[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-132]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA
COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT
FORCES COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 10, 2010
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
GLENN NYE, Virginia TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Roger Zakheim, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 10, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Requests from the U.S. European
Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command.... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 10, 2010........................................ 39
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUESTS
FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT
FORCES COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command 8
Stavridis, Adm. James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command.. 5
Ward, Gen. William E. ``Kip,'' USA, Commander, U.S. Africa
Command........................................................ 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Mattis, Gen. James N......................................... 157
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 43
Stavridis, Adm. James G...................................... 46
Ward, Gen. William E. ``Kip''................................ 107
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 181
Mr. Sestak................................................... 181
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUESTS
FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT
FORCES COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 10, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses today. And
this is, as you know, the posture hearing for the fiscal year
2011 budget for the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. African
Command (AFRICOM), and the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
Before I introduce our witnesses, I wish to make note that
our staff director, Erin Conaton, will be witnessing her last
hearing in the role of staff director. To say that she has done
yeoman's work is an understatement. I am immensely proud of the
leadership--she supported--her ability, her tireless energy,
her good judgment, and in steering this committee so very, very
well.
And we wish her well as the new Under Secretary of the Air
Force, and she will be joining that team in just a few days.
But this is her very last hearing.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to second
everything that you have said, plus I would like to add that,
you know, I am fairly new at this job, and Erin has made it so
enjoyable. You know, as we went through the conference the day
after I was named the ranking member, we had our markup. And so
it was like drinking out of a fire hose for the next several
months.
And we got down to the final four. Many of those meetings
that we held--and I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman,
because for what else is happening in this Congress, this
committee has been bipartisan due to your leadership. And
everything that we did, Erin made it bipartisan.
She made sure that we know everything that is going on and
all of the decisions. We didn't agree on everything. We
probably agreed on more than we did with the Senate. But, I
mean, through the process, she has been a true professional and
done an outstanding job. And she will be missed, but the Air
Force is gaining a great new member.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. McKeon, thank you very much.
Erin, we wish you well.
[Applause.]
The Chairman. We have announced her replacement, Paul
Arcangeli, standing by the door by Erin, and as the deputy,
Debra Wada, who all of us know so well through the years.
Welcome aboard.
[Applause.]
The Chairman. Appearing before us today, Admiral James G.
Stavridis, United States Navy; General William E. ``Kip'' Ward,
United States Army; General James N. Mattis, United States
Marine Corps. We appreciate your being with us today, and we
welcome you.
It has been the practice over several years, a very
compressed hearing calendar causes us to consider your
testimony as a group but, really, each of you deserve to have--
because of your position as commander of your important
commands--deserve your own separate hearing, but we were unable
to do that this year. And I hope you understand that.
First, European Command. Admiral, Europe remains critical
to our national security, and we should remember that. Long
trans-Atlantic ties have endured difficult times over the
years. Challenges in those relationships present themselves
today. We tend to think of our European friends and allies
solely as partners for operations outside of that theater, but
we should not so quickly put aside what the Russian incursion
into Georgia two summers ago reminded us; real regional
challenges do exist in Europe.
Many of our allies rely on us to guarantee security and
stability in Europe. One shining example of our commitment to
security is in the Balkans where, after nearly 15 years, the
American presence in Bosnia Herzegovina is down to a handful,
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in
Kosovo has brought us genuine stability.
We are all watching the NATO mission in Afghanistan
closely. Many of our allies are making considerable
contributions to that effort and, sadly, suffering casualties
to prove it. Somehow, however, are not able to perform all
missions where this is a matter of concern regarding capability
and not national will.
I encourage you to continue to find ways to build their
capacity and would like to hear your ideas along those lines.
Next, General, U.S. Africa Command. After a beginning of
fits and starts, it looks to me like AFRICOM has gotten its
feet underneath it. You worked very hard to bring together
parts of three other combatant commands, and until President
Obama laid out a clear vision of United States national policy
toward Africa last July, you had been operating under somewhat
vague policy guidance.
Now, it seems like things are finally coming together in
your shop, none too soon. From Al Qaeda in East Africa to Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabab in Somalia, we see
that violent extremism on the continent is on the rise. AFRICOM
has done some impressive things while working with its African
partners to promote African stability and security. And that
is, of course, a worthy effort.
The effect the United States Navy and its African
partnership station has had on developing African maritime
security is a great example. So we feel like we should pat our
Navy on the back for having done so well.
I have thought for some time, General Ward, that when it
comes to your command's activities that are not clearly
counterterrorism, your challenge has been to describe them in
terms of a clear linkage to U.S. national security interests. I
hope you will emphasize that point in your testimony today,
sir.
Last but of course not least, United States Joint Forces
Command, JFCOM, perhaps one of the most opaque commands for an
outsider because so much of what you do, General Mattis, is
conceptual. Sometimes, it feels like one has to be an
experienced practitioner of the art of war to understand it.
Still, that intellectual space is exact the where the next war
is going to be won before we even know who we will be fighting
against.
At last month's hearing in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), I observed that the QDR did not pay enough
attention to the operational needs of our money boot warriors.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan made it very clear that the
superiority of individuals in small units engaged in close
combat is essential if the United States is going to win these
sorts of wars.
These are our most effective weapons, and I understand the
Joint Forces Command is making great strides in developing
innovative tools to make sure our small units are fully and
realistically trained. I think we are a ground-combat team. It
is the same sort of preparation in terms of stimulus and other
training tools that we give our pilots, for instance, and I
hope, General Mattis, you will talk about that today.
We welcome you. We look forward to your testimony. This
should be a very, very interesting hearing.
The ranking member and the gentleman from California, my
friend, Buck McKeon.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today, we begin our series of posture hearings with the
commanders of U.S. EUCOM, U.S. AFRICOM, and U.S. Joint Forces
Command. I would like to welcome Admiral Stavridis, General
Ward, and General Mattis and thank each of you for your
leadership and your service to our Nation as well as all of
those people that are here with you in uniform. Thank you.
Your appearance also reminds us of our extraordinary
military men and women serving around the globe to protect
American national interests. Please pass along my sincere
gratitude to all of our service members and their families
serving under your command.
Admiral Stavridis, unfortunately, we do not have time to
cover all of the challenges facing EUCOM and NATO, but I would
like to highlight a few areas that I hope that you will address
today.
The first is the administration's Russia reset policy.
While your written statement correctly highlights the
complexities of engaging with Russia, we need to ensure that
the reset policy does not risk the viability of the security
architecture that has kept the European continent peaceful for
nearly 60 years.
In other words, reset needs to be balanced with U.S.
reassurance to our allies. This is why many of us support a
NATO-first policy which would make clear to our NATO allies
that U.S. bilateral engagement with Russia will not foster
collected insecurity amongst our allies.
I am pleased that your prepared statement addresses the
need to strengthen trans-Atlantic security, assure allies, and
dissuade adversaries. Important to assuring allies is a U.S.
force presence in Europe. Your prepared statement states that
force posture is key to achieving our national objective in
EUCOM's area of responsibility and offers context by
highlighting how U.S. personnel in Europe has decreased from
300,000 during the Cold War to less than 80,000 today.
While some have called for even less force presence, you
state that--and I quote--``without four brigade combat teams in
Europe, deterrence and reassurance are at increased risk. Given
Russia's military modernization efforts, its behavior in
Georgia, and its revised nuclear doctrine, this is not a risk
we can afford to assume.''
A key development in your area of responsibility (AOR)
since last year is missile defense. While I understand the
missile defense costs and capability are not EUCOM issues,
addressing our allies' concerns about the Iranian threat is a
major EUCOM equity. With respect to defense of Israel, EUCOM
should build on its October 2009 Juniper Cobra exercise which
successfully exercised the active missile-defense capabilities
of both U.S. and Israeli Armed Forces. I do have concerns about
the administration's phased adaptive approach, however.
In my view, it is critical that the administration deliver
on its promise on missile defense in Europe. We have learned
little about this plan since the September 2009 announcement.
Does EUCOM have a detailed plan in place to execute this
policy?
Finally, absent from your comprehensive testimony is
discussion of NATO as a nuclear alliance. While you highlight
that Article 5--and collective defense is a cornerstone of the
alliance--you do not address whether the U.S. should continue
to have a nuclear presence in Europe.
In my view, our forward-deployed nuclear forces strengthen
trans-Atlantic security and are critical to the credibility of
our collective defense commitment. I take to heart the view
that our nuclear forces work for us every day by providing
assurance to allies and deterrence to our adversaries.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that my entire statement be included
for the record where I address policies facing the other
combatant command testifying today.
Once again, I thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and I
look forward to your testimonies.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman, and the statement will
be spread upon the record without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Admiral Stavridis, welcome.
STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND
Admiral Stavridis. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member, members of the committee. Thank you so much for taking
time to have a dialogue with each of us and to hear our views
and to learn of yours.
I want to also commend Erin Conaton who has been a terrific
liaison and, sir, has represented this committee in an
extraordinary fashion. I was also pleased to see you use a
nautical metaphor to commend her doing ``yeoman's work'' which
we like that expression in the Navy. And she has been a good
friend to the Navy and, indeed, to all the services and I
believe will be an extraordinary addition to the civilian
leadership in the Pentagon.
I am very blessed to be here today with two outstanding
shipmates who are on my flanks and are both good friends. And
as I mentioned yesterday, I feel very safe in the company of
two combat-serious infantry-type officers from the Army and the
Marine Corps.
Mr. Chairman, I will be extremely brief. I want to, as
always, thank this committee for all of the support to all of
our men and women. Your visits matter. Your support through the
committee matters deeply. It is the fuel in the machine, and we
thank you for it. And we thank you for your informed engagement
with us that helps guide us.
I will talk--and I look forward to taking your questions on
Afghanistan. My role there, of course, is in my Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) NATO hat. I am cautiously optimistic
about progress in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates is down south in
the Helmand yesterday and said he sees bits of pieces of
progress. I think we have a long way to go and a tough year
ahead, but I am encouraged by what I have seen over the course
of the last year in terms of strategy, resources, and
leadership in Afghanistan.
The Balkans, Mr. Chairman, thank you for mentioning the
Balkans. It really is a success story. I look forward to a
continued reduction of our forces there. The key in the Balkans
is to ensure we don't fall backward.
As you pointed out, 10 years ago, we had almost 30,000
troops all over the Balkans. Today, we have less than 1,200.
Our allies are there. The allies have almost 15,000 troops
there. So they are pulling hard, and I think, overall together,
the Balkans are an example of trans-Atlantic security working
at its best.
A couple of other issues that I think are key I would like
to touch on at some point today are cyber. I am concerned about
that both in the context of U.S. European Command and, also, on
my NATO side. I am very concerned about Iran.
Thank you, Ranking Member McKeon, for mentioning the
missile defense threat. I think that Iran is what poses that
threat, and we need to be responsive to that.
