[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 7 (Tuesday, January 11, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1608-1620]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-594]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final 
Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: In November 1999, the Department of Energy (DOE or the 
Department), in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), issued the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental 
Impact Statement (SPD EIS)(DOE/EIS-0283). The SPD EIS was the 
culmination of a process started on May 22, 1997, when DOE published a 
Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 FR 28009) announcing 
its decision to prepare an EIS that would tier from the analysis and 
decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and 
Disposition PEIS)(DOE/EIS-0229). Accordingly, the Surplus Plutonium 
Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Draft EIS) (DOE/
EIS-0283-D) was prepared and issued in July 1998. It identified the 
potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the 
proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for 
the disposition of up to 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium, as well 
as a No Action Alternative. These three facilities would accomplish pit 
1 disassembly and conversion, plutonium conversion and 
immobilization, and mixed oxide (MOX) 2 fuel fabrication. 
The SPD Draft EIS also analyzed the potential impacts of fabricating a 
limited number of MOX fuel assemblies, referred to as lead assemblies, 
for testing in a reactor before starting full production of MOX fuel, 
and the potential impacts of examining the lead assemblies after 
irradiation.
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    \1\ A nuclear weapon component.
    \2\ A physical blend of uranium oxide and plutonium oxide.
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    For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the SPD 
Draft EIS described the potential environmental impacts of using from 
three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The 
potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis included in 
the Storage and Disposition PEIS that used actual reactor data and a 
range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DOE initiated a 
procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor 
irradiation services. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke 
Engineering & Services, COGEMA Inc., and Stone & Webster (known as DCS) 
to provide the requested services. Full implementation of the base 
contract was contingent upon the successful completion of the NEPA 
process. A Supplement to the SPD Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0283-S) was issued 
in April 1999, which analyzed the potential environmental impacts of 
using MOX fuel in six specific reactors named in the DCS proposal. 
Those reactors are: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in South 
Carolina, McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in North Carolina, and 
North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 in Virginia. The SPD Final EIS 
addresses the comments received during the public review process for 
the SPD Draft EIS and the Supplement to the draft.
    The Department has decided to implement a program to provide for 
the safe and secure disposition of up to 50 metric tons of surplus 
plutonium as specified in the Preferred Alternative in the Surplus 
Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement. The 
fundamental purpose of the program is to ensure that plutonium produced 
for nuclear weapons and declared excess to national security needs (now 
and in the future) is never again used for nuclear weapons. 
Specifically, the Department has decided to use a hybrid approach for 
the disposition of surplus plutonium. This approach allows for the 
immobilization of approximately 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium and 
the use of up to 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium as MOX fuel. The 
Department has selected the Savannah River Site in South Carolina as 
the location for all three disposition facilities. Based upon this 
selection, the Department will authorize DCS to fully implement the 
base contract. In addition, the Department has selected the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory in New Mexico as the location for lead assembly 
fabrication and Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee as the site 
for post-irradiation examination of lead assemblies.
    As previously stated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS Record of 
Decision (62 FR 3014, January 21, 1997), the use of MOX fuel in 
existing reactors will be undertaken in a manner that is consistent 
with the United States' policy objective on the irreversibility of the

[[Page 1609]]

nuclear disarmament process and the United States' policy discouraging 
the civilian use of plutonium. To this end, implementing the MOX 
alternative will include government ownership and control of the MOX 
fuel fabrication facility at a DOE site, and use of the facility only 
for the surplus plutonium disposition program. There will be no 
reprocessing or subsequent reuse of spent MOX fuel. The MOX fuel will 
be used in a once-through fuel cycle in existing reactors, with 
appropriate arrangements, including contractual or licensing 
provisions, limiting use of MOX fuel to surplus plutonium disposition.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The decisions set forth in this Record of Decision are 
effective upon publication of this document, in accordance with DOE's 
National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures and 
Guidelines (10 CFR Part 1021) and the Council on Environmental Quality 
regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508).

