[Senate Hearing 111-138]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-138
THE CHALLENGES FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 27, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Challenges Facing the Department of Defense
january 27, 2009
Page
Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense...................... 10
(iii)
THE CHALLENGES FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill,
Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Martinez, Wicker, Burr, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member;
Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; William G.P.
Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member;
John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; Arun A. Seraphin,
professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and
William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Adam J. Barker, research assistant; Richard H.
Fontaine, Jr., deputy Republican staff director; Paul C. Hutton
IV, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority
counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana
G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh,
minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Christine G.
Lang, Ali Z. Pasha, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator
Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni Berge,
assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh;
Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Andrew R.
Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Stephen C.
Hedger and Elizabeth McDermott, assistants to Senator
McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall;
Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood
Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde
A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake,
assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to
Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh and Erskine W. Wells III,
assistants to Senator Martinez; Kevin Kane, assistant to
Senator Burr; and Rob Epplin, assistant to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. This morning is
the first committee hearing since new committee members were
approved, so I'd like to recognize our new committee members:
Senator Mark Begich, Senator Richard Burr, Senator Roland
Burris, Senator Kay Hagan, Senator Mark Udall, and Senator
David Vitter. A warm welcome to you all. You will enjoy your
work on this committee for many reasons, but one surely is its
history of a bipartisan approach to our national security.
We also want to welcome Secretary Gates, who will testify
on the challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD). As we
can I'm sure notice, the Secretary has one arm a little bit
immobile this morning. I guess the snow this morning reminds
him of his losing combat with a snow plow a week or so ago. We
wish you well, Mr. Secretary. We know you're on the mend, and
this is not the first time we've seen the one-armed Secretary
before us.
We welcome you. When you previously testified in September,
I suggested that it would be likely your last appearance before
this committee. I'm glad to say I was wrong. I commend
President Obama's decision to ask you to stay on as Secretary
of Defense. We all appreciate your dedication, your willingness
to continue to serve, and we appreciate your family's support
for that decision of yours.
Given your unique position as the only Cabinet member to
serve across the Bush and Obama administrations, the continuity
and experience that you provide will be of great value to our
Nation. While this is not a nomination hearing today since you
do not need one as a carryover, it is an opportunity to ask you
how you plan to transition to the policies and priorities of
the new administration.
The challenges facing the Department at home and abroad are
extraordinary. Foremost we will be shifting the emphasis and
the balance between two ongoing wars, drawing down in Iraq as
we build up in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates, you have called
for deploying additional combat brigades and support units to
Afghanistan, potentially doubling the current 31,000 U.S.
troops deployed there. But making these additional forces
available as currently scheduled is slow, slower than the
commanding general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) International Security Assistance Force, U.S. General
David McKiernan, said last October was needed.
The past year has seen increasing violence in Afghanistan,
with roadside bombs reaching an all-time high and spreading
insecurity among the Afghan people. Secretary Gates's opening
statement tells us this morning that there is ``little doubt
our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan,''
where again we have 31,000 troops. President Obama has called
Afghanistan and Pakistan the central front in America's war
against terrorism. Admiral Mullen said recently that ``The
availability of troops for Afghanistan is tied to the drawdown
of our 140,000 troops from Iraq.'' Add to that the fact that
Iraq now has 265,000 of its own trained Iraqi troops and
310,000 trained police personnel.
Hopefully, the Secretary this morning will address these
disparities, which have existed for many months.
The security challenges in Afghanistan require that the
United States and its coalition allies not only provide
additional combat forces, but also increased capacity and
capabilities. We need to deploy key enablers that serve as
force multipliers. In particular, we need more trainers, more
quickly for the Afghan National Army (ANA), which is a highly
motivated and effective fighting force. We also need more
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in
Afghanistan, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), that
are tailored to the unique requirements that the situation in
Afghanistan presents.
Secretary Gates has said that in the long run this conflict
must be Afghanistan's war, and I agree. We should be doing all
we can to enable Afghan security forces to take responsibility
for their own country's security.
Hopefully, Pakistan will find a way to slow the activities
of terrorists using their borderlands as safe havens and bases
for attacks on Afghanistan. But I'm afraid we can't count on
that to stop cross-border incursions. We not only need to
aggressively increase the number of trainers and mentors for
building the capacity of the ANA and Afghan National Police
(ANP); we need to actively seek to get the best Afghan security
forces deployed where the greatest threat is coming from.
That's why I have urged Secretary Gates as well as General
McKiernan, former President Bush, his National Security Adviser
(NSA) Stephen Hadley to seek the deployment of the ANA along
the Afghan-Pakistan border to counter the threat of incursions
coming across that border. Brigadier General John Nicholson,
the Deputy Commanding General of the Regional Command South
says that ``We're not there. The borders are wide open.''
The challenges in Afghanistan also require that we mobilize
the full range of U.S. power, not just our military power, but
our civilian institutions, for diplomacy and development.
Secretary Gates has spoken and written with great
persuasiveness that military success is not sufficient to win,
and that the ingredients for success in the long term include
economic development, rule of law, good governance, training
and equipping internal security forces, and public diplomacy.
Yet the chronic underresourcing of the State Department and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has left our
military and civilian instruments of U.S. power out of balance.
The challenges facing the Department are not confined to
Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran continues to be a destabilizing
force throughout the Middle East because of uncertainty as to
Iran's nuclear weapons goal and its support of insurgent and
terrorist groups in the region.
In Europe, the United States will hopefully work with our
NATO allies in efforts to improve our relationship with Russia.
That relationship has become strained over a proposed missile
defense deployment in Europe and further NATO enlargement. We
should seek common ground with Russia where it is in our mutual
interests, including fighting terrorism, preventing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, reducing the
number of nuclear weapons and possibly even missile defense.
For instance, if we could work out a joint program with
Russia on missile defense against Iranian missiles, it would
change the entire dynamic of regional power and put pressure on
Iran to drop any plans for nuclear weapons or long-range
missiles to carry them.
We need to remain vigilant in the Asian Pacific region,
where North Korea remains a threat to regional stability and
China's strategic influence continues to grow.
The challenges confronting U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
are vast and complex: ungoverned or undergoverned areas that
offer potential havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists,
extremists, and Nations emerging from conflict, where peace is
fragile and international forces provide much of the security
and stability.
In the coming months, the Secretary of Defense will have to
make some tough decisions. The committee is interested in any
insights that you may have, Mr. Secretary, into changes the new
administration may be planning for major weapons systems,
priorities, and funding. To strike a better balance between the
needs of our deployed forces today and the requirements for
meeting the emerging threats of tomorrow.
Of particular interest would be plans for the Air Force's
F-22 fighter, the C-17 cargo aircraft, combat search and rescue
helicopter program, the Next Generation Aerial Refueling
Tanker, the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the DDG-1000,
DDG-51, the Army's Future Combat System, and missile defense
systems. These programs require tough choices, which will be
more difficult due to the current economic crisis.
A top priority for the DOD and Congress must be to reform
the acquisition system. Each year, hundreds of billions of
dollars of products and services are purchased. Last year the
committee received testimony that cost overruns on the
Department's 95 largest acquisition programs now total almost
$300 billion over the original program estimates, even though
the Department has cut unit quantities and reduced performance
expectations on many programs to reduce costs. Acquisition
reform will be a top priority for this committee this Congress.
Care for our wounded warriors must remain a priority. DOD
needs to continue to work closely with the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) in crafting and implementing policies and
processes to ensure seamless care and transition for our
wounded warriors and their families.
It is also essential that the Department continue to focus
on supporting all of our servicemembers, not only those who are
injured or ill, but also their families, as they face the
numerous challenges that lengthy and frequent deployments
present.
In the area of personnel, the Department will hopefully
continue to address and evaluate the appropriate Active Duty
and Reserve end strengths for all the Services. The Army and
Marine Corps continue to grow the active Force. While the
committee has supported growth in the active ground forces, we
must remain vigilant that we do not sacrifice quality to
enhance quantity. We must ensure that recruiting standards are
high and waivers are limited.
The Air Force and the Navy have in recent years reduced the
size of their Active Duty end strengths, in part to pay for
equipment, however, recently both Services halted the decline.
The Department must work with Congress to determine the
appropriate Active and Reserve end strengths for all the
military Services as measured against current and future
missions and requirements. We expect the Department to
comprehensively address end strength levels in the upcoming
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Some of the Department's choices may become clearer when
the second emergency supplemental 2009 appropriations request
is submitted in the coming weeks. The Department has indicated
it will provide a preliminary 2010 defense authorization budget
request, as required by law, on the first Monday in February.
But the more meaningful submission this year will be the
amended budget request reflecting the priorities of the new
administration, which are expected in the middle of April.
[Whereupon, at 9:48 a.m., the committee proceeded to other
business, then reconvened at 9:49 a.m.]
Chairman Levin. Since a quorum is now present, I ask the
committee to consider a list of 654 pending military
nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
committee the required length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report these 654 military
nominations to the Senate? [Motion.]
Is there a second?
All in favor say aye.
The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on January 27,
2009.
1. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 27 appointments to the grade
of major general and below (list begins with Donald A. Haught)
(Reference No. 1).
2. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Edmund P. Zynda II) (Reference No. 2).
3. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Daniel C. Gibson) (Reference No. 3).
4. In the Air Force, there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Donald L. Marshall) (Reference No. 4).
5. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Paul J. Cushman) (Reference No. 5).
6. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Christopher S. Allen)
(Reference No. 6).
7. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Ryan R. Pendleton) (Reference No. 7).
8. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Howard L. Duncan) (Reference No. 8).
9. In the Air Force Reserve, there are five appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Jeffrey R. Grunow) (Reference No.
9).
10. In the Air Force Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade
of colonel (Eugene M. Gaspard) (Reference No. 10).
11. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Michael R. Powell) (Reference No.
11).
12. In the Air Force Reserve, there are two appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Mary Elizabeth Brown) (Reference No.
12).
13. In the Air Force Reserve, there are three appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Gary R. Califf) (Reference No. 13).
14. In the Air Force Reserve, there are five appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Stephen Scott Baker) (Reference No.
14).
15. In the Air Force Reserve, there are nine appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Joseph Allen Banna) (Reference No.
15).
16. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 69 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Keith A. Acree) (Reference No. 16).
17. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Scott A. Gronewold) (Reference No. 17).
18. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Robert L. Kaspar, Jr.) (Reference No. 18).
19. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of
colonel (Emmett W. Mosely) (Reference No. 19).
20. In the Army Reserve, there are two appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Andrew C. Meverden) (Reference No. 20).
21. In the Army, there are six appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Douglas M. Coldwell)
(Reference No. 21).
22. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Thomas S. Carey) (Reference No. 22).
23. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Scottie M. Eppler) (Reference No. 23).
24. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of major
(Pierre R. Pierce) (Reference No. 24).
25. In the Army, there are two appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Cheryl A. Creamer) (Reference No. 25).
26. In the Army, there are 24 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Kathryn A. Belill) (Reference No. 26).
27. In the Army, there are 73 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Christopher Allen) (Reference No. 27).
28. In the Army, there are 137 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with John L. Ament) (Reference No. 28).
29. In the Army, there are 143 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Terryl L. Aitken) (Reference No. 29).
30. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Matthew E. Sutton) (Reference No. 30).
31. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Andrew N. Sullivan) (Reference No. 31).
32. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Tracy G. Brooks) (Reference No. 32).
33. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Peter M. Barack, Jr.) (Reference
No. 33).
34. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with David G. Boone) (Reference No.
34).
35. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with William A. Burwell) (Reference No.
35).
36. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Kurt J. Hastings) (Reference No.
36).
37. In the Marine Corps, there are three appointments to the grade
of lieutenant colonel (list begins with James P. Miller, Jr.)
(Reference No. 37).
38. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (David S. Pummell) (Reference No. 38).
39. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Robert M. Manning) (Reference No. 39).
40. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Michael A. Symes) (Reference No. 40).
41. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Paul A. Shirley) (Reference No. 41).
42. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of
major (Richard D. Kohler) (Reference No. 42).
43. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Julie C. Hendrix) (Reference No. 43).
44. In the Marine Corps, there are four appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Christopher N. Norris) (Reference No. 44).
45. In the Marine Corps, there are three appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Anthony M. Nesbit) (Reference No. 45).
46. In the Marine Corps, there are three appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Gregory R. Biehl) (Reference No. 46).
47. In the Marine Corps, there are two appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Travis R. Avent) (Reference No. 47).
48. In the Marine Corps, there are four appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Jose A. Falche) (Reference No. 48).
49. In the Marine Corps, there are six appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Keith D. Burgess) (Reference No. 49).
50. In the Marine Corps, there are three appointments to the grade
of major (list begins with Mark L. Hobin) (Reference No. 50).
51. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are 26 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Kevin J. Anderson) (Reference No.
51).
52. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Steven J. Shauberger) (Reference No. 53).
53. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Karen M. Stokes) (Reference No. 54).
54. In the Navy, there are seven appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with Craig W. Aimone) (Reference No.
56).
55. In the Marine Corps Reserve, there are two appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with John H. Croley) (Reference No.
59).
56. In the Army Reserve, there are 42 appointments to the grade of
major general and below (list begins with Peter M. Aylward) (Reference
No. 63).
Total: 654.
Chairman Levin. One other personnel note. The nomination of
Bill Lynn is before the committee and a number of additional
questions have been asked relative to any service by Mr. Lynn.
Those are appropriate questions and we will attempt to act on
that nomination as soon as we can after the answers to those
questions are received.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I again
look forward to working with you and all the members of the
committee as we begin the 111th Congress. I join you in
welcoming all the new members of the committee. It's been a
privilege to sit on this committee for 8 years and I've always
appreciated its bipartisan tradition. I'm certain that the new
members of our committee will find their participation very
rewarding.
I'd also like to welcome Secretary Gates back to the Senate
Armed Services Committee. Mr. Secretary, you have been a
tireless champion of our men and women in uniform and I cannot
think of a more qualified person to serve as our country's
Secretary of Defense. We all owe you a debt of gratitude for
your outstanding service and your willingness to continue to
serve in one of the most difficult jobs in America. I'm
confident that you will continue to serve in an exemplary
fashion.
Secretary Gates, you know well the challenges that our
country faces in the areas of national security, Afghanistan,
the drawdown of troops in Iraq, dwell times, closing the prison
at Guantanamo Bay, ensuring the readiness of our combat units,
and achieving meaningful acquisition reform. In all these areas
and more, we face enormous and difficult decisions.
I look forward to working with you and the new
administration as we pursue the foremost responsibility of the
American government, to secure the security of the American
people. Obviously, Afghanistan must be at or near the top of
any priority list. The situation there is increasingly
challenging and we need to develop and articulate a clear
strategy with measurable performance goals in order to prevail
there.
I am pleased that the administration is moving in the right
direction by increasing the number of U.S. troops on the
ground, particularly in the south of Afghanistan. But more
troops are just a piece of what is required, as you well know.
We need to put into place a comprehensive civil-military
plan, ensure unity of command among those fighting in
Afghanistan, increase dramatically the size of the ANA, improve
the police forces, and also address the corruption, governance,
and narcotics problems much more forthrightly than we have thus
far.
Mr. Secretary, last year you testified before this
committee fearing that NATO would become a two-tiered alliance
of those willing to die to protect people's security and those
who were not. We must convince our NATO allies and their
citizens that a stable and prosperous Afghanistan is in all of
our interests and therefore worthy of a greater contribution
from each member state. I look forward to your thoughts in this
regard.
Undergirding the efforts of all NATO members in Afghanistan
must be an absolute commitment to success in that country. We
cannot allow Afghanistan to revert to a safe haven for
terrorists who would plot attacks against the American people
or our friends around the world. I'll do all I can to convince
our allies that, while this war will be hard, it is necessary.
I look forward to hearing your assessment of the NATO
mission in Afghanistan, the viability of the Afghan government,
the relationship and necessity of a better interaction with the
Pakistan government, and how best to develop a comprehensive
civil-military strategy.
Also, Mr. Secretary, I think it's important--the most
important thing that I have to say to you today: The American
people must understand that this is a long, hard slog we're in
in Afghanistan. It is complex. It is difficult. It is
challenging. I don't see, frankly, an Anbar Awakening, a game-
changing event in Afghanistan, such as we were able to see in
Iraq. So I think the American people need to understand what's
at stake and they need to understand that this is going to take
a long time to secure America's vital national security
interests in the region.
In Iraq, obviously, we continue to worry about too rapid a
drawdown. I'm convinced that leaving a larger force in place in
the short run will permit us to make greater reductions later.
Critical elections are coming up in Iraq. The Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) will be up for some kind of referendum. We are
by no means finished with the situation in Iraq, but we can be
proud of the enormous success, at great sacrifice, of the men
and women who have served so nobly and so courageously.
I'm encouraged by Vice President Biden's pledge that the
new administration will not withdraw troops in a manner that
will threaten Iraqi security, and I look forward to hearing
specifically what such a commitment means.
Mr. Secretary, I also want to mention, on the issue of
Guantanamo Bay, I am one who said Guantanamo Bay needed to be
closed, but I think that we should have made the tough
decisions along with it. What do we do with those people who
are in our custody who have no country for us to send them back
to? What do we do with the people in our custody who we know if
returned to their countries, in some cases failed states like
Yemen, will be right back in the battle, as we have found out
about former prisoners who have been released and are now
leading members of al Qaeda? Also, I think that decisions have
to be made as to where these inmates are going to be located.
I believe the military commissions, after a long and
arduous process, were starting to function effectively. I'm
disappointed that they have been suspended.
We all know that there will be more prisoners that will be
kept at Bagram, so maybe we should anticipate a way to deal
with that situation rather than be faced with one which may
cause us more difficulties if we don't fully anticipate that
there's going to be a situation that has to be addressed at
Bagram in Afghanistan.
I share the chairman's commitment to acquisition reform.
Tough choices are going to have to be made quickly on
the F-22, the C-17s, and others, but true acquisition reform
is long overdue.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, I'm pleased with the information
that I've been receiving lately about the improvements that
have been made both in recruiting and retention in the
military. I'm sure there is a number of factors and I hope
you'll cover some of those as to why we are improving
significantly, in both retention and recruiting. Hopefully, the
actions of Congress would be helpful there.
I also think that it's very good for morale when you win a
conflict and don't lose one. But I'd be very interested in your
views about how we've been able to dramatically improve
recruiting and retention and what we need to do to continue
that as we face the challenges of a continued conflict in
Afghanistan and possibly other parts of the world.
[The information referred to follows:]
To date, we have met the challenge of recruiting and retention
during the global war on terror. I thank Congress for the various
enlistment and reenlistment bonus authorities, which are critical to
ensure recruiting, and retention success and, ultimately, our ability
to shape the force by enlisting quality youth and retaining members
with the correct specialties to maintain the capability of our forces.
In fiscal year 2008 and for fiscal year 2009 to date, recruiting and
retention programs have been successful for a variety of reasons. Not
the least of those reasons is the great confidence and respect directed
at those in uniform, in particular, military leadership. It is no
coincidence that the latest Harris poll (Figure 1) continues a two-
decade trend in rating leaders of the military as the group in which
American citizens have the greatest confidence--ahead of leaders of any
other enterprises including small or big business, medicine, organized
religion or a host of public sector entities. Our surveys of members
say the same thing: those in uniform have confidence in their leaders,
they like their colleagues, and they appreciate the support they
receive in preparing for missions, in performing their duties, or in
carrying out personal endeavors. Of course, those successes bear a
direct relationship to extraordinary congressional support.
Regrettably, rising unemployment and economic uncertainty advantage
those who are hiring, including the U.S. military. Clearly, recruiting
and retention are less challenging in the current economic environment.
However, the economic downturn is not the only factor affecting
recruiting. The improving situation in Iraq (in general) and the
reduction in casualties (in particular) over the last year certainly
impacts propensity to join and stay.
There have been increases in benefits that have also played a
significant role. Military pay has increased 52 percent since 1999,
compared to 38 percent in the private sector; the basic housing
allowance increased 119 percent since 1999--eliminating ``out-of-
pocket'' expenses; the increased use of the Critical Skills Retention
Bonus and Assignment Incentive Pays (discretionary incentives to target
skills, locations and combinations of same); increases in insurance
benefits; and the announcement of the new post-September 11 GI Bill.
Although the Montgomery GI Bill has been a cornerstone of our active
duty military recruiting efforts since 1985, we believe the provision
in the new program allowing career Service members to share or transfer
their GI Bill with immediate family members will be an added incentive
for new recruits as well as a retention factor for existing Service
members. We will be monitoring the effects of this implementation very
closely, but believe it is already having a positive effect.
On the cautionary side, there continues to be other factors that
significantly affect our ability to attract bright, young Americans
into the Armed Forces--the lower likelihood of influencers of youth
(e.g., parents and teachers) to recommend service, the lower interest
in service among youth themselves, higher numbers of youth going to
college directly from high school, and the continuing concerns about
the prolonged, worldwide, irregular campaign with its concomitant high
operations tempo. We are in uncharted waters--with significant factors,
both positive and negative, directly affecting military recruiting. As
a result, the Department and the Services are reviewing their
recruiting and retention programs to realign funding with current
realities. Whatever realignments are undertaken, they will be done
carefully and their effects closely monitored.
The continued success of the Department relies on the many quality
of life and standards of living improvements made with the help of
Congress. We must continue to sustain this standard, and we thank
Congress for its continued support of our All-Volunteer Force.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Secretary Gates, again our warm welcome and we turn it over
to you for your statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
provide an overview of the challenges facing the DOD and some
of my priorities for the coming year. In so doing, I am most
mindful that the new administration has only been in place for
a few days and new or changing policies will likely arise in
the weeks and months ahead. Later this spring I will present
President Obama's defense budget, and at that time, will be
better equipped to discuss the details of his vision for the
Department.
On a personal note, I want to thank many of you for your
very kind farewell remarks at my last hearing. I assure you,
you are no more surprised to see me back than I am. In the
months ahead I may need to reread some of those kind comments
to remind myself of the warm atmosphere up here as I was
departing.
Seriously, I am humbled by President Obama's faith in me
and deeply honored to continue to lead the United States
military. I thank the committee for your confidence in my
leadership and your enduring steadfast support of our military.
My submitted testimony covers a range of challenges facing
the Department: North Korea, Iran, proliferation, Russia,
China, wounded warrior care, ground force expansion and stress
on the force, National Guard, nuclear stewardship, defending
space and cyberspace, and wartime procurement. But for the next
few minutes I'd like to focus on Afghanistan, Iraq, and defense
acquisition.
There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge
right now is Afghanistan. The United States has focused more on
Central Asia in recent months. President Obama has made it
clear that the Afghanistan theater should be our top overseas
military priority.
There are more than 40 nations, hundreds of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), universities, development banks, the
United Nations (U.N.), the European Union (EU), NATO, and more,
all involved in Afghanistan, all working to help a nation beset
by crushing poverty, a thriving drug trade fueling corruption,
a ruthless and resilient insurgency, and violent extremists of
many stripes, not the least of which is al Qaeda.
Coordination of these international efforts has been
difficult, to say the least. Based on our experience, our past
experience in Afghanistan and applicable lessons from Iraq,
there are assessments underway that should provide an
integrated way forward to achieve our goals. As in Iraq, there
is no purely military solution in Afghanistan. But it is also
clear that we have not had enough troops to provide a baseline
level of security in some of the most dangerous areas, a vacuum
that has increasingly been filled by the Taliban.
That is why the United States is considering an increase in
our military presence in conjunction with a dramatic increase
in the size of the Afghan security forces, and also pressing
forward on issues like improving civil-military coordination
and focusing efforts on the district level.
While this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight,
we can attain what I believe should be among our strategic
objectives--above all, an Afghan people who do not provide a
safe haven for al Qaeda, who reject the rule of the Taliban and
support the legitimate government they have elected and in
which they have a stake.
Of course, it is impossible to disaggregate Afghanistan and
Pakistan, given the porous border between them. Pakistan is a
friend and partner and it is necessary for us to stay engaged
and help wherever we can. I can assure you that I continue to
watch the situation in Pakistan closely.
The SOFA between the United States and Iraq went into
effect on January 1. The agreement calls for U.S. combat troops
to be out of the Iraqi cities by the end of June and all troops
out of Iraq by the end of 2011 at the latest. It balances the
interests of both countries as we see the emergence of a
sovereign Iraq in full control of its territory.
Provincial elections in just a few days is another sign of
progress. The SOFA marks an important step forward in the
orderly drawdown of the American presence. It is a watershed, a
firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is
winding down.
Even so, I would offer a few words of caution. Though the
violence has remained low, there is still the potential for
setbacks and there may be hard days ahead for our troops.
As our military presence decreases over time, we should
still expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many
years to come, assuming a sovereign Iraq continues to seek our
partnership. The stability of Iraq remains crucial to the
future of the Middle East, a region that multiple presidents of
both political parties have considered vital to the national
security of the United States.
As I focused on the wars these past 2 years, I ended up
toward the end of last year punting a number of procurement
decisions that I believed would be more appropriately handled
by my successor and a new administration. As luck would have
it, I am now the receiver of those punts, and in this game
there are no fair catches.
Chief among the institutional challenges facing the
Department is acquisition, broadly speaking how we acquire
goods and services and manage the taxpayers' money. There are a
host of issues that have led us to where we are, starting with
longstanding systemic problems. Entrenched attitudes throughout
the government are particularly pronounced in the area of
acquisition. A risk-averse culture, a litigious process,
parochial interests, excessive and changing requirements,
budget churn and instability, and sometimes adversarial
relationships within the DOD and between Defense and other
parts of the government.
At the same time, acquisition priorities changed from
Defense secretary to Defense secretary, administration to
administration, and Congress to Congress, making any sort of
long-term procurement strategy on which we can accurately base
costs next to impossible.
Add to all of this the difficulty in bringing in qualified
senior acquisition officials. Over the past 8 years, for
example, the DOD has operated with an average percentage of
vacancies in key acquisition positions ranging from 13 percent
in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force. Thus the situation
we face today, where a small set of expensive weapons programs
has had repeated and unacceptable problems with requirements,
schedule, cost, and performance. The list spans all the
Services.
Since the end of World War II there have been nearly 130
studies on these problems, to little avail. While there is no
silver bullet, I do believe we can make headway, and we have
already begun addressing these issues. First, I believe that in
the fiscal year 2010 budget we must make hard choices. Any
necessary changes should avoid across the board adjustments,
which inefficiently extend all programs. We must have the
courage to make hard choices.
We have begun to purchase systems at more efficient rates
for the production lines. I believe we can combine budget
stability and order rates that take advantage of the economies
of scale to lower costs. We will pursue greater quantities of
systems that represent the 75 percent solution instead of
smaller quantities of exquisite, 99 percent solution systems.
While the military's operations have become very joint and
impressively so, budget and procurement decisions remain
overwhelmingly service-centric. To address a given risk, we may
have to invest more in the future-oriented program of one
service and less in that of another, particularly when both
programs were conceived with the same threat in mind.
We must freeze requirements on programs at contract award
and write contracts that incentivize proper behavior. I feel
that many programs that cost more than anticipated, are built
on an inadequate initial foundation. I believe the Department
should seek increased competition, use of prototypes, including
competitive prototyping, and ensure technology maturity so that
our programs are ready for the next phases of development.
Finally, we must restore the Department's acquisition team.
I look forward to working with you and the rest of Congress to
establish the necessary consensus on the need to have adequate
personnel capacity in all elements of the acquisition process.
This is no small task and will require much work in the months
ahead.
Which brings me to a few final thoughts. I spent the better
part of the last 2 years focused on the wars we are fighting
today and making sure that the Pentagon is doing everything
possible to ensure that America's fighting men and women are
supported in battle and properly cared for when they come home.
Efforts to put the bureaucracy on a war footing have, in my
view, revealed underlying flaws in the institutional
priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of
America's defense establishment. A set of institutions largely
arranged to plan for future wars, to prepare for a short war,
but not to wage a protracted war.
The challenge we face is how well we can institutionalize
the irregular capabilities gained and means to support troops
in the theater that have been for the most part developed ad
hoc and funded outside the base budget. This requires that we
close the yawning gap between the way the defense establishment
supports current operations and the way it prepares for future
conventional threats. Our wartime needs must have a home and
enthusiastic constituencies in the regular budgeting and
procurement process, while procurement and preparation for
conventional scenarios must in turn be driven more by the
actual capabilities of potential adversaries and less by what
is technologically feasible given unlimited time and resources.
As I mentioned, President Obama will present his budget
later this spring. One thing we have known for many months is
that the spigot of defense spending that opened on September 11
is closing. With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic
crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices
on this Department.
But for all the difficulties we face, I believe this moment
also presents an opportunity, one of those rare chances to
match virtue to necessity, to critically and ruthlessly
separate appetites from real requirements, those things that
are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are
truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the
missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead.
As I've said before, we will not be able to do everything,
buy everything. While we have all spoken at length about these
issues, I believe now is the time to take action. I promise you
that as long as I remain in this post I will focus on creating
a unified defense strategy that determines our budget
priorities. This, after all, is about more than just dollars.
It goes to the heart of our national security.
I will need help from the other stakeholders, from industry
and from you, the Members of Congress. It is one thing to speak
broadly about the need for budget discipline and acquisition
reform. It is quite another to make tough choices about
specific weapons systems and defense priorities based solely on
national interests and then to stick to those decisions over
time. The President and I need your help, as all of us together
do what is best for America as a whole in making those
decisions.
I have no illusions that all of this will be solved while
I'm at the Pentagon. Indeed, even if I am somewhat successful
on the institutional side, the benefits of these changes may
not be visible for years. My hope, however, is to draw a line
and from here forward make systemic progress to put the
Department on a glide path for future success.
I look forward to working with each of you to gain your
insight and your recommendations along the way. Once again, I
thank you for all you've done to support the DOD and the men
and women wearing our Nation's uniform.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide an overview of challenges
facing the Department of Defense (DOD) and some of my priorities for
the coming year. In doing so, I am mindful that the new administration
has only been in place for a few days and new or changing policies will
likely arise in coming months. Later this spring, I will present
President Obama's defense budget, and, at that time, will be better
equipped to discuss the details of his vision for the Department.
On a personal note, I want to thank many of you for your very kind
farewell remarks at my last hearing. I assure you that you are no more
surprised to see me back than I am. In the months ahead, I may need to
re-read some of those kind comments to remind myself of the warm
atmosphere up here as I was departing. Seriously, I am humbled by
President Obama's faith in me, and deeply honored to continue leading
the United States military. I thank the committee for your confidence
in my leadership and your enduring, steadfast support of the military.
I'd like to start by discussing our current operations before
moving on to my ongoing institutional initiatives.
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right
now is Afghanistan. The United States has focused more on Central Asia
in recent months. President Obama has made it clear that the
Afghanistan theater should be our top overseas military priority. The
ideology we face was incubated there when Afghanistan became a failed
state, and the extremists have largely returned their attention to that
region in the wake of their reversals in Iraq. As we have seen from
attacks across the globe--on September 11 and afterwards--the danger
reaches far beyond the borders of Afghanistan or Pakistan.
There are more than 40 nations, hundreds of nongovernmental
organizations, universities, development banks, the United Nations, the
European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and
more, involved in Afghanistan--all working to help a nation beset by
crushing poverty, a thriving drug trade fueling corruption, a ruthless
and resilient insurgency, and violent extremists of many stripes, not
the least of which is al Qaeda. Coordination of these international
efforts has been less than stellar, and too often the whole of these
activities has added up to less than the sum of the parts--a concern
I'm sure many of you share.
Based on our past experience in Afghanistan--and applicable lessons
from Iraq--there are assessments underway that should provide an
integrated way forward to achieve our goals.
As in Iraq, there is no purely military solution in Afghanistan.
But it is also clear that we have not had enough troops to provide a
baseline level of security in some of the most dangerous areas--a
vacuum that increasingly has been filled by the Taliban. That is why
the U.S. is considering an increase in our military presence, in
conjunction with a dramatic increase in the size of the Afghan security
forces. Because of the multi-faceted nature of the fight--and because
of persistent International Security Assistance Force shortfalls for
training teams--all combat forces, whether international or American,
will have a high level of counterinsurgency training, which was not
always the case.
In the coming year, I also expect to see more coherence as efforts
to improve civil-military coordination gain traction--allowing us to
coordinate Provincial Reconstruction Teams in a more holistic fashion,
both locally and regionally. There will be an increased focus on
efforts at the district level, where the impact of both our military
and rebuilding efforts will be felt more concretely by the Afghan
people, who will ultimately be responsible for the future of their
nation.
While this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight, we can
attain what I believe should be among our strategic objectives: an
Afghan people who do not provide a safe haven for al Qaeda, reject the
rule of the Taliban, and support the legitimate government that they
elected and in which they have a stake.
Of course, it is impossible to disaggregate Afghanistan and
Pakistan, given the porous border between them. I do believe that the
Pakistani Government is aware of the existential nature of the threat
emanating from the federally Administered Tribal Areas. The U.S.
military knows firsthand how difficult it is to wage counterinsurgency
with a force designed for large-scale, mechanized warfare--a fact
complicated by Pakistan's recent tensions with India. Pakistan is a
friend and partner, and it is necessary for us to stay engaged--and
help wherever we can. I can assure you that I am watching Pakistan
closely, and that we are working with State, Treasury, and all parts of
the government to fashion a comprehensive approach to the challenges
there.
IRAQ AFTER STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and Iraq
went into effect on January 1. The agreement calls for U.S. combat
troops to be out of Iraqi cities by the end of June, and all troops out
of Iraq by the end of 2011, at the latest. It balances the interests of
both countries as we see the emergence of a sovereign Iraq in full
control of its territory. Provincial elections in just a few days are
another sign of progress.
The SOFA marks an important step forward in the orderly drawdown of
the American presence. It is a watershed--a firm indication that
American military involvement is winding down. Even so, I would offer a
few words of caution. Though violence has remained low, there is still
the potential for setbacks--and there may be hard days ahead for our
troops.
As our military presence decreases over time, we should still
expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many years to come--
assuming a sovereign Iraq continues to seek our partnership. The
stability of Iraq remains critical to the future of the Middle East, a
region that multiple presidents of both political parties have
considered vital to the national security of the United States.
NORTH KOREA, IRAN, AND PROLIFERATION
Beyond these operations, one of the greatest dangers we continue to
face is the toxic mix of rogue nations, terrorist groups, and nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons. North Korea and Iran present uniquely
vexing challenges in this regard. North Korea has produced enough
plutonium for several atomic bombs; Iran is developing the capabilities
needed to support a nuclear weapons program. North Korea's conventional
capability continues to degrade as it becomes more antiquated and
starved--in some cases literally--for resources and support. Both
countries have ballistic missile programs of increasing range and a
record of proliferation.
The regional and nuclear ambitions of Iran continue to pose
enormous challenges to the U.S. Yet I believe there are non-military
ways to blunt Iran's power to threaten its neighbors and sow
instability throughout the Middle East. The lower price of oil deprives
Iran of revenues and, in turn, makes U.N. economic sanctions bite
harder. In addition, there is the growing self-sufficiency and
sovereignty of Iraq, whose leaders--including Iraqi Shia--have shown
they do not intend for the new, post-Saddam Iraq to become a satrapy of
its neighbor to the east. This situation provides new opportunities for
diplomatic and economic pressure to be more effective than in the past.
On North Korea, the Six-Party Talks have been critical in producing
some forward momentum--especially with respect to North Korea's
plutonium production--although I don't think anyone can claim to be
completely satisfied with the results so far. These talks do offer a
way to curtail and hopefully eliminate its capacity to produce more
plutonium or to enrich uranium, and reduce the likelihood of
proliferation. Our goal remains denuclearization, but it is still to be
seen whether North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear ambitions
entirely.
RUSSIA AND CHINA
Even as the DOD improves America's ability to meet unconventional
threats, the United States must still contend with the challenges posed
by the military forces of other countries--from the actively hostile,
to rising powers at strategic crossroads. The security challenges faced
by other nation-states is real, but significantly different than during
the last century.
The Russian invasion of Georgia last year was a reminder that the
Russian military is a force to be reckoned with in Eastern Europe and
the Caucasus. We should not, however, confuse Russia's attempt to
dominate its ``near abroad'' with an ideologically driven campaign to
dominate the globe--as was the case during the Cold War. The country's
conventional military, although much improved since its nadir in the
late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. Saddled with
demographic and budget pressures, the Russians have concentrated on
improving their strategic and nuclear forces, but recently have begun
to devote more attention to their conventional capabilities.