And Russia, I take your point entirely, Ranking Member
McKeon, that it is a balance between these polls of reset and
reassurance, as you correctly point out.
In terms of how we are approaching business as U.S.
European Command, as I did at U.S. Southern Command, we are
working very hard to have an international, an interagency
orientation in the work we do. We are trying to have effective
strategic communications and explain what we are doing. And
above all, we depend on the brave men and women, almost 80,000
of them in Europe today, who are defending our Nation forward.
I thank you for your time today, and I look forward to your
questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found
in the Appendix on page 46.]
The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very much.
General Ward, please.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM E. ``KIP'' WARD, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND
General Ward. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon,
thank you for this opportunity to be here, distinguished
members of the committee. We appreciate all that you do in
support of our command as we work to pursue our interests in
the continent of Africa.
I would also be remiss if I didn't acknowledge Erin. She
has been such an instrumental and supportive part of all that
we have done these past now two and a half years in standing up
our Nation's newest combatant command.
And, Erin, thank you for your support and how you were able
to help us along in so many ways and wish you all the best in
your new assignment. And we look forward to working with, also,
with Paul and Debra as they continue to work with us as we move
forward for our Nation.
I am honored to appear here today with my friends and
distinguished colleagues, Admiral Jim Stavridis and General Jim
Mattis.
What we do in AFRICOM to protect American lives and promote
interests is our mission, and we do that by supporting security
and stability programs in Africa and its island nations. We
concentrate our strategy and our efforts on helping African
states build their capacity to field professional and capable
militaries that respect human rights, adhere to the rule of
law, promote professionally dedicated militaries and, also,
effectively contribute to stability in Africa.
We are assisting our African partners in building capacity
to counter transnational threats from violent extremist
organizations, to stem elicit trafficking, to support
peacekeeping operations, and to address the consequences of
human disasters, whether they be manmade or natural.
Supporting the development of professional and capable
militaries contributes to increased security and stability in
Africa, allowing African nations and regional organizations to
promote good governance, expand development, and promote their
common defense to better serve their people and to help protect
the lives of Americans, be they abroad or here at home.
The Africa partnership station--and, Chairman, thank you
for mentioning that--which includes our European and African
partners as member of the staff, is now on its fifth deployment
and has expanded from the initial focus in the Gulf of Guinea
to other African coastal regions as well.
Africa Endeavor, a continental-wide command-and-control
exercise, has seen a steady increase in participation with over
30 nations projected to participate this year. Exercise
National Fire was acclaimed by all as a tremendously successful
exercise bringing together five Eastern African nations to
address their response in a humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief scenario.
Mr. Chairman, in my written statement, I highlight these
and other programs and activities all designed to help build
our partner security capacity, and I ask that it be made a part
of this record.
These programs reflect the willingness of our partners to
work with us and with each other to address common threats that
have the ability to impact us here at home and reflect that our
programs and our activities are, indeed, producing tangible
results. And I will provide some examples of that later on.
My focus is on activities, programs, and communications
that support our national interests and also reinforce the
success that we have established in ways that will assure
progress in the long term for our African partners to be more
capable of providing for their own security and, thus, helping
to guarantee our security here as well.
We closely harmonize our activities with our colleagues at
State, at United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), and other agencies of our government. Our service
components continue to mature. Our offices of security
cooperation, defense attaches, and network of forward-operating
sites and cooperative security locations, including Camp
Lemonier in Djibouti, are tremendously valuable as we pursue
U.S. security interests.
It is my honor to serve with the uniformed men and women as
well as those civilians who comprise the United States Africa
Command. We are making a difference in this vitally significant
and strategically important area of our global society. Their
dedicated efforts exemplify the spirit and determination of the
American people, and I would be pleased, with your permission,
to introduce someone here with me today representing those men
and women, the command senior enlisted leader, Command Sergeant
Major Mark Ripka, who is here.
What we do is important. We recognize the contributions of
this committee. We thank you for your support, and I look
forward to taking any additional questions to provide you any
additional information that I can with respect to our command.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Ward can be found in the
Appendix on page 107.]
The Chairman. General Ward, thank you.
General Mattis, welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT
FORCES COMMAND
General Mattis. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Ranking
Member McKeon, and members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify. And, sir, I request my written
statement be placed into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, the written statements of
each of the witnesses will be placed in the record.
General Mattis. Thank you, sir. And I wish to echo my
shipmates' respect of Erin's service and quiet support of our
military forces over many, many years.
You will be missed. You have been magnificent, Erin.
Over the course of the past year, Joint Forces Command has
continued to provide combat-ready forces to the combatant
commanders to support active military operations. We have
continued to prepare for future conflict by thinking ahead so,
if surprised, we have the fewest regrets. And after a historic
change of command in NATO in which I handed over supreme
command of allied command transformation, we continue to ensure
Joint Forces Command remains closely linked with our allied
partners in NATO.
The character of this current conflict remains different
or, better said, irregular. We have continued to adapt our
forces in stride to become increasingly competent in irregular
warfare. Across the board, the joint forces significantly
adapted to this new environment, but our watch board must be
balanced.
The chairman and Secretary of Defense have stated we must
not lose our nuclear deterrence, our conventional superiority
in the process of adapting to irregular warfare. Even as we
continue to prepare and deploy forces into the irregular fights
of Iraq and Afghanistan, we cannot permit the dormancy of our
conventional capabilities.
Our forces will continue to achieve balance as dwell times
build. Through effective training and education across the
force, we can strike the appropriate balance while ensuring our
current and future combat readiness. Based on the reality of
current active operations and future trends outlined in our
recent assessment of the joint operating environment, Joint
Forces Command's top priority continues to reflect balance
between support for the current fight and our constant
assessment of the future to ensure we remain the most capable
military in the world.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in
the Appendix on page 157.]
The Chairman. Thank you so much, General.
Let me ask a few questions, if I may.
Admiral, I made reference to Russia as well as the ranking
member did. Would you discuss for us what you see in Russia? Is
it a rising Russia? Is it going back to its earlier status?
What is your opinion of that country and where it is headed?
Admiral Stavridis. Mr. Chairman, as I look at Russia and
the way the impact of Russia is felt in the European landscape,
the view is varied. The view varies from the Baltics and the
Eastern European states who remain concerned about Russian
activities that range from Zapad exercises to the residual
effect of the activities involving Georgia. All of that raises
a certain level of concern in that part of Europe.
On the other hand, in Western Europe, there is a very
strong attempt to try and find zones of cooperation with
Russia. And so the view of Russia varies across the European
theater.
My own view--and I think the Secretary General of NATO has
expressed this well--is that we need to find areas of
cooperation with Russia wherever we can. And they can vary from
arms control in a bilateral sense to counter-piracy, counter-
narcotics, cooperation in Afghanistan is possible.
We can have discussions about military reform. As you know,
the Russians are in the process of doing a fair amount of
military reform, including a significant reduction in their
officer corps and raising the professionalism of their non-
commissioned officers (NCOs).
On the other hand, we need to find and demonstrate to our
allies in the Baltics and in Eastern Europe reassurance; show
them that we have contingency plans; that we have the ability
to back up Article 5 of the NATO treaty.
So I would conclude by saying it is really all about
balance in approaching Russia. And we must maintain a sense of
both reassurance with our allies but also find zones of
cooperation as we move forward.
The Chairman. What military-to-military operations do we
have?
Admiral Stavridis. In terms of operations at this point, we
are not engaged in anything that I would describe as an actual
operation, Mr. Chairman. But we are engaged in active dialogue
with Russian counterparts. For example, I held meetings in
Brussels recently with General Nikolai Makarov, the Chief of
Defense (CHOD) of Russia. We are in a dialogue with them about
exchanging noncommissioned officers and having a sense of
showing them our training program and understanding what they
are trying to do.
We are also talking to them in general terms about their
experiences in Afghanistan; trying it learn some lessons from
all that. And, also, we are operating with them--and this is
probably the closest we would come to an actual operation.
There are Russian ships that are involved in counter-piracy
operations alongside our ships, both on the U.S. side and on
the NATO side, of the Horn of Africa. So that is a quick
summary of where we are.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Ward in your capacity, you, of course, have the
service component commands working with you and for you. Is
that correct?
General Ward. That is correct, Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, in particular, tell us what the Navy
has been doing in the maritime security arena. And that has
been of help in working with our African partners--the United
States Navy?
General Ward. Mr. Chairman, approximately two and a half
years ago, in October of 2006, we conducted a maritime
conference in Cotonou, Benin. It was--at that time, I was still
the Deputy Commander at EUCOM, and we had the Commander of
Naval Forces Europe with me. And we worked with the Chief of
Defense there to find out from them what they needed to help
them be in a better posture to protect their territorial waters
from all the elicit trafficking things that had been going on.
As a result of that conference, we have expanded into what
we now call the Africa Partnership Station. It is a program. It
is not the platform. It is a program. It is a training program
that brings together the various nations of the littoral there
in the continent of Africa. It started in the western part of
the continent. As I have mentioned, it has expanded around to
the entire continent now. But it includes our U.S. Marine
Corps, Navy, other European partners, the Dutch, the Germans,
the British, French, as staff members of this training
platform. It also includes members from the African nations
where this platform, as it circumnavigates the continent, will
touch for two to three week periods of time, training these
African nations on things that they see for themselves as
important to increase their capacity to improve their security.
It includes such things as small boat maintenance and
repair. If you have a problem in your territorial waters, you
have to have assets to deal with that. And so as simple a thing
as keeping your boat motors operating, as keeping your
electrical systems running are the sorts of things that we do
with this platform.
It includes professionalization of the noncommissioned
officer corps. It includes other professionalism discipline
sorts of drills that increase the capacity of these nations to
bring their own security capacity to bear as they seek to
protect their territory waters.
It also includes how they work together in a linked way
with respect to how they monitor and surveil their maritime
areas. And so how they bring their surveillance systems into
play is part of that dynamic.
Training, in some cases, providing the equipment, that
program is being led by the United States Navy, and it is under
the auspices of my command, my component command, Naval Forces
Africa, who now leads that program but with the involvement of
the players of Europe, as I mentioned, the continental players,
as I mentioned, but also other parts of the interagency in that
attempt to help these countries increase their maritime safety
and security.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Mattis, let us talk about professional military
education for a moment. Our colleague from Arkansas, Dr.
Snyder, in his role as Chairman of the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee, has delved into the professional
military education at great length in a series of hearings.
And I have a concern that--well, it is reflected pretty
well in an article that retired General Bob Scales wrote
entitled, ``Too Busy to Learn.'' And he compared what we are
going through today, about putting off education for some
people and some not even getting it, to what the British went
through prior to the First World War.
How do we correct that? You know, there is only so much
time in a person's career. How do we do that? The promotion
timelines are so tight that it is just hard it fit it all in.
