[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 151 (Monday, August 5, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40619-40629]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-19798]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision for the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched
Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of Decision
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has decided to implement a
program to make surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) non-weapons-
usable by blending it down to low-enriched uranium (LEU), as specified
in the Preferred Alternative in the Disposition of Surplus Highly
Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement (HEU Final EIS,
DOE/EIS-0240, June 1996). DOE will gradually sell up to 85 percent of
the resulting LEU over time for commercial use as fuel feed for nuclear
power plants to generate electricity (including 50 metric tons of HEU
and 7,000 tons of natural uranium that will be transferred to the
United States Enrichment Corporation), and will dispose of the
remaining LEU as low-level radioactive waste. This program applies to a
nominal 200 metric tons of United States-origin HEU that the President
has declared, or may declare, surplus to defense needs. The purposes of
this program are to support the United States' nuclear weapons
nonproliferation policy by reducing global stockpiles of excess
weapons-usable fissile materials, and to recover the economic value of
the materials to the extent feasible.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The decisions set forth in this Record of Decision
(ROD) are effective upon being made public July 29, 1996 in accordance
with DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing
Procedures and Guidelines (10 CFR Part 1021) and the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR
Parts 1500-1508).
ADDRESSES: Copies of the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium
Final Environmental Impact Statement, the separate Cost Comparison for
Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives, and this ROD are
available in the public reading rooms identified at the end of this
Federal Register notice (section VIII of the Supplementary
Information). Copies of these documents may be obtained by writing to
the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,
MD-4, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20585, or by
calling (202) 586-4513. The 72-page Summary of the HEU Final EIS, the
Cost Comparison for Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives,
and this ROD are also available on the Fissile Materials Disposition
Electronic Bulletin Board/World Wide Web Page at: http://web.fie.com/
htdoc/fed/doe/fsl/pub/menu/any/
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on the HEU disposition
program or this ROD contact: Mr. J. David Nulton, Director, NEPA
Compliance and Outreach, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD-
4), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20585, telephone (202) 586-4513.
For information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act
process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy
and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20585, telephone (202) 586-4600 or leave a
message at 1-800-472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Synopsis of Decision
DOE issued the HEU Final EIS (DOE/EIS-0240) on June 28, 1996. In
the HEU Final EIS, DOE considered the potential environmental impacts
of alternatives for a program to reduce global nuclear proliferation
risks by blending up to 200 metric tons of United States-origin surplus
HEU down to LEU to make it non-weapons-usable. The resulting LEU could
either be sold for commercial use as fuel feed for non-defense nuclear
power plants, or disposed of as low-level radioactive waste (LLW).
After consideration of the HEU Final EIS, public comments received on
the Draft EIS, and the conclusions of a Cost Comparison for Highly
Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives, DOE has decided to implement
the proposed program as identified in the Preferred Alternative
contained in the HEU Final EIS. This implementation will involve
gradually blending up to 85 percent of the surplus HEU to a U-235
enrichment level of approximately 4 percent for eventual sale and
commercial use over time as reactor fuel feed, and blending the
remaining surplus HEU down to an enrichment level of about 0.9 percent
for disposal as LLW. This would take place over an estimated 15- to 20-
year period.
Three possible blending technologies may be used: uranyl nitrate
hexahydrate (liquid) blending, uranium hexafluoride (gas) blending, or
molten metal blending. Four potential blending facilities may be used:
DOE's Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
DOE's Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina; the Babcock &
Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division Facility in Lynchburg, Virginia; and
the Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. Plant in Erwin, Tennessee. As a first
concrete disposition action consistent with these programmatic
decisions, DOE will transfer title to 50 metric tons of its surplus HEU
and 7,000 metric tons of natural uranium from its stockpiles to the
United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), for eventual sale and
commercial use. This will comply with legislative directions contained
in the USEC Privatization Act (Public Law 104-134, Sec. 3112(c)).
II. Background
The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of weapons-usable
fissile materials both in the United States and the former Soviet
Union. Further agreements on disarmament may increase the surplus
quantities of these materials. The global stockpiles of weapons-usable
fissile materials pose a
[[Page 40620]]
danger to national and international security in the form of potential
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the potential for environmental,
safety, and health consequences if the materials are not properly
safeguarded and managed.
In September 1993, President Clinton issued a Nonproliferation and
Export Control Policy in response to the growing threat of nuclear
proliferation. Further, in January 1994, President Clinton and Russia's
President Yeltsin issued a joint statement between the United States
and Russia on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
means of their delivery. In accordance with these policies, the focus
of the U.S. nonproliferation efforts in this regard is five-fold: to
secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; to assure safe,
secure, long-term storage and disposition of surplus weapons-usable
fissile materials; to establish transparent and irreversible nuclear
reductions; to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime; and to
control nuclear exports.
To demonstrate the United States' commitment to these objectives,
President Clinton announced on March 1, 1995, that approximately 200
metric tons of U.S.-origin weapons-usable fissile materials, of which
165 metric tons are HEU, had been declared surplus to the United
States' defense needs.\1\
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\1\ The Secretary of Energy's Openness Initiative announcement
of February 6, 1996, declared that the United States has about 213
metric tons of surplus fissile materials, including the 200 metric
tons the President announced in March, 1995. Of the 213 metric tons
of surplus materials, the Openness Initiative indicated that about
174.3 metric tons (hereafter referred to as approximately 175 metric
tons) are HEU, including 10 metric tons previously placed under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. The February 1996 Openness Initiative announcement
released additional details about the forms and quantities of
surplus HEU at various locations, and that information is presented
in Figure 1.3-1 of the HEU Final EIS.
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The disposition of surplus HEU, consistent with the Preferred
Alternative in the Draft and Final HEU Disposition EIS and the
decisions described in section VI of this ROD, is consistent with the
President's policies and complies with the recently enacted USEC
Privatization Act (Public Law 104-134). The sale of LEU derived from
surplus HEU is also consistent with the Vice President's Reinventing
Government initiatives pertaining to sales of unneeded government
assets.
III. National Environmental Policy Act Process
A. HEU Draft EIS
On June 21, 1994, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the
Federal Register (59 FR 31985) to prepare a Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (Storage and Disposition PEIS), including both surplus and
nonsurplus HEU. DOE subsequently concluded that a separate EIS on
surplus HEU disposition would be appropriate. Accordingly, DOE
published a notice in the Federal Register (60 FR 17344) on April 5,
1995, to inform the public of the proposed plan to prepare a separate
EIS for the disposition of surplus HEU.
In accordance with a then-applicable DOE regulation implementing
NEPA, 10 CFR 1021.312, DOE published an implementation plan (IP) for
the HEU EIS in June 1995. The IP recorded the issues identified during
the scoping process, indicated how they would be addressed in the HEU
EIS, and provided guidance for the preparation of the HEU EIS. DOE
issued the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Draft
Environmental Impact Statement (HEU Draft EIS, DOE/EIS-0240-D) for
public comment in October 1995. On October 26, 1995, DOE published a
Notice of Availability of the HEU Draft EIS in the Federal Register (60
FR 54867). The Environmental Protection Agency's Notice of Availability
of the HEU Draft EIS appeared in the Federal Register (60 FR 55021) on
October 27, 1995, announcing a public comment period from October 27,
1995 until December 11, 1995. In response to requests from the public,
DOE on November 24, 1995 published another Notice in the Federal
Register (60 FR 58056) announcing an extension of the comment period
until January 12, 1996. Public workshops on the HEU Draft EIS were held
in Knoxville, Tennessee, on November 14, 1995, and in Augusta, Georgia,
on November 16, 1995.
