[Senate Hearing 111-233]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-233
NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: IMPLEMENTING A NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE
WORKFORCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 30, 2009
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
----------
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana
RONALD W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Lisa M. Powell, Chief Counsel and Acting Staff Director
Joel C. Spangenberg, Professional Staff Member
Jennifer A. Hemingway, Minority Staff Director
Benjamin B. Rhodeside, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
Senator Voinovich............................................ 3
WITNESSES
Thursday, April 30, 2009
Nancy H. Kichak, Associate Director, Strategic Human Resources
Policy Division, U.S. Office of Personnel Management........... 4
Major General William A. Navas, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired),
Executive Director, National Security Professional Development
Integration Office............................................. 6
Ronald P. Sanders, Ph.D., Associate Director of National
Intelligence for Human Capital, and Intelligence Community
Chief Human Capital Officer, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence................................................... 7
Hon. Bob Graham, Former Senator from the State of Florida, and
Chairman, Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism....................... 21
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Former Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Guiding
Coalition Member, Project on National Security Reform.......... 23
James R. Thompson, Ph.D., Associate Professor, and Head,
Department of Public Administration, University of Illinois-
Chicago........................................................ 25
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Graham, Hon. Bob:
Testimony.................................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Kichak, Nancy H.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Navas, Major General William A., Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R.:
Testimony.................................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 73
Sanders, Ronald P., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Thompson, James R., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 85
APPENDIX
Article titled ``Disease and Terror,'' submitted for the record
by Mr. Graham.................................................. 88
Questions and Responses for the Record from:
Ms. Kichak with attachments.................................. 90
General Navas................................................ 104
Mr. Sanders.................................................. 107
Mr. Graham................................................... 109
Mr. Pickering................................................ 112
Mr. Thompson................................................. 115
NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM:
IMPLEMENTING A NATIONAL SECURITY
SERVICE WORKFORCE
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THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. I call this hearing of the Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District
of Columbia Subcommittee to order.
I want to say aloha and welcome to our witnesses, and thank
you so much for being here today. I should tell you that I was
just notified that we expect to have a vote soon, so we will go
as far as we can, and possibly there might be a short recess
and we will continue. So, in the meantime, let me give my
opening statement.
Today's hearing, ``National Security Reform: Implementing a
National Security Service Workforce,'' will examine the need to
invest in strengthening the Federal civilian and national
security workforce and proposals to do so.
Recruiting, retaining, and developing the next generation
of national security employees is critically important both to
our current operations and in light of the impending Federal
retirement wave that we expect. Half of the Department of
Defense civilians will be eligible to retire within the next
few years. About 90 percent of senior executives governmentwide
will be eligible to retire within 10 years. We must ensure that
the Federal Government is able to attract the best and
brightest national security workers. As these workers rise to
more senior levels in government, we must also prepare them to
work across agency lines in confronting the complex challenges
that they will probably face. Such a rotation program should
have a strong focus on training and mentoring participants so
they get the most from their experiences.
There are several elements that I believe are critical to
developing world-class national security employees, which I
hope the witnesses will address today.
The first key element is rotational programs to improve
government coordination and integration. A number of events
this decade have demonstrated the need for greater coordination
and integration. These include the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and the
reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military
already has a Joint Duty program which has fostered unified
effort across military organizations. Likewise, developing a
rotation program for civilians in national security positions
can improve coordination and support a more unified effort
across government.
I am a strong supporter of rotational programs. In 2006, my
amendment to start a rotation program within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) became part of the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act. This program is supporting
integration and coordination efforts within DHS, but we can
benefit from an even broader, interagency focus on the national
security workforce.
Two interagency rotation programs have been created in
recent years. The Intelligence Community's Joint Duty
Assignment Program was set in motion by the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Today, joint duty
rotational assignments and a leadership development program
generally are required for IC employees to be eligible for
promotion above the GS-15 level. The other rotation program is
part of the National Security Professional Development Program
created by an Executive Order in 2007. This program envisions
the participation of a broad array of national security workers
at a number of Federal agencies.
Another key element needed to better develop the national
security workforce is a stronger student loan repayment
program. Student loan repayments help the Federal Government to
attract the best and brightest to government service and to
encourage advanced education in relevant fields. The current
Federal student loan repayment program has been underused, if
you can imagine that, in part because agencies must balance
funding loan repayments for its employees against other
priorities. Current operations often are prioritized over
investing in the long-term development of employees. However,
recent trends show that agencies are beginning to understand
the importance of this valuable recruitment and retention tool.
We must make sure agencies prioritize investing in this
workforce and that they have funds to do so.
Similarly, national security fellowships to support
graduate students could help the Federal Government attract and
develop national security leaders. Fellowships could be
targeted to help fill critical national security skills gaps,
for example, by focusing on graduate students pursuing studies
in foreign languages, science, mathematics, engineering, and
international fields. Fellowships could also be used to help
current Federal employees obtain the skills needed to meet our
national security requirements.
Finally, agencies should be required to improve their
strategic workforce planning to ensure that they have the
workforce needed to meet national security objectives.
In 2003, I introduced a bill that would have addressed all
of these key elements to building a stronger national security
workforce, the Homeland Security Federal Workforce Act. Many of
the proposals I have outlined were contained in that bill. I
hope that today's hearing will provide additional information
that will be useful in the introduction of a similar bill that
builds upon the changes that have taken place since then.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today as we
explore how we can build a stronger, more integrated national
security civilian workforce.
Now I would like to call on our Ranking Member, Senator
Voinovich, for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, reforming the Federal
Government's human capital management has been one of my
highest priorities as Chairman and now Ranking Member of this
Subcommittee, and I am thankful for the partnership the two of
us have forged to tackle these issues which affect the Federal
Government's most critical asset--its people. I suspect that
there is not two ranking members or chairmen that have been at
something as long as we have, and I am glad we have because, in
order to get change, it takes a while.
In preparing for today, I was reminded of the March 2001
hearing I chaired on the national security implications of the
human capital crisis. The panel of distinguished witnesses that
day included former Defense Secretary Jim Schlesinger, a member
of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st
Century. Secretary Schlesinger concluded, ``As it enters the
21st Century, the United States finds itself on the brink of an
unprecedented crisis of competence in government. The
maintenance of American power in the world depends on the
quality of the U.S. Government personnel, civil and military,
at all levels. We must take immediate action in the personnel
area to ensure that the United States can meet future
challenges. It is the Commission's view that fixing the
personnel problem is a precondition for fixing virtually
everything else that needs repair in the institutional edifice
of the U.S. national security policy.''
Eight years later, a great deal of action has been taken to
improve the human capital management for our national security
agencies, and we are daily building momentum for future reform.
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we
reassigned personnel, redistributed resources, and reorganized
agencies in order to make the security of our homeland our top
national priority. I am not sure that I would have done it the
way we did, but that is the way we did it.
We created the Department of Homeland Security. Overall,
the intelligence community implemented many recommendations
from the 9/11 Commission. The dangers and opportunities of our
international environment require us to renew our human capital
efforts. Creating a more secure, democratic, and prosperous
world for the benefit of the American people depends on a
highly skilled national security workforce held accountable for
their individual performance.
The Bush Executive Order establishing the National Security
Professional Development Program (NSPD) provides us with a road
map for improving collaboration between our national security
agencies through individual development, better enabling our
government to carry out what I like to refer to as ``smart
power.''
I look forward to hearing the initial results of the
National Security Professional Development Program from our
witnesses. It is essential that Federal agencies have all the
tools necessary to recruit, hire, train, and promote
individuals with the right competencies.
The new Administration gives us the opportunity to find
solutions that reinforce our commitment to the individual
employee. I look forward to an engaging discussion with our
witnesses as we consider whether additional workforce reform is
necessary to meet our national security mission.
I thank the witnesses for being here.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Both of us welcome our first panel of witnesses to the
Subcommittee today. They are:
Nancy Kichak, Associate Director for the Strategic Human
Resources Policy Division at the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management;
Major General William Navas, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired),
Executive Director of the National Security Professional
Development Integration Office;
And Dr. Ronald P. Sanders, Associate Director of National
Intelligence for Human Capital at the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear
in all witnesses, so I ask each of you to stand and raise your
right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to
give to the Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Ms. Kichak. I do.
General Navas. I do.
Mr. Sanders. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let it be noted in the record
that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
I want our witnesses to know that your full written
statements will be placed in the record, and I would also like
to remind you to keep your remarks brief, given the number of
people testifying this afternoon.
Ms. Kichak, will you please proceed with your statement?
TESTIMONY OF NANCY H. KICHAK,\1\ ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT
Ms. Kichak. Thank you. Chairman Akaka and Senator
Voinovich, I appreciate your invitation to be here today to
discuss national security professional development. We must do
everything we can to strengthen the government's capacity to
protect the American people. This includes continually looking
at ways to improve the ability of the Federal agencies to work
across organizational boundaries to protect our Nation and
advance our national security interests. We, at the Office of
Personnel Management, stand ready to do all we can to support
this vital initiative.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Kichak appears in the Appendix on
page 35.
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The effort to promote national security professional
development began in May 2007, with Executive Order 13434,
which sought to ``promote the education, training, and
experience of current and future professionals in national
security positions,'' in Executive Branch agencies so that
these professionals would be equipped to carry out coordinated
national security operations with their counterparts in other
Federal agencies and in non-Federal organizations. It directed
the creation of a National Strategy for the Development of
Security Professionals for achieving this objective.