But if we are to be successful in the future years, it is
important that we educate our officers at all levels.
Do you have thoughts on that, General?
General Mattis. I do. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The only thing worse in a war than obsolete weapons is
obsolete thinking. And you can get obsolete by thinking that
the war you are fighting is what all wars are going to look
like. There can be no doubt about the operational effectiveness
of the U.S. military today. It is unmatched in the world.
The problem is we are not worried about today in terms of
your question. We are worried about tomorrow. I think that you
point to a very specific problem of arithmetic. There is no
more years in a career right now, so you have to squeeze it all
in.
And when you look at the service competency upon which
officers create their own self-image, they test themselves,
they develop their confidence based on their service
capability, whether it be an infantryman in the Army or a ship
driver in the Navy or a pilot, they have got to get good at
their basic skills, their basic military skills.
Then what do we do? I believe that we are going to
eventually, in light of the better health of the force today
where we don't drink or smoke like we once did, this sort of
thing, that we need to look at extending officer careers. There
should be certain restrictions on this. There should be
continuation boards so we don't end up keeping the wrong people
around.
But you simply can't put in the amount of education and
everything else that needs to be into an officer's career if we
continue with the current 20- and 30-year expectations.
I believe that the danger is real, and we are going to have
to address it in more than just the manner in which we have in
the past. In other words, distance learning, we are going to
have to reward the kind of behavior that we want to keep.
Institutions get the behavior they reward, yet we do not have
sufficient rewards right now for those who, on their own,
commit to an active learning throughout their career.
So I think you need to change some of the reward systems.
We are talking personnel policies here. And we also need to
consider extending, as appropriate, not in all cases, the
normal career to 30 and 40 years versus 20 and 30.
I hope that addresses your question, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, while the current policy seeks to reset relations
with Russia, I think we ought to take steps to reassure our
allies and friends, as I said in my opening statement. And your
posture statement notes that, without four brigade combat teams
in Europe, deterrence and reassurance are at an increased risk.
I talked about moving from 300 down to 80,000 and then if
we took 2 brigade combat teams out, it would cut it in half
again.
Can you explain how reducing our force presence in Europe
puts deterrence and reassurance at risk?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I think you have outlined the
top two aspects of it very well, which are the physical
presence of our troops is extremely reassuring on the one hand
to the allies and friends about whom we spoke earlier. And I
think there is a deterrent value in it.
And so with that as backdrop, I would add three other
things that I think are important to this four brigade combat
team level presence in Europe.
One is one we don't always focus on, but it is logistics.
It is having that capability to move rapidly globally and, let
us face it, our current set of missions are on the other side
of Europe. And so that footprint in Europe is well supported.
And those four brigade combat teams are all cycling forward
into the fight in Afghanistan and Iraq.
So I would add logistics. I would also add training. There
is an extremely important training element in the building of
partnership capacity with our allies. And with four brigade
combat teams, the level, the complexity, the depth of training
that can be conducted with allies is twice as good as with two
brigade combat teams.
So I think that is a second element I would add to the two
you mentioned. And then thirdly, I would say there is really a
leadership component for the United States. For us to maintain
a leadership role, I think, that level of 80,000 troops in
Europe is roughly about right, particularly, when you look at
the steep decline it has gone through, as you pointed out
earlier, sir.
So I would sort of say reassurance, deterrence, logistics,
leadership, and training as the five reasons that I would put
forward the military advice to remain at the level of four
brigade combat teams.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you.
There seems to be a debate brewing over U.S. nuclear forces
in Europe. Your statement was notably silent on this issue. Do
you think keeping these forces in Europe strengthens the
alliance? Is our nuclear presence important to Article 5, the
common defense provision?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I have not taken a public stance on
this because, as you can appreciate, it is very much in the
political venue. I mean, this is an international dialogue that
has to be conducted among the members of the alliance. I will
say that the shared responsibility of these nuclear weapons
creates a military-to-military level of trust and confidence
that is extremely helpful, in my view, in maintaining the
military-to-military aspects of NATO.
I would also say that I would hope that any decisions that
are taken are made multilaterally and that we do this as an
alliance, not responding to this nation or that nation having a
particular political issue, but rather we look at the whole
question of nuclear weapons in the alliance as a whole.
And I believe that is where Secretary General Rasmussen
wants to take this dialogue.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you.
I understand that the recent Juniper Cobra exercise with
Israel was a success. Given the growing crisis over Iran's
nuclear program, what additional steps is EUCOM taking to
ensure the defense of Israel and its stability in your AOR?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, thank you, sir, for mentioning
Juniper Cobra. We are extremely proud of that exercise. We had
over 2,000 U.S. and allied forces involved in that. It was a
very complex missile defense exercise that married up the
Israeli systems, the Arrow and the Iron Dome system, with our
own AEGIS sea-based system as well as some of our land-based
systems.
Very complex to bring all that together. Very effective. I
would say that we need to build on that exercise and continue
to have that level of dialogue and engagement and actual
operational activities with our Israeli friends. And I believe
that we can learn from them and we can learn from their
technical systems just as they can marry up and learn from
ours.
So I would say build on that missile defense. I would say
continue information and intelligence sharing. And I would
say--I would support, obviously, the continued very strong
military-to-military cooperation across the board that we enjoy
with Israel today.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you.
I am concerned about the reset policy, particularly, the
impact on our NATO allies. What are you hearing from our NATO
allies on U.S.-Russian engagement? And what is the military,
particularly EUCOM, doing to prepare in the event of another
Russia-Georgia or similar conflict?
Admiral Stavridis. From all of the allies, there is a real
understanding that we have a need to train and be prepared for
any kind of contingency in Europe. And so we are constantly,
actively reviewing all of our contingency plans both on the
NATO side and on the U.S. European Command side to be prepared
for any security eventuality in Europe.
That is an active dialogue, and it is sort of step-one
planning. Step two is a very robust series of exercises both on
the NATO side and on the U.S. European Command side. Example,
this summer, we have what are called BALTOPS, Baltic
Operations, which will bring both Marines afloat as well as
ships at sea as well as Army operators ashore and special
operators ashore to practice and exercise with our Baltic
partners.
We are going to do a special operations series of exercises
this summer in the--in Eastern Europe as well. So exercises, I
would say, are number two and equally important.
And then third and finally, it is the sharing of
information and training--the kind of international military
education and training (IMET) program where we bring our
partners here to the United States to train. We send our folks
to train and be educated in their institutions. To the
Chairman's point about education, that also creates a real bond
among the allies at the officer-to-officer level and at the
senior NCO level which is extremely, extremely helpful in
maintaining the sense of reassurance amongst all of the allies.
So I did put those three things at the top--planning,
exercises, and shared education and training.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from California. We are
under the five minute rule.
Mr. Ortiz, please.
Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to thank all three of you for appearing
before our committee today, and thank you for your service.
General Ward, I just have a few questions for you. In light
of the horrific recent tragedies in Nigeria, does AFRICOM have
enough troops to conduct training? And I know you have had some
training exercises with countries that have requested support.
And can you also speak to the training of African troops by
AFRICOM? And I know that, in the beginning, you know, when we
set the command, there were some questions about being accepted
in the area where we had troops. How well are the African
troops faring in actual operations? Can we conduct the
performance reviews on the African training programs?
And I know that all of this comes into play with the
complex humanitarian emergencies that come about, but maybe you
can give us a little input as to what is going on and the
training and whether you have enough personnel to do something
that does justice to them.
General Ward. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.
First, you are correct. We have no assigned forces. We get
our forces through the global force management process
administered by the Department of Defense (DOD) here in D.C. as
well as my friend, Jim Mattis' Joint Forces Command. And we
submit, through a request-of-forces process, our requirements
for forces.
We are being--that requirement is being satisfied at about
the 80 to 85 percent rate which is commensurate with what
happens at the other combatant commands. It does affect us a
bit because we don't have any assigned forces to complement
that. But at the current time, we are looking at ways and the
Department of Defense is also looking at ways to reestablish
the global employment of the force priority structure such that
the requirement for building partner capacity that you have
addressed here is achieved--receives a higher priority in this
whole process.
But right now, that is how we do it. And for me, having
assigned force is not necessarily the issue. What is important
is that, when I have a demand for forces, those forces can be
provided. Owning them is not important, but having them
available is something that I think is very, very important.
As we work with the African nations with our various
exercises, we provided training support, logistics support, and
they have participated in peacekeeping operations. We see that
level of training and support being very, very instrumental to
their level of performance.
As a recent example of a training iteration that we
conducted in Mali as we were working with the Malian armed
forces as they conducted their counter-terror training. You may
recall that, last summer, the Malians suffered some pretty
substantial defeats on the part of Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb. Part of the outcome of this most recent training
happened in January from one of the members who participated
who said, had I had that training prior to or had those who
encountered that incident last July, had they had this
training, the outcome would have been different.
We think we are making a difference. The performance of
these African nations indicates that our presence, our training
with them makes a difference. And we certainly look to continue
that because that is how we help safeguard our own populations.
With their having increased capacities to do those things, to
provide for their own security, it has a direct impact on the
safety and security of our citizens and Africa but also in the
transnational nature of today's threat environment also helping
them do their part to counter those transnational threats.
Mr. Ortiz. And I know that we do have some health threats,
pandemics in the area. How are we addressing some of the health
problems, the pandemics that we have in the area? Are we
working jointly with them? Are we having doctors that help out
as well?
General Ward. Our efforts are part of the entire Department
of Defense health assurance program. We work our pandemic plans
with the African nations as well as, obviously, our European
friends because we see the global connectivity of all of those
things. We do work with them in their planning, their response.
A part of my staff--my surgeon staff, my medical staff--are
going and doing their engagement--our medical engagement, also,
to help them address their own individual unique requirements
and how they counter these threats from pandemics.
The H1N1, they didn't have a problem with it. It was kind
of in reverse how they tried to assure people that that didn't
have an effect on them. And, obviously, the health threat that
would emanate from the continent and would spread, likewise,
keeping those in check.
But other things as well from HIV-AIDS, malaria, robust
program with all those issues of health are also security
related if they are left unchecked.
Mr. Ortiz. Again, thank you so much for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. During the last break, I and 12
other members of Congress, both the House and Senate, spent the
better part of a week with several Russians in Madrid talking
about U.S.-Russian relations.
It was pretty obvious from the perspective of those
Russians present that there are two major impediments to better
relationships between the United States and Russia. One is
NATO, and the other is our placement of anti-ballistic missile
defenses.
Sometimes, it helps to put yourself in the other guy's
place. Suppose that the Cold War had gone differently and we
had lost and NATO was gone and the Warsaw Pact was alive and
growing, and the next two countries that were coming into the
Warsaw Pact are Canada and Mexico. How would we feel?