During the public comment period, the public was encouraged to
provide comments via mail, toll-free fax, electronic bulletin board
(Internet), and toll-free telephone recording device. By these means, a
total of 72 organizations and 125 individuals submitted a total of 464
comments for consideration. In addition, 224 comments were recorded
from some of the 134 individuals who attended the two public workshops.
All of the comments received, and the Department's responses to them,
are presented in Volume II of the HEU Final EIS, the Comment Analysis
and Response Document. All of the comments were considered in
preparation of the HEU Final EIS, and in some cases, resulted in
changes to the document.
B. Alternatives Considered
The HEU Final EIS analyzed the No Action Alternative and four
reasonable alternatives for blending a nominal 200 metric tons of
surplus HEU down to LEU to make it non-weapons-usable. The surplus HEU
consists of numerous material forms, including metal (pure and
alloyed), oxides, unirradiated fuel (including aluminum alloy fuel),
nitrate solutions, and other forms. The inventory of material declared
surplus also includes irradiated HEU fuel (the total quantity of which
remains classified). As discussed in section VI.A of this ROD, below,
the irradiated fuel is not directly weapons-usable. Thus, the
irradiated fuel is not within the scope of the HEU Final EIS or this
ROD unless the HEU is separated from the fission products pursuant to
other DOE programs (such as stabilization for materials management).
There are two possible end products from the action alternatives
considered in the HEU Final EIS: (1) LEU that can be used as commercial
nuclear reactor fuel feed (at a U-235 enrichment level of about 4
percent), and (2) LEU that can be disposed of as low-level radioactive
waste (at a U-235 enrichment level of about 0.9 percent). The HEU Final
EIS analyzed down-blending of HEU using one or more of three blending
technologies: uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) blending, molten metal
blending, and uranium hexafluoride (UF6) blending.
The HEU Final EIS analyzed the blending of HEU to LEU at four
existing U.S. facilities that presently have the capability to
undertake such activities. Two of them, the Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge
Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Savannah River Site (SRS)
in Aiken, South Carolina, are DOE facilities that have conducted
extensive HEU operations in support of nuclear weapons and other DOE
programs in the past. The other two analyzed facilities are the only
commercial enterprises in the United States that have licenses from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to engage in HEU operations: the Babcock
& Wilcox (B&W) facility in Lynchburg, Virginia, and the Nuclear Fuel
Services, Inc. (NFS) facility in Erwin, Tennessee.
Each of the analyzed facilities presently has the capability to
engage in UNH blending, which could be used either for blending for
commercial use or for blending to waste. Only DOE's Y-12 Plant has the
capability to conduct
[[Page 40621]]
molten metal blending, which would only be used for blending to waste,
since the metal product could not be used directly by the commercial
fuel fabrication industry. The capability to conduct UF6
conversion and blending does not currently exist at any of the
facilities. It is nonetheless analyzed in the EIS as a possible
blending technology that may be added at one or both of the commercial
facilities, since UF6 is the form in which commercial fuel
fabricators prefer to receive LEU product, and the two commercial
facilities have indicated that they may decide to add UF6
capability by modifying existing facilities.
Because there are many possible combinations of end-products,
blending technologies, and blending sites, DOE has formulated several
representative, reasonable alternatives that are described and assessed
in Chapters 2 and 4 of the HEU Final EIS. In addition to the No Action
Alternative (continued storage of surplus HEU), there are four
alternatives that represent blending different proportions of the
surplus HEU for commercial use or for disposal as waste, in some cases
with variations on number and locations of blending sites:
Alternative 1--No Action (continued storage)
Alternative 2 (No Commercial Use)--Blend 100% to waste (at
all 4 sites)
Alternative 3 (Limited Commercial Use)--Blend 75% to waste
(at all 4 sites), 25% to fuel (at 2 commercial sites)
Alternative 4 (Substantial Commercial Use)--Blend 35% to
waste, 65% to fuel (at any 1 site, the 2 commercial sites, the 2 DOE
sites, or all 4 sites)
Alternative 5 (Maximum Commercial Use)--Blend 15% to
waste, 85% to fuel (at any 1 site, the 2 commercial sites, the 2 DOE
sites, or all 4 sites)
Each of the alternatives involving commercial use of LEU derived
from surplus HEU (Alternatives 3, 4, and 5) include within them the
transfer of 50 metric tons of surplus HEU and 7,000 metric tons of
natural uranium from DOE stockpiles to USEC. The alternatives, which
were formulated to represent reasonable choices within the matrix of
possible combinations, were unchanged from the HEU Draft EIS to the HEU
Final EIS.
C. Results of Environmental Analyses
The environmental analyses in sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 of the HEU
Final EIS estimated that incremental radiological and several other
impacts for HEU disposition during normal, accident- free operations
would be low for workers, the public or the environment, and well
within regulatory requirements, for all alternatives, technologies, and
sites. Because no new construction would be required, and the blending
activities that would be conducted for this proposed action are either
the same as or very similar to operations that have occurred at the
analyzed facilities in the past, most of the incremental impacts from
this action at the blending sites would be low. There would be
increases in electrical energy consumption, fuel needs, and waste
generation, depending on the site and the alternative. Section III.D,
below, discusses potential floodplains impacts.
The transportation analyses in section 4.4 and Appendix G of the
HEU Final EIS indicate that radiological impacts to the public and
workers from transportation of materials, under both accident-free and
accident conditions, would be low. Approximately one to three
fatalities, depending on the alternative, could occur over the 20-year
duration of the program, primarily as a result of non-radiological
impacts from traffic accidents. The facility accident analyses in
section 4.3 and Appendix E.5 of the HEU Final EIS indicate that the
maximum credible accident from HEU blending operations, using
conservative assumptions, could result in latent cancer fatalities to
workers and members of the public surrounding the facility. However,
the estimated likelihood of occurrence of such accidents is low, so
total accident risk (consequences if the accident occurs times
probability of occurrence) to the public is low.
An environmental justice analysis was performed (section 4.10 of
the HEU Final EIS) to assess whether the proposed action or
alternatives could cause disproportionate adverse health impacts on
minority or low-income populations residing in communities around the
candidate blending sites. First, a demographic analysis was performed
for all of the 1990 Census tracts located within an 80-km (50-mi)
radius of the candidate sites. Then public health impact analyses were
performed to assess whether minority or low-income populations would be
disproportionately affected by facility operations through routine and
accidental releases of radiation and toxic emissions. Analyses of
public and occupational health impacts from normal operations showed
that air emissions and releases would be low and within regulatory
limits at all candidate sites. The analyses also showed that cumulative
effects of continuous operation over time would result in low levels of
exposure to workers and the public. As just discussed, the overall risk
from maximum postulated accidents is also low. Thus, there would not be
any disproportionate risk of significant adverse impacts to particular
populations, including low-income or minority populations, from
accidents.
Although the EIS indicates that the projected accident-free
radiological impacts and overall accident radiological risk from all
alternatives would be low, section 2.4 of the HEU Final EIS, Comparison
of Alternatives, shows that there would be some differences in impacts
among the alternatives, depending on the extent of commercial use vs.
disposal as waste of the product LEU material. Table 2.4-2 of the EIS,
Summary Comparison of Total Campaign Incremental Environmental Impacts
for the Disposition of Surplus HEU for Each Alternative, indicates that
the Preferred Alternative (85 percent fuel/15 percent waste at four
sites) generally would result in somewhat lower impacts from accident-
free blending and transportation than would the No Commercial Use
Alternative (100 percent waste). Blending for commercial use under the
Preferred Alternative would result in lower impacts than blending to
waste in the following resource areas: diesel/fuel oil, natural gas,
coal, and steam consumption; water use and wastewater; radiological
exposure from normal operations; most waste streams; and transportation
(under both accident and accident-free conditions). The Maximum
Commercial Use Alternative would result in higher total impacts than
the No Commercial Use Alternative for the following resources areas:
electricity consumed; facility accident consequences (estimated
accident probability is low); and mixed low-level and hazardous wastes
generated. The differences among the alternatives are negligible for
air quality and noise, socioeconomics, and chemical exposure.
