

**THE NEW AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY:
THE VIEW FROM THE GROUND**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2009

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar, Corker, Isakson, Risch, Barrasso, and Wicker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

We're delighted to welcome today Under Secretary Jack Lew, GEN David Petraeus, and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry from Afghanistan. We're very, very pleased that you could take time to be with us today.

As we all know, 8 days ago the President announced his decision regarding a new phase in our Afghan mission, including the important decision to send an additional 30,000 troops. And for all of the answers that the President offered—and there were many, certainly explanations of his strategy and reasons for his decision—a lot of questions remain and are appropriately being asked by various committees on the Hill, and we appreciate, obviously, the administration's cooperation in making themselves available so those questions can be answered. It is important, needless to say, for the American people to understand the strategy and the stakes, the details of our civilian strategy, particularly how Afghan governance at all levels will improve and, above all, how we will strengthen our partnership with Pakistan.

As I've said a number of times, I believe that there are just some commonsense conditions, based on the judgments that we have been hearing from commanders in the field and from our ambassadors, that ought to narrow and guide the deployment—ask the, sort of, mission tasking, if you will, of our additional troops. And I think those are, are there reliable Afghan partners—are there reliable Afghan forces to partner with? Because the object of this exercise is to transfer the responsibility to them. Second, are there local Afghan leaders to work with on the ground? Because we want them to be invested and to come in quickly underneath the “clear”

and “hold.” And third, is the civilian capacity in place to make the military gains sustainable?

I was very pleased to hear General McCrystal say, yesterday, that as we plan new operations, we’re going to take great care to ensure that the civilian and development elements are in place to immediately follow our troops. I think that is critical, and it is very reassuring to hear that that judgment will be made.

Ultimately, our success depends on having a robust civilian effort to build on our military gains. And General Petraeus has consistently argued when he was General Eikenberry, now Ambassador Eikenberry, consistently argued that there is no military solution, ultimately. And so, that needs to remain front and center.

Importantly, each of the challenges that I’ve mentioned demand not only that America improve our past performance, but also our partners, all of them, must improve theirs. And this challenge is especially crucial when it comes to Pakistan. I am convinced that what happens in Pakistan, particularly near the Afghan border, will do more to determine the outcome in Afghanistan than any increase in troops or shift in strategy. Pakistan is, in many ways, the core of our challenge.

From the Haqqani network to the Quetta shura, the interconnected extremist groups that we face don’t stop at the Afghan border. And so, our strategy cannot stop there, either. It must extend to Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda’s leaders are there, most likely including Osama bin Laden; homegrown militants like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba are there; and so are the individuals directing the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

Pakistan is a sovereign nation, and obviously we need to respect that; but, we must convince its government to tackle all of the extremist groups threatening regional and international security, for Pakistan’s sake as well as the region’s and for all of those who have a stake in this effort.

The Pakistani military should be congratulated. It has demonstrated firm resolve with its offensive against the Pakistan Taliban in the Malakand Division of the North West Frontier Province in South Waziristan, and its commanders and its soldiers deserve great credit. They have sacrificed.

Now we are looking to Pakistan to also take on the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, and al-Qaeda strongholds, and this will be crucial to our success in Afghanistan.

Today, we are prepared to provide Pakistan with additional equipment and other military assistance to help its people and its government to prevail against these extremists, but we have to know that we are building a new and a lasting partnership.

Many Pakistanis believe that America will once again abandon the region, as we did after the fall of the Soviet Union, one reason why Pakistan has often hedged its bets and used the Taliban for strategic depth. So, let me be clear, and I think I speak for the committee in this, and for the Congress, because it would be a mistake for anyone in Pakistan or elsewhere to believe that the President’s words about drawing down troops from Afghanistan somehow mean an end to our involvement or engagement in the region. It does not. Our challenge today is to persuade Pakistan that it

cannot, and does not need to, hedge its bets. Our troop deployments will eventually decrease, but the conditions that will permit them to decrease will be beneficial to Pakistan, and America remains committed to the people of the region for the long haul, as our \$7.5 billion civilian commitment demonstrates.

This also reflects our recognition that Pakistan's civilian, military, and intelligence leaders face serious challenges. All of us are engaged in a difficult balancing act between the tougher measures we believe must be taken and the anti-American blowback that such measures can bring to Pakistan's fragile democratic institutions. It should help our efforts that no country has suffered more than Pakistan at the hands of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups. Some 2,600 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan in the last 2½ years. And yet, when so many Pakistanis view the United States as a problem, we have to admit that we have simply not fought for our reputation enough.

We must do more to make the case that, fundamentally, America and Pakistan are fighting for the same things. We need to make clear to the people of Pakistan that we will be full partners in their fight against extremist elements, which is why, in 2009 alone, the United States has given about \$300 million for conflict-affected populations in Pakistan. As we know all nations are threatened by extremism, whether it takes place in New York City or in Mumbai or in Peshawar. We must work together in stopping people throwing bombs and killing innocent people. That is the world's challenge, and it means that Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India must cooperate to reduce the violence and eliminate the tensions.

Our troops are defending the right of Afghanistan to develop its own government. They are risking their lives to chase down international criminals who threaten not just the United States, but Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond.

There will come an inevitable moment in this fight where our partners in Pakistan must take up the fight with an equal vigor so that we don't have to take matters into our own hands. I believe we can build a significantly stronger relationship with Pakistan. And I also believe that, in the long run, Pakistan will strengthen its own democracy, institutions, and security by engaging in a comprehensive and unfettered fight against the extremists within its own borders.

Here in Washington, our domestic debate has focused a great deal of energy on the question of how many troops we will send to Afghanistan. I believe that other strategic questions—civilian capacity, improved governance, standing up Afghan security forces, and especially greater cooperation with Pakistan, greater partnership, if you will—that those are the crucial determinants of success, not the numbers of troops.

As CENTCOM commander, Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the State Department official responsible for the management, the members of this panel are, all of them, well equipped to talk the details of these vital efforts today, and I look forward to their testimony.

Senator Lugar.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary Lew, Ambassador Eikenberry, and General Petraeus. We appreciate very much that you have come to the Foreign Relations Committee today.

This hearing provides an opportunity to build on the hearing we held last week with Secretaries Clinton and Gates and Admiral Mullen. We explored with them, not only the prospects for success of the civil-military campaign in Afghanistan, but also how the President's plan fits into our broader strategic objectives of preventing terrorist attacks and stabilizing the Middle East and South Asia.

Much of the debate in Congress has focused on the President's stated intention to begin withdrawing some U.S. troops by July 2011. Some members have voiced the concern that such a date undercuts impressions of U.S. resolve, gives the Taliban and al-Qaeda a target beyond which they can wait us out. Other members, with a very different view of the war, worry that July 2011 date is so flexible it offers no assurance that troops will be withdrawn. This is a legitimate item for debate, but I'm doubtful that success or failure hinges on this point nearly as much as it does on the counter-insurgency strategy employed by allied troops, the viability of the Afghan security forces, and, most importantly, how the United States engages with Pakistan.

I have confidence that the addition of tens of thousands of United States and allied troops under the direction of Generals Petraeus and McChrystal will improve the security situation on the ground in Afghanistan. More uncertain is whether the training mission will succeed sufficiently to allow U.S. forces to disengage from combat duties in a reasonable time period. The most salient question, however, is whether improvements on the ground in Afghanistan will mean much if Taliban and al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan remain or if instability within Pakistan intensifies.

As hearings in our committee have underscored, the potential global impact of instability in a nuclear-armed Pakistan dwarfs anything that is likely to happen in Afghanistan. The future direction of governance in Pakistan will have consequences for non-proliferation efforts, global economic stability, our relationships with India and China, and security in both the Middle East and South Asia regions, among other major issues.

Last week, Secretaries Clinton and Gates and Admiral Mullen acknowledged the importance of Pakistan in the President's calculation. They underscored that the administration is executing a regional strategy. And I'm encouraged by press reports that have described the intense diplomatic efforts with the Pakistani Government aimed at securing much greater cooperation.

But we should remain cognizant the focus of policy tends to follow resources. By that measure, Afghanistan will still be at the core of our regional effort. The President and his team must justify their plan not only on the basis of how it will affect Afghanistan, but also on how it will impact our efforts to promote a much stronger alliance with Pakistan that embraces vital common objectives.

The President has said that the United States did not choose this war, and he is correct. But with these troop deployments to Afghanistan, we are choosing the battlefield where we will concentrate most of our available military resources. The Afghanistan battlefield has the inherent disadvantage of sitting astride a border with Pakistan that is a porous line for the militants, but a strategic obstacle for coalition forces. As long as this border provides the enemy with an avenue of retreat for resupply and sanctuary, our prospects for destroying or incapacitating the insurgency are negligible.

The risk is that we will expend tens of billions of dollars fighting in a strategically less important Afghanistan while Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders become increasingly secure in Pakistan. If they are able to sit safely across the border, directing a hit-and-run war against us in Afghanistan, plotting catastrophic terrorist attacks abroad, and working to destabilize Pakistan from within, our strategic goals in the region will be threatened, despite progress on the ground in Afghanistan.

Some reports indicate that Taliban leaders, aware of the threat from U.S.-operated predator drones, are moving out of remote areas into the crowded cities, including Karachi. If such reports are true, the United States will have even fewer options of pursuing Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, absent the active help of Pakistani authorities. Specifically, will Pakistan work with us to eliminate the leadership of Osama bin Laden and other major al-Qaeda officials?

In addition to improving the cooperation of the Pakistani authorities, the United States and our allies will have to become more creative in how we engage with the Afghan and Pakistani people. We should understand that, as a matter of survival, people in dangerous areas on both sides of the border will tend to side with whoever is seen as having the best chance of winning. We should also recognize that tribal loyalties—most notably, Pashtun loyalties—are at odds with a strong central government and with acquiescence to external military power.

As Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation has observed: “The objective should be to do what Afghanistan’s most effective historical governments have done: help Pashtun tribes, subtribes, and clans provide security and justice in their areas, and manage the process.” Meaningful progress in Afghanistan is likely to require tolerance or even encouragement of tribal administration in many areas, as well as convincing tribal leaders that opposing the Taliban is in their interest.

In these circumstances, we should explore how cell phones and other communication technologies can be used more effectively, both as an avenue for public diplomacy to the Afghan people and as a means for gathering intelligence from them. Already, 7 million cell phones are in Afghanistan, one for every four inhabitants. The Taliban’s reported priority on destroying communications towers underscores their understanding of the threat posed by these technologies. For example, cell phones could be used by sympathetic Afghans to produce real-time intelligence, including photographs of IEDs being prepared or calls alerting coalition troops to movements of the Taliban. Phones eliminate the need for informants to take

the risks of visiting a police station in person or of conversing openly with U.S. troops.

Similarly, expanding the use of credit card transactions could prove revolutionary in addressing some vexing problems in a country that lacks an effective banking system. They can provide a way to reduce corruption, improve accounting within the Afghan Government and security forces, and relieve soldiers from the need to go AWOL to deliver pay safely to their families.

I appreciate the innovation and dedication that our witnesses have displayed in the past, and their willingness to take on extremely difficult missions. I noted last week that the President deserves credit for accepting the responsibility for this difficult problem as we go forward, and that is equally true for our distinguished panel.

I look forward to our discussions and I appreciate their service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

We're going to start with the testimony from Secretary Lew, and we're grateful for you taking on the task on the civilian side of this, so thank you for coming to share thoughts today.

General Petraeus will follow. And, General, you've had about as interesting a set of challenges as any commanding general could have in succession, and we're pleased and delighted to have you here, and very respectful of your leadership in all of this.

And finally, Ambassador Eikenberry, let me just thank you. I had occasion to spend about 5 days with you, and I saw what an outstanding team you have there working with you and what a terrific job you, yourself, are doing. I want to thank you for that. I wish you would extend to them our gratitude, because the competence level was extraordinary. And I know that President Karzai and others there have great respect for that team and for the work you're doing. So, we're very grateful to you. Thank you.

Secretary Lew.

STATEMENT OF HON. JACOB LEW, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. LEW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I'm honored to be here with Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus, who have a deep understanding of Afghanistan, an appreciation of the challenges we face there, and clear ideas on how to move forward. Their leadership has been exemplary, their commitment to truly joint civilian-military efforts are absolute. Over the past week, Secretaries Clinton and Gates and Chairman Mullen have testified on the importance of the President's strategy for our national security. Today I'd like to discuss some of the key civilian components of that strategy, which, as the President and Secretary Clinton have emphasized, are central to the success of that mission.

Our troop increase must be matched by strong civilian deployment and foreign assistance that reaches the regions and functions targeted by the civilian-military plan. We're working with OMB to ensure the civilian programs are fully resourced, and look forward

to working with the Congress on funding levels that meet these requirements.

The State Department, USAID, USDA, and other civilian agencies are working with our Afghan partners to bolster institutions at the national and subnational levels so they'll be ready to ramp up their own responsibility when our combat troops begin to depart.

The President's timeframe gives the Afghan Government and President Karzai a sense of urgency to make the reforms needed for better governance and stronger institutions. The civilian effort will continue long after our combat troops begin to drawdown, and they're key to our enduring commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region. But, it's critical that Afghans take increasing responsibility for their own long-term welfare and security when our combat troops begin to depart.

On my visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, I've seen the challenging working conditions at our Embassies, in the field at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, and in our consulate in Peshawar. Each visit leaves me with growing appreciation for our brave men and women, both civilian and military, who carry out our Nation's policy and make extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of our security. As Secretary Clinton said last week, and Ambassador Eikenberry will elaborate, we really do have the best people in these jobs.

The civilian effort is a reason to be hopeful, despite the serious situation in Afghanistan. Civilian experts are helping to build Afghan Government capacity in the national ministries and at the provincial and district levels. They're providing development assistance in the field and working on scores of other roles.

As I will discuss in a few minutes, our civilians in Pakistan are making similar contributions. In the revised strategy, we will focus our resources at the provincial and district levels, partnering with local officials and Afghan citizens to deliver high-impact economic assistance. We'll expand programs that bolster Afghans' agricultural sector, the traditional core of the Afghan economy. We'll focus on increasing farmer productivity and helping farmers enter higher value markets, rehabilitating degraded watersheds and irrigation infrastructure, and expanding the Ministry of Agriculture's capacity to deliver critical services, like extension programs. This will create jobs, reduce the flow of funding to the Taliban from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off the battlefield.

Alongside our efforts to help the Afghan National Police recruit and train capable police, we are concentrating on rule-of-law programs to help the Afghan Government and local communities develop responsive and predictable dispute resolution mechanisms as an alternative to brutal Taliban justice. And we're launching a comprehensive communications effort to empower Afghans to challenge the threatening narrative that extremists use to assert control.

We will support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to former Taliban who abandon violence and want to reintegrate into society. We understand that some who fight with the insurgency do not do so out of conviction, but because of economic pressure, which is a powerful form of coercion. Our efforts will help Afghans have a

chance to pursue a better future if they do so peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow citizens, and renounce al-Qaeda.

It is also critically important that the Afghan Government make progress on controlling corruption. In his inaugural speech last month, President Karzai pledged to combat corruption, improve governance, and deliver for the people of his country. The Afghan people, the United States, and the international community will hold the Afghan Government accountable for continuing to make good on these commitments.

We have seen some promising first steps. The attorney general's office is investing several Cabinet-level officials, which, for legal reasons, the names are not disclosed until there's a conviction. A major crimes task force is expected to be fully operational by the first of the year. And the Afghan Government announced that it will establish a National Anticorruption Court. Even today, the Afghan High Office of Oversight is scheduled to hold a press conference to discuss efforts to combat corruption and share more details of actions that are underway.

I'd like to say a few words on our staffing and training. We're on track to triple the number of civilians in Afghanistan, to 974, by early next year. We anticipate that we will further increase our civilian staffing in 2010 by another 20 to 30 percent, concentrating on positions in the field and key ministries that deliver vital services to the Afghan people.

It's very important to remember the multiplier effect that civilian personnel provide. On average, each civilian leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed Afghan staff to experts who work with United States-funded NGOs. Since it is essential to recruit civilians with the right skills, we have enhanced both our recruiting and our training to make sure that we get the right people to the right place at the right time. For example, we conduct a weeklong civilian-military training exercise at Camp Atterbury, in Indiana, for civilians who are about to deploy to field positions from State, USAID, USDA, and other civilian agencies. I visited, a few weeks ago, and saw firsthand how this training immerses civilians and military in real-life exercises. They train side by side with Afghan-Americans who quite convincingly play the role of interlocutors. They plan projects, hold meetings with local officials, and practice safety and security with their military partners. Civilian experts who recently returned from the PRTs are contributing to the training as subject-matter experts, and they share their real-life experiences to civilians who are about to go abroad to take their place so that they can be more prepared and do their jobs more safely.

I want to assure this committee that we will do everything we can to make sure that our men and women are well prepared and well supported, both from Kabul and Washington, so that they can succeed in their efforts and make our Nation more secure.

We're building a core of Afghan and Pakistan experts who continue to contribute to the mission even after they return. Foreign Service officers with Pakistan and Afghanistan experience now serve in key positions at the desks here in Washington, at the For-

eign Service Institute, on training, in Ambassador Holbrooke's office at NATO, and in other posts.

When Secretary Clinton was in Kabul in November, she heard from a U.S. Army colonel, that, while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers under his command, none had 40 years of agricultural, rule-of-law, or governance expertise like the USDA, USAID, State Department civilian experts serving alongside his battalion. He told her that he was happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need, and he said, "We need more of them." The President's strategy, with congressional support, will make that possible.

Now, I'd like to take a few moments to address how the recently completed strategic review impacts United States-Pakistan relations. As the President made clear in his speech last week, our partnership with Pakistan is inextricably linked to our efforts in Afghanistan. We're committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust.

We're not only strengthening Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, we're also providing substantial resources to support democracy and development in Pakistan. As the President said, "Going forward, the Pakistani people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent so the great potential of its people can be unleashed."

The United States is committed to security assistance programs that strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target violent extremists that threaten both of our countries. To that end, the State Department working closely with our military partners, manages two complementary programs: Foreign Military Financing and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund. FMF assists Pakistan in the sustainable development of Pakistan's military services, building a long-term security relationship, and reinforcing the United States commitment to a strategic partnership. PCCF provides Pakistan with the military equipment and training necessary for Pakistan to wage the immediate battle against insurgents in its border regions. We're committed to deepening our relationship with Pakistan to foster a stable civilian-led, democratic government. Such a government can be a partner in regional stability and support the United States efforts in Afghanistan.

This committee, under the leadership of Chairman Kerry and Senator Lugar, has taken the lead in passing legislation to dramatically increase civilian assistance to Pakistan through the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, which authorizes \$7½ billion, over 5 years, of assistance. These funds will make it possible for us to support economic development in Pakistan and provide assistance in the critical areas of energy, education, water, agriculture, and governance. We're developing a civilian assistance strategy to reduce poverty and the vulnerability to terrorist recruitment that poverty breeds. We will help Pakistan address profound infrastructure needs with significant and highly visible projects in energy and agriculture.

We hear repeatedly from Pakistanis who want to be more involved in the design and implementation of these projects. Under

the leadership of Ambassador Anne Patterson, our Embassy is working closely with Pakistani partners to develop a program that reflects their needs. We will work through Pakistani institutions to develop programs, wherever possible, with the goal of enabling and expanding Pakistani capacity at both the national and provincial levels and through nongovernmental organizations.

Just as we need strong local partners for our assistance programs to succeed, we need our international partners to join in supporting Pakistan's development and democracy, helping Pakistan build on its success against militants. We're working closely with the Government of Pakistan and the international community to meet the relief and reconstruction needs in the Malakand Division, where military operations early in the year were effective, but left considerable need for reconstruction.

We're supporting the U.N. Special Envoy for Assistance to Pakistan's efforts to coordinate assistance in vulnerable areas. We're also encouraging other countries to follow through on their Tokyo Donor Conference pledges.

As we strengthen our partnership with Pakistan, we're forging trust and cooperation on a broad government-to-government basis that emphasizes institutions, not individuals. In addition to the President, Prime Minister, and other ruling party officials, we're reaching out to provincial and local officials and have developed strong working relationships with parties and civil society leaders across the political spectrum.

Building on the Secretary's personal direct engagement with the people of Pakistan during her October trip, our efforts in Pakistan are being supported by new public diplomacy efforts to redefine the United States-Pakistan relationship as one that goes beyond our shared security objectives. This communications effort will expand people-to-people contacts and provide an alternative to the narrative of fear and hate that extremists rely on.

We're also pursuing high-level policy dialogues to encourage the Government of Pakistan to undertake essential policy reforms that will lead to long-term economic growth and development. Sustained diplomacy on energy issues, for example, backed by our commitment to invest in significant energy infrastructure projects that will improve the lives of the Pakistani people, has reinforced Pakistan's resolve to implement critical electricity pricing reforms. These measures are essential for Pakistan to meet the electric utility demand necessary to support economic growth.

Our discussions with the President, Prime Minister, Finance Minister, and many others in the Pakistani Government, have stressed the importance of moving forward with reforms that will put Pakistan on a path to economic prosperity.

Creating new economic opportunities in Pakistan and Afghanistan is a core component of combating violent extremism. That's why we're continuing to work with Congress to create economic opportunities in the region, including initiatives such as the proposed Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, a trade preference program that is essential to our national security objectives in the region. ROZs would provide duty-free treatment to certain goods produced in all of Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, to help create much needed employment opportunities.

We're also supporting Pakistani and Afghan negotiations to finalize a transit trade agreement that will allow goods produced in either country to move quickly between markets through Pakistan's ports or across Afghanistan's Ring Road to Central Asia.

Our efforts to build a more stable Pakistan are in our national interest and in the interest of Pakistan. The most recent series of violent attacks, killing hundreds, including woman and children, underscores the importance of countering the insurgency on the security and stability of Pakistan. There will be ongoing humanitarian needs in Pakistan as the government continues to take military action against extremist groups. We're proud of our successful contributions to this humanitarian effort.

The responsibilities and interests I've described are shared by governments around the world. Our NATO allies and other international community partners have already made significant contributions of their own in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most recently, at the NATO ministerial last week in Brussels, allies and ISAF partners pledged to contribute approximately 7,000 additional troops for Afghanistan. In all, 25 countries pledged to do more, in terms of troops, trainers, and trust fund moneys.

The task we face is as complex as any national security challenge in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if this effort is viewed as the responsibility of a single party, a single agency, or a single country. We owe it to our troops and the civilians who face these dangers to come together as Americans and with our allies and partners to help them accomplish this critical mission.

I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lew follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JACOB J. LEW, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am honored to be here with Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus.

Over the past week, Secretaries Clinton and Gates, Chairman Mullen, and National Security Advisor Jones have testified on the importance of the President's strategy to our national security. Today, I want to focus on the civilian components of that strategy—which, as President Obama and Secretary Clinton have emphasized, will be essential to long-term security in Afghanistan. For truly sustainable progress, our troop increase must be matched by a stronger civilian effort and additional foreign assistance. We are working with OMB to ensure that our civilian programs are fully resourced, and we will work with the Congress to ensure that our funding levels match the requirements identified in the President's strategy.

The State Department, USAID, USDA, and other civilian agencies are working with our Afghan partners to bolster institutions at every level so that they are ready to take more responsibility when our combat troops begin to depart. The President's timeframe for transition to Afghan responsibility gives the Afghan Government and President Karzai a sense of urgency in making necessary reforms. Better governance and stronger institutions will enable the Afghans to guarantee their own long-term welfare and security when our combat troops begin to depart. Our civilian effort will continue long after our combat forces have begun to drawdown, as a key part of our enduring commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region.

In the past 8 months, I have made two trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I am planning a third in January. I have seen the challenging work situations at our Embassies, out in the field at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, and at our consulate in Peshawar in Pakistan. My appreciation for our men and women, both civilian and military, who are carrying out our Nation's policy and making extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of our security, has grown with each

visit. As Secretary Clinton said last week, and Karl just reiterated, we really do have our best people in these jobs.

Our civilian effort is one important reason why we can be hopeful, despite the serious situation in Afghanistan. The same is true with reference to Pakistan, about which I will speak more in a moment. Civilian experts are helping build Afghan Government capacity, in the ministries as well as at the provincial and district levels. They are also providing development assistance in the field and working in scores of other roles.

In the revised strategy, we will increasingly focus our resources at the provincial and district levels, partnering with local officials and Afghan citizens to deliver high-impact economic assistance. We will continue to expand our programs to bolster Afghanistan's agricultural sector—the traditional core of the Afghan economy—focusing on increasing farmers' productivity and ability to enter higher value markets, rehabilitating degraded watersheds and irrigation infrastructure, and greatly building the Ministry of Agriculture's capacity to deliver extension and other services. This will create jobs, reduce funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off of the battlefield.

Alongside our efforts to train more capable police, we are also focusing our rule-of-law programs on helping the Afghan Government and local communities develop responsive and predictable dispute resolution mechanisms that offer an alternative to the brutal Taliban justice. And we are launching a comprehensive communications effort to empower Afghans to challenge the extremists' narrative and offer their own vision for Afghanistan's future.

We will support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to Taliban who abandon violence and want to reintegrate into society. We understand that some who fight with the insurgency do so not out of conviction, but due to coercion or money. All Afghans should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so peacefully, respect basic human rights of their fellow citizens, and renounce al-Qaeda.

It is, of course, also critically important that the Afghan Government makes progress on addressing corruption. In his inauguration speech last month, President Karzai pledged to combat corruption, improve governance, and deliver for the people of his country. The Afghan people, the United States, and the international community will hold the Afghan Government accountable for continuing to make good on these commitments. We have seen some promising first steps. We have also been told that that Attorney General's office is currently investigating several Cabinet-level officials—for legal reasons neither the names nor the charges can be disclosed until there is a conviction. In addition, a Major Crimes Task Force is expected to be fully operational by the first of the year and the Afghan Government announced that it will establish a national anticorruption court. We will know more on December 9 when the Afghan High Office of Oversight will hold a press conference to announce past and future efforts to combat corruption.

I would like to say a few words now on our staffing and training. As Karl described, we are on track to triple the number of civilians in Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. We anticipate that we will need to further increase our civilian staffing in 2010 by another 20 to 30 percent, again concentrating on positions in the field and at key ministries that deliver vital services to the Afghan people. It is important to remember the multiplier effect that civilian personnel have. On average, each civilian leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed Afghan staff to experts with United States-funded NGOs.

To ensure we get the right personnel with the right skills, we have expanded and improved our recruiting and training efforts, from language skills to civ-mil integration. We are now conducting a 1-week, joint civ-mil training exercise every month at Camp Atterbury in Indiana. All civilians, from across the interagency, who are deploying to field positions or who regularly travel to the field as part of their duties must attend the course. I visited it a few weeks back and saw firsthand how this training immerses civilians and military in real-life exercises. They train side by side—with Afghan Americans playing the roles of local interlocutors—to plan projects, hold meetings with local officials, and, importantly, practice safety and security. State, USAID, and USDA experts who recently returned from serving at PRTs contribute to the training as subject matter experts and bring their real-life experiences.