That is kind of the way that the Russians feel, I think,
when the Baltic countries and the Ukraine might be coming into
NATO. If we need a good will--European good will society, it
probably ought to be called something other than NATO or Russia
ought to be invited into NATO. One of those two solutions, I
think, would be very preferable to what we are now doing.
The other major impediment to better relations was our
placement of the missile sites. I don't think there is any
country that is going to launch over the pole except Russia,
and our meager defenses there would be immediately swamped by
Russia. They have thousands of weapons.
These other people may be evil. They are not idiots. They
are not going to launch from their soil. Are they going to
launch from the ocean? They know if they launch from their
soil, they will be almost immediately vaporized. They are not
going to do that.
If, in fact, you think we need these sites in the Arctic,
why not put them in Russia? Russia has a lot of Arctic
territory.
As far as protecting Europe is concerned, we were going to
place them in Poland and Czechoslovakia. If you look at the
map, that leaves about half of Europe totally unprotected. You
really need these missile sites to protect Europe from Iran,
and Iran is not going to launch weapons from their soil.
But if we really think you need that, what is wrong with
the most extreme southwestern part of Russia? If you look at
that site as a far better place to put missiles to protect
Europe than where we are now planning to put them?
Would you agree that these are the two major impediments to
better relations with Russia?
Admiral Stavridis. I would say that I have heard both of
those discussions from my Russian interlocutors, and that
Russia, as you know, sir, just recently issued a new strategic
doctrine in which they talk about NATO expansion as a--they
call it a danger to Russia. So I think it is absolutely correct
to say that, from a Russian perspective, NATO expansion is of
concern.
Mr. Bartlett. Then, sir, why do we continue with this if we
want better working relations with Russia?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, NATO is an open organization. And
if you look at Article 9 of the NATO treaty, sir, it says very
simply that membership in NATO is open to any nation by a
unanimous-consent vote of all the current nations in NATO.
Mr. Bartlett. Have we invited Russia in?
Admiral Stavridis. We, the United States, have not invited
Russia into NATO, no, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Why would we not want Russia to be a part of
NATO if we want better working relationships with them and
better security on the continent?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, I think that that question really
is better posed to NATO rather than to the commander of U.S.
European Command. But I know that the Secretary General of
NATO, Secretary General Rasmussen, recently had a visit in
Moscow and had a very wide-ranging discussion about all of
these topics and is working very hard, along the lines of what
you suggest, to place himself and to place the alliance in a
position to look through the eyes of Russia so that we can find
these kinds of zones of cooperation.
So I think our hand is out from a NATO perspective. I have
heard the secretary general say repeatedly our hand is out in
cooperation. I think whether there is a follow-on along the
lines you are discussing is something that all 28 NATO nations
would have to discuss.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Before I call on Mr. Taylor,
General Ward, you formerly were the deputy at European Command.
Is that correct?
General Ward. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And your rank was four-star. Is that correct?
General Ward. Correct, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You do not have a four-star deputy in your
command. Is that correct?
General Ward. None of the combatant commands have four-star
deputies.
The Chairman. That answers the question. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield to Mr.
Kissell and take his place at the appropriate time.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Taylor. The last time, Mr. Taylor was
nice enough to yield to me like this, I said I would be glad to
take his time if he would also yield some questions to me
because Mr. Taylor asks some of the best questions that are
ever asked on this panel.
I welcome you gentlemen here today and thank you for your
service and thank you for being here today.
Admiral, we have talked quite a bit about the importance of
NATO and our relationship with NATO. What is the mindset of
NATO towards the organization--the European mindset. How
committed are they? What do they see as the future for NATO?
How do they view this alliance?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I believe that broadly--and here I
speak from polling data conducted in Europe--about 60 percent
of most Europeans in Western Europe feel extremely positively
toward the NATO alliance. And those numbers go up as you move
toward the east. So that in the eastern part of Europe, we see
numbers very high, as high as 70 percent, if you will, approval
ratings for NATO.
So from a public perception, I have that, broadly speaking,
there is acceptance of NATO as a fundamental construct in the
trans-Atlantic bridge.
My own experiences talking to heads of state, ministers of
defense, ministers of foreign affairs, chiefs of defense, the
equivalent of our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
certainly support that. I feel there is strong support for
NATO, even as we are today engaged in a wide variety of
activities. We have almost 90,000 NATO troops engaged on three
different continents in operations all around the world. There
are losses, but, overall, I believe there is a strong sense of
support for NATO as an alliance moving forward.
Mr. Kissell. Just curious in a specific country, Turkey.
Reading last week about conflicts between a less secular part
of Turkey versus the military. What do you see is the role of
Turkey and how it might play out there?
Admiral Stavridis. I believe Turkey is an extremely
important state geopolitically. It is a hinge state between
Europe and the Levant and South Asia and, indeed, the entire
arc of the Islamic world. So the presence of Turkey in NATO is
extremely important and I think is very helpful in maintaining
an orientation of Turkey toward and with the West.
Mr. Kissell. Okay. General Ward, we have had hearings
recently about our relationship with China. What is the
influence of China into the continent of Africa? How is that
playing out? Pros and cons about what is taking place there?
General Ward. Thank you, sir. China is pursuing its
interest in Africa like other nations. It is working with many
nations of the continent pursuing economic and developmental
interests. Their--from what I can see, their military relations
are not very robust. From time to time, you will note some
engineering sorts of things going on with infrastructure
development.
It is the type of thing that, from my perspective, we
clearly see how these sovereign nations reach out to other
sovereign nations to help them achieve various national
objectives that they may have. China is one of the countries
that they reach out to. China responds in ways that satisfies
requirements.
What impact that will ultimately have, I am not prepared to
address. The work that we do is work that we hope that, where
there are opportunities to cooperate from the standpoint of
promoting security and stability, that that would clearly be an
objective, also, of the Chinese and any other nation that is
engaging on the continent with the sovereign nations of Africa
as they move ahead and pursue those common objectives.
That is how I see the current situation as it moves ahead
there on the continent, sir.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir.
And General Mattis, you had talked about, in your opening
statement, about the thoughts in trying to envision the next
war. And looking at that now and our mindset--where we are with
the conflicts we have and the challenges we have--what would be
an area--or what is the area that most concerns you that we are
missing the most as we do move forward? What potentials are we
missing?
General Mattis. Sir, that is really the $64,000 question in
my line of work, knowing that we will not get it exactly right,
we just don't want to get it completely wrong. We look at what
happened in our current operations. We look at South Lebanon in
the second Lebanon war, and we look at Russia-Georgia, and we
put together what we believe is a hybrid nature of threat that
is coming at us, where it will not be all conventional or all
irregular; it will be more of a blurred hybrid threat that we
have to confront because the differences between types of
warfare seem to be blurring.
The enemy has found our weak area, and they are moving
against us in those areas. They are a very learning, adaptive
enemy.
So the most important point we can make is that we not
adopt a single preclusive view of war and we stay attuned to
what Secretary Gates has called for with this balance because
we could inadvertently actually incite an enemy to try us in an
area that we decide to abrogate because we don't think it is
very likely. It makes for a very difficult effort, but it is
one that is primarily addressed through education and training
that creates the kind of adroit officer that can move from one
type threat to another without being caught flat-footed, sir.
That is about the best answer I can give you with just a
couple moments here.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Taylor.
And, thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Forbes, the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And gentlemen, let me echo what my colleagues have been
saying in terms of our appreciation for your service and all
that you do.
And General Mattis, if I could follow up on some of your
previous comments that you just made in response to Mr.
Kissell's questions.
As you know, our forces face an adversary that does tend to
avoid our strengths and exploit our weaknesses and remains
quickly adaptable to the changing engagement environment. To
train our soldiers in our conventional manner is expensive and
time consuming.
I am just wondering if you could share with the committee
how we can use modeling and simulation to help train our
forces. And what do you believe the resulting benefits would
be?
General Mattis. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. This is an area of
some great focus to me. And if we would go back to the
Chairman's opening remarks about the need for superior
individual and small-unit capabilities being the most critical,
most effective weapons today, we are going to have to have the
ground forces adopt an aviation and a maritime view with the
use of modeling and simulation.
The aviators and the maritime forces have used them from
the Idaho desert where they have the reactors for the Navy to
the simulators on every single airbase for our aviators. We
just had signed 48 hours ago by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
a decision to create a line of funding that will permit us to
take advantage of the gaming industry's advances, and we will
try to put our young troops, our infantry, the ones who take--
over 80 percent of our casualties since 1945 have been
infantrymen--we are going to try to bring to them a level of
simulation and modeled training that will put them through as
many technical and ethical challenges as we can before they go
into their first firefight and during every dwell time after
that.
This is, to me, a fundamental area. It is both a military
effectiveness area of opportunity, and it is an ethical burden
that we need to take on right now.
Mr. Forbes. And, General, I have heard you speak before,
but I was just wondering if you could elaborate on your
thoughts about how that kind of modeling and simulation
training could actually save of the lives of some of our
infantrymen. And where do you see JFCOM in this role, and how
are they positioned to, perhaps, assist or help with this?
General Mattis. Yes, sir. JFCOM has a role because, today,
we find jointness where the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines,
coalition forces are working together at increasingly lower
levels. Where, at one time, you might have an Army division
alongside a Marine division alongside an allied division.
Today, we have Marine infantrymen with Army intelligence
specialists serving alongside them inside an Army brigade with
Air Force and Navy close-air support alongside a NATO ally that
is closely off an enemy line of retreat.
This means we can no longer leave simply to the services
without support the ability to train the joint and coalition
warfare at levels now that may involve NCOs receiving the same
kind of training that you and I have characterized in the past
for junior officers.
So the Joint Forces Command role is one to bring this joint
piece down to the lowest tactical level so joint intelligence
capabilities are understood and used there, joint fires are
used to mitigate danger, carry out the mission.
Mr. Forbes. And specifically as it relates to casualties
for our infantrymen, what role can modeling and simulation play
in helping to ratchet up their experience level and, perhaps,
reduce these casualties?
General Mattis. Mr. Forbes, I have been in a lot of fights,
and this isn't scientific, but I would say half the people--I
am an infantry officer--half the casualties I have seen on our
side were for silly, stupid reasons. And if we can put people
through simulation--it is not so they know one way to take down
an enemy stronghold but so they know five different ways to do
it and they have already been through it so many times they
know how not to make the mistake that can be made on a
simulator. We will still have to do live-fire training.
It won't give us a risk-free environment. But I am
convinced, both ethically and casualties wise, we can reduce
the missteps that we are taking on the battlefield and reduce
them significantly.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. We appreciate your
many, many years of service to our country.
Admiral Stavridis, Mr. Kissell asked about Turkey. In the
Arkansas River, we have the USS Razorback, which was a World
War II era submarine. It is actually one of the submarines that
you see in the row in Tokyo Harbor in 1945 at the surrender. It
saw some action at the end of the war and then did some Cold
War tours, but at some point, was donated to Turkey as part of
our U.S.-Turkey alliance. It served the Turkish navy for quite
a few years.