As discussed in section 4.7 of the HEU Final EIS, the avoided
adverse impacts from displaced uranium mining, milling, conversion, and
enrichment over time increase the environmental advantage of commercial
use of LEU derived from surplus HEU. Because LEU fuel feed derived from
surplus HEU would displace LEU fuel feed derived from virgin uranium,
the environmental impacts that normally result from the front end of
the nuclear fuel cycle (mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment)
would be avoided by using the HEU-derived material instead.
[[Page 40622]]
In actuality, those front-end environmental impacts have already been
incurred for the HEU. By making beneficial use of the material rather
than wasting it, the Department would derive both environmental and
economic benefit from those sunk costs. The analysis in section 4.7 of
the HEU Final EIS indicates that the total avoided impacts in terms of
radiological exposure, nonradiological air quality impacts, and waste
generation would be greater than those that are projected to result
from the HEU blending program.
An unavoidable corollary to the physical environmental advantages
of commercial use of surplus HEU is the potential socioeconomic
disadvantage: displacing the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle could
impact employment in the domestic uranium mining, conversion, and
enrichment sectors. The analysis in section 4.8 of the HEU Final EIS
concludes that DOE will be able to avoid causing adverse material
impacts on those industry sectors, as required by provisions of the
USEC Privatization Act.
D. Floodplains Impacts
1. Floodplain Assessment
As required by DOEs regulations on protection of floodplains and
wetlands (10 CFR Part 1022), the HEU Final EIS assesses whether the
proposed action would impact or be impacted by the floodplains at the
involved sites. The proposed action in the HEU Final EIS involves
blending activities that would be accommodated within existing
facilities at Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS. The locations of facilities at
the candidate sites with respect to delineated floodplains are
presented in the maps shown in Figures 3.3.4-2, 3.4.4-2, 3.5.1-2, and
3.6.4-1 of the HEU Final EIS, respectively.
Because HEU blending activities associated with the proposed action
and its alternatives could be accommodated in existing facilities, no
positive or negative impacts on floodplains would be expected at any of
the candidate sites. Similarly, since no new construction activity is
proposed at any of the candidate sites and blending facilities are not
located in the vicinity of wetlands, no impacts to wetlands are
anticipated.
As discussed in sections 3.3.4 and 3.5.4 of the HEU Final EIS, and
shown in Figures 3.3.4-2 and 3.5.1-2, blending operations at the Y-12
Plant and B&W, respectively, would be accommodated in facilities
located outside the 100- and 500-year floodplains. At SRS, the F- or H-
Canyons that could be used for blending also fall outside the 100-year
floodplains of the Fourmile Branch and the Upper Three Runs Creek (EIS
Section 3.4.4). The 500-year floodplain limits at SRS are not currently
delineated. However, the blending alternatives at SRS would not likely
affect, or be affected by, the 500-year floodplain of either the
Fourmile Branch or Upper Three Runs Creek because the F- and H-Canyons
are located at an elevation of about 91 m (300 ft) above mean sea level
and are approximately 33 m (107 ft) and 64 m (210 ft) above these
streams and at distances from these streams of 0.8 km (0.5 mi) to 1.5
km (0.94 mi), respectively. The maximum flow that has occurred on the
Upper Three Runs Creek was in 1990, with a flow rate of about 58 m\3\/s
(2,040 ft\3\/s). At that time the creek reached an elevation of almost
30 m (98 ft) above mean sea level. The elevations of the buildings in
F- and H-Canyons are located more than 62 m (202 ft) above the highest
flow elevation of the Upper Three Runs Creek. The maximum flow that has
occurred on the Fourmile Branch was in 1991 with a rate of
approximately 5 m\3\/s (186 ft\3\/s), and an elevation of about 61 m
(199 ft) above mean sea level. Elevations of the buildings in F- and H-
Areas are located more than approximately 30 m (101 ft) higher than the
maximum flow level that has occurred.
The NFS site is partially located on the 100- and 500- year
floodplains of the Nolichucky River and Martin Creek (as determined by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Flood Insurance Rate
Map, January 3, 1985). However, as described in section 3.6.4 of the
EIS and below, mitigation measures have been and would continue to be
implemented to reduce potential flooding of the site and the likelihood
of adverse impacts to site operations.
2. Final Floodplain Statement Of Findings
The HEU Final EIS includes, in section 4.13.1, a Proposed
Floodplain Statement of Findings. The Federal Register Notice of
Availability for the Final EIS (61 FR 33719) stated that DOE would
accept comments on the proposed statement of findings during a 15-day
period. The Department received no comments in response to that notice.
This section of the ROD constitutes the Final Floodplain Statement of
Findings, as required by 10 CFR 1022.15.
Four candidate sites, two DOE (Y-12 and SRS) and two commercial
(B&W and NFS), were considered in the HEU Final EIS as potential sites
where the proposed action could be implemented. These candidate sites
were selected for evaluation because they currently have technically
viable HEU conversion and blending capabilities and could blend surplus
HEU to LEU for commercial fuel or waste. In addition, the commercial
sites considered are the only ones in the United States presently
licensed for the processing of HEU.
As described above, all facilities except NFS that are proposed to
be used for this proposed action at the candidate sites would be
outside the limits of the 100-year floodplain and are at least one foot
above the 100-year floodplain elevation and, therefore would conform to
both State and local floodplain requirements.
The floodplains of the Nolichucky River and Martin Creek at NFS, as
presented in Figure 3.6.4-1 of the HEU Final EIS, cover approximately
one-third and two-thirds of the NFS site's northern portion under 100-
year and 500-year floodplain conditions, respectively. Based on the
Flood Insurance Rate Map and the flood profiles, both published by
FEMA, floodplain elevations at the NFS site are determined to be 499.5
m (1639 ft) and 500 m (1640 ft) above mean sea level for the 100-year
and 500-years floods, respectively. As stated in the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC) Environmental Assessment for Renewal of Special
Nuclear Material License No. SNM-124, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.,
Erwin Plant, Erwin, Tennessee (August 1991), elevations of the building
floors are between 500 m (1640 ft) and 510 m (1660 ft) above mean sea
level. At the time of construction of the plant (1956), there were no
local, State, or NRC requirements prohibiting construction or operation
of nuclear facilities in 100- or 500-year floodplains. Presently, the
State of Tennessee has no requirements pertaining to building in 100-
or 500-year floodplains. Local standards require that any new
construction or substantial improvement of any commercial, industrial,
or non-residential structure should have the lowest floor, including
basement, elevated no lower than one foot above the level of base flood
(100-year flood) elevation. Because NFS was built prior to 1974, site
operations are grandfathered, and this local requirement does not apply
to existing facilities at NFS. NRC, which regulates the NFS site, also
has no regulations against building or operating nuclear facilities in
floodplains. Nevertheless, with the widening of the site's culvert,
upgraded drainage system, rechanneling of the Nolichucky River, and
rerouting of Martin Creek to enter the Nolichucky River farther
downstream, the chance of flood levels at the site has been lowered.
