[Senate Hearing 111-100, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-100, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1390
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
----------
MAY 20 AND JUNE 3, 2009
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010--Part 7 STRATEGIC FORCES
S. Hrg. 111-100 Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1390
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
__________
MAY 20 AND JUNE 3, 2009
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
52-626 WASHINGTON : 2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Military Space Programs
may 20, 2009
Page
Payton, Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Programs................................................. 4
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Command....... 9
James, Lt. Gen. Larry D., USAF, Commander, 14Th Air Force, Air
Force Space Command and Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Space, United States Strategic Command............. 15
Harris, VADM Harry B., Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Communication Networks..................................... 19
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 22
Strategic Forces Programs
june 3, 2009
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Department of Energy.................. 49
Alston, Maj. Gen. C. Donald, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration................... 99
Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Floyd L., USAF, Commander, 8th Air Force,
Air Combat Command............................................. 102
Johnson, RADM Stephen E., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
Programs....................................................... 104
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Sessions,
and Vitter.
Committee staff member present: Jennifer L. Stoker,
security clerk.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
professional staff member; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Caple, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator
Udall; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Pete Landrum,
assistant to Senator Sessions; and Michael T. Wong, assistant
to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon. I will insert my
prepared statement for the record at this point, and now turn
to our ranking member, Senator Vitter.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
I would like to welcome all of our witnesses today to the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee hearing on military space programs and issues.
Today we have Gary Payton, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force
for Space; General Robert Kehler, Commander of Air Force Space Command;
Lt. Gen. Larry James, Commander of 14th Air Force and the Joint
Functional Component Commander for Space; Vice Admiral Harry Harris,
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communications Networks; and
Cristina Chaplain, the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management
at the Government Accountability Office. All of your statements will be
included in the record.
I would also like to welcome Senator Vitter, who, as of last week,
is the new ranking member on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
replacing Senator Sessions. I look forward to a productive working
relationship.
It has been a pleasure to work with Senator Sessions over these
past several years. We have tackled a lot of difficult issues together.
I am glad he will stay on the subcommittee.
Space is essential for modern life and for a modern military, but
getting satellites built and on orbit is not easy and not cheap.
Most of the space programs continue to struggle, although there has
been improvement in some programs, others, such as Space-Based Infrared
Satellite-Geosynchronous Orbit and the advanced extremely high
frequency satellite continue to be delayed. What are the problems and
how do they get fixed?
While the United States has been very lucky that satellites, once
launched, generally have a history of lasting longer than planned, in
some cases much longer. With the delays in the replacement programs
there is a potential for gaps in the various programs. This is
particularly true for missile warning.
We will also look at what role small satellites can play in meeting
certain requirements, augmenting or replacing capabilities, and in
reducing the overall size, complexity, and cost of space systems.
We look forward to hearing from all of you this afternoon.
We will have a very short closed session in the Office of Senate
Security relating to the launch of the North Korean missile at the
conclusion of the opening session. We will plan on moving over there at
a little after 3 o'clock.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAVID VITTER
Senator Vitter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is
great to be here as the ranking member of this subcommittee for
the first time. I look forward to working with you and all the
other members on these significant issues.
I will submit my full opening statement for the record, but
I do want to highlight a number of concerns.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is here today,
and I look forward to hearing from all the witnesses, including
them. For sometime, they have highlighted a number of systemic
problems associated with our major space acquisition programs.
Generally, they have said that competition for dollars leads to
low-cost estimation and unrealistic scheduling, and then that
gets us in a bind down the line when the true costs of programs
and true schedules come into clear focus. So I would like
everyone's reaction to that ongoing critique and what we should
do in light of it.
I want to thank Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain
for their acquisition reform bill, which I am happy to support
and would love folks' reaction to what is in that bill, how
that can make a difference and what more we need to do.
I am also encouraged with many--not all, but certainly
many--of Secretary Gates' strong recommendations to cancel
certain programs that were not proving out like the
Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program and to focus
resources and certainly would like folks' detailed thoughts on
that and how we move forward in a productive way.
Then finally, I would point out a recent Institute for
Defense Analyses (IDA) report, chartered by the Department of
Defense (DOD), to address significant congressional concerns.
One conclusion of the report is an assertion that ``no one is
in charge,'' that leadership is fragmented with respect to
strategy, budgets, requirements, and acquisitions, and it
recommends that the President establish and lead the execution
of a much more focused national space strategy. It also
recommends a top-to-bottom overhaul, and I very much look
forward to hearing everyone's reaction to that critique and
those recommendations.
But, again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for your leadership and I
look forward to working with you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator David Vitter
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our
witnesses. This is my first hearing as ranking member of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee and I look forward to working with you on the many
important issues under this subcommittee's jurisdiction.
The administration's fiscal year 2010 budget provided a significant
funding increase for Defense-wide, ``white space'' programs. This
year's request at about $11.1 billion--$9.2 billion of which is for Air
Force space programs represents a $412 million increase over fiscal
year 2009 appropriated levels. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today how this money will be spent wisely and what will be
done to guarantee that the programs we fund in fiscal year 2010 break
away from past practices of cost overruns and long delays.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), which I am pleased is
here today to testify, has for some time highlighted a number of
systemic problems associated with our major space acquisition programs.
GAO has found that because the Department of Defense (DOD) starts more
weapon programs that it can afford--competition for dollars lead to low
cost estimation and unrealistic scheduling. GAO notes that DOD tends to
start many of its space programs before it has a sound understanding
and the appropriate assurance that the technologies it seeks are
achievable within available funding. As a result of this broken
acquisition process, the Department all too frequently puts itself in a
bind with respect to supporting the warfighters' needs. Not only are we
constantly underestimating cost, but according to GAO, delays in
schedule are increasing the overall risk for capability gaps in areas
such as positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and
weather monitoring.
Under the leadership of Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain,
this committee broadly recognized those problems in developing the
``Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.'' That bill emphasizes
starting major weapons systems off right by having them obtain reliable
and independent cost estimates and subjecting them to rigorous
developmental testing and systems engineering early in their
acquisition cycle. In so doing, the bill (which will likely be signed
into law by the President within the next few days) intends to ensure
that programs not proceed from one stage of the acquisition cycle to
the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the
risk of cost growth and schedule slippage. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses how they believe the bill will help manage
technology and integration risk in DOD military space programs.
I am encouraged by Secretary Gates' recommendation to cancel the
Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program, an example of an overly
ambitious project, lacking a meaningful technology, schedule, and
funding path. I am also pleased to hear that the Department will not
let the $3.3 billion already invested in TSAT go to waste. With the
recommendation to eliminate TSAT and purchase two additional advanced
extremely high frequency satellites, it is clear that the Department
recognizes that smaller, more incremental steps forward, are far less
risky ventures, and are a significantly more responsible path forward
with respect to the taxpayers' money. I am encouraged that the
Department does not plan to let our hefty investment in TSAT go to
waste and does plan to harvest some of TSAT's more successful research
and development efforts. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
more about the plan to address our satellite communications needs, how
we will utilize TSAT technologies on the procurement of already proven
and technologically mature systems, and how TSAT can be a lesson moving
forward for our future space acquisition endeavors.
A recent Institute for Defense Analyses report charted by DOD to
address congressional concerns with the leadership, management, and
organization for National Security Space found that ``significant
improvements are imperative . . . in order to maintain U.S. space
preeminence and advert the loss of the U.S. competitive national
security advantage.'' The report asserts that ``no one's in charge,''
leadership is fragmented with respect to strategy, budgets,
requirements, and acquisition, and recommends that the President
establish and lead the execution of a national space strategy. The
report recommends a top-to-bottom overhaul and I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses what steps are being taken to address the
report's recommendations.
I recognize that space acquisitions are inherently risky and are
like no other venture the DOD undertakes. The challenges are many and
the unknown and need for pushing the technology envelope is great.
However, we must do a better job at managing the risk and spending the
taxpayers' money wisely. Nonetheless, I look forward to hearing from
the witnesses what is being done to address the space acquisition
shortcomings, if you believe the condition is getting better, and what
more needs to happen within the Department.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. As is the procedure, each of your
statements will be entered in the record at this time.
STATEMENT OF GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS
[The prepared statement of Mr. Payton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gary E. Payton
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before this subcommittee as the
Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs, and to
discuss with you our military activities. I support the Secretary of
the Air Force with his responsibilities as the Service Acquisition
Executive for Space Programs.
1I believe the overall soundness of our Air Force space program is
best illustrated by our consecutive string of 61 successful national
security space launches over the past 10 years and the sustainment of 4
distinct satellite constellations over the past 3 decades (navigation,
weather, missile warning, and military communication). This record is
the result of a world-class team of space professionals across our
government and industry, all dedicated to the single purpose of
providing essential capabilities to our joint warfighters and allies
around the world. As a Nation, we have cultivated, modernized, and
integrated space capabilities for over a half century into our national
instruments of power--diplomatic, information, military, and economic.
The nation's reward for this commitment is a space capability which
tilts the geopolitical and military advantage to our leaders with the
most current and accurate information around the world. With superior
space systems we provide our leadership with intelligence that
otherwise would be impossible to collect. Space enables us to employ
military force in both irregular warfare and conventional situations--
we see the battlefield more clearly and destroy targets with greater
precision. While acknowledging the ever increasing advantages that
these space capabilities provide, we acknowledge that many of the
satellites and associated infrastructure have outlived their intended
design lives.
To ensure the availability of these systems, the military space
portion of the President's fiscal year 2010 budget submission is
focused on the continuity of key mission areas including global missile
warning, worldwide communication, global positioning and timing,
weather, and launch. Simultaneously, we are taking added measures to
enhance the protection of our space capabilities through improved Space
Situational Awareness (SSA), defensive counterspace, and reconstitution
efforts.
Global Missile Warning through Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
is our unblinking eye ensuring that we know whenever a rocket launches
from anywhere on Earth. Our missile warning system is fast, persistent,
and accurate in determining missile vectors. At the strategic level, it
quickly aids leadership as they determine courses of action to defend
America and our allies, and at the tactical level our real-time warning
provides theater commanders with superior battlespace awareness.
Worldwide communication is enabled through a ubiquitous space-based
system with government and commercial platforms. Our users stretch from
the Oval Office to the mountains of Afghanistan. Using protected,
wideband, or narrowband communications, the President can command the
Nation's nuclear forces, our UAV pilots can fly Predators over Iraq and
Afghanistan from the United States, and Special Forces teams can call
for exfiltration or tactical air support.
Global positioning and timing is a free worldwide service. It
provides position accuracy down to the centimeter and time accuracy to
the nanosecond over the entire planet, 24-hours a day, 7-days a week,
and in any weather. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Intelligence Community depend on our Global Positioning System (GPS) to
support a myriad of missions and capabilities including weapon system
guidance, precise navigation, satellite positioning, and communication
network timing. The civil and commercial communities are equally
reliant on GPS as the underpinning for a vast infrastructure of
services and products including search and rescue, banking, map
surveying, farming, and even sports and leisure activities.
Weather observation and forecasting has greatly improved over the
last four decades primarily due to space-based environmental sensing.
Global, high resolution measurements of atmospheric temperature,
density, and humidity populate mathematic models for weather
prediction. Our warfighters need accurate, time-sensitive weather data
as a key enabler for maneuver planning, weapons employment, and
intelligence collection.
With events like the Chinese ASAT demonstration and the Iridium/
Russian satellite collision as examples of the increasing political and
physical complexity of the space environment, our on-orbit assets face
greater threats that could deny, damage, or destroy our access to space
capabilities. We must anticipate potential disruptions, either
accidental or intentional, to our space operations or risk losing
continuity of service. As such, we are expanding our ability to detect,
identify, characterize, and attribute threats, as well as clearly
discriminate between a hostile act and one that is naturally occurring.
In parallel, we are developing the organizational, operational, and
technical enablers including command and control architectures that
will allow us to react swiftly and decisively when threats materialize.
Though challenges remain, Congress' support has been a vital
component in improving our acquisition of space systems, maintaining
continuity of service, and charting a course for the next generation of
space capabilities that will enhance American security, freedom, and
prosperity.
UPDATE ON SPACE
I would like to briefly discuss some of the achievements we have
had over the last year and the progress we are making with regard to
the mission areas I described earlier.
Missile Warning
For over 35 years, our legacy Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellites, in conjunction with ground based radars, have unfailingly
met the Nation's missile warning needs. This legacy constellation,
however, continues to age, while threats such as the proliferation of
theater ballistic missiles and advanced technologies continue to grow.
These threats are driving the need for increased coverage and
resolution provided by the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS).
SBIRS supports four mission areas: missile warning, missile
defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness, and is
comprised of both geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites and
highly elliptical orbit (HEO) payloads. In 2008, the first HEO payload
was fully certified by United States Strategic Command to perform the
strategic missile warning mission. The second HEO payload is on-orbit
and proceeding through operational checkout. Launch of the first SBIRS
GEO satellite is scheduled for late 2010.
Our funding request continues development of the GEO satellite, HEO
payloads, plus the necessary ground elements. Additionally, this budget
requests advanced procurement for a fourth GEO satellite, and
procurement of our fourth HEO payload. We continue to work with our
industry partners to resolve challenges on the SBIRS GEO-1 spacecraft,
specifically with respect to the Flight Software Subsystem. Our budget
request also funds Wide Field-of-View (WFOV) technology development
within the Third Generation Infrared System funding line. By partnering
with the commercial space industry, we will have the opportunity to
conduct early on-orbit scientific experiment of WFOV infrared data
phenomenology using a Commercially Hosted IR Payload (CHIRP) in 2010.
WFOV offers considerable potential for reducing cost, schedule, and
performance risks for the next generation of missile warning
satellites.
Communications
The United States military is a highly mobile and dispersed force
that relies heavily on wideband, protected, and narrowband satellite
communications (SATCOM) for command, control, and coordination of
forces. SATCOM enables forces to receive real-time images and video of
the battlefield, thereby accelerating decision-making from the
strategic to the tactical levels. These images and video often come
from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) controlled via SATCOM links,
allowing the UAVs to fly far beyond the line of sight and to collect
information without endangering U.S. forces.
On April 3, 2009 we successfully launched the second Wideband
Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite as part of the Department's constellation
of wideband satellites providing increased capability for effective
command and control of U.S. forces around the globe. In August 2009 we
are planning to launch the third WGS satellite. As we populate the WGS
constellation, each individual satellite provides greater wideband
capacity than the entire legacy Defense Satellite Communications System
(DSCS) III constellation. Our fiscal year 2010 funding request
continues on-orbit support for WGS-2 and WGS-3, as well as, non-
recurring engineering development and advanced procurement for WGS-7.
In the protected SATCOM portfolio, we are completing testing of the
first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system with a projected
launch in late 2010. This initial AEHF launch will complete the
worldwide Medium Data Rate (MDR) ring, increasing the data-rate for low
probability of intercept/detection and anti-jam communications from
tens-of-kilobytes per second to approximately a megabyte per second.
Last September, the Secretary of the Air Force declared a critical
breach of the average procurement unit cost (APUC) against the AEHF
Acquisition Program Baseline. The cost growth was dominated by the 4-
year production break between the SV-3 being placed on contract in
January 2006 and SV-4 contract award projected for early 2010.
Subsequently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) led a team of DOD organizations
that reviewed the AEHF program to determine if: (1) the program was
essential to national security, (2) there were any alternatives that
could provide equal capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of
the unit cost were reasonable, and (4) the management structure was
adequate to control costs. On 29 December 2008, USD (AT&L) certified
the AEHF program as a four satellite constellation with the launch
dates of: SV-1 in September 2010, SV-2 in September 2011, SV-3 in
September 2012, and SV-4 in September 2016. Also as part of the
recertification, AEHF costs were rebaselined per DOD Cost Analysis
Improvement Group estimates. Our funding request supports the assembly,
integration, and test of AEHF SV-1 through SV-3 as well as the launch
and start of on-orbit check out of SV-1, continued development,
integration, and test of the AEHF Mission Control Segment, and the
production contract award for SV-4.
On 6 April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced key decisions
and recommendations for the fiscal year 2010 President's budget
submission. Among them was the cancellation of the Transformational
Satellite Communications program in favor of two more AEHF satellites
(SV-5 and SV-6). This recommendation was the result of careful
consideration to balance valid warfighter requirements against fiscal
constraints. The Air Force plans to work closely with the other
Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and the
combatant commands to meet the DOD's protected and wideband
communication needs. To this end, the Air Force will evolve the
MILSATCOM architecture to provide connectivity across the spectrum of
missions, to include land, air and naval warfare; special operations;
strategic nuclear operations; strategic defense; homeland security;
theater operations; and space operations and intelligence.
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
The United States Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to be
the world standard for positioning, navigation, and timing. As a
result, GPS has been incorporated into military, commercial, and
civilian applications, to include navigation, agriculture, banking,
cartography, telecommunications, and transportation. Last year the GPS
Program Office seamlessly implemented the Architecture Evolution Plan
upgrade to the existing GPS Operational Control System. This upgrade
increased sustainability and provided the ability to control the new
GPS IIF satellites. Perhaps most notably, these upgrades were
implemented with no impact to day-to-day operations and did not require
any modifications to existing user equipment.
This year we are going to launch the final GPS IIR satellite, a
program which was initiated over 20 years ago and represents one of our
most successful, enduring space acquisition programs. This year, we
will also begin launching the next generation GPS IIF satellites which
will sustain the constellation over the next 10 years. GPS IIF will
also populate the GPS constellation with additional M-code capability
and introduce a new ``L5'' civil signal.
Moving beyond GPS IIF, GPS III will offer significant improvements
in navigation capabilities by improving interoperability and jam
resistance. The procurement of the GPS III system will occur in
multiple blocks, with the initial GPS IIIA contract award in May 2008.
GPS IIIA includes all of the GPS IIF capability plus up to a ten-fold
increase in signal power, a new civil signal compatible with the
European Union's Galileo system, and a new spacecraft bus that will
support a graceful growth path to future blocks.
Weather
The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) continues to be
the Nation's workhorse for terrestrial forecasting and space
environmental sensing. We have three DMSP satellites remaining with
DMSP Flight 18 scheduled for launch this October. Flight 19 and 20 are
currently undergoing a Service Life Extension Program to repair,
replace, and test components that have exceeded their shelf life.
Flight 19 will launch in October 2012 and Flight 20 will launch in May
2014 or October 2016, depending on operational requirements.
In the future the Nation will transition to the next workhorse for
terrestrial weather--National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS)--a tri-agency effort with National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Department of Commerce.
Similar to the previous generation of satellites, NPOESS will provide
visible and infrared cloud imagery and other atmospheric,
oceanographic, and terrestrial information. It will become the Nation's
primary source of global weather and environmental data for operational
military and civil use.
Seemingly a straightforward idea to integrate DMSP and POES (Polar
Operational Environmental Satellite) in the early 1990s, the NPOESS
program has encountered unforeseen engineering challenges. Integration
of requirements across the spectrum of space and terrestrial weather
into several `first-of' sensors partially caused the 2006 Nunn-McCurdy
breach whereby two sensor suites were de-manifested from the program.
Currently, the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor
has bedeviled the program, but it is planned to deliver later this
year. As a result, NASA's NPP (NPOESS Preparatory Project) satellite
will become a defacto operational spacecraft when it is launched in
2011. Like the DSP/SBIRS missile warning architecture, NPOESS C-1 and
C-2, scheduled to launch in 2013 and 2016, respectively, will initiate
the phase out of four decades of DMSP service to the country.
Operational Responsive Space
As a complement to the Nation's assured access to space, the
Operational Responsive Space (ORS) program builds on the ``back-to-
basics'' approach we have cultivated over the past several years by
providing enhanced mission capability through incremental blocks of
small satellites and integration of other responsive space
capabilities. Key tenants of the ORS program are to keep costs low,
react rapidly to urgent warfighter needs, and reconstitute capability
in contested environments. A clear example of these tenants is
exemplified in the first ORS (ORS-1). It is being built for United
States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to monitor denied areas and will be
taskable like other USCENTCOM organic airborne ISR assets.
Leveraging on the ORS-1 experiences, the Air Force will apply this
model to other mission areas like communications and space situation
awareness. In the fiscal year 2010 budget request we will begin the
steps of on-demand space support with Rapid Response Space Capability,
whereby plug-and-play satellite busses will be assembled, integrated,
and tested with Modular Open System Architecture payloads.
Launch and Ranges
National Space Policy requires assured access to space. Currently
this requirement is satisfied by the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) program from the United Launch Alliance (ULA) consisting of the
Delta IV (developed by Boeing) and Atlas V (developed by Lockheed
Martin) launch vehicles. The first 23 EELV launches have all been
successful, and are part of our consecutive string of 61 successful
national security space launches. ULA achieves efficiencies through
combined engineering, production, and launch operations while
maintaining the separate Delta IV and Atlas V families of launch
vehicles. The fiscal year 2010 budget request funds EELV launch
capability, or infrastructure activities for two EELV launch systems
and on going support for over twelve launch services ordered by the Air
Force that are working toward launch. In addition, DOD requests funding
for five EELV launch services which will take place in 2012.
Space Protection
The need for increased space protection of our space assets is
paramount and requires enhanced SSA capabilities--improved accuracy,
responsiveness, timeliness, and data integration to support the
warfighter. To do this we must combine various inputs into a single
picture for decision makers. Currently, operators and warfighters must
assemble an understanding of the global space picture from many
disparate sources, including e-mails, telephone calls, classified chat
rooms, intelligence web sites, and imagery feeds. We have acknowledged
this shortcoming, and in our fiscal year 2010 budget request we are
consolidating the Integrated Space Situational Awareness, Rapid Attack
Identification Detection Reporting System Block 20, and Space Command
and Control (C2) programs into a new program element--the Joint Space
Operation Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS). The JMS program will
continue risk reduction engineering and focus on incremental deliveries
to deploy a services-oriented architecture (SOA) environment and tools
to progressively advance operational capabilities toward an integrated
JMS. JMS produces and delivers services in four major categories:
Infrastructure provides a SOA net-centric collaborative information
environment at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information,
Secret, and Unclassified levels; Mission Applications enhance and
modernize accuracy, sustainability, and responsiveness of space
surveillance capabilities from the legacy functionality; Command &
Control (C2) provides design, development, and integration functions
that create, visualize, and share decision-relevant views of space
operational environment at all echelons; and, Data Integration migrates
non-traditional sensors and data sources into a net-centric based
enterprise enabling distribution of data obtained across traditional
sensors within the space surveillance network critical to the JSpOC
mission.
Two programs critical to providing SSA data to the JMS are the
Space Fence and Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS). The Space Fence
is a three station, worldwide, radar system to detect and track smaller
sized space objects, while the SBSS satellite is an optical system to
search, detect, and track objects in earth orbit, particularly those in
geosynchronous orbit. The Space Fence replaces the Air Force Space
Surveillance System and SBSS builds upon our success with the Space
Based Visible technology demonstration. In the fiscal year 2010 budget,
the Space Fence program will complete a System Design Review and the
SBSS program will support on-orbit operations of SBSS Block 10 which is
expected to launch this summer.
Space Industrial Base
A stable industrial base is vital to successful space systems.
Numerous studies and reports have documented that the U.S. market share
of the global space business is steadily decreasing (CSIS Study,
January 2008). Maintaining a stable space industrial base is not solely
an Air Force or even DOD concern, and must be addressed with our civil
and commercial partners as one team.
We are working with our agency and service partners to strengthen
interagency awareness and support processes to better synchronize
efforts across the civil, commercial and national security space
domains. The Space Industrial Base Council and its subsequent working
groups consistently address industrial base and critical technologies
risks and opportunities. Their efforts lead to better management
practices, identification of cross-cutting technology risk areas and
subsequent mitigations, and improve communication with industry.
Specifically, the DOD is working to support U.S. industrial capacity in
several areas key to space including batteries, radiation hardened read
out integrated circuits, energy efficient solar cells, and traveling
wave tube amplifiers.
Continued and enduring attention to the space industrial base,
particularly the sub-tier industry, is vital to maintaining a robust
and viable capability to respond to national security space interests.
Space Cadre
DOD has over 15,000 military and civilian space professionals. They
are essential to our full spectrum of operations from keeping the peace
to fighting the overseas contingency operations, or engaging a peer
competitor. Consequently, we are committed to providing the best
possible education, training, and career development to these
professionals who operate, acquire, and enable our systems.
Institutions like the Naval Postgraduate School, the Air Force
Institute of Technology, Defense Acquisition University, and the
National Security Space Institute are at the forefront of our efforts
to educate and train these warriors. These organizations provide
education and training throughout a space professionals' career.
We recognize that we must be able to measure how we are doing with
respect to Space Professional Development. We have a set of metrics
that help us gauge the numbers of cadre needed, our current supply, and
the health of our cohort in terms of accessions and separations. All of
these measures will help make us more efficient and better at
developing our cadre, and ensuring we have the right professionals to
fill billets across DOD.
CONCLUSION
Our space systems are the envy of the world. Our infrared
surveillance satellites are able to detect missile launches anywhere in
the world; no other nation can do that. Our strategic communications
systems allow the President precise and assured control over nuclear
forces in any stage of conflict, and our wideband SATCOM systems
rapidly transmit critical information between the continental U.S. to
our front line forces; no one else has global, secure, anti-jam
communications. Our weather satellites allow us to accurately predict
future conditions half a world away as well as in space. Our GPS
constellation enables position knowledge down to centimeters and timing
down to nanoseconds; no one else has deployed such a capability. These
sophisticated systems make each deployed soldier, sailor, marine, and
airman safer, and more capable.
In the fiscal year 2010 budget, continuity of service across our
space portfolio and improved space protection is paramount. Our `back
to basics' strategy over the recent years is demonstrating results, as
we continue toward securing the world's best space capabilities today
and ensuring the same for our Nation's future.
The space constellations and the space professionals that deliver
these capabilities are our critical asymmetric advantage. We must
ensure the recapitalization and health of these constellations and
continue the professional development of our future space leaders.
Delivering space capabilities is complex, challenging, costly, yet
rewarding. Although we have faced significant challenges, we are also
making significant progress. I am honored to represent a dedicated
cadre of space professionals who are delivering space capabilities that
support our deployed warfighters, our allies, and our Nation.
I look forward to continuing to work with this committee and thank
you for your continued support of military space programs.
STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
COMMAND
[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. C. Robert Kehler, USAF
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Senator Vitter and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today as an Airman
and as the Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
I am proud to lead and represent the nearly 40,000 Active Duty,
Guard, and Reserve airmen; government civilians; and contractors who
assure strategic deterrence and deliver space-based capabilities to
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Joint Force Commanders,
the Services, the Intelligence Community, civil agencies, commercial
entities and allies. The men and women of AFSPC serve around the globe
from AFSPC Headquarters, 14th Air Force (14 AF), 20th Air Force (20
AF), the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), the Space Innovation
and Development Center (SIDC), and a host of deployed and forward
locations.
This has been an exciting and eventful year for AFSPC. Within the
Air Force, we witnessed two historic decisions in 2008: the assignment
of cyberspace responsibilities to AFSPC and the establishment of Air
Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). While in the midst of implementing
these decisions for the nuclear and cyberspace missions, reinvigorating
the Air Force's Nuclear Enterprise remains the highest priority for the
Air Force and Air Force Space Command.
Our mission is to provide an integrated constellation of space and
cyberspace capabilities at the speed of need, and our vision is to be
the leading source of emerging and integrated space and cyberspace
capabilities. At AFSPC, we look forward to assuming the lead role for
cyberspace within the USAF. Air Force operations in the air, space, and
cyberspace domains are mutually-supporting and reciprocally-enabling;
the cyberspace domain is inextricably linked to the other domains in
which the U.S. military operates. Not only must we protect these
domains, we must also properly integrate them with the other
operational domains to create joint warfighting effects significantly
greater than the sum of the parts. Our capabilities are woven through
Joint operations, weapons networks, and civil and economic activities
ranging from missile warning to the position, navigation, and timing
signals we provide both for military use and as a free, international
utility.
Space and cyberspace capabilities shape the American approach to
warfare, are embedded in an ever-more effective arsenal of modern
weaponry and are threaded throughout the fabric of our warfighting
networks. Our space-based capabilities are absolutely vital to the
joint fight. Yesterday's irregular warfare is today's regular warfare;
asymmetric warfare is the new norm. Space capabilities contribute
across the spectrum of regular and irregular combat and non-combat
operations and provide Joint commanders a decisive advantage. Space is
no longer just the high ground; it is a critical joint enabler and
force multiplier.
The airmen of AFSPC provide land-based strategic deterrence through
our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) fleet led by 20 AF,
conduct space operations and acquisition via 14 AF and SMC, and will
soon execute cyberspace operations as part of the future 24 AF. These
missions are being accomplished by our space professionals every day at
15 wings and 44 locations spanning the globe. It is my distinct
pleasure to outline the strategic way forward for AFSPC and to describe
for you our plan to develop, acquire, employ and execute Air Force
space, missile, and cyberspace capabilities in an increasingly complex,
dynamic and challenging global environment. The space, nuclear, and
cyberspace capabilities acquired with your help and support, and
delivered by AFSPC airmen, will help maintain America's freedom,
security, and prosperity.
THE WAY FORWARD
AFSPC activities in 2008 included comprehensive, concerted efforts
to deliver space and missile capabilities, develop and care for our
airmen and their families, and encourage collaboration across the space
enterprise. In addition, we made significant progress in modernizing
our force and made great strides toward improving our acquisition
processes with new strategies and actions. AFSPC is proud of its 2008
achievements; achievements that will serve as building blocks towards
progress in 2009. AFSPC's strategic way forward will focus on
delivering the space, nuclear, and cyberspace capabilities our Joint
Force Commanders require today and into the future. To do this, we have
outlined five goals that serve to guide our efforts.
AFSPC Goal: Guarantee a Safe, Credible, Ready Nuclear Deterrent Force
with Perfection as the Standard
To support the Air Force's priority of ``Reinvigorating the Air
Force Nuclear Enterprise,'' AFSPC will guarantee a safe, credible,
ready, nuclear deterrent force with perfection as the standard. Nuclear
deterrence remains the ultimate backstop of U.S. security, dissuading
opponents and assuring allies of America's military commitment to
defend our Nation, its allies and friends. Our Nation's security relies
heavily on the remarkable attributes of the ICBM force and the
dedication and professionalism of those who proudly secure, maintain,
and operate the Minuteman III weapon system. Over the course of 2009-
2010, we will meet daily USSTRATCOM operational requirements; invest in
sustainment, infrastructure, and our industrial base; continue to
restore our nuclear culture; and transition the ICBM force to Air Force
Global Strike Command.
In response to feedback and direction from the Secretary of
Defense, Air Force Blue Ribbon Panel, Defense Science Board, Admiral
Donald Investigation and others, we undertook a comprehensive set of
actions to address deficiencies and re-establish excellence across the
Air Force nuclear enterprise. Our roadmap, ``Reinvigorating the USAF
Nuclear Enterprise,'' is the strategic plan to restore a culture of
discipline, establish clear organizational structures, and increase
investment in critical operational and sustainment areas. Perfection,
precision, and reliability are our performance standards. In recent
months, all of our missile wings have undergone rigorous Nuclear Surety
Inspections (NSI) to ensure the utmost standards--and all three wings
satisfactorily passed their follow-on inspections.
As for the Minuteman III fleet, we are within 2 years of completing
an extensive 10-year sustainment effort. As part of this comprehensive
initiative, all three solid propellant motor stages have been removed
and re-poured. In addition, the guidance systems and post-boost
vehicles have been replaced with current technologies. These upgrades
will ensure the Minuteman III is fully operational until at least 2020.
The American people depend on the U.S. Air Force to deliver safe,
credible and reliable nuclear deterrence capabilities, and we will do
so. Our airmen perform the nuclear deterrence mission with pride,
professionalism, and a solemn commitment to the highest standards.
AFSPC Goal: Deliver Assured Combat Power to the Joint Fight
AFSPC will continue to deliver assured combat power to the joint
fight. In addition to the airmen deployed ``in-place'' manning ICBM
launch control centers and space operations centers around the clock,
in 2008 we forward-deployed nearly 4,000 AFSPC airmen to Operations
Enduring and Iraqi Freedom and Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in
support of ongoing counterinsurgency operations. As a result, 49 AFSPC
airmen were awarded Bronze Stars while engaged in military operations
in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of
responsibility. Today, we have over 1,200 AFSPC airmen continuously
forward-deployed.
In an environment that's more uncertain, complex, and changing than
ever before, most historic military leaders would not recognize today's
irregular warfare landscape. Although our Nation and its interests must
still be protected from hostile forces and strategic threats, today's
security challenges are more diverse and dispersed. Emerging threats
are fleeting, scattered globally, may strike anywhere, anytime, and
increasingly take advantage of the space and cyberspace domains. There
is a growing reliance from Joint Force Commanders on space-based
capabilities to provide vital services across the global commons. Our
airmen are enabling GPS signals to ensure we're putting Joint Direct
Attack Munitions on targets from aerial platforms and assuring the
reliability of Blue Force Tracking for soldiers on the ground.