Once the National Strategy for the Development of Security
Professionals was issued, the Executive Steering Committee
developed a NSPD Implementation Plan. Federal agencies, in
turn, developed their own implementation plans based on the
National Strategy and the Implementation Plan.
Executive Order 13434 charges the Director of OPM with
leading the establishment of a national security professional
development program that provides for interagency and
intergovernmental assignments and includes professional
development guidelines for career advancement. To facilitate
that development, OPM issued a recommended technical
qualification for selection into the Senior Executive Service
positions that are designated as national security professional
positions. The qualification is for demonstrated ability to
lead interagency, intergovernmental activities, or comparable
cross-organizational activities.
OPM held two forums on the recommended technical
qualifications in December 2008 and January of this year. We
cosponsored these sessions along with the NSPD Integration
Office and shared with the agencies a template for implementing
the new qualification and provided an opportunity for detailed
discussion of implementation approaches and issues. Agencies
were then required to develop their own policies for
implementing the qualification where appropriate.
OPM also has a broad oversight role regarding human
resources policy related to the implementation of the order. We
recognize that the competencies that national security
professionals need to have will vary for each mission area and
organization. Therefore, the particular agencies that employ
these individuals should, in large measure, determine the
content of their training and program implementation. OPM is
responsible for ensuring that training policies, as well as
other human resources policies, comply with applicable laws and
regulations, and that the NSPD effort is administered
consistently within and across agencies. For example, we want
to make sure that training opportunities do not result in pre-
selection of job candidates.
OPM has supported national security professional
development in other ways as well. For example, we continue to
contribute to the development of web content for the NSPD
website, and we participate in the National Security Education
and Training Consortium. The Consortium is a network of Federal
education and training organizations that support the
development of national security professionals, including by
making recommendations for training and educational courses
that should be available.
We are prepared to provide ongoing policy support regarding
the selection, training, and development of national security
professionals and related matters. This issue is likely to
remain one of critical importance to the Federal Government and
the American public for a very long time.
Thank you again for inviting me, and I will be happy to
answer any questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Kichak. Now we will
hear from General Navas.
TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR.,\1\ U.S. ARMY
(RETIRED), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT INTEGRATION OFFICE
General Navas. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
holding this hearing today to discuss the important issue of
strengthening our Nation's national security workforce. I also
want to take this opportunity to acknowledge Dr. Sanders' and
Ms. Kichak's contributions to the National Security
Professional Development Program as members of the Executive
Steering Committee during the past year.
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\1\ The prepared statement of General Navas appears in the Appendix
on page 38.
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The National Security Professional Development Program
(NSPD) was established in 2007 by Presidential Executive Order
13434 to promote and enhance the development of national
security professionals in 17 Federal agencies. The program was
designed to facilitate and integrate professional development
education, training, and interagency experience opportunities
for individuals who have national security responsibilities.
Let me state at this time that the current Administration
strongly supports the intent of this program and is considering
its way ahead. Although I am prepared to discuss the history of
the program, it would be premature for me to speculate on how
this program will be configured or implemented in the near
future. But please know that serious discussions have been
ongoing, and once decisions are made, I will be more than happy
to provide the Subcommittee with an update on the program.
Mr. Chairman, as this Subcommittee well appreciates, our
Nation must be able to rely upon a national security workforce
with the knowledge, training, and interagency experience to see
the big picture, to connect the dots, to coordinate
effectively, and to act decisively. We need to develop
professionals who can operate across agency boundaries and
understand how the combined efforts of multiple organizations
are necessary to leverage all of the elements of national power
and influence. That is precisely why the National Security
Professional Development Program was established, and I am
pleased to say that this effort is already underway, although
there is much more to be done.
Executive Order 13434 of May 2007, signed by President
George W. Bush, made it the policy of the United States to
promote the education, training, and experience of current and
future professionals in national security positions across the
Federal Government. A National Strategy expanding on the
direction of the Executive Order was approved by President Bush
in July 2007. An Executive Steering Committee, comprised of the
Secretaries or Directors--or their designees--of 17 designated
Federal agencies and departments provide oversight for program
implementation. The Executive Steering Committee, which reports
to both the National Security Council and the Homeland Security
Council, is responsible for coordinating cross-agency
integration and implementation of the program.
In September 2008, a program implementation plan was
developed by the Executive Steering Committee and was approved
by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism. Departments and agencies have developed their
own implementation plans.
During the first year of program implementation,
significant progress has been made, and this sets a good
foundation upon which the program needs to build. In addition
to the departments and agencies developing and executing their
program implementation plans, there are many other important
steps that have been taken which are highlighted in my written
statement, and I would be glad to discuss them during the
question-and-answer period.
Despite the challenges, I remain optimistic about the
future of the program and our government's ability to lead the
national effort to build the national workforce necessary to
protect the Nation in the 21st Century. The current
Administration is in strong agreement with the overall intent
of the program and is developing a way ahead to build on past
successes while charting new directions where necessary.
The Administration looks forward to working closely with
you in a collaborative fashion to help build upon and improve
this critical program for advancing the vital interests of our
Nation.
I welcome any questions that the Subcommittee might have,
thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. May I call now on Dr. Sanders.
TESTIMONY OF RONALD P. SANDERS, PH.D.,\1\ ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR HUMAN CAPITAL, AND INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY CHIEF HUMAN CAPITAL OFFICER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Sanders. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
inviting me to testify at today's hearing on creating a
national security workforce, and I would also like to thank you
and Senator Voinovich for your strong, sustained leadership in
this area. It is my pleasure to update the Subcommittee on the
implementation of the intelligence community's Civilian Joint
Duty program, which may serve as a model for developing a
national security workforce.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sanders appears in the Appendix
on page 48.
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Per your letter of invitation, I will discuss the
implementation of that program, including its associated
challenges in the broader context of the National Security
Professional Development Initiative, and offer some
recommendations based on our experiences in that regard.
As you know, human capital policies are among the most
powerful levers available to an institution intent on
transforming its culture, and the IC is certainly no exception.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has
led the design, development, and implementation of a number of
ground-breaking strategic human capital initiatives with this
particular end in mind. The Joint Duty program is one of these.
It is essential to the community's transformation and the
creation of a culture of collaboration that is critical to our
national security.
Our program is mandated by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). It authorizes the Director of
National Intelligence to facilitate the rotation of IC
personnel amongst its agencies by making ``joint``--that is,
interagency--duty a condition of promotion to certain positions
specified by the DNI. Indeed, Congress specifically said that
the DNI was, to the extent practicable, ``to duplicate joint
[military] officer management policies established by . . . the
Goldwater Nichols . . . Act of 1986.''
Goldwater-Nichols was arguably the most sweeping reform of
our Nation's military since the National Security Act of 1947,
and as the impetus for military jointness--it required a joint
assignment as a prerequisite for flag rank--it serves as our
philosophical, conceptual, and intellectual foundation.
Like Goldwater-Nichols and Executive Order 13434, our
Civilian Joint Duty program is intended to ensure that as a
minimum, the approximately 100,000 IC professionals, managers,
and executives come to know firsthand, through one or more
extended interagency rotational assignments, the entire
intelligence enterprise to build and leverage the collaborative
networks that will support its mission. Although joint duty
assignments are strictly voluntary, we have issued IC-wide
regulations that say that by October 1, 2010, some form of
joint duty experience will be a prerequisite for promotion to
almost all of the IC senior civilian positions. The cross-
cutting challenges of today's IC demand nothing less.
Thus, we share the same goals as Executive Order 13434, and
our program has given us a head start in achieving them.
However, in so doing, we have had to grapple with a host of
complex implementation and operational issues. Difficult enough
in their own right, they have been made even more complicated
by the complex interagency framework in which we operate.
Professor Jim Thompson on your second panel calls this a
``federated model.'' Thus, as a community of 17 agencies in six
different Cabinet departments, we have had to collaboratively
develop criteria for receiving joint duty credit; procedures
for advertising, applying for, nominating, and selecting joint
duty candidates; a process for granting waivers and claims; and
policies governing how employees on joint duty assignments are
to be fairly evaluated and considered for permanent promotion
while away from their home agency. We have also had to
establish procedural protections and oversight mechanisms to
ensure that no one is discouraged or penalized from accepting a
joint tour.
Now, 3 years since the first of these regulations was
issued, our Civilian Joint Duty program continues to enjoy the
strong support of our senior leadership as well as the vast
majority of our employees. We estimate that well over 3,000
employees are currently on some type of joint assignment, with
another 3,000 plus having completed one over the last several
years. Over 500 senior positions now require joint duty as a
prerequisite, with several hundred more to be covered this
fall. No waivers have been requested to date, and only about a
dozen positions--civilian physicians--have been exempted from
the requirement. However, we are still in our infancy, and the
program remains fragile.
As we help pave the way for NSPD, I would offer some hard-
won lessons learned over the last 3 years.
First, this requires strong, unequivocal senior leadership
commitment. Senior agency leaders need to own the program. It
cannot be seen as an HR program.
Second, any government-wide rotation program should be
flexible. Given the diversity of missions and organizations in
the Federal Government, one size cannot fit all.