[[Page 40623]]
In addition, warning devices and systems have been placed by the State
of Tennessee along the river to warn the public and the NFS plant of
the chance of possible flooding. In addition, NFS and the State of
Tennessee have emergency action plans to mitigate potential flood
impacts and protect the public water supply from any possible
contamination.
There are two alternatives in addition to no action that could be
considered to remediate potential flooding of facilities at NFS. One
would be to use the facilities in the 300 Area at NFS, which is outside
both the 100- and 500-year floodplain limits, for blending activities.
Facilities in the 300 Area have building floor elevations of at least
500.5 m (1642 ft) above mean sea level, which would conform to the
local requirement of at least one foot above the 100-year floodplain
and would also fall outside of the 500-year floodplain. The second
alternative is to eliminate NFS as a candidate blending site. Based on
the analyses in the HEU Final EIS and on the information in the
Floodplains Assessment and this Statement of Findings, DOE will, for
any blending done at NFS on the Department's behalf pursuant to this
ROD, specify that the work should be done in the 300 Area, and/or that
measures to mitigate potential flood impacts at NFS will continue.
E. Preferred Alternative
The Preferred Alternative is identified in the HEU Final EIS as
Alternative 5, Maximum Commercial Use (four sites), which is:
To gradually blend down surplus HEU and sell as much as
possible (up to 85 percent) of the resulting commercially usable LEU
for use as reactor fuel over time (including 50 metric tons of HEU that
are to be transferred to USEC over a 6-year period, along with 7,000
metric tons of natural uranium), using a combination of four sites (Y-
12, SRS, B&W, and NFS) and two possible blending technologies (blending
as UF6 and UNH); implemented over an approximate 15- to 20-year
period; with continued storage of the HEU until blend-down occurs; and
To blend down surplus HEU that has no commercial value
using a combination of four sites (Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS) and two
blending technologies (blending as UNH and metal); to dispose of the
resulting LEU as low-level radioactive waste (LLW) pursuant to the
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Managing, Treatment,
Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste (DOE/EIS-0200-
D, draft issued in August 1995) (Waste Management PEIS) and associated
RODs, and any subsequent NEPA documents tiered from or supplementing
the Waste Management PEIS; implemented over an approximate 15- to 20-
year period; with continued storage of the HEU until blend-down occurs.
Because some material is in difficult-to-access forms, only about
65-70% of the nominal 200 metric tons of surplus HEU could be blended
and made available for commercial use over the next 10-15 years. The
Department expects that 15-20 years would be needed to bring about the
disposition of the entire nominal 200 metric tons of surplus HEU
analyzed in the EIS.
F. Notice of Availability for HEU Final EIS / Basis for Record of
Decision
On June 28, 1996, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
published in the Federal Register (61 FR 33735) a Notice of
Availability of the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium
Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0240), after DOE had
disseminated approximately 750 copies of the EIS and/or the EIS Summary
to government officials, states, Indian tribes, and interested groups
and individuals. A separate DOE Notice of Availability, summarizing the
HEU Final EIS, appeared in the Federal Register that same day (61 FR
33719).
DOE has prepared this ROD in accordance with the regulations of the
Council on Environmental Quality for implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts
1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021).
This ROD is based on DOE's Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched
Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement (the HEU Final EIS). In
making the decisions announced in this ROD, DOE considered
environmental impacts and other factors, such as cost considerations
and public comments received on the HEU Draft EIS.
IV. Cost Analysis
To assist the Department in reaching a decision on the HEU
disposition program, a study comparing the expected costs of the
various disposition alternatives was conducted. The Cost Comparison was
completed in April 1996, and was disseminated at the beginning of May
1996 to over 200 individuals who either expressed an interest in the
cost issue in comments, or attended one of the public workshops on the
HEU Draft EIS, or requested the study. In addition, the availability of
the Cost Comparison was noted in the June 28, 1996 Notice of
Availability for the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium
Final Environmental Impact Statement (61 FR 33719), along with
notification that the Department would entertain comments on it during
a 15- day period. No comments were received.
The Cost Comparison provides estimates of the potential costs for
blending HEU by using each of the blending technologies analyzed in the
HEU EIS (UNH, UF6, and metal blending). It compares the economic
impact for disposition of the surplus HEU according to the various
action alternatives (Alternatives 2 through 5) defined in the EIS,
which are based on different proportions of the material being blended
for commercial use or for disposal as waste. The report derives the
following estimated unit costs for the various blending technologies
and end-products:
Metal blending to 0.9-percent LEU for disposal--$13,900/kg of HEU
UNH blending to 0.9-percent LEU for disposal--$22,900/kg of HEU
UF6 blending to 4-percent LEU for commercial use--$3,200/kg of HEU
UNH blending to 4-percent LEU for commercial use--$5,700/kg of HEU
Unit costs for blending to waste include estimated disposal costs
as well as blending costs. The report estimates that the potential
sales revenue for each kilogram of HEU blended for commercial use is
$11,700, which is substantially greater than the costs for blending it.
The cost of ultimate disposal of spent nuclear fuel derived from down-
blended HEU that is used commercially would be borne by the utility
purchasers of the fuel pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
Based on these unit costs and revenues from commercial sales, the
Cost Comparison concludes that disposition of the entire nominal 200
metric tons of surplus HEU under the waste option (Alternative 2) would
cost approximately $3.4 billion. In contrast, disposition of 170 metric
tons of surplus HEU for commercial use, and disposition of the
remaining 30 metric tons as waste (the Preferred Alternative) would
result in a net return of about $340 to $770 million. The analyses
indicate that, on average, each metric ton of surplus HEU that is
blended to LEU fuel and sold, rather than blended for disposal as
waste, would save taxpayers $21 million to $26 million (depending on
the mix of blending technologies used). The report concludes that it is
economically attractive to pursue the commercial fuel option to the
maximum extent possible
[[Page 40624]]
rather than to pursue the waste option exclusively.
V. Environmentally Preferable Alternative
CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2) require that a Record of Decision
identify the environmentally preferred alternative(s). The analysis of
alternatives presented in Chapter 4 and section 2.4 of the HEU Final
EIS indicates that, even using conservative assumptions (that is,
assumptions that tend to overestimate risks), all of the action
alternatives (Alternatives 2 through 5) would have low radiological
impacts on the human environment in or around the analyzed blending
sites during accident-free operations or on workers or the populations
near the potential transportation routes. However, there are
differences among the estimated impacts for the various action
alternatives. As discussed in section III.C. of this ROD, above, except
for the No Action Alternative, the analyses in the HEU Final EIS
indicate that the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 5, blend 85
percent to fuel/15 percent to waste at four sites) would generally
result in the somewhat lower total environmental impacts for many
resources, including radiological impacts, during accident-free
operations, and that the risk of accidents would also be low. Thus, the
environmentally preferable alternative is the Preferred Alternative
identified in the HEU Final EIS, which, as discussed above, also best
serves the economic recovery objective, and fully serves the
nonproliferation objective, of the HEU disposition program.
The environmental analyses in the HEU Final EIS indicate that the
radiological, air, hazardous chemical, and socioeconomic impacts on the
environment during accident-free operations would be low and within
regulatory standards for all blending technologies. There would be a
choice of two technologies for each of the two end-products (fuel or
waste). For surplus HEU that is blended to waste for disposal, either
UNH blending or molten metal blending could be used. On the whole, the
data in section 2.2.2 and the analyses in section 4.3 of the HEU Final
EIS show that molten metal blending would be the environmentally
preferable blending technology for most resources for blending surplus
HEU to waste, although molten metal blending would generate more
process LLW (as opposed to the LEU end-product waste) than would UNH
blending.