And a few years ago, they donated it back to the city of
North Little Rock as part of a museum. And so we actually have
a submarine sitting in the Arkansas River. We had to lift it a
little bit between some barges to get it up there.
But it sits there. I think it is a symbol of the very, very
strong relationship between Turkey and the United States. Would
you amplify, please, on how important Turkey has been or is
currently to our activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. I will be glad to.
As the--first of all, as the only Islamic nation in NATO,
Turkey has been extremely helpful in assisting all of the other
nations in understanding the cultural morays that are so
important as we go into these kinds of complex situations that
General Mattis is talking about.
Secondly, Turkey is a big, muscular country with a strong-
standing army and a very capable military. We have learned a
great deal and have drawn on their active support, for example,
the Turks today have 1,800 troops in Afghanistan doing
exceptionally good work really across a wide spectrum of
missions in the country.
Thirdly, they are an absolutely vital link in the overall
Article 5 defense of the alliance. They are a border state of
NATO. The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), the air-
control station in the southeastern portion of the alliance is
located in Ismir, Turkey. They link up with us extremely well.
We have forward aircraft there. At every dimension, Turkey
has been an extremely strong NATO partner. In terms of the U.S.
aspects of this, the bilateral relationship, equally so. They
have been very supportive. We are working with them on
intelligence and information sharing along their borders
working across that border with Iraq.
My good friend, General Ray Odierno, has been very engaged
in this. I count the chief of defense of Turkey, General Ikler
Basbug, a close friend and interlocutor who gives me good
advice on how we should be approaching and working in the
Islamic world.
So overall, an extremely important partner both to NATO and
to the United States.
Dr. Snyder. There also is a very strong relationship
between Armenia and the people of Armenia and the American
people. And as you know, on August 31st of last year, Turkey--
the leadership of Turkey and Armenia signed two protocols that
they intend to be a pathway to normalization. And the
protocols, as you know, are awaiting legislative approval in
both countries.
And we, as a Nation, certainly understand agreements,
whether they are trade agreements or other agreements, awaiting
approval by legislative bodies.
Should both countries approve those protocols, how
important a step do you think that will be forward for Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it would be an extremely
important step. There are several of these so-called frozen
conflicts in Europe. And this is one of them. And a step
forward between those two nations, I think, would also serve as
a very good example as other types of these issues are worked
through, for example, in the Balkans.
My grandparents were born in Turkey. They were of Greek
descent and immigrated here to the United States. It is an
extremely complex region of the world.
And whenever these nations can find common ground and move
beyond the disputes and the anger and the warfare of the past,
that is an extremely salutary step, really, for all of Europe
but certainly nations involved.
Dr. Snyder. And we wish both nations well as they grapple
with that issue.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Dr. Snyder. General Mattis, you specifically mentioned in
your opening statement in response to the Chairman's question
talked about PME. I was at Quantico a week ago or so, and we
wanted to have a discussion about enlisted PME. And one of the
topics that was brought up there by the leadership there was
the fact that, at the enlisted level--while we do a lot in the
Marine Corps and the military for enlisted PME--when you take a
30-year enlisted person and look at their career, how much time
they have been given during their career to actually go to
college, it is dramatically lower than the officers.
And the feeling was that is something that we need to look
at. I just have a few seconds left, but if any of you had any
comment about that issue of should we be revisiting the issue
of enlisted people and where time off to go to college. Because
a lot of them go to college, but it is on their own time at
night.
Any comments?
General Mattis. As you know, sir, the Congress has given us
money to defray the tuition costs for our NCOs going. And they
have taken great advantage. We have a quality of enlisted force
today that is eager to learn very broadly and, of course, their
own skills.
A point I would make is one of the great strengths of the
American forces is its NCOs--noncommissioned officers--and
petty officers. Much of what we call ``sergeant's work'' or
``chief's work'' cannot really be taught in a college or
university.
So we need to make sure that we separate out the natural
quest of almost all of these young Americans to improve
themselves and educate further versus the military requirement
which may require more extended military schooling at a level
that we usually associate with junior officers vice putting
them through college which may or may not actually make them
better NCOs.
But the need for the education is absolute. It is just
making certain we do it in a focused way so we stay at the top
of our game, sir.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being here.
Just a quick comment, General Mattis. I was very pleased to
hear your comments about modeling simulation response to Mr.
Forbes' questions on the one hand. On the other hand, it is
almost appalling that we have reached this 2010 and we are not
further along. I know the services--and certainly the Marine
Corps because I was involved in it going back 16 years or more
ago--was recognizing that need for modeling simulation.
So I hope we will move out aggressively to take advantage
of that technology.
General Ward, it is always great to see you. I sometimes
flash back those many years ago when we were colonels and
commanding soldiers and Marines in Somalia. And I want to get
to that country in just a second.
But I was looking at some headlines here in the last week
from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and others:
Hundreds dead in Nigeria attack; Mauritania vows no
negotiations or prisoner exchanges with Al Qaeda; tear gas
fired at Togo protestors; Sudan army says it now controls
strategic Darfur plateau; twin blasts hit Rwanda's capital;
Canada lists Somalia Shabab as a terrorist group; France claims
biggest haul of pirates off Somalia; Libya calls in U.S. oil
firms over Gathafi jibe; and so forth.
You have got a mess and very few forces. Let us go to
Somalia, if we can, to help me and us understand how AFRICOM
works to address these issues. If you look at Somalia--and you
know well what a mess it was 17 years or so ago when you and I
were there. And you look at Al Shabab and you look at the
headline that I just read. And today, in the New York Times, it
says as much as half the food aid sent to Somalia is diverted
from needy people to a web of corrupt contractors, radical
Islamist militants, and local United Nations staff members.
We could have read the same thing 16, 17 years ago. In
fact, that is why you and I were there because food wasn't
getting where it would supposed to go.
So we have AFRICOM. And somehow, you have got to work with
the interagency, with Special Operations Command, with African
forces. Who is in charge? And how do you do that?
I know that is a big question, but I know that we have been
grappling since the standup of your command. How does that
work? Is Special Operations Command in charge? Are you in
charge? You know, is the ambassador in charge? Is there nobody
in charge?
Use Somalia as the example or pick any one you want to kind
of tell us how that works.
General Ward. Well, thank you for that, Mr. Kline. And,
obviously, as you pointed out, that is a complex environment,
and things have not changed.
If you take the case of Somalia, obviously, with where we
are and the transition federal government that is there and the
fact that the African Union--which wasn't the case when we were
there 17 years ago--there is a continent-wide organization that
has said that we will do our best to help bring this transition
federal government into a place where it can begin to exert
some control over that vast territory.
The problem in Somalia is the lack of a government. It is
the lack of effective governance. But there are things being
done to address that. Is it truly an international effort. It
requires the support of the global community. And the response
that the United States has in that endeavor is--and the things
that we are doing to try to reinforce the work of this
transition government, to reinforce the work of the African
Union, its mission in Somalia, Amazon, as they have fielded
peacekeeping forces, African peacekeeping forces who have
familiarity, have understanding.
Our training support, our logistical support, our support
to the transition federal government forces to cause them to be
in a better state to help deal with this lack of governance are
the sorts of things that we are doing in support of this, I
think, international effort to address the problems of lack of
governance in Somalia. And doing what we do through our
interagency process, coordinating our activities with the
Department of State and where there are things that need----
Mr. Kline. If I could interrupt, I am about to run out of
time here, and I do really want to be respectful of that. But I
am just struck again that this New York Times story is talking
about a web of corrupt contractors, radical Islamic militants,
and local United Nations staff members.
And if the United Nations is, frankly, is as inept now as
it was when you and I arrived there those many years ago where
they were all holed up in a little corner of the Mogadishu
Airport, I guess I would like to have the confidence--or I
would like to have a feeling that, somehow, AFRICOM, now that
you are in existence, is going to be able to exert, perhaps,
more influence to help clear that up.
And I have run out of time, and I know it was too big a
subject. But it is worrisome to us that we don't--you don't
have, perhaps, the organizational ability to step in there.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a couple of areas to follow up on some of what my
colleagues had asked about and some from your opening
statements.
Admiral Stavridis, if you could talk to us a little bit
about our NATO partners in Afghanistan now that we have been
into our new strategy for a few months, making progress in some
areas, obviously, long-term continued support across Europe is
going to be critical and it is hard to come by.
Certainly, the population has considerable concerns and the
leadership is grappling with that. If you could just walk us
through how you think that is going as someone who is got to
perspective. Where are our European allies at in terms of their
cooperation short term and long term on our plan in
Afghanistan?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I would be glad to. Big picture,
U.S. has about--we are moving toward about 100,000 troops in
Afghanistan. Our allies are about 40,000 troops. We have taken
just over a thousand casualties. Our allies have taken about
750 casualties.
They are very much in the fight with us. I think it is
worth mentioning as a passing aside, if you will, 75 percent of
the casualties in Afghanistan are actually taken by Afghan
security forces. But of that 25 percent, our allies are very
much in this fight with us.
In fact, the nation who has taken the most casualties on a
per capita basis may surprise you. It is Estonia. Estonia,
Great Britain, Canada, the Dutch, many of these nations have
taken a great deal--have given a great deal of blood as well as
treasure.
At the moment, we are seeking to fill up to about a total
of 10,000 allied troops coming in alongside the 30,000 that
President Obama just sent forward. We have got about 9,500 of
them committed, but we are concerned about the fact that the
Dutch government, as you mentioned, appears to be taking their
forces out of Afghanistan by the end of this year. So that is
of concern.
Mr. Smith. And what--how many troops do they have there
now?
Admiral Stavridis. They have about 1,700 troops there now.
So that would set us back from filling up that goal of a total
of 10,000. My particular focus at the moment is on trainers
because the success strategy in Afghanistan will be training
the Afghan security forces, and that is really where we have
made significant progress and where our allies have been very,
very helpful over the last seven or eight months.
I need about 700 more NATO trainers, and we are working
very hard going country by country to get that and to fill it
up. So overall, we have a significant contribution from the
allies. I would like to get a little bit more. We are working
very hard to achieve that.
The war is, in various places in Europe, it is less popular
than the United States. And in other places, it is--I don't
want to say more popular--but it enjoys a higher level of
support even than it does here.
So it really varies across the European continent. I would
say, overall, the allies are very much in this with us. I think
they are--they will be with us through the short term, and I
would say as long as the U.S. is engaged, as long as NATO is
engaged, I am confident, overall, they will stay with us.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
General Ward, I don't have a lot of time left here, but I
would want to ask quickly about the situation in North Africa,
Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in particular. You know, we
are looking at, you know, future places that could be sort of
the next Yemen, if you will, in terms of a place that rises up
and becomes more of a problem than perhaps we expected, though
I will say the DOD expected Yemen for some time. It is a bit of
a misconception that we didn't see that coming.
