[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 157 (Monday, August 14, 2000)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 49511-49513]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-20477]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 157 / Monday, August 14, 2000 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 49511]]
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
13 CFR Part 107
Small Business Investment Companies
AGENCY: Small Business Administration.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: This proposed rule would modify the management-ownership
diversity requirement in SBA's Small Business Investment Company
(``SBIC'') Program to prohibit the ownership of more than 70% of a
leveraged SBIC by any single investor or group of affiliated investors.
This action will help to ensure that each new leveraged SBIC has
managers that exercise independence in managing the operations of the
SBIC.
DATES: Submit comments on or before September 13, 2000.
ADDRESSES: Address comments to Leonard Fagan, Investment Division, U.S.
Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, SW., Suite 6300,
Washington, DC 20416.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Leonard W. Fagan, at (202) 205-7583.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In 1994, SBA adopted a regulation requiring
that all small business investment companies (``SBICs'') intending to
issue participating securities have independence, or ``diversity'',
between the management and the ownership of the company. 59 FR 16918
(April 8, 1994). This requirement of independence was designed to
prevent the types of abuses that SBA had observed in SBICs owned and
operated by a single individual or group of individuals. The abuses,
which included conflict of interest transactions, misapplication of
funds, and other types of self-dealing activities, had resulted in
significant losses to SBA.
To satisfy the 1994 management-ownership diversity regulation, at
least 30% of the capital of the SBIC had to be owned by investors who
were neither Associates nor Affiliates of any Associates of the SBIC
(as such terms were defined in 13 CFR parts 107 and 121). In other
words, at least 30% of the capital of the SBIC had to be owned by
investors who were not part of the SBIC's management team and did not
control the SBIC's management team. In general, three such ``diversity
investors'' were required, but a single diversity investor would
suffice if the investor was an entity that met certain net worth and
regulatory oversight requirements.
The 1994 regulation permitted an SBIC with a parent company (i.e.,
an investor owning greater than 50% of the SBIC) to treat the parent
company's investors as if they were direct investors in the SBIC for
purposes of demonstrating diversity. SBA would, in effect, ``look-
through'' to the investors in the parent company for the desired
independence from, and oversight of, the management of the SBIC.
In 1996, SBA extended the management-ownership diversity
requirement to all new SBICs intending to use SBA financial assistance,
or ``leverage'', whether the leverage was in the form of participating
securities or debentures. 61 FR 3177 (January 31, 1996). SBA also
replaced the automatic look-through provision described above with a
discretionary look-through: SBA, in the exercise of its discretion,
could look through to the parent's investors, but such treatment was no
longer automatic. This change was in response to the increasing
complexity SBA was encountering in ``drop-down'' SBICs (SBIC
subsidiaries of larger companies), where the combination of multi-
tiered organizational structures and other factors had led SBA to
conclude that the necessary oversight by independent owners might not
be present. SBA could still look through to the parent company's
investors to find diversity, but would do so only if SBA believed that
the result was consistent with the intent of the diversity regulation.
Later in 1996, Congress expressed its support for management-
ownership diversity by enacting a statutory provision requiring SBA to
ensure that the management of all new SBICs ``is sufficiently
diversified from and unaffiliated with the ownership of the licensee in
a manner that ensures independence and objectivity in the financial
management and oversight of the investments and operations of the
licensee.'' 15 U.S.C. 682(c); Pub. L. 104-208, Sec. 208(c)(3)
(September 30, 1996). SBA subsequently made minor changes to strengthen
the management-ownership diversity regulation. These changes included
requiring (1) that the diversity investors be unrelated to each other,
(2) that each diversity investor have a significant ownership interest
in dollar and percentage terms, and (3) that an SBIC's diversity be
evidenced in its paid-in capital, not just its unfunded commitments. 63
FR 5859 (February 5, 1998).
SBA believes that, overall, the management-ownership diversity
regulation has been successful in encouraging the presence of investors
who are truly independent of management. However, SBA has had concerns
with whether independence is assured when a single investor, unrelated
to the management team, owns substantially all of an SBIC.
Under the current regulation, to provide diversity the non-
management interest is required to be at least 30% of the SBIC, but
could be as much as 100% and could be owned by a single entity. This
single super-majority investor can provide the required diversity from
management as long as the investor does not control, is not controlled
by, and is not under common control with, the managers of the SBIC.
Thus, for diversity to be provided by a single super-majority investor
who is otherwise unrelated to the SBIC's management team, SBA must
conclude that the investor does not control the SBIC's managers by
virtue of the size of the investor's ownership interest in the SBIC.
In that regard, SBA believes that the degree of influence that can
be exerted by a super-majority investor may significantly reduce the
management team's ability to act independently and objectively. The
larger the size of an investor's ownership interest, the greater the
investor's potential influence over the activities of the SBIC. This is
true even if the investor is a passive limited partner.
At some ownership level, an investor's power to influence
effectively becomes the power to control the managers of the SBIC, and
the management team can no longer be said to have the ability to act
independently. SBA's experience in administering the existing
management-ownership diversity regulation has persuaded it
[[Page 49512]]
that it is difficult to objectively establish when that ownership level
is reached. However, if the super-majority investor is limited to
owning not more than 70%, and there is a 30% diversity investor that is
independent of both the management and the super-majority investor, the
super-majority investor's degree of potential influence on management
becomes acceptable.