For surplus HEU that is blended for commercial use as reactor fuel
feed, either UNH blending or UF6 blending could be used. The data
in section 2.2.2 and the analyses in section 4.3 of the HEU Final EIS
show that, on the whole, at the commercial sites, UNH blending would be
the environmentally preferable blending technology for blending surplus
HEU for commercial use, although UNH blending would produce greater
impacts in three resource areas: liquid hazardous waste generated,
solid nonhazardous waste after treatment, and transportation. In the
area of potential facility accidents, in particular, UF6 blending
would result in higher accident consequences because of the possibility
of a UF6 cylinder breach accident that could release gaseous
UF6 (both radiologically and chemically toxic) into the
environment. However, as discussed in section III.C, above, the
probability of accidents that would release significant quantities of
material into the environment is estimated to be low. DOE concludes
that these differences in impacts would not dictate against the use of
UF6 blending technology for blending surplus HEU for commercial
use.
The analyses in section 4.3 of the HEU Final EIS indicate that all
four of the analyzed blending facilities (Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS) have
the capacity to process surplus HEU with low impacts to workers, the
public, and, for many parameters, the environment during normal
operations. For the two DOE sites, the generation of waste based on an
increased usage of utilities represents small increases--less than 5
percent over current operations. For the two commercial sites, the
generation of waste based on an increased usage of utilities represents
increases of over 20 percent, but both facilities have adequate
capacities to accommodate the increases since neither site is currently
operating at full capacity. Because the NFS site has not been operating
recently, it would require a large increase in water usage (166
percent) and fuel requirements (933 percent) relative to the current
baseline. However, because the quantity of water and fuel used in the
past for similar operations is comparable to that which would be used
for the proposed action, it is anticipated that the increase in these
requirements can easily be accommodated at NFS. As discussed in section
III.D, above, the potential for flooding at NFS is another relative
disadvantage of that facility.
For postulated facility accidents, there are also differences among
the sites based on different proximities and concentrations of workers
and nearby populations, as well as meteorological factors. The analyses
in section 4.3 of the HEU Final EIS indicate that accident impacts to
the maximally exposed individual member of the public and to the
population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) would be lowest at SRS,
where the involved facilities are in the middle of a very large,
limited-access, rural site, so the distances to members of the public
are large. The greatest impacts to the public from accidents would be
experienced at Y-12 and NFS, at both of which the involved facilities
are relatively close to site boundaries (in the case of NFS, the site
is small) and population centers. The postulated accident impacts to
on-site non-involved workers would be lowest at SRS (because the
workers are fairly widely dispersed) and NFS (because there are
relatively few workers on the site). The non-involved worker impacts
would be highest at B&W, which has a relatively large workforce in
close proximity to the blending facility. However, as noted in section
III.C, above, the probabilities of serious accidents at all sites are
low.
The environmental justice analysis shows that the SRS site has a
substantial minority and low-income population in surrounding census
tracts (more than 25 percent minority and low-income in most census
tracts, and more than 50 percent minority in several). However, the
impacts to surrounding populations are projected to be low for all
sites, and lowest for SRS, so there would be no disproportionate
adverse impacts on minority populations.
In summary, the analyses in the HEU Final EIS indicate that the
environmentally preferable blending facility would be SRS. However,
since the impacts at all sites are expected to be low during normal
operations for many parameters (including radiological impacts), well
within regulatory limits, and since overall risks associated with
potential accidents are low, DOE concludes that environmental
differences among the sites would not serve as a basis for choosing
among them. Each of the facilities would be capable of blending up to
the entire inventory of surplus HEU without significant adverse
environmental impacts, and use of a combination of facilities can
facilitate mission accomplishment.
VI. Decisions
A. Programmatic Decisions
DOE has decided to implement a program to make surplus HEU non-
weapons-usable by blending it down to LEU, as specified in the
Preferred Alternative (Alternative 5, site variation c [all four
sites]) in the HEU Final EIS.
[[Page 40625]]
As defined in section 1.4.2 of the HEU Final EIS, the Preferred
Alternative is:
To gradually blend down surplus HEU and sell over time as
much as possible (up to 85 percent) of the resulting commercially
usable LEU for use as reactor fuel feed, (including 50 metric tons of
HEU to be transferred to USEC over a 6-year period 2); using a
combination of four sites (Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS), and two possible
blending technologies (blending as UF6 and UNH); over an
approximate 15-to 20-year period; with continued storage of the surplus
HEU until blend-down occurs; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\ 2\ The transfer of 50 metric tons of HEU and 7,000 metric
tons of natural uranium from DOE stockpiles to USEC is specifically
mandated by section 3112(c) of Public Law 104-134. Both of those
transfers are components of the Preferred Alternative and this
decision. The delivery to commercial end users of the surplus
uranium transferred to USEC could not begin before 1998 pursuant to
the statute. Although the transfer of 7,000 metric tons of natural
uranium from DOE to USEC is not part of the HEU disposition program,
it is part of the same transaction as the transfer of 50 metric tons
of HEU, so the environmental impacts of that transfer are assessed
in section 4.9 of the HEU Final EIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To blend down surplus HEU that has no potential commercial
value; using a combination of four sites (Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS), and
two blending technologies (blending as UNH and metal); to dispose of
the resulting LEU as LLW pursuant to Record(s) of Decision associated
with the Waste Management PEIS and any other relevant site- or project-
specific NEPA reviews 3; over an approximate 15-to 20-year period;
with continued storage of the surplus HEU until blend-down occurs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\ 3\ For purposes of analysis of transportation impacts in the
HEU EIS, the LLW facility at DOE's Nevada Test Site (NTS) was
assessed as a representative site for disposal of LLW from the HEU
disposition program. The possibility that this material may be
received at the NTS facility is also reflected in the NTS Site-Wide
EIS (DOE/EIS-0243, draft published January 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because a portion of the surplus HEU is in forms, such as weapons
components, that would require considerable time to make available for
blending, it is anticipated that no more than 70 percent of the current
surplus HEU could be blended down and commercialized in the near term
(over the next 10-to 15-year period).
The preferred site variation is to use all four of the analyzed
sites. For purposes of analysis in the EIS, it was assumed that the
blending operations would be divided evenly among the four facilities
(25 percent to each) under this site variation. However, as noted in
section 2.1.2 of the HEU Final EIS, the defined alternatives and site
variations were not intended to represent exclusive choices among which
the decisionmaker must choose, but rather were proffered to define a
spectrum of reasonable alternatives. While the Department considers it
likely that each of the four analyzed blending facilities will be used
for part of the surplus HEU disposition program, it is highly unlikely
that the work would be so evenly divided, and there is no intent to
seek such a distribution. Section 4.5.6 of the HEU Final EIS explains
how impacts would change over the life of the campaign if the exact
fuel/waste ratio or division among sites were different. Because the
HEU Final EIS analyzes the impacts of site variations for the Preferred
Alternative that would involve blending 0, 25, 50, and 100 percent of
the surplus HEU at each of the sites, and concludes that expected
impacts would be low for many parameters (including radiological
impacts) during normal operations and within regulatory limits for each
site even if that site were to blend 100 percent of the inventory, the
impacts at any site from any possible distribution of the blending work
among the facilities would be low for many parameters (including
radiological impacts) during normal operations, and would be bounded by
the analyses in the EIS.