Third, it is imperative that the detailed enabling policy
and program infrastructure be addressed, including all of the
myriad administrative details outlined in my written statement.
Without those details, broad policy pronouncements will not go
very far.
And, finally, those details must be built collaboratively,
with all the stakeholders involved. Here again, Professor
Thompson has documented the advantages as well as the
challenges of such an approach.
The IC Civilian Joint Duty program remains one of the DNI's
top priorities, and we are pleased to note that in September
2008, Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government
recognized it with one of its coveted Innovations in American
Government Awards. However, the Subcommittee should note that
the program is but one part of a comprehensive 5-year human
capital strategy that is intended to renew and replenish our
workforce, integrating and transforming the IC's organizations
and cultures to support our vital national security mission.
That strategy also includes innovations in recruiting,
including a proposed Intelligence Officer Training Corps based
on a program originally sponsored by Senator Graham, who is
also part of the second panel.
These will all ensure that we have a pipeline of capable,
committed professionals to meet our mission critical needs. It
also includes other human capital innovations that are detailed
in Professor Thompson's report.
In conclusion, I would note that the success of the
National Intelligence Strategy depends on our people. It
requires nothing less than dedicated intelligence professionals
who are ``enterprise'' in orientation, integrated and joint in
action, able to lead and leverage collaborative networks that
are the IC's connective tissue. Our Joint Duty program is a
cornerstone of that effort.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. I am going to call for
a brief recess, and we will be right back. Senator Voinovich
will probably call us back to order for questions. We are in
recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Voinovich [presiding]. The Chairman asked me to
reconvene the meeting and start the questions, and so here we
go. Again, thank you for being here today.
This is a question to all of you, and it gets back to a
question I first asked when I came to the Senate, and I sent
out a letter to 12 agencies, and I asked them, ``How much money
are you spending on training?'' And 11 came back and said they
did not know. One came back and said, ``We do know, but we will
not tell you.'' In order to do the job that we want you to do,
you have to have the people to get the job done. Do you have
money earmarked for training in your respective budgets? And
has it been adequate for you to do the job that we have asked
you to do?
Mr. Sanders. Senator, I will speak for the agencies and
elements of the intelligence community. Since our inception 4
years ago, almost to this day, we have had three Directors of
National Intelligence, and they are all on the same page that
you are. They understand the importance of human capital. They
have all invested heavily in human capital generally and in
training. I cannot share budget numbers with you because as you
know they are classified, but I can tell you that we invest
millions and millions in language training. Director Blair has
just committed substantial funds, in the millions of dollars,
for our Joint Leadership Development program.
The intelligence community has been blessed with senior
leaders that understand you have to invest for the long-term
development of the workforce.
Senator Voinovich. General Navas.
General Navas. Senator, our office, as you are aware, is an
office that does not control any funding or resources and
basically promulgates policy and provides oversight on how the
departments and agencies execute that policy.
Having said that, we need to have an analysis of the
requirements--the training educational requirements. That is a
function for the National Security Education and Training
Consortium and its board of directors to advise the Executive
Steering Committee.
Once those requirements are established for participating
agencies to reprioritize their budgets and give a higher
priority to the development of their national security
professionals.
Senator Voinovich. Have you done that?
General Navas. No, sir, not at this time.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Kichak, OPM has lots of things to
do. Have you had the resources that you need to do the job we
have asked you to do?
Ms. Kichak. I think that I am going to answer that question
not just for national security professional development, which
is just now getting off the ground, at least as far as this
initiative is concerned, but what we are seeing now in the HR
community that we are working with that enough resources are
not being devoted to the development of human resources staff
in the offices, that we believe that training needs a lot more
attention to develop the kind of folks that are needed to
recruit and retain the next generation of Federal employees.
Senator Voinovich. Have you done an analysis of what it is
that you think the agencies you are working with need in terms
of resources to do the job that you think that they need to do?
And if you have, have you communicated it to OMB?
Ms. Kichak. We have not put a dollar figure on that. We
have done some analysis of the kind of training we think is
lacking, and as you know, we have a new Director who is turning
his attention to that. And so I would expect those
conversations will happen in the future.
Senator Voinovich. Now, this is kind of a follow-up for
you, General Navas. Your testimony discusses the development of
additional training programs for agency leaders, and given the
current size of the workforce, short-term stimulus hiring
needs, retirement projections, and resource constraints, will
our national security leaders be able to access this training?
Do we need to increase the number of national security
personnel to build a training float, as recommended by several
witnesses on our second panel? It is the same thing we have in
the State Department today. They need additional people so that
they can move people off the job they are doing for training,
and at the same time have enough to fulfill the other
responsibilities that they have.
General Navas. Yes, Senator. The issue of the float is a
valid one, and if you look at the experience in the military,
one of the reasons that the joint duty assignment and the joint
professional military education has been successful is that the
armed service have that float. They call it different, but it
is about a 10-percent element that they have to send
individuals to school, to assignments outside their parent
organization and still not jeopardize their ability to execute
their functions.
We are not at that level of flexibility in our civilian
workforce, and at some point a combination of interagency
exchanges, and an opportunity to provide additional slots to
the agencies to be able to send some of their people to these
assignments. In the case of some of the smaller agencies, you
may need to have a combination of the space and also the
dollars to be able to execute that. In the smaller agencies the
funding becomes critical.
That is one of the issues that has been discussed in the
Executive Steering Committee as a way forward. Initially, we
were concentrating on the senior executive level, SES National
Security Professionals. We have been able to leverage some of
the existing courses there. For example, the Army has been
conducting a program for their senior executive development,
and they have been very gracious in providing additional slots
that we offer to the member agencies at no cost except for the
travel, per diem, and the individual's salary. These are short
courses that have been conducted, and the individuals that have
participated have found very valuable.
Senator Voinovich. OK. How often do you talk with OPM about
it? I just said does OPM think they have the resources to get
the job done you are supposed to do. Ms. Kichak said she does
not think that resources are there that people have been able
to do it. Have you been discussing that? Because your job is to
make sure this thing gets done, isn't it?
General Navas. Yes, sir. And like I mentioned, Ms. Kichak
is a member of the Executive Steering Committee. She has been
participating with us, with the other representatives of the 17
agencies, one of which is Dr. Sanders here as the
representative of the ODNI.
The issue is establishing those requirements, which have
not yet been established. Once the requirements are
established, then the agencies and departments need to
prioritize their existing funds. That is an internal function
of the Secretaries and Department heads to do as they submit
their budgets.
Mr. Sanders. Senator, if I may, you missed my eloquent
statement, but we have about 6,000 people who have already
completed or who are on interagency joint duty assignments in
the intelligence community as we speak. We have found that our
large agencies have enough inherent float in just the dynamics
of their workforce that they have not needed to budget for
additional positions. But for the smaller agencies, we have
created a bank of positions, and DEA and others have used them
to support joint duty assignments because they are literally
too small to be able to absorb the loss of a person going off
on interagency assignment. They use that bank to be able to
backfill.
So we have been able to blend the large agencies who can
absorb it with the small ones who cannot to make the system
work.
Senator Voinovich. So your observation should be that Dr.
Sanders is doing the job he is supposed to do?
Ms. Kichak. Well, my observation was for HR professionals
throughout the Federal Government, not specifically national
security professional development. We have been looking at the
stand-up of this program and the rotational assignment, and we
see much of what is here is a very robust training program, not
that there does not need to be supplemental training, but I was
not speaking just to the national security professional
development. And, yes, I would observe that what ODNI is doing
is robust training.
Senator Voinovich. General Navas, the National Security
Professional Development Plan was due September 2008. The
December 2008 report indicates the plan was still in progress.
When is the plan going to be finished?
General Navas. Sir, the Implementation Plan was published
and approved by the Assistant to the President for National
Security and for Homeland Security, and it is being
implemented. Subsequent to that, the agencies developed their
implementation plans. This is a living document that will
probably be revised and adjusted, but we have a plan in place.
The agencies are executing to that plan. The plan calls for
identifying who are the national security professionals in each
of these 17 agencies.
We have identified about 14,000 national security
professionals within the 17 agencies, GS-13 and above, of which
1,200 of them are SES's. The numbers for the intelligence
community are classified and are not included within this
group.
The second requirement that we had for the plan was that
the identified national security professionals would take two
online courses. Those who had a national response framework or
a domestic function would take the FEMA online course on the
National Response Framework. Then we conducted a series, in
conjunction with FEMA and Homeland Security, of orientation,
lessons learned and best practices sessions, using the model of
Hurricane Katrina as the training vehicle. Admiral Thad Allen
came and spoke to us. Christine Wormuth from the CSIS presented
her paper on ``Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,'' and then we had
several sessions from which the participants developed a set of
keys to success to dealing with in interagency cooperation.
Subsequently, with the help of the Naval Postgraduate
School, we developed a similar module for those nontraditional
national security agencies on the basics of national security,
the Organization for National Security, the roles and functions
of the different departments, etc.
Senator Voinovich. This is all online?
General Navas. Online, through a national security
professional development web portal.
Senator Voinovich. How long has that been in being? And
have you measured its effectiveness?
General Navas. Sir, the initial NRF was placed in the Web
portal around June of last year. The agencies have reported
their individuals taking the course. The other module was put
online around September of last year. The agencies are
monitoring that.
