[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-121
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JIM COOPER, Tennessee LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
Columbia JIM JORDAN, Ohio
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
JACKIE SPEIER, California
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
------ ------
------ ------
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Ron Stroman, Staff Director
Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland DAN BURTON, Indiana
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire JOHN L. MICA, Florida
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
PETER WELCH, Vermont MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
BILL FOSTER, Illinois LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts JIM JORDAN, Ohio
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
Andrew Wright, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 29, 2009................................... 1
Statement of:
McCaffrey, General Barry, president, BR McCaffrey Associates,
former SOUTHCOM Commander, former Drug Czar; Jorge Pinon,
energy fellow, Center for Hemispheric Policy, the
University of Miami; Rensselaer Lee, senior fellow, Foreign
Policy Research Institute; Phil Peters, vice president,
Lexington Institute; and Sarah Stephens, executive
director, Center for Democracy in the Americas............. 15
Lee, Rensselaer.......................................... 29
McCaffrey, General Barry................................. 15
Peters, Phil............................................. 38
Pinon, Jorge............................................. 22
Stephens, Sarah.......................................... 72
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Flake, Hon. Jeff, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Arizona, prepared statement of.......................... 8
Issa, Hon. Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 12
Lee, Rensselaer, senior fellow, Foreign Policy Research
Institute, prepared statement of........................... 31
McCaffrey, General Barry, president, BR McCaffrey Associates,
former SOUTHCOM Commander, former Drug Czar, prepared
statement of............................................... 18
Peters, Phil, vice president, Lexington Institute, prepared
statement of............................................... 41
Pinon, Jorge, energy fellow, Center for Hemispheric Policy,
the University of Miami, prepared statement of............. 24
Stephens, Sarah, executive director, Center for Democracy in
the Americas:
9 Ways for us to Talk to Cuba & for Cuba to Talk to us... 73
Prepared statement of.................................... 166
Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts:
Cuba: A New Policy of Critical and Constructive
Engagement............................................. 52
Prepared statement of.................................... 4
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 2009
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tierney, Flake, Driehaus,
Fortenberry, and Issa (ex officio).
Also present: Representatives Cooper and Delahunt.
Staff present: Catherine Ribeiro, director of
communications; Mariana Osorio, Aaron Wasserman, and Cliff
Stammerman; legislative assistants; Anne Bodine, Alex McKnight,
Brendan Culley, and Steven Gale, fellows; Andy Wright, staff
director; Elliott Gillerman, clerk; Margaret Costa; intern;
John Cuaderes, minority deputy staff director; Adam Fromm,
minority chief clerk and Member liaison; Tom Alexander,
minority senior counsel; Dr. Christopher Bright, minority
senior professional staff member; Glenn Sanders, minority
Defense fellow.
Mr. Tierney. Good afternoon.
A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, the hearing entitled National
Security Implications of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, will come to
order.
I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking
member of the subcommittee and the ranking member of the full
committee be allowed to make opening statements. Without
objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Delahunt and Mr. Cooper
and Ms. Richardson all be allowed to participate in this
hearing. In accordance with the committee rules, they will only
be allowed to question the witnesses after all official members
of the subcommittee have had their turn first. Without
objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept
open for five business days so that all members of the
subcommittee will be allowed to submit a written statement for
the record. Without objection, that is so ordered as well.
First, let me thank all of you for your patience and
forbearance. They say the best-laid plans of mice and men
always go astray. And of course, they timed the voting just at
the beginning of this hearing, so 25 minutes has gone by, and
we regret that and apologize for any inconvenience it has made
for our witnesses.
We sincerely do appreciate all the help you have given us
in providing your written statements in advance, as well as
your willingness to testify here today.
At the outset of this hearing, I want to recognize the
leadership Ranking Member Flake has shown on this very
important issue. He has been recognized as one of the leaders
on this issue. He has recognized the need for advancement of
America's thinking on the subject, and he has been a principal
sponsor of major related legislation, together with our
Massachusetts colleague, Bill Delahunt. So thank you for your
leadership on this.
President Obama's April 13th announcement lifting
restrictions on family visits and remittances to Cuba I believe
is a step in the right direction. I hope it is the first step
in a long journey. Indeed, the President left open the door to
further changes when he stated ``We also believe that Cuba can
be a critical part of regional growth.`` The current U.S.
policy toward Cuba is anachronistic and unsustainable. It is a
source of contention between the United States and the rest of
Latin America, as well as the European Union.
In the lead-up to the recent Fifth Summit of the Americans
in Trinidad and Tobago the Costa Rican paper La Nacion observed
that all of Latin America is asking for an end to Cuba's
isolation. In today's hearing, the subcommittee aims to
identify concrete ways in which increased U.S.-Cuba cooperation
is in our own national security interest, ways it could support
the safety and security of U.S. citizens, and the nature of the
threat the United States would face should our interactions
stagnate or lessen.
The United States and Cuba have many shared concerns and a
long history of shared collaboration, such as joint medical
research that predates the Spanish American war, so-called
fence talks between Cuban and American soldiers on Guantanamo,
overflights by U.S. hurricane hunters to predict extreme
weather and piece-meal partnership between our Coast Guards.
Most of this cooperation requires nothing more than
political will to implement it. Increased cooperation in these
fields could give political leaders in both countries the
confidence they need to end the 50-year era of mistrust.
On April 13, 2009, a letter from 12 retired generals and
admirals to President Obama gave a persuasive argument for
greater U.S.-Cuba engagement. It stated as follows: ``Cuba
ceased to be a military threat decades ago. At the same time,
Cuba has intensified its global diplomatic and economic
relations with nations as diverse as China, Russia, Venezuela,
Brazil and members of the European Union. Even worse, the
embargo inspired a significant diplomatic movement against U.S.
policy when world leaders overwhelmingly cast their vote in the
United Nations against the embargo and then visited Havana to
denounce American policy. It is time to change the policy,
especially after 50 years of failure in obtaining our goals.''
These generals and admirals recommend ``renewed engagement
with Havana in key security issues such as narcotics
trafficking, immigration, airspace and Caribbean security.''
This idea of engagement underlies our current policies in Iran,
Syria and North Korea, all much graver concerns to the United
States, where Americans are currently free to travel.
Experts generally agree that the U.S.' national security
would be strengthened if Cuba pursued alternatives to
Venezuelan or Russian influence. Increasing energy trade with
Cuba would contribute to the U.S.' energy security. It would
create competition with the export-oriented populist agenda of
Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, while dampening Venezuela's
efforts to strengthen its regional presence through visible aid
to Cuba.
U.S. energy trade could also limit the attractiveness of
the more assertive foreign policy of Russia and China's
increased presence in Latin America and investment in Cuba's
energy segment. Cuba's strategic location and its apparent
seriousness of purpose in fighting drugs is another strong
argument for comprehensive U.S.-Cuban cooperation.
Closer coordination could also help close off trafficking
routes in the western Caribbean and disrupt ongoing operations
of South American cocaine mafias. Equally important, Cuba's
evacuation plans, post-disaster medical support and advanced
citizen preparedness education programs are well worth
studying. More than 1,600 Americans died during Hurricane
Katrina in 2005. The U.S. death toll from Hurricane Ike in 2008
came close to 100. Cuba's death rate from storms over the same
period, in contrast, was only about three people per year. Only
seven Cubans died from Hurricane Ike.
Hurricane preparedness is one of the few areas where the
United States and Cuba actually do talk to one another. The
U.S. National Hurricane Center has a good working relationship
with its Cuban counterpart, and hurricane hunters based in the
United States regularly cross Cuba's airspace, with its
government's permission.
However, other forms of cooperation with Cuba in hurricane
response are nearly non-existent. An open exchange of knowledge
and transfer of technologies could save lives.
All these factors, then, lead us to the inevitable
conclusion that talking to Cuba is in our own interest as well
as in Cuba's interest. Our expert witnesses today will detail
some steps that we should be taking. President Obama has taken
an important first step, now let's explore how and when we can
go further and do better.
At this point I would like to yield to Mr. Flake for his
opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John F. Tierney follows:]
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Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by
thanking you and the staff for the bipartisan manner in which
this hearing was prepared. And thank the witnesses, it is a
great group, I know all of you, and I look forward to the
testimony. We are sorry for holding you up.
I will be short here. As we know, the purpose of this
hearing is to review national security implications of our
current policy to Cuba. There is no denying, I think by
anybody, that our current policy toward Cuba has failed to
achieve the bipartisan goal of regime change. Instead, our
policy of isolation has turned the island in to what Retired
General Charles Wilhems has called a 47,000 square mile blind
spot in our security rear view mirror. We have little to show
for this policy but restrictions on the freedom of Americans
and tense regional relations.
While I have no sympathy for the Castro regime, my views on
the appropriate direction of U.S.-Cuba policy are well known. I
support ending the trade embargo, which has given the United
States a needless black eye in the region for far too long
without any gains. Along with many in the Cuban-American
community, I also support lifting of the travel ban for all
Americans, our best Ambassadors for democracy.
I congratulate the administration on the recent removal of
restrictions on Cuban-American travel and remittances. I also
welcome their willingness to review our current approach to the
island, perhaps a subject of a future subcommittee hearing, Mr.
Chairman.