As noted in sections 1.3 and 1.4.2 of the HEU Final EIS, decisions
about the timing and details of specific disposition actions (which
facility or process to use) might be made in part by DOE, by other
government agencies, by USEC, by a private successor to USEC, or by
other private entities acting as marketing agents for DOE. In the case
of the 50 metric tons of surplus HEU that is being transferred to USEC
as part of this decision (see below), the choice of blending sites for
that work will be made by USEC or its private, corporate successor. The
quantities and other characteristics of additional specific ``batches''
of surplus HEU and the exact time and blending sites at which such
batches would be subject to disposition are unknown at this time, and
would depend on a number of factors, including the rate of weapons
dismantlement; the timing and rate at which any additional HEU may be
declared surplus; market conditions; legislative restrictions on
delivery to commercial end users (see Public Law 104-134); and
available throughput capacities and unrelated workloads at the blending
facilities. (See section VI.B.2, below, for a discussion of a possible
transfer of ``off-spec'' surplus HEU material to the Tennessee Valley
Authority.) Competitive bidding procedures--including both the
commercial and DOE facilities (the latter under their ``Work for
Others'' programs)--as well as facility availability and other business
considerations are likely to be key components of disposition actions.
DOE is preparing an HEU Disposition Plan, which will be available
shortly following publication of this ROD, that will provide additional
information concerning specific disposition actions that are expected
to commence during the next several years, as well as describe an
approach to other future, specific actions. The ultimate distribution
of blending work among the four facilities will be determined in
multiple individual decisions by multiple decisionmakers, based largely
on business and facility availability considerations, over a period of
up to 15-20 years.
This programmatic decision does not include within it the choice of
blending technologies for specific batches of HEU. The HEU Final EIS
analyses indicate that all three of the analyzed technologies (UNH,
UF6, and metal blending) could be used. As in the case of facility
selection, the choices of blending technologies are expected to be made
largely on the basis of business and technical considerations, and may
be made by DOE, USEC, USEC's corporate successor, or other
entities.4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\ 4\ The UF6 blending technology will not even be
available unless the potential commercial blenders make the business
decisions to deploy it. If UF6 blending capability is not
developed, all blending for commercial use would use the UNH
process. If new blending facilities or processes are proposed in the
future, additional NEPA review would be conducted, as appropriate,
either by DOE or in connection with NRC licensing proceedings for a
commercial facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A portion of DOE's surplus HEU inventory is in various forms of
irradiated HEU fuel (the total quantity of which remains classified)
from the Department's nuclear weapons, naval nuclear propulsion, or
nuclear energy research programs. The irradiated fuel is not directly
weapons- usable, is under safeguards and security, and poses no
proliferation threat. DOE is not proposing to process the irradiated
fuel to separate the HEU for down-blending as part of this decision.
There are no current or anticipated DOE plans to process irradiated
fuel solely for the purposes of extracting HEU. However, activities
associated with the irradiated fuel for purposes of stabilization,
facility cleanup, treatment, waste management, safe disposal, or
environment, safety, and health reasons could result in the separation
of HEU in weapons-usable form that could pose a proliferation threat
and thus be within the scope of this EIS. Under the Preferred
Alternative
[[Page 40626]]
and this decision, DOE would blend such recovered HEU to LEU.5 To
provide a conservative analysis presenting maximum potential impacts,
the HEU Final EIS includes such HEU (currently in the form of
irradiated fuel) in the material to be blended to LEU, as if such HEU
had been separated from the irradiated fuel pursuant to health and
safety, stabilization, or other non-defense activities. However, such
HEU may actually remain in its present form (without the HEU ever being
separated) and be disposed of as high level waste in a repository or
alternative pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\ 5\ For example, weapons-usable HEU is anticipated to be
recovered from dissolving and stabilizing targets and spent fuel at
SRS pursuant to the analysis and decisions in the Final EIS (October
1995) and RODs (December 1995 and February 1996) on the Interim
Management of Nuclear Materials at SRS.
\ 6\ If HEU currently in irradiated fuel remains in its current
form, it would be managed pursuant to the analyses and decisions in
the Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management Programs Environmental Impact Statement (April 1995) and
the associated RODs (60 FR 28680, June 1, 1995, amended by 61 FR
9441, March 8, 1996), and subsequent, project- specific or site-
specific NEPA documentation. Such spent fuel could be disposed of as
high level waste in a repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.). DOE is in the process of
characterizing the Yucca Mountain Site in Nevada as a potential
repository for disposal of spent fuel pursuant to that Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Basis for Decisions
DOE has concluded that the Preferred Alternative identified in the
HEU Final EIS would best serve the purpose and need for the HEU
disposition program for several reasons. In terms of the fundamental
nonproliferation objective, DOE considers all of the action
alternatives (2 through 5) to be roughly equivalent in terms of serving
that objective. Both 4-percent LEU in the form of commercial spent
nuclear fuel and 0.9-percent LEU oxide for disposal as LLW--and any
allocation between them--are considered highly proliferation-resistant
material forms, because both reprocessing of commercial spent fuel (to
separate the roughly 1 percent of plutonium it contains), and re-
enrichment of the 0.9-percent LEU to make HEU again, are
technologically difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.
In terms of the economic recovery objective of the program, that
objective is best served by the Maximum Commercial Use Alternative.
Commercial use would reduce the amount of blending that would be
required for disposition (a 14 to 1 blending ratio of blendstock to HEU
as opposed to 70 to 1 for waste) and minimize Government waste disposal
costs that would be incurred if all (or a greater portion of) the
material were blended to waste. The sale of LEU derived from surplus
HEU would yield returns on prior investments to the Federal Treasury.
As noted in section IV of this ROD, the Cost Comparison for Highly
Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives indicates that the Preferred
Alternative could save as much as $4 billion compared to the blend-to-
waste alternative. Under the best case, the proceeds from commercial
sales of 85 percent of the inventory could actually more than pay for
the entire HEU disposition program, including the blending and disposal
of the 15 percent that would still need to be disposed of as waste, and
yield $340 million to $770 million in net revenues. (As noted above,
however, this degree of commercialization may not ultimately be
achieved.)
Finally, as discussed in section III.C of this ROD, the analyses in
the EIS indicate that the Preferred Alternative would have somewhat
lower overall environmental impacts than the other action alternatives.
The Maximum Commercial Use Alternative would generate smaller
quantities of radioactive waste requiring disposal than would the No
Commercial Use Alternative. Adverse environmental impacts from uranium
mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment would be avoided by using
this material rather than virgin uranium to produce nuclear fuel.
Making beneficial use of the LEU derived from surplus HEU would derive
some environmental benefit (when compared to the blend-100-percent-to-
waste alternative) in return for the environmental costs that were
expended in making the HEU in the first place, thus conserving non-
renewable natural resources.
The Maximum Commercial Use Alternative would, as discussed in
section 4.8 of the HEU Final EIS, displace some uranium mining,
milling, conversion, and enrichment. However, in light of the provision
in the USEC Privatization Act that requires DOE to determine that its
sales of uranium would not have adverse material impacts on those
industries, and the rate at which DOE expects to be able to make
surplus HEU available for disposition, serious, long-lasting impacts on
those industry sectors is not anticipated. Mitigation of any such
impacts, as required by the USEC Privatization Act, is discussed in
section VII of this ROD, below.
An indirect impact of the Preferred Alternative would be the
creation of spent nuclear fuel (through the use of commercial LEU fuel
derived from surplus HEU in power reactors). However, since the LEU
nuclear fuel derived from surplus HEU would replace nuclear fuel that
would have been created from newly mined uranium without this action,
there would be no additional spent fuel that would not otherwise be
generated. The domestic spent fuel would be stored, and potentially
disposed of in a repository or other alternative, pursuant to the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.), with
appropriate associated NEPA review.
