

**SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2010**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SPECIAL HEARING

MARCH 25, 2010—WASHINGTON, DC

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CONTENTS

	Page
Opening Statement of Chairman Daniel K. Inouye	1
Statement of Senator Thad Cochran	2
Statement of Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Department of State	3
Prepared Statement of	5
Statement of Hon. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense	7
Prepared Statement of	10
Contingency Contracting (ANSF Police Contract)	11
Afghanistan National Security Forces Fund	12
State Personnel	12
Afghanistan/Pakistan Funding Execution	13
Leahy Amendment	14
National Guard Deploy	15
Air Force C-130	15
Airlift	15
Detainees at Guantanamo	16
Facility at Thompson	16
Base Realignment and Closure Commission	17
Goals in Afghanistan	17
Sufficient Funding at Department of State for Transition	18
Military Spouse Career Advancement Accounts Program	18
Mi-17	19
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Capability	20
UAV Exports/Sales	21
Counternarcotics in Afghanistan	22
Haiti Disaster Assistance	22
Haiti Humanitarian Assistance	23
Mideast Policy	24
NATO/Afghanistan Army	24
Future Supplementals	25
Status of Surge	27
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)	28
Trust Issues in Afghanistan	29
Afghanistan	30
Status of Women in Afghanistan	31
Women's Rights/Reconciliation	31
Corruption	32
Mideast Peace	32
Pakistan and India	33
KCX Tanker/EADS	34
WTO	35
Training Afghan Forces	36
Afghan Army	36
Afghan Fighting Force	37
Afghan Army/Civilian Surge	37
Somalia	38
Additional Committee Questions	39
Questions Submitted to Secretary Hillary Clinton	39
Question Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye	39
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd	40
Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl	41
Question Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein	42
Counternarcotics Operations	42

IV

	Page
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu	42
Family Reunification	42
Universal Definition of Orphan	43
Long-term Solutions	43
Local Contracting	44
Hazard Mitigation	44
Sheltering	45
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins	46
Question Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski	47
Questions Submitted to Hon. Robert M. Gates	47
Questions Submitted by Chairman Daniel K. Inouye	47
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd	48
Question Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl	50
State and Agriculture Role in Global Food Security	50
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray	50
Haiti Support	51
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein	52
Counternarcotics Operations	52
Poppy Crop Eradication	52
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	53
Cluster Munitions	54
Private DOD Contractors	55
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Johnson	55
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu	67
Afghanistan Withdraw	67
Haiti Support	68
Question Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg	68
Questions Submitted by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison	69
Detainee Facility	69
Guam Relocation	70
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins	71

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2010

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 2:20 p.m., in room S-127, the Capitol, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye, Leahy, Mikulski, Murray, Dorgan, Feinstein, Landrieu, Nelson, Pryor, Tester, Specter, Cochran, Bond, Shelby, Bennett, Hutchison, Brownback, Alexander, Collins, Voinovich, and Murkowski.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUYE

Chairman INOUYE. Good afternoon.

This afternoon the committee meets to hear testimony on the fiscal year 2010 supplemental request.

The request by the administration totals \$47.5 billion in discretionary spending, of which approximately \$37.5 billion is to support overseas contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Late yesterday afternoon the administration forwarded a request of \$2.8 billion to support our humanitarian operations in Haiti. The committee has not had an opportunity to review this matter, but we'll do so over the coming weeks. To review the defense and international affairs portion of this supplemental request, the committee is pleased to receive testimony from the Secretaries of State and Defense, Ms. Hillary Clinton and Mr. Robert Gates.

It's good to see both of you. We look forward to your responses to the many questions I'm certain we'll have.

Over 9 years ago, in response to the 9/11 attacks, our Nation embarked on a mission to rid Afghanistan of the Taliban and al Qaeda and to work to ensure security and stabilization in the region. But, once we entered Iraq, many believe our efforts in Afghanistan were shortchanged, and only now are we refocusing on our primary missions, the defeat of al Qaeda and regional stability. With a renewed effort and focus, President Obama has approved a military and civilian strategy in Afghanistan that will, hopefully, enable us to restore regional stability and to begin withdrawing our forces from Afghanistan in the summer of 2011.

The supplemental request before us provides the necessary resources for a military and civilian surge that is critical if we are to achieve that goal. We look forward to hearing, today, about the

preliminary results of this surge and the challenges you face in meeting the President's timetable.

As I noted, we have been at this war for almost a decade, and now we have our eye on the target. At the same time, we're also seeing the spread of al Qaeda with cells in Yemen, al Qaeda members showing up in Somalia, and related activity elsewhere in Africa.

While we focus our efforts on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, we also need to allocate sufficient resources to curtail the growth of these terrorist cells. We cannot allow new safe havens to be created elsewhere as we tighten the stranglehold on al Qaeda's senior leadership in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. We hope to get assurances from both Secretaries today that they understand these dangers and are responding to these hotspots with enhanced efforts and focus. Hopefully, these issues will be among those addressed either in your statements or in the questions that follow.

I would note to my colleagues that I recognize that there are many issues which you may want to address and remind you that today's hearing is on our wartime funding requirements and not on other matters. I would urge you to focus your questions on that topic.

In addition, as you can see, we have many Senators, but they're all over the place. They are in press conferences, and they are en route here. But, we'd like to limit our questions to 4 minutes per Senator, and I would like to urge you to keep your answers as brief as possible.

Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, the committee thanks you both for appearing today. Without objection, your full statements will be made part of the record.

At this point, I'd like to yield to the vice chairman, Senator Cochran, for any opening remarks he may wish to make.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm pleased to join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses to this hearing.

Of course, the focus of the hearing is on the immediate need to address the President's request for full funding for the mission that is now President Obama and his administration's suggestion as to how we can better achieve likely peace in the region and, in due course, begin withdrawing some of the 30,000 troops that have now been identified as needed for the effort in Afghanistan. We know that's going to cost money. And we are anxious to get the facts about what those funds are to be used for, and to justify the appropriations request that this committee will transmit to the full Senate.

I hope you will let us know of any urgent unmet requirements that aren't reflected or haven't been discussed publicly that we need to know about. I'm sure the committee is going to want to move expeditiously, without delay, in acting on this request and urging the Senate to follow the leadership of this committee.

With respect to Iran, we would also appreciate your thoughts on the challenges that we face through Iranian activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and what that might mean for the need for additional funds, as well.

We thank you for your distinguished service in the jobs you have; they're very important. We want to be helpful, and I think this hearing will help us start that process in the right direction.

Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. I thank you very much.

And may I now call upon Secretary Clinton.

STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman Cochran and members of the committee. It's very good seeing you all, and especially in this historic room to have this hearing.

I thank you for the opportunity to testify alongside Secretary Gates, because we are very much committed, together, on behalf of our civilian and military efforts in the front-line states. We don't think that they can be separated, because the challenges we face demand that we draw on all of the tools of American leadership and American power. And the strategies we now have in place in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq do exactly that.

This whole-of-government approach has shown results, and it has also enabled us to more clearly understand the challenges we face. That's why we're coming to you today with a \$4.5 billion supplemental request. Without this new funding in 2010, we will fall short in all three of the front-line states.

I am well aware of the economic strain we all face here at home. And I believe, along with each of you, that every dollar must deliver clear results. Our request addresses urgent demands that will advance our efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and ensure a smooth transition to a civilian-led effort in Iraq.

First, with respect to Afghanistan, we are implementing the strategy President Obama announced in December. Success requires a fully integrated civilian and military effort, one in which security gains are followed immediately by economic and political gains. As new troops arrive, our civilian surge has already tripled the number of civilians on the ground, and it is these civilian-led efforts that will translate the bravery of our troops into stability for Afghanistan and security for Americans. The challenges are still great. The enemy is still determined. But, we are recapturing the momentum in Afghanistan. New funds in 2010 will give us the capacity to move forward at a time when every day is crucial.

Let me briefly describe what we are currently doing in Marjah and the surrounding areas, for Marjah is a proving ground for our strategy and the story, thus far, is an encouraging one.

Our civilians were on the ground within hours and days of the military operation. They quickly stood up a district support team that has helped, already, to open two schools and a prosecutor's office. They've registered more than 7,000 farmers to begin receiving supplies for licit crops. They've employed more than 1,000 residents a day through cash-for-work projects. A nearby United States Agency for International Development-built (USAID) airstrip has allowed the Ministry of Agriculture officials to reach Marjah's farmers, and a USAID contract is paying a woman-owned Afghan firm to rebuild the highway.

The military offensive, rightly, may get the headlines. But, what happens behind the scenes is equally important. As our military leaders put it, "After clearing, we must hold, build, and transition." And Marjah's residents have made it clear they will judge the Afghan government and us on our ability to help build enduring security and credible governance. Our \$2 billion request for Afghanistan supports efforts like those in Marjah, which we are ramping up quickly and which need additional assistance and operational funding in 2010.

New assistance will help Afghans provide for their families and revitalize the agricultural sector, which is crucial to reducing poppy cultivation and drawing insurgents back into society. We also have funding for governance and rule-of-law programs, as well as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which helps build capable institutions. These will work in conjunction with U.S. support for the Afghan National Security Forces, which I also would urge you to fully fund. And through all of this, we have maintained our focus on expanding women's opportunities, one of our best tools for combating extremism and spurring progress.

In Pakistan, our efforts are vital to success in Afghanistan, but also to our own American security. We've made it a strategic priority to strengthen our partnership with the Pakistani people. And I'm under no illusion that success in this arena will come quickly or easily, but think about where we were 1 year ago. The extremists were 100 miles from Islamabad. They met little resistance in launching attacks on American troops from border areas. Since then, the Pakistani Government has launched important offensives in Swat, South Waziristan, and throughout the country. We're moving in the right direction, and the progress that we've made is possible because we have demonstrated a clear commitment to work with the people and the Government of Pakistan.

Yesterday at the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, we worked very hard—in fact, late into the night—to advance the resolve that we have begun building with the Pakistani leadership. The \$370 million we're requesting for assistance and operations in this supplemental will allow us to expand civilian cooperation at a critical moment. The military offensives have created new humanitarian needs that, if not addressed immediately, could make these areas ripe for extremism. And in much of the country, water, energy, and economic problems create new challenges. So, our success depends on rapidly and sustainably scaling up our efforts, especially in high-impact projects that visibly demonstrate our long-term commitment on helping the Pakistanis build capacity while ensuring accountability.

In Iraq, we have different challenges. But, in the wake of this election, we're at a moment of great opportunity to consolidate stability and forge an enduring partnership sustained by a strong diplomatic presence. Our \$2.1 billion supplemental request should be seen in light of the more than \$15 billion decrease in defense funding.

As we prepare to move from a defense-led to state-led mission in Iraq at the end of August, new funding will allow us to make sure our civilians can work safely in still dangerous places. It will allow us to move from an intensive, defense-led police training program

to a smaller state-administered program for police leadership. And our support of Iraqi civilian law enforcement, like support for the Iraqi Security Forces, is critical to the success of their new democracy.

Now, in putting this supplemental together, I've had to make some tough calls and had to have some tough conversations about priorities, and the decisions reflect that. The result is a request that addresses only urgent needs directly related to our security interests. And I want to emphasize, all of these programs have been designed with careful attention to accountability and a determination to learn from past mistakes. Waste and corruption are fundamental threats to our success, and we're serious about combating them. So, we have more funds for strengthened oversight by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and takes into account the problems highlighted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. We'll also be working with the Congress on updated benchmarks.

Just a brief word on Haiti, Mr. Chairman. Despite the work the United States has done to respond to the disaster, there is still too much suffering. And our rebuilding, along with the international community, is an important commitment to the people of Haiti and to our hemisphere. Of our \$1.6 billion Haiti supplemental request, about \$500 million will reimburse relief efforts by State and USAID; the rest will go to strategic investments coordinated with our international partners.

I thank the Congress for the ongoing bipartisan support of these efforts.

PREPARED STATEMENT

And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this committee's continuing work on behalf of the missions and the priorities of our country.

Chairman INOUE. I thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Cochran, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here. As always, it is a pleasure to testify alongside Secretary Gates, a good friend as well as a true champion of diplomacy and development.

We are here together because our civilian and military efforts in front-line states cannot be separated. The challenges we face demand that we draw on all the tools of American leadership and American power. And the strategies we now have in place in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq do exactly that.

This whole-of-government approach has shown results. It has also enabled us to assess more clearly the challenges we face. That is why we are coming to you with a \$4.5 billion supplemental request for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Without this new funding in 2010, we will fall short in all three of these front-line states.

I am well aware that, at a time of economic strain at home, every dollar must deliver clear results. Our request addresses urgent demands that will immediately advance our efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan and Pakistan and ensure a smooth transition to a civilian-led effort in Iraq.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, we are working to implement the new strategy President Obama announced in December. Success requires a fully integrated civilian-military effort, one in which security gains are followed immediately by economic and political gains. As new troops arrive, our civilian surge has already tripled the number of civilians on the ground and will continue in the months ahead. It is up to these ci-

vilian-led efforts to translate the bravery of our troops into stability for Afghanistan and security for Americans.

The challenges are still great, the enemy is still determined, but we are recapturing the momentum in Afghanistan. New funds in 2010 will give us the capacity to move forward at a time when every day is crucial.

Let me briefly describe what we are currently doing in Marjah and the surrounding areas—for Marjah is a proving ground for our strategy, and the story there is an encouraging one so far. Our civilians were on the ground within days of the military operation, and they quickly stood up a District Support Team that has helped open two schools and a prosecutor's office; registered more than 7,000 farmers to receive supplies; and employed more than a thousand residents a day through cash-for-work projects. A nearby USAID-built airstrip has allowed Ministry of Agriculture officials to reach Marjah's farmers, and a USAID contract is paying a women-owned Afghan firm to rebuild the highway.

The military offensive may get the headlines, but what happens behind the scenes is equally important. As our military leaders put it, after clearing, we must hold, build, and transition. And Marjah's residents have made clear that they will judge the Afghan government and us on our ability to build enduring security and credible governance.

Our \$2 billion request for Afghanistan will support efforts like those in Marjah, which we are ramping up quickly and which need additional assistance and operations funding in 2010 to continue. New assistance will help Afghans provide for their families and revitalize the agricultural sector, which is crucial to reducing poppy cultivation and drawing insurgents back into society. New funding for governance and rule-of-law programs, as well as for the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, will help build capable institutions free from corruption. These will work in conjunction with U.S. support for the Afghan National Security Forces—which I would also urge you to fully fund. And through all of this, we have maintained our focus on expanding women's opportunity, one of our best tools for combating extremism and spurring progress.

Pakistan

In Pakistan, our efforts are vital to success in Afghanistan, and also to American security in their own right. We have made it a strategic priority to strengthen our partnership with the Pakistani people and to bolster the Pakistani state's ability to counter extremism and provide for its citizens.

I am under no illusion that success will come quickly or easily. But think where we were 1 year ago. The extremists were 100 miles from Islamabad and met little resistance in launching attacks on American troops from border areas. Since then, the Pakistani government has launched important offensives in Swat, in South Waziristan, and throughout the country.

We are moving in the right direction, and this progress has been possible because of our commitment to Pakistan's people and government. I have had many opportunities to personally stress this commitment, and yesterday, at the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, I once again saw the Pakistani leadership's resolve to advance shared interests.

The \$370 million for assistance and operations in this supplemental will allow us to expand civilian cooperation at a critical moment, as a down payment on our long-term partnership. The military offensives have created new humanitarian needs that, if not addressed immediately, could make these areas ripe for extremism. And in much of the country, water, energy, and economic problems have created new challenges.

Our success depends on rapidly and sustainably scaling up our efforts, especially high-impact projects that visibly demonstrate our long-term commitment, and on bolstering the capacity of the Pakistanis while ensuring accountability. That simply cannot happen without more funds in the pipeline.

Iraq

In Iraq, we also face continued challenges. But in the wake of the election, we are at a moment of great opportunity—to consolidate stability and forge an enduring partnership sustained by a strong diplomatic presence.

Our \$2.1 billion supplemental request is a reasonable price to pay to help finish the job. And it comes amid a more than \$15 billion decrease in Defense funding.

As we prepare to move from a Defense-led to a State-led mission in Iraq at the end of August, new funding will allow us to make sure our civilians can work safely in a still-dangerous place. And it will allow us to move from an intensive Defense-led police-training program to a smaller State-administered program for police lead-

ership. Our support of Iraqi civilian law enforcement—like support for the Iraqi Security Forces—is critical to the success of Iraqi democracy.

We see on the horizon a self-sustaining Iraq that can meet the needs of its people and play a positive regional role. But we are not there yet. Even as we turn our attention to other conflicts, we must remain patient and committed. This supplemental is a timely investment in a strong partnership with a sovereign, democratic, and increasingly capable Iraq.

A Strategy of Results

In putting this supplemental together, I've had some tough conversations about priorities. And we've made some tough decisions. The result is a request that addresses only urgent needs directly related to our security interests.

I also want to emphasize that all of these programs have been designed with careful attention to accountability and a determination to learn from past mistakes. Waste and corruption are fundamental threats to our success, and we are serious about combating them. Our request includes funding for strengthened oversight by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and takes into account problems highlighted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. We will also be working with you on updated benchmarks and reporting back to you on how we're meeting them.

Haiti

Let me also mention the Haiti supplemental released yesterday. Despite the work the United States has done to respond to the disaster and start the recovery process, there is still too much suffering in Haiti, and rebuilding will require billions of dollars in international support. Of our \$1.6 billion Haiti supplemental request, about \$500 million will reimburse relief efforts by State and USAID, while the rest will go to strategic investments that, coordinated with our partners, will help drive recovery by building local capacity and catalyzing development.

The ongoing bipartisan support of these efforts has made clear to me that this Committee, Congress, and the American people understand the importance of our challenges and the urgency of our task, in Haiti and in frontline states. Thanks to the bravery and sacrifice of our diplomats, our development experts, and our men and women in uniform, we have reached a moment of opportunity. I thank you for your commitment, and look forward to working with you closely as we move forward.

Chairman INOUE. And now may I call upon Secretary Gates.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Cochran, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity this afternoon to discuss the Defense Department's portion of the fiscal year 2010 supplemental request.

I'm honored to appear with the Secretary of State. Our joint testimony today reflects the close cooperation of our two Departments and the importance of a properly funded and integrated civil-military approach to the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. And at the outset, I would like to offer my strong support for the important programs funded in the State portion of the supplemental request, without which our military efforts would not be—will not be successful.

These times of economic and fiscal stress place enormous pressure on all of us to be good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars, including the two Departments represented here today. That is why President Obama and I, in last year's and this year's budget, made tough decisions about major programs that were either performing poorly or an excess to real-world needs. However, even at a time of budget pressures, I believe it is critical to sustain an adequate sustainable level of investment in the instruments of national security, be it defense, diplomacy, or development, that are so essential to America's security and position in the world.

I recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan. There I had the chance to talk to our military commanders, Afghanistan's leaders, and our troops serving at the tip of the spear in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces. Overall, I believe there are grounds for guarded optimism as our campaign to roll back the Taliban gains momentum and as the Afghan government shows an increasing willingness to take on additional responsibilities. Nonetheless, there will be many long and tough days ahead, and it may take several months to produce visible results, as most of the additional forces ordered by the President have not yet arrived in theater and begun operations.

I would also caution against an overly ambitious view of what true stability and security will look like in a place that has known nothing but war for three decades. For most Afghans, a roof over their heads, an opportunity for their children, both boys and girls, to attend school, and the ability to provide for the basic needs of their families, free from violence, would be considered a pretty good life. The scale of the international coalition's efforts and ambitions should reflect that basic reality.

The fiscal year 2010 supplemental request totals \$33 billion for the Defense Department, almost all of which is to support operations in Afghanistan and the additional 30,000 troops being deployed as a part of the President's strategy announced in December. We remain on schedule to see overall U.S. troop levels reach 98,000 by the end of the fiscal year. The request includes \$1.1 billion, on top of the \$11.3 billion already enacted, to field and sustain life-saving mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles and the MRAP all-terrain vehicles for troops already in theater and for the additional forces being deployed.

Finally, this supplemental contains \$2.6 billion to strengthen the Afghan National Security Forces. The goal of the President's strategy, and our supporting military efforts, is to create conditions that will allow for a full transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan government. Earlier this month, I visited the Combined Fielding Center at Camp Blackhorse near Kabul and had a chance to speak with Afghan troops undergoing training. I told them that Afghanistan is their country and ultimately this is their fight to win.

I know many of you have concerns about the Afghan Security Forces. I share those concerns, as do our military commanders. The Afghan Army has made real progress over the last year, and many Afghan soldiers are shedding their blood for their country. Increased Afghan involvement in operations is critical to success and is being demonstrated in Marjah. Significant work remains to be done with the police force, but there, too, changes are underway that will, I believe, yield progress. As you consider this request, I would emphasize that successfully accomplishing the training mission represents both our exit strategy and the key for long-term stability in Afghanistan.

The supplemental request also includes \$1 billion to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces. These additional resources will be used this year to strengthen Iraqi capabilities in areas General Odierno believes are important to ensure that the Iraqis are fully prepared to assume internal security responsibilities. The money will be spent

by U.S. forces in Iraq, not provided directly to the Government of Iraq.

In Haiti, as the President requested, the Department is providing continuing support in the wake of January's earthquake. Due to the urgent need for an immediate response, the Department used funds from existing accounts, with the understanding that these accounts would be replenished in a supplemental. As such, the \$655 million is part of an amendment for Haiti that was recently submitted to Congress, and will include funding to cover these costs.

All of these operations are fuel intensive. Due to rising prices, our fuel costs this year in operations has been greater than anticipated. And so, included in this request is \$2 billion to partially offset the resulting shortfall in the Department's base and overseas contingency operations—operating accounts, and to ensure uninterrupted operations.

I should note that this Department has moved most funding for programs not directly related to the war into the base budget. The budget request being discussed today is a true supplemental, as they were originally intended, for the purposes of funding immediate and unforeseen requirements. In this case, primarily the troop surge associated with the President's new strategy for Afghanistan. And I urge approval of this request by early spring to prevent costly and counterproductive disruptions to the Department's operations.

Before closing, I'd like to say just a few words about the Commander's Emergency Response Program, CERP, which continues to be a powerful tool for military commanders in carrying out counter-insurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. General Petraeus has called it "the most important—his most important authority." And I would urge the Congress to fully fund the CERP programs contained in the budget's—the Department's budget request.

Having said that, I understand there is concern—some concern on this committee about the way CERP has been used in recent years. The Department is currently performing an internal assessment of existing processes which include consideration of a single departmental coordinator; additional dedicated CERP managers and contracting personnel in theater; an increased pre-mobilization and in-country training. Nonetheless, even with improved execution and oversight, it is unrealistic to expect a tool like CERP, whose very effectiveness and existence is tied to its flexibility and the discretion to—granted to local commanders in a war zone to attain a zero-defect standard.

PREPARED STATEMENT

In conclusion, I'd like to thank the committee for your support of the men and women of the military, extraordinary Americans who have fought our Nation's wars, responded to natural disasters, and protected our interests around the world. I know their health, safety, and welfare will be your top priority in making these difficult decisions in the weeks ahead.

Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity this afternoon to discuss the Defense Department's portion of the fiscal year 2010 supplemental request.

I am honored to appear with the Secretary of State. Our joint testimony today reflects the close cooperation of our two departments, and the importance of a properly funded and integrated civil-military approach to the challenges we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. At the outset, I would like to offer my strong support for the important programs funded in the State portion of the supplemental request, without which our military efforts will not be successful.

While this hearing is focused on the specifics of the fiscal year 2010 request, this occasion also represents an opportunity to discuss broader national budget priorities. These times of economic and fiscal stress place enormous pressure on all of us to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars—including the agencies represented here today. That is why President Obama and I—in last year's and this year's budget—made tough decisions about major programs that were either performing poorly or in excess to real world needs. However, even at a time of budget pressures, I believe it is critical to sustain an adequate, sustainable level of investment in the instruments of national power—be it defense, diplomacy, or development—that are so essential to America's security and position in the world.

As you know, I recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan. There, I had a chance to talk to our military commanders, Afghanistan's leaders, and our troops serving at the tip of the spear in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. Overall, I believe there are grounds for guarded optimism as our campaign to roll back the Taliban gains momentum, and as the Afghan government shows an increasing willingness to take on additional responsibilities. Nonetheless, there will be many tough and long days ahead. And it may take several months to produce visible results, as most of the additional forces ordered by the President have not yet arrived in theater and begun operations.

I would also caution against an overly ambitious view of what true stability and security will look like in a place that has known nothing but war for three decades. For most Afghans, a roof over their heads, an opportunity for their children to attend school, and the ability to provide for the basic needs of their families free from violence would be considered a very good life. The scale of the international coalition's efforts and ambitions should reflect that basic reality.

The fiscal year 2010 supplemental request totals \$33 billion, almost all of which is to support operations in Afghanistan and the additional 30,000 troops being deployed as part of the President's strategy announced in December. We remain on schedule to see overall U.S. troop levels reach 98,000 by the end of the fiscal year.

The request includes \$1.1 billion—on top of the \$11.3 billion already enacted—to field and sustain lifesaving MRAPs and M-ATVs for troops already in theater and for the additional forces being deployed.

Finally, this supplemental contains \$2.6 billion to strengthen the Afghan National Security Forces. The goal of the President's strategy and our supporting military efforts is to create conditions that will allow for a full transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan government. Earlier this month, I visited the Combined Fielding Center at Camp Blackhorse and had a chance to speak with Afghan troops undergoing training. I told them that Afghanistan is their country, and ultimately their fight to win. I know that many of you have concerns about the Afghan security forces. I share those concerns—as do our military commanders. The Afghan army has taken real strides over the last year and many troops have shed blood for their country. Increased Afghan involvement in operations is critical to success, as is being demonstrated in Marjah. Significant work remains to be done with the police force, but there, too, changes are underway that will, I believe, yield progress in the near term. As you consider this request, I would emphasize that successfully accomplishing the training mission represents both our exit strategy and the key to long-term stability in Afghanistan.

The supplemental request also includes \$1 billion to strengthen Iraqi security forces. These additional resources—which will be used to strengthen Iraqi institutions such as the Ministry of Defense—are needed this year to ensure that the Iraqis are fully prepared to assume internal security responsibilities. This is a critical period in Iraq as government forms and as we consolidate security gains.

In Haiti, as the President requested, the Department is providing continuing support in the wake of January's earthquake. Due to the urgent need for an immediate response, the Department used funds from existing accounts, with the under-

standing that these accounts would be replenished in a supplemental. As such, the \$655 million is part of an amendment for Haiti that was recently submitted to Congress and includes funding to cover these costs.

All of these operations are fuel intensive. Due to rising prices, our fuel cost this year has been greater than anticipated. Included in this request is \$2 billion to partially offset the resulting shortfall in the Department's base and OCO operating accounts and ensure uninterrupted operations.

I should note that this Department has moved most funding for programs not directly related to the war into the base budget. The budget request being discussed today is a true supplemental as they were originally intended, for the purposes of funding immediate and unforeseen requirements—in this case, primarily the troop surge associated with the President's new strategy for Afghanistan. I urge approval of this request by the spring to prevent costly and counterproductive disruptions to the Department's operations.

Before closing, I'd like to say a few words about the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which continues to be a powerful tool for military commanders in carrying out counterinsurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. General Petraeus has called it his "most important authority," and I would urge the Congress to fully fund the CERP programs contained in the Department's budget requests.

Having said that, I understand there is some concern on this committee about the way CERP has been used in recent years. The Department is currently performing an internal assessment of existing processes, which includes consideration of a single departmental coordinator, additional dedicated CERP managers and contracting personnel in theater, and increased pre-mobilization and in-country training. Nonetheless, even with improved execution and oversight, it is unrealistic to expect a tool like CERP—whose very effectiveness is tied to its flexibility and the discretion granted to local commanders in a war zone—to attain a zero-defect standard.

In conclusion, thank you for your support of the men and women of the U.S. military—extraordinary Americans who have fought our nation's wars, responded to natural disasters, and protected our interests around the world. I know their health, safety, and welfare will be your top priority in making these difficult decisions in the weeks ahead. Thank you.

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING (ANSF POLICE CONTRACT)

Chairman INOUE. Madam Secretary and Mr. Secretary, I'll be submitting questions, but I would like to ask one. Recently, the vice chairman and I submitted a request to the Department of Defense inspector general, together with the Department of State inspector general, to look over the contract of the Afghan National Police Training Program. I think we all agree that one of the key components that must be in place would be a fully trained Afghan National Police Force before we can start withdrawing; however, as you may be aware, the inspector general came out with a rather negative report, criticizing the contract and suggesting that the contract be held up. That, to me, would seem like we will not be able to move out on time. What are your thoughts on this?

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, if we're talking about the same contract that—before there was—before it was implemented, the contract was protested. The protest was upheld by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and so, the contract has not been implemented. And the contract with DynCorp has been extended. So, they will continue their efforts. We've made some changes to improve the terms of the contract, particularly in terms of what we're asking them to do. But, that's the current situation with the would be contract.

Chairman INOUE. So, you believe that the criticism that we see in some of the publications has no bearing?

Secretary GATES. Well, I think—as I understand it, the protest was grounded in the vehicle that was being used to let the con-

tract, and the protest was that it was an improper vehicle for the kind of work that was being contracted for. That's my understanding of what the key issue, at least in the protest, was. In terms of some of the other criticisms, I'd have to look at them in specifics.

Chairman INOUE. So, you believe that the timetable is still in place on the withdrawal?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. The situation with this contract will—as I understand it, will not delay the training.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Cochran.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman.

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES FUND

Mr. Secretary, the budget request before the committee includes \$2.6 billion for the Afghanistan National Security Forces Fund. We are told it is for the purpose of accelerating growth of the Afghan Security Force. Now, 8 years of training, you would assume, would get the forces to where we think they ought to be, and would be sufficient in their skills, would be sufficient to help maintain, without so much active involvement of American or other forces, approval of eligible quality recruits to man the ranks of the army and police. Is that what the administration is advocating here today?

Secretary GATES. It is, Senator. And I would just say that, you know, at the—for the first several years, the size of the Afghan National Security Forces, and particularly the army—and I'm going back to a period when I wasn't in Government, so I may be wrong on some of the particulars—but, the initial planning for the ANSF was for forces that the Afghan government itself could afford. So, for the first few years after we went in, in 2001, 2002, it was limited to 5,000 or so. And the dramatic expansion of the Afghan Security Forces really began 3 or 4 years ago.

And so, we are just really getting—and to tell you the truth, both for the army and the police, there were significant shortages in the resources available for training both of them. We've done a lot better, in terms of training the army, where—there is still a deficiency in the number of trainers needed for both, but I would say that—you know, as opposed to looking at it as an 8-year project that's just now ramping up, I'd say it's more of a project that has begun to look at significant numbers for both of those forces just within the last year or two.

STATE PERSONNEL

Senator COCHRAN. Madam Secretary, does your Department not have the infrastructure and people in place to administer the programs that are needed now, as would be available for traditional aid programs? What makes this a different kind of program, to justify the increase in funding that you're requesting?

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, are you—well, your question really could cover both Iraq and Afghanistan, because, in the case of Iraq, we are taking over responsibilities from the Defense Department that we are not fully equipped to do without the additional funding.

Two aspects of that, which are important: One is that as our troops leave, in accordance with the agreement entered into between the United States and Iraq, they will be taking a lot of their

equipment and they will be turning over certain of their facilities that are hardened. And we have to harden our facilities for our civilians to be able to take over the continued police training. As we do this transition, there are certain adjustments that are going to have to be made, since we'll no longer be able to rely on our military forces to protect our civilians, to embed with them on existing military bases. So, that's where the additional costs for Iraq come in, so that we can be prepared to be ready to take on this responsibility as the military leaves.

In Afghanistan, as Secretary Gates said, there has been a decision to give the responsibility for police training to the military, which we fully support, because we're trying to get closer to something resembling a unity of command, so that General McChrystal and General Caldwell and our other military commanders are able to coordinate. Because when, for example, they go into an area like Marjah, they have to be able to begin to stand up the police force that will be there as our troops transition. So, there's a very close connection between the military and the police training and deployment work. And the Defense Department will be taking over that responsibility.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. I'd like to advise the committee that our witnesses cannot be here all afternoon, so please limit your questions to about 4 minutes apiece.

And now may I recognize Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And during the hours we have, most of us wouldn't last all afternoon either.

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN FUNDING EXECUTION

First off, I'm pleased to see Secretary Clinton—you and Secretary Gates. You both know the high—very high regard I have for both of you in doing a superb job for our Nation. I'm also glad to see—and this is something I've talked with both of you privately about—the effort of the Department of Defense to have the Department of State take over those things that really we—are best suited for the Department of State, which a number of things the Department of Defense, by default, has probably taken over in the past.

But, now we've got to figure out where the money goes. We appropriated, in fiscal year 2010, a total of \$4.9 billion for assistance for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. We received a spending plan for those funds only a couple of weeks ago, didn't have a whole lot of detail. None of the funds have been spent. And while the fiscal year 2009 funds have been obligated, a lot of it remains to be disbursed. Now, you're asking for another \$2.6 billion.

I worry we're dealing with countries where in—particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan—where enormous corruption—a huge amount of money already is in the pipeline. We're basically borrowing this money from other countries to be able to spend it here. Are we going too fast? I mean, what kind of controls? Do we have a special inspector general, for example, to go over these funds, I might ask, Madam Secretary? And I'm thinking especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, we share your concerns and appreciate the opportunity to work with you, as the chair of the Appropriations Committee that considers these—the subcommittee that considers these requests. We are ramping up our spending. We are currently expending funds at an estimated \$324 million per month. We are growing that to \$400 million, with new projects that are starting up, in addition to continued support to quick disbursing to programs such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, that does have adequate safeguards built in.

And what we are trying to do in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in particular, is to build in safeguards to have certification systems in place so that we can hold entities that we contribute funds to, to account. It is an ongoing challenge. I'm not going to sit here—

Senator LEAHY. Well—

Secretary CLINTON [continuing]. And tell you that it isn't.

Senator LEAHY. Yeah. I mean, under our law, money cannot go to army or police units that are violating human rights. I'm quite familiar with that law. But, could we say, especially today, that that law is not being violated in either Pakistan or Afghanistan?

And I'll close with that question, Mr. Chairman, and submit the rest of my questions.

But, I address that to both of you.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, let me say, first of all, on the nonhuman-rights front we are putting in new personnel; we're beefing up our presence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to have greater oversight, accountability, monitoring of the funds. It is something that we take very seriously.

It's been challenging to get those people in, under the conflict circumstances in Afghanistan, but we've made a lot of progress. We've quadrupled the number of people that we actually have on the ground in Afghanistan.

And in Pakistan, that's one of the areas that Secretary Gates has been working on with the Pakistanis so that we can have a better oversight mechanism on the funding part of it. But, I'll let him respond to the second part of your question.

LEAHY AMENDMENT

Secretary GATES. We are very mindful of the Leahy amendment. And I would just say, in this unclassified setting, Senator, that we are monitoring the situation in multiple countries very carefully. We have the attention of their leaders on this subject. And if and when there are abuses, we expect, and they have acknowledged the need, to take action.

Senator LEAHY. Well, I don't want—I think we're both referring to the same thing. I'm not going to go into it in an open session like this. But, I would appreciate being advised of just how that's done. I've already—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs dropped to see me yesterday to help on this. And I—it is a matter of some concern.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Bond.

Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I welcome the Secretaries together, because your joint appearance represents what we, I believe, all three on this committee believes, is the only way we're going to make progress. That is smart power, combining the military and the economic/diplomatic efforts.

NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOY

And I believe that the work that has been done by the National Guard teams, which began in Afghanistan in 2008, at a time when we tried for 2 years to get the USAID to go there and they could not go there—but, the National Guard units, with their ability to carry weapons and bring training, have made tremendous differences. And I understand that there are now about 10 different State Guard units in different provinces, which I think is one part of the solution. And, on that subject, I have heard, firsthand, so many times, that the importance of the Commander's Emergency Response Program funds, which have funded those efforts—and, not only those, but, again, I've heard firsthand how successful the CERP funds were in supporting the counterinsurgency strategy, for example, in 2007, in Al Anbar Province. So, I am a strong supporter of it.

But, one thing I would caution as the State Department begins to take over, I think there are many security challenges still in Iraq, and I hope that the withdrawal of forces will be conditioned on the ability of the remaining forces to provide the security that's needed, not just for USAID and other State agencies, but for our allies there. And I hope you will do that.

AIR FORCE C-130

But, turning to a particular question: last year, Mr. Secretary, you testified that Air Force had over 200 extra C-130s aircraft, and the Air Force cut that number to 65. But, I have just read, in Defense News, that there are only—that there are less than 50 C-130s in southwest Asia. And the reports are that they are—the commanders are requesting more C-130s to relieve the burden on the CH-47 Chinook helicopters. What is the situation with regard to the heavy lift in southwest Asia?

Secretary GATES. What's the publication?

Senator BOND. This is Defense News.

Secretary GATES. Well, Defense News is apparently better informed than I am.

Because I have not heard such a requirement from General McChrystal, or General Odierno for that matter. I certainly will ask the question, following the hearing.

AIRLIFT

Senator BOND. Well, I—they cited a Lieutenant General Stevenson, so I—I will follow up with you later. But, I do believe there is need for lift. And I am concerned that we not overlook the need, not only for strategic lift, but for tactical aircraft. And when the Air Force studies itself, I am—have questions about the reliability of those studies. And we will continue that discussion in other fora than today.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator HUTCHISON.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And it is good to see both of you. And I know how many hours you're putting in and how hard you're working.

DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO

Mr. Secretary, I want to just talk to you about the issue of Guantanamo detainees. As the ranking member of the Military Construction Subcommittee of this committee, there is now a \$350 million request for transfer to prison; and \$150 million of that is for military construction, \$200 million for startup costs, and that is in addition to the cost of purchasing the prison. In addition to that, we are told, at the committee here, that we may need up to 1,000 personnel to man the prison, and that they will live on the local economy.

So, I am very concerned about the costs. I'm concerned about the security. And I just wondered if there is any effort to look at these costs, considering that we've spent hundreds of millions on Guantanamo Bay, and even just, in the recent years, built a new state-of-the-art courthouse for trying the detainees that are eligible for trial. Is there any thought about reconsidering this, in light of costs of—or what is the thinking behind this effort?

Secretary GATES. Well, the administration is still committed to closing Guantanamo. Thomson is—it appears to be the most likely civilian site. The costs that you cite are substantial, but they are onetime costs. And our latest estimates are that, once that transfer is made, that the actual operational costs would be several million dollars a year less than they are at Guantanamo. So, for the long term, the operating costs would produce savings over keeping Guantanamo open, despite the original construction costs.

FACILITY AT THOMPSON

Senator HUTCHISON. And do you—are you still believing that the 1,000 people who would be the guards and personnel at the prison can be accommodated in the local economy? It's a pretty remote area, I'm told. Haven't been to this place in Illinois. But, do you think that is going to add a significant cost, or will there have to be future military construction requests for the housing of the guards, as well?

Secretary GATES. I would have to get back to you on the record, how much of the original costs that you've cited are involved in living quarters for the troops that would be associated with the prison for guarding. I think some of those costs are incorporated into that, but let me get back to you, for the record, on that.

Senator HUTCHISON. All right. I would like that. I will also have another area of questioning for the record.

[The information follows:]

The \$350 million request does not include any costs to construct living quarters for the troops associated with this mission because our initial preliminary environmental assessment shows that the local economy can support the estimated number of personnel who will work at Thomson and Rock Island Arsenal. Specifically, the

analysis reveals that within a 1 hour drive of Thomson Correctional Center, there are approximately 14,000 vacant houses or apartments for rent, and approximately 5,000 vacant houses or apartments for sale.

Until such time that a Combatant Commander is assigned and they can perform the necessary mission analysis and threat assessments necessary to support a DOD-constructed housing solution, the Department does not recommend constructing housing.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE COMMISSION

Senator HUTCHISON. Let me ask you one other one, though. In—during the last Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC), Congress passed the Overseas Basing Commission, looking at our overseas basing, the training constraints, the contribution made by the host countries, and determined that we could do better training and have more control when there are training facilities in the United States, as compared to those overseas.

Well, I see that my time has expired. I'm going to ask you about that in writing, because I'm very concerned that the previous administration's decision to move 70,000 troops back from Germany and Korea, as well as the congressional act that created this atmosphere, is being changed. And I want to know more of the thinking about it. So, I will ask you that for the record, as well.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

Since the Department reported on major Global Defense Posture initiatives in 2004, including those reviewed by the Overseas Basing Commissions, we have taken great strides to transform our posture and returned many of our permanently stationed overseas forces to the United States. During the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department placed special emphasis on evaluating Global Defense Posture and the principles by which it is maintained and enhanced.

Global defense posture is a key indicator of U.S. foreign and security policy priorities. U.S. military personnel are forward-stationed or rotationally deployed around the world to help sustain U.S. capacity for global reach and power projection. The Department must ensure that our overseas posture adapts and evolves in ways that respond to, and anticipate, changes in the international security environment.

The presence of U.S. military forces overseas can be a powerful catalyst for promoting multilateral approaches and regional security architectures that serve both United States and partner states' interests. As such, training, quality-of-life, and readiness are key factors whenever we consider changes to defense posture overseas. The Department takes these and other strategic factors into consideration whether considering basing forces in the United States or abroad.

The Department will be guided by several principles in making defense posture decisions: forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and required; our defense posture will balance the need for a permanent overseas presence with the need for a flexible ability to respond to contingencies; we will balance the need for assured access with the risks of introducing fragility into its lines of communication; the posture should provide a stabilizing influence abroad; and the posture will continuously adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Murray.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, to both of you, and thank you for the tremendous jobs both of you are doing.

GOALS IN AFGHANISTAN

Secretary Gates, let me start with you. I think we all recognize that the environment in Afghanistan is extremely complex and our goals there are very challenging. I wanted to ask you, given the current military and political and social situation that we have

there, what are your short-term goals before the surge force departs?

Secretary GATES. Well, in—clearly, the thrust of General McChrystal's campaign is to reverse the momentum of the Taliban, to deny them control, particularly in the south of populated areas and areas of production, and degrade their capabilities. That has begun in Marjah, and the next major campaign will be in the Kandahar area. But, an important part of this—and it gets to the integrated civil-military campaign—was the preparation, weeks in advance of the military operation, to have civilians, both from the Afghan government and from our Government and our coalition partners, ready to go into Marjah and begin to provide development and governance. So, that will be the same approach that we take in the environs of Kandahar.

SUFFICIENT FUNDING AT DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR TRANSITION

Senator MURRAY. Secretary Clinton, then let me ask you. So, we make that transition, assuming we're successful. Do you have the funds that you need within your Department to adequately staff for the transition that will need to take place?

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Senator.

That is one of the reasons for this supplemental. As we evaluate the progress that was made with the Marjah operation and the necessity for our civilian presence to move very quickly, we want to be prepared, so we are ramping up our planning and implementation. As Secretary Gates just said, it is likely that an operation around Kandahar will be the next mission that our military undertakes, which requires us to have a greater capacity to partner with the Afghans, both on the local level and on the national level. So, I am, you know, very convinced that what we're asking for is necessary and will give us exactly what your question implies we need.

Senator MURRAY. Okay. I appreciate that.

And, Secretary Gates, I will be submitting to you a question about the transition for men and women, as they come home, into the Veterans Administration (VA), and making sure we have accurate data as an increasing number of casualties with both physical and mental wounds of war are coming home. We need to make sure we are keeping those connections. I want to ask you that, off the record, once we're through here.

MILITARY SPOUSE CAREER ADVANCEMENT ACCOUNTS PROGRAM

But, I do want to, while I have a short time left, ask you about the issue of the Military Spouse Career Advancement Accounts, the MyCAA Program. It was a great program put out there for spouses. About 136,000 military spouses have enrolled in that program—very popular—in order to get training, classes, and certificate training. A number of them were frozen out of the program over management issues. I wrote to you about this several weeks ago. I know you are aware of this, but I am deeply concerned about the number of spouses out there who've now been left out, and the importance of getting this back on track. I want your commitment to work with me to ensure we get that moving correctly forward.

Secretary GATES. I'm very familiar with it, since I launched it, with the Secretary of Labor, a couple of years ago. This is one of

the—this is one of those cases, where we had a program that ramped up slowly and then exploded in popularity. Part of the problem that we have is that we have \$61 million in the budget for this program for fiscal year 2010, and I think we've only asked for \$65 million, or thereabouts, for fiscal year 2011, in the budget that we have.

The applications for the program, as I indicated—I know you—first of all, you are correct, there are 135,000 spouses that signed up, a little over that. The management of the program shut it down entirely on—in mid-February, because of the incredible demand. This was probably, in my view, a mistake. We should have—all those who were still in the program, we should have kept in the program, kept it open, put the applications on hold. The program was reopened in mid-March, to those who had already been enrolled, and we are looking at the way ahead to see how we might be able to accommodate this extraordinary demand. We are—the demand we are looking at, potentially, could end up with this program costing \$1 billion to \$2 billion. So, I mean, it's a measure of the popularity of the program. But, it—

Secretary GATES [continuing]. Also becomes—

Senator MURRAY. Well, I think it—

Secretary GATES [continuing]. A real—

Senator MURRAY [continuing]. It's a measure—

Secretary GATES [continuing]. Challenge.