We are building a cadre of Afghanistan and Pakistan experts who will continue to contribute to the mission even after they have returned. Besides the PRTers who help train at Atterbury, we have also recruited numerous State Foreign Service officers with Afghanistan and Pakistan experience to positions in the Department on the desks, at the Foreign Service Institute, and in Ambassador Holbrooke's office, as well as at USNATO and other posts. I want to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we will do everything we can to make sure that our men and women are well pre-

pared and supported—both from Kabul and Washington—so that they can succeed in their efforts to make our Nation safer.

When the Secretary was in Kabul in November, she heard from an American colonel that while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers under his command, none had 40 years of agricultural experience or rule of law and governance expertise like the USDA and State Department civilian experts serving alongside his battalion. He told her that he was happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need. And, he said we need more of them. The President's strategy—with congressional support—will make that possible.

I would also like to take a few moments to address how the recently completed strategy review impacts United States-Pakistani relations. As the President made clear in his December 1 speech, our partnership with Pakistan is inextricably linked to our efforts in Afghanistan. We are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We are not only strengthening Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, we are also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan's democracy and development. As the President said, ". . . going forward, the Pakistani people must know America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed."

The United States is committed to security assistance programs that strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target violent extremists that threaten both of our countries. To that end, the State Department manages two complementary programs: Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). FMF assists Pakistan with long-range strategic development of Pakistan's military services, building a long-term security relationship and reinforcing the U.S. commitment to a strategic partnership; PCCF provides Pakistan with the military equipment and training necessary now for Pakistani forces to win the current fight against insurgency in its border regions.

We are also committed to deepening our relationship with Pakistan to foster a stable, civilian-led democratic government that is supportive of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and is a partner in regional stability. We have affirmed this commitment through the Kerry-Lugar-Berman authorization of \$7.5 billion (\$1.5 billion annually over 5 years) in civilian assistance to Pakistan—funds that will support Pakistan's economic development, energy, education, water, agriculture, and governance. We have developed a civilian assistance strategy to reduce poverty and the susceptibility to terrorist recruitment that poverty breeds. We will assist Pakistan to address the country's profound infrastructure needs with highly visible projects in energy and agriculture.

On my trips, I heard repeatedly from Pakistanis their desire to be more involved in the design and implementation of projects. I spoke with our personnel at the Embassy about how this would be feasible. We will work through Pakistani institutions to implement programs wherever possible, with the goal of enabling and expanding Pakistani capacity. I was also impressed by the drive and capacity of Pakistani organizations; I am confident that there are skilled and eager local NGOs with whom we can productively partner.

Just as we need strong local partners for our assistance programs to succeed, so too we need our international partners to join us in supporting Pakistan's development and democracy, and helping Pakistan build on its success against militants. We are working closely with the Government of Pakistan and the international community to meet the relief and reconstruction needs in Malakand, impacted by military operations earlier in the year, and we are supporting the U.N. Special Envoy for Assistance to Pakistan's efforts to coordinate assistance in vulnerable areas. We are also encouraging other countries to follow through on their Tokyo Donor Conference pledges.

As we strengthen our partnership with Pakistan, we are forging trust and cooperation on a broad, government-to-government basis that emphasizes institutions, not individuals. In addition to the President, Prime Minister, and other ruling party federal officials, we are reaching out to provincial and local officials and have developed strong working relationship with parties and civil society leaders across the political spectrum.

Building on the Secretary's personal and direct engagement with the people of Pakistan during her October trip, our efforts in Pakistan will be supported by a new public diplomacy effort to redefine the United States-Pakistan relationship as one that goes beyond our shared security objectives. This communications effort will expand people-to-people contacts and challenge the extremists' narrative. It will involve greater engagement with Pakistani media, academic and business exchanges, and reaching out to the Pakistani-American community.

We are also pursuing high-level policy dialogues to encourage the Government of Pakistan to undertake the necessary policy reforms that will lead to long-term economic growth and development. For instance, our consistent diplomacy on energy issues, backed by our commitment to invest in energy infrastructure projects that will improve the lives of the Pakistani people, will reinforce Pakistan's resolve to implement critical electricity pricing reforms. I have also had multiple meetings with Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin, and we have talked about the importance of moving forward with government reforms that will put Pakistan on a path to economic prosperity.

Creating new economic opportunities in Pakistan and Afghanistan is a core component of combating violent extremism there. That is why we continue to work with Congress to pass legislation to create economic opportunities in this region, including through initiatives such as the proposed Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), a trade preference program that is essential to our national security objectives in the region. ROZs would provide duty free treatment to certain goods produced in all of Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. Such initiatives can create much-needed employment opportunities. We are also supporting Pakistani and Afghan negotiations to finalize a transit trade agreement that will allow goods produced in either country to more quickly reach markets through Pakistan's ports or via Afghanistan's ring road to Central Asia.

As we consider how to best support Pakistan, we should remember the enormous costs that the Pakistani people are bearing as they courageously confront the threat of violent extremism. In response to the government taking military action against extremist groups, these groups have launched a string of violent attacks against women and children in markets, and families worshipping in mosques. In recent months, hundreds have been killed and many more injured.

We recognize that there will be ongoing humanitarian needs in Pakistan. As the government takes military action against extremist groups that threaten not only Pakistan but also the region and the world, it is in the U.S. interest to support Pakistan's efforts on the basis of the long-term partnership that the President described.

In closing, I would only add that we share these responsibilities with governments around the world. Our NATO allies and other international community partners have already made significant contributions of their own in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the NATO Ministerial last week in Brussels, allies and ISAF partners pledged to contribute approximately 7,000 additional troops for Afghanistan. In all, 25 countries pledged to do more in terms of troops, trainers, and trust fund moneys.

The task we face is as complex as any national security challenge in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if this effort is viewed as the responsibility of a single party, a single agency, or a single country. We owe it to the troops and civilians who face these dangers to come together as Americans—and with our allies and partners—to help them accomplish this mission.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Lew.
General.

**STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS, COMMANDER,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, TAMPA, FL**

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the situation in Afghanistan together with Deputy Secretary Lew and Ambassador Eikenberry, two great partners in this effort.

As you know, I had the honor of coming before this committee to provide my assessment of the situation in Iraq when I was the Commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq, and I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the way ahead in Afghanistan.

Let me state up front that I fully support the policy President Obama announced at West Point last week. Success in Afghanistan is necessary and attainable, but the challenges are great. The United States and its ISAF and Afghan partners can disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of the sanctuaries it enjoyed there prior to 9/11, and we can degrade the capabilities of the Afghan Taliban

and other extremist elements while building Afghan security forces that can increasingly lead the fight against the Taliban, allowing international forces to redeploy over time. But, none of this will be easy.

Improving the capacity of the Afghan Government will also be difficult, as Ambassador Eikenberry forthrightly observed during the deliberations of the President's national security team. Nonetheless, while certainly difficult or different and, in some ways tougher than Iraq, Afghanistan is no more hopeless than Iraq was when I took command there in February 2007. Indeed, the level of violence and number of violent civilian deaths in Iraq were vastly higher than we have seen in Afghanistan. But, achieving progress in Afghanistan will be hard, and the progress there likely will be slower in developing than was the progress achieved in Iraq.

As President Obama has observed, success in Afghanistan is vital for America's security. Reversing the Taliban's momentum is essential to the effort to degrade and defeat al-Qaeda. The Taliban we are fighting in Afghanistan today is the same organization that sheltered and supported Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda as they planned the 9/11 attacks. The relationship between these groups remains strong. As Secretary Gates observed last week, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other.

The Afghan Taliban are, to be sure, distinct from the Pakistani Taliban and their partner groups, which also have close relationships with al-Qaeda. The Pakistani Taliban are part of a syndicate of extremist groups that includes, as the chairman noted earlier, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the group that carried out the Mumbai attacks, and the Haqqani network, among others. That syndicate threatens the stability of Pakistan and Afghanistan and, indeed, the entire subcontinent.

Although most Taliban fighters confronting our forces are local Afghans motivated by local circumstances, the Afghan Taliban leadership is organized, ideologically motivated, and a beacon and symbol for other dangerous extremist elements. As Secretary Gates noted, defeating al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions; they cannot be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.

Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan, thus, will not be easy. The Taliban has in recent years been gaining strength and expanding the extent of its control of parts of Afghanistan. It is important to remember, nevertheless, that the Taliban commands significantly less support among Pashtuns than either Sunni or Shia extremist groups in Iraq had in their communities in 2007, and it commands virtually no support among Afghanistan's other ethnic groups.

Beyond the insurgent challenge, corruption within the Afghan Government, particularly the serious abuse of power by some individual leaders and their associates, has eroded the government's legitimacy. Flaws in the recent Presidential election further undermined confidence in the government.

And, of course, Taliban sanctuaries in the Afghan-Pakistan border area remain a major challenge to security in Afghanistan,

although we have been making progress in coordinating with our Pakistani partners in addressing this issue.

Meanwhile, Iran has played a mixed role in Afghanistan, helping with the country's development, but also providing some lethal support to the insurgents, albeit on a more limited scale than it provided to militants in Iraq.

Our Armed Forces and civilians, and those of our NATO allies and ISAF partners, will therefore face tremendous challenges in the months ahead. As in Iraq, our troopers and their partners in Afghanistan will have to fight their way into enemy strongholds and clear enemy-controlled population centers. As in Iraq, the situation is likely to get harder before it gets easier. Violence likely will increase initially, particularly in the spring, as the weather improves. Moreover, as the Afghan Government, with international encouragement and assistance, moves to combat corruption and abuses of power, the result likely will be increased reporting on those problems, and greater turmoil within the government, as malign actors are identified and replaced.

These factors and the seasonal nature of violence in Afghanistan will undoubtedly result in an increase in security incidents in the summer of 2010. It will be important, therefore, to withhold judgment on the success or failure of the strategy in Afghanistan until next December, as the President has counseled. That will be the right time to evaluate progress, consider the way forward, and begin discussing the nature and pace of the transition of security tasks to Afghan forces and initial reductions of United States forces in Afghanistan that will begin in July 2011, transitions and reductions that will, as the President explained, be based upon conditions on the ground.

To address the challenges in Afghanistan, we have already implemented important changes that have improved our prospects for progress as General McChrystal works with the 43 ISAF member nations and our Afghan partners in waging a joint campaign. We have fundamentally restructured ISAF to create increased unity of effort. General McChrystal is dual-hatted as ISAF commander and commander of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, giving him control over the operations of all United States and ISAF forces in that country. LTG Dave Rodriguez is commanding the first-ever three-star operational command in Afghanistan, which frees up General McChrystal to focus on strategic and coalition aspects of the war.

The critically important training command has moved from being a United States-led coalition effort to one augmented by the new NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. And its new commander, LTG Bill Caldwell, is setting conditions to accelerate the critically important expansion and improvement of Afghan security forces.

United States combat forces will actively assist in the development of Afghan security forces by training and partnering directly with Afghan units at all levels, a concept that has been effective in Iraq, but that was only recently implemented in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, we're now working, not just to secure the Afghan population, but also to mobilize and enable local citizens, engaging them in community defense initiatives so that they can help defend themselves against the extremist elements trying to establish control in various areas.

We have also worked to improve coordination between the military and all other agencies of government. Wearing his U.S. hat, General McChrystal has worked with Ambassador Eikenberry and the U.S. Embassy in developing a U.S. civil-military campaign plan.

Further, we have established a Joint Task Force for Detainee Operations, an Afghan Threat Finance Cell, an Information Operations Task Force, a Counternarcotics Task Force, and a coordination cell to oversee reconciliation and reintegration efforts, and each will partner with Embassy, USAID, and other interagency officials, as did similar elements in Iraq.

U.S. forces have also established partnerships between battlespace owners and senior civilian representatives at several echelons in Regional Commands East and South, and launched other initiatives to improve unity of effort in the North and West, as well.

General McChrystal has also transformed the way our forces operate. He has developed a coherent and focused campaign plan for the entire theater, assisted in this effort by General Rodriguez and by General Rodriguez's two-star French deputy.

General McChrystal has issued new counterinsurgency guidance to ensure appropriate focus on the critical task of securing the population in order to help facilitate Afghan-led reintegration of reconcilables, a core objective of any counterinsurgency effort. And he has updated the ISAF Tactical Directive and taken a number of other steps to reduce civilian casualties without compromising the ability of our forces to operate.

As we focus on the U.S. civil-military effort, we also recognize that we are not fighting this war alone. In addition to our Afghan partners, United States forces are part of an international coalition that includes elements from 43 countries. Our ISAF partners have recently committed some 7,000 additional soldiers, and more are likely to be pledged in advance of the international conference planned for January in London.

Allied forces have been fighting skillfully and bravely, and taking casualties from Herat to Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif to the Pakistani border. And while there are concerns that some partners have declared end dates for their combat participation, there is hope they will be able to continue to contribute in other roles.

One of the most important developments over the past year has been the impressive determination of Pakistan's efforts against extremists that threaten the stability of the Pakistani state. And the chairman noted this earlier. Pakistani operations in Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Swat, Buner, Lower Dir, and now South Waziristan have significantly degraded Pakistani Taliban groups. These are the largest and most successful operations Pakistan has conducted against internal extremists, and we should acknowledge the losses the Pakistani military, Frontier Corps, and police have sustained in the course of these operations.

To be sure, these operations have not directly engaged the sanctuaries of the Afghan Taliban groups in Pakistan, nor those of some of the extremist syndicate I described earlier. However, the determination of Pakistan's civilian and military leaders to fight elements of the extremist nexus is an important step forward and

does facilitate our efforts to degrade the extremist groups in the border region and to defeat al-Qaeda.

In short, success in Afghanistan is, again, of enormous importance, and it is attainable, but achieving our objectives will not be easy. To paraphrase what the great Ambassador Crocker used to say about Iraq, everything in Afghanistan is hard, and it's hard all the time. Nonetheless, I do believe that the policy the President announced last week, and the additional resources being committed, will, over the next 18 months, enable us to make important progress in several critical tasks: to reverse the Taliban momentum; to improve the security of the Afghan people; to increase the capabilities of Afghan security forces; to help improve Afghan governance; and to set conditions for the start of the reduction in United States combat forces in a way that does not jeopardize the progress that has been achieved.

The American military has been at war or had forces deployed on robust contingency operations continuously since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. And for the past 8 years, we have fought terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. The All-Volunteer Force has been tested during this period as never before, but it has also performed as never before. It is, without question, the finest fighting force, and, in particular, the finest counterinsurgency force, our Nation has ever fielded. The determination, skill, initiative, and courage of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen are awe-inspiring. So are the sacrifices they and their families make every day. It continues to be the greatest of privileges to serve with them, and with our civilian and coalition partners, in such important missions as those we are undertaking in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. And I want to thank you and your colleagues for the continued great support that you provide to our wonderful men and women in uniform and their civilian partners.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, COMMANDER,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, TAMPA, FL

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the situation in Afghanistan and our strategy and prospects going forward in that critical theater. As you know, I had the honor of coming before this committee to provide my assessment of the situation in Iraq when I was the Commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq and I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the way ahead in Afghanistan.

Let me state upfront that I fully support the policy President Obama announced at West Point last week. Success in Afghanistan is necessary and attainable, but the challenges are great. The United States and its ISAF and Afghan partners can disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of the sanctuaries it enjoyed there prior to 9/11. And we can degrade the capabilities of the Afghan Taliban and other extremist elements while building Afghan security forces that can increasingly lead the fight against the Taliban, allowing international forces to redeploy over time. But none of this will be easy.

Improving the capacity of the Afghan Government will also be difficult, as Ambassador Eikenberry forthrightly observed during the deliberations of the President's national security team.

Nonetheless, while certainly different and, in some ways tougher than Iraq, Afghanistan is no more hopeless than Iraq was when I took command there in February 2007. Indeed, the level of violence and number of violent civilian deaths in Iraq were vastly higher than we have seen in Afghanistan. But, achieving progress

in Afghanistan will be hard and the progress there likely will be slower in developing than was the progress achieved in Iraq. Nonetheless, as with Iraq, in Afghanistan, hard is not hopeless.

As President Obama has observed, success in Afghanistan is vital for America's security. Reversing the Taliban's momentum is essential to the effort to degrade and defeat al-Qaeda. The Taliban we are fighting in Afghanistan today is the same organization that sheltered and supported Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda as they planned the 9/11 attacks. The relationship between these groups remains strong. As Secretary Gates observed last week, "the Taliban and al-Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other."

The Afghan Taliban are, to be sure, distinct from the Pakistani Taliban and their partner groups, which also have close relations with al-Qaeda. The Pakistani Taliban are part of a syndicate of extremist groups that includes Lashkar-e-Tayyiba—the group that carried out the Mumbai attacks—and the Haqqani network, among others. That syndicate threatens the stability of Pakistan and, indeed, the entire subcontinent. Although most Taliban fighters confronting our forces are local Afghans motivated by local circumstances, the Afghan Taliban leadership is organized, is ideologically motivated, and has become a beacon and symbol for other dangerous extremist elements. As Secretary Gates noted, "Defeating al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case."

Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan thus will not be easy. The Taliban has, in recent years, been gaining strength and expanding the extent of its control of parts of Afghanistan. It is important to remember nevertheless that the Taliban commands significantly less support among Pashtuns than either Sunni or Shiite extremists groups in Iraq had in 2007, and it commands virtually no support among Afghanistan's other ethnic groups.

Beyond that, corruption within the Afghan Government—particularly the serious abuse of power by some individual leaders and their associates—has eroded the government's legitimacy. Flaws in the recent Presidential election further undermined confidence in the government. Taliban sanctuaries in the Afghan-Pakistan border area remain a major challenge to security in Afghanistan, although we have been making progress in coordinating with our Pakistani partners in addressing this issue.

Meanwhile, Iran has played a mixed role in Afghanistan, helping with the country's development but also providing some lethal support to the insurgents, albeit on a more limited scale than it provided to militants in Iraq.

Our Armed Forces and civilians—and those of our NATO allies and ISAF partners—will therefore face tremendous challenges in the months ahead. As in Iraq, our troopers and their partners in Afghanistan will have to fight their way into enemy strongholds and clear enemy-controlled population centers. As in Iraq, the situation is likely to get harder before it gets easier. Violence likely will increase initially, particularly in the spring as the weather improves. Moreover, as the Afghan Government, with international encouragement and assistance, moves to combat corruption and abuses of power, the result likely will be increased reporting on those problems and greater turmoil within the government as malign actors are identified and replaced. These factors and the seasonal nature of violence in Afghanistan, will undoubtedly result in an increase in security incidents in the summer of 2010. It will be important, therefore, to withhold judgment on the success or failure of the strategy in Afghanistan until next December, as the President has counseled. That will be the right time to evaluate progress, consider the way forward, and begin discussing the nature and pace of the transition of security tasks to Afghan forces and initial reductions of U.S. forces in Afghanistan that will begin in July 2011—transitions and reductions that will, as the President explained, be based upon the conditions on the ground.

To address the challenges in Afghanistan, we have already implemented important changes that have improved our prospects for progress as General McChrystal works with the 43 ISAF member nations and our Afghan partners in waging our joint campaign. We have fundamentally restructured ISAF to create increased unity-of-effort.

General McChrystal is dual-hatted as ISAF commander and commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, giving him control over the operations of all U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. LTG Dave Rodriguez is commanding the first-ever 3-star operational command in Afghanistan, which frees up General McChrystal to focus on strategic and coalition aspects of the war. The critically important training command has moved from being a U.S.-led coalition effort to one augmented by the new NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. And its new commander, LTG Bill Caldwell, is setting conditions to accelerate the critically important expansion and

improvement of Afghan security forces. U.S. combat forces will actively assist in the development of Afghan security forces by training and partnering directly with Afghan units at all levels, a concept that has been effective in Iraq but was only recently implemented in Afghanistan. Furthermore, we're working not just to secure the Afghan population but also to mobilize and enable local citizens—engaging them in community defense initiatives so that they can help defend themselves against the extremist elements trying to establish control in various areas.

We have also worked to improve coordination between the military and all other agencies of government. Wearing his U.S. hat, General McChrystal has worked with Ambassador Eikenberry and the U.S. Embassy in developing a U.S. civil-military campaign plan. Further, we have established a Joint Task Force for Detainee operations, an Afghan Threat Finance Cell, an Information Operations Task Force, and a coordination cell to oversee reconciliation and reintegration efforts—and each will partner with Embassy, USAID, and other interagency officials, as did similar elements in Iraq. U.S. forces have also established partnerships between battlespace owners and senior civilian representatives at several echelons in Regional Commands East and South, and launched other initiatives to improve unity of effort in the north and west, as well.

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As we focus on the U.S. civil-military effort, we must also remember that we are not fighting this war alone. In addition to our Afghan partners, U.S. forces are part of an international coalition that includes elements from 43 countries. Our ISAF partners have recently committed some 7,000 additional soldiers and more are likely to be pledged in advance of the international conference planned for January 28 in London. Allied forces have been fighting skillfully and bravely—and taking casualties—from Herat to Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif to the Pakistan border. And while there are concerns that some partners have declared end-dates for their combat participation, there is hope they will be able to continue to contribute in other roles.

One of the most important developments over the past year has been the impressive determination of Pakistan's efforts against extremists that threaten the stability of the Pakistani state. Pakistani operations in Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Swat, Buner, Lower Dir, and now South Waziristan have significantly degraded Pakistani Taliban groups. These are the largest and most successful operations Pakistan has conducted against internal extremists—and we should recognize the losses the Pakistani military, Frontier Corps, and police have sustained in the course of these operations.

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The American military has been at war or had forces deployed on robust contingency operations continuously since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. And for the past 8 years, we have fought terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. The All-Volunteer Force has been tested during this period as never before. But, it has also performed as never before. It is, without question, the finest fighting force and, in particular, the finest counterinsurgency force, our Nation has ever fielded. The determination, skill, initiative, and courage of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen are awe-inspiring. So are the sacrifices

they and their families make every day. It continues to be the greatest of privileges to serve with them—and with our civilian and coalition partners—in such important missions as those we are undertaking in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. And I want to thank you and your colleagues for the continued great support that you provide to our wonderful men and women in uniform and their civilian partners.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. KARL EIKENBERRY, AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to present my views on Afghanistan today.

I'd like to ask that my full statement be submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Last week, in his speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Obama presented the administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His decision came after an intensive, deliberative, and a far-reaching review. I'm honored to have been part of that process.

I believe the course the President outlined offers the best path to stabilize Afghanistan and to ensure al-Qaeda cannot regain a foothold to plan new attacks against us. I can say, without equivocation, that I fully support this approach.

I consider myself privileged to serve as a United States Ambassador and to represent an amazing team of diplomats, development specialists, and civilian experts who form the most capable and dedicated United States Embassy anywhere in the world today. I'm extraordinarily proud of them.

I'm also honored to testify alongside my very close professional colleague, Deputy Secretary of State Jack Lew, as well as my old friend, GEN David Petraeus. Yesterday, I also had the honor of testifying with GEN Stan McChrystal, my professional colleague and friend of many years. And I want to say from the outset that General McChrystal and I are united in a joint effort, where civilian and military personnel work together every day side by side with our Afghan partners and our allies. And we could not accomplish our objectives without this kind of cooperation.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the United States is at a critical juncture in our involvement in Afghanistan. On December the 1st, the President ordered 30,000 additional troops to deploy to Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable, with the goal of breaking the insurgency's momentum, hastening and improving the training of the Afghan National Security Forces, and establishing security in key parts of the country.

On the civilian side, we aim to increase employment and provide essential services in areas of greatest insecurity while improving critical ministries and the economy at the national level. These steps, taken together, we believe will help remove the insurgents from the battlefield and build support for the Afghan Government.

As the President said, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance. After a difficult election, the Afghan Government does show signs of recognizing the need to

deliver better service, governance, and security. We await urgent, concrete steps, though, in a number of areas.

We'd like to briefly discuss the three main pillars of our effort in Afghanistan: security, governance, and development.

In his testimony yesterday, General McChrystal addressed our plans for improving security and building the Afghan National Security Forces. And since assuming my post, I've made a special point of getting outside of Kabul to see conditions firsthand, and I fully concur with General McChrystal's assessment that the security situation remains serious. Sending additional United States and NATO/ISAF forces to Afghanistan is critical to regaining the initiative, and I'm confident that, as these troops arrive, the situation will stabilize and will turn in our favor. Additional troops will also permit us to expand our work with the Afghan army and the police so that they can take a larger role in providing for the security of their own people. As President Obama said, the transition to Afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of 2011, when we expect Afghan security forces to assume lead responsibility for defending their country.

Moving on from security, the second pillar of our comprehensive strategy focuses on governance at the national and the subnational levels. Our overarching goal is to encourage improved governance so Afghans see the benefit of supporting the legitimate government and the insurgency loses support.

As General McChrystal has pointed out, one of the major impediments our strategy faces is the Afghan Government's lack of credibility with its own people. To strengthen its legitimacy, our approach at the national level is on improving key ministries by increasing the number of civilian technical advisers and providing more development assistance directly through these ministries' budgets. By focusing on ministries that deliver essential services and security, we can accelerate the building of the Afghan Government so that it is sufficiently visible, effective, and accountable.

At the provincial and in the district level, we're working jointly with the military through our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, District Development Working Groups, and District Support Teams, which help build Afghan capacity, particularly in the areas of greatest insecurity, in southern and in eastern Afghanistan.

Underpinning all efforts is the need to combat corruption and promote the rule of law. With our assistance, the Afghan Government is steadily building law enforcement institutions to fight corruption, organized crime, and drug trafficking. In his inaugural address, President Karzai stated his intention to make merit-based appointments in his new Cabinet and to implement an anticorruption strategy, and we're encouraged by his statements.

The cultivation of poppy and trafficking in opium also continue to have a very debilitating effect on Afghan society. Our strategy is multipronged, involving demand reduction, efforts by law enforcement agencies and the military to detain traffickers and interdict drug shipments, and support for licit agricultural development.

The narcotics problem, of course, will never have a solution without economic development. And this leads to the third pillar of our effort, which is development. In recent months, we've adjusted our approach to focus on building key elements of Afghanistan's private

sector economy, increasing our emphasis on agriculture, enhancing government revenue collection, and improving the coordination of assistance within the United States Government and the international community. And these steps were taken to produce improvements in the lives of ordinary Afghans and to contribute directly to more effective government and lessened support for the insurgency.

Rebuilding the farm sector, in particular, is essential for the Afghan Government to reduce the pool of unemployed men, who form the recruiting base for extremist groups. We estimate that some 80 percent of the Afghan population derives their income either directly or indirectly from agriculture.

And, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize, we're concentrating on what is essential and attainable. The President's strategy is based upon a pragmatic assessment of the security interests of the United States of America and our belief that sustainable, representative governance and a sustainable economy are essential to success. We do need a viable Afghan Government so our forces can drawdown and the investment of United States taxpayer dollars can be reduced.

In closing, I'd like to mention two important risks that we face in carrying out our strategy. The first is that, in spite of everything we do, Afghanistan may struggle to take over the essential task of governance and security on a timely basis. The second is our partnership with Pakistan.

The effort we're undertaking in Afghanistan is likely to fall short of our strategic goals unless there is more progress at eliminating sanctuaries used by the Afghan Taliban and their associates inside of Pakistan.

If the main elements of the President's plan are executed, and if our Afghan partners and our allies do their part, I'm confident we can achieve our strategic objectives. I say this with conviction, because, for the first time in my three tours of duty in Afghanistan, all elements of our national power are employed with the full support of the President, and, increasingly, of our allies.

