served in Afghanistan in the last 2 years; and they have
piloted a range of new platforms, plans, and integration
efforts that will now set the stage for a successful civilian
increase.
Here are a few highlights of our work to date in
Afghanistan: Our civilian responders pioneered the design and
management of the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group,
the ICMAG, at Embassy Kabul which is at the forefront of
civilian-military integration in Kabul, ensuring that the
civilian and military are planning together and assessing and
acting together at all levels of the mission.
We have also developed a planning system now in use by all
of the American PRTs in our new military and civilian elements
across Afghanistan to ensure that civilian-military plans are
put together and executed properly. Thanks to these efforts,
there are now plans for similar operations at each American PRT
and at Regional Command East.
We have also developed pre-deployment training for civilian
and military personnel deploying to Afghanistan so they can
work as a team once they hit the ground in Afghanistan.
We have initiated the first civilian teams at U.S.
taskforces that will now be the platform for the upcoming
civilian increase.
We have developed a new integrated performance measurement
system for sub-national levels, which is currently being
piloted.
And we have developed new ideas such as the model for
district teams that would operate under provincial
reconstruction teams.
Under Ambassador Holbrooke's direction, we have put
together and are leading the interagency Afghan Election
Support Team to provide assistance to Embassy Kabul as it
prepares for the upcoming Presidential and provincial council
elections.
Additional details on all of these items are in my prepared
statement.
With the funds that have been appropriated to date, we have
hired and identified 338 members of the Civilian Response
Corps; and we began last week to train those first members. By
the summer, we should be in a position to deploy our first
members to Afghanistan as part of the ramp-up. By the fall, we
should be in a position to deploy dozens of CRC members to
Afghanistan or other places.
As Afghanistan so clearly demonstrates, failing states and
ungoverned spaces can quickly spawn threats to the security of
our Nation, its citizens, and our interests and those of our
allies and partners.
Building the U.S. planning and operations capacity embodied
in the Civilian Stabilization Initiative and the Civilian
Response Corps will ensure that we are prepared in the future
for the challenges that are coming our way. In the end, this
effort will depend on a strong, effective U.S. civilian
response capacity. With this, we will ultimately spend less
money and lose fewer lives in dealing with the challenge of
failed and failing states.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Herbst follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Well, thank you. Thank all of you for your
testimony. I think it has been a good platform for us to start
some questions on that.
I will begin the 5 minute questioning session, if I might.
One general question for each of you: Have you all brought
in the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
into the planning stages on this? Has his office been brought
in along with any other inspector generals so they know in
advance exactly what it is you are planning so they can set up
their structure to better oversee this throughout?
Mr. Bever, you addressed that a little bit in your remarks.
Mr. Jones, if I start left to right, can you give us any
information you have on that?
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Indeed, we meet frequently with General Field and his team,
both in Washington and in the field; and I think he is
completely aware of our civilian increase plans. I am
personally not so familiar with how his team and ours have
synched up on that, but his team is a growing presence in Kabul
and in Afghanistan, and we are very supportive of that.
Mr. Tierney. Good thank you.
Mr. Sedney.
Mr. Sedney. Mr. Chairman, as I said, we are in support on
this, so we have had direct contact with the Inspector General
on this issue.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Bever, you can reiterate what you said
earlier, I suppose.
Mr. Bever. In terms of our own Inspector General for USAID,
the Deputy Inspector General of the agency sits on our Afghan-
Pakistan Task Force that meets every Friday morning at 10 a.m.,
sir. So he is there all the time, and we welcome his presence
as our ``in-house physician,'' if you will.
In Pakistan and Afghanistan, we look forward to our IG
residing there as well, in presence. That is a good lesson
learned from Iraq, sir, that concurrent audit are needed.
As for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, we have met with General Fields and his staff
three times here in Washington, had him meet our Acting
Administrator, and our people in Kabul meet regularly with his
staff.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Michener.
Mr. Michener. Mr. Chairman, our planning for the increase
in USDA personnel in Afghanistan is just now getting under way,
so we have not yet been in touch to coordinate with the Special
Inspector General. But we will be.
Mr. Tierney. You do intend to do that.
Mr. Michener. We do intend to do that.
Mr. Tierney. We appreciate that. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Herbst. We have been in touch with the Inspector
General.