One of the issues--and it could be a measure of
effectiveness--was the response that we have had to the forest
fires and the response that we have had to the catastrophe of
the bridges in the Twin Cities showed some improvement in the
interagency coordination.
We stood up the Web portal, as Ms. Kichak said. This is an
initiative that is being funded through OPM and OMB through
existing programs. And we have continued developing the
requirements for orientation and training.
Senator Voinovich. Has there been any kind of effort made
to inquire from the people that are taking the training about
whether or not they think it is any good and whether they feel
it is good for their professional development? Is it relevant
stuff, or is it something they are just looking at and saying,
``I have got to do this because they told me we have to do it''
and, ``Who needs this?''
General Navas. We did a survey of the participants after
the four sessions. We had some very good returns. Both modules
also have a feedback function. It is tracked internally by the
agencies. We have a master task list and a self-assessment
scorecard that is produced and reported to our office on a
quarterly basis by the agencies on how they are tracking the
implementation tasks.
Now, one of the issues raised by Dr. Sanders is the concept
that ``one size does not fit all.'' Not all agencies are the
same, not all have the same missions. So it is more of
facilitating and assisting the agencies. Ultimately the
responsibility of developing their national security
professionals rests with the individual departments and
agencies.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I just think it is a good idea to
get the folks that are there, particularly if it is kind of a
same plan for a lot of them, to have them come back and sit
down and share with you whether or not they think the training
they are receiving is relevant to the job that they are doing.
Do you get that kind of feedback at all from your people,
Dr. Sanders?
Mr. Sanders. Senator, I will go one step further. In my
view, this is one of the things that is essential to making a
broader program work. We actually incorporate these interagency
leadership skills in our employees' appraisals. So the training
is a means to an end. Our workforce needs to be equipped and to
perform better in an interagency context.
In the IC, we have defined the entire intelligence
community, not just pieces and parts but the whole IC, as
requiring those interagency competencies. So we have built it
into our employee appraisals. We have built it into our senior
officer appraisals.
Senator Voinovich. So the thing is they have to take the
courses as part of their performance evaluation.
Mr. Sanders. The courses, the assignments, and then they
have to actually demonstrate the behaviors on the job. That is
the bottom line.
Senator Voinovich. And from your point of view, the fact
that they have had the training, that they are growing in their
job, and you see the results of that training and the
performance of the functions you have asked them to undertake.
Mr. Sanders. Well, again, if you will permit me, I will
broaden the response. We have seen far more collaborative
interagency cooperation and teamwork in the intelligence
community since the advent of the IC Joint Duty program. I
think our senior leadership gets it. Our newer employees--we
have more than 50 percent of the IC with 5 years or less of
service--get this. And our most recent employee climate survey
results say that now upwards of 84 percent of our workforce
understands that these kinds of skills are essential to our
mission.
And so training is an important part of it. In my view, the
most important part is this interagency assignment where you go
walk a mile in another agency's shoes. But it is the
combination of all those things as well as being evaluated on
it that will really make something like this work.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Kichak, General Navas, the Executive
Order charged the Director of OPM with leading the
establishment of this program, and I think all of us know that
the person that headed it up was Clay Johnson. And just for the
record, do you agree that the M in OMB should be the person
that should be the orchestra leader and the quarterback on it?
And does that person have enough time to do the work that is
necessary here to provide that leadership?
Ms. Kichak. I cannot assess whether that is the appropriate
person to chair the organization or not. I would say two
things.
Because this is a national security professional
development effort, I think that the leadership does have to
have a role in national security because the training has to be
and the development of employees has to be focused on national
security. And I think OPM needs to have a strong role in it
because these are, after all, employees and they need the
oversight that OPM can give on these issues.
Senator Voinovich. So you think the way it has worked is
appropriate?
Ms. Kichak. Well, of course, that is all under discussion,
as Secretary Navas said, but I think that the folks at the
Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council
have a valid interest in making sure the leadership reflects
their oversight.
Senator Voinovich. Senator Akaka is back. One of the things
you talked about in your testimony is that the program has not
been administered consistently within and across agencies. And
what I would like to know would be what agencies could use
additional guidance and oversight. And it gets back to what I
asked you before, doing an inventory of whether they have got
the resources to do the job.
Ms. Kichak. We think that each agency, because of their
varying missions, needs to administer the training differently.
The training for each mission could be different. We do not
have any agencies identified who have not done a good job based
on their mission. We only want to recognize that each agency
has differing needs in this, and they need to have the
flexibility to pick the training and administer the training
appropriate for their employees and their mission.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I would sure like to--how many of
the agencies that were out there would have a national security
dimension in them. You say 17 agencies.
Ms. Kichak. Seventeen.
Senator Voinovich. Dr. Sanders has got a little cluster
there, and that--not a little. It is a pretty big cluster, and
real important. But the fact is that you have got a thread that
runs through all of them, and it is, I think, a little easier
to move and expedite some of these things as contrasted to
different agencies, as you point out, that have different
roles. So the challenge there, it seems to me, is a lot more
formidable maybe in Dr. Sanders' area. And it sure would be
comforting to me to have a real analysis of that, of where they
are, and try and see if we cannot up the priority that is being
given to this.
Ms. Kichak. Well, when we had the training sessions for all
of the agencies on how to develop some of their job
descriptions to take account of the technical qualification,
all agencies participated, and I believe all agencies did their
implementation plan. We were there. We worked with all of them.
It is just that some agencies have a handful of folks working
on this, where in other agencies, this is a much bigger part of
their mission.
Senator Voinovich. They are different agencies, but the
fact of the matter is to get into dotting the I's and crossing
the T's. Another suggestion--and maybe you have done it
already--has Dr. Sanders or any of his people ever been asked
to look at what is going on in some of these agencies and
perhaps evaluate them and suggest how they might be helped, and
maybe you might even have some resources that you could make
available to them or tell them where to go?
Mr. Sanders. I have viewed that as our role in the
Executive Steering Committee. We have been at this 3 years, and
we have been through the struggles, and we have been able to
share a lot of lessons learned with Secretary Navas and Ms.
Kichak and the rest of the members of the Executive Steering
Committee.
The notion of creating or requiring some sort of
interagency assignment as a requisite for SES promotion, OPM
and Secretary Navas' office sponsored a workshop, and my staff
was instrumental in putting that together because, again, we
had established that requirement a couple of years ago and were
familiar with how it could be phased in.
Senator Voinovich. So the fact of the matter is that you
are pitching in and trying to help them because you----
Mr. Sanders. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. OK, good.
General Navas. Sir, if I may, what we are trying to do is a
transformational process--to create a culture of collaboration
among these national security professionals to cut across the
vertical stovepipes and to be able to operate as a national
security professional across these agencies.
The idea is to have an understanding through the training
and education of what that means and then having the experience
of having participated in the interagency. That should be the
ultimate goal.
Now, we have 17 agencies at various levels, very mature,
the Foreign Service Corps in the State Department, the
intelligence community since the inception of the office of the
ODNI; Department of Defense in the military side first, but
still making great progress in the civilian; Department of
Homeland Security. They have come together, 22 agencies. They
have a robust internal system.
The other nontraditional, if I could use that term,
agencies like Department of Commerce, Department of Interior,
they are taking baby steps. What is encouraging is that they
all banded together, and they produced a common Implementation
Plan that they share. So they are mentoring each other. The
larger agencies are also doing that.
So I think that this is a program that we need to build
from the bottom up, because at the end of the day our goal is
to have this culture of national security, writ large. You can
see what is happening today with the pandemic flu. It involves
immigration, diplomacy, health, border. I mean, it is the whole
of government.
So that is what we are striving for. But this is not easy.
We have a national security system vintage 1947 that operates
like a regulated steel mill. And today our enemies act like
franchises, so we need to be flexible enough to operate in that
environment.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. Senator Akaka, I have had
almost 20 minutes, so it is all yours. [Laughter.]
Senator Akaka [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Voinovich.
Ms. Kichak, as you know, in 2003 I introduced the Homeland
Security Federal Workforce Act. Among other provisions, that
bill included an enhanced student loan repayment program with a
specified funding stream. The existing student loan repayment
program, although growing in use by agencies, is still hindered
by agency budget limitations. The current economic crisis may
increase the demand for the student loan repayment program
while decreasing agencies' flexibility to provide program
funding.
What is OPM doing to ensure that agencies are providing
adequate funding for this program?
Ms. Kichak. What we are doing on student loan repayment is,
unfortunately, we are not helping them with their funding, but
we are helping them with the administration of their programs.
We are reporting on the use of student loan repayment and its
effectiveness. We are continuing to educate agencies on the use
of it.
Senator Akaka. Well, as you probably know, in 2007, over
6,000 employees participated in that program, and the future
seems to indicate that we need to expand this program as much
as we can.
Dr. Sanders, the IBM Center for the Business of Government
Report identified a concern by some agencies that those who
serve in joint duty assignments might be disadvantaged with
respect to promotions upon their return. What steps has the IC
taken to overcome this concern?
Mr. Sanders. We have taken three steps. First, as I said
earlier, we have built these interagency competencies into
employee and senior officer appraisals, and we also evaluate
our senior executives on how well they are promoting the
program.
