[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 183 (Wednesday, September 22, 1999)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51236-51240]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-24675]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
19 CFR Part 351
[Docket No. 990521142-9252-02]
RIN 0625-AA54
Amended Regulation Concerning the Revocation of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders
AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Commerce.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce (the ``Department'' or ``DOC'') is
amending its regulation, which governs the revocation of antidumping
and countervailing duty orders, in whole or in part, and the
termination of suspended antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations, based upon an absence of dumping or subsidization,
respectively. The amended regulation conforms the existing regulation
to the United States' obligations under Article 11 of the Agreement on
the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 (``Antidumping Agreement'') and Article 21 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (``SCM Agreement'').
The amended paragraph relating to revocation or termination based on
absence of dumping provides that the Secretary, upon considering
whether producers or exporters have sold subject merchandise at not
less than normal value for at least three consecutive years, and
whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order is
otherwise necessary to offset dumping, will revoke an antidumping duty
order if warranted. The amended paragraph relating to revocation or
termination based on absence of countervailable subsidy provides that
the Secretary, upon considering whether the government of the affected
country has eliminated all countervailable subsidy programs covering
the subject merchandise for at least three consecutive years, or
exporters or producers have not applied for or received countervailable
subsidies for at least five consecutive years, and whether the
continued application of the countervailing duty order is otherwise
necessary to offset subsidization, will revoke a countervailing duty
order if warranted.
EFFECTIVE DATE: November 1, 1999.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melissa G. Skinner, Office of Policy,
Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, at (202) 482-1560,
or Myles S. Getlan, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, at (202) 482-5052.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On June 3, 1999, the Department published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking which proposed to amend 19 CFR 351.222(b).1 See
64 FR 29818 (the ``Proposed Rule''). The Department explained that the
process of amending this regulation arose from the findings of a
dispute settlement panel convened under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization (``WTO'') that considered various aspects of the
Department's final results of administrative review in Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMs) Of One Megabit Or Above From Korea
(62 FR 39809, July 24, 1997) (``DRAMs From Korea'').
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\1\ This amendment does not affect the Department's regulations
at 19 CFR 351.218, which implements the statutory provision at 19
U.S.C. 1675(c) and governs the Department's five-year sunset
reviews, in which the Department determines whether revocation of an
order ``would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of
dumping or a countervailable subsidy (as the case may be) and of
material injury.''
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On January 29, 1999, the Panel determined that the Department's
standard for revoking an antidumping duty order contained in 19 CFR
353.25(a)(2) (the precursor to 19 CFR 351.222(b)) was inconsistent with
the United States' obligations under Article 11.2 of the WTO
Antidumping Agreement. See United States--Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic
Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above
From Korea, WT/DS99/R (``Panel Report''). Specifically, the Panel
determined that requiring the Secretary
[[Page 51237]]
to conclude that ``it is not likely'' that the persons requesting
revocation will dump merchandise subject to an antidumping duty order
in the future did not implement properly Article 11.2 of the
Antidumping Agreement. This provision requires an administering
authority to consider whether ``the continued imposition of [an
antidumping] duty is necessary to offset dumping'' in determining
whether to revoke an antidumping duty order. Thus, the Panel
recommended that the United States ``bring section 353.25(a)(2)(ii) of
the DOC regulations * * * into conformity with its obligations under
Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement.'' The Dispute Settlement Body
(``DSB'') adopted the Panel Report on March 19, 1999. On April 15,
1999, the United States announced its intention to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Consistent with section 123(g)
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA''), which governs the
Department's implementation of adverse panel reports, the Department is
revising 19 CFR 351.222(b) and (c).
Explanation of the Final Rule
The proposed amendment to the Department's revocation regulation
concerned only antidumping proceedings, as the Department focused upon
implementing the specific findings contained in the Panel Report.
Consequently, at that time, the Department did not propose amending the
companion revocation provision applicable to countervailing duty
proceedings. However, we believe that a decision not to amend the
countervailing duty provision would render the revocation standards in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases inconsistent with each other.