Mr. Tierney. Ambassador, while I have you for a second, do
you have any numbers where you anticipate on moving through
your program and out into the field on an annual basis now that
you have some resources finally allocated to you? I know you
are just ramping up. Probably this year is when you first
started going in the last couple of months. Do you have a plan
of how many you expect to pass through the program and be
available for deployment on a periodic basis?
Mr. Herbst. Yes. We anticipate that by the fall we will
have over 150--actually, 250 members of the Civilian Response
Corps not just hired but trained and equipped and ready to go.
By the end of the first quarter of next year, by March 31st, we
would expect all 600 of the CRC that we were building with the
money we received last fall to be ready for deployment.
Beyond that, we received additional appropriations a couple
of months ago. We would expect within by early or mid-2011 to
have the 1,250 members that we are planning to put together
with the money that has been appropriated thus far ready for
deployment purposes.
Mr. Tierney. To the extent that we may be fortunate enough
to not have all the active people deployed at any given time,
is there a plan for utilization of their services other than in
the field to keep them active?
Mr. Herbst. We anticipate they will train extensively even
after they come back from missions. Part of what we have to do
is not just find the right people with the right skills but to
form them as teams depending upon circumstances. So creating
those teams will be an important part of what we do even after
folks deploy.
But it is also true they may be available for what I call
conflict prevention, stabilization work before a country gets
out of hand. There are, as I think you know, anywhere from 30
to 50 countries which are in the failed or failing state
category. So, unfortunately, there is a great deal of work for
people with these skills to do. So I expect they will be
deployed quite regularly.
But it is also true, in order to keep our costs down, we
are keeping the numbers of active component relatively small
compared to the others, so that when we are passed these large
engagements we don't have lots of people sitting around.
Mr. Tierney. To scale down. Thank you.
Mr. Jones, can you give me a current estimation when it is
you will fill all of the billets in the so-called surge? And
when I say ``fill,'' I mean not with the Department of Defense
people but with in-house USAID, State, Department of Justice or
Ag people?
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our team in Kabul identified a first tranche of 56 critical
slots that they wanted filled in June and July. Some of those
personnel are already arriving, particularly several from
USAID. We have hired virtually all of them at this stage. There
are a couple left that were still back and forth with our
Embassy deciding on candidates, and they are all in training to
go through training of various types, which is actually several
weeks of training, the package that we give them. So we expect
to have all 56 in place in that timeframe.
The balance of the 420 will deploy in phases throughout the
next months, with the final ones arriving no later than March
is our plan. We feel confident we can fulfill that plan,
because, as I said, we have no hesitation to turning to the
other streams of hiring if we find some difficulties.
Mr. Tierney. I have more questioning on that, but my time
is up.
Mr. Flake, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jones, is there a status of forces agreement in
Afghanistan at the current time? That was a problem in Iraq.
Contractors didn't know if they were immune to charges or
whatever else. What do we have to ensure that we won't have
those problems in Afghanistan?
Mr. Jones. I am sorry. Your question is the question of
contractors?
Mr. Flake. Is there a status of forces agreement in place
in Afghanistan at the current time that clarifies the role of
civilian personnel, contractors?
Mr. Jones. Civilian personnel. I would have to take that
question.
I don't know, David, if you know the answer to that. I have
some general ideas, but I don't want to speak out of turn.
Mr. Flake. Anybody? Mr. Sedney.
Mr. Sedney. We do have an outstanding status of forces
agreement that we signed with the Afghans. I will have to get
back to you on the date. I think it was 2003.
Mr. Flake. If you could speak up just a little?
Mr. Sedney. We do have an outstanding status of forces
agreement that we signed--which we agreed to with an exchange
of diplomatic notes in 2004, I believe. But the status of
civilians under that status of forces agreement I am not clear
on, and we would have to get back to you.
Mr. Flake. If you could do that, that would be of interest.
Mr. Sedney. I certainly will.
Mr. Flake. Mr. Jones, what type of deployment are we
talking about here? How long will these civilians be in
theater?
Mr. Jones. The civilians that we are assigning, we took a
policy decision that we are looking for the civilians to stay a
minimum of 1 year. Some seek to extend, and that would be fine.
But each one will be deployed for 1 year.