Warfighters depend on military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) in
austere environments for data, imagery, and streaming video feeds from
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Today, our forces are interconnected,
have world-wide cognizance, and strike with greater speed and precision
than any military in history providing overwhelming and decisive
results with minimal collateral damage. Our continuous need for global
communications, GPS, missile warning, weather forecasting and world-
wide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance continues to be met
by space systems in the face of evolving warfare.
In 2009-2010, we will continue to improve Space Situational
Awareness (SSA), execute the Space Protection Strategy, increase GPS
navigational accuracy and signal security, modernize MILSATCOM, assure
and exploit new Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities, and
transform the launch enterprise.
Space Protection Program
Another history-making ``first'' occurred in March 2008 when AFSPC
and the NRO established the Space Protection Program (SPP). The purpose
of this program is to develop an integrated approach to protect
critical defense, intelligence, civil, and commercial space systems
that support national security.
In response to Congressional direction, AFSPC and the NRO delivered
the first Space Protection Strategy to Congress in August 2008. The SPP
strategy was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and identified
mission critical investments, capability improvements, and critical
interdependencies. Complementing the SPP Strategy, AFSPC also finalized
a new roadmap for the SSA mission area along with an interim
architecture.
Space Situational Awareness
In concert with the SPP initiative, AFSPC continued efforts to
develop a cost effective strategy to protect space capabilities, while
striking the right balance among awareness, hardening, countermeasures,
reconstitution, and alternate means. The Integrated Space Situational
Awareness (ISSA) program provides USSTRATCOM, Joint Functional
Component Command for Space and the joint community an integrated
source of historical, current and predictive space events, threats, and
space activities.
In a dramatic display of teamwork and excellence, AFSPC developed
the first-ever training procedures and exercises for a real-world
intercept mission, Operation Burnt Frost. We ensured personnel at the
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA,
were properly trained and our senior leaders possessed accurate and
timely location of the target satellite, potential impact locations,
and possible environmental effects. During the mission, we provided a
glimpse of the future by transforming the legacy ``hub and spoke''
space surveillance network into a collaborative, net-centric operation
providing real-time SSA and sensor-to-sensor hand-offs. Through
subsequent orbital tracking and cataloguing efforts, we've determined
every bit of debris created from the intercept has since de-orbited.
The importance of SSA continues to grow as the space domain becomes
an increasingly contested and crowded environment. Issues common to
other domains remain unresolved for space. As a Nation, we have gaps in
the operational space domain not found in other domains across the
global commons. The Iridium collision with a Russian communication
satellite is a recent example highlighting the critical need for
advanced Space Situational Awareness.
Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) support is one of our top
initiatives. The CFE Support Program was created in 2004 to focus on
safety of flight in orbit for government, commercial, and foreign
satellite operators in the US and around the world. Under our current
pilot program, we are equipped, manned, and resourced to provide
Conjunction Assessment (CA) analysis for capabilities critical to
national security and homeland defense. An ever-changing space
environment continues to become further crowded with increasing amounts
of debris and new entrants. This has challenged our capability in the
midst of declining resources and greater demand for basic CA and
advanced services.
In an effort to improve our capabilities, we are augmenting our CFE
resources and communicating the expanded services to the CFE community.
AFSPC will expand and automate our processing and analytical
capabilities thereby enabling expanded CA services and in the fall of
2009, we will transition our CFE pilot program to USSTRATCOM to
continue long-term operations and support from the JSpOC. Our goal
remains to provide SSA services to legitimate and trusted CFE users
ensuring space flight safety and freedom of action in space.
Schriever War Game Series
The recurring AFSPC Schriever Title 10 War Game series has proven
insightful in identifying key operational and policy issues. Having
just wrapped up our Schriever V War Game in March 2009, we are now
reviewing key issues involving space deterrence, capability employment,
and national space policy considerations with senior Air Force and
other national decisionmakers. Schriever V clearly identified areas
requiring additional emphasis, policy development, resources and
analysis. It also demonstrated the far-reaching importance of space to
combat operations, policy execution, and diplomacy. We are now underway
with plans for Schriever VI, and we look forward to increased
international and industry participation.
Position, Navigation and Timing
The Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to provide highly
accurate position, navigation and timing signals enabling Joint combat
operations around the world. GPS is a free global utility that serves
as an enabler for economic transactions influencing the global economy
by more than $110 billion annually. Throughout 2008, AFSPC operated the
most precise, largest-ever GPS constellation and took its first big
step towards deploying GPS III when we awarded a contract in May 2008
to build eight of the Block IIIA satellites. Complementing the space
segment, we replaced the unsustainable legacy GPS Master Control
Station ground segment with the Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP) and
Launch Anomaly and Disposal Operations (LADO) Systems. AEP improves GPS
accuracy, provides the capabilitiy to operate the GPS IIF satellites,
and affords increased protection of the military's GPS M-code. LADO
provides critical launch operations support and on-orbit operations for
the GPS constellation. The transition to both the AEP and LADO system
was seamless and transparent to users across the globe. In 2008, our
acquisition team began developing the Next-Generation Operational
Control Segment (OCX). This segment is not only required to launch and
sustain GPS IIIA space vehicles on orbit, but is essential to moving
the GPS towards robust, effects-based operations.
At the same time, plans are well underway to launch, deploy and
begin operating the first GPS IIF space vehicle by December 2009. These
new vehicles will broadcast the first operational L5 signals, thereby
providing civilian users an additional, higher powered signal. This
signal is protected by internationally recognized safety of life
spectrum rules ensuring robust quality of service with minimal
interference.
Military Satellite Communications
As our MILSATCOM capability continues to grow, so does the age of
our fleet. Aged in many cases beyond their design lives, the Military
Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) and the Defense
Satellite Communications System-III (DSCS-III) will have to continue to
provide critical communications services for the Nation's protected and
non-protected military and diplomatic activities while we deploy the
next generation of advanced MILSATCOM capabilities.
With the commencement of mission operations over the first Wideband
Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite in April 2008, we demonstrated a ten-fold
increase in our wideband SATCOM capabilities providing the warfighter
increased data, voice, video, and imagery. Additionally, we validated
and accepted the geographically separated Backup Satellite Operations
Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base. This $2.7 million effort supports
MILSTAR, DSCS, and WGS operations.
Looking towards the future of MILSATCOM, we began preparations to
accept the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
communications satellite in 2010. We look forward to the AEHF system as
it will increase the protected communications data rate more than five-
fold and afford more coverage opportunities than what MILSTAR provides
today. Not only will AEHF provide enhanced national command and control
satellite networks for the President, Secretary of Defense, and our
combatant commanders, it will also ensure warfighters receive critical
information such as the air and space tasking orders, operational
plans, and time-phased force and deployment data. We transitioned to an
innovative $1.25 million operations center and began training Subject
Matter Experts (SME) in preparation for our next generation satellite
system. Deployment of WGS and AEHF allows us to close the gaps in the
areas of volume, data rates, protected communications, and net-
centricity for the warfighter and our Nation's leadership.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) will provide the Nation
with critical comprehensive missile warning, missile defense, technical
intelligence, and battlespace awareness information well into the 21st
century.
In November 2008, the SBIRS Mission Control System Backup--Highly
Elliptical Orbit (HEO) facility and HEO-1 payload were accepted for
operational use, followed by USSTRATCOM certification in December 2008.
The second HEO payload is now on-orbit and undergoing checkout. The
exceptionally high quality of HEO infrared data has led to additional
exploitation initiatives providing major long-term benefits to our
Joint Force Commanders.
As the SBIRS HEO-1 system was certified for operations and is
providing critical data to warfighters, the SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth
Orbit (GEO-1) and GEO-2 space vehicles made significant assembly,
integration and test progress. We will continue satellite testing and
integration and look forward to launch readiness testing in fiscal year
2010.
The future of OPIR is the Third Generation Infrared Satellite
currently undergoing research and development. In 2009-2010, we will
continue down the path of wide field of view technology maturation
activities. We have received wide field of view sensor prototypes and
are on contract for a scientific experiment on a commercial rideshare
mission in 2010.
Space Control
As the Air Force enters its 18th year of continuous combat
operations in the Persian Gulf, AFSPC continues to provide sustained
counterspace capability to USCENTCOM and is in its fifth year of
continuous presence in theater with the defensive counterspace system--
Silent Sentry. The resounding success of the Silent Sentry has led to
the Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS)
Block 10 program, which detects and geolocates satellite communications
interference via fixed and transportable ground systems.
Operationally Responsive Space
The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program is also focused on
the joint fight. AFSPC partnered across the space enterprise and
responded to three urgent warfighter needs in communications, SSA, and
ISR. We addressed the warfighters' requirements through a variety of
innovative approaches to include: accelerated delivery of demonstration
efforts, explored alternative uses of on-orbit capability, expanded use
of commercial assets, and military utility experimentation with a
tactical communications satellite. In addition, we began development of
ORS Sat-1 to meet a critical USCENTCOM ISR requirement.
Launch Enterprise Transformation
Assured access to space is paramount to providing space
capabilities to the warfighter. AFSPC continues to deliver 100 percent
space launch mission success--one mission at a time. Within our launch
community, we witnessed the continuation of our winning streak with an
unprecedented string of 61 successful national security space launches
including the 23rd consecutive successful launch of the Atlas V and
Delta IV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs). Following a 22-
month, $300 million launch site modification effort, the first west
coast Atlas V successfully delivered a critical NRO satellite into
orbit. We recently launched the GPS IIRM-20 onboard a Delta II in
March, as well as the second WGS satellite in April onboard an Atlas V.
Additionally, AFSPC supported two world-wide tests of the Ground-based
Mid-course Defense long-range missile interceptor system.
In a broader context, AFSPC continues to advance our Space Launch
Enterprise Transformation (LET) effort to posture our command for the
future of assured access to space. The LET focuses on three
initiatives: transformation of launch services acquisition, upgrading
the launch range architecture, and fully leveraging Total Force
Integration (TFI). While the military launch business has long been
recognized as a key contributor to space, we understand the
significance of fostering the growth of commercial launch capabilities.
AFSPC Goal: Forge a Battle-Ready Team by Attracting, Developing and
Retaining America's Best
To support the Air Force's priority of ``Developing and Caring for
Airmen and Their Families,'' AFSPC is forging a battle-ready team by
attracting, developing and retaining America's best. During 2009-2010,
we will improve training and professional development programs,
establish viable career pathways, and guarantee quality of life
programs for our members and their dependents. We are taking the
necessary steps to care for our airmen and their families. While we
undertake comprehensive organizational realignment, AFSPC is working
hard to ensure a seamless transition of the land-based nuclear
deterrent to Air Force Global Strike Command and to establish processes
for deliberate development of nuclear expertise among our ICBM
professionals. At the same time, we're preparing for the integration of
the cyberspace mission by carefully crafting a professional development
program that guarantees appropriate education, training and skill sets
for this unique and challenging mission area and its synergies with our
space professionals.
Developing Airmen
AFSPC further defined space and missile training as well as
professional qualification and development relationships with Air
Education and Training Command allowing us to focus on our Organize,
Train and Equip (OT&E) activities. Contributing to our educational
efforts, the National Security Space Institute (NSSI) continued to
enhance its reputation as the center for top-quality space education
and training for students of all ranks across the Department of Defense
and related government agencies. In 2008, the NSSI taught 77 courses to
over 1,500 students. We also established an ICBM Advanced Course at the
NSSI providing 2 weeks of mission-focused education for the operations,
maintenance, security and helicopter personnel who operate, sustain and
secure our ICBM force. Furthermore, we institutionalized attendance at
the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center's Nuclear Management Fundamentals
Course for all inbound commanders who will serve at our nuclear units,
and we are developing a focused ICBM Weapons Instructor Course (WIC) at
the USAF Weapons School (USAFWS) at Nellis Air Force Base, NV.
Families and Quality of Life
AFSPC recognizes the critical roles our families play as integral
members of the Air Force team. In AFSPC, we extended the Air Force's
wingman culture to our families to help nurture success on the home
front. AFSPC aggressively improved the quality of life where airmen
work and live by awarding $143 million in 2008 for a host of
revitalization initiatives to include family housing, a dormitory, and
child development center. In addition, American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act stimulus funds of $145.5 million are being invested
across the command for modernization of base infrastructure and
military construction (MILCON). For 2009, we have $31.5 million in
MILCON projects for dorm renovation, facilities construction, and other
key projects across the Command.
AFSPC Goal: Modernize and Sustain AFSPC's Enduring Missions and Mature
Emerging Missions
To support the Air Force's priority of ``Modernizing Our Air and
Space Inventories, Organizations and Training,'' AFSPC will modernize
and sustain AFSPC's enduring missions and mature emerging missions.
Throughout 2009-2010, we will transition cyberspace capabilities to
AFSPC and standup a new operational Numbered Air Force (NAF). We will
also finalize a basing location and establish cyberspace training and
acquisition processes through which we will present cyber forces to the
Joint Force Commanders.
In 2008, AFSPC increased the depth and breadth of Air Reserve
Component (ARC) support to AFSPC missions. AFSPC's first-ever TFI
Strategy was developed to fully leverage the unique strengths of the
ARC in both existing and emerging missions. New TFI partnerships are
underway across the launch, SSA, space control, and cyberspace
operational mission sets. In April 2008, we activated the 310th Space
Wing at Schriever Air Force Base, CO, as the Air Force's first-ever
Reserve space wing. In addition, we activated the 380th Space Control
Squadron at Peterson Air Force Base, CO, as the Reserve Associate Unit
for the RAIDRS mission.
AFSPC Goal: Reengineer Acquisition to Deliver Capability at the Speed
of Need
To support the Air Force's priority of ``Acquisition Excellence,''
AFSPC will reengineer acquisition to deliver capability at the ``speed
of need.'' During 2009-2010, we will continue working a ``back to
basics'' philosophy and block-build approach, fund to the most probable
cost, increase our acquisition work force, improve relations with
industry, and control requirements. Our Space and Missile Systems
Center will deliver five major new systems and mission capabilities in
the next 6 to 24 months for SBIRS, AEHF, WGS, GPS IIF, and the Space-
Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) system. The GPS III and OCX programs
are on the right vectors for success, and we are improving our space
development expertise, processes and culture.
In today's world of rapid technological advancement and
proliferation, we cannot afford to do business as usual when it comes
to delivering space capabilities. The nature of warfare, as influenced
by the information age, has changed dramatically in terms of symmetry,
ambiguity, time, distance, and boundaries. This environment requires a
paradigm shift necessary to deploy space capabilities at the ``speed of
need'' while still executing efficient acquisition practices.
CONCLUSION
Defending the United States of America and its allies and friends
is a continuous mission that requires the utmost planning and
execution. As technology advances, so do the means that can be employed
by those who threaten our way of life. AFSPC seeks to perfect the most
formidable, capable and remarkable military space, missile and
cyberspace force the world has ever known. This will allow warfighting
commands to meet the challenge of protecting the American people, their
livelihoods and interests with precision at the moment of need. With
the continued support of Congress, AFSPC is postured to maintain a
crucial leadership role as we realize our vision to be the leading
source of emerging and integrated space and cyberspace capabilities.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LARRY D. JAMES, USAF, COMMANDER, 14TH AIR
FORCE, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND AND COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL
COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General James
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, USAF
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Vitter, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, I am honored to be here today for my first
opportunity to appear before you as United States Strategic Command's
(USSTRATCOM) Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
Space (CDR JFCC SPACE).
It's a distinct privilege to address you on our space posture, and
to represent the men and women of JFCC SPACE who employ space
capabilities around the globe every day. These soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines are a dedicated and innovative joint force, working
hard to ensure efficient and effective space operations. Their
professionalism ensures our joint forces can exploit space-based
capabilities to the maximum extent.
Today I will focus my discussion on employment of space
capabilities, the events shaping our future planning, and identify some
of the challenges we face as we work to operate effectively and safely
in an increasingly complex and congested space environment.
EMPLOYMENT OF SPACE CAPABILITIES
USSTRATCOM provides space effects to Department of Defense (DOD)
global users that are critical to military operations. CDR JFCC SPACE
is designated by CDRUSSTRATCOM as the single point of contact for
military space operations. As such, I am tasked to provide tailored,
responsive, local, and global space effects to the various combatant
commanders. My USSTRATCOM-delegated authorities include Global Space
Coordinating Authority, which makes me the primary interface with
supported joint commanders for operational-level planning and execution
to provide space effects in support of those combatant commanders'
objectives. CDR JFCC SPACE also is assigned Operational Control and
Tactical Control authorities for designated worldwide space forces.
These authorities provide USSTRATCOM a single, globally focused
component commander to enhance functional integration of space
capabilities for the joint warfighter and for the Nation.
Every significant military operation uses space capabilities in
some way--space capabilities are truly integral to military operations
in the 21st century. The criticality of space effects to the warfighter
is readily apparent in ongoing operations in Afghanistan where Global
Positioning System (GPS) services provide foundational data, enabling
us to track the location of U.S. and coalition forces. But it is not
just Blue Force Tracking; for the military users, there are multiple
examples of space-based successes.
For example, precision accuracy of the GPS-guided Excalibur
artillery rounds have enabled the U.S. Army to strike top al Qaeda
operatives in close proximity to our infantrymen, without exposing
soldiers to undue risk. On 27 March 2009, following an enemy ambush
against a coalition unit, a B-1B Lancer used GPS-guided 500 lb. bombs
to destroy a series of enemy fighting positions and a fortified heavy
machine gun position near Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan. On 26 April 2009,
four F/A-18 Super Hornets flown from the deck of the Eisenhower Carrier
Strike Group delivered four 500 lb. GPS-guided JDAMs onto enemy
fortified compounds and machine gun fighting positions, ending a fire
fight with coalition forces. Clearly, the GPS constellation enables our
forces worldwide to maneuver into a militarily advantageous position
and then, through various GPS-aided munitions, exploit that tactical
advantage to create effects ranging from tactical to strategic.
Our military satellite communications capabilities provide ample,
readily accessible bandwidth, delivering joint warfighters secure
military communication, and enabling the free-flow of battlespace
characterization data and critical intelligence. The recent
introduction of Wideband Global Satellite Communication operations
boosted area of responsibility communications tenfold for 140,000
warfighters. Wideband satellites allowed theater commanders to rely on
real time, high-capacity broadcast video feeds from Predators to
enhance their execution of tactical battlespace management, and to
providecombat support information for deployed forces.
Our space-based missile warning systems were absolutely essential
to providing tracking and assessment of the latest Taepo-Dong 2 (TD-2)
missile launch from North Korea. Multiple space-based missile warning
systems provided initial launch detection, enabling rapid threat/non-
threat characterization, and confirming the event as a space launch.
Clearly, space-based assets provide critical data to produce effects
for successful military operations across a multitude of engagements.
Strong communication links, operational relationships, and reach back
to the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) ensure USSTRATCOM is able
to provide users the effects they need.
Space capabilities are no longer just the province of large
nations. Access to space and space products becomes cheaper and more
widely available every year. The commercialization of space has allowed
many developing nations and non-state actors to acquire space-based
capabilities, such as imagery and satellite communications, that were
previously the exclusive purview of superpowers. With more space
players, space is more crowded than ever. In 1980 only 10 countries
were operating satellites in space. Today, 9 countries operate
spaceports, more than 50 countries own or have partial ownership in
satellites and citizens of 39 nations have traveled in space. In 1980
we were tracking approximately 4,700 objects in space; 280 of those
objects were active payloads/spacecraft, while another 2,600 were
debris. As of 1 May 2009 we are tracking approximately 19,900 objects;
1,300 active payloads and 8,700 pieces of debris. In 29 years, space
traffic has quadrupled. We have already seen one catastrophic collision
in space with the Iridium/COSMOS conjunction, and as the number of
objects in space increase, so do the chances of another collision.
Clearly, managing this environment and our assets is a key focus of our
efforts.
KEY EVENTS OF 2008/2009
Although we have made progress in improving our space situational
awareness (SSA), February's unfortunate collision between an active
Iridium communications satellite and an inactive Russian satellite, and
last month's test of another North Korean TD-2 missile, continue to
tangibly demonstrate the complexity of the environment, the challenge
of emerging space faring nations, and the demands on our space systems.
To date we have cataloged over 940 pieces of debris that resulted from
the Iridium/COSMOS collision and there are likely thousands of smaller
pieces our sensors can't track. Only 18 items of debris have reentered
so far, with the remainder expected to be in orbit for decades. This
debris will slowly decay due to natural forces, but it will remain a
hazard to manned and unmanned spaceflight in low Earth orbit, and to
satellites transiting that region, for several years.
We've derived many lessons from the TD-2 missile event, chief among
them the requirement to integrate and fuse many sources of space,
ground and intelligence data, in many disparate systems and security
channels. This is a lesson we identified during the 2007 Chinese anti-
satellite (ASAT) test, and experienced again during the 2008 NRO
satellite intercept, and although we have implemented tactics,
techniques, and procedures to mitigate potential delays in information
flow, the challenge of collecting, integrating and fusing this data
still exists. It again took the significant efforts of many to manually
assemble information and then pass it to senior decision makers. While
we were very successful once again due to outstanding cooperation
between the intelligence and operations communities, we clearly need
improved processing and analytic systems that can continually compile
and automatically fuse SSA, intelligence and other all-source
information in real-time to keep us abreast of space events. Our
lessons learned from the TD-2 test will continue to guide future
improvements and our developmental efforts for the JSpOC to ensure
USSTRATCOM is able to provide users the effects they need.
However, collisions and space traffic growth are not the only
challenges or threats to our space assets. The January 2007 Chinese
test of an ASAT demonstrated the kinetic kill capability of space
assets and this capability will continue to be a threat in the future.
Even more ubiquitous is the capacity to jam satellite communications
links; this is within the capability of many nations, as well as non-
state actors. Space-related ground sites can be damaged by direct
attack. Several nations are working on high-energy lasers that could
damage or destroy our satellites. With the exception of the high-energy
laser, all of these threats to our space systems exist today. Our
Nation's growing dependence on space-based capabilities, coupled with
the increasing threats and operational risks we face, creates
corresponding potential military and economic vulnerabilities. We must
protect our space assets against intentional and unintentional acts in
order to preserve our essential space capabilities, and accordingly, we
must change our mindset from passive to active protection measures to
ensure USSTRATCOM's ability to execute and integrate operations across
all lines of operations.
SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Space situational awareness is more than understanding the space
environment, tracking objects, and conducting conjunction assessments.
We need to be able to discriminate between natural and manmade threats.
We need to understand the location, status and purpose of these
objects, their capabilities, and their owners' intent. This
comprehensive knowledge enables decision makers to rapidly and
effectively select courses of action to ensure our sustained freedom of
action and safety in what is clearly a contested space environment.
The U.S. space surveillance architecture currently detects and
tracks thousands of objects, but critical gaps remain in our ability to
fully track and characterize all on-orbit objects, analyze and predict
conjunctions, and protect not just military satellites, but also the
commercial and civil satellites that are critical to national security.
The Space Surveillance Network provides acceptable coverage in the
northern hemisphere, but we have a significant coverage gap in the
southern hemisphere. By filling this gap we increase the JSpOC's
ability to rapidly detect, track, and characterize new payloads and
maintain awareness of maneuvering spacecraft.
Our sensor network is currently able to track objects as small as
10 centimeters across. We do this well for low Earth orbits; however,
our ability decreases as we track objects in the more distant
geosynchronous orbit. We need to improve our capability to track and
assess smaller objects in all orbits if we are to keep pace with the
potential threats from emerging small satellite technologies, and to
gain better awareness of the hazards posed by small space debris.
We must sustain the momentum gained through investments such as the
Space Fence and Space-base Space Surveillance system and strive to
close SSA gaps, bringing us ever closer to combining an operational
picture of space with command and control systems, and moving us from
``watching and reacting'' to ``knowing and predicting'' in the space
domain.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
Obtaining intelligence of other nations' intentions in space is a
particularly challenging issue. Our Intelligence Community is working
towards building the necessary foresight to improve our ability to
anticipate what others may do in space, whether to use the space
environment to benefit their military operations, terrorist attempts,
or to deny the U.S. space-provided services which we have grown
dependent on.
Improved analytic systems and connectivity will help us fuse
operations and intelligence data. Backing that up must be a cadre of
space intelligence experts, both within the Intelligence Community (IC)
and within the JSpOC, who can readily focus and apply information to
support our command and control activities, and ultimately provide
necessary support to the warfighter. The DOD, IC, and National Air and
Space Intelligence Center are working together to improve systems and
develop our intelligence experts. These efforts are a tremendous start,
but must remain a priority in order to provide near real time,
actionable intelligence to the warfighter.
Furthermore, we have barely begun to scratch the surface in terms
of the potential data to be exploited from current and future space
systems. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has recognized this need and
formed a Battlespace Awareness and Technical Intelligence Capability
Team to develop the exploitation and dissemination systems, processes
and architecture that will allow us to more fully integrate AFSPC
sensor capabilities with those of the rest of the Air Force, our sister
Services, and the IC, to provide multi-source intelligence from DOD
space-based sources to support joint warfighters and national
decisionmakers. We fully endorse these efforts and are partnering
closely with AFSPC to prepare ourselves for the key role JFCC SPACE
will play in commanding and tasking these assets.
SPACE AND CYBERSPACE INTEGRATION
Emerging threats may originate anywhere, at anytime, and
increasingly take advantage of space and cyberspace domains. Global
effects, speed of attack, availability of information, and the ability
to strike from remote locations are common attributes across both
domains. As such, our adversaries have unprecedented, immediate access
to information utilizing minimal resources. Space and cyberspace are
truly contested domains, and our Nation's critical information is more
vulnerable than ever and must be protected.
Space and cyberspace capabilities continue to shape the world's
approach to warfare. They are embedded in an increasingly, diverse
arsenal of modern weaponry, and are threaded throughout warfighting
networks. When integrated, space and cyberspace operations will become
an even more powerful force multiplier. We must take actions to
integrate space and cyberspace operations to protect the United States'
freedom of action and information.
We will continue to face many challenges in space and cyberspace.
To ensure their integration, we must take the same operational
mentality we have of the space environment and apply this mindset to
cyberspace.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
JFCC SPACE commands and controls worldwide space forces to ensure
space-based effects meet warfighter needs. To ensure we can continue to
effectively support the warfighter and senior decisionmakers, we
require more automated, net-centric capabilities to command and control
space forces, and networked sensors and information systems that
seamlessly share information to more effectively leverage our current
resources. This will give us the ability to rapidly react via real-time
dataflow to the JSpOC for processing and analysis, and then real-time
flow of the refined product back to the user.
We are aggressively pursuing command and control capabilities to
consolidate intelligence information, predict adversary threats to U.S.
space systems, improve our ability to monitor assigned and attached
force status, and predict impacts to operational users due to system
outages. Together, these capabilities provide a predictive knowledge of
the space operating environment and impacts to operations, as well as
enable a broader set of options to proactively posture U.S. space
forces to mitigate threats.
The U.S. must continue to lead the community of space-faring
nations and encourage responsible behavior in all facets of space
operations. The JSpOC is the focal point for ensuring safe, effective
operation of our space forces and those of our partners. We need to
gather real-time, quality data, have the ability to exploit that data
rapidly and accurately, and then export decision-quality information
across a range of customers from the intelligence community to deployed
forces to produce effects for the warfighter in an integrated, holistic
way.
Finally, we must continue to focus on capability requirements of
the joint warfighter. Matching future users' requirements with
technological advances will allow USSTRATCOM to provide the most
advanced and reliable space effects in response to the growing demands
of the Nation's warfighters.
CONCLUSION
The nature of space operations is rapidly evolving, as is the
United States' and coalition partners' dependence on space. While we
continue to exploit current space-based capabilities to the maximum
extent, we still need increased efforts to close intelligence and SSA
gaps, and increased efforts to enhance our command and control
capabilities, ensuring USSTRATCOM's ability to continually provide the
right effect, to the right user, at the right time anywhere on the
globe. Working in collaboration with other departments and agencies in
the U.S. Government, the DOD must continue to build the relationships,
processes, and capabilities within the global space community that
allow us to operate effectively together to meet our national security
objectives. I am truly honored to lead such a talented group of men and
women. Perfection is our standard and you can be proud of your
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that expertly tackle the
challenges we face every day. I thank the subcommittee for your
continued strong support as we work to preserve our vital space
capabilities for our Nation.
STATEMENT OF VADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement by VADM Harry B. Harris, USN
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, as the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks, I am
honored to appear before you today to address your Navy's space
activities. Let me begin by thanking Congress for its sustained and
significant support to the men and women in our Armed Forces. I am the
Navy's resource sponsor for space; in that capacity, I am responsible
for funding Navy space programs. This sponsorship includes the Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS), which is the next generation Ultra High
Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communication system. MUOS will provide more
capable tactical communications to our joint, mobile warfighter. I am
also responsible for developing the Navy Space Strategy, writing the
Navy's Space Needs letter, and supporting the Navy Space Cadre.
If I had to summarize my testimony to you today in a one sentence
sound bite, it would be that the Navy is critically dependent on space
to conduct not only our wartime mission, but also our core capabilities
of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection,
maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. A
day without space is a long day, indeed. A wide array of national,
joint, and commercial satellites currently provides Navy commanders
with essential worldwide communication capabilities; navigation;
missile warning; meteorological data; and over-the-horizon
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Although the Navy is one
of the largest `users' of space in DOD, we rely on the Air Force and
the Intelligence Community to develop and field the majority of our
space systems.
NAVY SPACE STRATEGY
Let me now address the Navy Space Strategy. One of the Navy's
primary goals is to shape the outcome of joint deliberations on future
space capabilities to maximize naval combat effectiveness. Within the
Navy, space-related functions and responsibilities are distributed
among different commands, which together constitute a functional ``Navy
Space Team'' that works collaboratively to advance our many goals in
space.
In 2008, the Chief of Naval Operations published the Navy Space
Strategy, which provides key elements and guidance to implement the DON
Space Policy. The Navy Space Strategy focuses on two broad themes.
First, to influence the large DOD and national investments in space
systems through direct, active participation in the National Security
Space enterprise. Second, to leverage DOD and national space resources
through improvement of the integration of space systems capabilities
into the Navy's combat systems. Our strategy addresses five key goals:
(1) mitigating the impact of the risk that adversaries pose to critical
space systems upon which the Navy depends; (2) identifying,
documenting, and advocating Navy's specific requirements for future
space systems; (3) posturing the Navy Space Cadre to ensure we place
the right person in the right job at the right time; (4) prioritizing
and funding essential science, technology, research and development
efforts to meet Navy's needs in space; and (5) expanding Navy
leadership engagement with senior Department of Defense, Joint, and
National Intelligence Community space leaders to better advocate for,
and positively influence, Navy issues in space.
Your Navy is actively engaged with key national and joint space-
related organizations to ensure current and future Navy needs in space
are identified. Venues for this engagement include the DOD Space
Posture Review, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and National Security
Space Program assessments.
A specific example of this is our active participation with other
Services and the intelligence community in addressing the current and
future electro-optical satellite architecture. Secretary Gates' and
Director Blair's recent decision on electro-optical modernization
validates the importance these systems play in our national security.
Through this modernization we will create an enabling collection of
capabilities to support current and future naval operations. In
addition, we continue to assess the military utility of commercial
sensing capabilities to support our current operations worldwide. For
example, within the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility we are currently
looking at the value of commercial sensing to support Theater Security
Cooperation and Maritime Domain Awareness.
Navy is also working with the newly established Space Protection
Program sponsored by Air Force Space Command and the National
Reconnaissance Office.
ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY NARROWBAND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
The Navy's major space segment responsibility to the joint
community is the UHF narrowband satellite communications constellation.
Today this constellation consists of eight UHF Follow-On satellites,
two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), one Leased Satellite (LEASAT
5), and leased capacity on SKYNET 5C. The MUOS will begin to replace
these systems in 2011.
MUOS, which is designated as a Major Defense Acquisition Program,
is the next generation UHF satellite constellation; it will consist of
four operational satellites and an on-orbit spare. MUOS will support
Unified Commands and Joint Task Force Components, DOD and non-DOD
agencies, and allied and coalition users. With both a legacy UHF
payload that provides the same capability as the current UHF Follow-On
satellite, and a new UHF waveform payload, MUOS will significantly
increase the number of accesses and throughput available to the
warfighter by more than an order of magnitude while retaining backward
compatibility with legacy UHF terminals. It will provide tactical
narrowband netted, point-to-point, and broadcast services of voice and
data worldwide in challenging environments including double canopy
foliage, urban environments, and high sea states, as well as mitigate
threats to deny use of the satellite.
