[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 112 (Friday, June 9, 2000)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 36649-36651]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-14685]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
Re-evaluation of Power Reactor Physical Protection Regulations
and Position on a Definition of Radiological Sabotage
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is re-evaluating its
power reactor physical protection regulations and the proposed
definition of radiological sabotage, using performance criteria as the
basis. The purpose of this re-evaluation is to state precisely what
kinds of sabotage-induced events a licensee is expected to protect
against. This request invites public comment on these issues. The NRC
is publishing as an attachment to this Federal Register Notice, a
Commission paper entitled, ``Staff Re-Evaluation of Power Reactor
Physical Protection Regulations and Position on a Definition of
Radiological Sabotage,'' (SECY-00-0063).
DATES: Submit comments by August 23, 2000. Comments received after this
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission
is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before
this date.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff.
Deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,
between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
You may also provide comments via the NRC's interactive rulemaking
website at (http://ruleforum.llnl.gov). This site provides the
capability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web
browser supports that function. For information about the interactive
rulemaking website, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905 (e-
mail: [email protected]).
The attached Commission paper is associated with a rulemaking plan,
``Physical Security Requirements for Exercising Power Reactor
Licensees'' Capability to Respond to Safeguards Contingency Events,''
which is located on the NRC's rulemaking website.
Copies of any comments received and certain documents related to
this re-evaluation may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room,
2120 L Street NW, (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents
may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the rulemaking website.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard P. Rosano, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-2933, e-mail: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) of November 22, 1999, the
Commission approved the staff's recommendation in SECY-99-241
(Rulemaking Plan, Physical Security Requirements for Exercising Power
Reactor Licensees' Capability to
[[Page 36650]]
Respond to Safeguards Contingency Events, October 5, 1999) to begin a
comprehensive review of 10 CFR 73.55 and associated power reactor
physical protection regulations. The Commission directed the staff to
provide position papers on: (1) The attributes of the design basis
threat; and (2) the definition of radiological sabotage. The purpose of
the first position paper is to identify the types of weapons and
equipment that may be used in the design basis threat and clarify the
intent of the regulations concerning the strength of the response and
the strategy of a licensee's security organization. The purpose of the
second position paper is to define precisely what kinds of sabotage-
induced events a licensee is expected to protect against. This request
for comments responds to the Commission's second direction to the NRC
staff regarding development of a position paper on radiological
sabotage at reactors.
Discussion
In accordance with the SRM dated November 22, 1999, the staff began
considering the fundamental issues that would guide a re-evaluation of
the power reactor physical protection requirements, including
conducting several public meetings with stakeholders on the subject.
This process highlighted a longstanding issue with the implementation
of 10 CFR 73.55 requirements at power reactors. Specifically, the
implementation of these requirements assumed that compliance with the
prescriptive requirements of the physical protection plans written in
accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(b) through (h) would provide the high
assurance required by 10 CFR 73.55(a). In fact, results of force-on-
force drills conducted pursuant to the Regulatory Effectiveness Review
(RER) program and the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE)
program cast doubt on the validity of this assumption, due in part to
the way the requirements were (a) understood by licensees and (b)
inspected and enforced by NRC. However, overall site security and the
security organization's readiness to respond to an adversary attack
were tested and confirmed during regional inspection activity and
OSREs.
The staff examined approaches and principles used in existing NRC
regulations, including the use of margin of safety. The staff also
integrated appropriate results of previous analyses, such as the study
to re-evaluate the guidelines and bases used to determine vital
equipment and areas to be protected in nuclear power plants, as
documented in ``Vital Equipment/Area Guidelines Study: Vital Area
Committee Report,'' NUREG-1178 (March 1988).
In the attachment to SECY-99-241, the staff proposed to review the
definition of radiological sabotage and consider ways to clarify the
issue in a way that is meaningful for the protective strategy and
enhances the process of performance evaluation. After considerable
discussion, the staff determined that a definition of radiological
sabotage at power reactors in the new rule may not be necessary if the
regulation could delineate more clearly the performance criteria to be
used as the basis for the new physical protection regulations. Several
public meetings were held with representatives from the Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI), the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), and the media,
from which the staff developed a set of physical protection performance
criteria that are consistent with criteria used in other areas of
nuclear power plant regulation. These performance criteria would
provide the risk-informed basis for the comprehensive review of 10 CFR
73.55 and associated power reactor physical protection requirements,
including the exercise requirement.
These performance criteria are based on ensuring that a plant
retains the capability to shutdown the reactor safely and assure long-
term heat removal in the face of a malevolent act by the design basis
threat against the facility. The staff is developing performance
criteria and requirements for 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect the plant
against a malevolent act by protecting critical safety functions, with
an appropriate margin of safety, that include:
(1) reactivity control;
(2) reactor coolant makeup for maintaining reactor and spent fuel
pool inventory;
(3) reactor and spent fuel pool heat removal;
(4) containment of radioactive materials;
(5) process monitoring necessary to perform and control the above
functions; and
(6) actions necessary to support the operation of the equipment
used for safe shutdown.
These performance criteria would clarify the scope of radiological
sabotage against which a licensee is expected to protect. In 10 CFR
73.55(b) and succeeding paragraphs, specific performance criteria would
be provided for the physical security organization and response
elements. As described in SECY-99-241, new paragraphs of 10 CFR 73.55
would require periodic drills and exercises and corrective actions for
vulnerabilities identified in the exercises.
The above performance criteria represent a new concept in
formulating security programs and aligning security with other areas of
regulation involving plant operations. This approach would provide
insights on how the remainder of 10 CFR 73.55 might be revised. The
staff believes that it is important to continue to have stakeholder
involvement in the early stages of development of performance criteria.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of June, 2000.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
Rulemaking Issue--SECY-00-0063
(Notation Vote)
March 9, 2000.
For: The Commissioners.
From: William D. Travers, Executive Director for Operations.
Subject: Staff Re-evaluation of Power Reactor Physical Protection
Regulations and Position on a Definition of Radiological Sabotage.
Purpose: To obtain Commission approval of the staff's (a) approach
to re-evaluation of the power reactor physical protection regulations,
and (b) definition of radiological sabotage by providing design
criteria as the basis for physical protection regulations.
Background: In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) of November
22, 1999, the Commission approved the staff's recommendation in SECY-
09-241 (Rulemaking Plan, Physical Security Requirements for Exercising
Power Reactor Licensees' Capability to Respond to Safeguards
Contingency Events, October 5, 1999) to begin a comprehensive review of
10 CFR 73.55 and associated power reactor physical protection
regulations, and directed the staff to provide position papers on: (a)
the attributes of the design basis threat, and (b) the definition of
radiological sabotage. The first is used to define the weapons and
equipment used by the design basis threat and clarify the intent of the
regulations concerning the response strength and strategy of the
licensees' security organizations. The purpose of the second is to
precisely state what sabotage-induced event sequences the licensees are
expected to protect against. This paper addresses the second request
regarding development of a position paper on radiological sabotage at
reactors.
Contact: Richard Rosano, NRR, (301) 415-2933.
Discussion: In accordance with the Staff Requirements Memorandum
dated
[[Page 36651]]
November 22, 1999, the staff began consideration of the fundamental
issues that would guide a re-evaluation of the power reactor physical
protection requirements, including conducting several public meetings
with stakeholders on the subject. This process highlighted a
longstanding issue with the implementation of 10 CFR 73.55 requirements
at power reactors. Specifically, the implementation of these
requirements assumed that compliance with the prescriptive requirements
of the physical protection plans written in accordance with 10 CFR
73.55(b) through (h) would provide the high assurance required by 10
CFR 73.55(a). In fact, results of force-on-force drills conducted
pursuant to the Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) program and the
Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program cast doubt on
the validity of this assumption, due in part to the way the
requirements were (a) understood by licensees and (b) inspected and
enforced by NRC. However, overall site security and the security
organization's readiness to respond to an adversary attack were tested
and confirmed during regional inspection activity and OSREs.