We actually call this a civilian increase because we don't
have a plan to decrease. So that is why we avoid the term
``surge,'' because it gives the impression this is just for a
few months. Actually, we plan to continue this deployment and
fill those slots after 1 year.
Mr. Flake. I am still a little unclear. Mr. Sedney, maybe
you can clear it up in terms of where all of these civilians
are going to come from. I know some are currently full time at
USAID, will they simply be reassigned. Others, are we talking
about contractors that will be hired in country that will make
up some of this force?
Mr. Jones. Actually--thank you, Congressman Flake. Let me
clarify that.
We have special hiring authorities at the Department of
State and at USAID to hire U.S. direct-hire employees on a
temporary basis. So we will use a mix of, in the case of U.S.
Department of State, regular U.S. Foreign Service Officers plus
individuals that have particular skills we are hiring
temporarily. And we are advertising that on USA Jobs and hire
them under what is called 3161 authority.
Mr. Flake. Mr. Michener, obviously, we see the need with
regard to shifting economies. In Helmand Province where a lot
of the work is going to be done, obviously, that is where a lot
of the poppy production has moved to. What percentage of this
500 do you expect to be deployed in agriculture or as
agriculture experts? I know you probably want more than you are
going to get, but what do we expect? And from the others as
well, the composition of this. How many are going to be legal
affairs or democracy building, agriculture? Give me some sense,
if you could, of how this breakdown is going to be.
Mr. Michener. I can speak to USDA's portion of agricultural
experts, which is roughly 10 percent of the number right now.
But at the 421 number being floated, it is my understanding
that is a living document that is being revisited. That number
could increase, depending on need.
I also want to stress USDA is not the sole source of
agricultural expertise. There would be USAID agricultural
experts as well.
Mr. Flake. That is surprising. That is a little smaller
than I thought it would be in terms of the agricultural
experts.
Mr. Bever, do you want to comment?
Mr. Bever. I just want to add we are entering into a
partnership with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to make
sure that both the public sector government functions of the
agricultural sector are adequately covered along with the
private sector business end of the equation and the
infrastructure requirements as well.
We already have some agricultural officers in country. We
will be adding at least another 16 or more specifically
agricultural officers out of the 150. We also have breakouts
for the numbers of engineers and the numbers of governance
officers to work at local government levels and private sector
officers, as well as what we call general development officers,
who also can cover agriculture because they have had some
background in that area.
As the situation evolves, we will bring even more on board
if we find that is what is particularly required. We will
concentrate in the south and east in this regard.
Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Foster, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Foster. Thank you.
Could any of you say something about the age distribution
of the civilians being deployed for this effort? Is that easy
to characterize one way or another? Are these a bunch of starry
eyed kids coming out of college? Are they a bunch of retired
people? Is there any easy way to characterize that?
Mr. Tierney. Where would you put yourself in that crowd?
Mr. Foster. I don't know. I have retired from two careers
so far.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Congressman.
If I could just begin with that, I have personally reviewed
all of the resumes of those we are hiring in this first
tranche, and I didn't really focus on age. But the experience
was quite remarkable. I think in fact in this first tranche
virtually all of the candidates, at least that are being hired
by the State Department through this temporary hiring authority
or Foreign Service Officers, were already well-known to our
Embassy colleagues in Kabul because they had been in
Afghanistan before in some capacity.
A couple of--and really a range of different backgrounds
and experience, from former military, some former academics who
had clearly done research in Afghanistan before--and then
people who had been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I
doubt any were young, and certainly all were very experienced.
Mr. Foster. How does the size and scope of this effort
compare to what NGO's might be attempting in the area? Are
NGO's viewed as a force multiplier or an annoyance by the
people that are having to deal with them? And are we doing
everything we can to make maximum use of them?
Mr. Bever. Sir, I can just respond to that, and I can also
follow on Mr. Jones' comments about the caliber of people we
are bringing on board.
They are very carefully scrutinized. We have a very careful
selection process by teams of people at USAID headquarters and
the mission who look at who these people are and check their
references.
They are generally quite seasoned people. Even if they are
retired, they might still be a little starry eyed, but they are
not wet behind the ears. Most of them are what we would call
battle-hardened, meaning they have worked in civil strife
settings or country development settings in their own
profession.