MUOS is critical to satisfying the demand for tactical satellite
communications. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom,
the UHF system (UHF Follow-On, FLTSAT, and LEASAT 5) was only able to
support 20 percent of the narrowband tactical UHF satellite
communication capability requested by operators even though 80 percent
of the capacity was devoted to these operations. LEASAT 5 will reach
its end of service life in early 2011, and the UHF Follow-On
constellation is predicted to reach an unacceptable level of
availability in May 2010. The good news is that the FLTSAT and UHF
Follow-On satellites are operating well past their design lives--we are
getting every bit of our investment out of them . . . and then some. In
order to minimize the operational impact of any gap in UHF satellite
availability, we are executing a mitigation plan, and developing
further paths to maximize system capability until MUOS satellites and
MUOS-capable terminals come online. We have increased the use of leased
commercial bandwidth on LEASAT 5, and have recently added a lease on
Skynet. One of our major mitigation efforts involves the maximization
of available satellite communications channels on the newest UHF
Follow-On satellite. The program office for UHF Follow-On took
advantage of the satellite's digital capability and component
redundancy to allow use of 10 additional channels, beginning 5 months
ago in December 2008. This was achieved at virtually no cost. Similar
gains may be possible on the legacy payload that MUOS satellites will
carry, once on orbit. We are now exploring this option as part of our
effort to maximize accesses during the transition from legacy to MUOS-
capable terminals. The MUOS advanced waveform will deliver capabilities
such as increased capacity, higher data rates, and ability to operate
with smaller terminals. The fielding of MUOS-capable Joint Tactical
Radio System terminals, and/or the upgrade of existing UHF legacy
software-programmable terminals, are required for the use of this new
MUOS capability.
Today, the UHF Follow-On satellite supports approximately 600
simultaneous accesses worldwide. Based on evolving warfighting concepts
in support of the Guidance for Development of Forces, UHF satellite
communications requirements are expected to grow, and MUOS, as
designed, will be able to support that requirement.
The MUOS program office currently projects a schedule delay to
satellite #1's on-orbit capability, from March 2010 to no earlier than
February 2011. The prime contractor has experienced challenges with two
of the key pieces of technology. Several challenging technical hurdles
still remain, including final satellite assembly and certification. The
program office has been aggressively addressing and mitigating cost and
schedule issues.
The delivery of MUOS is a high priority for Navy. Warfighters need
MUOS not only for the advanced capabilities that it will provide, but
also for the warfighter-critical legacy payload, which will replenish
our rapidly aging UHF Follow-On constellation.
OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE
With regard to Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), satellites
provide global access and are a key enabler for our Navy's worldwide
missions. To maintain our asymmetric expeditionary advantage, we must
be able to surge additional space-based capabilities such as
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; position, navigation,
timing; and satellite communications, on accelerated timelines. We must
be able to add capabilities in any area of focus, as well as rapidly
reconstitute lost capability. ORS solutions have the potential to fill
the gaps for warfighters going in harm's way, and represent a
capability which the Navy needs to maintain our operational advantage.
We are excited about the potential of the ORS concept, as it offers
maritime forces the flexibility to meet critical warfighting
capabilities and counter increasingly agile adversaries. As part of the
joint Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) and ORS effort, the Office of Naval
Research invests $15 million of science and technology funds each year
in moderate-to-high-risk projects that result in significant prototypes
through the Space Innovative Naval Prototype program. Investments are
focused on naval capability gaps that space-based systems can fill,
such as ship tracking, acoustic data exfiltration from sonobuoys,
mobile communications, submarine detection, red force cueing, and
littoral environment characterization. The Naval Research Laboratory is
managing the ORS Payload Technology initiative for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
TACSAT-3, which is scheduled to launch this month, includes a
payload sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, which provides an
IP-based data exfiltration capability to collect information from a
wide variety of underwater, surface, and land-based sensors.
The Office of Naval Research and the Naval Research Laboratory are
leading development of TACSAT-4 for the joint community, and funding a
UHF Communications payload which will support mobile communications as
well as sensor data exfiltration. TACSAT-4 uses a prototype spacecraft
bus which was designed as part of a government-industry team effort to
develop and mature standards for increased modularity. The TACSAT-4
spacecraft is scheduled to be launched this September. It will
primarily support the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility,
although other combatant commanders may benefit from its coverage as
well.
The TACSAT series of experiments reflect the partnerships that must
be developed and nurtured between the services, combatant commanders,
the Intelligence community, and industry, to produce innovative
solutions that leverage the best talent available across the national
security space community to solve warfighting challenges.
The ORS attributes of flexibility and agility not only provide
advantages in the current operational environment but also have the
potential to positively affect the space industrial base. The shorter
project cycles should provide a broader base of rapid response
experience for the space industry and space cadre, and will establish a
faster acquisition rhythm in the long run.
SUMMARY
In summary, space systems are a critical enabler for maritime
operations. Your Navy has a long and proud history in space, having
developed a number of technological breakthroughs. The list of Navy
`firsts' in space includes: the first space communications used for
operations; the first controllable space launch vehicle; the first
satellite tracking system; the first successful electronic intelligence
reconnaissance satellite; the first space object tracking system; the
first demonstration of on-orbit atomic clocks; the first military
broadcast satellite; and the first astronauts to orbit the earth, orbit
the moon and crew the Space Shuttle. The Navy looks forward to more
innovative space ``firsts'' to come in the decades ahead.
The Navy's mission of keeping air and sea lanes open and ensuring
the security of our citizens at home and abroad requires a global reach
and persistent presence. We must be constantly ready, whether it is to
deliver on a mission of mercy on one hand, or more lethal measures in
combat on the other . . . and everything in between. Our ability to
respond, as well as work with our Sister Services and coalition
partners, depends on space capabilities with inherent flexibility and
speed to support our worldwide responsibilities.
The Navy must leverage DOD's and the intelligence community's space
capabilities and must be involved in future space developments to
ensure our ability to successfully conduct maritime operations. Future
U.S. satellite programs are now being developed that promise additional
benefit and capabilities to Navy warfighters. Due to the long lead
times involved in complex space programs, it is even more critical that
naval requirements and maritime missions continue to be factored into
the pre-launch design and planned on-orbit operation of all future
satellite systems being considered for acquisition. Without active Navy
involvement today in ongoing deliberations over future satellite
programs, your Navy risks operating in future scenarios with space
systems not optimized for the maritime environment and ill-equipped to
contribute to key important issues affecting our national security.
Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today.
So let me end as I began--the help of Congress in general, and this
subcommittee in particular, is deeply appreciated.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be
here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) space
acquisitions. The topic of today's hearing is critically important.
Despite a growing investment in space, the majority of large-scale
acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems
during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and
increased technical risks. The cost resulting from acquisition problems
along with the ambitious nature of space programs has resulted in
cancellations of programs that were expected to require investments of
tens of billions of dollars, including the recently proposed
cancellation of the Transformational Satellite Communications System
(TSAT). Moreover, along with the cost increases, many programs are
experiencing significant schedule delays--at least 7 years--resulting
in potential capability gaps in areas such as positioning, navigation,
and timing; missile warning; and weather monitoring.
My testimony today will focus on the condition of space
acquisitions, causal factors, and recommendations for better
positioning programs for success. Many of these have been echoed by the
Allard Commission,\1\ which studied space issues in response to a
requirement in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2007, and by a study by the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI),\2\ among other groups. The two
studies highlighted concerns about diffuse leadership for military and
intelligence space efforts and declining numbers of space engineering
and technical professionals. Members of the Allard Commission were
unanimous in their conviction that without significant improvements in
the leadership and management of national security space programs, U.S.
space preeminence will erode ``to the extent that space ceases to
provide a competitive national security advantage.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and
Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the
Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of
National Security Space (Alexandria, VA: July 2008).
\2\ House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on
Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture
(Washington, DC: October 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPACE ACQUISITION PROBLEMS PERSIST
Figure 1 compares original cost estimates and current cost
estimates for the broader portfolio of major space acquisitions for
fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The wider the gap between original and
current estimates, the fewer dollars DOD has available to invest in new
programs. As shown in the figure, estimated costs for the major space
acquisition programs have increased by about $10.9 billion from initial
estimates for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The declining investment
in the later years is the result of the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program's no longer being considered a major acquisition
program and the cancellation and proposed cancellation of two
development efforts that would have significantly increased DOD's major
space acquisition investment.
Figures 2 and 3 reflect differences in total life-cycle and unit
costs for satellites from the time the programs officially began to
their most recent cost estimate. As figure 2 notes, in several cases,
DOD has had to cut back on quantity and capability in the face of
escalating costs. For example, two satellites and four instruments were
deleted from National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) and four sensors are expected to have fewer
capabilities. This will reduce some planned capabilities for NPOESS as
well as planned coverage.
Figure 4 highlights the additional estimated months needed to
complete programs. These additional months represent time not
anticipated at the programs' start dates. Generally, the further
schedules slip, the more DOD is at risk of not sustaining current
capabilities. For this reason, DOD began a follow-on system effort, now
known as Third Generation Infrared Surveillance, to run in parallel
with the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program.
This fiscal year, DOD launched the second Wideband Global SATCOM
(WGS) satellite. WGS had previously been experiencing technical and
other problems, including improperly installed fasteners and data
transmission errors. When DOD finally resolved these issues, it
significantly advanced capability available to warfighters.
Additionally, the EELV program had its 23rd consecutive successful
operational launch in May. However, other major space programs have had
setbacks. For example:
In September 2008, the Air Force reported a Nunn-
McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical cost growth threshold
\3\ for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
communications satellite because of cost growth brought on by
technical issues, schedule delays, and increased costs for the
procurement of a fourth AEHF satellite. The launch of the first
satellite has slipped further by almost 2 years from November
2008 to as late as September 2010. Further, the program office
estimates that the fourth AEHF satellite could cost more than
twice the third satellite because some components that are no
longer manufactured will have to be replaced and production
will have to be restarted after a 4-year gap. Because of these
delays, initial operational capability has slipped 3 years--
from 2010 to 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2433 establishes the requirement for unit cost
reports. If certain unit cost thresholds are exceeded (known as Nunn-
McCurdy breaches), DOD is required to report to Congress and, in
certain circumstances, if DOD determines that specific criteria are
met, certify the program to Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) communications
satellite estimates an 11-month delay--from March 2010 to
February 2011--in the delivery of on-orbit capability from the
first satellite. Further, contractor costs for the space
segment have increased about 48 percent because of the
additional labor required to address issues related to
satellite design complexity, satellite weight, and satellite
component test anomalies and associated rework. Despite the
contractor's cost increases, the program has been able to
remain within its baseline program cost estimate.
The first Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF
satellite is now expected to be delayed almost 3 years from its
original launch date to November 2009. Also, the cost of GPS
IIF is now expected to be about $1.6 billion--about $870
million over the original cost estimate of $729 million. (This
approximately 119 percent cost increase is not that noticeable
in figures 2 and 3 because the GPS II modernization program
includes the development and procurement of 33 satellites, only
12 of which are IIF satellites.) The Air Force has had
difficulty in the past building GPS satellites within cost and
schedule goals because of significant technical problems--which
still threaten its delivery schedule--and challenges it faced
with a different contractor for the IIF program, which did not
possess the same expertise as the previous GPS contractor.
Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA
program to prevent mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air
Force is aiming to deploy the GPS IIIA satellites 3 years
faster than the IIF satellites. We believe the IIIA schedule is
optimistic given the program's late start, past trends in space
acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contractor.
Total program cost for the SBIRS program is estimated
around $12.2 billion, an increase of $7.5 billion over the
original program's cost, which included 5 geosynchronous earth
orbit (GEO) satellites. The first GEO satellite has been
delayed at least 7 years in part because of poor oversight,
technical complexities, and rework. Although the program office
set December 2009 as the new launch goal for the satellite, it
is currently assessing the satellite launch schedule and
expects to have a new plan in place by June 2009. Subsequent
GEO satellites have also slipped as a result of flight software
design issues.
The NPOESS program has experienced problems with
replenishing the current constellation of aging weather
satellites and was restructured in July 2007 in response to a
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical cost-growth
threshold. The program was originally estimated to cost about
$6.5 billion for six satellites from 1995 through 2018. The
restructured program called for reducing the number of
satellites from six to four and included an overall increase in
program costs, delays in satellite launches, and deletions or
replacements of satellite sensors. Although the number of
satellites has been reduced, total costs have increased by
almost 108 percent since program start. Specifically, the
current estimated life-cycle cost of the restructured program
is now about $13.5 billion for four satellites through 2026.
This amount is higher than what is reflected in figure 2 as it
represents the most recent GAO estimate as opposed to the DOD
estimates used in the figure. We reported last year that poor
workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the
delivery of a complex imaging sensor. This late delivery caused
a delay in the expected launch date of a demonstration
satellite, moving it from late September 2009 to early January
2011.
This year it is also becoming more apparent that space acquisition
problems are leading to potential gaps in the delivery of critical
capabilities. For example, DOD faces a potential gap in protected
military communications caused by delays in the AEHF program and the
proposed cancellation of the TSAT program, which itself posed risks in
schedule delays because of TSAT's complexity and funding cuts designed
to ensure technology objectives were achievable. DOD faces a potential
gap in ultra high frequency communications capability caused by the
unexpected failures of two satellites already in orbit and the delays
resulting from the MUOS program. DOD also faces potential gaps or
decreases in positioning, navigation and timing capabilities because of
late delivery of the GPS IIF satellites and the late start of the GPS
IIIA program. There are also concerns about potential gaps in missile
warning and weather monitoring capabilities because of delays in SBIRS
and NPOESS.
Addressing gaps in any one of these areas is not a simple matter.
While there may be opportunities to build less complex ``gap filler''
satellites, for example, these still require time and money that may
not be readily available because of commitments to the longer-term
programs. There may also be opportunities to continue production of
``older'' generation satellites, but such efforts also require time and
money that may not be readily available and may face other challenges
such as restarting production lines and addressing issues related to
obsolete parts and materials. Further, satellites on orbit can be made
to last longer by turning power off at certain points in time, but this
may also present unacceptable trade-offs in capability.
UNDERLYING REASONS FOR COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH
Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost
growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First,
on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford,
creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating,
optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and, for
space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess
potentially more executable alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at
the expense of realism and sound management. Invariably, with too many
programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to
and from programs--particularly as programs experience problems that
require additional time and money to address. Such shifts, in turn,
have had costly, reverberating effects.
Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that
is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing
can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This
tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition
programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on
proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend
technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical
problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover,
when this approach is followed, cost estimators are not well positioned
to develop accurate cost estimates because there are too many unknowns.
Put more simply, there is no way to accurately estimate how long it
would take to design, develop, and build a satellite system when
critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively
early stages of discovery and invention.
While our work has consistently found that maturing technologies
before a program's start is a critical enabler of success, it is
important to keep in mind that this is not the only solution. Both the
TSAT and the Space Radar development efforts, for example, were seeking
to mature critical technologies before program start, but they faced
other risks related to the systems' complexity, affordability, and
other development challenges. Ultimately, Space Radar was cancelled,
and DOD has proposed the cancellation of TSAT. Last year, we cited the
MUOS program's attempts to mature critical technologies before the
program's start as a best practice, but the program has since
encountered technical problems related to design issues and test
anomalies.
Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all
requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or
the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full
capability. DOD has preferred to make fewer but heavier, larger, and
more complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather
than larger constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that
gradually increase in sophistication. This has stretched technology
challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly
increased the complexities related to software. Programs also seek to
maximize capability because it is expensive to launch satellites. A
launch using a medium- or intermediate-lift EELV, for example, would
cost roughly $65 million.
Fourth, several of today's high-risk space programs began in the
late 1990s, when DOD structured contracts in a way that reduced
government oversight and shifted key decisionmaking responsibility onto
contractors. This approach--known as Total System Performance
Responsibility (TSPR)--was intended to facilitate acquisition reform
and enable DOD to streamline its acquisition process and leverage
innovation and management expertise from the private sector.
Specifically, TSPR gave a contractor total responsibility for the
integration of an entire weapon system and for meeting DOD's
requirements. However, because this reform made the contractor
responsible for day-to-day program management, DOD did not require
formal deliverable documents--such as earned value management reports--
to assess the status and performance of the contractor. The resulting
erosion of DOD's capability to lead and manage the space acquisition
process magnified problems related to requirements creep and poor
contractor performance. Further, the reduction in government oversight
and involvement led to major reductions in various government
capabilities, including cost-estimating and systems-engineering staff.
The loss of cost-estimating and systems-engineering staff in turn led
to a lack of technical data needed to develop sound cost estimates.
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SPACE AND WEAPON ACQUISITION PROBLEMS
Over the past decade, we have identified best practices that DOD
space programs can benefit from. DOD has taken a number of actions to
address the problems on which we have reported. These include
initiatives at the department level that will affect its major weapons
programs, as well as changes in course within specific Air Force
programs. Although these actions are a step in the right direction,
additional leadership and support are still needed to ensure that
reforms that DOD has begun will take hold.
Our work--which is largely based on best practices in the
commercial sector--has recommended numerous actions that can be taken
to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended
that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an
incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and
requirements at program's start, and use quantifiable data and
demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We
have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program
manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array
of other aspects of acquisition-program management that could benefit
space programs. Table 1 highlights these practices.
DOD is attempting to implement some of these practices for its
major weapon programs. For example, as part of its strategy for
enhancing the roles of program managers in major weapon system
acquisitions, the department has established a policy that requires
formal agreements among program managers, their acquisition executives,
and the user community that set forth common program goals. These
agreements are intended to be binding and to detail the progress a
program is expected to make during the year and the resources the
program will be provided to reach these goals. DOD is also requiring
program managers to sign tenure agreements so that their tenure will
correspond to the next major milestone review closest to 4 years. Over
the past few years, DOD has also been testing portfolio management
approaches in selected capability areas--command and control, net-
centric operations, battlespace awareness, and logistics--to facilitate
more strategic choices for resource allocation across programs.
Within the space community, cost estimators from industry and
agencies involved in space have been working together to improve the
accuracy and quality of their estimates. In addition, on specific
programs, actions have been taken to prevent mistakes made in the past.
For example, on the GPS IIIA program, the Air Force is using an
incremental development approach, where it will gradually meet the
needs of its users, use military standards for satellite quality,
conduct multiple design reviews, exercise more government oversight and
interaction with the contractor and spend more time at the contractor's
site, and use an improved risk management process. On the SBIRS
program, the Air Force acted to strengthen relationships between the
government and the SBIRS contractor team, and to implement more
effective software development practices as it sought to address
problems related to its flight software system. Correspondingly, DOD's
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics is asking space programs to take specific measures to
better hold contractors accountable through linking award and incentive
fees to program milestones. DOD interim space guidance also asks space
programs to make independent technology readiness assessments at
particular points in the acquisition process and to hold requirements
stable.
Furthermore, the Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, and other key
organizations have made progress in implementing the Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) initiative. This initiative encompasses several
separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical
capabilities as well as identifying and implementing long-term
technology and design solutions to reduce the cost and time of
developing and delivering simpler satellites in greater numbers. ORS
provides DOD with an opportunity to work outside the typical
acquisition channels to more quickly and less expensively deliver these
capabilities. In 2008, we found that DOD has made progress in putting a
program management structure in place for ORS as well as executing ORS-
related research and development efforts, which include development of
low cost small satellites, common design techniques, and common
interfaces.
Legislation introduced in recent years has also focused on
improving space and weapon acquisitions. In March, the Senate Committee
on Armed Services introduced an acquisition reform bill which contains
provisions that could significantly improve DOD's management of space
programs. For instance, the bill focuses on various measures, including
increasing emphasis on systems engineering and developmental testing,
instituting earlier preliminary design reviews and strengthening
independent cost estimates and technology readiness assessments. Taken
together, these measures could instill more discipline in the front end
of the acquisition process when it is critical for programs to gain
knowledge. The bill also requires greater involvement by the combatant
commands in determining requirements and requiring greater consultation
among the requirements, budget, and acquisition processes. In addition,
several of the bill's sections, as currently drafted, would require in
law what DOD policy already encourages, but it is not being implemented
consistently in weapon programs. In April, the House Committee on Armed
Services introduced a bill to similarly reform DOD's system for
acquiring weapons by providing for, among other things, oversight early
in product development and for appointment of independent officials to
review acquisition programs. Both bills are moving forward in the
Senate and House.
The actions that the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of
Defense have been taking to address acquisition problems are good
steps. However, there are still more significant changes to processes,
policies, and support needed to ensure reforms can take hold. With
requirements, resource allocation, and acquisition processes led by
different organizations, it is difficult to hold any one person or
organization accountable for saying no to a proposed program or for
ensuring that the department's portfolio of programs is balanced. This
makes it difficult for DOD to achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems
that are affordable and feasible. For example, diffused leadership has
been problematic with the GPS program in terms of DOD's ability to
synchronize delivery of space, ground, and user assets. GPS has a
separate budget, management, oversight, and leadership structures for
the space, ground, and user equipment segments. Several recent studies
have also concluded that there is a need to strengthen leadership for
military and intelligence space efforts. The Allard Commission reported
that responsibilities for military space and intelligence programs are
scattered across the staffs of the DOD and the Intelligence Community
and that it appears that ``no one is in charge'' of national-security
space. The HPSCI expressed similar concerns in its report, focusing
specifically on difficulties in bringing together decisions that would
involve both the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense. Prior studies, including those conducted by the Defense
Science Board and the Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization (Space Commission) \4\ have
identified similar problems, both for space as a whole and for specific
programs. While these studies have made recommendations for
strengthening leadership for space acquisitions, no major changes to
the leadership structure have been made in recent years. In fact, an
``executive agent'' position within the Air Force that was designated
in 2001 in response to a Space Commission recommendation to provide
leadership has not been filled since the last executive resigned in
2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Department of Defense. Report of the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization
(Washington, DC: Jan. 11, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, more actions may be needed to address shortages of
personnel in program offices for major space programs. We recently
reported that personnel shortages at the EELV program office have
occurred, particularly in highly specialized areas, such as avionics
and launch vehicle groups. Program officials stated that 7 of 12
positions in the engineering branch for the Atlas group were vacant.
These engineers work on issues such as reviewing components responsible
for navigation and control of the rocket. Moreover, only half of the
government jobs in some key areas were projected to be filled. These
and other shortages in the EELV program office heightened concerns
about DOD's ability to use a cost-reimbursement contract acquisition
strategy for EELV since that strategy requires greater government
attention to the contractor's technical, cost, and schedule performance
information. In previous reviews, we cited personnel shortages at
program offices for TSAT as well as for cost estimators across space.
While increased reliance on contractor employees has helped to address
workforce shortages, it could ultimately create gaps in areas of
expertise that could limit the government's ability to conduct
oversight.
Further, while actions are being undertaken to make more realistic
cost estimates, programs are still producing schedule estimates that
are optimistic while promising that they will not miss their schedule
goals. The GPS IIIA program, for example, is asking the contractor to
develop a larger satellite bus to accommodate the future GPS increments
and to increase the power of a new military signal by a factor of 10,
but the schedule is 3 years shorter than the one achieved so far on GPS
IIF. We recognize that the GPS IIIA program has built a more solid
foundation for success than the IIF program. This foundation offers the
best course to deliver on time, but meeting an ambitious schedule goal
should not be the Air Force's only measure for mitigating potential
capability gaps. Last year, we also reported that the SBIRS program's
revised schedule estimates for addressing software problems appeared
too optimistic. For example, software experts, independent reviewers,
as well as the government officials we interviewed agreed that the
schedule was aggressive, and the Defense Contract Management Agency has
repeatedly highlighted the schedule as high risk.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, senior leaders managing DOD's space portfolio are
working in a challenging environment. There are pressures to deliver
new, transformational capabilities, but problematic older satellite
programs continue to cost more than expected, constrain investment
dollars, pose risks of capability caps, and thus require more time and
attention from senior leaders than well-performing efforts. Moreover,
military space is at a critical juncture. There are critical
capabilities that are at risk of falling behind their current level of
service. To best mitigate these circumstances and put future programs
on a better path, DOD needs to focus foremost on sustaining current
capabilities and preparing for potential gaps. In addition, there is
still a looming question of how military and intelligence space
activities should be organized and led. From an acquisition
perspective, what is important is that the right decisions are made on
individual programs, the right capability is in place to manage them,
and there is someone to hold accountable when programs go off track.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
For further information about this statement, please contact
Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Pubic Affairs may
be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key
contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant
Director; Maria Durant; Arturo Holguin; Laura Holliday; Rich Horiuchi;
Karen Sloan; Alyssa Weir; and Peter Zwanzig.
Senator Bill Nelson. Once Senator Vitter and I get through
with our questions, we are going to adjourn to the Office of
Senate Security for a discussion on classified matters. So I
will start out with just a couple of questions, and then flip
it to you, and we will just keep going back and forth.
Ms. Chaplain, GAO recently issued a report about a
potential gap in the Global Positioning System (GPS)
satellites. Can you explain that gap and what happens in the
gap period and the assumptions that you made in determining
there is potential for a gap?
Ms. Chaplain. Thank you. We recently reported on the GPS,
and the bottom line, in terms of the gap analysis we did, we
did an analysis that replicates what the aerospace corporation
does, and we even matched up our results with the aerospace
corporation. So we have a lot of confidence in the results of
our gap analysis.
With regard to the potential gap in satellite capability,
our analysis showed that if both the GPS IIF and the GPS IIIA
programs are executed on schedule, there is still just an 80 to
90 percent probability that the constellation will stay above
24 satellites, which is the commitment the United States has to
provide. If there were a 2-year delay--our analysis in the 2-
year delay in the GPS IIIA program, that is--our analysis
showed that the probability would drop to as low as 10 percent.
I have a couple parameters on this. I think our analysis
has been exaggerated in some of the recent media reports. They
are painting a bit more dire picture than we had in our report.
There are also measures that can be taken to extend the life of
satellites, such as turning off secondary payloads, but they
need to be discussed among all the players involved with that
action.
Our concerns are with the issue of aging satellites in the
constellation, the delays in the IIF program, and whether that
schedule can even be achieved as it is now because they still
have some technical problems they are working on.
Then on the IIIA program, we were very pleased to see the
Air Force has taken a lot of actions to prevent mistakes that
were made on the IIF programs, and those actions mirror the
things that we all want done for all the space programs,
including trying to keep requirements manageable, hold more
design reviews, follow military design standards, and things of
that nature.
But even with that, the schedule, in our view, will be
challenging, given the nature of satellite development, the
fact that they want a bigger satellite bus on the IIIA program,
they are increasing the signal by a power of 10. It is a lot of
challenge for the contractor to meet and there may be not
enough room in the schedule to accommodate problems that could
come up. So that is where we had a concern on the IIIA program.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary and General, what is
your assessment of a probability of a gap, and how can you
mitigate it?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. The GAO concerns are the same
concerns that we had initially going back 3 years ago as we
were architecting the IIIA program, the GPS III program. That
was the first program where the Air Force applied what we call
``back-to-basics'' in our space acquisition. Back-to-basics
includes intense conversations with the warfighters to
understand their needs. It includes evolutionary block
deliveries of new capabilities and GPS III, for example, has
three separate blocks, and each one delivers more capabilities
for the warfighter as opposed to trying to leap dramatically to
a brand new, almost Battle Star Gallatica kind of a delivery.
So additionally, we have gone through independent cost
estimates. We went through 4 years of systems engineering and
technology risk reduction in a competitive industrial
environment to buy down the risks on the program and to better
understand how different designs can satisfy the warfighters'
needs. So we have much more confidence in the acquisition of
GPS III due to these back-to-basics fundamentals that we are
implementing compared to the systemic problems that prior space
programs had suffered. So GPS III, IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC is the
first and currently still successful implementation of the
back-to-basics philosophy in our space acquisition.
To date, it has IIIA. The GPS III design work has been
progressing faster than schedule. In fact, today is the first
major design review on the IIIA spacecraft, and the program is
progressing much faster and with much higher confidence simply
because of those 4 years we spent before we settled on a
particular industry team and before we settled on a particular
spacecraft design.
Senator Bill Nelson. General, do you have anything to add?
General Kehler. Sir, just a couple of things. First of all,
thank you for inviting us today--you and Senator Vitter both.
We appreciate the committee's attention and concern on all the
space issues. I would just add a couple things to what
Secretary Payton has said.
First, the world depends on GPS. We know it. We are
responsible for it. We take that responsibility seriously and
we are committed to keeping the level of service and actually
improving the level of service that the world has come to
expect out of us.
The second thing I would point out to you is that today we
have the largest, most capable GPS constellation on orbit that
we have ever had. There are over 30 satellites on orbit today,
and they are performing well. They are not all in the same
state of health. Some are older than others. Some have some
problems that others that are newer do not have, but it is a
large and very robust constellation on orbit today.
That gives us a little bit of breathing space, if you will.
We understand where the problems are here. We know and believe
that we have worked through the problems on the IIF satellites.
We are not disagreeing with GAO over the nature of the problems
that have arisen, but we are ready by the end of the summer/
early fall to put the first GPS IIF satellite on orbit. We
believe, as Mr. Payton said, that GPS III is progressing very
well. There are other steps that we can take and will take to
work through the gap if this gap arises.
By the way, it is not a gap in terms of coverage. It is a
reduction in the global coverage. It is hard to explain, but
characterizing it as a gap, I think, is a little bit of a
mischaracterization.
But having said that, we are not pushing back on where the
issues have been. We do think that we have measures in place to
work our way through this time period. We are looking forward
to GPS III because we have brought forth the very acquisition
improvements that have been suggested to us into that program
and believe that will be very helpful for us.
I think as we look at this today and we look at IIF now
getting ready to launch, III going through its acquisition
cycle, and us having committed the right people, the right
funding, the right cost estimates, et cetera, sir, as you had
mentioned earlier on, the fact that we have new signals
entering into the constellation, the fact that we have some
ways to manage power and other things, we think that we can
manage our way through this.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Vitter?
Senator Vitter. Thank you.
Just to follow up directly on that, Mr. Secretary, in
general, what would be your bottom line on this in terms of,
what do you think the probability is of any sort of gap,
however broadly defined developing? Is there, in fact, a backup
plan besides just the roll-out of what you have scheduled? If
that slows, if that fails to continue to meet targets, what is
the backup plan to mitigate or avoid any so-called gap?
Mr. Payton. Senator, I would suggest we push that question
to General James because he is the operator of the
constellation, the warfighter that delivers that GPS
capability, and he has those sorts of operational mitigations
that you referred to.
General James. Yes, sir. Just to address that, there are
several things that we look at. First of all, we manage the
constellation in totality, as General Kehler said, 30
satellites. If we start to lose satellites before we can launch
replacements, we can adjust those orbits to ensure that we
provide the best possible coverage for GPS. The fundamental
requirement is 24 satellites. So we will continue to manage
that constellation to make sure that we adjust orbits to
improve and provide the best possible GPS capability we can.
In addition, we actually have----
Senator Vitter. I do not mean to interrupt. But the best
capable. What is the possibility of falling short of what is
our expectation and defining a gap as anything short of that?
General James. Sir, again, the fundamental requirement is
24 satellites. We are at 30 now. Plus, we have three on-orbit
spares that we can actually bring back into the mix. So again,
just an opinion that the probability is relatively low that you
would see major problems with a GPS signal worldwide. There
could be areas where, for example, over the poles or northern
latitudes that you have less accurate coverage, but still
within requirements, et cetera. So again, it is a very dynamic
position, as the satellites move around in the sky, in terms of
the coverage you get and what you would see. But you would
really have to drop from 33 today, 30 plus 3 on-orbit spares
that we have, down to that 24, which is the very basic
requirement that we are required to meet and provide from the
United States.
Senator Vitter. Gentlemen, any of you can respond. What are
your general thoughts regarding this IDA report and the
specific conclusion that we suffer from no one really being in
charge in a global sense with regard to space? Do you think
there is some fairness in that? What should be done about it?
How can we bring more focus in terms of developing an overall
space road map and investment plan?
Mr. Payton. I would say, Senator, when we say no one is in
charge, that is a misnomer. I would say the warfighter is in
charge. Those of us on the acquisition side turn to the
warfighter to determine what capabilities we deliver, at what
pace we deliver those capabilities, and at what price. Again,
part of our back-to-basics is a very tight integration of
warfighter conversations with the acquisition community so that
we do satisfy those needs that they advertise.
Senator Vitter. Let me ask it a little differently.
Warfighter is a lot of different people, and we salute them and
we certainly want to service them. Who is in charge of
integrating all of that input and those needs into a clear,
unified road map?
Mr. Payton. Since space is global inherently, we turn to
Strategic Command for that.
Senator Vitter. Do you think they are effective in truly
integrating that into an overall road map and investment plan?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir.
Senator Vitter. Where is that sort of overall road map laid
out and defined?