However, I am also concerned about the continued emphasis
on reciprocity with respect to changes in U.S.-Cuban relations.
Rather than allowing the Cuban government to control the pace
and nature of our bilateral relations, I have long felt that
the United States must act in a manner consistent with our own
self-interest, independent of the politics and whims of a
foreign leader.
Given the recent emphasis on U.S.-Cuban relations, both
domestically and within the region, I welcome the opportunity
presented by this hearing to answer important questions such as
are there national security liabilities associated with our
policy of isolation? Given the lack of results of the current
approach, are these liabilities justified?
Now, independent of the imminent shift in U.S.-Cuba
relations, are there bilateral steps that can be taken that
will improve U.S. national security? Again, Mr. Chairman, I
thank you for holding this hearing and look forward to the
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jeff Flake follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you for your remarks.
We would like to give Mr. Issa, the ranking member of the
full committee, the opportunity to provide opening remarks as
well. So please, Mr. Issa, proceed.
Mr. Issa. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Chairman-in-waiting is
always a good title for a ranking member. [Laughter.]
Mr. Tierney. As long as you wait a long time. [Laughter.]
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be appropriately
patient.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing.
I want to take this opportunity to consider the debate on this
very important matter and to provide some alternate thinking,
but not to the extent that some might consider. I do agree that
we need to review our policy with all of the world's nations,
including Cuba, on a regular basis. I believe that this
administration, like all administrations, does need to
carefully analyze the longstanding policies of previous
administrations.
I certainly, for example, would hope that very shortly the
Taiwan Straits question be answered in the way that it has best
been answered since at least Richard Nixon.
But in the case of the 50 years since Fidel Castro toppled
a corrupt government and replaced it with his own tyrannical
regime, these true communists, both Fidel and Raul, have
retained their power by stifling any and all dissent. They have
imprisoned those who tried to open Cuban society and have
murdered political opponents. All the while the Cuban people
have suffered from failed economic conditions and imposed
communism.
We are not debating that here today. What we are debating
is how to best deal with a regime which is best described as
the Castro Brothers, now in the last years of their lives,
Fidel no longer running the government on a day-to-day basis,
but clearly having some role in the decision process. The air
waves are still not free in Castro's Cuba and will not be as
long as they remain in power.
But they cannot remain past the clock that God gives them.
So whether we see Hugo Chavez' influence in Cuba or North
Korea's or Russia's, there will be a change. I welcome the
opportunity today to consider, when that time comes, a little
before or a little after, being prepared to engage in positive
dialog with the people of Cuba, being able to end what since
1962 has been a blight on the Americas, with a failed state,
failed not just because economically it fails, but because it
fails to give its own people, some of the best, the brightest
and the most ambitious, the opportunities they so dearly seek.
In short, the Castro government is coming to an end and we
do need to consider today what to do when it ends. Having said
that, I believe the United States owes no apology for standing
up against Cuba and its government for many years. I continue
to believe that we must be prepared, if we cannot reach
effective transition for the Cuban people, we must be prepared
to stand up to them as we stand up to North Korea.
I do note to both the chairman and the ranking member of
the subcommittee, that we do have travel of Americans to many
countries, for example, China, which spies on us more than any
other nation on earth, and which is building a world class navy
and military and which has already shown an ability to shoot
down a satellite, and has certainly made it clear that is not
only their own satellite that could be shot down, is a place in
which Americans travel and Chinese students come here.
So Mr. Chairman, this is a mixed opening statement for a
reason. I want to hear what people have to say. I want to try
to reconcile the good policy of many years with the future
policy that may be an opportunity for the American people to
engage at the right time.
Last but not least, I would like to make it clear that when
it comes to General McCaffrey and the question of drugs, I
stand with all those who want to utilize every tool at our
disposal to stop drugs. I must, however, note that any
relationship with Castro's Cuba would have to begin to look at
the head of their own navy, who stands accused of drug
trafficking in this country and has not been brought to task
for that, and other similar situations in which it is believed
that Castro's Cuba may in fact be part of the problem and not
part of the solution.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for calling this
hearing and yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much for your comments.
Now, the subcommittee will receive comments from the panel
before us here today. I will introduce all of them and then ask
for testimony, starting at my left and moving across.
General Barry McCaffrey is a retired four star general, and
a 32-year veteran of the U.S. Army, during which he served as
Commander of the U.S. Southern Command [SOUTHCOM]. For 5 years
after leaving the military, General McCaffrey served as the
Nation's Cabinet Officer in charge of U.S. drug policy. After
leaving government service, General McCaffrey served from 2001
to 2005 as the Bradley Distinguished Professor of International
Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
He continues as an adjunct professor of international
affairs. He holds a B.S. from West Point and an M.A. from
American University and told me earlier he is a Massachusetts
native. That always counts for extra points here.
Mr. Jorge Pinon is an energy fellow from the University of
Miami Center for Hemispheric Policy. Prior to his current
position, he held a variety of senior positions in the energy
sector, including president and CEO of TransWorld Oil USA,
president of Amoco, Corporate Development Co. Latin America,
president of Amoco Oil of Mexico, and president of Amoco Oil
Latin America, based in Mexico City.
Mr. Pinon also currently serves as an advisor and a member
of the Cuba Task Force at the Brookings Institution and the
Council of the Americas.
Dr. Rens Lee is president of Global Advisory Services, a
McLean, VA based consulting firm. From 2002 to 2003, Dr. Lee
worked as a research analyst at the Congressional Research
Service. Dr. Lee has performed overseas contract assignments
for the State Department, the Department of Energy, the World
Bank, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
and other agencies. These assignments have covered Russia,
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caribbean and much of South
America.
He is currently writing a book on drugs, organized crime
and the politics of democratic transition in Cuba. Dr. Lee
holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University.
Mr. Philip Peters serves as vice president of the Lexington
Institute, where he has responsibility for international
economic programs with a focus on Latin America. Prior to
joining the Lexington Institute, Mr. Peters served in the State
Department under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.
He has also served as a senior aide in the House of
Representatives.
Mr. Peters is an advisor to the Cuba working group that
formed in January 2002 in the House of Representatives. Mr.
Peters holds both a B.A. and an M.A. from Georgetown
University.
Ms. Sarah Stephens is the executive director of the Center
for Democracy in the Americas. A long-time human rights
advocate, Ms. Stephens began her work with Central American
refugees in Los Angeles in the 1980's, and has since worked
with a number of human rights and civil rights organizations.
From 2001 to 2006, Ms. Stephens worked for the Center for
International Policy before leaving to launch the Center for
Democracy in the Americans.
Ms. Stephens has also led dozens of delegations of U.S.
policymakers, academics, experts and philanthropists to Cuba,
Chile and Venezuela on fact-finding and research missions.
Thank you all again for taking your time and making
yourselves available today and sharing your expertise.
It is the policy of this subcommittee to swear you in
before you testify, so I ask you to please stand and raise your
right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, the record will please reflect that
all the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
I remind all of you that your full written statement will
be put in the hearing record. We ask you to try to keep your
remarks to roughly 5 minutes. Most of you are familiar with the
lights. With 1 minute left, the amber light will come on. And
when 5 minutes are up, the red light will go off, and we will
ask you at that point to wind down.
So again, thank you. General McCaffrey, would you care to
start?
STATEMENTS OF GENERAL BARRY McCAFFREY, PRESIDENT, BR McCAFFREY
ASSOCIATES, FORMER SOUTHCOM COMMANDER, FORMER DRUG CZAR; JORGE
PINON, ENERGY FELLOW, CENTER FOR HEMISPHERIC POLICY, THE
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI; RENSSELAER LEE, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN
POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE; PHIL PETERS, VICE PRESIDENT,
LEXINGTON INSTITUTE; AND SARAH STEPHENS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS
STATEMENT OF GENERAL BARRY McCAFFREY
General McCaffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to
Congressman Flake also, and the members of the committee, for
the opportunity to be here.
I am also very impressed by the other members of the panel
and look forward to hearing their testimony. I thank you for
introducing into the record my own comments, which I wrote in
consultation with a bunch of people whose judgment I have
respect for.
Whenever you talk about Cuba, there are such powerful
animosities among the political agendas of those discussing the
situation that I always try and set the baseline of what I
actually think about Cuba. There are six quick observations,
one of which is, I understand Cuba as a failing Marxist
dictatorship. Second, that it is locked in a revolution that,
essentially since 1962, has had some difficulty adapting to the
globalization and the movement of the world around it.
Third, that their economy is a disaster. And in the short
term, they are being propped up by Venezuelan oil and dollars
out of the Chavez regime. But their bigger problem is that they
are running an artificial, centralized, under-resourced economy
where the true creative spirit of the Cuban people has been
suppressed.
Fourth, I understand there is no freedom of assembly,
speech, press, unions, where to live, no real choices. When you
see a lot of these refugees coming out of Cuba, it is not just
economic opportunity in Florida or Louisiana or Mississippi or
Texas they are seeking, they are looking for freedom, the same
reasons our grandparents came here.
Fifth observation, at the end of the day, the real power in
Cuba is unquestionably held in the hands of the two Castro
brothers. And indeed, I think Fidel recently has stepped on
Raul Castro's sort of grudging attempts to expand the nature of
the debate.