With respect to the ultimate disposal of LLW material, certain DOE
LLW is currently disposed of at commercial facilities, and other DOE
LLW is stored or disposed of at DOE sites. A location where LLW derived
from DOE s surplus HEU can be disposed of has not been designated.
Disposal of DOE LLW would be pursuant to DOE's Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement for Managing, Treatment, Storage, and
Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste (DOE/EIS-0200-D, draft
issued in August 1995) (Waste Management PEIS) and associated ROD(s),
any subsequent NEPA documents tiered from or supplementing the Waste
Management PEIS, and any applicable project- or site-specific NEPA
reviews (such as the NTS Site-Wide EIS, currently in preparation).
Waste material derived from surplus HEU would be required to meet LLW
acceptance criteria of DOE's Office of Environmental Management. No LLW
would be transferred to any LLW facility until completion of the Waste
Management PEIS (or other applicable project or site-specific NEPA
documentation) and would be in accordance with decisions in the
associated RODs. Additional options for disposal of LLW may be
identified in other documents.
Continued storage of surplus HEU prior to blending may be required
for some time. The storage, pending disposition (for up to 10 years) of
surplus HEU at the Y-12 Plant (where most of the HEU is stored or
destined to be stored), is analyzed in the Environmental Assessment for
the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum
Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/
EA-0929, September 1994) (Y-12 EA). Impacts from storage, as analyzed
in the Y-12 EA, are summarized and incorporated by reference in the HEU
Final EIS (see section 4.2). Should storage of surplus HEU pending
disposition be required beyond 10 years, it would be done pursuant to
and
[[Page 40627]]
consistent with the ROD associated with the Department's Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement or tiered NEPA documents.
C. Specific Action Decisions
1. Transfer of HEU and Natural Uranium to USEC
As a first concrete disposition action pursuant to the programmatic
decisions described in section VI.A of this ROD, above, DOE has decided
to transfer title to 50 metric tons of surplus HEU and 7,000 metric
tons of natural uranium to USEC for gradual sale and commercial use. In
addition to serving the objectives of the HEU disposition program,
these transfers are consistent with the Fiscal Year 1996 Federal
Budget, and are specifically mandated by the USEC Privatization Act
(Pub. L. 104-134, Sec. 3112(c)(1)).
Specifics concerning the timing of deliveries and the
characteristics and locations of material to be delivered to USEC (or
to blending contractors that USEC selects) are to be established in a
separate DOE/USEC Memorandum of Agreement pertaining to the transfers.
USEC or its corporate successor will make decisions concerning where
and when blending of the 50 metric tons of HEU being transferred will
occur, what technologies will be used, and when and how the resultant
LEU will be marketed (consistent with the USEC Privatization Act). It
is anticipated that USEC will utilize one or both of the commercial
blending facilities for down-blending, that the first transfers of HEU
will occur before the end of 1996, and that they will continue for
about six years. Under the USEC Privatization Act, USEC (or its
corporate successor) may not deliver this material for commercial end
use prior to 1998, and there are quantitative limits on annual
deliveries to end users (Pub. L. 104-134, Sec. 3112(c)(2)).
The transfer of 7,000 metric tons of natural uranium to USEC is not
part of the HEU disposition program. However, since it is part of the
transaction transferring 50 metric tons of HEU, the impacts of the
transfer are assessed in section 4.9 of the HEU Final EIS. This
material is in the form of UF6, and is part of a larger quantity
of UF6 that is in storage at DOE's Portsmouth (Ohio) and Paducah
(Kentucky) Gaseous Diffusion Plants, which are currently being leased
to USEC for uranium enrichment operations. The most likely disposition
of the 7,000 metric tons of natural uranium is eventual use as
feedstock for enrichment to nuclear power plant fuel, the usual
business of the enrichment plants. If it is so used, and follows the
typical path of such uranium, it would probably be enriched to about 2
percent U-235 at the Paducah Plant, then transported to the Portsmouth
Plant for additional enrichment to an appropriate commercial material,
generally about 4 percent. From there the enriched UF6 would be
transported to a commercial fuel fabrication plant for conversion and
fabrication of nuclear fuel. The analysis in section 4.9 of the HEU
Final EIS indicates that the environmental impacts from enrichment and
transportation of this material would be negligible. Commercialization
of the 7,000 metric tons of natural uranium by USEC is regulated by the
same USEC Privatization Act limits as described in the preceding
paragraph for commercialization of the 50 metric tons of HEU.
2. Down-Blending of ``Off-Spec'' Materials at SRS
A significant portion of the surplus HEU inventory, including most
of the approximately 22 metric tons of surplus HEU that is currently
located at the SRS site, is in various forms of off-specification or
``off-spec'' material which, when blended down, would not meet standard
U.S. commercial nuclear fuel specifications for content of the uranium
isotopes U-234 and/or U-236.7 As noted in section 2.1.1 of the HEU
Final EIS, such off-spec material might nonetheless be commercially
used as reactor fuel feed under certain circumstances, which might
involve blending to somewhat higher enrichment levels, and NRC license
amendments for reactors that would use the material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\ 7\ The quantities of the various surplus HEU material forms
located at SRS remain classified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOE had previously decided, in two RODs pursuant to the Interim
Management of Nuclear Materials at Savannah River Site Final EIS (DOE/
EIS-0220, October 1995)(IMNM EIS), to use the H-Canyon and/or F-Canyon
and associated facilities at SRS for down-blending, as part of its
interim stabilization activities under the IMNM EIS, for UNH solutions
(60 FR 65300, December 19, 1995), and Mark-16 and Mark-22 (irradiated)
fuels (61 FR 6633, February 21, 1996). These materials are part of the
inventory of surplus HEU. The IMNM RODs stated that these HEU materials
would be blended down to LEU and then either oxidized using the FA-Line
in the F-area at SRS, or stored as LEU solutions pending decisions on
ultimate disposition.8
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\ 8\ As discussed in section 2.2.3.3 of the HEU Final EIS, due
to criticality issues, the FA-Line is not capable of oxidizing
material at commercial enrichment levels (4-5 percent), so that
facility would not be used for oxidation of the commercial material.
Rather, these LEU solutions will be stored at SRS until other
arrangements can be made for oxidation of commercial-enrichment
material. There are several options for providing for solidification
of UNH solutions at commercial enrichment levels at SRS, although
none is being proposed by DOE at this time. One option being
considered is construction of a private, commercial facility on land
leased from DOE at SRS. Such a private facility would need to be
licensed by the NRC, and would be accompanied by appropriate NEPA
review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the materials noted above, there is also off-spec
unirradiated aluminum alloy HEU reactor fuel material located at SRS
and Y-12. Pursuant to this HEU ROD, DOE has decided that the
unirradiated HEU reactor fuel will also be down-blended at the F-Canyon
and/or H-Canyon and associated facilities at SRS, and will eventually
be sold for commercial use, if possible. The ability of SRS facilities
to withstand earthquakes is currently being reviewed. No surplus HEU
from decisions made in this HEU ROD would be introduced into the
canyons or blended in the canyon facilities until completion of the
seismic review. The HEU down-blending activities at SRS pursuant to
this decision will occur during a relatively limited period, subject to
facility operations and availability.