Accordingly, SBA proposes to amend the management-ownership
diversity regulation, section 107.150, to prohibit ownership of more
than 70% of a leveraged SBIC by a single investor or group of
affiliated investors.
SBA recognizes that there may be categories of investors who can be
permitted to own in excess of 70% of an SBIC without destroying the
SBIC's management-ownership diversity. SBA believes that one such
category is the traditional investment company--a professionally
managed firm organized exclusively to pool capital from more than one
source for the purpose of investing in businesses that are expected to
generate substantial returns to the firm's investors.
A subsidiary SBIC of such a traditional investment company can
offer meaningful management-ownership diversity even if the investment
company owns substantially all of the SBIC. This is true for a number
of reasons. First, a traditional investment company has managers who
are largely unrelated to and unaffiliated with the investors in the
firm. These independent managers typically also serve as the managers
of the subsidiary SBIC. Second, the managers of a traditional
investment company and its subsidiary SBIC are properly authorized and
motivated to make investments that, in their independent judgment, are
likely to produce significant returns to all investors in the
investment company and in the SBIC. Although the managers act
independently of the investors in the firm, they are directly
accountable to them. Most importantly, a traditional investment company
benefits from the use of a subsidiary SBIC only if the SBIC makes
profitable investments.
SBICs with other types of super-majority investors do not
necessarily present the same degree of management independence and
objectivity, plus investor oversight. The objectives of other super-
majority investors may include something other than profit maximization
at the SBIC level. Large operating companies, for example, may profit
from the use of a subsidiary SBIC other than through the financial
performance of the SBIC. The SBIC might make strategic investments to
support or otherwise benefit the non-investing activities of the
operating company, rather than investments intended solely to
contribute to the profitability of the SBIC. This would defeat one of
the underlying purposes of management-ownership diversity--the
protection of SBA's financial interest in the SBIC.
The proposed rule would permit a traditional investment company to
own and control more than 70% of an SBIC. SBA welcomes comments and
suggestions as to whether a similar exception should be provided for
other types of investors in an SBIC.
The 30% test in the current diversity regulation would continue to
be required under the proposed regulation, but with slight
modifications. First, current paragraph (a)(2), which treats publicly-
traded licensees as automatically satisfying the 30% test, would be
eliminated. SBA expects that the small number of license applicants
intending to be public companies should easily be able to demonstrate
their compliance with the 30% test.
Second, the proposed rule would add two new categories to the list
of entities currently permitted to serve as the sole (30%) diversity
investor in an SBIC, and would clarify one of the existing categories.
The current list includes, in paragraph (a)(1)(i), entities that are
subject to some satisfactory form of government oversight or
regulation. The proposed rule clarifies that this category is intended
to capture only those entities whose overall activities are both
regulated and periodically examined by a satisfactory governmental
authority. U.S. federal and state bank regulators or insurance
commissions are examples of satisfactory governmental authorities for
this purpose. Regulation of an entity's health and safety activities by
the Office of Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), on the other
hand, would not be acceptable for this purpose.
The two new categories of entities to be added to paragraph (a)(1)
by the proposed rule would cover any Institutional Investor that (1) is
listed on the New York Stock Exchange or (2) is publicly-traded and
meets the minimum numerical and corporate governance listing standards
of that Exchange. Companies satisfying either of these listing
standards have sufficient size and public oversight and visibility to
justify treating them the same as regulated companies for purposes of
the diversity regulation. SBA expects this proposed change to resolve
any uncertainty as to the requirements for a publicly-traded company to
be considered acceptable to SBA as a single diversity investor under
the regulation.
The proposed management-ownership diversity regulation would apply
to an existing SBIC only if SBA requires management-ownership diversity
as a condition of SBA's approval of the licensee's change of control or
if a non-leveraged SBIC wants to be approved as eligible to issue
leverage. SBA is proposing to amend section 107.440(c) to clarify that
SBA's approval of a change of control of an SBIC may be conditioned
upon the licensee's compliance with the diversity regulation, as well
as minimum capital requirements, then in effect. This has been SBA's
practice since the diversity regulation was first adopted.
Compliance With Executive Orders 12866, 12988, and 13132, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612), and the Paperwork
Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Ch. 35).
This proposed rule is a significant regulatory action for purposes
of Executive Order 12866 and was reviewed by the Office of Management
and Budget.
SBA has determined that this proposed rule would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities
within the meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
The purpose of the proposed rule is to redefine and clarify the concept
of management-ownership diversity in an SBIC. The proposed rule would
not apply to the approximately 365 companies currently licensed as
SBICs, except in the insignificant number of cases where a transfer of
control of the licensee occurs or where an SBIC that was not licensed
with the expectation that it would issue leverage applies for such
approval.
For purposes of Executive Order 12988, SBA has determined that this
proposed rule is drafted, to the extent practicable, in accordance with
the standards set forth in Section 3 of that Order.