Achieving our goals in Afghanistan will not be easy, but I'm optimistic that we can succeed, with the support of Congress. Our mission was underresourced for many years, but it is now one of our government's highest priorities, with substantial development funds and hundreds more civilian personnel available. We will soon have increased our civilian presence in Kabul threefold, and in the field, sixfold, just over this past year. We will, of course, need more.

U.S. foreign assistance is also comparatively small, but an essential fraction of the total spent in Afghanistan over the past 8 years. Additional resources will be necessary, and we look forward to sharing more details on our anticipated need, with Congress in the coming days and weeks.

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan represents a daunting challenge. Success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. With the additional troops and the other resources provided by the President and with the help of the United States Congress, we will work tirelessly to ensure al-Qaeda never again finds refuge in Afghanistan and threatens our country.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. We look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Eikenberry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KARL EIKENBERRY, AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to present my views on Afghanistan today. Last week, in his speech at West Point, President Obama presented the administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His decision came after an intensive, deliberate and far-reaching review of conditions, risks and options available. The course he outlined offers the best path to stabilize Afghanistan and to ensure al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups cannot regain a foothold to plan new attacks against our country or our allies. I fully support this approach. It has been welcomed by the Afghan Government, which said it will spare no effort to achieve the strategy's key objectives. I hope it will be welcomed here in Congress.

I consider myself privileged to serve in Kabul and to represent an extraordinary team of diplomats, development specialists and civilian experts from many fields and multiple agencies who form the most capable and dedicated U.S. mission anywhere. Our civilian presence will have tripled by early 2010 and, with the support of the Congress, we anticipate it will expand further next year. More important than the numbers of people are the skills that these men and women possess, and their willingness to work tirelessly under the most difficult conditions. Many of them are out in the field with our military at the forefront of our Nation's effort to stabilize Afghanistan and the region. I am extraordinarily proud of them.

I am honored to testify today alongside my close professional colleague, Deputy Secretary of State Jack Lew, and my old friend, GEN David Petraeus. Yesterday, I also had the honor of testifying with GEN Stan McChrystal, my professional colleague and friend of many years, to describe how we will carry out the President's strategy for Afghanistan. My testimony today will focus on the civilian role in that strategy, but I want to underscore at the outset that General McChrystal and I are united in a joint effort in which civilian and military personnel work together every day, often literally side by side with our Afghan partners and allies. We could not accomplish our objectives without such a combined effort, and I am proud that we have forged a close working relationship at the top and throughout our organizations, one that will deepen in coming months as additional troops and civilians arrive.

Our Nation is at a critical juncture in our involvement in Afghanistan, and my testimony today represents my assessment of the situation and prospects for achieving our goals.

A mission that in past years was poorly defined and underresourced is now clear and, thanks to the Congress, better resourced. As you know, the President on December 1 authorized 30,000 additional troops to deploy to Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable, with the goal of breaking the insurgency's momentum, hastening and improving the training of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and restoring security in key areas of the country. I joined Secretary Clinton and General McChrystal in Brussels last week to present the administration's decisions to the allies, and we anticipate our troops will be joined by a substantial increase of other NATO/ISAF forces. Our military effort and civilian assistance will be closely coordinated. On the civilian side, we aim to increase employment and provide essential services in areas of greatest insecurity, and to improve critical ministries and the economy at the national level. These steps will, I believe, help to remove insurgents from the battlefield and build support for the Afghan Government.

As the President said, "we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance." We expect the Afghan Government to take specific actions in the key areas of security, governance, and economic development on an urgent basis. In the eighth year of our involvement, Afghans must progressively take greater responsibility for their own affairs. As we reduce our combat role, we will be transforming our diplomatic, security, and economic relations to reflect a more fully sovereign Afghanistan.

I firmly believe these adjustments to our course provide the best possible chance of achieving success on a reasonable timetable, but I will also give you my honest appraisal of the challenges as I see them.

No way forward is without risk. Eight years after the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the removal of the Taliban from power, Afghanistan remains a disconnected society, divided by factionalism, plagued by corruption and illegal narcotics, and challenged by insecurity. These problems are in large measure the product of

nearly three decades of war, which broke down the fabric of Afghanistan's centuries-old society and contributed to deep poverty, illiteracy, drug addiction, and unemployment. This has been compounded in recent years by a growing disillusionment among Afghans, both with their own government and with the uneven results of the assistance delivered by the international community. The United States must approach the daunting complexities of Afghanistan with an awareness of our limitations. Our forces and our civilians are trying to help a society that simultaneously wants and rejects outside intervention. Afghans yearn for the peace and stability that has been denied them for too long. We will not fully heal their society's deep-seated problems, but we can help them along a path to normalcy and stability that is key to protecting our own vital interests. We are, simply put, helping Afghanistan build security forces and other basic institutions of government to prevent a return to the conditions that it endured before September 11, 2001.

Let me mention two challenges we face. The first is that, in spite of everything we do, Afghanistan may struggle to take over the essential tasks of governance; the second is our partnership with Pakistan, which the President has stated is inextricably linked to our success in Afghanistan. Though these risks cannot be discounted, if the main elements of the President's plan are executed, and if our Afghan partners and our allies do their part, I am confident we can achieve our strategic objectives.

I say this with conviction, because for the first time in my three tours in Afghanistan—two while in uniform and now as Ambassador—all the elements of our national power are employed with the full support of the President and, increasingly, of our allies. We have made great strides over the last 6 months in improving interagency coordination and civil-military collaboration. Our military and civilian teams on the ground are the best ever fielded. More important, after a difficult election, the Afghan Government shows signs of recognizing the need to deliver better governance and security, though we await concrete steps in many areas.

Achieving our objectives on an accelerated timetable will almost certainly take additional resources—more troops, but also more development aid and additional civilian personnel to assist the Afghan Government and people, so they can assume control of their own affairs. The administration will be working with Congress in coming days and weeks to define our request.

I would like to now discuss the three main pillars of our effort in Afghanistan—security, governance, and development—and then say a few words about the organization of our mission and about the wider region.

SECURITY

In his testimony yesterday, General McChrystal addressed our plans for improving security and building the Afghan National Security Forces. The civilian role in this effort at the local level is to partner with the military and with the Afghan Government in restoring basic services and economic opportunity in cleared areas. I will return to this partnership and our role in it shortly. First, though, let me give you my perspective as Ambassador on the security situation.

Since assuming my post in May, I have made a special point of getting outside Kabul as frequently as possible to see conditions around the country firsthand and to consult with Afghans, allies, and our own civilian and military personnel. I fully concur with General McChrystal's assessment that the security situation, which worsened dramatically this past year, remains serious. The Taliban and other extremists groups exercise increasing influence in many areas of the south and east, and attacks and instability are rising in parts of the north and west as well, which long have been relatively stable. The insurgents are loosely organized, yet resilient and effective in many areas.

Augmenting U.S. and NATO/ISAF forces is critical to regain the initiative. I am confident that, as the additional U.S. troops arrive in coming months, the situation will stabilize and turn in our favor. Most Afghans have little interest in a future under the Taliban's brutal and arbitrary rule, and the troops now deploying will reassure them that they have the opportunity for a secure and better future. Our troops will serve as a bridge, improving security in key areas, just as the Marine and Army units sent earlier this year are doing with great skill in Helmand and Kandahar provinces.

Additional troops will also permit us to expand our partnering with, and training of, the Afghan army and police, so they can take on a progressively larger role in providing security. We all recognize the extraordinary challenges of building competent security forces. Afghanistan has not had a national army recruited from all ethnic groups and regions for many years, and low literacy, high attrition, and the lack of resources and expertise pose continuing problems. However, our forces are

highly skilled at this training and partnering mission, which they have performed ably under the most difficult circumstances in Iraq as well as in Afghanistan. I am confident that deployment of additional U.S. troops will yield improvements in the ANSF.

On the civilian side, we are supporting our military's efforts. Our Drug Enforcement Administration provides specialized training to the Afghan Counternarcotics Police. Our Federal Bureau of Investigation assists the Afghan Ministry of Interior in improving law enforcement capabilities. And, lastly, our Border Management Task Force, which includes U.S. Central Command, the Department of Homeland Security, and its Customs and Border Protection Agency, assists both the Afghan Border Police and the Customs Department.

As part of assuming the sovereign responsibility of protecting its people, the Afghan Government must build the ministerial capacity to recruit, train, and sustain the army and police, so that when our support begins to diminish Afghan forces are capable of protecting the country on their own. Simply put, the Afghan army and police need the full commitment of their political leadership. As President Obama said, the transition to Afghan responsibility will begin in the summer of 2011, when we expect Afghan security forces and the entire Afghan Government can begin assuming lead responsibility for defending their country.

We should recognize that one reason Afghanistan has been slow to assume a larger role in providing for its own security is the widespread concern among the populace that it will be abandoned by the international community, as happened after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989. For more than a decade afterward, Afghanistan endured brutal civil war, anarchy and later, the repressive Taliban regime that harbored and enabled al-Qaeda. The fear of once again having to fend for itself again is deeply felt in the country, which lies in a volatile region where many of its neighbors have competed to control events inside Afghan borders.

While the United States does not intend to continue our high level of deployed forces indefinitely, we are fully committed to assisting Afghanistan. To give Afghans confidence that they will not be abandoned again, the United States is committed to engaging in a strategic dialogue to define our long-term relationship on the basis of shared interests and values, just as we do with other nations. We will continue to assist and advise the ANSF to ensure they succeed over the long term. Though our relations are today dominated by questions about security, we have no territorial ambitions and do not seek permanent military bases. Afghans should be confident the United States is a trustworthy friend on whom they can rely after our combat forces begin to go home. Afghanistan's place in Central and South Asia must be secure.

GOVERNANCE

The second pillar of our comprehensive strategy focuses on improving Afghan governance. I would like to describe the civilian role in this effort, first at the national level and then in the provinces and districts. At both levels, our overarching goal is to encourage good governance, free from corruption, so Afghans see the benefits of supporting the legitimate government, and the insurgency loses support.

As General McChrystal points out, one of the major impediments our strategy faces is the Afghan Government's lack of credibility with its own people. To build its legitimacy, our approach at the national level is on improving key ministries, both by increasing the number of civilian technical advisers and by providing more development assistance directly through these ministries' budgets. By focusing on key ministries that deliver essential services and security, we can accelerate the building of an Afghan Government that is visible, effective, and accountable.

We must support the government's ability to deliver for the Afghan people. Afghan ministers say that too much of the development assistance provided is spent outside their national budget, often on programs that are not their priorities. We agree, and as part of the President's new emphasis we are committed to providing more direct assistance. We are reviewing the financial management systems of these key ministries and, if their financial system can be certified as accountable and transparent, we provide direct funding to be used for basic services, such as health, education, and agriculture. Similarly, to extend the government's reach around the country, Afghanistan needs educated, trained, and honest civil servants. To accomplish this, the United States and international partners will train current government employees in public administration and help build a pool of administrators and technical managers.

Cutting across this entire effort to improve Afghans' confidence in their government is the need to combat corruption and promote the rule of law. Without institutions that serve the needs of ordinary Afghans and government officials who are

accountable and honest, Afghanistan will always be in danger of returning to the conditions that made it a haven for violent extremists.

With our assistance and that of our allies, the Afghan Government is steadily building law enforcement institutions to fight corruption, organized crime, and drug trafficking. With the support of the FBI, the DEA, and our military, the Ministries of Interior and Counter Narcotics, and the Afghan National Directorate of Security recently created the Major Crimes Task Force, which is responsible for investigating major corruption, kidnapping, and organized crimes cases. Similarly, Afghanistan's Attorney General recently established a special Anti-Corruption Unit, aimed at prosecuting misconduct by mid- and high-level government officials. In addition, a specialized Anti-Corruption Tribunal is being created to handle significant corruption cases, including prosecutions involving provincial officials. Our mission's Department of Justice team is also providing support.

In his inaugural address, President Karzai stated his intention to make merit-based appointments in his new Cabinet and to implement an anticorruption strategy, including by expanding the powers of the existing High Office of Oversight. We are encouraged by his statements, but we need to work together to aggressively implement this goal and produce results. In addition to his Cabinet, it is important that qualified appointments are made at the vice minister, provincial, and district levels, which would give the Afghan Government greater credibility with its people and permit more rapid reforms. Secretary Clinton last month discussed with President Karzai the necessity of moving swiftly to develop concrete plans to implement this agenda to improve government accountability and performance.

Beyond the national level, I would like to address our efforts to promote governance at the provincial and district levels. We are working jointly with the military through our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, District Development Working Groups, and District Support Teams, which help build Afghan capacity in key areas, particularly in areas of greatest insecurity in southern and eastern Afghanistan. We are improving governance beyond Kabul through rule-of-law programs and other mechanisms that have proven effective in giving Afghans a greater stake in their government, including through the National Solidarity Program. We have expanded our support for the Afghan Social Outreach Program to create provincial and district councils and build citizen involvement. We are working with the Afghan Government to provide incentives for subnational leaders to improve performance. I would like to emphasize that we are concentrating on what is essential and attainable. In all of these efforts, we must not wait too long to create an Afghan autonomous capability, or we risk building a dependency that will be that much harder to break.

Some might argue that we are reaching too high—that Afghanistan has rarely in its history had a central government capable of carrying out these tasks and that to expect a coherent state to emerge now is unrealistic and a waste of resources. I disagree with that argument on several levels. First, while the Afghan state has never been particularly strong, Afghanistan has had functioning governments in Kabul that were widely viewed as legitimate. Second, the government structure we are helping to develop is one with the minimum set of capabilities that any state must possess to serve its people.

Our goal is not nation-building, nor are we attempting to impose a Western model of governance. Afghanistan is a poor country that will remain dependent on international aid for years to come. This strategy for improving governance is based on a pragmatic assessment of the national security interests of the United States, and our belief that sustainable representative government is essential to success. Afghanistan needs a viable government so our forces can drawdown and the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars can be reduced. Achieving those goals will prevent the need for the United States and its allies to intervene to protect ourselves from extremists who, unless we succeed, might once again find refuge in Afghanistan.

The cultivation of poppy and the trafficking in opium without a doubt has the most debilitating effect on Afghan society, feeding corruption and undermining the legal economy, while generating funds for the insurgency. Our strategy for combating the pervasive impact of illegal narcotics is multipronged, involving demand reduction, efforts by law enforcement and the military to detain major traffickers and interdict drug shipments, and support for licit agricultural development. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration works closely with Afghan partners to investigate and prosecute major traffickers. With our support, the Counter-Narcotics Justice Task Force has become the most effective judicial organization in Afghanistan today, with successful investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of hundreds of drug traffickers. But the narcotics problem will never have a satisfactory solution without economic development in this still desperately poor country.

DEVELOPMENT

Along with security and governance, the third pillar of our effort is development assistance. In recent months, we have adjusted our approach to focus on building key elements of Afghanistan's private-sector economy, increasing our emphasis on agriculture, enhancing government revenue collection, and improving the coordination of assistance delivery within the U.S. Government and across the international community. These refinements are designed to produce measurable improvements in the lives of ordinary Afghans—and thus to contribute directly to more effective government and to lessened support for the insurgency.

We are targeting much of our assistance where violence is worst and shifting to more flexible and faster contract and grant mechanisms, to ensure our dollars are effectively supporting our efforts in the provinces. Development specialists at USAID, joined by experts from multiple departments and agencies of our government, are focusing on key sectors, such as agriculture. Rebuilding the farm sector is essential for the Afghan Government to reduce the pool of unemployed men who form the recruiting base for extremist groups. We estimate that at least 80 percent of the Afghan population derives their income, either directly or indirectly, from agriculture. Our agriculture efforts also seek to reinforce our governance strategy, so that the Agriculture Ministry will increasingly be—and be seen as—a tangible example of a more effective government.

At the same time, we are encouraging long-term investment, specifically by funding water management and electrification projects that deliver power and large-scale irrigation, and we promote mining and light industry that leverage Afghanistan's agricultural products and natural resources.

We are also helping Afghanistan's Government increase revenue collection. Without improvements in its ability to collect taxes and customs receipts, Afghanistan will always remain overly dependent on the international community and will struggle to meet the needs of its people. The Afghan Government has made progress in recent years in increasing domestic revenue collection, which has risen from 3.3 percent of gross domestic product to 7.7 percent. That is still too low. Most low-income countries collect 11 to 12 percent of their GDP on average, and we and our other partners are working with the Ministry of Finance on reforms that will further increase revenue. The biggest problem remains corruption, however. The current rough estimate is that only half of the revenue collected actually makes it into the treasury. Low domestic revenue undermines the Afghan Government's ability to provide services, while graft and bribery diminishes confidence in, and support for, the government. Representatives from the U.S. Treasury Department are working with the Afghan Finance Ministry and other essential ministries to build fiduciary systems that will permit us to provide them more direct funding.

Additionally, our Department of State and Commerce experts are assisting the Afghans to promote regional trade to help their economy. We expect that Afghanistan and Pakistan will shortly conclude a Transit Trade Agreement that will open new opportunities for commerce between the two countries. Finally, we also seek congressional support to soon pass Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation to create long-term and sustainable employment opportunities. Improving official commercial and trade relations will also contribute to an improved Afghanistan-Pakistan security relationship.

OUR CIVILIAN EFFORT

Achieving our goals for Afghanistan will not be easy, but I am optimistic that we can succeed with the support of the Congress. Underresourced for years, our mission is now one of our government's highest priorities, with substantial additional development funds and hundreds of additional personnel. By early 2010, we will have almost 1,000 civilians from numerous government departments and agencies on the ground in Afghanistan, tripling the total from the beginning of 2009. Of these, nearly 400 will serve out in the field with the military at Provincial Reconstruction Teams or at the brigade-level and on forward operating bases. By comparison, one year ago there were only 67 U.S. civilians serving outside Kabul. The hundreds of dedicated Americans who have taken on this assignment voluntarily accept hardship and risk and deserve our recognition and appreciation for the exemplary work they are performing under very difficult conditions. They are an extraordinarily skilled group, chosen because they have the proper skills and experience to achieve the results we seek.

In coming months, as our troops conduct operations to stabilize new areas, they will be joined by additional civilian personnel to work with our Afghan partners to strengthen governance and provide basic services as rapidly as possible. The integration of civilian and military effort has greatly improved over the last year, a

process that will deepen as additional troops arrive and our civilian effort expands. We have designated Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) as counterparts to NATO/ISAF commanders in each of the Regional Commands. These SCRs are senior professionals, experienced in conflict environments. They direct the work of U.S. Government civilians within their regions, subject to my overall guidance. This organizational structure has two important features: First, it ensures that our civilian efforts are fully integrated with the military's in the field. Second, it is decentralized, enabling quick response to local needs, which is essential to deal with the varying conditions in Afghanistan. To maximize our impact in priority areas, we have created District Support Teams, which allow civilians in the field to collaborate with the military to build Afghan capacity in assigned districts.

U.S. foreign assistance is a comparatively small but essential fraction of the total dollars spent in Afghanistan over the last 8 years. Our increased civilian presence has enabled us to more effectively and more rapidly invest our assistance in the areas of agriculture, job creation, education, health care, and infrastructure projects. Additional resources will be necessary for our effort to keep pace with the military's expansion, to carry out the President's strategy on a rapid timetable. We look forward to sharing additional details on our anticipated needs with Congress in the coming days and weeks.

We have also improved our contracting to enhance performance and increase the effectiveness of our development aid programs. In a conflict zone, a degree of program risk is unavoidable, but U.S. Government agencies in the mission remain accountable to Congress for every dollar they spend. Given the great amount of resources and emphasis devoted to Afghanistan, our programs receive extraordinary oversight, including by a Kabul-based Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, multiple audits of USAID and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs, and a hotline to report fraud, waste, and abuse.

PAKISTAN

Finally, let me say a few words about Pakistan and the critical impact that developments in that country will have on our efforts over the next year. The expanded military and civilian effort we are undertaking in Afghanistan is likely to produce measurable improvements in security and in Afghanistan's governance capacity, but we will likely fall short of our strategic goals unless there is more progress at eliminating the sanctuaries used by Afghan Taliban and their allied militant extremists in Pakistan. The vast majority of enemy fighters our troops face on the battlefield are local Afghans, fighting in their home provinces or regions. But the Afghan Taliban and other insurgents receive significant aid and direction from senior leaders operating outside Afghanistan's borders. The Afghan Taliban's leadership may employ those sanctuaries, as they have in the past, to simply wait us out and renew their attacks once our troops begin to go home. Recognizing this, the administration has emphasized the need for a regional approach that deals with the interrelated problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan and seeks to improve relations between the two governments.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is a daunting challenge. I have tried to describe how our mission, as part of an integrated civil-military team, will pursue the President's goals and our country's interests. I have also given you my best assessment of the risks we face. Let me, in closing, once again thank the men and women of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and our Armed Forces. Together with the members of other NATO/ISAF Armed Forces, the international community, and our Afghan allies, they do exemplary work on a daily basis that helps to protect the American people. They are prepared to work even harder to help the Afghan Government to stand on its own and handle the threats it faces. They believe firmly that our mission is necessary and achievable, and so do I. Success is not guaranteed, but it is possible. With the additional troops and other resources provided by the President—and with the help of Congress—we can ensure al-Qaeda never again finds refuge in Afghanistan and threatens our country.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me just say, to my colleagues on the committee, there's a balance, as everybody knows, and I've always tried to give everybody, the longer period of time to question, because then you can develop sort of a train of thought. But, we have a lot of members, and everybody wants to have a chance, here, and I think we have lim-

ited time, so I'm just going to cut it down. And I hate to do that. I hope everybody is agreeable to that. And we'll go with a 6-minute round, under the circumstances.

General, let me thank you for your comments about the troops. Every one of us here, every time we go over there, we are struck by how extraordinary they are, the contributions they're making. And this time of the year, it's a tough time to be away from home, and our thoughts are very, very much with them. And we are very grateful to you and to all of the leadership and to all of them.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I mentioned Pakistan in the opening comments, and it seems as if, for the moment at least, this question of hedging the bet is very much on the table with respect to Pakistan's leadership. And I wonder if you could, General, and perhaps Jack Lew, very quickly share with us—the recent Pakistani military offensives have gone after the Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan, and yet we have yet to see their operations directed at the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, or some of the al-Qaeda strongholds. And during that time, the military has continued to work with rival Taliban factions, including those led by Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir, who are believed to be involved in the Afghan insurgency and linked to al-Qaeda and Haqqani. So, could you share with us your strategy, General, and what the administration's strategy is, Mr. Secretary, vis-a-vis the Pakistan military, how to convince them that we have a long-term commitment to the region, we're not about to leave that, and we need them to focus on these other networks and groups?

General PETRAEUS. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, as we were discussing before the session, the developments of the last 10 months really are quite significant, because the Pakistani leadership, all the political leaders, the civilian populists, the clerics, and the military have all united in recognizing that the internal extremists represent the most pressing existential threat to their country, more pressing than the traditional threat to the east. And they have taken action in response to that recognition, as you noted, in the Malakand Division, Swat, North West Frontier Province—did quite good work there, I might add, as well. They did not just clear and leave, they have cleared, they have held onto it, they are working the rebuilding piece, and they're already looking forward to ultimate transition.

They then have shifted; they've conducted operations in Mohmand, Bajaur, and Khyber against extremist elements there related to those in Swat, and, as you noted, gone after the group that was held by the late Baitullah Mehsud. That operation is now drawing to a close, both because of having achieved their objectives and winner, but they have moved further north and begun operations in other agencies—Kurram and Orakzai to go after some of those that got away.

Now, in these operations, they are encountering, and actually conducting, some fighting against those that are part of that extremist syndicate that I described, that does do fighting in eastern Afghanistan, certainly not the Afghan Taliban, which, of course, is based down—its sanctuary is down in Baluchistan.

With respect to, How do they eventually take those on? I think, frankly, that the effort to demonstrate a sustained substantial commitment to Pakistan—frankly, the Kerry-Lugar bill is a hugely important manifestation of the level of security assistance, foreign military financing, Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, and so forth—also very important, given the history that we have with that country, and having left it, as you well know, a couple of times before.

So, this is a process of building trust, building mutual confidence, and building a relationship in which the mutual threats that we face are addressed by those who are on the ground. And again, as I mentioned and as you mentioned, we have to recognize the enormous sacrifices that the Pakistani military, Frontier Corps, and police have made in these operations recently, and also the losses that their civilians have sustained.

But, it's about building a partnership that can transcend these issues that we have had before, where we have left after supporting one operation or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Lew, as you answer it, because otherwise we'll run out of time, could you also tie into it the question of the political reforms with respect to the FATA? Because, as you know, in order to sustain stability out there, you've got to have some political reform. And fundamentally, the Pakistani military has been averse to changing that, because they've always, historically, used the region to promote the perceived interests in Afghanistan. And those relate to the perceived interests of India. So, if you could perhaps share with us, as you talk about how we establish the long-term relationship—I think there are some linkages to the other issue.

Mr. LEW. Senator, I think—just to pick up where General Petraeus ended, the relationship between the multiyear commitment and Kerry-Lugar-Berman, the relationship between our—maintaining long-term security assistance through the FMF program while we ramp up counterinsurgency training, is critical. It's clear, this year, that we have a common interest in an immediate threat. The actions the Pakistani military is taking are in the interests of Pakistan and the United States. Where there is the question, Are we there for the long-term relationship? Our ongoing long-term security assistance speaks to the long-term in a way that counterinsurgency does not. So, it's critical that we maintain a balance there.

In terms of the activities in the FATA and the NWFP, it's not just what they do in the military maneuvers that's important, it's, Are we with them there in the post-military periods to help with the reconstruction, not just the humanitarian assistance, but with the rebuilding? I think that gets to the question you're asking about the local provincial leadership in the territories.

There is the capacity to work with local leaders on projects, for us to use the funding that we bring in, to rebuild, to do economic development, to support local decisionmaking, local institutions. And we've been having conversations, with the Government of Pakistan, where it's clear that we're going to work with the national ministries and with the local leadership. I think it's important that we not make it either/or. You know, there is a tendency

to hear it in a—that we’re “turning off” assistance. We’re very much working with the national government of—the ministries—of Pakistan. But, what we haven’t done in the past is develop those relationships at a deep level, at a provincial level. I think that it’s critical that we do both as we work in the coming months and years.

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I just wanted to directly address the issue of the political participation, because, as you know, I think, in recent months there have been some unprecedented steps taken to extend certain political rights and other rights to those who live in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, rights that they’ve never had before. And I think that’s an important step forward, as well.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate your saying that. I agree with that.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Eikenberry, I just have a couple of comments, and I’m aware the time will not permit an extensive response at this point. But, as you’re organizing the Embassy in Kabul, staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has observed that deputy ambassadors working in Afghanistan are faced with considerable bureaucratic obstacles, which may stem from Afghans, or even from ourselves. I’m hopeful that you’re cognizant of their work and that there’s a free flow of information to you as well as to them. Likewise, the regional command senior civilian representatives need to be a responsive partner with the regional military commanders. Our impression, at least of staff, is that there are currently some problems with this. They’re not beyond working out, but these are our problems, and ones that we need to be aware of; as I’m sure you are.

I want to take my time, though, by asking a more monumental question. We’ve had all sorts of estimates of how many members of the army and police force of Afghanistan, are going to be trained by United States personnel. What are our goals, in terms of the number we wish to train? And I ask this because press accounts of the estimated number of those in the army who will be trained have ranged from 200,000 to 400,000, which illustrates quite a disparity.