The ``not likely'' standard in 19 CFR 351.222(b), which governs the
revocation of antidumping duty orders, is identical to the standard in
19 CFR 351.222(c), which governs revocation in countervailing duty
cases. In addition, the ``necessary'' standard in Article 11 of the
Antidumping Agreement, to which we have conformed the antidumping
regulation, is identical to the standard in Article 21 of the SCM
Agreement which regulates the duration of countervailing duties. Since
the revocation standards in the two WTO agreements are identical, and
since at least one party commented on this issue during the public
comment period, we conclude that the public was on notice that the
countervailing duty regulation could similarly be revised. Therefore,
we are making conforming amendments to the countervailing duty
provision as well in order to maintain consistency between the
Department's procedures governing revocation in both antidumping and
countervailing duty cases and the standards in both the Antidumping
Agreement and SCM Agreement.
In addition, in response to comments, the final rule incorporates
several changes to the Proposed Rule. First, the language which read
``[t]he Secretary may revoke an antidumping order * * *'' has been
altered to read ``[t]he Secretary will revoke the antidumping duty
order.'' Second, the final rule no longer states that the Secretary
will consider whether the continued application of the order is ``no
longer necessary to offset dumping.'' Instead, the final rule provides
that, inter alia, the Secretary will consider ``whether the continued
application of the antidumping duty order is otherwise necessary to
offset dumping.'' These changes are discussed in more detail below.
We received comments concerning the Proposed Rule from various
parties. One commenter believes that the proposed revision to the
Department's regulation, which incorporates the standard set forth in
Article 11.2 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, responds appropriately
to the concerns articulated by the WTO panel decision and represents a
fair implementation of the panel's recommendation. Moreover, this
commenter states that the proposed revision should not negatively
affect the protection afforded U.S. industries against unfairly traded
imports.
Several commenters insist that the revised ``necessity'' standard
is ``effectively not a standard at all.'' In this respect, these
commenters note the Panel's finding that there must be a demonstrable
basis for consistently and reliably determining that the maintenance of
an order is necessary to offset injurious dumping. These commenters
contend that the Proposed Rule contains no guidelines or definitions of
the ``evidence'' that would be relevant to the continued necessity of
an order. Consequently, these commenters argue that the Proposed Rule
will not improve the demonstrability, consistency, and reliability of
revocation decisions or ensure that decisions to maintain antidumping
or countervailing duty orders are based upon positive evidence
demonstrating the continued need for the order. One commenter suggests
that using a ``likely to recur'' standard ``would have been the most
logical, direct means to meet the WTO requirement that a positive
finding is necessary to support continuation of an [antidumping duty]
order.''
However, another commenter noted that the amended regulation
establishes a ``necessity'' standard which reflects the same standard
established in the Antidumping Agreement. Thus, this commenter believes
the revised standard does in fact provide the ``demonstrable basis upon
which to reliably conclude that the continued imposition of the duty is
necessary to offset dumping.''
We disagree with those commenters who state that the revised
``necessity'' standard is ``effectively not a standard at all.''
Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement allows interested parties to
request authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the
duty is ``necessary'' to offset dumping. To say that the ``necessity''
standard contained in the Department's revised regulation is
effectively no standard at all is to say that Article 11.2 contains no
standard. This is illogical given that this process of revising the
revocation regulation stems from a panel finding that the Department's
existing regulation did not properly implement the ``necessary''
standard contained in Article 11.2. On the other hand, we agree that
each determination made pursuant to this new regulation will need to be
supported by positive evidence. Moreover, we are confident that the
revised standard, along with our established practice of considering
evidence relating to the likelihood of future dumping, will provide for
consistent and reliable decisions regarding revocation.
One commenter urges the Department to discontinue its practice of
applying a presumption in favor of revocation in the absence of dumping
for three consecutive years. As support, this commenter refers to the
Court of International Trade's (``CIT'') characterization of the
Department's regulation as a three-part test for revocation and states
that the ``not likely'' (or the revised ``necessary'') prong
constitutes an independent criterion that must be established to attain
revocation. See Hyundai Electronics Co., Ltd. v. United States, Slip.