ADDRESSES: Copies of the SPD EIS and this Record of Decision may be 
obtained by placing a call to an answering machine or facsimile machine 
at a toll free number (1-800-820-5156), or by mailing a request to: 
Bert Stevenson, NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of Fissile Materials 
Disposition, U.S. Department of Energy, Post Office Box 23786, 
Washington, DC 20026-3786.
    The full SPD EIS, including the 54-page Summary, and this Record of 
Decision are available on the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition's 
web site. The address is http://www.doe-md.com. The full SPD EIS is 
also available on DOE's NEPA web site at http://tis.ch.doe.gov/nepa.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Questions concerning the plutonium 
disposition program can be submitted by calling or faxing them to the 
same toll free number (1-800-820-5156), or by mailing them to Mr. Bert 
Stevenson at the above address. Comments may also be submitted 
electronically by using the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition's 
web site. The address is http://www.doe-md.com.
    For general information on the DOE NEPA process, please contact: 
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance, U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 
20585, 202-586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The United States and Russia are working together to reduce the 
threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by disposing of 
surplus plutonium in a safe, secure, environmentally acceptable and 
timely manner. Comprehensive disposition actions are needed to ensure 
that surplus plutonium is converted to proliferation-resistant forms. 
In September 1993, President Clinton issued the Non-proliferation and 
Export Control Policy in response to the growing threat of nuclear 
weapons proliferation. Further, in January 1994, President Clinton and 
Russia's President Yeltsin issued a Joint Statement Between the United 
States and Russia on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
and the Means of Their Delivery. In accordance with these policies and 
statements, the focus of U.S. non-proliferation efforts is to ensure 
the safe, secure, long-term storage and disposition of surplus weapons-
usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). In July 1998, the 
United States and Russia signed a 5-year agreement to provide the 
scientific and technical basis for decisions concerning how surplus 
plutonium will be managed and a statement of principles with the 
intention of removing approximately 50 metric tons 3 of 
plutonium from each country's stockpile. The Department is pursuing 
both the immobilization and mixed oxide (MOX) fuel approaches to 
surplus plutonium disposition, which include the siting, construction, 
operation, and deactivation of three facilities at one or two of four 
DOE candidate sites:
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    \3\ Some materials are already in a final disposition form 
(i.e., irradiated fuel) and will not require further action before 
disposal.
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    1. A facility for disassembling pits (a weapons component) and 
converting the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from 
other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition. 
Candidate sites for this facility are the Hanford Site (Hanford) near 
Richland, Washington; Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL) near Idaho Falls, Idaho; the Pantex Plant (Pantex) 
near Amarillo, Texas; and the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, 
South Carolina.
    2. A facility for immobilizing surplus plutonium for eventual 
disposal in a geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act. This facility would include a collocated capability for converting 
non-pit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for 
immobilization. The immobilization facility would be located at either 
Hanford or SRS.
    3. A MOX fuel fabrication facility for fabricating plutonium 
dioxide into MOX fuel. Candidate sites for this facility are Hanford, 
INEEL, Pantex, and SRS. Also part of the proposed action are MOX lead 
assembly 4 activities at five candidate DOE sites: Argonne 
National Laboratory--West (ANL-W) at INEEL; Hanford; Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California; Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL) near Los Alamos, New Mexico; and SRS. The 
Department would fabricate a limited number of MOX fuel lead assemblies 
for testing in reactors before starting full production of MOX fuel 
under the proposed MOX fuel program. Post-irradiation examination 
activities would be performed at one of two sites, ANL-W or Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
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    \4\ A MOX lead assembly is a prototype reactor fuel assembly 
that contains MOX fuel.
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    In March 1999, DOE awarded a multi-phase contract to Duke 
Engineering & Services, COGEMA Inc., and Stone & Webster (collectively 
known as DCS) for the design, licensing, construction, operation, and 
eventual deactivation of the MOX fuel fabrication facility and for 
irradiating the MOX fuel. Full implementation of the base contract was 
contingent upon the successful completion of the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) process. The contract includes future provisions to 
use MOX fuel in six specific reactors: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 
and 2 in South Carolina, McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 in North 
Carolina, and North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 in Virginia.
    DOE is aware that a decision to use surplus plutonium in MOX fuel 
could be perceived as a change in U.S. civilian fuel cycle policy. In 
fact, however, such a decision would not represent a change in policy. 
The United States does not encourage the civilian use of plutonium, and 
does not itself engage in reprocessing for the purposes of either 
nuclear explosives or nuclear power generation. Disposition of excess 
plutonium, regardless of the specific option chosen, will not change 
this basic fuel cycle policy.