As we know, China is modernizing across the whole of its armed
forces. The areas of greatest concern are Chinese investments and
growing capabilities in cyber- and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and
anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Modernization
in these areas could threaten America's primary means of projecting
power and helping allies in the Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets,
and the networks that support them.
We have seen some improvement in the U.S.-Chinese security
relationship recently. Last year, I inaugurated a direct telephone link
with the Chinese defense ministry. Military to military exchanges
continue, and we have begun a strategic dialogue to help us understand
each other's intentions and avoid potentially dangerous
miscalculations.
As I've said before, the U.S. military must be able to dissuade,
deter, and, if necessary, respond to challenges across the spectrum--
including the armed forces of other nations. On account of Iraq and
Afghanistan, we would be hard pressed at this time to launch another
major ground operation. But elsewhere in the world, the United States
has ample and untapped combat power in our naval and air forces, with
the capacity to defeat any adversary that committed an act of
aggression--whether in the Persian Gulf, on the Korean Peninsula, or in
the Taiwan Strait. The risk from these types of scenarios cannot be
ignored, but it is a manageable one in the short- to mid-term.
WOUNDED WARRIOR CARE
Apart from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, my highest priority as
Secretary of Defense is improving the outpatient care and transition
experience for troops that have been wounded in combat.
Since February 2007, when we learned about the substandard out-
patient facilities at Walter Reed, the Department has implemented a
number of measures to improve health care for our wounded, ill, and
injured servicemembers. We have acted on some 530 recommendations put
forth by several major commissions and the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2008. Notable progress includes:
Working closely with the Department of Veterans
Affairs to better share electronic health data and track
patients' long-term recovery process;
Dedicating new facilities, with the help of private
partners, such as the national intrepid centers in Bethesda,
MD, and San Antonio, TX; and
Improving overall case management through programs
such as the Army's ``Warrior Transition Units'' that shepherd
injured soldiers back to their units or help them transition to
veteran status.
More than 3,200 permanent cadre are now dedicated to soldiers
assigned to warrior transition units, and they have cared for more than
21,000 men and women thus far. I have personally visited these units at
Fort Bliss, TX, and Fort Campbell, KY.
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury
(TBI), and associated ailments are, and will continue to be, the
signature military medical challenge facing the Department for years to
come. We have made some strides to reduce the stigma associated with
the scars of war, both seen and unseen. For instance, last February,
the Army Inspector General identified a disturbing trend: Troops were
hesitant to get help for mental health because they were worried about
the impact on their security clearance, and perhaps their career. To
resolve this problem, we worked with our interagency partners to change
``Question 21'' on the government security clearance application so
that, as a general matter, it excludes counseling related to service in
combat, including PTSD. Put simply, mental health treatment, in and of
itself, will not be a reason to revoke or deny a security clearance.
We have invested more than $300 million in research for TBI
prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and recovery. The Department created
a comprehensive TBI registry and thus now has a single point of
responsibility to track incidents and recovery. In the last year, we've
added more than 220 new mental-health providers to treatment facilities
across the country.
The Services are doing more to address mental health needs. The
Marine Corps is, for instance, embedding Operational Stress Control and
Readiness teams in front-line units to better channel medical attention
to those who need help quickly. All the Services have 24-hour ``hot
lines'' available to troops. Health-care providers are being trained to
better identify the first signs of psychological trauma.
We are addressing PTSD and related injuries on a number of fronts
and have made much progress. But not every servicemember returning from
Iraq and Afghanistan is getting the treatment he or she needs. I
believe we have yet to muster and coordinate the various legal, policy,
medical, and budget resources across the Department to address these
types of injuries.
Considerable work remains as we institutionalize what has been
successful and recalibrate what still falls short. The Disability
Evaluation System (DES) is a useful example. In November 2007, a pilot
program was launched to streamline the DES by providing a VA rating to
be used by both DOD and VA. Approximately 900 servicemembers are
currently enrolled in the pilot program, and it has enabled us to
reduce the time required to determine their disability rating and, more
importantly, to alleviate some frustration caused by a needlessly
complex process.
Overall, I remain concerned that our wounded warriors are still
subjected to a system that is designed to serve the general military
beneficiary population--the overwhelming majority of whom have not been
injured in combat. Earlier this month, we implemented a policy that
allows the Secretaries of the Services to expedite troops through the
DES who have combat-related illnesses or injuries that are
catastrophic. Nonetheless, we must give serious consideration to how we
can better address the unique circumstances facing our servicemembers
with combat-related ailments.
As long as I am Secretary of Defense, I will continue to work to
improve treatment and care for every single wounded warrior.
GROUND FORCE EXPANSION AND STRESS ON THE FORCE
In an effort to meet our Nation's commitments and relieve stress on
our force and their troops' families, the Department continues to
expand the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps--growth that began
in 2007 and will continue for several years.
The Army exceeded both recruiting and retention goals for fiscal
year 2008, and is on path to achieve its goal of an active duty end
strength of 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year. It will continue to
increase the number of active Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) with a
goal of moving from 40 to 42 BCTs this year and towards an end goal of
48 BCTs.
Despite having fallen 5 percent short of its retention goal, the
Marine Corps is on track to meet its end strength goal of 202,000 by
the end of this fiscal year.
In all, the Army and Marine Corps are undergoing the largest
increase to their active ranks in some four decades. The expectation is
that, with a larger total force, individual troops and units will, over
time, deploy less frequently with longer dwell times at home. The goal
for the Army is 3 years off for every year of deployment. The expected
reduction of American troops in Iraq could be offset by proposed
increases in Afghanistan, so it may take some time before we reach that
goal. The Services are carefully managing their growth to ensure that
it is consistent with the high standards expected from an All-Volunteer
Force.
NATIONAL GUARD
As a result of the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, the role of the
National Guard in America's defense has transformed from being a
Strategic Reserve to being part of the pool of forces available for
deployments.
In view of the National Guard's growing operations and homeland
security responsibilities, and to elevate the Guard in deliberations
over policy and budget, I am pleased to say that the chief of the
National Guard Bureau is now a full general. Another senior Guard
officer recently became Northern Command's Deputy Commander, also a
historic first that I hope will pave the way for a Guard officer to one
day head that command.
One of the challenges we face is to see that, to the extent
possible, the Guard's critical domestic responsibilities do not suffer
as a result of its operational missions. The demand for Guard support
of civil authorities here at home remains high: For example, the ``man-
days'' that Guardsmen have spent fighting fires, performing rescue and
recovery, and other duties increased by almost 60 percent in 2008 as
compared to 2007.
With the support of Congress, the Department has substantially
increased support for America's Reserve component--the Guard and
Reserves--which for decades had been considered a low priority for
equipment, training, and readiness. Today, the standard is that the
Guard and Reserves receive the same equipment as the active Force. For
fiscal year 2009, the base budget request included $6.9 billion to
continue to replace and repair the National Guard's equipment.
The panel created by Congress 4 years ago, the Punaro commission,
has been a useful spur to the Department's efforts to ensure that both
Reserve components are better trained, manned, and equipped for this
new era. We have taken, or are taking, action on more than 80 percent
of the commission's recommendations.
For example, the panel suggested a combined pay and personnel
system to fix problems stemming from the shift from the Reserve pay
system to the active Duty pay system. The Department is now launching
that integrated system.
Since taking this post I have tried to ease, to the extent
possible, the stress on our Reserve components by implementing
mobilization policies that are more predictable and conducive to unit
cohesion. We have provided greater predictability as to when a Guard
member will be deployed by establishing a minimum standard of 90 days
advance notice prior to mobilization. In practice, on average, the
notification time is about 270 days.
There is no longer a 24-month lifetime limit on deployment, but
each mobilization of National Guard and Reserve troops is now capped at
12 months. The goal is 5 years of dwell time for 1 year deployed. We
have made progress towards this goal but are not there yet. For
example, the ratio of dwell time to mobilization for the Army National
Guard this fiscal year is just over three to one.
Reliance upon the Reserve component for overseas deployment has
declined over time. For example, the percentage of Army soldiers
serving in Iraq and Afghanistan who are guardsmen or reservists is
about half what it was in summer 2005.
NUCLEAR STEWARDSHIP
I continue to believe that as long as other nations have nuclear
weapons, the U.S. must maintain an arsenal of some level. The
stewardship of that arsenal is perhaps the military's most sensitive
mission--with no margin for error.
That there should be any question in that regard is why recent
lapses in the handling of nuclear weapons and material were so grave.
They were evidence of an erosion in training, expertise, resources, and
accountability in this critical mission. They brought severe
consequences, starting at the unit level and reaching up to the top
leadership of the Air Force.
Nonetheless, despite the shortcomings of the past, I do believe the
U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable. The Air
Force has taken significant steps to improve its nuclear stewardship
by:
Streamlining the inspection process for nuclear
material to ensure that it is all handled properly;
Standing up a new headquarters office--Strategic
Deterrence and Nuclear Integration--that concentrates on policy
oversight and staff integration for nuclear programs. The
office's leader reports directly to the Air Force chief of
staff;
Creating a Global Strike Command, which has brought
all of the Air Force's nuclear-capable bombers and
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles under one entity; and
Reassigning the supply chain for nuclear programs to
the complete control of the Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland
Air Force Base, which is being overhauled and expanded.
A task force headed by former Energy and Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger has now reported that it has identified many trends, both
recent and long-term, that may warrant corrective action. Among its
recommendations:
A new Assistant Secretary of Defense for deterrence to
oversee nuclear management; and
Develop and maintain a strategic roadmap to modernize
and sustain our nuclear forces.
I will be evaluating all of the Schlesinger Commission
recommendations along with the new Service Secretaries and Defense
team.
DEFENDING SPACE AND CYBERSPACE
The full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities on land, sea, and
air now depend on digital communications and the satellites and data
networks that support them. Our communications, navigation, weather,
missile warning, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems rely on
unfettered access to space. At the same time, more nations--about 60 in
all--are active in space, and there are more than 800 satellites in
orbit. The importance of space defense was highlighted during my first
year in this job when the Chinese successfully tested an anti-satellite
weapon.
In an effort to maintain our technological edge and protect access
to this critical domain, we will continue to invest in joint space-
based capabilities such as infrared systems and global positioning
systems. Air Force Space Command has nearly 40,000 personnel dedicated
to monitoring space assets and is training professionals in this career
field.
With cheap technology and minimal investment, current and potential
adversaries operating in cyberspace can inflict serious damage to DOD's
vast information grid--a system that encompasses more than 15,000
local, regional, and wide-area networks, and approximately 7 million
information technology devices. DOD systems are constantly scanned and
probed by outside entities, but we have developed a robust network
defense strategy. We will continue to defend our systems against
network attacks, intrusions, and other incidents.
It is noteworthy that Russia's relatively crude ground offensive
into Georgia was preceded by a sophisticated cyber attack. The massive
cyber attack suffered by Estonia in 2007, which I discussed with our
partners during a recent visit there, illustrates how quickly malicious
hackers can bring even a technologically-sophisticated government to a
standstill. To learn from this experience and share technological know-
how, the U.S. Government is co-sponsoring the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defense Center of Excellence.
WARTIME PROCUREMENT
When we are at war, I believe the overriding priority of the DOD
and military Services should be to do everything possible to provide
troops in the field everything they need to be successful. To place our
defense bureaucracies on a war footing with a wartime sense of urgency,
I have accelerated procurement of a number of capabilities, notably:
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)--
specifically, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs); and
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.
UASs have become one of the most critical capabilities in our
military. They give troops the tremendous advantage of seeing full-
motion, real-time, streaming video over a target--such as an insurgent
planting an improvised explosive device (IED). Last April, I launched a
Department-wide taskforce to speed additional UASs to theater and to
ensure we were getting maximum use out of the assets already there.
Since then, the Air Force has:
Increased Predator air patrols by nearly 30 percent;
Opened a second school to train personnel on UASs;
Created a career track for UASs; and
For the first time, allowed non-rated officers to
operate UASs.
We've also seen how relatively low cost, off-the-shelf technology
can have a huge impact on the battlefield. The Army's Task Force Odin
resulted in a dramatic increase in the amount of full-motion video
available to commanders in Iraq. We are in the process of trying to
replicate those successes in Afghanistan. As part of the effort to
increase ISR, we are fielding more than 50 turboprop aircraft outfitted
with sensors.
In Iraq, the majority of our combat deaths and injuries have been a
result of road-side bombs, IEDs, and explosively-formed penetrators.
The casualty rate from an attack on an MRAP vehicle is less than one-
third that of Humvees, and less than half that of an Abrams tank. In
May 2007, I directed the Department to make MRAP vehicles our top
acquisition priority, and, with extraordinary help from Congress, the
Department has sent more than 12,000 MRAP vehicles to theater. The Army
is currently developing a lighter version of the MRAP vehicle better
suited for the difficult terrain of Afghanistan.
The MRAP vehicle and ISR experiences raise a broader concern about
wartime acquisition. In the past, modernization programs have sought a
99 percent solution over a period of years, rather than a 75 percent
solution over a period of weeks or months. Rather than forming ad hoc
groups to field capabilities like UASs and MRAP vehicles, we must
figure out how to institutionalize procurement of urgently-needed
resources in wartime.
One option is to continue to spin out components of large-scale,
long-term modernization projects in real time for early field testing
and use in ongoing operations, then fold the results into longer-term
product development. We are doing so in Afghanistan and Iraq with Small
Unmanned Ground Vehicles, a component the Army's Future Combat Systems
(FCSs) used to clear caves, search bunkers, or cross minefields. Such
field testing ensures that a program like FCS--whose total cost could
exceed $200 billion if completely built out--will continue to
demonstrate its value for both conventional and unconventional
scenarios.
DEFENSE ACQUISITION
As I focused on the wars these past 2 years, I ended up punting a
number of procurement decisions that I believed would be more
appropriately handled by my successor and a new administration. Well,
as luck would have it, I am now the receiver of those punts--and in
this game there are no fair catches.
Chief among institutional challenges facing the Department is
acquisitions--broadly speaking, how we acquire goods and services and
manage the taxpayers' money. Congress, and this committee in
particular, have rightly been focused on this issue for some time. The
economic crisis makes the problem even more acute. Allow me to share a
few general thoughts.
There are a host of issues that have led us to where we are,
starting with longstanding systemic problems:
Entrenched attitudes throughout the government are
particularly pronounced in the area of acquisition: a risk-
averse culture, a litigious process, parochial interests,
excessive and changing requirements, budget churn and
instability, and sometimes adversarial relationships within the
DOD and between DOD and other parts of the government.
At the same time, acquisition priorities have changed
from Defense Secretary to Defense Secretary, administration to
administration, and Congress to Congress--making any sort of
long-term procurement strategy on which we can accurately base
costs next to impossible.
Add to all of this the difficulty in bringing in
qualified senior acquisition officials. Over the past 8 years,
for example, the DOD has operated with an average percentage of
vacancies in the key acquisition positions ranging from 13
percent in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force.
Thus the situation we face today, where a small set of expensive
weapons programs has had repeated--and unacceptable--problems with
requirements, schedule, cost, and performance.
While the number of overturned procurements as a result of protests
remains low in absolute numbers--13 out of more than three and a half
million contract actions in fiscal year 2008--highly publicized issues
persist in a few of the largest programs. The same is true of cost
over-runs, where five programs account for more than half of total cost
growth. The list of big-ticket weapons systems that have experienced
contract or program performance problems spans the Services: the Air
Force tanker, CSAR-X, VH-71, Osprey, FCS, Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter, Littoral Combat Ship, Joint Strike Fighter, and so on.
Since the end of World War II, there have been nearly 130 studies
on these problems--to little avail. I mention all this because I do not
believe there is a silver bullet, and I do not think the system can be
reformed in a short period of time--especially since the kinds of
problems we face date all the way back to our first Secretary of War,
whose navy took three times longer to build than was originally planned
at more than double the cost.
That said, I do believe we can make headway, and I have already
begun addressing these issues:
First, I believe that the fiscal year 2010 budget must
make hard choices. Any necessary changes should avoid across-
the-board adjustments, which inefficiently extend all programs.
We have begun to purchase systems at more efficient
rates for the production lines. I believe we can combine budget
stability and order rates that take advantage of economies of
scale to lower costs.
I will pursue greater quantities of systems that
represent the ``75 percent'' solution instead of smaller
quantities of ``99 percent,'' exquisite systems.
While the military's operations have become very
joint--and impressively so--budget and procurement decisions
remain overwhelmingly service-centric. To address a given risk,
we may have to invest more in the future-oriented program of
one service and less in that of another service--particularly
when both programs were conceived with the same threat in mind.
We must freeze requirements on programs at contract
award and write contracts that incentivize proper behavior.
I feel that many programs that cost more than
anticipated are built on an inadequate initial foundation. I
believe the Department should seek increased competition, use
of prototypes, and ensure technology maturity so that our
programs are ready for the next phases of development.
Finally, we must restore the Department's acquisition
team. I look forward to working with Congress to establish a
necessary consensus on the need to have adequate personnel
capacity in all elements of the acquisition process. On that
note, I thank you for continuing to give us the funding,
authorities, and support to sustain our growth plan for the
defense acquisition workforce.
CONCLUSION
As we look ahead to the important work that we have in front of us,
I would leave you with the following thoughts.
I have spent the better part of the last 2 years focused on the
wars we are fighting today, and making sure that the Pentagon is doing
everything possible to ensure that America's fighting men and women are
supported in battle and properly cared for when they return home.
Efforts to put the bureaucracy on a war footing have, in my view,
revealed underlying flaws in the institutional priorities, cultural
preferences, and reward structures of America's defense establishment--
a set of institutions largely arranged to plan for future wars, to
prepare for a short war, but not to wage a protracted war. The
challenge we face is how well we can institutionalize the irregular
capabilities gained and means to support troops in theater that have
been, for the most part, developed ad hoc and funded outside the base
budget.
This requires that we close the yawning gap between the way the
defense establishment supports current operations and the way it
prepares for future conventional threats. Our wartime needs must have a
home and enthusiastic constituencies in the regular budgeting and
procurement process. Our procurement and preparation for conventional
scenarios must, in turn, be driven more by the actual capabilities of
potential adversaries, and less by what is technologically feasible
given unlimited time and resources.
The choices we make will manifest themselves in how we train, whom
we promote, and, of course, how we spend. As I mentioned, President
Obama will present his budget later this spring. One thing we have
known for many months is that the spigot of defense funding opened by
September 11 is closing. With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic
crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this
department.
But for all the difficulties we face, I believe this moment also
presents an opportunity--one of those rare chances to match virtue to
necessity. To critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real
requirements--those things that are desirable in a perfect world from
those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America
faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead.
As I've said before, we will not be able to ``do everything, buy
everything.'' While we have all spoken at length about these issues, I
believe now is the time to take action. I promise you that as long as I
remain in this post I will focus on creating a unified defense strategy
that determines our budget priorities. This is, after all, about more
than just dollars: It goes to the heart of our national security.
I will need help from the other stakeholders--from industry, and
from you, the Members of Congress. It is one thing to speak broadly
about the need for budget discipline and acquisition reform. It is
quite another to make tough choices about specific weapons systems and
defense priorities based solely on national interests, and then to
stick to those decisions over time. The President and I need your help
as all of us together do what is best for America as a whole in making
those decisions.
I have no illusions that all of this will be solved while I am at
the Pentagon. Indeed, even if I am somewhat successful on the
institutional side, the benefits of these changes may not be visible
for years. My hope, however, is to draw a line and make systemic
progress--to put the Department on a glide path for future success.
I look forward to working with each of you to gain your insight and
recommendations along the way. Once more, I thank you for all you've
done to support the DOD and the men and women wearing our Nation's
uniform.
I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
We're going to have a 6-minute round of questions. We have
a lot of members here. I don't know that we'll be able to get
to a second round. That's going to depend on how quickly the
first round goes. But we'll have to limit the first round to 6
minutes.
Mr. Secretary, what is the relationship between the speed
of our force drawdown in Iraq and the speed of our force
increase in Afghanistan? Let me put it another way more
specifically. What is the earliest that a first, second, third,
and fourth additional combat brigade can deploy to Afghanistan,
and why is this driven by our force rotation strategy in Iraq?
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, at this point I think that
we are actually in a position to address most of General
McKiernan's requirements in the relatively near future. Should
the President make the decision to, the final decision to
deploy additional brigades to Afghanistan, we could have two of
those brigades there probably by late spring and potentially a
third by mid-summer.
Quite honestly, in terms of the remaining requests that he
has, the infrastructure requirements that are needed in
Afghanistan, to be able to support and sustain a force that
size would probably make it not possible for us to deploy them
before they would be ready in any event later this year.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
The SOFA with Iraq requires that U.S. forces withdraw from
Iraqi cities and towns by the end of June. Approximately how
many of the 140,000 troops that we have in Iraq are affected by
that repositioning requirement?
Secretary Gates. I don't know the answer to that, Mr.
Chairman. I'll get it for you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) requires that combat forces
withdraw from Iraqi cities and towns by the end of June. Withdrawing
U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities will impact approximately 13,000
U.S. troops.
In order to comply with that provision in the SOFA, as well as
other provisions related to forces and basing, the United States and
Iraq have established two joint subcommittees within the SOFA committee
framework: the Joint Subcommittee for Agreed Facilities and Areas and
the Joint Subcommittee for Military Operations, Training and Logistics
to negotiate, among other items, specific procedures for the turnover
of bases and the repositioning of U.S. forces. Because those
negotiations are ongoing, it has not yet been determined precisely how
many U.S. forces or which bases will be affected by the requirement to
reposition forces.
We have been working and will continue to work with the Government
of Iraq (GOI) to ensure full compliance with all provisions of the
SOFA, including the requirement to remove combat forces from cities and
towns within the prescribed timeline. While those negotiations are
ongoing, U.S. forces have already begun closing some bases and turning
others over to the GOI, including some bases that previously held U.S.
forces within Iraqi cities and towns. We are ahead of schedule to meet
the 30 June 2009 deadline for combat forces to be out of urban areas,
and working on an agreement with the GOI on which bases and forces may
remain in those areas.
Since December 2008, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) has either
closed or returned 11 bases, comprising 30 percent of the 37 bases that
MNC-I identified in urban areas. This ongoing effort will impact
approximately 13,000 U.S. troops. The remaining 26 bases to close or
return remain on schedule with no issues identified to meet the June
2009 deadline.
Supporting information:
At risk bases in December 2008: 32 Contingency Operating
Locations, 5 Contingency Operation Sites
Thru 28 Feb 09 - Close/transferred 11 bases - impacting 4,000
troops
Remaining bases:
MND-N - 13 bases and 3,800 troops
MND-B - 10 bases and 3,500 troops
MNID-C - 1 base and 200 troops
MND-SE - 1 base and 1 facility and 100 troops
MNF-W - 1 base and 200 troops
Total estimated troop impact = 13,000 troops
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, last month, December 9, I
sent you two letters regarding proposed contracts that seem to
pave the way for a significant increase in the use of private
security contractors (PSCs) in Afghanistan. I expressed concern
in those letters about these steps and I laid out a number of
those concerns: the extent to which the use of deadly force to
protect government facilities and personnel should be an
inherently governmental function that should not be performed
by contractors; the requirement for proper oversight and
supervision of PSCs; what are the rules applicable under the
law of war to PSCs who exercise deadly force?
I urged you not to enter those contracts until those
questions and other questions had been resolved. I haven't
received an answer yet to those letters, but let me ask some of
the questions here this morning.
Do you intend to conduct the requested review of the
appropriate use of PSCs in a battlefield situation before those
contracts are entered into?
Secretary Gates. We will probably be doing them
simultaneously, Mr. Chairman. We have the need for these
protective capabilities in Afghanistan. They guard convoys,
they guard some of our facilities. Frankly, until we can get
additional U.S. troops into Afghanistan these capabilities are
necessary. We are creating the supervisory structure in Iraq
that we developed over the course of the last year--I'm sorry,
in Afghanistan, that we developed over the course of the last
year or so, in Iraq to ensure that the commander on the field
sets the guidelines and the rules for the employment of these
security forces.
I would say that, of all the security forces, contract
security forces in Afghanistan at this point, I think only nine
are U.S. citizens. The rest or almost all the rest are Afghans.
Chairman Levin. If we could get quick answers to those
letters of mine, I'd appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Wall Street Journal reported this morning that the U.S.
military has come into conflict with PSCs in Afghanistan,
Afghan-hired companies, on a number of occasions. According to
the article, these PSCs have generally been hired either by
Afghan authorities or by private companies, and that some of
the employees may actually be taking orders from Taliban
forces.
How serious a problem do you think this is?
Secretary Gates. This is the first I've heard of it, Mr.
Chairman. Let me check into it.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Last week, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry issued a statement
calling U.S. missile strikes on population territory
counterproductive and requesting that they be discontinued.
What's your reaction to that?
Secretary Gates. I think that the strikes that are being
undertaken are--well, let me just say both President Bush and
President Obama have made clear that we will go after al Qaeda
wherever al Qaeda is, and we will continue to pursue that.
Chairman Levin. Has that decision been transmitted to the
Pakistan Government?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Gates, some time ago, I think it
was end of 2007, you had discussions with your Russian
counterpart on proposals for missile defense cooperation, at
least the possibilities of that cooperation, and certain
proposals were formulated with the assistance of your
Department, that were then presented to Russia.
Would you support further exploration with the Russians of
a possible cooperative arrangement in the area of missile
defense?
Secretary Gates. Sure. I think that there's real potential
there. I've outlined it to, first to President Putin and
subsequently to President Medvedev. I think there are some real
opportunities here. Russia is clearly not the target of our
missile defense endeavors. Iran is. We have a mutual concern
there. I think the Russians have an unrealistic view of the
time line when an Iranian missile with the range to attack much
of Russia and much of Europe will be available. But I am very
open to the idea of pursuing further cooperation on missile
defense with Russia.
Chairman Levin. Is that also the position of the Obama
administration as far as you know?
Secretary Gates. Frankly, the subject has not been
discussed as far as I know. I expect it'll be on the agenda
here pretty soon.
Chairman Levin. I had a very brief discussion with the
Secretary, the new Secretary of State, on this subject and I
think her thoughts are very similar to yours, and I think
that's good news.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, how large do you believe the ANA should be?
Secretary Gates. Well, we have, working with the Afghans,
have just agreed to an increase in the size of the Afghan army
from a nominal 80,000 to 134,000. I'm not sure that even that
number will be large enough, but I believe that our highest
priority needs to be increasing the size of that army and
training, and that army. I think we have money in the budget,
in the budget submissions that we have made, that would help us
accelerate that growth.
Senator McCain. That's a vital ingredient in any
comprehensive strategy for success in Afghanistan, a
dramatically increased Afghan army.
Secretary Gates. I couldn't agree more, Senator McCain.
I think that, as I've told our European allies, ultimately
a strong ANA and a capable, reasonably honest ANP represents
the exit ticket for all of us.
Senator McCain. Do you agree with the facts on the ground
that in Helmand and Kandahar Province the Taliban basically
operates fairly freely?
Secretary Gates. I must confess, Senator, that I get
different readings on the freedom of action that they have and
the success that they have between analysts here in Washington
and what I hear when I go into the field. When I
visited Kandahar late last year, all of the commanders
in Regional Command-South (RC-South) told me: ``The
situation here is no worse; it's just different.''
I'm not quite sure entirely what that means, but I believe
that the relatively open border that the chairman talked about
and the ability of not just the Taliban, but other insurgent
groups, to cross that border easily have created an environment
in which the Taliban have greater freedom of action than
they've had in the last couple of years.
Senator McCain. I think it's indicated by the charts that
map out the increases in attacks, particularly along the Ring
Road, that the Taliban attacks have been significantly
increased, particularly over the last 2 or 3 years. Do you have
any evidence that there are more or fewer Iranian-made weapons
or explosively-formed penetrator components going into Iraq?
Secretary Gates. My impression from the intelligence that I
have seen is that there is some modest increase, but overall
the number of Iranian weapons going into Afghanistan remains at
a relatively small level.
Senator McCain. What can you tell us about Iranian
involvement in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. I think the Iranians are trying to have it
both ways, to cultivate a close relationship with Afghanistan
and the Afghan Government for both political and economic
reasons and at the same time impose the highest possible costs
on ourselves and on our coalition partners.
Senator McCain. How serious is the issue of corruption in
the Afghan Government and society?
Secretary Gates. It is a very serious problem.
Senator McCain. It reaches the highest levels of
government?
Secretary Gates. I don't know about the highest levels of
government, but it certainly reaches into high levels of
government.
Senator McCain. We won't be able----
Secretary Gates. But it actually is as much the
pervasiveness as it is the level of officials that are involved
in the corruption that I think is a concern.
Senator McCain. We agree we won't be able to achieve our
goals in Afghanistan without addressing the drug problem?
Secretary Gates. I think that's right, and I think that
that was one of the reasons why at the defense ministerial last
December Minister Wardak, on behalf of the Afghan Government,
requested NATO's help in going after the drug lords and the
rules of engagement (ROE) for those NATO nations willing to
participate. He said that where there's a link between drug
lords and drug labs and support for the Taliban that their
troops were authorized to go after them both.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Do you have all the legislative authorities you require to
go after the drug labs and the drug lords in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. We have changed our own ROE just in recent
weeks to try and make sure that our commanders have that
authority. I think we ought to let it play out for a few months
and if we find that we need legislative help we'll be right up
here asking for it.
Senator McCain. Do you believe we can count on the Afghan
central government to seriously address the drug problem during
the upcoming election period?
Secretary Gates. Probably not.
Senator McCain. Is it going to take some pretty careful
balancing of withdrawals from Iraq and at the same time a
buildup in Afghanistan to prevent a very difficult stress on
our combat troops?
Secretary Gates. It does require a careful balancing, but I
think we are on the right path. The estimates that I've been
given are that by the end of fiscal year 2009 we should be in a
position where our brigade combat teams have a year deployed
and 15 months at home, in fiscal year 2010 a year deployed, 2
years at home, and by fiscal year 2011 a year deployed, 30
months at home.
So I think we're on the right track. The next few months
will continue to be hard. The last units that have the 15 month
deployments will be coming home I think by late spring or early
summer.
Senator McCain. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Gates. Welcome back. Thanks for coming
back.
I'd like to begin with a few questions about Iraq. I
appreciate what you said in your opening statement, that we've
taken important steps forward in the orderly drawdown of the
American presence, that American military involvement is
winding down. Even so, words of caution. There's still the
potential for setbacks. This is not an irreversible situation.
I know that last week President Obama convened the NSAs and
there was discussion about the pace of withdrawal. I gather
that you have been charged, along with our military leaders, to
consider various options for withdrawal from Iraq. Could you
describe those to the committee?
Secretary Gates. Well, I would just say that there is--we
are working on a range of options for the President that range
from a withdrawal of--essentially, a completion of the work of
the brigade combat teams and a translation to an assist and
advisory role, beginning in 16 months and then at various
intervals proceeding further forward from that. We're drawing
those out for him along with the risks attendant to each.
Senator Lieberman. So my interpretation of your comments is
that the plans range from the 16 months where there would be no
combat forces left in Iraq to an outer point at the end of
2011, corresponds with the end of the SOFA?
Secretary Gates. Yes, we're looking at all of those.
Senator Lieberman. Previously, many of us on this committee
urged you and others to give a lot of attention and respect
with regard to decisions of action in Iraq to the commanders on
the ground. I assume, but I wanted to ask you, that General
Odierno will have a significant part of the discussion of the
various options for withdrawal from Iraq?
Secretary Gates. Senator, it's been my approach since I
took this job that on all these major decisions I believe it is
important for the President to hear directly from his senior
military commanders. So in every one of these decisions I have
structured a process so that the President hears from the
ground commander, who would be General Odierno, the Central
Command (CENTCOM) Commander, General Petraeus in this case, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then from the Chairman and
myself.
President Obama has agreed to that same kind of approach. I
think you've read in the newspapers he's coming over to the
Pentagon tomorrow to meet with the Chiefs. So I believe the
President will have had every opportunity to hear quite
directly from his commanders about what they can accomplish and
what the attendant risks are under different options.
Senator Lieberman. That's very reassuring. I thank you for
that.
Let me ask a quick question or two about Afghanistan.
Clearly one of the lessons we all learned, as your testimony
indicates this morning, is that there's no purely military
solution to these kinds of conflicts, Iraq or Afghanistan, and
one of the great prefaces to our success in Iraq was the
development of a nationwide civil-military plan. It's my
impression from my last trips to Afghanistan, twice last year,
that there still is no nationwide joint civil-military plan in
Afghanistan. Am I right about that, and if so why, and when can
we expect one?
Secretary Gates. Well, I think that part of the problem
that we face in Afghanistan is also a reflection of our
success. That is the number of partners that we have. As I
mentioned in my testimony, we have 40 some countries, the U.N.,
the EU, NATO, hundreds of NGOs. So there are a lot of people
trying to help Afghanistan come out right. But figuring out how
to coordinate all of that and then how to coordinate it with
the military operations is a very complex business, and I think
a lot of the reviews that have been going on toward the end of
the last administration and now under this administration is to
figure out how do we get at that problem.
Our hope had been that--and I must say still has to be--
that the U.N. Senior Special Representative, Ambassador Kai
Eide, is perhaps in the best position to do this and finally,
after long delays, he has begun to get both the financial and
human resources from the U.N. that would enable him to do this.
We're also trying an experiment in RC-South where all of
the Nations who are participating in the security operations in
RC-South have committed to build a civil-military cell in the
headquarters of RC-South that would have civilian
representatives from each of our Governments, where there could
be better coordination of the civilian-military operations.
So I think we're going to have to experiment with some of
these things. But unlike in Iraq, where Ambassador Crocker and
General Petraeus were essentially able to put together an
integrated strategy because we were doing most of the work, the
situation is much more complex in Afghanistan.
Senator Lieberman. But you would say that ideally we should
be moving toward a unified and joint civil-military plan for
the whole country in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. A final question, very different. We're
obviously focused very much on an economic stimulus program
here in Congress now. We're looking directly at infrastructure
spending around the country because it's so-called ``shovel-
ready,'' creates jobs and moves throughout the economy. There
has been discussion about whether some defense projects might
also fit into that. The standard that President Obama has laid
out creates jobs, would be quick to go into the economy, and be
consistent with national goals.
I'm wondering how you feel about that. I'm not thinking
about getting into controversial programs, but things we're
going to have to spend money on anyway over the next 5, 6, or 7
years. Should we be thinking about accelerating investments in
those programs now?
Secretary Gates. We were asked to make a submission to the
White House of programs that fell within the guidelines of
being able to be started within a matter of months. We have
given them some suggestions in terms of military hospitals,
clinics, barracks, some child care centers, and things like
that, where we think the work could begin right away or is
already underway and could be accelerated.
Senator Lieberman. Well, I appreciate that. I hope that we
on the Senate side--I know in the House the number of military
projects in the stimulus is small relative to the size of the
package, and I hope we'll take another look at your list and
see if we can add some more.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To maximize my time, let me just ask unanimous consent that
the very kind remarks I made about Secretary Gates at the time
of his departure be made a part of the record today.
Chairman Levin. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary Gates, before I begin my questions, I add my personal
thanks to those already given by the chairman. You took office during
an uncertain time in the war in Iraq and successfully spearheaded plans
that have brought the stability that country enjoys today. You improved
conditions at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, making the necessary
changes in personnel and practices. I salute you for not just saying
that we have no higher priority than taking care of our wounded
warriors but for following through on those words. Finally, you
consistently listened to your commanders on the ground and gave credit
to military and their leaders for the success in Iraq, especially
Generals Petraeus and Odierno. You have done well and I wish you and
your family all the best in your future endeavors.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates, last July you had--I never
quite understood the position that you were taking relative to
increasing the State Department's authority and perhaps their
budget in terms of things that are quasi-military. Do you have
any thoughts on that that you'd like to share with us for
clarification?
The reason I ask that, there are some programs I feel very
strong about, strongly about, such as the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which was at
one time a program that had certain requirements. The idea was,
we're doing these countries a favor by training their people,
which I think they're doing us a favor, and then the expansion
of the 1206, 1207, 1208 train and equip, that these should
remain as DOD run programs.
Secretary Gates. I continue to agree with that. I think
they should be funded through the DOD. Program 1206 is
basically a dual-key program, where nothing goes forward
without the support of the Department of State, the Secretary
of State. We've done a lot of good things with that program in
Lebanon, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and elsewhere.
Program 1207 is more an initiative for the State
Department, but where the funding is in the DOD and we work
cooperatively with the State Department in implementing those
programs. Of course, 1208 has to do with Special Forces and
training.
So I think these are all very important programs and I
think that the approach that has been taken, heretofore, in the
way they've been managed, is the way they ought to continue to
be managed.
Senator Inhofe. That's good.
I've been concerned, as all of us have been up here, with
some of our ground capabilities, where we have the Abrams tank
and we have the Bradley Assault Vehicle, the Paladin, the
Stryker, all on different chassis and all of that. Then along
came the Future Combat System (FCS), and I think that there has
been a lot of discussion on it. It is on track right now where
we will have all of these systems with the same common chassis.
It seems to be working pretty well right now.
Do you maintain your commitment? I know tough decisions
have to be made, but I'd like to know where you would rank the
FCS in your priorities?
Secretary Gates. Well, one of the useful things that I
think the Army did last summer or fall was to reexamine the FCS
and see what capabilities being developed in FCS could be
accelerated and spun out for the use of forces in the field
today. I have seen some of those capabilities down at Fort
Bliss.
I think that in terms of the longer lead time items, along
with many other large-scale weapons systems, we're going to
have to take a close look at it and take a look at the other
elements of FCS. As we do the major programs of the other
services, see what can be made available, what is useful in
this spectrum of conflict from what I would call hybrid complex
wars to those of counterinsurgency, where you may encounter
high-end capabilities that have been sold to some of our
adversaries by near-peers, but they are in use in a conflict
such as we face in Afghanistan or in Iraq or perhaps elsewhere.
So I think all these things are going to have to be looked
at. I don't think anything's off the table at this point.
Senator Inhofe. I've appreciated some of the comments that
General Chiarelli has made concerning this. An area that has
not been brought up yet that I have a particular interest in is
AFRICOM. Of course, we worked through several years of the
continent of Africa being under the Pacific Command (PACOM),
the CENTCOM, and European Command. Now we have our own AFRICOM,
which I think is long overdue, but I'm glad we do.
However, I'm concerned with all the problems that are
there, that with the squeeze of terrorism in the Middle East
and a lot of it going down through Djibouti and the Horn of
Africa, that there are serious problems there. Everyone talks
about the Sudan, they're familiar with that, but there are
other problems like Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army
and what's happening with Mugabe down there.
My concern with AFRICOM is it doesn't seem as if they have
the resources that they need. I know there's a lot of
competition for these resources. General Ward is doing a great
job, General Wald before him was, and of course Admiral Mueller
is right in the middle of this. I would like to ask you to
maybe have your people evaluate the potential in AFRICOM and
then see what kind of resources they need.
Right now I know that they don't even have an airplane down
there to get back and forth. A lot of us had thought that the
headquarters should have been in Ethiopia or someplace on the
continent. However there's resistance down there to that.
So do you have any thoughts about AFRICOM and about their
lack of resources and how we might address that?
Secretary Gates. Well, it's a reality that we're having to
deal with. I would say this, though. As we have tried to help
African countries understand what we have in mind with AFRICOM
and the role that we would like for it to play in terms of
helping them create more democratically oriented, better
trained internal security and military forces and train them
for peacekeeping, train them to deal with humanitarian
missions, and so forth. Clearly our eagerness to present a
military face in terms of civil conflicts or conflicts between
states down there has been important.
Now, when it comes to al Qaeda I think General Ward does
have the resources that he needs in the Horn of Africa and
elsewhere. But this is something that we will have to continue
to look at.
I would say with respect to the headquarters, I made the
decision to leave the headquarters in Europe for the time, for
a 3 year period, because it seems to me what's key for AFRICOM
now is building relationships in Africa, and in 3 years we may
have a better idea of the kinds of relationships with other
countries that will allow us to move the headquarters of
AFRICOM onto the continent. I don't think that's possible right
now, so I didn't want to make a permanent decision about moving
the headquarters back to the United States.
Senator Inhofe. I think you did the right thing and I
appreciate that. But frankly, when you talk to President
Museveni and some of the presidents of these countries, they
think it would function better down there, but they can't sell
it to their own people. So that is where we are now.
My time has expired, but I hope you got the message I left
at your office that, while there are a lot of us on this panel,
and the President has talked about the closing of Guantanamo,
some of us don't think that's a good idea and we want to at
least be heard as well as the other side.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Secretary, let me join my colleagues in thanking
you for your continued selfless service to the Nation and the
men and women who wear the uniform of the United States, and
extend that appreciation to your family, who in a very real
sense serve with you. This is a singular act of patriotism.
We have many challenges and you have many challenges. With
respect to the transfer of resources from Iraq to Afghanistan,
it seems that it's not just a question of numbers of troops,
but it's also a question of the types of forces--engineers,
civil affairs, military police, those enablers that really
increase your effectiveness on the ground, and particularly
equipment like UAVs, which might in fact go a long way to help
the situation there.
Is there any thought of not just sheer numbers, but
increasing specialized units, increasing the number of UAVs,
special requests for that?
Secretary Gates. We have pretty dramatically increased the
number of ISR platforms in Afghanistan over the past 6 or 8
months. We are now in the process of standing up an Afghan
equivalent to Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and
Neutralize that in Iraq enjoyed considerable success in
locating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and people
planting IEDs. We're establishing that kind of capability. It
began last month to stand up in Afghanistan, particularly
focusing on the Ring Road.
The question you raise really is the more difficult
question raised by the chairman in his question in terms of the
tradeoffs. The tradeoff difficulty has been less actually at
the brigade combat teams and the Marine regiments than it has
been the enablers, the rotary lift capability, ISR, engineers,
and so on. That's where we've been working very hard in terms
of what can we afford to move from Iraq to Afghanistan or
remission instead of going to Iraq to go to Afghanistan.
Frankly, I think this is for the Joint Forces Command and
the folks on the Joint Staff, the biggest challenge about
strengthening our forces in Afghanistan, is really where to get
these enablers to ensure that the troops have what they need.
An aspect of this, for example, that I'm wrestling with
right now. Philosophically or in terms of the regulations or
however you want to put it, we have a different standard for
medical evacuation (MedEvac) in Afghanistan than we do in Iraq.
In Iraq our goal is to have a wounded soldier in a hospital in
an hour. It's closer to 2 hours in Afghanistan. So what we've
been working on the last few weeks is how do we get that
MedEvac standard in Afghanistan down to that golden hour.
Where our forces are thicker, in RC-South and RC-East,
that's probably more manageable than in the more scattered
areas of the north and west. But it's an example of the kind of
enablers and the kinds of support capabilities where we're
having to make some tough choices.
Senator Reed. Another aspect, there are so many with
respect to Afghanistan, but when there are incidents in combat
actions with collateral casualties, disputes about whether
they're civilians or whether they're just combatants, I think
having more of these type of enablers, particularly the
intelligence platforms, the UAVs, might minimize that. Is that
something that you've considered?
Secretary Gates. I think it would help. The truth of the
matter is I think 40 percent of the air missions that are
called in are called in by our allies, because they don't have
enough forces there. So this is not strictly an American
problem, if you will.
But I will tell you that I believe that the civilian
casualties are doing us enormous harm in Afghanistan, and we
have to do better in terms of avoiding casualties. I say that
knowing full well that the Taliban mingle among the people, use
them as barriers. But when we go ahead and attack, we play
right into their hands. We have to figure out a better way to
do these things or to have the Afghans in the lead, because my
worry is that the Afghans come to see us as part of their
problem rather than part of their solution, and then we are
lost.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, you stress continuously that
this is an interagency effort, that military action will buy
time, but without effective economic development, political
institution capacity-building, it will be a very difficult
challenge ahead. Can we expect legislative proposals and budget
proposals to truly energize other Federal agencies, the
Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture, et cetera?
Are you and your colleagues in the Cabinet working on that?
Secretary Gates. I have not yet had the opportunity to sit
down with Secretary Clinton and the others, but my impression
is that the Department of State is in fact going to have some
proposals that will be made a part of the remaining part of the
fiscal year 2009 supplemental.
Senator Reed. Again, thank you for your service, Mr.
Secretary.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, I was participating in one of my favorite
pastimes the other day, which is watching college basketball,
and I happened to be watching Texas and Texas A&M, and you
flashed through my mind and that you could have been sitting
there watching that basketball game instead of coming out of
the private sector and serving your country again, and for that
we are all grateful.
Secretary Gates. Probably a lot less stress here, Senator.
[Laughter.]
Senator Chambliss. They were wearing you out pretty good.
Your Aggies were struggling.
I could spend all my time talking to you about the F-22,
but you and I have been down this road over the last couple of
years and I know these hard choices that you're talking about
directly implicate that program, as well as the C-17, the
tanker program, and others. I know also that senior Air Force
officials are going to be briefing you on these programs and
their recommendations over the next couple of weeks.
So I'm not going to dwell on that, except to say, along the
lines of what Senator Lieberman alluded to, and that is from a
stimulus standpoint. We are wrestling with an issue that's
entirely outside the Pentagon relative to stimulating this
economy. But if you take any one of these programs--and I just
cite the F-22 program as an example. If we shut down that line,
we're talking about the loss of 95,000 jobs on top of the other
woes that we are looking at in the economy right now.
While there were a number of folks during the campaign who
talked about reduction in the defense budget, I would argue
very strongly for the opposite, that if we truly want to
stimulate the economy there is no better place to do it than in
defense spending. When you look at the specific programs that
are in place, you're talking about not only maintaining jobs,
but increasing jobs. As we look at, whether it's 16 months, 22
months or whatever, coming out of Iraq, there are going to be
issues relative to what sort of equipment you leave there
versus what you bring back. You have reset costs versus
acquisition costs.
So I think there are any number of factors that I hope you
will discuss in great detail with the President as you talk
about not only what we're going to do from an acquisition
standpoint, but from a stimulus standpoint when it comes to
truly stimulating our economy.
I want to go back to something also that Senator McCain
mentioned, and that is the Guantanamo issue. I am very
skeptical of what's going to happen down there. I don't have a
lot of confidence that the Europeans and other countries are
going to step up and take these hardened killers that we know
that are there. In addition to that, there's a whole separate
issue that he alluded to somewhat and that's the issue relative
to Bagram. I don't know whether we have any prisoners still at
Baqubah or not, but we have thousands of prisoners in Iraq
today that are not in Guantanamo.
What is the thinking of this administration, entirely
separate from Guantanamo, as to what we intend to do with those
prisoners?
Secretary Gates. Well, to take Iraq as an example, we have
released probably on the order of 16 or 17,000 detainees over
the course of the past year or so. Of course, those detainees
under the SOFA, those that remain will fall under the
jurisdiction of the Iraqi government pretty shortly, and we're
working out procedures to do that.
I'm heartened, in terms of the Afghan experience, we've
returned probably 500 prisoners overall to Afghanistan from
Guantanamo. The Afghans have put I think 200 of those on trial
and have a conviction rate of about 80 percent. So I think that
we will continue to work with the Afghan government in this
respect. But we certainly continue to hold detainees at Bagram.
We have about 615 there, I think something in that ballpark.
Senator Chambliss. How many of those that have been either
turned back to Afghanistan and not tried or have been found not
guilty that we know have returned to the battlefield?
Secretary Gates. I don't know the number for Afghanistan.
The recidivism numbers that I've been told until recently from
Guantanamo have been on the order of about 4 or 5 percent, but
there's been an uptick in that just over the last few months.
Senator Chambliss. May I ask you about Afghanistan. It's
really a two-part question. I have real concerns about
Afghanistan from a different perspective than Iraq. In Iraq at
least we have the potential for their economy to be rejuvenated
and I think it is being rejuvenated, primarily because of the
natural resources that they have, versus Afghanistan where we
don't have anything like that.
But unless we get their economy going again, it simply is
going to take a much longer period of time to ever hopefully
see some sort of peaceful Afghanistan. What is your thought
relative to the U.S. participation in stimulating that economy?
Second, there was a quote made by John Hutton, Britain's
defense secretary, the other day where he criticized members of
NATO. He said they were ``freeloading on the back of U.S.
military security.'' Do you think our NATO allies are doing
enough, and if not what do we need to be pushing them on?
Secretary Gates. I think that there are three areas where
our allies need to do more. I think that there is a need for
them to provide more caveat-free forces. I think that there is
a need for them to provide more civilian support in terms of
training and civil society. I also think they need to step up
to the plate in helping to defray the costs of expanding the
Afghan army. That cost is going to be probably $3 or $4 billion
in the first year or 2, a steady state somewhere around $2.5
billion. Total Afghan national government income this past year
was probably $800 million.
So this country is going to, as Senator McCain said, this
is going to be a long slog. Frankly, my view is that we need to
be very careful about the nature of the goals we set for
ourselves in Afghanistan. My own personal view is that our
primary goal is to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a
base for terrorists and extremists to attack the United States
and our allies. Whatever else we need to do flows from that
objective. Afghanistan is the third or fourth poorest country
in the world and if we set ourselves the objective of creating
some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose
because nobody in the world has that kind of time, patience, or
money, to be honest.
Now, we can help the Afghans. They are good farmers. They
do need a lot of technical help to modernize the way they go
about things. They have some minerals. So there is an economy
there to be developed. But it seems to me that we need to keep
our objectives realistic and limited in Afghanistan. Otherwise
we will set ourselves up for failure.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to add my welcome and gratitude to
you for your leadership of our Armed Forces and look forward to
working with you. My questions are not about Iraq and
Afghanistan, but more about the troops. As a strong advocate
for the readiness and quality of life for troops and their
families, I recognize that the ability of the Armed Forces to
attract and retain quality personnel to the future depends on
how we meet the needs of those serving today.
In 2008, Congress approved the Veterans Educational
Assistance Act of 2008, which is known as the 21st Century GI
Bill. This bill provides enhanced educational benefits for
veterans and servicemembers who have served in our Armed Forces
after September 11, 2001. Secretary Gates, the 21st Century GI
Bill grants authority for servicemembers to meet certain
criteria to transfer unused educational benefits to family
members.
What progress has DOD made with the VA in establishing
policy to implement this critical part of this bill across the
Services?
Secretary Gates. First of all, Senator Akaka, let me say,
with a nod to Senator Webb, I think that the bill as it finally
was passed really hit the sweet spot. Obviously, the economy is
helping us in recruitment over the last number of months, but
the surveys we've taken indicate that the enhanced educational
benefits have contributed to a greater willingness to enlist
and to enter the Armed Forces.
But the transferability provision that you just cited is
also an incentive in terms of retention, in terms of people
seeing this as an opportunity for their spouses or their
children. My understanding, I'm not exactly familiar, and we
can get you a precise answer, but my understanding is that the
transferability provisions are set to be put into practice this
fall, that the procedures are being worked out right now and
that the first availability of that transferability provision
would be this fall.
Senator Akaka. Yes, and we're looking forward to that
taking place in August.
Mr. Secretary, in May 2007, as a result of problems
identified at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, you and the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs established the Senior Oversight
Committee (SOC) to address the concerns of the treatment of
wounded, ill, and injured members of the armed services. Based
upon concerns about sustaining these efforts, the 2009 National
Defense Authorization Act directed the Departments to continue
the SOC's activities until December 2009.
I'm concerned that in the waning days of the Bush
administration the effort to achieve a united effort on behalf
of the wounded warriors became fragmented due to
interdepartmental differences on how best to organize the SOC.
As a result of DOD's reorganization, the VA now has to
coordinate its efforts through multiple offices within DOD.
I greatly value the efforts of SOC. Secretary Gates, do you
have your commitment to work with Secretary Shinseki to get
things back on track?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, Senator. In fact, I attended
Secretary Shinseki's swearing in and it was the first time we'd
had a chance to talk since he had been nominated and confirmed.
I told him at his swearing in that we needed to get the SOC
back up and running. I told him that one of my worries, as is
often the case with the bureaucracy, is that this thing has
been going on now for a year or a year and a half and it's done
some amazing things, but if you take away the energy and the
pressure from the top these things tend to get bureaucratic and
institutionalized again and the energy goes out of continuing
to make changes.
So we've just expanded the pilot program in terms of trying
to cut the time down on the disability evaluation system.
That's now expanded out of this metropolitan area into a number
of other areas. So I think it's important to keep the energy
going and the creativity in addressing the recommendations with
respect to wounded warriors, and Secretary Shinseki and I are
in total agreement that this special operations committee be
continued.
Senator Akaka. I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, if
you would get back to me in 30 days to let me know how you are
proceeding on that policy.
Secretary Gates. Sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to provide additional
details on the ongoing collaboration of the interagency Wounded, Ill,
and Injured Senior Oversight Committee (SOC). Through this
unprecedented union, the Department of Defense and Department of
Veterans Affairs are working to provide a seamless continuum of care
that is efficient and effective in meeting the needs of our wounded,
ill, and injured servicemembers, veterans, and their families.
We recently realigned our SOC functional leads and support staff to
provide permanency in our oversight of SOC taskings. The new
organization provides us an effective means of keeping senior
leadership focus on these important issues. In the near-term, Secretary
Shinseki and I plan to co-chair the SOC and we look forward to our
continued partnership in resolving wounded warrior issues.
Next to the war itself, providing care for our wounded, ill, and
injured servicemembers, veterans, and their families remains my highest
priority. Thank you for your continued support of our servicemembers,
veterans, and their families.
Senator Akaka. Secretary, our military has experienced
strains after nearly 7 years of warfare. It is imperative that
we support our forward deployed forces engaged in current
operations, but we must not overlook other important
developments in the international system. In your opening
statement you address China's military modernization. China's
continued investment in its military transformation has grown
and the balance of power in Asia and the Pacific region has
changed. In March 2007 Beijing announced a 19.47 percent
increase in its military budget.
In light of China's continuing military modernization
efforts, do you believe that the U.S. forces in PACOM are
properly equipped to address any possible future threats
related to China's modernization, particularly with regards to
PACOM's forward basing strategic needs?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I think that we need to complete
the relocation programs with respect to Guam and Okinawa, as
well as in South Korea. But I think with the forward deployment
of the USS George Washington to Japan, I think that the U.S.
forces, both Navy and Air Force in particular, are well
positioned.
We have a number of programs underway in development that
are intended to counter some of the Chinese technological
advances that have the potential to put our carriers at risk,
and I think we're making good progress on those and I think we
have the capability in place to be able to deal with any
foreseeable Chinese threat for some time to come.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your willingness to continue
on and to serve in this very important role. Many of us, I
think when the President was filling out his Cabinet, were very
pleased when he announced that he was going to ask you to
continue, and even more pleased to hear that you would agree to
do that. So I thank, as my other colleagues have said, your
family as well for their continued sacrifice and service to our
country.
I want to address briefly an issue which is of great
concern to me and I think should be an issue of concern to all
Americans, and that is the very dangerous overdependence that
we have on foreign energy. In my view that is a national
security issue. We transfer over half a trillion dollars a year
to foreign countries to purchase oil.
Of course, the military is one of the biggest purchasers of
fuel. The Air Force alone in 2007 spent $5.6 billion for
aviation fuel. As you well know, increased oil prices in the
past couple of years have had a very negative effect on Air
Force readiness.
Last month, Air Force Secretary Donnelly signed an Air
Force energy program policy memorandum establishing the goals
of certifying the entire Air Force fleet to use a synthetic
fuel blend by 2011 and to acquire 50 percent of the Air Force's
domestic aviation fuel requirement via an alternative fuel
blend by 2016.
My question is, do you think that the Air Force's energy
initiative regarding synthetic and alternative fuels is
something that should be considered for Department-wide
implementation?
Secretary Gates. Yes, and in fact one of the transition
papers that was prepared for my successor had to do with a
consolidation of oversight within the DOD on energy-related
issues, we have many individual programs in the DOD oriented
toward energy conservation and toward alternative fuels. But
there is no one place where it all comes together for oversight
or for the sharing of ideas and the sharing of technologies and
so on.
I think that, if I'm not mistaken, there is a position
provided for in the Department at a fairly senior level to do
this, and it would be my intention to fill that position to
accomplish what you just suggested, but with a broader mandate
than that.
Senator Thune. One of the things that I think would help
achieve that objective and something that I have supported and
tried to get included in the defense authorization bill up here
is an initiative that would allow for greater private sector
investment in synthetic fuel production, which would increase
multi-year procurement authority for the Department.
One of the things that we believe would incentivize private
sector development and production of synthetic fuels is knowing
that they would have a multi-year authority through the
Department to actually enter into contracts that would give
them some certainty about the future.
I guess my question is, is that something that you could
see the Department supporting?
Secretary Gates. I think that there are some real
opportunities for partnerships with the private sector. What
you've mentioned is one. Another that I encountered at the Red
River Depot is one. Most of the vehicles that come back from
Iraq come back with their petroleum supply still in them, the
oil, diesel, and so on. Previously we had to pay to have that
material discarded. We entered into a contract with a private
company and we now sell that material to a private company that
rerefines that material and sells it on the open market. So all
of this in the past waste petroleum, oil, and lubricants is now
being converted back to useful fuels, and at the same time we
get paid for providing it.
I think that there are a lot of opportunities like this.
Senator Thune. I think the multi-year procurement authority
is one initiative that would help accomplish some of the things
you are talking about doing, and we would like to work with you
toward that.
Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in a recent article that our
ability to strike from over the horizon will be at a premium
and will require a shift from short-range to longer-range
systems, such as the Next Generation Bomber. In your opinion,
how will the Next Generation Bomber fit into our national
defense strategy and what steps do you see the Department
taking to ensure that the Next Generation Bomber achieves
initial operational capability by the stated goal of 2018?
Secretary Gates. First of all, I would say that I think
that I made that speech at a time when the economic outlook was
rather different than it is now and the prospects for the
defense budget perhaps differed accordingly. I think we have to
look at all of the aspects of our strategic posture. I think
that the role of a Next Generation Bomber along with some of
the other systems that we've been talking about clearly have to
be a focus of the QDR. It is my intent to launch that next
month and to do so in an accelerated way so that it can, if not
shape the fiscal year 2010 budget, have a dramatic impact on
the fiscal year 2011 budget. The bomber would be looked at in
that context.
Senator Thune. I want to follow up on a question that
Senator Lieberman asked you earlier about the stimulus and ask
you if you have any unfunded requirements related to reset that
should be included in the pending economic recover package?
Secretary Gates. I would say that I think we do not. If the
requests that we have put in in the context of the remaining
fiscal year 2009 budget supplemental are attended to, I think
that the reset requirements that we have currently are taken
care of.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Levin. Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gates, I want to say how great it has been over
the last year or 2 to hear and read so much that you have said
and so many of your thoughts about where we need to proceed
forward as a Nation in terms of our foreign policy. I think
your sensible and informed views have really helped calm down a
lot of the debate here in this country.
Your realistic views of how we need to proceed forward with
Russia, I think are very welcome in this debate. I'm not quite
as optimistic as you are about China. I'm probably as hopeful
as you are about China, but, having watched that situation for
many years and having just returned from a fairly extensive
trip to East Asia, I hope we can have a discussion on that at
some point.
With respect to Afghanistan, I'm looking forward to hearing
the views of the special emissary that the President just
created. For the purposes of the DOD, I certainly would hope
that we don't at this point let our operational policy get
ahead of a clearly enunciated strategy, which I think was one
of the big pratfalls in going into Iraq.
But principally today I would like to comment on the last
portion of your statement, which I haven't heard anybody
mention, and I think it was a vitally important commitment that
you have just made, that you are going to get into the
procurement side of the DOD and the management side. I spent 5
years in the Pentagon, 4 of them working under the leadership
and with Captain Weinberger. I think the job that you have is
the hardest job in the executive branch except for the
President himself--every day working on three different
budgets: implementing one, arguing one, and developing one.
The Pentagon is, in my view, really in need of that kind of
tightening of the process that I think pretty much got out of
control after September 11. We need to see more discipline and
more leadership and a clearer articulation of the priorities of
where this money is going and why. You can look at the
Department of the Navy as a classic example of how these
problems have evolved.
You'll recall last year you and I exchanged correspondence
about this question I had with the Blackwater contract out in
San Diego. In that process I discovered that a relatively low-
level official in the Department of the Navy had the authority
to let a $78 million contract, contracts of $78 million or
below, without even having the review at the Secretary of the
Navy level, much less DOD level.
We have the Navy coming over here telling us in the fiscal
year 2009 budget that they have a $4.6 billion decrement in
unfunded requirements, not priorities. They are trying to build
their fleet up to 313 ships. They're now at 282, which is half,
almost exactly half, the size of the Navy when I was Secretary
of the Navy. The procurement programs in naval air are in total
disarray, as are the shipbuilding programs. They have $450
million in critical maintenance that's unfunded.
Then they turn around and say they want to spend a billion
dollars putting a nuclear aircraft carrier down in Mayport, FL.
We haven't needed that since 1961. No one's asked about that
since 1961. We got a commitment from the individual who, if
confirmed, will be your deputy that this will be reviewed at
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level. But it's
just a classic example, to me, of how this process has gotten
so out of control that we're not focusing on the areas that can
truly help the country, like rebuilding the fleet and putting
aircraft out there into the squadrons.
I would also like your thoughts on reviewing the notion of
civilian contractors. Years ago when I was in the Pentagon, we
used to talk about civilian contracting as kind of a default
position, long-term civilian contracting. We had the Total
Force, which was Active, Guard, and Reserve, and career
civilian force; and then when things went wrong we'd go into
civilian contracting. Now I keep hearing this phraseology that
civilian contractors are a part of the Total Force.
I would hope, with the growth of this area and the
difficulties that we've had in terms of legal issues and these
sorts of things, that you would put that on your plate as well.
Secretary Gates. I think that it has to be. I think one of
the things that's underway right now is a study on the use of
civilian contractors in contingency operations. I think that
the use of contractors in many respects grew willy-nilly in
Iraq after 2003, and all of a sudden we had a very large number
of people over there and, as became clear, inadequate capacity
to monitor them.
One of the benefits of the exchange you and I had last year
was really in a way bringing to our attention through the
Blackwater contract the way that elements of training had been
contracted out. There are parts of the training that
legitimately and properly and probably less expensively can be
done by private contractors. But again, it had grown without
any supervision or without any coherent strategy on how we were
going to do it and without conscious decisions about what we
will allow contractors to do and what we won't allow
contractors to do.
So I think we have not thought holistically or coherently
about our use of contractors, particularly when it comes to
combat environments or combat training, and those are the areas
that I think we need to focus on first.
Senator Webb. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, I might add my word of thanks to you and
your family for continuing to serve our country so capably and
to thank you for the continuing sacrifice that you're making in
this service. So I add to the chorus of thanks and continued
best wishes for all that you are doing for our country.
In regards to NATO and its participation in Afghanistan, I
was very taken by your comments some months ago about a two-
tiered alliance. In fact, I continue to be concerned about
that. I know my colleague Senator Chambliss discussed this with
you. I want to just ask if this administration has a strategy
on how to obtain the true participation without the caveats of
our NATO allies in the fight in Afghanistan.
I recognize the need for us to have additional troops. I
also recognize what you mentioned as the need, which is to
build the Afghan army. There's going to be a need for there to
be serious commitment. What is the strategy to get that to take
place for this administration?
Secretary Gates. I think, with all fairness to the new
administration, they've been in office 6 days.
Senator Martinez. Actually 8 today.
Secretary Gates. Or 7. But I think that this clearly is
going to be an issue that we will have to address very soon. I
know it's an issue that Secretary Clinton has thought about. It
is an issue that the President clearly has thought about. But
there are three forcing events, I think. One is I have a
defense ministerial, NATO defense ministerial meeting, in mid-
February. Secretary Clinton will have a foreign ministers
ministerial, NATO ministerial, a couple weeks after that. Then
of course there's the 60th anniversary of the alliance in
April. These three will, I think, require us to develop a
strategy on how we approach our European allies and at what
level in terms of asking them to do more, and I think do more
in each of the areas that I've talked about.
My sense is from some of the information and diplomatic
comments and public comments that some leaders have made in
Europe that they are prepared to be asked and that they are
prepared to do something. In fact, there's some indications
that a few of our allies have been sitting on a capability so
that they could give the new President something when he asks.
So I think there are opportunities not only in terms of
caveat-free troops or additional military capability, but again
the civilian enablers, if you will, and also perhaps better,
bigger contributions in terms of defraying the costs of the
growth of both the police and the army in Afghanistan.
All three areas, seem to me, to be areas where our allies
can and should do more.
Senator Martinez. I want to thank your Department for the
very farsighted decision, the strategic dispersal of our
nuclear fleet on the East Coast of the United States. I applaud
the decision to make Mayport a nuclear-ready homeport for our
nuclear fleet. I think that it's a matter of national security
to understand the need for there to be more than one
strategically situated base on the east coast. So I applaud the
decision and look forward to working with you and others in the
Department on the funding priorities for that to take place.
I want to ask your thoughts on the LCS program. I recognize
that perhaps this may be too much in the weeds, but I do think
that the LCS is an integral part of the future of our fleet. I
believe that getting our fleet back to that 313-ship Navy is
essential and the LCS is a big part of that.
I'm wondering whether any movement forward has been made in
terms of deciding on which of the two prototypes to pursue,
whether the Lockheed or the General Dynamics version of this
particular vessel?
Secretary Gates. I don't know the answer to that, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
As a result of congressional direction contained in the fiscal year
2009 Defense Appropriations Act, the Navy amended the current littoral
combat ship (LCS) seaframe construction solicitation to delete the
fiscal year 2008 ship and add three fiscal year 2010 Ships. This
solicitation seeks to procure a total of five ships, two in fiscal year
2009 and three in fiscal year 2010 via continuation of limited
competition between the two incumbent industry teams. The Navy intends
to award one ship to each industry team in fiscal year 2009 and hold a
concurrent competition for quantity in fiscal year 2010.
The fiscal year 2009 awards will be fixed-price type contracts,
with the Navy anticipating that each LCS prime contractor receives one
ship. The fiscal year 2010 ship options will be a competition for
quantity. The fiscal year 2009 ship prices will be included with the
fiscal year 2010 ship prices in evaluating this competition.
The acquisition strategy for fiscal year 2011 and out-year ships is
under development, although the Navy does not intend to down-select to
one variant at this time. The Navy's strategy will be guided by cost
and performance of the respective designs, as well as options for
sustaining competition throughout the life of the program. The Navy
remains committed to effective cost control and has modified
contracting strategies and management practices to provide program
stability.
Secretary Gates. But I will tell you that I think the LCS
or LCS-like ship is really needed for us in the kinds of
conflicts, as I look around the world, that we're likely to
face. As I look at the Persian Gulf, as I look at various other
places, I think it is a capability that we need.
Senator Martinez. The strategic situation on the east
coast, of course, also impacts our Fourth Fleet and the issue
in the area of Latin America, which we often don't talk about,
which I think increasingly becomes a security concern. We know
that Venezuela did some naval exercises with Russia in recent
days and also the continuing involvement of Iran with Cuba and
Venezuela raises concerns for many.
What are your thoughts on the potential threats emanating
from our southern border?
Secretary Gates. I'm concerned about the level of, frankly,
subversive activity that the Iranians are carrying on in a
number of places in Latin America, particularly in South
America and Central America. They're opening a lot of offices
and a lot of fronts, behind which they interfere in what is
going on in some of these countries.
To be honest, I'm more concerned about Iranian meddling in
the region than I am the Russians. I felt that our best
response to the Russian ship visits to Venezuela was
nonchalance, and in fact if it hadn't been for the events in
Georgia in August I probably would have tried to persuade the
President to invite the Russian ships to pay a port call in
Miami, because I think they'd have had a lot better time than
they did in Caracas.
But basically I think at $40 oil the Russian navy does not
bother me very much. They clearly have some capabilities.
This is the first time they've had an out-of-area exercise
in a decade or so. It's important for us to keep perspective
about their capabilities. When they complained about our
escorting their Blackjack bombers to Venezuela, I wanted to say
that we just wanted to be along for search and rescue if they
needed it.
So these deployments by the Russians I think should not be
of particular concern to us. On the other hand, Iranian
meddling is a concern.
Senator Martinez. I love the idea of promoting Florida
tourism. We can work together on that. [Laughter.]
I do concur with your assessment of the Iranian situation
and I think it's something that we need to keep a close eye on
because I think it's going to be a potential future threat.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I'm also thrilled that you are here today
and I will tell you that I fully appreciate the knife fight
that you're going to be in as it relates to procurement,
particularly as it relates to the competition between the
different Services and the competitions between the various
Members of Congress to take care of the folks at home. Please
consider me a partner in that alley in your knife fight and I
think more of us need to get our knives out for the good of the
whole as opposed to looking after some of the parochial
interests that occurs around here.
I want to start with substance abuse in the military. As
I'm sure you're aware, we've had a 25 percent increase in
soldiers seeking help for substance abuse. I'm sure you're also
aware that we had a scandal of sorts at Fort Leonard Wood in
Missouri where we discovered that over 150 soldiers who had
wanted help had not been given help, some of them waiting for
as long as 9 months for substance abuse treatment. We have more
than a fourth of the slots are open military-wide for substance
abuse counselors.
Most important and my question to you today is the culture.
Is this a command notification issue or is this an issue where
we should be more supportive of the soldiers that come forward,
particularly in light of the pain medication addictions that
we're seeing more frequently as it relates to those who have
been injured, and obviously the alcohol and illegal drug
problems?
This has always been a notify the commander culture, and so
the culture has been don't come forward and ask for help. As we
look at all of the mental health issues, domestic issues, as
the operations tempo of deployment in Iraq, and of dwell time,
I think that that's something that we need to get figured out
at the very top. Are we going to change the culture of command
notification for those who are seeking substance abuse help in
the military?
Secretary Gates. This is something that I'm happy to look
into. I think that one of the things that I've seen just in the
reporting that I receive is the concern that in a significant
number of cases where we have substance abuse, it began with
prescribed medication for physical or psychological wounds. In
that respect it seems to me we have an obligation to these
folks to try and help them get past this substance abuse. The
objective is not to end their career, but to cure them and get
them back to work.
Senator McCaskill. I know that Secretary Geren is looking
at all the issues surrounding this in response to a letter I
wrote him at the end of last year. I look forward to continuing
information about how we're going to change the ability of
these folks to get help when they need it.
As we talk about drawing down in Iraq, and to follow up on
Senator Webb's question, who is the person that I can hold
accountable for the drawing down of the contract forces? The
Congressional Research Service said in December that we had
200,000 contractors on the ground in Iraq. As we pull out our
active military, who's in charge of winding up these contracts?
What steps have you taken to make sure that the lessons that we
learned in Bosnia, which it was admitted to me that we didn't
follow in Iraq in terms of contracting, what are we doing to
make sure that these incredible mistakes--I think ``willy-
nilly,'' by the way, is kind as to what happened with
contracting in Iraq.
What are we doing to make sure that we don't repeat these
same mistakes in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. Well, the commander in Afghanistan is in
the process of setting up the same kind of oversight monitoring
group for contracting that was established by the Multi-
National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) commander last year. So we're
trying to take the lessons learned out of Iraq over the last
couple of years, in terms of the lack of oversight and
transfer, to Afghanistan.
Overall, the responsibility for DOD contracting in Iraq is
in the hands of MNF-I and the people who work for him. This is
one of the issues, frankly, as we withdraw that is going to be
a challenge for us. First of all, we have been rotating troops
into equipment that was already in Iraq. The contractors in
Iraq are using a lot of equipment that belongs to the United
States Government. The question as we draw down in significant
numbers over the next 18 months or whatever the period of time
is, 16 months, the question is we are going to have to bring
the equipment that belongs to us back, but we have to decide
what of the equipment that belongs to us that the contractors
are using are we going to bring back.
I think all of this is going to require a high level of
supervision, and we need to think pretty quickly and with some
agility in the DOD to make sure that we get this right.
Senator McCaskill. I'm worried we're going to have 30,000
troops in Iraq and 100,000 contractors. I think if we're not
careful that could happen, if we don't pay attention to that
side of it.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to bring your attention to
a situation that I think is deserving of your attention and
that is the scandal at the Defense Contracting Audit Agency
(DCAA) as it relates to the incredibly negative essentially
peer review they got from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), their failure to abide by the appropriate government
auditing standards, and how that kind of shakes the timbers.
