satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: B.F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, PA 15001.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra.

Duquesne Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–334 and 50–412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Shippingport, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: July 9, 1998.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.1.1 and associated Bases for both units. TS 3.7.1.1 currently provides requirements for reducing the power range high neutron flux trip setpoint when one or more main steam safety valves are inoperable. The current basis for determining the amount of trip setpoint reduction has been determined to be non-conservative. The proposed amendment would specify maximum allowable reactor power level based on the number of operable main steam safety valves rather than requiring a reduction in reactor trip setpoint. This change would be consistent with the NRC staff's guidance provided in the NRC's improved Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse plants (NUREG–1431, Revision 1). The maximum allowable reactor power level with inoperable safety valves would be calculated based on the recommendations of Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) 94–01. The proposed change to the Unit 1 TS 3.7.1.1 would also delete reference to 2 loop operation since 2 loop operation is not a licensed condition for either unit.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change will generally incorporate the Improved Standard Technical Specification (ISTS) main steam safety valve (MSSV) requirements of NUREG–1431 into Specification 3.7.1.1 and associated Bases. The Unit 1 specification currently includes reference to 2 loop operating requirements in Action ''b'' and Table 3.7–2. Reference to 2 loop operation is being deleted since it is not addressed in the ISTS and is not a licensed condition for these plants. The limiting condition for operation has been modified to incorporate the ISTS wording and requires MSSV operability in accordance with Tables 3.7–1 and 3.7–2. Table 3.7–1 lists the maximum allowable power level as a function of the number of operable MSSVs per steam generator and continues to require a minimum of 2 operable MSSVs per steam generator for continued plant operation. Table 3.7–2 specifies the MSSV lift setting and tolerance for each MSSV. The valve lift setting remains unchanged along with the current tolerance of +1 percent −3 percent. The Applicability statement has not been changed since it is consistent with the ISTS requirements.

Proposed Action ''a'' applies with one or more inoperable MSSVs and requires that within 4 hours power must be reduced in accordance with the value specified in Table 3.7–1; otherwise, shut down. This action satisfies the same goal as the current action by restricting thermal power so that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity for that steam generator. Proposed Action ''b'' incorporates additional conservatism by specifically requiring at least 2 operable MSSVs per steam generator. This ensures that a minimum overpressure protection is available during all applicable modes of operation. Proposed Action ''c'' provides an exception to Specification 3.0.4 which does not allow entry into a mode where the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) is not met and actions require a shutdown. This exception is not addressed in the ISTS requirements; however, an exception to Specification 3.0.4 allows entry into a mode where the LCO applies in conformance with the action statements.

Proposed Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.1 requires verification of the lift setpoint for each MSSV listed in Table 3.7–2 in accordance with the Inservice Test Program. Note (1) is applied to Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.1 to provide clarification of the testing requirements, such that this testing is required only in Modes 1 and 2 so that the plant can enter Modes 2 and 3 where this specification applies without first performing the test. A note (2) has been applied to the lift setting in Table 3.7–2 that requires a setting corresponding to the ambient conditions of the valve at the nominal operating temperature and pressure. The ISTS does not include this note but it has been included for consistency with the current note and provides a clear reminder to test personnel of the required test conditions.

The safety valve Bases have been revised to generally incorporate the ISTS Bases which significantly improve the content and understanding of the MSSV requirements. These changes are consistent with the UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] design description and analysis assumptions where the MSSVs provide the required overpressure protection. The proposed changes are consistent with the regulations and provide additional assurance that the secondary side pressure remains within the bounds of the safety analyses; therefore, the proposed changes will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed changes generally incorporate the ISTS MSSV requirements to ensure adequate secondary side overpressure protection is available and properly maintained. The revised Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) limits plant power level based on the number of operable MSSVs as stated in Table 3.7–1 and provides the valve lift settings and tolerances as shown in Table 3.7–2. The actions require a reduction in power when the number of valves is less than the full complement for each steam generator and also require at least 2 operable MSSVs per steam generator. When these requirements cannot be met a plant shutdown is required. An action also provides an exception to Specification 3.0.4 and is consistent with the exception currently provided. These actions are more conservative than the current requirements and provide additional assurance that Specification 3.7.1.1 will continue to govern the MSSV limitations in a manner consistent with the accident analyses assumptions. The revised surveillance requirement provides clearly understandable testing requirements to ensure the MSSVs are adequately monitored and will perform in accordance with the accident analysis assumptions. The proposed change does not introduce any new mode of operation or require any physical modification to the plant; therefore, this change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The MSSVs ensure the ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] Code, Section III requirements are maintained to limit the secondary system pressure to within 110 percent of the design pressure when passing the design steam flow. This ensures that the overpressure protection system can cope with all operational and transient events. Operation with less than the full number of MSSVs is permitted as long as thermal power is restricted to meet the ASME Code requirements. This limitation is provided in the proposed technical specifications along with operability and surveillance requirements to ensure the level of overpressure protection is maintained. MSSV operability is defined as the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced. MSSV operability is determined by surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Test program which provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform their designed safety functions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The proposed change continues to ensure that the required components are properly maintained and that the assumed parameters are verified during the applicable conditions and on a consistent basis; therefore, this change will not reduce the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: B.F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, PA 15001.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: Robert A. Capra.