Op. 99-44 (Ct. Int'l Trade, May 19, 1999). This commenter believes that
the presumption nullifies the satisfaction of the second
(``necessary'') prong.
In this regard, two commenters assert that a presumption favoring
revocation unfairly and improperly shifts the burden to petitioners to
come forward with affirmative evidence. Since respondents are in
possession of information relevant to revocation, as argued by these
commenters, the burden
[[Page 51238]]
of producing such evidence should rest with the respondents. One
commenter requested that the Department include in its initial
questionnaire a solicitation of data and other information from the
respondent seeking revocation on why the antidumping duty order in the
respondent's opinion is no longer needed to offset dumping. While this
commenter conceded that this procedural element could be implemented
without regulatory modification, the commenter contended that there was
no reason that such a provision could not be incorporated in the
regulations.
By contrast, several commenters stated that the revised regulation
continues to place a burden on respondents to prove eligibility for
revocation, rather than placing the burden on the Department to find
positive evidence establishing that the maintenance of the order is
necessary. These commenters contend that placing the burden on the
Department necessitates a reformulation of the regulation, such that
the revised regulation should not treat maintaining the order as the
norm. Thus, these commenters suggested that the new regulation require
the Secretary to revoke if the respondent has not dumped for three
consecutive years and has furnished the required reinstatement
agreement, ``unless the Secretary reliably demonstrates on the basis of
a foundation of positive evidence that the continued application of the
antidumping duty order as to the exporter or producer is necessary to
offset dumping.''
However, one commenter welcomed the Department's confirmation that
the regulation reflects a rebuttable presumption that favors revoking
an order when there is an absence of dumping for three or more years.
In this regard, this commenter states that the initial burden should
clearly rest on the petitioners, as the beneficiaries of the
continuation of the order, to provide evidence that the order is still
necessary. Thus, this commenter states that the Department should not
request information from a respondent until petitioners make
allegations supported by tangible evidence that the order is still
necessary.
As discussed in the Proposed Rule, in situations where there is an
absence of dumping (or subsidization) for three (or five) consecutive
years, the Department intends to presume that an order is not necessary
in the absence of additional evidence. We believe that such a
presumption is consistent with prior Department practice as well as
U.S. obligations under Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and
Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement. As the Panel recognized, a decision
to maintain an order must be substantiated by positive evidence. If the
only evidence on record is a respondent's ability to sell subject
merchandise at not less than normal value for three consecutive years,
the record would not support a decision to maintain the order in light
of the requirement in Article 11.2, as interpreted by the Panel, that
there be positive evidence reflecting the continued necessity of the
order.
We decline at this time to adopt the commenter's suggestion that we
solicit information from respondents at the outset of an administrative
review. The absence of dumping for three consecutive years,2
while satisfying the first prong of the regulatory standard, is also
sufficient evidence relevant to the continued necessity of the order to
shift the burden of production to the petitioners. However, if a party
raises an issue relating to the necessity of an order, the Department
may seek additional information relevant to that issue. Nonetheless,
since the manner in which we collect evidence is not necessarily a
regulatory matter, we may revisit this issue at a later time in the
development of our practice in applying the revised regulation.
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\2\ In accordance with 19 CFR 351.222(e)(ii), to be considered
for revocation, the producers and exporters must have sold the
subject merchandise in commercial quantities in each of the three
years.
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We disagree with those commenters who suggest that the revised
regulation continues to place a burden on respondents, rather than the
Department, to prove eligibility for revocation. The threshold
requirement for revocation continues to be that respondents not sell at
less than normal value for at least three consecutive years and that,
during each of those years, respondents exported subject merchandise to
the United States in commercial quantities. See 19 CFR 351.222(d)(1).