Behind the power of the Castro brothers is the Army and the
Interior Ministry. There are six three star generals and one
four star general in the military, Raul being the four star
general. All seven of them are in their late 60's or 70's. They
will be gone, along with much of the leadership of Cuba, in the
coming 5 years.
And then finally, I think when you look at the current
Cuban leadership, to some extent, you are looking at the Soviet
Union in the 1980's. It is the calm before the storm. The
question is, what do we do in the first term of the Obama
administration to make this thing come out better.
Congressman Flake I think said it in a very different way,
and I agree with his comment that to some extent, U.S. policy
has failed and we have left U.S. policy in the hands of the
Cubans. It is a very interesting dilemma. There is no question
we lack influence. When I was down there, I spent 12 hours with
the Castro brothers, acting as a professor at West Point on a
visit a couple years after 9/11. It was clear to me in my
subsequent dialog with the 40 somethings of the Cuban
Government that they are smart young people out there. They are
bilingual, they have traveled, they have ideas. We don't know
who they are and we are not engaged with them. We have
truncated and minimized our access to that regime.
Another observation, if I may. It seems to me
unquestionable that Cuba is of little threat to U.S. national
interests, certainly U.S. national security interests. Also, I
think this is a problem of modest importance to U.S. foreign
policy goals. In fact, although the Cubans wake up in the
morning thinking about little else than the injustice and the
opportunity the United States represents to them, on the
contrary, in the United States, I don't think we give it one
bit of thought. It just has not been central to our concerns,
even in the Caribbean region where we have seen other actors
with energy and leadership playing such a dramatic role,
certainly including Puerto Rico as a prime mover of
modernization in the region.
I think that at the end of the day, the saddest comment I
would make is I think the Cuban leadership is stuck. I cannot
imagine Fidel Castro or Raul in fact relenting and negotiating
away some aspects of the revolution. They are not going to do
it. I think they are worried about their families, their place
in history. They understand the time clock is running out on
them.
And I say that because I worry that the Obama
administration, which has done, I think, some incredibly smart
things, opening the dialog, acting in such a gracious and open
manner at Trinidad and Tobago, going to Mexico, sending the
Secretary of State to the region, eliminating some restrictions
on travel and remittances. Having said that, I think they will
be under great pressure to explain changes in terms of
reciprocity. What did we get back from them? Did they release
300 political prisoners in return for something we would do?
I don't think they are going to do anything for us. And
indeed, I would disengage U.S. foreign policy from trying to
get something back in the coming year or two. There are three
obvious things we ought to do, one of them has been mentioned
already. We ought to lift the economic embargo and allow
American citizens free transit to Cuba. I think that will be
the greatest benefit to the Cuban people imaginable in terms of
economic opportunity, new ideas, products, political thinking.
Second, we ought to formalize coordination on law
enforcement institutions between the Cuban government and the
American Government. I actually hadn't heard of the accusation
against the Navy chief. It is probably not central. I do not
believe the Cuban government is part of an international
conspiracy on drug smuggling. I think there are remnants of
communist morality there. They are worried about their own
kids. They have lots of drugs floating around Cuba that are
causing problems among their own young people and corrupting
their own institutions of government. But we ought to cooperate
not just on drugs but also human smuggling and other
international concerns such as terrorism.
Then finally, it seems to me the U.S. Government ought to
end opposition to Cuban participation in Western Hemisphere or
multinational fora to include the Organization of American
States, Summit of the Americas, etc. Through engagement, we can
move this process along. We are going to have a terrible
challenge in Cuba. I liken it to East Germany. That problem
took a generation to begin to solve. And I think the same thing
is going to happen in Cuba.
So I am all for dramatic, sudden initiatives on the part of
the Obama administration to directly engage the Cubans.
Thanks very much for allowing me to offer these ideas, and
I look forward to responding to your own questions.
[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, General. We appreciate your
remarks.
Mr. Pinon.
STATEMENT OF JORGE PINON
Mr. Pinon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Nearly 2 years ago, under the auspices of the Brookings
Institution, I was invited to be part of a group of 19
distinguished academics, opinion leaders and international
diplomats committed to seeking a strong and effective U.S.
policy toward Cuba. Under the leadership of Ambassador Carlos
Pascual and Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, our team of well-known
experts in the field of U.S.-Cuba relations carried out a
series of simulation exercises and discussions that have served
to enhance our understanding of the complex political realities
of Cuba and the United States.
By testing the responses of several strategic actors and
stakeholders through a variety of scenarios, we have identified
potential catalysts and constraints to political change on the
island. The end result of our effort was a road map report
entitled Cuba: A New Policy of Critical and Constructive
Engagement, which I believe the committee has a copy of.
Two-thirds of Cuba's petroleum demand currently relies on
imports, and Venezuela is the single source of these imports
under heavily subsidized payment terms. This petroleum
dependency, valued at over $3 billion in 2008, could be used by
Venezuela as a tool to influence a Cuban government in
maintaining a politically antagonistic and belligerent position
toward the United States.
Cuba has learned from past experiences and is very much
aware of the political and economic risks and consequences of
depending on a single source for imported oil. The collapse of
the Soviet Union 1991 and the 2003 Venezuelan oil strike taught
Cuba very expensive lessons.
Raul Castro understands the risks. His recent visits to
major oil exporters such as Brazil, Russia, Angola and Algeria
underscore his concerns. A relationship with Brazil would
provide a balance to Cuba's current dependency, while others
could bring with it corrupt and unsavory business practices.
Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its own
resources, estimated by the USGS to be at 5.5 billion barrels
of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, will it have
the economic independence needed in order to consider a
political and economic evolution.
Although Cuban authorities have invited U.S. oil companies
to participate in developing their offshore oil and natural gas
resources, U.S. law does not allow it. Today, international oil
companies such as Spain's Repsolo, Norway's Statoil Norsk Hydro
and Brazil's Petrobras are active in exploration activities in
Cuba's Gulf of Mexico waters.
American oil and oil equipment and service companies have
the capital, technology and operational know-how to explore,
produce and refine in a safe and responsible manner Cuba's
potential oil and natural gas reserves. Yet they remain on the
sidelines because of our almost five-decade old political and
economic embargo.
The President can end this impasse by licensing American
companies to participate in developing Cuba's offshore oil and
natural gas. In the opinion of legal experts consulted, Mr.
Chairman, no legislation prevents the President from
authorizing U.S. oil companies from developing Cuba's oil and
natural gas reserves.
The Cuban government, influenced by its energy benefactors,
would most likely result in a continuation of the current
political and economic model. If Cuba's future leaders are
unable to fill the power vacuum left by the departure of the
old cadre, they could become pawns of illicit drug activities,
drug cartels, and the United States could face a mass illegal
immigration by hundreds of thousands of Cubans.
The Brookings report proposes, Mr. Chairman, as part of a
phased strategy, a policy that supports the emergence of a
Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the political and
economic future of their country through democratic means. To
achieve this goal, Mr. Chairman, Cuba must achieve energy
independence.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, if U.S. companies were allowed
to contribute in developing Cuba's hydrocarbon reserves, as
well as renewable energy, such as solar, wind and sugar cane
ethanol, it would reduce the influence of autocratic and
corrupt government on the island's road toward self-
determination. Most importantly, it would provide the United
States and other democratic countries with a better chance of
working with Cuba's future leaders to carry out reforms that
would lead to a more open and representative society.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pinon follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much, Mr. Pinon.
Dr. Lee.
STATEMENT OF RENSSELAER LEE
Mr. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My argument today is that Cuba can play a potentially
pivotal role in controlling the Caribbean drug trade and that
this reality creates both opportunities and challenges for
U.S.-Cuban relations. Cuba's geographical location makes it a
tempting target for international traffickers. The island lies
only 90 miles from Key West on a direct flight path from
Colombia's Caribbean coast to the southeastern United States.
Cuba claims to have seized some 65 tons of drugs in the
past decade, most of it heading toward the Bahamas and the
United States. The United States and Cuba have an obvious
mutual interest in stemming this flow and in preventing
Colombian and Mexican cocaine kingpins from setting up shop on
the island. Yet they have not entered into a formal agreement
to fight drugs, although Cuba maintains such agreements with
more than 30 other countries. What cooperation exists occurs
episodically on a case by case basis.
Washington and Havana need to engage more fully on the
issue, jointly deploying intelligence and interdiction assets
to disrupt smuggling networks that operate in the western
Caribbean. To date, though, Washington has shied away from a
deeper relationship, fearing that this would lead to a
political opening and confer a measure of legitimacy upon the
Castro regime. Yet current strategic realities in the region
and Havana's evident willingness to engage in such a
relationship, as well as impending leadership changes in Cuba,
argue that we should rethink these concerns.
The cooperative framework that I envisage does not imply
approval of the Castro regime. It would entail increased U.S.
law enforcement presence on the island and increased bureaucrat
to bureaucrat contacts at the working level that might serve as
a platform for reshaping U.S. relations with Cuba during a time
of leadership transition.
Now, Cuba has some history of high level official
connections to Colombian cocaine exporters. And I describe
these at some length in my written testimony. But in the past
20 years, the regime has made considerable effort to distance
itself from these criminal associations, expanding drug
cooperation with western and Latin American nations and
adopting an increasingly prohibitionist approach toward illegal
drugs at home that includes some of the most draconian anti-
drug legislation anywhere on the planet.