For purposes of Executive Order 13132, SBA has determined that this
proposed would have no federalism implications.
For purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. Ch. 35, SBA
has determined that this proposed rule, if adopted in final form, would
contain no new reporting or recordkeeping requirements.
List of Subjects in 13 CFR Part 107
Investment companies, Loan programs, business, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Small businesses.
[[Page 49513]]
For the reasons stated above, the SBA proposes to amend 13 CFR part
107 as follows:
PART 107--SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANIES
1. The authority citation for part 107 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 681 et seq., 683, 687(c), 6887b, 687d, 687g
and 687m.
2. Revise Sec. 107.150 to read as follows:
Sec. 107.150 Management and ownership diversity requirement.
You must have diversity between your management and your ownership
(1) In order to obtain an SBIC license (unless you do not plan to
obtain Leverage),
(2) If at the time you were licensed you did not plan to obtain
Leverage, but you now wish to be eligible for Leverage, or
(3) If SBA requires it as a condition of approval of your transfer
of Control under Sec. 107.440. To establish diversity you must meet the
requirements in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, and you must
maintain voting rights and diversity in accordance with paragraphs (c)
and (d) of this section.
(a) Percentage ownership requirement. (1) Except as provided in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, no Person or group of Persons who are
Affiliates of one another may own or control, directly or indirectly,
more than 70 percent of your Regulatory Capital or your Leverageable
Capital.
(2) Exception. An investor that is a traditional investment
company, as determined by SBA, may own and control more than 70 percent
of your Regulatory Capital and your Leverageable Capital. For purposes
of this section, a traditional investment company must be a
professionally managed firm organized exclusively to pool capital from
more than one source for the purpose of investing in businesses that
are expected to generate substantial returns to the firm's investors.
In determining whether a firm is a traditional investment company for
purposes of this section, SBA will also consider:
(i) Whether the managers of the firm are unrelated to and
unaffiliated with the investors in the firm;
(ii) Whether the managers of the firm are authorized and motivated
to make investments that, in their independent judgment, are likely to
produce significant returns to all investors in the firm;
(iii) Whether the firm benefits from the use of the SBIC only
through the financial performance of the SBIC; and
(iv) Other related factors.
(b) Non-affiliation requirement.--(1) General rule. At least 30
percent of your Regulatory Capital and Leverageable Capital must be
owned and controlled by three Persons unaffiliated with your management
and unaffiliated with each other, and whose investments are significant
in dollar and percentage terms as determined by SBA. Such Persons must
not be your Associates (except for their status as your shareholders,
limited partners, or members) and must not Control, be Controlled by,
or be under Common Control with any of your Associates. A single
``acceptable'' Institutional Investor may be substituted for two or
three of the three Persons who are otherwise required under this
paragraph. The following Institutional Investors are ``acceptable'' for
this purpose:
(i) Entities whose overall activities are regulated and
periodically examined by state, Federal, or other governmental
authorities satisfactory to SBA;
(ii) Entities listed on the New York Stock Exchange;
(iii) Entities that are publicly-traded and that meet both the
minimum numerical listing standards and the corporate governance
listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange;
(iv) Public or private employee pension funds;
(v) Trusts, foundations, or endowments, but only if exempt from
Federal income taxation; and
(vi) Other Institutional Investors satisfactory to SBA.
(2) Look-through for traditional investment company investors. SBA,
in its sole discretion, may consider the requirement in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section to be satisfied if at least 30 percent of your
Regulatory Capital and Leverageable Capital is owned and controlled
indirectly, through a traditional investment company, by Persons
unaffiliated with your management.
(c) Voting requirement. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2)
of this section, the investors required for you to satisfy diversity
may not delegate their voting rights to any Person who is your
Associate, or who Controls, is Controlled by, or is under Common
Control with any of your Associates, without prior SBA approval.
(2) Exception. Paragraph (c)(1) of this section does not apply to
investors in publicly-traded Licensees, to proxies given to vote in
accordance with specific instructions for single specified meetings, or
to any delegation of voting rights to a Person who is neither a
diversity investor in the Licensee nor affiliated with management of
the Licensee.
(d) Requirement to maintain diversity. If you were required to have
management-ownership diversity at any time, you must maintain such
diversity while you have outstanding Leverage or Earmarked Assets. To
maintain management-ownership diversity, you may continue to satisfy
the diversity requirement as in effect at the time it was first
applicable to you or you may satisfy the management-ownership diversity
requirement as currently in effect. If, at any time, you no longer have
the required management-ownership diversity, you must:
(1) Notify SBA within 10 days; and
(2) Re-establish diversity within six months. For the consequences
of failure to re-establish diversity, see Secs. 107.1810(g) and
107.1820(f).
3. In Sec. 107.440, revise paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 107.440 Standards governing prior SBA approval for a proposed
transfer of Control.
* * * * *
(c) Require compliance with any other conditions set by SBA,
including compliance with the requirements for minimum capital and
management-ownership diversity as in effect at such time for new
license applicants.
Dated: August 7, 2000.
Fred P. Hochberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 00-20477 Filed 8-11-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-U