Senator MURRAY [continuing]. Of the significance of this program, in terms of readiness, for these families who have given so much. And if it's a matter of requesting money through the supplemental, or whatever we need to do. We now have a situation where spouses have gotten the money and the training, and living right across the street from somebody who's not. It has created a very unfair situation. It's an important benefit and we want to work with you to make sure we get it moving forward again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MI-17

Secretary Gates, as we review the year 2010 supplemental request, there's an additional \$72.6 million in there for the Mi-17 sustainment and maintenance and training for the Russian helicopter. This is on top of the \$596 million that we put into the Defense Appropriation bill of 2010. The committee is still waiting, Mr. Secretary, the report required from the 2010 Defense Appropriation bill detailing the current and anticipated demand for Mi-17s, which I—should have been delivered 60 days after the enactment of the bill. I know you're busy, and the Department is, but that was 97 days ago. Instead, we received a fiscal year 2011 request that includes the procurement of 10 more Mi-17s for Afghanistan, at a cost of \$180 million, which is \$18 million per airframe, nearly triple the price that we paid for an airframe in 2006. That's—pretty good price. What's the status of the overdue report? And what's going on here? Do you—

Secretary GATES. I'm aware of the requirement for the report, Senator. I was not aware that it had not yet been delivered.

Senator SHELBY. Okay.

Secretary GATES. But, I'll find out.

Senator SHELBY. Will you get back to us—

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Senator SHELBY [continuing]. On that?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The Mi-17 report was completed on March 24, 2010 and is in the process of being delivered to the congressional defense committees.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES CAPABILITY

Senator SHELBY. And then—and I go to another subject: unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). And this is something you know a lot about. It's been reported that, by 2015, Predator UAVs will have so many simultaneous patrols—that's a long time off—over Afghanistan that the Predator may soon exceed the bandwidth to carry data to ground stations. A lot of people are concerned that this data overload of networks in the theater are insufficient to the point that information collected by wide-area sensors is being saved on computer disks and flown back to the United States before it can be reviewed. In other words, it's not quite—

We could be retrieving actionable data in real time that could save lives, hopefully, of the warfighters. Can you discuss this issue and what the Department's doing to address this? Are you familiar with that?

Secretary GATES. All I can tell you, Senator, is that I know that bandwidth in both Iraq and Afghanistan is a continuing concern, but I have not heard, from General McChrystal or anyone else, frankly, until today, that it is a current concern or that they are not expanding the bandwidth—

Senator SHELBY. Okay.

Secretary GATES [continuing]. To take it—to take advantage of the additional capabilities that we're putting in there. I can just assure you, I wouldn't be asking for the extraordinary uplift in the number of—the extraordinary increase in the number of UAVs if I didn't think the intelligence we'd get from them could be made operationally available almost in real time.

Senator SHELBY. Okay. The command and control for the unmanned systems—this has been an ongoing thing—one issue that continues to be of concern to the—is the Army's ability to continue utilizing unmanned systems when and where soldiers want them. And we continue to hear from our commanders on the ground about the importance of retaining control of tactical UAVs.

A lot of our success depends on this. Some would like to see the Army lose that. What's your opinion on all of that? I know that's a kind of an interservice deal, but—

Secretary GATES. Well, I think that the key—what we have seen with the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that we have deployed, first in Iraq and now in Afghanistan in ever growing numbers, is a unique fusion of intelligence and operations in the history of warfare. My view is that it has to be responsive to the needs of the commander on the ground. And whatever mech-

anism is required to do that is the way it ought to be handled. But, it—just as we need the bandwidth so that it can—the intelligence itself can be transmitted to the ground in real time, we need the capability for those systems to be responsive to the commanders on the ground in the same way.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator Feinstein.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome, Madam Secretary. Welcome, Secretary Gates.

Secretary Gates, let me follow up on Senator Shelby's questions. I have a good deal of concern about UAV technology. It is getting better. These are able to fly higher, stay in the air longer; they can carry heavier payloads, a mix of both guided and unguided munitions. And many of these advances are now being made by foreign countries, which may or may not support our international objectives. With technical modifications, even UAVs that do not currently carry weapons can, in fact, be modified into armed platforms. They are proliferating all over the world.

So, I have three specific questions to ask of you and then you can choose your answers.

UAV EXPORTS/SALES

One, what is DOD's current policy regarding the sale or transfer of UAVs to foreign countries?

Two, what is your view on limiting the export of United States UAV technology capable of being employed as a combat platform?

And three, what is the Department doing to ensure that UAVs are not used against American troops?

Secretary GATES. First of all, our policy toward the sale of UAV technology—I would differentiate, first of all, between armed and unarmed. But, overall, our policy is guided by the missile technology control regime. And so, at this point, to the best of my knowledge, we have only sold UAVs, at this point, to Italy and the United Kingdom, two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. There are other countries that are very interested in this capability; and frankly, it is, in my view, in our interest to see what we can do to accommodate them. But, I am—I share your concern about the possibility of the transfer of technology, or about these capabilities getting into the hands of those who are our adversaries. And the reality is that countries like Iran are developing their own UAVs, and already have a UAV capability.

With respect to export, again, as I just suggested, I think there are some specific cases where we have allies, with whom we have formal treaty alliances, who have expressed interest in these capabilities, and we have told them that we are limited in what we can do, by the MTCR, but I think it's something we need to pursue with them.

The reality is, so far, we have been in situations where UAV technology cannot be used, or has not been used, against our troops anywhere. I just referred to the fact that Iran has UAVs, and that is a concern, because it is one of those areas where, I suppose, if

they chose to, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, they could create difficulties for us.

By the same token UAVs are relatively slow flyers, and we have very capable air forces. And so, I actually think that our ability to protect our troops from these things, particularly in a theater of combat like this, is quite good.

My worry would be capabilities like this getting into the hands of nonstate actors who could use them for terrorist purposes.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.

COUNTERNARCOTICS IN AFGHANISTAN

The Drug Caucus of the Senate, which I happen to chair, has been looking into the narcotics picture in Afghanistan. And this raises—and let me just be very quick with this—this raises the question of standing by and letting these opium poppies grow. At the same time, the Taliban is emerging into a major drug cartel. I think it's a problem. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) tells me it's a problem. People that have made the busts in Afghanistan tell me that it's a problem. And I would be very interested in your response to that.

Secretary GATES. Well, about 1½ or 2 years ago, the coalition in Afghanistan received changed rules of engagement that allowed them to go after drug lords and drug labs. And we have been fairly aggressive in doing that. Ninety-eight percent of the poppies grown in Afghanistan are grown in seven provinces, where—and they are the ones where we are engaged in the most significant combat.

Let's just face facts, here. Until we have measures in place—until we can establish a security environment that allows us then to go forward with economic development and provide alternative—the means to grow alternative crops for these individual farmers—I have believed all along that if you eradicate a man's crop without getting—giving him a substitute income, you have just recruited a significant number of additional Taliban. And so, we have to weigh aggressive efforts to go after the lords and the labs, with providing the—with the time required to provide the security where you have the environment that we can go in, with the civilian capabilities, and provide these people alternative means of supporting their families so, frankly, they don't pick up a gun and start shooting our soldiers.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator Landrieu.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you very much.

HAITI DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Mr. Secretary, Madam Secretary, many of the questions that I had on Afghanistan have been addressed. But, I wanted to bring up Haiti if I could. I understand that's the subject of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, is not? The Haiti supplemental? The Haiti supplemental? Yes?

I know that you all are both aware, and maybe—the committee, I know, has been focused on the tragedy in Haiti. And I guess I'm particularly close to it, because we went through a horrible situa-

tion just 4½ years ago in south Louisiana and Mississippi. But, I just think, for the record, it's important for us to focus just a minute, despite all the extraordinary challenges of our military in other parts of the world, that 220,000 individuals lost their lives in this disaster, compared to about 2,000 on the gulf coast, just to put it in scale; 1.3 million people are living in temporary shelters. That's really a stretch of the imagination, because actually it's a piece of plastic. There are 105,000 homes that have been completely destroyed; 200,000 were severely damaged; 1,300 schools were destroyed, and 50 healthcare centers collapsed.

HAITI HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

I know that Secretary Clinton's focus and heart and attention have been on this. And so, my question, Madam Secretary, might be with the documents that are before us, which were just received last night, looking at the situation for Haiti. I'm a little concerned that I'm only able to find about \$5 million, stuck down in the budget for USAID, to completely repair, it looks like, these families, which is going to be difficult, since I understand that most children in Haiti don't even have a birth certificate.

So, this is going to be a long, hard road to climb, trying to shelter—sustain these families with just the basics; help with our international partners to get housing built quickly for them; but also, Madam Secretary, trying to get the wherewithal to create some sort of civil registry with our international partners to just get the basic birth certificates so we can start actually finding families for children, getting them families if their families have been lost, et cetera, et cetera. So, could you just comment on some of your ideas along these lines?

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, Senator.

And thank you, as always, for your deep concern about children, and particularly children who are in the foster-care system or who are orphaned. Your voice has been very, very strong on that.

And, as you know so well, children, within the context of a complex humanitarian emergency, such as we saw in Haiti, are among the most vulnerable children in the world. And I want to assure you that the United States Government recognizes that the protection and caring for these children has to be one of our highest priorities. So, we have been working to support children on our own, in partnership with the United Nations, other international organizations, NGOs, and many faith-based organizations.

First and foremost, we continue to focus on meeting children's emergency needs for medical care, shelter, food, water. Simultaneously, we are supporting an effort, led by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Government of Haiti, to find unaccompanied and separated children, and ensure they are in a safe place until we can determine whether they have any family at all that they can be reunited with, or what alternative permanent care provisions can be made. We're also expanding child-safe and child-friendly spaces within all of the facilities that we are supporting in Haiti. And that includes health, nutrition, education, and psychosocial support.

The Haitian health professionals are asking for a lot of assistance in understanding how to deal, in a psychological way, with

children who have been so traumatized. And we're supporting the Government of Haiti and UNICEF to rapidly assess all the orphanages in the earthquake-affected zone, with the aim of addressing their security and subsistence needs. In all of these efforts, we are coordinating closely with the U.N. protection cluster and the Government of Haiti, which, as you know, has very strong feelings about being in charge of their children. And I understand that, and we're trying to provide the support they need in order to meet their obligations.

But, we will continue to work closely with you and keep you closely informed, because this is our very highest priority. And we're trying to do it in cooperation with the many other organizations that are as concerned as we are.

Senator LANDRIEU. And I thank you.

My time's expired, Mr. Chairman.

But, there are many members of this committee I've had informal discussions with, Madam Secretary, and their support for laying the foundation of a new, more vibrant Haiti focused on strengthening each and every family in Haiti, and providing every child—serving them through families, not independently, not, you know, in an orphanage, but through families. So, I thank you for your longstanding commitment to this issue.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And it's nice to see the two of you sitting next to each other. And, Madam Secretary, you know, when you were on Foreign Relations, people came in and said we need soft power, and you're it.

MIDEAST POLICY

My question is this. I met with Ambassador Holbrooke in October, and I'm very impressed with his plan in terms of securing the environment there, and nation building. The question I have is, How much is that costing us? number one. And number two, How long are we going to have to be there? Because I don't think that we should be, in terms of how long it's going to be.

NATO/AFGHANISTAN ARMY

Next is, How much help are we getting from our NATO and other allies, in terms of this nation building? So, that's on your side of the coin.

Secretary Gates, on your side, I'd like to know—and you don't have to, maybe, give it to me now, but I'd love to have the information—is, How much help are you getting now from our NATO allies with boots on the ground without the KDFs? We have people there, but they have—still have KDFs. I've gone to countries, and they've said, "I'm sorry, Senator, we cannot have our people involved in," you know, "military activity, but we're willing to train these individuals." So, the question is, How much help are we getting there from them?

And last but not least, you're asking for \$2.6 billion to build up the—the Afghanistan Army. And the question I have, Is anybody else pitching in to help pay for the Afghanistan Army? And we know that we're probably going to have to spend maybe twice that

amount in the future, for a long period of time, in order to maintain the security that you talked about, in terms of dealing with the drug problem, and so forth.

So, could you both comment on what I've raised?

FUTURE SUPPLEMENTALS

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator.

And first let me say that our request is aimed at our diplomatic and development efforts. We view these not as nation building for Afghanistan, but as in the core security interests of the United States. Without additional resources, we cannot create that environment that our troops need as they clear—

Senator VOINOVICH. Yeah, I—listen, I understand that the real issue here—

Secretary CLINTON. Right.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Is about how much is that costing us. And the question is, How long is that going to have to continue to the point where we can kind of say, "We've done our thing"? Is it 5 years, 10 years, 15 years?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I don't know if I can answer it that way, but I can answer it this way. We believe that our efforts, which are coordinated so closely with our military, will transform into a regular diplomatic and development relationship. I mean, we provide development aid to a lot of countries where we don't have troops, because we think it's in our interest. And so, as we are in this intense phase, that will be several years—obviously, I don't know that either of us could put a timeline on it—what we're trying to do simultaneously is clear territory from the Taliban, be able to work more closely with the Afghan Army, that Secretary Gates will talk about, by helping to build them up with our allies—and we're getting a lot of support there; and at the same time—

Senator VOINOVICH. But—

Secretary CLINTON [continuing]. Create—

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. I mean could you—

Secretary CLINTON [continuing]. More capacity—

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. Outline the help that you're getting from these people on that—in that score?

Secretary CLINTON. Sure. And we can give you, in detail—and we'd be happy to take that for the record.

[The information follows:]

During Secretary Clinton's testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on March 25, 2010, you asked the Secretary about development assistance our allies and partners are providing in Afghanistan.

Our efforts in Afghanistan have an international face with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leading the military effort, which is complimented by broad civilian contributions from our NATO Allies and other partners including leadership and support to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, police training efforts and local development projects.

Following President Obama's December 1, 2009 declaration that we would increase our troop strength, NATO Allies and other partners have pledged an additional 9,000 troops, which are arriving alongside the 30,000 additional U.S. troops. Simultaneously, NATO Allies and other partners have substantially increased their security forces' training contributions to the NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A), filling institutional trainer positions, Operational Liaison and Mentor Teams (OMLTs) and Police Operational Liaison and Mentor Teams (POMLTs). We continue to work with our NATO Allies and other partners to fill the remaining

trainer shortages and ensure a capable and sustained Afghan National Security Forces.

Although the United States is the largest donor to Afghanistan's civilian reconstruction efforts, our Allies and partners are sharing the burden of the civilian mission in Afghanistan. Fourteen of 26 PRTs are led by allies and partners, and provide training for the Afghan National Security Forces and reconstruction assistance, as well as humanitarian assistance in many cases. Forty-three percent of all civilian assistance to Afghanistan comes from donors other than the United States, as detailed in the attached table as provided by the Afghan Ministry of Finance. The Asian Development Bank and World Bank have contributed a combined \$5 billion since 2001, in addition to helping other donors through trust funds.

The European Union has contributed approximately \$2 billion since 2001 and in 2009 pledged to increase its assistance significantly. Many European countries also provide additional assistance bilaterally. The United Kingdom is a major contributor to security and training missions and civilian assistance, with nearly \$3 billion in contributions since 2001. A number of countries have recently pledged to increase their civilian assistance. For instance, in November 2009, Japan increased its 5-year civilian commitment to Afghanistan from \$1 billion to \$5 billion. In January 2010, Germany doubled its assistance commitment to 430 million Euros annually through 2013.

Despite severe budgetary constraints over the past 2 years, even smaller donors like Greece and Latvia have decided to make new contributions in the past year. Our international outreach efforts have inspired a growing list of nontraditional partners to play a larger role in Afghanistan, including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, India and others. Some of these countries are providing financial assistance or funding the activities of other donors, while some are providing civilian advisors, doctors, engineers, or other human resources but rely on other sources of funding for their efforts.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

[In millions of dollars]

Donor	Total Pledges
Japan	6,900.0
UK	2,897.0
WB	2,800.0
ADB	2,200.0
EU/CE	1,768.7
Canada	1,679.1
India	1,200.0
Germany	1,187.9
Norway	938.0
Iran	864.0
Netherlands	753.2
Denmark	672.8
Saudi Arabia	533.0
Italy	514.6
Spain	486.5
Australia	369.3
UAE	307.7
Pakistan	305.0
Sweden	288.6
ECHO	268.2
U.N. Agencies	252.4
AKDN	239.3
China	196.5
Turkey	190.0
Finland	152.0
France	151.8
Russian Fed	141.0
Switzerland	134.0
Other Donors	97.1
Belgium	86.8
Korea (Rep. of)	85.0
Islamic Dev Bank	70.0
Kuwait	60.0
Ireland	33.4

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN—Continued

[In millions of dollars]

Donor	Total Pledges
New Zealand	30.3
Taiwan	28.6
Croatia	28.1
Czech Republic	22.0
Qatar	20.0
Org Islamic Conf	15.0
Austria	14.0
Greece	11.7
Global Fund	11.5
Luxembourg	7.2
Oman	6.0
Poland	5.0
Brunei	3.6
Hungary	3.0
Malta	3.0
Kazakhstan	2.3
Egypt	2.0
Portugal	2.0
Lithuania	1.6
Greece	1.6
Singapore	1.5
Estonia	1.2
Portugal	1.2
Slovakia	1.0
Brazil	1.0
Vietnam
Total	29,047.1

STATUS OF SURGE

Secretary CLINTON. But, just as in Iraq—our troops are going to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Well, we're going to have relationships with Iraq. We're going to have an Embassy with Iraq. We're going to continue to fulfill the request that the Iraqis made to us in the framework agreement about continuing assistance, and most particularly high-level police training. So, we're going to continue to have relationships. And so, that's going to go on for the foreseeable future, just like—I was in Mexico Tuesday. We've got—you know, we're putting money into Mexico, because there's a lot of challenges that are in our interests.

So, it will be a different relationship, but it will still be one of priority for the United States.

Secretary GATES. Senator, we have, at this point, pretty close to 45,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan. There are several thousand more that have been pledged, so that, by the time the pledges that we see are fulfilled, there will be pretty close to 50,000 non-U.S. troops. That's up from 17,000 in 2007. I would say that, for the last year, 1½ years, but especially since the NATO summit last spring, we have seen a number of NATO allies reduce or eliminate their caveats. And so, the number of situations that we face now, where caveats have prevented effective operations, have really dropped pretty dramatically. So, I think we have really good cooperation from our NATO and other partner nations, and they have really stepped up to the plate, despite, in many cases, considerable domestic opposition to it.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, for being here. We appreciate very much your candor.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

Secretary Gates, the materials that were submitted with the fiscal year overseas contingency operations (OCO) supplemental request highlight that you're requesting an additional \$1.3 billion for the Military Intelligence Program to Enhance U.S. Intelligence Capabilities and Operations, which includes ISR. And I'd like to talk a little bit about the Department's efforts to coordinate investments and enhance the ISR mission.

We've heard, from all of the services, that combatant commanders have a large appetite for ISR. My concern is that the focus has been on how many UAVs are in the field, which I think is important, and how quickly we can get more. But, I hope, in that effort, we're not overlooking the critical aspects of expanding ISR, like how the services plan to train the analysts that will be required to process the expanding volumes of data, and what infrastructure will be required to move data, and share it with those that need it. In a sense, maybe the easy part is buying the—the hard part is exploiting and using the intelligence that we're able to get from it.

A GAO report issued last week states that, "Within Central Command, less than half of the electronic signals collected by Predator are exploited." The report also identifies a shortage in analytical staff to process ISR—and you already mentioned bandwidth—and limited bandwidth to disseminate intelligence, as principal challenges. I've asked questions of General Schwartz about the manning mission, and he stated that the current manning structure was unsustainable. And I'm just concerned.

So, can you give me some idea of what DOD is doing to help coordinate services so that we match ISR capabilities with the ability to access it, and also coordination within the services?

Secretary GATES. The—there are two aspects to this. First of all, when you say that the commanders' appetite for ISR is large, I would say that's one of the great understatements of all time.

Insatiable is more like it. We have taken—two things. First of all, we understand—I understand very much that when we talk about ISR, it is not just the platform. It's the analysts, it's the linguists, it's the ground stations. And, in fact, one of the problems that we had, 1½ or 2 years ago, when we really began pushing this capability to the field in—significantly added numbers—was the shortage of ground stations. Another problem, that has been remedied by the Air Force and the Army over the last year or so, was also a shortage of crews to run these UAVs. So, I think we're addressing those issues. I think that we have—linguists, I would say, is a real challenge, as well as analysts.

There are two bureaucratic vehicles for coordinating this effort on behalf of the Department. The first and the most institutional is the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, General Clapper, who has complete overview of this and watches the full package, not just the platforms. And then the other has been the Spe-

cial Task Force, that I established on ISR about 1½ or 2 years ago, that has been focused on, How can we get this capability in usable fashion to the field? And using not only unpiloted vehicles, but also, we are putting a number of what are the equivalent of King Airs in there, the MC-12s, Liberty aircraft. So, all of these capabilities, we are very mindful of the need for the full package so that, as I told Senator Shelby, if we can't get the stuff to the commanders in the field, it's not worth the investment.

Senator NELSON. Well, and getting it adequately analyzed would be just as significant a portion of getting it to them in the field.

I appreciate your answers, and I hope that—

Secretary GATES. But, I would tell you—I went to a counter-improvised explosive device (IED) facility the other day that is run by DIA. And I had—I took the Canadian Defense Minister there, and I have no idea. You know, we talk about the commanders in the field, but with today's electronics, I walk into a room that's probably got 60 analysts in it from all over the intelligence community, sitting here in the Washington area, with realtime links to the UAVs and other capabilities in the theater, and providing information on IED networks to the theater. So, the theater doesn't have to do all the analysis. A lot of it can be done back here, with today's electronics. And we have these capabilities. This was one of the things that JIEDDO has done; this is under their auspices. So, there's a lot of capability here, but as we try and ramp this up, there are obviously going to be some imbalances that we have to try and fix.

Senator NELSON. Well, I appreciate that you're on top of it. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

I'd just like to announce that a vote just started. So, if some of you wish to go, be my guest.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't think I'll go yet. How about that?

Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, thank you so much. Good to see both of you again.

TRUST ISSUES IN AFGHANISTAN

So many of us have had an opportunity to travel recently to Afghanistan, and certainly recognize the challenges, the great difficulty that we face over there, that the men and women who are serving us face every day.

We were in a situation—we were in—down in the—Helmand Province, down outside of Garmsir, and were able to walk through a market, and felt very comfortable, given the situation; left, and 5 days later in that same community, eight people died as a result of suicide bombing. So, we recognize the volatility of the situation.

One term that we heard used quite frequently was this “deficit of trust” that remains there. And I think, Secretary Gates, you have said that, “Successfully accomplishing the training mission represents both our exit strategy and the key to long-term stability in Afghanistan.” But, again, going back to this “deficit of trust” situation that we heard so much about, it was very clear that the peo-

ple there appreciate that there is a—there's a clear choice. You can either side with the Americans, who, it's clear, will someday leave; or you side with the Taliban, who will likely be there indefinitely. And the question to you is, While an exit strategy is absolutely necessary as part of any military operation, what assurance are we able to give to the Afghan tribal leaders to ensure that they do, in fact, remain on our side of the fight, that they believe that it is more worthwhile, in the long term, to stay on our side of the fight?

AFGHANISTAN

Secretary GATES. First of all, I think that the thing to remember, historically and culturally, about the many Afghans is that they've been at war for 30 years. And the average Afghan is going to come down on one side or the other only when he thinks he's spotted who's going to win. And that's part of what our endeavors are about.

