

the United States of America as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Written objections to the prospective grant of a license should be sent to Kennedy Space Center.

**DATE:** Responses to this notice must be received by August 31, 1998.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Beth Vrioni, Patent Counsel, Kennedy Space Center, Mail Code MM-E, John F. Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899.

Dated: June 22, 1998.

**Edward A. Frankle,**  
General Counsel

[FR Doc. 98-17281 Filed 6-29-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510-01-P

## NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION

### Sunshine Act Meeting

**TIME AND DATE:** 2:00 p.m., Monday, June 29, 1998.

**PLACE:** Board Room, 7th Floor, Room 7047, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314-3428.

**STATUS:** Closed.

#### MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

1. Two Personnel Actions. Closed pursuant to exemptions (2) and (6).

The Board voted unanimously that Agency business requires that a meeting be held with less than the usual seven days advance notice, that it be closed to the public, and that earlier announcement of this was not possible.

The Board voted unanimously to close the meeting under the exemptions stated above. Deputy General Counsel James Engel certified that the meeting could be closed under those exemptions.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Becky Baker, Secretary of the Board, Telephone (703) 518-6304.

**Becky Baker,**

Secretary of the Board.

[FR Doc. 98-17470 Filed 6-26-98; 11:10 am]

BILLING CODE 7535-01-M

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-302]

### Crystal River Unit 3; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 issued to Florida Power Corporation (the licensee), for operation of Crystal River Unit 3, located in Citrus County, Florida.

The proposed amendment would allow operation with a number of indications previously identified as tube end anomalies (TEA) and multiple tube end anomalies (MEA) in the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG) tubes. The duration of the proposed license amendment would be until CR-3's next refueling outage, currently scheduled for fall 1999. This proposed change may be necessary due to the potential condition of noncompliance with CR-3 Improved Technical Specification 5.6.2.10.4.b. Such a condition may result from confirmation of an ongoing re-analysis of eddy current testing (ECT) data, of indications previously identified as TEAs and MEAs in the upper roll expansion of the OTSG upper tube sheet, as now being within the pressure boundary of the tubes.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

This change does not involve a significant hazards consideration for the following reasons:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

This evaluation addresses the potential effects of operating with TEAs and MEAs within the pressure boundary cladding region. The indications remaining in service are within the upper end of the tube pressure boundary. Two accidents analyzed in the SAR [safety analysis report] must be evaluated: Steam Generator Tube Rupture and Main Steam Line Break.

The steam generator tube rupture accident assumptions bound the possible effects of leaving these indications in service. A complete circumferential severance of a tube is assumed in the accident scenario. The location of these indications in the upper tubesheet precludes a tube rupture from occurring (the tubes are restrained by the tubesheet). Additionally, in the event of a complete circumferential severance, the tube will not retract from the tubesheet. Thus, the probability of occurrence of this accident is not increased by leaving these indications in service.

The main steam line break accident is not initiated by the condition of the tubing. However, an assumption of one gpm primary-to-secondary leakage through the OTSG is assumed in the MSLB [main steam line break] accident analysis. Calculated cumulative leakage, assuming all of the indications are leaking, is determined to be well below one gpm, thus the accident analysis initial assumptions bound the existing condition of the OTSGs. Thus, it is concluded that the probability of occurrence of a main steam line break is not increased by this change. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

No new failure modes or accident scenarios are created by allowing operation with TEAs and MEAs extending within the tubes' pressure boundary. The TEAs and MEAs remaining in service are within the upper end of the tube pressure boundary and even in the event of a complete circumferential severance, the tube will not retract from the tubesheet. Therefore, the tubesheet hoop effect will still act to minimize leakage. The postulated potential leakage generated from allowing these indications to remain in service is bounded by the CR-3 MSLB scenario. The MSLB scenario has been thoroughly evaluated and the potential damage to the steam generator tubes is not increased. This change does not increase the risk of a plant trip or challenge other safety systems. Therefore, this change does not create a possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

ITS Bases 3.4.12 contains relevant information pertaining to the limitations on RCS [reactor coolant system] leakage. These Bases discuss the one gpm primary-to-secondary leakage assumed for a main steam line break accident as well as the steam generator tube rupture accident. As discussed, the maximum calculated accident leakage, assuming all of these indications leak, is well below one gpm. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the ITS bases is not significantly reduced.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff