[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 172 (Tuesday, September 7, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48675-48678]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-23158]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-423]
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), et al., Millstone
Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3; Environmental Assessment and Finding
of No Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-49, issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the
licensee), for operation of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit
No. 3 (MP3) located in New London County, Connecticut.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action is in response to the licensee's application
dated March 19, 1999, requesting an amendment to the operating license
for MP3 to support the rerack of its spent fuel pool to maintain the
capability to fully offload the core from the reactor as the unit
approaches the end of its operating license. To achieve this goal, the
licensee plans to install two types of additional higher density spent
fuel racks into the spent fuel pool. Existing spent fuel racks will
remain in the pool in their current configuration, but are reanalyzed
to only accept fuel lower in reactivity than they are presently
licensed to accept. The proposed additional racks will have a closer
assembly to assembly spacing to increase fuel storage capacity. The
number of fuel assemblies that can be stored in the spent fuel pool
would be increased from 756 assemblies to 1,860 assemblies (an increase
of 1,104).
The Need for the Proposed Action
An increase in spent fuel storage capacity is needed to maintain
the capability for a full core off-load. Loss of full core off-load
capability will occur as a result of refueling outage 6 (RFO 6), that
started on May 1, 1999. The licensee plans to install an additional 15
high density storage racks (with the capacity to store 1,104 fuel
assemblies) following RFO 6 (14 will be installed between RFO 6 and RFO
7, with the last one to be installed later if it is necessary), while
keeping the existing racks in place. The additional capacity will
ensure the capability for a full core off-load as the unit approaches
the end of its operating license (November 25, 2025).
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
Radioactive Waste Treatment
MP3 uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and process
gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive
material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were evaluated in
the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated December 1984. The
proposed spent fuel pool expansion will not involve any change in the
radioactive waste treatment systems described in the FES.
[[Page 48676]]
Gaseous Radioactive Wastes
Gaseous releases from the fuel storage area are combined with other
plant exhausts. Normally, the contribution from the fuel storage area
is negligible compared to the other releases and no significant
increases are expected as a result of the expanded storage capacity.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
No significant increase in the volume of solid radioactive waste is
expected from operating with the expanded storage capacity. The
necessity for pool filtration resin replacement is determined primarily
by the requirements for water clarity, and the resin is normally
changed about once a year. During reracking operations, a small amount
of additional resins may be generated by the pool cleanup system on a
one-time basis.
Personnel Doses
During normal operations, personnel working in the fuel storage
area are exposed to radiation from the spent fuel pool. Radiological
conditions are dominated by the most recent batch of discharged spent
fuel. The radioactive inventory of the older fuel is insignificant
compared to that from the recent offload. Analysis shows that the
rerack will not significantly change radiological conditions.
Therefore, the rack expansion project falls within the existing design
basis of MP3's Spent Fuel Pool.
All of the operations involved in reracking will utilize detailed
procedures prepared with full consideration of ALARA [as low as is
reasonably achievable] principles. Similar operations have been
performed in a number of facilities in the past, and there is every
reason to believe that reracking can be safely and efficiently
accomplished at MP3, with low radiation exposure to personnel. Total
dose for the reracking operation is estimated to be between 2 and 5
person-rem. While individual task efforts and doses may differ from
those estimated, the total is believed to be a reasonable estimate for
planning purposes. Divers will be used where necessary, and the
estimated person-rem burden includes an estimate for their possible
dose. The existing radiation protection program at MP3 is adequate for
the reracking operations. Where there is a potential for significant
airborne activity, continuous air monitors will be in operation.
Personnel will wear protective clothing as required and, if necessary,
respiratory protective equipment. Activities will be governed by a
Radiation Work Permit, and personnel monitoring equipment will be
issued to each individual. As a minimum, this will include
thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and self-reading dosimeters.
Additional personnel monitoring equipment (i.e., extremity TLDs or
multiple TLDs) may be utilized as required. Work, personnel traffic,
and the movement of equipment will be monitored and controlled to
minimize contamination and to assure that dose is maintained ALARA.
On the basis of its review of the licensee's proposal, the NRC
staff concludes that the MP3 spent fuel pool reracking operation can be
performed in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers will be
maintained ALARA. The estimated dose of 2 to 5 person-rem to perform
the proposed spent fuel pool reracking operation is a small fraction of
the annual collective dose accrued at MP3.
Accident Considerations
The licensee has evaluated the consequences of an accidental drop
of a fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool and the consequences of an
accidental drop of a fuel pool gate onto racks. The results show that
such accidents will not distort the racks sufficiently to impair their
functionality. The analysis indicates no radiological consequences from
these postulated accidents. The consequences of a design basis seismic
event have been evaluated and found acceptable. The proposed additional
racks and existing racks have been analyzed in their new configuration
and found safe and impact-free during seismic motion, save for the
baseplate-to-baseplate impacts of the proposed additional racks that
are shown to cause no damage to the racks' cells or Boral (used for
criticality control). The structural capability of the pool walls and
basemat will not be exceeded under the loads. Thus, the consequences of
a seismic event are not significantly increased. The criticality
consequences of a misloading/drop of a fuel assembly during fuel
movement have been evaluated. The minimum subcriticality margin,
keff less than or equal to 0.95, will continue to be
maintained because of the proposed pool water soluble boron related
requirements. The consequences of an accidental drop of a rack module
into the pool during placement have been evaluated. The analysis
confirmed that very limited damage to the liner could occur. Expected
damage from this accident is repairable. Any small seepage occurring is
well within makeup capability, and is mitigated by emergency operating
procedures. The consequences of a spent fuel cask drop into the pool
have not been considered in this submittal since the licensee is not
currently licensed to move a fuel cask into the MP3 cask pit area.