But in North Africa, in Mali and Mauritania, Al Qaeda (AQ)
is very active and we simply don't have the resources there,
certainly, than we have in Iraq and Afghanistan but even than
we have watching Yemen and Somalia. What is your assessment of
where that threat is at and what more we can do to be aware of
what is happening? Because my great fear is there is a lot of,
you know, vast open space out there that we know AQ is active.
We don't have the type of intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (ISR) coverage or intelligence that we would
like to know what is going on there.
Could you give me your quick assessment of that region and
what more we should be doing?
General Ward. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
That region that you are describing is the size of the
continental United States. It is a vast region, and what we are
doing, working with those nations--those are sovereign nations
there. So our effort is focused on trying to give them
additional capacity to help, in fact, have better control over
those vast spaces.
So we will work with Malians, Algerians, Burkina Faso,
Niger, other nations in the Sahel so that they have increased
capacity. The intel piece is a very great piece of that, sir.
And so how we are able to have additional information that
helps them understand better what the Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb is doing will also be a part of their ability to then
deal with that threat.
Mr. Smith. Can you say a quick word about Mauritania? I
know we have the--their critical there in the middle of this.
We had the problem--they had the coup a few years back, broke
off relations to a certain extent.
What are we trying to do to deal with Mauritania's role in
all of that?
General Ward. Thankfully, in Mauritania, we are past the
coup, and we are looking to increase our cooperation with the
Mauritanians to work with them as well as other international
players working with the Mauritanians to give them increased
capacity to deal with the threat as well.
And we are opening that again.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. It is an area of particular interest
to me and would like to be supportive as I can of your efforts
there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Before I call Mr. Coffman,
Admiral, earlier, you mentioned a concern regarding the cyber
world. Would you explain that, please?
Admiral Stavridis. As I look at a world today in which 1
billion devices are connecting to the Internet and I look at
all of our vulnerabilities in U.S. European Command and also
look at it from the perspective of a NATO commander with 28
nations all of whom are very dependent on this cyber world,
this cyber sea in which we sail, I am concerned that we are
vulnerable from a military perspective; that we do not have the
level of international cooperation that would create the norms,
the systems of maintaining together how we navigate this cyber
sea.
And so I am an advocate of an international and an
interagency approach, and I think the cyber world really needs
to be a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach. And so
as I look at our vulnerabilities, I am seeking to improve those
by working with interagency partners as well as international
partners in the NATO context particularly with the NATO cyber
center that we have established in Estonia as one example of
that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the admiral.
Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, General Mattis, I first want to commend you
in taking a look at going beyond this 20-year career path and
looking at a longer career path. Having served as an infantry
officer, too, only having one year as a rifle platoon commander
in my first assignment, I mean, I think that we need to look at
individuals being able to serve more time at different develops
in their career path. And I think we are pushing people through
faster than we ought to.
But one question--first, a statement that I disagree with
using nation building as a principle tool for achieving our
foreign policy objectives, but I understand that is beyond the
pay grade of--or beyond the Department of Defense to make that
decision.
But one question I have of you is, number one, has using
our conventional forces and a heavy footprint for
counterinsurgency purposes--how has that degraded our war
fighting capability from a conventional standpoint? And
prospectively, are there plans to use our--rely more heavily on
special operations forces (SOF) to counter irregular threats,
asymmetric threats and utilize our conventional forces to
counter conventional threats going forward?
Could you address that, please?
General Mattis. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.
On using our SOF more, we are using them right now to the
absolute limit of capacity in a number of areas, not just the
ones that make the newspapers every day. So between General
Casey, General Conway, Admiral Olson who commands Special
Operations Command, between the Army, Marine Corps, SOF, and
Joint Forces Command, we are looking at those engagement
efforts, counterinsurgent efforts, that require SOF only. We
are building relationships and this sort of thing.
If it is just teaching troops how to fight small-unit
tactics, how to march, how to shoot, how to do first aid, those
are things the general-purpose force can take off of the
special forces so they are free to do only the things that they
are best tuned for.
So there is going to continue to be a need for our general-
purpose forces to be able to fight across the spectrum of
combat. We cannot have forces that we basically put on the
shelf and say we only use them in this kind of a fight. We try
to bring all of them together. And I recognize there is some
degradation right now, but we believe that, with the
congressional build-up of the Army and the Marines that they
have funded, and with the drawdown of about 10,000 fewer troops
in the Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR in September of this year
compared to September of a year ago, you will see dwell times
extending. And that will allow the Chief of Staff of the Army,
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to get back to some of the
more conventional aspects of war, which we have put on the back
burner right now.
We have Marines who have not been on board ship, although
they have been in the Marine Corps for eight years. We have
Army troops who have not coordinated large artillery fires in
support of brigade maneuver. Dwell time will give us the chance
to do that, sir, without segregating the general-purpose force
out of irregular warfare.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Mattis.
Admiral, I think you have four brigade combat teams organic
to NATO or positioned in Europe. But my first assignment was in
the United States Army mechanized infantry in Europe, and we
did Reforger exercises every year--I don't know if those are
still ongoing--where forces from continental United States
(CONUS) would then go to Europe and we would kind of simulate
being able to utilize them for a counterattack against, at that
time, Warsaw Pact forces.
Since we have that capability, can't we preposition those
forces within the United States without compromising our
commitment to NATO and simply utilize those forces on an
ongoing operational basis by deploying them into Europe on a
very temporary basis and then pulling them back but basing them
inside the United States?
Admiral Stavridis. You could examine a construct like that,
and I recognize that any decision like this has political and
economic elements that need to be worked out. There is a
business case that is involved with all this, and I would refer
that aspect of it to the Department of the Army which looks
very closely at all this.
My job is to provide my military advice as to what I think
is best for the security and defense of the United States in
Europe, and I have look at this very closely. And from my
perspective, because of the things we talked about earlier--the
reassurance, deterrence, leadership, logistics, training--I
think four brigade combat teams in Europe is a good investment
for the United States, sir.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, in reverse alphabetical order, if you don't
mind, we will start with you, General Ward, in a minute and a
half, what keeps you awake at night, if anything?
General Ward. Sir, I am concerned about the potential that
American lives will be lost because of what might generate and
emanate from the continent of Africa. That is why our focus on
the security capacity of those nations to secure their
territorial borders, to secure their territorial waters is so
important. Those threats could affect us wherever we may be in
this globalized society.
What goes on in Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, what goes on in
East Africa with respect to Al Qaeda, what goes on in Maghreb
with respect to Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb--our programs are
all designed to address those threats that are faced by
Americans who live on the continent and also could have an
effect on us here at home.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, sir.
Admiral.
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I will be very brief. Afghanistan,
through my NATO hat, is of extreme concern, and we are working
that. And I would put that at the top of my list of things I
worry about.
I am concerned, also, about the Balkans, making sure we
don't fall back into the situation we saw in the 1900s. As I
mentioned to the chairman, I worry about cyber. I don't think
we spend enough time looking and thinking at that.
And then, lastly, I worry about Iran, about the growing
threat of ballistic missiles, about the possibility of them
acquiring a nuclear weapon, about state-sponsored terrorism.
So those four things, sir.
Mr. Taylor. General Mattis.
General Mattis. Sir, mine are a mix of current and future
concerns. First of all, the loss of precision dominance by our
forces means that no longer do we have the ability to hit the
enemy in ways they cannot reply in kind. Just think of Israel.
Instead of under attack by ballistic-launched rockets, think if
each one had a GPS transmitter or receiver on the front that
can guide them precisely onto locations and what are we doing
to make certain, if we deploy forces, they can protect
themselves.
Second is counter-improvised explosive device (IED). We
need to get away from defensive measures and create
technologically sustainable offensive ways to turn the IED on
the enemy so we are no longer putting more armor or more
jammers on ours.
Mr. Taylor. General, can I interrupt? Do you see that
technology anywhere? And is Congress missing the boat on
acquiring it?
General Mattis. Sir, it is not the Congress. There is
enough money that you have given to Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and others. What we have is
a technologically challenging effort, as a physicist put it to
me, General, you are asking us to do something harder than
going to the moon. That took us 10 years. You have been at war
eight. We should be getting pretty close then.
We have the money, sir. We need to organize the effort. But
this one very much concerns me. This weapon is coming to a city
near us very soon.
A couple other things that keep me awake at night, sir, the
quality of the troops joining the U.S. Army. The Army continues
to do most of the fighting and most of the bleeding for this
country. It is okay right now, but we all saw a concern about
this a few years ago. And the all-volunteer force is unmatched,
but we must maintain the quality of this force.
I am also concerned in the long run about the financially
unsustainable path that our national budget is on and whether
or not we will be able to maintain the military forces when the
only discretionary money you may have to play with, to address,
to allocate, is at the Department of Defense. And what are the
long-term implications of that?
And last is the one that was just mentioned by my comrade
here, and that is the cyber vulnerability.
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, while I still have you, going back to
your days in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), are there any surface
combatant missions off the coast of South and Latin America
that cannot be handled by a Guided Missile Frigate (FFG) or a
SLEP'd [Service Life Extension Program] FFG?
Admiral Stavridis. Day-to-day, no. Everything can be
handled by a frigate-sized vessel. I would only point out the
Haiti experience that you and I remember both from the
hurricanes and most recently from the earthquake, hospital
ship, big-deck amphib for those extremely discreet individual
high-end events.
But other than that, those frigates do us very well down
there, sir.
Mr. Taylor. General Ward, on the counter-piracy mission off
of Somalia, is there anything that could not be handled by a
frigate?
General Ward. To my best understanding, Congressman, there
is not.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. Thank you very much. And, again, thank
you, all of you, for your tremendous service to our Nation.
Thank you for being here today.
Mr. Taylor [presiding]. The chair now recognizes the
gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for five minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Generals and Admiral, I want to join with you. I agree
with you about Erin Conaton, who has been confirmed to be the
Under Secretary of the Air Force. Ms. Conaton has just been a--
I have seen firsthand a devoted person for our military and, of
course, she was trained by Chairman Ike Skelton. So we know
that she will be an excellent resource and supporter of our
military. So I am grateful for that.
And General Ward, of course, each year, I like to welcome
you. I like to remind you that Charleston, my birthplace, would
love to have you and AFRICOM to locate there. The Chamber of
Commerce in Charleston has an open invitation for AFRICOM.
And with that, I understand that Secretary Gates has stated
that a move of AFRICOM's headquarters will not be considered
until 2012. When this decision is made, what are the primary
issues that are going to be considered? Particularly, I am
interested in the quality of life for dependents, access to
schools, medical facilities, transportation access, jobs.
How would that be weighed in the decision?
General Ward. Thank you, Mr. Wilson, and thank you for your
invitation, again, as well, sir.