When an employee is on joint duty, in the past they were
evaluated by their home agency, even though they had left. That
disadvantaged many, so one of the major rule changes we
instituted was that for the last 3 years now, as an employee is
off on an interagency assignment, the gaining agency does the
evaluation. That is where they are contributing. That is who
evaluates them. That is who gives them their performance bonus.
Permanent promotions remain with the home agency, but we
have set up a very rigorous oversight mechanism. We collect
quarterly statistics to enforce a policy that says employees
who are or have been on joint duty must be promoted at rates
comparable to their peers. Again, a lesson learned from the
military. So every quarter, we look at promotion rates, how
many people with joint duty have been promoted, how many
without, how many total vacancies have been filled, and we are
doing a pretty good job of maintaining that parity.
The third requirement, of course, is that we are phasing in
the mandatory prerequisite for joint duty to be promoted to
senior executive rank. So that is the ultimate acid test here.
We already have several hundred positions covered. Come
October 1, 2010, virtually all of the senior positions in the
IC--and by the way, we have five different senior services in
the IC: The regular SES, the Senior Intelligence Service, the
Senior National Intelligence Service, two senior services in
the Department of Defense, and the FBI-DEA SES. But all of
those agencies and all those agency heads have said we are
going to come together on this requirement and make this a
mandatory prerequisite.
Senator Akaka. Well, I am glad to hear that the move is in
that direction.
General Navas and Ms. Kichak, the Project on National
Security Reform recommends the creation of a National Security
Fellowship Program to recruit and train highly qualified
individuals for national security service in areas such as
science, technology, language, and culture.
Do you agree that a National Security Fellowship Program,
as described by PNSR, would be an effective recruitment and
retention tool?
General Navas. Sir, we have been working together with PNSR
and particularly with their Human Capital Working Group, and I
would say that the way our Executive Order and our strategy as
established today would be compatible with such a program, and
in the future I hope that would still be the same case.
Ms. Kichak. Yes, I believe that such a program would be a
good tool to recruit people with difficult-to-find skills,
certain languages, etc. So I concur.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
General Navas, the Deputy Director of the Office of
Management and Budget issued the NSPD Implementation Scorecard
in December 2008. The Departments of Homeland Security, Health
and Human Services, and Agriculture had a number of tasks that
had not yet been completed.
What mechanisms are in place to ensure that these
departments complete those tasks?
General Navas. Sir, as we mentioned earlier, the
departments and agencies are responsible for the
implementation. The Executive Steering Committee, and assisted
by the Integration Office, provides guidance and support. We
monitor that and assist the agencies, and we had a system, the
scorecard has a green-amber-red, where amber was a task not
completed by the time that the implementation plan specified,
but there was a reason for it, and there was a time to be
completed where it did not affect the overall program. In those
very few instances where there was a red was that not
completing the task by the time expected would have an adverse
impact, and those were very few, and most of them have been
resolved.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for that.
Dr. Sanders, in your testimony you mentioned that, as part
of their annual inventory of all senior IC positions, each
agency involved may exempt senior positions from the joint duty
requirement. According to policy, this may happen in narrowly
focused areas of the IC.
How are you ensuring that agency use of this exemption is
as narrow as intended?
Mr. Sanders. The approval of exemptions, as well as the
approval of waivers in individual promotion actions, resides
exclusively with the Director of National Intelligence or, for
DOD agencies, his Director of Defense Intelligence, Under
Secretary Clapper. So only two people in the intelligence
community can approve those exemptions.
And I might add that, to our agencies' great credit, while
we anticipated a fair amount of requested exemptions, for
example, for some of our very highly technical positions,
senior crypt analysts and the like, our agencies only asked for
a dozen exemptions out of a couple of thousand senior
positions, and those exemptions involved highly specialized
medical professionals and physicians. So less than one-
hundredth of 1 percent of the IC senior position population has
been exempted.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Kichak, it is important that we recruit
and retain employees to support our national security efforts,
of course. Has OPM or the Chief Human Capital Officers Council
performed a skills gap analysis focused on the national
security workforce? If so, what were the results?
Ms. Kichak. We have not performed a skills gap analysis
specifically for that community. We have been working with that
community for certain hiring flexibilities for certain
occupations that they have identified, but we have not, nor do
I think we would be permitted to because of some of the
security issues, been able to do an assessment of employees
needed for the mission of some of the security agencies.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Sanders, the IBM report observed that IC
professionals in one element may not have the specialized
skills needed to succeed in another element. This may be a
challenge for the IC in its rotation program.
What have you done to enhance training and mentoring to
mitigate skill gaps that may emerge in the rotation programs?
Mr. Sanders. We have done a number of things, but let me
just recommend one that has, I think, really been key to our
success to date.
There are lots of mechanical things you can do to measure
skill gaps and close them, build them into your training
budgets. We do all of those things. But when Ambassador
Negroponte, the first Director of National Intelligence, issued
the first regulations creating the program, he also
commissioned our agencies' Deputy Directors as a Leadership
Development Council, and he gave them the power to oversee all
of this. They are the ones that actually run the agencies. They
are the chief operating officers of our agencies. And as I said
in my testimony, to me the single most important element of
success is that this be owned by senior leaders. They are the
ones that set the requirements. They are the ones that are
going to invest in the future. If it is seen as an HR program,
its chances of success are diminished.
That is why I think it is important that OPM and OMB
maintain the partnership that they have within NSPD--OPM to
help with the policy piece of it, but ultimately it is OMB and
bodies like the President's Management Council that will make
NSPD a success, just as our Leadership Council of Agency Deputy
Directors has been key to our success in the intelligence
community.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Sanders, you testified that 3,000 IC
employees currently serve on some type of joint duty
assignment, and that is encouraging to know. However, you state
that application rates for joint opportunities posted on the
ODNI website remain low.
Why do you believe this is? And are you doing anything to
address that?
Mr. Sanders. Yes, sir, we are. We are doing two things.
First, with respect to joint duty postings--and these are
individual positions that are filled ad hoc--we have expanded
our website. We are about ready to unveil an unclassified
version of it because the website we have now is only on our
high side, our classified system, and the agencies of the IC
that do not have access have found it difficult to see the
vacancies and the postings.
But, actually, I think a more powerful too in this regard
is what we are loosely referring to as ``joint manning
documents.'' The National Counterterrorism Center, for example,
when it was stood up, literally said it was intended to be a
joint organization, the IC's version of a combatant command in
DOD. And they went to the individual agencies and said, CIA,
you owe us X number of intelligence analysts, FBI, you owe us Y
number of intelligence analysts; build that into your staffing
plans so that year in and year out you furnish your best and
brightest to us on rotation--not filling the individual jobs ad
hoc but filling them through a regular rotation built into the
agency staffing plans.
We have found that to be very successful and, in fact, that
is emerging as the principal way of filling joint opportunities
rather than through ad hoc individual postings. So that is one
of our lessons learned, again, that we have passed on to OPM
and OMB.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
General Navas, you state in your testimony that the
criteria for identifying and designating a position as a
national security professional position is set at the
department and agency level. How well does this work? Do
agencies have any reason to underreport their national security
professional positions?
General Navas. Sir, as we mentioned, the determination of
the mission of the different departments and agencies is an
evolving issue. It is very clear in the traditional national
security agencies, like the Department of Defense, Department
of State, the intelligence community. The other agencies
sometimes struggle with defining and visualizing what their
role is in the national security environment, and then
determining who are the individuals that would be performing
these functions.
The Executive Order established a broad enough definition
that the agencies used; that the report we got was that in the
17 agencies we have at the GS-13 and above level about 14,000
national security professionals.
Now, this is a number that is continously revised as
agencies better define their mission. As we progress and start
conducting exercises, training and education, and developing
scenarios (for example, Project Horizon) that should inform the
agencies, and thus get a much more granular picture of who are
the national security professionals are. Right now the 14,000
that I mentioned; if we could just get them to this training,
education, and professional development opportunities--that
would be a major, significant, progress towards our goal.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much for your
responses. It will be helpful to this Subcommittee, and I want
to thank you for being here today and wish you well in your
future work. We have so much more to do, but we are going to
have to work together to do it.
I want to welcome the second panel. It is good to have you
here with the Subcommittee.
Senator Bob Graham, Chairman of the Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and
Terrorism.
Hon. Thomas R. Pickering, Guiding Coalition Member of the
Project on National Security Reform.
And Dr. James R. Thompson, Associate Professor and Head,
Department of Public Administration at the University of
Illinois-Chicago.
Welcome to all of you, and as you know, it is the custom of
this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so I would ask all
of you to please stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear
that the testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee is
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you, God?
Mr. Graham. I do.
Ambassador Pickering. I do.
Mr. Thompson. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let it be noted for the record
that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
I just want the witnesses to know that your full written
statements will be placed in the record, and I would also like
to remind you that your remarks should be brief given the
number of people that we have as witnesses.
So, Senator Graham, it is good to have you, and will you
please begin with your statement?
TESTIMONY OF HON. BOB GRAHAM,\1\ FORMER SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM
Mr. Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Voinovich. It is an honor to be back on this side of the table.
[Laughter.]
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on
page 63.
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You have indicated that our full statement will be entered
into the record, so I would like to summarize my comments
around four points.
First, our Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism has found that this
issue of a weapon of mass destruction being used someplace in
the world is real. This is not a fanciful concern, and the
consequences are grave.