NEPA Process

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft EIS

    In December 1996, the Department published the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS. That PEIS analyzes the potential environmental 
consequences of alternative strategies for the long-term storage of 
weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium and the 
disposition of weapons-usable

[[Page 1610]]

plutonium that has been or may be declared surplus to national security 
needs.5 The Record of Decision (ROD) for the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS, issued on January 14, 1997, outlines DOE's decision 
to pursue an approach to plutonium disposition that would make surplus 
weapons-usable plutonium inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use. 
DOE's disposition strategy, consistent with the Preferred Alternative 
analyzed in the Storage and Disposition PEIS, allows for both the 
immobilization of some (and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium, 
and use of some of the surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in existing 
domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium 
would also involve disposal of both the immobilized plutonium and the 
MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a potential geologic 
repository.6
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    \5\ DOE addressed the disposition of surplus highly enriched 
uranium in a separate environmental impact statement, the 
Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental 
Impact Statement, issued in June 1996, with the Record of Decision 
issued in July 1996.
    \6\ The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reviewed DOE's plans 
to phase immobilized material into the potential geologic 
repository, and has agreed that with adequate canister and package 
design features, the immobilized plutonium waste forms can be made 
acceptable for disposal in the repository.
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    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the 
Federal Register (FR) announcing its decision to prepare an EIS that 
would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with 
the PEIS discussed above. The follow-on EIS, the Surplus Plutonium 
Disposition Environmental Impact Statement, addresses the extent to 
which each of the two plutonium disposition approaches (immobilization 
and MOX) would be implemented, and analyzes candidate sites for 
plutonium disposition facilities, as well as alternative technologies 
for immobilization.7 In July 1998, DOE issued the SPD Draft 
EIS. That draft included a description of the potential environmental 
impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to 
irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic 
reactor analysis presented in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. In 
March 1999, DOE awarded a contract, contingent on completion of the 
NEPA process, for MOX fuel fabrication and irradiation services, that 
identified the specific reactors that would be used to irradiate the 
MOX fuel. After this contract award, DOE issued a Supplement to the SPD 
Draft EIS (Supplement) (April 1999) that describes the potential 
environmental impacts of using MOX fuel at the three proposed reactor 
sites. These site-specific analyses have been incorporated into the SPD 
Final EIS.
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    \7\ The SPD EIS also analyzes a No Action Alternative, i.e., the 
possibility of disposition not occurring but, instead, continuing to 
store surplus plutonium in accordance with the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS ROD.
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Alternatives Considered

    The SPD EIS analyzes the potential environmental impacts associated 
with implementing pit disassembly and conversion of the recovered 
plutonium and clean plutonium metal at four candidate sites; conversion 
and immobilization of plutonium from non-pit sources at two candidate 
sites, and MOX fuel fabrication activities at four candidate sites. The 
SPD EIS also evaluates immobilizing plutonium in ceramic or glass 
forms, and compares the can-in-canister approach with the homogenous 
ceramic immobilization and vitrification approaches that were evaluated 
in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. As part of the MOX option, the SPD 
EIS also evaluates the potential impacts of fabricating MOX fuel lead 
assemblies (for test irradiation in domestic, commercial nuclear power 
reactors) at five candidate DOE sites, the impacts of subsequent post-
irradiation examination of the lead assemblies at two candidate DOE 
sites, and the impacts of irradiating MOX fuel in domestic, commercial 
reactors.
    Fifteen surplus plutonium disposition alternatives and the No 
Action Alternative are evaluated in the SPD EIS. These action 
alternatives are organized into 11 sets of alternatives, reflecting 
various combinations of facilities and candidate sites, as well as the 
use of new or existing buildings.
    Each of the 15 alternatives includes a pit conversion facility, but 
the need for additional facilities in each alternative varies depending 
on the amount of plutonium to be immobilized. Eleven alternatives 
involve the hybrid approach of immobilizing 17 metric tons of surplus 
plutonium and using 33 metric tons for MOX fuel, and therefore require 
all three facilities. Four alternatives involve immobilizing all 50 
metric tons, and therefore include only a pit conversion facility and 
an immobilization facility. The No Action Alternative does not involve 
disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium, but instead addresses 
continued storage of the plutonium in accordance with the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS Record of Decision (ROD), with the exception that DOE 
is now considering leaving the repackaged surplus pits in Zone 4 at 
Pantex for long-term storage in lieu of Zone 12 as originally planned.
Immobilization Technology Alternatives
    The Storage and Disposition PEIS discusses several immobilization 
technologies, including the homogenous ceramic and vitrification 
alternatives that were evaluated in detail, as well as variants of 
those alternatives, which include the ceramic and glass can-in-canister 
approaches and a homogenous approach using an adjunct melter. The ROD 
for the Storage and Disposition PEIS states that DOE would make a 
determination on the specific technology on the basis of ``the follow-
on EIS.'' The SPD EIS is that follow-on EIS, and it identifies the 
ceramic can-in-canister approach as the preferred immobilization 
technology.
    In order to bound the estimate of potential environmental impacts 
associated with ceramic and glass immobilization technologies, the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS analyzes the construction and operation of 
vitrification and ceramic immobilization facilities that employ a 
homogenous approach. These facilities are based on generic designs that 
do not involve the use of existing facilities or specific site 
locations. These generic designs allow for surplus plutonium to be 
immobilized in a homogenous form, either within a ceramic matrix and 
formed into disks, or vitrified as borosilicate glass logs.
    In order to support a decision on the immobilization technology and 
form, the SPD EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of the 
ceramic and glass can-in-canister technologies, and compares those 
impacts with the impacts of the homogenous facilities evaluated in the 
Storage and Disposition PEIS. Hanford and SRS are the candidate sites 
for immobilization based on their existing plans for a high-level waste 
vitrification facility.
MOX Fuel Fabrication Alternatives
    Alternatives that involve the fabrication of MOX fuel include the 
use of the fuel in existing domestic, commercial nuclear power 
reactors. The environmental impacts of using MOX fuel in these reactors 
are evaluated generically in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. When the 
SPD Draft EIS was published, the specific reactors were not known; 
therefore, the generic analysis from the Storage and Disposition PEIS 
was incorporated by reference in the SPD Draft EIS.
    In May 1998, DOE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel 
fabrication and irradiation services. In compliance with its NEPA 
regulations in 10 CFR 1021.216, DOE requested that each offeror 
provide, as