This incidentally contrasts very sharply with the harm-
reductionist and non-coercive drug control policies espoused by
some Latin American leaders. Several factors may account for
this shift: the growing internal market for cocaine and
marijuana; the need for international acceptance following the
collapse of the USSR, Cuba's main patron at the time; and a
perceived juxtaposition of international drug connections and
pressures for economic and political reform inside Cuba.
For these reasons and others, a U.S.-Cuban entente against
the hemispheric drug threat, unthinkable a decade or more ago,
seems worthy of consideration today, despite vast differences
in our political systems and the absence of diplomatic ties. In
any case, we need to look forward and not backward in managing
relations with that country. The drug threat from Cuba seems
likely to increase with time as the Castro regime's
revolutionary order loses its hold and appeal. More opening to
foreign trade and investment, coupled with liberalization of
the economy and some loosening of political controls, could
foster new alliances of convenience between criminally inclined
Cuban nationals and South American or Mexican drug cartels.
Interdiction successes in Mexico and resulting shifts in
drug routes eastward to the Caribbean could aggravate these
problems, culminating in the emergence of a bastion of
organized crime and drugs only 90 miles from U.S. shores, an
outcome I think hardly in the best interests of the United
States and other countries in the hemisphere.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Peters.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP PETERS
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Flake. I want
to commend you for having this hearing.
I think that our policy toward Cuba has been an extremely
ambitious one, but it has also been one that has been very un-
examined. So I think it is a very good thing that Congress look
piece by piece at this policy, as you are doing here,
especially when you consider that, for all the changes
President Obama has made, and they are good changes, the policy
remains 90 percent that of President Bush. There is a lot to
examine.
With regard to the security issues that you bring us here
to discuss today, I agree with General McCaffrey that I don't
believe that Cuba represents a security threat to us. I think
the security issue for us is whether we want to seize the
opportunity to address some security issues that are regional
in nature by talking with the Cubans and seeing if it's
possible to establish or increase our cooperation.
So I think that it would make sense for the United States
to talk more intensively with Cuba about migration. We already
have migration accords with them. But there may be additional
steps we could take to address issues such as alien smuggling,
which is a transnational crime. As you know, there are rings of
unscrupulous alien smugglers that have put people's lives at
risk, that have killed migrants and that also operate through
Mexico and complicate our relationship with Mexico and cause
the Mexican government a great deal of grief.
We of course should talk more about drug trafficking with
Cuba. We have limited cooperation with them. In my statement,
which I would ask that you put in the record, I cite at length
the assessment of the U.S. State Department that was just put
out last month, which basically says that our cooperation with
Cuba works reasonably well and that Cuba is in the habit of
passing on actionable information when they get it about drug
shipments passing through their territory.
We should talk about the environment with Cuba for a very
simple reason. Take a map, look at where Cuba is thinking of
drilling, look at where the Gulf Stream goes and see that it
ends up on the eastern coast of Florida, and take into account
that area off Florida's coast is the area of greatest
biodiversity in our marine environment anywhere. An accident in
Cuba's offshore area where they are going to drill for oil
becomes our problem within a matter of days. So it is nuts that
the United States is not talking to Cuba about the normal
disaster preparedness things that we would do if it were any
other country.
Also, I think we should add, or at least explore, military
relations with Cuba. It makes no sense whatsoever that our
SOUTHCOM commanders know the leadership of the military
institutions everywhere in the hemisphere but not that of Cuba.
Certainly, if you look at the relationship, the military to
military relationship we have with China, it is not a bowl of
cherries, it doesn't work perfectly, but it has gone on for
about two decades with all the incidents that have occurred and
with the broad differences we have because the idea is to
establish relationships, to establish an understanding of each
side's intentions and to work on things such as crisis
prevention. And certainly without exhausting our imaginations
too much, it is easy to think of crises that could occur in the
straits between the United States and Cuba.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I was struck by Mr. Issa's opening
statement. Even thought he has departed the room, I want to
address myself a little bit to him, because I believe in all
these initiatives I just stated to you, I believe in them in
the context of greater engagement. As a Republican, listening
to him, I hear him expressing some of the doubts and issues
that come to any Republican's mind, or any American's mind,
when you think of Cuba. That is a very clear revulsion against
the human rights practices of the Cuban government, not in a
political science theory way, but because those practices hold
down the Cuban people, suppress their creativity and their
energy and their ability to make a better life for themselves.
And at the same time, there is a nagging question of
whether we should engage on a broader sense, as Mr. Issa
referred, as we do with China. As he said, we allow Americans
to travel there and we allow Chinese students to come here. But
he asked the question, well, what would be the right time to
engage. Well, I would just say this: what time is it in Cuba?
It is the end of an era in Cuba right now. Our influence is
low. We were a superpower and we think we can do a lot of
things.
But it is a little hard for us to swallow some times, this
country is so close to us, our influence is very low. Our
influence is low because our contacts are very low. They are at
a time now when this generation of the Castros that won the
revolution, the clock is running out and they are going to be
leaving. The younger generation, as General McCaffrey referred,
is in the wings. They know that the system is not a failed
system, but it is not working. Young people don't have hope.
The young people that are such a precious resource are
emigrating and want to emigrate in very large numbers. There is
severe income inequality that they haven't been able to solve,
and there is not hope among the younger generation. They don't
create enough jobs. This younger generation knows they have to
do something to address those issues, because they will be much
worse if the current generation doesn't get to them before they
leave.
So they have these huge problems hanging, and what is our
response? Well, we don't really want to connect with the next
generation. Oh, you want to invite Cuban academics here? Well,
no, our policy won't allow that. You want to have conferences
in Cuba? Well, the Treasury Department is going to stop you
because of what you would spend on that. Our universities want
to have student exchanges? Well, no, you can't get a license
for that if it is a 2-week program, it has to be 10 weeks or
more. High school students? No, they can't go to Cuba.
All the people-to-people programs, abolished under the Bush
administration. It is no wonder we have no influence in that
country, because we don't have contact there. So I would say
this is a moment, with all respect to his question, of course
it is the right question to ask when. I would say the time is
now, because this is a time when, of all times, we should be
seeking to engage that next generation of Cubans.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Peters follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much, Mr. Peters.
In response to your comment, all of your statements and all
of the other witnesses' statements will be incorporated into
the record by unanimous consent.
Mr. Pinon, I noticed that in your written remarks, you
asked that a report entitled, ``Cuba: A New Policy of Critical
and Constructive Engagement,'' that was just released last
week, also be put into the record. If you still wish that to be
done, with unanimous consent, that will happen.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Ms. Stephens, please.
STATEMENT OF SARAH STEPHENS
Ms. Stephens. Thank you, Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member
Flake and the members of the subcommittee for the opportunity
to appear before you today.
I serve as the executive director for the Center for
Democracy in the Americas. It is a non-profit, non-
governmental, independent organization. Our freedom to travel
campaign has taken bipartisan delegations with over 60 Members
of the House and Senate and their professional staffs to Cuba
since 2001.
With the prospects for talks between the United States and
Cuban governments increasing, having a discussion now about how
engagement can best serve our Nation's security and broader
interests could not be more timely. Earlier this year, our
organization published this report, ``The Nine Ways for Us to
Talk to Cuba and for Cuba to Talk to Us.'' Mr. Chairman, I
would appreciate having this submitted for the record as well.
Mr. Tierney. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Ms. Stephens. Our contributors, who include a former
combatant commander of SOUTHCOM, a Homeland Security appointee
from the Bush administration, energy scholars from the James
Baker Institute at Rice University and authorities on issues
from migration to academic exchange, all argued this. Rather
than refusing to engage with Cuba diplomatically, our country
could best promote our national interest and our values by
engaging Cuba's government in talks about problems that concern
us both.
This report is a direct outgrowth of our organization's
trip to the island. Our delegations speak to government
officials, the Catholic Church, civil society, foreign
embassies and foreign investors, artists, and ordinary people,
about everything from their private aspirations to their views
about U.S. policy. These conversations drive home to the
policymakers the cost of our isolation from the Cuban people in
powerful and practical ways beyond simple commerce.
Isolation stops us from working with Cuba on issues we have
heard about today, like migration and counter-narcotics, that
lie at the core of our neighborhood security. It prevents our
diplomats at the U.S. Interest Section from doing what their
counterparts at foreign embassies do, traveling the island or
meeting with Cuban officials.
Many Cubans find our refusal to sit down with their
government and acknowledge its sovereignty disrespectful to
them and their country. This isolation from Cuba reduces the
United States to bystander status, as Phil said, as Cubans are
seeking to determine their future.
After these trips, almost every member of our delegations
asks, why aren't we talking to these people? We don't propose
talk for its own sake. Instead, experts like those here today
and the qualified scholars we recruited for our book have
identified proposals that would allow Washington and Havana to
work together on issues of concern to both countries. Let me
highlight just a few of those recommendations.
On security issues, they urge increased dialog between the
Cuban armed forces and the U.S. Southern Command; greater
intelligence sharing to fight drug trafficking; and increasing
contacts between the DEA, the Marshals Service, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and their Cuban counterparts.