The decision, when it is considered in 2012, has not been
outlined at this point in time. However, to be sure, in any
environment, the quality of line, the well-being of the serving
members, be they uniformed or civilian, their family members
will be a part of that dynamic, I am sure. To what degree it
will take, again, I am--we are not at that point just yet.
As you are aware, those are factors in determining where
the headquarters are currently located from the standpoint of
the enduring location that Stuttgart offers, the availability
of those facilities. So I am sure they will be considered in
that same light when this decision is revisited in a few years.
Mr. Wilson. Well, anytime I see you, whether in the
hallway, anywhere, do understand, we would love for you to
relocate to Charleston, South Carolina. [Laughter.]
And, Admiral, DOD-sponsored programs for spouses and
dependents of service members are very important. What are you
doing to ensure the dependents of members stationed within
EUCOM are receiving the same benefits as those stationed within
the continental United States? In particular, are education
standards for schools-age children meeting these of their
counterparts in the United States?
What are the employment opportunities for spouses? And what
measures are being taken to increase awareness of those?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, sir.
I do want to mention that my sister lives in Charleston and
she lives in Mount Pleasant. She is a schoolteacher there. And
she loves Charleston which brings me to teaching children and
the quality of that over in Europe.
And I am very pleased to report that the budget coming
forward for which we are seeking the support of the Congress
does, in fact, allocate a significant upgrade in the schools
for our DOD children which I would argue is at the very top of
the quality-of-life programs. Every parent--we all know this--
every parent, the first thing we ask as military members when
we are moving, the very first thing is how are the schools.
So we have gotten a good level of support in the budget in
front of you, and we would sure ask for your support on that.
We also, to your question of how do we focus on this, we
hold a lot of conferences. In fact, right now, my senior
enlisted is not with me because he is back in Europe
spearheading my annual quality-of-life conference which I know
all of the combatant commanders do. We really value that direct
feedback from the families.
That is our kind of input loop. And I must say, this
Congress has been terrifically supportive of our dependents in
Europe and, of course, Kip is actually my next-door neighbor in
Europe. His headquarters, as you know, is currently there.
We are very happy with the overall level of support, and we
ask for the continuance of that from the Congress, sir.
Mr. Wilson. And we appreciate your efforts.
And, General Mattis, I want to thank you for raising the
threat and danger of the budget irresponsibility that is going
on here in Washington. I am also concerned, though, about the
joint training events. Are they sufficient for our troops to be
trained?
General Mattis. Sir, I just want to correct one thing. I
did not say anything about budget irresponsibility. I just--I
am concerned about the sustainability of the budget.
Mr. Wilson. Right.
General Mattis. But as far as the training, sir, we have
the dollars, and we have the means to train. Where we are
challenged right now is primarily for chief of staff of the
Army, Special Operations Command coming out of the Marine Corps
is the dwell time. That is improving, as you know, but it is
mostly a time constraint, not a physical plant or a dollar
constraint.
Thanks, I might add, to the support of this committee.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Taylor. The chair recognizes the gentleman from
Georgia, Mr. Johnson, for five minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With the ice melting in the North Pole due to global
warming which does open up new lanes for commercial activity,
shipping in particular, and given the fact that abundant
natural resources lie in that area--natural gas, coal, even
oil--and given the fact that Russia has planted its flag on a
disputed region of the intercontinental shelf, I would like to
know what we are doing from a security standpoint to protect
our commercial interests in that area.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you for the question, sir. It is
an extremely interesting part of the world, as you allude to.
There are actually three combatant commanders who have
contiguous responsibility, and I am one of them. U.S. European
Command, also, U.S. Northern Command from the northern part of
Canada and then U.S. Pacific Command.
So the three of us, together, look at these security issues
in that region. Today, there are five nations that surround
that North Pole where you are correct, there are shipping lanes
that, I think, over the next decade will begin to open up.
U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway are the five nations.
There are two others, Sweden and Finland, who are also
associate members of a group called the Arctic Council. This
Arctic Council, sir, is the forum in which all of these
issues--and it is really security but also navigation. It is
the environment. It is scientific research. It is hydrocarbon
recovery, as you mentioned. All of those issues come together
in this Arctic Council which provides a forum for discussion.
I think that is probably the right place for this
discussion to be occurring. It is a cooperative, an active
body. And that is the center of the security discussion at this
time.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Well, let me ask you this question and
follow up. There is a need for vessels that can accommodate the
conditions--icy conditions--in that area. Do we have--are we
properly equipped navally to be able to address any concerns
that would occur up there?
And, also, I wanted to know about the relationship,
military-to-military, between China and Russia. And not just
military-to-military, but even other ways that they may
cooperate with each other.
Admiral Stavridis. In terms of the ability of U.S. ships to
operate in high-north conditions, I think we are reasonably
capable in that regard. In terms of more specifics, I would be
happy to take the question for the record and go to the
commandant of the Coast Guard because we should remember a
great deal of this ice-breaking capability is resident in the
Coast Guard and to the Chief of Naval Operations who, I think,
are better suited than I to address--and I will get you that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 181.]
Mr. Johnson. How many working seaworthy ice breakers do we
have in this country?
Admiral Stavridis. I don't know the answer to that. It is
not in my purview or my remit as commander of U.S. European
Command.
Mr. Johnson. I appreciate you----
Admiral Stavridis. I will be glad to find that data out for
you and provide it for the record, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 181.]
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Johnson. And with respect to the rest of the questions.
Admiral Stavridis. To China--excuse me--China and Russia.
As I survey the relationship between those two, I look at it,
of course, from a Russian perspective because Russia is part of
U.S. European Command's area of focus. I would say it is a
relationship that has commercial, demographic, limited
military-to-military cooperation, although they are both
cooperating in the counter-piracy operation off the Horn of
Africa.
So I would say it is a relationship of both of the nations
watching each other. They share one of the longest land borders
in the world. But at this time, they are not in an extremely
active geostrategic dialogue.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
And last question. How are AFRICOM and the U.S. military
efforts in Africa perceived by Africans and by other foreign
nations, General Ward?
General Ward. The perception is increasingly favorable. It
has been rising over the last two years, and they are
continuing to increase in a most favorable way. Positive
perceptions.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. Thank you, all three of you, for
your work. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
And General Mattis, I want to thank you. I read your
article in Marine Times, March 1, 2010, ``Better Officer
Training.'' And you called for an overhaul. I found that
article very interesting, and I would hope that some of my
colleagues would have a chance, maybe, to read the article and
your recommendations. Thank you very much for that.
Admiral, I want to ask you a question. I have got most of
my questions for General Ward. But if you would, give me kind
of a short answer.
I remember back in 2003, 2004 many Generals--and I don't
mean this disrespectfully--I mean, respectful. They would get
questions about the Afghan security force, and they would say,
well, the training is going well, we, you know, have got a lot
to do, we have got years ahead, but it is going well.
You know, the American people are frustrated, many in the
military, particularly wives and some children are very
frustrated. Do you see--I know this might be very difficult to
project the future. That, I fully understand.
But you know, I know the President said we are there
another year and a half, but many of us are concerned that, as
we get closer to that year and a half and another Presidential
election, that some advisers--not necessarily military--might
say, well, I don't think right now you need to pull down the
troops in Afghanistan; we need--you know, we have got an
election coming up. We have got to make sure that the people
understand, you know, this and that.
If you would, this is 2010, and I don't know who will be
here--maybe I am running the gambit--maybe I will, maybe I
won't.
But two or three years down the road, if there is an
admiral or a general that says that the training of the Afghan
security force is going pretty well, how long should we say to
the American people it is pretty well before we get to a point
that we are financially broke as a country, we have worn out
our military, we have worn out the equipment? I am not asking
you for a timeline, but truthfully, do you see that maybe, in
the short term, whatever the short term might be, that the
Afghans can pick up it and take the responsibility?
Admiral Stavridis. I will be very brief. I can talk for an
hour and a half on that.
Mr. Jones. I am sure.
Admiral Stavridis. The short answer is, in the seven months
that I have been in command and the eight months that Stan
McChrystal has been in command, I think both of us would sit
here and tell you honestly we have seen progress. And in
January, February, and March of this year, we have seen
everything from Afghans piloting MI-17 helicopters going on
commando raids to them repulsing serious attacks inside the
capital to the current operation in Marjah which is being
conducted in a one-to-one ratio.
So I can't speak to the four, five, six years ago, sir, but
I can say that I think we are on a positive trajectory now. We
have an outstanding three-star general who has unified command
of all training for the first time, Lieutenant General Bill
Caldwell. I would love to take you to Afghanistan and show you
what is going on.
It is hard. It is very challenging. There is great risk
ahead. But I am seeing progress. And that is as short as I can
be about it.
Mr. Jones. Admiral, thank you. And maybe at some point in
time in the future, I could ask you to come to my office and
give me a briefing for an hour and a half if you want to.
Admiral Stavridis. I would love to. I will do it.
Mr. Jones. Really would appreciate that.
General Ward, I want to pick up very briefly because time
goes so quickly with five minutes. But the issue of China. You
made a statement--and I accept your statement--that the Chinese
are, as it results to their military, they are not very robust
but in other ways, they are being very aggressive, I would
assume.
My concern is that--in your discussions with African
leaders and other countries, do you feel that, at the present
time, that the Chinese are trying to buy the hearts and souls
of leaders by being able to be in a position of spending money,
making investments in the infrastructure of certain countries?
Do you feel that this is something that policy makers in
Washington, not necessarily military people but policy makers
need to be concerned about?
General Ward. Thank you, Mr. Jones. I don't know if I am in
a position to characterize Chinese actions in that way. I think
what I would say is, as I see Chinese activities, as they
attempt to secure the sorts of things that will help fuel their
economic development, they are pursuing multiple lines and
multiple channels to secure resources to have the type of
impact in Africa that would be in keeping with them achieving
whatever their national interests from the Chinese perspective
may be.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I see my time is over.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Sestak, please.
Mr. Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning--good afternoon.
Admiral, the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, is this a good
thing we are doing to repeal it? And I have a couple of
questions, so I am just going to try to get to them rapidly.
Admiral Stavridis. I think that the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman have come forward and spoken to this, and they
have put in place a process----
Mr. Sestak. As an operational commander, do you agree with
it?
Admiral Stavridis. I agree with their process that they are
undertaking.
Mr. Sestak. Good. There was a program called the Arctic
Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) Group where we
focused with Norway and Russia on the SSBNs that were rotting
away up there in--we have stepped away from that but never did
the SSNs up there as at reactors are rocking away.
Do you believe we should reengage on that effort? We
stopped this about two, three years ago. What is your proposal?
Admiral Stavridis. I will have to get back to you on that
one. I don't have a set response for that.
Mr. Sestak. It was called AMEC.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. We are looking at that type of
issue, sir, in the Arctic Council which I spoke about a few
moments ago.
Mr. Sestak. Right.
