[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 177 (Tuesday, September 12, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55061-55064]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-23359]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-219]
Amergen Energy Company, LLC; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating
Station; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering
issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-16,
issued to AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, (the licensee), for operation of
the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek), located in
Lacey Township, Ocean County, New Jersey.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action would revise the Technical Specifications (TSs)
to reflect the installation of additional spent fuel pool (SFP) storage
racks. The additional new racks would provide 390 additional spent fuel
assembly storage locations.
The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's
application for amendment dated June 18, 1999, as supplemented on June
22 and December 10, 1999, and February 10, and May 2, 2000. On the date
of the application, GPU Nuclear, Inc. (GPUN) was the licensed operator
for Oyster Creek. On August 8, 2000, GPUN's ownership interest in
Oyster Creek was transferred to AmerGen Energy Company, LLC (AmerGen).
By letter dated August 10, 2000, AmerGen requested that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission continue to review and act upon all requests
before the Commission, which had been submitted by GPUN.
The Need for the Proposed Action
The proposed action is needed to provide for storage of spent fuel.
The underlying purpose of the expansion is to provide interim
additional storage capacity for spent fuel to allow for continued
operation of the plant until additional methods of storing spent fuel
have been established.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
The NRC has completed its evaluation of the proposed action and
concludes that there are no significant environmental impacts
associated with the proposed action. The factors considered in this
determination are discussed below.
Radioactive Wastes
Oyster Creek uses waste treatment systems designed to collect and
process gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that might contain radioactive
material. These radioactive waste treatment systems were evaluated in
the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated December 1974. The
proposed SFP expansion will not involve any change in the waste
treatment systems described in the FES.
Radioactive Material Released to the Atmosphere
The storage of additional spent fuel assemblies in the SFP is not
expected to affect the releases of radioactive gases from the SFP.
Gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 are produced
by the fuel in the core during reactor operation. A small percentage of
these fission gases are released to the reactor coolant from the small
number of fuel assemblies which are expected to develop leaks during
reactor operation. During refueling operations, some of these fission
products enter the SFP and are subsequently released into the air.
Since the frequency of refuelings (and therefore the number of freshly
off loaded spent fuel assemblies stored in the SFP at any one time)
will not increase, there will be no increase in the amounts of these
types of fission products released to the atmosphere as a result of the
increased SFP fuel storage capacity.
The increased heat load on the SFP from the storage of additional
spent fuel assemblies could potentially result in an increase in the
SFP evaporation rate. However, this increased evaporation rate is not
expected to result in an increase in the amount of gaseous tritium
released from the pool. The overall release of radioactive gases from
Oyster Creek will remain a small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR
20.1301.
Criticality analyses were performed with several assumptions which
tend to maximize the rack reactivity. For example, it was assumed that
the racks contain the most reactive fuel authorized to be stored at
Oyster Creek without any control rods or any uncontained burnable
absorber and with the fuel at the burnup corresponding to the highest
planar reactivity during its burnup history. The criticality aspects of
the proposed expansion of the spent fuel storage racks are acceptable
and meet the requirements of General Design
[[Page 55062]]
Criterion 62 for the prevention of criticality in fuel storage and
handling. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the
probability or consequences of accidents which could include the
release of radioactive material.
Solid Radioactive Wastes
Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water through
the SFP purification system at Oyster Creek. These spent resins are
disposed of as solid radioactive waste. The water turbulence caused by
the SFP reracking may result in some minor amounts of resuspension of
particulate matter in the SFP. This could result in a small, temporary
increase in the resin change-up frequency of the SFP purification
system during the SFP reracking operation. The licensee will use, as
necessary, an underwater vacuum to clean the floor of the SFP.
Vacuuming of the SFP floor will remove any extraneous debris and crud
and ensure visual clarity in the SFP (to facilitate above-pool and
diving operations, if necessary). Additional solid radwaste will
consist of any interferences that may have to be removed from the SFP
to permit installation of the new SFP rack modules. Other than the
radwaste generated during the actual new rack installation operation,
the staff does not expect that the additional fuel storage made
possible by the increased SFP storage capacity will result in a
significant change in the generation of solid radwaste at the facility.
Liquid Radioactive Wastes
The release of radioactive liquids will not be affected directly as
a result of the SFP modifications. The SFP ion exchanger resins remove
soluble and particulate radioactive materials from the SFP water. When
the resins are changed out, the small amount of resin sluice water
which is released is processed by the radwaste system. As stated above,
the frequency of resin change-up may increase only slightly during the
installation of the new racks. However, the amount of liquid
radioactive material released to the environment as a result of the
proposed SFP expansion is expected to be negligible.
