[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 236 (Thursday, December 7, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 76672-76675]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-31157]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-305]
Nuclear Management Company, LLC; Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant;
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering
issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43
issued to the Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC or the licensee),
for operation of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP or Kewaunee),
located in Kewaunee County, Wisconsin.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action would increase the number of fuel assemblies
that can be stored in the Kewaunee spent fuel pools (SFPs) from 990
fuel assemblies to 1,205 fuel assemblies, an increase of 215 fuel
assemblies, by installing 215 new spent fuel storage racks in the new
north canal pool. In addition, the new spent fuel storage racks will
use Boral as the neutron absorber material.
The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's
application for amendment dated November 18, 1999, as supplemented by
letter dated August 7, 2000.
The Need for the Proposed Action
KNPP is a pressurized water reactor (PWR) which commenced
commercial operation in 1974, and its current operating license will
expire in December 2013. Initially, KNPP was designed to accommodate
168 spent fuel assemblies (SFAs). The last phase of re-racking the SFP
at KNPP was completed in 1987, which provided for the current storage
capacity of 990 SFAs. Currently, KNPP has two storage pools. The larger
south pool contains racks with a storage capacity for 720 SFAs, and the
smaller north pool contains racks with a storage capacity for 270 SFAs.
There are presently 718 SFAs stored in the south pool and 106 SFAs
stored in the north pool. As a result of the present unavailability of
an off-site spent fuel
[[Page 76673]]
storage facility and the current rate of fuel discharge (approximately
40 assemblies per cycle), KNPP will currently lose full-core reserve
capability after the Fall 2001 outage. The addition of the 215 storage
locations in the new north canal pool will extend the full-core reserve
capability until after the 2009 outage, and increase the total capacity
to 1205 SFAs.
The proposed action is needed to provide additional spent fuel
storage capacity to extend the full-core reserve capability beyond the
Fall 2001 outage.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
Radioactive Wastes
The Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant uses waste treatment systems
designed to collect and process gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that
might contain radioactive material. These radioactive waste treatment
systems were evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) dated
December 1972. The proposed SFP expansion will not involve any change
in the waste treatment systems described in the FES.
Radioactive Material Released into the Atmosphere
The expanded fuel storage capacity obtained by installing new fuel
racks into the transfer canal is not expected to affect the release of
radioactive gases from the SFP. Gaseous fission products such as
Krypton-85 and Iodine-131 are produced by the fuel in the core during
reactor operation. A small percentage of these fission gases are
released to the reactor coolant from the small number of fuel
assemblies which are expected to develop leaks during reactor
operation. During refueling operations, some of these fission products
enter the SFP and are subsequently released into the air of the spent
fuel building. Gaseous releases from the fuel storage area are combined
with other plant exhausts. If radio-iodine levels become too high, the
air can be diverted to charcoal filters for the removal of radio-iodine
before release to the environment. Normally, the radioactive gas
contribution from the fuel storage area is negligible compared to the
gaseous releases from other areas of the plant. Since the frequency of
refueling (and therefore the number of freshly off loaded spent fuel
assemblies stored in the SFP at any one time) will not increase, there
will be no increase in the amounts of these types of fission products
released to the atmosphere as a result of the increased SFP fuel
storage capacity.
Tritium gases contained in the SFP are produced from two sources.
The first source is the tritium from the reactor coolant system (RCS),
which is a result of neutron capture in the reactor core by Boron-10.
Tritium produced in this manner can only enter the spent fuel pool
during refueling outages when the SFP and the RCS are interconnected.
Since the proposed amendment does not increase the frequency of
refueling outages, this source of tritium does not change. The second
source of tritium is a result of neutron capture by Boron-10 in the SFP
water. The decay neutron flux from the old fuel in the SFP is
considerably smaller than the neutron flux in the core of an operating
reactor. Due to the small neutron flux associated with the fuel to be
stored in the new racks, the effect on tritium production will be
insignificant. Therefore, the release of tritium from the storage of
additional spent fuel assemblies in the transfer canal will be
insignificant.
In addition, the plant radiological effluent Technical
Specifications, which are not being changed by this action, restrict
the total releases of gaseous activity from the plant (including the
SFP).
Solid Radioactive Wastes
Independent of the proposed modification, the concentration of
radionuclides in the SFP is controlled by the filters and demineralizer
of the SFP purification system as well as by the decay of short-lived
isotopes. Spent resins are generated by the processing of SFP water
through the SFP purification system. Both spent resins and filters are
disposed of as solid radioactive waste. Since the frequency of
refueling outages is unchanged by the proposed action, the activity in
the SFP is not expected to increase significantly above its current
value. Thus, the radioactivity collected on the spent fuel resins and
filters is not expected to significantly increase above its current
value as a result of the storage capacity increase. The cumulative
amount of radioactivity collected on the spent fuel resins over time
will increase slightly with an increase in the amount of spent fuel
that is added to the SFP; however, this increase is expected to be
insignificant.