Mr. Payton. Through the normal Pentagon planning processes.
Strategic Command quantifies their priorities, representing the
theater combatant commanders. They quantify their priorities
and the pace that they need those priorities filled, and
whether it is Air Force or Navy or even the National
Reconnaissance Office, we marry our deliveries to those
warfighter needs.
General Kehler. Sir, if I could add a little bit to that as
well. Again, on the DOD side of this equation, Strategic
Command, as a combatant command, sits in a very critical place
in terms of space operational capabilities. That is where the
requirements originate, and when the warfighting requirements
for space-related things originate, there is a process that
ultimately hands those requirements, once they're validated, in
large part--not exclusively, but in large part--to the Air
Force. When they come to the Air Force, then the Air Force
Space Command, my command, is responsible for taking those
requirements and turning them into actual capabilities.
On the operational side, a very similar thing happens.
Strategic Command is responsible for the day-in and day-out
operations of our space assets as well, our DOD space assets.
General James is the commander day-in and day-out that
exercises that operational responsibility, the operational
control, if you will, over those assets.
So there are two chains here. In terms of the warfighters
and warfighting requirements, we think this works pretty well.
This is something we have arrived at after a great deal of
effort to get us into this particular position where
warfighting requirements follow the standard chain that other
warfighting requirements follow, and space operations follow a
standard set of activities that actually puts the capability in
the hands of the people who are forward who need it.
So we are pretty comfortable that, as we sit here today, we
understand how requirements turn into programs that turn into
capabilities and who is responsible for that. We are also
pretty comfortable today that the operational use of these
platforms and how we make that available to the warfighters is
also pretty well understood.
General James. Sir, if I could just expand quickly. Again,
under the Joint Forces Component Commander, then we have
responsibility for Army, Navy, and Air Force space forces. We
also reach out to the combatant commanders around the globe. We
receive inputs from them on a daily basis in terms of what are
the requirements for current operations today, and we build all
that into a tasking order and provide those capabilities on a
regular basis. So we are, indeed, integrating those space
capabilities across all the Services, provide that combatant
commander with what he needs on a regular basis.
General Kehler. I would add one final point, sir, if I may.
The IDA reports and other reports have really not just looked
inside the DOD, but they have looked across the interagency
where they have raised some of their concerns. You have a
defense activity. You have an intelligence activity. You have
other activities. The question that they have raised is how do
those interact, and those are questions that, among other
things, will be looked at in the space posture review.
Senator Vitter. The final question for now. I would love
thoughts from any of you, including the GAO, about the
suggestion by some that we do not have enough focus--it is not
all or nothing--but enough focus on small satellites, things
that are more focused, simpler, much cheaper, and we focus too
much on mega, extremely complex systems, and that we could get
some benefit in certain areas from focusing on smaller, simpler
things, including spurring more entrants in the field and more
competition because not everyone is going to get in the
business of building the mega, most complicated satellites. Do
you have reactions to that very broad suggestion?
Mr. Payton. It is a very timely topic, Senator. Last night
we launched out of Wallops Island a spacecraft called Tactical
Satellite (TACSAT)-3, a small satellite launched off of a
Minotaur to low-earth orbit. It was a project run by Air Force
Research Lab but with participation from Navy Research Lab, and
it was part of our operational responsive space program. Again,
a technology demonstration, but demonstrating that we can field
and deploy a spacecraft for a particular theater combatant
commander's needs.
So that demonstration, again launched last night, will have
about a year of on-orbit operation to demonstrate some new
technologies, but mostly how to operate more efficiently with
an on-orbit asset. So, again, that is one example of small
satellites through the operational responsive space program,
how small satellites can benefit military combatant commanders.
General Kehler. Sir, we would agree. We see that there is
great potential in smaller platforms that do single-purpose
kinds of things that can be put up faster and at lower cost.
The warfighters have said that there are requirements for
platforms like that. The Commander of Strategic Command has
told us that he is interested in being able to augment or
reconstitute pieces of the constellations that the warfighters
depend on.
As Mr. Payton said, this is a next step that we just took
last evening on this road. We are very encouraged by what we
are seeing so far. We would like it to go faster, and we are
trying to work on that in terms of investment, but we see the
great potential in being able to put another strategic arrow in
our quiver with smaller satellites. In some cases, we may be
able to do a substantial amount of some of these missions. In
some cases, we are going to have to have larger platforms.
General James. Sir, just from an operational perspective,
we are preparing, once they are done with the experimental
phase of these, to actually take them over operationally and
build the concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures to
actually provide that data right into the theater and develop
those procedures where we accept requests from the theater and
use these operationally as well as experimentally. So we are
all on board with moving forward in that arena.
Admiral Harris. Sir, from the Navy's perspective, we are a
strong believer in the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
concept. Our Navy Research Lab, in conjunction with the Office
of Naval Research and the Air Force Research Laboratory and
various applied physics labs across the country--we partner
with them to participate in the ORS program. We think it is
great for the country. It is great for industry, and it gives
the warfighter the potential for on-call services down range.
So we are committed to it, and we happily participate in it.
Ms. Chaplain. We have been generally supportive of the ORS
program, not just because of the focus on small satellites, but
because it also provides the potential to standardize design
techniques and to also lower the costs of launch, which is very
important to reducing acquisition costs overall, and also of
the potential of the program to bring in new players into the
space business.
Also, just by virtue of working on smaller programs that go
faster, you are providing a lot of learning opportunities for
people that do not have those opportunities on these longer
kinds of efforts. It encourages just more learning and risk-
taking in general.
You have to be cautious in applying this concept across all
of space because some of the requirements are very demanding
and the solutions inherently have to be different at this point
in time.
Senator Vitter. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is
good to be back with you, and I am glad that my colleague,
Senator Vitter, is your ranking member. I am sure you can get a
lot more productive work out of him than you were able to get
out of me. He is committed to our country's defense and has the
brain power to understand the complexities that we deal with.
[Laughter.]
General Kehler, you point out in your testimony that Air
Force Command provides land-based strategic deterrence through
the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fleet. Could you
outline for us, briefly, how you maintain the reliability of
this force over time and what are the challenges in what you
do?
General Kehler. Sir, first of all, we are about to complete
a very substantial investment in the Minuteman ICBM force that
will take it to 2020. We are looking at what it might take in
additional investment to take it to 2030.
Now, how do we do that? We do that through a variety of
programs that sustain this force and analyze the force and
where it may need investment and then take those investment
steps. One of the key activities that we have is an aging and
surveillance program. That aging and surveillance program looks
very hard at the boosters themselves and the supporting
equipment that goes with those to try to predict where failures
might occur in the future.
For example, three times a year--and we are looking at
going to a fourth, but for right now three times a year--we
operationally test fly a full-up Minuteman round, if you will,
from one of the operational bases where it is disassembled,
taken to Vandenberg Air Force Base, reassembled, shot down the
western range. We also fire static test assets at various
locations around the country. We also dissect some of these
missiles. We do analysis on the chemical content of the fuels,
and we constantly look at the electronics. The system, as it
sits there deployed operationally in the field every day, is
constantly going through a set of self-checks and self-analysis
to tell us what its health is.
Senator Sessions. I think you are to be commended for that.
I think that has been an important part of the confidence we
have in that system.
So you are doing as many as three flights a year?
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. I remember we cut the ICBM force from 500
to 450. Part of the agreement to do that was that we needed
those launches for testing. I believe that is right.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. So, Mr. Chairman, I do not know if we
have lined up enough in our Ground-based Midcourse Defense
program for testing. You have always felt we probably should
have more rigorous testing, and then if we are going to keep
this system in place for a while, we will need to make sure we
have enough when we look at that number on testing.
Senator Bill Nelson. We are going to bring General O'Reilly
in here.
Senator Sessions. Okay, very good.
ORS is something I know that the chairman has been
interested in and supportive of. You announced, Secretary
Payton, a launch yesterday?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. Last night.
Senator Sessions. So far, so good?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. It was a successful routine launch
out of Wallops Island. The satellite separated from the last
stage of the Minotaur launch vehicle. Solar rays unfurled, and
they are going through on-orbit checkout right now.
Senator Sessions. Just briefly, how do you feel about how
the progress is going on this? I think you said that earlier,
but would you summarize that for me what your best judgment is?
Are we on schedule?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. In addition to the TACSAT operational
experiments, we have another program that is responding to an
urgent need from Central Command, a project we call ORS
satellite number 1, not very descriptive. It is intended to
respond to an urgent need from Central Command. So we have
selected an industry team to go out and build the spacecraft
with very mature technology, piece part technology designs.
Part of that is to even use the existing link from space to the
ground, use the existing link that the U2 uses today, so that
when this satellite flies over Central Command, they will be
able to receive it as if it is a very high altitude U2. It fits
right into their analytical work stations for Central Command.
So it is a very fast-paced program that the ORS program is
managing.
Senator Sessions. Space News reported May 18 that the 2010
funding request is insufficient to launch the ORS 1 satellite
mission planned for 2010. Is that a disappointment? How did we
let that slip?
Mr. Payton. No, sir. We have a decision point in the
program, again, part of our back-to-basics. If the program is
still making good progress on its design evolution and its
subcontracting and delivery of the piece parts for the
spacecraft and the sensors, if that is going well in early
July, we will make a conscious decision about how fast to
continue that program. So the budget requests necessary to keep
that program on a fast pace are in the process to come to
Congress for approval.
Senator Sessions. So you have an urgent request. The
original plan, as I understood it, was to do it by 2010, but
our warfighter now is not going to have it.
Mr. Payton. No, sir. Again, we do not want to spend money
to keep a program on a pace that technically it will not
deliver. So the decision point this summer is what pace to
deliver that spacecraft on.
Senator Sessions. It is not a question of money but a
technological capability?
Mr. Payton. It is a question of can the industry prove that
they can deliver on that 2010 pace.
Senator Sessions. If they can, you will have the money to
fund it?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. If not, our plan is to continue the
program, but not on the rapid pace.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Kehler, you were mentioning
other agencies. Of course, DOD has an imminent interest in
knowing what the weather is. We have not had too good of an
experience with a National Polar-Orbiting Operational
Environmental Sensing Satellite (NPOESS). General James, how
important is it that these sensors get fielded?
General James. Sir, from the warfighting perspective,
weather it is absolutely essential and maintaining our
awareness of the weather in theater and out is extremely
critical to planning and conducting operations. So it is
certainly critical.
Looking to the ground weather perspective, there are many
weather satellites that we rely on, of course, the current
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) constellation,
which we will have three satellites to be launched. So that
will carry us forward for some period of time. Then other
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and civil
weather satellites that we can utilize for weather forecasting.
But it is absolutely critical to military operations and also
space operations because there is space weather that our space
satellites conduct and determine and monitor solar wind, solar
flux, those sorts of things that are important for satellite
operations that we also need to maintain the capabilities for
from the warfighter and operational perspective.
Senator Bill Nelson. The structure on NPOESS between the
Air Force and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and NASA has not worked. There is a committee or a task
force report that is coming out in a week or so headed by a
very respected person in these matters, Tom Young. That report
is going to say that basically, since it is underfunded, it
needs to be funded, but that between the DOD and NOAA and NASA,
they have to get their act together. The recommendation is
going to be that basically NASA design and operate the
satellite for NOAA with the cooperation of DOD. Do you have any
problem with that?
General James. Sir, I will just speak from the warfighter
perspective. The warfighter has weather requirements. As long
as the acquisition process meets those requirements, then no.
But I would turn to the acquisition side to talk about the
management of the program itself, but the requirements will
still be the requirements and they need to be addressed in
whatever form or program management structure exists.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Mr. Secretary and General
Kehler?
Mr. Payton. I would suggest that today NOAA operates not
only the polar-orbiting satellite that they have sponsored, but
also the DMSP military spacecraft. So from a shared operational
perspective of constellation management and flying the
spacecraft and tasking the spacecraft, NOAA does that for both
the Air Force and the rest of the world right now. We rely on
European sensors also from their program they have called
MEDOP. So the operational relationship is already established.
The difficulty with NPOESS has been a very complex and
sophisticated suite of sensors that have been troublesome in
their development, in their engineering, most notably a sensor
called visible and infrared sensor. That is the shared
difficulty that NASA and NOAA and the Air Force have right now,
and the delivery and development of that sensor has been the
cause of our frustrations with the NPOESS program.
Senator Bill Nelson. I would suggest to you that another
problem is its management by committee, and you have to have a
lead. The Tom Young report is going to suggest that NASA be the
lead.
Mr. Payton. If we do march down that path, we will have to
have very strong confidence and guarantees from NASA that they
could satisfy the warfighters' requirements. We would have to
work out mechanisms to ensure that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Where does Ash Carter play into this?
Mr. Payton. Senator, I honestly do not know. He would be a
critical decision-maker if we moved down that path.
Senator Bill Nelson. What I would like you to do is maybe
we will get him and you back up here after you have looked at
this Tom Young report. But this thing is going to take another
billion, billion and a half dollars, to complete. I think the
management structure has in large part been the problem, as
well as the technical challenges. So we will visit that one on
another day.
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. In the meantime, I think it would be
well if you would get with Ash Carter and you all get Dr.
Young's report and see what conclusions and reach out to NOAA
and to NASA.
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. His organization is already working
with us to scrutinize to date his suggestions and to look at
alternative implementations.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let us talk about protected
communications. It appears there may be a gap in 2018. What is
the likely potential for this gap? General Kehler and Mr.
Secretary?
General Kehler. Sir, protected communications remains a
critical warfighting requirement. That has not changed here
recently, although some of the budget decisions with the fiscal
year 2010 budget have adjusted the demand date for increased
protected communications. Some of it was tied to the Army's
future combat system and some other Service programs that have
now been altered with other budget decisions.
Nevertheless, the requirement for protected communications
for the forward forces remains an especially growing
requirement for communications on the move that are protected.
We have two programs underway right now. One is not protected.
That is the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system. We have put
two of those satellites on orbit. The first one was turned over
to Pacific Command almost a year ago and is functioning very
well. The second one is on orbit and going through its checkout
phase, and all indications are that that one will be very
successful. We have four more of those to launch in the coming
several years to put much more unprotected capability on orbit,
which is important for the warfighters as well.
Protected communications today is the Military Strategic
and Tactical Relay satellite. That is the name of the satellite
that does that. We are going to replace that with the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite. We expect to launch
the first of the AEHF satellites within the next year or so,
perhaps a little bit longer, the fall probably of 2010, and
that will be the first of four AEHF satellites. Now with the
budget decisions on TSAT, which was to be the follow-on, we are
looking very hard at an architecture that will continue to put
upgraded, if you will, AEHFs into the system beyond number 4.
So sitting here today, I am not concerned about a gap, as
we would think of no satellites on orbit. The question is how
quickly can we bring additional capability into AEHF as the
warfighters' need goes up. I think we have a way forward to do
that. I think it was Mr. Payton who used a great word a week or
so ago in another appearance where he talked about
``harvesting'' the technology out of the TSAT program. We will
need to go do that, find out how quickly we can infuse some of
that technology, both in WGS and in AEHF, and continue to rely
on commercial as well and approach this in the sense of an
architecture.
So I am not overly concerned, sitting here today, about a
gap, if you will, in 2018 or 2019. I think the challenge for us
is to decide how do we go forward here with advanced EHF and
what does that mean in terms of being able to pull new things
into advanced EHF. Those decisions have to be made and brought
back probably in the next budget, not this one.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, do you think there is a
gap?
Ms. Chaplain. We have not done a formal gap analysis on
this issue and would like to, but we are concerned about the
potential gap in protected communications, as well as the ultra
high frequency (UHF) communications, as well as missile warning
capabilities, and of course, the GPS and the weather
satellites.
AEHF is still not out of the woods yet either in terms of
technical problems, it is important to remember that. While you
can add evolutionary over-time capabilities to AEHF, you have
to also be aware that at some point you might be adding so much
you need, again, a larger satellite bus and more redesign that
might take more time than you think to answer.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to talk about TSAT. It was
canceled, but after we spent $2 billion on it. Mr. Secretary,
what plans are in place to preserve the work that was done for
TSAT?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. The TSAT program had matured what I
call piece part technologies to a very high technical readiness
level. These are irradiation hardened processors, laser com, a
multitude of technologies that the GAO identified several years
ago and the Air Force agreed with, and we spent over $2 billion
maturing those technologies before we would set the
configuration of the spacecraft itself and before we would
select a single particular industry to go build the spacecraft.
Those are the technologies that I used the term ``harvest''
from the TSAT program so that we collect the intellectual
property that the government has rights to, we collect the
equipment that the government justly, rightfully owns, and we
start laying in the plans and the designs on how to apply those
harvested technologies to both AEHF and WGS.
So that is in front of us over the next months, and again,
we will turn to the warfighter to prioritize which new
capabilities we add when out of that harvested collection of
intellectual property and piece part technologies from the TSAT
program.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is AEHF next?
Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. The first launch is a little bit more
than a year from now. The fiscal year 2010 budget request
includes money for the fourth AEHF, and again, our intention is
to look at continuing that constellation with the properly
phased upgrades to satisfy the warfighter needs.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Kehler, what are the lessons
learned from the cancellation of TSAT?
General Kehler. Sir, that is a really good question. We had
begun the TSAT program, I think, doing a lot of things right.
We were insisting on technology readiness that was high. We
were dedicated to locking down requirements, et cetera. We
thought that if TSAT had continued, that we had started the
program correctly and that we had addressed many of the
concerns that GAO and others have raised about programs like
this.
I think the lesson learned is this is, in part, an issue, I
believe, about synchronizing capability with need over the
longer term. We were producing TSAT on a schedule that was
going to have it ready to provide increased support for
warfighting systems that are now perhaps taking a little bit
different direction. So I think it is about synchronizing need.
At some point, I think Ms. Chaplain is also correct here in
that you can only add to advanced EHF to a certain point, and
from there on, we will have to look at a follow-on system to
advanced EHF. So we will see where this will have to go in the
future, but certainly for the near term, continuing with
advanced EHF through number 4 or perhaps beyond that, as we
look at the next budgets, will be the right thing to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, do you have heartburn as a
result of TSAT being canceled?
Admiral Harris. No, sir, we do not have heartburn that TSAT
was canceled as long as AEHF proceeds on the course that
Secretary Payton and General Kehler have outlined. Protected
communication, obviously, is important to the Navy, as it is to
all the Services; and we are confident, sir, that the Air Force
will manage AEHF through to fruition.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have heartburn that the Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS) is 11 months late?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir, we do have heartburn with MUOS.
The Air Force does not have a monopoly on delayed satellite
systems. MUOS is suffering an 11-month delay right now. I
believe that we will get through it. There are some technical
challenges that the builder is experiencing with the critical
path through the antenna di-plexer. After it goes through that,
the next phase of MUOS testing will involve the thermal vac
where a lot of problems could come up; but right now, the
problem is in the antenna piece. It is mating the legacy UHF
payload to the new antenna bus, and that is a very significant
problem.
The Air Force has offered to help us in that, and we are
grateful for that offer of assistance. The Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition has
determined that he needs to put together a team of national
experts to help industry to go through this problem that we are
having with MUOS. We recognize the importance of the satellite
to the warfighter for the UHF communications, and we are
grateful for the assistance that the Air Force has offered in
that regard.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is the Air Force going to pay for it
for you?
Admiral Harris. No, sir. That is our program.
Senator Bill Nelson. How much extra is it going to cost?
Admiral Harris. Sir, I do not have that information now;
but as soon as I get it, I will get that back to you as soon as
we know what it is.
[The information referred to follows:]
There is no additional Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) funding
required in fiscal year 2010. The MUOS Program Manager is currently
projecting Satellite #1 On-Orbit Capability in 2011. Satellite
subsystem testing has uncovered technical problems that are being
addressed by the prime contractor; not surprisingly, this is causing
delivery date slippage. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RD&A) has chartered a
national team of space experts to assess the program and provide
recommendations to reduce schedule and technical risks. Following the
team's report, ASN RD&A will work with OPNAV N6 on a budget to meet
MUOS requirements in support of PRESBUD 11. Since this assessment is
ongoing the budget figures are not yet ready. Therefore, this is an
interim response. Once the new cost is fully understood, I will forward
the difference for fiscal year 2011 to you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We need to know that.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. The legacy UHF satellite is not
lasting as long as it was supposed to. So now there appears to
be the possibility of a UHF gap. Tell us about that.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. Sir, if MUOS suffers this 11-
month delay, the first on-orbit capability will be in February
2011. The projected 70 percent line from which we would call a
gap will happen in mid-2010.
There is a bit of good news here and that is that we are
using the legacy satellites and our fleet satellites. Every day
that those satellites do not fall out of the sky or fail, that
extends that gap point further to the right. I think it is a
tribute to good satellite design and acquisition practices that
those satellites, as old as they are, continue to remain in
orbit and are continuing to produce for us.
The Navy has also put in place several mitigation
procedures, including using the digital part of UFO F11 in
order to increase channel accesses. So that is good news.
We are optimistic that we will be able to manage through
this, and if there is a gap, below 70 percent, that will be
minimized, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Have you thought about putting a UHF
transponder on a commercial satellite?
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir, we have. What we have determined
is that the cost of doing that and the availability of a
satellite to do that in terms of time--the earliest we could
put one up would be in the 2012 timeframe, which is after the
first MUOS should be on orbit.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are there other contractors involved
besides Boeing?
Admiral Harris. For MUOS, the prime is Lockheed Martin.
What we are trying to do with MUOS, sir, is put the legacy UFO,
UHF payload onto the MUOS satellite, on the antenna bus. So the
industry is trying to mate a Boeing legacy payload to a
Lockheed Martin antenna bus, and that is where the first
challenge, the critical path challenge, that we are facing is.
Senator Bill Nelson. We are going to go in just a minute
over to the Office of Senate Security.
General James, we had an Iridium satellite collide with a
Russian satellite. Joint Space Operations Center has the job to
track and to warn of collisions. DOD submitted to us a
legislative proposal that would enlarge and expand the program
to assist commercial entities with additional support. Will
this expanded program result in additional information being
provided to the Joint Space Operations Center?
General James. Sir, the commercial and foreign entity
program is that to which you refer, and that is a program for
us to provide data to various users who sign agreements, and
that data would be the location of your satellite, the possible
conjunction of your satellite with another object, and then
anomaly supports if you have a problem with your spacecraft.
The potential for data coming into the Joint Space
Operations Center would be that, as a part of those agreements,
we would look to possibly share data from the commercial
providers of the world such as INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and SES
Americom, where they have very accurate knowledge of their
satellite location and they could then provide that into the
Joint Space Operations Center freeing up our sensors to go look
at other satellites from which we do not have very accurate
information. So from an information-sharing perspective, we are
looking at some agreements that we would like to foster with
the commercial entities to gather some of that location
information on their satellites.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would the Air Force get reimbursed for
the services you provide to nongovernmental entities in that
Joint Space Operations Center?
General James. Sir, the law allows that. At this point, the
Department has not elected to charge for those services. I
believe that will be a policy decision that needs to be made at
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and above on how we
implement that.
Senator Bill Nelson. In that operation center, do you not
need upgrades?
General James. Yes, sir. As we look at expanding our
conjunction assessment capability, we are looking at additional
processing capability requirements, as well as additional
analyst capability requirements in order to meet some of those
needs.
Senator Bill Nelson. In order to avoid these collisions, do
you think anything else needs to be done?
General James. Sir, where we are today is that we are
bringing on that additional processing capacity here in the
near term. We are adding, through funding provided by Air Force
Space Command, additional analyst capability, and we are
planning to be able to do this conjunction assessment for
roughly 800 satellites, those that can maneuver, by this fall.
So that is our current plan that we are marching down.
But in the broader sense, we certainly need to increase our
capability for space situational awareness, increased sensor
capability, increased radar capability, increased on-orbit
sensor capability, because we do have shortfalls today in terms
of how often we can track objects, how small of an object we
can track, and how accurately we can track those objects. So
broadly speaking, we need increased space situational awareness
capacity.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, may I add just a quick remark
to this? Space is more crowded than ever. We catalog over
19,000 objects that are on orbit today. There are most likely
thousands more that we do not catalog because of their size,
nuts, bolts, washers, that sort of debris, if you will, that is
up there, fragments from things that have gone wrong, for
example. We know that all of them are traveling at extreme
speed, 17,000 miles an hour roughly, and this problem is
growing for us.
We have now an investment road map for how we improve our
space situational awareness. You will see some of that
investment request in this budget that comes to you this year.
That includes not only some improvements in sensors, but there
is a piece of this investment that will go to General James so
he can fuse the data that is out there better. To get better,
faster, it is not about putting more sensors out, although we
will do some of that. It is about using the sensors we have
more effectively. We have plans in place to do that that will
be included in this investment plan that you see from us this
year.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you all for your public service.
We are grateful. This is highly technical stuff that we are
getting into. We are going to get several layers deeper now. So
the subcommittee will stand in recess and we will reconvene
over in the Office of Senate Security area. Thank you. We are
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
1. Senator Udall. General Kehler, is there a need for a strategy to
rapidly develop and deliver cyber capabilities for the Air Force
missions?
General Kehler. Yes, there is such a need. The cyber domain is
characterized by a rate of change that is orders of magnitude faster
than the other domains of military operations. The cyberspace threats
are constantly changing and require rapid response in order to blunt
attacks and secure our ability to fight in air, space, and cyberspace.
Every day, Air Force systems are threatened from a variety of sources.
It is essential that we have effective capabilities to protect
ourselves and respond. Our abilities in this area are limited at this
time and enhancements are underway. We are developing a strategy, in
conjunction with the acquisition community, to strengthen and improve
our capabilities in the burgeoning cyber arena.
2. Senator Udall. General Kehler, what is Air Force Space Command's
plan for rapidly developing and delivering cyber capabilities?
General Kehler. Our plan is to quickly improve upon the
capabilities and processes we currently have and define new ones where
needed. We will do this by developing improved processes for rapid
decisionmaking, making our capability delivery processes more
responsive, better resourcing the real-time response capabilities we
already have, and bringing in more cyber smart people and developing
them as cyber warriors. We want to fully leverage the finest expertise
of U.S. industry, academia, and national laboratories, as well as our
sister Services and coalition partners.
Air Force Space Command is taking on the cyber mission for the Air
Force, and the ensuing standup of 24AF, will enable development of
improved processes for rapid decisionmaking. The dispersed Air Force
cyber community will be unified under a single major command, providing
efficient command and control of cyber. We must be able to operate
faster than our adversaries' decision processes.
We need to strengthen our teaming relationships with key
organizations by closely integrating intelligence, operations,
requirements, acquisition, and testing. We need to streamline processes
to eliminate existing seams in the rapid prototyping development and
test environment.
Improved processes are not the total solution. The United States
has some of the finest cyberspace minds in the world, and the Air Force
has tremendously bright military personnel, civilians, and contractors
executing the Air Force missions in cyberspace today. We intend to
continue to recruit America's best and brightest, and develop them into
technically skilled cyber warriors. We will develop within them the
operational arts necessary to ensure mission dominance in the cyber
domain. Finally, we will provide them the world-class tools and
networks necessary to successfully execute their missions.
[Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2010
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Sessions,
and Vitter.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Ryan Ferris,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Rob Soofer, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; and Michael
T. Wong, assistant to Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon. We're going to welcome
Tom D'Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), and General Donald Alston, Air
Force Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
Integration, General Floyd Carpenter, Commander of the 8th Air
Force, and Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, Director of the Navy
Strategic Systems Programs. It's a pleasure to have you.
My opening statement will be put in the record, and when
Senator Vitter arrives, his will, as well, and we'll ask him if
he would like to make any comments.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
We welcome our witnesses this afternoon. Today we have with us Tom
D'Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration; Major General Donald Alston Assistant Air Force Chief
of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration; Major General
Floyd Carpenter, Commander, 8th Air Force; and Rear Admiral Stephen
Johnson, Director of Navy Strategic Systems Programs. It is a pleasure
to have you all here.
I note that this is the last subcommittee hearing prior the markup
of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2010, which
will occur the week of June 22.
We have a number of topics to cover including the actions taken by
the Air Force to improve its management of nuclear weapons and the
nuclear weapons enterprise; long-range bomber and ballistic missile
programs and the programs at the National Nuclear Security
Administration. An overarching question and one that in many ways was a
root cause of the problems that the Air Force had in the fall of 2007
is the need to maintain rigor in the management of all things nuclear
while reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security
strategy. We are no longer in the Cold War but the care with which
nuclear weapons are managed and maintained can never be diminished. In
many ways a smaller stockpile will be more difficult to maintain and
ensure that it remains safe, secure, and reliable.
[The prepared statement of Senator David Vitter follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator David Vitter
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our
witnesses. This is my first hearing as ranking member of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee and I look forward to working with you on the many
important issues under this subcommittee's jurisdiction.
The administration's fiscal year 2010 budget provided a significant
funding increase for Defense-wide, ``white space'' programs. This
year's request at about $11.1 billion--$9.2 billion of which is for Air
Force space programs represents a $412 million increase over fiscal
year 2009 appropriated levels. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today how this money will be spent wisely and what will be
done to guarantee that the programs we fund in fiscal year 2010 break
away from past practices of cost overruns and long delays.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), which I am pleased is
here today to testify, has for some time highlighted a number of
systemic problems associated with our major space acquisition programs.
GAO has found that because the Department of Defense (DOD) starts more
weapon programs that it can afford--competition for dollars lead to low
cost estimation and unrealistic scheduling. GAO notes that DOD tends to
start many of its space programs before it has a sound understanding
and the appropriate assurance that the technologies it seeks are
achievable within available funding. As a result of this broken
acquisition process, the Department all too frequently puts itself in a
bind with respect to supporting the warfighters needs. Not only are we
constantly underestimating cost, but according to GAO, delays in
schedule are increasing the overall risk for capability gaps in areas
such as positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and
weather monitoring.
Under the leadership of Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain,
this committee broadly recognized those problems in developing the
``Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.'' That bill emphasizes
starting major weapons systems off right by having them obtain reliable
and independent cost estimates and subjecting them to rigorous
developmental testing and systems engineering early in their
acquisition cycle. In so doing, the bill (which will likely be signed
into law by the President within the next few days) intends to ensure
that programs not proceed from one stage of the acquisition cycle to
the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the
risk of cost growth and schedule slippage. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses how they believe the bill will help manage
technology and integration risk in DOD military space programs.
I am encouraged by Secretary Gates' recommendation to cancel the
Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) program, an example of
an overly ambitious project, lacking a meaningful technology, schedule,
and funding path. I am also pleased to hear that the Department will
not let the $3.3 billion already invested in TSAT go to waste. With the
recommendation to eliminate TSAT and purchase two additional Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites, it is clear that the
Department recognizes that smaller, more incremental steps forward, are
far less risky ventures and are a significantly more responsible path
forward with respect to the taxpayer's money. I am encouraged that the
Department does not plan to let our hefty investment in TSAT go to
waste and does plan to harvest some of TSAT's more successful research
and development efforts. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
more about the plan to address our satellite communications needs, how
we will utilize TSAT technologies on the procurement of already proven
and technologically mature systems, and how TSAT can be a lesson moving
forward for our future space acquisition endeavors.
A recent Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) report charted by DOD
to address congressional concerns with the leadership, management, and
organization for National Security Space found that ``significant
improvements are imperative . . . in order to maintain U.S. space
preeminence and advert the loss of the U.S. competitive national
security advantage.'' The report asserts that ``no one's in charge,''
leadership is fragmented with respect to strategy, budgets,
requirements, and acquisition and recommends that the President
establish and lead the execution of a national space strategy. The
report recommends a top-to-bottom overhaul and I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses what steps are being taken to address the
report's recommendations.
I recognize that space acquisitions are inherently risky and are
like no other venture DOD undertakes. The challenges are many and the
unknown and need for pushing the technology envelope is great. However,
we must do a better job at managing the risk and spending the
taxpayers' money wisely. Nonetheless, I look forward to hearing from
the witnesses what is being done to address the space acquisition
shortcomings, if you believe the condition is getting better, and what
more needs to happen within the Department.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, we will put all of your
opening statements in the record, so the record will be
complete, and we'll get right into it.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino follows:]
Prepared Statement by Thomas P. D'Agostino
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our vision for the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). My remarks today focus
on the fiscal year 2010 President's budget request. The budget
requested today will allow the NNSA to continue to achieve the mission
expected of it by the President, Congress, and the American people.
In a recent trip to Prague, President Obama outlined his vision of
a world without nuclear weapons. To this end, the United States will
take concrete steps towards achieving such a world by reducing the role
of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urging others
to do the same. Until that ultimate goal is achieved, however, the
United States will maintain nuclear forces sufficient to deter any
adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies. To support this
vision, the NNSA will continue to:
Ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear
weapons stockpile, even if that stockpile is reduced under a
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Follow-On Treaty.