Radiological Impact Assessment
Radiation Protection personnel will monitor the doses to the
workers during the SFP expansion operation, and all work will be in
accordance with radiation work permits. If divers are used for the SFP
racking operation, the licensee will provide procedures which will
specify required survey, personal dosimetry, and other work controls
consistent with the intent of Regulatory Guide 8.38, Appendix A
guidance. The total occupational dose to plant workers as a result of
the SFP expansion operation is estimated to be between 1 and 2 person-
rem. This dose estimate is reasonable, given the limited work scope
proposed, and is consistent with comparable doses for similar SFP
modifications/operations performed at other plants. The upcoming SFP
rack installation will follow detailed procedures prepared with full
consideration of as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles.
On the basis of our review of the licensee's proposal, the staff
concludes that the Oyster Creek Station SFP rack installation operation
can be performed in a manner that will ensure that doses to workers
will be maintained ALARA. The estimated collective dose to perform the
proposed SFP racking operation is a small fraction of the annual
collective dose accrued at the facility.
Accident Considerations
In its application, the licensee evaluated the possible
consequences of a fuel handling accident to determine the thyroid and
whole-body doses at the Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population Zone,
and Control Room. The proposed SFP rack installation at Oyster Creek
will not affect any of the assumptions or inputs used in evaluating the
dose consequences of a fuel handling accident and therefore will not
result in an increase in the doses from a postulated fuel handling
accident.
The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of
any effluents that may be released off site, and there is no
significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure.
Therefore, there are no significant radiological environmental impacts
associated with the proposed action.
With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed
action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact.
Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental
impacts associated with the proposed action.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
Spent fuel pool expansion was found by the licensee to be the
preferred option. An overview of the alternative technologies
considered by the licensee is provided below.
Rod Consolidation
Rod consolidation has been shown to be a feasible technology. Rod
consolidation involves disassembly of spent fuel, followed by the
storage of the fuel rods from two assemblies into the volume of one and
the disposal of the fuel assembly skeleton outside of the pool (this is
considered a 2:1 compaction ratio). The rods are stored in a stainless
steel can that has the outer dimensions of a fuel assembly. The can is
stored in the spent fuel racks. The top of the can has an end fixture
that matches up with the spent fuel handling tool. This permits moving
the cans in an easy fashion.
Rod consolidation pilot projects in the past have consisted of
underwater tooling that is manipulated by an overhead crane and
operated by a maintenance worker. This is a very slow and repetitive
process.
The industry experience with rod consolidation has been mixed thus
far. The principal advantages of this technology are the ability to
modularize, compatibility with Department of Energy (DOE) waste
management system, moderate cost, no need of additional land, and no
additional required surveillance. The disadvantages are the release of
fission gases from rod breakage, the potential for increased fuel
cladding corrosion from scraping of the protective oxide layer, the
potential interference of the (prolonged) consolidation activity with
ongoing plant operation, the increased dead weight and floor loading,
and the lack of sufficient industry experience.
On-Site Cask Storage
Dry cask storage is a method of storing spent nuclear fuel in a
high capacity container. The cask provides radiation shielding and
passive heat dissipation. Typical capacities for boiling-water reactor
fuel range from 44 to 68 assemblies that have been removed from the
reactor for at least 5 years. The casks, once loaded, are then stored
outdoors on a seismically qualified concrete pad. The pad will have to
be located away from the secured boundary of the site because of site
limitations. The storage location will be required to have a high level
of security that includes frequent tours, reliable lighting, intruder
detection, and continuous visual monitoring.
[[Page 55063]]
The casks, as presently licensed, are limited to 20-year storage
service life. Once the 20 years has expired the cask manufacturer or
the utility must recertify the cask or the utility must remove the
spent fuel from the container. In the interim, the U.S. DOE has
embraced the concept of multi-purpose canister (MPC), obsolescing all
existing licensed cask designs. Work is also continuing by several
companies to provide an MPC system that will be capable of long-term
storage, transport, and final disposal in a repository. For example,
the plant must provide for a decontamination facility where the
outgoing cask can be decontaminated for release. There are several
plant modifications required to support cask use. Tap-ins must be made
to the gaseous waste system and chilled water to support vacuum drying
of the spent fuel and piping must be installed to return cask water
back to the spent fuel pool/cask pit. A seismic concrete pad must be
made to store the loaded casks. This pad must have a security fence,
surveillance protection, emergency power, and video surveillance.
Finally, facilities must be provided to vacuum dry the cask, back fill
it with helium, perform leak checks, remachine the gasket surfaces if
leaks persist, and assemble the cask on-site. Presently, no MPC cask
had been licensed. Because of the continued uncertainty in the
government's policy, the licensee stated that the capital investment to
use a dry storage system is considered to be an inferior alternative
for Oyster Creek at this time.