In terms of NGO's, we see a great opportunity to increase
and deepen and expand our involvement with nongovernmental
organizations. There is a caution there. In both Afghanistan
and Pakistan, there is a caution in hitting the right balance.
Because both of the host governments are concerned about how
much attention we strengthen the government functions at all
levels as well as the nongovernment functions. So getting that
balance right is going to be a matter of dialog.
But the NGO's, Pakistan, and Afghanistan NGO's are
certainly very active already and certainly willing to step up
to the plate. We have to check to make sure they are
accountable and that they use the money which is given as gifts
to them of our people's money in the way they are intended to
be used.
But with that, they have the access on the ground that is
needed and the insight, so we will use them even more.
Mr. Foster. Do you share any of your support or training
with the NGO personnel?
Mr. Bever. When a grantee asks for it or we think it is
appropriate, we will provide them certain kinds of training,
particularly if they are here on the U.S. side and haven't had
experience inside Afghanistan or Pakistan.
But in terms of inside the country for local NGO groups, we
often will have our controllers or contract officers or
technical people as part of the grant strengthen their ability
to function effectively. So not only do they help us get the
work done, but they are stronger as a result of it a few years
later.
Mr. Foster. Are there Blackwater-type private security
contractors used anywhere in this effort?
Mr. Jones. There are private security companies in
Afghanistan, and it is a subject of considerable scrutiny both
from our government and the government of Afghanistan. We would
love to not have to rely on private security companies, but we
really don't have that option in some of the areas where we
have to work.
What we are looking to do, as I indicated in consultation
with General Petraeus, is to work as closely as we can with our
military to secure the civilians or the areas in which the
civilians are working in order to minimize any reliance we have
to have on private security contracts.
Mr. Foster. Do you have any feeling for the percentage of
the military support that you get that comes from private
contractors versus actual armed services personnel?
Mr. Jones. For the percentage, I am sorry----
Mr. Foster. You said in some areas there was not an
alternative. But what is the overall effort? Is it 50 percent
supported by private contractors? Or 10 percent? Do you have
any idea----
Mr. Jones. I am not sure I can put a percentage down. It is
very small in the field. For a couple of very specific projects
we hire private security because our military forces are not in
that region where we have to have people. But it is minimal in
the field.
In Kabul, where our military is not deployed in the same
manner, we have more reliance on private security contracts.
But, as I say, our goal is to minimize that.
Mr. Foster. And then for actual construction projects, are
there private contractors involved in that?
Mr. Jones. For construction of----
Mr. Foster. When you are, I don't know, actually building
something specific, is that typically done through a private
contractor, or how is that sort of stuff handled?
Mr. Bever. On the construction work and buildings and so
on, both State and USAID use private construction companies,
both United States and local, and third countries, sometimes,
as subcontractors when there is international competitive
bidding.
In the case of security subcontractors for the assistance
program, some of our U.S. firms and their subcontractors and,
in certain cases, even our NGO's, USPVO's have in the past or
currently do use some security people in order to keep them
safe, both statically and when they are on the move.
This is particularly important in the infrastructure area,
which is where we've had the most of our casualties,
particularly in Afghanistan, but even in Pakistan with CHF and
the murder of Stephen Vance and his driver. Some of our
entities in Pakistan that work under the assistance program are
beginning to meet with our Diplomatic Security colleagues and
us to figure out what kind of potential protection they might
need as situations warrant.
Thank you.
Mr. Foster. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
With unanimous consent, we would like to offer Mr. Quigley
the opportunity to ask some questions. He is looking to be on
the committee; the House just hasn't acted yet.
Sir, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Quigley. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members
of the panel.
Specifically, as it relates to the security of the
civilians--and you have started to touch on this--but with an
increase in civilians, there is an increase in risk and
exposure. What is the general plan as you enter this next phase
for protecting these civilians, as, you might say, a whole new
ball game here? And how does it change our plans with private
security?
Mr. Jones. The civilians in the field, deployed in the
field, will be deploying out of--they will be based on military
platforms either in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or the
district support teams.
What we have discussed--and there has been great
receptivity from our CENTCOM and our U.S. forces components--is
prioritizing civilian-led missions. That is, where the
civilians--at each of these military platforms, there will be
one designated senior civilian who will integrate directly with
the commander and propose, prioritize missions that they need
to do to get their job done, to get out and meet with local
officials and travel in the region.