The staff examined approaches and principles used in existing NRC
regulations, including the use of margin of safety. The staff also
integrated appropriate results of previous analyses, such as the study
to re-evaluate the guidelines and bases used to determine vital
equipment and areas to be protected in nuclear power plants, as
documented in ``Vital Equipment/Area Guidelines Study: Vital Area
Committee Report,'' NUREG-1178.
In the attachment to SECY-99-241, the staff proposed to review the
definition of radiological sabotage and consider ways to clarify the
issue in a way that is meaningful for the protective strategy and
enhances the process of performance evaluation. After considerable
discussion, the staff determined that a definition of radiological
sabotage at power reactors in the new rule may not be necessary if the
regulation could delineate more clearly the performance criteria to be
used as the basis for the new physical protection regulations. A series
of public meetings were conducted, including representatives from
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), and
media, from which the staff developed a set of physical protection
performance criteria in terms of public protection that are consistent
with criteria used in other areas of nuclear power plant regulation.
These performance criteria would provide the risk-informed basis for
the comprehensive review of 10 CFR 73.55 and associated power reactor
physical protection requirements, including the exercise requirement.
These performance criteria are based on ensuring that a plant
retains the capability to safely shutdown the reactor and assure long-
term heat removal in the face of a malevolent act by the design basis
threat against the facility. The staff is developing performance
criteria and requirements for 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect the plant
against a malevolent act by protecting critical safety functions,
including appropriate margin of safety, including:
(1) reactivity control,
(2) reactor coolant makeup for maintaining reactor and spent fuel
pool inventory,
(3) reactor and spent fuel pool heat removal,
(4) containment of radioactive materials,
(5) process monitoring necessary to perform and control the above
functions, and
(6) actions necessary to support the operation of the equipment
used for safe shutdown.
These performance criteria would clarify the scope of radiological
sabotage which licensees are expected to protect. 10 CFR 73.55(b) and
succeeding paragraphs would provide specific performance criteria for
the physical security organization and response elements. As described
in SECY-99-241, a new sub-section of 10 CFR 73.55 would require
periodic drills and exercises and corrective actions for
vulnerabilities identified in the exercises.
The above performance criteria represent a new concept in
formulating security programs and align security with other areas of
regulation involving plant operations. This approach would provide
insights on how the remainder of 10 CFR 73.55 might be revised. The
staff believes that it is important to continue to have stakeholder
involvement in the early stages of development of performance criteria.
OSREs have been conducted since 1992 to test licensees' performance
relative to the requirements in 10 CFR 73.55(a). The last OSRE in the
current cycle is scheduled for May 2000 and with the final rule not
expected to be published for three years, steps have been taken by the
staff to fill the gap between May 2000 and the time when the new rule
is in place. In the short-term, OSREs will continue. Then, pending NRC
endorsement, an industry proposal for a Self-Assessment Program will be
used on a trial basis, with NRC oversight, to pilot the performance
criteria envisioned in the revised physical protection regulations.
Coordination: The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this
paper and has no legal objection to its content. The FTE and resource
issues involved in this paper are already budgeted.
Recommendations: That the Commission: Approve (a) the staff's
approach to re-evaluation of the power reactor physical protection
regulations, and (b) the definition of radiological sabotage by
providing design criteria as the basis for physical protection
regulations.
Note that: Upon the Commission's approval, the staff will (a)
continue with this work to implement this approach in the new security
regulations; (b) test these concepts in the industry Self-Assessment
Program, as appropriate; and (c) publish this paper in the Federal
Register for public comment, seeking comment on the approach described
above for revising 10 CFR 73.55(a).
William D. Travers,
Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 00-14685 Filed 6-8-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P