When I talked earlier about General McChrystal's first objective being to reverse the momentum of the Taliban, that is, in the first instance, about changing the psychology of the people about who's going to win this struggle. I think that the thing also to keep in mind is that the Taliban may be vicious, but they're also incredibly unpopular in Afghanistan. Every reliable poll that I've seen over the past couple of years shows the Taliban support in Afghanistan at around 10 percent or less. So, these people aren't fond of the Taliban, they're just intimidated by them, for the most part.

And the key here is, when we begin the process of transitioning security control to the Afghans, in a province-by-province or district-by-district area, that we have degraded the capabilities of the Taliban to the point where local security forces and the Afghan National Army and various national police units can sustain the security of the people. So, it's not that the Afghan Army or Police are ever going to achieve the skill level of American forces—the truth of the matter is nobody in the world's ever going to do that, with all due respect even to our allies—but, can we degrade the capabilities and the numbers of the Taliban fighters to the point where the local security forces and the Afghan Army can keep them under control and provide the kind of local security for people that is required.

The way this works is, if you get the population on your side—and we saw this in Anbar—that is a self-reinforcer of security. It is the local population in Anbar—once they began—once they felt that they could defeat al Qaeda in Iraq, that they began telling us where the IEDs were being planted, and so on. We're beginning to see that in some places in Afghanistan, where the local population is figuring, "You know, maybe this is going to go the way of the Afghan government and the coalition." And so, they're beginning to cooperate with us, and support us.

So, as Secretary Clinton talked about, this is a complex business, but having the population not necessarily trust us, but have confidence that their security will be protected, is a mix of our capabilities over the next number of years, capabilities of our allies, and the capabilities of the Afghan forces themselves. And not just the national forces, but, I would say, also local security forces.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Senator PRYOR.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll try to keep mine to 4 minutes, or less even, because I know we have a vote.

Thank you both for being here.

STATUS OF WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN

Secretary Clinton, let me start with you, if I may. And that is, I know that you have been a champion for women's rights for a long time. And in Afghanistan, as I understand it now, girls and women are doing three things that we take for granted here in this country. They're going to school. They're getting jobs. And they're actually participating in the government.

I'd just like to hear your thoughts on where that stands and if you think that is a long-term change in Afghanistan, or if that's still in its infancy and could go away at any time?

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you for asking that, Senator, because I think it's important that we use that as one of the markers for the kind of success that we're hoping to achieve there. You're absolutely right, there has been a great deal of change in the opportunities available to women and girls. When you look at the increase in the number of young women going to school, it's dramatic. But, there's still a long way to go. There are a lot of obstacles that are deeply cultural and historic. What we are looking out for is, not that we can mandate a change in culture and history, but to keep that door of opportunity open—

Senator PRYOR. Right.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS/RECONCILIATION

Secretary CLINTON [continuing]. And not let anything slam it shut. So, we're particularly concerned about the reintegrating/reconciliation plans that the Karzai government has undertaken. They have, thus far, made it clear that they are expecting people with whom they reconcile to abide by the laws and constitution of Afghanistan, which does provide protection for women's rights. But, thank you for raising it, because it's a high priority of ours.

Senator PRYOR. Well, thank you. I think it's a great policy and a great priority.

I recently read that the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime estimates that corruption comprises 25 percent of Afghanistan's GDP. When I see a number like that it—it's obviously shocking, and it also makes me realize that we need to be very, very careful in how we're spending U.S. tax dollars in Afghanistan.

So, when it comes to accountability for our foreign aid there, could you give us a status report of the things that your Department is doing to try to make sure there is sufficient accountability?

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, we are increasing our support for our inspectors general. We are also adding more auditors in order to keep track of funding. We are certifying any Afghan Government entity that would receive any of our funding, to be clear that it is managing those funds in a way that we find acceptable. We are working to put people into those agencies.

CORRUPTION

So, we're taking a lot of prophylactic steps. But, as you point out, corruption is a deeply ingrained problem, and we just have to be very vigilant about making sure that we're not caught up in it.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the final time, I propose to use it to raise a number of questions. There's hardly time for questions and answers within 4 minutes. And I understand the limitations that we have here.

MIDEAST PEACE

The first question that I have relates to a report in The Washington Post yesterday, where General Petraeus is quoted as saying that, "The conflict foments"—referring to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—"The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism toward Israel." His comment within the commentary is—the paper—his comments suggested that U.S. military officials were embracing the idea that failure to resolve the conflict had begun to imperil American lives." Well, that's obviously very serious and very heavy.

[The information follows:]

The Department of Defense does not believe that the U.S. commitment to Israel's security or the failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict imperils U.S. lives, nor did General Petraeus state this. However, a lack of progress in the peace process is one of many issues that is distorted and exploited by our adversaries in the region, thereby affecting U.S. national security interests.

This Administration's commitment to Israel's security and our defense relationship with Israel are based on mutual security interests. Israel is one of our strongest allies, and, in this role, is a crucial partner on security and anti-terrorism in the region.

Peace in the Middle East is a national interest of the United States, as well as of Israel, the Palestinians, and Arab States. The Department of Defense has provided significant support to both the Israelis and the Palestinians to increase security for both populations and thus improve the chances of attaining a just and lasting peace. The United States continues to work through negotiations to assist the Israelis and Palestinians to realize a solution with two states living side-by-side in peace and security. In this effort, the Department of Defense stands ready to assist Senator Mitchell in his work to achieve a comprehensive Middle East Peace.

Senator SPECTER. And my question, which I would like you to respond to for the record, would be, What evidence is there to—

Mr. Secretary, we have an expensive war in Afghanistan. The question of success in Afghanistan is very much open. I think it's going very well, and I commend what's going on at the present time, buttressed by a visit which I made recently there with other colleagues. But, the question on my mind, when al Qaeda can organize somewhere else, like Yemen or Somalia or somewhere else, why fight in Afghanistan, where it is so costly and where the Soviets, the Brits, going back to Alexander the Great, have not met success?

[The information follows:]

A combination of personal, ethnic, tribal, historical, and other ties to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region makes it al Qaeda's preferred base of operations. Over the past 20 years, al Qaeda has developed a network in this region that supports training,

financing, recruiting, and other operational needs. Even if the lack of security in other regions is appealing to al Qaeda, it would take years for al Qaeda to develop a new network as robust as the present one.

There is a very sharp distinction between the historical experience of many in Afghanistan, those who were there to conquer, and our mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. campaign is aimed at enabling the development of Afghan capacity so that the Afghan Government may exert sovereignty over its own territory and prevent al Qaeda and its affiliates from using the country as a base of operations. The Taliban in Afghanistan, because Afghans have experienced its rule, has little popular support. Even in areas the Afghan Government has yet to fully establish itself, the Taliban is not the preferred choice for the Afghan people. This creates great opportunity for us to help develop Afghan institutions and capacity that are a viable alternative for the population. The United States does not have the option of allowing al Qaeda and its affiliates freedom of movement and sanctuary, given the threat that they pose to our homeland and to our vital interests abroad. Our campaign on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, and our campaign against al Qaeda and its affiliates in other locations around the world, put continuous pressure on this network to disrupt their operations and deny their ability to launch spectacular attacks. Denying sanctuary to al Qaeda and its affiliates is critical to preventing their ability to attack our homeland, our interests, and our forces and our allies abroad.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA

Senator SPECTER. A third area of questioning is, What has happened in Pakistan and India?

[The information follows:]

The United States encourages India and Pakistan to discuss their differences bilaterally. We welcome recent meetings between the two, and are prepared to assist if the two countries so request.

Senator SPECTER. There have been some suggestions that there could be a cooling of that—of the tension, which might relieve a number of Pakistani military to assist the United States in fighting al Qaeda or fighting the Taliban. In the CODEL, where we met with the Indian Prime Minister, we raised this, directly. And the Prime Minister of India was explicit, saying that he would like to see a lessening of tensions, soldiers released, but they're—they would have to be in control of the terrorists by the Pakistan Government. And he was asked, "Well, do you think that's realistic?" And he said, very emphatically, "Yes. They are their creation." So that if there's a real prospect here of that, there may be more Pakistani soldiers who could help us, and they might have some more inclination to do so, and that would impact that picture very decisively.

The area of sanctions is a very difficult one against Iran. And we have been discussing that for a long time, in a lot of contexts. And I know there's no simplistic answer. But, the question that I get consistently involves, Where are we going? The military option is on the table. Everybody says it's unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon. President Obama drew a line in the sand last December. Hard to really be specific about lines in the sand, but that was my sense of if it and the sense of a number of people.

So, the question is, What is it going to take? Is it a constantly moving position by China? I don't envy either of you, in dealing with China, or, for that matter, in dealing with Russia, although we congratulate you on what appears to be a really big breakthrough on nuclear weapons. But, what are we looking for? There's talk about—gasoline could bring them to their knees if we really got tough on financial matters.

[The information follows:]

As the President has stated, our policy goal is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. To ensure this, the Administration is pursuing a dual-track strategy of engagement with, and pressure on, Iran, while also building support with our allies in the region and around the world. After a year of attempts at principled engagement with Tehran, Iran's continued nuclear intransigence left us with no other option but to resort to the pressure track and pursue sanctions within the United Nations Security Council, as well as additional coordinated national measures with the European Union and other like-minded states. We expect that these sanctions—although an imperfect tool—will have both a material and psychological effect on Iran, particularly when the sanctions have broad international support, including from China and Russia. Whether this will be sufficient to bring Iran back to the negotiating table, or convince it to make material concessions on its nuclear program, remains to be seen.

Senator SPECTER. It looks like I could go on indefinitely. The chairman has left.

Do you have a question, Senator?

Senator COLLINS. I do.

Senator SPECTER. Well, I have posed those areas of concern. And my request would be that you respond to them on the record, as opposed to asking a question and a half, and having the 4 minutes go.

Thank you for your service. Thank you for taking the job, Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Secretary Gates. Great to see you. Graduate of a grade school in Wichita, Kansas, that I attended, doing so well in the tough Washington climate.

Well, Dole and I are from Russell, which is a smaller town. Gates's experience in Kansas is limited to a big city, Wichita, where I left when I was 12.

Thank you very much.

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, to another Kansan here—

VOICE. There's Kansans everywhere.

Senator BROWNBACK. Absolutely. I—

VOICE. We're not in Kansas anymore.

Senator BROWNBACK. Yeah, we're going to make the rest of the country Kansas. That's how we're going to fix that.

Mr. Chairman, I didn't know if you knew this, but Secretary Gates was Kansan of the Year this year.

Chairman INOUE. Really?

Senator BROWNBACK. And his mother was at the ceremony, who was very proud of her son, and we all were of what all he's done, and very appreciative of that. It was a very touching moment. Mr. Secretary, you gave a beautiful, beautiful speech at it, as well.

KCX TANKER/EADS

A couple of things that I wanted to raise with you, if I could, Secretary Gates, in particular. In one—this is the old one that you're familiar with, very familiar with, on the tanker contract. I've been reading that Airbus is asking for an extension of your RFP time deadline so they can make another bid on this contract. And I've been reading throughout the European Press that Sarkozy and others are concerned, and they think this RFP is terrible, that they haven't been able to partner with Northrop. I would hope we would stick with the timeframe and the timeline that this 10-year project is on and hopefully getting close to a resolution and that it not be extended for a bid to be put forward from EADS. Have you made

a decision on that? The last press account I recall seeing said you were reviewing it.

Secretary GATES. That's correct. We have had some informal—as best I've—as I'm up to date, we've had some informal questions from EADS about it. And I think they were going to do a letter to us. I have not seen that letter. I don't know if it's been received in the Department. We will look at it.

As I told the House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, yesterday, we will not change the requirements. We are buying the best plane for the Air Force, and to meet Air Force needs. And so, we will look at this letter. Believe me, no one is more eager to get on with this than I am.

Senator BROWNBACk. But, no decision has been made——

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Senator BROWNBACk [continuing]. Whether to extend the time deadline, because——

Secretary GATES. No.

Senator BROWNBACk. Obviously I would urge you to stay with the current time deadline. This thing has gone on far long enough, and it's time to move on.

WTO

And then, you've also seen that the WTO has recently ruled in the United States' favor that the airframe that EADS has proposed to bid was an illegally subsidized airframe that they developed. And that's now a final ruling by the WTO.

I saw in the——

Secretary GATES. Senator, I've just been handed a note. "Late breaking news" as it were, we have received the letter requesting an extension from EADS, so we'll look at it and see what it has to say.

Senator BROWNBACk. Well, my vote's no on this, that we not extend it, and certainly not based off of President Sarkozy's concerns, because the very thing that they're going to bid is the very plane that they used to beat our brains in on the commercial marketplace for a number of years, and knocked several of our big companies out. This has been a 20-year litigation by USTR, that we just won. They've really driven down our share in a commercial market space, and now they want to take it in the military airframe space. I see no reason to concede this to the Europeans, and particularly since they've been cheating on subsidizing this aircraft and stealing commercial market share from us with it. So, I really hope you would look at that.

And I noticed, yesterday, you were saying that whether or not the current DOD law actually prohibits you from addressing the illegal subsidy issue, you said that you were not required to include it. If I could get a point of clarification on that. And if you can't address it here, I understand. But, do you understand current law to actually prohibit DOD from addressing the illegal subsidy issue, or are you saying only that no provision requires DOD to account for illegal subsidies?

Secretary GATES. I think that we are prohibited, but let me get you an accurate answer for the record.

Senator BROWNBACk. Okay, if you could.

[The information follows:]

Article 23 of the international, multilateral Understanding and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO) establishes that the United States Government's sole avenue for redress is through the WTO. As the WTO itself has put forth in a formal, official commentary on Article 23, "Any attempt to seek 'redress' can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding]."

TRAINING AFGHAN FORCES

Senator BROWNBAC. And then, finally, General Caldwell is a guy I got to know at Leavenworth that's working on the operation to stand up Afghan security forces. That sure looks like, to me, to be paramount for us to have an exit strategy in Afghanistan. Do you have any idea on timeframes for having sufficient Afghan troops stood up for us to be able to pull down?

Secretary GATES. Well, I think it'll be a gradual process, much as we saw in Iraq. Just as an example, when the marines first went into the south last summer, the partnering with the Afghans was about nine Americans to every Afghan. Now, in the Marjah operation, it's three Americans for every two Afghans. So, as they train up and get into the field and partner, those ratios and capabilities will grow.

The—I think that, in some ways, the way to look at the process that we will use is very similar to that, that we used in Iraq. And it's better described as a transition than a transfer.

Right now, in some of these places, we're in the lead and the Afghans are with us. At a certain point, we will partner, then they will be in the lead, then we will withdraw to a tactical overwatch, and then a strategic overwatch. So, this multiphase approach is the way we did province-by-province in Iraq, and it really worked pretty well. And I think that General McChrystal has the same kind of model in mind in Afghanistan.

AFGHAN ARMY

So, we don't need the Afghan Army to be fully trained up everywhere in the country at the same time. We will do it on a province-by-province basis. And I think that he's pretty optimistic he can make this work.

Senator BROWNBAC. Over a 2- to 5-year timeframe?

Secretary GATES. Well, as his—as the President's made clear, and as we agreed in the process, we will begin that first transition, or that first transfer, if you will, in July 2011. But, from that point on, it will be decided on a province-by-province basis, based on the conditions on the ground.

Senator BROWNBAC. Thank you.

Thank you, Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you—

Secretary GATES. And I expect that to take some period of time.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, while everyone was out of the room briefly, I had this brief shining moment when I might be in your position.

VOICE. Oh-ho-ho.

Senator COLLINS. And it was a wonderful feeling, however, fleetingly it passed.

AFGHAN FIGHTING FORCE

Secretary Gates, I've read a lot of press reports recently that describe our marines as extremely frustrated with their Afghan counterparts. And I must say, I've been surprised because I've always had an image of the Afghans as being very good and effective fighters. But, there have been two major stories that suggest the marines are so concerned that the shortcomings of the Afghan soldiers could undermine our joint efforts in the region. Could you give me your assessment of whether these reports are valid, and whether the Afghans themselves have the desire and the skills to succeed in the fight?

Secretary GATES. First, just in terms of answering the last questions—the last point first, this is actually one of the principal reasons, Senator, why I came around to the view that it was important to set a time when we would begin a transfer or transition to Afghan security control. They need to know this is their fight and that they are going to have to assume responsibility for it, and not at some distant unknown date, but beginning next year. And between that and the pay raises that we saw last November, we have seen a significant increase in recruitment in Afghanistan for both the Afghan Army and the Police. Retention has improved significantly in the Army; it's still a problem in the Police. But, we—they need to know that this is going to be their fight at some point. And I think they are taking that on board.

The feedback that I've gotten—I have not heard complaints from General McChrystal or the commander in RC South, General Carter, about the quality of the Afghan troops. I must say that, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I went to Camp Blackhorse, outside of Kabul, a couple of weeks ago when I was there, where the Afghan Army is being trained, and the Americans that I talked to there were pretty impressed with them. By the same token, when I talk to our troops, I get mixed reviews. Some of them say that they're really good fighters and that they're really good partners and are very impressed with them. That was certainly the case in Nawaz, where I toured a marketplace. I didn't—you know, the security is a lot better there, but I had no illusions as to the security that was around because I was there. The—but, on the other hand, others are not as impressed. And so, I think it's a mixed picture. But, in terms of the views of the commanders, who have a view of the entire battle space, I think they're very impressed with the quality of the Afghan National Army, and believe that it's making good progress.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

AFGHAN ARMY/CIVILIAN SURGE

Secretary Clinton, when I was last in Afghanistan, the most common complaint that I heard from our military personnel was the lack of a civilian surge. You commented earlier that we have increased the number of civilians to do the civilian component that is so essential to the counterinsurgency strategy. Could you give a brief update, since I just got a note that my time is expired, telling

us your level of satisfaction in meeting the requirements for civilian employees?

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, Senator. And thank you.

We have roughly quadrupled the number of civilians, in a year. And they are both in Kabul, working with the Government of Afghanistan; and then they are out in the country. They are, in effect, embedded with our military, so they move with our military, and they are working closely to leverage their presence. You know, we don't have battalions of civilians. It's a much smaller number, in comparison to our military forces. But, each one leverages, on average, about 10 other civilians—NGOs, partnering with civilians from other countries, who are there as part of the government commitment, partnering with the United Nations, partnering with Afghans, hiring Afghans.

And, you know, one of the examples that I was going to give, if Senator Bond had asked, because I know how interested he is on agriculture—and this is—just gives you a little bit of a taste. You know, as soon as the marines secured Marjah, civilians began to go out. And they have a program called the Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture Plus (AVIPA-Plus)—don't ask me why—the AVIPA-Plus program. They've distributed 7,000 of those vouchers for fertilizers, for new seeds, trellises for grapes. And it's that kind of intensive work, on the ground, that doesn't take a lot of civilians, it takes the right kind of civilians. So, we have USDA agriculture experts. We have people, as Senator Bond has pointed out, from National Guard units, who have expertise in agriculture.

So, we are leveraging the presence of our civilians, and we will probably be adding more, but we want to be sure that where we add them is really critical to the mission.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much.

Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, this afternoon we have focused our attention on Afghanistan and Iraq, and I believe we focused our resources there, also. However, we have been receiving disturbing news on the conditions in Somalia and of Somalia as a safe haven for al Qaeda.

SOMALIA

My question is, Do we have sufficient resources to counter the Somali threat? Has that become a sufficient threat to us, the Somali situation?

Secretary GATES. We probably both ought to both answer on this one.

Secretary CLINTON. I was just wondering where the buzzing sound is from.

Senator, we are working very hard, again, in our civilian-military cooperation, with the aim of trying to bolster the transitional Federal Government in Somalia, which doesn't have a lot of scope of authority. It's basically confined to a part of Mogadishu. Our main source of support is the AMISOM, the African Union troops primarily from Uganda that are providing a lot of the logistical and backup support that the Somalis need. Al Shabab is a threat. I

mean, Al Shabab is a very clear threat. And we see, unfortunately, it's morphing into a kind of al Qaeda junior partner over the last year. But, there is a growing sense that many of the Somalis themselves are no longer willing to be intimidated by, or just give in to, Al Shabab. They've been extremely brutal in their treatment of people—a lot of amputations and other kinds of very barbaric punishments. They have, you know, stolen and diverted food aid, and prevented it from getting to the people. So, there's a gradual growth of opposition internally in Somalia. But, clearly our support for the African Union mission, and then the additional help that our military is providing, in terms of training, is critical to the survival of the nascent government there and our hope that we can gain more ground by supporting it.

Secretary GATES. That says it all.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Cochran, do you have anything more?

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, no, except to thank our witnesses, the Secretaries, for being here and helping us fully understand what we need the funding for. I've been impressed by their testimony and their leadership of their Departments.

Chairman INOUE. I wish to echo that, also.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing but were submitted to the Departments for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY HILLARY CLINTON

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE

Question. Secretary Clinton, several audits and reports from the Department of State Inspector General, Department of Defense Inspector General, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction have uncovered several deficiencies with the Department of State's oversight and management of contracts in theater and have made several recommendations on ways to improve. Many of those recommendations are not implemented and contract management and oversight staffing shortfalls remain. How does the Department of State plan to improve its management and oversight of its contracts in both Afghanistan and Iraq especially as your Department takes over increased responsibility in Iraq?

Answer. The Department of State is committed to strengthening our contract management processes. The majority of the Department of State (DoS) contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan have increased the number of overseas and domestic contract management staff significantly. For example, in Iraq the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL) is increasing their contract management support from five individuals overseas and 9 domestic individuals in September 2008 to 15 overseas individuals and 24 domestic individuals by August 2010. In Afghanistan, INL is increasing their contract management support from 6 individuals overseas and 15 domestic individuals to 25 individuals overseas and 25 domestic individuals by September 2010.

In the last 2 years, the Office of Acquisitions Management (A/LM/AQM) created a strategy and established a business process for audits of A/LM/AQM contracts. We developed a close and professional working relationship with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) which are the Department's audit agencies for major programs. We also issued an A/LM/AQM operational policy pertaining to audit services to ensure staff is aware of the policy. This strategy ensures that the Department meets contract administration responsibilities required by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). During fiscal year 2009, the Department initiated 12 external audits of significant programs. In addition to financial audits, we initiated a series of business system audits to review contractor accounting and internal controls, billing systems, estimating systems, labor system controls, subcontractor systems, and property management systems in conjunction with audits of specific contracts on a pre-award and

post-award basis. The Quality Assurance Branch works closely and successfully with contracting officers, the Office of Inspector General, and program offices to obtain documentation, provide answers to audit related questions, support negotiations, and reach settlement agreements.

Since 2008, A/LM/AQM has also significantly improved our contract close-out process. A/LM/AQM designed an effective business process and formed a team of close-out specialists, trained to identify contractual and budget issues, perform contract analysis, and to reconcile and document obligations and payments. This team is developing standard operating procedures for all of our contract managers to follow and is training their colleagues in A/LM/AQM on our new business process. In fiscal year 2010, as of February 24, 2010, nearly 500 contracts have been closed out.

The Department is continuing to examine other improvements to contract oversight through the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review with USAID acquisitions offices.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Question. Secretary Clinton, the fiscal year 2011 budget submitted by the President includes estimates for overseas contingency operations of \$50 billion per year for fiscal year 2012 and beyond. Can you address, in detail, the rationale behind the budget estimate and whether the President is anticipating submitting revenue or spending measures to offset the amount requested should it exceed \$50 billion?