The SRS canyon facilities, with their large chemical processing and
separations capabilities, are capable of processing these off-spec
materials. Commercial blending facilities are reluctant to handle these
materials because of the resultant contamination of their facilities
with undesirable uranium isotopes. The UNH blending facilities at the
Y-12 Plant are also not considered likely candidates for blending of
such off-spec material, as their processing capacity and chemical
separation capabilities are much lower than the SRS canyon facilities,
and may be needed for future defense programs activities.
The USEC Privatization Act (Pub. L. 104-134, Sec. 3112(e)(1))
provides that DOE may transfer off-spec uranium to a Federal agency
without resale or transfer to another entity. Pursuant to the Act, DOE
may pursue discussions with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a
Federal agency that operates several nuclear power plants, to try to
reach agreement on a demonstration of the use of off-spec LEU derived
from surplus HEU that would be down-blended at SRS.
[[Page 40628]]
3. Other Future Actions
DOE has no other concrete surplus HEU disposition actions under
specific contemplation at this time. DOE has decided that, when
additional HEU blend-down actions for either commercial use or for
disposal as waste are developed in the future, they could involve the
use of all four of the analyzed blending facilities. The commercial
facilities (B&W and NFS) are considered to be available for such
activities immediately. The SRS facilities may also be available for
blending some of the HEU. The Y-12 facilities are currently not
operational. Under DOE Order 425.1, Startup and Restart of Nuclear
Facilities, DOE must successfully complete an Operational Readiness
Review addressing operational health and safety issues prior to restart
of the Y-12 facilities. HEU operations are expected to resume at Y-12
in 1998. Thus, all four of the facilities would potentially be
available, and could be used for portions of the HEU down-blending, in
the timeframes that additional disposition actions might develop.
DOE is preparing an HEU Disposition Plan, which will be available
shortly after publication of this ROD, that will provide additional
information concerning specific disposition actions that are expected
to commence during the next several years, as well as describe an
approach to other future, specific actions. The plan will be updated
periodically based on industry response and program progress.
VII. Avoidance/Minimization of Environmental Harm
As discussed in section III.C. above, implementation of the
decisions reached in this ROD will result in low environmental and
health impacts during normal operations. However, DOE will take all
reasonable steps to avoid or minimize harm, including the following:
DOE will use current safety and health programs and
practices to reduce impacts by maintaining worker radiation exposure as
low as reasonably achievable.
DOE will meet appropriate waste minimization and pollution
prevention objectives consistent with the Pollution Prevention Act of
1990. As discussed in section 2.3 of the HEU Final EIS, segregation of
activities that generate radioactive and hazardous wastes will be
employed, where possible, to avoid the generation of mixed wastes.
Treatment to separate radioactive and non-radioactive components will
be employed to reduce the volume of mixed wastes. Where possible,
nonhazardous materials will be substituted for those that contribute to
the generation of hazardous or mixed waste. Waste streams would be
treated to facilitate disposal as nonhazardous wastes, where possible.
In addition to following such practices at its own facilities, DOE will
seek to include comparable requirements in any contracts with
commercial facilities.
Consistent with the requirement of the USEC Privatization
Act (Pub. L. 104-134, Sec. 3112(d)(2)(B)), DOE will determine, before
making sales of LEU derived from HEU for commercial use, whether such
sales would have adverse material impacts on the domestic uranium
mining, conversion, or enrichment industries, taking into account other
DOE sales of uranium and the sales of uranium under the Russian HEU
Agreement and the Suspension Agreement. Such determinations may be made
on a periodic basis (for example, for all contemplated sales over a
certain period), as opposed to a sale-by-sale basis. (No such
determination is required under the USEC Privatization Act for the
initial transfer of 50 metric tons of HEU and 7,000 metric tons of
natural uranium to USEC, as provided in section VI.B. of this ROD, or
to transfers to other government agencies [such as TVA] of off-spec
material.)
VIII. DOE Public Reading Rooms
Copies of the HEU Final EIS, the Cost Comparison for Highly
Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives, and this ROD, as well as
technical data reports and other supporting documents, are available
for public review at the following locations:
Department of Energy Headquarters, Freedom of Information Reading
Room, Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC
20585, Attn: Carolyn Lawson, 202-586-6020
Albuquerque Operations Office, Technical Vocational Institute, 525
Buena Vista, SE, Albuquerque, NM 87106, Attn: Russ Gladstone
(contractor), 505-224-3286, Elva Barfield (DOE), 505-845-4370
Nevada Operations Office, Nevada Operations Office, U.S. Department
of Energy, Public Reading Room, 2753 South Highland Dr., P.O. Box
98518, Las Vegas, NV 89193-8518, Attn: Janet Fogg, 702-295-1128
Oak Ridge Operations Office, U.S. Department of Energy, Public
Reading Room, 200 Administration Road, P.O. Box 2001, Oak Ridge, TN
37831-8501, Attn: Amy Rothrock, 615-576-1216
Richland Operations Office, Washington State University, Tri-Cities
Branch Campus, 300 Sprout Road, Room 130 West, Richland, WA 99352,
Attn: Terri Traub, 509-376-8583
Rocky Flats Office, Front Range Community College Library, 3645 West
112th Avenue, Westminister, CO 80030, Attn: Dennis Connor, 303-469-
4435
Savannah River Operations Office, Gregg-Graniteville Library,
University of South Carolina-Aiken, 171 University Parkway, Aiken,
SC 29801, Attn: Paul Lewis, 803-641-3320, DOE Contact: Pauline
Conner, 803-725-1408
Los Alamos National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, c/o Los
Alamos Community Reading Room, 1450 Central, Suite 101, Los Alamos,
NM 87544, Attn: LANL Outreach Manager, 505-665-2127
Chicago Operations Office, Office of Planning, Communications & EEO,
U.S. Department of Energy, 9800 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, IL
60439, Attn: Gary L. Pitchford, 708-252-2013
Amarillo Area Office, U.S. Department of Energy, Amarillo College,
Lynn Library/Learning Center, P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, TX 79178,
Attn: Karen McIntosh, 806-371-5400
U.S. DOE Reading Room, Carson County Library, P.O. Box 339,
Panhandle, TX 79068, Attn: Tom Walton (DOE), 806-477-3120, Kerry
Cambell (contractor), 806-477-4381
Sandia National Laboratory/CA, Livermore Public Library, 1000 S.
Livermore Avenue, Livermore, CA 94550, Attn: Julie Casamajor, 510-
373-5500
IX. Conclusion
DOE has decided to implement a program to make surplus HEU non-
weapons-usable by blending it down to LEU, and gradually selling as
much of it as possible for commercial use over time, as specified in
the Preferred Alternative in the HEU Final EIS, and including the
mitigation activities identified in section VII. This programmatic
decision is effective upon being made public, in accordance with DOE's
regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR Sec. 1021.315). The goals of this
program are to support the United States' nuclear weapons
nonproliferation policy by reducing global stockpiles of excess fissile
materials so that they may never be used in weapons again, and to
recover the economic value of the material to the extent feasible. This
program will demonstrate the United States' commitment to its
nonproliferation goals, as specified in the President's
Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy of 1993, and provide an
example for other nations, where stockpiles of surplus HEU may be less
secure from potential theft or diversion than those in the United
States, to encourage them to take similar actions. The impacts on the
environment, workers, and the public from implementing this HEU
disposition program are estimated to be low for most parameters
(including radiological impacts) during normal
[[Page 40629]]
operations, and well within applicable regulatory limits.
The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.
Sec. 4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations at 40 CFR Parts
1500-1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.
Issued in Washington, D.C., July 29, 1996.
Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-19798 Filed 8-2-96; 8:45 am]
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