To help with hurricane preparedness and self-defense, they
suggest allowing Cuban scientists and emergency managers to
visit the United States and share information on evacuation
plans, post-disaster medical support and citizen disaster
preparedness education programs, and permitting U.S. scientists
and emergency managers to visit Cuba and observe storm
evaluations in real time.
On medical research and academic exchange, they advocate
removing Cuba from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list to
allow exchange of professionals in health care and research,
lifting restrictions on educational trips to facilitate medical
education and including Cuba in the Fulbright Program and the
Benjamin A. Gilman International Scholarship Program.
In every case, these recommendations and others in the
report can offer tangible benefits for both Cubans and
Americans and improve the prospect that our governments will
address issues that have divided us for so long.
Engagement is not a panacea. We know that the differences
between the United States and Cuba cannot be papered over and
that the United States has profound disagreements with Cuba
about how best to advance the ideas of human rights and
democracy. But the message today is this: if we wait for Cuba
to capitulate as a precondition for our talking to them, or if
Cuba waits for us to repeal the embargo before they will talk
to us, nothing will ever change, and the status quo is
increasingly harmful to U.S. national and diplomatic interests.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we need to
accept these facts and take the initiative, not in leaps and
bounds, but with small steps on concrete issues where
cooperation is in our national interest and likely to yield
real results. The administration appears ready to follow this
approach, and it is our hope that the ideas, like those in our
Nine Ways report, will be helpful to them and to this committee
going forward.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stephens follows:]
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Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much. Like all the other
witnesses, your testimony is extremely helpful and we are
appreciative of it.
We are going to go into our question and answer period
here. I would just like to begin by noting that, General
McCaffrey, in your written remarks, you indicate obviously that
Cubans will have to define their own political systems and
determine the pace of transition. You note that outsiders can
be supportive, and those outsiders include the United States,
Latin American nations, European Union, non-governmental
organizations and multi-lateral organizations. But in the end,
Cubans have to own and be in charge of the process of
determining their own future political system and rules of
engagement.
Given that, who should take the lead? Should it be a
regional organization? A non-profit organization? An
international organization? Or a particular country?
General McCaffrey. Well, it is probably at the heart and
soul of how we move ahead. It seems to me, back to Congressman
Flake's opening remarks, that the opening salvo of engagement
on Cuba ought to be U.S. unilateral decisions. There is a
series of them, the easiest ones of course being economic
embargo, people, law enforcement cooperation, that sort of
thing. Then there are some dramatic moves we could make, some
of which really don't cost us anything.
Mr. Castro engaged me for a couple of hours, he wants his
spies back from Florida. I remember telling him, I said, Mr.
Castro, I am sure you are very proud of these men and they are
Cuban patriots and you will get them back eventually when we
have normalized relations. So at some point, they may be
another pawn we can throw to Castro that would allow him to
move ahead.
It seems to me, however, that the real process of bringing
Cuba back into the family of the Americas ought to be multi-
national. We ought to go find multiple mechanisms that allow us
to be one of many engaging with Cuba. And certainly that
includes the Organization of American States, which indeed
needs something to develop its own muscle power.
But then there are obviously international organizations.
The United Nations itself has several law enforcement
mechanisms that could serve our purpose on counter-drug
cooperation. I don't think U.S.-Cuba direct dialog in the
immediate future is likely to be as effective as going to
multi-national engagement.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
Mr. Peters, there were great comments about all the
positive things that could come from re-engaging with Cuba. If
that re-engagement were actually to take place, are there
potential negatives we ought to be prepared to deal with should
things get normalized eventually? Will there be consequences of
that which will impact the United States in such a way that we
are going to have to prepare in advance? Immigration being one
that comes to my mind right away, but that or others?
Mr. Peters. Well, I don't, Mr. Chairman, see a particular
down side in engaging with Cuba on migration, on drugs, on
environmental protection, or for that matter, establishing
military to military relations. I don't think the thing is to
deal with Cuba as if it were any other country, I think we
should deal with Cuba as we have dealt with communist
countries, across administrations of both Democrats and
Republicans, with our eyes wide open. But on the security
issues, I don't see a particular down side.
I also think it is important to point out, I don't believe
that Cuba is necessarily going to be an ideal partner on all
these things. We have good cooperation on drug interdiction.
But that took some time to get going, and there were some bumps
along the way if you talk to people in the Coast Guard that
were involved in that.
Perhaps there was a sense in your question about long-term
immigration policy. I believe that immigration policy is
something that should be examined. It is interesting that in
Miami right now there is some discussion about the need to
perhaps re-examine our immigration policy. It is unique toward
Cuba. Cubans come here without a visa and set foot on our
territory and they are admitted. Within a year, they are
permitted to move toward legal permanent residence. And from
the very beginning, they get a lot of government benefits, the
same package of government benefits that a refugee would get.
These are people who come without a visa and don't claim or
meet the standard of having a well-founded fear of persecution
if they were to return.
There is some debate in Miami now about whether that should
continue or not, especially when Cuban Americans are now free
to travel back and forth. Certainly this policy that we have,
which is purely at executive discretion, is not something that
was contemplated in the Cuban Adjustment Act, although it is
permitted by it. So I think that is something worth looking at.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
And finally, Ms. Stephens, you note that the Interest
Section that the United States has in Cuba is not doing some of
the very ordinary things that their counterparts in foreign
embassies do. What are they doing?
Ms. Stephens. What are the people in our U.S. Interest
Section doing?
Mr. Tierney. What are they doing, if they are not traveling
the island, meeting with officials and the normal things that
you would expect for embassies to do, can you give us some
observation of what effect they are having and what they are
doing?
Ms. Stephens. Well, it sort of depends who is there. The
current chief of the U.S. Interest Section is Mr. Farrar. He, I
think, is doing a very good job of having eyes and ears out as
far as he can go. He is really making a genuine effort to
understand what is going on within the boundaries of where he
is allowed to travel on the island.
When I was last in Cuba, I had a meeting with him at the
Interest Section and then the next morning ran into him at the
church across the harbor in Regla. He is clearly trying to
learn and understand within the limitations he has.
Others have done it differently. Previous chiefs have put
up billboards along the highway in front of the Interest
Section, I am sorry, not billboards, but have put up electronic
signs, you have probably heard about this, that run news and
then accusations about the reality on the island that are
meant, I guess were meant to educate the Cuban population but
instead embarrassed the United States and infuriated the
Cubans. So I would say it kind of depends who is there.
But they definitely have a very limited experience, not
being able to talk to the Cuban government.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Flake.
Mr. Flake. Thank you. I appreciate all of the testimony. It
was very enlightening.
General McCaffrey, you mentioned, I liked your statement
that we have truncated and minimized our access to that regime
and the people in that regime. And certainly that has been my
experience there, we have no idea who the people in waiting are
there. That is a bit troubling.
But one thing that we always hear is, we can't engage with
a country or we can't allow Americans to travel to a country
that is one of our listed state sponsors of terrorism. Does
that give you any pause in making the recommendations that you
have made to lift the embargo or what-not? Should we be doing
that to some country that has been identified as a state
sponsor of terrorism?
General McCaffrey. I think there are still seven nations on
State Sponsors of Terrorism. The Cuba piece of it I think is 80
words, very cryptic. There is probably no current reality to
that at all. I think in past years, you could have made that
argument. They were an active threat, 25 years ago, they had
250,000 troops in Africa, they were very aggressively, with
covert agents, trying to foment revolutions around the
Americas. But I don't think that is the case any longer. I
cannot imagine the Cubans realistically being a threat to our
national security interests in the short run.
Now, having said that, again, I think Mr. Peters makes a
good point, we ought to have a dialog with them with our eyes
wide open. But clearly, 5 years from today, if we don't know
who the one star generals and the battalion commanders and the
key intelligence officers are in Cuba, we have harmed our own
ability to protect the interests of the American people. We
have to get down there and engage with them. We ought to have
influence. We ought to give them something to prize as opposed
to merely withholding things from their society.
It seems to me, again, the down side risk is almost non-
existent.
Mr. Flake. Mr. Pinon, it is often said as well that we
somehow lend legitimacy to the regime if we take action to
engage them on issues of national security, drug interdiction,
migration. Can you comment on that? Do we somehow lend
legitimacy to that regime?
Mr. Pinon. I come from the private sector. Early on I
learned from a former boss of mine that when you read it on the
front page of the Wall Street Journal, it is too late. So I
believe in early engagement. Early engagement somehow gets
misdirected. We are talking about conversations, we are talking
about dialog at different levels.
I was just in Cuba 2 weeks ago. I was there at the time of
the baseball game between Cuba and Japan. Let me tell you,
people in the street want to engage you. They do want to talk.
They want to talk about the United States. They want to talk
about President Obama.
So I think the fear of engagement, the fear of
conversation, particularly in the case of Cuba, there is really
no justification for not having it.
Mr. Flake. Mr. Peters, do you have any comment on that, as
far as the legitimacy argument? Is it a moot point after 50
years that we would somehow lend legitimacy to the regime? That
is often brought up, I can tell you, in Congress here, should
we lend legitimacy to that regime at this point.