Second, it is not only an important issue, it is an urgent
issue. The next 5 years, in our judgment, will be a critical
time in terms of our efforts to mitigate this potential
problem.
Third, the good news is that there are steps that can be
taken which would have the effect of reducing the probability
of a weapon of mass destruction being used.
And, fourth, the role of the Congress is critical and
central to mitigate the risk of a WMD attack.
I would like briefly to elaborate on those four points.
The Commission had three principal findings: First, that
the United States is increasingly vulnerable to a weapon of
mass destruction attack, and that we are less secure today than
we were 10 years ago. Our Commission was composed of nine
persons--five Democrats, four Republicans, each of whom had
backgrounds in areas such as the Congress, the Executive
Branch, the military, the intelligence services, and academic
areas relevant to this topic. It was our unanimous conclusion
that our margin of safety is eroding.
Second, it was also our unanimous conclusion that it is
more likely than not that there will be a weapon of mass
destruction used somewhere in the world before the end of 2013.
So we now have less than 5 years before the window that we
found was a probability of use of a weapon of mass destruction.
Shortly after our report was issued in early December 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence made a statement which was
very consistent with that probability.
And, third, that it is more likely that the weapon of mass
destruction will be a biological rather than a nuclear weapon.
We think that this current example of the swine flu
epidemic and the concern that it has created helps frame the
importance of this issue. This epidemic, as of 11 o'clock this
morning, had approximately 100 reported and confirmed deaths in
Mexico. The Mexican Government has ordered the suspension of
all non-essential activities, including all schools, which
contain 33 million students. All restaurants and bars have been
closed. All retail stores have been closed. All museums, movie
theaters, and outdoor sporting events have been suspended. That
is what has happened with this event. Imagine if this had been
a biological terrorist attack which had not killed a hundred
people, but had killed thousands or tens of thousands of
people. Imagine what the reaction would be in the country in
which it occurred and around the world. We think this matter is
urgent, that time is not on our side.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask to submit for the record
a piece which is going to appear in the next issue of Newsweek
Magazine called ``Disease and Terror,'' written by Dr. D.A.
Henderson, who is the Dean Emeritus of the School of Public
Health at Johns Hopkins.\1\
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\1\ The article submitted by Mr. Graham appears in the Appendix on
page 88.
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In this very informative and, frankly, frightening article,
Dr. Henderson states that the central driver to attacks is the
increasing interconnected world in which we live. As the world
becomes smaller, the impacts of catastrophic events are more
significant than what in the past would have seemed to be
sufficient distance away; a geographical level of protection no
longer is the case.
I think this urgency of time is particularly important for
the two areas that you have identified for today's hearing,
issues of agency collaboration and the development of a
national security workforce.
There are steps which can be taken to reduce the
probability of an attack. These steps can be found in the
Commission's recommendations.
First, under the category of the national security
workforce, the U.S. Government should recruit the next
generation of national security experts by establishing
programs of education, training, retraining, and joint duty,
all with the goal of creating a culture of interagency
collaboration, flexibility, and innovation. The intelligence
community should expedite efforts to recruit and streamline the
hiring process for people with language capability and cultural
backgrounds, especially those coming from an ancestry in the
regions of the world from which our greatest threats are now
emanating.
Second, to improve interagency cooperation, there should be
a policy change in the area of sharing of weapons of mass
destruction, proliferation, and terrorism intelligence. This
should be a top priority for the intelligence community. An
acceleration of these efforts is necessary to assure that
analysts and collectors receive consistent training and
guidance on handling sensitive and classified information.
Third, we need to address the weakening science and
technology base in our nuclear science and biotechnology
programs. Secretary of Defense Gates recently commented on the
state of science at our most important National Laboratory,
Sandia, in New Mexico. He stated that half of our scientists at
Sandia--the laboratory that is primarily responsible for our
nuclear program and supporting our efforts in Russia through
the Nunn-Lugar program--are over 50 years of age, and many of
those under 50 have limited, or no involvement, in the design
and development of a nuclear weapon. Within the next several
years, three-quarters of the workforce in nuclear engineering
at the National Laboratories will reach retirement age. We have
an urgent need to begin to rebuild this workforce.
The President was requested by our Commission within 180
days of taking office to present to the Congress an assessment
of changes that are needed in existing legislation to enable
the intelligence community to carry out its counterterrorism,
counter-proliferation, and weapons of mass destruction counter
terrorism missions. I would urge this Subcommittee to ensure
that the Administration is fully aware of this suggested
timetable and to be able to present you with such
recommendations before the August recess.
The final point is the fact that the Congress must play a
central role in order to change the intelligence community.
There is a natural resistance to change within any bureaucracy.
It is going to take the actions by this Subcommittee and your
counterparts in other areas affected by this challenge to see
that real reform is achieved.
I would like to conclude by asking the question that one of
our former colleagues, Sam Nunn, has asked, and that is, ``On
the day after a weapon of mass destruction goes off someplace
in the world, what are we going to say that we did in order to
have avoided that now reality?'' That is the question that all
of us are going to have to face if and when it occurs.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.
And now we will hear from Ambassador Pickering. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING,\1\ FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, AND GUIDING COALITION MEMBER, PROJECT ON NATIONAL
SECURITY REFORM
Ambassador Pickering. Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich,
thank you for inviting me here to speak today to you on
national security workforce issues. They are at the heart of
comprehensive national security reform.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Pickering appears in the Appendix
on page 73.
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The Project on National Security Reform is grateful for
this Subcommittee's initiative in addressing national security
workforce issues, including its past efforts with S. 589.
Evidence of the importance of workforce reform can be found in
the government's experience in Goldwater-Nichols. Title 4 of
the Act, which addressed joint personnel policies and added
training, education, and joint assignment requirements for
career advancement, was essential to producing the unified and
joint workforce capabilities of the Defense Department.
Many talented employees devote their lives to assuring
America's security. Their achievements occur, however, despite
rather than because of the system's human capital policies,
programs, and procedures. Many reforms are needed involving
structural, process, knowledge management, visioning, strategic
planning, and resource management decisions and issues.
Developing a national security workforce, however, will begin
to create the culture and capabilities needed for other changes
to occur. In essence, people are central.
I want to talk about the current human capital challenges
and then the solutions that we propose. The system does not
hire, train, educate, or develop the necessary workforce
adequately to meet the requirements. It is unable to correctly
allocate workforce capabilities. The cultures and interests of
the departments and agencies trump the need for interagency
collaboration. Leaders have not paid sufficient attention to
building institutional capacity, nor have they paid sufficient
attention to the interagency mission.
Proposals for reform. What should we think about in terms
of rectifying these problems? I would like to discuss eight of
the principal proposals of the Project on National Security
Reform for addressing these problems.
First, develop a National Security Human Capital Strategy
and an associated Implementation Plan. The strategy and the
plan are necessary to align human capital capabilities with the
national security system's programs, needs, and priorities.
These documents will define the tools, the capabilities, the
core competencies, and the needs of the national security
workforce. They will outline both the goals for the workforce
and the means for achieving the goals.
Second, create a Human Capital Advisory Board consisting of
public and private sector experts on human capital and the
national security system to advise the President and the
National Security Council (NSC.)
Third, enact career planning processes and require
rotational assignments, joint duty. Career planning should be
used to guide careers and to make position assignments and
promotion decisions. National security professionals should
also be required to fulfill extended assignments in departments
or agencies other than their own. The workforce reform element
of Goldwater-Nichols and the Foreign Service Officer tenure
requirements serve as useful models in this area.
Fourth, enact training and educational requirements. These
are essential to ensure individuals know how to work with and
to use all the government's tools to develop and implement
national security policy. Training should include both
orientation to the system as well as continuing instruction on
the system and how it operates. Training and educational
requirements will assure professionals continue to develop
their knowledge and talent and make government service more
appealing.
Fifth, create professional development programs. Potential
programs include a national security fellowship, something I
know you have already thought about a great deal, and a cadre
of interagency professionals to lead the system.
Sixth, enact, enhance, and fund the National Security
Education and Training Consortium. The consortium should
consist of public and private sector educational institutions
whose curricula should address the full range of national
security issues and requirements.
Seventh, provide tuition reimbursement and loan repayment
plans to train foreign language speakers, assure technical
expertise, and other needed competencies. Such programs should
target both current and graduated students.
And, eighth, build a professional float for personnel to
enable career development opportunities. Many departments can
barely meet their programmatic needs, which gives them little
or no ability to incorporate systematic education, training,
and career development opportunities in their programs. These
opportunities will only succeed if the Congress authorizes and
appropriates money for a civilian personnel float that will
allow individuals to take advantage of these career development
opportunities without having to pull people out of operational
tasks with no replacements.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, these proposals will substantially
improve the system and its ability to support and enable our
national security workforce. The U.S. Government has a talented
and dedicated national security workforce. They work incredibly
hard and with unsurpassed dedication. Too much of their hard
work is wasted by a dysfunctional system. Working longer hours
and harder is no longer just the only answer. Our national
security workforce deserves a better system. Our national
security and survival, as Senator Graham has made crystal
clear, requires a better system.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am submitting a full written
statement for the record, and I am happy, obviously, to address
any questions that you or your colleagues may have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ambassador Pickering.