Reduce the threat to the United States posed by the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and related nuclear materials
and expertise.
Provide safe, reliable, militarily-effective
propulsion systems to the U.S. Navy.
By pursuing its mission to achieve these ends, and by providing our
unique knowledge and support to our partners in national security, the
NNSA will continue to meet its current statutory responsibilities while
supporting the long-term goal of a world free from the threat of
nuclear weapons.
While the President's long-term objectives are clear, the role of
the nuclear weapons stockpile and America's deterrence policy are being
reviewed as part of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Efforts
are underway in the NPR to establish the size and composition of the
future stockpile and the means for managing geopolitical or technical
risk--NNSA is fully engaged in these activities. Its role is to provide
the technical and scientific input to inform policy decisions, and then
to enable the implementation of the decisions.
NNSA is advancing our knowledge of the physical; chemical, and
materials processes that govern nuclear weapons operation and is
applying that knowledge in extending the life of existing weapons
systems. We have recently completed construction of the National
Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to
explore weapons-critical regimes of high temperature and pressure and
will begin our first ignition campaign to improve our scientific
understanding of phenomena that could previously only be explored
theoretically or in full-scale nuclear testing. The NNSA is also
conducting warhead Life Extension Programs to ensure that our country
remains secure without the production of new fissile materials, and
without conducting underground nuclear tests. On the basis of the most
recent assessment by the directors of our national nuclear weapon
laboratories, today's nuclear stockpile remains safe, reliable, and
secure. At the same time, we are concerned about increasing challenges
in maintaining, for the long term, the safety and reliability of the
aging, finely-tuned warheads that were produced in the 1970s and 1980s
and are well past their original planned service life.
I am committed to continuing to transform our national laboratories
and production plants into a smaller and more cost-effective Nuclear
Security Enterprise. However, I am mindful that our design laboratories
and production facilities are national assets that support a large
number of defense, security, and intelligence activities. As the role
of nuclear weapons in our Nation's defense evolves and the threats to
national security continue to grow, the focus of this enterprise must
also change and place its tremendous intellectual capacity and unique
facilities in the service of addressing other challenges related to
national defense. We are taking steps to move in this direction,
including functioning as a national science, technology, and systems
engineering resource to other agencies with national security
responsibilities.
The NNSA fiscal year 2010 congressional budget request will allow
continued progress in obtaining the essential goals I have outlined. It
will allow us to:
Continue transforming into a Nuclear Security
Enterprise by:
Involving the next generation of our Nation's
scientific, engineering, and technical professionals in
the broad sweep of technical challenges;
Operating the National Ignition Facility,
allowing the use of innovative technology to provide
answers to important scientific questions;
Shrinking the Cold War complex by preparing
buildings for decommissioning and decontamination, and
replacing these antiquated facilities with modern and
efficient facilities; as well as disposing of excess
real property through demolition, transfer and the
preparation of process-contaminated facilities for
transfer to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of
Environmental Management (EM) for final disposition ;
Initiating a Site Stewardship program to
ensure that NNSA increases the use of renewable and
efficient energy, and reduces the number of locations
with security Category I/II Special Nuclear Materials,
including the removal of these materials from the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by the end of
2012, and
Reducing security, safety, and environmental
risks by consolidating and disposing of excess nuclear
materials wherever possible.
Support the development and implementation of arms
control, nonproliferation, and civil nuclear energy agreements
by:
Providing technical and policy support to U.S.
delegations negotiating arms control, nonproliferation,
and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation agreements;
Developing the technologies and approaches
needed to verify compliance with negotiated treaties
and agreements, and
Providing training and technical support to
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Support U.S. commitments through construction of the
Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and Waste Solidification
Building to provide a disposition pathway for excess U.S.
fissile materials, and to help Russia implement its reciprocal
commitments.
Continue our successful programs to secure and/or
eliminate vulnerable nuclear and radioactive material in other
countries, enhance nuclear/radiological material detection
capabilities at borders, airports, and seaports, and strengthen
nonproliferation practices and standards worldwide.
Embark on the design and development of an advanced
reactor core and propulsion plant supporting the timely
replacement of the Ohio class submarine.
Overhaul of the land-based prototype reactor plant
used to test advanced materials and techniques in a realistic
operating environment prior to their inclusion in propulsion
plants.
Honor the commitments made to those who won the Cold
War by ensuring their pensions are secure in times of financial
uncertainty.
Today, I'd like to testify on our efforts in Weapons Activities,
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors.
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES OVERVIEW
The NNSA will ensure that our nuclear stockpile remains safe,
secure and effective to deter any adversary, and provide a defense
umbrella to our allies. At the same time, NNSA will continue to pursue
a modern more flexible Nuclear Security Enterprise that is
significantly smaller than the Cold War complex, but is able to address
a variety of stockpile scenarios.
As I have committed to you previously, NNSA continues to retire and
dismantle nuclear weapons. By 2012 our stockpile will be one-quarter of
the size it was at the end of the Cold War. As the United States
prepares for the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, this fact alone should emphasize the commitment we make to both
our Nation and to the world.
As a full partner in the NPR, the NNSA is working with the
Departments of Defense and State to establish the plans, policies, and
programs that will govern the future posture of our nuclear forces and
supporting infrastructure. The recently issued report of the Bipartisan
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States
will help guide these efforts. These reviews will assist the U.S.
Congress and the administration in clearly defining our future
direction.
As the NPR proceeds, NNSA continues to carry out a number of
activities in support of the stockpile including warhead surveillance,
assessment, replacement of limited life components in existing weapon
systems, and dismantlements. We are also continuing the W76 Life
Extension Program and a feasibility study with the Air Force for a Life
Extension Program for some models of the B61 gravity bomb. There are
also activities planned in the six campaigns and the studies needed for
Annual Assessment of the stockpile.
The NNSA will also continue transforming the Nuclear Security
Enterprise into a modern, smaller, and more flexible complex. The NNSA
inherited a system of laboratories and production plants designed to
produce large volumes of weapons and designs needed to counter Soviet
aggression. We have initiated a major effort to right-size the
enterprise to meet the new, anticipated requirements. The NNSA is
consolidating Category I and II Special Nuclear Materials; removing
these items from selected sites and providing safe, secure storage for
this material.
In fiscal year 2010, we will be reducing our infrastructure
footprint through the deactivation and decommissioning of buildings
such as buildings 9206 and 9201 at Y-12. We will also plan for the
future infrastructure through continuing design of the Uranium
Processing Facility at Y-12, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion
Facility at the Savannah River Site, and the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement Facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory,
and begin the process of planning for an orderly migration of missions
to a smaller and more flexible facility at the Kansas City Plant.
The NNSA has received assistance in our ability to alter our
infrastructure in the form of an increase in the General Plant Projects
limit. We are pleased with the decision to increase the ceiling on
General Plant Projects from $5 million to $10 million. We believe that
this aids in the maintenance and repair of the enduring enterprise.
Following on this increase, the NNSA is submitting a legislative
proposal to similarly increase the design cost limit for these
construction projects from $600,000 to $1,500,000. We seek your support
for the proposal.
But while NNSA is reducing its footprint, and while the total
number of warheads in the stockpile continues to decline, there are
capabilities that must be preserved. Not only are these capabilities
needed to support the maintenance of any stockpile, but they are also
needed to support the Nuclear Security Enterprise's initiatives in
nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, nuclear forensics, and
nuclear incident response. It's important to note that the enterprise
does not scale linearly with the size of the stockpile; and the need
for baseline functional capabilities is not eliminated with cessation
of research into new designs and the cessation of any production of new
weapons systems. These capabilities are needed whether we have a few
warheads, or a few thousand.
Although NNSA did not receive any funds directly from the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, we are assisting other parts of the
Department in implementing their plans for stimulus work at the NNSA
sites and stand ready to do more.
As NNSA prepares for the future, we must focus on the retention of
our scientific, technical, and engineering personnel throughout the
complex. Without experienced scientific, technical, and engineering
personnel, NNSA cannot succeed at its mission. Throughout the cold war
we were able to attract the Nation's brightest scientists, engineers,
and technical professionals by providing challenges, facilities, and
opportunities that were unique, were on the forefront of science, and
that allowed them to put their talents to work to serve their country.
Today we are transitioning our emphasis to a broader nuclear security
mission, but our need to attract the best scientists, engineers and
technical professionals remains. By developing new scientific tools
such as the National Ignition Facility, new challenges such as the
detection of smuggled uranium and plutonium, and the modernization of
facilities such as the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
Facility, we can continue to attract bright technical minds who wish to
serve their country. We believe that our response to the spectrum of
threats to national security is not only the right steps for us to take
to make the Nation more secure, but also will provide a significant set
of technical areas that will motivate young scientists to join us in
our mission.
The challenges are huge and meeting them calls upon both basic
science and applied technology. Approximately 70 years ago, Hans Bethe
advanced the state of science with his critical work explaining the
physical processes governing the life cycles of stars. Today the
National Ignition Facility (NIF) stands on the threshold of producing
stellar conditions in the laboratory. By moving the enterprise forward
in advancing the boundaries of science, we will continue to attract our
Nation's brightest minds to our scientific endeavors. In fiscal year
2009, two significant technological milestones were achieved; crossing
the one mega joule threshold with NIF and the one petaflop threshold in
the Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION OVERVIEW
As part of the President's comprehensive strategy to address the
international nuclear threat, the President also called for
strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, accelerating our
efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the world, and
increasing our work to detect, deter, and eliminate illicit trafficking
of nuclear materials. The NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise is actively
engaged in these and other nonproliferation missions and will provide
the technical expertise to ensure they are successful.
The movement of funding for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication
Facility and the Waste Solidification Building into the Fissile
Materials Disposition budget is the largest change in the fiscal year
2010 Congressional Budget for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program.
These critical facilities provide the nonproliferation programs a
disposition pathway for at least 34 metric tons of surplus U.S. weapons
grade plutonium. I'm pleased to report that the U.S. and Russia have
agreed on a revised Russian program to dispose of Russia's 34 metric
tons of their surplus weapons plutonium. These changes will be codified
in a Protocol that will amend the 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement, and we expect to sign the
Protocol this summer. In light of President Obama's recent statements
in Prague and London, I am particularly pleased that the U.S. and
Russian plutonium disposition programs are coming together at this
time. As a result of these efforts, the U.S. and Russia will ultimately
dispose of enough weapons plutonium for at least 17,000 nuclear
weapons.
I should note also that with this budget request, we are submitting
our last request for funding to eliminate the production of weapons-
grade plutonium production in Russia by December 2010, through the
shutdown of Russia's last weapons-grade plutonium production reactor in
Zheleznogorsk.
The NNSA directly supports President Obama's goal to accelerate
efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear material from around the world
within 4 years, including the expansion and acceleration of our
existing efforts. The NNSA is the key agency supporting the
administration's goal of minimizing the use of highly-enriched uranium
(HEU) in the civil nuclear sector through our program to shutdown
entirely or convert HEU fueled research reactors to the use of low-
enriched uranium fuel. In fiscal year 2010, we will direct significant
funding to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative mission to eliminate
and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at
civilian sites worldwide.
In fiscal year 2010, we will also improve the physical security of
nuclear material, as well as facilitate the development and
implementation of material control and accountability procedures, and
train personnel, to protect a total of 73 nuclear sites throughout
Russia and the former Soviet republics. The NNSA will fulfill the
administration's goal of securing nuclear weapons-usable material by
ensuring that the material possessed by the Russian Navy, the Russian
Ministry of Defense, Rosatom and Russian civilian sites is secured.
But improving the security of weapons-usable material at its source
is only the start. We must also develop a Second Line of Defense in
order to anticipate the possibility that nuclear weapons-usable
material could be smuggled out and transported across international
borders. In fact, we know that illicit trafficking in nuclear and other
radioactive materials continues, especially in Eastern Europe, the
Caucasus, and Central Asia. In response to the President's charge to do
more to combat nuclear trafficking, we will install additional
radiation detection equipment at 42 foreign sites across Europe, Asia,
and North America, and provide detection equipment in 15 additional
ports where cargo is loaded for shipment to the U.S.
This work started several years ago. Technology advances and
foreign personnel turnover have occurred since NNSA first began
securing sites and borders in foreign countries. Funds will be used not
only to perform new installations and train personnel at new sites, but
will also be used to upgrade older equipment at existing sites, and to
provide refresher training to foreign security professionals.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2010, NNSA will expand and accelerate
its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), adding $15 million to
revitalize the U.S. technical and human capital base necessary to
strengthen the international safeguards system and the International
Atomic Energy Agency, in line with President Obama's charge in Prague.
The NGSI complements related NNSA priorities to reduce proliferation
risks associated with growing international interest in the use of
nuclear power; to expand export control training and outreach; to
develop and implement reliable fuel services as an alternative to the
further spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities; and--
consistent with the President's call for progress towards a world
without nuclear weapons--to provide technical support for negotiations
of the START follow-on agreement, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty, and a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
NAVAL REACTORS OVERVIEW
The NNSA also contributes to national security through the Naval
Reactors Program. This program ensures that the nuclear propulsion
plants aboard our Navy's warships remain safe and reliable for their
complete service lives. Over 40 percent of the Navy's major combatants
are nuclear-powered. All of the Nation's aircraft carriers, attack
submarines, guided missile submarines, and ballistic missile submarines
enjoy the significant operational advantage afforded by nuclear power,
including speed, endurance, and enhanced combat payload. Through NNSAs
efforts, nuclear-powered warships are on station where American
interests are threatened, and ready to conduct sustained combat
operations.
For over 60 years, the Naval Reactors program has had complete
responsibility for all aspects of Naval Nuclear Propulsion. The Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program currently supports 82 active nuclear-powered
warships and 103 operating reactors. This represents eight propulsion
plant designs, in seven classes of ships, as well as a training
platform.
Naval Reactors funding supports safe and reliable operation of the
Nation's Nuclear Fleet. This includes providing rigorous oversight,
analysis of plant performance and conditions, as well as addressing
emergent operational issues and technology obsolescence for 71
submarines, 11 aircraft carriers, and 4 research and development and
training platforms. This funding also supports new plant design
projects (i.e., reactor plant for the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft
carrier and alternative lower-cost core for Virginia-class submarines),
as well as ensuring proper storage of naval spent nuclear fuel, prudent
recapitalization of aging facilities, and remediation of environmental
liabilities.
The Ohio-class SSBNs, which are the most survivable leg of the U.S.
Strategic Forces, are approaching the end of their service lives. The
Navy recently completed studies for a follow-on replacement to the
Ohio-class and is funding the commencement of design work in fiscal
year 2010. NNSA funding in fiscal year 2010 supports reactor core and
propulsion plant design and development efforts to support this
replacement.
Since 1978, the land-based prototype reactor plant (S8G) has
provided an essential capability to test required changes or
improvements to components and systems prior to installation in
operational ships. The prototype has also provided required, high-
quality training for new sailors preparing to operate the Nation's
nuclear-powered vessels. This land-based prototype will run out of fuel
and require a refueling overhaul starting in 2018. This overhaul and
the resultant opportunity to test advanced materials and manufacturing
techniques in a caustic operating environment will significantly
mitigate risk in the Ohio Replacement reactor plant design. To support
the refueling overhaul schedule, concept studies and systems design and
development efforts will begin in 2010.
The Expended Core Facility, located at the Naval Reactors Facility
on the Idaho National Laboratory, is the central location for Naval
spent nuclear fuel receipt, inspection, dissection, packaging for dry
storage, and temporary storage, as well as detailed examination of
spent cores and irradiation specimens. Continuous, efficient operation
of this facility is vital to ensure the United States can support fuel
handling operations in our shipyards conducting construction, repair,
and restoration of nuclear ships. The existing facility and related
infrastructure is over 50 years old and requires recapitalization. The
mission need for recapitalizing this capability has been approved and
conceptual design efforts begin in 2010.
The Program continues to explore and develop potentially advanced
technologies that could deliver a compellingly better energy source for
nuclear ships. For example, using a supercritical carbon dioxide energy
conversion as a replacement for the traditional steam cycle is
envisioned to be significantly smaller for the same power output,
simpler, more automated, and more affordable. Leveraging existing
university, industry, and Nuclear Security Enterprise scientific and
engineering work in this technology, conceptual development and small-
scale testing is underway to support eventual megawatt-scale testing
and prototyping.
Acquisition of a new surface combatant (i.e., cruiser) in support
of new ballistic missile defense and anti-air warfare mission
requirements are currently under evaluation by the Navy. Based on these
mission requirements, this new ship will potentially require higher
energy capacity and output than is currently available from traditional
fossil fueled power plants. Further, the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for 2008 authorizes the Navy to construct all future major
combatant vessels with integrated nuclear power systems unless this
requirement is waived by the Secretary of Defense. The Navy is
currently analyzing alternative shipboard systems that will determine
final power plant requirements. Should the Navy decide to pursue a
nuclear-powered cruiser in its current long-range shipbuilding plan,
DOE-cognizant reactor core and propulsion plant design and development
will be required.
The value of nuclear power for naval propulsion is well recognized
and the demand for its inherent capabilities remains strong. By taking
every opportunity for economies in our work and business practices, we
have made a concerted effort to meet the Navy's demand for new
propulsion plant designs while assuring the safe and reliable operation
and maintenance of the existing fleet. However, the need to deal with a
formidable collection of new challenges coupled with the Program's
aging infrastructure and environmental legacies requires a fortified
level of resource commitment.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. C. DONALD ALSTON, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF
OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION
[The prepared statement of Major General Alston follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. C. Donald Alston, USAF
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, distinguished members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Air Force
strategic programs.
In the Executive Summary of the Final Report of the Congressional
Commission of the Strategic Posture of the United States, the
commission stated: ``In addressing the challenges of nuclear security
for the decades ahead, the United States must pursue a comprehensive
strategy. So long as nuclear dangers remain, it must have a strong
deterrent that is effective in meeting its security needs and those of
its allies.''
The Air Force contributes to effective deterrence by operating,
maintaining, securing, and sustaining intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), dual-role bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft.
Although the numbers of systems are dramatically smaller than at the
height of the Cold War, the Air Force provides national leadership with
the most responsive, flexible and visible nuclear deterrence
capability.
Strategic deterrence is in an airman's DNA; we were born with this
mission in 1947. For the past 61 years, we have successfully provided
our Nation and our allies diverse and effective nuclear deterrence
capabilities. Today, the international security environment is more
complex than during the Cold War, with more nations in possession of
nuclear weapons and non-state actors in pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction.
Our continued ability to provide a safe, secure, reliable, and
credible nuclear deterrence capability underpins our national defense,
a sober responsibility that the Air Force, with responsibility for two
legs of the traditional TRIAD, executes with skill and commitment on a
consistent basis.
The Air Force depends on a nuclear enterprise that involves
thousands of professionals to include dedicated airmen operating,
securing, maintaining and sustaining our operational forces; our
partners in the industrial base; the exceptional capability at the
national laboratories; and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
partners.
The airmen and civilians involved in the nuclear mission area are
uniquely qualified to execute the significant responsibilities
associated with nuclear weapons and are known for their discipline,
rigor, precision and reliability. Thousands are certified under the
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) and many others have critical
duties supporting PRP. All our nuclear units across five different
major commands undergo rigorous and unforgiving Nuclear Surety
Inspections with necessarily high standards that demand consistent
precision and reliability. It's a tough business, but the stakes are
too high for it to be any other way
Over this past year, the Air Force made a series of key decisions
to address systemic weaknesses in its nuclear mission area. The US Air
Force Posture Statement 2009 states: ``Through a back-to-basics
approach, the Air Force is re-emphasizing accountability, compliance,
and precision in the nuclear enterprise. We are reorganizing our
nuclear forces in a manner that reduces fragmentation of authority and
establishes clear chains of supervision for nuclear sustainment,
surety, and operations. These changes include: (1) consolidating all
nuclear sustainment matters under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center;
(2) establishing a new Air Staff nuclear directorate responsible for
policy oversight and integration of our nuclear enterprise activities;
and (3) standing up Air Force Global Strike Command, which is already
operating in a provisional status at an interim location. Global Strike
Command will consolidate Air Force ICBMs and nuclear-capable bombers
under a single command, and is on track to activate later this year.''
The basis for these three key organizational decisions, as well as
additional institutional direction can be found in the nuclear roadmap
published last fall, ``Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear
Enterprise.'' The roadmap represents a comprehensive approach to
address root causes of documented deficiencies to ensure we are
aggressively working to reclaim our legacy of excellence in the nuclear
mission area. The roadmap-related efforts well underway in the Air
Force to reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise can be categorized into
six broad strategic objectives: (1) Develop adequate nuclear-related
expertise and properly man the enterprise: right experience, right job;
(2) Implement a process for ensuring sustained advocacy, focus, and
commitment; (3) Establish clear lines of authority; (4) Implement a
disciplined, comprehensive enterprise system-of-systems methodology to
ensure day-to-day sustainment excellence; (5) Implement processes to
uncover, analyze, address, and review systemic weaknesses; and (6)
Sufficiently invest in the nuclear deterrence mission area. By
accomplishing these objectives, we will continue to build on the
confidence that our Nation and allies have in our commitment to this
critical mission.
Our first strategic objective, to improve the professional
development of our nuclear experts, is a multi-year effort involving
education, training, and the assignment process.
All professional military education courses, both officer and
enlisted, have been reviewed and modifications are underway to ensure
the appropriate level of content regarding the nuclear mission area.
Additionally, Air Force nuclear doctrine has been updated to include a
greater focus on deterrence.
It is vital to assign the best qualified people to key positions.
We are aligning our training, education, and career force development
with significant work completed by our personnel directorate on the Air
Staff in conjunction with the Air Force Personnel Center in San
Antonio, TX; truly an ongoing effort that must be continually re-
evaluated with the ultimate goal is to ensure the right expertise is
matched to the right job. Also, the Air Force has identified billets
both inside the AF and across joint and interagency positions that
require key nuclear expertise, and these authorizations will be given
priority for filling. Additionally, nuclear experience identifiers are
being added to personnel records to ensure we are able to track
individual experience levels, which aides our efforts to properly
develop our people to take on positions of greater responsibility in
the future.
We are achieving our second strategic objective--to implement a
process for ensuring sustained advocacy, focus, and commitment for the
nuclear enterprise--with a series of process changes. The internal AF
resourcing process has been changed to now include a new Nuclear
Operations Panel, whose role is to ensure a thorough assessment of
nuclear funding requirements. The Air Force Strategic Plan, a key
planning document to link future capabilities to the programming
process, established reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise is the
number 1 priority of the Air Force. Additionally, the Secretary of the
Air Force and the Chief of staff, at their initiative, established and
co-chair the Nuclear Oversight Board, composed principally of the
nuclear Major Command Commanders, to ensure proper focus and advocacy
is maintained Air Force-wide.
To effectively manage the nuclear enterprise, it is necessary to
ensure our third objective is achieved, establishing clear lines of
authority. Discussed earlier, these changes include: (1) consolidating
all nuclear sustainment matters under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons
Center; (2) establishing a new Air Staff nuclear directorate
responsible for policy oversight and integration of our nuclear
enterprise activities; and (3) standing up Air Force Global Strike
Command.
A significant force-wide challenge is encompassed in the fourth
objective, implementing a disciplined, comprehensive system-of-systems
methodology to ensure day-to-day sustainment excellence. A large
component of this effort is being achieved by consolidating our nuclear
sustainment activities under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. The
Center is working in conjunction with our Air Staff maintenance and
logistics experts on a comprehensive positive inventory control
methodology and a fusion center for maintaining continuous oversight of
nuclear weapons related material.
Critical to our day-to-day excellence in the nuclear mission area
is our fifth objective, implementing processes to uncover, analyze,
address and review systemic weaknesses throughout the nuclear
enterprise. Regardless of the size or structure of our nuclear force,
every action by every airman must be executed with precision and
reliability. The Air Force is rebuilding a nuclear culture with a
robust self-assessment and inspection process in order to effectively
uncover, analyze, and address systemic weaknesses within its nuclear
enterprise. The Air Force has developed standardized training,
qualification, and certification requirements for nuclear inspection
team members. Where appropriate, common checklists will be used across
all nuclear commands. When significant deficiencies are noted, common
root cause analysis techniques are implemented to fix the problem and
improve related processes. Today, every AF Nuclear Surety Inspection
(NSI) is performed under the oversight of the Air Force Inspection
Agency. Also, a core team of inspectors will be attached to each MAJCOM
NSI team to ensure consistency across all MAJCOMs. In addition to the
increased depth of inspections, ``no-advanced-notice'' inspections are
now occurring across nuclear major commands.
The Air Force has taken aggressive actions to achieve our sixth
objective, sufficiently investing in the nuclear deterrence mission
area, an area that numerous studies have identified as being
significantly under-resourced. Ensuring continued reliability and
credibility of our nuclear systems requires a sustained commitment to
funding weapons and platforms while simultaneously investing in a
credible deterrent capability for the future. We have already
programmed resources to address many of the recommendations provided by
the various assessments of the nuclear enterprise and continue to focus
and prioritize future investments.
Expanding upon our sixth objective, the fiscal year 2010 PB
represents significant progress toward addressing many issues and
recommendations made by numerous internal and external reviews and
investigations. This includes funding and investment to bring all 76 B-
52s in our inventory to a common configuration with updated
communications and flight systems making all aircraft capable of
nuclear and conventional missions. We are revitalizing our
intercontinental ballistic missile force, the Minuteman III, with
additional resources for sustainment, aging and surveillance. We have
funded improvements to the rural missile complex gravel roads to bring
them up to standards which ensure safe transport of our critical
systems to and from base, as well as our most precious asset, our
airmen, who travel thousands of miles on these roads every day. Other
initiatives include the Air Force study of the B61 Life Extension
Program that will look at options to extend the service life of the
oldest weapon in our inventory. Finally, we are introducing a program
to replace our Vietnam-era helicopters for missile field complex
security operations with an airframe that will provide required lift
capacity, speed and range.
Additionally, with your support, we requested and received
permission to reprogram over $100 million to address immediate and
achievable needs to the nuclear enterprise in fiscal year 2009. With
these funds, we were able to accelerate procurement of armored security
vehicles for the missile complexes and weapons storage areas, complete
overdue electromagnetic pulse protection work on critical
infrastructures, upgrade weapons security systems in Europe, and
develop software that will enable our Nuclear Weapons Center to track
all Nuclear Weapons Related Material from cradle to grave.
CLOSING
According to the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on
DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, ``the strategic role of nuclear
capability is to deter and dissuade current and emergent enemies from
attacking the United States and its vital interests. To be successful
in this critical national objective, the Nation's nuclear forces must
be demonstrative and credible, and be survivable against a preemptive
attack. This combination of capability, credibility, and survivability
presents high uncertainty to a potential adversary in attempting to
anticipate the success of executing one or more courses of action.''
Collectively, all of the actions described above are ultimately
focused on deterrence. Strategic deterrence is vital to America's
security, and the Air Force is an essential provider of strategic
deterrence. Our actions will ensure the Air Force continues to deliver
the unique, effective strategic capabilities of stable, flexible and
visible nuclear deterrence, thereby instilling confidence in the
American people and national leadership; assuring allies; and
dissuading and deterring potential adversaries. The Air Force is fully
committed to the nuclear deterrence mission.
Thank you for the committee's continued support of the U.S. Air
Force.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. FLOYD L. CARPENTER, USAF, COMMANDER, 8TH
AIR FORCE, AIR COMBAT COMMAND
[The prepared statement of Major General Carpenter
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Carpenter, USAF
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to represent the
men and women of the Eighth Air Force and to answer your questions
regarding the use of bomber aircraft in the United States Air Force. A
key component in our Nation's ability to conduct long-range strike
missions is found within our Air Force bombers. This unique capability
is not possessed by any other branch of our armed services or by any
other nation. Globally, the distance of our potential adversaries and
lack of basing options hampers our ability to perform in a variety of
theaters and scenarios. Long-range strike aviation is one of the few
hedges our Nation maintains to mitigate these fundamental challenges.
Air Force strategic bombers are a critical element of our National
Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, providing unique
capabilities to fulfill combatant commanders' mission objectives from
shaping and deterring to large scale conventional operations and even
nuclear scenarios.
Despite the age of our Nation's three bombers, the Air Force long-
range bomber force is unmatched in its ability to provide conventional
power for initial response to regional crises within hours.
Additionally, our bombers can provide sustained operations in any
region of the world employing either conventional or nuclear options.
As we move away from forward overseas basing, the speed, range, and
payload of today's manned bombers allow for a U.S. presence anywhere on
the globe within 24 hours.
The end of the Cold War brought about a false feeling of global
security, especially surrounding the long feared use of nuclear weapons
between the Cold War superpowers. Shortly after the end of the Cold War
we saw the world in its new form--violent and unstable. Different from
the last century, non-state actors, specifically radical
fundamentalists, moved to the forefront of the international stage. Our
national security debates centered on not only how to counter this
threat, but whether insurgent radical fundamentalism is the likely
dominant form of warfare for the 21st century. These are critically
important questions when deciding the best national military force
structure size and composition. But in an effort to ``tailor'' our
force structure we would be remiss if we were to assume this type of
warfare will totally dominate the global security horizon for the
foreseeable future. For at least the first 25 years of the 21st
century, instability, violence, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and cultural/religious clashes will be center stage on the
global arena. However, we must guard against absolute predictions of
what forms of warfare may occur in the future.
As we moved into the 21st century, the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review
revealed that the Cold War's Triad was limited in scope and in need of
an update. Our deterrence foundation still relies on our strike
capability composed of a formidable balance of Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and manned
recallable and retargetable bombers. In today's threat environment
where non-state actors and counterinsurgency operations are center
stage, the importance of our bomber force to deterrence is often
overlooked and little understood. The strategic bomber is unique in its
ability to assure allies, shape the environment, dissuade potential
adversaries, complicate adversary strategy, provide the President and
Secretary of Defense escalation control options, and ultimately offer
alternatives to the insertion of precious ground forces on foreign
soil.
Unquestionably, there are a myriad of applications for the use of
bombers. These include but are not limited to: (1) the demonstration of
national resolve through force generation and arming with either
conventional or nuclear weapons; (2) upon order, covert, or overt
dispersal within the U.S. or deployment to forward locations; (3)
strike operations from single-aircraft to multi-aircraft conventional
and/or nuclear packages, which, most importantly, can be executed,
retargeted, or recalled; and (4) employment of a vast array of weapons
to include conventional unguided general purpose bombs, cluster
munitions, precision-guided munitions, hard target penetrators, nuclear
gravity weapons, and conventional or nuclear cruise missiles. Further,
bombers have a unique ability to communicate de-escalation through
visible downloading and removal from alert status and/or redeployment
to home stations. Overall, and possibly most notable, bombers are
differentiable from other strategic nuclear weapon systems--thereby not
forcing an enemy into assuming a worst case nuclear scenario.
In the new Strategic Triad, it is the bomber that provides the most
flexibility to U.S. command authorities, with this flexibility being
multifaceted and unique among the triad components. Air Force bombers
are recallable, scalable, directional, and visible and provide our
President and Secretary of Defense with both assurance and deterrence
at the same time. This deterrence flows not only from the bombers'
nuclear strike capability but also from the robust demonstrated
conventional capability that can hold any target on the planet at risk.
Another unique feature of our bomber force is the ability to deter even
while strike operations are being executed. Simply put, deterrence from
bombers can continue despite shots being fired. Furthermore, by
enabling the effectiveness of other U.S. and partner instruments of
power, bomber conventional capability can provide alternatives for
deterrence beyond the obvious threat of annihilation. The most
illustrative example is U.S. bombers operating in conjunction with
indigenous ground forces in Serbia, which ultimately helped facilitate
enemy capitulation without large scale North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ground force insertion.
To be sure, all components of the Strategic Triad are critical to
our National Security Strategy but the bomber force has and will
continue to be unique in its ability to assure allies, shape
environment, dissuade potential adversaries, complicate adversary
planning, provide escalation control, and offer alternatives to our
combatant commanders and the President and Secretary of Defense.
Bombers are the only platform in the Strategic Triad which can be
employed in either conventional or nuclear roles. As our forces
continue to redeploy from forward bases around the world, long-range
strike aviation will remain one of our Nation's key power projection
capabilities in the foreseeable future. This long-range strike
capability provides the Nation the most powerful means to rapidly
respond or attack around the globe and offers our Nation's leaders
freedom of choices and freedom of action in the new world environment.
Our national security will increasingly depend on strategic bombers to
meet the demands of responding rapidly and decisively to security
threats. Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your
questions.
STATEMENT OF RADM STEPHEN E. JOHNSON, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Stephen Johnson, USN
Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, distinguished members of the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear
before you to discuss our Navy's nuclear enterprise, today's force and
the efforts to ensure the continued reliability of our submarine
strategic forces, and the Ohio class replacement to maintain continuous
strategic deterrence.
NAVY NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE
The Navy remains vigilant in executing our nuclear strategic
deterrent mission. The Department of Defense nuclear enterprise has
gone through several important events over the last year. Through
numerous reviews, both internal and external, the Navy has been found
satisfactory in executing our responsibilities although there are areas
where improvement is required. These efforts included an in-depth
review of nuclear weapon custody and accountability procedures, weapons
handling procedures, training, and flight test non-nuclear verification
requirements. These reviews have confirmed the Navy has maintained a
safe and secure environment for our strategic assets As a result of
these reviews, the Navy has established two new three Star level
councils chaired by the Director Navy Staff to provide central
coordination to focus and address policy, operational and acquisition
issues associated with our nuclear weapons enterprise, and ensure the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) receives comprehensive recommendations
for nuclear weapons governance. The first council involves the three
Star Admirals on the CNO's direct staff and is called the Operational
Navy Nuclear Weapons Council. The second brings together the
Operational Navy leadership, the Fleet leadership, and acquisition
leadership and is called the Navy Nuclear Weapons Senior Leadership
Oversight Council. These new councils demonstrate the Navy leadership's
continued focus and commitment to this mission area.
I have focused Strategic Systems Programs on six major areas to
continue to sustain high standards which include: (1) rigor; (2) field
activity oversight; (3) self-assessment; (4) corrective action; (5)
material management; and (6) personnel. These six areas of focus form
the guiding principles by which we will manage our day to day
operations and set the culture to sustain this mission for the long
term. The men and women of Strategic Systems Programs and our industry
partners remain dedicated to implement these guiding principles to meet
the mission of our sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our
marines and sailors who are standing the watch to ensure the security
of the weapons we are entrusted with by this Nation.
TODAY'S FORCE
Our 14 Trident Submarines, eight of which are homeported in the
Pacific and 6 in the Atlantic fleet, continue to provide a credible,
survivable, and reliable sea-based strategic deterrent for our national
leadership. Two of our submarines, USS Nevada (SSBN 733) and USS
Tennessee (SSBN 734) are undergoing Engineering Refueling Overhauls
which will maintain the viability of these platforms through the end of
the class. USS Alaska (SSBN 732) has recently completed her overhaul
and post availability testing and is preparing for her Demonstration
and Shakedown Operation with a Replacement strategic outload and return
to the operational cycle next spring.
The men and women of Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) are committed
to maintaining the high reliability of our 14 Ohio class SSBNs with
their Trident II D5 Missiles, as well as the four Ohio class SSGNs that
have been converted to carry Tomahawk missiles and support Special
Operating Forces (SOF) missions as directed by our combatant
commanders. In February the USS Alabama (SSBN 731) conducted the 126th
consecutive successful flight test of the Trident D5 missile as part of
her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation. This record of successful
flight tests is unmatched by any previous missile launch system.
Therefore, I am pleased to report to you that the Trident Strategic
Weapons Systems continues to meet the operational requirements
established for the system almost 30 years ago. However, it is my
military opinion that the overall health of the D5 weapons systems is
not without cause for pause, as the weapon system is nearing its 20th
year of deployment and now enters an era of its lifecycle where age-
related issues may impact its reliability. With D5 planned for
operational deployment to match the Ohio class hull life extension, D5
hardware will age beyond our previous experience base and will be
operational almost twice as long as any previous sea-based strategic
deterrent. Age related concerns have been validated by several
technical issues that have arisen over the past year that remind us
that the Trident weapons system requires increased vigilance to
maintain the demonstrated high reliability of the system. I am
confident that the dedicated SSP team is up to this challenge.
D5 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM
Our efforts to extend the life of the Trident II D5 missile
continue. We are procuring additional missiles, due to the Ohio class
hull life extension, to ensure that our Ohio class submarines are fully
out loaded throughout their service life. This is being accomplished
through continuous production of critical components such as rocket
motors, major requalification efforts when necessary, and an update to
missile electronics and guidance packages to address obsolescence.
However, even with continuous production of solid rocket motors, we are
experiencing cost challenges today as both NASA and Air Force demand
declines and will continue to experience those cost increases as demand
continues to shrink in future years. We are approaching the Critical
Design Review for our missile electronics update and are evaluating
various options to determine the most cost effective implementation
into the fleet. These updated electronic packages form a large part of
the life extension strategy which supports the deployment of the
Trident II D5 weapons systems on the Ohio class submarine and its
impending replacement program.
Key to the success of the Trident II, D5 Life Extension is the life
extension of the W76, Mk4 warhead refurbishment known as the W76-1
which we are executing in partnership with the Department of Energy.
This program is on track to provide the Navy with the weapons we need
to meet operational requirements throughout the Ohio class deployment
and the planned follow-on platform.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY
As technical program manager responsible for the Navy's Nuclear
Weapons Security, SSP has actively pursued technologies which will
provide credible, cost effective security for the nuclear assets
entrusted to our watch. Our Marines and Navy Master-at-Arms are
providing an effective and integrated elite security force at both of
our strategic weapons facilities. We have begun construction of our
Limited Area Production and Support Complex at Strategic Weapons
Facility Pacific, Bangor, WA. When complete, this facility will provide
a higher degree of security for our ashore operations.
The United States Coast Guard, Maritime Protection Force Units have
been commissioned at Kings Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. These Coast
Guardsmen and the Navy vessels they man provide a security umbrella for
our Ohio class submarines as they deploy and return from their
deterrent patrols. They form the basis of our Trident Transit
Protection System.
OHIO CLASS REPLACEMENT
In 2027, the Navy will retire the oldest of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs
when it reaches the end of its service life. Over the subsequent 13
years the Navy will retire the remaining Ohio-class SSBNs at a rate of
approximately one per year. The Ohio class replacement is the
replacement capability for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine.
It will be a strategic national asset whose endurance and stealth will
enable the Navy to provide continuous uninterrupted survivable sea-
based strategic deterrence. Appropriate investment in the Ohio class
replacement research and development and concept development is
essential to a reliable, survivable and adaptable sea-based strategic
deterrent prepared to face an uncertain future. The Analysis of
Alternatives study commenced on 13 Aug 2008 and will complete this
summer. The Navy's fiscal year 2010 budget provides the required RDT&E
investment to support the lead ship construction.
The U.S. will maintain its strong strategic relationship with the
U.K. for follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement of
1963 and recently reinforced by the Presidential, Prime Minster and
Secretary of Defense exchange of letters. The U.K. has provided funding
in 2008 and 2009 to support the design and development of a Common
Missile Compartment that supports both the Ohio class replacement and
the successor to the U.K. Vanguard class.
SSGN
Although SSGN is not a strategic asset, the program synergizes off
of the Trident system. This highly successful program, authorized by
Congress as a method to maintain the viability of four Ohio class
submarines and bring a major advance in tactical submarine overseas
presence is almost complete. All four of these submarines have
completed their conversion to SSGN Attack and SOF Platforms. USS Ohio
(SSGN 726) completed a highly successful 14 month forward deployed
period, USS Florida (SSGN 728) just returned from her deployment in 5th
Fleet, USS Michigan (SSGN 727) is forward deployed in 7th Fleet, and
USS Georgia (SSGN 729) will depart on her maiden deployment later this
year. By any measure, these platforms have delivered on the promise to
provide high volume strike and high capacity SOFs capability to our
combatant commanders. I am in the process of turning over the day-to-
day maintenance operations and future spiral development efforts of
these fine ships to the Naval Sea System Command In-Service Submarine
Organization as these platforms are no longer considered part of the
Nation's Strategic Forces.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I
sincerely appreciate your continued support of the Navy's nuclear
enterprise. Your efforts will ensure the continued credibility and
reliability of our Trident II Weapons System and its remarkable Trident
II D5 Missile, maintaining an unmatched record of success by any
missile system. The men and women of Strategic Systems Programs are
committed to the highest standards of safety, surety, and reliability
of this remarkable system. Thank you again for the opportunity to
appear before you today and am prepared to answer any questions you may
have.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, there's an article in
the New York Times and in a bunch of other papers about the
publication of the Government Printing Office (GPO) Web site of
a report that, according to the article, ``gives detailed
information about hundreds of the Nation's civilian nuclear
sites and programs, including maps showing the precise location
of stockpiles of fuel for nuclear weapons.'' I understand that
they've taken this report down from the Web site.
Tell us about this, and tell us your assessment of any
vulnerability that was disclosed in the report.
Mr. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, I'd be glad to.
First of all, the report that you mentioned is the United
States declaration associated with the additional protocol,
which is a more rigorous inspection regime set up to assist in
our nonproliferation efforts around the world. In fact, it's
not a report about our nuclear weapons activities or sites,
specific locations of nuclear weapons or nuclear security; it's
civil nuclear materials that exist around the United States. It
is a sensitive, but unclassified, report. Ultimately, it would
have gone after 60 days here in Congress, it would go over to
the International Atomic Energy Agency. We think the report's a
great demonstration of U.S. leadership and wanting to be
upfront, wanting to be the first one to get on to these more
rigorous inspections. We're certainly dismayed that the
sensitive information was displayed publicly, but I can assure
you, sir, I've looked at the actual report--in fact, this
morning again--to make sure that I was very clear, particularly
at sites that are the responsibility of my organization, to
make sure that the information there is all unclassified. It
went through a detailed interagency review. So, while I'm
dismayed that it's out, I can assure you, sir, that it doesn't
release weapons information.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, it's just an easy locator for
where nuclear weapons complexes are.
Mr. D'Agostino. It's an easy locator for the civil side of
what I would say the research and development that the Nuclear
Energy Program does in the Department of Energy (DOE); some of
that work is done at the NNSA site, some of it is done at the
laboratories. There is some commercial power plant information
that's out there. But, it does not reveal any classified
information. Unfortunately, it's a nice compilation of
information dealing with civil nuclear, and we are always very
sensitive--and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is, as well,
very sensitive--to how much information gets out there that
doesn't necessarily need to be out there. Unfortunately, this
is one of those cases.
The real concern, I think, has to do with, how did this
information get out onto the GPO Web site, and that's something
I'm sure we'll be working very closely with Congress on, trying
to figure that out.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have any idea how this would
have appeared in the paper? Did they just cobble together a
bunch of unclassified information?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think what probably happened is, this
sensitive, but unclassified, report that was sent was
inadvertently placed on the GPO Web site. Another group--I
believe it was the Federation of American Scientists--picked
that up and placed it on their Web site, and from there it
spilled into the media. It has since, as I understand it, been
taken off of the GPO Web site. It's all unclassified
information, but it's sensitive. It details where the country
is doing some of its civilian research in nuclear areas, so it
has information about materials and things like that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do we have to worry about any enhanced
security, or do you feel like the security is adequate?
Mr. D'Agostino. I'm very comfortable with the security at
our NNSA sites. Those are the ones I know about the most. We
design our security posture fairly rigorously against--the
details, of course, are classified--a pretty broad set of
threats. It would certainly cover the potential threats that
might be here.
We don't want to make things easier for people. I think,
unfortunately, something like this does make some things
easier. It just means that we have to maintain our security
posture and keep it strong and continue to check on how we're
doing, per our own standards.
So, I'm very comfortable with the security of our NNSA
sites, even with this report out, because I've looked at the
``maps,'' if you will, and there's--on all of our sites--really
nothing there, quite frankly. It just shows a corridor, for
example, in a building, nothing else around it, so you have no
idea of those kinds of details.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is
underway, and each of you have a role in the process. So, why
don't we start with you, Admiral, and you all just go right
down the line and tell us about your role in the process.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. The Navy assigns a flag officer
to each of the working groups for the NPR. I am assigned,
appropriately, to the Stockpile and Infrastructure Working
Group, and I support Mr. Henry and Dr. Harvey, who are the
chairmen of that group. Then, the Strategic Systems Programs
has key individuals supporting all parts of the NPR. We meet
weekly. In my opinion, it's good communication, it's a good,
healthy process, and I expect a good outcome.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Now, you said you're assigned
and that you meet weekly. What's your role in the process?
Admiral Johnson. I provide the answers to postulated
scenarios provided by the other groups primarily who are the
force structure groups. In the case of change in weapons
loading, we would analyze: where would we store weapons; how
many would have to be moved; how long would it take; what would
it cost; et cetera. Those sort of practical answers. In the
group that I'm in, we also help illuminate the investments
necessary within the infrastructure for the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and for it to carry on into the future.
General Carpenter. Sir, like the Admiral, I have no real
direct role, other than as a technical advisor, if you will, or
a subject matter expert on the bomber side, since 8th Air Force
is the nuclear bomber leg, which we consider a critical part of
the triad. I act as an advisor when there are questions about
that particular part of the triad, and how many weapons would
be appropriate for that part of the triad. So, I'm removed, at
Barksdale Air Force Base, from the NPR process itself, but very
much engaged, through STRATCOM and through the air staff, with
General Alston.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you get involved in the design of
the new bomber?
General Carpenter. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Bill Nelson. How about you, Admiral? With regard to
the new submarine?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. You get involved in the design?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. I have been responsible, on the
Navy side, for all the pre-milestone work, the system-
engineering work that preceded the start of the analysis of
alternatives, and I will be responsible for the design and the
operation of the missile compartment.
Senator Bill Nelson. General?
General Alston. Mr. Chairman, I am responsible for the Air
Force support to the NPR process, so I ensure that we have
proper representation on all of the working groups that are
working the NPR. Admiral Johnson and I have found ourselves, in
my 21 months, together very often, because of our somewhat
common responsibilities, and we also share seats in some of the
NPR forums. But, my responsibility would be not only to ensure
that we have active engagement at every level within the NPR,
but that I ensure that, as discussions and propositions and
excursions would develop, that whatever would be asked of the
Air Force, in terms of replies, that I would help manage those
replies to that process.
I, too, agree that this has been a very collaborative
process. I think it's been a very transparent process. It is
bona fide that the Services have been invited to participate
fully. I'm very encouraged that, with this level of
collaboration and a focus on strategy and policy-leading force
structure, that I, too, am confident that we will get a very
competent outcome for the Nation.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I'm a member of the
Senior Integration Steering Group (SISG). We meet weekly.
Essentially, there are a series of working groups--the
Stockpile and Infrastructure Working Group, as you heard
Admiral Johnson describe, Policy Working Group, Force Structure
Working Group, an International Working Group. We have this
organization above that worries about the interagency
coordination between these detailed working groups. So, I sit
on that group. We do tradeoffs. We make sure that the strategy
force structure feeds the number of warheads, types of
warheads, and then do the iteration back and forth and make
sure all these pieces tie together. Then, occasionally I've sat
in as acting for the Deputy Secretary in deputies' committee
meetings at the National Security Council (NSC) to be on the
receiving side of some of this. I would agree with General
Alston, I've seen a tremendous level of collaboration, not only
between the Services and OSD policy, acquisition technology,
and logistics, but State Department and international partners,
as well. So, it's been a great process.
Senator Bill Nelson. Jeff, do you want to ask any questions
at this point?
Senator Sessions. You can go ahead.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Mr. D'Agostino, you know
that there is a reasonable chance that we're going to reduce
the nuclear stockpile. That's going to increase the size of the
backlog of the nuclear weapons waiting to be dismantled. How
would NNSA handle that increased number of dismantlements?
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely right, sir, we do expect some
increase in our dismantlement queue. As I've mentioned publicly
before, we have a pretty sizable dismantlement queue. The
actual number is classified, but at the pace that we're on,
we'll take apart our last warhead in that dismantlement queue
in 2022. That actually is a fairly accelerated rate from where
we were about 4 years ago, on the pace that we were on. Our
plan--we submitted a report last year with the classified
details to Congress, and every 2 years we'll re-up that report.
The way we would handle the increased rate is to continue to
use what we call a special tool set. It's what we call
``Seamless Safety for the 21st Century.'' It's a series of
special tools that assist us in working on our warheads, where
we don't have to move the warhead around so much, but it sits
in a special toolcase where it allows us to take it apart
fairly rapidly. But, most importantly, more important than
speed, is the safety piece of this. Many of these warheads,
particularly these old warheads, were built 40-plus years ago
of fairly exotic materials, and have been in very hot silos and
up in cold airplanes and back and forth. It's a very
complicated job. So, my primary concern is not if I can take
them apart faster every single year, but can I continue on the
safety record that we've held essentially since the program
started, because we're dealing with conventional high
explosives that don't have the safety--on old systems that
don't have the safety features of our more modern systems.
So, I can assure you, safety is number one, not how fast I
can do them. Clearly it's going to require us to maintain a
good set of production technicians who are trained in this
area. I think we have that crew in place right now.
What I don't want to do is hire up essentially 300 people,
because it's going to take me a few years to get them trained
up--have them work really hard for 6 years to take everything
apart, and then have to lay them off, because it doesn't make
sense economically.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have enough pit storage at
Pantex?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, right now, our expectation is
that we will be able to handle our expected future pit capacity
not only today on our current plans, but the expectations of
the NPR. I don't want to be predisposed that I know the answer
before the review is done, and I don't. But, we're going to
reevaluate all of these questions on storage facility locations
as soon as we get the exact numbers. So, I'm anxiously waiting,
frankly, to get this review done, get the details out, because
that assists me greatly in my 5-year planning.
Senator Bill Nelson. Why did you move the responsibility
for the construction of the pit disassembly facility from one
office to another?
Mr. D'Agostino. In many cases, the pit disassembly and
conversion facility move was directed by Congress, so we had a
shift. I'm never a big fan of moving large projects from one to
the other, because what you do is, you disrupt teams. These are
very complicated facilities. They require a certain set of
consistency over years of time. Both of those organizations are
in the NNSA, so I am ultimately responsible for it and
ultimately that's going to be my objective.
Senator Bill Nelson. In disassembling the nuclear weapons,
do you want to do some of that in Nevada or do you want to do
all that at Pantex?
Mr. D'Agostino. I want to do that at Pantex, because first
of all, my production technicians are at Pantex. Next, the
facilities that I have at Pantex are actually certified by
ourselves and checked by the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety
Board to be able to do what I would call the highest level of
nuclear safety work, because safety is primarily number one. If
we're ever in a situation where we have, I would say, a problem
disassembling a particular warhead, for example, because it's
just been together for so long and we are in a situation where
we need to get it out of the system because it's stopping a lot
of other disassembly work from happening, we do have the
option, and it will be on a case-by-case basis, to say, ``Let's
use our device assembly facility at the Nevada Test Site, fly
some technicians out there, do this specialty work on this
particular warhead while we continue to work away this larger
bucket of dismantlement work.''
So, Nevada is always a nice contingency plan for us. I
don't see anything in the near future that would cause us to
use it right now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Mr. D'Agostino, when we talk about nuclear stockpile
reductions, which will be part of the President's talks with
the Russians--have they already begun?
Mr. D'Agostino. The Assistant Secretary, Rose Gottemoeller,
from the State Department, has started working with the
Russians. Yes, sir, she has.
Senator Sessions. It's on a fast track. I would just note
that there's no reason that that has to be done this year. It's
a self-imposed goal. We can extend the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) for up to 5 years with little problem. But, at
any rate, the President seemed to be determined to move forward
with that, and announced some reductions. But, the question I
think we're hearing from various experts in the field, that any
reduction done by current stockpile should be tied to some sort
of modernization plan of our existing nuclear weapons. Do you
share that view?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think that's a discussion that I'm
currently having right now. One statement I would make is, I
feel very strongly that we are in a fragile position, if you
will, from an infrastructure and people standpoint. There's a
Perry-Schlesinger report that has come out recently that has a
fairly accurate portrayal of the infrastructure and people
concerns that they have. One thing to do is make--we have great
people in our outfit. The people want to know that they're
doing work that the country cares about and that they're doing
work that exercises their skills. So, an element of that is
extending the life of the warhead. The way that Perry-
Schlesinger Commission report describes life extension is a
continuum of activities, from refurbishment to replacement. I
think working in that continuum is where we're going to end up
and what the NPR is going to end up showing us.
So, all of these pieces are tied together. In my view, you
can't just talk about one piece, just talk about size only, and
not address, frankly, the whole integrated situation, not only
on the NNSA side, but my colleagues in DOD who also have
concerns with critical skills.
Senator Sessions. Former Secretary Perry, on May 28--who's
been, frankly, very aggressive, more than I would suggest, is
required to draw our weapons systems down--said this in his
article: ``The U.S. should maintain a safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear deterrent for itself and its allies, and that
this deterrent should be adequately funded and staffed with
topnotch managers, scientists, and engineers.'' I know that you
are challenged with making sure that there's no waste, every
dollar is spent wisely. But, is the budget before us today
that's been proposed, is that sufficient to meet the standards
that Secretary Perry made?
Mr. D'Agostino. The budget we have before us today meets
the standard for today, for the year that we're talking about,
2010. I would like to note, though, that particularly when one
looks at the out-year plan--typically we submit a 5-year series
of numbers to show direction, if you will, on our programs.
This program, you'll note that our out-year numbers are
exactly, in some cases, in science and technology, fairly
identical with the 2010 number. That is done because I
recognize that changes are going to have to be made in the out-
years in order to make Mr. Perry's statement a sustainable and
true statement out in the out-years.
So, the way I would describe this is as a 1-year budget
submittal to Congress, that once the NPR comes out, my plan,
Tom D'Agostino's plan, is to make sure that the challenges of
securing nuclear materials in 4 years, the challenges
associated, as the Perry-Schlesinger report puts out, on doing
life extensions on our warhead and exercising our people, are
duly reflected in the science element of my program, the
infrastructure element of my program--not ``my program,'' but
the program that the country has entrusted me with for now, as
well as the direct stockpile work piece, the life-extension
piece.
Senator Sessions. Is there money in it sufficient to do
those things in the out-years?
Mr. D'Agostino. Not in the out-years, but in 2010, yes,
sir.
Senator Sessions. Secretary of Defense Gates, just last
October, said, ``The U.S. is experiencing serious brain drain
in the loss of veteran nuclear weapons designers and
technicians.'' He went on to say, ``To be blunt, there is
absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and
reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either
resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization
program.'' Do you agree with that?
Mr. D'Agostino. I largely agree with that statement.
There's details below some of those statements. A modernization
effort, in my view, encompasses a wide variety of activities,
from reuse of components that we've previously made, exercising
our scientists, to making sure that when we do a life extension
on our program, we modernize the safety and security elements
of our warheads. That's absolutely important. The last thing I
think is--as we maintain our deterrent, put warheads into our
stockpile that are based on 1970s- or 1980s-era safety and
security efforts, because we know that things have changed in
the last 30 years.
Senator Sessions. A modernization program should result
into weapons being more reliable and significantly more safe,
should they not?
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely, Senator. I agree 100 percent
with that statement.
Senator Sessions. What objections are you getting to
modernizing, even as we draw down some of the numbers?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think making sure that it's put in the
context of the President's overall strategic direction, making
sure that it fits in. We have an integrated framework to talk
about nuclear security.
Senator Sessions. Yet, you don't have a commitment for
funding that would allow you to do that. Is that what you're
saying?
Mr. D'Agostino. The program I have right now puts us in a
position to be able to respond to the NPR. I'm very confident--
and that's why I'm very excited about being able to get a NPR
out, because we want that detail and that information in there.
That's why Dr. Harvey, who is co-leading the stockpile and
infrastructure group, understands this program, has my views--
is working that in the NPR process, because I have these views
that I want to be reflected in, ultimately, the
administration's position for the future.
So, I have no objection to modernization. I think it's
important. We need to put safety and security into our
stockpile. We have some in already. We want to make sure that,
if we're going to extend the lives and maintain our deterrent,
that continues out into the future.
Senator Sessions. You also would acknowledge that we're the
only nuclear weapons country in the world that doesn't have a
modernization ongoing program. Is that right?
Mr. D'Agostino. That's correct, but we do have a life
extension program. I want to make sure that that's clear. Some
of this is not semantics--there are some details behind the
difference between a pure refurbishment life extension and a
reuse life extension or a replacement life extension activity.
So, it's absolutely correct, if we're talking about what I
would call advancing the ball dramatically on safety, security,
and reliability. But, we do have a life extension program
underway; in fact, we're supporting the Navy, Admiral Johnson's
requirements, for the W-76 warhead, in that respect.
Senator Sessions. We just need to do what is necessary to
move forward with these programs. I just am not seeing a firm
commitment from the administration that that's what's going to
happen. We hear some positive talk. I think you guys hope that
the NPR will help move us in that direction, but I haven't seen
it yet, and it makes me somewhat nervous.
Admiral Johnson, tell us briefly about missile defense,
about your requirements to test submarine-launched missiles,
how often do you launch those, how many you do, and why you
think that's necessary to guarantee the reliability of those
systems.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. The Navy tests four missiles per
year in a program we call a Follow-on Commander's Evaluation
Test. The submarines are on patrol. They are notified. They're
selected at random. They're notified by message. They return to
port. Two missiles are selected--again, randomly. Those
missiles are then--the warheads are removed, and the
appropriate test instrumentation, telemetry, and destruct
capability are installed. It takes a couple of days, a matter
of days, and the ship proceeds to the range area and conducts
normally two missiles from that submarine. We do that twice a
year, a total of four.
Senator Bill Nelson. Tell us where that range is, Admiral.
Admiral Johnson. There are two ranges. The one we used
yesterday is off the coast of Florida. It's the same operation
center the Air Force runs for a variety of tests. They share
that facility with us at the 45th Space Wing, and it's the
eastern range. We fired, in this case, from Her Majesty's ship,
Victorious, a Royal Navy submarine fired off the coast of
Florida for a 5,000-mile test splashing down off the coast of
Africa.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I think, one thing we will
need to look at is that the national missile defense--they
reduced the number to 30. If that goes forward, which I'm not
comfortable with, I think it puts an even greater requirement
that we have enough missiles that we have tested over the
years, because all of our other areas test. You've been a
critic, I know, for some time, and then--that we haven't
probably tested that system enough. So, however we come out
with national missile defense, I think we're going to have to
produce those things while the assembly line is hot so they can
be used for testing.
Thank you. I appreciate your leadership. You are
exceedingly knowledgeable on all these issues, and I'm pleased
that you're chairing our committee.
Senator Bill Nelson. Just for you students, here, this is
the famous Senator whose picture is on the front page of the
Washington Post this morning. [Laughter.]
Mr. D'Agostino, we're not only reducing the number of
nuclear warheads, but we're going to reduce the actual types of
nuclear warheads. So, how do you go about reducing the weapons
types and reducing redundant warheads?
Mr. D'Agostino. What I would say now is, there is
discussion about reducing types, but that will be left for the
NPR ultimately to come out. But, I would offer the following,
if I could. Ultimately, it gets driven by DOD's requirements,
the types of targets that are part of the algorithm that
determines the size of the stockpile, whether or not certain
targets can be covered by multiple warheads, are there backups
needed. From my standpoint, reducing the numbers of types makes
the maintenance element a lot easier. I don't have to make X
number of different types of neutron generators or thermal
batteries or other particular components that we have to
replace on a periodic basis. So, the maintenance piece becomes
easier. There's a downside, of course, to reducing the types,
and that is, you become more and more dependent on the types
you have remaining. Therefore, that drives you to want to make
doubly sure or triply sure that you know exactly what's going
on with those particular warheads you've decided you're going
to retain in your arsenal, both in numbers and types. So, I've
always emphasized the point that as--if our stockpile gets
smaller, and if the numbers of types go down, that more and
more reinforces the need to have this discussion on having a
very sustainable workforce and infrastructure that does that.
Right now, we don't have that in the out-years, in my opinion,
but that's what we have to get to.
General Chilton ultimately can provide a more fullsome
answer, sir, to your question on reducing the types.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We'll take that up with him.
Historically, each lab has been responsible for the weapons
that it designed. What do you think of the idea of having all
the data on all of the weapons available to each of the
laboratories and having each lab do an independent review of
each weapon?
Mr. D'Agostino. I like that idea, sir. I think it's a great
idea. We discussed, last year, on how we make our annual
assessment process stronger as our stockpile size changes. We
believe we've reached that point where our stockpile size is
small enough that we need two independent checks, full sets of
experiments run independently by both labs, keeping the
responsibility, of course, for the design with one laboratory,
because we always want one organization responsible. But,
having another institution do that--Secretary Chu has looked at
this idea. In his first month or so as the Secretary, I talked
to him about that. He was convinced enough that he signed out,
essentially, a piece of paper that directed us to go off and
establish the system where we work that in. It means a little
bit more science work, it means a few more experiments, it
means a bit more analysis, and it means a bit more back and
forth between our two laboratories, but that's a good thing. I
think the country will be better off because of that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Just briefly. The Wall Street Journal, on
June 2, has an article that the U.S. and Russia talks appear
headed for a framework agreement by July 6, and a final treaty
by December. That's moving right along.
Mr. D'Agostino. I would agree with that, sir.
Senator Sessions. Have you been involved in that?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, at what we call the interagency
meetings we have at the NSC and advising the Assistant
Secretary of State--that is the prime negotiator for the
administration.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director
of the Arms Control Association here in Washington, which is a
private group, I think, that apparently knows a lot about it,
described the atmosphere at these meetings, usually tedious, as
``electric.'' White House officials wouldn't say what their
targets are on a treaty with Russia, but Mr. Kimball said the
deployed nuclear weapons in each country could be reduced by 30
percent to 40 percent from their current limit of 2,200 warhead
delivery systems, Admiral Johnson, would be cut by half.
General Alston and team, let me ask the military witnesses
whether they've conducted any analysis on the implications of
these reductions for their leg of the triad.
Who wants to start?
General Alston. Senator, I'd be happy to start.
The process so far with regard to the NPR has been looking
at the existing treaty limits with regard to Moscow and the
combatant commander has been involved in his assessment as to
force levels, but the discussions have not gotten so specific
yet as to identify specific force levels. It has been a
priority, certainly of the Air Force, and I will let Admiral
Johnson speak for his service, but that we are ensuring that
our responsibilities to maintain nuclear surety at lower levels
is a very important matter to us. You would have, in your
workforce, their ability to perform their roles and
responsibilities. It's a sensitivity that we have. As we get
deeper into this discussion and deeper into the NPR, I know
we're going to reach a point where we're going to have to be
able to make the assessments that you indicate we will need to
make.
Senator Sessions. But, you haven't been asked to, and have
not completed an assessment to reduce your delivery systems by
one-half?
General Alston. No, sir, we have not. There have been some
excursions to see what would be the art of the possible, but I
really would not qualify those as reaching the point where they
would be sufficiently mature for force-structure
recommendations. But, for half of the force, no, sir, there
hasn't been that level of detailed discussion involved in the
Air Force.
Senator Sessions. General Carpenter?
General Carpenter. I agree with everything General Alston
said. Our position basically has been that we have been
promoting a balanced triad, whatever the numbers are, that the
end result should end with a triad, as we have today, that is a
balanced triad, so that every leg has a sufficient number of
weapons to make it sustainable.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Johnson?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir, I agree with the same position.
I do make the observation that, in the case of the missile tube
numbers, the current numbers are set higher than the number of
missile tubes that we have today, and that may provide some
insight into the way--I haven't read the article, so I can't
exactly respond to it.
Senator Sessions. They just speculated. They talked about
delivery systems being reduced by half. Let me ask you--you're
aware--and I know when you've been promoted and had hearings,
you've been asked whether or not you would give your honest
assessment, regardless of what the politicians tell you, so I'm
going to ask each one of you three uniformed personnel, will
you, if asked about whether or not you can accept a 50 percent
reduction in the delivery systems of our triad, will you give
your best military judgment?
General Alston. Yes, sir.
General Carpenter. Yes, sir.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. All three of you said ``Yes.'' I
appreciate that.
Also, Secretary D'Agostino, on the question of nuclear
weapons, the numbers slip my mind right now; perhaps you can
recall how many tactical nuclear weapons the Russians have and
how many we have.
Mr. D'Agostino. The actual numbers are classified, but I
will say there's a 10-to-1 ratio, roughly, give or take. It's a
big difference between the two.
Senator Sessions. If the START goes forward, we're talking
about the strategic nuclear weapons primarily being reduced,
and there's no plan to narrow the gap in the tactical nuclear
weapons, is there?
Mr. D'Agostino. The administration is focused--you
described the timeframe earlier, which is correct, sir.
Addressing the tacticals would be very difficult to do in the
time period. There's other implications. Russia's been very coy
about the role of their tactical nuclear weapons, vis-a-vis
their overall national defense. It's a different approach than
what we have.
Senator Sessions. Oh, I see. The Russians don't want to
talk about it? That's right, the Russians don't want to talk
about tactical nuclear weapons. That's off the table. They're
willing to talk about strategic nuclear weapons, and that's the
fact of the matter. The administration is determined to reach
this treaty, for reasons that baffle me. Hopefully we can go in
that direction and move forward in that direction. I'm
supportive of that. But, we're not under any pressure to do
this. This is a self-imposed pressure that worries me. So,
these are important issues. I know you will work on them, and
give your best judgment.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Originally, under START II, there was a general
understanding that once we got to START III, they would take up
the tactical nuclear weapons, but we never got around to
ratifying START II. So, this is something you have brought up
in a most timely fashion, and I thank you for bringing it up.