Answer. The Department of State defers to the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Defense in responding to this question.

Question. Secretary Clinton, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction has reported that corruption and mismanagement continue to waste hundreds of millions of reconstruction dollars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but you have rejected his recommendation for the creation of a new entity to coordinate and oversee reconstruction efforts. What, then, are you doing to ensure that those monies are spent effectively on projects that contribute to stability and that can be maintained after the U.S. presence has withdrawn?

Answer. Corruption and the mismanagement of development resources in Iraq and Afghanistan could undermine our efforts in both countries. As a result, even though we have not accepted all of the Special Inspector Generals' recommendations, we are taking concrete measures to ensure U.S. government funds are well spent and carefully monitored in Iraq and Afghanistan. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Stuart Bowen, has stated several times, including in testimony before your Committee, that fraud has played a very small role in the use of U.S. funds appropriated for Iraq reconstruction. We have greatly benefitted from SIGIR's recommendations and have taken steps to address deficiencies SIGIR has identified. We take seriously findings from the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction on the dangers of corruption and mismanagement of development funding and are taking steps to address these concerns. Specifically, we are increasing our staffing to improve programming and oversight; developing alternative oversight mechanisms in situations where direct access to development activities is not yet possible; and, through the provision of technical assistance, are increasing the capacity of local institutions to provide services to the population and make assistance efforts more sustainable.

USAID is working intensively with our Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan to discern mission staffing requirements, recruit, and retain qualified staff for roles in capital cities and countryside. These new personnel have a wide variety of backgrounds including financial management, agriculture, governance, and engineering, and add much needed development assistance to Afghanistan, while overseeing projects they are able to access.

In areas where ongoing insecurity or military operations can make supervisory visits by USAID direct hires more difficult, we have devised methods to either allow U.S. personnel access to sites with military escorts or facilitate locally engaged staff reporting visits. We have developed and are continuing to refine "movement agreements" with our military colleagues that guarantee our development representatives on PRTs regular access project sites, increasing their ability to directly oversee development projects funded with U.S. dollars. Where our American managers are unable to access development sites, we rely on trusted local staff, Quality Assessment/Quality Control (QA/QC) contractors, and implementing partners to oversee projects.

Finally, and most importantly, we are working to develop native Afghan ability to administer and oversee development throughout Afghanistan. We are increasing the funds we send through local entities (the government and private sector) via a robust certification process. This shift is helping to build Afghan capacity to manage

development funds, make Afghan ministries and implementers more accountable, and build Afghan capacity to support long-term, sustainable development.

Against this backdrop, USAID works collaboratively with our inspector general community and promotes audits to enhance the effectiveness of our activities and confirm that our efforts to weed out corruption and mismanagement are successful.

Question. Secretary Clinton, what is the status of efforts to address corruption and build a workable Afghan government that can protect and continue the reconstruction work accomplished to date?

Answer. President Karzai spoke to the need for improved governance and anti-corruption reforms in his inaugural address and at the London Conference in January 2010. Since January, the Afghan government and the international community have made several commitments to key reforms and anti-corruption initiatives. Major successes include the March 18 adoption of a presidential decree to tackle administrative corruption and strengthen the High Office of Oversight (HOO), Afghanistan's primary anti-corruption institution, but we still have significant work to do.

The Afghan and U.S. governments have a variety of programs to address governance and corruption. To improve the prosecution of corruption-related offenses, the Afghan Government created the Major-Crimes Task Force (MCTF), a multi-ministry initiative responsible for investigating corruption, kidnapping and organized crime cases and preparing them for prosecution, and the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) within the Attorney General's Office. The Afghan government also agreed to establish an Anti-Corruption Tribunal (ACT) of specially vetted judges to oversee high-profile cases. The MCTF receives financial and technical support from the Department of Defense and the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, while the Department of Justice provides technical support. In March, the MCTF conducted its first arrest and prosecution of an Afghan government official.

To improve transparency and accountability, the Afghan government, with USAID support, has implemented hiring reforms and a vetting process for Afghan government employees through the Civil Service Commission. We are also working to strengthen the HOO so that it can better serve as an oversight mechanism for nationwide anti-corruption efforts. At a recent press conference, the HOO publicly named the Afghan Ministers who had not yet filed asset declaration forms. It is now working to secure 100 percent compliance.

We are also reviewing our own procedures to ensure they do not contribute to Afghan corruption. USAID is reviewing the financial, management, procurement and expenditure systems of key ministries to determine their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance. We are also using fewer big contractors, reducing the layers through which our assistance flows. Finally, we are dramatically increasing the numbers of USAID officers and inspectors to monitor our aid.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HERB KOHL

Question. Secretary Clinton, you are now requesting an additional \$150 million in food aid assistance for Haiti, which obviously indicates the problems there are longer-term than first thought.

Do you expect the food aid needs in Haiti to continue next year? Also, if that is the case, will the 2011 budget request for Public Law 480 still be adequate?

Answer. USAID anticipates that there will be a continued need for food assistance to address both chronic and acute food insecurity in Haiti over the next year. In addition to USAID's annual \$35.5 million non-emergency program, which addresses chronic food insecurity in Haiti, USAID has provided approximately \$125.3 million in emergency food assistance in fiscal year 2010 to the World Food Program (WFP) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to address acute food insecurity associated with the earthquake. Emergency food assistance, ordered in fiscal year 2010, will support WFP's emergency operation, which runs through December 2010, and PVO emergency programs, which run through February 2011. It is not possible at the present time to predict emergency food aid needs for fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year 2011 Title II in-kind food aid request helps fulfill the Administration's commitment to transparent budgeting by making the regular food aid request closer to the historic average.

Question. Secretary Clinton, I know that you and Secretary Vilsack are working together on the issue of global food security. It seems to me that USDA, including the Extension Service and land grant universities can make a significant contribution in that effort.

Secretary Clinton, can you please describe how you are working with Secretary Vilsack on this effort and your views on enhanced Agricultural research and extension efforts to assist developing countries?

Answer. We have placed high priority on the role of agricultural research under this initiative. USAID and USDA are collaborating on the development of a new strategy for harnessing advances in science and technology to promote food security and that will strengthen ties between the United States, international, and developing country research institutions. USAID brings a long history of leadership in international agricultural research spanning back to the Green Revolution. And, for more than 30 years under Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act, USAID has supported U.S. land grant universities to engage in collaborative research with developing countries and to train thousands of agricultural researchers and policy makers. USDA brings additional expertise and dual use technologies through both their intramural research and the extramural grants of the National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA). For example, USDA's Agricultural Research Service has some of the world's leading expertise in wheat stem rust, a disease of major significance to global food security. The recently issued NIFA call for proposals includes an emphasis on food security. We are integrating the efforts and strengths of both Agencies into a single strategy that will contribute to the objectives of this initiative.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS

Question. The U.S. military is planning to scale down its presence in Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. Almost every counternarcotics operation conducted in Afghanistan at this time is supported by the U.S. military and these operations are increasing in number. In 2009, DEA conducted 82 interdiction operations in Afghanistan compared with 43 in fiscal year 2008.

Looking ahead, does the State Department have a plan for continued counternarcotics operational support after the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan?

Answer. The State Department currently provides support for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in a variety of ways; while it is certainly true that military support is vital for conducting interdiction operations in insecure areas, it has always been and remains our goal, together with the DEA and the military, to build up Afghan capacity to carry out all facets of the counternarcotics mission, from investigations to operations and operational support. The Afghan National Army has been involved in supporting some of these operations already within the past year, and with the military's help, we hope that they and the Afghan National Police will continue to progress in their ability to conduct independent operations. Additionally, INL's Air Wing in Afghanistan has provided operational support to some CNPA/DEA missions, and will continue to do so on an as-available and as-needed basis.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

FAMILY REUNIFICATION

Question. As you are well aware, U.S. Federal law requires that State officials who place children in foster care to pursue the primary goal of family reunification, while at the same time, developing an alternative permanency plan for the child. If the family reunification efforts fail, then the alternate plan will already be in place and well on its way to completion. This practice, which is called concurrent planning, is intended to reduce the total period of time a child will remain in out of home care before being permanently placed with a family. Is this an approach the United States might encourage its international partners to consider taking here so that children in Haiti are not spending unnecessary time in non-permanent situations?

Answer. Yes, we are aware of and support the concept of concurrent planning for children in care. We note that the main problem in Haiti before and after the earthquake is that the GoH does not have a child welfare system that is able to engage in case-by-case analysis of each child's situation and needs so that, if needed, a concurrent plan could be written, approved, and executed. Immediately after the earthquake so many children were in need of emergency care—such as food, water and shelter—that the immediate priority was to focus on those needs. In the near future, with fiscal year 2010 bilateral and supplemental funding, the USG will prioritize support to the GoH in building and leading a national child protection plan based on international standards, child welfare laws and regulations, and effective moni-

toring and evaluation. Such a plan will lead to improved legislation and policies, thus providing the legal framework for alternative care, including conditions for placement of children with foster families.

UNIVERSAL DEFINITION OF ORPHAN

Question. As you know, one of the many challenges in addressing the needs of orphan children in Haiti is the lack of a universally accepted definition of what is an orphan. In fact, the often cited estimate that there were 380,000 orphans in Haiti prior to the earthquake include children who had one living parent and/or extended family.

What can the United States do to assist the Government of Haiti in developing the data necessary to better understand what children's precise needs are?

Answer. The United States Government is actively assisting in the development of the data systems necessary to better understand children's precise needs by providing expert technical assistance to the U.S. Mission Child Protection Team, technical assistance and transport for the Government of Haiti (GoH) and UNICEF assessments of the needs of children in hundreds of orphanages in the Port-au-Prince area, and by supporting nationally representative surveys such as periodic demographic and health surveys (DHS) and a recent survey of child trafficking, restaveks (children in residential care performing household labor in slave-like conditions), and child victims of violence.

The figure of 380,000 is the UNICEF estimate of the number of children under 18, before the earthquake, who had lost one or both parents. Of this number, 330,000 children had lost one parent and 50,000 had lost both parents. The great majority of these children were living with the surviving parent (if a single orphan) or with extended family members, usually a grandparent or aunt or uncle.

Prior to the earthquake, only 67 of an estimated 600 residential care centers (referred to as "orphanages," though many of the children have one or both parents living) had been registered with the GoH. Because a majority of these centers were unregistered, there is little official data or statistics on children living in these conditions. Approximately 300 of these centers were located in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding earthquake-affected area.

The USG is supporting the GoH and UNICEF to map and build a database of children's residential care centers to facilitate stronger oversight through registration and monitoring in the future. As of March 15, the UNICEF-led Child Protection Sub-cluster (CPSC) had completed assessments in 488 residential care centers. More than 30,000 children were residing in assessed centers, while some were found to be no longer hosting children. The USAID-funded database is now co-managed by UNICEF and the Haiti Institute of Social Welfare and Research (IBESR), and includes information made available and continuously updated by 59 international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based groups and faith based organizations that compose the Child Protection Sub-Cluster. This database has utmost relevance as it represents the first ever baseline regarding the situation of children in residential care in Haiti.

With USAID support, Haiti carried out demographic and health surveys in 1994–1995, 2000, and 2005–2006. The 2005–2006 survey included information for children under 18 about whether the parents are alive, whether the children live with their parents and the relationship to other members of the household.

Nonetheless, there is wide recognition that Haiti's knowledge base about orphans and vulnerable children is not sufficient to immediately inform program development. Within the next 6 months, UNICEF and the Haitian Institute of Social Welfare and Research plan to conduct an ample survey to investigate the root cause for the unprecedented concentration of children in Port-au-Prince orphanages (e.g., direct consequence of the earthquake, poverty-driven separation, and displacement for household labor, among others) and to refine estimates of the number of children in restavek.

The USG may assist the GoH to conduct this survey as soon as possible, thus ensuring that accurate data is available and that child protection activities are based on solid evidence, benefiting the largest number possible of vulnerable children.

LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS

Question. Long term solutions to the issues facing Haiti's orphan children will undoubtedly require the mobilization and coordination of both traditional and non-traditional partners. Have you given any thought about how you might mobilize faith based, corporate and professional partners around the goal of providing families for orphan children?

Answer. Yes, a great deal of thought has been given to the mobilization of such partners. Faith-based partners in particular have long played a central and seminal role in assisting children and are well positioned to scale-up such services. USG agencies are currently working with a variety of faith-based partners in Haiti to address the needs of orphans and vulnerable children.

Catholic Relief Services, the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Food for the Hungry, Samaritan's Purse, World Vision, Care International and Save the Children, several of which are faith-based, are among the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance's main partners in the January to April emergency assistance phase. Together, these organizations have received over \$85 million from USAID to provide shelter, food, water and emergency health services to Haiti's vulnerable children and their caregivers.

LOCAL CONTRACTING

Question. Under the Stafford Act, preference is supposed to be given to local contractors in disaster affected areas when bids on Federal contracts are being awarded. However, following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Louisiana experienced a situation by which out-of-state contractors coming in and underbidding local contractors for the disaster recovery projects. In this instance the government needed to enforce stricter oversight of contract awards to ensure that the recovery contracts were not only going to help rebuild these communities, but also ensure that local economies would benefit as well.

Does the proposed funding for rebuilding Haiti include planning provisions to provide preferences for local contracting as the country works to rebuild its infrastructure and its economy?

Answer. The USG is committed to engaging local partners in its reconstruction efforts. We are pursuing several different strategies to ensure that local partners are included in ways that are transparent and in compliance with USG contracting regulations.

For example, we will maximize local procurement and are developing a program to assist local entities in understanding and complying with USAID reporting guidelines. We are designing scopes of work and program descriptions in a way that will emphasize a larger number of small awards to open the contracting process to local enterprises. Engagement with local partners will be part of the selection criteria in all of our solicitations. Similarly, we will increase local participation by making Creole language skills a requirement for certain personnel under our contract solicitations.

HAZARD MITIGATION

Question. The U.S. government recognizes the importance of hazard mitigation response particularly in the wake of a disaster. After the President issues a disaster declaration Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funding is made available to the disaster affected states. In fact, a Congressional Budget Office study supports the concept of funding hazard mitigation practices as a way for the Federal government to ultimately save money. The study concluded that for every \$1 invested in mitigation projects the Federal government saves \$3.

Does the U.S. funding request for Haiti include a plan for hazard mitigation assistance if the donated funds are used to rebuild the damaged infrastructure?

Will USAID also provide technical assistance to the Haitian government in regards to developing building codes that can withstand future earthquake and hurricane damage?

Answer. Since 1994, Haiti has witnessed five devastating natural catastrophes, each destroying livelihoods that Haitians worked hard to rebuild. Overcoming this cycle of disaster requires an in-depth understanding of the threats. The United States has worked with leading scientists to map high-risk areas by tracking flooding, landslides and storms over the past decades and complementing this analysis with projections on future hazards. This analysis has been shared and discussed with Haitian authorities and informed the GOH's preliminary vision document. It is also informing the drafting of the final Haitian National Reconstruction and Development Plan, which will be presented at the March 31 donors conference in New York.

Recently the White House National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction (SDR) convened a meeting, co-sponsored by USAID, Dept of State, and the U.N. International Strategy on Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), on "Rebuilding for Resilience: How Science and Engineering Can Inform Haiti's Reconstruction". This workshop was held in Miami earlier this week and included academics, practitioners, and policy makers representing the top scientists,

engineers, social scientists, land-use planners, and officials associated with Haiti for hazard evaluation, construction, and social structure. Among the 107 invited participants were nearly a dozen Haitians, from academics to the Minister of the Environment. The intent of the workshop was to establish a dialogue among all parties and to produce a set of statements to guide donors and others in the effort to build back with resilience in the face of multiple hazards. The workshop was quite successful in meeting its goals.

The President's Supplemental Budget Request for Haiti, submitted to Congress yesterday, recognizes that Port-au-Prince should be built back to a better standard. Reconstruction investments must decongest the city to a safer and more sustainable size, and institute building codes and effective zoning. The same principles apply to the newly designated growth poles. In all of the infrastructure and housing activities described in the supplemental request, the United States will support stronger building codes as part of our goal to "build back better."

SHELTERING

Question. Tragically, as a result of the earthquake in Haiti, approximately 600,000 people are still living under tarps, tents or bed sheets in an effort to find shelter. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. government acknowledged that temporary housing options such as travel trailers were not the only solution, clearly, tents are not a long-term viable option for Haiti as the rainy season approaches.

What is the U.S. plan for long-term housing assistance to Haiti?

As we work to rebuild Haiti, does the U.S. government intend to recommend the implementation of economical, environmentally sustainable housing solutions like those being tested by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Emmetsburg, Maryland?

Answer. The durable plastic sheeting/tarps that USAID and other partners distributed is on track to reach its May 1 target. Learning from past disasters like the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquake in Pakistan, the humanitarian response in Haiti focused on waterproof, rip-proof, and fire-resistant sheeting instead of tents, since tents are not as durable or adaptable. The plastic sheets have been used as weather-resistant covering for roofs and walls of emergency shelters, and they will be integral in supporting the Government of Haiti's longer-term housing response.

As hurricane season approaches and the humanitarian response begins to focus on constructing more durable shelter, these sheets will be combined with transitional shelter kits that contain cement, timber or steel framing, tin roofs, and nails to create transitional shelters that will protect from heavy winds and rain. The transitional shelter kits can be recycled and re-used in the construction of more permanent housing with a concrete slab floor, and can be easily assembled by local labor. USAID, in keeping with the internationally accepted best practices espoused by the U.N. Shelter Cluster, has encouraged these community-based, equitable, and cost-effective transitional shelters instead of larger pre-fab housing in order to minimize the opportunity for social conflict, maximize cost-effectiveness, and ensure that housing solutions are culturally and site-appropriate. Past experience has shown that inequitable resource distribution—such as providing pre-fab shelters to some, but not all community members—can be a driver for conflict. Land scarcity and the relatively high cost of pre-fab shelters would preclude their being distributed universally. By using emergency shelter materials for more durable transitional and permanent shelter, USAID is supporting economical and environmentally sustainable housing that is culturally appropriate for the Haitian context.

The President's supplemental request for Haiti includes \$133 million for investments in new settlements. In Port-au-Prince, through a "sites and services" approach, the program would deliver an estimated 9,600 houses to homeless families. In two of the designated secondary cities, an additional 14,400 families would benefit from this program. These communities would have access to clean water, sewage, and electricity. Homes on allocated lots would be constructed incrementally to adequate building codes, supported by training in construction, supervised by experts, and include materials appropriate for the Haitian climates and customs. This would ensure the creation of thousands of temporary jobs in the construction sector and allow Haitians to gain the skills required to perform maintenance and find future employment in this sector. These 24,000 units would be home to 100,000–120,000 people. They would be integrated with planned investments by the United States and other donors and multilateral partners in social sectors, roads, security, rule of law and governance.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

Question. Just last week, The Washington Post featured an article which reported that “many Afghan women say they still feel voiceless.” And, CNN featured a heart-breaking story last week about a 19-year-old Afghan woman whose nose and ears were cut off for shaming her in-laws. She had suffered torture and abuse for years.

It also is not surprising that there are media reports that say that President Karzai’s peace conference next month will have very limited input from women.

During your service in the Senate, you and I had the opportunity to travel to Afghanistan together where we met a group of Afghan women. The progress we were seeing then seems so distant. We cannot forget about these women.

Can you comment on any progress you are seeing in this area?

Answer. Women’s empowerment in Afghanistan and their full and equal participation in their society are fundamental prerequisites for achieving a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. I underscored this in my remarks in London earlier this year at the International Conference on Afghanistan, where I met with the women from Afghan civil society who addressed the conference and emphasized that women need to be involved at every step of the way in the process of rebuilding Afghan civil society. The participation of Afghan women is critical for sustainable development, better governance, and peace—in short, they are essential to securing a better future for Afghanistan.

As reintegration and reconciliation efforts move forward, the United States is committed to ensuring that Afghan women’s rights will not be sacrificed. I underscored this during our recent United States-Afghanistan Strategic Dialogue, where I met with the three women members of the Afghan delegation. Women want peace. They do not want to be sold out. We supported Afghan women civil society’s own recommendations to include 20 percent women at the Consultative Peace Jirga that just took place between June 2 and June 4 as well as follow-on shuras and consultations at all levels—at the national, provincial, and local levels. There were 336 female delegates among the 1,600 total delegates, which is approximately 21 percent. Women had diverse experiences during the Consultative Peace Jirga. While some felt they were able to participate in their committees and ensured that women were mentioned in the outcome document, others were disappointed with the outcomes of the peace jirga, since only one woman was a facilitator out of 28 groups.

Via the Ambassador’s Small Grants Fund, which aims to strengthen the technical and organizational capacity of Afghan women-led NGOs, we supported a 2-day pre-Peace Jirga conference for most of the female Jirga participants, which helped provide them with the training and skills necessary to assist them serve as key participants and facilitators in the Consultative Peace Jirga. I assure you we will continue to advocate for the full participation of women in the ongoing discussions in Afghanistan on issues of peace, stability and security.

While there has been progress for women in certain areas, including girls’ education and women’s political participation, much remains to be done to improve the lives of women overall. Today, more than 6.2 million students are enrolled in Afghanistan’s schools, of which 35 percent are girls. Nonetheless, overcoming years of exclusion from education is a long process. Only an estimated 21 percent of Afghan women are literate, and the female illiteracy rate is as high as 90 percent in rural areas. Although there is broad popular support for girls’ schooling, extremists still try to impose their brutal agenda by force, by burning down schools, gassing school-girls, or throwing acid in the faces of female students.

In health as well as in education, the Taliban excluded women from all services. The legacy of those restrictions has left Afghanistan with the second-highest maternal mortality rate in the world, and other health indicators for women, particularly in the area of reproductive health, are similarly low, although slowly making progress. With U.S. government assistance, access to health services has risen dramatically since 2001. The number of midwives available to assist with deliveries has quadrupled; the number of health facilities with women health workers has more than doubled. There has been a 26-percent increase in the total number of antenatal visits and a 30-percent increase in the number of women delivering with the assistance of a skilled midwife.

As you can see, while women’s lives are improving in some areas, there is still much more work to be done to achieve full political, economic and social empowerment. I look forward to continuing to work with you to ensure that our programs for Afghan women effectively address their needs and promote their sustained political, economic, and social progress.

Question. President Karzai has said an action plan for reintegrating Taliban fighters into society and talking with the insurgency’s top leaders will be crafted at a

spring peace conference in Kabul. Can you comment on what you expect will be the outcome of this conference?

Answer. President Karzai's Consultative Peace Jirga will build momentum as a stepping stone toward the Kabul Conference and give voice to the Afghan people in their efforts to end the insurgency. Specifically, the Consultative Peace Jirga will unveil to a cross-section of Afghan society the Afghan Government's peace plan, including a program to reintegrate insurgent commanders and fighters peacefully back into their communities. The jirga will seek to incorporate input from participants on the peace plan and reintegration program. It will be the first in a series of national-level meetings we expect to foster discussion of the peace process in Afghanistan, including the Kabul Conference, and a tentatively planned follow-on jirga in fall 2010.