Second, and, General Petraeus, maybe you can give us some insight on this, keeping in mind an answer to my first question regarding an attainable goal for the number of forces we need to train. There are press accounts from President Karzai’s visit with Secretary Gates this morning that President Karzai has said, “We’re going to need financial support in Afghanistan until 2024.” I’m not certain how the President arrives at that time, which is 15 years away, but I am interested in the amount of money such a commitment would require from us. In other words, we appropriate money from year to year, and part of our goal in doing so is to have a very stable army and police force under the command of the Afghan central government. Maybe a part of the response is that the entire police force will not always be under the direct administration of the central government, but in any case, at some point there have to be resources in Afghanistan, either at the central or

regional level, to pay for the wages and upkeep of these forces, regardless of whether a significant number of our troops begin to leave in 2011. It will be essential that the Afghans we have trained and will be paying, in large measure, be there to maintain these forces and uphold order.

This isn't an area I have seen staked out in testimony or in the press. That being said, will you help us a little bit with the arithmetic, this morning, of the numbers and finance and longevity of that obligation?

General PETRAEUS. Senators, I think, in previous testimony in the past week or so, what has been identified is that we have established goals by year, right now, for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. To give you a sense of that, the ANA, right now, is roughly 96,000 or so, and the goal by the end of October next year is 134,000. The ANP is 94,000; goal by the end of October next year is 109,000.

Now, along with that, you have heard these aspirational goals. I think General McChrystal, yesterday—others—have stated that we could envision Afghan security forces numbering as many as 400,000, that an army of 240,000 and a police—now, police includes border police and a variety of other different police elements, beyond just local police, but could ultimately be in the 160,000. Now, again, right now what we want to do is reach our annual goals. Certainly, there have to be some programmatic things that run beyond that, without question. But, we want to, first, confirm that we can, in fact, meet those goals; and to do that, by the way, we have to make significant improvements, not just in recruiting, but also in retention, because the losses, in some of these cases, not just to battle loss—killed, wounded, AWOL and so forth—but all just—also just elapsed—

Senator LUGAR. And apparently also in pay—

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Time in service.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Pay to these people.

General PETRAEUS. Well, the—and the pay has just been increased. And again, there is, essentially, a benefits package to work out how to, in fact, recruit and to retain more Afghans for those security forces.

Beyond that, by the way, a shift in momentum will end up being the best recruiting tool of all, because when you think that the good guys are going to win, you want to be a good guy. If you have doubts about that, then you will hedge your bets or perhaps even tacitly support the bad guys.

Now, there's no question, as President Karzai was highlighting yesterday, that Afghanistan will require substantial international funding for years to come, in a whole host of different areas, not the least of which is their security forces. But, I would submit that it is a lot cheaper to maintain a certain number of Afghan forces than it is to maintain the number of United States and coalition forces required to compensate for their absence.

Senator LUGAR. Roughly, what would 243,000 people, if that's what we're having this year—

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I—

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. What would that cost?

General PETRAEUS. Well, if you get up—if you get up to the 400,000 range—and again, no guarantee that that’s where we’re going; that’s an aspiration—but, if we end up there, that’s in the 10—over \$10 billion range per year. And that highlights the importance of helping Afghanistan develop and really exploit—Afghanistan exploit—its extraordinary mineral wealth. The Ambassador can probably talk to that far better than I could, but there is enormous potential in Afghanistan to dramatically increase its national revenue, but if and only if it can get the security and then the infrastructure that enables them to extract that mineral wealth and, of course, get it out to a market.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And let me welcome all three of you here this morning. I know you’ve been busy testifying and meeting with Members of Congress.

And let me underscore the comment made by Chairman Kerry, General, again. Not only at this time of year, any time of year, as you point out, I—sort of set me back on my heels a little bit this morning when you mentioned 1990, that it’s been that long a time that we’ve been asking our men and women in uniform to be on 24-hour watch, so to speak, in that part of the world. That’s a long time. And all of us are deeply grateful to them. Whatever differences are about policy questions, I think the unbounded respect we have for the men and women in uniform, who represent our country every single day all over the world, needs to be conveyed as often as we possibly can. So, please continue to do that for us all.

And as I think Jack Lew pointed out, this is of utmost importance to our national security, how we cripple al-Qaeda, if we can, obviously, to how we secure the nuclear arsenals in Pakistan, that I’d put almost on an equal footing—maybe I should have mentioned that first, in terms of priorities, and obviously dealing with violent extremism. And so, all of us up here have a lot of questions about this. I respect, on one hand, the desire to have some sort of an end-date strategy here, but almost—there’s an inherent problem with that as you look at the massive difficulty in confronting the issues in Afghanistan, the goal of training and having the Afghan people assume the greatest responsibility for their own long-term security.

So, I’ll ask, Chairman, for a full statement of my comments—opening comments—to be put in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Senator DODD. Let me, if I can—and I’ll raise this with all three of you, and you decide which of the three of you is best able to respond to this.

Again, the Pakistan part of this equation is most troubling to me in the short term, because obviously if we don’t secure the nuclear arsenals in Pakistan, and you end up with a fundamental change of order, political order in that country, all of these efforts, of course, would seem to pale by comparison.

President Zardari has been under increasing pressure from both the members of the military in his own country as well as those opposed to his close relationship with us. And the threat of impeachment continues to loom. I’m told that that was the case.

Give us some sense, if you will here this morning—and maybe I ought to start with you, Ambassador—what you think the current political tensions of Pakistan—whether or not they imperil civilian rule of that country. How serious are those threats to President Zardari?

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Senator, if I could, let me turn it to Jack Lew, who's the Ambassador to Afghanistan. I'm probably not the best to talk on the situation inside of Pakistan.

Mr. LEW. Let me answer briefly and then, on the, kind of, core security question, turn to General Petraeus.

You know, the difficulties of maintaining a stable civilian government in Pakistan are not new. You know, we've been working with the current government to try and help build the institutions, not just the people, so that there's the ability to rely on ongoing relationships, regardless of the leadership. Without addressing the kind of day-to-day risks that the current administration faces, I think that, you know, we do see signs of improvement and strength and governmental capacity in a number of areas. There's still a lot of progress that needs to be made. You know, the tension—constant tension between the civilian concerns and the military concerns is one that is publicly debated.

You know, the support that we've shown over the last year, that your leadership in this committee has shown, in terms of mapping out a 5-year strategy of support for civilian leadership, is really central to what we've been trying to do—shore up the idea of the need to invest in lasting civilian institutions.

Senator DODD. Well, let me ask the question. I think you've answered this already with some of the stuff that's been said, but my understanding, the success of this overall program—

Mr. LEW. Yes.

Senator DODD [continuing]. In no small measure depends upon a very willing partner in Pakistan. Is that agree—do you agree with that?

Mr. LEW. I think we do agree with that. And I think, because the actions being taken are—under the leadership of the civilian government, but carried out by the military—it might be helpful to have General Petraeus comment a little bit on the relationships we've had—military-military relationships—over the last year, as well.

General PETRAEUS. Senator, as one who's been in Pakistan, in fact, about four or five times in the last 6 months, and had a lot of conversations with military leaders as well as the civilian leadership, I actually don't think that the current challenges imperil civilian rule. There clearly are challenges to—potential challenges to President Zardari. But, again, I don't see the prospect or the desire for anyone to change civilian rule.

We've worked very hard to establish relationships of trust and confidence with the Pakistani military, and especially the Pakistani army, and again, against this backdrop of history that we discussed earlier, and a realization that there was a period of a decade or so during which no Pakistani students came to the United States, and all the rest. So, we're making up for the lost generation.

But, I think we have built those relationships, patiently and stronger. Chairman Mullen has done a great deal of that, as well.

We've substantially augmented the number of individuals in the Office of Defense Representative Pakistan—by the way, he was promoted to three stars yesterday—as a sign, again, of the importance of that position.

And again, I think what we're trying to do, as the Secretary mentioned, is to build these relationships to where they become a partnership in confronting what clearly are shared threats, not just to Pakistan and the region, but also to our own country.

Senator DODD. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.

General Petraeus, Ambassador Eikenberry, thank you for being here, and for your tremendous leadership and service to this country.

As I said last week, when this committee met to discuss Afghanistan with Secretaries Clinton and Gates and Admiral Mullen, the decision regarding how to move forward represents an incredibly difficult moment for our Nation.

Our strategic imperatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan—crippling al-Qaeda, safeguarding Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and combating violent extremism—are of the utmost importance to our national security.

And today, we continue our consideration of the President's proposal for achieving those critical goals.

President Obama has carefully and conscientiously weighed our military and policy options. And he has laid out a serious proposal that merits close consideration.

It is our job, however, to subject the President's proposed strategy to tough and pointed scrutiny. And, frankly, as we meet today, I remain skeptical about the likelihood that this new mission will meet our goals.

I have great respect for our President and his team of advisers. I have great confidence in our military and its leadership.

But I also have great concern about the prospect of sending more young Americans into Afghanistan, because simply escalating our presence, in my view, won't achieve our objectives. And we must only assign our troops missions that are necessary and sufficient to support our interests.

We need to know more about the President's strategy—not just his military strategy, but the economic and diplomatic initiatives that will be necessary to make it work.

We need to know more about what our civilian surge will look like, who will run it, and whether our development experts at USAID have a meaningful seat at the table to help develop and implement it.

We need to know more about the President's plans to protect key population centers, provide for targeted and limited economic development, and crack down on rampant corruption.

We need to know more about the administration's thoughts on governance, a key pillar of counterinsurgency strategy, and its proposed efforts to bolster the Afghan Government's ability to meet the basic needs of its people.

We need to know more about whether we have a reliable partner in the Karzai government.

We need to know more about whether we have a reliable partner in Pakistan, and whether that government is taking the necessary steps to combat violent extremism, including the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and extend law and order to the tribal areas.

We need to know more about how the President views the relationship between our efforts in Afghanistan and our national security interests in Pakistan.

We need to know more about whether our allies are prepared to share the burden of this effort, whether NATO is ready not just to send more troops, but to aid in the other parts of our strategy.

And most of all, we need to know more, much more, about how and when our work in Afghanistan will come to an end, so that we can bring our troops home.

We have before us today a wealth of foreign policy and national security experience. I hope that we can call upon that experience to help us further evaluate the President's proposal.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And certainly, thank each of you for your service, and I very much appreciate you coming and being with us today. I know this is somewhat painful, and we appreciate it.

General Petraeus, when you came up and talked with us about the surge in Iraq, there was a sense of a really strong commitment that really encompassed the whole country. And I know that, in March, there was an announcement about what we were doing in Afghanistan, that, while it was spoken that it was narrowed, it was actually pretty expanded, from the standpoint of how we looked at what we were going to do in Afghanistan. If you looked at all the metrics that General Jones presented in September, I mean, it was an all-out effort throughout the country.

I know Secretary Gates mentioned, last week, he realized that this was becoming a full-out nation-building effort, for lack of a better description. And now that's been narrowed some. And so, we hear sort of a partial effort taking place as it relates to the country itself, and sort of our leaving a country that's a little different than the type of country we're trying to leave in Iraq. And I guess what would be good for me, clarificationwise, would be to understand what you see Afghanistan being when we begin to drawdown troops, whenever that is, and its ability to actually maintain itself successfully. I know we're talking about pulling back away from rural areas into population centers. And what I see is a country that's, candidly, not unlike I guess what we're discussing in Pakistan, where you've got a lot of areas out there that are not administered, not really governed, if you will. So, if you could describe fully what you see us having there, what the world would have there, when we begin withdrawing, that—I think that would be very helpful. Because I think it has been confusing as to what we're actually doing there.

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Senator. And thanks, as always, for looking after the great 101st Airborne Division.

Senator CORKER. Yes, sir.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think it would be worth reviewing the objectives of the policy, because they were, indeed, sharpened as a result of the deliberations that took place with President Obama and the national security team. And they're pretty straightforward. They are to reverse the Taliban momentum; to deny the Taliban access to, and control of, population centers and lines of communication; disrupt the Taliban outside the secured areas, and prevent al-Qaeda from regaining sanctuaries in Afghanistan; degrade the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan security forces; increase the size and capability of those security forces and other local forces to begin transitioning security responsibility to the government within 18 months; and selectively build capacity of the Afghan Government, particularly in key ministries.

What this produces, I think, is a country that can basically secure itself and see to the needs of its citizens, using traditional local organizing structures at local levels, and then tying in to a central government that is seen increasingly as serving the people rather than preying on them.

As those conditions begin to appear in different areas, we can then thin out our forces. Again, I want to be very clear that Afghanistan is not Iraq; it's also, by the way, not Vietnam; it's not a lot of other places. It's Afghanistan, and it has plenty of its own challenges. But, we have to look at that.

But, the fact is, the way we thinned out in Iraq, as we were able to get Iraqi security forces and Iraqi officials capable of taking over local responsibilities, is somewhat similar to what it is that we want to do in Afghanistan. And you keep certain capabilities there longer than others—again, as in Iraq. What we are doing in Iraq right now, for example, is working to enable the Iraqi security forces, with a variety of assets that they just don't have, so that they can keep the heat on al-Qaeda and reduce at least the frequency of the kinds of horrific attacks that we saw yesterday. And prior to that, as you probably know, the month of November, for example, saw the lowest level of security incidents and the lowest number of violent civilian deaths in Iraq since we got good data, post-liberation.

So, that would be the concept, I think. That's sort of the vision of how this would go.

Senator CORKER. I know we have a briefing later today, in a secure setting—

General PETRAEUS. Right.

Senator CORKER [continuing]. With McChrystal, and I will talk through a lot of that at that time, but—and I know our time's very short today. I think the—and none of us like being where we are. And I know all of this is complex, and we, I think, are all glad that we have people of your caliber, each of you, doing what you're doing. But, as we look at this whole issue of the Taliban, and maybe it becoming almost a sort of a brand of—type of activity that's occurring around the world when people are unhappy with what's happening within the country. I think that's a concern that you've expressed. I know that's been a—you know, expressed at the State Department. I think that the difficulty that we have is envisioning that, in each of the countries that have these issues, we end up with a sort of all-out building of a country, because these countries are poor, and there's no economic development, and it's easy to pay somebody to take up weaponry against a government. Looking into the future—not Afghanistan, but in future efforts—are we developing different types of strategies that don't end up being nation-building?

General PETRAEUS. I think it would be accurate to say we are developing strategies that are appropriate to the countries we're trying to help, and they involve greater or lesser amounts of nation-building, depending on the problems that afflict those countries.

But, I think you've raised a very important point, and that is trying to figure out how we can, without, again, conducting complete all-out nation-building levels of assistance, keep countries from becoming failed states and perhaps being sanctuaries for transnational extremist groups. And Central Command has a couple of candidates for that, as you know, within its area of responsibility, and we are working in those other areas, as well.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
 Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Lew and General Petraeus, Ambassador Eikenberry, thank you all for being here today, and for your selfless service to our Nation. We are all indebted to each of you.

And I'd like to ask a question of General Petraeus first. Special Envoy Holbrooke and Admiral Mullen have both acknowledged in testimony before this committee that there is a danger that sending additional troops to Afghanistan could push militants into Pakistan and further destabilize that nuclear-armed nation. Do you agree that there is a risk that sending more troops could just push militants over the border?

General PETRAEUS. There is, indeed, a risk that our operations could lead some of these elements to seek sanctuary in Afghanistan, particularly, frankly, the leaders, those that have the resources to do that.

Senator FEINGOLD. In Pakistan.

General PETRAEUS. I'm sorry, in Pakistan. And that is why we're working very hard to coordinate our operations more effectively with our Pakistani partners, so that they know what our operational campaign plan is and can anticipate and be there with a catcher's mitt or an anvil, whatever it may be, to greet these individuals. We have actually conducted some operations of medium scale in Regional Command East, where that kind of coordination was conducted. And before we launched the operations with the Marines in Helmand province, we also briefed our Pakistani partners. So, that effort—and we have, in fact, begun, just recently—literally in the last several weeks—an effort to lay out, in real detail, our operational campaign plan, and then to coordinate that with the actions of the Pakistani—

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I—

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Elements.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Appreciate, General, your description of what we're doing and what we're laying out to the Pakistanis, but isn't the case that they're going to have to move against all of the militants in that area if this is really going to work?

General PETRAEUS. Well, they're going to have to move against enough of them so that, obviously, their capability is sufficiently degraded. Again, I don't see any of these kinds of efforts as, you know, unconditional surrender, planting the flag on a hilltop, and going home to a victory parade. These are long, tough slogs, if you will. But, what we need to do is beat them down to a level to where they don't threaten. And that was the point about degrading the Taliban, for example, to levels manageable by the Afghan security forces.

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand that. But, I guess my only point would be, not so much that we can get rid of every militant in Pakistan, but that they do move against all the different pockets that exist—

General PETRAEUS. Over time, no question that they have to, again, deal with these, because, of course, they present an internal extremist threat to Pakistan—

Senator FEINGOLD. And, in particular—

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. As well.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Not necessarily “over time,” but now, because we are going to be pushing now—

General PETRAEUS. We—

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. And we’re going to be potentially pushing these militants into Pakistan.

General PETRAEUS. As we—

Senator FEINGOLD. So, they need to be able to do this now.

General PETRAEUS. As we conduct operations, Senator—again, we’ve got to coordinate what we’re going to do with them, so that they’re not surprised by what is happening. I should note, though, that they’re—we need to also be realistic that there’s a limit—you know, they’re—they’ll say—you can only stick so many short sticks into so many hornets’ nests at one time. And they have a very impressive military and an increasingly impressive Frontier Corps. But, again, there are limits on their capacity. And that’s the challenge that they’re working with. And, by the way, that’s why the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund that you’ve provided for us, and the Foreign Military Financing, has been so important, to help them with that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, General.

Ambassador Eikenberry, there’s a myth that the Pakistanis fear that we will “abandon” them, and that we must send more troops to persuade them otherwise. However, the Pakistani’s do not support military escalation, have expressed concern that it will further destabilize the situation on both sides of the border. If we were to reduce our troop levels in Afghanistan, but maintain an ability to carry out counterterrorism operations in the region while continuing to provide the Pakistanis’ robust financial support, wouldn’t that communicate our commitment to Pakistan and actually be more responsive to their concerns about the instability caused by our massive military presence in Afghanistan?

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Senator, I’m not—again, I’m not the Ambassador to Pakistan, but I will comment on this, from my long time in the region. And with a reduction of U.S. military support at this juncture inside of Afghanistan, the security situation in Afghanistan would decline. I think it would decline, over time, with the lack of U.S. commitment—dramatically. Insecurity in Afghanistan will breed insecurity within Pakistan.

Senator FEINGOLD. General, there’s no doubt that al-Qaeda has found safe haven among militant groups in the region, but is it fair to say that there are continuing differences between the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda over their strategic goals that intermittently provoke tensions between the two groups?

General PETRAEUS. There are, indeed, periodic tensions, and then there are, indeed, periodic reconciliations, if you will. Again, as Secretary Gates explained, I thought, quite effectively, in his testimony last week, some of which I summarized today, there is this symbiotic relationship, really, between all of these groups. And sometimes the Taliban are up and the al-Qaeda is not quite as much in the forefront; and other times, it’s reversed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I understand that, but the description of it as “symbiotic” is a little surprising to me. General McChrystal,

in his nomination process, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, "continuing differences over strategic goals could persist and intermittently provoke tensions between the two groups." So, maybe it's just semantics, but it strikes me that it may not really be at a level of symbiosis.

But, I thank you all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And best of the holiday season to all of you. We'll enjoy it with our families while you and your men and women will be deployed all over the world, keeping us safe, and we appreciate that very much.

The CHAIRMAN. We hope to enjoy it with our families.

Senator ISAKSON. We hope to enjoy. I wasn't going to throw that in there. I'll let you do that, Mr. Chairman. We'll get there.

Ambassador Eikenberry, you, with a twinkle in your eye, I might add, acknowledged that we were encouraged by President Karzai's statement about reducing corruption, improving the government, et cetera, but you also said, in your nonprinted remarks, that you were very impressed that finally all elements of our national power are deployed, and our biggest challenge is the lack of credibility of the Afghan Government. You followed that with a statement, "We should work with the ministries and work to help improve the ministries and the confidence level of the Afghan people." Do we have to work around President Karzai to improve the ministries of the Afghan Government? Are we impressed, but not yet certain, that his words of corruption reduction and things like that are just a statement, or is he committed to it.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Senator, we work in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan, and President Karzai is the duly elected, legitimate President of the country; he is our partner. We have four areas, Senator, that we need to concentrate in partnership with the Afghans. The first is in the area of law enforcement. We're making progress in that area. Second, it's going to be essential that we improve the financial accountability, which you've referred to, working with competent ministries. We have a good program, that's been underway now for over a year, of ministry certification, taking the essential ministries of Afghanistan, working with them to improve their procedures in which they reach a level, then, of competency. We put funds directly in through them. We have a more expansive program, this year, planned, working with the international community, more effort in trying to train civil administration. Understandably, after three decades of conflict, low literacy rates, and a disrupted society, we don't have it. We did not, in 2002, begin with a strong base. We're making progress in that area. And fourth, in the way that we deliver our aid programs.

In fairness to the Government of Afghanistan, currently, for the international community, 80 percent of aid funds don't go through the Government of Afghanistan. The United States Government is really the leading element right now in trying to change that. So, when we talk about the accountability of the Government of Afghanistan, it really does require a partnered approach.

Behind all of that, though, Senator, as you're asking in your question, leadership at the top, and commitment, is absolutely vital. We are encouraged by President Karzai's inaugural address, and what he has said will be his plan of action, but it will wait deeds over the next year.

Senator ISAKSON. You mentioned the High Office of Oversight. Is that an office set up by President Karzai?

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. It's an office set up by the Government of Afghanistan. It was set up 1 year ago, Senator, to deal with corruption. There is my understanding that there was a press conference today in Kabul. I'll have to check on that. But I know that President Karzai's administration intent is to try to give that High Office of Oversight, which is now an administrative organization, trying to give it more teeth.

Senator ISAKSON. So, their legislative branch created that, not President Karzai? Or—

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. This was—I'll have to go back and—for the record.

But, the High Office of Oversight, at least the manning of the High Office of Oversight, comes from the executive branch, Senator. I don't know what the legislative base of it is, though. But, our intent is, if President Karzai decides to put more emphasis in that, we're prepared to work in partnership and offer support.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, from everything I have seen when I've been to Afghanistan, as well as what some Georgia soldiers have told me who have been deployed and come back, if we reverse the Taliban, if we disrupt the Taliban, and we degrade the Taliban, we still won't be successful if we don't improve the government and the image of the government with the people, in addition to improving the security situation in Afghanistan. Is that right?

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. That's absolutely correct, Senator. We have the two efforts. At the national level, we're working—I already articulated what some of those programs are. They're more comprehensive. But really the lynchpin of this is going to be at the district level, at the local level. We're working closely with our military, we're working closely with the Government of Afghanistan to innovate and try to figure out the best combinations of the delivery of very basic government, security, justice, and those essential services, like health and education, in rural areas, in areas where, right now, our troops are operating, where the insurgency is, in the south and the east, in order to achieve that end that you've articulated, the need for governance to follow in behind combat operations.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, the success of the surge in Iraq, and the example that's been set by Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the government there, to be able to take over responsibilities once the insurgency was reversed, is evidence of the same thing we have to accomplish in Afghanistan, although in a much different way, because of the history and the nature of that country. And I commend you all on what your effort is. I'll pledge to give you all the support I personally can to accomplish that goal.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Isakson.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Senator, if I could, just a clarification on the High Office of Oversight, it was established by Presidential decree, so it doesn't have a legislative base.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank you all for your service, and, through you, the people who serve underneath you and make very significant sacrifices. And, particularly, General Petraeus, I am one of those who understand that never have so few been asked to bear so much of the sacrifice, and it's because of that that I ask the questions that I do.

And I want to start with you, General. Let me get this straight. From everybody's testimony here, when we had the Secretary of State and Defense, the essence of what I get is that we have defined our national security, in the context of Afghanistan, as having stability and security in Afghanistan in our own national interests, is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. Well, our overriding objective, of course, is to ensure that al-Qaeda and other transnational extremists don't reestablish a sanctuary in Afghanistan such as—

Senator MENENDEZ. And as such—

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. What they had—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. We want to have—

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Prior to 9/11, and—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. We want to have safety and security there so that they don't have the ability to—

General PETRAEUS. And the way to ensure that overriding interest is to have a country that is not a failed state and allows that to happen.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, if that is the case, and if we accept that as our national security interest, then what follows is that, while we are aspirational as to whether President Karzai will meet the standards of eliminating the corruption and what goes on right now in Afghanistan, whether or not he succeeds in our aspirations—and I understand, Ambassador Eikenberry, that you may have written sections of what we now praise as his commitment—we will still be in the same national security paradigm. If he fails to have the good governance we want, if he fails to support the creation of the level of Afghan troops and police, and the quality of them, to carry out missions, we will still be in the position that it will be our national security interest to have security and stability in Afghanistan because we don't want it to be a safe haven for al-Qaeda. Is that fair to say?

General PETRAEUS. Yes; it is.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, therefore, the problem seems to me that—part of the question here is that that dictates that we have a long-term obligation to Afghanistan, because, you know, we hope that Karzai will do everything that's right, but, you know, again—and we may prod and poke and, you know, maybe try to direct money in different ways, but, at the end of the day, this depends upon an Afghan Government that can ultimately sustain itself. And my view of that, therefore, is skepticism on that goal, based on what I've seen.

So, let me ask you, then, Do we agree with the comments made by President Karzai, that it may be as much as 5 years before his troops can take on insurgents, and 2024 before the Afghans will be able to pay for their own security? Is his statement a fair one?

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, I think, again, it's not a light switch that takes place in a situation like this.

Senator MENENDEZ. But, is that a reasonable timeframe?

General PETRAEUS. I can't talk about the long-term timeframe. Again, that depends on how rapidly, obviously, they can generate much greater revenue, and that depends, to a degree, on security and infrastructure and so forth. But, certainly it is going to be years before they can handle the bulk of the security tasks and allow the bulk of our troopers to redeploy. What our goal is, of course, is to get that process going, to create the conditions where they can handle the security situation because of the capability they have and because of the degradation of the Taliban in those particular areas.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, if I factor out your previous answer to "assuming that the Afghans got to certain levels of both police and troop strength, and what it would cost," and if it's true that his statement that it'd be 2024 before they'd be able to handle the bill on themselves, we're talking about \$150 billion just on the security side before we get to the development side. So, you know, at some point we need to get the pricetag, here, to be part of the equation so we understand what we're spending in our security context.

And that brings me to the questions of, you know—Secretary Lew, I think we've spent \$13 billion in development assistance to date in Afghanistan. Is that correct?

Mr. LEW. Roughly, correct.

Senator MENENDEZ. Roughly, OK. But, all the testimony I hear leads me to believe that after \$13 billion, we are basically starting from scratch as it relates to development efforts, which is pretty alarming. So, you know, I want to get a sense of how we are going to, you know, go from, right now, a clearly overwhelmingly military context to all of the statements that we need a government that can sustain itself and operate, and then, do that, \$13 billion later, without virtually any success, and think about—you're going to triple, you say, your civilian corps, which—to 900-some-odd—which means we only have 300-some-odd. And I'm looking at all of this in the timeframe and the money that has been spent, and we haven't quantified what we're going to be looking, on the civilian side, and, you know, I get rather anxious.