If we don't have the DCAA with a clean report from a fellow
auditing agency, we have serious problems. More importantly,
when the whistleblower wanted to provide information as it
related to the problems internally at DCAA, she received an
incredibly threatening letter that was signed by an audit
supervisor, but in fact I found out was drafted by a lawyer at
DOD under the general counsel.
I want to make sure that I bring this letter to your
attention. Nothing strikes more fear in the heart of, I hope,
everybody in this room and everybody in America than the idea
that someone who is trying to fix a problem in government is
threatened with criminal prosecution if they pursue the
information that they need to document the claim they're making
in terms of inappropriate auditing standards at the agency. I
would ask you to look into that.
I believe that lawyer is still there and I don't believe
anything has happened to that lawyer that wrote that letter.
The fact that his name wasn't on the letter doesn't change
anything. There needs to be some accountability in that regard.
I will forward a copy of the letter to you and ask for your
follow-up on that situation.
[The information referred to follows:]
I share your commitment that the Department must perform quality
audits under Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards. I also
share your concern that whistleblowers receive the statutorily-based
protections they deserve when they act on our behalf to do the right
thing. The letter in question was inappropriate and should not have
been issued, as the Director of Defense Contracting Audit Agency (DCAA)
has testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee.
The investigation by the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) is ongoing
and includes a review of the actions of the DCAA attorneys. I am
advised that title 5 of the United States Code, section 1214(f),
expressly prohibits the imposition of disciplinary action against any
employee for any alleged prohibited activity under investigation by the
OSC, or for any related activity, without approval of the Special
Counsel. The Department will consider initiating appropriate
disciplinary action after a full investigation has been completed by
OSC to ensure that the proper measure of discipline is imposed, should
OSC recommend corrective action.
Secretary Gates. Okay. I agree it's important, and some
time ago I asked the DOD Inspector General to look into these
abuses at DCAA, and particularly the allegation of the abusive
treatment of one of the auditors.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service and for your
straight answers today. I think it's just remarkable that
someone like you could serve in the previous administration and
be asked to stay over in the new administration. So thank you
for your willingness to do that.
Our chairman mentioned in his opening remarks his hope that
we might move toward a possible joint missile defense program
with Russia against a potential strike from Iran. I think it's
your testimony today that you think that it indeed is important
to pursue such an idea and that Secretary Clinton shares this
goal.
Do we have any indication at all that the Russian
Government is interested in talking with us meaningfully about
moving to something like this?
Secretary Gates. I had the distinct impression when I
presented a range of opportunities for cooperation and
transparency to then-President Putin, that he was actually
taken by some of the ideas, that there were some opportunities
for cooperation. Being an old Kremlinologist, what got my
attention was the fact that when Secretary Rice and I first sat
down to meet with Putin and they brought in all the press,
Putin basically just beat the tar out of the United States on
every conceivable subject, and once the press left we then had
a nice civil conversation.
But after our meeting it was clear, his comments to the
press were very positive, that he'd heard some very interesting
ideas. Equally important, when we began our two-plus-two
meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov and my Russian
counterpart, Lavrov, instead of opening with the same kind of
screed against the United States, started off by talking about
how there had been some interesting exchanges of ideas,
interesting possibilities for cooperation, and that they looked
forward to pursuing that subsequently.
We've also heard informally from some of their military
that there was interest in pursuing some of these
possibilities. They were intrigued by the possibility of
working together on some of this, for example a joint data
center in Moscow and sharing the radar capability and so on.
So, in writing, no. But in some of the things that have
been said, some of the inferences, I think if we were able to
get some of the political baggage out of the way that there is
actually some potential for cooperation.
Senator Wicker. Is it your view that, in any event, it's
essential that the United States continue its current plans for
missile defense deployment in Eastern Europe?
Secretary Gates. As I said earlier, we have not had the
opportunity to pursue this in the new administration and to
discuss the administration's policy on it. I will say this. All
of the NATO heads of government unanimously last April in
Bucharest endorsed the importance of a NATO-wide, European-wide
missile defense capability. So this is a commitment that has
been made by the alliance and so I think we at least need to
take it very seriously.
Senator Wicker. Thank you.
I note in your prepared testimony you mention working
closely with the VA to better share electronic health data and
track patients' long-term recovery process. I understand you
and Senator Akaka had a conversation about the SOC and the fact
that you attended General Shinseki's swearing in ceremony, and
that you're determined to work together to oversee joint
activities of the two Departments.
A couple of weeks ago I had the opportunity to participate
in General Shinseki's confirmation hearing and I asked him
about the ongoing effort to create a joint electronic medical
record between the DOD and the VA. In my judgment, our ultimate
goal, Mr. Secretary, should be a joint electronic medical
record, a common record shared by both Departments to allow
this seamless transition that we all talk about.
On the other hand, there are those people in the government
who say that it will suffice to have an information
interoperability plan, which would simply give us the ability
to share information. When I asked General Shinseki about this,
he expressed the opinion that the primary barrier to
implementing a joint record was not technical, but a question
of leadership. I just wondered if you've had a chance to think
about this issue and if you'd care to respond to us about that.
Secretary Gates. There are some technical challenges in
terms of building the kind of joint capability that you
describe. But I think that those challenges can be overcome
with leadership and, frankly, I look forward to working with
Secretary Shinseki to see if we can't make some significant
progress on this. I think this is an area where we probably,
instead of trying to eat the whole pizza in one bite, we
probably need to take several steps to get us to the joint
capability.
I don't want to wait several years while we have a massive
new kind of program coming into place and not do anything in
terms of sharing and having interoperable information. So I'd
rather get to the first and then move on to the second, rather
than wait several years and put all our chips on a new
technology or a new capability. But I think we can get there
and, what's more, I think with our leadership, if we can get
this done in the next year or two, what we achieve may in some
respects serve as a model for what I think is the President's
desire to look at doing this more broadly for the Nation in
terms of the civilian health care system.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Welcome, Secretary Gates. You and I had a
chance to interact and work together on the House side. I don't
know whether I followed you over here or you followed me over
here, but it's excellent to see you here today. I share the
sentiments and praise of my colleagues here today on both sides
of the aisle for your service and am looking forward to working
with you as we face these big challenges, but I think
significant opportunities.
If I might, I'd like to turn to a couple of Colorado-
specific situations and do that quickly and turn back to some
other broader scale opportunities we have. You're familiar with
the Pinyon Canyon Maneuver Site, I believe, in southern
Colorado. It's been the focus of some controversy, given the
Army's interest in expanding that facility. The GAO has
conducted a study of the Army's report on those training needs
and I wanted to urge you today to work with the GAO to answer
fully all the questions that the Army posed for itself, but
that the GAO in its follow-on report suggested hadn't been
fully answered.
Can you commit to me that the Army will work to answer
fully those questions that the GAO has posed?
Secretary Gates. Sure.
Senator Udall. I appreciate that.
Second, in regards to the site as well, the Army has made
it clear, and you and I have exchanged correspondence, as to
the use of condemnation. The indications we've received is that
the Army won't pursue condemnation authority today, tomorrow,
or ever when it comes to those Pinyon Canyon expansion plans.
Can you continue that commitment?
Secretary Gates. I'm not familiar with the details,
Senator. But if the Army has made that commitment to you, then
I would stand behind it.
Senator Udall. I appreciate that. It's, I believe, an
opportunity here for this to be worked out to the satisfaction
of all the parties involved. But there are many ranchers and
farmers who fear for their way of life, who ironically or
interestingly enough, also many of them are veterans and
they're patriots. But they want to have a clear and transparent
process underway.
In that spirit, let me turn more broadly. I was pleased to
hear you talk about the importance of consolidating energy
issues at the DOD and the position that was established in the
Defense Authorization Act to do this. I hear you plan to fill
the position quickly. I look forward to working with you in any
way possible, as in many ways the military is leading in this
cause of energy independence. The men and women in uniform know
more than almost any American the price of having to defend oil
supply lines and our dependence on regimes that don't
particularly like us. So I commend you for this effort and
again look forward to working with you.
Let me turn to the recent article that you wrote in Foreign
Affairs where you said ``We must not be so preoccupied with
preparing for future conventional strategic conflicts that we
neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and
win conflicts, such as those the United States is in today.''
How do you envision institutionalizing a counterinsurgency
focus in the DOD and what can we do in the Senate and in the
House to support you in those efforts?
Secretary Gates. I think that there are two broad
approaches, Senator. One is to institutionalize the thinking
about counterinsurgency, particularly in the Army, and it's one
of the reasons why I've worked with the Chairman and also with
General Casey, quite frankly, to put the people in the proper
places to make sure that the Army does institutionalize what
it's learned both for good and ill in Iraq and Afghanistan. So
putting General Dempsey in at the Trade and Doctrine Command,
putting General Petraeus at CENTCOM, General Chiarelli as the
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno at MNF-I,
General Austin, all of these people really get it in terms of
what needs to be done.
I'm also long-time enough in the bureaucracy to know that
an institution can always beat one or two people, but it's
tough to beat four or five. That's a long time to wait in your
career, to wait for all those guys to retire. So I think that
institutionalizing the thinking is the first thing.
The second is to figure out a better way to
institutionalize support for the warfighter in terms of the
regular procurement and acquisition process, development,
acquisition, and procurement process in the DOD that we use for
the longer term kinds of equipment. The question I keep coming
back to is, why did I have to go outside the regular Pentagon
bureaucracy in order to build mine-resistant ambush protected
(MRAP) and to get additional ISR? We need to figure out a way
where that happens within the institution and where there are
institutional support of getting that kind of thing done in a
prompt and timely way.
The problem is there are two different mentalities
involved. The one is the typical culture in the Defense
Department, which is 99 percent exquisite solutions over a 5-
or 6- or 10-year period; and the other is a 75 percent solution
in weeks or months. People approach problem-solving in very
different ways when they have that different kind of
experience. We have to figure out how to be able to walk and
chew gum at the same time.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that outline.
Let me end on this note. I commend you for your willingness
to wade into procurement reform and count on me as an ally, as
I think are many members on this committee.
Your statement was compelling on the need to move forward
in that direction.
So thank you again for being here.
Secretary Gates. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Gates, for serving longer. We
appreciate that. I think not only does it speak well of you and
the success of your tenure, but of President Obama in selecting
you. I can't think of a single thing he's done that's been a
more comforting and bipartisan act of leadership than retaining
you as Secretary of Defense. He's seen in you some fine
qualities that I think this entire committee has seen over the
years. I do think that you have accomplished quite a lot and I
look forward to working with you in the future.
I really appreciated your thought, and we briefly discussed
this earlier, about Afghanistan and what our goals should be
there. The Afghani people that I've seen when I'm there are
wonderful people, but they are not prepared to want to be like
us now.
Rory Stewart, who walked across Iraq and wrote the book
``Places In Between'' and now has a foundation there, talks
about respecting the people of Iraq, accepting them pretty much
as they are and helping them develop and become more prosperous
and more educated, but to be patient and a bit humble about
that process.
How do you see us there at this point? Is there--and I
would ask fundamentally, where are we going with more troops?
How far do we see that happening? Don't, in some ways, we
just have to be more patient about what we can expect this
country to achieve in the years to come?
Secretary Gates. Senator, I'm perhaps more mindful of some
of the lessons in Afghanistan than some others, both as a
historian but also as somebody who 23 years ago was on the
other side of that border trying to deal with the Soviets. The
Soviets couldn't win that war with 120,000 troops and a
completely ruthless approach to killing innocent civilians.
They had the wrong strategy and they were regarded, properly,
as an invader and an occupier. It's not for nothing Afghanistan
is known as the graveyard of empires.
I am prepared to support the requirements that General
McKiernan has put forward in terms of being able to work with
more additional U.S. troops, many of whom will serve as
trainers as well as being deployed in combat. I'm willing to
support that. I think it's necessary. But I would be very
skeptical of any additional force levels, American force
levels, beyond what General McKiernan has already asked for.
The secret to success from a security standpoint is the ANA
and the ANP and, I might add, a more effective border control
police. So I think that we need, as has been discussed here
before, we need a fully integrated civilian-military strategy.
We need to, I think, have modest, realistic goals. Above all,
there must be an Afghan face on this war. The Afghan people
must believe this is their war and we are there to help them,
because if they think we are there for our own purposes then we
will go the way of every other foreign army that has been in
Afghanistan.
So one of the things that I've been focused on, in addition
to trying to see what more we could do to reduce civilian
casualties, is how do we get more of an Afghan face on every
single one of our operations, how do we get them out in front,
so that the villagers see that it's their army that we're
helping; it's not us kicking down their door, it's an Afghan
who's kicking down their door to try and find the bad guy.
I think that the Afghan aspect of this has to be at the
absolute forefront of any strategy going forward in that
country for any of us to be successful over the long term.
That's one of the reasons why I would be deeply skeptical about
additional U.S. forces beyond those that General McKiernan has
already asked for.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think you
should ask tough questions. It's easy to feel we need more
troops, and we may well. I'll defer to your decision. But, I do
think that this country ultimately will have to make it on its
own. It'll have to be true to its own history and its own
culture, and it's going to be a slow thing to see one of the
poorest nations in the world, most remote nations in the world,
develop. We can't be too optimistic about our abilities to snap
our fingers and make that change occur.
Mr. Secretary, you are really focusing on defense
acquisition. I think that's important. Senator McCain, who was
here earlier, raised a question some time ago about, basically,
a sole source lease arrangement to purchase the Air Force's
number one priority, which is a refueling aircraft tanker. This
committee, Senator Levin and everybody on the committee,
supported a bid process. I think at that time I referred to
Senator McCain as the seven billion dollar man. I think it was
more than that, by GAO standards accounting review, how much it
saved the government to bid this contract.
So we've had some difficulties in moving forward. You
punted it, I was disappointed to see, and now I guess you'll
have to catch your own punt and move forward with selecting
this aircraft.
First, don't you think we should not depart from our
fundamental acquisition strategy to get the best value product
for the American warfighter on a fair and competitive basis,
because that's what Congress has directed explicitly the
Defense Department to do, to bid this contract? Second, what
are your plans to move forward?
Secretary Gates. I'm firmly committed to a competitive
process. My plan is when a new deputy gets confirmed and when a
new Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
is confirmed, then I would sit down with the two of them and
with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of
the Air Force and determine the best way forward.
It seems to me that this is an issue that obviously arouses
strong feelings around the country, but it seems to me that the
key is a competitive bid, meeting technical requirements, and
the best deal for the taxpayer. But I certainly intend to
proceed with a competitive process.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, and I will take that as a
commitment that you will work to ensure we get the best product
for the taxpayer and the warfighter.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Gates. I'm pleased that President
Obama has asked you to remain in this position and that you've
accepted it and that you are willing to forego witnessing
firsthand the stress of watching those college basketball
games.
A lot of what the discussion around here today is
concerning procurement and acquisition, and in some of the
prepared remarks that you put together you said that the DOD
has difficulty in bringing in qualified senior acquisition
officials and that in the past 8 years the average percentage
of vacancies in key acquisition positions has been 13 percent
in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force.
When you're talking about the number of contracts, the
number of cost overruns, etcetera, what's the problem here?
Secretary Gates. I think that there are a couple of
problems. The first is that there was a dramatic reduction in
the number of people involved in the acquisition and
procurement process in the DOD following the end of the Cold
War. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), for
example, fell from 27,000 people to around 8 or 9,000. The
number of people involved in procurement in the Department
overall fell from about 500 to 600,000 to about half that
number. So part of the problem is just plain numbers, and we've
been working with the committee. DCMA plans to hire 2,300
additional people over the course of the next 18 months or so.
The Army is adding 1,000 civilians and 400 military in this
area. I think either the Air Force or the Navy are adding a
thousand.
I think the Services and OSD are beginning to address this
problem, but it will take us some period of time to get back.
The other factor I would tell you, Senator, I take a back seat
to no one in terms of the ethics, in terms of the importance of
ethics, ethical behavior, ethical standards, and the importance
of integrity in office. But in a way, over a period of time,
and I would say going back 20 years, in some respects we have
worked ourselves into a box canyon, because we have created a
situation in which it is harder and harder for people who have
served in industry, who understand the acquisition business,
who understand systems management, to come into the public
service, and particularly when they are not coming in as career
people, but perhaps at more senior levels to serve for a few
years and then go out.
Last thing I would do is criticize the ethics executive
order that the new President has just signed. This is a
cumulative problem that has taken place over many, many years.
My own view is on a lot of these issues, transparency is the
answer and the recusal approaches that we have, the President
recognized the need to be able to get some of these people he
would need to exercise a waiver and he provided for that, I
think wisely, in the executive order.
But there is a reason we have those kinds of vacancies and
that they endure year after year after year. I think all of
us--Congress and the executive branch together--need to look at
this and see whether we're cutting off our nose to spite our
face, if we haven't made it so tough to get people who have the
kind of industry experience that allows them the know-how to
manage an acquisition process to come into government, do
public service, and then return to their careers.
I can't pretend I have an answer to it, but I will tell you
that's a part of the problem.
Senator Hagan. It certainly seems like something that we
need to work together on, because with these huge numbers of
vacancies it's certainly posing problems and risks in this
area.
Secretary Gates. It's not a problem when we hire an
accounting major or a business major out of a university and
they decide to make a career at the DOD. It's not a problem
when we try to create, recreate a contracting career field in
the Army, which had basically disappeared. When we're dealing
with career people it's not really an issue. But it's when
you're trying to go after more senior officials, like the
senior acquisition executives in each of the services. These
people manage billions of dollars and you need somebody who has
real world experience to be able to make those decisions and
those recommendations. Getting people at that level and more
senior levels who have the credentials to be able to do the job
is very tough.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
I also wanted to ask a question on drawing down the troops
in Iraq. As President Obama has stated, and you've discussed
that too, the question I have is how secure will the remaining
troops be? I get that question all the time. Do you believe
that we're doing all we need to do in order to ensure that the
remaining troops are secure? Do you foresee any situation where
we would have to put more people, more troops, in Iraq in a
situation? Do you have contingency plans that you're preparing
for that?
Secretary Gates. No, I don't see a circumstance in which we
would have to put more people into Iraq. I think that the plans
that General Odierno has drawn up for consolidating our forces
and the idea would be that there would be several sites in Iraq
that would not only have our military forces, remaining
military forces consolidated, but that that's where our
civilian capacity would be concentrated as well, so we can
provide protection for the civilians who are out working in the
communities and out doing that part of the job in Iraq as well.
I've seen General Odierno's plans to move to this advisory
and assistance role for the United States, both civilian and
military, and I have great confidence in the plans that he has
drawn up.
Senator Hagan. Thanks, Secretary Gates. I look forward to
working with you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thanks for staying on. I was delighted when
I heard it, a bit surprised, but America wins when you stay. So
we really appreciate that.
From Iraq's point of view, let's look down the road at the
end of the SOFA. Do you think it's in our national security
interest long-term to have a sustained relationship with the
people of Iraq if they are willing to do that?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Graham. It would be a stabilizing force in the
Mideast not known today; would that be true?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. They're right between Syria and Iran and it
would be good to have a friend in that neighborhood.
Secretary Gates. There are a lot of our friends and
partners in that region that I think would welcome it a lot.
Senator Graham. Now, we have about 15,000 prisoners still
at Camp Bucca, I believe. Are you confident that the Iraqi
penal system, prison system, and legal system can accommodate
all these people in the next year, 2 years?
Secretary Gates. My hope is that the transition plans that
are being put in place by General Odierno and with the Iraqis
will be satisfactory. As I mentioned earlier, we have over the
last year or so released probably 16,000 people from Camp
Bucca. I must say that beginning about 2 or 3 years ago the
leadership that we had, beginning with General Stone, the
leadership we've had at Camp Bucca has been absolutely
extraordinary in sort of separating the wheat from the chaff
and getting some rehab programs going and reconciliation
programs.
So I think those programs combined with the transition
should give us some heart that this will work out okay.
Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more. I think one
of the unsung heroes of the war would be General Stone and the
process he's put in place at Camp Bucca.
But I'm fairly familiar with the prison population. There
are going to be hundreds, if not thousands, that are going to
be hard to reconcile, that are foreign fighters, and I just
encourage you to work with the Iraqi government to make sure
that we are thinking long and hard about when to let these
people go and where to let them go.
Now let's go to Afghanistan. You said something I think
America needs to understand, that we need to have realistic
goals. That is to make sure that Afghanistan is not a safe
haven for international terrorism, the Taliban, or al Qaeda,
like it was on September 11. I understand that and I think
people need to know that.
But we cannot win in Afghanistan without Pakistan's help;
do you agree with that?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Do you believe the Biden-Lugar legislation
would be beneficial to the relationship between our country and
Pakistan?
Secretary Gates. Absolutely, and the amount of money is
important, but just as important is the fact that it is a
multi-year commitment. One of the problems that we have with
Pakistan is that more than once in the past we have turned our
backs on Pakistan, and so they don't have confidence that they
can count on us over the long term. So the multi-year aspect of
it is really important.
Senator Graham. I think the American people need to
understand that our economy is on its knees at home and that
there is no end in sight. But the money that would be spent
under Biden-Lugar and the sustained relationship that that
would envision between us and Pakistan is worth its weight in
gold, literally. We cannot win in Afghanistan unless Pakistan
is on board.
Is it fair to say that casualties in Afghanistan are likely
to go up?
Secretary Gates. I think that's likely.
Senator Graham. The amount of money we spend is likely to
go up in the short term, maybe the foreseeable future?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Now, when you said that the goal was a
place that did not harbor terrorists, one of the ways to
achieve that goal is to make sure the Taliban does not fill in
the vacuum, right? So that means you have to have a legal
system the people can trust and not a shura court run by the
Taliban?
Secretary Gates. Right.
Senator Graham. It means an economy that people can make a
living without turning to drugs, right? It means governance,
where people buy into the idea that their government represents
their interests. All those things are essential to not provide
a safe haven for the Taliban or any other group; do you agree
with that?
Secretary Gates. Correct.
Senator Graham. When we say don't have unreasonable
expectations, I agree. But the basic elements to keep the
country from becoming a safe haven requires institutions to be
built that don't exist today. So on behalf of my view of this
and the new administration, I think the time, the money, and
the casualties we're going to sustain in Afghanistan are
necessary and important to make sure that Afghanistan does not
become, in the future, a safe haven for terrorism to strike
this country again.
Bottom line is it's going to be tough, it's going to be
difficult, in many ways harder than Iraq. Do you agree with
that?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Senator Graham. Now, when it comes to civilian casualties
in Afghanistan, are you spending a lot of time to minimize
that?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir. I have taken a lot of time with
this myself. It was the primary subject of my conversations
with both President Karzai and with General McKiernan and his
staff when I last visited Kabul. I think we have, particularly
in terms of how we respond when there are civilian casualties,
been too bureaucratic about it. Our approach has been in a way
classically American, which is: Let's find out all the facts
and then we'll decide what to do. But in the meantime, we have
lost the strategic communications war.
So the guidance that I provided is that our first step
should be: If civilian casualties were incurred in this
operation we deeply regret it, and you have apologies, and if
appropriate we will make amends. Then we will go investigate,
and then we will figure out whether we need to do more or,
frankly, if we paid somebody we shouldn't have, frankly I think
that that's an acceptable cost.
But we need to get the balance right in this in terms of
how we interact with the Afghan people or we will lose.
Senator Graham. I could not agree with you more. Instead of
saying there were 14, not 16, we need to say we're sorry if
there was one, and move forward.
I just want to end on this note. There's two sides to this
story. The Afghan government army doesn't have an air force. Do
you believe that the rhetoric of President Karzai when it comes
to civilian casualties has been helpful or hurtful? Quite
frankly, I am very displeased with the rhetoric coming from the
president. We're trying very hard to minimize civilian
casualties. The enemy integrates itself among the civilian
population on purpose. I would love an Afghan to go through
every door in Afghanistan, not an American soldier, but they
don't have the capacity. I would argue that our Air Force and
our Navy is probably the best people in town to have to
minimize casualties.
Do you believe that his rhetoric has been helpful or
hurtful when it comes to dealing with this issue?
Secretary Gates. I don't believe that his rhetoric has been
helpful. I must tell you that when I was last there and visited
Bagram, I got a briefing on the procedures that our pilots go
through to try and avoid civilian casualties and how, with film
clips of how they abort missions at the last minute if a truck
drives into a village, and things like that.
I took a significant element of the Afghan press with me,
with their cameras, so that they could see that briefing and
see just how hard we do work at trying to avoid civilian
casualties.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and
congratulations, I guess again, that you're going to continue
on to serve. After Senator McCaskill mentioned that she wanted
to be in the alley with you with the knife, I'm not sure I want
to do my two parochial things here at this moment, but I will,
and a have a broader couple questions.
I just want to make a quick short comment to see how you
feel. I know you're aware of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) System we have in Alaska at Fort Greeley, the GMD. I'm
just curious to hear what your comments are on that and how you
feel this fits into the strategic needs of the military?
Secretary Gates. I think that we have a missile defense
capability that is able to take on a rudimentary threat. It is
clearly not aimed at dealing with a large-scale threat, for
example from either Russia or from China. I happen to think
it's important. I think that having a layered defense such as
we are building, that includes the ground-based interceptors,
is very important.
Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you very much.
The single ones are very, very small. I just want to make
you aware that the delegation--Congressman Young, Senator
Murkowski, and I--sent you a letter regarding an issue with
some of our folks, our Territorial Guard. These are 26 folks
that are probably in their mid-80s now. They have been
receiving military retirement for some time and they were just
notified as of February 1 they will no longer receive it
because of some glitch in the law.
We are working on a piece of legislation to solve that
problem. But the reality is, this is in the middle of winter in
Alaska. It is folks who have served our country as Territorial
Guard. They are Alaska Native community and they are
subsistence livers, so the cash that they receive in retirement
is their only lifeblood to a cash economy.
There's a letter that's been sent to you and I hope you
would take note of it. It is a small group, but a significant
impact to us. I just wanted to bring that to your attention
while you were here.
Secretary Gates. Okay, and my understanding is that
Secretary Geren is working on this issue.
Senator Begich. He is and he's been very supportive on the
new legislation. Our concern is February 1 is around the
corner, so we're concerned and we're trying to figure out how
to ensure that they continue to receive payments.
I am very happy that you're looking at the procurement and
the purchasing process. As a former mayor, I had to deal with
this more than I probably ever thought I would as an executive.
But I do want to just give you a couple comments. I agree with
your comments on how you deal with recruitment of those senior
members. I guess I would be very anxious to help in any way I
can.
I know as a mayor we had to do that on a regular basis.
They were high-priced folks. Sometimes they had worked in the
private sector, people who had bid on city stuff in the past.
But they had the experience we needed, so we had to really
recruit aggressively in order to get them and maintain them in
our workforce. So I recognize the struggle. I would be anxious
to work with you on that.
Is there also a pay issue or not with these senior levels?
To have this kind of vacancy factor, 43 percent, that's very
significant.
Secretary Gates. I don't think the pay aspect is a
significant one. That is not something that has been brought to
my attention as an issue.
Senator Begich. I would be very anxious to work with you on
that.
Also, a technique we implemented in our city. When people
do capital projects, especially private contractors--and we did
a $100 million plus building. What we did with them this time,
the first time in the city's history, we required the owners of
the company to personally guarantee any cost overruns, which
has never been done in Anchorage, because usually they just
come in with an order to up the amount and get their check.
We made them personally guarantee it, and lo and behold,
the project came in a month early. It came in $6 million under
budget.
We also made an incentive, that we would split the
difference with them. They save it, we'll split it. It was a
design and build project. So on smaller projects it's amazing
how quickly they become responsive when they have to sign
personally. In that project we had four owners and they were
required to pay $8 million personally if they did not meet the
guarantees that they had committed to in their contracts. The
first time the city of Anchorage had ever done that, and it
worked.
The bigger ones are much more difficult, but it sure did
make them responsive.
The other thing I'll just mention, you had in your written
testimony, you had talked about post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and some of the issues surrounding that. Your comment
here was, I believe, ``We have yet to muster and coordinate the
various legal policies, medical and budget resources across the
DOD to address these types of injuries.''
Are you working or is it your intent to work on a plan that
we could see what kind of resources you need? This is a strong
interest to me and I would be very anxious to see how you
proceed on that.
Secretary Gates. Sure. Congress actually, Senator, has been
very generous to us in terms of money for dealing with both
PTSD and traumatic brain injury. I think the issue is more
making sure that the money get spent in the right way and is
targeted properly.
Senator Begich. Is that something that, as your comment
here indicates, will you then at some point report back to us
on how you're achieving and whatever areas you need assistance
in?
Secretary Gates. Sure.
Senator Begich. Last two quick ones. One is you'll hear
from me on probably a regular basis, the status of the military
family and how we need to do additional work and additional
services. Are you willing to, and maybe you have already done
it and I'm just not familiar with it, report to Congress in
regards to the status of the military family and the needs they
have as the military has changed dramatically over the last 30,
40 years?
Secretary Gates. I think we've done a lot of that over the
last couple of years and perhaps even before, Senator. We'd be
happy to send some folks up to brief you. The Services all have
extremely ambitious family support programs and I can assure
you that the leadership, both civilian and military, of the
Services, as well as the Department, take this extremely
seriously.
The saying is you enlist the soldier and you reenlist the
family. This is the longest war we have fought with an All-
Volunteer Army since the Revolution. We have learned a lot in
terms of the stresses on the families in an All-Volunteer
Force, and particularly with repeated deployments of the
servicemember and so on.
So along with the lessons we've learned about
counterinsurgency and so on, it seems to me one of the
important lessons we need to absorb and institutionalize is the
importance of taking care of our military families, and that
the range of resources that are out there for them to provide
support both when the soldier is at home and deployed.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
My time is up. The last comment I'll just make; no answer
at this point. But if you ever get an opportunity to move to a
2-year budgeting cycle, I would be a big, big supporter, so you
can manage people rather than paper. We did that in Anchorage
and it made a huge difference. So anything I can do to help you
in that endeavor, I will be there.
Secretary Gates. Thank you.
Senator Begich. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. The first thing I would hope you would do
is touch base with our appropriators.
You see the kind of struggle that the Secretary has.
I just have a few loose ends I want to pull together here.
One, I want to commend you on the Afghan policy which you've
enunciated, the wisdom of it, the strength of it, the passion
you put into it; that this war has to be a war of the Afghan
people against those who would try to destroy their country and
their hopes and dreams. Minimizing civilian casualties is part
of that, but the economic picture is part of it as well.
I would just bring to your attention in terms of the
economic hopes one program, which is called the National
Solidarity Program (NSP). I don't know if you're familiar with
it, but it's a program where our agency, I think it's USAID,
gives a few tens of thousands of dollars directly to villages,
without anything skimmed off by the central government. I
visited near Bagram three villages that had come together to
build a school with a few tens of thousands of dollars. The
feeling, the possessive feeling that they had about that school
finally in their area--it's something like ``Three Cups of
Tea'' on the Pakistan side, that book that was written.
These villagers, their leaders came together just to greet
me and to tell me that the Taliban would never dare touch that
school; they will protect that school with their lives.
I'd like you to become familiar with the NSP because it
fits in directly with what you have talked about.
Second, in terms of the comments about trying to explore
the possibilities of doing some things jointly with Russia on
missile defense and the importance of exploring that, what it
could mean strategically in terms of kind of reducing the
Iranian threat if they saw us and the Russians working
together. You mentioned that you do think it's worthy of
continuing those explorations.
You pointed out that NATO has been supportive of what we've
been doing up to now with Poland and the Czech Republic. Would
NATO, in your judgment, likely support those kind of
explorations between us and the Russians if we undertook them?
Secretary Gates. I think they'd welcome it.
Chairman Levin. Finally, a number of us have raised the
question of the use of contractors in Iraq, including security
contractors, and that we need to look at that, particularly for
lessons learned purposes as it might affect what we do in
Afghanistan, and you're in the middle of looking at that and
reviewing that, which is more than welcome.
Again, I would in that line request that you promptly
respond to the December 9 letter, because that's really what
that letter from me to you is all about.
We thank you again. Obviously, I think every member of this
committee thanked you for continuing your service to this
country, and that consensus I hope gives you a real boost. I
know you're struggling with the arm wrestling that you
undertook. But we hope that you're given a real boost by the
support that you got from every member of this committee and
the gratitude that we expressed for your continued service. If
you'll pass that along to your family as well.
With that, we will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
FIELD MEDICAL EVACUATION AND MEDICAL AND SURGICAL CAPABILITIES IN
AFGHANISTAN
1. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, what steps have been implemented
to improve field medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and first line medical
and surgical capabilities in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. In November 2008, I directed a comprehensive
bottom-to-top review on how to best synchronize efforts in theater and
accomplish the goal of improving the MEDEVAC benchmark to a 1-hour
execution standard in Afghanistan. Improving MEDEVAC response times
requires a systematic approach and the synchronization of aircraft,
medical capabilities, communication, infrastructure, and security to
support these operations.
Based on detailed analysis and coordination, we are now executing a
course of action that achieves parity of MEDEVAC operations in both
theaters to the mission completion planning standards currently used in
Iraq. The specific details of this solution are classified, and were
briefed to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) staffers on
February 12, 2009.
2. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, with regard to field MEDEVAC and
medical and surgical capabilities in Afghanistan, what measures to
improve timeliness and effectiveness are being considered but have yet
to be implemented?
Secretary Gates. In October 2008, Central Command (CENTCOM)
implemented procedural changes to MEDEVAC launch reporting requirements
that have already significantly decreased Regional Command-East (RC-
East) and Regional Command-South (RC-South) average MEDEVAC mission
completion times.
To decrease these times further, CENTCOM has submitted two requests
for forces to increase the capability currently in Afghanistan. The
Joint Staff, in conjunction with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and CENTCOM,
conducted further analysis, and based on those recommendations, we are
sourcing additional MEDEVAC and surgical assets which will further
augment these capabilities in Afghanistan. We have also resourced a
MEDEVAC ``bridging strategy'' to immediately increase MEDEVAC
capability in theater prior to the arrival of these forces. According
to General David McKiernan, these forces are sufficient to bring the
MEDEVAC missions in RC-East and RC-South to the same standard used in
Iraq.
3. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, what are the greatest impediments
(e.g., lack of equipment, lack of personnel, dwell time) to providing
more expedient field medical services to our troops deployed to remote
locations?
Secretary Gates. The Department of Defense (DOD) currently provides
the highest standards of lifesaving care for all of its U.S. service
men and women deployed to remote locations in Afghanistan and Iraq--and
we are deploying medical capabilities and assets farther forward on the
battlefield than ever before.
Providing the most expedient field medical services, including
shorter MEDEVAC response times, require a systematic approach and the
synchronization of aircraft, medical capabilities, communications,
infrastructure, and security to support these operations. In
Afghanistan, the challenges of extreme weather, the necessity for hoist
operations and significant differences in terrain contour and elevation
increases the risk and total mission time of MEDEVAC missions. However,
our experiences in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) suggest that far-forward resuscitation and stabilization
rendered during the ``platinum 10 minutes'' by combat lifesavers,
medics and corpsmen are contributing significantly to our troop
survival rates.
During the length of these wars, there have been a number of
ongoing improvements to the DOD's forward medical treatment &
stabilization capabilities, such as:
Self-Aid/Buddy Aid: All deploying military personnel are now
issued an Individual First Aid Kit which includes the latest in
medical supply innovations (Combat Application Tourniquet,
Combat Gauze, Nasopharyngeal Airway, et cetera)
Combat Lifesaver: Now trained and equipped to treat
penetrating chest trauma and tension pneumothorax; more
extensive supplies stocked as part of Combat Lifesaver bag
Combat Medic/Corpsman: More extensive Combat Casualty Care
training; has skills comparable to an Emergency Medical
Technician-Intermediate or -Paramedic
Forward Surgical Team/Forward Resuscitative Surgical System:
deploys lifesaving operating room capability to the Brigade/
Regimental area and forward to save the lives of casualties
whose injuries are so severe that they would not survive
transport to theater hospitals
Fighting a prolonged war on two fronts, in addition to continuing
our global engagement in the war on terrorism, has stretched our
military forces, especially those in low-density, high-demand areas.
However, thru the creative use of Joint Sourcing solutions, we have
been able to continue to support all missions and requests for forces
with the appropriate unit fills.
4. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, when will you be able to schedule
a briefing with my staff to address the nature and scope of this
problem, as well as measures that the DOD is taking to address this
matter?
Secretary Gates. The Joint Staff J3 and Joint Staff Surgeon
provided a classified brief to the SASC staffers on February 12, 2009.
SASC Staffers in attendance were:
Professional Staffers: Bill Sutey, Diana Tabler, Gabriella
Eisen, and John Quirk
Personal Staff: Jim Tuite (from your staff)
TRANSITION OF MISSION IN IRAQ
5. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the agreement negotiated with the
Iraqi Government calls for U.S. troops to be withdrawn from Iraqi
cities by June 2009. Once U.S. Forces have been withdrawn from the
cities, what will be their role? What level of redeployment do you see
occurring at that time?
Secretary Gates. The Department is working with the Government of
Iraq to determine mutually agreeable plans for a responsible withdrawal
of U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities by
June 30, 2009 in full implementation of the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement (SA). The Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee,
as provided for by the SA, is the forum for senior Iraqi and U.S.
officers to consult and agree upon the role of U.S. forces after June
30, 2009. Discussions continue with the Iraqis regarding mutually
acceptable roles for U.S. forces within the structure of the SA. The
Department is currently working with other Federal agencies, as
requested by the President, to develop options for a responsible
drawdown of U.S. combat forces from Iraq as we continue to seek to
improve Iraq's ability to security itself and continue to develop a
long-term strategic relationship.
6. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, are the Iraqi security forces
(ISF) prepared to effectively assume their responsibilities for border
and national security, and basic civil and law enforcement? If not,
when will the Iraqi forces be ready to do so?
Secretary Gates. The ISF continue to improve their capabilities,
and as we transition responsibility to them over the next 18 months, we
believe that they will be ready in most respects. In many cases, they
have already assumed responsibility for security with little or no
assistance from U.S. forces.
More than 70 percent of the Iraqi military battalions are assessed
as being in the lead or operating with minimal assistance from U.S.
forces. The Iraqi Air Force flies over 350 operational and training
sorties per week and the Iraqi Navy conducts on average 42 independent
patrols and 35 boardings per week. Over the last 18 months, the Iraqi
military has conducted successful operations in Basrah, Baghdad and
other places previously dominated by insurgent groups.
The Iraqi police forces continue to improve and are assuming
significantly more responsibility for internal security. For example,
local Iraqi police are the primary security force in Anbar province and
the Iraqi National Police have greatly increased security through their
operations in the volatile Ninewa province.
The different elements of the ISF combined recently and effectively
provided a secure environment for the conduct of the Provincial
Elections.
All of these examples demonstrate that the ISF will continue to
improve and with our continued support, will effectively secure their
country. We believe that, though the bulk of U.S. forces will depart
Iraq by August 2010, the transition forces who remain will be fully
capable of helping the Iraqis achieve full responsibility in a short
period of time.
7. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, what assistance, if any, will
they expect or receive from U.S. Forces in the interim?
Secretary Gates. Though the ISF are becoming increasingly more
capable, they still need our assistance providing critical enabling
capabilities like logistics, intelligence, and fire support. They also
require our technical advisory support to help them continue to develop
into a force capable of providing internal and external security.
The Government of Iraq, with our support, is working hard to
develop and field these enabling capabilities that will reduce their
reliance on the U.S. For example, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense is
developing a national supply and distribution network that will support
all their combat divisions and accelerated fielding of Iraqi motor
transport regiments has significantly reduced their dependency on the
U.S. to move supplies.
The Ministry of Interior began fielding a National Police
Sustainment Brigade in October 2008. This will be a mobile organization
providing support to the four National Police divisions and separate
brigades during operations.
CONTRACT REFORM, CONTRACT OVERSIGHT, AND FRAUD AND CORRUPTION
INVESTIGATIONS
8. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, audits conducted by the Special
Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) have consistently revealed pervasive
contracting and oversight problems that have resulted in the loss of
billions of dollars due to fraud, waste, or corruption. What are you
doing to improve contract accountability and ensure the prosecution of
criminal acts?
Secretary Gates. Senior leadership within the Department's
acquisition community is combating fraud, waste and abuse. For example,
the section 813 senior leader panel on Contracting Integrity, in
response to GAO 06-838, stood up 10 committees to improve oversight and
management of the contracting and acquisition process. They implemented
20 of the 21 actions identified in 2008 and held one in abeyance to
analyze the effect of recent legislation. The panel has commenced
implementation of 28 additional actions in 2009. The Department has
found the Panel on Contracting Integrity to be an effective DOD-wide
forum to identify and deal with vulnerabilities in the defense
contracting system.
We are reviewing our processes to comply with regulations and avoid
fraud, waste and abuse. The DOD Inspector General and Army Audit Agency
(AAA) perform continual audits and theater-specific reviews of
contracting-related issues. For the past 18 months, the AAA has audited
the contracting processes at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/
Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) at the request of the JCC-I/A Commanding General.
This ongoing review allows for the identification of issues, the
implementation of corrective action, and a review at another
organization to determine if the corrective action is effective.
Additionally, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement)
has a team of contracting professionals annually perform an in-theater
Procurement Management Review to ensure contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan meets the highest professional standards.
Contract accountability and oversight is being continually improved
in theater. The implementation of a number of e-business systems will
provide real-time and wide-spread access to contract data. Prior to the
implementation of electronic systems, only a ``boots on the ground''
review of paperwork would allow the identification of problems. The lag
time to discover a problem allowed the continuation of sloppy or
improper procedures, or in a few instances, fraud. The Standard
Procurement System (SPS), a DOD-wide automated contract writing and
reporting tool, was implemented for the JCC-I/A on October 1, 2008. SPS
will help to ensure consistency and completeness in the writing of
contracts in theater and will track and provide timely reports and
visibility of contract awards, both through the input of real-time
contracting information into the Federal Procurement Data System-Next
Generation and through the Army Contracting Business Intelligence
System.
9. Senator Byrd. Secretary Gates, the United States has in the past
provided ISF with weapons, some of which have quickly found their way
onto the black market and into the hands of terrorists. What have you
done to improve the accountability of weapons transferred to ISF?
Secretary Gates. I share your concern regarding weapons provided to
Iraq's security forces falling into the hands of terrorist or being
sold into the black market. The DOD has carefully reviewed all
authorities and programs responsible for exports and transfers of
defense articles to Iraq and implemented policies and procedures to
improve accountability and prevent misuse of U.S.-provided weapons.
These policies and procedures comply with the requirements of the
registration and monitoring program prescribed in section 1228 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law
110-181. The registration and monitoring program provides for serial
number registration of small arms; an end-use monitoring program for
lethal defense articles; and a detailed record of the origin, shipping,
and distribution of defense articles transferred to Iraq under the Iraq
Security Forces Fund or any other security assistance program.
These policies have been implemented through a DOD issuance
requiring all DOD components involved in export or transfer of defense
articles to Iraq to comply with section 1228. The Department also
verified that all organizations transferring or authorizing the export
of defense articles to Iraq have implemented appropriate measures
complying with section 1228. The Department is ensuring quarterly
reporting by the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq of
lethal items transferred and compliance assessment visits when
appropriate.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
DISPLACED PERSONS IN IRAQ
10. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, many of us are concerned
about the millions of displaced persons in Iraq and the region and are
interested in knowing what reports or assessments DOD has prepared
regarding the likelihood of their returning to their homes and
communities in the short-, medium-, and long-term?
Secretary Gates. The State Department has the lead on this issue.
DOD does not produce formal assessments regarding the likelihood or the
pace at which displaced persons might return. DOD monitors observable
displacement and return trends reported by U.S. Forces or other
agencies, especially if the volume of returns ignites renewed violence
or degrades hard-won security gains. DOD participates in interagency
deliberations on Iraqi displacement and returns.
11. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Gates, we have similar concerns and
would like the same assessment from the DOD about displaced persons and
refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Would you provide this
information to the committee and continue to keep us apprised of
developments and assessments in this area? Additionally, we would like
to know which office in DOD is responsible for this area.
Secretary Gates. Although DOD monitors these issues, the Department
of State, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
generally has the lead on this issue within the U.S. Government. We at
DOD are concerned about the situation of refugees and displaced people
in Afghanistan. The DOD's twice annual report on Progress toward
Security and Stability in Afghanistan (submitted pursuant to the 2008
National Defense Authorization Act) addresses the issue of displaced
persons and refugees. DOD supports these efforts within its means and
capabilities.
Within DOD, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (APSA) oversees this issue. APSA
coordinates closely with counterparts within DOD and in the Department
of State and USAID. I will keep you apprised of any developments or
assessments DOD conducts in this area.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
ENERGY EFFICIENCY TECHNOLOGIES
12. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, in addressing the energy
challenges that face the Nation, I believe the DOD can play a dual role
of investing in advanced research and manufacturing of new energy
technologies, and by acting as an early adopter of these technologies
to help lower their cost and help initiate their more wide-scale
adoption. What steps will you take to make DOD an aggressive early
adopter of advanced energy technologies, for example by leasing or
purchasing hybrid electric vehicles for use on DOD installations?
Secretary Gates. We have increased our investment in developing,
testing, and procuring energy technologies from about $400 million in
fiscal year 2006 to $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2009. We are testing
and validating these technologies, and expanding successful
demonstrations for broader use. Initiatives cross a broad range of
functional areas, focused on reducing demand, increasing assured
supply, and improving business processes, and all could lead to greater
commercial use. Examples include:
Nellis Air Force Base, NV, which has the largest solar farm
in the Americas, providing \1/4\ of the base power.
Insulation of tents in Iraq and Afghanistan, for a 30-60
percent reduction in energy consumption.
Development of efficient jet engines with a 25 or greater
improvement in fuel efficiency.
LED lights in Wedge 5 of the Pentagon, providing a net
savings of $4 million over life of the fixtures.
Development and certification of affordable synthetic and
biofuels.
Development of high efficiency, compact fuel cells.
13. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, do you plan on focusing more
effort on energy research and on investing in manufacturing of advanced
energy technologies?
Secretary Gates. The Department has made a significant investment
in developing and procuring energy technologies. Our current annual
investment is approximately $1.3 billion and includes investments in
manufacturing and facilitization for fuel cell components, solar power,
and high-density energy storage devices. We recognize the value of
energy, both financially and in terms of operational capability, and
are developing a prudent energy program that balances requirements and
opportunities with competing priorities.
DEFENSE LABORATORIES
14. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, what are the major challenges
you see facing DOD laboratories and technical centers as they seek to
stay technically competitive with their Federal, industry, academic,
and global peers?
Secretary Gates. The ability of the DOD laboratories and technical
centers to support the Department's missions through research and
technology development is important for our national security. Over
time, specific challenges for laboratories and centers change, but
these challenges tend to cluster around recruiting and retaining
personnel, balancing the need for security with the need to
collaborate, and having access to world class equipment. The Department
needs to attract and retain a workforce that is competitive with hiring
mechanisms that provide flexibility to recruit the best, and we need to
maintain a workforce environment that will retain and reward them.
Laboratories and centers must maintain modern, high-quality facilities
both to accomplish their technical work and to retain a high-quality
scientific and engineering workforce.
15. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, what steps will you take to
improve the quality of the laboratories' technical workforce and
research infrastructure?
Secretary Gates. To enable laboratories to attract scientific and
engineering personnel, I am implementing authorities granted by
Congress for expedited hiring of highly qualified experts, medical
personnel, acquisition personnel, and, for selected Science and
Technology Reinvention Laboratories professional scientific and
engineering personnel with advanced degrees.
I will be evaluating the effectiveness of existing personnel
demonstration programs conducted at Science and Technology Reinvention
Laboratories to identify which approaches have proven to be effective
in: addressing workforce recruitment, retention, technical
qualifications and imbalances; improving laboratory quality and
effectiveness; and assessing whether there are approaches that the DOD
may choose to pursue across its entire science and technology
workforce. I will also review other relevant authorities available to
the Department to assess their effectiveness and applicability to other
Departments.
Beyond these steps, we have conducted the first prize challenge led
by the DOD Research and Engineering (DDR&E) team. The Department has
the authority to approve additional prize competitions at DOD
laboratories. These challenges connect DOD to nontraditional providers,
generate awareness of DOD needs and programs, and invigorate the
creativity of our lab personnel. DOD needs to expand these programs to
encourage creativity and innovation in our DOD labs and warfare
centers.
TEST AND EVALUATION ENTERPRISE
16. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, how would you assess the state
of the Department's test and evaluation enterprise, including test
resources and ranges, instrumentation, and workforce?
Secretary Gates. The Department views test resources as an all
encompassing term that includes the workforce, infrastructure, funding,
and associated processes that result in needed test and evaluation
capabilities to support our acquisition programs and ultimately our men
and women in uniform. To ensure adequate funding, management, and
support of these test ranges and resources, 10 U.S.C. 196 directs the
Secretary of Defense to establish a DOD-level resource management
organization, the Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) to provide
robust and flexible test and evaluation capabilities to support the
development, acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of defense systems.
Workforce:
There are about 13,500 military and civilian personnel located
across some 24 activities that comprise what is known as our Major
Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB). The ratio is about 2-to-1
civilian to military.
During the past decade there has been an overall 20 percent decline
in work years across the MRTFB due to reductions in manpower. That
decline has stabilized during the fiscal year 2005-fiscal year 2007
time period primarily due to increased activity in support of our two
major conflicts. Where there have been government personnel shortfalls,
those facilities and ranges have augmented their core workforce with
additional contractor support to meet customer demands.
While the workforce that supports the MRTFB continues to meet
current demands, our concern is for the future. We will need to
continue our efforts to attract and retain the scientists, engineers,
and technicians to support our future testing requirement in areas such
as Directed Energy, Unmanned Systems, and Information Operations.
Infrastructure:
As a whole, the assessment of the current test and evaluation
infrastructure for the Department remains healthy. Military Department
test and evaluation accounts are primarily maintaining stable levels,
with the exception of the Army Test and Evaluation Ranges account, but
customer requirements are becoming more and more complex. The Military
Departments must take a pragmatic approach to assessing capacity and
free up existing dollars for investment by divesting of unnecessary or
duplicate infrastructure; however, this should only occur after
assessing impacts of such divestitures and informing the appropriate
stakeholders prior to closure or reduction. In the past, several assets
across the MRTFB have been reduced or mothballed without appropriate
notification. As a result, the USD(AT&L) signed an interim policy
memorandum on January 18, 2008 requiring any action that would result
in a change to a test and evaluation capability be approved by the
Director, TRMC. TRMC is working with the appropriate military
department and Defense agency representatives to develop policy to
eliminate this practice and ensure the test and evaluation
infrastructure remains capable and available to support the future test
needs of the acquisition community.
Funding:
With the exception of a slight increase in user funding correlating
to the post-September 11 era initiation, the overall MRTFB
infrastructure and investment funding has changed little over the
course of the past several years. Despite the fact that test and
evaluation funding has remained relatively constant, it has not
experienced an increase, which corresponds with the overall increase in
DOD Research, Development, and Acquisition funding. In addition, given
the significant increase in emerging, expedited requirements due to
U.S. participation in two simultaneous wars, and the resultant increase
in test and evaluation workload, the MRTFB buying power has lost
ground. Though the MRTFB funding through fiscal year 2008 has been
determined to be sufficient, the Army fiscal year 2010 test and
evaluation operations accounts are inadequate. The Army has been tasked
to assess the impacts of the fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010
funding reductions to acquisition programs and test and evaluation
capabilities. By March 31 of this year, I will be providing a separate
report to Congress on a get well plan to address Army test and
evaluation range shortfalls.
17. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, what steps will you take to
ensure that the Department has the test and evaluation capabilities
necessary to support the development of operationally effective weapons
systems in the most cost effective and efficient manner?
Secretary Gates. As a result of earlier congressional action, I
already have a process in place that assesses the adequacy of DOD's
test and evaluation infrastructure and provides me recommendations on
needed investments. Congress recognized the need for test and
evaluation capabilities and to have a healthy test and evaluation
infrastructure capable of supporting the development of complex weapon
systems. Section 231 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 enacted 10 U.S.C. 196 that directed the
Secretary of Defense to establish the TRMC, under the supervision of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to:
(1) Review and provide oversight of proposed DOD budgets and
expenditures for the MRTFB of the DOD and all other test and
evaluation facilities and resources within and outside of the
DOD;
(2) At least every 2 years, develop a Strategic Plan
reflecting the needs of the DOD with respect to test and
evaluation facilities and resources for the next 10 fiscal
years;
(3) Conduct an annual review of the proposed test and
evaluation budgets of the Military Departments' and Defense
Agencies with test and evaluation responsibilities and certify
whether they are adequate and whether they provide balanced
support for the Department's Strategic Plan for Test and
Evaluation Resources; and
(4) Administer the Central Test and Evaluation Investment
Program and the DOD test and evaluation science and technology
program.
Besides these statutory responsibilities, I require the TRMC to
assess the adequacy of the MRTFB to support development and testing of
defense systems and to maintain an awareness of other test and
evaluation facilities and resources, within and outside the Department,
to understand the impact of any changes that occur there on DOD's test
and evaluation capabilities. The TRMC provides me regular reports and
recommendations on current and projected infrastructure matters to
ensure that adequate capabilities exist to support testing of DOD
acquisition programs, and that the DOD test and evaluation workforce,
infrastructure, and funding will be fully capable of supporting the
Department with quality products and services in a responsive and
affordable manner.
RAPID ACQUISITION PROCESSES
18. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, what do you see as the major
challenges to the rapid development and deployment of new technologies
to warfighters?
Secretary Gates. There are three major challenges to the rapid
development and deployment of new technologies to the Warfighter. They
are:
(1) Availability and alignment of resources in the year of
execution. We must have funds available in the execution year
to rapidly react to warfighting needs with new technology from
commercial sources, prototyping, or accelerated maturation of
technology from the Science and Technology base.
(2) Availability and training of contracting officers that
specialize in statutes, authorities and regulations that
facilitate rapid response.
(3) Accepting solutions that are 75 percent to 95 percent
ready. By waiting for full development and testing, we defeat
the goal of rapid acquisition. With this challenge also comes
the difficulty in supporting the transition and sustainment of
these rapidly supplied capabilities including deciding which
will not be transitioned and sustained.
In recent years, the Department has taken several actions to meet
these challenges. With the support of Congress, the Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) program has been funded through the MRAP
Transfer Fund, which allowed the flexibility of funding essential to
rapid acquisition. We have also used our experiences with MRAP to
update acquisition training at the Defense Acquisition University in
addition to looking at different alternatives for community management
of contracting officers. The Army has also been very successful with
its emphasis on contingency contracting by restructuring its
contracting corps. The final challenge of accepting a solution that is
less than 100 percent has been the most difficult to achieve. We have,
however, had success with rapid prototyping and demonstration programs
fielding solutions that continued to mature as they were being used.
The longer-term challenge will be to transition or phase out these
interim capabilities in a way that is equitable and cost effective
19. Senator Reed. Secretary Gates, what steps do you plan to take
to address these challenges?
Secretary Gates. The Department adapts to its lessons learned; and,
has learned a great deal with the fielding of MRAPs and new
capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
counter-Improvised Explosive Device, and other emerging technologies.
The Department is taking steps to integrate and institutionalize these
lessons learned into the Defense Acquisition System, including its
science and technology efforts.
The Department intends to develop parallel processes that allow us
to wage wars while providing rapid responses to changing threats and
conditions, as well as plan for future wars. Additionally, section 801
of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009 directs the Department to study and report upon the effectiveness
of the processes used for the generation of urgent operational need
requirements, and the acquisition processes used to fulfill such
requirements. The Department will evaluate findings and recommendations
from that report and other related studies to address the challenges in
adapting technology to quickly fulfill immediate warfighter needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
NAVY DECISION TO ESTABLISH A SECOND AIRCRAFT CARRIER HOMEPORT
20. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, since the 1980s, the Navy
has expressed the importance of strategic dispersal of capital ships
like aircraft carriers, and geographic diversity of unique maintenance
facilities like radiological work facilities. Accordingly, the Navy
deemed one aircraft carrier homeport on the West Coast unacceptable.
Consequently, the Navy has three nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN)
homeports on the west coast.
In 2005, the Navy began a study to look into the feasibility of
homeporting additional surface ships at Naval Station Mayport, and on
14 November 2006, in accordance with the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), the Navy began a study to determine the environmental
impacts of moving additional ships to Naval Station Mayport. On 14
January 2009 the final Record of Decision (ROD) was signed,
recommending that a CVN be homeported in Mayport. Among the reasons
stated in the ROD was the need to develop a hedge against the
potentially crippling results of a catastrophic event at Naval Station
Norfolk, the only East Coast CVN homeport.
Please describe your assessment of the Navy's decision in terms of
the Navy's mission and the Nation's security interests.
Secretary Gates. The Navy's Title X mission is to maintain, train
and equip combat-ready naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring
aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas. To provide this combat-
ready and responsive force, ships, submarines, and aircraft must be
strategically positioned and homeported. These homporting decisions
must meet required response times to contingencies and planned
operations, efficiently support global engagement, maximize training
effectiveness, and protect the fleet from future threats.
I concur with the Navy's assessment that there is significant
national security value in establishing an additional east coast CVN
support base. Specifically, there is a clear need to develop a hedge
against the potentially crippling results of a catastrophic event in
the sole Atlantic Fleet CVN capable homeport. The consolidation of CVN
capabilities in the Hampton Roads area on the east coast presents a
unique set of risks. CVNs assigned to the west coast are spread among
three homeports. Maintenance and repair infrastructure exists at three
locations as well. As a result, there are strategic options available
to Pacific Fleet CVNs should a catastrophic event occur. In contrast,
Naval Station Norfolk is homeport to all five of the CVNs assigned to
the Atlantic Fleet and the Hampton Roads area is the only east coast
location where CVN maintenance and repair infrastructure exists. The
Hampton Roads area also houses all Atlantic Fleet CVN trained crews and
associated community support infrastructure.
There are many factors effecting strategic carrier dispersal such
as future threats, the future of Navy force structure and likely cost
effectiveness. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will assess
these factors as well as the costs of upgrading Naval Station Mayport
to permanently homeport a nuclear aircraft carrier including follow-on
wharf improvements, infrastructure upgrades for nuclear propulsion
plant maintenance facilities, and any changes required to comply with
the NEPA. These potential costs and potential benefits will be assessed
for an additional carrier homeport on the east coast before Defense
puts forth the final decision.
21. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, please describe the risks
to the Nation should implementation of the Navy's decision be delayed.
Secretary Gates. The most significant risk caused by delay in
implementing the Navy's decision is the continuing vulnerability of our
Atlantic Fleet CVN force to the potentially crippling effects of a
catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area. The Nation can not wait
for a catastrophic event to occur before recognizing the potential
impacts of such an event and appropriately planning and preparing for
continuity of operations. On the most aggressive schedule, it would be
no sooner than 2014 before a CVN could be homeported in Mayport.
Delaying the process could defer the opportunity to mitigate risk for
several years as the process is lengthy. Having a single CVN homeport
is not considered acceptable on the west coast and should not be
considered acceptable on the east coast.
The Navy will continue with the scheduled dredging of the Mayport
channel in fiscal year 2010 to support any future decisions to
permanently homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Making Naval
Station Mayport CVN-capable will be the first step towards providing a
second naval port capable of berthing a nuclear carrier in the event of
a catastrophic event in Hampton Roads. The final decision on whether to
homeport a carrier in Mayport will be made by the 2010 QDR.
SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN/DEPENDENCY AND INDEMNITY COMPENSATION
22. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, under current law, if the
surviving spouse of a servicemember is eligible for Survivor Benefit
Plan (SBP), that annuity is offset by the amount of Dependency and
Indemnity Compensation (DIC) received (approximately $1,200). I would
like to work with DOD to eliminate this offset.
Understanding the challenges you face with balancing discretionary
and mandatory spending, please provide your thoughts about this
important quality-of-life issue.
Secretary Gates. The offset to SBP for simultaneous DIC entitlement
is fair, reasonable, and equitable. To allow receipt of both annuities
without offset would create an unjust inequity by giving dual lifetime
annuities to certain survivors, while survivors of other deceased
former military members would continue to receive only one or the
other. If current levels of the annuity for survivors of members who
die from service-connected causes are deemed insufficient, perhaps the
level of DIC should be reevaluated, rather than allowing dual
compensation for a select group.
The current offset process allows dual entitled survivors to
receive a lifetime annuity that is the larger of SBP or DIC, while
preventing duplication of compensation for the same purpose. It also
allows such members to take advantage of the tax-exempt status of DIC.
SBP was developed for the military retiree and DIC for the veteran not
serving to retirement (to include those who die in Active service). The
existing offset rule made it reasonable in 2001 to extend SBP to
survivors of members who died on Active Duty before retirement
eligibility. This was advantageous, since SBP and DIC are
complementary. SBP is based on the pay of a member while DIC is a flat
rate; thus, DIC sets a floor for the annuity that is advantageous for
junior personnel with fewer years of service, while SBP offers the
potential for a higher annuity for more senior personnel with greater
years of service. Both programs are highly subsidized by the government
(DIC at 100 percent and SBP from 50 to 100 percent), and to pay both
would be double payment for the same purpose.
23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, please provide plans,
which Congress can consider, that would eliminate this offset over
time.
Secretary Gates. As noted in the response to question #22, I do not
favor eliminating the SBP-DIC offset and suggest that if current
annuity levels for survivors of former military members who die of
service-connected causes are deemed inadequate, the level of DIC should
be reevaluated.
PAKISTAN
24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, last fall, the New York
Times reported a U.S. military operation across the Afghanistan border
into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. This
was a new initiative for uniformed U.S. military forces to cross the
border. It also drew outrage from the Pakistanis.
It is important to brief any and all such operations to the full
membership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. DOD
continues to refuse to brief anyone but the chairman and ranking member
about this alleged operation. What is DOD's role in stabilizing the
FATA?
Secretary Gates. DOD is working with Pakistan's military and
paramilitary forces to help build their counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency capacity to deny terrorists and insurgents safe haven
within its sovereign territory, especially in the tribal region of the
Northwest Frontier Province and FATA. Through the Security Development
Plan, DOD is training and equipping Pakistani military (PAK MIL) and
paramilitary security forces to enhance their ability to conduct
counterinsurgency operations. This is one element of a broader
counterinsurgency initiative that includes a $750 million, 5-year
commitment by USAID to enhance infrastructure development and social
welfare in the border region and parallel efforts by the Department of
State to enhance the ability of Pakistani institutions to extend their
writ of governance into the border region.
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, you have publicly stated
that a new Afghanistan strategy is a high priority for the Obama
administration. Has President Obama explicitly endorsed the Pentagon's
plan to send up to 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan? If the
decision is made, when can we expect the deployment to occur and where
in Afghanistan would the U.S. troops be deployed?
Secretary Gates. President Obama has not yet made any decisions on
the deployment of additional military forces to Afghanistan. The
administration will conduct a strategic review of our policies toward
Afghanistan. As we move forward, we will come to this committee and
other Members of Congress for advice and support.
Decisions on further deployments of military forces to Afghanistan
will be informed by that review.
26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Gates, how will Special
Representative Richard Holbrooke's new mandate coincide with that of
General Petraeus, who was tasked with a strategic review of U.S. policy
in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. Special Representative Holbrooke will work closely
with my office, and with General Petraeus on all matters related to
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The administration will conduct a strategic review of our policies
toward Afghanistan. I am confident that Ambassador Holbrooke and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will work together closely on the
strategic review. As we move forward, we will come to this committee
and other Members of Congress for advice and support.
Early in his command, General Petraeus directed his staff at U.S.
CENTCOM to lead an interagency assessment of his entire area of
responsibility. I expect the findings of the CENTCOM assessment to help
inform the new administration's comprehensive review.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
OUTPATIENT SERVICES FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL
27. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Gates, late last year, 57
Senators wrote to you expressing grave concern with a DOD proposal that
would subject hospitals to sudden and severe cuts in payments for
outpatient services provided to military personnel. In late December,
DOD responded with a final policy that, in effect, ignored our
concerns. I, for one, am offended and I am reasonably confident that
the 56 other Senators who signed the letter agree.
Will you reopen this rule per the Emanuel Memo so you can work with
me and my colleagues to ensure implementation of a 15 percent annual
limit on losses for all Services until the Medicare-like rates are
reached? This will ensure a predictable and sustainable transition that
reaches our common interest of providing quality care to military
personnel while being stewards of the public dollar.
Secretary Gates. Yes, the rule was reopened on February 6, 2009 for
an additional 30-day period, even though legal counsel believes the
decision not to reopen public comment would be fully supportable based
on the criteria of Mr. Emanuel's Regulatory Review memorandum of
January 20. All new comments will be evaluated. Barring any resulting
modification of the rule, TRICARE's Outpatient Prospective Payment
System (OPPS) will be implemented May 1, 2009.
Transition was a key element in the development of the Department's
implementation plan. The Senators recommended a transition to the
Medicare OPPS rates. TRICARE has taken measures to buffer the initial
revenue reductions that hospitals will experience upon implementation
of OPPS. Under the final rule, temporary transitional payment
adjustments (TTPAs) above current Medicare rates will now apply to both
network and non-network hospitals. This is consistent with the stop
loss transitional period over which the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services fully implemented its OPPS rate structure, providing
hospitals with sufficient time to adjust and budget for potential
revenue reductions. The duration of the TTPAs has also been extended
for an additional year for network hospitals. The 4-year network
hospital transition period will set higher payment percentages for
emergency room and hospital clinic visits. For non-network hospitals,
the TTPAs will cover a 3-year period. Under the TRICARE transitional
methodology, OPPS payments would be around 80 percent of the total
billed amounts currently allowed under TRICARE's charge based
reimbursement system for network hospitals. This would approximate the
15 percent stop loss provisions being promoted by the hospital
associations. The Department believes that modification of the
transitional payment methodology is responsive to the Senators'
concerns.
The Department by no means ignored the concerns of the Senators.
Appropriate responses were promptly drafted. Circumstances of timing
and coordination resulted in a delay, and ultimate change in the
original position. This unusual circumstance was compounded by
subsequent congressional staff questions, and our legal counsel's
review of the Emanuel memorandum relative to this rule. The Department
has gone to great lengths to comply with the Senators intent and
desires on this issue, but agrees that an apology for our timeliness
may be in order.
STRESS FROM DEPLOYMENTS
28. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Gates, in an American Forces
Press Service news article dated 21 January 2009, Admiral Mullen was
quoted as saying:
``The next 2 years will be a delicate time for the U.S. military .
. . [I] am worried about the force and the stress that repeated
deployments place on servicemembers and their families . . . [I] will
continue to monitor dwell time, the ability to recruit and retain the
force and ways to maintain the balance of the military.''
I agree with Admiral Mullen that the next 2 years will be a
delicate time for our military. I am also very concerned about the
stress that repeated deployments place on our servicemembers and their
families. As we embark on these next 2 years, what do you consider are
the top personnel issues that must be addressed and what can I do as
the chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee to assist you with these
issues?
Secretary Gates. I appreciate your support of our military members
and all the efforts of you and the committee to take care of our
servicemembers and their families and I agree with Admiral Mullen that
we have much to do to reduce stress on the forces. Although we face
many challenges in the coming years, the top personnel issues should be
protecting the totality of resources needed to attract and retain a
robust volunteer force and ensuring we take care of our wounded
warriors, their families and families of the fallen.
This is the best military we've ever had and its members are making
an extraordinary difference even as they and their families sacrifice
on behalf of our Nation. Balancing the stress of the force with the
health of the force becomes an imperative. We must ensure our personnel
have the equipment, training and other resources required to win our
Nation's wars and protect military pay and benefits. Of equal
importance is providing for the well-being of our military families in
ways that will encourage them to support the military members entering
and remaining on active duty for full careers.
We must improve and expand our existing support structures for
families with greater sensitivity to their challenges and daily
sacrifices. We should examine ways to increase spouse employment
programs, and child care and development services for working families.
Strengthening the support structure could be a decisive factor in
helping families reduce divorce and suicide rates, and have a positive
impact on recruiting and retention.
We must honor our responsibility to our Wounded Warriors, their
families, and the families of the fallen who have sacrificed
everything. Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs (VA) must
partner in screening war veterans for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) upon return from combat and
after discharge from military service. Also, both departments should
assist in helping the Wounded Warriors secure meaningful government
employment and ensure their health care needs are met.
Again, thank you for your support of our military members and their
families.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
AFGHANISTAN
29. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in your view, should our near
term focus in Afghanistan be protecting the population along the lines
of a traditional counterinsurgency strategy, or should it have as its
aim the complete elimination of the Taliban and al Qaeda?
Secretary Gates. The administration will conduct a strategic review
of our policies toward Afghanistan. The results of that review will
help us establish near-, mid-, and long-term goals in Afghanistan and
identify ways and means to achieve those goals. As we move forward, we
will come to this committee and other Members of Congress for advice
and support.
As the United States and its partners work with the Government of
Afghanistan to extend its reach into the provinces, we must continue to
apply pressure on al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in
Afghanistan. I believe we can effectively degrade their capabilities,
deprive them of significant support, and successfully mitigate the
threat they pose to the United States and its allies.
30. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I believe that we need to
develop a comprehensive civil-military plan for Afghanistan, akin to
that used in Iraq. I find it hard to understand why we do not have such
a plan, and I understand that plans in the works may not encompass the
entirety of the country. Can you comment on the need to develop a
comprehensive civil-military plan for Afghanistan and to better
coordinate civilian and military efforts there?
Secretary Gates. Well-integrated civilian and military efforts in
Afghanistan are essential to achieving U.S. objectives in the country.
The DOD is working with other government offices and agencies to
integrate civilian and military efforts in Afghanistan.
31. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how do you assess the
contributions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies
to the effort in Afghanistan, and how do you believe the United States
can persuade these allies to increase their efforts as the United
States does so?
Secretary Gates. Success in Afghanistan will require greater effort
by the U.S., our Allies and our partners. NATO and non-NATO
contributors have made notable commitments to the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, but more needs to be done.
President Obama has called for greater contributions from our NATO
Allies, either military, or, in support of governance and development.
To ensure appropriate burdensharing, we must underscore to our partners
the linkage between stability in Afghanistan and the security of our
homelands, which warrants additional resources and sacrifices. By
committing more of our own resources to the challenge, the United
States is better positioned to persuade our Allies to do more.
32. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, General McKiernan has spoken
of increasing U.S. troops in Afghanistan by something on the order of
four combat brigades. Do you support this request? Would increasing the
number of troops in Afghanistan require us to draw down in Iraq faster
than we otherwise might?
Secretary Gates. I do support General McKiernan's request. Based on
the analysis of the Joint Staff, the CENTCOM Commander, and the Multi-
National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) Commander, supporting General McKiernan's
request for additional troops should not force a change in the pace of
a responsible drawdown of forces in Iraq.
33. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are we on the same page as our
allies with respect to the need to go after narcotics traffickers and
drug labs in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. The United States supports the increased
participation of NATO Allies in addressing the narcotics challenge in
Afghanistan. At the Budapest Ministerial in 2008, Defense Ministers
agreed to expand ISAF's counternarcotics mandate to conduct
counternarcotics missions against narcotics facilities and facilitators
supporting the insurgency. The United States supports NATO taking an
active role in deliberate counternarcotics interdiction operations and
in the training of specialized Afghan counternarcotics forces. However,
some nations in ISAF have differing national authorities that may
preclude them from participating in counternarcotics activities.
34. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you consider drug labs a
legitimate military target?
Secretary Gates. At the request of the Government of Afghanistan,
during the October 2008 NATO Defense Ministerial in Budapest, Allied
Ministers directed ISAF to take action in concert with Afghans against
narcotics facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency. Where
this nexus exists, the drug labs are legitimate military targets.
Subject to applicable rules of engagement (ROE), military commanders on
the ground now have the flexibility to target narcotics production
facilities and facilitators for military action if they are determined
to provide support to insurgents.
35. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe that DOD should
provide support for counternarcotics operations carried out by other
agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency?
Secretary Gates. DOD should continue to provide support for
counternarcotics operations carried out by other agencies. In
accordance with section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended, the DOD may provide support to the
counterdrug activities of any other department or agency of the Federal
Government. This support should come at the request of the supported
department or agency in order to assist with capabilities such as
transportation, training, intelligence analysis, or language support
and should leverage otherwise valid military training or operations.