Mr. Peters. That seems to me to be a diplomatic issue that
would be raised in the very early months of a government such
as Cuba's, when there is doubt as to whether it is going to
hang on or not. But we are quite a bit past that point, and I
don't think that issue or any of the variations imply that Cuba
is on the brink and that whether we engage or not is going to
change the equation in a decisive way. I don't think any of
those arguments hold water.
But more importantly, I think the fact that this issue
comes up tells us just how far out of the mainstream of
American foreign policy this policy is. President Reagan
engaged with the Soviet Union. President Nixon engaged with
China. Presidents of both parties have engaged with all kinds
of governments that are not particularly nice and where we have
very, very vast differences in terms of our security interests
and our values and about things like human rights practices.
I don't think that President Reagan's trips to the Soviet
Union, his walking around Moscow with Gorbachev, anything like
that, I don't think anyone would say that President Reagan was
legitimizing the Soviets or their system.
Mr. Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Driehaus, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Driehaus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I missed
the oral testimony. I was in a markup in another committee, but
I appreciate the opportunity to ask a few questions today.
I notice in your written testimony, General McCaffrey, that
you noted that Cubans must own and be in charge of the process
of determining their future political system. And the United
States can be supportive of that effort.
How have you seen the attitudes of Cubans on the ground
change in recent times to suggest that this is a unique
opportunity to engage and to pursue more open relations? Have
you seen that? Is there an attitude in Cuba that this is a
unique time and that we do have a critical opportunity to
engage?
General McCaffrey. Well, I would probably say it is more a
unique time in the United States than in Cuba. For the first
year of this administration, there is a tremendous openness to
new thinking, to erasing past mistakes. We have been, I say
this painfully, discredited in many ways in the international
community. So I think we have an opportunity to proceed
unilaterally to change the nature of the debate.
In Cuba, by the way, years ago, I lose track of time, 1996
or so, I had 10,000, 15,000 Cubans pulled out of the sea and
end up under my care in Panama. We had them there really as
refugee status. I spent a lot of time walking around talking to
Cubans from all walks of life, from intel officers to military
officers to business people, to families, whatever. It came
across to me that there is a general notion that Fidel was a
national symbol that they admired.
But almost uniformly, across every aspect of Cuban society
as I talked to them, they thought that these people had a
failed philosophical approach, the economics weren't going to
work, it would never change as long as they were in power. And
that is why they took grandmother and children and everyone and
went down to the sea to escape. They were seeking freedom from
a failed system.
I don't think there is any support, long-term, among the
rank and citizens of Cuba for this kind of regime. But I do
think the power still flows out of the barrel of a gun. Until
we have engaged in new ideas and opportunities and thinking and
tourism and engagement of people to people happens, it is
unlikely that Cuba is going to represent anything but an
insular prison.
Mr. Driehaus. Just as a followup to Congressman Flake's
question regarding whether or not we are legitimizing the Cuban
government structure and some of their human rights efforts or
violations by engaging them, can you draw a comparison? I
appreciate, Mr. Peters, the comparison with the Soviet Union
and the visits to the Soviet Union. But obviously, we are very
engaged with China. Are there substantive differences in terms
of regime, in terms of human rights policies, between Cuba and
China, such that Cuba is so much worse that we wouldn't engage
them, versus the types of practices we currently engage with in
China?
General McCaffrey. Was that addressed to me, sir?
Mr. Driehaus. You or Mr. Peters.
General McCaffrey. I was thinking, with some amusement, I
have been a negotiator in international arms control and other
drug policy. I have dealt with a lot of people around the face
of the earth, many of whom I was thinking throughout the dialog
that probably the next visit would be from the U.S. Air Force,
some truly dreadful regimes that we opened dialog because we
thought it served our interests and our own people. Certainly
the pre-Balkan-Serbian leadership that was enslaving a lot of
the region, and for that matter, dealing with the Russians,
trying to help them get away from their dreadful past, with
tens of millions murdered by their own political system.
So I cannot imagine that the United States, notwithstanding
the damage that has been done to our reputation in the last few
years by some mis-steps, but I cannot imagine our international
reputation for our values, for open government, for
opportunity, for the way in which minorities and women have
taken their place in our society, it is hard to imagine that we
would damage that reputation by dealing with the Cubans. It is
silly, completely silly. We are dealing with the North Koreans,
for God's sake. They murdered a million of their own people
through starvation in gulags. They have nuclear weapons. They
are a tremendous threat to the region. We are dealing,
correctly, with the Iranians now in a very careful way.
So I think most of the other panel apparently feels the
same way. The lack of open dialog, public dialog with the
Cubans is a huge mistake and needs to be corrected. The window
might close on us within a year or so.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to return to the question that Congressman
Flake posed about conferring legitimacy by the potential
engagement, and look at that through another nuanced
perspective. Not so much legitimacy on the current regime, but
the legitimacy in the sense of potentially extending the power
and authority of the current regime into time if we empower
them with resources by the types of, well, perhaps more
aggressive engagement, particularly economically, that you see
some persons interested in.
I think that is an important point. Several years ago,
before coming to Congress, as I was just simply looking at this
from the perspective of a citizen watching American public
policy dynamics in the region, it occurred to me that some
movement in a direction of potential engagement with the
country seemed reasonable. There seemed to be some opening for
liberalization in society with differing viewpoints that
occurred. A number of people took that opportunity and 75
academics, political scientists, journalists, librarians were
then thrown into jail, many of them still in jail, several were
executed, who had tried to leave.
That was a grave reminder of what we are dealing with here.
So two questions, conferring legitimacy to the extent that it
has the risk of extending the brutality of the regime into the
future, and second, engagement with whom? They could engage
with us tomorrow. They could throw the door wide open and I am
sure we would rush through it and embrace them if there was a
change of perspective and a certain increase of their capacity
for that society to respect human rights and reevaluate itself
based upon the fundamental principles that inform the hearts of
all humanity.
So I throw that question to all of you, since you all have
touched on that narrative thread.
General McCaffrey. I think your concerns are entirely on
target. My take on it was that first of all, if I thought
strangling Cuba economically would bring down the regime, it
might be an appropriate course of action to consider. But it
hasn't worked. In fact, I think the last time we tightened the
screws in the last couple of years, a lot of the Cuban American
community said, yes, let's give it a chance, maybe it will
work. It hasn't. So you have seen these dramatic changes in
polling data now, of the Cuban American community, where
particularly the younger people are saying, this isn't the way
to go, our families are suffering. We want open access to them.
I think the mood of the country, by the way, has changed
dramatically, our country. And they are open now to new
thinking.
Another thought, just to offer it. I have participated in
an awful lot of U.S. efforts to bring somebody to their knees
through blockades and economic embargoes: Serbia, the Iraqis,
the North Koreans and others. And it never works. Normally what
happens is you end up lowering the lifestyle of the broad
population, Serbia certainly springs to mind, and suddenly
cigarette smugglers become the wealthiest people in Serbia. So
you distort the economy, you magnify the control of the
repressive forces.
Now, there may be some room for some of that, certainly, if
we are worried about nuclear weapons. We have to be very
careful about technology access for some of these regimes. But
again, it is hard for me to think in my own mind objectively of
a reason why we don't unilaterally open the floodgates of
ideas, people, and access to Cuba, and then in the coming
decade, because I think we are talking about 10 years to re-
integrate Cuba, try and work in a very positive way and not
determine their future but assist them in thinking through and
struggling through this issue.
Mr. Pinon. Your pushback was one that we received at
Brookings when we put on the table the proposal of somehow
finding a way that we would de-link Cuba from Venezuela.
Because our proposal was to open the energy sector. And the
answer, the pushback was, well, that could certainly have an
effect in which it would continue supporting the current
regime.
So we went through that scenario planning. We did spend a
least a day and a half on that. We found that it was very, very
important to find a way to de-link Cuba from Venezuela. The
first 30 years of the Cuban revolution partly was successful
because of its dependence on the Soviet Union. For the last 8
years, Cuba today economically is still going because of its
dependence on Venezuela.
Oil development is going to take, Congressman, at least
anywhere between 3 to 5 years. So it is something that is not
going to happen overnight. It will take at least 3 to 5 years.
And Cuba will have to produce at least 200,000 barrels a day in
order for them to net the same economic benefit that they are
receiving today from Venezuela.
So the issue of opening Cuba's energy sector for
exploration and production for U.S. companies was a way of de-
linking Cuba from Venezuela, because we don't believe that Cuba
can make its own decisions in the future, depending on
Venezuela.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. If other members of the panel want
to give a brief response to Mr. Fortenberry's question, we
would appreciate that. But I know they are going to call votes
on us again in a second. I don't want to have to ask all of you
to wait and come back. So Dr. Lee, Mr. Peters, Ms. Stephens, if
you want to run through that, we will appreciate it.
Mr. Lee. Opinions on this question that Congressman Flake
rose really run the gamut. I have heard people within some of
the communities here in the United States, in Washington, and
in Miami, arguing that we should simply close down the U.S.
Interest Section in Havana and simply cutoff all contact with
Cubans. My view of how to deal with, how to manage the U.S.-
Cuban relationship is very different. As you know, I favor
increasing, intensifying, deepening law enforcement and even
intelligence cooperation with the Cubans with respect to the
issue of the hemispheric drug threat.