Now we will hear from Dr. Thompson.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. THOMPSON, PH.D.,\1\ ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
AND HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS-CHICAGO
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Voinovich. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you
today on national security workforce reform.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Thompson appears in the Appendix
on page 85.
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My colleague, Rob Seidner, who is also here today, and I
wrote a report for the IBM Center for the Business of
Government last year titled ``Federated Human Resource
Management in the Federal Government: The Intelligence
Community Model.'' The report is about the intelligence
community's efforts to put into place a common human resource
management framework across the entire community. That effort
was driven by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, which directed the intelligence community to
identify a set of common personnel human resource management
practices. That law, in turn, was driven by the 9/11 Commission
report, which found a need for enhanced collaboration across
the intelligence community and which determined that a common
human resource management framework would contribute to
enhanced collaboration within the community.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has
proceeded to drive a process whereby all the agencies within
the intelligence community have participated in an effort to
develop this framework. One of the most important elements of
that framework is the intelligence community's joint duty
program, modeled after that in the armed services.
It is too early to say definitively whether or not that
program has been a success, but we think the early signs are
auspicious. Most importantly, for the purpose of this
discussion, we think there are some important things that can
be learned by the national security community from what the
intelligence community has experienced to date.
First and foremost, I would like to re-emphasize a point
made by Dr. Sanders in the first panel, which is that for a
joint duty program to succeed, it is important that there be an
infrastructure in place. For example, within the intelligence
community, before they implemented the joint duty program, they
put into place a common set of performance elements across all
the intelligence agencies so that when a senior officer in one
agency goes on temporary assignment in another agency, he or
she knows that he or she is going to be appraised according to
the same elements as in his or her home agency.
Another issue is the ``out of sight, out of mind'' issue,
which was referenced in the first panel. This refers to a
concern by some intelligence officers that if they leave the
agency for some period of time, they will be forgotten when
opportunities for promotion come around. And so, as Dr. Sanders
referenced, the ODNI has put into place an effort to monitor
the promotion rates for those who are on joint duty as well as
those who are not on joint duty.
Also as referenced in the first panel, there is this issue
of a personnel float. As the ODNI went around to the different
agencies trying to encourage the officers to participate in the
joint duty program, what they often heard was, ``Well, my
manager or my boss will not let me go,'' because the boss, of
course, driven by mission considerations, was reluctant to let
the person go on joint duty. So it is important that there be a
personnel float so that the agency can fill in behind these
people that are on joint duty.
Perhaps most importantly with regard to how the
intelligence community has proceeded with its joint duty
program is that the program was designed in a collaborative
manner. Contrary to how things usually work in the Federal
Government--where things are designed at the top and, by and
large, imposed on the various agencies--in this case, because
the ODNI was structured, without direct line authority over the
individual agencies, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence was forced to engage in a collaborative process
with the agencies whereby they had to come to consensus on the
elements of the joint duty program. And as we talked to the
human capital officers in the different agencies, we found a
great deal of support for the program, largely based on the
fact that it had been a collaborative process and that they had
all had an opportunity to contribute to its design. So we think
that is an important element and something to be learned by the
national security community as well.
But it is also important that there be a central entity
promoting and pushing the process, which, of course, within the
intelligence community was the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence itself. They were pushing the process. It
is not quite clear within the national security community which
entity would serve the purpose of making sure that the process
moves and that the effort comes to successful fruition.
One possibility would be, of course, the National Security
Professional Development Executive Steering Committee, which
has already been created by Executive Order 13434. I have
speculated in my testimony that one option that might be
considered would be to actually allow the central management of
the SES-ers within the national security community by this
board, by the National Security Professional Development
Executive Steering Committee. As it is now, the careers of
these officials are, of course, managed by each individual
agency.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Dr. Thompson.
Senator Graham, in your testimony, you urged Congress to
take the lead in reforming how we recruit, develop, and retain
the national security workforce for the 21st Century. Congress
previously has taken the lead in establishing joint duty
programs for military officers and in the IC. In 2003, I
introduced legislation that would have established a similar
program for national security workers.
Do you believe that the Goldwater-Nichols Act provides a
good model for the establishment of an effective national
security interagency rotation program?
Mr. Graham. Yes, and I think the history of Goldwater-
Nichols is also instructive. Prior to 1947, each of the major
military branches had its own Cabinet-level Secretary. In 1947,
the Department of Defense was established with a Secretary of
Defense who essentially sat on top of what had been two
organizations, but became three with the establishment of the
Air Force.
It took from 1947 until 1986 to make the conversion from
that organizational chart to what Goldwater-Nichols provided
for, which was organizing around the principle of regional
combatant commands and requiring joint duty among the branches
to staff those various combatant commands. I do not think that
we have 30 years to wait to act on the issue that is before us.
I think we have got to move with a far greater sense of
urgency.
Frankly, I am discouraged that your legislation, which has
many very important components, was introduced in 2003 and we
are now at April 30, 2009, talking about it as something that
should be done rather than what we should be doing here which
is evaluating how well it is being implemented.
So I hope that you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Voinovich
will continue with tenacity and, if necessary, aggressiveness
to move this forward, because time is not our ally.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator.
Ambassador Pickering, in your testimony you state that a
National Security Human Capital Strategy and a National
Security Strategic Human Capital Implementation Plan would
align national security goals through program execution. The
National Security Council would likely provide this guidance.
How do you foresee the National Security Council working in
partnership with the Executive Steering Committee, the
interagency group charged with implementing this program?
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that
these recommendations are predicated on another set of
recommendations which recommend, in fact, that the National
Security Council do for the country at large our strategy, our
budgeting and programming guidance, so that, in fact, the
agencies in the national security cluster of agencies would
have a common effort. This would be done with the full
participation of the agencies rather than a top-down dicta.
Once we see, in fact, where an Administration wishes to go,
we then have some better ideas of what personnel resources are
required to be brought to bear to deal with those, and the
personnel strategy would answer that question. Then, obviously,
beyond that, which is policy, comes implementation. And we feel
very strongly that an implementation plan would be required--
again, with the full participation of the agencies.
As the national intelligence establishment has shown us, in
order to have buy-in, you have to have participation, and this
is extremely important. But we all demonstrated in the past in
many different ways that this can happen. And so this kind of
an approach with planning incorporated at an early stage I
think is an efficient way. And certainly the bodies that you
mention would be very important players in this process.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Ambassador.
Professor Thompson, in your report you identify the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency as agencies that have been able to work out
the skills gaps among individuals rotating between agencies.
Do you have any additional information about how those
agencies were able to overcome these potential skills gaps?
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I do not specifically have
information on those two agencies. My general observation would
be that at some level the job becomes predominantly one of
leadership, and that leadership skills that are relevant in one
context could also be relevant in another context. If one is a
good leader within the CIA, presumably one can be an effective
leader within the FBI or the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency.
So I think at the SES level we are predominantly talking
about management and leadership skills that can, in fact,
translate across agency lines. In some cases, there are issues
relating to technical skills, but, in general, with possibly
some exceptions, I think those kind of gaps can be overcome.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. We will have a second round.
Senator Voinovich, your questions.
Senator Voinovich. First of all, I would like to thank all
of you for being here. I apologize I was not here, Senator
Graham, at the beginning of your testimony. It is good to see
you again. And, Ambassador Pickering, it is good to see you.
And, Mr. Thompson, thanks for coming over.
Mr. Thompson, you had a chance to hear Mr. Sanders talk
about what they were doing at DNI, and he has 18 agencies that
are under his jurisdiction. And I heard the testimony of
Senator Graham, and it did not seem to reflect what Dr.
Sanders' testimony was in terms of what they are doing over in
his shop. I would like to get your observations on that.
And I will also ask you, Senator Graham, when you were
making the point about getting some of this stuff done, have
you distinguished between what is being done in the 17 agencies
outside of the DNI versus what they have been doing?
Mr. Thompson. Again, our conclusion based on our interviews
and the data that we collected was that, to a large extent, the
effort within the IC has been substantially successful in terms
of inducing a fairly significant level of interagency
collaboration, at least on the human resource element of their
efforts; and that, again, it is largely attributable to the
fact that the ODNI was forced to engage in a fairly
collaborative effort to design this new framework and to design
these specific policies.
As a result, there is a very substantial and significant
level of buy-in by the individual agencies, which historically
have been very autonomous and somewhat insular in their
approach to human resource management. So the fact that we
found as high a level of buy-in to the new framework as we did,
I think, is an encouraging sign. The fact that it appears to
have been sustained over the Presidential transition is also an
encouraging sign because efforts like these, which otherwise
induce resistance are often lost when there is a transition
from one Administration to the next.
Senator Voinovich. Well, I am really pleased that Mr.
Sanders is there and continuing. One of the things that happens
around here is that when we take on transformation, and then it
is 6 months or 7 months before somebody else takes their place,
and you lose the momentum that you have. Mr. Sanders, keep it
up.
Your observations--and I did not give you a chance----
Mr. Graham. Senator, to answer your question, the answer is
yes. In the report from our Commission called ``World at
Risk,'' we identified the progress that has been made in the
intelligence community as one of the most significant positive
signs, and in many ways a road map for other agencies that
needed to move aggressively in that direction. And I want to
also say that, in addition to the reasons that Dr. Thompson has
given for the ability of the intelligence community to achieve
its success, do not overlook the value of having some very
competent and capable people such as Dr. Sanders, running the
systems. Our Nation is fortunate to have him in the position
that he is occupying.
Ambassador Pickering. Senator Voinovich, could I make a
couple of points on your question very briefly?
Senator Voinovich. Yes.
Ambassador Pickering. Certainly there is no question at
all, I think all of us agree that the intelligence community is
a model that now should be spread to the rest of the national
security group of agencies. I would also want to tell you with
some humility that for the last 50 years, 60 years, our
embassies have operated in an integrated way--not perfectly,
but they have drawn from sometimes as many as 40 agencies. They
have all been working under the authority of the ambassador.
You provided for that here in the Congress. It has been
extremely important. It is the first example, I think, of
across-the-board national security working together
arrangements. They have had their problems, but in many cases
they have done extremely well. And obviously this critical
question of leadership, willingness of agencies to cooperate
and be part of a team has been a significant contribution to
that kind of activity. The problem has been how do we get that
in Washington.
Senator Voinovich. Well, what you are saying to me--now, as
I travel the country, that we have located people in the
intelligence community at those places, which I guess has not
happened in the past. What you are saying is a good idea. The
one thing I am interested in--in fact, I brought to the
attention of Secretary Clinton, is that the report from the
Academy of Diplomacy on Foreign Affairs budget for the future,
and she was before us today in Appropriations, and they are
asking for $7.5 billion out of the supplemental to do some
things, and one of the things in the report that was made, if
you will recall, was that they needed enough people so that you
could get a float in the State Department. And today, because
of the lack of resources, that has not been available.
It would seem to me that if we are going to deal with this
problem the way we would like to, each of the agencies need to
be looked at in terms of the human capital commitment that has
been made in the agencies, and also whether or not you have
some folks there that, when they leave, they are not being held
there because their boss says, ``We do not want you to go
because if you go, we are not going to be able to get the job
done.'' And so it is going to take--when we had Ms. Kichak in
here, somebody has to go in there in each of these agencies and
examine it, where are you at, how many do you have, and what is
the program. And I think that in DNI and what Mr. Sanders has
done, it is a leadership thing.
I have to tell you, Senator Graham, Senator Akaka and I,
that is all we have been concentrating on over here, is human
capital. I think that probably in the last 10 years we have
made the largest change in Title 5 since 1978. But a lot of
what needs to be done is part of leadership. And I know Clay
Johnson seemed to be interested in it, but I would be
interested in your observations about where do you get the
leader that is going to make sure that this gets done. Where
should that person be? And how should it be organized so that a
year from now we can say that some significant progress has
been made?
Ambassador Pickering. We have to start on this, I think, at
the very top. The Project on National Security Reform, in fact,
said that the President has clearly wanted--needs and wants to
need to have the national security restructure reflect how and
in what way the 21st Century provides the challenges. So I
think it is very much at that level that you have to have it.
The Cabinet Secretaries have to know that this is the kind of
direction which people want to go.
There needs to be, I think, great care in this process
because the Cabinet departments and agencies have the funding
and the personnel to carry out many of the implementation
tasks. That cannot all be taken away from them and put into
some other box where, in fact, then we have to come back to you
and reinvent the entire government. But there is, I think, a
crying need for training, for education, and, indeed, for
preparation for people to work even more vigorously on an
interagency basis, on a cooperative basis, on a whole of
government basis than we have seen. The intelligence community
is leading the way across the intelligence community, and I
think that the Defense Department has led the way within its
own structures. Now is the time to bring the rest of the
civilian portions of the government together and the national
security cluster of issues to do everything we can to improve
that efficiency. But I think it has to be something that the
President has to say he wants.
Senator Voinovich. Well, should it be out of OMB?
Ambassador Pickering. OMB has an important role because
money lubricates all work in the government. And OMB does not
run the President. The President runs OMB. And the President, I
think, can make it very clear. I think cooperation between the
National Security Council and the Office of Management and
Budget is essential to make this happen, just as you have to
bring in the key Cabinet departments. They have to be part of
the answer to the problem. They do not become--if they do not,
they become part of the problem.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. There has been a vote
that has been called, and I would like to ask a final question
on my side, and any final question you may have.
Senator Voinovich. Go ahead.
Senator Akaka. I thank you very much for your testimonies.
This question is to the three of you, and what I want to ask
you to do is please list your top three recommendations for
ensuring that we have a strong national security service
workforce.
Mr. Graham. First, we need a clear set of what our
expectations are. We still have a woefully deficient number of
people in our national security agencies who can speak the
languages of the regions of the world from which our greatest
threats are coming, and who understand the history and culture
of those regions. That is illustrative of a goal that must be
clearly articulated and monitored by the Congress. Are we
making progress in building the national security workforce we
need?
Second, we need to have a regular pipeline. I am a great
advocate of the military's ROTC approach where it is able to
assure an adequate number of young men and women coming into
the Officer Corps of all of our military services. I think we
need something analogous to that for our other national
security agencies.
And, third, once we get people into these agencies, we need
to understand the importance of maintaining and expanding their
professional competencies. We were told in our Commission that
the average military officer will spend as much as 25 percent
of his or her time during their period in the military in some
form of training. That percentage is dramatically lower for
most of our other national security agencies. I think we need
to try to use the military example as the point at which we are
trying to move and assuring the continued professional
development of the people that we have recruited and hired into
our national security agencies.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Ambassador Pickering. I will try to be brief because I
think they reflect what Senator Graham has said. I think we
first need to know what it is we have to do, and that obviously
is a principal question. Without knowing what it is we have to
do, any reform will or will not get us there.
Second, we need the plans and programs, many of which you,
Mr. Chairman, and Senator Voinovich have already proposed, that
are going to get us there--things like joint duty, which we
know can work and has worked and will continue to work, much
better training.
I have in my career learned two languages from the bottom
up, had one polished, and studied five more. And my feeling is
that that kind of ongoing training and education is critically
important. For the State Department and other agencies, they do
not have enough positions to do training without pulling people
out of the line. And everybody is either on the line or on
training. And so we badly need help across, I think, the
spectrum of national security agencies to find a way to provide
for that. The State Department estimated they need 1,200
people--positions for 1,200 people adequately to do the
training and the other rotational assignments that are
critical. So the programs are very important.
Then, finally, the funding. These are not big-dollar items.
They are really critical items, and they involve investment in
the long term, as Senator Graham has said. If you can teach
somebody to speak a foreign language, you can use them for the
rest of their lives in many different assignments centered
around that capability. And, of course, we know we have still
huge shortages. We had in Arabic, and it continues to be large.
We have in many of the languages in the areas where the
terrorist threat is larger, in Farsi, Persian, Urdu, and Hindi,
and other languages where we can continue, I think, to expect
troubles coming at us.
And so funding programs and understanding where it is we
want to go are my three top priorities.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Dr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I would actually focus more
broadly, and I would focus on the structure of the SES itself,
going beyond just the national security professional workforce,
which is, I think, there is a general consensus that the SES
has not achieved its original vision as put forth in the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, which is that it was intended to be
a corps of generalist managers and executives whose careers
would routinely take them across agency lines so they would get
a broad perspective. It has never achieved that mission, and
that is the case largely because the careers of these
individuals are managed at the departmental level.
So my first recommendation would be look at the option,
which is what they do in Great Britain, whereby the careers of
the senior executives are managed centrally, by a central body,
of which OPM would have to be a part, maybe OMB or whatever,
but to actually look at that model where the loyalty of these
individuals is not so much to their individual agency but to
the service, as a service. So they act in ways that induce
interagency collaboration.
So that would be my first recommendation, to look at the
structure of the SES as a whole and at least contemplate the
option of moving towards the British model.
Then the other issue, of course, is that which Senator
Voinovich has emphasized, which is training. We have
systematically underinvested in training in the Federal
Government. I think having a more centralized model might
facilitate expanded investment in training, at the Executive
level as well as at subsidiary levels.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Senator Voinovich, any last comments or last questions?
Senator Voinovich. Senator Graham, who in the
Administration is going to read your report? I notice it is not
a real big report, so somebody should be able to read that, I
think, maybe in a couple of hours.
Mr. Graham. We briefed President Bush in December on this
report. We met subsequently with Vice President-to-be Biden,
who was given the point on this issue for the Administration.
We have met with the leadership of both the House and the
Senate, so I believe that the significance of this challenge
has been heard by the people who have the greatest
responsibility and opportunity to increase our level of
security.
Senator Voinovich. That is good news. Senator Akaka and I
can talk about trying to figure out how we are going to
quarterback this or oversight it to make sure that it gets
done. I think the first test is going to be what the State
Department does. It is going to be that--that will be the first
test: What are they willing to do over there? And do they get
it? I think they know they need more people, but we will see
how they are doing. And Ms. Kichak was here, and I think we
ought to have her come back and tell us exactly what her
evaluation is in each of the departments and what needs to be
done, because this stuff has all got to be reflected in
somebody's budget.
Thank you very much for being here. We will follow up.
Senator Akaka. Again, let me say thank you very much to
this panel. You have helped us. Your comments have been great.
It will help this Subcommittee. I am planning to introduce
legislation that provides effective tools to recruit, retain,
and develop national security employees, and your responses
will help us do that as well.
The hearing record will be open for one week for additional
statements or questions other Members may have. Again, thank
you so much for your help to this Subcommittee.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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