Support can also maintain or repair equipment to ensure future utility
for or compatibility and integration with the DOD. DOD may also
establish bases of counternarcotics operations or training. The DOD
does not provide support to other departments or agencies when such
support adversely affects military preparedness.
36. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how large do you believe the
Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) should
ultimately be?
Secretary Gates. The currently approved size of the ANA is based on
the assumption that levels of violence in Afghanistan are likely to
increase in the near future. The currently approved size of the ANA
(134,000) included plans to reassess the overall size of the Afghan
National Security Forces on a semi-annual basis. We will work with the
Government of Afghanistan and the international community to determine
the appropriate future size of the ANP based on the existing conditions
in Afghanistan.
37. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how do you believe we should
act to enhance the civilian side of our efforts in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. I support efforts to increase the number of
civilian officials and the overall non-military level of effort in
Afghanistan. As we consider the possibility of deploying additional
military forces to Afghanistan, it is crucial that we also look at how
we can leverage civilian agencies' expertise to ensure a whole-of-
government approach. However, the United States should not shoulder
this burden alone. It is important that the international community
also contribute more to the non-military lines of effort in
Afghanistan.
SUPPLY ROUTES IN AFGHANISTAN
38. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, about three-quarters of
``nonlethal'' supplies for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan--food,
fuel, construction materials and other goods--travel by road from the
Pakistani port of Karachi and across the mountainous Afghanistan-
Pakistan border through the Khyber Pass. Pakistani transit convoys have
repeatedly been attacked in recent months by the Taliban. Earlier this
month, General Petraeus said that the United States had reached
agreements to open additional logistical routes into Afghanistan
through its neighbors to the north. This will reduce dependence on
logistics lines through Pakistan. This is an important development. Do
you have the resources and authorities you need to ensure that these
logistics lines can be improved, sustained, and protected?
Secretary Gates. Over the past 5 months, we have worked hard across
the interagency to mature routes to sustain OEF from the north.
Representatives from OSD Policy, CENTCOM and Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) continue to visit the region to garner support for our
Northern Distribution Network efforts. CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, and Defense
Logistics Agency are evaluating requirements and network capabilities
to identify required resources and possible overarching areas for
improvement. We have started shipping material through the north and
will expand shipments to include a variety of commodities as these
routes mature.
NATO AND MID-EAST REGIONAL SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN
39. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in February 2008, in testimony
before this committee, you said: ``I worry a great deal about the NATO
alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in which you have some
allies willing to fight and die to protect people's security, and
others who are not.'' Earlier this month British Defense Secretary John
Hutton criticized other NATO members for their ``limited appetite'' for
the mission in Afghanistan and for ``freeloading on the back of U.S.
military security.'' What is your assessment of our allies' current
contributions to the NATO mission in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. When I testified last year about the Alliance
evolving into a two-tiered Alliance, I stated that certain Allies bear
a disproportionate share of the fighting and the dying and others opt
only for less dangerous or limited missions. We are moving towards
adjusting this imbalance, but work remains to be done. We are working
with allies, in the context of a U.S. strategic review, to identify
shortfalls in forces and civilian assistance to Afghanistan and seeking
greater contributions to meet those specific needs.
NATO's mission in Afghanistan falls squarely within the Alliance's
role of defending the security interests and values of the
transatlantic community and NATO has repeatedly said that Afghanistan
is its top priority.
40. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is your assessment of the
mood in Europe on helping out in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. I believe our European partners understand the
pressing need for greater resources in Afghanistan and they have
expressed a willingness to increase material support for our efforts to
strengthen stabilization and reconstruction efforts there. To make this
possible, most European leaders recognize that they need to do a better
job of communicating the importance of Alliance strategic objectives on
their home fronts to ensure sufficient domestic support for greater
sacrifices in a critically important, but geographically distant,
theater.
In addition to providing military forces, one of Europe's great
strengths lies in its ability to provide civilian expertise and
development assistance to build better governance in Afghanistan and
address the needs of Afghan people, which is the key to long-term
stability there.
41. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will they increase troop
levels? Revise national caveats?
Secretary Gates. President Obama has both called for greater
civilian and military contributions with fewer restrictions from our
NATO allies. We have had and will continue to have frank discussions
with allies about the need for all coalition members to make
significant contributions and sacrifices to the common cause in
Afghanistan. Such contributions extend to both the quantity of forces
committed as well as their ability to perform a full range of missions.
The President will continue these exchanges with allies at the NATO
Summit in April.
42. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will they increase deployment
time of their troops?
Secretary Gates. We recognize and appreciate each country's
commitment to the ISAF mission; we are working to secure greater
involvement from our allies and partners on both the civilian and
military side. Obviously, the length and type of contribution by any
particular country is a decision for that country's leaders and public,
however, we will continue to urge allies to increase the length of
their deployments to the ISAF mission. Where we are able, we will
assist partners through pre-deployment training, logistics, and
transport if that helps to extend deployments.
43. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, will they increase the number
of civilian experts they send to Afghanistan to help with
reconstruction and development?
Secretary Gates. Allies have committed money, personnel and
equipment to reconstruction and development efforts, but the demand
currently swamps supply in this area. As one of the poorest countries
in the world and one that has suffered through more than a generation
of war, Afghanistan's development challenges are daunting. Four out of
five Afghans make their living from farming, yet widespread drought and
a crumbling agricultural infrastructure have created an opening for
illicit opium production to supplant the legal agricultural economy.
While Afghanistan has made significant strides since 2001 in health
care delivery, life expectancy is still below 45 years and more than
half of Afghan children are growth-stunted from poor nutrition and
disease. While progress has been made towards primary education in
Afghanistan, fewer than half of adult males and only one in eight
females can read, impeding the professionalization of the Afghan
Government and security forces and limiting economic growth.
I look forward to working with our international partners to help
create a truly comprehensive civil-military strategy to help the
Afghans build the necessary foundation for a stable and secure
Afghanistan. Convincing our Allies to provide more civilian experts and
other resources is a key priority in developing Afghan capabilities to
sustain itself in the future.
44. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do the Nations of the Middle
East have much to offer to efforts to stabilize and rebuild
Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. The nations of the Middle East have demonstrated
they have much to offer the Afghan people. We understand from the
Government of Afghanistan that the Gulf countries pledged a total of
$287 million in financial support at the Paris conference in 2008. As
we work to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan, there are other areas in
which other nations, including the Gulf nations, can also contribute,
such as:
training, equipping, and advising Afghan National Security
Forces--as the U.S. is doing--to improve the size and quality
of the ANA;
helping fund sustainment of an expanded ANA;
supporting the 2009 and 2010 Afghan elections through
increased forces, financial assistance or civilian monitors and
observers;
sending civilian experts and equipment to help build Afghan
capacity in areas such as medical care, engineering, and
agriculture; and
ensuring that their governments are doing everything they can
to halt financing of the Taliban, whether through the
legitimate banking system or illicitly through the drug trade,
to include strengthening counterterrorism finance laws.
45. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what can you tell us about
what Arab countries contribute to Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. Arab countries support the U.S.-led OEF and NATO-
led ISAF missions in various capacities, to include contributing
resources and personnel for hospital and medical assistance. Arab
nations have also pledged financial assistance to Afghanistan, most
recently at the June 2008 Paris Support Conference.
COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN
46. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in August 2008, the United
Nations' Afghanistan Opium Survey showed a 19 percent decrease in opium
cultivation compared to 2007. While that is something of a positive
development, the report also showed a distinct geographical overlap
between regions of opium production and the zones of insurgency
demonstrating the inextricable link between drugs and conflict.
Illicit drugs and terrorists should not determine the fate of
Afghanistan. The opium economy will continue to prosper unless there is
a crackdown on corruption in Afghanistan. As you proceed through the
strategic reviews on Afghanistan: here in the U.S.; with our NATO
allies; and with the Afghan Government are we coming to the point where
we have reached a general accord about going after poppy cultivation
and the drug trade in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. The narcotics trade is a threat to stability and
security in Afghanistan as it feeds the insurgency and corruption. We
are working closely with counternarcotics forces in the Afghan
Ministries of Interior and Defense to increase their counternarcotics
capabilities. The development of competent indigenous forces is a key
factor in fighting the insurgency. The Government of Afghanistan and
the United States both acknowledge the corrosive effects of opium trade
on stability and security. At the October 2008 NATO Defense
Ministerial, NATO Allies acknowledged the threat of the opium trade to
stability and security in Afghanistan and issued a joint statement
indicating willingness to provide support. As an active participant in
the U.S. Government interagency policy formulation and review process,
DOD supports the five-pillar counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan
developed and published in 2007.
47. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is it clear to all parties
that we may not be able to achieve our mutual goals in Afghanistan
without going after the drug problem?
Secretary Gates. The nexus between the narcotics trade and the
insurgency is clear. We are working closely with Afghan security forces
and our allies to tackle the problem. As long as the Afghan narcotics
trade continues to provide material support to the insurgency, the
counterinsurgency campaign in support of the Government of the Republic
of Afghanistan will continue to realize uneven success.
48. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in a press conference on
January 22, 2009, you said that the pursuit of drug labs and drug lords
is ``fair game'' for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan if there is evidence
that those drug labs and drug lords have ties to the Taliban. Do you
have all the legislative authorities you require to go after drug labs
and drug lords in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. At the present, DOD has the necessary legislative
authorities to support counternarcotics operations in support of the
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. I will keep you advised
should we need additional authorities.
49. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, when will Afghan security
forces be prepared to take this task over themselves?
Secretary Gates. Narcotics is a major concern in Afghanistan and we
are taking this issue seriously. The Counternarcotics Police of
Afghanistan are being trained by the interagency to mitigate this
problem in the long term. Although the Afghans are making great strides
in the counternarcotics realm, it will take several years before police
units will have the expertise required to conduct sophisticated
investigations and interdiction operations independently.
50. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what efforts are being taken
at Afghanistan's borders to stop the smuggling into Afghanistan, of
precursor chemicals used to process heroin?
Secretary Gates. The Border Management Initiative through the U.S.
Embassy Kabul's Border Management Task Force aims to improve customs
and immigration performance at all ports of entry and customs
facilities, to reduce illegal narcotics flow out of Afghanistan, and of
insurgents, weapons, and precursor chemicals into Afghanistan and to
increase revenue through proper customs procedures. Additionally, the
construction of border crossing points in Islam Qala, Toreghondi, Shir-
Khan, Bander, and Spin Boldak as well as the refurbishment of existing
facilities also enable the Afghan Border Police to stem the flow of
opiates out of Afghanistan and to prevent the flow of precursor
chemicals into Afghanistan. Finally, the DOD provides advanced training
and additional equipment to the Afghan Border Police in order to enable
it to counter the insurgent and narcotrafficker threat more
effectively.
51. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe we can count on
the Afghan Central Government to seriously address the drug problem
during the upcoming election period?
Secretary Gates. There is no alternative. The Government of
Afghanistan has identified the drug problem as a priority. The
Department, working with the Drug Enforcement Administration, has and
will continue to focus on building Afghan capacity to disrupt drug
trafficking organizations and decrease narcotics trafficking and
processing in Afghanistan. Such assistance included building new
counternarcotics bases of operations, and establishing and operating an
Afghan Ministry of Interior counternarcotics helicopter squadron. The
Department has also helped Afghanistan control its borders to stop the
flow of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals by constructing border-
crossing checkpoints and providing necessary training and equipment to
the Afghan Border Police.
The Department has worked with the Department of State to help
Afghanistan surpass last year's eradication efforts by retraining the
Afghan Central Government's Poppy Eradication Force and assisting the
Afghan Ministry of Defense in providing security support for
eradication. The Department is doing everything it can to bolster the
Afghan Government's will and capacity to counter its drug problem.
IRANIAN ACTIVITY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
52. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you have any evidence that
there are more or fewer Iranian-made weapons or explosively formed
penetrator components going into Iraq?
Secretary Gates. [Deleted.]
53. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you anticipate Iranian
meddling during the upcoming elections in Iraq?
Secretary Gates. Iran has taken a multi-prong approach in Iraq, by
covertly supplying arms to extremists, publicly supporting the Iraqi
Government, and seeking to strengthen its connection with Shia. While
we acknowledge Iran's right to develop a neighborly relationship with
the government of Iraq, we do not accept their malign efforts to
undermine U.S. and Iraqi initiatives. The administration is currently
conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Iran; Iran's
malign activities are included in this review.
54. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what can you tell us about
Iranian involvement in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. Iran continues to pursue a multi-pronged approach
in Iraq and Afghanistan by covertly supplying arms to insurgents,
publicly supporting the governments, and seeking to strengthen its
connection with Shia.
Such Iranian actions seem to indicate that Tehran wants greater
influence for itself while seeking to raise the cost for the United
States and our allies.
IRAQ
55. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the President has stressed the
need for a responsible redeployment of U.S. combat forces from Iraq,
and there are reports that he would like to withdraw combat troops
within 16 months. Is this timeline currently under consideration?
Secretary Gates. The President has given clear direction for the
interagency, facilitated by the National Security Council, to review
the current strategy in Iraq and develop a comprehensive recommendation
to him. This recommendation is not just an assessment of possible
drawdown scenarios but seeks to develop updated national strategic
objectives and the proposed civilian and military force levels that
will achieve these objectives. In this regard, all options are on the
table and it is a consultative process where the field commanders and
interagency partners have input into the process.
56. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, where do the commanders in the
field come down on this question?
Secretary Gates. The security agreement specifies that all U.S.
combat forces will be out of Iraq no later than 31 December 2011. The
field commanders first and foremost seek to establish the conditions in
Iraq that will make this transition smooth. In doing so, they recommend
going to a residual force some time prior to that date to test those
conditions and posture the enduring mutually agreed upon partnership
for success. To achieve this end, the commanders and interagency
partners will be intimately involved in the current review process.
This consultative process will ensure that all risks have been
appropriately considered and addressed.
57. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, where does the Government of
Iraq come down on this question?
Secretary Gates. We have informed the Iraqi leadership how the
United States will draw down its forces while adhering to the security
agreement concluded with Iraq in December of last year. We will
continue to coordinate and discuss the details of our phased drawdown
as the ISF increasingly take the lead, and carefully consider Iraqi
concerns as we implement the President's guidance.
The Iraqi leadership is confident that the capabilities of the ISF
and the capacity of its governmental institutions will continue to grow
in the coming year, and recognizes that the long-term success of the
sovereign Iraqi state is in the Iraqi people's hands.
58. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how do you envision such a
redeployment proceeding in a way and on a timeline that does not
jeopardize the dramatic gains we have seen in Iraq since early 2007?
Secretary Gates. The President's plan represents a responsible and
reasonable drawdown of our combat units in Iraq and does not sacrifice
the hard-fought gains that our forces and the Iraqis have made over the
last several years.
Because progress still remains fragile, a U.S. military presence
will be necessary to support the Iraqis while they conduct national
elections and further develop the capabilities of the ISF through 2009.
Therefore, after an initial drawdown this year, U.S. force levels will
likely hold steady from the period immediately preceding until shortly
after the national elections expected to take place before the end of
January 2010.
After this period, we will see an accelerated pace of drawdown
consistent with the anticipated conditions on the ground. This plan
provides our military commanders with the flexibility they will require
during this critical time in Iraq to ensure hard fought security gains
are not lost. This plan also identifies an initial transitional force
to help consolidate our progress to date.
UPCOMING PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN IRAQ
59. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on January 22, Ambassador
Crocker said ``I think the ISF have made enormous progress during my
time in Iraq, both quantitatively and, more important, qualitatively.
There is still a ways to go. And clearly, still a continuing need for
our security support.'' The Ambassador went on to say that ``the
conduct and outcome of those elections I think are going to be very
important for the country.'' What role are U.S. Forces playing in the
upcoming provincial elections?
Secretary Gates. The Provincial Elections in Iraq are Iraqi
planned, managed, and executed, with MNF-I, United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), USM-I, and nongovernment organizations in a
supporting role. MNF-I is coordinating closely with the Iraqi Supreme
Council for Electoral Security and will provide support to the ISF upon
request. In coordination with the ISF, commanders are given maximum
latitude to ensure legitimate and credible Provincial Elections in
their battle space.
Specific support which MNF-I is fully prepared to provide during
the Provincial Elections will include:
Support with a Quick Reaction Force, as well as MEDEVAC
capability
Assistance with joint threat assessments of General Elections
Office warehouses
Assisting Iraq with the conduct of a Command Post Exercise to
rehearse ballot movement, interagency coordination, and
reporting procedures
Support to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, UNAMI, and the
Iraqi High Electoral Commission
MNF-I will prioritize transportation, security, and critical
life support for International Observers and UNAMI
I agree with Ambassador Crocker that the ISF have made enormous
progress, and we expect that the elections will take place with a
minimum of security incidents.
60. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how important are the
provincial elections and the national elections scheduled for later
this year in determining your plans for the way forward?
Secretary Gates. Iraq's ability to plan and conduct legitimate
elections--to include the recently concluded provincial elections--is a
significant demonstration of the Government of Iraq's development and
maturation. The President's drawdown plan accounts for the critical
period surrounding such major political events in Iraq. Accordingly,
U.S. Forces will remain at a robust level until immediately after
Iraq's national elections scheduled to take place between late 2009 and
early 2010, and will then draw down to a level consistent with the
anticipated conditions on the ground. The plan gives commanders the
flexibility to pause the redeployment of combat brigades temporarily
for the period immediately before and after the Iraqi national
elections to assist the Iraqis in consolidating hard fought security
gains through the political process. The Department recognizes that our
civil and military support to the Government of Iraq and assistance to
the ISF during these election cycles are central to achieving the U.S.
goal of increasing the capacity and independence of Iraq's governing
institutions.
ACQUISITION REFORM
61. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the Defense Business Board
(DBB), an internal management oversight board that you stood up, warned
that the DOD's budget is ``unsustainable'' and that the Department can
only meet its priorities, particularly those relating to military
personnel (such as escalating health care costs), if it makes hard
budget decisions on its largest and costliest acquisition programs. As
indicated in a briefing to the administration's transition team,
``[b]usiness as usual [in terms of the Department's budget decisions]
is no longer an option.''
Do you agree with the DBB's admonitions and what principles will
guide your thinking on possible cuts to large acquisition programs?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I agree that business as usual is not an
option, and that hard choices are needed. To that end, in my statement
for the record for this hearing January 27, 2009, I said that for
acquisition programs, DOD needs to:
Make hard choices, not across-the-board adjustments that
stretch out programs.
Have economic production rates, budget stability, and
economies of scale.
Buy more ``75 percent solution'' systems and fewer expensive
``99 percent solution'' systems.
Not let each Service buy its own system to counter a threat
common to all.
Freeze requirements at contract award and incentive contract
performance.
Increase competition, use prototypes more, and ensure
technology maturity before programs go to the next phase of
development.
Restore and strengthen the DOD acquisition workforce.
62. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, early this year, this
administration will be required to make what amounts to a go/no-go
decision on the F-22A Raptor program, an increasingly expensive program
that (as you rightly point out) has made no contribution to the global
war on terror and may impinge on the timing and cost of when the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter may first be operationally capable. What
principles guide your thinking on the future direction of this program?
Secretary Gates. The F-22 and F-35 were developed for different
types of missions and to fill different capability gaps. The F-22 was
developed to replace the aging F-15 aircraft inventory, while the F-35
is being developed to replace the aging F-16, AV-8B, and F/A-18 C/D
aircraft inventories. While the F-22 may not have made significant
contributions to the global war on terror, it is an important asset and
the most capable air-to-air aircraft in our military arsenal, ready to
be used for any current and future threats that face our Nation. The
future direction of the F-22 program lies in factors such as compliance
with the requirements of the current National Military Strategy, the
affordability of additional F-22 aircraft within the Department's
resource constrained environment, and whether continued production or
termination is in the national interest of the United States.
63. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, as you likely know, this
committee has developed several legislative initiatives intended to
reform the process by which the Department buys its largest and most
expensive weapons systems. Most of those initiatives have addressed
acquisition policy and the requirements system. You and your staff,
too, have been busy on defense acquisition reform. I am gratified by
initiatives recently undertaken by the current Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to help reform the
defense acquisition system. Those initiatives (codified at DOD
Instruction 5000.02) attempt to start major acquisition programs off
responsibly by increasing emphasis on systems engineering and greater
upfront planning and management of risk; call for using competitive
prototyping in a newly-named Technology Development Phase (before
Milestone B), to mete out risk; and establish review boards to monitor
weapon system configuration changes. Those initiatives appear
consistent with the knowledge-based approach to weapons development
that the GAO has recommended for years. At this point, what other
aspects of the defense acquisition system do you see need reform?
Secretary Gates. As you have said, the Department has undertaken a
broad range of initiatives designed to improve the effectiveness of the
defense acquisition system. These initiatives were institutionalized
via the recent update to DOD Instruction 5000.02, our primary
acquisition policy document. Likewise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
continue to refine our requirements process, the system we use to
define our warfighter capability needs. I plan to monitor the
effectiveness of these changes over time and will, where necessary,
make adjustments to ensure our process improvement objectives are being
achieved.
64. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, among the reforms I'm calling
for is a comprehensive audit of the DOD budget aimed at identifying the
unnecessary, wasteful programs and procurements that should be
terminated or suspended immediately. What is your preliminary reaction
to that reform initiative?
Secretary Gates. The DOD will open the fiscal year 2010 budget in
the next few weeks and one aspect we will specifically look at is
performance and funding for acquisition programs. Those programs not
performing or with cost growth will be considered for suspension or
termination. We have made several changes in the acquisition process
reflected in the recently approved DOD 5000.02 to include a mandatory
acquisition process entry point, competitive prototyping, more frequent
and effective reviews, configuration steering boards and technology
readiness assessments aimed at keeping programs on cost and schedule.
We will also do a much more comprehensive review and possible program
restructuring/termination in support of the President's fiscal year
2011 budget.
ACQUISITION REFORM
65. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, another reform I'm calling for
is putting Nunn-McCurdy (the law that requires the Department to report
excessive cost growth on weapons programs to Congress) ``on steroids''.
It is my hope that doing so will reinforce the process by which cost
estimates are independently assessed and strengthen congressional
oversight over chronically poor performing weapons programs. What ways
do you think Nunn-McCurdy can be improved to transform it from a mere
reporting requirement to a management tool to help the Department keep
cost growth in check?
Secretary Gates. Congress provided the DOD with tools that make
Nunn-McCurdy more effective when it enacted a requirement for
certifications in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006 (Pub. L. No. 109-163) and the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181). The certification
requirements in Sections 2366a (for Milestone A) and 2366b (for
Milestone B) in Title 10, United States Code allow DOD to do the
necessary analysis and due diligence to set programs up for success.
For example, the certifications require a confirmation of the
requirement, an analysis of alternatives, an estimate of cost, and a
review of affordability. In addition, at Milestone B, the 2366b
certification requires an assessment of technological readiness and
assurance of compliance with statutory and regulatory policies.
The Department has also undertaken internal initiatives to address
contributing factors that cause programs to incur Nunn-McCurdy
breaches. These initiatives include establishing Configuration Steering
Boards to address requirements creep, increased emphasis on Milestone A
and prototyping, improving knowledge available by encouraging a
preliminary design review prior to Milestone B, when that is possible,
and a rigorous post-breach certification process.
There are changes that could help DOD with making the Nunn-McCurdy
process more effective. We sometimes see Nunn-McCurdy breaches driven
by valid requirements changes or procurement quantity changes that are
not problems in the acquisition program. Allowing for valid adjustments
would fix management attention on true cost increases. This could be
fixed by allowing DOD to adjust the acquisition program baseline
established at Milestone B (the original baseline) for program
restructures caused by requirements changes approved by the JROC and
Department agreed-to quantity adjustments. I do believe it is important
for the Defense Department to retain the management discretion to
continue programs which are necessary for our national security, even
if the Department unexpectedly encounters technical challenges or is
forced to recognize errors in initial cost estimates.
66. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, another reform I'd like to see
is establishing (and resourcing adequately) an Office of Independent
Assessment to provide the Department and Congress independent
assessments of cost, technological maturity, and performance. It is my
view that, while laudable, the cost and technological assessment
capability provided by, respectively, that the Cost Analysis
Improvement Group (CAIG) and DDR&E is not sufficiently robust, given
how vital those capabilities are in the defense procurement process.
What is your preliminary reaction to that reform initiative?
Secretary Gates. The situation for the acquisition of weapon
systems has been dramatically improved, and with congressional support
the momentum will continue. By DOD Directive, the CAIG already serves
as the principal advisor to the appropriate Milestone Decision
Authority for acquisition program cost. Establishing an Office of
Independent Assessment would be duplicative and wasteful of taxpayer
dollars.
MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES
67. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, Congress responded quickly to
the Department's funding requests for armored vehicles in Iraq. MRAPs
have saved lives and aided the execution of the surge strategy. The
Department is currently conducting a competition to procure a smaller,
all-terrain variant of the MRAP for use in Afghanistan known as MRAP
all-terrain vehicle (ATV). Committee will be watching the competitive
bidding process closely and expect it to be conducted transparently. To
reduce the logistical burden, the MRAP program office has stated its
intention to have only one supplier of these MRAP ATVs. Will this slow
production and fielding?
Secretary Gates. The acquisition strategy for the M-ATV takes into
account the production capacity of the vendor or vendors as one of the
factors being considered in the competition. We want to ensure we
select the most capable vendor or vendors to produce vehicles on
schedule. It is a strategy very similar to the one we used for MRAPs
from 2007 to present. The mission remains the same; to get as many
lifesaving vehicles to our men and women in harm's way as fast as we
are able. There will be up to five vendors awarded indefinite delivery-
indefinite quantity contracts for further test articles. The request
for proposal states that final award in mid-June 2009 will be made to
``one or more'' vendors. This allows the Department the most
flexibility in addressing the needs of the theater.
68. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what added measures are
necessary--on the part of the Department, industry and Congress--to
further accelerate the delivery of these vehicles to theater?
Secretary Gates. The Department appreciates the support that
Congress has provided. To ensure the rapid fielding of any additional
vehicles, we need a timely appropriation of the full amount of funding
requested for this program in the budget submission for the Fiscal Year
2009 Supplemental Appropriations. More than 15,000 vehicles have been
produced in less than 2 years, with approximately 10,000 MRAP vehicles
being fielded in Iraq and 2,000 currently in Afghanistan. On November
3, 2008, I directed several actions to accelerate the movement of MRAPs
to Afghanistan. In one case, the manufacturer accelerated production of
vehicles 2 months ahead of schedule. Another effort was to redirect
MRAPs that were used for training and sustainment to OEF. The
combination of these two efforts provided over 1,000 additional MRAPs
to Afghanistan in less than 3 months.
69. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, of the more than 10,000 MRAP
vehicles in Iraq, how many can be redeployed for use in Afghanistan?
Secretary Gates. The Combined Joint Task Force-101 originally
requested to limit MRAP variants in OEF to three types of CAT I
vehicles. These variants were determined to be the most capable for the
mission and terrain. Of the available MRAP vehicles currently deployed
in Iraq, 1,500 MRAP variants would be available for use throughout
Afghanistan.
Additionally, 1,100 of the larger CAT I and CAT II variants could
be used in specific areas where mission and terrain permit.
DETAINEES
70. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on January 22, President Obama
ordered that the military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay be
closed ``as soon as practicable'' and in any event, no later than 1
year from the date of his order. What is the Department doing, and
planning to do, to implement President Obama's order?
Secretary Gates. In accordance with the President's Executive
order, the DOD is acting in concert with other U.S. departments and
agencies to close the detention facilities at Guantanamo. As part of
this process, the Department has developed a Detainee Task Force, a
group responsible for coordinating and facilitating all issues related
to Executive order implementation within the DOD.
The Department is participating fully in the review team
coordinated by the Attorney General. This team was charged with
reviewing the files for all of the detainees currently held by the
Department at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Once the team is chosen, it will
move forward expeditiously with its review of the status of each
individual currently detained at Guantanamo and its determinations
regarding each individual.
71. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how will you approach your
role on the cabinet-level review panel in sorting the detainees into
groups of those who can be transferred or released; those who can be
tried; and those in the most difficult third category who can neither
be released or tried in regular Federal courts?
Secretary Gates. The DOD looks forward to supporting fully the
Attorney General-coordinated review of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay
pursuant to the President's Executive order, and I have directed my
staff to work closely with the Justice Department and other U.S.
departments and agencies in completing this review.
72. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what options do you think
exist for disposition of the third group?
Secretary Gates. The ultimate disposition of those detainees who
cannot be released, transferred, or tried in Federal Court will depend
upon the determination of the President's Executive order review
coordinated by the Attorney General. The DOD looks forward to working
with the Justice Department and other U.S. departments and agencies in
completing this review.
73. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe that once a
detainee's status has been established as an ``enemy combatant'' they
can be held indefinitely? What other alternatives are there?
Secretary Gates. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court recognized
that enemy combatants may lawfully be held for the duration of
hostilities. The DOD's practice has been to conduct periodic reviews of
the cases of detainees held as enemy combatants, and the Department is
currently participating in the ongoing interagency review of the
detention of every individual at Guantanamo required by the President's
January 22, 2009 Executive order titled ``Review and Disposition of
Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of
Detention Facilities.''
Other lawful alternatives to detention as an enemy combatant may be
appropriate depending on the circumstances, including criminal
prosecution, transfer, and release. The Department is participating in
the Special Interagency Task Force on Detainee Disposition established
by the President's January 22, 2009, Executive Order titled ``Review of
Detention Policy Options.'' The Task Force is charged with:
Conduct[ing] a comprehensive review of the lawful options
available to the Federal Government with respect to the
apprehension, detention, trial, transfer, release, or other
disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in
connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism
operations, and to identify such options as are consistent with
the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States and the interests of justice.
74. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is the current Annual Review
Board process sufficient to continue to evaluate whether detainees
should be released?
Secretary Gates. The President's Executive order, Review and
Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base
and Closure of Detention Facilities, January 22, 2009, directed the
review of the status of each individual currently detained at
Guantanamo. The President's Executive order, Review of Detention Policy
Options, January 22, 2009, directed a comprehensive review of the
lawful options available to the Federal Government with respect to the
apprehension, detention, trial transfer, or other disposition of
individuals captured or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts
and counterterrorism operations, and to identify such options as are
consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States and the interests of justice. Given the comprehensive
nature of these ongoing U.S. Government reviews, the annual
Administrative Review Board (ARB) process was suspended until after
their completion. The Department anticipates reviewing the ARB process,
but it would be premature to provide an assessment of the process at
this time.
75. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, should a review process that
includes more due process, including the participation of lawyers and
judges, be established by Congress?
Secretary Gates. Detainees at Guantanamo currently have access to
U.S. Courts through habeas petitions.
76. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, should the review process be
solely under the executive branch, or should it include oversight or
appeal to the judicial branch?
Secretary Gates. The current Combatant Status Review Tribunal
process is properly a function to be conducted under the executive
branch. Moreover, detainees at Guantanamo have access to the U.S.
Courts through habeas petitions to challenge the lawfulness of their
detention.
In addition, the President's Executive order directed that the
Attorney General lead a review of the status of each individual
currently detained at Guantanamo. The review will examine the factual
and legal basis for the continued detention of all individuals
currently held at Guantanamo, and whether their continued detention is
in the national security and foreign policy interests of the U.S. and
in the interests of justice.
77. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, should some sort of
rehabilitative program be established at Guantanamo Bay, similar to
some of the programs recently implemented in Iraq, to mitigate the risk
of releasing some of the less dangerous detainees?
Secretary Gates. The Department regularly examines its detention
operations and policies, and assesses the viability of applying lessons
learned from one detention facility to others, as well as to future
conflicts. Many of the approximately 15,000 detainees currently in Iraq
participated in the insurgency in response to economic reasons, or for
other reasons not associated with Islamic extremist agendas. Education
programs have proven to be valuable in encouraging detainees in Iraq to
reject participation in the insurgency and to recognize the value of
working within Iraqi society.
In contrast, many of the Guantanamo detainees are motivated by an
extremist ideology. Many traveled from their home countries to receive
training in terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Others are professed
members of terrorist organizations. Many of these detainees
participated in or supported violent acts of terrorism to further
extremist objectives. Nonetheless, the detention facilities at
Guantanamo Bay already offer literary classes and a library with books,
DVDs, magazines, and other educational publications in the detainees'
native languages for those detainees who choose to participate. The
Department continues to assess the benefits of the education programs
available at Guantanamo Bay.
78. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what can the United States do
to convince some of our friends and allies to help solve this problem
by taking some of the detainees who we have evaluated are no longer a
threat?
Secretary Gates. The Department has seen some encouraging
indicators that nations across the world, in Europe in particular, are
potentially more open to the idea of accepting non-nationals who have
previously been approved for transfer or release from detention at
Guantanamo. As the Attorney General-led case-by-case review continues,
it will be necessary to remain in dialogue with those nations. The
State Department has an engagement strategy with those nations and we
will continue to urge them to consider taking detainees currently under
the control of the Department at Guantanamo.
79. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is the administration
examining the logistics associated with the transfer of Guantanamo
detainees to the United States?
Secretary Gates. Consistent with the President's Executive order to
close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, the DOD is assessing
the logistical requirements that would be necessary should the
Department be required to transfer detainees to the United States.
80. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, president Obama's order also
charges you with evaluating whether the conditions of detention at
Guantanamo Bay comply with Common Article III of the Geneva Convention
and reporting back within 30 days. Do you think changes will be
necessary?
Secretary Gates. In response to the President's Executive order
signed on January 22, 2009, I directed Admiral Patrick Walsh, Vice
Chief of Naval Operations, to assemble a team to conduct a
comprehensive review. The purpose of the review was to ensure that all
detainees at Guantanamo are held ``in conformity with all applicable
laws governing the conditions of confinement, including Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions.'' Admiral Walsh and his team had
unrestricted access to the detention facility and the camp authorities
at Guantanamo.
Admiral Walsh concluded ``that the conditions of confinement in
Guantanamo are in conformity with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.'' Specifically, his team determined that there were no
violations of prohibited acts listed in Common Article 3. In addition,
in assessing whether detainees are treated ``humanely,'' he concluded
that ``the conditions of confinement in Guantanamo also meet the
directive requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.''
In addition, his team noted that the chain of command responsible
for the detention mission at Guantanamo consistently seeks to go beyond
a minimalist approach to comply with Common Article 3, and endeavors to
enhance conditions in a manner as humane as possible consistent with
security concerns. In that regard, his report identifies several areas
in which the Department could further enhance the conditions of
detention.
I have directed the Department to conduct an immediate review of
the recommendations in the report and provide me with an implementation
plan.
81. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would you support the
continued use of military commissions if the cabinet-level review panel
concludes that some detainees cannot be tried in normal Federal
criminal courts or in courts-martial?
Secretary Gates. In his Executive order titled ``Review of
Detention Policy Options,'' dated January 22, 2009, the President has
directed the establishment of a Special Interagency Task Force on
Detainee Disposition (Special Task Force) to ``identify lawful options
for the disposition'' of individuals captured or apprehended in
connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations.
Further, President Obama's Executive order titled ``Review and
Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base
and Closure of Detention Facilities,'' dated January 22, 2009, finds
that some detainees may have committed offenses for which they should
be prosecuted. In this Executive order, the President ordered a review
to determine ``whether and how any such individuals can and should be
prosecuted.'' Moreover, his Executive order specifically directed this
review to address ``whether it is feasible to prosecute such
individuals before a court established pursuant to Article III of the
United States Constitution.'' The Executive order also states that this
review shall select other ``lawful means, consistent with the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the
interests of justice, for the disposition of'' individuals who cannot
be tried in an Article III court.
If the review of individual detainees and the Special Task Force
conclude that some detainees should be tried by military commissions
because they cannot be tried by an Article III Federal criminal court
or a court-martial, I will support that recommendation.
82. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe the Army Field
Manual will be adequate for interrogations conducted by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)?
Secretary Gates. While the Army Field Manual has proven adequate
for the DOD, I think the CIA is in the best position to judge whether
or not the Army Field Manual is adequate for interrogations conducted
by the CIA.
83. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, would you consider making the
changes to the Field Manual that are consistent with Common Article III
to accommodate the CIA?