And there is great receptivity for our military
counterparts in prioritize in providing security. So that is
our priority, to take that approach, to rely on the cooperation
of our U.S. military and not to be hiring private security.
Mr. Quigley. So these additional civilians will be in
military platforms, and you don't imagine having to hire
additional private security at all?
Mr. Jones. That is our intention, that is right. Now, as
for the civilians, there is also a civilian increase at our
Embassy in Kabul, which will obviously be provided security by
our Diplomatic Security and our own security personnel.
Mr. Quigley. I yield back.
Mr. Tierney. Did you want to add something to that?
Mr. Sedney. If I could add, on the issue of security
contractors, the Department of Defense does employ security
contractors for some functions in Afghanistan, as it does in
Iraq. Currently, according to the first quarter 2009 census,
the Department of Defense has 3,651 host-country nationals. In
other words, these are Afghans who DOD or DOD contractors or
DOD subcontractors hire to provide security for various
contracts that the Department of Defense carries out.
There are also 23 third-country nationals and 15 U.S.
coalition nationals who are employed by the Department of
Defense as security contractors in Afghanistan.
Mr. Tierney. Well, we probably don't have to go into great
detail about the testimony that we have had on this
subcommittee and the full committee about some pretty
questionable activity and conduct of some of our paid private
contractors, particularly in the security area. There were a
number of hearings and, I think, a number of reports done. We
have to really make a determination of what is inherently
governmental and what isn't.
So are there any plans that either Mr. Sedney or Mr. Jones
are aware of to increase the amount of security in the State
Department, their own security personnel--there is a division
that you have for that--or Marines or other military personnel
so that, at some point in the not-too-distant future, we will
have all of those inherently governmental security aspects done
by people on the U.S. payroll? Or is there nothing happening in
that area?
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A significant portion of the increase from the State
Department side in Kabul is actually an increase in security
personnel. I don't have the number right in front of me, but
that is a significant focus, in order to help our people get
out without reliance on other security.
Mr. Tierney. In-house security people?
Mr. Jones. Yes, in-house security.
Mr. Tierney. OK.
Mr. Sedney.
Mr. Sedney. At the current time, I am not aware of any
plans to add additional security contractors for the purpose of
enabling the civilians out into the field.
Mr. Tierney. I guess my question was not hiring more
civilian contractors, but hiring fewer of them. We have people
stationed all over the world here; we have a thousand military
bases around the world. It seems striking to me that we can't
have enough trained Marines and military people to take over
that responsibility so that we are dealing with the Afghan
population on our terms.
As General Petraeus has said, you know, it makes a lot more
sense to have the sensitivity of our personnel in there doing
it, as opposed to a hired gun whose job is just to get people
from A to B and, they are not overly concerned about how they
did it.
Mr. Sedney. I am familiar that there has been a long series
of exchanges about this. The point I would make about the
numbers that I mentioned is these are Afghan nationals who are
security contractors for those who are providing primarily for
contractors, subcontractors, and sub-subcontractors of the
Department of Defense.
So they are not involved in the security surge, and I don't
know of any plans for the security surge to have an increase in
those amounts. But I will go back and check, taking
acknowledgement of your concern, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Jones, are you the person that is in charge of this
thing writ large? I mean, are you the one that is going to know
how many United States and allied civilians are out there, how
they are coordinating their activity, who is doing what, how
many people are stationed with PRTs or other provincial
district places, monitoring the progress of this, monitoring
how Ambassador Herbst is doing, putting people through the
pipeline, whether you are going to meet the goals and the
numbers that you need or look elsewhere? Is that your job?
Mr. Jones. Well, let me--with a lot of help, say yes. But
if I could just describe a little bit about the structure.
Our Deputy Secretary of State, Jack Lew, is personally
engaged on this issue and has told us that any bottlenecks, any
trouble that we have in filling these positions go directly to
him for his adjudication, to make sure that they are opened up.
And he is in direct contact frequently with Under Secretary
Michele Flournoy and other senior members of the
administration. So we have that element.