The Panel did not disturb this aspect of the Department's revocation
practice. Moreover, we re-emphasize our statement in the Proposed Rule
that ``the absence of dumping for three consecutive years served as a
presumption in favor of revoking the order, which could be rebutted by
positive evidence indicating that dumping may recur if the order were
revoked.'' Thus, we disagree that an impermissible burden is placed on
respondents. Instead, a thorough analysis of all relevant information
requires a system in which there is a shifting burden of production
such that the parties in the best position to provide relevant
information are compelled to do so. All parties may be in a position to
provide information concerning trends in prices and costs, currency
movements, and other market and economic factors that may be relevant
to the likelihood of future dumping. If no party provides information
addressing these issues, we rest with the presumption that an order is
not necessary in the absence of dumping. If the petitioner comes
forward with information demonstrating that the maintenance of the
order is necessary, that initial presumption is rebutted, and the
burden of production shifts to respondents. While the burden of
producing evidence shifts among the parties, we emphasize that the
Department does not impose a burden of proof on any party. The
Department must weigh all of the evidence on the record and determine
whether the continued application of the order is necessary to offset
dumping (or subsidization). Each revocation determination must be based
upon substantial, positive evidence and be otherwise in accordance with
law.
One commenter stated that, unlike the ``not likely'' standard,
``necessity'' is a minimum standard that has no shades or degrees
within it. Stated differently, something that is not ``no longer
necessary'' is necessary.
However, another commenter claimed that the Department's revised
standard retains the negative and passive elements which rendered the
prior regulatory standard inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement.
This commenter noted the Panel's distinction between failing to
establish something as a negative finding and establishing something as
a positive finding in the context of the ``not likely'' criterion and
concluded that this same principle applies to the proposed regulation.
We have formulated the final rule in a way that clarifies that the
Secretary must make an affirmative finding of necessity in order to
retain an antidumping or countervailing duty order. While this
reformulation does not affect the process by which the Department
considers revocation, the reformulated regulation more closely tracks
the wording of Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article
21.2 of the SCM Agreement.
Several commenters argue that the continued use of the
discretionary term ``may'' in the Proposed Rule conflicts with the
mandatory term ``shall'' contained in Article 11.2 of the Antidumping
Agreement. These commenters suggest that the Panel rejected the
existing regulation, in part, because the regulation allows the
[[Page 51239]]
Department to maintain an order where Article 11.2 of the Antidumping
Agreement requires revocation. Thus, these commenters believe that the
Proposed Rule, which contains the permissive ``may'' and not the
mandatory ``shall'' or ``must,'' is inconsistent with the Panel's
findings.
In the final rule, we have substituted the term ``will'' for
``may.'' We do not agree that the use of the term ``may'' imbued the
Department with unbridled discretion in making revocation
determinations, as argued by these commenters. The Department's
determinations are constrained by general legal principles. Every
decision must be based upon substantial evidence and otherwise in
accordance with law. In addition, each decision must be consistent with
prior practice unless we reasonably explain the departure from prior
practice. However, by adopting the ``necessary'' standard contained in
the Antidumping and SCM Agreements, we are persuaded that it is more
appropriate to use the term ``will'' instead of the term ``may'' in the
amended regulation. The ``necessary'' standard represents the full
spectrum of circumstances under which the Department could maintain an
order and be consistent with the United States' WTO obligations under
Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM
Agreement. In other words, considering the comprehensive nature of the
new standard, the Secretary can only retain an antidumping or
countervailing duty order if there is positive evidence on the record
indicating the continued necessity of such order to offset dumping or
subsidization. Thus, in accordance with Article 11.2 of the Antidumping
Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement, we are substituting
the term ``will'' for ``may'' in the amended regulation.
Several commenters took issue with the Department's claim in the
Proposed Rule that the ``Panel's ruling was not based upon the
Department's application of the standard in DRAMs from Korea.'' These
commenters note that the Panel specifically found that the regulation
and the third review final results in DRAMs were inconsistent with
Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement.