Radiological concerns due to fuel damage are not an issue, since
the fuel handling design basis accident considers the worst case
condition of a falling assembly (a fuel assembly falling onto another
fuel assembly). This design basis accident remains unchanged. Fuel
assembly damage subsequent to a fuel assembly drop is primarily
influenced by the weight and design of the fuel assembly, the drop
height (determines the kinetic energy upon impact), and the orientation
of the falling assembly. Since none of these parameters are changed
under the proposed modification, the results of the previously analyzed
and NRC-accepted design basis accident bound the radiological
consequences of accidents analyzed for the spent fuel pool rerack.
In summary, the proposed action will not increase the probability
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made to radioactive
waste treatment systems or in the types of any radioactive effluents
that may be released offsite, and the proposed action will not result
in a significant increase in occupational or offsite radiation
exposure. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no
significant radiological environmental impacts associated with the
proposed action.
With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed
action does not involve any historic sites. The proposed action does
not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other
nonradiological environmental impacts. Therefore, there are no
significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the
proposed action.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant
environmental impacts associated with this action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity.
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until
approximately 2010, at the earliest. In October 1996, the
Administration did commit DOE to begin storing waste at a centralized
location by January 31, 1998. However, no location has been identified
and an interim federal storage
[[Page 48677]]
facility has yet to be identified in advance of a decision on a
permanent repository. Therefore, shipping spent fuel to the DOE
repository is not considered an alternative to increased onsite spent
fuel storage capacity at this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
Reprocessing of spent fuel from the MP3 is not a viable alternative
since there are no operating commercial reprocessing facilities in the
United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be shipped to an
overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this approach has never
been used and it would require approval by the Department of State as
well as other entities. Additionally, the cost of spent fuel
reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the residual
uranium; reprocessing represents an added cost.
Shipping Fuel to Another Utility, Site, or the Millstone Units 1 or 2
Spent Fuel Pool for Storage
The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring MP3 spent
fuel to the Millstone Units 1 or 2 spent fuel pool for storage could
provide short-term relief from the storage problem at MP3. The Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982 and 10 CFR part 53, however, clearly place the
responsibility for the interim storage of spent fuel with each owner or
operator of a nuclear plant. The Millstone Units 1 and 2 spent fuel
pools have been designed with the capacity to accommodate each of those
units and, therefore, transferring spent fuel from MP3 to either of
these pools would create fuel storage capacity problems with those
units. The shipment of fuel to another site or transferring it to
Millstone Units 1 or 2 is not an acceptable alternative because of
increased fuel handling risks and additional occupational radiation
exposure, as well as the fact that no additional storage capacity would
be created.
Alternative Creation of Additional Storage Capacity
Alternative technologies that would create additional storage
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, modular vault dry
storage, and constructing a new pool. Rod consolidation involves
disassembling the spent fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods from
two or more assemblies in a stainless steel canister that can be stored
in the spent fuel racks. Industry experience with rod consolidation is
currently limited, primarily due to concerns for potential gap activity
release due to rod breakage, the potential for increased fuel cladding
corrosion due to some of the protective oxide layer being scraped off,
and because the prolonged consolidation activity could interfere with
ongoing plant operations. Dry cask storage is a method of transferring
spent fuel, after storage in the pool for several years, to high
capacity casks with passive heat dissipation features. After loading,
the casks are stored outdoors on a seismically qualified concrete pad.
Concerns for dry cask storage include the potential for fuel or cask
handling accidents, potential fuel clad rupture due to high
temperatures, the need for special security provisions, and high costs.
Vault storage consists of storing spent fuel in shielded stainless
steel cylinders in a horizontal configuration in a reinforced concrete
vault. The concrete vault provides missile and earthquake protection
and radiation shielding. Due to large space requirements, a vault
secured area for MP3 would likely have to be located outside the
secured perimeter of the plant site. Concerns for vault dry storage
include security, land consumption, eventual decommissioning of the new
vault, the potential for fuel or clad rupture due to high temperatures,
and high cost. The alternative of constructing and licensing a new fuel
pool is not practical for MP3 because such an effort would require many
years (i.e., 10 years) to complete and would be the most expensive
alternative.
The alternative technologies that could create additional storage
capacity involve additional fuel handling with attendant opportunity
for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers
effecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures, are
significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant
improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed reracking
modifications.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
Generally, improved usage of the fuel and/or operation at a reduced
power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of
fuel being stored in the pool and thus increase the amount of time
before full core off-load capacity is lost. With extended burnup of
fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be extended and fewer offloads
would be necessary. This is not an alternative for resolving the loss
of full-core offload capability that occurred as a result of MP3
refueling outage that began on May 1, 1999, because the spent fuel
transferred to the pool for storage during this outage eliminated the
licensee's ability to conduct a full core offload. Operating the plant
at a reduced power level would not make effective use of available
resources, and would cause unnecessary economic hardship on the
licensee and its customers. Therefore, reducing the amount of spent
fuel generated by increasing burnup further or reducing power is not
considered a practical alternative.
The No-Action Alternative
As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered
denial of the proposed action. Denial of the exemption would result in
no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts
of the proposed exemption and this alternative are similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
This action does not involve the use of any resources not
previously considered in the ``Final Environmental Statement Related to
the Operation of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3,'' dated
December 1984 (NUREG-1064).
Agencies and Persons Contacted
In accordance with its stated policy, on June 21, 1999, the staff
consulted with the Connecticut State official, Mr. Gary McCahill of the
Department of Environmental Protection, regarding the environmental
impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.
Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated March 19, 1999, which is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document rooms located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich,
Connecticut, and the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope
Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
[[Page 48678]]
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of August, 1999.
James W. Clifford,
Chief, Section 2, Project Directorate I, Division of Licensing Project
Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-23158 Filed 9-3-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P