Mr. LEW. Well, Senator, first, I think it's not correct to say that there's nothing to show for the past development program.

Senator MENENDEZ. Tell me what we—

Mr. LEW. I think that—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Show for the \$13 billion.

Mr. LEW [continuing]. Before the development assistance that you're describing, there was virtually no access to health care in Afghanistan. There's very substantial access to health care in Afghanistan, in the 80-percent range. There were virtually no girls enrolled in schools, there are now a lot of girls enrolled in schools, and more every week, every month. I think that it's fair to say that we have an awful lot of work ahead of us, that the institution-

building, particularly, at the governmental level, and outside of Kabul, at the subnational level, is a substantial challenge.

I don't think it's quite the same as starting from scratch. I think if you look at the government that President Karzai has, with all the problems that we spend a lot of time discussing, there are a lot of ministries and ministers who have been doing quite a good job. If you look at their agriculture program, and where we're coming in to support their agriculture program—there's an Agriculture Minister who has a 5-year plan that's a good plan. He is relying on the international community, and, in our case, USAID and USDA, to be supporting their plan. That's not to say that it's easy, but the work is building on a foundation that is an Afghan-driven agriculture plan. That's true in other ministries, as well. It's not true in every ministry.

In terms of the level of U.S. civilian presence, when we started, at the beginning of the year, there were roughly 300, 320 civilians on the ground. By the end of January, we're going to be close to 1,000. That's a very big difference, in terms of the amount of programming that we have going on, not just in Kabul, but in all of the provincial areas, the district areas, where we'll be teaming on a day-to-day basis. And I think that you're going to see very substantial change in the progress made, and it's all tightly coordinated in a civilian-military plan, where the civilians are going in right when the military is—created the space for them to work.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wicker.

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, Senator Isakson was just pursuing a line of questioning with regard to corruption. Let me follow along.

President Karzai was expected, yesterday, to release his list of 25 Cabinet members. I understand, now, that decision has been postponed until Saturday. This issue has a lot to do with corruption. The President's under pressure to exclude corrupt ministers from his government. At the same time, it's reported that some powerful Afghans, who feel that they were instrumental in bringing about a tainted election victory, feel that they should participate in this government. And other Members of Parliament see this list as Karzai's first step to clean up his government. In other news reports, I hear that, with regard to some Afghans, heavyhanded though the Taliban may be, and violent and repressive as they may be, some Afghans prefer to see their form of order and certainty in decisionmaking over the endless process of having to grease the palms of official Afghan governmental bureaucrats.

General Petraeus, do you—do your people in the field see this? And, Mr. Ambassador, would you comment about this? We have reports of Afghan Mines Minister Mohammad Ibrahim Adel, receiving a \$30 million bribe from the Chinese for making decisions favorable to the Chinese.

Mr. Ambassador, would you comment as to the credence of that as part of your answer. And then, of course, we know the allegations about the first Vice-President-elect, Mohammad Fahim, reportedly being involved in the Afghan narcotics trade.

I view the corruption issue as a major factor in determining whether the Afghan people are going to come around to supporting the government and getting rid of a regime—a Taliban regime,

which, admittedly, has every reason to be unpopular on the surface.

So, Mr. Ambassador, and then, General, if you'd like to follow up. Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Great, thanks, Senator.

The report about the naming of the Cabinet, yes, we had anticipated it was going to be announced on Tuesday, and now we understand it's been postponed several days. I've heard that President Karzai is working with the Parliament to make a decision whether or not the entire package of ministers should be named in one setting, or should part be named and then the Parliament will go on recess and the rest will be named afterward. They do need parliamentary confirmation.

I'd emphasize what—following on what Secretary Lew had said—the quality of the Afghan ministries and the leadership of the ministries—indeed, it's—Senator, it's very impressive in many areas. The Ministers of Education, Health, Agriculture, Rural Reconstruction and Development, Commerce, Finance, Interior, Defense, the Director of the National Security—Director of Intelligence—these are world-class ministers who could do well in Europe or North America. They're challenged within their ministries, as, of course, they would be after three decades of war, such low literacy rates in the country, the absolute destruction of bureaucracy and organizations over the course of three decades. These are difficult tasks, to try to run these ministries. But, I have confidence, at the national level—I don't want to prejudge what ministers will be named, but I think, in the main, we'll see a reinforcement of what's a pretty good list. Improvements have to be made, though.

Second point, about Taliban justice, you're absolutely correct. In areas where there is absolute corruption in the countryside, there is no legitimate Government of Afghanistan, Taliban can deliver a very predictable justice. But, it's a feudal, brutal justice that includes the chopping off of heads and the hanging of the so-called "defenders" in the market squares. That is not a brand of justice that the Afghan people aspire to see return to their country. Every poll that's been taken, still, since 2002, when Afghanistan was liberated by United States military forces and our allies—every poll still shows the Taliban to be deeply unpopular. But, when you reach a point in parts of Afghanistan, where the alternative is an absolutely rapacious or brutal government alternative, then, of course, the Taliban will find an opening.

So, our challenge—and, indeed, the Government of Afghanistan's challenge—is to construct legitimate alternatives to what is a very brutal Taliban way of life and governance.

Senator WICKER. All right. Let me ask you, then—General, I think I'll ask you to take my question for the record, and let me see if I can squeeze in one more.

Of the 7,000 additional allied troops that have been promised, my understanding is that approximately 2,000 of them are already there; they were there to help with the elections. We're really only talking about an additional 5,000 troops. It's been well documented that restrictions placed by many countries on their troops in Afghanistan will impact their mission there. So, I'd like to ask you to comment about that. Will they be primarily trainers? Will they primarily serve in support functions? Or will they be combat

troops? And if a large portion of our allied—of the additional 7,000 allied troops are restricted in their military activities, how will that impact their ability to provide assistance to our mission and to ensure victory in this effort?

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, the additional 7,000 or so really are additional, because the election forces were supposed to go home. And if a country, obviously, commits to extend them or to replace them, obviously that is in addition to their projection.

They really are a mix, across the board, of combat forces, trainers—in some cases, PRT element support, the so-called OMLTs, the military transition teams, and so forth. And certainly some of those will be restricted by caveats, there's no question. This is not something new to Afghanistan, though, candidly. When I was in Bosnia as the chief of operations, I had a matrix on my desk that had all the countries down the left, a list of tasks across the top, and an X mark that filled the block as to whether that country could do that task in a certain location. I had the same thing—

Senator WICKER. Some of them?

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Same thing in Iraq. And again, we had to—you know, so General McChrystal's challenge, as was the challenge for the commander in Iraq, is to understand who can do what, employ them to the fullest extent possible, and then figure out how to complement what it is that they can contribute with the actions of other forces that can truly do everything, everywhere—

Senator WICKER. What do you mean by "some"—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I've got to interrupt—

Senator WICKER. I know. I just wondered if the—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Out of fairness to the other colleagues.

Senator WICKER [continuing]. If the General could clarify whether "some" means a majority or—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he could clarify it, but it would mean you have about 3 minutes more than anybody else. So, maybe you could clarify for the record or in the course of another answer.

General PETRAEUS. I'd be happy to do that, sir.

[The written information referred to follows:]

Approximately 3,043 of the 7,000 troops will be restricted by caveats. To keep the response unclassified, caveats affiliated with specific countries must be excluded. Some examples of caveats and associated number of troops affected are:

(1) 700 troops are restricted to operations within their assigned Regional Commands. Any operations outside these areas must be approved by that country's higher authority. An exception exists for "in extremis" operations declared by COMISAF and are considered on a case-by-case basis.

(2) 330 troops are forbidden from undertaking direct military action against narcotics producers.

(3) 250 troops may not operate outside Afghanistan, and require higher authority approval to participate in counternarcotics activity.

(4) 232 troops can only operate outside their assigned AOR after consultation with higher authority.

(5) 202 troops are not allowed to operate outside their assigned AOR.

(6) 175 troops are restricted from military actions that do not threaten ISAF and could inflict collateral damage to the civilian population.

Examples of other generic caveats include:

(1) Forces may not be used to destroy bridges, tunnels, dams, dikes and infrastructure of specific significance to the region.

(2) Forces may not be used in a territory where there is a possibility for the presence of nuclear, biological or chemical agents.

(3) Forces may not be used to conduct operations in religious facilities, museums or cultural and/or archaeological heritage.

(4) Forces will not be used to conduct riot control operations.

(5) Forces will not be used to execute an order, the execution of which represents a criminal act according to national legislation or conflicts with international conventions on human rights protection or the laws on armed conflict.

VOICE. Yes, thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. I just need—I want to try—because we can do another round; there's no problem in that. I just want to be fair to everybody here, if we can.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

First, let me thank Deputy Secretary Lew and Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus for your service. You are providing extraordinary talent to our Nation, and we thank you very much.

General Petraeus, I want to concur in your assessment of our military. The men and women who are serving under extremely difficult circumstances are the best in the history of America, and I appreciate the leadership. Just to give you one example, I had a chance to talk to a Maryland serviceman who is in Afghanistan, and he gave testimony to your assessments. It was a wonderful opportunity to see the spirit and the commitment and the difference that our servicepeople are making.

So, during the holiday time, particularly, we can never express our appreciation enough. Sacrifices are tough any time of the year, but during the holidays, they're even more remarkable. I just really want to express that at this hearing.

It's amazing how many of our Senators have talked about the Karzai government and corruption. And it has to do with all three of the objectives. If we're going to be able to achieve security in Afghanistan, if we're going to be able to have governance in Afghanistan, if we're going to be able to have economic progress in Afghanistan, it all depends upon having a partner that can work with us. We've got to transition the security, we've got to have a government in the country that respects the rights of its people, and we have to deal with economic development. If there are moneys being taken through corruption, it's going to cost the American taxpayer and the international community and Afghans themselves more than it should.

So, Deputy Secretary Lew, I just really want to challenge a statement you made. First you said, "We're going to have a policy against corruption, and we're going to hold the Afghan Government accountable." How do you hold them accountable? What do you do if you find corruption? Do you pull our soldiers out? Do you cut off the money? How do you hold them accountable?

Mr. LEW. Well, I think, as Secretary Clinton testified last week, it's going to be a long-term challenge to end corruption in Afghanistan, and we have to have realistic expectations. And I think—when we talk about holding them accountable, it means that we have to see where our money is going, and, if it's not going to the right place, we move our money and put it through other channels. It means we have to have our auditors come in and—not after we're done, but while we're implementing the program, be there,

side by side, so we can catch things early. It means that when the—

Senator CARDIN. That may work for particular projects, and I think that plan needs to be implemented. But, if you find corruption at the highest levels that is not being dealt with, how do you hold the government accountable?

Mr. LEW. I think that the conversations prior to the inaugural, and the statements that were made and the actions taken after President Karzai's inaugural, reflect the kind of influence—

Senator CARDIN. But, if there's backtracking, if it doesn't work—

Mr. LEW. Well, I think we have to maintain the pressure. You know, we clearly have an interest in Afghanistan that can't be achieved if we don't—if progress is not made on this corruption issue. The—you know, we've seen promising signs, though there's more progress to be made.

Holding them accountable does not mean that, a year from now or 5 years from now, there'll be zero corruption in Afghanistan.

Senator CARDIN. There's not zero corruption in any country.

Mr. LEW. Right.

Senator CARDIN. But, we know that at the highest levels there is major reason for concern, that's compromising our ability to get our mission done. And I guess what concerns me is that I agree with your statements. I just don't know how you hold President Karzai and his top officials accountable if, after all the efforts we make, we still find that there is corruption encouraged at the highest levels.

Mr. LEW. To the extent that there are investigations—and, ultimately, indictments—at the highest level, it will do a lot to change—

Senator CARDIN. But, if they don't happen.

Mr. LEW [continuing]. What has been a culture of impunity. We have to work with them, and we have to make—"hold them accountable" means driving it toward having it happen, not having it not happen.

Senator CARDIN. General Petraeus, you, in response to Senator Corker, talked about the objectives that we're trying to achieve. I appreciate the way that you listed that. Then you talked about having a matrix, as far as other countries' help. Do we have a matrix? Do we have specific objectives, benchmarks, whatever you want to call them, that we will be using to determine where we are next summer, as to whether we are prepared to withdraw, and how many soldiers are able to be redeployed? Do we have specific expectations that are at least well known between the Afghans and the Americans and our allies?

General PETRAEUS. We don't have specifics, Senator, in terms of, "We want to do this number of troops by this time," or something like that. Again, the President was quite clear that this is conditions-based, and so, as we get closer, obviously—

Senator CARDIN. Oh, I know that, but do we have—

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. To that time—

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. Specifics as to what we're trying to achieve, and what triggers the ability to reduce our numbers.

General PETRAEUS. We have specifics in what we're trying to achieve. We have an operational campaign plan, to give you one— one measure will be the increase of security, something that we'll track by district, not just by province. And there is an operational campaign plan, and we can track that. And you should ask, certainly General McChrystal—in the closed session today, I think, would be a great opportunity to get a layout of what it is—how he's thinking through the operational piece of that.

Senator CARDIN. Well, I'll tell—

General PETRAEUS. And the—

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. General McChrystal that you told him it's OK for him to give us the specifics.

General PETRAEUS. And tell him I—class—actually, I didn't classmate him, because he's a couple of years behind me. [Laughter.]

I buddied him.

He—then, also, of course, we will have specific goals for the Afghan National Security Force growth over time. Again, that is yet another metric.

And there are a number of other metrics that will enable us to have a sense as to whether we can transition as we approach that time. And again, these will be somewhat similar to the kinds of analysis that we did in Iraq, where you look at a host of different factors in a district's area, including local governance, including the economic situation, political situation, in addition to the security situation, because they're all, of course, related. As you know, you're either spiraling upward or you're spiraling downward. And the spiral is not just all security factors, it's also local markets coming back to life; it might be the traditional less-extreme tribal leader returns and is more solidified, and that kind of thing.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.

Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you.

And I make this comment—any one of the three of you can comment on it, but I've been rather hoping, after the President thought about this for some time, that we would have a clearer picture than what we have. And with all due respect, I'm just not getting a clear picture. I listened to the President very carefully, and he told us we were going to start leaving in July 2011. Then I asked Gates about it the next day, and he said it was a target. I don't know where we are. You know, are we in or are we out? And then they talk about reviewing at this time or another time.

Then, the thing that really bothered me was, I listened to Karzai yesterday, and he was standing alongside Gates, and he starts talking about 15 years. Now, I don't know whether he wasn't listening to the President, or what. The President said, "Well, we're not going to give an open-ended commitment there." Well, probably, to Karzai, 15 years isn't an open-ended commitment, but, I've got to tell you, to the people of the United States, 15 years is an open-ended commitment. I don't know whose job it is to sit down with him and look him in the eye and say, "Look, you're dreaming, this is not going to happen," but we just need a lot more clarity

than what we're getting. And I don't—I have every confidence that our United States military, if given a mission, they will go in, they will accomplish that mission, but our—unfortunately, it seems like, always, the military mission gets mixed with what our overall goals are there. And I'm just not happy about what's come out of the last—about what's come out of the last week. And I was sincerely hoping that we would get there.

So, have at it, whoever wants to comment on it.

Mr. LEW. Why don't I start, Senator, and—just to talk about the difference between, you know, July 2011 and the nature of our long-term commitment to Afghanistan.

The President did not say that, in July 2011, our relationship with Afghanistan would end; it would be the beginning of Afghanistan taking over areas, it would give the military—our military the ability to begin to drawdown.

I think that all of us see a long-term relationship with Afghanistan, particularly on the civilian side, that's going to have to go on for many years. The questions that have been raised about the magnitude of the commitments, those are very serious questions. We take them very seriously. We're not in this alone; it's an international effort, where we have to work with international partners to take this responsibility, not just on the United States.

I think that the signal that we're sending is very clear, that the buildup of troops is headed toward a crescendo and then will start to come down. There will be other parts—if you look at Iraq, we're building up certain civilian capacities in Iraq right now, as our military withdraws. You know, so we're taking over certain responsibilities. I think we have to look at the different parts of it separately, and they're not—they shouldn't be a source of confusion. It's progress when the military is able to leave and civilian programs can step in and have a more normal relationship.

Senator RISCH. Well, I couldn't agree with you more. The difficulty is, I really question whether you're going to have the same security situation in Afghanistan that you have in Iraq right now, looking forward to July 2011. I hope I'm wrong.

Mr. LEW. Well—

Senator RISCH. But, in addition to that, the financial commitment to stand up their army and police, particularly over the period of time that Karzai's talking about it, I don't think the American people are going to accept that.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Senator, if I could just augment what Secretary Lew had said, our goal is—we all agree, is on, as rapidly as possible, have an Afghan Government that can provide for their security of their own people and deny sanctuary for al-Qaeda. The July 2011 date is very important in one regard. The Afghan people, they're a very insecure people, given their history, given the neighborhood that they live in. But, at the same time, 8 years after our arrival, there's a growing sense among the Afghans, they want to take charge, they want to take control of their sovereignty. There is a desire among the Afghans to lead with security, to develop their police and their army. President Karzai, in his inaugural address, was very clear when he said a goal—5 years from now, he wants Afghanistan security forces to be in charge throughout the country. That's a good goal, that we should be reinforcing.

This July 2011 date is, in a sense, a good forcing function for the Afghans, now in partnership with us, to stand up and accelerate the development of their army and police so, at that point in time, they're ready to transition, start taking lead for security in certain parts of the country.

The final point I'd make here, Senator, longer term—What does this all mean? And we saw President Karzai's remark. What—we don't know how long and what type of security assistance program we're going to need in Afghanistan. We know it's going to have to be a long-term program; we don't know the level. As time moves on, we'll have a better understanding of what is their exact requirements. But, what we also know, as well, is that, for every one U.S. Army soldier or marine that's deployed to Afghanistan right now, the cost ratio of that versus Afghan police and army on the ground, it must be on the order of 20, 30, or 40 to 1, so a pretty good investment.

Senator RISCH. But, again, I come back to—the President talked about July 2011. Karzai's talking about 5 years before they're ready to take it over. Who's going to take it over between July 2011 and the 5 years that President Karzai's talking about?

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Well, I don't want to—I think President Karzai's inaugural address had said "security throughout the country," a very comprehensive control of the security throughout their country—

The CHAIRMAN. General Petraeus—

Ambassador EIKENBERRY [continuing]. The army, police—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. You wanted to add to that, I think.

General PETRAEUS. Well, I was really going to state the same thing, Senator, again, that what's envisioned in July 2011 is the beginning of transition. What President Karzai is talking about is something that's much more comprehensive.

And if I could also just say, Senator, again, I hope that you'll be able to attend the session with General McChrystal this afternoon, because I think you'll—

Senator RISCH. I intend to.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Get some—out of that some clarity. We know what the operational campaign plan is, and we also know what the plan is to work with our civilian partners, from Ambassador Eikenberry's Embassy, in carrying that out.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you first, General Petraeus, for your extraordinary service and sacrifice. And I know you must be a proud father, as well as of your son's commission. We're grateful to know about that.

And, Secretary Lew, we appreciate your service and your availability. I know we tend to call a lot from over here. We're grateful for that.

And, Ambassador Eikenberry, I want to thank you for your service and also the way you make time for us when we travel to Afghanistan. You work us pretty hard when we're there, as well, so I want people to know that.

I was going to ask a series of questions about President Karzai and governance, because we try to think about this challenge in

three ways: security, governance, and development. And I know that's helpful to us, to keep our focus on three major challenges to get this strategy, and implement it correctly. But, I'll leave that for another day and will submit questions about concerns I have about the way he's conducted himself.

And we talked about this when I was in Afghanistan in August.

But, I wanted to focus on two areas. One is the buildup of the Afghan police and the local tribal militias.

In particular, with regard to the police—and I know this may be a question for one of you, or all three of you—but in Washington, numbers get attached to issues, and we keep hearing over and over again—and now I doubt the accuracy of this number; that's why I bring it up—92,000 Afghan police as a number—and General McChrystal, hopefully, can get that to 160,000—that we have been hearing a lot about lately. We are hearing that the 92 being way, way off, in terms of the police that are ready to train now. By one estimate, only 24,000 have completed formal training, and the attrition rate is 25 percent. If either of those statements are true, it creates all kinds of challenges and big problems.

General, I'd ask you or Ambassador Eikenberry, what can you tell us about the accuracy of those numbers, No. 1. And, No. 2, what's the plan—and I guess if General McChrystal has a—or, if General Petraeus has a couple of moments, if he can tell us anything that we learned in Iraq about training police or law enforcement in Iraq that can be applied here, or not. Maybe it's a different challenge.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Yes, just, Senator, two points, and then I'll turn to General Petraeus. I know that General McChrystal will have clarity on those numbers when he talks to you this afternoon. But, attrition is a problem with the police. There are problems of discipline with the police. We don't want to understate the challenges that we have ahead of us right now.

Against that, though, General McChrystal does have a very aggressive program for partnering with the police. One of the keys we've seen with the police, as we've seen with the army, wherever you provide good mentors or partners on the ground, good things start to happen. But, they have to sustain that presence. It doesn't happen over a 24-hour period. And I have a lot of confidence in the plan that he's laid out, where he's going to, wherever possible, expand out the amount of partners that we've got out there with the police forces. We'll certainly welcome a lot of help from our NATO allies to expand that kind of capability.

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I agree with everything that Ambassador said. Beyond that, we're actually conducting a 100-percent personnel asset inventory, and getting biometric data and everything. We're trying to nail this down so that we can tell you, tell ourselves, tell our Afghan partners, what ground truth really is.

Beyond that, Central Command also, at General McChrystal's request, hired a team from RAND to look at, in fact, the overall effort of Afghan security forces, and hired some individuals that have had some very good experience in this.

Speaking of that, I mean, the lessons—a couple of lessons from Iraq. One is—and I don't want to, you know, sound sort of flippant here, but it's a lot easier when you're winning than when you're

losing. The fact is, in Iraq, that, during that escalation of sectarian violence that took place in 2006, particularly after the bombing of the Askari Shrine in Samarra, there were whole units that were hijacked by sectarian militias, for example, because the situation got so bad—and, in fact, the police are the most vulnerable, and so we have to be very careful—another lesson is that you have to get the organizational construct right; you cannot train police and put them into an area that is an active area with the insurgency, and expect them to survive, because they're—not only are they vulnerable, but their families are vulnerable, they live in the neighborhood, their kids have to go to school—get kidnapped, and all the rest of that. So, we have to get that construct right, actually, intellectually. And then, beyond that, the partnering piece really is hugely important.

So, if you can get the construct right, get the right forces in—and that may mean that you end up using more—in Afghanistan, they're called the Civil Order Police, which are actual units, as a—they're really a paramilitary force, rather than just a local police force, but that's a much more appropriate construct for real conflict zones than are local police. At some point, you have to bring in the army. In Iraq, we had areas where there were no security forces left at all, and we literally had to bring in our forces and then Iraqi army forces, then to get back to the point that you could get to local police going again.

Senator CASEY. I'll either ask in the next round or submit for the record on the local travel militias. We'll get to that.

Thank you.

General PETRAEUS. It's a very important element of this, by the way. And, first of all, making sure the warlords don't come back, as this—we don't enable warlords, but do enable and empower, actually, local security forces in what's called the Community Defense Initiative. We won't have something akin to the Anbar Awakening of all of—you know, tribal linking as this reaches critical mass and takes off in rejecting, in this case, the Taliban, but what we can do is help—it's a village-by-village, valley-by-valley effort, and we are using some of our best Special Forces teams—right now really to experiment with this, but we think it is something that has good potential.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, to each of you, for your commitment and for being here today.

Thank you, Ambassador Eikenberry, for your hospitality when I visited Afghanistan with a number of other Senators, and—you were very new there; we appreciated very much your hospitality and your direction.

A lot of the discussion this morning has focused on what's happening on the governance and development side, as well as what's happening with security. There has been discussion about a civilian coordinator for Afghanistan, a civilian counterpart to General McChrystal. Can you give us your assessment of how important you think that position and person might be, and then where we are in the attempt to find someone to fill that position?

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Well, coordination, Senator, at the—international coordination at the United Nations level, that’s essential to our success, and, as well, within NATO/ISAF. Within that command, the civil-military coordination aspects are also fundamental, in terms of just trying to rationalize our developmental assistance and ensure that we’re making the most of our resources.

Some ideas have been now developed, both for UNAMA, trying to improve the efficiency there, and within NATO/ISAF itself. And those are being looked at.

Senator SHAHEEN. Given the urgency of that position, do you have any sense of what the timeline will be for having somebody in that role?

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. I know that Secretary Clinton, at the recent Foreign Ministers meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels, she discussed this with her fellow Foreign Ministers, and I believe it’s going to be on their agenda for the month of January.

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Lew, can you give us any more insight on that?

Mr. LEW. I would just make two points. First, there is some natural turnover at UNAMA, and it’s part of the discussion there, as well, in terms of choosing a new head of the U.N. mission. And a point that Secretary Clinton made last week which is important to remember is that, while ISAF is a very useful and critical coordinating mechanism at the military level, at the civilian level we have many non-NATO countries that are making significant contributions, and we have to make sure that, in getting civilian coordination, we don’t coordinate out some major partners. So, just a little bit more complicated, and that’s the kinds of conversations that are going on right now.

Senator SHAHEEN. Certainly recognizing the sensitivity of that person, and who might fill it, I would urge, given what everyone is testified to about the importance of the civilian efforts, that we move as fast as possible in that direction.

General Petraeus, I want to follow up a little bit on Senator Casey’s questions about what’s happening with the local militia and efforts at reconciliation with some of the Taliban.

I think I understood you to say that some of those discussions have begun and—or negotiations, I guess is a better way to put it. I think that’s the first time I’ve heard that from anyone. And so, I just wanted to clarify that that is what you said. And how do you envision that, going forward? Who’s going to do those negotiations? What—if you could explain that a little more.

General PETRAEUS. There’s—I was actually talking more about the Community Defense Initiative, which is—

Senator SHAHEEN. Ah, OK.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Again, a local—but I’d be happy to talk about reintegration—

Senator SHAHEEN. Please.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Because it’s used—and the term is “reintegration of”—

Senator SHAHEEN. OK.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. “Reconcilables” in Afghanistan, as—

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. General McChrystal and others remind me all the time.

But, recognizing that, again, you can't kill or capture every bad guy out there, you need to take as many of them as you can, as we did in Iraq, and take them from either actively or tacitly supporting the insurgency and, in our view right now, at low and mid-level, try to break them away. And that involves, again, isolating them, securing them from the irreconcilables, separating the irreconcilables who, make no mistake about it, do have to be—

Senator SHAHEEN. Right.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Killed, captured, or run out—and then, helping to reestablish local structures, many of them tribally based—the Maliks, the tribal elders, local imams, and so forth.

And there is an element that has now been formed—in fact, it—the one of the individuals helping General McChrystal to do this is an individual that General McChrystal and I knew very, very well from Iraq. He helped us do the reconciliation piece there. He was my deputy, the first British deputy that I had as a Multinational Force Iraq commander, General (Retired) Sir Graham Lamb. He is a special adviser to General McChrystal. They have now established an organization called the Force Reintegration Cell. It has a two-star British officer. There's some diplomatic component to it now, as we had in Iraq. We still haven't fleshed it out as fully as we need to; that is ongoing, as is the development of the kind of robust intelligence element that we learned in Iraq you have to have dedicated on nothing but figuring out, again—because this is a pretty big question, you know, Is this individual—

Senator SHAHEEN. Right.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Reconcilable or not? And if not, again, they have to be killed, captured, or run off. But, if they can be, then, of course, you can make them part of the solution instead of part of the problem.

And then there have to be certain incentives. And there are—you all gave us the authority, with CERP, to use some of that for reintegration purposes. Obviously, we can also do local projects. NAID is tied into this again, as well, and especially now, as we have more closely knit the civilian components together with the military.

Just one quick note, for example, an AI—great AID official, named Dawn Liberi, is literally the equivalent of the division commander of the great 82d Airborne Division, Regional Command East, and they are partners. And we've tried to establish what is not necessarily a civilian chain of command, if you will, but there's at least a—What do you call it?—it's a line, anyway, of civilians.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Oh, the “unity of civilian effort.”

General PETRAEUS. That's it. And that helps to achieve unity of overall effort. So—but, that's the effort in the reintegration arena. And then, separate from that is this Community Defense Initiative, where we're putting small Special Forces units literally in the villages, and then helping to develop conditions that enable the local individuals to defend themselves and be linked to a district of sub-district quick-reaction force, and then on up the line.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator—

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Kaufman.

Senator SHAHEEN [continuing]. Very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaufman.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to echo everybody else's comments about thanking you for your service. And I've been to Iraq and Afghanistan twice this year, and I am totally inarticulate to express the courage, the intelligence, and the motivation of the troops over there. I wish everybody in America could have an opportunity—I really mean this—I wish everybody in America could go over there and drop in randomly anywhere in Iraq, Afghanistan. They would be so proud of our forces over there.

And I also think that—we had Petraeus and Crocker in Iraq, we're going to have Eikenberry and McChrystal in Afghanistan, and I think you can fill those big shoes.

Mr. Ambassador, can you talk about what's happened—how the 18-month deadline has helped motivate the Afghan Government, both on the area of training troops and also in dealing with corruption?

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Yes. Let me speak on the first one, Senator.

We know that, after the announcement that President Obama made about the importance of July 2011, that the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, with us, together, sat down and rolled up their sleeves and said, "OK, what does this mean? How can we get behind this?" So, I think it will have a very good galvanizing effect, but that will be in full partnership and with support of us.

And I know that Secretary Gates had very positive talks with President Karzai, just yesterday in Kabul. This was one of the items of discussion, President Karzai showing his commitment, as he has publicly, for this date, and getting behind his role as Commander in Chief, which will be important, his support for this being, of course, important in the development of the army and the police forces.

Our efforts that we have against trying to improve government accountability, these are long-going efforts, Senator, as we talked about when you visited me in Kabul. President Karzai's inaugural address, as I said earlier, we found helpful, we found encouraging. We do have programs that have been underway for several years.

I'll give you one example of the progress that we're making in this area. They have something called the Major Crimes Task Force of Afghanistan, just announced several months ago, but a lot of preliminary work had been put into it. This is going to be, hopefully the Afghan FBI. And we have 10 FBI agents on the ground right now, DEA agents on the ground. We have military partners with us. We have the British working this element. I could go on. We've got a lot of different initiatives that are out there. They aren't seen right now, they're not visible. We tend to spend all of our time talking about one individual or one particular case, but, at the end of the day, it's the spadework that's going out there steadily, training of civil servants, training of law enforcement agencies, things as simple as trying to improve procedures.

The Minister of Finance recently told Secretary Clinton at a dinner, very proudly, that he had overseen an effort in Kabul to reduce the steps required to get a license for a car from 54 steps in 1 month to three steps in a couple of hours. That's not a headline story in the New York Times, but that probably has more to—that will give us bigger results in a fight against corruption than one middle-level criminal put behind bars.

So, just steady work.

Senator KAUFMAN. General Petraeus, just help me through this. We've talked in the past, and Secretary Gates, when he was here, talked about how the Taliban reconstituted themselves in ungoverned areas. In the strategy we're talking about, we're going to be mainly in the populous areas, leaving large swaths of Afghanistan without any real involvement. What—

General PETRAEUS. But—

Senator KAUFMAN. Do we have a—

General PETRAEUS. But, the difference is that, of course—

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. In Afghanistan, we can go into those areas. We—

Senator KAUFMAN. No, no, I understand. So, is the—

General PETRAEUS. We can't keep them disrupted. And, in fact, the Taliban really reconstituted as much in remote areas of Pakistan as they did actually in Afghanistan. There was a great article, by the way, in Newsweek, I think about a month ago, cover story, that talked about how the Taliban came back. And I commend that to you, if your folks haven't shown it to you.

Senator KAUFMAN. So, the idea would be, concentrate on the populated areas, but having forces available to go into the less populated areas to dismantle and—

General PETRAEUS. That's correct, sir. In fact, we actually will be increasing our counterterrorist component of the overall strategy, as well. And General McChrystal may want to talk to you a little bit about that during the closed session, as well.

But, there's no question, you've got to—again, you've got to kill or capture those bad guys that are not reconcilable, and we are intending to do that, and we will have additional national mission force elements to do that when the spring rolls around.

Senator KAUFMAN. I ask you and Ambassador Eikenberry, have you guys thought about a Strategic Forces Agreement with Afghanistan?

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. We have an agreement, which covers the status of our forces, not formally, called the Status of Forces Agreement. And, at this time, Senator, we're comfortable with the arrangements that we have.

Senator KAUFMAN. Secretary Lew, 388 civilians outside of Kabul by the end of the year. I know you talk about a 10 to 1 ratio, but is that enough, considering the number of forces—military forces we have, to really implement a COIN strategy?

Mr. LEW. The people—the civilians that are out there are being deployed in a civilian-military plan where—if you look at the map, there's two dots at each spot; there's a military assignment and there's a civilian assignment. The numbers are very different. You put one agricultural specialist in a town surrounded by the appro-

ropriate Afghan, you know, support, that's a program. You don't need a battalion of U.S. agricultural experts in a town.

I think that, with the increased coverage that we will get with the additional troops, there will likely be an increase in the number of civilians that we need. That's why we're referring to—the number is likely to go up in the order of 20 to 30 percent.

The goal is to fully resource the civilian requirement so that, as we go through the civ-mil plan, we have the right number of civilians.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Senator, if I could add to that, just quickly, to give you orders of magnitude, right now in part of southern Afghanistan we have five U.S. agricultural experts. They, in turn, are creating a network of some 500 Afghans, who, in turn, are administering an agricultural program that, over time, will reach out to tens of thousands of farmers. So, it's not necessarily how many, it's how are they employed? What effects are they getting? But, as Secretary Lew said, I'm certain that, over the next several months, as we work with General McChrystal and better analyze the implications of his campaign, that we will have to come back with a request for additional U.S. civilians to be deployed.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman.

We thank all of you. We're going to leave the record open for—just until the end of the week, in case there are some additional questions.

Senator Wicker did have that last-minute question. Do you want to put that on the record now, just so we can honor his question and—do you recall it? I thought I saw you writing notes at the time.

VOICE. Was it on militias?

General PETRAEUS. The question on the militias?

VOICE. Yes.

General PETRAEUS. And—I'm not sure if it was the national caveats or the militias, actually.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. I thought he had one question—

General PETRAEUS. I thought I actually answered that one right before he—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General PETRAEUS. I thought I answered that when I—

The CHAIRMAN. We're fine. We're fine.

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, Senator Kaufman asked the last question. I wanted to ask you, Secretary Lew—needless to say, we scratched the surface of a lot of these questions, and there are a lot remain outstanding. We look forward to meeting with General McChrystal, and we'll have a chance to be able to follow up on the military side, so I appreciate that.

And I know, Secretary Lew, you're always available to us, so we appreciate it.

Yes, Ambassador.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Chairman, I wonder if I could also say one—make one other point, here, if we're getting ready to close out.

The CHAIRMAN. Please, yes.

Ambassador EIKENBERRY. Earlier in the hearing, you said there were concerns raised about bureaucracy within the Embassy. And I'd be the first to say that we operate in an environment right now with our challenges on the ground, with the Government of Afghanistan, our allies, the friction of bureaucracy that goes with working with our own headquarters. We have a surfeit of bureaucracy.

I would say, though, within the Embassy, that we don't create additional impediments out there, in terms of bureaucracy. I'd highlight that, over the last 12 months, our Embassy strength has increased threefold, sixfold out in the field. During the months of August and September, we had a 100-percent turnover of our Embassy personnel. As General Petraeus has said, we have reorganized, not only ourselves out in the field, but we had a significant reorganization within the Embassy, which brings the interagency teams together efficiently and works with our partners in the military in a very comprehensive, indeed unprecedented, way.

I want to emphasize, Chairman, that the leadership that we've got in the United States Embassy, starting with the—starting with my deputy, it's an absolutely superb leadership, the very best in the world. It goes down to sections, down to the last staff person. So, if there are concerns about bureaucracy, I'd welcome the opportunity, of course offline, to talk to anybody that has those concerns.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that's fair. And I'm sure—there, I think, are some concerns, but I think it's an important thing to work through.

The key here, needless to say, is going to be the ability of these folks out in the hinterland to do their jobs, and that's going to depend on the local security, local leadership, politically partnering, so to speak. It's a tall task, which, again, I repeat, will be so positively impacted by getting something going in the western part of Pakistan. That'll make the job so much easier.

So, that said, we are very, very grateful to you. Thank you, again, each of you, for your service, which is exemplary. And we look forward to seeing you along the trail here.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. While the President committed an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, his West Point speech noticeably did not mention the word "counterinsurgency" once. The closest the speech came to mentioning COIN was a statement that additional troops will "target the insurgency and secure key population centers," although the brief timeframe of the surge stands in direct contrast to standard COIN doctrine which deploys troops for years, not months. While the administration appears to have backtracked away from a COIN approach, General McChrystal is still describing the strategy in those terms.

- Are we still pursuing a COIN strategy in Afghanistan?

Answer. The situation in Afghanistan is complex and requires a comprehensive strategy. A COIN strategy is an element of our strategy in Afghanistan, but since the population is the key objective, more than COIN is required. This comprehensive strategy includes protecting the population from insurgents while expanding government services throughout the country, building infrastructure that aids the

Afghanistan population, and expanding and training the Afghanistan National Security Force and Afghanistan National Police.

Question. The key question isn't the number of troops, it's how they're used: It's one thing to reinforce our current forces in order to fulfill promises we've already made—but it's quite another thing to escalate the conflict by making new commitments that will require years of followthrough. Shortly after returning from Kabul in October, I suggested that any deployment of troops to clear an area we don't currently control should be premised on three conditions that we have a sufficient number of reliable ANSF, we can partner with local leaders, and the civilian side can move in to build.

- Will we proceed with a geographic expansion of our footprint before such conditions are met? Where will the new troops be deployed? What will their mission be?

Answer. U.S. and coalition forces continue to pursue a clear, hold, build, and transfer strategy in Afghanistan. As forces become available in theatre, we will expand our geographic footprint while simultaneously partnering with Afghanistan National Security Force units, local leaders, and the civilian population. In order to build, we must be able to provide security for the population and to the forces conducting the build. New troops will be deployed to all areas of Afghanistan in accordance with this strategy. Their mission will be to protect the population from insurgents, partner with Afghan units, and conduct counterinsurgency operations.

Question. Last week, Secretary Gates said the administration would evaluate conditions in December 2010 in deciding how to drawdown troops starting in July 2011.

- What benchmarks will the administration use to evaluate the success of the strategy? How will we know the tide has turned?

Answer. In December 2010, success will be judged, in part, on demonstrating progress in: (1) expanding security to 30–36 percent of the population in key areas through effective COIN operations; (2) building an increasingly capable and self-sufficient ANSF, on track to a total strength of approximately 305K by 31 October 2011 with a majority of fielded forces capable of planning and executing independent or partnered operations; and (3) instituting Afghan Government capacity to provide for basic services, rule of law, and economic opportunity to an expanding percent of the population in key areas. Key indicators that will inform when the “tide has turned” are the decrease in violence, kinetic activity and number of civilian casualties. Correspondingly, we will see an increase in the number of districts with favorably rated governance, development, and security conditions outnumbering those rated poorly; the ANSF will have a permanent and effective presence in the designated key areas and major population centers; effective and enduring government control and services will be established in key areas and major population centers; and the majority of Afghan people will recognize GIRoA as a culturally and ideologically acceptable government.

Question. Our efforts to train the Afghan National Security Forces over the past 8 years have had mixed results at best. About a third of the army battalions are judged capable of operating independently and the figure is far lower for the police.

- Given the very real challenges of training the Afghans, and some of the structural weaknesses in their command structures, can you please outline the concrete steps that will be taken to stand up credible Afghan forces over the next 18 months?
- What is a realistic goal for how many Afghan soldiers we can train in a year? What are the barriers to reaching those goals? How many Afghan brigades are now capable of operating on their own and taking control of a real fight? The police lag far behind in training. Is it realistic to include them in the equation?

Answer. For Afghan National Army, the capacity to train and mentor soldiers has been expanded to increase the force to 134K soldiers for October 2010 and 171.6K soldiers for October 2011. We are less than 40,000 from the goal for 2010. We currently have the training capacity to train 73K soldiers annually in basic warrior training skills. We are making some progress in holding the Afghan leadership accountable. Coalition units are partnering and mentoring with their ANSF counterparts to ensure continuous training. Afghan soldiers are participating in missions with coalition forces all over Afghanistan. There are currently 29 Afghan National Army Battalions capable of conducting operations on their own. There has been significant progress in assisting the Afghans developing personnel management systems and they have begun moving toward merit-based selections and promotions. This is evidenced by the first central selection board for senior noncommissioned officers. To reach the Army goals, we need to work on getting the right leaders in

the right place; filling the requirements for Afghan trainers; moving both the personnel and logistic system forward. Finally, the Afghans must continue to make recruiting numbers, during the spring and summer time periods, which have historically been a difficult recruiting period.

For Afghan National Police, the capacity to train and mentor police is being expanded to increase the force to 109K police for October 2010 and 134K police for October 2011. The Minister of Interior and NTM–A/CSTC–A are working now to create two very important units: the Afghan National Police Training Command and the Afghan National Police Recruiting Command. These two organizations will directly increase the training level of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The Police Training sites have capacity to train 28,700 students in 2010. Only the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) is task organized in Brigades. All four ANCOP Brigades are fully trained and fielded. The Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) is organized into Districts and in some cases Precincts. The ANP is fully engaged in fighting the insurgency. Current operations involving coalition forces could not happen without ANP support. NTM–A/CSTC–A fully includes the ANP as a critical force in planning the future development and growth of the Afghan National Security Forces.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KARL EIKENBERRY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR JOHN KERRY

Question. A key feature that enabled the success of the “surge” in Iraq was near-seamless civil-military cooperation under Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. Their unusually close personal collaboration was backed by a joint civil-military campaign plan that enumerated the roles and responsibilities of the military and civilian efforts there. In Afghanistan, 8 years into the war effort, civilian efforts to improve governance and stimulate the Afghan economy are not fully coordinated or resourced.

- Does the administration support an international civilian coordinator for Afghanistan? Why or why not?
- Does the United Nations in Afghanistan (UNAMA) have the capacity and credibility to exercise sufficient leadership over international donors?
- In November, the United Nations temporarily relocated about 600 of its 1,100 international staff for security reasons. How is this affecting our civilian operations?

Answer. To date, UNAMA has suffered from insufficient staff and resources, which have prevented it from fulfilling its mandate as the international lead for civilian assistance coordination. There is broad consensus in the international community on the need to improve civilian assistance coordination. This requires strengthening UNAMA’s ability to perform this task. To that end, the administration supports UNAMA continuing in its international civilian assistance coordination role, with a clear mandate and a strong Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). We intend to support the request from the SRSG that the international community supply his office with experts in priority areas to help ensure the SRSG has a secretariat capable of following up on coordination efforts. By strengthening UNAMA centrally and in the provinces, coordination of civilian assistance should improve at the national and subnational levels, between the international donors, and between the donors and the Afghan Government.

UNAMA’s ability to fulfill its mandate will be determined in part by the security situation in Afghanistan. We support ongoing efforts by the U.N. to improve the security of UNAMA personnel in the wake of the October 2009 guesthouse attack. We also support an expanded UNAMA presence in the provinces. Eight regional and 12 provincial UNAMA offices are currently operational, and three additional provincial offices are expected to open soon. We understand that UNAMA is considering adding new civilian positions in the near future—many of them in the provinces. This will greatly enhance UNAMA’s ability to observe and coordinate civilian assistance in the field.

We continue to work closely with UNAMA officials. Our civilian assistance efforts have been largely unaffected by the U.N.’s decision to temporarily relocate UNAMA personnel.

Question. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair warned in congressional testimony on March 10, 2009, that growing challenges to Central Asia’s stability ultimately “could threaten the security of critical U.S. and NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan through Central Asia.” He stated that the “highly personalized politics, weak institutions, and growing inequalities” in the Central Asian coun-

tries make them “ill-equipped to deal with the challenges posed by Islamic violent extremism, poor economic development, and problems associated with energy, water, and food distribution.”

Please describe the level of coordination and cooperation between Embassy Kabul and our U.S. Embassies in Central Asia. Who in Embassy Kabul is responsible for coordination with our Central Asian Embassies on Afghanistan policy? What are Embassy Kabul’s biggest priorities in northern Afghanistan, and how does the Embassy view cooperation from the Central Asian states?

Answer. Cooperation and coordination between our Embassies in the region happens routinely, at working and senior levels. The contacts facilitate cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors on security issues, political dialogue, and economic cooperation. Inter-Embassy coordination and cooperation occurs primarily between our Political and Economic Sections, and INL; in addition, our Political-Military Sections maintain close contact.

In northern Afghanistan, we are focused on working with the Government of Afghanistan and other partners to improve security, foster national unity, and expand economic opportunities, especially in agriculture and related activities. The opening in 2010 of the new U.S. Consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif sends a powerful signal of our enduring commitment to Afghanistan. Officers working out of our consulate will facilitate coordination of a comprehensive approach to the North and drive resources to key areas, conduct outreach, and partner with Afghan ministries.

We are grateful to all the Central Asian states for contributing to coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Their significant assistance ranges from supplying much-needed electricity to Kabul, to providing food and medicine, to building schools and hospitals. We also rely on all our Central Asian partners to move coalition military supplies through the region into Afghanistan. There is great potential for the expansion of the existing Northern Distribution Network to improve transportation infrastructure and stimulate trade routes connecting Central to South Asia, which will have a lasting, beneficial economic impact for the region. This will also reduce our reliance on the more risky Pakistani ground line of communication where convoys are attacked by militants.

RESPONSES OF DEPUTY SECRETARY JAMES LEW TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Success in Afghanistan depends largely on what happens in Pakistan, particularly in the west. At West Point, the President said, “In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days are over.” Presumably, he was referring to a transactional relationship dominated by military aid: for that reason, Congress has authorized \$7.5 billion in nonmilitary aid over the next 5 years. During her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 3, 2009, Secretary Clinton said the administration fully supported S. 1707, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill on Pakistan and would seek full funding.

- Please explain why the administration requested less than \$1.5 billion for FY 2010 for civilian assistance for Pakistan as authorized by S. 1707, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act. Why did the administration not seek a budget amendment increasing its FY 2010 request for civilian assistance for Pakistan to levels set forth in S. 1707? Will the administration seek further funding for civilian assistance for Pakistan—excluding Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) in a supplemental bill, and if so, how much?
- How will the administration leverage the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill to build greater trust with Pakistanis, especially if funding levels for civilian assistance (excluding security assistance) are lower than the authorized levels of \$1.5 billion per fiscal year?

Answer. The President’s request for foreign assistance in the FY 2010 budget included \$1.3 billion for nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan, of which Congress appropriated \$1.2 billion. With available funds from FY 2009 and the FY 2010 appropriation, we are on the path toward funding our foreign assistance programs in Pakistan at Kerry-Lugar-Berman levels. We will continue a conversation within the administration and with Congress concerning FY 2010 funding as we work closely with the Government of Pakistan to expand existing programs, work more closely with Pakistani partners to implement programs, help the government provide basic services to the Pakistani people, particularly in vulnerable areas, and identify high impact, high visibility projects.

As outlined in the December 14 report to Congress on the administration's strategy for civilian assistance to Pakistan, U.S. assistance will be used to establish greater trust with Pakistan in several ways.

- First, U.S. assistance will fund investments in Pakistan's economic infrastructure, particularly in energy and agriculture, to reinforce Pakistan's efforts to address chronic energy and water shortfalls, improve the daily lives of the Pakistani people, and increase opportunities for economic growth. These high impact, high visibility programs will be tied to a strong communications strategy to demonstrate to the Pakistani people that the United States has a long-term commitment to help bring stability and prosperity to Pakistan.
- Second, U.S. assistance will continue to help the Government of Pakistan improve services to poor and vulnerable communities, which extremists often target for recruitment and to build popular support for their causes. This effort will help achieve U.S. and Pakistani mutual interests of building Pakistani stability by increasing access to health, education, infrastructure and rule of law for Pakistanis, and building the Pakistani people's trust in their government.
- Third, the United States, together with other donors, will invest more heavily in technical assistance to the Pakistani executive, legislative, and judicial branches to strengthen the Pakistani Government's capacity to achieve economic and political reforms that will bolster Pakistan's future stability.
- Finally, by providing more U.S. assistance through accountable Pakistani institutions at the national, provincial, and local levels to implement Pakistani-identified priority programs, U.S. assistance will enhance Pakistanis' stake in the long-term sustainability of programs funded by international assistance. Through this effort, the United States, and other donors will help Pakistan develop accountable and transparent resource management structures that will lead to greater trust between Pakistan and the United States.

Question. Since 2001, the United States has spent over \$20 billion dollars on development and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Today, only a fraction of that money—roughly 10 percent—goes directly to the Afghan Government, even though we have identified some competent line ministries and decent governors at the federal and provincial levels. While corruption and limited capacity within the Afghan Government are huge problems, the international community is hardly free of blame. Many Afghans see Western consultants drawing hefty salaries and riding around in SUVs, and they draw the conclusion that too much of the development aid is geared toward the development industry itself.

By directly funding capable Afghan ministries or governors (in those cases where they can be found), we could help build the basic capacity of the government to function and thereby empower it. We could also create powerful incentives for competent Afghans to work with us because they can see the rewards.

- Do we have a specific, concrete plan to transfer a larger percentage of U.S. funding to the capable Afghan Government entities as a way to better leverage U.S. assistance, build the basic capacity of the government, and create incentives to partner with us?

Answer. We are committed to transferring a larger percentage of assistance and responsibility to capable Afghan Government entities. The effort emphasizes Afghan leadership and Afghan skill-building efforts at all levels. Direct assistance enables the Afghan Government to deliver services and to build the trust of its people. As part of our effort to support the Afghan Government's ability to deliver services for the Afghan people, USAID is reviewing the financial, management, procurement and expenditure systems of key ministries regarding their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance. Assessments (financial and procurement) are conducted for ministries that USAID intends to fund with direct assistance. If the assessments determine that the management, procurement, financial, and expenditure systems can be certified as accountable, the USAID mission in Afghanistan will certify the ministry as having the capacity to accept direct funding. If the assessments determine that additional specific technical assistance is required, USAID will provide it. As of December 2009, the Ministries of Public Health; Communications and Information Technology; and Finance have been assessed and certified to directly accept U.S. Government funds. USAID is planning to conduct assessments on the Ministries of Education; Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; and Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

The USG is implementing a three-pronged approach to channel more funds directly through the Afghan Government: (1) Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF); (2) Host Country Contracts; and (3) Direct Budget Support in partnership with the Afghan Government and the international community. The goal is to move from 12 percent provided through direct assistance in FY 2009 to around

40 percent in FY 2011, more than tripling the percentage of direct assistance in 3 years, while concurrently putting into place mechanisms for countering corruption and increasing accountability.

Question. Can you please provide specific staffing and resource figures related to the increase in civilians in support of the administration's Afghanistan strategy? In particular:

- a. Ambassador Holbrooke and the State Department have announced that the number of civilians in Afghanistan would be at 974 by the end of the year. As of October 2009 it was reported that 575 civilians were on the ground. Is the USG on track to reach 974 civilians in Afghanistan by the end of the year? If not, by what date?
- b. How many civilians are currently operating in Afghanistan? Please provide a breakdown by department and agency of the number of staff from each department and agency currently deployed as part of the civilian effort in Afghanistan.
- c. What number of civilians beyond the 974-person level is the administration planning to send to Afghanistan in support of the broader strategy in 2010? What is the timeframe for this increase?
- d. From which departments and agencies does the administration anticipate the additional staff will come from?
- e. Where will State and USAID find additional staff to support the further civilian increase? What programs or activities in other countries will have to be minimized or reduced in order to allow for the increase in civilians?
- f. Of the posts in Afghanistan that were originally intended to be staffed by civilians, are any actually being staffed by military Reservists instead?

Answer.

a. We started with less than 320 civilians on the ground in January 2009. We will have 920 civilians on the ground by the end of January. Those not already there have fixed start dates, and we have identified individuals who are in final clearance or training for all but a small handful of the remaining positions.

b. Our Government civilian presence in Afghanistan is being staffed by 8 different agencies: State, USAID, USDA, DHS, Justice, Treasury, Transportation, and HHS. In July 2009, the Deputies' Committee approved the target of 974 direct hire positions which break down as follows: State—423; USAID—333; USDA—64; DHS—11; Justice—128; Treasury—8; Transportation—2; HHS—2. By the end of February, we will have 920 civilians on the ground, with the remainder of the 974 to follow soon thereafter.

c. Following decisions taken in the strategic review, we anticipate moving toward a larger civilian force of well over 1,000 during the course of 2010—timely funding permitting. We are working with post now to elaborate timing and positions needed. As we deploy our personnel to the field, we are focusing on ensuring that they have the mobility and security that they need to be effective, on our military platforms and coalition PRTs.

d. We anticipate that the additional staffing request will be largely for field positions and will be primarily staffed by State, USAID, and USDA.

e. We do not anticipate minimizing or reducing programs or activities in other countries to staff the additional increase. Many of the field positions will be filled with temporary direct hire employees (3,161 employees for State and Foreign Service Limited and Personal Service Contract employees for USAID).

f. We have not yet deployed any military Reservists to fill civilian positions in Afghanistan.

RESPONSE OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES LEW AND AMBASSADOR KARL EIKENBERRY TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. Secretary Lew's written testimony states that the administration intends to triple the number of civilians to 974 by early next year.

- Even with this surge, we'd still have fewer than U.S. 1,000 civilians compared with American 100,000 troops. Is that ratio 1 civilian per 100 troops—truly sufficient when both General Petraeus and General McChrystal assert that a civilian pillar is of equal importance to the military pillar for any successful strategy?
- The number of civilians actually deployed on the ground, outside the Embassy compound, will certainly be far fewer than 1,000. Ambassador Eikenberry testi-

fied that fewer than 400 will be posted outside of Kabul early next year. What sort of impact can 400 U.S. civilians make in changing the governance of a nation of 30 million?