While we accept that, based upon the inconsistency of the
revocation regulation applied in DRAMs from Korea with the Antidumping
Agreement, the Panel invalidated the third review final results, we
maintain that several aspects of our practice were not invalidated by
the Panel and, thus, do not require revision. As discussed above and in
the preamble to the Proposed Rule, we continue to believe that, while
an absence of dumping for three years is evidence that the antidumping
duty order is no longer necessary, it is not conclusive in all cases.
Evidence relating to the likelihood of future dumping will still be
considered under the revised regulation because such evidence relates
to the necessity of the order. Thus, while the Panel decision
necessitated revising the standard by which the Department considers
revocation, it did not necessitate changes to these specific aspects of
our practice.
One commenter, citing Hyundai Electronics, in which the CIT
affirmed the Department's final results of administrative review in
DRAMs from Korea, argued that it is unnecessary to amend the regulation
because the CIT determined that the ``not likely'' standard is
consistent with U.S. international obligations and with U.S.
obligations under Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement.
The CIT decision in Hyundai does not preclude amending the
regulation in question. While the Court stated that the Panel Report
was not binding precedential authority on the Court, it recognized that
``Congress provided that the response to an adverse WTO panel report is
the province of the executive branch and, more particularly, the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative.'' The United States Trade
Representative and the DOC have decided to respond to the Panel Report
by amending the regulation in question, and we are confident that the
amended regulation, if challenged, will be found to be consistent with
the statute as well as U.S. obligations under the WTO Antidumping
Agreement.
Another commenter expressed concern with the Department's practice
of relating an absence of dumping to declining imports following the
imposition of an order. This commenter asserts that numerous factors,
including changes in the strengths of alternative markets, exchange
rates, changes in production capacity, changes in marketing strategies,
and changes in the technology of production, may contribute to the
decline in imports rather than the exporter's inability to sell in the
U.S. market without dumping.
This matter is appropriate for consideration on a case-by-case
basis, rather than in a rulemaking proceeding because, as the commenter
suggests, numerous factors underlying an absence of dumping may be
considered when evidence relating to those factors is developed on the
record of each proceeding.
Classification
Executive Order 12866
This rule has been determined to be not significant under Executive
Order 12866.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This rule contains no new collection of information subject to the
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35.
Executive Order 12612
This rule does not contain federalism implications warranting the
preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In issuing the proposed regulation, the Chief Counsel for
Regulation of the Department of Commerce certified to the Chief Counsel
for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration that this rule would
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The Department's existing regulations provide a procedural
and substantive process by which the Secretary considers whether to
revoke an antidumping duty order. The rule retains the current
procedural process and revises the substantive standard used by the
Secretary to make the appropriate revocation determination. As
discussed above, the regulation would not significantly change the
Department's practice in determining whether to maintain an antidumping
duty order. Moreover, as the revised regulation only changes the
standard by which the Department considers whether to revoke an
antidumping duty order, this action, in and of itself, will not have a
significant economic impact. Therefore, the Chief Counsel concluded
that the rule would not have a significant impact on a substantial
number of small business entities, and a regulatory flexibility
analysis was not prepared. We received no comments concerning this
conclusion.
List of Subjects in 19 CFR Part 351
Administrative practice and procedure, Antidumping duties, Business
and industry, Cheese, Confidential business information, Countervailing
duties, Investigations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
[[Page 51240]]
Dated: September 16, 1999.
Richard W. Moreland,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
For the reasons stated, 19 CFR part 351 is amended to read as
follows:
PART 351--ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
1. The authority citation for part 351 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 19 U.S.C. 1202 note; 19 U.S.C. 1303
note; 19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.; and 19 U.S.C. 3538.
Subpart B--Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Procedures
2. Section 351.222 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) to
read as follows:
Sec. 351.222 Revocation of orders; termination of suspended
investigations.
* * * * *
(b) Revocation or termination based on absence of dumping. (1)(i)
In determining whether to revoke an antidumping duty order or terminate
a suspended antidumping investigation, the Secretary will consider:
(A) Whether all exporters and producers covered at the time of
revocation by the order or the suspension agreement have sold the
subject merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of at
least three consecutive years; and
(B) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order
is otherwise necessary to offset dumping.