Secretary Gates. Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence
Collector Operations, September 6, 2006, is designed to be used by
military intelligence collectors. I would be willing to consider any
changes to the manual that are consistent with U.S. domestic law and
U.S. obligations under international law, including Common Article 3,
and are compatible with military practices and procedures.
84. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what role will DOD play in
detaining the most dangerous and sensitive terrorists now that the CIA
is prohibited from operating its own detention facilities?
Secretary Gates. The Department will continue to detain captured
enemy combatants, consistent with law and policy. Any requests to hold
detainees captured during non-DOD operational activities would require
careful, case-by-case considerations within the U.S. Government.
85. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how should we approach the
issue of habeas corpus at places like Bagram where we may have al Qaeda
detainees who were captured both within Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
also during operations elsewhere, such as in the Horn of Africa,
Europe, or Indonesia?
Secretary Gates. Bagram Air Field is a military base used by U.S.
Forces, leased from the Government of Afghanistan, and located in a
theater of active combat. The Department has consistently maintained
that extending habeas corpus review to such a location would pose
numerous practical and legal problems and could have a crippling effect
on war efforts. The writ of habeas corpus has never before been
extended to such a location, and doing so would inject domestic courts
into the conduct and supervision of ongoing military operations, a role
they were never intended to fulfill. Further, attempting to support
domestic civil litigation in the midst of such ongoing operations could
impose serious, potentially unsupportable security and logistical
burdens on forward-deployed U.S. Forces.
The Department is participating in the Special Interagency Task
Force on Detainee Disposition established by the President's January
22, 2009, Executive order titled ``Review of Detention Policy Options''
to review and identify lawful detention options available to the
government, including places like Bagram. The outcome of this review
will determine the ultimate disposition of detainees at Bagram.
86. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, does it concern you that if we
had captured Mohammad Atta in Germany before September 11 and taken him
to Bagram for questioning that some would argue that he should have
immediate habeas rights?
Secretary Gates. If, in the context of the currently ongoing
military efforts against al Qaeda and the Taliban abroad, U.S. Forces
were to capture a person engaged in planning another September 11-type
attack, the ability to detain and question that person would be
essential to U.S. national security. If that person were transported to
an overseas military installation located in an active theater of
operations, the same concerns regarding habeas corpus review stated
above (in response to question 85) would also apply.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush specifically
rejected the notion that ``a habeas court should intervene the moment
an enemy combatant steps foot in a territory where the writ runs.''
Instead, the Court held that ``[t]he Executive is entitled to a
reasonable period of time to determine a detainee's status before a
court entertains that detainee's habeas corpus petition.''
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE
87. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you recently wrote that the
``capabilities needed to deal with [terrorist attacks] cannot be
considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions. The United
States does not have the luxury of opting out because these scenarios
do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war.'' Is
the Department postured to deliver counterinsurgency expertise to the
troops?
Secretary Gates. Counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign
internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations are not
new missions to the DOD. Yet, the Department's force development
processes and programs, including professional military education, have
primarily focused on the ability to defeat the conventional military
forces of an adversary state. In an era when the character of warfare
is blurring, and current and future adversaries are more likely to pose
irregular and asymmetric threats, the Department is broadening the
aperture of its force development efforts to account for strategies and
capabilities needed to conduct irregular and hybrid forms of warfare.
Many of the capabilities and expertise required to execute these
missions are resident in Special Operations Forces (SOF), but not with
sufficient capacity to meet current, or expected future, demand. In
other cases, the Department must develop new capabilities to address
the range of irregular challenges.
Rebalancing the overall Defense portfolio to ensure that the U.S.
Armed Forces are as expert and proficient in irregular warfare as they
are in traditional warfare requires focused efforts in three key areas:
growing the capacity of SOF, reorienting General Purpose Force (GPF)
expertise and capabilities toward irregular warfare while maintaining
their ability to prevail in traditional campaigns, and promoting
increased integration between SOF and GPF.
Although there is more to be done, to date, the Department has
taken significant strides toward achieving lasting institutional
change. For example, it has invested in SOF growth; produced an
irregular warfare Joint Operating Concept; published a DOD directive to
establish policies and assign responsibilities for the development of
irregular warfare-relevant capabilities; and completed a comprehensive
review of the capability and capacity demands for GPF to conduct long-
duration counterinsurgency operations and to train, advise, and assist
foreign security forces. Various other initiatives are underway to
integrate and coordinate U.S. military efforts with civilian agencies
more effectively, and U.S. Joint Forces Command has established an
irregular warfare center to collaborate with the military departments
and U.S. Special Operations Command to develop joint irregular warfare
doctrine, education, and training programs for the GPF. These efforts
contribute toward ensuring that the joint force has the capabilities,
knowledge, and skills needed to counter the range of irregular threats
from state and non-state actors.
88. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what specific programs have
you put in place to give field commanders understanding of the cultural
environment in which they operate?
Secretary Gates. The Department recognizes that not all personnel
will be able or required to demonstrate intermediate or advanced level
language skills and cultural expertise. However, we do recognize the
need for personnel to acquire the language skills and cultural
knowledge to interact effectively with the local population and their
leaders. Therefore, Department policy requires that military units
deploying into, or in transit through, foreign territories be equipped,
to the greatest extent practicable, with an appropriate capability to
communicate in the languages of the territories of deployment or
transit and to operate with an appropriate knowledge of the cultural
norms.
The Services have taken great efforts to prepare members to achieve
optimum outcomes by understanding the regions in which they deploy and
being culturally aware. The Services have established Centers of
Excellence to oversee and standardize training and impart essential and
mission-targeted cultural training to their members. The Army Training
and Doctrine Command Culture Center, the Navy Center for Language
Regional Expertise and Culture, the Air University Cultural Studies
Center, and the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture
Learning all focus on offering information and training that best
supports their deployment model and is compliant with Joint
Professional Military Education (PME) guidelines. Additionally, the
2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap required the Joint Staff
and Military Departments to ensure regional area content was
incorporated into language training, PME and development, pre-
deployment training, and, in some cases, mid- or intra-deployment
training. In response, the Joint Staff and Military Departments have
made tremendous progress--cultural training and regional area content
are now included in the curriculum at the Service Academies, Reserve
Officer Training Corps, during the officer and enlisted accession
training pipeline, and throughout PME and development.
``Just-In-Time'' training is getting the right information to
deploying personnel in time to be useful, but not so early that it is
forgotten before they arrive. We have significantly improved our means
of providing language and regional familiarization training to units
during their deployment cycles. The Defense Language Institute Foreign
Language Center's (DLIFLC) foreign language and cultural instruction
extends beyond the classroom to servicemembers and civilians preparing
for deployment by offering Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Video Tele-
Training, Language Survival Kits (LSK), and online instructional
materials. Since 2001, DLIFLC has dispatched more than 380 MTTs to
provide targeted training to more than 66,000 personnel. Deploying
units have received over 1,000,000 LSKs (mostly Iraqi, Dari, and
Pashto). Field Support Modules outlining the geopolitical situation,
regional and cultural information, and fundamental language skills, key
phrases and commands are available for 34 countries in 49 languages on
the DLIFLC Web site.
Additionally, the use of the Human Terrain System was developed in
response to identified gaps in commanders' understanding of the local
population and culture and its impact on operational decisions. The
Human Terrain Teams use the expertise and experience of social
scientists and regional experts and, coupled with reach back and open
source research, integrate and apply the socio-cultural knowledge of
the indigenous civilian population to military operations in support of
the commanders' objectives.
The Department is working hard to enhance and expand regional and
cultural education and training for the GPFs. More specifically, we are
focusing on providing cross-culturally competent personnel to our
commanders--personnel with the ability to quickly and accurately
comprehend, then appropriately and effectively interact, to achieve the
desired effect in a culturally complex environment. This translates to
a force that is ready and available to respond effectively to any
operational contingency, whether it is combat, humanitarian, or in
response to other national security emergencies, anywhere in the world.
89. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, during the Cold War there
existed a large group of researchers both inside and outside of the
Department whose expertise was the Soviet Union. Does the Department
have a similar set of experts today who can offer specific insight into
the social and cultural fabric of Afghanistan and Iraq?
Secretary Gates. There is no specific body of experts on
Afghanistan and Iraq within the DOD. However, various individuals
employed in the DOD have a wealth of experience and a depth of
understanding regarding Afghanistan and Iraq. These individuals play
important roles in informing the development of our policies. Moreover,
the Department frequently consults with outside experts who contribute
insights and experiences from the private sector, academia, and
elsewhere. Additionally, the Joint Staff and Services have brought onto
their staffs cultural anthropologists and sociologists. Indeed, the
independent insights from foreign area experts in academia are
particularly valuable, which is why the Department launched the Minerva
Initiative last year to cultivate and solicit academic social science
expertise in areas that will inform policymaking.
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY BILL
90. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, our colleagues in the Senate
Appropriations Committee are marking up this morning their version of a
National Economic Recovery Bill. The House's version of the bill
released last week includes over $6.6 billion for military construction
(MILCON) requirements which were offered to the House Appropriations
Committee (HAC) by certain representatives of the DOD as being ``shovel
ready'' and able to create jobs in the next 12 months. Over the past 2
weeks, my staff has repeatedly asked for a copy of the documents
justifying the MILCON request with no response. Furthermore, my staff
has obtained DOD documents that state in order for certain MILCON
projects to be shovel ready, ``fast execution would require waiver of
competitive bidding and environmental impact statements,'' and that
``under extraordinary circumstances, projects could be started in under
12 months.'' Not very reassuring caveats for job creation, I must
admit. Were you aware of these conditions?
Secretary Gates. Back in late December I was aware that the
President Elect's economic team, led by Larry Summers, was putting
together the President-Elect's stimulus bill proposal, and was sorting
out what it would do regarding conditions for projects to be included
in the proposal. But my Department and I were not directly involved in
preparing the proposal. Any DOD documents your staff might have
obtained would not necessarily contain conditions or projects that the
President Elect's team took into account in preparing its stimulus
proposal.
91. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how were the military
requirements submitted to the HAC determined with the Department?
Secretary Gates. The Department did not submit military
requirements for the stimulus bill to the HAC. What occurred was this:
About December 23, 2008, I responded to questions from Representatives
Murtha and Edwards regarding possible DOD funding in a future stimulus
bill. This was merely a response to specific questions, not a finalized
list of requirements. The President Elect's economic team, led by Larry
Summers, developed the stimulus bill proposal, and DOD was not directly
involved.
92. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, can this committee have full,
open, and immediate access to all documents provided to members of the
HAC to support the request for MILCON so that we can perform due
diligence and oversight?
Secretary Gates. I would be happy to provide access to such a
budget request, but in fact the DOD did not provide documents to the
HAC as part of an official request for MILCON in the stimulus bill. The
actual request for the stimulus bill was developed by the President-
elect's team.
93. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, is the potential for quick
jobs creation resulting from MILCON that the Department has proposed
contingent on circumventing laws, related to free and open competition
as well as requirements set forth in NEPA?
Secretary Gates. The Department does not intend to circumvent any
laws, including the NEPA, in execution of MILCON projects proposed for
the economic stimulus package. One of the criteria considered for
potential projects was that they must have NEPA documentation completed
(including categorical exclusions) or projected for completion prior to
execution. As with all MILCON projects executed by the Department, all
contracts are in compliance with applicable acquisition laws, rules,
and regulations.
94. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, during the process of
proposing areas for military funding to help stimulate the economy, did
the Department consider investments in equipment and materials that
would have a direct impact on the readiness of our forces as well as
generating jobs on assembly lines around the country?
Secretary Gates. In considering input for the President-Elect's
team, the Department focused primarily on infrastructure, not readiness
because we understood that infrastructure (including energy
conservation) was the team's focus. Of course, most infrastructure
improvements--e.g. better barracks and health care facilities--support
readiness of our forces.
EARMARKS
95. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, former President Bush signed
an Executive order last year intended to reduce the number and cost of
earmarks and make their origin and purpose transparent. It directed
that executive agencies not expend funds on earmarks listed in non-
statutory sources, like congressional reporting or explanatory
language. What direction have you given the Department with regard to
this Executive order?
Secretary Gates. I have not given any new direction because I
expect President Obama will be deciding what to do about that Executive
order.
96. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you anticipate that the new
administration will alter the order?
Secretary Gates. I anticipate that President Obama will make a
decision on what he wants done regarding this order.
97. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is your understanding of
the effect of unrequested earmarks on the Department's ability to
maintain stable funding for meritoriously-selected programs?
Secretary Gates. Unrequested congressional funding within a
constrained budget topline causes reductions in requested funding, and
thus threatens the stable funding of programs that are Defense
priorities which were included in the President's budget request.
F-22 RAPTOR
98. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary England
recently stated, that investing in fifth-generation fighters for all
three Services, by committing to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program,
provides more effective capability to the joint force commander than
concentrating investments in a single Service by buying more F-22As. Do
you agree with Secretary England? Please explain.
Secretary Gates. The F-22, when combined with the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter, will provide the Nation with the most capable and lethal mix
of fifth generation aircraft available for the foreseeable future. Each
fills different capability gaps for the Joint Force Commander and are
equally important investments. The critical question is the appropriate
mix between the F-22 and F-35. The Department is reviewing whether to
procure more F-22 aircraft beyond its current Program of Record
quantity of 183 and will make a recommendation to the administration.
99. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, although this does not
represent my views, others have stated that military requirements
should consider the need to sustain our industrial base, which would
argue against discontinuing a weapons program and a basis for keeping
the production-line open indefinitely. What are your views?
Secretary Gates. The Department is currently reviewing whether to
procure more F-22A aircraft beyond its current Program of Record
quantity of 183. Some of the factors that will go into the Department's
recommendation to the administration are: compliance in meeting the
requirements of the current National Military Strategy; affordability
of additional F-22A aircraft within the Department's resource
constrained environment; and consideration of the national technology
and industrial base.
100. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, recently, the DBB warned that
the DOD's ability to see through its current plans and programs over
the long-term is ``not sustainable''. The Board advised that the
current financial crisis will require that the Department (and
Congress) make hard budget decisions on some of the Department's
largest weapons programs. Only by doing so, according to the Board, can
other military priorities be met. As the Board indicated, ``[b]usiness
as usual is no longer an option; the current and future fiscal
environments facing the Department demand bold action.'' In light of
sustained military requirements from continued troop deployments on the
global war on terror, would you characterize a decision to purchase
additional F-22A Raptor aircraft as business as usual?
Secretary Gates. A decision to purchase additional F-22A Raptor
aircraft would not be characterized as business as usual. The
Department is currently reviewing whether to procure more F-22A
aircraft beyond its current Program of Record quantity of 183.
Affordability, in light of the Department's fiscal constraints, whether
continued production or termination is in the national interest of the
United States, as well as military requirements, will go into the
Department's recommendation to the administration on whether to procure
additional F-22A aircraft.
101. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, through fiscal year 2008,
over $58 billion have been spent on the F-22 program. With unit costs
having risen over 177 percent, the F-22's program acquisition unit cost
is $350 million per aircraft. We have learned that other traditional
Air Force superiority fighter aircraft lines remain open for some
limited foreign sales--specifically the F-15 and F-16 lines--fighter
aircraft that are significantly less expensive. I believe I am uniquely
suited to understand the importance of the need for U.S. air
superiority to counter future perceived threats--something, I realize,
buying many more F-22 aircraft ostensibly provides; however, I would
like to know whether such air superiority simply be achieved by
another, more cost-effective approach?
Secretary Gates. The F-22 Raptor is the most advanced tactical
fighter in the world and, when combined with the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter, will provide the Nation with the most capable and lethal mix
of fifth generation aircraft available for the foreseeable future. The
tremendous capability of the F-22 is a critical element in the
Department's overall tactical aircraft force structure requirements.
The Department's decision to transition from legacy tactical aircraft
to a mix of fifth generation fighters, in essence, allows the
Department to buy fewer aircraft while meeting and exceeding the
capability requirements of the legacy fleet. While fifth generation
fighters, such as the F-22 and F-35, have higher unit costs than the
legacy fighters they will replace, there are savings to be realized by
avoiding the increasing operations and support costs of the aging fleet
and the costs of maintaining that force structure. Air superiority can
be achieved through an appropriate mix of F-22, F-35, and other
tactical fighters. The Department is currently reviewing what this
appropriate mix should be.
102. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, has the F-22 flown a single
combat sortie in the CENTCOM theater?
Secretary Gates. No.
103. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how long has the F-22 been
operational?
Secretary Gates. The F-22 was declared operational (initial
operational capability) December 15, 2005, at Langley AFB, VA.
104. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what is the F-22's relevance
to the current or reasonably foreseeable threat environment, dominated
by non-State actors and asymmetrical threats?
Secretary Gates. Today, the U.S. is faced with a wide range of
threats and much uncertainty. As a result, we must ensure balance
across our force application and battle space awareness portfolios, to
shape and react to a host of scenarios. The F-22 will represent a
relatively small percentage of the total U.S. fighter/attack inventory,
but represents a significant capability.
We need not envision a replay of earlier conflicts to acknowledge
that the U.S. may yet again find itself challenged by hostile actors
capable of denying our use of the air or space in engagements across
the full spectrum of military operations. Highly capable ground and
sea-based air defenses, enabled by advancements in computer processing
and digital technology, offer increasingly attractive alternatives to
the fielding of modern air forces for many would-be adversaries. The
proliferation of such weapons will effectively inhibit airspace access
to non-stealth platforms, and can radically alter our thinking about
what it means for any actor to be considered a viable threat to the
U.S. military. We may also plausibly encounter an enemy willing and
able to exploit the air domain to threaten security of an Ally or
region, in a manner similar to Hezbollah's use of cruise missiles and
unmanned aircraft in its 2007 war with Israel. These challenges are not
particular to any specific category of conflict, yet all put a premium
on America's ability to dominate the air. Although none of the actors
we face directly in ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have
demonstrated the combination of ability and willingness to deny use of
the air, nor exploit its use to challenge U.S. and coalition forces, we
should consider whether this will always be the case.
The F-22 is best associated with its air dominance mission but it
is also important to recall that two decades of development and
innovation have resulted in much more than just an air-to-air fighter.
The aircraft also provides the ability to negate or defeat advanced air
defenses, provides significant surface attack capability, and is a
capable surveillance and reconnaissance platform. It is the synergy of
these attributes that best summarizes the F-22's relevance in the
Department's overall portfolio, both from the perspective of deterrence
and as an effective enabler. This is especially true given that many of
the world's most prominent supporters of terrorist organizations are
acquiring or will soon acquire counter-air systems that render some of
our aircraft incapable of accomplishing the mission. The F 22's
capability to find, fix, track, target, and engage these threats
provides significant advantage to gain operational access in order to
conduct the direct support mission for the Joint Force Commander. The
F-22 may not be the most efficient force application or battle space
awareness solution for every problem we may face, but for some of the
toughest ones, it may be one of a very small group of viable options.
FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM
105. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you have set, as a priority,
to concentrate the minds of the defense establishment on the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Last May you said, ``I have noticed too much of a
tendency towards what might be called `next-war-it-is,' the propensity
of much of the defense establishment to be in favor of what might be
needed in future conflicts.'' Instead of large, complex weapons
systems, you called for simpler, more numerous and presumably more
affordable designs for new equipment. You also said every new weapons
system would have to be useful for fighting irregular wars. How would
you assess your progress?
Secretary Gates. As I stated in my testimony, my strategy involves
going after greater quantities of systems that represent the 75 percent
solution versus smaller quantities of the 99 percent solution. This
strategy has not yet been fully manifested in the acquisition system,
but I expect it will over time. We continue to make progress in
institutionalizing responses to irregular warfare across the
Department, and--as requirements are defined to meet operational
needs--these requirements will flow to the acquisition process. For
example, irregular warfare has been formally established as a Core
Mission Area and our joint commanders now have a Joint Operating
Concept that describes how they might employ capabilities to meet
future irregular warfare operational challenges. At the component
level, the Services have established irregular warfare-related training
and education centers, and together with the Joint Staff, we are
conducting studies of irregular warfare-relevant requirements. While
these efforts reflect progress, we acknowledge more has to be done to
achieve our irregular warfare vision. Gaps still exist, and we are
developing a resource strategy that achieves the right balance of
capabilities needed to meet future challenges across the spectrum of
operations.
106. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in that same speech you
specifically cited the Army's Future Combat System (FCS), a multi-
billion dollar program of interlinked armored fighting vehicles,
unmanned aircraft and cannons and said: ``a program like FCS . . . must
continue to demonstrate its value for the types of irregular challenges
we will face as well as for full-spectrum warfare.'' The FCS is a
multi-year, multi-billion dollar program at the heart of the Army's
transformation efforts. Some question if FCS, envisioned and designed
prior to September 11, 2001 to combat conventional land forces, is
relevant in this current national security environment where
counterinsurgency and stabilization operations feature prominently.
The FCS program has achieved a number of programmatic milestones
and is transitioning from a purely conceptual program to one where
prototypes of many of the 14 FCS systems are under development. With a
variety of estimates on the total cost of the FCS program, questions
have been raised about FCS affordability. In 2007, citing the impact of
past budget cuts, the Army restructured the program from 18 to 14
systems. In 2008, in response to both congressional and DOD concerns,
the Army restructured the program again.
Assessing the current national security environment, the current
readiness of the Army, and the economic situation facing the Nation,
how will the Department proceed on the development of FCS?
Secretary Gates. In my Foreign Affairs article, ``A Balanced
Strategy,'' I addressed the importance of developing a strategy, and
the force structure to implement the strategy, that balances: ``between
trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other
contingencies, between institutionalizing capabilities such as
counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the
United States' existing conventional and strategic technological edge
against other military forces.'' The kinds of capabilities we will most
likely need in the years ahead will often resemble the kinds of
capabilities we need today. This understanding is driving the Army's
approach to FCS where defeating a specific threat, in a specific
context, often for a specific geographical area is not entirely
adequate.
The Army continues to review and adjust the FCS program to address
the operational needs of commanders, incorporate lessons learned from
current operations, and accelerate FCS capabilities to soldiers engaged
in the prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign. The decision to field
FCS capabilities to the infantry brigade combat teams first, the Army's
highest demand and most vulnerable BCTs, is a clear example of how the
Army adjusted the FCS program based on operational needs and lessons
learned from the current fight. We will continue to look for
opportunities to adjust the program in order to provide capabilities to
commanders and enhance the effectiveness and survivability of soldiers.
107. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, both the Army and the Marine
Corps have accelerated their efforts to grow their end strength in
order to meet the continued high tempo of contingency operations. While
I am encouraged by this development, I am concerned that each Service
may grow beyond their capacity to provide adequate support for the new
military personnel and their families. Potential shortages in barracks,
housing, and family support facilities will cause hardship for ALL
soldiers, marines, and their families over the next 3-5 years.
In your view, do we have challenges in this area? If so, what is
being done within the Department to ensure the rapid pace of end
strength growth can be supported with adequate facilities meeting the
standards we have provided to our personnel?
Secretary Gates. With full funding of the President's fiscal year
2010 budget request, we can support our servicemembers and their
families as we grow the force over the next 3 to 5 years. The
Department has been planning for this growth in barracks, family
housing, and family support facilities since the initial Grow the Force
announcement was made in December 2007. The Department continues to
provide adequate facilities in a timely manner to meet these
requirements.
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
108. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, every 4 years, the DOD is
required by law to conduct a QDR, a comprehensive review of the
Nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans,
infrastructure, and budget. The most recent QDR was issued in February
2006 and the next one is scheduled for release in 2010.
Broadly speaking, the QDR was originally intended to be a vehicle
for making strategic shifts in the department's orientation, sizing and
shaping forces, and managing risks. Have you reviewed the process used
to prepare the 2006 QDR?
Secretary Gates. The Department has conducted an extensive review
of the process used to prepare the 2006 QDR.
109. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what strengths and weaknesses
did you find in it?
Secretary Gates. The 2006 QDR went a long way toward establishing
the foundation for new approaches to address our most pressing
challenges. In terms of process strengths, through the 2006 QDR we
established a senior deliberative body to guide the process. Combatant
commands, other Federal agencies, and multinational partners
participated in the 2006 process at unprecedented levels.
However, the review of the 2006 QDR showed some areas for
improvement, including the importance of working with Congress.
Additionally, the need for whole-of-government solutions to national
security problems and to balance current and future threats continues
to be a key focus area.
110. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, describe the process you
intend to use in the 2010 QDR.
Secretary Gates. Broadly speaking, my intention is to use this QDR
to make difficult choices and immediately influence defense budgeting.
In terms of process, I see great value in continuing to engage U.S.
Government stakeholders, Congress, and international partners. To be
effective, the 2010 QDR must lay the foundation for an effective force
for the 21st century and establish the right balance for addressing the
complex and hybrid forms of warfare we face today and those we will
face in the future.
111. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in an article entitled ``Did
the Pentagon Get the Quadrennial Defense Review Right?'' which appeared
in the Washington Quarterly in spring 2006, Michele Flournoy, the
President's nominee to be the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
wrote that the 2006 QDR ``did not include a regular consultation
process with the process with the chairs and ranking members of the key
defense committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives.'' Do
you believe that political engagement on the QDR is important and would
you consider including it in the process?
Secretary Gates. I believe regular engagement with all stakeholders
in the Nation's defense enterprise is an important part of QDRs. The
Department must regularly consult with Congress, other U.S. Government
partners, defense industry, and key international partners with whom
the United States works to meet the challenges of today's security
environment.
The Department's engagement with Congress throughout the QDR
process is especially important to ensure a smooth transition between
QDR decisionmaking and any related legislation, including
appropriations. We expect to make hard choices in this QDR and will
depend on the support of Congress to be successful.
RELATIONS WITH THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
112. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, at his confirmation hearing
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on January 22,
Admiral Blair, the President's nominee to be the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), said that there are coordination issues between the
DNI and the DOD regarding the global war on terror.
Admiral Blair said ``I think we need to get rid of this artificial
division in this global campaign against terrorists when the tools that
are available in the DOD and the Intelligence agency are both
applicable and both need to be put together to get the job done. And I
find that operational effectiveness is in fact distorted by the way the
authorities which are written for a different area--era come down. But
I think that in the meantime given what we have, we should not use
different Titles as a shell game to try to keep information from
Congress who has the oversight responsibility and the funding
responsibility for these programs and I can undertake to you that I
will make sure that we don't use a different title to hide something,
that people who have knowledge and responsibility and oversight
responsibility to carry out are kept in the dark.'' How are your
relations with DNI?
Secretary Gates. In order for us to achieve the full scope of our
national security objectives, the burgeoning requirements within
Defense for timely, relevant and actionable intelligence must be
carefully balanced against the DNI's national intelligence priorities.
This cannot be done unless the Secretary of Defense and the DNI work in
full partnership as I did with Director McConnell during his tenure. I
have spoken to the DNI about the need to stay closely linked on these
issues, and he has responded favorably. In fact, we have committed to
meeting regularly to discuss issues of mutual importance. I have also
agreed to dual-hat the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as
the Director, Defense Intelligence and in that capacity he will work on
behalf of the DNI. The current Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, James R. Clapper, meets weekly with the DNI and even sits
in on his staff meetings. So I believe my relations with the new DNI
are already on a very positive footing.
113. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how serious are the divisions
between the DOD and the Intelligence Community?
Secretary Gates. I do not think that there are serious divisions
between the two at all. Instead I tend to agree with the following
statement from the DNI: ``The issues that often arise between the
demands of military operations and of other intelligence requirements
have to do with the capacity of collection systems and with assignment
of analysts. Sometimes multi-purpose collections systems for signals
and imagery intelligence do not have the capacity to handle all
requirements. Sometimes analysts are taken from one area and assigned
to another. It is incorrect always to characterize these priority-based
decisions as conflicts between military and national requirements. They
are rather the decisions that have to be made by the intelligence
enterprise of a global power that needs good intelligence in many
different areas of the world and for many different potential
threats.'' This statement I think accurately characterizes the
relationship between the DOD and Intelligence Community as well
considering that many of non-DOD Intelligence Community members are
also national level customers of the DOD components of the Intelligence
Community.
114. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do authorities in title 10
and title 50 require clarification?
Secretary Gates. No, I have a clear understanding of my
responsibilities and authorities under both title 10 and title 50 of
the United States Code. In order to discharge my statutory
responsibilities as Secretary of Defense, I provide authority,
direction, and control over the DOD and its components. DOD engages in
traditional military activities as directed by the President of the
United States and by the Secretary of Defense. Traditional military
activities include both overt and clandestine activities. These
activities are reported to the appropriate oversight committees of
Congress based upon committee jurisdiction.
RESET - CURRENT UNIT READINESS
115. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, on the issue of the readiness
of our combat units, which I mentioned in my opening statement,
Congress has provided over the past 3 years more than $25 billion to
repair or replace equipment used by our forces in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Yet, in quarterly readiness reports received by our committee, we see a
significant number of combat units with degraded readiness ratings due
to a lack of equipment. What kind of risk are we taking by having such
a high number of our combat units assessed as not ready to take on a
full range of missions?
Secretary Gates. Current funding for repair and replacement of
equipment used in Iraq and Afghanistan is approximately $25 billion per
year. That funding is sufficient to keep up with equipment losses and
increased wear and tear due to combat operations. In addition to the
$25 billion of annual equipment repair and replacement costs, there is
an overall liability of $41 billion to repair or replace equipment
returning from theater that will need to be funded when we reduce
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
While our deploying forces' readiness for ongoing counterinsurgency
missions is high, we lack the dwell time required to train ground
forces for the full range of military operations. This impacts our
readiness to counter future threats, providing potential opportunities
for adversaries to act as if they are undeterred by a less capable
force. We must continue to balance the force for an uncertain future
while remaining focused not only on dwell time but on restoring and
repairing equipment to levels that support training and response
capability for a full range of missions. It is important to strike a
balance between retaining prudent and appropriate conventional
capabilities while ensuring that we fully develop the flexible force we
need to overcome ever-changing irregular challenges.
116. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what more can Congress do to
assist the Services in restoring the readiness of major combat units?
Secretary Gates. In the current fiscally-constrained environment,
it is critical to fully fund the president's budget and to continue to
support the supplementals that are necessary for equipment repair and
replacement throughout the duration of our commitment in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the subsequent reset, reconstitution and
recapitalization of the force.
117. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you have any unfunded
requirements related to the reset that should be included in the
pending economic recovery package?
Secretary Gates. DOD has and continues to request reset funding
through War Supplemental Appropriations. With the support of Congress,
we continue to receive the necessary funding to enable operations and
to reset the force. The Department does not have any near-term unfunded
requirements related to reset that should be included in the economic
recovery package. We provided the White House an economic stimulus
submission consisting of construction projects that can start within
months to help address the needs of our servicemembers and their
families and the near-term economic state of the economy.
118. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you have any concerns
that, with competing budget priorities, we run the risk of not fully
investing heavily in reset requirements and ending up with a hollow
force?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I do have such concerns, and that is why we
are making hard choices to ensure our military does not become a hollow
force. As President Obama has said, we must scrutinize all our programs
to cut unnecessary funding. We must have sufficient resources for
resetting forces returning from combat.
RELOCATION OF U.S. MARINES FROM OKINAWA TO GUAM
119. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, I have a question about the
agreement between our Government and the Government of Japan to realign
U.S. marines on Okinawa, and to station 8,000 marines and their
families on the Island of Guam. This committee most likely will see in
the fiscal year 2010 budget a substantial request for investment in new
facilities to support movement of the marines to Guam. How do you view
the agreement from a theater-wide strategic perspective?
Secretary Gates. As the western-most U.S. territory for basing in
the Pacific, Guam provides the strategic flexibility and freedom of
action necessary to support peacetime engagement, crisis response,
theater security cooperation, and partner capacity building.
By implementing our bilateral agreement with Japan and carrying out
our other plans to expand military presence in and around Guam, we send
a message of assurance to our Allies, partners, and friends in Asia and
beyond. Security in the Pacific is key to not just our national
security and that of our treaty allies, but also to our neighbors
throughout the Americas, whose economic future is linked more and more
to cross-Pacific trade and exchanges.
Guam also serves as a logical and cost-effective location for
training with our regional allies. The agreement with Japan to relocate
Marine forces also builds on other changes the U.S. is making that will
support forward-basing of submarines and transient aircraft carriers,
provide a hub from which to project Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance and strike assets, and increase logistical sustainment
capabilities and prepositioning in the Western Pacific. The relocation
of 8,000 marines and their dependents to Guam is also key to a much
broader strategic effort to transform the U.S.-Japan Alliance
relationship in ways that will strengthen the political support in
Japan for our reduced and consolidated presence on Okinawa, while also
expanding the roles and missions cooperation between U.S. and Japan
forces. Overall, these efforts will strengthen the stand-off deterrent
effect of U.S. Forces regionally and assure our regional allies and
partners of an enduring U.S. forward presence in the Asia/Pacific.
120. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the current estimate for the
costs to relocate the marines from Okinawa to Guam is at least $10
billion, with the Government of Japan directly contributing $2.8
billion. The remainder will be funded by DOD through MILCON or loans
paid back through future housing allowances. With all the other
modernization, recapitalization, and reset requirements facing the
Department in the next 4 years, in your opinion, can we afford this
move?
Secretary Gates. Executing the relocation of marines from Okinawa
to Guam and completing the military build-up of Guam is an important
long-term investment in our enduring regional posture. Japan shares our
view that this is a worthy and critical investment and as such is
committing up to $6.09 billion in total funding. The Department will
ensure fiscal discipline is exercised throughout the duration of this
effort. We look forward to working with Congress to ensure that we
appropriately fund this important strategic priority.
121. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, there has also been
discussion about the significant investment necessary to upgrade port,
road, and utility infrastructure on Guam to support the stationing of
marines and their families. Do you believe the DOD should assume this
financial obligation as well?
Secretary Gates. Executing the relocation of marines from Okinawa
to Guam and completing the military build-up of Guam is an important
long-term investment in our enduring regional posture. Japan shares our
view that this is a worthy and critical investment and as such is
committing up to $6.09 billion in total funding. The Department will
ensure fiscal discipline is exercised throughout the duration of this
effort. We look forward to working with Congress to ensure that we
appropriately fund this important strategic priority.
CHINA - TAIWAN
122. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, this year marks the 30th
anniversary of the Taiwan Relation Act (TRA). Given China's rapid
military modernization, please discuss the relevancy of the TRA today
and how do you suggest we move forward as China's military grows more
capable of projecting power beyond the Taiwan Straits?
Secretary Gates. U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan is a
longstanding one, based on the three U.S.-China joint communiques, and
the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This policy, which includes making
available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, has served the
interests of the United States and of the region well for the past 30
years. In light of the rapid buildup of military capabilities on the
Mainland, I believe the Taiwan Relations Act continues to serve the
interests of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and East Asia
writ large.
As China's military grows more capable of operating beyond the
Taiwan Straits, we have the opportunity to work with China in pursuit
of common goals as we are doing in our naval efforts off the Horn of
Africa. China's increasing capabilities also present us with potential
challenges. We need to both prepare for these challenges and work with
China to ensure we understand each other and find ways to work
together.
123. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how do you suggest we come to
a common conclusion with our NATO allies about how to address narcotics
trafficking that by all accounts is funding the insurgency?
Secretary Gates. We are working closely with our NATO Allies to
address narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan. Allied Ministers agreed
at the October 2008 NATO Defense Ministerial in Budapest that ISAF has
the authority to take action in concert with Afghans against narcotics
facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency. As an example of
exercising this authority, ISAF has reported three interdiction
operations, security support for eradication efforts, and
counternarcotics public information efforts for the first 15 days in
February 2009. Additionally, CENTCOM updated the U.S. Forces' ROE in
Afghanistan to support participation in counternarcotics activities.
Counternarcotics activities now need to be integrated into the
counterinsurgency campaign, recognizing that where a nexus between the
narcotics trade and the insurgency exists, military action must be
taken, either directly or in support of law enforcement agencies and
host nation security forces.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
124. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, we have seen great
improvements and recent testing success of a national missile defense
system. In addition, our allies continue to support our efforts,
despite extreme pressure from their neighbors in the region. The U.S.
is in the process of finalizing arrangements with the Poles and the
Czechs to place components of a fixed Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
site in their two countries. Construction is scheduled to start in late
2009. What is your current assessment of this program and the near-term
plans for construction of facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic?