And I think that the more contact that we have with the
intelligence people, law enforcement people, the Cuban
military, others that have an interest in containing the drug
problem, the more we are in a sense getting into the guts of
the Cuban power structure and the Cuban system. I think this is
where we need to be in order to be able to, well, I don't want
to use the word manipulate, but shall we say be in a position
to creatively observe the transition that is going to be
occurring very soon as the Castro brothers leave the scene.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Peters.
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To respond to Mr.
Fortenberry's question, I think it is exactly the right
question to raise, whether U.S. engagement would extend the
life of the government in Cuba.
But I don't think it is in play. We tend to look at a place
like Cuba, look at the economy there and say to ourselves, God,
if it was like that in the United States, our government would
be out. It is easy to mirror image that way, but that just
hasn't been the case.
The Cuban economy is not in great shape. The personal
economies of many families are not in great shape in Cuba. But
these economic difficulties do not translate into political
risk for the Cuban government. In 1992 and 1993 when they were
in the most horrendous economic crisis you can imagine, when
the Soviet Union disappeared and left them in a ditch,
nutrition levels, everything just collapsed, that economic
deprivation did not translate into a threat to the political
longevity of the Cuban government.
So at the margin, I don't believe our economic sanctions
have any discernible impact on the political longevity of the
Cuban government. At the margin what they do is they stop
universities from engaging, they stop people from engaging,
they stop somebody from Miami from getting some help to his
aunt so that she can repair her house after a hurricane. They
stop people from sending money that would help somebody
establish a business, whether legitimate or illegal. They stop
cultural activities from taking place. At the margin, our
sanctions stop churches and synagogues from engaging. They stop
people from being able to send help through religious
organizations. So at the margin, it is an embargo on American
influence.
Finally, I would just invite you to think for a minute,
though, what would it mean for this policy to work? Because I
think we are pretty confident that the Cuban government, it is
a communist government and their convictions are quite deep. We
have seen that for 50 years. So our sanctions are not going to
lead them to change their stripes.
So what would it mean for it to work? Would that mean that
we would create such terrible economic conditions that the
Cuban people would have such acute suffering that they would
see nothing to do but revolt against their government? That to
me is not likely. Because when the economy gets bad, they think
about leaving, they don't think about revolting. And that is
not a criticism, that is just a political fact of life.
But it gets into, I think, a fairly serious ethical
question of what would it mean if it would actually work.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Peters.
Ms. Stephens, do you have something to quickly offer?
Ms. Stephens. Yes, very quickly. I just wanted to thank you
for bringing up the issue of human rights and the question of
the 75 dissidents who were rounded up in 2003. I was fortunate
to be in Cuba with Congressman Flake, Mr. Peters, Mr. Delahunt
and a delegation just a couple weeks before that round-up. We
met publicly with many of those dissidents and had a very
valuable and moving encounter with them.
For me, that is probably the strongest and most important
experience I have had in Cuba. It very much motivates me to
want to try something new in terms of U.S. policy in order to
prevent things like that from happening. For me, that is an
example of how our current policy isn't having any impact at
all in helping these people.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Ms. Stephens.
Mr. Delahunt, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Delahunt. I thank the gentleman. I see that Mr. Issa is
here, I know he is a member of the committee, I obviously would
defer to him if he wishes to proceed.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Issa, member of the full committee.
Mr. Issa. I am on a leave of absence from Foreign Affairs
and miss it deeply.
Mr. Delahunt. We note your absence, Mr. Issa, and some of
us miss you, too. [Laughter.]
Mr. Issa. Thank you. As they say, the heart grows fonder
the longer I am away from the committee. And this is an
important committee hearing, because I believe it does sort of
cross foreign policy and foreign security.
Let me go through a couple of quick questions. Ms.
Stephens, is there any basis, not based on a change in policy,
but based on your past experience, including going there,
meeting with dissidents, sort of playing up the good of what
could be, and then seeing them arrested and/or killed and put
away for a long time without trials, is there any reason to
believe that the Castro regime would change if there were no
quid pro quo at the time of opening relations, but rather, we
open relations unilaterally, effectively said we have been
wrong for 50 years, and you don't have to do anything in return
for a lift of the travel ban, etc?
Ms. Stephens. I think you have gotten right to the
question. First of all, the Cubans will never sit down to talk
with us if the pre-condition of sitting down has anything to do
with us telling them that they should change their system, that
they should release their prisoners, anything of a domestic
political nature. They are just not going to do it. So that is
a non-starter.
Mr. Issa. Let me follow up with that, because that is
probably the crux to my question. They are members of the
United Nations, they are a signatory nation to almost every
agreement that has come down the pike since Jesus was a
corporal. I think they are probably in Kyoto. And since they
only seem to burn organic leftovers most of the time, or import
their oil, I guess they are compliant.
They have signed everything, they have obeyed nothing.
Isn't it reasonable for the United States, as part of our
engagement and any liberalization that would benefit them, if
you will, at our expense, isn't it reasonable to ask them to
obey, not to change their own laws, but to obey international
law, particularly in the many, many places where they are
signatories?
Ms. Stephens. Yes.
Mr. Issa. So there are some things that we could put in as
effective preconditions, as long as they are not our conditions
or their domestic policy, but rather international law which
they claim to abide by?
Ms. Stephens. I just think if we could take a deep breath
and decide that it is in our interest to just sit down with
them, to skip the precondition notion, just sit down at the
table----
Mr. Issa. Congressman Flake sat down with them. They have
had that. There can be no higher calling. He did his mission
elsewhere, but he came back to do Fidel.
Ms. Stephens. Could I just say one thing about that,
because we also spent a lot of time visiting with diplomats
from other countries who do have relations with the Cuban
government. For me, that is where the model exists.
Now, I am not saying, obviously, that they have changed,
through their great conversations with the Cuban government,
that they have changed the country from being communist. But
they have had some successes in quiet discussions about
specific human rights cases and specific political prisoners. I
think that is a way to start.
Mr. Issa. I appreciate that, and I have been involved in
that. I am fortunate enough to be on the Helsinki Commission
and we try to look at that globally.
Mr. Pinon, assuming we were to allow U.S. oil companies to
drill in the region or engage in any other way, what good faith
belief do we have that they would not, at the appropriate time
in their best interests, nationalize our resources as Hugo
Chavez has done, or as they did before and still owe countless
billions to us over it? Is there anything under the current
regime that would cause us to think that could likely occur
again and it wouldn't be completely consistent with their
communist form of government?
Mr. Pinon. No, and that is why I said earlier, when we went
through our scenario planning, we made a point, and I make a
point again in my testimony that this process takes anywhere
between 2 to 5 years before any oil can come to production. So
the assumption, when we went through our recommendation at
Brookings, was that within that 5-year period there would be a
movement in Cuba already in which the transition or a new cadre
of leadership will be in place. Again, hopefully that will help
them to divorce themselves from the dependence on Venezuela.
So again, what we are talking about is nothing that will
bring an immediate economic benefit to the Cuban government, we
are talking about 3 to 5 years. Is there risk of
nationalization? Yes, it is there.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate just very
quickly, if they can't answer directly, for the record, I would
ask the question, which is, in light of those questions and
current government, then is your common recommendation that
even if the U.S. Government does not lift sanctions and so on,
that an engagement with a plan for the change that is likely to
appear or occur is in our best interests based on, if you will,
the 5-year horizon that you referred to?
Mr. Pinon. Yes.
Mr. Issa. Is that pretty consistent across the board that
is a common recommendation that we should take away from today?
Mr. Tierney. If we could just please keep it brief so that
we don't have those votes called down.
Mr. Peters. You say they might nationalize our resources. I
am not interested in seeing the U.S. Government being involved
at all. And I think that American companies, if they choose to
get involved, would have to weigh the risks and risk the loss
of their resources in a country where the economic policies
present that risk. There is no doubt about it.
General McCaffrey. In fact, what I think I would add to
that, I don't see us in this coming phase negotiating changes
in Cuba so much as unilaterally lifting the economic embargo,
people access, initiating law enforcement cooperation, and not
blocking them from being buffered by being part of
international organizations. I think the negotiations, whether
we do them or not, are almost irrelevant until Fidel and Raul
are gone, until we get the 40 somethings in government, we
shouldn't expect dramatic change in Cuba.
But certainly the wash of U.S. ideas, influence and
tourists, in my view, will help set the pre-conditions for
those ultimate negotiations.
Mr. Issa. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, for the record,
it was Admiral Aldo Santa Maria that I was referring to in my
opening remarks.
Mr. Tierney. We just want to thank you for living up to
your opening remark that you would be brief. We appreciate
that. We will know what to expect in the future.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes, Mr. Chairman, an excellent hearing. I
congratulate you and the committee on this hearing.
I am just going to make some observations and then invite
response if there is sufficient time. I will make an effort to
be brief.
I noted that, I think it was General McCaffrey that talked
about the need for military to military contacts. Every single
commander of SOUTHCOM that I have discussed this with, and they
have made public statements, have echoed that particular
sentiment. General Wilhelm, General Pace and General Jack
Sheehan all recommended instituting military to military
contact. I think it is important to get that on the record.