Another element that is very important is at our Embassy in
Kabul, we have, as I mentioned, four Ambassadors. One
Ambassador, Tony Wayne, will be arriving shortly. He is
responsible for ensuring all of our interagency assistance is
coordinated, especially out in the field.
And then Ambassador Joe Mussomeli is responsible for
ensuring our interagency management is coordinated and making
sure that the flow of these people is coherent and demand-
driven out to the field and that they are supplied, as well.
Mr. Tierney. So it is Mr. Lew, then you, and then those
four fellows that you were just talking about.
Mr. Jones. We have a whole team, actually, sir. There are a
lot more of us.
Mr. Tierney. Well, no, but I am just saying, basically,
this committee will want to know who to come back to. We don't
want to drag everybody back in if we don't have to, but we want
to go right to the source of people who know the answers on
this and be responsible for it. So I am looking at the right
office right here?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you on that.
Mr. Bever, one of the questions we keep having in some of
the more delicate areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well,
is we put more resources in, sizable amounts of money for
redevelopment and construction. On that basis, how are we going
to be accountable for that money? In a lot of those areas, we
can't really safely send in some of our civilians to do that
kind of accountability work, to assess how the progress is
going and whether the work is actually being completed or not.
What are your plans in some of those areas?
Mr. Bever. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is an excellent
question, and it is a continuing challenge for us--I want to be
straight with you on this--especially in those highly dangerous
areas.
As we increase the number of our direct-hire officers and
as we get the assistance we need from either our Diplomatic
Security RSO, regional security officer, at post, and/or from
the U.S. military in the case of Afghanistan, also to be able
to get our people out, we will have more of our officers out
there to sort of kick the tires and make sure things are going
right.
But we also have, in both places, independent monitors. We
hire other firms and other groups to keep eyes and ears and
brains----
Mr. Tierney. So, contractors?
Mr. Bever. Either contractors or sometimes their
cooperative agreement grantee partners, who have the ability to
move around the area without attracting attention.
Mr. Tierney. And how do you assess their reliability and
their honesty in that situation?
Mr. Bever. Pretty high. Not completely, 100 percent
foolproof. Sometimes they miss things, either because of the
timing of when they have done a visit on a construction project
or something or other phenomena like that in very hard-to-reach
places.
We also use our foreign service nationals, which are an
extremely valuable asset to our American people in these
countries.
Mr. Tierney. But even there--I mean, I really respect the
difficulty you are having here. We were in Pakistan, and even
some of the foreign nationals have a difficult time getting up
into the areas that we are doing this work.
Mr. Bever. Right. Right.
Mr. Tierney. So is there a backup plan on that?
Mr. Bever. Well, we also invite concurrent audit by our
inspector general, who then in turn hires local auditing firms,
who in turn use Pashtuns, for example, to get up into the
areas. But in the case of FATA, Northwest Frontier, you have to
be from those areas to be credible and to be able to get around
safely.
So it is a challenge. We keep working at it. In the case of
Afghanistan, we have certain other means which we also like to
employ. For example, when U.S. military travels around, we
sometimes ask them to give us feedback, especially if it is in
a combat area, to give us feedback on how things are going. We
don't have those capabilities, of course, in Pakistan.
But we are very mindful of this, sir. And we are looking
for technological assets which could help us, as well.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Flake, do you have any additional questions?
Mr. Flake. Just a few.
Ambassador Herbst, the PRTs, many of them are obviously run
by our NATO allies. They have different rules of engagement,
mission limitations. How are we going to--and I know, from
previous testimony and from visits that many of us have taken
in the area, there isn't very good coordination. There is a
striking lack of coordination, it seems.
How is that going to change? What will this do, having a
lot more civilians there, what will it do to change the dynamic
that we have seen, where it is difficult to mesh our efforts
with theirs?
And would you agree with that assessment, by the way?
Mr. Herbst. I am not sure that I am the right person to
answer your question, because, while we are doing things in the
field in Afghanistan, and we believe coordination is very
important, and we have also had some contact, a little bit of
contact, with other PRTs, we don't have any formal
responsibility for it. I don't know if one of our other
panelists would want to take a crack at that question.
Mr. Flake. Would someone else on the panel like to answer
that? Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Congressman Flake.