We support Afghan-led reintegration of former insurgents—identified as a priority by President Karzai in his November 2009 inauguration speech—as it is aimed at reducing fighting and reintegrating insurgents peacefully into communities. Fighters must pledge to cease violence, live in accordance with the Afghan Constitution, and have no ties to al-Qaeda or affiliated transnational terrorist organizations.

Reintegration will require the strong financial support of the international community as well as political support in keeping with the hard-won political and human rights of all Afghan citizens—men and women alike—as enshrined in the Afghan Constitution. We support the inclusion of Afghan women in the upcoming Consultative Peace Jirga deliberations.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LISA MURKOWSKI

Question. In order to protect U.S. interests in the Arctic region, I believe that it is vital for the Senate to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Secretary Clinton, you have previously stated that you support ratification. What can we do to make the Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty a priority for this administration?

Answer. This Administration continues to strongly support accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, and, as you are aware, we have included the Convention on the Treaty Priority List as one for which the Administration seeks Senate approval. As conveyed to Senators Kerry and Lugar in October 2009, the Department of State stands ready to facilitate the Senate's consideration of this treaty by providing witnesses, testimony, and overall support. We appreciate your leadership in our efforts to gain the necessary support for advice and consent to accession of this vitally important treaty.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO HON. ROBERT M. GATES

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN DANIEL K. INOUE

Question. Secretary Gates, one of our military strategies in Afghanistan is to clear, hold, then build in an area. U.S. forces and the Afghan National Army have begun that mission in Marja. They have successfully cleared the area of the Taliban and are now in the process of holding the area. The ability to hold an area in the long term will largely come down to the Afghan National Police maintaining security. Unfortunately, I am informed that the people of Marja have so little faith in the Afghan National Police that some have stated they prefer to have the Taliban over the Police force. If this is the perception of the Afghan Police, how do we move forward with our strategy to hold and build?

Answer. The premise of the question is only partly accurate. The Taliban have controlled Marjah for several years. Prior to the Taliban controlling Marjah, the local Afghan police were untrained and were led by and loyal to a local strongman. When a combined effort of Afghan and international forces pushed the Taliban out of Marjah, they were welcomed by the local population who said they wanted neither the Taliban nor the old abusive police back. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was well aware of the history and had planned for this by having the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), the nationally led, well-trained element of the Afghan National Police (ANP), ready to go into Marjah as combat ended. The ANCOP have been deployed to Marjah for almost 2 months, and have been welcomed by the local population as they build trust in the ANP as an institution. We are working with the Afghans to develop their capabilities to improve the ANP and begin the process of transition for the long term.

It is essential to our counterinsurgency strategy that the ANP be trusted by the people, and perceived as effective and not corrupt. The NATO Training Mission Af-

ghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (NTM–A/CSTC–A) is working to increase accountability and transparency, as well as to institutionalize processes within the ANP to counter corruption.

Question. Secretary Gates, the supplemental request before the Committee supports our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan but also supports the troop surge of an additional 30,000 troops in Afghanistan that President Obama approved in December 2009. Of those 30,000 troops, roughly 10,000 are already in theater and the remaining 20,000 are still being deployed by the Department and will largely consist of Army units and enablers. If this surge is one of the keys to success in Afghanistan, why is it taking so long for those troops to get on the ground and why are the Marine units able to get on the ground faster than the Army units?

Answer. The speed at which forces flow into theater is determined by the sequence and timing specified by the Combatant Commander. The flow of forces is also impacted by transportation availability and the theater's ability to absorb (or accommodate) the arrival of incoming forces.

The majority of the forces associated with the additional 30,000 troops were requested in three USCENTCOM Requests For Forces (RFFs). The first 12,485 forces were ordered by the SecDef on December 4, 2009. The Combatant Commander requested a Marine regiment to arrive in March 2010, Army brigades in July 2010, and an Army combat aviation brigade in July 2010. Efforts to accelerate this force flow succeeded in delivering the first of these forces to Afghanistan in mid-December 2009. While 97 percent of the requested forces are scheduled to arrive in Afghanistan by August 31, 2010 in accordance with the Combatant Commander's requirement, forces have requested arrival dates as far out as November 15, 2010.

The first unit of the 30,000 additional forces to arrive in Afghanistan was an Army aviation battalion in mid-December. This Army battalion was immediately followed by two Marine battalions and another Army infantry battalion which arrived at the end of January 2010. In total, between December 15, 2009 and January 31, 2010 forces approximately equal in size from both the Army and the Marines arrived in Afghanistan.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Question. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2011 budget submitted by the President includes estimates for overseas contingency operations of \$50 billion per year for fiscal year 2012 and beyond. Can you address, in detail, the rationale behind the budget estimate and whether the President is anticipating submitting revenue or spending measures to offset the amount requested should it exceed \$50 billion?

Answer. The \$50 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO) for fiscal year 2012 and beyond is a placeholder developed by the Administration. The actual OCO budget requests will be dependent upon the security situation on the ground.

I do not know whether the President anticipates submitting revenue or spending measures to offset the actual amount requested should it exceed \$50 billion.

Question. Secretary Gates, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction has reported that corruption and mismanagement continue to waste hundreds of millions of reconstruction dollars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but you have rejected his recommendation for the creation of a new entity to coordinate and oversee reconstruction efforts. What, then, are you doing to ensure that those monies are spent effectively on projects that contribute to stability and that can be maintained after the U.S. presence has withdrawn?

Answer. The Department places significant emphasis on addressing waste, fraud, and abuse in reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The Department works closely with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and other inspector general organizations to ensure appropriate oversight.

From a practical standpoint, the creation of a new U.S. Government oversight organization for reconstruction would likely take some time to establish, which would exceed the timeline for the drawdown of military presence in Iraq. Given the current conditions in Iraq, theater guidance has continued to emphasize a shift towards smaller-scale, capacity-building projects that contribute to stability. Commanders on the ground work closely with local Iraqi organizations to transfer responsibility for projects where necessary, to identify any sustainment requirements, and to ensure there is the required Iraqi commitment to a new initiative before it is launched.

Question. Secretary Gates, you and I have both devoted a great deal of attention to addressing the timeliness of the medical evacuation responses in Afghanistan. I recently learned that the average time of these missions has been significantly decreased from over an hour and a half to an average of less than 45 minutes from the time of notification of the injury of a service member to the time of arrival at

a first level surgical facility. Recognizing that the more rapid the response, the more lives are saved, what are the current challenges in providing rapid evacuation and are you firmly committed to continue to provide the most rapid response and evacuations possible?

Answer. [Deleted].

Question. Secretary Gates, I have been informed that certain NATO allies have standards or caveats on their medical evacuation aircraft limiting their support during certain times of the day and under certain battlefield conditions. When U.S. combat forces operate in these areas, they are often required to provide their own medical evacuation capabilities because of either the NATO 90 minute response standard or caveats on their operations limiting response to daylight or non-combat response. What is being done to remedy this issue?

Answer. Seven nations currently have caveats on MEDEVAC missions that include minimum night vision goggle illumination requirements, dust limitations, constraints on flying in mountainous terrain, requirements for landing zones to be secured, or higher headquarters approval processes. Although the Departments of Defense and State consistently appealed to ISAF nations to remove operationally restrictive caveats, we are realistic that limitations in training and budgets, as well as political factors, will preclude all caveats being dropped. Therefore, as part of the President's increase in forces to Afghanistan, a Combat Aviation Brigade is being deployed in RC-North to provide, among other missions, timely MEDEVAC coverage. Additionally, General McChrystal has directed regional commanders to ensure that all Allied service personnel receive appropriate and expedient medical care, ideally within 60 minutes of receipt of a MEDEVAC request.

To support achievement of the goal of 60 minutes for our servicemen and women, in June 2009 I issued a memorandum to Commander, USCENTCOM directing him to achieve medical evacuation parity between Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with the standard for both theaters at 60-minute mission completion time. I further instructed General Petraeus to improve MEDEVAC response times in Afghanistan by: establishing procedures to expedite MEDEVAC mission launches without having to wait for approval; creating a process to identify, analyze, and report all MEDEVAC missions that take longer than 60 minutes; reviewing existing MEDEVAC approval and launch procedures across Afghanistan; directing U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to review International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/NATO procedures and Standard Operating Procedures, and making recommendations to ISAF for streamlining current requirements; and requiring all U.S. forces in the USCENTCOM to review and understand existing MEDEVAC procedures.

Question. Secretary Gates, it has been brought to my attention that during operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces enter areas believed to be infiltrated by the Taliban and, because of the widespread availability of cell phone and satellite phone technology, their efforts to capture the enemy are thwarted when lookouts provide early warning of their approach. What efforts can be undertaken to provide readily available, comprehensive and continuous support to defeat this enemy capability?

Answer. [Deleted].

Question. Secretary Gates, it has come to my attention from a variety of sources that Special Operations forces in Afghanistan do not have sufficient medivac, manned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms or dedicated air assets. As a result, forces are at increased risk. What is being done to remedy this situation and when can these units expect to receive additional support?

Answer. [Deleted].

Question. Secretary Gates, I recently learned that the Air Force plans to transfer 12 C-130 aircraft, including 2 from the 130th Airlift Wing in Charleston, West Virginia, to an Air Force Reserve unit in Arkansas without discussion with the National Guard and without apparent consideration for the ability of the National Guard to sustain its critical support mission during a period of active overseas military operations. Please address the following:

What analyses was conducted by the U.S. Air Force to support the transfer of the 12 C-130 aircraft from National Guard bases across the United States to the Little Rock Air Force Base? My understanding of this proposed reallocation is that, in order to avoid the expense associated with recapitalization of an aging fleet, the Air Force is simply commandeering aircraft from the Air National Guard.

Answer. The recently released Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS) 2016 heavily influenced our decision during the fiscal year 2011 budget development to reduce our C-130 force structure. MCRS showed a decrease demand for tactical airlift, so we opted to retire a portion of our oldest C-130Hs to avoid future required modifications and increasingly costly sustainment. Additionally, we were able to accelerate the planned retirement of C-130Es, whose average age is

46 years. These retirements allowed us to save \$256 million in modification and operations cost over the Future Years Defense Program. In retiring these aircraft we created a gap in the C-130 schoolhouse which had to be sourced from within the remaining C-130 fleet to meet our training requirements. As part of the Air Force Corporate process, it was decided to take small reductions in aircraft inventory from several Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve squadrons.

Question. If the decision is made to transfer these aircraft, will you commit to supporting a request for the procurement of 12 new C-130 aircraft to replace those aircraft being taken from the Air National Guard; aircraft which are very actively involved in support of the homeland security mission as well as direct support of U.S. overseas contingency operations in the theater of operations?

Answer. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study (MCRS) 2016 showed a decreased demand for tactical airlift, so we opted to retire a portion of our oldest C-130Hs to avoid future required modifications and increasingly costly sustainment. These retirements created gaps in the C-130 schoolhouse that we sourced from within the remaining C-130 fleet. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request reduces the total C-130 fleet based on the excess capacity identified in MCRS. There is no current replacement plan to procure additional aircraft specifically for the Air National Guard or Air Force Reserve which would add excess capacity into the C-130 fleet.

Question. The C-130 issue is not the first time the Air Force has attempted to recapitalize the active force at the expense of the National Guard. In the recent past, the Air Force also acquired six RC-26 aircraft from the Air National Guard to supplement Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets in support of overseas contingency operations as an enduring requirement. These aircraft which are critical to the National Guard's homeland defense, homeland security, and domestic counter-narcotics missions in the United States have not been replaced.

Will you commit to supporting a request for the procurement of new aircraft to provide suitable ISR capabilities to the Air National Guard to reconstitute these capabilities?

Answer. The aircraft are operated and owned by the Air National Guard (ANG). Consistent with their Federal role, the Air National Guard has been supporting Air Force Special Operations Command requirements by deploying a small number of RC-26 aircraft on a continuing basis in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The ANG has approached the Air Force to advocate making the RC-26 an Air Force program of record. Those discussions are ongoing and no decisions have been made. However, prior to making any investment decisions, the Air Force would require the ANG to complete a capabilities-based assessment, an initial capabilities document and an analysis of alternatives to determine the best solution to address this operational requirement.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HERB KOHL

STATE AND AGRICULTURE ROLE IN GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY

Question. Secretary Gates, from a national and international security perspective, and from your experience as the former president of a land grant university, what are your views on this?

Answer. I wholeheartedly support the role of the U.S. Departments of State and Agriculture in the Global Food Security initiative. The Administration's Principles for Advancing Global Food Security provide a good roadmap for addressing food security and world hunger issues, which have definite implications for national security and state stability. For any additional comment on global food security, I would defer to the Departments of State and Agriculture.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

Question. If we are going to meet these growing needs, the VA is going to have to accurately predict estimated casualties and develop a long-range strategic casualty plan. And as you know, that is going to take the full commitment of the Pentagon. So I want to make sure that there is not a disconnect between the VA and DOD with regard to data collection and forecasting the needs of our returning service members.

Can you tell me about how you are working to share information? Are you working with the VA on developing and implementing a strategic casualty plan?

Answer. Yes, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) have been working closely in data sharing and on developing and implementing a strategic casualty plan.

Since 2000, DOD has been providing automated daily updates of Service member and veteran personnel data to the VA. By May 2010 the data sent to VA will also include all members who became wounded, injured, or ill (WII) while serving in the military.

Question. But as you also know, there are now an untold number of military spouses who have been completely frozen out of the program after it was closed off to new enrollees. Two weeks ago I sent a letter to you outlining my disappointment in the management of this program and requesting that you expand it to all military spouses from this point forward.

Please comment on your commitment to working with me on reopening this program to all military spouses so that we can better honor the many sacrifices they make.

Answer. I am committed to working with Congress in supporting the families and spouses of Service members.

On March 13, 2010 we resumed the MyCAA program for the 136,583 currently enrolled spouses (Phase 1). We continue to consider a wide range of long-term options for its sustainment (Phase 2) and should have a decision soon on the way ahead.

Question. You previously testified the Department would not change the Air Force's tanker requirements in response to EADS' request for a 90-day extension to the May 10 proposal submittal deadline. However, I am concerned about the recent DOD announcement that EADS would have an additional 60 days if they committed to submitting a bid for the KC-X tanker. They have been a participant in this process for several years and have had ample time to consider whether or not to submit a bid. The delays triggered by this decision will only result in further hindering the replacement of these Eisenhower-era aircraft.

Why did the Department grant an extension for the KC-X tanker RFP to accommodate EADS?

Answer. Competition on KC-X is in the best interest of the Warfighter and taxpayer. In the DOD News Briefing on March 31, 2010, the following was announced, "The Defense Department informed both EADS and Boeing that if we receive formal notification from EADS of their intention to make an offer, we will extend the deadline for bids from May 10 to July 9." Additionally, "It is not uncommon to grant reasonable extensions in competitions of this sort, and we consider 60 days to be reasonable in this case." On April 10, 2010, EADS-NA announced their decision to bid on the KC-X proposal. As a result, the Department granted a 60 day extension to all offerors.

Question. You had previously testified that the Department's lawyers had indicated that there was no legal basis to account for illegal European subsidies to Airbus in the KC-X tanker competition. I would like for you to elaborate on this further as this should be a factor in making a contract award that could negatively impact the U.S. defense aerospace industry.

What did you mean by that statement?

Answer. It would be premature as well as inappropriate to take account of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling in the RFP as any attempt to seek redress can take place only within the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to rules and procedures of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.

Question. Can you provide to the committee within the next week the legal analysis you have undertaken that supports the position that there is no basis for including or accounting for illegal European subsidies to Airbus in the tanker competition?

Answer. No formal written legal position exists on this topic.

HAITI SUPPORT

Question. What legislation would be required for there to be a basis on which you could address the illegal subsidies issue in the tanker competition?

Answer. Legislation already exists. Section 886 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 directs DOD to conduct a study of the impacts to the KC-X source selection from subsidies after a ruling by the World Trade Organization that the United States, the European Union, or any political entity within the United States or the European Union, has provided a covered subsidy to a manufacturer of large commercial aircraft. DOD is to complete the review not later than 90 days after the World Trade Organization has completed ruling on

all cases involving the allegation of a covered subsidy provided to a manufacturer of large commercial aircraft. We intend to comply fully with this requirement.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

Question. According to a recent article, Abdul Qayum Zakir, who was released from Guantanamo Bay this past December, has become a senior Taliban military commander in Afghanistan, replacing Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, whom Pakistani security forces captured last month. What concerns me is that Zakir was released from U.S. custody on December 7.

Are you aware of other detainees that have been released since January 2009 who have returned to the fight?

Answer. QFR response is classified and will be handled via classified channels.

COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS

Question. The U.S. military is planning to scale down its presence in Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. Almost every counternarcotics operation conducted in Afghanistan at this time is supported by the U.S. military and these operations are increasing in number. In 2009, DEA conducted 82 interdiction operations in Afghanistan compared with 43 in fiscal year 2008.

Looking ahead, has DOD begun to plan for continued counternarcotics operational support after the departure of U.S. troops from Afghanistan?

Answer. Since 2004, DOD has built counternarcotics capacity within the Afghan Government, with the goal of creating self-supporting organizations that contribute to the security and stability of Afghanistan. The Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) is the lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution on Afghanistan. To assist with the long-term development and transition of ownership to the Afghan Government, DOD established the CNPA Development Cell (CDC) under the Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC-A)/NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A), with experts from DOJ's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). DOD, partnering with DEA and the Department of State, will continue to build Afghan CNPA capacity to ensure they are capable of countering narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan.

POPPY CROP ERADICATION

Question. It was reported that in the recent U.S. Marine offensive in Marja, Afghanistan orders were given to leave the fields of opium alone. A member of General McChrystal's strategic Advisory Group, Commander Jeffery Eggers was quoted in the N.Y. Times as saying, "We don't trample the livelihood of those we're trying to win over." The spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Counternarcotics said, "How can we allow the world to see lawful forces in charge of Marja next to the fields full of opium, which one way or another will be harvested and turned into poison that kills people all over the world?"

Answer. The current U.S. Counternarcotics (CN) Strategy for Afghanistan focuses resources on those programs that will contribute directly to (1) breaking the narcotics-insurgency-corruption nexus, and (2) helping to connect the people of Afghanistan to their government. U.S. resources are not being applied directly to eradication, which is a shift from the previous CN strategy, but will focus instead on interdiction of drug products, elimination of drug production infrastructure, and development of alternative crops. Eradication efforts are the responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan. The Department appreciates that there is no single easy answer to dealing with Marja's winter opium crop. It is critical that counterinsurgency operations involving clearing and holding territory include CN efforts within the subsequent "build" phase, during which counterinsurgency forces build support for the Afghan government.

Question. The Taliban is both a terrorist organization and a drug cartel that makes hundreds of millions of dollars a year selling the heroin that comes from poppy plants in Afghanistan.

Why has DOD allowed the illegal poppy fields, that produce opium and provide essential funding for the Taliban, to be harvested?

Answer. As part of the Administration's new Afghanistan strategy, the U.S. Government no longer funds or supports large-scale eradication of poppy fields which targets the local farmer, though we do not object to Afghan-led eradication. Preventing workers from growing poppy as a cash crop can lead to unrest and contributes to Taliban recruiting. Moreover, payments to prevent poppy cultivation have

also failed. Instead, the Counternarcotics (CN) strategy is directly linked to the counterinsurgency strategy undertaken in a “whole-of-government” approach. The new strategy is focused on the re-development of the agricultural sector as an engine for job growth and higher incomes for rural families, enabling farmers to choose licit alternatives to poppy and promotes self reliance. At the same time, we focus on the interdiction of drugs, precursor chemicals, stopping drug traffickers, and arresting drug lords.

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, along with their international and Afghan partners, are clearing and holding key terrain, securing an environment where a building effort can proceed. U.S. Marines are currently providing micro-grants and loans to farmers in Marjah that provide them agriculture inputs—things like tools, seeds, and fertilizer—to grow licit summer crops. USAID and other United States, Afghan, and international organizations are providing additional developmental support to local Afghan populations to allow them to participate in a legitimate economy.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Question. As you know, with some technical modifications unarmed UAVs can be converted into capable armed platforms. With increased proliferation of advanced UAV technology, I am concerned that the military advantage the United States currently retains will be undermined through unregulated exports or transfers of this technology by our own country or other nations.

In detail, what is DOD’s current policy regarding the sale or transfer of UAVs to foreign countries?

Answer. Given the wide range of U.S.-origin UAV platforms and systems that are available for sale, DOD evaluates proposed foreign sales or transfers on a case-by-case basis since all UAV equipment and technologies controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) are subject to a case-by-case review. MTCR Category I systems, which include almost all armed UAVs in the Department of Defense’s inventory¹, are subject to a strong presumption of denial and are evaluated in accordance with the MTCR Guidelines and U.S. nonproliferation policy.

Within DOD, the term “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)” (rather than “UAVs”) is normally used to describe the complete capability delivered with these systems, including the aircraft or vehicle, payloads, control segment, and communications architecture. There are several DOD policies and processes that are employed to assess proposed foreign sales or transfers of UAS platforms and technologies. These DOD policies and processes are also used to make recommendations to senior DOD officials for or against proposed UAS sales, and establish proposed terms and conditions for such sales if they are deemed to be in the U.S. national security interest. DOD uses several technology security and foreign disclosure processes (e.g., National Military Information Disclosure Policy Committee; Low Observable/Counter Low Observable Executive Committee; Committee for National Security Systems) to assess proposed foreign sales or transfers of UASs. The Combatant Commanders’ opinions play a key role in these DOD decision processes. These DOD assessments and recommendations, as well as the Department of State’s (DoS’s) independent assessments and views, are considered in the DoS/DOD MTCR process. If necessary, the National Security Council decision process can be used to resolve divergent views within the interagency arena and formulate an Administration position on a proposed UAS foreign sale or transfer.

In the event the Administration decides a proposed UAS foreign sale or transfer is needed to build the partner capacity of an allied or friendly nation, specific details of the UAS capability and technology offered for sale or transfer must be established by the Department. For example, the Combatant Commanders have asked that modifications be made in areas such as UAS sensor or data transmission capabilities in order to retain the warfighting advantage for U.S. Forces. In addition, the Department may implement anti-tamper techniques to protect UAS critical program technology. To provide further protection against misuse or diversion, the Department normally recommends that UASs with significant military capability be sold via the Foreign Military Sales program, including Enhanced End Use Monitoring of the sale or transfer after delivery to the foreign government, consistent with Defense Security Cooperation Agency policies and procedures.

Accordingly, the Department fully complies with all Arms Export Control Act statutory requirements, as well as USG export control regulations and DOD national disclosure policy requirements prior to UAS foreign sales or transfers.

¹The only armed MTCR Category II UAS in the U.S. inventory is the Hunter B UAS. To date, there have been no exports of the armed Hunter B UAS.

Question. Do you support limiting the export of U.S. UAV technology capable of being employed to deliver munitions?