And I would also note for the record that the dissidents
that we met with and that were alluded to by Ms. Stephens,
every single one of them today, some having been released
because of humanitarian concerns, many of them still
incarcerated in the Cuban prison system, advocate for change of
the current policy. And specifically advocate for change in
terms of Americans' rights to visit unrestricted and
uninhibited to Cuba. I think that is very important, and that
we should listen to those particular individuals.
When it comes to human rights, naturally we share the
concerns. I think the question by Mr. Driehaus went to that
issue. But I would also note that we have relationships with
other nations, in fact, some are our allies, where I would
submit that their human rights record is worse in fact than
that of the Cuban government in terms of how we define human
rights. I have been to Cuba, I have been to church there, I
have gone to Mass there. There is a vibrant, healthy Jewish
community there. Clearly, the Catholic Church in Cuba has a
strained relationship with the government, but one can wear a
cross, one can wear a Star of David in Cuba. You cannot do that
in Saudi Arabia. There is in fact a religious police in Saudi
Arabia. When President Bush, and I am referring to President
George Herbert Walker Bush, had to go to an aircraft carrier to
celebrate a Christian service in terms of celebrating
Christmas.
And by the way, I can assure you that women can drive in
Cuba. They cannot drive in Saudi Arabia. And there are no
independent unions, and the list goes on and on and on. So I
think it is very important to understand that.
If we are going to measure engagement with other nations
predicated on the human rights record, we would find ourselves
having to terminate diplomatic relationships with a long list
that we currently deal with. I think in particular of
Uzbekistan, where our own human rights record indicates that
Islam Karimov has instructed human beings to be boiled alive.
So I think we have to understand that.
And the state-sponsored terrorism issue, and how do they
get there, I posed that question a while back. It was
interesting to discover that the primary motivation for the
placement of Cuba on that particular list was because in Cuba,
there are members of the Basque Separatist organization. I then
went on to learn, however, that was done at the request of the
Spanish government. So maybe that whole issue should be
revisited.
But I would like to speak specifically to the issue of
drugs. Mr. Peters and I first met at a conference in Havana on
drug interdiction. The reality is, if there is an area that
they and we share a mutual interest, it is in dealing with the
issue of drugs. I would invite a response from Mr. Lee or
General McCaffrey about drugs.
I can remember there was a case in Florida where
cooperation, it was a case involving the seizure of a ship,
where Cuban agents came and testified and there was a
conviction. The ship was the Lemur, if you remember, General
McCaffrey.
And by the way, I have never heard of this particular
Admiral before, and I think it was Mr. Lee who indicated that
the narcotics laws are draconian. Any good police state is
going to be very, very careful in terms of allowing drugs to be
sold or purchased or even a transit venue for interdiction
here.
I cannot imagine why we have not formalized a drug
agreement with Cuba at this point in time. We are doing a
disservice to ourselves. We are doing a disservice to our own
people. I would invite, I guess particularly General McCaffrey
to respond to the drug issue. I have heard again and again from
some individuals that Cuba is a narco-terrorist state. That is
pure baloney.
General McCaffrey. You probably summarized my own arguments
pretty well. It was interesting to watch the animosity develop
between me and selected Members of Congress over just that
issue. Again, I tried to go to every source of intelligence I
could find. There is no question in my mind that there is
corruption at times in the Cuban government and incompetence.
There is no question that there are lots of drugs floating
around Cuba, particularly washing up on shore, bundles of
cocaine and marijuana.
But it was clear to me that they were not on a governmental
basis, and part of an international conspiracy that would
threaten the regime, threaten their sense of communist
morality. I did get a Coast Guard element into Cuba over
tremendous hew and cry, I think three of them. One of the panel
members mentioned, I went on a night-time walk with that Coast
Guard officer who knew more about what the Cuban people were
thinking and talking about than a dozen of the folks in the
Cuban Interest Section in Havana, because he was out, he would
walk his dog and they would approach him and ask him about the
latest thing over Radio Marti.
So again, I think your point is right on track. Our
interests are served by law enforcement cooperation, not just
interdiction, on human trafficking, trafficking in human
beings, in drugs and terrorism. I expect the Cubans would find
that to be an open option.
I think the other thing, on SOUTHCOM to Cuban military
dialog, not too much of it. Not too much training. But clearly,
dialog on peacekeeping operations and on international
humanitarian operations and others, certainly at their officer
corps level, would be a great investment in our future. I would
bring some of them into our schooling system, get two of them
to go to Leavenworth. The first 5 years, they would all be
intel people, but eventually they would get jealous and some of
the comers would get the slot.
So dialog, engagement on areas of mutual interest, that
will work.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt, for your
contributions to this record. We appreciate it, as well as your
skill of asking a 5-minute question and eliciting an answer
afterwards. We will all take note of that. [Laughter.]
We have no further questions for the panel here. I want to
give each one of you an opportunity, however, to make a last
remark, if there is anything you feel has been left unsaid. You
don't need to make a remark, but I don't want anybody to leave,
after having invited you here and made you wait, we want to
make sure you have commented on everything you thought was
relevant for this committee to hear.
So Ms. Stephens, do you have anything to add? It is almost
irresistible, isn't it? [Laughter.]
Ms. Stephens. Yes, I have to say something. I think one
thing that is so clear to me, when we are in Cuba, is that the
notion that our embargo is somehow crippling the Cuban economy
is just, it isn't right. What we instead have done is created a
void that has been filled by everybody else. It has been filled
by Venezuela, Brazil, Russia, China, Europe. So in that sense,
it is just not working. And in fact, we are ceding that space
to others, and losing the opportunity to have influence on the
island.
So I guess I just wanted to reiterate that.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Peters, last thoughts?
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I listened to some of the comments about concessions and
reciprocity. I would address them as follows. I think clearly
we are in a 50-year adversarial relationship with Cuba. It
could be we will get to a point in the relationship where there
is a negotiation and one side won't give unless there is a
concession from the other. Given the fact that the embargo is
in place, and I don't see that changing for some time, I think
that if people are concerned about leverage, that is there.
But I see the situation somewhat differently. What is at
issue now, I think, is not a concession of the Cuban
government, but concessions to ourselves. We are sort of like a
chess player that has been playing for a long time getting
nowhere and deciding to use a different gambit. When one
changes, you don't do it and demand that the other side make a
concession to you. You do it to become more effective.
We don't have influence in Cuba. We don't have contacts in
Cuba. We have a lot of issues, those we mentioned here, the
drug issue, the environmental issues, the fact that Cuba has a
lot of fugitives from U.S. justice. And we need to get into the
game and start addressing those things, change the policy to
make a concession to ourselves.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Dr. Lee, last note?
Mr. Lee. Well, certainly, I agree with General McCaffrey
and others that we need to engage the Cubans on law
enforcement, intelligence issues of mutual concern.
I did want to add something, just a couple of comments
about the Cubans, their internal drug control program, which
has been highly successful, at least according to the Cuban
authorities themselves. When I was in Cuba last year, I talked
to one Cuban medical professional. He said that between 1999
and 2003, the price of a gram of cocaine increased from $15 a
gram to $90 a gram. He attributed this to a number of different
policies, but especially their laws, which, in 1988, the
maximum penalty for drug abuse in Cuba, rather for drug
trafficking in Cuba, was 7 to 15 years in prison. Today, the
maximum penalty is 20 years to life. So what we are talking
about here is a regime which is really very, very serious about
controlling this problem.
I think given their interest and given their concern, I
think it makes a lot of sense for us to try to find some way to
cooperate with them in some fairly creative ways. For example,
we could conceivably even train Cuban border guards, Ministry
of Interior operatives in various areas of drug control. We
could conduct joint naval patrols in the Caribbean with the
Cubans. We could coordinate investigations of regional drug
trafficking networks and suspicious financial transactions
going through Cuba.
We could do a lot of different things and I think we have
to talk about this, even now, even before the Castro brothers
leave the scene.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much, Dr. Lee.
Mr. Pinon.
Mr. Pinon. I am the only Cuban American on the panel. I am
an historico, I came here in 1960. My parents died in their
90's in Miami waiting to return to Havana tomorrow. I am 61
today. Like the rest of my generation in Miami, at least the
majority of my generation in Miami, we, Mr. Chairman, Cuban
Americans, are willing to sit down and talk. Because we believe
that the death of my parents wasn't necessary, if we would have
established conversations with Cuba a while back.
Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Happy birthday, and thank you for
sharing your day with us.
General, by virtue of your rank, you have the final word.
General McCaffrey. Thank you for the opportunity to be
here.
It is a great book, and I mentioned to your director, I
think it was S.L.A. Marshall's Battles in the Monsoon. It is
something I used talking about combat leadership. Young major
commanders in a ferocious fight for 2 days. He continues in his
own mind being engaged by the North Vietnamese Army and they
have gone for 3 days.
So I tell people, you have to watch, you have to have a
broader perspective than the immediate fight at hand. The
American people, as Mr. Pinon has admirably said, have changed
their view on how to deal with the Cuban regime. This is not
serving our self-interest. This is time to seize an opportunity
and not let this drift along for another 2 or 3 years.
We have a terrific foreign policy team in office now,
Secretary Clinton and others. It is time to engage.
So thank you again for the chance to be here and join this
panel.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Flake and Mr. Delahunt, for your leadership
on this issue, my colleagues on the panel. Thank all of you for
your testimony here today and sharing your wisdom with us.
Meeting adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]