The licensee will use a vacuum to clean the floor of the fuel
transfer canal following the drying of the canal prior to installing
the new fuel racks. Vacuuming of the canal floor will remove any
extraneous debris and crud. Filter bags from the vacuum will be
disposed of as solid radioactive waste. Depending on the waste
characterization of these filters, the licensee will dispose of them
utilizing shielded canisters and high integrity containers which will
then be stored onsite or shipped for burial accordingly. However, this
amount of solid radioactive waste is expected to be negligible in
comparison with other sources of solid radioactive wastes generated at
the plant (it is expected that the total volume of low level
radioactive waste generated due to this project will be less than 50
cubic feet).
Therefore, the staff does not expect that the additional fuel
storage capacity made possible by the addition of fuel racks in the
north portion of the Kewaunee fuel transfer canal will result in a
significant change in the generation of solid radwaste at the Kewaunee
Nuclear Power Plant.
Liquid Radioactive Wastes
The SFP ion exchanger resins that are part of the SFP water cleanup
system remove soluble radioactive materials from the SFP water. When
the resins are changed out, the small amount of resin sluice water
which is released is processed by the liquid radwaste system before any
water is discharged to Lake Michigan. The resin in the spent fuel pool
demineralizer is typically replaced every 12 to 15 months. It is
possible that fuel movement may stir up a small amount of settled
contamination during loading of the fuel into the new racks. However,
it is expected that this will have an insignificant effect on the
frequency of resin change out. Therefore, the installation of the new
fuel racks is not expected to increase the amount of liquid radioactive
wastes generated at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.
In addition, the plant radiological effluent Technical
Specifications, which are not being changed by this action, restrict
the total releases of activity in liquids from the plant.
Radiological Impact Assessment
Radiation protection personnel will provide constant coverage,
including dose monitoring, for the majority of the work. Since this
license amendment does not involve the removal of any spent fuel racks,
the licensee does not plan on using divers for this project. However,
if it becomes necessary to utilize divers to remove any interferences
which may impede the installation of the new fuel racks, the licensee
will equip each diver with radiation detectors with remote, above
surface, readouts which will be continuously monitored by Radiation
Protection personnel. The total occupational dose to plant workers as a
result of the SFP expansion operation is estimated to be between 0.7
and 1.3
[[Page 76674]]
person-rem. This dose estimate is lower than doses for SFP
modifications performed at other plants. The upcoming SFP rack
installation will follow detailed procedures prepared with full
consideration of as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principles.
On the basis of our review of the licensee's proposal, the staff
concludes that the KNPP SFP expansion can be performed in a manner that
will ensure that doses to workers will be maintained as low as is
reasonably achievable and within the limits of 10 CFR part 20. The
estimated dose of 0.7 to 1.3 person-rem to perform the proposed SFP
expansion operation is a small fraction of the annual collective dose
accrued at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.
Furthermore, as stated previously, the concentration of
radionuclides in the SFP is not expected to increase beyond its present
value as a result of the proposed action. Therefore, doses to workers
are not expected to increase above their current values. However, since
additional spent fuel will be added to the SFP, cumulative doses over
time may increase slightly, although this increase is expected to be
insignificant with annual doses remaining below regulatory limits.
Accident Considerations
The licensee evaluated criticality safety calculations for normal
conditions, criticality safety calculations for accident conditions,
long-term reactivity changes, calculation of the transient decay heat
load in the SFPs, calculation of the resulting maximum SFPs bulk
temperature, calculation of the time-to-boil after a loss of forced
cooling or makeup water capability, rack seismic/structural
evaluations, rack fatigue analysis, SFP structural evaluation, bearing
pad analysis, and liner integrity analysis, shallow drop event, deep
drop event, and object drop event. The proposed modification increases
the spent fuel storage capacity, but it does not change the frequency
or probability or method for handling spent fuel assemblies.
The proposed expansion of the SFP will not affect any of the
assumptions or inputs used in evaluating the dose consequences of a
fuel handling accident and therefore will not result in an increase in
the doses from a postulated fuel handling accident.
Environmental Impact Conclusions
The proposed action will not significantly increase the probability
or consequences of accidents, no changes are being made in the types of
any effluents that may be released off site, and there is no
significant increase in occupational or public exposure. Therefore,
there are no significant radiological environmental impacts associated
with the proposed action.
With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed
action does not involve any historic sites. It does not affect
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impacts.
Therefore, there are no significant nonradiological environmental
impacts associated with the proposed action.
Accordingly, the NRC concludes that there are no significant
environmental impacts associated with this action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity.
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until
approximately 2010, at the earliest. To date, no location has been
identified and an interim federal storage facility has yet to be
identified in advance of a decision on a permanent repository.
Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to the DOE repository is not
considered an alternative to increased onsite fuel storage capacity at
this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
Reprocessing of spent fuel from Kewaunee is not a viable
alternative since there are no operating commercial reprocessing
facilities in the United States. Therefore, spent fuel would have to be
shipped to an overseas facility for reprocessing. However, this
approach has never been used and it would require approval by the
Department of State as well as other entities. Additionally, the cost
of spent fuel reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the
residual uranium; reprocessing represents an added cost.
Shipping the Fuel Offsite to Another Utility, another NMC Site, or
Private Fuel Storage Facility
The shipment of fuel to another utility or transferring fuel to
another of the licensee's facilities would provide short-term relief
from the problems at Kewaunee. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,
Subtitle B, Section 131(a)(1), however, clearly places the
responsibility for the interim storage of spent fuel with each owner or
operator of a nuclear plant. The SFPs at the other reactor sites were
designed with capacity to accommodate spent fuel from those particular
sites. Therefore, transferring spent fuel from Kewaunee to other sites
would create storage capacity problems at those locations. The shipment
of spent fuel to another site or transferring it to another NMC site is
not an acceptable alternative because of increased fuel handling risks
and additional occupational radiation exposure, as well as the fact
that no additional storage capacity would be created.
The shipment of fuel to a private fuel storage facility is an
alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity.
However, a private fuel storage facility is not licensed at this time.
Therefore, shipping the spent fuel to a private fuel storage facility
is not considered an alternative to increased onsite fuel storage
capacity at this time.
Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity
Alternative technologies that would create additional storage
capacity include rod consolidation, dry cask storage, modular vault dry
storage, and constructing a new pool. Rod consolidation involves
disassembling the spent fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods from
two or more assemblies into a stainless steel canister that can be
stored in the spent fuel racks. Industry experience with rod
consolidation is currently limited, primarily due to concerns for
potential gap activity release due to rod breakage, the potential for
increased fuel cladding corrosion due to some of the protective oxide
layer being scraped off, and because the prolonged consolidation
activity could interfere with ongoing plant operations. Dry cask
storage is a method of transferring spent fuel, after storage in the
pool for several years, to high capacity casks with passive heat
dissipation features. After loading, the casks are stored outdoors on a
seismically qualified concrete pad. Concerns for dry cask storage
include the need for special security provisions and high cost. Vault
storage consists of storing spent fuel in shielded stainless steel
cylinders in a horizontal configuration in a reinforced concrete vault.
The concrete vault provides missile and earthquake protection and
radiation shielding. Concerns for vault dry storage include security,
land consumption, eventual decommissioning of the new vault, the
potential for fuel or clad rupture due to high temperatures, and high
cost. The alternative of constructing and licensing new spent fuel
pools is not practical for Kewaunee because such an effort would
[[Page 76675]]
require about 10 years to complete and would be an expensive
alternative.
The alternative technologies that could create additional storage
capacity involve additional fuel handling with an attendant opportunity
for a fuel handling accident, involve higher cumulative dose to workers
affecting the fuel transfers, require additional security measures that
are significantly more expensive, and would not result in a significant
improvement in environmental impacts compared to the proposed reracking
modifications.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
Generally, improved usage of the fuel and/or operation at a reduced
power level would be an alternative that would decrease the amount of
fuel being stored in the SFPs and thus, increase the amount of time
before the maximum storage capacities of the SFPs are reached. With
extended burnup of fuel assemblies, the fuel cycle would be extended
and fewer off-loads would be necessary. This is not an alternative for
resolving the loss of full core off-load capability that will occur as
a result of the Kewaunee refueling outage scheduled for the Fall 2001,
because the spent fuel to be transferred to the pool for storage has
almost completed its operating history in the core. In addition,
operating the plant at a reduced power level would not make effective
use of available resources and would cause unnecessary economic
hardship on the licensee and its customers. Therefore, reducing the
amount of spent fuel generated by increasing burnup further or reducing
power is not considered a practical alternative.
The No-Action Alternative
Also, the NRC staff considered denial of the proposed action (i.e.,
the ``no-action'' alternative). Denial of the application would result
in no significant change in current environmental impacts. The
environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative
actions are similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
This action does not involve the use of any resources not
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for
Kewaunee.
Agencies and Persons Contacted
In accordance with its stated policy, on October 12, 2000, the NRC
staff consulted with the Wisconsin State official, S. Jenkins of the
Wisconsin Public Service Commission, regarding the environmental impact
of the proposed action. The state official had no comments.
Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the environmental assessment, the NRC concludes
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the NRC has determined
not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed
action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated November 18, 1999, as supplemented by letter
dated August 7, 2000, which are available for public inspection at the
NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available
records will be accessible electronically from the ADAMS Public Library
component on the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov (the Electronic
Reading Room).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of November, 2000.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Claudia M. Craig,
Section Chief, Section 1, Project Directorate III, Division of
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 00-31157 Filed 12-6-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P