Obviously, coordination is a major challenge, and
particularly when we are dealing with multiple countries in
multiple different, sort of, structures and models of field
presence, Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Two things. Let me--one, we have begun in Kabul fairly
recently, over the last several weeks, an interaction hosted by
the United Nations to coordinate better the civilian
deployments outside of Kabul, and particularly focused, as a
point of entry, the Afghan Government's request for 650
technical advisors from the international and Afghan community.
That was a good entry point for us to open up that discussion
and have it take place much more frankly. And with our
increased capacity in Kabul, we think we will be better able to
coordinate those discussions there.
I also want to point out, in the very important area in RC
South, the coordination actually has been better than elsewhere
in the country and has been planned and coordinated from the
beginning. And that is where a lot of our new forces will be
flowing into. We are very actively engaged with the Canadians,
for example--the Canadians have coordination conferences here
that we attend--in order to make sure that we are linked up.
What we want to move to is areas where we actually train
together in greater quantities than we do now.
But there are--you know, you identify an important issue.
We are at work on it. It is getting a little better, and it is
particularly more effective in the south, where we are very
focused.
Mr. Flake. OK, thanks.
One additional question. Mr. Sedney, is there any type of--
I know it is different depending on which province you are in
or the area, but how much more of a burden is this going to
place on our military there?
I know with PRTs and depending on the area they are in, it
requires a lot, in terms of escorts, in terms of simply being
able to carry out their activities, to have the type of
military backup that is often required.
Is there any kind of formula that we have that each new
civilian will require this much? Should we worry about that?
And is the increase in our military presence going to account
for that?
First, is there any kind of formula that we know of?
Mr. Sedney. Congressman Flake, I don't know of any formula,
but I will check and make sure, because I don't know
everything.
Mr. Flake. I know it will be rough.
Mr. Sedney. But my understanding is that the planning for
the integration of civilians into the military effort is done
based on the situation in the area. So it is different whether
it is in a less or more permissive environment. And in
Afghanistan, from, say, the Panjshir province in the north down
to the provinces in the south, situations are very different.
In terms of will it put additional stress on the force,
yes, it will, but it is a stress that we welcome, because in
order to carry out the effective counterinsurgency effort, we
know we need this joint civil-military effort.
We have right now ongoing, as a result of the President's
new strategy, a combined civil-military planning effort going
on out in Kabul between Ambassador Eikenberry and General
McKiernan. It is a very intense look at how we integrate the
civilians and the military and to do that effectively.
And I would add, along with what my colleague Mr. Bever
said, this is going to be a dynamic process where we are going
to continue to be evaluating that. Once the field has developed
the integrated civil-military plan, I think we will be in a
better position to answer your questions about the factors that
go into the decisions to deploy civilians in particular areas.
Mr. Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Flake.
Let me leave you with one question for homework, if I
might. I think probably we don't want to bring you back after
votes, so we don't want to make you come back on that. But I
think it is something that will be helpful to this committee.
President Karzai has recently complained about the current
model of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. He basically
thinks that they are inadvertently forming parallel provincial
governments, and he has great concern about bleeding off of the
impact of the central government.
The former State Department counternarcotics advisor,
Ambassador Tom Schweich, has also echoed those sentiments. He
called on the United States to replace the PRT model with a
model focused on decentralized developmental councils.
Now, my question would be, how could we reform the PRT
model--or should we reform it? If we should, how should we, to
make each team more responsive to the central government but,
at the same time, making them responsive, as they should be, to
the local government, and doing all of that without risking any
corruption in the PRT system?
So I will leave that to each of you gentlemen, if you will
think on that. We can supply it to you in writing, as well, on
that and ask that you get back to us on that to see if we are
planning to do anything. It could be the simple answer, you
think everything is fine the way it is. Or you could put some
merit to those objectives that are being raised and how we
ought to address those.
I want to thank all of you for your valuable testimony here
today. It really is helpful to us in our oversight
responsibilities. We will be working with the inspectors
general and your offices in the future on this. Obviously,
everybody wants this to be a successful effort, and we wish you
well in your jobs and your responsibilities.
And, again, the three gentlemen that were working with
USAID that we were introduced to earlier, again, we want to
thank you for your service and hope you take it back to your
colleagues in the field how much their work is respected and
appreciated.
Thank you. Meeting adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]