Modular Vault Dry Storage
Vault storage consists of storing spent fuel in shielded stainless
steel cylinders in a horizontal configuration in a reinforced concrete
vault. The concrete vault provides radiation shielding and missile
protection. It must be designed to withstand the postulated seismic
loadings for the site.
A transfer cask is needed to deliver the storage canisters from the
fuel pool. The plant must provide for a decontamination bay to
decontaminate the transfer cask and connection to its gaseous waste
system and chilled water systems. A collection and delivery system must
be installed to return the pool water entrained in the canisters back
to the fuel pool. Provisions for canister drying, helium injection,
handling and automatic welding are also necessary.
The storage area must be designed to have a high level of security.
Due to the required space, the vault secured area must be located
outside the secured perimeter. Consideration of safety and security
requires it to have its own video surveillance system, intrusion
detection, and an autonomous power source.
Some other concerns relating to the vault storage system are the
inevitable ``repackaging'' for shipment to the DOE repository, the
responsibility to eventually decommission the new facility, the large
``footprint'' (land consumption), the potential fuel handling
accidents, the potential fuel/clad rupture due to high temperatures,
and the high cost.
At the present time, no MPC technology based vault system has been
licensed for fuel transport. The high cost and uncertainty make this
option less prudent.
Horizontal Silo Storage
A variation of the horizontal vault storage technology is more
aptly referred to as ``horizontal silo'' storage. This technology
suffers from the same drawbacks that other dry cask technologies have,
namely:
a. No fuel with cladding defects can be placed in the silo.
b. Concern regarding long-term integrity of the fuel at elevated
temperatures.
c. Potential for eventual repackaging at the site.
d. Potential for fuel handling accidents.
e. Relatively high cumulative dose to personnel in effecting fuel
transfer (compared to reracking).
f. Compatibility of reactor/fuel building handling crane with fuel
transfer hardware.
g. Potential incompatibility with DOE shipment for eventual off-
site shipment.
h. Potential for sabotage.
New Fuel Pool
Constructing and licensing a new fuel pool is not a practical
alternative for Oyster Creek because such an effort may take up to 10
years. Moreover, the cost of this option is prohibitively high.
As a result, the licensee concluded that none of the alternative
technologies that could create additional spent fuel storage capacity
at Oyster Creek could do so with less environmental impact than the
impacts associated with the preferred alternative.
Shipment of Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity.
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until
approximately 2010, at the earliest. In October 1996, the
Administration did commit DOE to begin storing wastes at a centralized
location by January 31, 1998. However, no location has been identified
and an interim federal storage facility has yet to be identified in
advance of a decision on a permanent repository. Therefore, shipping
spent fuel to the DOE repository is not considered an alternative to
increased onsite spent fuel storage capacity at this time.
Shipment of Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
Reprocessing of spent fuel from Oyster Creek is not a viable
alternative since there are no operating commercial reprocessing
facilities in the United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be
shipped to an overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this
approach has never been used and it would require approval by the
Department of State as well as other entities. The shipment of spent
fuel to a reprocessing facility is not an acceptable alternative
because of increased fuel handling risks and additional occupational
exposure.
Shipment of Fuel to Another Utility or Site for Storage
The shipment of fuel to another utility for storage would provide
short-term relief from the storage problem at Oyster Creek. The Nuclear
Waste Policy Act and 10 CFR Part 53, however, clearly place the
responsibility for the interim storage of spent fuel with each owner or
operator of a nuclear plant. The shipment of fuel to another source is
not an acceptable alternative because of increased fuel handling risks
and additional occupational radiation exposure, as well as the fact
that no additional storage capacity would be created.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
Operation at a reduced power level would decrease the amount of
fuel being stored in the pool and thus increase the amount of time
before full core off-load capacity is lost. However, operating the
plant at a reduced power level would not make effective use of
available resources. Therefore, reducing the amount of spent fuel
generated by reducing power is not considered a practical alternative.
The No-Action Alternative
As an alternative to the proposed action, the NRC staff considered
denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative).
Denial of the application would result in no change in current
environmental
[[Page 55064]]
impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the
alternative action are similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
This action does not involve the use of any resources not
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for Oyster
Creek.
Agencies and Persons Consulted
In accordance with its stated policy, on July 17, 2000, the NRC
staff consulted with the New Jersey State official, Mr. Richard Pinney,
of the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State
official had no comments.
Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined
not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed
action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated June 18, 1999, as supplemented on June 22 and
December 10, 1999, and February 10, and May 2, 2000, which are
available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document
Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC. Publicly
available records will be accessible electronically from the ADAMS
Public Library component on the NRC Web site, http:\\www.nrc.gov (the
Electronic Reading Room).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of September, 2000.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Helen N. Pastis,
Senior Project Manager, Section 1, Project Directorate I, Division of
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-23359 Filed 9-11-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P