GPU Nuclear, Inc. et al., Docket No. 50–219, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: July 21, 1998.

Description of amendment request: The proposed change request would permit an alternative to the requirement to perform Control Rod Drive (CRD) scram time testing with the reactor pressurized prior to resuming power operation. The change would permit: (1) scram time testing with the reactor depressurized prior to resuming operation, and (2) a second scram time test with the reactor pressure above 800 psig, prior to exceeding 40% reactor power.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (or)

There will not be an increase in the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) because the requested change provides additional assurance that the CRD System is able to perform its safety function, and therefore does not change the probability of occurrence of an accident.

There will not be an increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) because the requested change will ensure that the CRD System is able to perform its safety function, and therefore does not change the consequences of an accident.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; (or)

The requested change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The first issue associated with the requested change is increased wear on the CRDs, resulting in increased buffer seal wear or failure. This wear or failure of the buffer seal would result in difficulty or inability to withdraw the rod subsequent to the depressurized scram. The safety function of the rod to insert on a scram signal, however, would be unaffected by this seal degradation. Therefore, there is no safety concern with the increased wear due to performance of the cold scram test.

The other consideration associated with the new requested change is the possible increased risk of stub tube leakage during the cold (depressurized) test. Without the download due to reactor pressure, the momentary upward loading on the CRD stub tube puts the stub tube into tension. Any flaws in the stub tube could grow and eventually result in a stub tube leak. The likelihood of flaws in the stub tubes, however, is very small, based on the extensive repair work on the stub tube surfaces performed prior to plant operation. The integrity of the stub tube repairs is verified by the 1000 pound leak test performed during every startup of the reactor. This test, therefore, poses very minimal risk of stub tube leakage.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The change will not decrease the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. This is because the requested change, like the existing Technical Specification test, provides assurance that the CRD System is able to perform its safety function, and therefore does not change the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Ocean County Library, Reference Department, 101 Washington Street, Toms River, NJ 08753

Attorney for licensee: Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire. Shaw, Pitman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: Cecil O.Thomas.

GPU Nuclear, Inc., et al., Docket No. 50–289, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: June 11, 1998

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would incorporate an alternative high radiation area control for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (TMI–1) in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1601(c). The alternative would modify Technical Specification 6.12 to allow for a conspicuously posted barricade and flashing light in individual high radiation areas that are located within large areas where no enclosure exists for locking, and no enclosure can be reasonably erected. A minor clarification to indicate that the requirement of paragraph 6.12.1.a also applies to 6.12.1.b and an editorial change were added.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed amendment involves changes to the TMI–1 Technical Specifications, which are consistent with Regulatory Guide 8.38. This change does not involve any change to system or equipment configuration. The proposed amendment incorporates an alternative high radiation area control, which has been previously found to be acceptable by the NRC. The reliability of systems and components relied upon to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents previous evaluated is not degraded by the proposed changes. Therefore, this change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. This change only involves controls for access to high radiation areas. Access to plant equipment during normal or accident conditions will not be affected by utilizing this alternate method. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed amendment is consistent with Regulatory Guide 8.38. The proposed amendment involves high radiation area access control and is not related to the margin of safety associated with any plant operation or transients. Therefore, it is concluded that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.