Answer. Although the absolute number of civilians deployed is much lower than the number of troops, we have found that on average each civilian leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to experts with U.S.-funded NGOs to military staff. We also expect that as our troop levels increase and our civilian presence expands into the provinces and districts, we will need to increase our civilian personnel as well, perhaps by another 20 to 30 percent.

Civilian experts come from a range of U.S. Government departments and agencies and bring specific expertise. They contribute to the mission in Kabul and increasingly out in the field—at the beginning of 2009, there were only 67 U.S. Government civilian personnel deployed in the field working on development and governance issues. As of January 5, 311 civilians are working beyond Kabul, including civilians from the State Department, USAID, USDA, DEA, FBI, DHS, and DOJ. We are concentrating our efforts in the East and South, where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President Obama will deploy. Our civilians are partnering with Afghans to enhance the capacity of key government institutions at the national and subnational levels, and are helping rehabilitate Afghanistan's key economic sectors.

As you know, since announcing our strategy in March 2009, we have embarked on an extensive transformation of U.S. civilian assistance activities in Afghanistan. The result is a more focused and effective effort increasingly implemented and overseen by Afghans, more tightly bound to our civilian-military strategy in Afghanistan, and with the dual-benefit of helping the Afghan people while also directly contributing to achieving our core goal of defeating al-Qaeda.

One example of this is our new approach to agriculture in Afghanistan. Our agricultural assistance strategy brings greater coherency to the U.S. efforts through a whole-of-government approach that supports Afghanistan in the redevelopment of its agricultural sector. A key guiding principle of this strategy and its implementation is that it supports the plans and objectives of the Ministry of Agriculture, especially in achieving effects felt at the district level. Our agriculture assistance strategy, developed with the Ministry, will serve as the chief tool in helping us identify where resources are needed and how they might be best applied.

We are continuing to enlist top-quality people to assist Afghans in developing and securing their country. Alongside our diplomats and military servicemembers, there are lawyers, agriculture specialists, economists, law enforcement officers, and others serving in Afghanistan.

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

COORDINATION WITH DOD

Question. DOD has increasingly taken on expanded development roles in Afghanistan, including in agriculture and business development, police training, and capacity-building within main ministries. Is DOD acting in coordination with the Embassy country team on matters relating to diplomacy, development and capacity building? When was the Embassy informed of the assignment of several DOD civilian mentors to Afghan ministries? What authorities and resources will improve civilian agency capacity to maintain effective engagement with DOD in the dynamic counterinsurgency realm? If U.S. military forces will begin departing the country in as soon as 18 months, and many responsibilities are assumed by DOD, who will manage the programs and sectors that DOD has been managing upon their departure? How will USG ensure an effective transition plan is developed and implemented?

Answer. This question is best answered by Ambassador Eikenberry.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM—POLICE TRAINING

Question. There have been challenges in training and mentoring the Afghan National Police that have survived three distinct Security Sector Reform organizations and now confront the latest reorganization of our training effort entitled “NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan” (NTM–A). What are the primary changes in the training to be incorporated in the Afghan National Police curriculum that will distinguish it from the past 3 reorganizations? Why is the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau at State being removed from its important role as a partner with DOD in police training? What agency will be responsible for

Afghan National Police training? How will the U.S. monitor and evaluate NATO multilateral police training? What are the education standards for police officer recruitment? What goals have been established to achieve basic literacy among recruits?

Answer. Afghan National Police curriculum changes include incorporation of practical lessons learned and embedded performance standards measured by practical testing. In addition, NTM-A, working with the Minister of Interior, will add more leader training, improved "Train the Trainer" courses, and senior leadership courses. In addition, the instructor/candidate ratio will be increased with the addition of international police trainers (Carabinieri, French Gendarmerie and European Gendarmerie Force) with a wide range of skills. INL Bureau will remain a partner, specifically controlling and delivering Justice Sector Support Program and Corrections System Support Program. Commander Training Assistance Group-Police, for NTM-A, will coordinate the entire police training initiative from a multinational perspective and thereby be better positioned to influence the variety of bilateral and international contributions throughout the Afghan police training environment. The Minister of Interior, with NTM-A assistance, will be responsible for Afghan police training. NTM-A will provide advisors, mentors, and trainers to support this effort. NTM-A will maintain constant contact with all training agencies. The training will be monitored and evaluated by NTM-A's Combined Training Advisory Group-Police. Frequent visits and assessments will be the primary mechanism to collect metrics. The education standard is being literate in one of the Afghan languages. Recruits not meeting minimum standards are enrolled in training to bring them up to minimum standards. Recruits are enrolled in training to teach them the basic skills they will need to perform their duties. If recruits do not show improvement after a period of training, they are replaced with a new recruit.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KARL EIKENBERRY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

Question. The position of the Senior Civilian Representative colocated with the Regional Command military headquarters is a new construct in Afghanistan. There are also additional civilian representatives assigned to smaller units such as PRTs and DRTs within each region.

- What is the structure and what is the timeline for establishing these elements within each RC?
- What resources and authorities are available to the Senior Civilian Representatives assigned to the Regional Commands?
- How is this structure intended to coordinate with the Embassy, the military, the local and regional Afghan authorities, Afghan civil society, and NGO/Contractor partners?
- What role will USAID play at all levels of the Regional Commands?
- How will the Office of Transition Initiatives efforts be coordinated and leveraged within the Regional Command structure?

Answer. Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) are in place at all Regional Commands.

The SCRs report directly to the Embassy's Interagency Sub-National Program Coordinator, and through him to Ambassador Tony Wayne, the Coordinating Director of Development Assistance and Economic Affairs. The SCR positions are at the Minister Counselor level, and they coordinate and direct the work of all U.S. Government civilians under Chief of Mission authority within their area of responsibility. They ensure coherence of political direction and developmental efforts, and execute U.S. policy and guidance. The SCR also serves as the U.S. civilian counterpart to the military commander in the Regional Command, to senior coalition civilians, and to senior local Afghan Government officials. The SCRs also oversee sub-national civilian staff engagement in USG planning, assessment, program execution and evaluation, direct analytical reporting and activities in the RC across all lines of effort, engage with Afghan Government officials, international partners and PRT-contributing countries to improve collaboration at all levels, and contribute input to USAID priorities implemented through the USAID Regional Program Platform. The SCR also provides foreign policy guidance and advice about the region to the military commander, and receive security advice from the commander.

Each SCR is supported at the Regional Command level by a team of roughly 10-30 personnel under Chief of Mission authority, including policy, development, and administrative support from several agencies, including USAID, USDA, U.S. law enforcement and other agencies. The USAID Regional Program Platforms, com-

prised of technical experts from each of USAID's sectoral offices, will be led by a USAID Senior Foreign Service officer, who serves as the Senior Development officer and supports the SCR. In RC-South, personnel supporting the SCR include a subset of officers assigned to the RC-S Civilian-Military Integration Cell and the Counternarcotics Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF), to connect these multinational structures working for the RC-S Commander to Embassy senior leadership. In RC-E, civilian staff participate in relevant planning boards and fusion cells to enhance our integrated civilian-military effort.

The creation of the SCR positions has enabled civilian agencies to devolve more decisionmaking authority to the field, and enabled civilians to more quickly tailor programs to the counterinsurgency challenges of each specific environment. The SCR leads the interagency team to define and set priorities, and supervises team efforts to monitor and report program effects. The SCR can elicit and provide feedback into the development programs through the Senior Development officer. The Senior Development officer is authorized to manage the USAID program portfolio through the USAID Automated Directives System (ADS).

Outside the RCs, lead U.S. Government civilian representatives are identified for each operational level in the field, down to the District Support Team level, to promote increased responsiveness and accountability for U.S. policy implementation. The selection of a State Department, USAID, or other agency lead depends on the relative experience of the agency representatives and on the operating environment in each specific location.

USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has embedded OTI Deputy Country Representatives, Monitoring and Information Officers, and regionally based response/surge staff at the RC-East and RC-South headquarters to coordinate efforts throughout the chain of command. OTI staff are part of the SCR's team in each regional platform. OTI has devolved authority to Deputy Country Representatives to design regionally/context-specific approaches to stability programming. In this way, OTI activities are better integrated into short-term military planning, and can be changed quickly to respond to new priorities as they arise. Additionally, lessons learned from the field regarding stability programming are coordinated through the Regional Commands to higher level headquarters. The OTI representatives at the regional platforms work within integrated CIV-MIL teams responsible for making sure stabilization activities are coordinated and aligned with USG strategic guidance.

At the district level, OTI field representatives are primarily embedded with maneuver units on Forward Operating Bases and Combat Outposts, where they work collaboratively and in strict coordination with the other USG agencies active in the district.

All OTI activities are coordinated up the chain through the lead Civilian Representatives at each operational level, from the District Support Teams on up to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and ultimately to the Task Force and Regional Command Headquarters levels.

Question. The President's strategy in Afghanistan calls for both military and civilian activities to stabilize and rebuild the country's economy. A formal Civilian-Military Campaign Plan was created to direct U.S. efforts and has had a positive effect on the coordination of normally stove-piped efforts of USG agencies.

- How is the Civil Military Campaign Plan organized for review and, if necessary, amended?
- Who will serve as the arbiter on contentious interagency issues, including military issues?
- With regard to the coordination of civilian and military development activities, what is the chain of command among the numerous agencies engaged in some aspect of development?
- How are DOD reconstruction activities, such as those of the Agribusiness Development Teams, integrated with those of civilian agencies?
- What is the role of Ambassador Tony Wayne with regard to DOD development activities?

Answer. The USG assesses progress on its operations in Afghanistan via a quarterly interagency metrics review conducted by the Embassy, ISAF and USFOR-A and submitted to the NSC. The assessment has two purposes: (1) To provide decisionmakers in Afghanistan with the necessary information to prioritize and direct allocation of resources within the framework of the Civilian-Military Plan, and (2) to inform Washington decisionmaking through integrated reporting. Quarterly stakeholder meetings identify where progress has been made or setbacks have been encountered, where opportunities and obstacles exist, and how policy, activities, planning and resourcing should be adjusted.

The 14 National-Level Working Groups that were created under the Integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan (ICMCP) and work to address various aspects of Afghanistan's reconstruction all fall under the responsibility of Ambassador Wayne and report through him to Ambassador Eikenberry. Each of these working groups includes representatives from the military and civilian elements engaged in the particular issues, such as infrastructure development, agriculture, or rule of law. Some working groups have only USG civilian and military representatives, but others—such as the Border Issues Working Group—have numerous representatives from the donor community and involve Afghan Government officials, while the U.K. cochairs the Counter Narcotics Working Group because of their important contributions in that area. Civ-mil teams in the ISAF regional commands have also been coordinating their strategies and activities via similar mechanisms.

Ambassador Wayne maintains oversight over and close engagement with the working groups and the leadership of the agencies that are part of those groups. As the Embassy cochair, with ISAF Brigadier General McKenzie of the Executive Working Group (EWG), Ambassador Wayne takes strong interest in their activities to strengthen coordination and ensure progress. He and Brigadier General McKenzie conducted a review of the activities of the 14 civ-mil groups at the NLWG Shura in November 2009. The EWG also feeds information and issues into the agenda for weekly meetings between Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal. Ambassador Wayne and Brigadier General McKenzie collaborate closely to resolve inter-agency differences and, as appropriate, raise them with Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal for joint resolution.

The U.S. Army National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) in Afghanistan have been active in generating agricultural activity in RC-East, particularly in areas of small-scale agricultural production. ADTs are stand-alone operations that are not physically linked to the neighboring Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). When an ADT and a PRT are operating in the same vicinity, the ADT tends to replace the need for agricultural advisors at the local PRT, while the PRT tends to focus on nonagricultural aspects of subnational engagement. With the recent increase of agricultural advisors, however, civilian agricultural experts from USDA have been working closely with ADTs in an effort to increase civ-mil collaboration in agricultural projects in the field. Civilian agricultural experts continue to be placed at PRTs around the country where ADTs do not already have a presence.

Embassy Kabul and CENTCOM have been examining how to migrate the agricultural development activities of the ADTs to the civilian PRTs as the Army National Guard ADT units decrease over the next 24 to 30 months. A workshop in Kabul in late January with strategic planners from CENTCOM, and representatives from USDA, USAID, ISAF, and the Army National Guard laid out the road ahead for the transition from military to civilian agricultural program implementation in the field.

As far as DOD development activities are concerned, the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) remains an important tool for advancing U.S. counter-insurgency strategy and development goals in Afghanistan. USFOR-A and USAID coordinate all CERP infrastructure (usually transport) projects. Proposed projects undergo a vetting process that includes buy-in at the local and community/ministry level. Civil-military collaboration occurs at the Regional Platform, PRT, District Support Team (DST) or Forward Operating Base (FOB) level, depending on the location and size of the potential undertaking. A USAID representative is a voting member of the USFOR-A CERP Board in Kabul. This ensures a civilian/development perspective and that CERP activities complement those of USAID. National Level Working Groups occasionally discuss larger CERP projects where Chief of Mission and USFOR-A interests converge. Projects exceeding \$1 million must be authorized by CENTCOM.

Question. DOD has increasingly taken on expanded development roles in Afghanistan, including in agriculture and business development, police training, and capacity-building within main ministries.

- Is DOD acting in coordination with the Embassy country team on matters relating to diplomacy, development, and capacity-building?

Answer. Civil-military cooperation and coordination is a key priority for me—a priority also shared by General McChrystal. We meet formally and informally throughout the week to ensure that our organizations are aligned and in synch. The Embassy country team coordinates with DOD and NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through a variety of mechanisms. The Embassy and ISAF established structures and processes this past year designed around civ-mil integration and based on the Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan I signed with General McChrystal this summer. National-level working groups have been formed around our most important lines of effort. These groups are cochaired by Embassy

and coalition military personnel and report to an interagency Executive Working Group. The Embassy has placed a liaison officer at ISAF Joint Command (IJC) to better synchronize our efforts in the field. A U.S. Forces–Afghanistan liaison office represents the military in the Embassy and is involved in all aspects of the Embassy’s operations and activities. This liaison office is headed by a USAF brigadier general who has direct access to me and the Embassy leadership. Individual DOD personnel are assigned to key Embassy sections to further enhance civ-mil integration and cooperation. In matters of diplomacy, the Embassy has the lead with respect to the U.S. Government in Afghanistan—a role fully acknowledged and accepted by General McChrystal.

Question. When was the Embassy informed of the assignment of several DOD civilian mentors to Afghan ministries?

Answer. For quite some time there have been U.S. military advisors in the security-related ministries. We recently learned of plans by our military colleagues also to place some advisors, either military or civilian, in service delivery ministries. We are working with those colleagues to coordinate those plans with our own ongoing initiative to make advisors available to those ministries as part of our effort to implement the President’s call for extending government services at the subnational level.

Question. What authorities and resources will improve civilian agency capacity to maintain effective engagement with DOD in the dynamic counterinsurgency realm?

Answer. The civilian agencies have the authorities needed to maintain effective engagement with DOD. Special hiring authorities are enabling the State Department and USAID to place highly skilled civilian experts in the field with military operational units—enabling us to establish critical linkages at the Provincial and District levels. Existing authorities and the civilian uplift give us the tools to implement the administration’s plan for Afghanistan in cooperation with our DOD and ISAF partners. The challenges we face here in Afghanistan will require the support of Congress and the American public for some time to come. It is important that we continue to receive the program funding requested to build capacity and develop institutions here in Afghanistan.

Question. If U.S. military forces will begin departing the country in as soon as 18 months, and many responsibilities are assumed by DOD, who will manage the programs and sectors that DOD has been managing upon their departure?

Answer. General McChrystal and I share a commitment to a joint civ-mil mission, and we understand the need to support each other in our different responsibilities. The Embassy’s efforts are aligned around building capacity within Afghanistan’s national, provincial, and district governments. DOD and ISAF forces will depart as the Afghan National Security Forces are built and trained to assume primary security responsibilities over more and more of Afghanistan. Ultimately, the U.S. Embassy represents U.S. Government priorities and interests in any foreign country, including Afghanistan. The mission is postured to accept growing responsibilities for oversight of the many programs and activities initiated by the military. Civilian agencies are quickly increasing the numbers of personnel in the field, which will allow us to expand our activities. For instance, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is expanding its presence and role in Afghanistan and is organizing a much more robust Agriculture team and the Department of Homeland Security is preparing to establish an attaché office. USAID is reorganizing to place more responsibilities in the field to ensure that development officials have the tools necessary to rapidly respond at the local level. The law enforcement community and justice sector will continue to play vital roles—particularly in developing rule of law institutions. These initiatives will increase the impact of civilian activities to build capacity in the justice sector and display the U.S. Government’s long-term commitment to the Afghan people. Core DOD missions will continue for some time to come—including the development of the Afghan National Security Forces and the Ministries of Defense and Interior—even while the role of combat forces evolves from one of direct participation in stability operations to that of supporting the Afghan National Security Forces.

Question. How will the USG ensure an effective transition plan is developed and implemented?

Answer. Our ultimate goal is to transition security responsibilities to the Afghans while continuing to support them in critical areas such as logistics, training, and intelligence. The Embassy and DOD will continue to closely coordinate all activities through a variety of coordination mechanisms in Kabul, and at the regional and district levels. My staff and I will continue to meet regularly with General McChrystal

and his staff to ensure our structures and mechanisms are evolving to reflect the changing environment and our evolving roles. The national level working groups and the Executive Working Group coordinating team will be the primary vehicles for ensuring continuing cooperation. The Senior Civilian Representatives at the Regional Command level will continue to be in a position to coordinate resources and priorities and ensure a proper balance of military and civilian activities. We continue to be proactive in identifying areas where additional coordination and cooperation are required. We have established new working groups and mechanisms as necessary to ensure that we are working as effectively as possible and have begun incorporating Afghan participation as their capacity improves. Eventually, our Afghan partners will lead the efforts in transitioning activities and programs under the control of their own agencies and organizations.

Question. There have been challenges in training and mentoring the Afghan National Police that have survived three distinct Security Sector Reform organizations and now confront the latest reorganization of our training effort entitled—NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM—A).

- What are the primary changes in the training to be incorporated in the Afghan National Police curriculum that will distinguish it from the past 3 reorganizations?

Answer. The primary changes in the Afghan National Police curriculum will be: additional leadership training for supervisors, including senior leadership; and improved “Train-the-Trainer” courses. In addition, the instructor/student ratio will be improved with the addition of international police trainers (Italian Carabinieri, French Gendarmerie, and the European Gendarmerie Force) with a wide range of skills. For further information, I would refer you to the Combined Security Training Command—Afghanistan (CSTC—A) and NTM—A, which has had the lead on curriculum development.

Question. Why is the INL Bureau at State being removed from its important role as a partner with DOD in police training?

Answer. Real improvements have been made to the Afghan National Police (ANP) through the Afghanistan Civilian Advisor Support (ACAS) program that the INL Bureau has administered. However, due to the ANP’s significant needs and role in Afghanistan’s security environment, combined with the need to accelerate the pace of police training, the State Department (including Embassy Kabul) and the Department of Defense agreed that those challenges could most effectively be met by unifying the police training effort at CSTC—A/NTM—A. The State Department will continue to have a policy oversight role, while INL will continue to provide support to the training effort, including dedicated representation within the CSTC—A/NTM—A organization.

Question. What agency will be responsible for Afghan National Police training?

Answer. The Defense Department, through CSTC—A/NTM—A, will have the lead responsibility for Afghan National Police training. The State Department will continue to provide policy oversight, and the INL Bureau will continue to provide training support.

Question. How will the United States monitor and evaluate NATO multilateral police training?

Answer. NTM—A will monitor all NATO training, using personnel from its Combined Training Advisory Group—Police (CTAG—P). Metrics to be used for evaluation will be collected during frequent site visits and assessments. For further information, I would refer you to the Combined Security Training Command—Afghanistan (CSTC—A) and NTM—A, which will have the lead on evaluation of police training.

Question. What are the education standards for police officer recruitment?

Answer. Officers, noncommissioned officers, and members of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) must have had at least 6 years education. Basic recruits do not have minimum education requirement for recruitment. For further information, I would refer you to the Combined Security Training Command—Afghanistan (CSTC—A) and NTM—A, which will have the lead on police development.

Question. What goals have been established to achieve basic literacy among recruits?

Answer. A literacy training program has been incorporated into all basic police training courses, incorporating 2 hours of classroom time into each working day. In addition, a nationwide voluntary ANP literacy program has been established at

more than 160 sites around the country. For further information, I would refer you to the Combined Security Training Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) and NTM–A.

Question. The long effort to create an effective justice sector has been dedicated for the most part to the high crimes of counternarcotics trafficking in Afghanistan.

- Would you describe how that has evolved and what lessons will be applied to the Major Crimes Task Force that will now deal directly with other significant crimes such as corruption and kidnapping?

Answer. One of the strongest justice sector initiatives the United States has launched in Afghanistan is the Criminal Justice Task Force, or CJTF, dedicated to the prosecution of high-value narcotics cases. Located in Kabul, the CJTF is completely self-contained, with a detention center for the accused, a court where the accused are tried, and facilities for investigators, prosecutors, and guards. Department of Justice Assistant U.S. Attorney mentors funded by the Department of State/INL work with Afghan investigators, prosecutors, and judges; in addition, State/INL provides sustainment funds for the facility and mentors the corrections staff through its corrections program. Many of the CJTF cases originate in cases developed by the specialized units of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan that the U.S. DEA has developed and continues to mentor. The CJTF is a success with over 400 counternarcotics arrests and acquittals over the past year. Morale is high there, and its director makes a strong case that Afghans can carry cases all the way through the legal system. This capability has been developed through the intense, continuous, one-on-one training and mentoring of the investigators, prosecutors, and judges by experienced federal prosecutors, who have been serving in this role since 2005. Advisory support and facility sustainment are currently provided by State/INL and the Government of Afghanistan has agreed to take over some of these responsibilities in one year. The natural questions that follow are, can it be sustained, and whether the Afghans, with assistance, can replicate it elsewhere.

DEA actively synchronizes the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) operations with the U.S. military, ISAF and other inter-agency partners. State/INL provides significant financial support to these units, including operations and sustainment costs for vehicles and facilities. DEA coordinates intelligence, resources, targets, operations, and priorities with the U.S. military to further stability, advance the rule of law in order to disrupt material support for the insurgency and break the nexus between narcotics and corruption. As a result, narcotics, and the insurgent financing it represents, as well as insurgent leaders and fighters have been removed from the battlefield.

The success of the SIU and NIU depends on an effective judicial component to adjudicate cases in a fair and impartial application of justice. Consequently, all cases are brought to the Criminal Justice Task Force, or in some instances, to U.S. Federal District Court.

The Major Crimes Task Force, or MCTF, is a small, vetted investigatory unit focused on general corruption and kidnapping cases. The MCTF builds on the success of the CJTF and aims to create a more sustainable model for effectively investigating, prosecuting, and convicting criminals in an Afghan court. The FBI has been working closely with the MCTF to train and mentor its staff, in the hopes of developing the MCTF into one of the premier independent law enforcement entities in Afghanistan. Additional support has been provided by the United Kingdom's Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), DOD's Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) and State/INL, among others.

Question. In the context of a counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan, what are the respective roles of State/INL, USAID, USDEA and DOD?

Answer. The U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan is a true interagency effort, with a number of different agencies drawing on their own strengths and resources to both reduce the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan and also to build lasting Afghan capacity to continue these efforts in the future. State provides the overall policy guidance, and INL—a Bureau of State—implements programs to build the capacity of the Ministry of Counternarcotics; carry out counternarcotics public information and messaging; enhance provincial-level capacity and commitment to combating the drug trade; expand drug addiction prevention and treatment capacity; and support provincial-level supply reduction through Governor-Led Eradication and the Good Performer's Initiative. INL also engages with multilateral partners such as the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime to consolidate regional commitment to combating the flow of Afghan opiates and to diversify the base of international support for enhanced CN, law enforcement, and rule of law cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors. Through its assistance programs, USAID plays an important role in promoting and supporting alternative livelihood

programs for farmers, rule-of-law programs, and capacity-building programs that enhance subnational governance. The DEA has played a vital role in mentoring specialized units of the Afghan Counternarcotics Police, which has led to increasing success in interdiction and law enforcement operations. DOD has also helped build the capacity of Afghanistan's National Security Forces, and has been involved in interdiction operations and the seizure of opium stashes, weapons caches, and the shutting down of heroin and bomb factories. Working closely with our National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams and our USDA representatives in the field, our colleagues from the aforementioned agencies and our military have also helped Afghan farmers to transition to licit livelihoods and improve their situations growing crops and produce for markets inside and outside Afghanistan. Additionally, the Department of Justice has provided experienced federal prosecutors to provide one-on-one training and mentoring to the Counternarcotics Judicial Task Force and the prosecutors assigned to the Anti-Corruption Tribunal.

Our counternarcotics strategy reflects a civilian-military and whole-of-government approach to assisting the Afghan Government in waging a counterinsurgency. Capacity-building is key: Our civilian and military agencies understand that in order to achieve lasting success, we must help get the Afghans to a position where they play a more effective leadership role in the fight against narcotics, drawing on the support of the United States and other international partners.

Question. How are each agency's activities integrated into a coherent strategy?

Answer. The administration has worked hard through 2009 to fuse our interagency counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan into a coherent strategy. Our counternarcotics strategy provides the overall direction to guide interagency activities. There is also an interagency counternarcotics working group, chaired by State, that meets at least once a month. This working group serves as a forum for discussing and coordinating positions on narcotics issues, and on reviewing performance measures and other counternarcotics matters. It also played a lead role in drafting the counternarcotics strategy. This interagency structure is mirrored in Kabul, where an ambassador at U.S. Embassy in Kabul also chairs a counternarcotics working group that brings together all the agencies involved in counternarcotics (as well as ISAF and other partners) and meets at least once a month to review and coordinate policy priorities (with subgroups meeting on an ad hoc basis). The strategy and these working groups ensure that the respective agencies' activities are well coordinated.

Question. A significant increase in resources and responsibilities has been allocated to the communications strategy for Afghanistan.

- How have you organized the Embassy to effectively employ a broad and innovative public diplomacy strategy?
- How will the civilian and military responsibilities in public diplomacy and strategic communications be divided?
- What are the advantages that civilian agencies and DOD bring to this mission?
- How will this strategy extend across the border regions that incorporate much of the Pashtun belt? Is there coordination with Embassy Islamabad?

Answer. Our Afghanistan Communication Plan is a comprehensive strategy that demonstrates America's long-term commitment to Afghanistan, supports President Obama's agenda, strengthens Afghan institutions and moderate voices, counters insurgent messaging, and enhances America's enduring partnership with the people of Afghanistan. This plan aims to reduce the ability of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremists to influence public perceptions and attitudes; supports Afghanistan's people and government as they establish a more secure, moderate, just, and lasting state; demonstrates the American commitment to Afghanistan, and strengthens the partnership between Afghanistan and the United States. Our communication plan is explicitly designed to complement our integrated civilian-military campaign plan.

Though different agencies and departments have different mandates and different funding when it comes to communication, there is very active cooperation and coordination between Embassy Kabul's Public Affairs section, ISAF Communication Offices, our Regional Command and PRT Public Affairs sections, and other government agencies through regular coordination meetings and planning sessions in country. This collaboration is not only conducted by the Embassy's Public Affairs team, but with members from all Embassy sections—Economic, Political, USAID, Treasury, USDA, to name a few. ISAF liaison officers work with the Embassy team on a daily basis and help ensure close coordination.

Because it is impossible to completely separate roles and responsibilities in information arena, we integrate and coordinate constantly, and we follow common prin-

ciples. Some of the principles that guide all of our work, be it State or Defense, are adaptability (fast response; targeted messages for distinct audiences); clearly providing facts (refuting of terrorist lies); projecting strength (showing our commitment to helping Afghans build a better future); showing respect (fostering dialogue; building Afghan Government institutions); and stressing the shared goals of the Afghan people and the international community.

Our new civilian strategy is under consolidated leadership at the Embassy and follows four key avenues: Focusing and Expanding Media Outreach, Building Afghan Communications Capacity, Countering Extremist Messaging, and Strengthening People-to-People Ties. ISAF has also revamped its efforts through an integrated communication team with increased resources. Information operations and psychological operations run by ISAF are also now better coordinated, including with civilian partners, under a joint civil-military campaign plan. To ensure all of our efforts are mutually supportive, the Embassy interacts daily with all ISAF communication sections, from ISAF Public Affairs to their Information Operations Task Force. This is true in Kabul and in the field where senior civilian communication experts work with Regional Commands, PRTs and Task Force commanders and their staffs to ensure our public messaging and our information and psychological operations all support our overall effort in Afghanistan. Finally, we work closely with our Afghan partners at every level on both the civilian and military side.

Additionally, we have begun to implement a comprehensive communication strategy for countering terrorist messaging and improving relations with the people of Pakistan. Given the nature of the shared challenges we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan, our communication strategies for both countries share many commonalities. But because the United States has a very different footprint in each country in terms of personnel and resources and because of the more developed communications infrastructure in Pakistan, our approaches differ on many levels between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we ensure cooperation on our approach to communications along the Afghan-Pakistani border through close interagency coordination in Washington and with U.S. personnel in both countries.

Question. S/CRS has provided a number of personnel for discreet tasks within the Embassy and country team operations, including most recently, a 6-person tiger team to rapidly capitalize on the mission requirements of the Public Diplomacy strategy, as well as laying the initial groundwork for important civil-military coordination through the ICMAG, and providing support to the elections. How would you characterize the value and importance of the role of the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to date?

Answer. S/CRS has been assisting Embassy Kabul since 2007 with specialized staff and missions. Over that time, S/CRS has deployed 65 people from core staff, the Civilian Response Corps and interagency partners in support of Embassy Kabul and ISAF. Currently, S/CRS has 18 staff deployed in specialized roles in Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar and preparing several additional personnel for newly requested positions.

The value of S/CRS has been rapid provision of specially trained staff and teams who have been able to fill focused needs of the mission in that unique environment. These staff have supported the Embassy at critical moments in the recent mission restructuring and expansion, elections period, and strategy revision.

Roles requested by the Embassy have included: developing an integrated civ-mil planning and assessment system at the national level which resulted in the Embassy's first Integrated Civil-Military (Civ-Mil) Campaign Plan as well as regional and provincial plans/assessments; support to the design and standup of the new civ-mil decisionmaking structure; providing civilian experts to pilot civ-mil teams at the regional and provincial levels; representing the Embassy in the Regional Command-South Civ-Mil cell—the first multinational integrated planning cell of its kind; forming an Interagency Elections Support team to reinforce the Embassy's effort to assist the Afghan-led elections process and to develop and put mechanisms in place to identify fraud and enhance security coordination; supporting current work on reviewing rule of law and detentions; and assisting the Government of Afghanistan to design and execute the next phase of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

S/CRS has been able to draw on a wide range of skills and expertise from other agencies as well as from within the State Department including rule of law and detention experts from DOJ and the NSC, economic advisors from OPIC, public affairs officers from USAID, and planners from DOD. Many of these individuals have served in difficult and dangerous environments, piloting the concepts underpinning the civilian uplift while supporting the senior civilian representatives in east and south with their specialized stabilization expertise.

Question. How can S/CRS respond more effectively to Embassy requirements across any number of sectors?

Answer. S/CRS regularly responds to Embassy requests for assistance with CRC and S/CRS staff to the maximum extent resources allow. As this collaboration continues it will become faster and more regularized, allowing for “just in time” deployments as needed. S/CRS is working with S/SRAP and the Embassy to determine future needs from the CRC and S/CRS core staff.

Question. In October of this year, the Broadcasting Board of Governors briefed the committee on its operations worldwide, including our programming for the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. The BBG noted in a followup written response that, in spite of working with the Afghan Government since the fall of 2005, “The Ministry of Information continues to block the contract for the operation of the Khost facilities . . . Minister of Information Khurram continues to block efforts to resolve this issue . . .” The Voice of America later reported that, also in October, the Pakistani Government reversed its decision to allow VOA transmission from Peshawar into the border region after only a month of operations.

- What if any progress has been made since October?
- Are these host country decisions isolated or are they indicative of a lack of cooperation more broadly in this sector and from this ministry?

Answer. The Department of State has worked closely with the Broadcasting Board of Governors to resolve the impasse with the Government of Afghanistan over the commissioning of the Khost transmitter site.

On January 5, the Broadcasting Board of Governors received from the Director of Radio Television Afghanistan a signed amendment to the BBG–RTA agreement as it had been presented by BBG to the Afghan side in August. This clears the way for BBG broadcasts using the Khost Tower to begin. As of January 10, BBG was conducting technical tests. We expect the broadcasts to begin soon.

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. I am concerned that there is an alarming disconnect between the more targeted vision President Obama articulated in his speech regarding U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, and statements made by General McChrystal about how he intends to move forward.

The word “counterinsurgency” was notably absent from the President’s speech last Tuesday. He stated that he “rejected goals that were beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.”

But according to media reports, General McChrystal gave a number of statements the very next day in Afghanistan in which he repeatedly used the word “counterinsurgency.” He even announced that he had created a counterinsurgency advising team.

The Washington Post summed up McChrystal’s comments by saying “McChrystal has left little doubt that counterinsurgency is what he intends to do.”

In your counterinsurgency manual, you clearly state that “20 counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density for effective” counterinsurgency operations. Or in other words, we need 20 security forces for every 1,000 Afghans.

So it appears as though we would need roughly 570,000 security forces to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

But as you know, our troop levels will not come close to this target figure. According to my calculations, we would have roughly 330,000 forces—including U.S., NATO/ISAF and Afghan security forces once the 30,000 additional Americans are deployed.

And even if we are able to train additional Afghan security forces, we would only have a total of 370,000 forces by the end of October 2010.

This is clearly hundreds of thousands of forces short of the minimum articulated in your manual.

This is the kind of discrepancy that leads me to question whether increasing U.S. troop levels by 30,000 will only lead to our forces getting bogged down in an increasing cycle of violence.

- Is there a disconnect between the President and General McChrystal? Why did President Obama omit the use of the word “counterinsurgency” while General McChrystal continues to use it?
- How can you reconcile the fact that the United States may be conducting a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan with 330,000 troops when your

counterinsurgency manual recommends hundreds of thousands of additional forces for a country the size of Afghanistan?

Answer. The situation in Afghanistan is complex and requires a comprehensive strategy. The objective in Afghanistan is the population. The population must be protected from intimidation and coercion by the insurgents while creating conditions for the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to be seen as an enduring government that can provide basic government services. Using a strategy of clear, hold, build, and transfer, the United States and coalition forces will provide protection and will transfer the security mission to Afghan forces when they are ready. This strategy will combat the insurgency while allowing the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan the time it needs to be able to provide basic services throughout Afghanistan. It also allows for an expanding footprint using the authorized troop limits set by the President and our coalition partners. As for the word “counterinsurgency,” the President was speaking to the U.S. population about a troop increase and our goals in Afghanistan, while General McChrystal was talking about how to use the troop increase in order to provide security from the insurgents.

Question. Last month, the Washington Post reported that Ambassador Eikenberry sent two classified cables to President Obama expressing his reservations about sending additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan.

The Post cited senior U.S. officials who said that the cables conveyed the Ambassador’s “deep concerns about sending more U.S. troops to Afghanistan until President Hamid Karzai’s government demonstrates that it is willing to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that has fueled the Taliban’s rise.”

I take this very seriously, particularly in light of Ambassador Eikenberry’s outstanding credentials, including 40 years of service in the Army and two tours of duty in Afghanistan.

However, it is clear that Ambassador Eikenberry is not alone in his skepticism of President Karzai’s approach to governance.

In a 2007 survey conducted by Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), 60 percent of Afghans said that the Karzai government was the most corrupt in 40 years, compared with 10 percent for the Taliban.

One tribal leader was even quoted by the Washington Post as saying “When I see what this government is doing, it makes me want to join the Taliban.”

- After 8 years of rampant corruption and inefficiency, what has changed in the past month since Ambassador Eikenberry sent his cables that make you confident in the Karzai government’s ability to root out these problems?
- Can you assure us that President Karzai will dramatically change his approach to governance and make the reforms necessary to be a credible partner?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is in full support of the Embassy’s and State Department’s efforts to improve the Afghan National Government, and supports their efforts to root out corruption. I will support Ambassador Holbrooke’s diplomatic efforts with President Karzai to provide a legitimate government. I will lend further support to its people by conducting counterinsurgency operations to secure the populace and train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to counter internal and external threats to the Afghan people.

The Afghanistan National Government will require time and continued support from the U.S. and partner nations in order to become a legitimate authority that can effectively lead its people and be trusted by the international community.

Question. It appears as though the strategy proposed by General McChrystal in August is moving forward.

There is one part of General McChrystal’s report that makes me particularly worried about the safety of our troops.

In his report, General McChrystal indicates that abandoning important protective measures—such as the use of armored vehicles—in the near term will save lives in the longer term.

For example, in the report he states that the use of armored vehicles in secure areas of the country conveys “a sense of high risk and fear to the [Afghan] population.”

He goes on to recommend giving leaders the ability to accept “some risk” and use less protective equipment, such as armored vehicles and body armor, in order to better relate to the population.

But, he concludes that doing so “could expose military personnel and civilians to greater risk in the near term.”

This concerns me because the weapon of choice for our adversaries in Afghanistan is the improvised explosive device, or IED, which allows the enemy to target us from a distance.

These bombs have become more sophisticated, and their impact more deadly. The former director of the Pentagon agency established to deal with IEDs recently said that they cause between 70 and 80 percent of all casualties in Afghanistan.

- Are you comfortable with this element of General McChrystal's strategy? Are we asking our forces to assume an unacceptable risk?

Answer. The strategy laid out by General McChrystal is prudent and does not place our forces at unacceptable risk. In secure areas, the threat from IEDs is greatly diminished and this strategy will give commanders the flexibility to use protective measures based on the prevalent threats in that area. Based on the mission, commanders will have the latitude they need to determine the methods they will use to achieve the desired results.

Question. It has become apparent over the past week that the President's Afghanistan strategy is largely dependent on the ability of Afghan security forces to step up in the near term and assume responsibility for the security of their country.

But everything suggests that building credible security forces will take a very long time.

The following description of the state of the Afghan forces by Dexter Filkins recently appeared in the New York Times: "While many Afghans have demonstrated an eagerness to fight the Taliban, the Afghan army and police have shown themselves unable to maintain themselves in the field, to purge their ranks of corruption, to mount operations at night or to operate any weapon more complicated than a rifle."

He goes on to say that "the bureaucratic skills and literacy levels necessary to administer a large force have not materialized, even after years of mentoring." Mr. Filkins adds that "American trainers often spend large amounts of time verifying that Afghan rosters are accurate—that they are not padded with 'ghosts' being 'paid' by Afghan commanders who quietly collect the bogus wages."

The Associated Press also reported earlier this week that Afghan President Hamid Karzai said that it may be 5 years before the Afghan army is ready to take on insurgents and that it will be at least 15 years before the Afghan Government can "bankroll a security force strong enough to protect the country from the threat of insurgency."

- Do you disagree with Mr. Filkins' assessment?
- Are you concerned by President Karzai's statements?
- What happens in July 2011 if the Afghan security forces aren't ready to step up?

Answer. Mr. Filkins' statement was based on the situation and the training methods that were used at the time he assessed the situation with the Afghan security forces. The training of the security forces is a dynamic process, with changes and solutions occurring rapidly to correct the issues that he mentioned. Since President Karzai made his statements, the increased forces being sent to Afghanistan will have the mission to partner and mentor with Afghan security forces. The additional forces will ensure sufficient numbers of trainers are available to train every unit in the Afghan security forces. This increased focused training effort will accelerate the existing plan to bring Afghan units up to readiness levels that will allow us to transfer the security mission to them in time to meet the deadline established by the President. The transfer process will be a gradual process, as units and areas achieve readiness, they will assume responsibility for their own security. In areas where Afghan units are not ready, coalition forces will continue to provide security until that responsibility is transferred to Afghan security forces.

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KARL EIKENBERRY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

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Question. Do you disagree with Mr. Filkins’ assessment?

Answer. Parts of Mr. Filkins’ assessment generalize deficiencies which exist in parts but may not be endemic throughout the Afghan National Security Forces. There are units which operate independently with little or no oversight from ISAF units. The ongoing Afghan National Police Personnel Asset Inventory, a program asked for by the Ministry of Interior with ISAF assistance, is addressing personnel and weapon accountability and scientifically identifying the scale of the drug problem in order to provide the best data possible for future reform rather than relying upon anecdotal evidence.

Over the past year, several changes in the command and control structure within ISAF have improved our ability to remedy some of the deficiencies noted by Mr. Filkins. The creation of the ISAF Intermediate Joint Command has freed General McChrystal’s staff to more fully partner with the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Additionally, NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, established in November 2009, will provide additional capacity to partner and mentor Afghan ministries, as well as provide needed training and oversight at the ministry level down to police district and Afghan National Army battalion level. Finally, the civilian uplift from the State Department and other civilian agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation, will also increase the number of experts in Kabul and throughout the country who will also play a key role in capacity-building, particularly with the Ministry of Interior.

Question. Are you concerned by President Karzai’s statements?

Answer. The President has repeatedly stated that it is in the long-term interest of the United States and the international community to support the Government of Afghanistan until it is capable of supporting itself. This is a shared responsibility in partnership with the Afghan Government. It is important to note that the international community materially and financially shares this burden with the United States. Key to reducing this burden over time is the development of the Afghan economy and improving revenue collection so that the Afghan Government can increasingly pay for its own needs.

Question. What happens in July 2011 if the Afghan security forces aren’t ready to step up?

Answer. The Afghans are already in the lead in several areas, including Regional Command–Capital. Our military forces seek to conduct all operations by, with, and through the Afghan National Security Forces and conduct planning and leadership of these operations in the closest partnership possible. Over time, we will assess the progress of the Afghan National Security Forces and adjust the nature of our mission accordingly. Areas which are secure enough, are relatively stable, and with Afghan National Security Forces at or near requisite levels could be transitioned when ready. More insecure areas will obviously take longer. While conditions on the ground will dictate the rate at which we transfer responsibility, we are committed to beginning the transfer of areas which are ready, starting in July 2011 or sooner.

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

Question. What percentage of the 7,000 new NATO/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military personnel assigned to Afghanistan will be restricted by caveats? How does the administration plan to engage countries with prohibitively restrictive national caveats?

Answer. Approximately 43 percent of the planned foreign troop surge (3,043 out of 7,000) will have at least one restriction or caveat placed on their forces. Caveats that limit the geographic and operational flexibility of ISAF forces remain a challenge in Afghanistan. Despite this challenge, the trend over the last year has been positive with several nations dropping specific caveats and a majority of ISAF troop contingents now caveat free. Four countries became caveat free in 2009. We continue to impress upon our allies and partners the importance of providing the com-

manders on the ground the maximum possible flexibility in the employment of ISAF forces.

Question. How confident are you that President Karzai's selection of Cabinet ministers will result in a Cabinet comprised of honest ministers? To what extent will domestic political considerations require President Karzai to appoint less than credible ministers?

Answer. This question is best answered by Ambassador Eikenberry.

RESPONSES OF GEN DAVID PETRAEUS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

Question. You have come to speak to us about one of the most challenging decisions facing the President, you as one of his advisors, the Congress and the Nation. I commend President Obama and you all for your careful deliberation. While I am reluctant to send another 30,000 troops into Afghanistan and spend billions at a time when we have so many domestic priorities, I recognize that U.S. national security is at stake and the President pledged to keep our military intervention limited in time. I have a few questions to help me better understand our military strategy. I understand from the President's speech and the testimony we have heard from Secretary Gates and others that our goal is to begin to pull American troops out in the summer of 2011.

- How does that match up with the classic COIN (counterinsurgency) guidance, which you published based on your Iraq experience? Is that sufficient time to achieve the goal of an Afghan security force buildup?

Answer. The COIN guidance of clear, hold, build, and transfer will support the goal of pulling troops out in the summer of 2011. The troop increase will accelerate our progress in all areas of Afghanistan's development. Additional troops will allow for a larger footprint in Afghanistan, which will protect more of the population, allow the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan the ability to provide basic services to more of the population, and allow the Afghan army and police forces to grow and train so we can transfer security duties to them. Coalition forces are setting the conditions under which Afghan forces can be recruited and trained in order to expand their operations throughout all areas of Afghanistan. The current pace of development and operations will provide sufficient time to build up Afghan security forces before summer 2011. More troops will also allow for every Afghan army unit to be mentored and partnered with U.S. and coalition units, enhancing their training and operations capabilities before U.S. forces begin redeployment in summer 2011.

Question. President Karzai has said that 5 years are needed for the security buildup.

- Is there a discrepancy between our visions, or are we and the Afghan Government talking about different measures?

Answer. Our vision of providing protection to the Afghan population from the insurgency is the same as President Karzai's. The 30,000 increase in U.S. troops and the international non-U.S./ISAF troops will allow for accelerating the growth and training of the Afghan security forces. By partnering and mentoring with Afghan security force units, we will be able to begin transferring security duties in time to support a U.S. drawdown in 2011.

Question. Since the increased number of U.S. troops arrived earlier this year, what successes have we seen that can be attributed to the earlier troop surge?

Answer. The earlier force expansion provided greater security for the population in more areas across Afghanistan. This accelerated the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's ability to provide basic governmental services throughout Afghanistan, allowed for partnering and training additional Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan National Police units, and provided security for additional infrastructure improvements at an accelerated pace.

Question. A major aspect of counterinsurgency (COIN) is to secure and serve the civilian population, which entails a change in tactics and may increase risk to our troops.

- Are our International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) allies, which have often put significant limits on their troop operations, on board with COIN?

Answer. Our ISAF allies are operating according to COIN and according to their national guidance. Due to the regional and tribal differences throughout Afghani-

stan, coalition forces have tailored their COIN operations to each region. What works in one region may not work in all regions. Each region commander has the flexibility to adapt COIN operations to enable coalition forces to be effective at meeting COIN objectives. Coalition forces are our partners in maintaining security for the Afghan population. They are also involved in building infrastructure, the expansion of the Afghanistan National Security Forces, and they allow for the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to provide basic government services. Our allies and U.S. troops conduct operations to counter the insurgency and protect the population from intimidation and coercion.

RESPONSE OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JACOB LEW TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND

Question. To what extent is the State Department's Civilian Response Corps being used in Afghanistan? How many S/CRC staff or stand-by personnel in country?

Answer. S/CRS has been deploying personnel to Afghanistan since 2007, with 65 core staff, Civilian Response Corps (CRC) members, and interagency partners having deployed to date in support of Embassy Kabul and ISAF. Currently, a total of 18 staff from S/CRS and the CRC are deployed in specialized roles in Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar, with additional CRC members expected to deploy over the next year.

In Afghanistan, S/CRS and CRC personnel have applied new tools developed by S/CRS and its interagency partners to more effectively plan, implement, and assess needs. These have included developing and executing an integrated civ-mil planning and assessment system including an innovative multinational cell in RC-South; piloting new approaches to civ-mil integration at combat taskforces, provincial teams and regional commands, which has evolved to the Senior Civilian Representative system and civilian platforms; supporting the elections process and increasing antifraud detection; and providing stabilization expertise to ISAF leadership, the Detentions and Corrections taskforce, the civilian uplift design process, implementation of a new communications strategy, and support to the next phase of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR KARL EIKENBERRY TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND

Question. This week the President spelled out the grave risk to United States national security if Afghanistan falls to Taliban control. After 8 years of insufficient resources and lack of focus, we risk providing a stronghold for al-Qaeda and threatening the stability of nuclear Pakistan. That is exactly the concern of experts in and outside our Government if the Taliban takes control in Afghanistan again.

We and our international partners must implement a thoughtful civilian strategy that strengthens effective government services and builds a stable coalition that does not depend on corrupt officials, so that the Afghan people have a reason to support their government rather than Taliban rule. I have no illusions of a Western-style modern state, which has never existed in Afghanistan. What we must aim for is a stable state that provides sufficient security and services to its people, so that it is preferable to the Taliban alternative.

- You have reportedly raised concerns about the surge strategy because of reservations that you have about the Karzai government. What about the strategy discussions has changed your mind?

Answer. The review process was extraordinarily thorough and the debate was frank and vibrant—exactly what you need to weigh decisions of this magnitude, in a situation this complex. I was pleased to take part and am fully supportive of the outcome. I provided my thoughts, by video conference, phone, in person and in cables, which are routine for ambassadors in the field. I never doubted the need for additional troops, and fully support General McChrystal's assessment.

There are always risks and benefits of adding U.S. troops. I expressed my views. All the President's advisers raised questions about the various options.

I fully support the refined mission focused on south and east, on helping build basic governance and on accelerating Afghan National Security Forces growth.

In the end, the strategy review process was as it should be: comprehensive, open, and deliberative. It was appropriate given the stakes—U.S. vital national security interests and the commitment of troops and treasure. Getting it right was more important than doing it fast.

Question. What do you think we need to see from the Afghan Government to make the President's strategy a success?

Answer. Much of what we need to see from the Afghan Government in order to succeed was laid out by President Karzai himself in his inaugural speech last November. President Karzai's agenda aligns very closely with our priorities for the next 18 months. The Afghan National Security Forces must continue to develop so that they can continue taking over responsibility for security in their own country. President Karzai must stay true to his commitment to attack corruption so that the Afghan people can have faith in their government, demonstrating this by appointing competent officials at all levels of government, and removing those who are corrupt or unqualified. His approach to economic development should focus on key sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure and education that can provide jobs and a more capable workforce. He must present a plan for peace and stability through the reintegration of those former Taliban fighters who renounce terrorism and al-Qaeda, and agree to abide by the Afghan Constitution.

And finally he should continue to pursue constructive diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan's neighbors. Progress in these areas will lessen our security role and provide the basis for stronger public support for the Afghan Government.

Question. What leverage do you plan to use to achieve our goals?

Answer. Our preferred course of action is to work jointly with the Afghan Government, set shared goals and objectives, and then work cooperatively to achieve them. As one of the lead contributors to international assistance designed to help the Afghan Government wage a counterinsurgency, we have leverage in terms of our assistance—both material and diplomatic. We also have excellent collaboration with other key donors and missions in Afghanistan, and can also apply leverage on a multilateral basis. Success in Afghanistan is in our national interest, and we will use all of our tools to pursue it.

Question. You have testified about the tripling of the number of U.S. civilians in Afghanistan to 1,000. But that is still far lower than the number of military. How are you ensuring that our civilian program is as robust as our military and that cooperation is solid, given the difference in levels of personnel?

Answer. The integration of civilian and military efforts has greatly improved over the last year, a process that will deepen as additional troops arrive and our civilian effort continues to expand. We have Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) counterparts to NATO-ISAF commanders in each of the Regional Commands. These SCRs are senior professionals, experienced in conflict environments. They direct the work of all U.S. Government civilians under Chief of Mission authority within their regions, subject to my overall guidance. This structure has two important features: First, it ensures that our civilian efforts are fully integrated, both across the different civilian agencies and with the military units; second, it is decentralized, enabling quick response to local needs, which is essential to deal with the varying conditions in Afghanistan.

In conjunction with the arrival of U.S. military units in key districts, we anticipate a further significant increase in our civilian staffing in 2010. In all, we expect staffing will grow by another 20–30 percent above the 1,000 by the end of 2011. Aligning with the strategy, the majority of these new personnel will deploy to the east and south. We are concentrating experts in the field and at the key ministries which deliver vital services to the Afghan people. Our increased civilian presence has enabled us to more effectively and rapidly invest our assistance in agriculture, job creation, education, health care, and infrastructure. To maximize our impact in priority areas, we have created District Support Teams, which allow civilians in the field to collaborate with the military to build Afghan capacity in key districts.

Although the number of civilians is considerably less than their military counterparts, each civilian works with numerous implementing partners, NGOs and Afghan counterparts, producing a multiplier effect estimated to be 10 to 1. Beyond pure numbers, we are ensuring that we have the right civilians, with the right skills and training, deployed to the right locations in order to achieve our objectives.

Question. In outlining the U.S. strategy the President correctly focused on both Pakistan and Afghanistan. This administration is correctly analyzing the risk as a regional one, and crafting a strategy accordingly. Our ability to help bring security and stability to Afghanistan is key to the security of a nuclear Pakistan. The Taliban network stretches across the porous Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan. So should a smart U.S. strategy. Are you and Ambassador Patterson in Islamabad consulting on a regular basis?

Answer. Yes. Ambassador Anne Patterson and I, as well as the staff of our Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad, consult regularly and work together under Special Representative Richard Holbrooke's direction, to facilitate collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan on security issues, political dialogue, and economic cooperation. I speak frequently to Ambassador Patterson and officers of our two Embassies travel on a regular basis to work on shared programs. Both Embassies maintain Border Coordination offices that were established to enhance cooperation on key issues, including the movement of critical U.S. and NATO-ISAF supplies through Pakistan to support military operations in Afghanistan. We have placed particular focus on a transit-trade agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which will facilitate the movement of goods across the border, and on improving customs procedures and facilities on both sides of the border, thereby enabling the expansion of lawful commercial activity led by the private business sectors of both countries.

Question. I understand that there is a pilot project, the Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP), which supports local tribally recruited militias. I am concerned that by building local militias, we are repeating past mistakes and may leave behind military groups without sufficient civilian oversight. This could continue the human rights abuses of the past and destabilize the government after we leave. What are we doing to address that?

Answer. The Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP or AP3) is an Afghan-led pilot project in Wardak province that is training a public security force. It is important to note that this is not a tribal militia but a community-based force that is part of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) under the Afghan National Police. The APPP is a uniformed service with members who serve a fixed term of enlistment and receive salary and benefits. The personnel in the APPP are drawn from the community and are generally representative of its different ethnic and tribal groups. Since it is a security force that is part of the Afghanistan National Police, it is not under control of warlords but under the command of the district police chiefs. Members sign an enlistment contract and swear an oath to the Government of Afghanistan. In addition to this oath, they are held accountable by local community councils of elders that help select individuals for this program.

Overall, the APPP was developed out of experience with several other local forces, and is grounded in the belief that community support is essential to effective and comprehensive security. Recruits are vetted by local councils, closely tied to other improved local governance efforts, and are fully integrated into the MOI structure. Special Operations Forces, Police Mentor Teams, and the Battle Force Commander all provide oversight to the APPP during both training and deployment. As noted earlier, the APPP is a pilot program and we are still reviewing its performance.