Secretary Gates. The United States and Poland are continuing to
negotiate the supplemental agreement to the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA), which is necessary to provide the legal basis for
U.S. personnel to perform their functions in Poland under the U.S.-
Poland missile defense basing agreement. There has been a great deal of
progress in the talks, but there remain important issues to resolve. We
hope to conclude negotiations soon, followed shortly thereafter by
ratification by the Polish Parliament. The United States and the Czech
Republic have signed a BMD Basing Agreement and a supplemental SOFA.
These agreements await ratification by the Czech Parliament. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 provides that
no fiscal year 2009 funds may be obligated or expended for the
interceptor site in Poland until both host nations have ratified the
missile defense agreements and the SOFA supplemental agreements. Once
the necessary agreements are ratified, the United States could begin
construction, if a decision is made to do so.
125. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you anticipate any major
policy changes with the new administration related to national missile
defense?
Secretary Gates. The United States will continue to develop and
field missile defenses that are technologically sound and cost-
effective. We will also develop missile defenses in consultation with
our friends and allies.
CARE FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS AND THEIR FAMILIES
126. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you have stated that with
regard to care for our wounded warriors, ``. . . apart from the war
itself, this Department and I have no higher priority.'' I commend you
Mr. Secretary for your recognition of the debt owed by our Nation to
wounded servicemembers and their families who have sacrificed so much
for our freedom.
Last June you wrote a memo to the Deputy Secretary in which you
called for additional focus within the Department on four critical
objectives in support of our wounded warriors: disability ratings,
support for families, medical related research and the signature
injuries of the war--PTSD and TBI. What progress has been made in the
areas you identified, and what remains to be done?
Secretary Gates. A foremost priority of the DOD, in close
collaboration with the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA), continues
to be caring for our Nations' wounded warriors and their families.
Significant progress has been made on the critical objectives.
Disability Evaluation System (DES) improvements have successfully
made the process less complex and provided faster adjudication in the
pilot program. A DES pilot final report is due in August 2009 and will
include recommendations for system-wide improvements being implemented
in an expansion program now. Additionally, a priority DES program is
being developed for use by catastrophically injured servicemembers.
The DOD is providing more for family members of wounded
servicemembers today than at any time in our history. Last year (2008)
was a banner year for wounded warrior family initiatives to include:
creation of an online national resource directory, with over 10,000
services and family resources; launching a wounded warrior resource
center, providing around-the-clock assistance for family members to
report concerns with facilities, benefits, or services; holding a
family summit to share ``best practices'' for care management and
family issues; publication of a family handbook to provide care
information; and, publication of a benefits and compensation handbook.
Additionally, Military OneSource is an important around-the-clock
resource for military members and their families. Case managers and
care coordinators are available and trained to provide personal
assistance to servicemembers and families of recovering servicemembers.
DOD is committed to providing excellence in protection, prevention,
diagnosis, research, treatment, recovery, and care transition for our
servicemembers and their families who experience a mental health
condition or TBI. In accomplishing those objectives, we have worked
hand-in-hand with our Federal partners in the VA, as well as the
Department of Health and Human Services.
A comprehensive plan has been developed for PTSD/TBI centered upon
seven strategic goals: the leadership and advocacy of the Defense
Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and TBI; care quality at
medical treatment facilities and TRICARE providers; access to care;
psychological resilience program promotion; screening and surveillance;
transition and coordination of care; and, research and development.
The future should continue to be focused on these critical
objectives with additional emphasis on the ability to attract and
retain all healthcare personnel to include mental health staff,
continued and expanded research within the Centers of Excellence, and
continue the push towards reducing suicide rates.
127. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you believe these are
enduring requirements for the Department, and should be funded through
the normal program and budgeting process of the Department rather than
through supplemental appropriations?
Secretary Gates. Yes, care for our wounded warriors are enduring
requirements for DOD. And yes, as I have said before, war-related
requirements that are occurring every year should be funded through the
Department's normal program and budgeting process rather than through
supplemental appropriations.
CHANGE TO THE DISABILITY EVALUATION SYSTEM
128. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, you also asked: ``. . . is
there a reason why we could not change the disability rating
presumption for wounded warriors to a minimum of 30 percent . . . (to)
provide a foundational base of lifetime support that could then be
supplemented based on specific circumstances.'' What answer have you
received to that question?
Secretary Gates. I am told that an assumed rating of all members
who have combat-related conditions that render them unfit on the
permanent disability retirement list (rating of 30 percent) is subject
to the presumption of fitness rule and the statute governing ratings.
There are options within policy that could come very close to achieving
this outcome.
129. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, have you formulated a view on
the best way forward in modernizing this antiquated system?
Secretary Gates. Yes, the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) and
DOD, through the Senior Oversight Committee, agreed that the VA would
lead the interagency development of a legislative package that would
transform the DES toward the construct envisioned by the Dole-Shalala
Commission. I applaud the VA's willingness to manage the lead in this
difficult endeavor and look forward to working with Secretary Shinseki.
APPEAL PROCESS FOR DISABILITY RATINGS
130. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in the Wounded Warrior Act,
Congress created a special appeals board to review disability ratings
of 20 percent and below, because many injured and ill servicemembers
felt their disabilities had been rated unfairly by the DOD; those who
are discharged with lower ratings are eligible for care from the VA,
but their families lose their Government-provided care through TRICARE.
This Board was intended to right the wrongs, where they exist, in
the results of disability evaluations for wounded and ill warriors
since 2001. Are you committed to ensuring that the intent of Congress
will be achieved when the Board finally begins its work this year?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I am committed and will ensure that the
Physical Disability Board of Review achieves the intent of Congress.
ARMY END STRENGTH
131. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, in late 2007 you approved the
Army's and Marine Corps' proposal to accelerate by 2 years their growth
in Active-Duty soldiers to 547,000 and 202,000 respectively. With a
commitment to eliminating the use of stop-loss as soon as feasible and
to ensure a minimum of 1 year ``dwell time,'' it seems likely that the
Army may need to grow even larger to fulfill its operational
requirements. What is your assessment of the Active-Duty manpower needs
for the Army and Marine Corps and will the 2010 budget support these
numbers?
Secretary Gates. I believe the increases in our Ground Forces (Army
and Marines) are necessary, and will strengthen the ability of the
Department to continue to support our deployment needs. We must have
the right numbers and kinds of uniformed personnel to win our wars, and
to deter potential adversaries. Additionally, our Forces (Active and
Reserve) must be large enough to not only satisfy deployed demands, but
have a rotation base that recognizes the personal needs of our
volunteers and their families. At the same time, our volunteers must
have the weapons, equipment, and support that will enable mission
success. Striking the right balance between personnel,
recapitalization, and the resources of operational and support costs
will be a challenging imperative and I look forward to working with
Congress.
132. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, are you satisfied that the
quality of new recruits coming into the Armed Forces--and the Army in
particular--is satisfactory?
Secretary Gates. The quality of new recruits is above the average
of that in the civilian youth population. For the Active component, at
the end of January 2009, 70 percent of new recruits were drawn from the
top half of America in math/verbal aptitude, and 94 percent possessed a
high school diploma, compared to about 75 percent of American youth.
The Army's quality has significantly improved since fiscal year 2008,
and is on track to meet or exceed the Department's quality benchmarks
for fiscal year 2009.
133. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how about the National Guard
and Army and Marine Corps Reserve? Are they sized correctly for the
requirements being placed upon them?
Secretary Gates. We are well on the way towards increasing the size
of the Army and Marine Corps. We are in the middle of growing the Army
by 74,000 (Active, Guard, and Reserve). In fiscal year 2009, the Army
National Guard (ARNG) has an authorized end strength of 352,600. The
National Guard will grow to 358,200 spaces by fiscal year 2013. The
Army Reserve will grow by 1,000 spaces. This growth in end strength is
a continuation of growth that began last year and is expected to
continue through fiscal year 2013.
The Marine Corps growth is in the Active component to enable the
Corps to build three Marine Expeditionary Force units and to increase
time at home stations between deployments. This growth provides
additional Ground Forces to meet strategic demands and mitigate
persistent capability shortfalls.
MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN
134. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, advances in battlefield care
and MEDEVAC yielded the lowest mortality rate in history for U.S.
Forces serving in Iraq, due largely to the ability to provide care
within the first ``golden hour'' following injury. Does the Department
have the resources it needs in Afghanistan to achieve the same standard
of lifesaving care for U.S. service men and women who may be injured
while serving there?
Secretary Gates. The DOD currently provides the highest standards
of lifesaving care for all of its U.S. service men and women whether
they are injured in Afghanistan or Iraq.
As a means of background, metrics used for measuring performance of
MEDEVAC is from receipt of 9-line MEDEVAC request to drop-off at a
medical/surgical facility. Analysis of recent data shows that OEF
MEDEVAC currently uses the Joint and NATO doctrinal standards as the
mission planning factor, where OIF MEDEVAC uses a more compressed
mission complete planning factor.
Despite the differences between OIF and OEF average MEDEVAC mission
times, the Joint Theater Trauma Registry shows that the survivability
rates of our servicemembers deployed to OIF and OEF are comparable,
within 1-2 percent of each other, with OEF having a higher survival
rate than OIF. From a medical perspective, our experiences suggest far-
forward resuscitation and stabilization rendered during the ``platinum
10 minutes'' by combat lifesavers, medics and corpsmen have contributed
far more to our survival rates than efforts to meet a ``golden hour''
standard. Recent data and literature support rapid resuscitation,
stabilization and evacuation to surgical care after the trauma improves
survival for periods of 90-120 minutes--except for a small number of
noncompressable thoracic trauma cases. With these early interventions,
the cumulative Died of Wounds (DOW) rates in Afghanistan and Iraq are
also comparable, with OEF having the lower DOW rate between the two
theaters. Nonetheless, we are taking measures to reduce average MEDEVAC
mission times in Afghanistan to be comparable with Iraq.
CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENTS
135. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the changes in expectations
for national guardsmen and reservists about the nature of the service
they will be expected to perform have been pronounced. We have an
Operational Reserve now, and you have been instrumental in ensuring
that DOD policies and organizational changes keep up with the new
requirements that now exist. Do you think that the Department and the
individual Services have made adequate progress in making the best use
of the professionals of the Reserve and Guard?
Secretary Gates. Your point that the Guard and Reserve are manned
by professionals is a very good one. These citizen-warriors are among
the best our Nation has to offer. They serve locally in their
communities as civilian professionals and they serve their States and
Nation as professionals of their respective Services. These are truly
great Americans to whom we owe it to get the best, the most effective,
use of their specific and varied expertise. I believe that the DOD is
making tremendous strides in capturing and utilizing civilian acquired
skills; skills that are often not found in our Active components. One
excellent example of this is the Afghan Agriculture-business
Development Teams. Guardsmen from across the Nation are using their
expertise in Agri-business to coach and mentor Afghan farmers,
universities, and the Ministry officials on innovative techniques. More
programs like this can be developed and we are working with the
Services and their Reserve components to find appropriate force
structures that can capitalize on the professional skills of reservists
and Guardsmen, while not detracting from the readiness in our
conventional formations.
136. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what progress has been made
in ensuring that the Department, Northern Command, the Department of
Homeland Security, and States and their Governors are ready for a
natural or man-made disaster?
Secretary Gates. The DOD, including U.S. Northern Command and U.S.
Pacific Command, are well prepared to provide substantial lifesaving
and life-sustaining assistance, with a sense of urgency, when needed.
During the past 8 years, the Department has developed unprecedented
capabilities to respond to natural or manmade disasters and has trained
and exercised its forces (in more than 40 exercises) to employ these
capabilities to provide timely, efficient, and effective support to
civil authorities. Consistent with the Department's 2005 Strategy for
Homeland Defense and Civil Support,\1\ priority has been given to
preparing to provide forces and capabilities in support of civil
authorities in responses to chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) incidents, with an emphasis
on preparing for multiple, simultaneous mass casualty incidents. On
September 11, 2001, DOD had approximately 400 specially trained and
equipped personnel ready to assist civil authorities in the response to
a domestic CBRNE incident; DOD has more than 9,000 such personnel today
and, by 2011, will have nearly 20,000.
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\1\ DOD, The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June
2005, page 3.
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As required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of
2006, DOD and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have
developed prescripted mission assignments to expedite the process for
requesting DOD assistance.\2\ Current DOD prescripted mission
assignments include support in several critical resource areas,
including transportation, communications, debris removal, wide-area
damage assessment, patient evacuation, incident management, mass care
and shelter, resources support, and health and medical support.
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\2\ Section 653(c) of Title VI (the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006) of Public Law 109-295 (Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007) (6 U.S.C.
Sec. 753(c)).
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Progress also has been made in the arena of planning. Our nation
needs realistic, detailed, and coordinated planning at the Federal,
State, and local level to eliminate organizational, jurisdictional, and
operational seams and gaps, solve shortfalls in needed resources, and
ensure a unity of effort in future responses.
In accordance with a December 2007 Presidential directive,\3\
Federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities, led by the
Department of Homeland Security, are developing Federal plans
addressing the 15 National Planning Scenarios, which are representative
examples of the gravest dangers facing the United States and have been
accorded the highest priority for Federal planning.\4\
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\3\ President of the United States, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-8, National Preparedness, Annex I, National Planning,
December 2007.
\4\ National Response Framework, January 2008, page 73.
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This is, however, only the beginning. Incidents begin and end
locally, and most can be managed at the local or State level. Federal
plans need to complement and supplement State and local plans. To this
end, in 2008, FEMA, with DOD support, started a pilot program known as
the ``Task Force for Emergency Readiness'' (TFER) initiative. A TFER
will be a planning activity, operating under the authority and
direction of a Governor, supported by the Secretary of Homeland
Security and Secretary of Defense and augmented by the expertise of the
National Guard, that will (a) support participating States' Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment processes to identify threats/
hazards, vulnerabilities, and consequences; (b) develop State
operations plans for the national planning scenarios; (c) synchronize
and integrate, as appropriate, State operations plans with Federal
operations plans for the national planning scenarios; (d) synchronize
and integrate such State operations plans with those of other States;
(e) support the use of State operations plans for training and
exercises consistent with section 648 of the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C. 748); and (f) support State
efforts to monitor and improve their operational readiness consistent
with the national preparedness system required by sections 641-647 of
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (6 U.S.C.
741-747). Currently, the TFER initiative is a pilot program in five
States (Hawaii, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Washington, and West
Virginia); in the future, we hope to see a TFER established and
developing plans in every State. With a TFER in every State, we will
have taken a revolutionary step from asking questions about needed
capabilities and resources, proper response actions, and responder
readiness to having the answers to these questions.
137. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, from what you have seen, are
the Army and Air Force fully integrating their National Guard
components into their planning and resourcing?
Secretary Gates. The integration of National Guard capabilities is
paramount to our ability to perform assigned missions in response to
the Global Strategic Environment. The Army and Air Force Departments
are working with the National Guard Bureau, through the Directors of
the ARNG and Air National Guard (ANG), to fully integrate National
Guard components into the planning and resourcing programs of their
respective Services. As the Services refine their planning and
resourcing efforts, they are also developing processes to provide
greater transparency and accountability for the funding and equipment
provided to the National Guard and Reserve components. The DOD is
committed to making the changes necessary to ensure that the National
Guard and Reserve components are resourced and ready to support our
Nation both abroad and at home.
138. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, what are your current views
about the need for further changes to the organizational structure of
the Army, Air Force and the National Guard?
Secretary Gates. The National Guard is comprised of the ARNG and
ANG. The ARNG and ANG are Reserve components of the Army and Air Force,
respectively. The National Guard Bureau was recently designated as a
Joint Activity of the DOD and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
promoted to General. These changes are commensurate with the shift in
the Guard's role that we have seen in recent years from a strategic
Reserve to an operational Reserve as well as the commitment of National
Guard forces to expeditionary and domestic operations. The Army and Air
Force both maintain Title 10 responsibilities to organize, man, train,
and equip their formations, to include the National Guard components in
their respective service. The NGB assists the Services with their Title
10 responsibilities, and facilitates, through the several Joint Force
Headquarters, their statutory responsibilities under Title 32, U.S.C.,
and their duty to their Governors. Full recognition of Joint Force
Headquarters-State is a vital next step in ensuring the most effective
use of National Guard forces in providing support to civil authorities.
I believe that this structural framework is the best way to ensure that
the Services as well as the National Guard are able to most effectively
operate in their new role.
139. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, do you think that the Chief
of the National Guard Bureau should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS)?
Secretary Gates. No, I do not. The idea of making the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau (CNGB) a member of the JCS has been debated for
quite some time. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
(CNGR), in fact, took a very detailed look at the concept and
recommended that the CNGB not be a member of the JCS. The DOD concurred
with the CNGR in 2006 and I reaffirm my belief that CNGB should not be
a member of the JCS. The JCS consists of the Chairman, Vice Chairman
and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services. The National Guard is a
component of the Armed Services and is represented on the JCS by the
Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force. A separate
representation of a portion of the Reserve components from a portion of
the services would be inappropriate, and in my view divisive of a Total
Force. As a four star general officer, the CNGB is already
participating in all appropriate JCS tank sessions when domestic issues
which fall under the purview of our National Guard are involved. This
is similar to the methodology used to include the Commandant of the
U.S. Coast Guard when specific Coast Guard equities are involved.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND
140. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, from what I've read, it seems
that most of the bomber portion of Air Force Global Strike Command
(AFGSC) is already part of Eighth Air Force's mission. Would it be more
cost efficient to have the Eighth Air Force designated as the AFGSC
since many of the assets are already in place?
Secretary Gates. The Task Force I directed on DOD Nuclear Weapons
Management made a number of recommendations regarding the Air Force
nuclear enterprise. The Air Force has made great strides concerning
these recommendations having completed or is in the process of taking
action on all 35 recommendations.
The Air Force thoroughly evaluated the organizational
recommendation made in the Task Force report and concluded the best way
to address the issues highlighted in the report was to establish a new
Major Command (MAJCOM) dedicated to the nuclear and global strike
missions. The establishment of AFGSC will clearly align nuclear
operational units under a single command and demonstrates an Air Force
commitment to the nuclear deterrence and global strike missions.
AFGSC will be a component MAJCOM to United States Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), and a lead MAJCOM for all nuclear organizing, training and
equipping functions. By keeping its focus on the nuclear mission, AFGSC
will foster a robust nuclear culture and establish an effective self-
assessment climate while at the same time allowing Eighth Air Force to
focus on its operational warfighting mission in support of STRATCOM.
141. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, if the Global Strike Command
is focused totally on the nuclear role, will the B-52 and B-2 still
have a conventional role?
Secretary Gates. The B-52 and B-2 will continue to maintain their
conventional role in supporting all combatant commanders. AFGSC is
organizing all contiguous United States-based nuclear-capable missiles
and aircraft under one MAJCOM. AFGSC bombers will support both nuclear
and conventional missions just as the current forces do. The only
difference evident to the combatant commanders will be that a different
Air Force MAJCOM will be providing the forces. Additionally, the
command will work closely with Air Combat Command (ACC) to ensure
continued commitment of bombers to current Irregular Warfare/Close Air
Support roles in support of CENTCOM operations.
142. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, there has been discussion to
downgrade the Eighth Air Force commander's position from a three-star
general to a two-star general, does that make sense when the Air Force
is emphasizing the nuclear bomber mission?
Secretary Gates. The realignment of Eighth Air Force commander's
grade structure is a decision that our Air Force takes very seriously.
These grade changes were deemed necessary by the Air Force as a result
of organizational changes underway, and in no way undermine the
emphasis being placed on the nuclear mission. Changes made to the eight
AF/CC grade structure will align it with that of the 20th Air Force
Commander; the other numbered Air Force to be aligned under AFGSC, and
will have no impact on the 8th Air Force Commander's ability to execute
his or her role as the commander.
143. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, I understand that Eighth Air
Force and ACC have made a number of changes as a result of the transfer
of nuclear-armed cruise missiles from Minot, SD, to Barksdale, AZ. Some
of these include toughening the inspection process, putting Eighth Air
Force in the operational chain of command, creating a fourth B-52
squadron, revising the nuclear weapons handling regulations. Is there
more that Eighth Air Force and ACC could or should have done that would
have avoided the Air Force changes being contemplated?
Secretary Gates. We should have recognized the symptoms in the
erosion of the nuclear culture much earlier. Both the daily focus
required for nuclear surety compliance and the robustness of nuclear
exercises had decreased due to continuous conventional deployments and
readiness requirements centered on the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Key to this result was a lack of comprehensive self
assessment, as highlighted by several investigations and reports. The
use of no-notice inspections, which are now required, could have been
better used to gauge the day-to-day status of compliance. Robust
nuclear exercises could have been accomplished to stress the
sustainment and operational systems in order to identify any
weaknesses. I have asked for help from external Task Forces and Boards
in identifying the root cause of these problems, and the Air Force has
welcomed these studies. The Air Force has taken positive action to re-
establish a culture of excellence and superior performance within the
nuclear enterprise and to better organize its nuclear forces. I am
pleased with their response and progress to date, but there remains a
significant amount of work to be done.
144. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, since Barksdale currently
operates the Provisional Cyber Command, should the Air Force conclude
that the Cyber Numbered Air Force be located elsewhere, would it not be
cost-efficient to keep the current cyber assets at Barksdale operating
under the Numbered Air Force?
Secretary Gates. Barksdale is one of the bases being considered for
basing 24th Air Force, and one of the criteria being evaluated is
proximity to an operational cyber unit. While cost efficiency is part
of the reason for that criteria, mission effectiveness and synergy are
also part of the equation. We will consider all of this and more as we
decide where best to base 24th Air Force and organize for effective
cyberspace operations.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
SHIPBUILDING
145. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, a stable shipbuilding
industrial base and predictable levels of funding are critical to
achieving shipbuilding cost projections. As has been evident in the
shipbuilding industry, the lack of a stable, fully funded shipbuilding
plan causes disruptions in the industrial base and leads to
uneconomical rates of production. While I applaud Secretary Winter and
Admiral Roughead for continuing to state that the Navy's goal is a 313-
ship fleet, I was very concerned with their decision last summer to
suddenly change, without any consultation with Congress, the Navy's
shipbuilding plan. Our shipyards make strategic decisions based upon
long term plans, such sudden changes have significant impacts, one of
which is cost. As we move forward toward this year's budget, what will
you do to help stabilize our country's shipbuilding industrial base?
Secretary Gates. The Annual Report to Congress on the Long-Range
Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels (commonly referred to as the 30
Year Shipbuilding plan) is the Department's strategic plan to field the
force structure to meet the requirements of the National Security
Strategy and the QDR meeting the fiscal year 2020 threat. This year's
plan will be submitted with the President's budget and represents the
best balance of available resources and acceptable risk in meeting the
security demands of the 21st century.
The Navy's decision last summer to restart the DDG 51 program
in lieu of continuing the DDG 1000 program was not reached
lightly or without due consideration of the ramifications of
such a dramatic change in our shipbuilding program. While the
CNO's early testimony supported the existing program of record,
and by extension continued procurement of the DDG 1000, the
assessment of the intelligence community regarding future
threats caused the CNO to question the efficacy of the DDG 1000
to meet the growing demands for Integrated Air and Missile
Defense and the DDG 1000's ability to serve as the foundation
for the CG(X). Navy's challenge was to find a solution that
reduced risk and cost, while providing more ships with better
capability to address evolving threats. The Navy presented many
options for the most appropriate path forward. While there were
concerns, similar to yours, the data supported restarting the
DDG 51 line which was already in production. The primary
arguments were related to the warfighting capabilities these
two ship-types possessed, with a discussion of the relative
options for upgrade, merit of those upgrades in meeting the
threat we face today and room for additional growth as the
threat evolves. Finally, the costs of the options were
considered with a view toward finding the solution that had the
greatest likelihood of defeating the threat at the lowest
overall cost with the least risk.
In order to better support a stable shipbuilding plan, the
Department has been exploring alternatives with the
shipbuilding industry to mitigate workload fluctuations among
shipyards to maintain a stable and skilled workforce across
shipbuilding industry sectors.
Level loading of ship procurements helps sustain
minimum employment levels and skill retention and will
promote a healthier U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
To achieve affordability goals, the Navy plans to
make greater use of other contract incentives, such as
multi-year procurements, fixed-price contracts (when
and where appropriate), and increased use of
competition. These efforts are expected to contribute
to real cost containment in future shipbuilding plans.
The Navy's shipbuilding plan requires a balance among
operational requirements and risk, affordability, and
industrial base utilization. Keeping the shipbuilding
plan affordable and achievable also requires long-term
stability in the plan.
Implementation of Acquisition Governance to improve
oversight of shipbuilding programs and better integrate
the requirement and the acquisition communities have
been implemented.
Navy's long range vision reduces the types and models
of ships, maximizes the reuse of ship designs and
components, and implements open architecture for
software and hardware systems. The Navy will continue
to focus on affordability of programs of record by
ensuring ship designs are mature prior to the start of
construction and emphasizing design for affordability
concepts in both the initial design and follow-on
ships. These efforts will improve cost and schedule
performance which will reduce the growth and variation
in existing shipbuilding programs that impact shipyard
planning and execution.
Navy continues to work with shipbuilders to strive
for level loading of production facilities. Workload
peaks and valleys are mitigated through work share
opportunities and regional outsourcing.
Sustaining procurement rates can contribute to
reducing the magnitude of annual funding variations and
will provide a more stable demand signal to industry.
Sustaining procurement rates are planned for aircraft
carriers, major surface combatants, attack submarines,
and amphibious ships.
The Department believes that future stability in the shipbuilding
program is a cornerstone in sustaining a cost effective and affordable
future maritime capability supporting the National Security Strategy.
Toward that end, the Department of the Navy will continue to work with
Congress to ensure a stable shipbuilding strategy that is aligned with
the fiscal year 2010 President's budget.
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE SUPPORTING GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
146. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, it has now been over 7 years
since the initial call up and mobilization of National Guard and
Reserve Forces in support of the global war on terrorism. In the Afghan
Study Report of 2007, it stated that ``Afghanistan stands at a
crossroads,'' and that the progress achieved over the previous 6 years
was threatened by resurgent Taliban violence. The report recommended
that the ``light footprint'' in Afghanistan be replaced by the ``right
footprint'' of U.S. and Allied force levels.
Unfortunately, it appears that the gains that we made in the past
are eroding. President Bush indicated that as troop levels in Iraq
decreased, many of those forces would be redeployed to Afghanistan, and
I understand that President Obama will continue to refocus our
military's efforts to this region.
Last year, Congress authorized an increase in end strength for both
the Army and Marine Corps to help address the pressure the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan had caused to the military. Given the strain on the
Active-Duty Forces and the over-usage of the National Guard and
Reserves, do you think the current end strength numbers for the Armed
Forces are sufficient to meet today's current needs and threats while
reducing the strain on our Active, Reserve, and National Guard troops?
Secretary Gates. All of our servicemembers (Active and Reserve)
continue to perform extraordinarily in light of the demands we have
placed upon them. I believe the increases in our Ground Forces (Army
and Marines) are necessary, and will strengthen the ability of the
Department to continue to support the global war on terror. We cannot
fail to have the right numbers and kinds of uniformed personnel to win
our wars and to deter potential adversaries. Additionally, our Forces
(Active and Reserve) must be large enough to not only satisfy deployed
demands, but also have a rotation base that recognizes the personal
needs of our volunteers and their families. At the same time, our
volunteers must have the weapons, equipment, and support that will
enable mission success. Striking the right balance between personnel,
recapitalization, and operational and support costs will be a
challenging imperative and I look forward to working with Congress.
AFGHANISTAN
147. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, the new administration has
already committed to sending additional forces to Afghanistan. Many of
us are concerned about the lack of any publicly described theater
strategy for using those additional forces. I am also concerned about
the apparent lack of a coherent civil-military plan for integrating our
military operations with economic and political development that is so
essential to success in counterinsurgency. Is there a plan, and if so,
will it be articulated publicly?
Secretary Gates. President Obama has not yet made any decisions on
the deployment of additional military forces to Afghanistan. The
administration will conduct a strategic review of our policies toward
Afghanistan. As we move forward, we will come to this committee and
other Members of Congress for advice and support.
Decisions on further deployments of military forces to Afghanistan
will be informed by that review.
NATO
148. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, Article 5 of the NATO
Alliance states ``an armed attack against one or more . . . shall be
considered an attack against . . . all''. Do you believe that Article 5
of the NATO Alliance is still credible in the eyes of the new, and old,
NATO members?
Secretary Gates. Yes. The commitment stated in Article 5 is the
fundamental bedrock of shared security among members of the Alliance.
Its universal application was demonstrated following the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States, when NATO formally invoked Article 5
to provide support to our country.
Last year's events have further highlighted the critical importance
of Article 5 to all members of the Alliance, particularly for newer
NATO members. The Alliance has been considering a range of options to
underscore the fundamental nature of this commitment, including prudent
planning, exercises, and the continued development of capabilities such
as the NATO Response Force to handle the full range of crisis response
operations up to and including responding to an Article 5 situation.
149. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, do you believe it is
credible to potential adversaries of the members of the NATO Alliance?
Secretary Gates. Yes, Allies have always been united in their
conviction that the Article 5 collective defense provision of the North
Atlantic Treaty is the essential foundation of the Alliance. That
Alliance solidarity, backed up by the enduring U.S. commitment to the
idea that the security of Europe is inextricably linked to the security
of North America, is a credible deterrent to potential adversaries of
the members of the NATO Alliance.
150. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, in your opinion, what should
the priorities of the Obama administration be for NATO during the next
4 years?
Secretary Gates. I expect we will all hear President Obama himself
lay out his priorities for NATO at the 60th Anniversary Summit in
April. My own view is that the United States has enormous stakes in a
strong, mutually supportive NATO Alliance that is organized and has the
capabilities to meet 21st century security challenges. NATO has made a
great deal of progress in these areas and continues to evolve as it
conducts the largest and most important operation in Alliance history
in Afghanistan. However, challenges remain. These include, first and
foremost, achieving durable progress in Afghanistan, while also
developing a common approach toward managing relations with Russia. We
also want to keep the door open to qualified aspirants, and improve the
prospects for unity-of-action between NATO and the EU. Finally, it is
important for Allies to continue to seek common ground across the
Alliance on emerging threats and opportunities.
151. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, what do you believe is the
proper role for NATO in meeting the foreign policy challenges that the
United States and our allies face today?
Secretary Gates. NATO is, first and foremost, a military alliance
committed to the security of its members. The greatest challenge to
that security, today, emanates from Afghanistan, so it must be our top
priority. In a broader sense, NATO also serves as a valuable forum for
cooperation and consultation among the U.S. Allies, partners, and other
European organizations such as the EU.
In addition, NATO has the opportunity to strengthen its security
capacity by continuing to professionalize, transform, and develop the
forces of its newer members to work in challenging operational
environments.
PAKISTAN
152. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, the situation in Pakistan is
extremely worrisome, not only because Taliban fighters are using
Pakistani bases to attack our soldiers in Afghanistan, but also because
of the persistence of the sanctuaries of al Qaeda and affiliated groups
within Pakistan itself. The PAK MIL has been making much of its recent
operations in portions of the FATA, but it is very hard to tell from
this distance how serious those operations are. Do you believe that the
PAK MIL is making sustainable progress?
Secretary Gates. I believe the PAK MIL has been making progress in
counterinsurgency missions in the FATA, but that progress has not been
wholly adequate to the threat or capabilities of the militant, nor has
it been sustained long enough to make a significant impact.
Counterinsurgency is a relatively new mission area for the PAK MIL and
Frontier Corps, one for which they were ill-prepared and poorly
trained. We are assisting them in that training requirement, and in
providing some technical assistance, but much more needs to be done to
make an effective clear, hold, build strategy. Without the holding
capacity provided by effective security, the military's progress is
unsustainable, since terrorists and militants will reoccupy those
areas. Additionally, peace agreements that are supposed to allow the
Federal and provincial governments to provide the local populace with
development often undermine the military's progress by allowing
terrorists and militants time to regroup. The government also does not
follow through on their development promises, which results in a
frustrated local populace and a security vacuum which can be exploited.
153. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, is it willing and able to do
what is necessary to finish the job?
Secretary Gates. Although Pakistan continues to assist in the fight
against extremists, its participation does not come without a domestic
price. The Army's reputation has suffered as a result of these efforts.
Army senior leaders appear committed to combating the terrorist threat,
but they have other concerns that at times trump their commitment, such
as Pakistan's stability, domestic opposition, Army morale, and
potential conflict with India. Pakistan's Army and security forces
historically have had little counterinsurgency training. Their
capability has and will continue to improve through combat experience
and training, but faces continued manpower and equipment shortfalls,
particularly in the current global economic environment, which has hit
Pakistan hard.
154. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, are we doing everything we
can to help?
Secretary Gates. Senator, your question is very timely. The
administration will conduct a strategic review of our policies toward
Pakistan and Afghanistan to determine what we should and can do. As we
move forward, we will be coming to you and other Members of Congress
for advice and support as we determine what we can do to help with
Pakistan.
The U.S. has worked closely with Pakistan to provide the Frontier
Corps and elements of Pakistan's Army--including its SOF--with the
training and equipment necessary to enhance its ability to secure the
border, deny terrorists safe havens, and provide a secure environment
for the border population so that investments in development can yield
results.
The United States reimburses Pakistan through Coalition Support
Funds for the incremental costs it incurs while conducting operations
in support of OEF. These reimbursements are enablers that allow a
country like Pakistan, which is undergoing severe economic pressure, to
continue operations against extremists. Nevertheless, more needs to be
done to enhance Pakistan's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
capabilities to defeat extremists within its borders. To this end, DOD
will seek to expand its train-and-equip mission to help Pakistan's Army
improve its ability to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
missions.
IRAQ
155. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, the situation in Iraq is
improving, but as all of the commanders and our ambassador constantly
repeat, it remains fragile and potentially reversible. Iraq is
scheduled to hold provincial elections at the end of this month, a
referendum on the Strategic Framework Agreement in the summer, and
parliamentary elections at the end of the year. Each event offers
opportunities for the U.S. and the Iraqis, but also dangers. How
confident are you that the current plans for American force levels, and
proposed funding levels for nonmilitary tasks, are adequate to ensure
the success of our efforts in Iraq?
Secretary Gates. The President's plan represents a responsible and
reasonable drawdown of combat units in Iraq to an initial transitional
force that will help consolidate the hard-fought gains that coalition
and Iraqi forces have made over the last several years. This plan,
based on an assessment of conditions in Iraq that includes
significantly reduced levels of violence, more capable ISF, and recent
successful provincial elections, provides our military commanders with
the flexibility they will require during this critical time in Iraq.
Because progress remains fragile, a U.S. military presence will be
necessary to support the Iraqis while they conduct national elections
and further develop the ISF's capabilities through 2009. After an
initial drawdown this year, U.S. force levels will likely remain at a
robust level in the period immediately preceding until shortly after
the national elections, currently expected to take place before the end
of January 2010.
As we redeploy our combat brigades, we will simultaneously pursue
the second part of the U.S. strategy: sustained political and
diplomatic efforts to secure a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq.
Although Iraq's long-term success depends on its leaders and the
fortitude of the Iraqi people, a strong political, diplomatic, and
civilian capacity-building effort can advance progress and lay a
foundation for lasting peace and security. The Department recognizes
that resources applied to non-military efforts are critical to success
in Iraq, and fully supports the State Department's funding requests for
these vital activities.
F-22
156. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, you will be advising the
President on the certification of the F-22 program. Will you seek the
position of ACC as well as the Pacific and European Air Component
Commanders to inform your decision on this issue?
Secretary Gates. The Department is currently reviewing whether to
procure more F-22A aircraft beyond its current Program of Record
quantity of 183. We will take into consideration all appropriate data
from the necessary sources in the development of our recommendation to
the administration.
157. Senator Collins. Secretary Gates, our economy is in a deep
recession, and the defense industrial base is an important part of our
economy. I believe that the administration must consider the defense
industrial base, such as the 95,000 (direct and indirect) jobs
associated with the F-22 program. Will industrial base considerations
be a factor in this vital decision?
Secretary Gates. The Department will consider all appropriate
factors in making a recommendation to the administration on whether to
continue or terminate F-22 production. Some of the factors that will go
into the Department's recommendation are: compliance in meeting the
requirements of the current National Military Strategy; the
affordability of additional F-22 aircraft within the Department's
resource constrained environment; and consideration of the national
technology and industrial base.
[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee adjourned.]