(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in
paragraphs (b)(1)(i)(A) and (B) of this section, that the antidumping
duty order or suspension of the antidumping duty investigation is no
longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order or terminate the
investigation.
(2)(i) In determining whether to revoke an antidumping duty order
in part, the Secretary will consider:
(A) Whether one or more exporters or producers covered by the order
have sold the merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of
at least three consecutive years;
(B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the Secretary
previously has determined to have sold the subject merchandise at less
than normal value, the exporter or producer agrees in writing to its
immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as any exporter or
producer is subject to the order, if the Secretary concludes that the
exporter or producer, subsequent to the revocation, sold the subject
merchandise at less than normal value; and
(C) Whether the continued application of the antidumping duty order
is otherwise necessary to offset dumping.
(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in
paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the
antidumping duty order as to those producers or exporters is no longer
warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order as to those producers or
exporters.
(3) Revocation of nonproducing exporter. In the case of an exporter
that is not the producer of subject merchandise, the Secretary normally
will revoke an order in part under paragraph (b)(2) of this section
only with respect to subject merchandise produced or supplied by those
companies that supplied the exporter during the time period that formed
the basis for the revocation.
(c) Revocation or termination based on absence of countervailable
subsidy. (1)(i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty
order or terminate a suspended countervailing duty investigation, the
Secretary will consider:
(A) Whether the government of the affected country has eliminated
all countervailable subsidies on the subject merchandise by abolishing
for the subject merchandise, for a period of at least three consecutive
years, all programs that the Secretary has found countervailable;
(B) Whether exporters and producers of the subject merchandise are
continuing to receive any net countervailable subsidy from an abolished
program referred to in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) of this section; and
(C) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty
order or suspension of countervailing duty investigation is otherwise
necessary to offset subsidization.
(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in
paragraphs (c)(1)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the
countervailing duty order or suspension of the countervailing duty
investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the
order or terminate the suspended investigation.
(2)(i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty order
or terminate a suspended countervailing duty investigation, the
Secretary will consider:
(A) Whether all exporters and producers covered at the time of
revocation by the order or the suspension agreement have not applied
for or received any net countervailable subsidy on the subject
merchandise for a period of at least five consecutive years; and
(B) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty
order or suspension of the countervailing duty investigation is
otherwise necessary to offset subsidization.
(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in
paragraphs (c)(2)(i)(A) and (B) of this section, that the
countervailing duty order or the suspension of the countervailing duty
investigation is no longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the
order or terminate the suspended investigation.
(3)(i) In determining whether to revoke a countervailing duty order
in part, the Secretary will consider:
(A) Whether one or more exporters or producers covered by the order
have not applied for or received any net countervailable subsidy on the
subject merchandise for a period of at least five consecutive years;
(B) Whether, for any exporter or producer that the Secretary
previously has determined to have received any net countervailable
subsidy on the subject merchandise, the exporter or producer agrees in
writing to their immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as any
exporter or producer is subject to the order, if the Secretary
concludes that the exporter or producer, subsequent to the revocation,
has received any net countervailable subsidy on the subject
merchandise; and
(C) Whether the continued application of the countervailing duty
order is otherwise necessary to offset subsidization.
(ii) If the Secretary determines, based upon the criteria in
paragraphs (c)(3)(i)(A) through (C) of this section, that the
countervailing duty order as to those exporters or producers is no
longer warranted, the Secretary will revoke the order as to those
exporters or producers.
(4) Revocation of nonproducing exporter. In the case of an exporter
that is not the producer of subject merchandise, the Secretary normally
will revoke an order in part under paragraph (c)(3) of this section
only with respect to subject merchandise produced or supplied by those
companies that supplied the exporter during the time period that formed
the basis for the revocation.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 99-24675 Filed 9-21-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P