We need to keep it out there on the table and ultimately get to
that issue.
The idea was to address the strategic weapons first and
then get to the tactical. Well, we never got there. So, thank
you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Vitter?
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, to all of you. In particular, General Carpenter,
welcome to you, and thanks for your new leadership of the
Mighty 8th in Louisiana. We're very proud of that.
My first question goes to something focused there, which is
of the Air Force's movement on Global Strike Command, which is
slated for Barksdale and obviously we hope that moves along and
continues, in terms of the new major command that is clearly a
significant high national priority, and it's a national
priority to stand it up in a timely way. Can you give us a
view--and/or, General Alston--an update on how that's
progressing?
General Carpenter. I can give you a timeline, and General
Alston can fill in any gaps I missed.
June 27 is the end of the environmental assessment period.
Assuming that all comes out as we hope, then it will be
announced as the final location. Once that happens, then you
will start seeing people and resources being moved there.
General Kowalski, who's the vice commander now of Global Strike
Command, I believe is scheduled to arrive the first week and a
half of July, followed by General Klotz, the new commander, and
he is to arrive by early August. We're going to have a standup
of the command, an activation of the command, and I believe
August 7 is the planned date right now, tentatively at least. I
think you know that the initial operating capability is
scheduled for September. Come December of this year, the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) wings move over to
Global Strike Command out of Space Command, and then followed,
in February 2010, the bomber units will be moved from Air
Combat Command into Global Strike Command, with, finally, full
operating capability in September 2010. So, that's the schedule
as I know it today.
Senator Vitter. Thank you very much, and thanks for your
leadership in that important transition. Again, thanks for your
leadership of the Mighty 8th and your being part of our
military community in Louisiana. We're very proud to have you.
General Carpenter. Thank you.
Senator Vitter. Gentlemen, I share many of Senator
Sessions' concerns about some of this work toward treaties with
regard to START. I can support the concept, and I can support
the goal, I just want to make sure we do it right and don't set
deadlines or timetables or goals with PR in mind, versus
substance, and basically put politics and PR ahead of
substance.
With respect to that, I'm concerned about this schedule of
trying to get to a new START in December, when the current NPR
isn't slated to be done yet. It isn't slated to be completed
until early next year. Isn't that potentially putting the cart
before the horse? Shouldn't we have the new NPR finalized to
understand the landscape with regard to what we should agree
to, in terms of a new START?
General Alston. Senator, I'll be glad to take a first
answer there. Sir, I think the process that we have, that we
are participating in with the NPR, has been a very
collaborative process. It has been a very transparent process.
Personally, I see very talented people that are trying to work
these issues very much in earnest, very much in the open, and
the Services have been a part of this process from the
beginning. So, the dynamic that is helping work through these
issues, I think, is a very positive dynamic, so I can't comment
on assessing the pace. But, for the efforts that are underway,
there's been very good, deliberate effort, and I think the work
is moving towards a productive outcome from DOD for the
participation that the Air Force is having in this process
right now.
Senator Vitter. I appreciate that. My question is about
timing. Is it correct that that process is slated to be
finalized early next year?
General Alston. Sir, I think the NPR is supposed to be
complete by the end of this year, but clearly there's a
relationship between the analysis that is underway with the NPR
and the START activities. It's just the way the process is
working right now.
Senator Vitter. I'm not sure I understand what that means.
Let me ask it a different way. Does it make any sense to agree
to a new START product before the NPR is completed and digested
and understood, including by the START negotiators?
General Alston. Sir, I can't speak to that, I can only
speak to the Air Force role contributing to that process. The
Department would be ultimately responsible for the quality of
the NPR product.
Senator Vitter. Mr. D'Agostino, maybe that's more
appropriate for you to comment on that. It seems pretty logical
that you want to complete and digest and understand the NPR
before you agree to a new START. What's the matter with that
assumption?
Mr. D'Agostino. I think there clearly are two activities
happening. In fact, one does inform the other activity. But,
there's overlap. I think it is not unreasonable to say--there's
a lot of detail that would have to happen in the NPR that
doesn't have anything necessarily to do with START. If I can
give an example or two, it might help, examples associated with
maintenance of how we recapitalize our infrastructure, on what
pace we would recapitalize our infrastructure, the actual
different types of warheads themselves, where it depends on if
the focus on the START number--the situation is a number and an
agreement in a general direction. We can get the President,
who's already said publicly that he is looking at a lower
number than what the Moscow Treaty was and that he's interested
in certain verification measures, as well. That framework is
already established, in essence, and that provides a framework,
so you don't have to wait until the NPR is exactly done, until
the books are closed on it, because my expectation, frankly,
what we want to do in the NPR process is, in fact, fairly
accelerated.
The DOE, the NNSA, need elements of that NPR understood
before we develop our budget for fiscal years 2011 through
2015, our 5-year budget. That is a program and budget that
we're working on to get done by September of this year, so it's
an element of the NPR process that's accelerated to get to that
answer sooner so we can develop an actual program. In fact,
that's exactly what we're going to do, and that's why General
Alston described the NPR largely being completed by the
beginning of the fiscal year later on this fall, if you will,
because that's going to inform us as we develop, with DOD, our
joint programs.
So, there's certainly some parallelism going on. I can't
deny that, and I don't want to deny that. I don't want to send
that signal. But, at the same time, because we have such very
good collaborative process, frankly, and we've gone through,
already, a couple of iterations of how policy drives the force
structure and how the force structure drives the warheads,
numbers, and types, we've gone through an iteration that way.
We have some sense of where things may end up. We don't want to
give an answer right now.
Ultimately there's a negotiation piece with Russia; that's
important. So, I'm very confident, because of the transparency
and because of our desire to get that NPR largely done later
this year, so we can finish our budget preparations, because we
submit that to you, sir, in January, that we are on a very
tight path, but doable, is how I would describe it. It's not
just one finishes and then the other starts, sir.
Senator Vitter. I'm not suggesting it should be one
finishes and then the other starts. I'm suggesting it should
not be that the treaty finishes before the NPR finishes.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, I understand.
Senator Vitter. Do you understand the difference? I'm not
saying the NPR has to finish before treaty discussions start,
but it does seem a little odd for the detailed treaty
negotiations potentially to finish before the NPR is finished.
What am I missing?
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me interject, here. I think
there's an element of this that the NPR discussions will inform
the START negotiations, and the box that they find themselves
in, that neither the Russians nor the Americans want this START
extended. Under the terms of the treaty, it can only be
extended for 5 years. Five years only. It can't be extended 1
year, it can't be extended 10 years. It can only be extended 5
years. So, the expectation may well be, according to the
implication of your question, which I think is right on the
money, is that these negotiations own what may end up being
several treaties will be informed by the NPR discussions. Is
that in the ballpark, Mr. D'Agostino?
Mr. D'Agostino. That's my understanding, sir. I'm not an
expert on the extension parts of the treaties, frankly, but
that is, in essence--we can be informed enough by the work
we've actually done to date on the NPR to start on the treaty
discussions. Details do matter.
Senator Vitter. Start. But my question is about the
finishing of the treaty discussions before you finish the NPR.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your comment, and you make some very
good points. But, forgive me, as a recovering lawyer, the first
thing I would say is, I don't care what the current START says.
You can sign a new treaty that's the same as the old one, with
one comma missing, and it can last 6 months if you want to, if
that's the smart thing to do, and it can be a new treaty that
can just bridge to the next treaty, if that is the right thing
to do, substantively. My only suggestion is, let's put
substance first, whatever that is.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Vitter. I have a similar question about the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Now, I have to say, right
off, my impulse about that is a lot different from START, which
is--I questioned the whole premise of the soundness of the
CTBT. But, Secretary Gates has said that, without testing, it
will, ``become impossible to keep extending the life of our
arsenal.'' Given that, do you think any consideration--
ratification of a CTBT should be preceded by plans for a new
redesigned and more reliable warhead?
Mr. D'Agostino. Sir, I would look at the question. I'm
going to answer your question, but I would say, for the last
13-plus years--or longer than that, frankly, 16 years--we have
been operating, in effect, without underground testing, as a
matter of policy. So, we have a program, a Stockpile
Stewardship Program, designed to take a deep look inside our
warheads, do an annual assessment.
In an earlier question, Chairman Nelson asked about beefing
up our peer-review process to make sure that we can do that. I
am comfortable that, with what I could call a sustainable
effort on science, a sustainable effort on the facilities that
are required that the country is going to need, and a
sustainable effort on modernization activity for our stockpile,
that we can maintain the stockpile well on out into the future,
without underground testing. I would add that that's one
element of the CTBT discussion, sir, that the Senate will be
looking at, I'm sure. Another element, of course, is the
verification questions, which are fairly complicated, deal with
seismic issues and being able to find out what the rest of the
world is doing.
The one comment I would like to make on that is, the same
people that maintain our current stockpile and that we need to
beef up, if you will, over the next few years, are the exact
same people that do the intelligence analysis, the seismic
analysis, as well. So, having a NNSA infrastructure that is
taken care of out into the future is going to be an important
part of a CTBT. That's the piece I'm going to make sure I
communicate very clearly in this administration. That is my
job, sir.
Senator Vitter. Okay. I take it from what you said that you
just disagree with Secretary Gates that it will ``become
impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal,'' without
testing.
Mr. D'Agostino. That's if we just leave the arsenal the way
it is. In other words, to just do the day-to-day maintenance, I
would agree with the Secretary, if we do what I would call the
life-extension approach, which is a reuse or replacement
approach--and I think this is where Secretary Gates was going,
in effect, was modernizing, driving more reliable performance
margins in there so we're sure we don't have to test--then my
view is that we can do that in a nontesting future.
Senator Vitter. I just want to make clear, his comment was
not about that, it was about testing. He said, ``Without
testing, we won't have this.'' You're disagreeing with that,
correct?
Mr. D'Agostino. I don't know the context of Mr. Gates's
statement, so I think we are actually agreeing that if I can't
modernize the stockpile, we're going to find ourselves where
every year we're getting closer and closer to the point where
the scientists and engineers in my organization--they're going
to get to a point that say, Mr. President or Mr. Secretary,
first, and then we tell the President, we're facing a moment of
truth here with respect to testing, but we believe, in DOE or
in the NNSA, that an integrated program of fixing the
infrastructure, of working on the stockpile, and modernizing
pieces of it, together with a science program to back it up,
can take care of our nuclear deterrent out into the future
indefinitely without testing.
Senator Vitter. I will try to get that full context to you.
But, my understanding is, he wasn't talking about this, he was
talking about testing. Without testing, we can't do this. But,
I will get that.
Mr. D'Agostino. I would love to come back on that.
Senator Bill Nelson. I would be surprised, Senator Vitter,
if it were said in that isolated context, because I've had
lengthy discussions with General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, on this very issue, and I think he has
every confidence to feel that, with the appropriate
modernization program, that we can have the reliability we have
to have. That's my impression.
Senator Vitter. I will get that context to you and follow
up on the discussion.
Mr. D'Agostino. I would love to do that.
Senator, I'd appreciate that.
Senator Vitter. Admiral, if I can ask you--and thank you
for your visit yesterday; I enjoyed that very much--the fiscal
year 2010 budget continues funding for the next-generation
follow-on to the Ohio-class SSBN. Can you discuss the Navy's
current plans for that next generation, and steps, in
particular, that have been taken early on to try to ensure we
don't experience cost overruns or scheduling delays?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. This budget includes a request
for $495 million to begin the work for the replacement of the
Ohio class. The Ohio class is tremendously capable submarine
today. It has no particular shortcomings. This request is based
on the end of service life of that ship, which has been
extended to 40 operational years. This is an on-time--it's not
early, it's not late--it's an on-time start for the engineering
and the research and development work to support and start
construction in 2019. It's also on time with respect to the
industrial base, and it's timed well to support our ally the
United Kingdom. The work that we're doing early is concept work
and missile launcher development prototype work, and it can be
guided by the decisions of the NPR and the other events we talk
about. I think it is well-timed to accommodate all the work
that is going forward. It includes the early propulsion work
for a ship of that size.
Senator Vitter. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to take your previous question
and now ask that of the Admiral. How can you start the design
of the new submarine if you don't know the outcome of the NPR?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. The very early work is concept
work, layout, and qualification of vendors. In the case of the
Ohio class, the youngest of the Ohio class is the Louisiana,
delivered in 1996, so we have been out of production of large,
heavy missile tubes and the launching equipment for about 25
years. So, this early work is a combination of laying out how
we will make that part of the submarine acoustically quiet, and
other characteristics because, of course, we have very quiet
attack submarines, but they do not have a missile compartment.
It will be assessing how to do design and build that part of
the ship, the missile compartment, with the same labor-saving
techniques that we used on the attack submarines, in that
section of the ship that we have not looked at in our Navy for
almost 40 years.
So, the exact number of tubes, the exact number or
dimensions of those tubes, the exact speeds, none of those
things need to be known in the first year of concept and
research and development. Instead, we do things like we find a
vendor capable of doing a missile hatch of that size out of the
type of materials that we need to do--a core test article,
which is representative, but not identical--and then
destructively test it to make sure that vendor can give us a
device or a hatch without flaw.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston, the same question. How
can you design a future airplane without knowing the results of
the NPR?
General Alston. Sir, we won't do that. The follow-on bomber
requirements--we heard the Secretary of Defense loud and clear,
in terms of our requirement to improve and take a harder look
at the requirements that we had already posited, as well as the
technology that would be available at the time that we need
this penetrating platform to be available. This platform would
be informed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), probably
even more so than the NPR, but we do see linkages between both
of those examinations, and we think that we will be better
informed as the QDR and the NPR analysis continues. So, we
think there's a strong relationship between the two studies,
and the outcome of that, with a better set of requirements for
that platform in the future.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is the B-1 bomber going to be part of
the Global Strike Command?
General Alston. No, sir, it's not. It's a conventional-only
platform, and that will remain in the Air Combat Command.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did you have a question, Senator
Vitter?
Senator Vitter. I just have one followup.
Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead.
Senator Vitter. I just wanted to follow up on the Senator's
line.
Admiral, I take it from what you're saying, you would
never, for instance, finish design of a submarine before the
NPR was finished.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Senator Vitter. General, similarly, you would never finish
design of a new aircraft before this NPR is finished.
General Alston. No, sir.
Senator Vitter. I was just suggesting, earlier, that
logically it seems pretty clear to me we shouldn't finish a new
START before the NPR is finished. That was my earlier point.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Carpenter, from an operational
perspective of the 8th Air Force, what are your plans to
balance the conventional and nuclear excellence of the bomber
force?
General Carpenter. Sir, we've been doing that for a long
time, ever since we took on the conventional mission in full
force, starting around the Operation Desert Storm timeframe,
but with the recent issues with the nuclear mission, obviously
we've put a lot more focus on the nuclear side, and we designed
the global deterrent force to address that issue. But, we've
put a wing in the bucket, if you will, for the nuclear mission,
and they stayed there for a whole year. So, while Minot Air
Force Base is in North Dakota, the 2nd Bomber Wing at Barksdale
is focused on the nuclear mission. So, we have that balance
now.
The 4th Squadron becomes a big issue now. When we stand up
the 4th Squadron at Minot, it fills out that force, so we have
enough force structure to separate that mission as we can.
So, while neither are always exclusively focused, we always
have to keep the nuclear certification, the crews ready to go,
and the nuclear and on the conventional side, both, but the
focus shifts from day-to-day, or from year-to-year, if you
will. So, while the Global Deterrent Force, 2nd Bomber Wing
right now--or, I'm sorry--and I got that backwards--2nd Bomber
Wing is in Guam today, and Minot is in the Global Deterrent
Force, kind of really focused on the nuclear mission, and that
swaps back and forth. The B-2s don't have the luxury of having
two separate wings, but they have two separate squadrons. So,
those two squadrons rotate back and forth, as well, where one
is always assigned the Global Deterrent Force mission, and they
focus, primarily at least, on the nuclear mission. When they do
the training, they really go out and focus on the nuclear side.
Then, the other squadron is the conventional role. So, we're
able to do that with the force structure we have today.
General Alston. Sir, I just might add that, to the credit
of 8th Air Force and General Elder and now General Carpenter,
all three of our bomber wings have undergone no-notice nuclear
surety inspections and have all passed those inspections. Those
are exceptionally rigorous tests of nuclear requirements, and
so, we are showing some positive results in that regard.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Now, we're expecting B-52s
and B-2s to take us all the way through 2030. Are we going to
be able to sustain their viability?
General Alston. Yes, sir, we will. I would ask General
Carpenter to comment on this, as well, but first let me just
say that the B-52 has a lot of life left in it, and we have
plans in place to ensure its vitality in both the nuclear and
conventional roles into the out-years. The B-2 ultimately will
be facing threats that will exceed its capability as a
penetrating platform; hence, the reason that we believe we need
a penetrating platform to take on that responsibility when the
B-2 may no longer be as effective at that role as we believe it
is today.
General Carpenter. I would agree, sir. The great programs
we have in place now, with the radar programs and all three
bomber platforms--the B-2 specifically, and the B-52 on the
books, and the B-1, as well, and the communications upgrades we
have planned for all those platforms--it will take them well
into the 2040 timeframe. So, yes, sir, we can sustain those
weapon systems.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston, you've had to work
overtime to straighten out the loose nukes and all of that.
Have you got it under control?
General Alston. Sir, we absolutely have it under control.
As you may know, I came into my Pentagon tour about 21 months
ago, which happened to coincide within days of the challenge
that we had with the unauthorized munitions transfer. So, I've
been personally focused on this through this entire assignment.
My responsibilities have shifted, and right now, as a
consequence of Secretary Donley's and the Chief of Staff,
General Schwartz's, decision last fall, I work directly for the
Chief of Staff now in my responsibilities, on their behalf.
Their personal leadership drove us to prepare a roadmap that we
published last fall to set the course, with six principal
strategic objectives to help the institution focus better and
achieve the outcomes that we are starting to achieve at this
time.
General Carpenter's folks and our other deployed
commanders, with a lot of very aggressive personal leadership,
are ensuring the success that we have today. But, we need to
move forward with the personnel development changes that we
have underway. We're bringing an additional 2,500 people into
the nuclear mission over the course of this next year.
General Chilton has pointed out in previous Defense Science
Board studies, there has been an erosion of nuclear deterrence
skills. So, the people component of our effort will continue to
require the kind of vigilance and focus that we have in motion
right now, and I believe it will take several more years before
we feel that we have completely overcome some of the skill
challenges we have.
But, we have aggressive inspection programs, we have 100
percent oversight of all of our inspections. We've changed the
Air Force corporate structure to have a dedicated nuclear
operations panel. This is going to ensure a very thorough
vetting of nuclear-related requirements so that they compete
well for Air Force resources. Air Force leadership intervention
has ensured very good resourcing of the nuclear mission at this
time. So that's a thumbnail of the number of programs that we
have underway that is fulfilling the Chief and Secretary's
establishment of reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise as the
Air Force's number-one priority in the strategic plan.
Senator Bill Nelson. Part of our labs need to help out the
intelligence community to support the analysis of foreign
nuclear capabilities. There's no funding in your budget for
2010 in the NNSA fiscal year 2010 budget request. Are you going
to be needing funding for this, coming up in the future?
Mr. D'Agostino. For intelligence analysis, sir?
Senator Bill Nelson. For analysis of foreign nuclear
capabilities and the proliferation challenges.
Mr. D'Agostino. In a way, the intelligence funding request
comes through another part of the Department, not through the
NNSA. But, what I would say, with respect to your question, the
funding that we do--the same people that do this intelligence
analysis are the same people that are either experienced
weapons designers, people that understand the physics behind
how to understand timers, special detonator devices--these are
the same people that we start off with in the NNSA. Ultimately,
as they go through our program, they can shift to other
divisions in the laboratory. So, Z Division, for example, at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, funded through the
intelligence program, essentially contained people that started
off in my program in the NNSA.
So, the funding that I have ultimately supports
intelligence, but in an indirect way, by exercising the
capabilities, by getting these folks exercised, not only
experiments, but having this design experiment.
That essentially goes to the previous questions we talked
about, is, are we sustainable, in the long term? That is why I
want to get the science and the infrastructure pieces
essentially on the right track.
We've turned it around in this budget. We've shifted $130
million back into the science area, for this very reason. My
view is, in the out-years we'll ultimately need more, and that
will be, ultimately, my job within the administration, to work
this problem in the out-years.
Senator Bill Nelson. You're going out to outside financing
for a number of the buildings that you need. Why wouldn't you
ask for a government line item?
Mr. D'Agostino. I'll go. For an example, one of the
facilities you probably allude to, sir, is our Kansas City
project. That is a General Services Administration project.
There are a couple of reasons, but let me focus on one that is
particularly attractive to me as we look at transforming
ourselves from a kind of a Cold War nuclear weapons complex
into a 21st-century nuclear security enterprise, and that is, I
don't know what the future brings with respect to unclassified
parts that the Kansas City plan may need to make. We may find,
as a result of our modernization efforts, that we can reduce
the number or the complexity of these non-nuclear parts and
find ourselves much more efficient, 20 years from now, if you
will, from being able to make those parts at our laboratories.
There's a certain attractiveness that I find in driving
efficiency in the program if I have a 20-year lease that is
approved, of course, appropriately--there's a financial
payback, in this case, of $100 million a year that has been
audited, we believe--but being able to say, 20 years from now,
I'm not building a facility that the Nation does not need way
out into the future. So, from my standpoint, there's a certain
attractiveness in being able to say, 20 years from now, turning
that manufacturing facility back over to the developer, and not
having to worry about maintaining the structure out on the
taxpayers' burdens.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let's talk about Los Alamos and Y-12.
That's where the problems are. Tell us about that.
Mr. D'Agostino. Los Alamos has a proposal that I have not
approved yet. It's a proposal, right now, for a science
complex. It's a proposal that we agree that we need to get
people out of trailers at the laboratory. These are our world-
class scientists, and yet, we have them in facilities, frankly,
that I'd be embarrassed to have any of these folks go into. So
the laboratory is looking at--and we agree that there's a need,
but now we're in the process of examining--should it be a
third-party-financed facility, should it be a line-item
facility, do the numbers work, does the analysis come through?
General Harencak, who's with me, who's running defense
programs--I talked to him this morning, frankly, about, where
are we on our third-party-financed projects? He's looking at
this--DOD calls it an alternative analysis. What are our
options with respect to acquisition? Doing what we need for our
scientists.
One thing that's clear to me, though, is, for facilities
that are--we have to be very careful about employing this
technique. For one thing, it has to be done judiciously.
Obviously, it has to make a lot of sense, financially, for the
taxpayers. Obviously, it can't put us in the position where we
have to be moving large fences around and having pockets of
uncleared spaces, because, ultimately, if the country decides
it doesn't need it anymore, then we turn it back over to the
developer, and then we have an issue of fencelines and the
like.
Senator Bill Nelson. The lease would probably provide that,
if you can't fill it up with the government activities, that
they could lease it on their own.
Mr. D'Agostino. If the government walks away from the
lease, and each arrangement is, in effect, different.
Certainly----
Senator Bill Nelson. But, let me just cut to the chase.
Theoretically you wouldn't have the space leased; they
could lease the space. You'd be inside the fence.
Mr. D'Agostino. Theoretically, if we ended up that way,
yes, sir. Theoretically, yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. You have to watch that.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Bill Nelson. We had some very serious problems at
Air Force bases, on Air Force housing, with the result that,
inside the fence, at the Air Force base, you could have private
housing, because the housing could be rented to non-Air Force
personnel. Now, there's a pecking order that they would have to
go through, but, theoretically, at the bottom of the pecking
order, you could have somebody just off the street renting a
house inside an Air Force base. That's what our present
condition is. So, we don't want that, especially when you start
fooling around with facilities in your line of work.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center,
an accelerator facility that produces protons for a variety of
scientific and weapons research, was supposed to have an
upgrade beginning in fiscal year 2010, but the upgrade was not
funded. Is this upgrade necessary to maintain nuclear weapons?
Mr. D'Agostino. Sir, the facility is definitely necessary
to maintain our stockpile. The upgrade reduces the risk that
the facility will not--reduces the risk. We want the facility,
of course, online to support our deterrent out into the future.
So, the upgrades approach was to take away a fair amount of
risk associated with the facility going down. You're right,
sir, first of all, we continue to operate that facility. Second
of all, you're absolutely right, we need it for neutron cross-
section measurement for doing material science, nuclear
science.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. So, you're saying you need it.
So, what happens to the facility without the upgrade?
Mr. D'Agostino. What happens without the upgrade is
increased risk associated with operations. It's a fairly old
facility. It's something that I believe is an important part of
maintaining a deterrent and maintaining a laboratory, quite
frankly, that can attract scientists that want to work in
material science and in nuclear science.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. How much will the full
upgrade cost, and how long will it take?
Mr. D'Agostino. I'll give you a sense, sir, but I would
like to take that for the record, if I could.
There's rough numbers of $150 to $200 million or so, as
preconceptual design activities, but I don't have the
particulars. If I could take that for the record, I will
provide the answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center refurbishment project would
replace major components of the accelerator and accelerator control
system that are required to maintain reliable operations and extend the
life, but would not alter the design capability or capacity. The cost
is currently estimated at $149 million, and the project could be
completed within a few years of receiving full funding. This estimated
cost places the project within the oversight guidelines of the
Department of Energy order for project management. This order requires
the cost for a project of this size to be validated; therefore, it is
possible this estimate could fluctuate.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have a guess on how long?
Mr. D'Agostino. Multiple years. It's not a 2-year activity.
It's probably 3 to 5 years, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask each of you, were your top
five unfunded priorities--if funds were available, what would
your top five be?
Admiral Johnson. Sir, I would like to take that question
for the record, if I may.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. So, you have to counsel up the
chain of command?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
General Alston. Sir, the Air Force would have to do the
same. We would like to take that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Admiral Johnson. The President's budget represents the best balance
of resources to requirements. The Chief of Naval Operations' top
unfunded priorities includes SSP's considerations and represents the
top priorities of the Navy if additional funding should become
available.
General Alston. Currently we have identified only one unfunded
strategic deterrence-related requirement for fiscal year 2010, the B-52
1760 Data Bus Internal Weapons Bay programs, which is on the unfunded
requirements list submitted by the Chief of Staff on 18 May 09. The B-
52 1760 Weapons Bay unfunded requirement totals $30.6 million which
funds modification of the bay to add internal carriage capability for
smart weapons and overall bomb-load capacity on the B-52. We will
continue to identify areas requiring additional funding, and develop
strategies to meet all combatant commanders' requirements.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you want to take a stab at it?
[Laughter.]
Mr. D'Agostino. I'd like to provide the details for the
record, but what I would like to iterate--and I can give you
my--three broad priorities, are----
Senator Bill Nelson. Modernization?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. Modernization. It's the science
and the infrastructure that need to do that. But, we'll take
the question for the record, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Our top five unfunded priorities, if funds were available,
would be to: (1) fully satisfy our Directed Stockpile Work
program of work, including targeted life extensions for the
weapon systems which support the Navy and Strategic Command
needs and meet our extended deterrent obligations to our
allies; (2) protect, replenish, and sustain the science,
technology, and engineering capabilities required to leverage
the Nation's significant investment in science-based tools to
assess the state of the stockpile and certify it's safety,
security, and reliability; (3) recapitalize our Cold War
infrastructure so that our special nuclear materials (plutonium
and uranium) processing capability is assured for the unknown
future, including actions that will greatly reduce the size of
the complex and reduce our security costs; (4) begin work on
specific projects in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative
that will help achieve some of the goals in the President's
speech in Prague; and, (5) support International Materials
Protection and Cooperation activities to reduce special nuclear
material inventories through down-blending, and initiate
activities to upgrade security in countries outside of the
Former Soviet Union.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
Thank you all very much. The record will be kept open for 3
days.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE
1. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston, are there any authorities
that you need or that your successor will need to fully manage,
oversee, and coordinate the Air Force nuclear enterprise?
General Alston. I am confident we have the requisite authorities
and structure in place to ensure enduring stewardship, manage, oversee,
and coordinate the Air Force nuclear enterprise. The establishment of
AF/A10 sends a clear and visible signal that the Air Force is committed
to resolving the fragmented lines of authority across all levels of the
nuclear enterprise and provides a headquarters Assistant Chief of Staff
that reports directly to the Chief of Staff with authority to drive
nuclear enterprise policy, guidance, requirements, and advocacy across
the Air Staff. I am the single Air Staff authority for all nuclear-
related issues and have lead responsibility for nuclear operations,
plans, policy, and requirements.
INSPECTIONS
2. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston and Admiral Johnson, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) also has a role in conducting
inspections at nuclear facilities. How are the DTRA inspections
coordinated with the service inspections, what do the DTRA inspections
cover that the service inspections do not, and what is the benefit from
each type?
General Alston. DTRA inspects Air Force nuclear certified units in
accordance with T.O. 11N-25-1, Department of Defense (DOD) Nuclear
Weapons Technical Inspection System. These inspections are coordinated
with the Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) and the appropriate nuclear
major command. DTRA inspections encompass those criteria established in
T.O. 11N-25-1. The Air Force inspects using the same guidance, as well
as that contained in AFI 90-201, Inspector General Activities, and
major command specific supplemental guidance. Additionally, AFIA
conducts independent oversight of Air Force nuclear surety inspections.
DTRA inspections allow for an independent assessment, validation, and/
or oversight of DOD nuclear weapon surety for the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Air Force inspections, in line with their supplemental
guidance, validate mission readiness as well as nuclear weapon surety
for the major command commander and the Secretary of the Air Force.
Admiral Johnson. There are two types of DTRA inspections associated
with Navy nuclear weapons certified units. A Defense Nuclear Surety
Inspection (DNSI) is conducted on a not-to-exceed 5-year basis for each
certified unit. DTRA is also tasked to conduct Surveillance Inspections
(SI) that involve DTRA inspection team members providing an over-the-
shoulder assessment of the Navy's inspection team performance during a
scheduled service Navy Technical Proficiency Inspection (NTPI).
DTRA inspections of Navy nuclear weapons units are coordinated
annually through direct liaison with the organizations responsible for
Navy inspections. DTRA coordinates inspection scheduling of Navy afloat
units with the type commanders for submarine inspections and with SSP
for Strategic Weapons Facility inspections.
DTRA inspections evaluate the 10 areas directed by the Joint Staff
(JS) approved Special Weapons Ordnance Publication 25-1 which includes
Management and Administration; Technical Operations; Tool, Test,
Tiedown, and Handling Equipment; Condition of Stockpile; Storage and
Maintenance Facilities; Security, Safety, Supply Support; Nuclear
Weapon Personnel Reliability Program; and Logistics Movement. A NTPI
covers an additional four areas which include Nuclear Weapons
Radiological Controls; Radiation Health; Command and Control; and
Nuclear Weapons Accident/Incident procedures.
The benefit of DNSI is subjective and has been called into question
by recent DOD level reports: Defense Science Board Report of Nuclear
Surety Inspections, Schlesinger Commission Report, and others.
3. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston and Admiral Johnson, do you
see any use in joint Air Force-Navy inspections? Would joint
inspections address, among things, the shortage of skilled inspectors?
General Alston. The Air Force fully supports the current joint
inspection process performed by DTRA. Any new joint inspection
requirement for Air Force personnel would have limited applicability
due to Service-specific mission requirements and weapon systems.
Admiral Johnson. Joint inspections occur today in the form of DTAR
DNSI.
Variations exist in technical operations and weapons system
facility design between Air Force and Navy. A more consistent Office of
Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Navy/Air Force criteria for inspection will
better support a more streamlined DNSI process in the future.
BOMBERS AND GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
4. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston and General Carpenter, the
new Global Strike Command, which will stand up at the end of the year,
will eventually have responsibility for the B-52 and B-2 aircraft. It
will not have responsibility for the B-1 aircraft. While I understand
that the B-1 is no longer nuclear capable, on many occasions we have
been told that the new Global Strike Command is not a reincarnation of
the old Strategic Air Command and is not ``nuclear command''. In any
event, the majority of the B-1, B-2, and B-52 sorties is, and will
continue to be, conventional. I would like to get your personal and
professional views on whether the B-1 should or should not be part of
the new command and why?
General Alston and General Carpenter. The Air Force is reversing
the trend of declining nuclear mission focus and erosion of nuclear
expertise. One of the root causes of this trend was fragmented lines of
authority and responsibility of our nuclear forces. Global Strike
Command was created to align all nuclear forces under a single command
and demonstrate full commitment to the global strike mission.