Admiral Stavridis. And that is--that, I think, is the right
forum to address that, and I will get back to you with a more
detailed answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 181.]
Mr. Sestak. Thank you.
Sir, I heard your response on AFRICOM. My understanding is,
when we established this, we kind of pushed it a little
harshly, potentially, without being a bit more ingratiating
with South Africa. Is that an unfair statement after having sat
down with them a bit and talked?
General Ward. I am not aware of not being fair with South
Africa, Mr. Sestak. That doesn't resonate with me. The South
Africans had concerns, as did a few of the other nations, that
it was being established to bring large military formations to
militarize the continent. As we have seen, that didn't happen.
The South Africans' response has been, certainly, less strident
against the command.
Mr. Sestak. We have a good bilateral Defense Department
relationship with South Africa, particularly, in the
environmental area. Is that part of your charge, also, as
AFRICOM as part of this engagement that you are doing down
there?
General Ward. Not directly. Our engagement, military-to-
military, that is very robust. It is growing. Our naval
relationships, our land relationships, our air relationships,
the work between the component commanders of my command and
their South African counterparts----
Mr. Sestak. Mainly military-to-military?
General Ward. Mainly military-to-military.
Mr. Sestak. Wasn't your staff supposed to be two-thirds
civilian, and so you were supposed to be a broader engagement
than just military-to-military?
General Ward. The staff is about half civilian. Of that
half, a percentage of that is from the interagency. Not from
the standpoint of doing the work of the interagency, from the
standpoint of how the interagency work is more and better
supported by what we do so we have a better understanding----
Mr. Sestak. I understand now.
General Ward. Correct.
Mr. Sestak. General, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
testified to a question a week or two ago that it would take
us, because of our involvement in Iraq and now Afghanistan,
upwards of 10 years before we get the U.S. Marine Corps back to
where it is able to respond to the war plans.
My question to him had been that for the last four years,
we have done no training except--nothing on combined arms--just
on counterinsurgency--and that the Army can't respond to any
other war plan around this nation; was that the same for the
Marine Corps?
In your joint training area, would you say that is a
correct assessment that our military is--in order to get back
to the pre-Iraq days of readiness to respond to that is about
10 years?
General Mattis. Sir, I did not see the Commandant's--the
context of how he was----
Mr. Sestak. His exact words were ``about a decade.''
General Mattis. Yes, sir. We have lost some of our edge
that I believe that, thanks to the increased numbers of troops
that you have authorized us and the drawdown in CENTCOM, is
going to allow a graduated return to some of the things that
have atrophied.
Mr. Sestak. Would you think the time----
General Mattis. I don't believe it will take 10 years----
Mr. Sestak. All right.
General Mattis. But I can't--I would have to study it a
little bit and actually look at dwell times and training----
Mr. Sestak. If you are able to with our commitment in
Afghanistan, it would be great because I think that is one of--
you know, the national fabric of national security got changed
by Iraq. I am not arguing good or bad right now, although I
would argue bad.
But I would be curious if you did.
Admiral, one last question. And, first, for all three of
you, thanks for your service.
Advanced Electronic Guidance and Instrumentation System
(AEGIS)--we have taken and plucked out from the Czech Republic
and Poland what some would say was a stick in the eye of the
bear and placed the same missile defense capability at sea in a
way that protects us, some would argue, where we couldn't do
before--Turkey and Israel more immediately but also can give us
something in 2017 to more effectively defend our Nation here.
Right step?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes.
Mr. Sestak. He always cuts me off because I am a sophomore.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Finish your question.
Admiral Stavridis. I think the question was finished, and I
agree. I think we need to--we need to move forward, and I have
confidence in the AEGIS----
Mr. Sestak. In terms of, also, of negotiating with Russia
and----
Admiral Stavridis. I think it is----
Mr. Sestak [continuing]. Helping them pivot to Iran?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes.
Mr. Sestak. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Franks, wrap it up.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your lifetime commitment to
freedom. We never are grateful enough to you.
If it is okay, I wanted to take off on a point that Mr.
Taylor makes often about what keeps you up at night.
I have to suggest to you, even though my perspective is not
nearly as relevant as your own, that what keeps me up at night
is the potential of Iran gaining a nuclear capability. I know
that has been talked about and touched on significantly here.
But I think that we, perhaps, made an error--and I am sure
that there will be disagreement on the panel here--relating to
the European missile defense site. Most of you know that the
phased adaptive approach--and when we were in the Bush
Administration, these were things that were planned in general
already. These are already kind of on the planning schedule.
But I am concerned about the timing. You know, one of
critiques of the former missile defense plan was that it was
only expected to cover about 75 percent of our European allies
by 2013. But how does the phased adaptive approach compare
coverage wise by percentage of allies supported by that
timeline? And what can we look to in the future?
And, Admiral Stavridis, I will talk to you first about
that.
Admiral Stavridis. Sure. First of all, the answer to that
is a technical one, and I would have to really direct you to
the Missile Defense Agency. They are the people that kind of
come with that, and they can give you a very detailed briefing
on it.
But as I mentioned to Representative Sestak a moment ago, I
am confident in the ability to begin by using a sea-based
system off of our AEGIS ships, and it will provide some initial
coverage. And then the plan, without going into classified
details, is to use some of those systems ashore.
And I am confident that we will be able to transition that
technology. As to the precise degree of coverage and when it
walks in, there is a classified briefing that can take you
through that in detail.
Mr. Franks. Well, Admiral Stavridis, I appreciate your
perspective. I will just suggest to you that there is at least
a conclusion on the part of a lot of us that, even though no
one supports the AEGIS system more than I do--I think it is a
magnificent testimony of American technology and capability--it
is the timing.
My concern is that Iran, in all of their calculus of moving
forward a nuclear weapons program, I think part of their
concern is what would be the response of the Western world. I
am not sure that they are really too shook up about our
response at this point. I am thinking they are more concerned
about Israel's response.
But if we had had that capability to defend most of Europe
in the timeframe that could have at least beat them to the
punch, I think it might have played in their calculus. At this
point, I don't think that we are going to be able to have much
of a deterrence within the timeframe here.
And I guess I illustrate that by--it seems that we have
made a buy of eight SM-3 Block 1-B interceptors for this year,
and how does that affect the timeline in the phased adaptive
approach? I mean, what happens if the industrial base that is
currently set to produce 48 interceptors cannot make up the
difference after 2 years without any real substantive orders
from the Department of Defense? I mean, you understand we are
behind the eight ball here.
Admiral Stavridis. Well, again, sir, I am not the right
person to address the slip stream of missile moving forward,
but I will take that question to the Missile Defense Agency,
and I will make sure they come and give you a brief in-depth
about that.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Franks. Okay. I certainly don't mean to badger you
because I think you are doing your job in a magnificent way.
General Mattis, I appreciate your soldier statesman
diplomacy in clarifying that you were saying ``sustainability''
instead of ``irresponsibility.'' That is a word left to people
like myself, and I think I would probably--if I were to use
``irresponsibility,'' I would berate myself for understatement
because I do think that the budget irresponsibility this
administration has some pretty profound implications for our
military readiness in the future.
So with that in mind, if there were some area that you feel
like we are maybe missing the boat on making sure that we are
going to be ready for whatever contingencies come in the
future, what area of the budget--and it is not fair to ask you,
but I am sure your statesmanship will be in tact here too.
What area of the budget would you be concerned about the
most?
General Mattis. Representative, looking at my crystal ball,
which is about as good as anyone else's, we are facing an
increasingly difficult problem gaining access around the world.
And that access is being denied technologically, as we see a
profusion of precision weaponry being passed around the world.
We see it going to potential adversaries. It is political. All
politics being local, there are places where large footprints
of our troops ashore are not welcome.
I think we are going to have to see an increased naval
aspect to how we reassure our friends and temper potential
adversaries' plans using our asymmetric strengths of sea
control.
Thank you.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. McKeon, any further questions?
If not, the hearing comes to a close. We thank each one of
you for being with us, for your excellent testimony. In a word,
you make us proud.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 10, 2010
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK
Admiral Stavridis. BLUF: Re-engagement thru the Arctic Military
Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program would be prudent for the long
term cooperation and protection of the Arctic. The more venues in which
we can encourage dialogue and cooperation amongst the Arctic nations
the better opportunities we have to develop peaceful and meaningful
solutions to our challenges.
Background:
The AMEC program began as a Norwegian initiative to combine the
efforts of the U.S., Norway, and Russia to address environmental
problems in the arctic region associated with Russian nuclear submarine
decommissioning. In a 1999 program plan to the Congress, DOD stated
that AMEC projects would support the goals of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program. However in GAO-04-924 the GAO found that
``only one of eight AMEC projects designed to support CTR's objective
of dismantling Russia's ballistic missile nuclear submarines'' had done
so. ``Despite AMEC's limited contribution to the CTR, DOD officials,
including CTR representatives, said that most of the projects can be
used to support dismantlement of other types of Russian nuclear
submarines''
Jerry Havens, Distinguished Professor of chemical engineering and
director of the Chemical Hazards Research Center and reviewer for the
Technical Guidance Group of the AMEC program stated in 2004 that
``nuclear submarines pose a transnational-boundary environmental threat
primarily because of the highly radioactive spent fuel that remains in
their nuclear reactors'' and that ``It is critical that the United
States participate in the efforts to prevent further damage to the
environment. It's not just Norway's problem or Russia's problem . . .
eventually the pollutants released into the Barents Sea will wash up
onto our own shores.'' [See page 34.]
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
Admiral Stavridis. Last year, Admiral Roughead, the Chief of Naval
Operations, began studying the implications of climate change for the
Naval services. That research is ongoing as there are many factors that
must be analyzed. The U.S. Navy has no ice-hardened surface ships and
all of its icebreakers were transferred to the Coast Guard in 1965. As
such, the Coast Guard is the federal agency charged with operating the
Nation's icebreaking fleet. Polar-capable icebreakers are unique
national assets and the only USCG surface assets capable of projecting
and fulfilling national objectives in the Arctic region year round.
Therefore, I feel it prudent that the USCG maintain its current
icebreakers in operational condition until such time as the Nation can
determine the best mix of assets needed to meet national requirements.
[See page 32.]
Admiral Stavridis. Currently the Coast Guard has three polar-
capable icebreakers, although the USCGC POLAR STAR (WAGB-10) and USCGC
POLAR SEA (WAGB-11) are the only two built to handle heavy ice. Both
Polar-Class icebreakers are near the end of their service life. The
third icebreaker, HEALY is a multi-mission, medium icebreaker that
primarily supports Arctic science research; however, HEALY is not
nearly as capable at breaking thick ice as our two Polar-class
breakers. HEALY and POLAR SEA are operational. The Coast Guard is
reactivating POLAR STAR from a caretaker status and it should be
operational by the end of 2012. [See page 32.]