Answer. We believe the existing regulatory and statutory limitations on the export of U.S. UAS technology capable of being employed to deliver munitions are working well. As noted in a previous answer, almost all current armed UASs in the DOD's inventory are Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I systems. These UASs are subject to a strong presumption of denial and are fully evaluated for missile proliferation issues consistent with our commitments under the MTCR. Any proposed export of armed UASs undergoes an extensive review and vetting through both the Departments of Defense and State. Finally, the Administration (normally the Department of State) provides applicable congressional notifications required by the Arms Export Control Act and other relevant statutes prior to making a commitment to sell or transfer such UASs. These notifications enable Legislative Branch oversight of such proposed sales as an integral part of the overall U.S. Government decisionmaking process.

Question. What is the Department doing to ensure that UAVs are not used against American troops?

Answer. The Department is committed to ensuring that Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) technologies do not fall into the wrong hands. We are undertaking several initiatives to ensure these systems are appropriately controlled.

Currently, all armed U.S. UASs are Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I systems, and as such, there is a presumption of denial of any export. The Department evaluates any key operational or strategic basis that could potentially overcome the presumption of denial. The Department is working with the Department of State on a Foreign Military Sales (FMS)-only policy specifically for MTCR Category I systems. In addition to the FMS-only policy for armed UASs, all UAS transfers are subject to enhanced use-monitoring using the Department's Golden Sentry and end-use checks. In addition, the Department has implemented a number of processes to ensure that the Direct Commercial Sales of UAS do not pose a threat to U.S. Forces. These measures include rigorous background end-user checks by the Departments of State and Defense.

Question. Have you investigated the possibility of entering into agreements with foreign nations and foreign producers of advanced UAV technology to limit the sale or transfer of this technology?

Answer. Two multi-lateral regimes, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, already address the export of advanced UAVs, their subsystems and components, and associated technologies (DOD uses the term UAS). The Department will continue to work closely with our allies and partners to add export controls on UAVs in the Wassenaar Arrangement. In addition, the Department is continually updating the UAV technologies controlled under the MTCR. Normally, the Department meets twice a year with our MTCR Partners to consider updates to the list of items controlled. In addition, the Department shares intelligence and proliferation trends at the MTCR Information Exchange with our MTCR Partners to achieve a common understanding of worldwide proliferation trends. The U.S. Government does work with other countries in its efforts to limit UAS proliferation to end-users of concern. Although the Department of Defense is not the lead agency, it works closely with the Department of State to address UAS proliferation issues, including by cooperating with other countries to address potential exports that raise proliferation concerns or may not be consistent with international norms. Given the U.S. Government's extensive involvement in these multilateral regimes and existing bilateral contacts, the Department does not believe there is a need for additional arrangements with foreign nations and producers of advanced UASs.

CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Question. Secretary Gates, on September 29, 2009, Senator Leahy and I sent a letter to the President along with 14 of our colleagues urging him to conduct a thorough review of U.S. policy in cluster munitions. As you may know, Senator Leahy and I have introduced the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act—co-sponsored by 25 of our colleagues—to restrict the use of cluster bombs with high failure rates. And on August 6, 2010, the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions which prohibits the use of cluster bombs formally comes into effect. I understand the White House has referred our letter to the Pentagon for a response.

What is the status of your response?

Answer. The National Security Advisor, General Jones, provided a written response to your letter on April 14. He said, in part, "United States policy on Conventional Weapons is a priority for the Administration. We are already conducting a

comprehensive policy review on U.S. landmine policy. Once this is complete, we intend to initiate a comparable comprehensive review of our cluster munitions policy, which deserves equal attention.”

Currently, the Military Services are implementing the DOD policy entitled “DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians” which I signed in June 2008. This policy was the result of a year-long Departmental review and requires that after 2018 all cluster munitions, after arming, result in no more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments. The policy establishes a comprehensive approach to addressing concerns related to cluster munitions that will significantly reduce the potential risk to civilians associated with the use of cluster munitions while retaining an important military capability. DOD will continue to ensure that employment of cluster munitions is consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, U.S. targeting methodologies and Rules of Engagement, and applicable international agreements in order to minimize the impact on civilian populations and infrastructure.

PRIVATE DOD CONTRACTORS

Question. I understand that you have initiated a 15-day review to look into reports that Michael D. Furlong used government funds to hire private contractors to gather information on suspected insurgents in Afghanistan. I have the following questions about your 15-day review.

Will the review also go beyond Mr. Furlong to examine the expanding network of Pentagon contractors with professed expertise in “information operations” or intelligence collection?

Answer. There are no plans at this time to expand the review beyond the examination of Mr. Furlong’s activities.

Question. Will the results of the review be shared with the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and with the Intelligence Committee?

Answer. Once the review has been completed the results will be shared with the appropriate Congressional Committees.

Question. Is it true that the DOD Inspector General is also investigating Mr. Furlong’s work?

Answer. Formal investigations by the Defense Criminal Investigation Service and Air Force Office of Special Investigations are underway, as well as ATSD (IO), Mike Decker, conducting investigations on whether Joint Information Operations Warfare Center personnel or contractors were used to conduct HUMINT.

Question. Will the DOD IG’s report be shared with the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and with the Intelligence Committee?

Answer. The results from the various reports will be shared with the appropriate Congressional Committees.

Question. If there were concerns raised about Mr. Furlong’s activities why was there no notification made to any Congressional Committee?

Answer. The initial assessment addressed overall contracting oversight and found no evidence of problems beyond this specific contract. We have now focused investigations on this specific contract and associated activities to determine whether contractual, security or department policy violations may have occurred in the past. Once the investigations are completed we will share the results with the appropriate Congressional Committees.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM JOHNSON

Question. The supplemental request includes \$529 million for military construction in Afghanistan to support the troop increase. The fiscal year 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations request includes another \$1.26 billion for military construction to support the war in Afghanistan. Most of the fiscal year 2011 projects are not scheduled for completion until well into fiscal year 2012 or even 2013. Some are at locations that are likely to be enduring, but others are not.

Given that the President has announced his intent to begin to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July 2011, how do you reconcile the construction timeline for the projects at non-enduring bases with the President’s timeline for withdrawing troops from Afghanistan?

Answer. In accordance with the Presidential timeline for withdrawal, the International Security Assistance Force will, in July 2010, begin to transfer responsibility to the Afghans. Because this transfer will occur district-by-district and province-by-province, based upon conditions as they evolve on the ground, the USCENTCOM and ISAF Commanders will continue to synchronize the application of resources to include military construction funds within a dynamic timeline.

Currently, military construction resources are primarily being applied to the major logistical and command and control hubs; designated as enduring bases. Other locations where military construction funding is being applied include critical locations to support the expansion of security and governance; focused on areas that are unlikely candidates for early transition to Afghanistan. Finally, some of the military construction projects are occurring at non-enduring bases which address force protection issues, including life, health, and safety concerns in compliance with Sections 317 and 807 of the 2010 NDAA.

Question. If the primary purpose of these projects is to support our troops, is there any reason why they shouldn't be funded in the fiscal year 2010 supplemental in order to accelerate the construction timeline?

Answer. There is no reason fiscal year 2011 OCO projects should not be funded in the fiscal year 2010 supplemental. However, with the large fiscal year 2010 program already appropriated and projects requested in the fiscal year 2010 OCO Supplemental, accelerating the fiscal year 2011 program will be a challenge to execute by the end of fiscal year 2010. Our execution/contracting agents are nearing capacity and thus would focus on those fiscal year 2011 projects for which earlier timing would most benefit our forces on the ground. The majority of projects in the fiscal year 2011 OCO request will most likely be awarded in fiscal year 2011, regardless of the year of funding.

Question. In light of the President's timeline for troop withdrawal, do you anticipate additional military construction requirements beyond fiscal year 2011?

Answer. It is too early to determine if additional military constructions requirements will be needed.

Question. An accounting of the total funding appropriated for military construction in Iraq since 2003, by location, project, and fiscal year, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Answer. The attached tables display the total funding for military construction and contingency construction authority (CCA) projects in Iraq since 2003 for all Services.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MILCON) FUNDING IN IRAQ—FISCAL YEAR 2004-FISCAL YEAR 2010
 [In thousands of dollars]

	Appropriated	Current Funding Level
Appropriated MILCON ¹	1,502,780	1,237,174
Title 10 U.S.C. 2808		145,000
Contingency Construction Authority		704,000
Total Funding	1,502,780	2,086,174

¹ The difference between the "Appropriated" and "Current Funding Level" is attributable to the: Fiscal year 2008 undistributed reduction (Public Law 111-32) in the amount of \$120,576,000. Canceled projects. \$56,780,000. \$42,000,000 funded Title 10 U.S.C. 2808 projects.

Note: There were no Military Construction projects in Iraq for fiscal years 2003, 2009, or 2010.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN IRAQ

[In thousands of dollars]

Service	Fiscal Year	Location	Project	Appropriated Amount	Current Funding Level
Army	2008	Al Asad, Iraq	Hot Cargo Ramp 1	18,500	
Army	2008	Al Asad, Iraq	Landfill Construction	3,100	2,100
Army	2008	Al Asad, Iraq	South Airfield Apron (India Ramp) 1	28,000	
Army	2008	Baghdad, Iraq	Water Supply, Treatment & Storage, PH III 1	13,000	
Army	2008	Camp Adder, Iraq	Convoy Support Center Relocation, Phase II	39,000	39,000
Army	2008	Camp Adder, Iraq	Petroleum Oil and Lubricant Storage Area 1	10,000	
Army	2008	Camp Adder, Iraq	Wastewater Treatment and Collection System	9,800	9,800
Army	2008	Camp Anaconda, Iraq	Hazardous Waste Incinerator 1	4,300	
Army	2008	Camp Anaconda, Iraq	Landfill Construction	6,200	2,800
Army	2008	Camp Constitution, Iraq	Juvenile Tifric 2	11,700	
Army	2008	Camp Marez, Iraq	Landfill Construction	880	880
Army	2008	Camp Ramadi, Iraq	Landfill Construction	880	880
Army	2008	Camp Speicher, Iraq	Aviation Navigation Facilities 1	13,400	
Army	2008	Camp Speicher, Iraq	Landfill Construction	5,900	3,900
Army	2008	Camp Speicher, Iraq	Military Control Point	5,800	5,800
Army	2008	Camp Taqqadum, Iraq	Landfill Construction	880	880
Army	2008	Camp Victory, Iraq	Landfill Construction 2	6,200	
Army	2008	Camp Victory, Iraq	Level 3 Hospital 1	13,400	
Army	2008	Camp Victory, Iraq	Wastewater Treatment and Collection System 1	9,800	
Army	2008	Camp Warrior, Iraq	Water Treatment and Storage, Phase II 1	18,000	
Army	2008	Fallujah, Iraq	Landfill Construction 2	880	
Army	2008	Q-West, Iraq	Landfill Construction	880	880
Army	2008	Q-West, Iraq	North Entry Control Point	11,400	11,400
Army	2008	Q-West, Iraq	Perimeter Security Upgrade	14,600	9,600
Army	2008	Scania, Iraq	Entry Control Point 2	5,000	
Army	2008	Scania, Iraq	Water Storage Tanks 2	9,200	
Army	2008	Various Locations, Iraq	E-Glass Overhead Cover, Phase IV	105,000	105,000
Army	2008	Various Locations, Iraq	Overhead Cover E-Glass	30,000	30,000
Air Force	2008	Balad AB, Iraq	Fighter Ramp	11,000	11,000
Air Force	2008	Balad AB, Iraq	Foxrot Taxiway	12,700	12,700
Air Force	2008	Balad AB, Iraq	Helicopter Maintenance Facility	34,600	13,450
			Total 2008	454,000	260,070

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN IRAQ—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

Service	Fiscal Year	Location	Project	Appropriated Amount	Current Funding Level
Army	2007	Al Asad, Iraq	Heavy Aircraft Apron	14,400	11,700
Army	2007	Al Asad, Iraq	Transient Aircraft Apron	4,150	4,150
Army	2007	Al Asad, Iraq	Runway with Shelters	13,600	13,600
Army	2007	Al Asad, Iraq	Water Storage Tanks	14,000	9,200
Army	2007	Al Asad, Iraq	Electrical Infrastructure Upgrades	14,600	14,600
Army	2007	Al Asad, Iraq	Facilities Replacement	23,000	20,300
Army	2007	Al Asad, Iraq	Life Support Area ³	16,500	1,800
Army	2007	Al Asad, Iraq	Facilities Replacement	1,800	1,800
Army	2007	Camp Adder, Iraq	Life Support Area ³	8,500	8,500
Army	2007	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	Life Support Area ³	7,400	7,400
Army	2007	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	North Entry Control Point	7,500	7,500
Army	2007	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	South Entry Control Point	3,450	3,450
Army	2007	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	CSOAC Operations Center	2,600	2,600
Army	2007	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	Truck Lane Access Road	2,200	2,200
Army	2007	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	Water Wells	10,000	10,000
Army	2007	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	Water Storage Tanks	9,900	9,900
Army	2007	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	POL Tanks	7,000	7,000
Army	2007	Camp Speicher, Iraq	Facilities Replacement	19,000	19,000
Army	2007	Gayarah West, Iraq	Facilities Replacement	1,800	1,800
Army	2007	Camp Scania, Iraq	Facilities Replacement	2,400	2,400
Army	2007	Camp Speicher, Iraq	Life Support Area ³	8,500	8,500
Army	2007	Victory Base Camp, Iraq	Facilities Replacement	33,000	33,000
Army	2007	Various Locations, Iraq	Facilities Replacement (Anti Terrorism/Force Protection)	8,000	8,000
			Total 2007	241,800	189,600
Army	2006	Al Asad, Iraq	Airfield Improvements	15,000	15,000
Army	2006	Al Asad, Iraq	Electrical Distribution/Generation Station	8,900	8,900
Army	2006	Al Asad, Iraq	Force Protection Improvements	7,400	7,400
Army	2006	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	Perimeter Security Upgrade	12,000	12,000
Army	2006	Baghdad, Iraq	Urban By-Pass	50,000	50,000
Army	2006	Camp Talil, Iraq	Construct/replace Roads	5,700	5,700
Army	2006	Camp Talil, Iraq	Base Security Fence	22,000	22,000

Army	2006	Camp Tallil, Iraq	Convoy Support Center Relocation	21,000	21,000
Army	2006	Camp Tallil, Iraq	Dining Facility	5,100	5,100
Air Force	2006	Balad AB, Iraq	Material Handling Equipment	5,300	5,300
Total 2006				152,400	152,400
Army	2005	Camp Hope, Iraq	CMU Barracks	2,500	2,500
Army	2005	Camp Tallil, Iraq	CMU Barracks	24,600	24,600
Army	2005	Camp Warrior, Iraq	Medical Facility	7,500	7,500
Army	2005	Camp Warrior, Iraq	Tactical Ops Building	6,100	6,100
Army	2005	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	Battalion and Company HQ	7,800	7,800
Army	2005	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	Equipment Support Activity	17,100	17,100
Army	2005	LSA Anaconda, Iraq	Hospital Facility	39,000	39,000
Army	2005	Marez, Iraq	CMU Barracks	9,300	9,300
Army	2005	Marez, Iraq	Combat Support Hospital	9,900	9,900
Army	2005	Marez, Iraq	Troop Medical Clinic	2,900	2,900
Army	2005	Muthanna, Iraq	Harden Ammunition Bunkers	11,300	11,300
Army	2005	Various locations, Iraq	CMU Barracks	55,200	55,200
Army	2005	Various locations, Iraq	Overhead Cover System	250,000	250,000
Army	2005	Various locations, Iraq	Main Supply Route Aspen	36,000	36,000
Air Force	2005	Balad AB, Iraq	Construct Cargo Marshalling Area	15,000	16,715
Air Force	2005	Balad AB, Iraq	Construct Hot Cargo Pad	3,500	3,408
Air Force	2005	Balad AB, Iraq	Construct CSAR/SOAD/WEDEVAC Alert Compound	8,000	8,952
Air Force	2005	Balad AB, Iraq	Construct and Repair Munitions Roads	2,700	2,097
Air Force	2005	Balad AB, Iraq	Repair/Install Airfield Lighting	15,000	13,381
Air Force	2005	Balad AB, Iraq	Construct Special Operations Compound	2,850	2,850
Air Force	2005	Tallil AB, Iraq	Construct Temporary Cantonment Area 2	10,800	
Total 2005				537,050	517,604
Army	2004	Al Faliujah, Iraq	Power Plant and Electrical Distribution	8,000	8,000
Army	2004	Baghdad, Iraq	Entry Control Points	4,000	4,000
Army	2004	Baghdad, Iraq	Power Plant and Electrical Distribution	7,000	7,000
Army	2004	Baghdad, Iraq	Power Plant	11,500	11,500
Army	2004	Baghdad, Iraq	Sensitive Comartmented Information Facility	6,000	6,000
Army	2004	Baghdad, Iraq	Joint Operations Center	3,500	3,500
Army	2004	Baghdad, Iraq	Training Facility	2,200	2,200
Army	2004	Balad, Iraq	Theater-wide Postal Distribution Facility	7,000	7,000
Army	2004	Balad, Iraq	Power Plant and Electrical Distribution	16,000	16,000
Army	2004	Balad, Iraq	Base Camp Water Treatment Plant	9,800	9,800

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN IRAQ—Continued
 [In thousands of dollars]

Service	Fiscal Year	Location	Project	Appropriated Amount	Current Funding Level
Army	2004	Balad, Iraq	Base Camp Wastewater Treatment Plant	10,500	10,500
Army	2004	Taji Military Complex, Iraq	Power Plant and Electrical Distribution	16,500	16,500
Army	2004	Tikrit, Iraq	Power Plant and Electrical Distribution	15,500	15,500
		Total 2004		117,500	117,500
		Grand Total—Appropriated		1,502,750	1,237,174
Title 10 U.S.C. 2808 Construction Authority in the Event of Declaration of War or National Emergency:					
Army	2007	Al Ramadi, Iraq	Brick Factory ³		3,900
Army	2007	Al Taji, Iraq	TIFRIC and Brick Factory ³		87,413
Army	2007	Camp Bucca, Iraq	WasteWater Treatment Plant ³		25,000
Army	2007	Camp Bucca, Iraq	Water Treatment Plant ³		18,987
Army	2007	Camp Bucca, Iraq	Brick Factory ³		9,700
		Grand Total—Title 10 U.S.C. 2808			145,000

Reconciliation: Appropriated to Current Funding Level:

¹ Fiscal Year 2008 Undistributed Rescission—Public Law 111-32

² Canceled Projects

³ Title 10 U.S.C. 2808 Authority

(\$120,576)
 (\$56,780)
 (\$42,000)

\$1,382,174

Question. Please provide for the record the following information: A list of the U.S. bases in Iraq that have not yet been returned to the Iraqis, and a list of the bases currently planned to be enduring sites.

Answer. As of March 31, 2010, U.S. Forces occupy 154 locations consisting of eight co-located operating bases (COBs), 32 co-located operating sites (COSs), 36 co-located operating locations (COLs), 32 facilities, and 46 partnered bases. Detailed list attached. The number of enduring bases is unknown.

COMPLETE LIST OF AGREED FACILITIES AND AREAS REMAINING BASES AS OF March 31, 2010

LFA #	Base/Facility/Area Name	Type of Base	Current Base Type	USG Location	Basing Stance In-active/Active	Estimated Closure or Return Date
289	LOVE	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	2-Apr-2010
293	CADWELL	COD	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	2-Apr-2010
442	QASR AMIJ	COMPOUND	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	3-Apr-2010
398	YUSIFIYA, PB (Patrol Base)	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	10-Apr-2010
235	PHOENIX	COL	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	15-Apr-2010
240	PHOENIX BASE ANNEX	MNSTC-I COMPOUND	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	15-Apr-2010
271	SUJ, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	15-Apr-2010
135	SUMMERALL	COS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	17-Apr-2010
182	ABU GHRAIB, JOINT COORDINATION CENTER	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	20-Apr-2010
401	SALLE, JSS (Joint Security Station)	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	20-Apr-2010
294	PALIWODA	COS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	25-Apr-2010
340	ZAYTUN	COS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	25-Apr-2010
258	UR, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	30-Apr-2010
291	SHEIK AMIR, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	30-Apr-2010
307	ISTIQLAL, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	30-Apr-2010
411	TAJI RTC	COMPOUND	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	30-Apr-2010
13	UBAYDI, BATTLE POSITION	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	1-May-2010
246	EMBASSY ESTATES BILLETING	LSA	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	1-May-2010
247	TRAVIS, CAMP BILLETING	LSA	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	1-May-2010
248	BLACKHAWK ANNEX	HOUSING AREA	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	1-May-2010
250	RIVERSIDE BILLETING	LSA	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	1-May-2010
402	CLEARY, JSS (Joint Security Station)	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	1-May-2010
304	ORYAN	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	2-May-2010
278	763, COMBAT OUTPOST	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	7-May-2010
4	KOREAN VILLAGE, CAMP	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	5-May-2010
266	LOYALTY	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	10-May-2010
268	ZAFARANIYA, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	10-May-2010
263	BELADYAT, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	13-May-2010
279	CAHILL, COMBAT OUTPOST	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	17-May-2010
280	CARVER	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	24-May-2010
331	BERNSTEIN	COS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	25-May-2010
349	NORMANDY	COS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	25-May-2010
308	TARMIYA, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	30-May-2010
281	ASSASSIN, PATROL BASE	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	1-Jun-2010
276	CASHE SOUTH, COS	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	5-Jun-2010
407	VOLUNTEER, ISS	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	15-Jun-2010

212	AL MAHMUDIYAH, CAMP	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	20-Jun-2010
297	MUSHADA, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	30-Jun-2010
405	AL MUTHANA AIRFIELD, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	30-Jun-2010
380	ABU GHRAIB WAREHOUSE	FACILITY	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	1-Jul-2010
269	MEADE	COS	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	10-Jul-2010
251	DOURA, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	15-Jul-2010
179	MASIR WA SALAM, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	30-Jul-2010
285	BESMAYA RANGE	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	31-Jul-2010
434	Mithaq RETRANS	JSS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	31-Jul-2010
435	Tawila RETRANS	JSS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	31-Jul-2010
207	WAR EAGLE	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	10-Aug-2010
28	CEDAR II	COS	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	31-Aug-2010
217	FALCON	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	15-Sep-2010
146	Q-WEST (CAMP AND AIR BASE), Also, ENDURANCE, FOB	COS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	Aug-2010
150	QAYYAF PUMP HOUSE	SUPPORTING FACILITY	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	Aug-2010
147	ASHURA, CAMP	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	Jun-2010
175	SCANIA	COS	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	Oct-2010
10	NIMR	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
11	SINJAR COMMUNICATIONS SITE	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
19	ECHO	COS	SPOKE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
20	ENDEAVOR, FORWARD OPERATING BASE	COS	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
23	JENKINS, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
25	EASTERN BARRACKS	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
20	GARRY OWEN	COS	SPOKE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
31	ADDER	COS	HUB	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
33	UR, CAMP	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
34	UR, CAMP LOCATION COMMAND TALLIL (LCT)	OFFICE	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
38	APACHE (AL SHEEB)	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
40	SAFWAN HILL	COL	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
44	BASRA AIR STATION	COS	SPOKE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
46	Wessam, Camp 1, MILITARY TRAINING TEAM (CAMP WESSAM 1)	MITT CAMPS	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
47	Wessam, Camp, JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND CENTER (CAMP	JOCC	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
48	Wessam, Camp 2, MILITARY TRAINING TEAM (CAMP WESSAM 2)	WITT CAMPS	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
55	BASRA OPERATIONAL COMMAND	MITT CAMPS	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
62	BUCCA	COS	SPOKE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
63	UWM OASR	COL	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
65	AL TIB	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
66	SFER, COP	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
70	MINDEN, SHALAMSHAH, FORWARD OPERATING BASE	COL	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
73	SPARROWHAWK, CAMP	JSS EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	C/SOTF	ACTIVE	TBD