While our primary focus is on reinvigorating the nuclear
enterprise, we do realize there is a vital conventional mission for our
B-52s and B-2s that must not be compromised. The B-1 is currently being
used as a combat support aircraft in today's operations, and related
organize, train, and equip responsibilities will be retained by Air
Combat Command. Additionally, Global Strike Command will provide the
necessary leadership and focus to effectively balance the nuclear and
conventional missions of the B-2s and B-52s to ensure they are ready to
support the warfighter when called upon by combatant commanders.
LOS ALAMOS NEUTRON SCIENCE CENTER
5. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the Los Alamos Neutron
Science Center (LANSCE), an accelerator facility that produces protons
for a variety of scientific and weapons research, was supposed to have
an upgrade beginning in fiscal year 2010, but the upgrade was not
funded. Is the LANSCE upgrade necessary to maintain nuclear weapons?
Mr. D'Agostino. The LANSCE facility is currently used to conduct
experiments to answer specific stockpile-relevant questions, the
answers to which are required to improve the science-based tools which
allow certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile without resorting
to underground nuclear testing. Those experiments include precision
measurements of nuclear data on special materials important to nuclear
weapons performance, classified experiments, and experiments utilizing
high explosives and proton radiography. The weapons program requires
data from LANSCE. The loss of the data from LANSCE would seriously
affect our ability to improve our stockpile stewardship tools and
therefore our capability to maintain the stockpile without testing.
Unfortunately, the LANSCE accelerator facility has not received
adequate preventive maintenance for years. Many of its components are
long past their expected lifetimes and spares are in short supply. In
the opinion of experts, the accelerator is ``running to failure.'' The
failure of any one of the major components could result in a loss of
continued operation of the facility for an extended period. The
probability of a failure grows each year without refurbishment; yet
other funding priorities within funding constraints have required that
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) continues to absorb
this risk. It was a Presidential initiative to cancel the original
LANSCE refurbishment partly because we acknowledged that cheaper
approaches to ameliorate these problems were available. These are now
under consideration.
6. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, what happens to the LANSCE
facility without the upgrade?
Mr. D'Agostino. It isn't really possible to know how long the
accelerator will be able to operate without refurbishment. All of the
individual components are in principle repairable indefinitely, but in
practice, we expect that the reliability of the facility will continue
to decay without further investment. Without the refurbishment, we are
accepting increased risk of major component failures affecting
continued operations and increasingly large downtime.
7. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, how much would the full
upgrade cost and how long would it take to complete?
Mr. D'Agostino. The LANSCE refurbishment project would replace
major components of the accelerator and accelerator control system that
are required to maintain reliabe operations and extend the life, but
would not alter the design capability or capacity. The cost is
currently estimated at about $150 million, and the project could be
completed within a few years of receiving full funding. This estimated
cost places the project within the oversight guidelines of the
Department of Energy order for project management. This order requires
the cost for a project of this size to be validated; therefore, it is
possible this estimate could fluctuate.
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION REORGANIZATION
8. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the Strategic Posture
Commission made several recommendations with respect to the
organization of the NNSA. One in particular was focused on the
regulatory environment. It appears that there might have been some
confusion on the part of the Commission with respect to the role of the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), which is not a
regulatory body, when they suggested that the nuclear weapons complex
be regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rather than the
DNFSB. Have you looked at the cost and the impact of having the nuclear
weapons complex regulated by the NRC in lieu of the self-regulation
that is in place today?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA has considered the impact of having the
weapons complex regulated by the NRC in lieu of self regulation. We
have not evaluated the cost impact of NRC regulation as opposed to
self-regulation; however, there are several reasons that continued
self-regulation is advisable.
The first is that self-regulation has demonstrated an enviable
nuclear safety record. Although the Commission was critical of our
treatment of requirements, it did not question the safety of our
operations.
The second is that self-regulation permits the operational
flexibility we need with respect to nuclear safety requirements to
ensure we meet our mission. Following recommendations from the Colombia
Accident Investigation and those of the DNFSB, we have established a
Central Technical Authority and associated safety infrastructure to
evaluate and concur on requests for relief from nuclear safety
requirements where appropriate. Since September 2005, we have received
and evaluated 20 requests for related exemptions. Only two were
ultimately denied. Our streamlined evaluation process allows a quick
turnaround where warranted, and exemptions have been concurred on in
less than a day from receipt. Such responsiveness would not be possible
with external regulation. Our demonstrated ability to grant relief
where warranted provides effective control over the requirements under
which we operate.
Finally, external regulation would not relieve NNSA from the need
to oversee nuclear safety. Most of our nuclear facilities are unique
and provide products and services that are vital to our mission and
that cannot be obtained elsewhere. In addition to possible damage to
personnel, public, and the environment, a serious accident in one of
our facilities would result in a loss of capability that would
jeopardize our mission. If a public power utility has an accident,
power can be obtained at a higher cost from other utilities. The same
is not true for our operations. If our plutonium facility (for example)
shuts down there is no replacement for the lost services and our
mission is crippled. The same is true of most of our facilities. Thus,
from a business perspective, our mission responsibilities require us to
ensure that our nuclear facilities are operated safely. External
regulation would result in more oversight, not less. These and similar
considerations have led us to conclude that it is best if NNSA
continues to self-regulate.
TRIDENT D-5 MISSILES
9. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Johnson, the Navy is moving towards
more fixed-price type contracts to purchase the D-5 ballistic missile,
which is used on the Trident ballistic missile submarine. In making
this transition what are the issues that concern you most?
Admiral Johnson. SSP recognizes the potential value of using fixed-
price type contracts for mature production efforts and has committed to
transition to the use of such contracts beginning in fiscal year 2011,
where appropriate. As we make this transition there are several issues
that concern us.
First, there is a concern that the contractor may be motivated to
make cost, performance, and safety tradeoffs that might not be in the
best interest of the program or the Nation. Through the years, SSP has
developed and implemented an acquisition strategy that maintains a
primary focus on safety and reliability, while managing cost risk at or
below budget. Because of the strategic importance of the system, any
deviation from this successful acquisition strategy could engender
unintended consequences that could impact the safety and reliability of
the weapon. SSP will closely monitor contractor performance to ensure
we maintain the optimal balance between contractor assumption of
significant cost risk and managing an acceptable level of technical
risk.
Our second concern is maintaining the affordability of the system.
While Trident II (D5) is a mature production program, the nature of the
technical requirements leads to a program that still contains
significant risk. The technical requirements of the D5 missile are
unique in many respects. The volume limitation of the launch tubes
combined with the stringent range performance requirements dictate the
need for high energy class 1.1 propellants in the rocket motors. This
technology is unique to the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
systems, and is not otherwise supported by other DOD or commercial
(space) applications. A similar situation exists for the Trident Post
Boost Control System components. Driven by the requirement for a
Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle capability and the
submarine safety requirements of using solid propellants, the designs,
materials, and processes are unique to the SLBM system and are not
supported by other government or commercial applications. Additionally,
the electronics designs are driven by the need for radiation hardened
components capable of performing in hostile environments. These unique
requirements combined with very low production rates driven by budget
constraints result in an increasingly fragile supplier base which
requires constant management and oversight by the prime contractors to
ensure a continuous supply of safe, reliable components. The ever
present potential for complex, expensive efforts to requalify
substitutes for legacy technologies and loss of suppliers represents
significant cost risk along with the attendant technical risk which, in
a fixed-price environment, would inevitably result in higher prime
contractor cost proposals.
Finally, we are concerned about the potential degradation of the
open communication between SSP and its prime contractors. The success
of the Trident program is due in no small measure to the cooperative
government/contractor partnership developed over the past 50 years.
When potential problems are identified they are discussed openly and
solutions are developed through a collaborative effort. In a fixed-
price environment, our contractors may be more motivated to
unilaterally increase technical risk in an effort to save costs. This
incremental increase in program risk may not be immediately apparent,
but could lead to a cumulative unacceptable level of risk in the
program.
HELICOPTERS FOR THE ICBM FIELDS
10. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston, for years the Air Force
has been searching for replacement helicopters for use in the ICBM
fields. In your prepared statement you are introducing a program to
replace the old, Vietnam-era helicopters. What is the new program and
what is the fiscal year 2010 funding?
General Alston. The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP)
program will replace the existing 39 year old UH-1N helicopter fleet.
CVLSP will provide vertical lift support for a number of missions
including: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) nuclear weapon
convoy escort, ICBM emergency security response, and National Capitol
Region emergency response support. The UH-1N has deficiencies in
carrying capacity, speed, range, endurance, and survivability for
meeting mission requirements.
The fiscal year 2010 budget requests $9.5 million of RDT&E for the
CVLSP program. This funding supports development of statutory and
regulatory acquisition documentation along with activities to support a
request for proposal and source selection.
MISSILE AND COMPONENT TESTING
11. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, General Alston, and
Admiral Johnson, the Services and NNSA work together to establish and
conduct a minimum number of missile and component tests to ensure
reliability. Most years there are not enough tests to meet the minimum
standards. What is the minimum number of tests, including the number of
joint test assemblies (JTAs), that are needed in fiscal year 2010 and
are all of these tests funded? If not, why not?
Mr. D'Agostino. Each weapon system has a testing plan that will
feed the reliability model so a proper reliability assessment can be
made. The number and type of tests for each weapon system varies every
year based upon trends that are discovered and data gaps from previous
years. NNSA accomplishes system, component, material, margin, aging,
and flight tests as well as performing modeling and simulation
programs. Joint flight testing with the DOD has the highest priority
within the surveillance and assessment program. There are currently 19
joint flight tests planned for fiscal year 2010. All are fully funded.
While additional laboratory tests would certainly enhance our
confidence in the stockpile, NNSA must also prioritize this testing and
assessment work against all of the other NNSA workload to maximize the
benefit of the budget allocation.
General Alston. Reliability testing involves both the delivery
system and the warhead or bomb. DOD's portion of weapon system
reliability is computed using the delivery system reliability combined
with the weapon's or bomb's reliability. Warhead and bomb reliability
testing requirements are NNSA's responsibility, with the number of
associated JTAs determined in consultation with the Services.
A minimum of four ICBM tests, all using JTAs, are required to
determine weapon system reliability. The Air Force conducts
approximately one test every 4 months, resulting in a 16-month cycle to
determine weapon system reliability. This frequency meets the minimum
requirement for nuclear weapons planning activities.
A minimum of eight gravity weapon tests per year (five strategic
and three non-strategic), all using JTAs, are required to determine
reliability.
A minimum of eight Air Launched Cruise Missile tests per year,
three using JTAs, are required to determine reliability.
In total, the Air Force has 19 fully funded reliability tests
scheduled in fiscal year 2010, 14 of which will also contribute to
warhead reliability testing, requiring NNSA support with JTAs.
Admiral Johnson. Reliability is determined by a combination of
flight test and ground test activities. The Navy performs four Trident
II Follow-on Commander Evaluation Tests to validate that the weapons
system continues its demonstrated performance in terms of reliability
and accuracy as required by U.S. Strategic Command Instruction 526-1.
Within the Navy flight test program, we fly four test heads (three NNSA
JTAs and one Navy Enhanced Navy Test Bed) per weapon type to maintain
reliability of Navy/NNSA components. These flight tests and hardware
are funded in the President's budget request. The Navy requirement for
ground test evaluation is 11 warheads per year to be disassembled,
tested, and 10 reassembled into war reserve units. The Navy portion of
the cost of this testing is in the President's budget, the NNSA portion
should be in the NNSA budget.
B-2
12. Senator Bill Nelson. General Carpenter, the B-2 budget request
for fiscal year 2010 includes $16.8 million to integrate the Massive
Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) on the B-2. Has DTRA completed the MOP
development program?
General Carpenter. No, the DTRA technology demonstration is
scheduled to complete in calendar year 2009. The MOP is being developed
in three phases. Phase I (Concept Refinement) and Phase II (Design and
Preliminary Testing) have been successfully completed. Phase III,
Weapon Performance Demonstration, is underway and will culminate with
MOP research and development flight tests from a B-52 aircraft.
B-2 integration efforts are occurring concurrently with the DTRA
effort and will culminate with final hardware buildup and testing
during the Air Force program.
13. Senator Bill Nelson. General Carpenter, what is the capability
and purpose of the MOP and why is it being integrated on the B-2?
General Carpenter. MOP will provide the B-2 with a capability to
defeat very hard and deeply buried targets such as deep bunkers and
tunnel facilities. MOP is designed to improve weapon survivability,
lethality, and penetration compared to existing Air Force penetrator
weapons.
The purpose of MOP technology demonstration program is to
demonstrate the survivability, lethality, and penetration of a 30,000-
lb. class penetrator weapon. The purpose of the MOP Quick Reaction
Program is to deliver an improved Hard and Deeply Buried Target (HDBT)
defeat capability beyond the Air Force's current (2,000-lb. and 5,000-
lb. class) penetrator weapons.
MOP is being integrated on the B-2 to provide a capability to
defeat high value assets in HDBTs in a high threat environment.
14. Senator Bill Nelson. General Carpenter, what is the requirement
that the MOP is satisfying?
General Carpenter. MOP requirement is captured in the following
Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated documents: HDBT-Defeat
Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) dated January 20,
2005; and in HDBT Characterize, Engage and Assess ICD dated September
19, 2005. Those documents specify a requirement for improved HDBT
defeat capability beyond the Air Force's current (2,000-lb. and 5,000-
lb. class) penetrator weapons. Additionally, the 2006 HDBT Analysis of
Alternatives Weapons Effectiveness Study found that MOP provides
greatly improved HDBT defeat capability and the 2007 Air Force
Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment highlighted the need for HDBT
defeat capability. Most recently, the Air Force received an Urgent
Operational Need (UON) request for a HDBT capability. The UON has been
endorsed by multiple COCOMs.
FUTURE CONCEPTS
15. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, General Alston, and
Admiral Johnson, in thinking about the future of the life extension
programs for nuclear weapons in a smaller stockpile without testing,
there may be opportunities to fundamentally improve the safety,
security, and reliability of the weapons. This could include having a
complete inventory of weapons with fire-resistant pits, insensitive
high explosives, and other safety and security features. To do this
could require replacing or rebuilding the pit or the secondary and
other components of a weapon or slightly reducing the yield of the
weapon. Have there been discussions about this type of approach for the
future?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, NNSA is working closely with DOD to study
opportunities for life extension programs (LEPs) that would increase
surety (safety, security, anti-use control) and reliability in the
nuclear weapons stockpile. Within the context of the joint NNSA-DOD
Phase 6.x acquisition process, NNSA iterates the military requirements
with the DOD and conducts design and trade studies. These studies
examine trade-offs between improvements in surety and potential
reductions in performance (yield), as well as other impacts to both DOD
and NNSA. The amount of rework required to improve weapon surety varies
between weapon system and detailed assessments already required to
understand the trade space. The optimal technical approach for the
future involves modernizing the stockpile by selecting from among the
spectrum of options described in the Perry/Schlesinger Congressional
Posture Review Report. Success in improving the safety, security, and
reliability of the nuclear weapon stockpile will require all of the
tools developed in the stockpile stewardship program and support for
the Nation's nuclear weapons enterprise. The affordability of making
such improvements in safety and surety must ultimately be considered in
relation to other priorities. Such investment decisions should be made
on the best available analysis as derived from the planned studies.
For example, the current B61 LEP Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study and
Option Down-Select) was initiated by the Nuclear Weapons Council in
September 2008, and is conducting an assessment to determine
requirements and options for improving safety, security, use control,
and reliability. This study is examining the amount of pit and
secondary work that would accompany certain proposed surety
enhancements. Although the B61 is an insensitive high explosive (IHE)
weapon, and contains some of the most advanced surety features in the
stockpile, additional features are being considered to address current
and postulated future threats. Other weapons could require even more
extensive nuclear explosive package (NEP) modifications to update their
surety features, to include, for instance, replacing conventional high
explosive with IHE. LEPs would require more extensive NEP rework, which
would be assessed during the study phase and in conjunction with DOD.
Preliminary discussions on such improvements to the W78 ICBM warhead
are already underway with the Air Force, prior to entering its LEP
study phase.
Accomplishing these improvements to the safety, security, and
reliability of the stockpile without nuclear testing is understandably
challenging and will integrate all of the tools developed under the
stockpile stewardship to ensure success. In addition, understanding the
overall enterprise capacity for design and production drives the time
to achieve a stockpile with modern safety and security features.
Optimizing the order and priority of weapons is an ongoing conversation
between the NNSA and DOD communities and requires all participants for
success. However, a modernized stockpile with improved safety,
security, and reliability is achievable and should be actively pursued.
General Alston. Yes. The Air Force has established long-term goals
with NNSA to incorporate enhanced surety features (safety, security,
and use-control features) and reliability in life extension programs.
Additional considerations include reduced maintenance workload,
complexity, and cost. The use of alternative pits and major components,
along with the possibility of reduced yield (which may be offset by
increased accuracy) or other performance trade-offs would also be
factors in planning for the long-term viability and reliability of the
future nuclear deterrent stockpile, consistent with congressional
direction and support.
Admiral Johnson. The Navy, in coordination with NNSA through the
Project Officers Group, is evaluating options for maintaining the
Navy's nuclear deterrent that include improving weapon safety,
security, and reliability. For example, in coordination with the NNSA,
the Navy, Air Force, and United Kingdom are working on a joint fuze
effort to leverage technologies across Services. In addition, the Navy
is coordinating with NNSA to look at safety and security technology
applications in the planning and development of current and future
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) weapons.
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
16. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the United States has
maintained nuclear weapons for 17 years without explosive nuclear
weapons testing. As one lab director recently said, ``we know how to do
this.'' On the other hand, there are many experimental and
computational tools, and skilled people needed to do this task. What is
needed in the way of tools, people, and funding to continue to maintain
the stockpile over the next 5 to 10 years without nuclear testing, and
does the fiscal year 2010 budget support this? If not, why not, and
what is missing or not funded?
Mr. D'Agostino. The Stockpile Stewardship program has invested in
improved experimental and simulation capabilities--e.g., Dual-axis
Hydrodynamic Radiographic Test (DAHRT) facility, National Ignition
Facility (NIF), and Advanced Simulatilon and Computing (ASC) tools--as
key elements of a comprehensive science-based approach to the nuclear
mission. Employing these capabilities is essential to deliver the
robust, scientific underpinning needed to maintain the legacy stockpile
over the coming decade. Additional resources would enable us to
recapitalize major production facilities and enhance the science and
engineering and Directed Stockpile Work needed to transform the
stockpile to a smaller, more reliable deterrent without Underground
Tests (UGTs). We incur more risk each year as the stockpile ages,
critical skills erode, and historic UGT data becomes less relevant. The
recent Perry Schlesinger Report indicates that in order to keep a vital
skills base we will need to evolve the legacy stockpile by
demonstrating capability to field modern warheads that have no new
military capabilities. We have not fielded a modern warhead in two
decades, and critical skills are deteriorating. Activities are needed
now to ensure experienced designers and engineers can mentor a new
generation. Additionally, the growing dependence on scientific
understanding for the future stockpile will require additional experts
in theory, experiments, and simulation.
Each year the NNSA evaluates its ability to accomplish its mission
and prioritizes its work scope within available resources across a 5-
year horizon. Our fiscal year 2010 request is sufficient to assure the
safety and reliability of the current stockpile and sustain critical
skills as we wait for the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to conclude and
the national level direction to be provided for the future stockpile.
We anticipate that identified funding levels for the out-years may
not be sufficient to meet the post-NPR stockpile requirements--
including directed stockpile work, science-based stewardship, and
recapitalization of NNSA's aging plutonium and highly-enriched uranium
facilities--along with the requisite skills to be successful.
MAINTAINING CRITICAL SKILLS AT NNSA
17. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, maintaining critical
skills throughout the NNSA complex is necessary to maintain a smaller
stockpile in absence of nuclear weapons testing. This is not a new
revelation but the Strategic Posture Commission (the Perry-Schlesinger
Commission) has raised this issue again as one of their highest
priority issues. What specifically is the NNSA plan to maintain these
skills and transfer them to a next generation?
Mr. D'Agostino. I am committed that the talents and facilities of
the NNSA can and should be brought to bear on science and technology
for the full complement of national security challenges. I am working
to broaden the NNSA mission to become a science and technology arm for
national security issues, a resource to which other agencies with
national security responsibilities turn. By taking on the additional
challenge of national security science and technology, we can provide
the next generation of graduate students in science and engineering
with exciting and relevant scientific challenges at premier research
facilities such as Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National
Laboratories, so that they may contribute to the security of our
Nation.
In the absence of nuclear testing, the mission of the Defense
Programs laboratories is focused on Science-Based Stockpile
Stewardship. The success depends on the ability to show that
simulations can credibly be used to replace nuclear testing as a means
of ensuring stockpile confidence. Universities recognize the challenge
in developing new kinds of simulation tools across a number of related
disciplines to accomplish this mission.
Multitude of university collaboration programs are being conducted
by NNSA that include establishing focused center of excellence at
universities performing leading-edge research to graduate and
undergraduate internships and summer institutes in various disciplines
at the laboratories. In addition, NNSA funds fellowships, Research
Centers of Excellence, Minority Serving Institution partnerships, post-
doctoral appointments, and critical skills development programs. These
activities not only engage academic communities in advanced research in
areas of critical importance to NNSA but also maintain hiring pipelines
from university graduates to the national laboratories. NNSA's
investment in key critical skills pipeline programs exceeds $74 million
annually.
NNSA also offers unique capabilities and facilities such as the
Roadrunner, the world's fastest computer; National Ignition Facility,
the most powerful laser in the world; the Microsystems Engineering
Science Applications facility, a premier micro-electronics facility;
and the LANSCE, doing research that helps maintain the Nation's nuclear
deterrent, counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and lay
the foundation for many of the products we use in our daily lives by
supporting materials, sciences, and technology. These are but a few of
the capabilities and facilities that attract university researchers and
in turn, universities develop cutting-edge simulation tools,
experimental methods, et cetera that are critical to NNSA's mission.
Specific examples of collaboration include the Advanced Simulation and
Computing (ASC) Program's 10-year $220 million Academic Strategic
Alliance Program (ASAP) (1997-2007) and the followup, 5-year $87
million Predictive Science Academic Alliance Program (PSAAP) (2008-
2013); and the Science Campaign's Stockpile Stewardship Academic
Alliances Program (SSAA). These programs engage multiple universities
in the country and research conducted through these partnerships
contributes to the knowledge base required to demonstrate the
capabilities of predictive modeling and simulation across a broad
spectrum of science and engineering applications using some of the most
powerful computers in the world. The ASAP, PSAAP, and SSAA encourage
collaboration between the national laboratories and universities in the
advancement of multi-disciplinary predictive modeling and simulation
technologies, and educating and recruiting individuals with skills
critical to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS-STOCKPILE MIX
18. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, with the possibility of a
smaller stockpile there is the possibility that there will be fewer
types of nuclear weapons in the future. In preparation for the NPR, is
NNSA looking at the technical feasibility of reducing the total number
of weapons types and how technically feasible it is to reduce the
number of redundant warheads? For example would it be possible to have
an ICBM warhead serve as a backup for an SLBM warhead?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA's Defense Programs is a force provider to the
DOD and does not establish the mix of weapons or the stockpile
quantities needed to support the mission. As an active participant in
the DOD-led NPR, NNSA is assisting DOD in assessing the nuclear weapons
stockpile needs of the future. NNSA will be supporting DOD in the
process to define options for force size and mix of weapons in the
future stockpile. Currently, the operational environments of ICBMs and
SLBMs differ significantly and no current warhead meets the
requirements of both. The DOD would be the appropriate agency to
determine if warfighting needs for such things as military targeting,
weapon effects against targets, and military characteristics such as
reliability and survivability could be met by having an ICBM warhead
serve as a backup for an SLBM warhead.
19. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, would the overall
stockpile be easier to maintain if there were fewer types of nuclear
weapons, and if so, why?
Mr. D'Agostino. While ``easier'' is subjective, there are
sustainment advantages to having fewer types of nuclear weapons. Fewer
warhead types would reduce the variety of surveillance and maintenance
activities. Furthermore, it would reduce the number of life extension
programs. Over the long-term, it would also reduce the diversity of
weapons capabilities and expertise needed across the Nuclear Security
Enterprise. Once the entire inventory of a particular weapon type is
retired, NNSA could eliminate recurring activities and funding needed
to support such efforts as maintenance, core surveillance, assessment,
and other design and production support; however, NNSA will need
continued funding for associated weapons experts, safety, surveillance,
and dismantlement and disposition of weapon components until all
activities associated with the retired weapon type are complete.
There are counterpoints to these advantages. Fewer weapons types
will reduce the capabilities provided to the DOD. The DOD would have to
respond regarding the impact this reduction of capability would have on
mission effectiveness. For the NNSA, even though there are potential
cost avoidances by reducing nuclear weapon types in the stockpile,
there are also potential investments needed. For example, having
multiple nuclear weapon types available for each weapon system in the
triad does provide confidence that one technical failure will not
completely negate one leg of the triad. By eliminating redundancy, the
confidence in the reliability of each remaining system will be much
more critical. Modernization of the stockpile and an even greater
reliance on surveillance and the tools of Stockpile Stewardship will be
essential to provide credibility of deterrence.
COMPUTATIONAL CAPABILITIES
20. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the computational
capabilities of all the labs have proved to be the real game changer
for maintaining nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing. As
you move from two-dimensional modeling to three-dimensional modeling,
is NNSA able to fund fully the code development and hardware needs of
the stockpile stewardship program?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)
Program and DOE Office of Science's Advanced Scientific Computing
Research have recently established a long-term collaboration and have
charged a steering committee of laboratory technical experts to
identify the impediments to exascale and strategies for overcoming
them. Once the steering committee's analysis is properly vetted, we
will understand the schedule and resources required to achieve exascale
computing and move our trusted codes to this next generation of
computing.
One of the greatest successes of the ASC program has been the
successful addition of three-dimensional capability in the codes and
the corresponding computer power to run highly resolved, three-
dimensional calculations. So while many of the day-to-day calculations
run in two dimensions for practical computing purposes, three-
dimensional capability also exists to explore detailed weapons
characteristics and explore scientific phenomena. Because of the grand
challenge nature of the modeling and simulation in ASC, this will
continue to be a balancing act for code development and hardware--as
well as other aspects of the program.
For the near future, the ASC program is working to maintain
expertise, utilize peer-review, and sustain healthy code teams to
improve the scientific underpinnings of the codes and meet the
simulation needs of the SSP for key applications. This will be
supported by the Roadrunner, Zia, and Sequoia platforms slated to run
these simulations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
NEXT GENERATION BOMBER
21. Senator Vitter. General Alston, 20 B-2s are the only long-range
strike assets in the Air Force inventory that can access high threat
environments and survive. These aircrafts have not been in production
since 1997 and so there are no viable replacements to backfill losses.
When a B-2 crashed in Guam in 2007, the Air Force lost 5 percent of its
stealthy long-range strike fleet. The B-52 and B-1 have been upgraded
numerous times to take advantage of new technology such as precision
strike, global positioning systems, and targeting pods. However,
stealth can never be incorporated into these aircrafts and they could
remain vulnerable to attacks by surface-to-air missiles and fighters.
It is important to remember that in the final days of Vietnam, the
Air Force lost 15 B-52s in 12 days during Operation Linebacker II. Air
defenses have advanced markedly since then, but 47 percent of the long-
range strike fleet is comprised of these same B-52s. While aircrafts
such as the F-22 are certainly useful in certain scenarios, tactical
strike assets require access to regional bases and forward deployed
logistical support.
As recent events at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and K2 in
Uzbekistan have illustrated, access to regional operating bases is
becoming increasingly tenuous. Furthermore, potential adversaries have
anti-access and area denial capabilities that could severely curtail
operations at these forward bases. Taking all of this into
consideration, what were the original Air Force recommendations in the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for the Next Generation Bomber?
General Alston. The Air Force manages Long Range Strike (LRS)
capability through execution of its three-phase strategy: sustain and
modernize the legacy bomber fleet, develop a mid-term LRS capability
survivable in a high threat environment, and create a long-term
solution using advanced technologies to generate revolutionary LRS
capabilities. The existing bomber fleet, while aging, uses focused
sustainment and modernization programs to maintain mission relevance,
addressing issues with communications, navigation, electronic attack,
and weapons delivery systems, as well as for integrating new weapons
onto the B-52. While these aircraft do face survivability concerns
against advanced air defenses, this can be mitigated by using
complementary capabilities, such as standoff weapons. To address this,
the Air Force has funded in fiscal year 2010 an Analysis of
Alternatives (AOA) for a Long Range Standoff follow-on capability that
will mitigate the high threat scenarios. America's bombers retain
superior direct attack capability in lower threat environments. These
continuing Air Force efforts ensure the bomber fleet continues to be a
responsive, flexible, adaptive, and lethal platform able to support the
Nation's LRS requirements.
Concerning the Next Generation Bomber (NGB), as part of its second
phase, the Air Force was actively pursuing LRS capability to meet
emerging operational requirements. One specific initiative within this
effort, completed in 2007, was an AOA that identified the most
promising of many possible aircraft designs. In April 2009, OSD
cancelled the NGB program with Secretary Gates citing the need to
better define the need, requirement, and technology required for this
complex program. As a next step, the Air Force is fully committed to
supporting and participating in the ongoing 2009 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) and accompanying NPR. After completion of the reviews, the
Air Force will reevaluate its LRS strategy based on direction and
findings from the reviews.
22. Senator Vitter. General Alston, what threat-based analysis
changed this requirement?
General Alston. The decision to cancel the Next Generation Bomber
was directed by the Secretary of Defense in the fiscal year 2010 budget
submission until we have a better understanding of the need, the
requirement, and the technology. The Air Force supports the QDR and NPR
to assess future strategic requirements.
23. Senator Vitter. General Alston, stand-off weapons are key
enablers for legacy bombers that are increasingly less survivable in
defended air space. Conventional air launched cruise missiles (CALCM)
comprise the majority of the Air Force's stand-off weaponry inventory,
but recent comments by Air Force leaders suggest that these systems
will not be viable over the long-run. This year's budget paused joint
air to surface standoff missile (JASSM) acquisition, the replacement
for CALCM. Why did this pause occur?
General Alston. JASSM went through Nunn-McCurdy certification in
fiscal years 2007-2008 based on unit cost increases. Defense
Acquisition Executive direction out of Nunn-McCurdy was to test Lot 5
missiles prior to awarding the fiscal year 2009 contract. This test
resulted in 6 successes out of 10 shots. Based on the test results, the
program was paused to incorporate fixes identified during the Nunn-
McCurdy certification, determine root causes of the failures on Lot 5,
and incorporate necessary fixes on Lot 5, Lot 6, and Lot 7 missiles.
With the delay of the Lot 8 award, fiscal year 2010 production money
was removed.
24. Senator Vitter. General Alston, will the Air Force continue to
invest in JASSM?
General Alston. Yes, the Air Force is committed to the JASSM
program as it is the Nation's only stealthy, conventional, precision,
launch-and-leave, standoff missile capable of being launched from
fighter and bomber aircraft. As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification,
OSD certified the JASSM program's importance to Congress and stated
that there are no alternatives to the JASSM program which will provide
equal or greater military capability at less cost.
25. Senator Vitter. General Alston, is the Air Force investigating
new technologies that enhance or supersede JASSM?
General Alston. Yes, the Air Force is investigating both
enhancements to JASSM and technologies to supersede JASSM.
The Air Force is committed to the JASSM program as it is the
Nation's only stealthy, conventional, precision, launch-and-leave,
standoff missile capable of being launched from fighter and bomber
aircraft. As part of the Nunn-McCurdy Certification effort, OSD
certified the JASSM program's importance to Congress and stated that
there are no alternatives to the JASSM program which will provide equal
or greater military capability at less cost. Near-term enhancements to
the baseline JASSM missile include extended range (ER) and Anti-Surface
Warfare (ASuW) variants. Currently in development, JASSM-ER uses a
different engine and larger fuel tanks to significantly increase
standoff capability. In addition, the Air Force is investigating a
JASSM/ASuW variant that would integrate a datalink onto the weapon and
update JASSM software to enable attacking moving surface ships.
The Air Force, in conjunction with the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL) and other national laboratories, is constantly
looking at the next level of technologies. The Air Force is researching
technologies for higher survivability weapons, high speed (up to
hypersonic) weapons, and directed energy but none are planned to be
operational within the Future Years Defense Plan. One example is an Air
Combat Command (ACC) coordinated effort working with AFRL on a
Technologies for Responsive Precision Air Strike (TRESPAS)/Technologies
for Responsive Precision Air-Land-Surface Strike (TRESPAL2) concept
which will examine future technologies that can be developed to strike
fixed and mobile targets with varying degrees of weapon effects.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]