COMPLETE LIST OF AGREED FACILITIES AND AREAS REMAINING BASES AS OF March 31, 2010—Continued

LFA #	Base/Facility/Area Name	Type of Base	Current Base Type	USG Location	Basing Stance In-active/Active	Estimated Closure or Return Date
79	BASRAH COMPLEX	PB EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
82	AL ASAD	COS	HUB	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
85	HEIDER	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
86	SYKES	COS	SPOKE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
87	AL KASIK IRAQI MILITARY BASE	BILLETING	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
90	HABUR GATE	POINT OF ENTRY	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
94	ANBAR PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (PGC)	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
121	AR RAMADI, CAMP	COS	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
133	KAUFMAN	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
137	BAYIL OIL REFINERY (BOR)	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
139	SPEICHER (CAMP AND AIR BASE)	COS	SPOKE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
143	DAGGER	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
144	JAIL IRAQI ARMY BASE WITH COALITION FORCES	IA BASE W/CF	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
152	MCHEMRY	COS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
154	DAHUK RESIDENT OFFICE	OFFICE	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
161	MAREZ/DIAMONDBACK	COS	HUB	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
162	AL KINDI	IA BASE W/CF	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
163	DAHUK TRAINING CENTER (I)	TRAINING FACILITY	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
168	IMN COMBAT OUTPOST	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
174	BABIL RESIDENCE OFFICE	REGIONAL EMBASSY OFFICE	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
181	HUSSINIYAH, CAMP	COL	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
187	HAMIYAH, CAMP	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
188	VICTORY BASE COMPLEX	COS	HUB	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
209	JUSTICE	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
211	DEASON, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TEF
214	PROSPERITY	COL	SPOKE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	TBD
220	UNION III, FORWARD OPERATING BASE	COL	SPOKE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	TBD
221	RASHEED, JOINT SECURITY STATION (OLD MINISTRY OF	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
226	COMMAND LIAISON ELEMENT COMPOUND	COMPOUND	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	TBD
233	COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE COMPOUND	COMPOUND	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	TBD
256	SHIELD	COS	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
257	MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, 7TH FLOOR	OFFICE	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
273	AL RASHEED AIRFIELD	FACILITY	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	TBD
284	ZULU, FORWARD OPERATING BASE	COL	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
287	HAMMER	COS	SPOKE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD

298	TAJI, CAMP	CO5	SPOKE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
306	BALAD, JOINT BASE (CAMP AND AIR BASE)	CO5	HUB	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
315	GRIZZLY	CO5	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
316	KHAWEES (JEDI MAIN)	MITT CAMPS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
317	WARHORSE	CO5	SPOKE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
330	DORIA	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
334	GAINES-MILL	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
335	K1	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
338	WARRIOR	CO5	SPOKE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
339	ERBIL	COL	SPOKE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
342	IRBIL RESIDENT OFFICE	US BASE	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
343	DELTA	CO5	SPOKE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
348	SHOCKER, PATROL BASE	COL	US BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
352	KIRKUSH PROJECT OFFICE	US BASE	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
353	KIRKUSH—LOGISTICS MILITARY ADVISORY TEAM	TRAINING FACILITY	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
354	MUNTHERIA, CAMP—AKA EDGE	TRAINING FACILITY/CHUS	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
356	SULAMANIYAH RESIDENCE OFFICE	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
364	HEIDER, COMBAT OUTPOST	RESIDENT OFFICE USAGE	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
366	SCHWEDLER, CAMP	JSS EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
367	LEE, CAMP	JSS EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
368	OLSON, PATROL BASE	PB EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
369	SUMERALL, FORWARD OPERATING BASE	JSS EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
376	STACK HOUSE	PB EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
383	APACHE, COMBAT OUTPOST	JSS EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
392	GABE, FORWARD OPERATING BASE	PB EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
394	IRBIL, CAMP	JSS EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
395	COBRA, FORWARD OPERATING BASE	JSS EQUIVALENT	SPOKE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
396	CALDWELL, FORWARD OPERATING BASE	JSS EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
397	ANDREA, PATROL BASE	JSS EQUIVALENT	PARTNERED BASE	CJSOTF	ACTIVE	TBD
404	DIBIS, JSS (Joint Security Station)	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
406	AL RASHID, JOINT SECURITY STATION	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
408	CONSTITUTION	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
410	MAHAWIL, PB	COL	PARTNERED BASE	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD
413	RUSTAMIYAH NTM-I	COL	US BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
423	RAMADI, CAMP QUARTERS	COMPOUND	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
428	JBB OFFSITE BACKUP PUMPING STATION	SITE	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
431	CJSOTF COMPOUND	FACILITY	US BASE	USD-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	TBD
437	Tikrit JCC	JCC/JSS EQUIVALENT	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
439	CRUIZ-MORRIS (next to Gabe) on Lion	COL	US BASE	USD-N	ACTIVE	TBD
443	BAGHDADI	COMPOUND	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD

COMPLETE LIST OF AGREED FACILITIES AND AREAS REMAINING BASES AS OF March 31, 2010—Continued

LAF# #	Base/Facility/Area Name	Type of Base	Current Base Type	USG Location	Basing Stance In-active/Active	Estimated Closure or Return Date
446	BLUE DIAMOND, COL	COMPOUND	PARTNERED BASE	USD-C	ACTIVE	TBD
447	ECP 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 17, 18	ECP	US BASE	USC-C (IZ)	ACTIVE	TBD
262	KALSU	COS	HUB	USD-S	ACTIVE	TBD

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAW

Question. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, has stated President Obama's additional goal to begin withdrawing U.S. troops in July 2011 will force Afghan officials to take the lead in ensuring their country's security. The United States hope would be to grow the Afghan National Security Forces to their authorized size of 170,000 soldiers and 134,000 police by the pullout date.

With your recent visit, in your opinion do you think the Afghan National Security Forces will meet those numbers?

Answer. The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) are on track to meet these goals. As of March 2010, the ANA had 112,779 personnel, which is slightly above its March goal of 112,700 personnel. The ANA has achieved high recruiting and good retention over the past several months. We will continue to watch the program closely and guard against the risk that the ANA might fall short of its larger goals.

The ANP had 102,138 personnel as of March 2010, which was above its goal of 99,261 personnel. The ANP's ability to meet its growth goals is more at risk, as it has suffered high attrition and poor retention, especially in the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), which accounts for much of the growth in 2010 and 2011. NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A), the Ministry of Interior, and the European Union Police (EUPOL) established an ANCOP Working Group to examine how to reduce attrition and improve the ANCOP program, for example, by examining personal protection, pay, and quality of life issues. In particular, the Working Group is examining a rotational deployment model for the ANCOP to reduce operational stress. In June 2010, the group will reassess how new initiatives have affected the ANCOP program.

One of the most significant changes to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) program is the embedding of international forces to partner with the ANSF at all levels to provide mentorship and leadership in the operational environment. The August 2009 initial assessment by the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), acknowledged the risks inherent in rapidly growing the ANSF, including inadequate training, lack of enablers, and inexperienced leadership. To mitigate these risks, ISAF instituted a program of close partnership between operational ISAF forces and the ANSF. The partnering concept is a critical piece of COMISAF's strategy and requires international partners to integrate fully with the ANSF to develop a full partnership with the shared goal of working together to bring security to the Afghan people. Under partnering, ISAF units will be physically co-located with the ANSF from the national headquarters level through the regional, provincial, and district levels, establishing the same battle rhythms while planning and executing operations together. Embedded partnering is beginning to provide daily mentoring, training, and operational oversight to mitigate risk and develop more capable and professional army and police forces.

Question. Does the fiscal year 2010 supplemental request give us additional assurance in helping them meet those goals?

Answer. Yes. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved the Afghan Government request to establish new end-strength goals for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The new end-strength goals are shown in the following table:

	By October 2010	By October 2011
ANA	134,000	171,600
ANP	109,000	134,000
Total	243,000	305,600

In February 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted the fiscal year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Supplemental request and the fiscal year 2011 OCO request to support the revised ANSF end-strength goals of 243,000 by October 2010 and 305,600 by October 2011. The fiscal year 2010 OCO Supplemental request includes \$2.6 billion for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and the fiscal year 2011 OCO request includes \$11.6 billion for the ASFF.

The fiscal year 2010 OCO Supplemental request supports the overall program requirements and allows us to achieve accelerated growth of the ANA beyond 134,000 and the growth and reform of the ANP beyond 109,000. Ongoing and projected ASFF investments in fiscal year 2010 will continue to advance the ASFF program toward the goal of developing the capabilities of the ANA and the ANP to conduct

and sustain independent counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and counterinsurgency operations with limited international partner support; perform law enforcement functions; provide for the internal security of the population; gain the trust of the population; and facilitate the rule of law throughout Afghanistan, thereby helping set the conditions for the Afghans to assume the lead responsibility for securing the country and improving the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

HAITI SUPPORT

Question. I would like to congratulate the U.S.S. *Bataan* (LHD 5) and the embarked Marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) for their recent completion, of their support to Operation Unified Response yesterday (March 24) after 10 weeks on-station. I plan to make a visit to Haiti in the near future to see the wonderful work our military members have done with various United States and numerous independent aid organizations to deliver aid, and helping the Haitians prepare for long-term reconstruction.

Can you elaborate on some of the other Defense strategies to partner with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to elevate stability missions to the same priority as combat operations and the commitment to working more closely with its civilian partners?

Answer. The Department takes its role in stability missions very seriously, as emphasized by the critical policy document referenced by your question. DOD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, states that “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” As recently noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review, “Reforming How We Do Business” section, the Department of Defense plays both lead and supporting roles in a range of stability operations. Within these roles, we have engaged in partnering efforts with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), often acting as a facilitator by matching resources with needs in stability missions. For example, recognizing the need for better communication between physicians and victims of the earthquake in Haiti, U.S. Southern Command partnered with academic institutions to bring in translators to assist in the effort. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command has been exploring opportunities with the University of Hawaii to develop—in partner nations—an executive-level course for emergency management organizations, which would increase countries’ ability to respond more effectively in humanitarian and disaster relief situations. Finally, on a broader note, the Department has been working to define its relationship with NGOs more clearly in non-hostile, humanitarian environments.

Question. Are there long term plans from the Defense Department partnering with State to support Haiti in its rebuilding efforts?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to reduce its military force footprint in Haiti as the humanitarian mission shifts from relief and recovery to reconstruction. Following the transition of Joint Task Force—Haiti to lead civilian agencies on June 1, the USSOUTHCOM military liaison office (MLO) will continue to coordinate DOD activities in support of USAID and the Department of State, focusing on strengthening the capacity of the Haitian government to provide essential services to its populace. DOD will also support rebuilding efforts in Haiti through the “New Horizons” exercise, which provides medical, construction, and engineering support from June through September 2010, and the “Continuing Promise 2010” exercise, which provides humanitarian and civic assistance from July 24 to August 3, 2010. Beyond September, DOD will continue to look for opportunities to partner with USAID and the Department of State through additional humanitarian assistance and disaster preparedness projects and exercises that support Haiti’s effort to rebuild.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Question. In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Petraeus stated that the insufficient progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace is a cause of instability in the region. However, Israel makes significant contributions to our national security. Do you agree that America’s relationship with Israel plays an important and positive role in our national security?

Answer. Yes, Israel plays an important and positive role in our national security and is one of our strongest regional partners.

This Administration’s commitment to Israel’s security is unshakeable, and our defense relationship with Israel is as strong as ever. The relationship supports both the security of Israel as well as the advancement of U.S. national security interests.

Our military-to-military relationship continues to develop and strengthen, as evidenced by the conclusion of the largest United States-Israel joint exercise in history last October, Juniper Cobra, with more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel from the U.S. European Command participating in this exercise in Israel. Israel's contributions to U.S. national security also include sharing of military technology and anti-terrorism know-how.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON

DETAINEE FACILITY

Question. The Department of Defense has requested \$ 350 million in the fiscal year 2011 budget for military construction related to renovation and construction and start up cost at the maximum security prison in Thomson, Illinois. While the decision by the Obama Administration to close Guantanamo is a policy decision with which I disagree, I am also concerned about whether or not the decision to transfer the Guantanamo detainees to an existing prison in Illinois with the associated construction and renovation costs is a fiscally responsible decision and my questions for the record are focused on additional costs associated by making the Illinois option the only option.

Since 2002, what is the total cost of the facilities at Guantanamo constructed primarily for the purpose of housing detainees or providing support for military personnel related to the incarceration of combatant detainees?

Answer. To date, the total construction cost of the detention facilities at Guantanamo has been approximately \$155 million.

Question. What was the cost for the courtroom facilities and does the DOD contemplate replacing those facilities with new construction in Illinois or at some other location?

Answer. The cost of the expeditionary legal complex (ELC) at Guantanamo was approximately \$12 million.

The plan for Thomson is to renovate the existing library into a temporary courtroom and leverage office space at Rock Island Arsenal while constructing two permanent courtrooms and supporting office space. This will allow us to conduct single-defendant, non-high value detainee commissions at Thomson once we reach initial operating capability in 10–13 months.

To reach full operational capability, we will build a 24,000 square foot modular building at Thomson with two courtroom facilities, evidence holding/viewing rooms, conference rooms, offices, administration, etc.), that will use equipment relocated from the courtrooms in Guantanamo. We estimate the cost of this new facility to be approximately \$10 to \$12 million.

The draft Military Construction Project Data Sheet (DD Form 1391), which states the requirements and justification to support funding requests for all projects requiring OSD approval and non-appropriated fund military construction, includes the cost to construct the OMC facility at Thomson. However, it is not possible to isolate the cost of just the OMC facility as the courtroom building was part of a system of buildings that supported the OMC function. For example, office space for OMC personnel would be provided in part of a building at Rock Island Arsenal; the cost for that building was not broken out in the draft 1391. Additionally, the draft 1391 includes the cost of renovating the prison library to serve as a temporary courtroom in case there is a need to commence military commission proceedings quickly at Thomson. If such a need should not arise, the cost of renovation will be deducted from the original cost estimates.

Question. The Department of Defense has a request for \$350 million for renovation and construction at a prison currently owned by the State of Illinois. Why was this site selected and what other locations were considered?

Answer. The \$350 million is a comprehensive request for detainee operations involving Guantanamo detainees and not just for construction and renovation at Thomson. Of the \$350 million, approximately \$100 million is for improvements at Thomson Correctional Center so that it can accept detainees from Guantanamo, approximately \$50 million is for improvements at Rock Island Arsenal to support using Thomson to house those detainees, approximately \$35 million is for procuring capital equipment for the facility, and approximately \$60 million is for investment equipment and supplies for detention operations. The remaining \$105 million is for operations at Guantanamo and Thomson, or wherever the detainees are located.

This site was selected by the President both to reduce the Bureau of Prisons' shortage of high-security, maximum custody cell space and to accommodate the relocation of detainees from the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. The Department

of Defense was tasked to consider many military and civilian sites including facilities in Standish, Michigan, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Charleston, South Carolina.

Question. I am concerned about the future support cost for the personnel that will be assigned to the prison in Illinois. Were any locations near existing military facilities considered for a new detainee facility so we could leverage the existing support facilities?

Answer. Yes. Furthermore, the plan for use of the Thomson Correctional Center for detention operations does leverage existing support facilities at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal, as well as those in the local community.

Question. Was a business case evaluated that resulted in the selection of the Illinois prison? If so, what was the estimated cost to build a new facility near an existing military facility?

Answer. The Department of Defense was tasked to develop options for facilities in the continental United States, and a number of locations and construction methods were examined. The President determined that using Thomson Correctional Center as a "joint use" facility provided the best solution for both the Bureau of Prisons and the Department of Defense.

Question. What additional military requests are contemplated for fiscal year 2012 and beyond for facilities to support military personnel assigned to the guard force at the Illinois prison?

Answer. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects the results of all planning efforts completed to date. However, since the Commander, USNORTHCOM, will conduct even more extensive mission analysis and detailed planning efforts, this request is subject to increase or decrease when those efforts are complete.

Question. What was the total cost to the State of Illinois for the acquisition of the land and the construction of the current prison in Illinois? And, what is the price being paid by the Federal Government for the existing site in Thomson, Illinois?

Answer. According to public sources, the total cost to the State of Illinois to construct the facility was approximately \$140 million. The Federal Government has not yet begun negotiating a price with the State of Illinois because the Bureau of Prisons cannot negotiate before it has the funds to purchase the facility.

Question. It has been suggested that the Federal Prison System has the capacity to absorb all the detainees at existing Federal high security prisons. Was the option of transferring the detainees to other Federal high security prisons studied and rejected and if so, why?

Answer. According to the Bureau of Prisons, the Federal Prison System is 35 percent over its capacity and, thus, it does not have the additional capacity necessary to absorb the detention population.

GUAM RELOCATION

Question. One of the major issues within the military construction program is the Marine's relocation to Guam. I am deeply troubled by the fact that this relocation move is in such disarray. The plan to relocate 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members to Guam is a massive undertaking that presents several challenges and will place a serious burden on the island's infrastructure. The infrastructure of Guam is unsatisfactory before factoring in the Marine move. We have been informed that the latest cost estimate for this relocation could approach \$13 billion. The report that the Governor of Guam needs \$3 billion in Federal assistance before we spend \$13 billion on Milcon is just too much to ask of our taxpayers. The EPA reports the relocation plan is unsatisfactory so our 2010 milcon projects are on hold. If the Marines can't acquire enough land on the island to adequately train, the move will not be advantageous to them. The plan is way over budget and behind the time schedule already.

If the environmental and infrastructure issues are not successfully resolved in a cost effective manner will you stop this relocation to Guam?

Answer. The Department of Defense believes there are cost-effective solutions to the environmental and infrastructure shortcomings identified by the EPA and other U.S. departments and agencies. We are committed to working with the Government of Guam and the Federal partners to develop satisfactory mitigation strategies in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, which will enable a Record of Decision by fall. We are committed to spending the funds provided by the Government of Japan and the MILCON funds appropriated by Congress in an effective and cost-efficient manner. Also, the Japanese Government has committed to contributing funds to offset the costs of dealing with the environmental and infrastructure challenges of the Guam relocation.

Despite these challenges, it is important to keep in mind the significant geo-strategic benefits of the Guam relocation. Guam provides an excellent basing option in the region from which our forces can respond quickly and effectively to any contingency scenarios. The ability for U.S. forces to quickly mobilize and deploy in response to all sorts of contingencies hinges on location. Forward deployment saves us days in terms of response time.

Question. Considering the excessive cost and environmental concerns involved in this relocation move, what alternatives were considered?

Answer. The move of Okinawa-based Marine units to Guam is first and foremost an operational issue. We arrived at the current agreement after conducting a thorough analysis of the full range of U.S. force realignment alternatives. The Guam relocation is part of a larger force restructuring under the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) process. The full realignment package will allow us to reposition more than 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of land south of Kadena Air Base, benefiting the Okinawan people, addressing noise, safety, and environmental concerns, and creating a much more sustainable presence for U.S. forces on Okinawa, all without adversely impacting the Alliance's operational needs and capabilities. As a U.S. Territory strategically located in the Western Pacific, forward deployment to Guam enabled us to meet our treaty and alliance requirements with Japan, allows for rapid response to areas of potential contingencies, and grants our forces freedom of action.

We believe there are technical solutions to the issues identified in the draft Environmental Impact Statement, and we are working with the Government of Guam and within the Federal Government to identify mitigation strategies that are effective as well as cost-efficient.

Question. Was a business case developed that determined Guam was the best location for the Marines, and what was the cost of other alternatives?

Answer. Following the Department's thorough analysis of various Asia-Pacific locations, Guam was identified as the best site for the Marine move in terms of operational viability, political sustainability, and strategic requirements. A strictly cost-based comparison was not conducted. Estimates of the cost of relocation were developed at the time of the United States-Japan negotiations in 2005 and 2006, however. On that basis, we were able to secure commitments from the Government of Japan to fund up to \$6.09 billion of the cost of the move, including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions.

Question. What is the status of the Futenma Air Field replacement, and if that move does not take place will you stop the relocation to Guam?

Answer. The Government of Japan (GOJ) is currently conducting a review of the FRF and assessing alternatives. We respect the GOJ review process and will consider any official proposals they may offer based on their operational viability and political sustainability. Moving forward on the Guam relocation depends upon tangible progress on implementing the FRF agreement.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

Question. Prime Minister Maliki has raised the possibility of asking U.S. Forces to remain beyond the 2011 deadline for the withdrawal.

Secretary Gates, do you expect the Iraqi government to ask us to stay in Iraq longer, or do you expect we will pull-out of Iraq by the end of the year?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is on schedule to draw down to 50,000 U.S. forces in Iraq and end the combat mission by August 31, 2010. The remaining U.S. forces will be engaged in training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); targeted counterterrorism operations; and protection of U.S. military and civilian efforts. U.S. forces will continue to draw down responsibly, consistent with the Security Agreement, which terminates on December 31, 2011.

To date, the Iraqi government has not asked the United States to retain forces in Iraq past the termination of the Security Agreement.

The Strategic Framework Agreement lays out a solid foundation for a long-term and enduring strategic partnership with the Government of Iraq and its people, across multiple lines of operation to support a peaceful and prosperous Iraq.

Question. In the past, it took 4 to 6 months to form a government in Iraq. With the added complexities caused by the De-Ba'athification Commission, that timeline could be extended even further this year. Some observers have suggested that this period of government formation could bring significant risk of renewed violence. Do you agree?

Answer. We anticipate an extended government formation period. Both United States and Iraqi officials are aware that a protracted, contentious government for-

mation period as experienced in 2006 will offer opportunities for anti-Iraqi government forces to attempt to reignite sectarian violence. Prior to the elections, we assisted the Iraqi government in developing plans to ensure continuity in government functions in its caretaker status, as well as to maintain Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) pressure on violent, extremist networks. We are confident that the ISF, with U.S. support, are capable of maintaining internal stability during this period.

Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) has sought to exploit the current period of political transition by waging high-profile attacks designed to undermine the Iraqi people's confidence in their government and the ISF. Recent AQI leadership losses have seriously degraded the network's capabilities, and both Iraqi leaders and citizens reject violence. Despite recent high profile attacks, AQI has failed to trigger wide-scale, retributive violence, or raise significant doubt about the ISF's abilities. Overall, violence remains low and the ISF are working closely with USF-I to maintain pressure on militant networks.

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Chairman INOUE. And so, now the committee stands in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., Thursday, March 25, the hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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