[[Page 1611]]

part of its proposal, environmental information specific to its 
proposed MOX facility design and the domestic, commercial reactors 
proposed to be used for irradiation of the fuel. That information was 
analyzed by the Department to identify potential environmental impacts 
of the proposals, and DOE's analysis was documented in an Environmental 
Critique prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 1021.216(g). That analysis was 
considered by the selection official as part of the award decision. DOE 
awarded a contract (contingent on completion of the NEPA process) to 
the team of Duke Engineering & Services, COGEMA Inc., and Stone & 
Webster (DCS) in March 1999 to provide the requested services. These 
services include design, licensing, construction, operation, and 
eventual deactivation of the MOX fuel fabrication facility, as well as 
irradiation of the MOX fuel in six domestic, commercial reactors. The 
reactors proposed by DCS are Duke Power Company's Catawba Nuclear 
Station, Units 1 and 2; and McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; and 
Virginia Power Company's North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. Under 
the contract, no construction, fabrication, or irradiation of MOX fuel 
is authorized until the SPD EIS ROD is issued. Such site-specific 
activities, and DOE's exercise of contract options to allow those 
activities, would be contingent on decisions in this ROD.
    Because the Environmental Critique contains proprietary 
information, it was not made available to the public. However, as 
provided in 10 CFR 1021.216(h), an Environmental Synopsis of the 
Environmental Critique was provided to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, made available to the public, and incorporated into 
the SPD EIS. Sections of the SPD EIS were revised or added to include 
reactor-specific information and were issued as a Supplement to the SPD 
Draft EIS. A Notice of Availability was published in the Federal 
Register on May 14, 1999 (64 FR 264019), providing a 45-day public 
comment period on the Supplement.8 This Supplement was 
distributed to the local reactor communities, to stakeholders who 
received the SPD Draft EIS, and others as requested.
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    \8\ On June 15, 1999, DOE held a public meeting in Washington, 
D.C., to receive comments on the Supplement to the SPD Draft EIS.
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    Under the hybrid alternatives, DOE could produce up to 10 MOX fuel 
assemblies for testing in domestic, commercial reactors before 
commencement of full-scale MOX fuel fabrication, although it is likely 
that only two lead assemblies would be needed.9 These lead 
assemblies would be available for irradiation to support NRC licensing 
and fuel qualification efforts. Potential impacts of MOX fuel lead 
assembly fabrication are analyzed for three of the candidate sites for 
MOX fuel fabrication (Hanford, ANL--W at INEEL, and SRS), and two 
additional sites, LANL and LLNL. Pantex was not considered for lead 
assembly fabrication because it does not currently have any facilities 
capable of MOX fuel fabrication. Post-irradiation examination of the 
lead assemblies would be conducted, if required, to support NRC 
licensing activities. Two potential sites for this activity are 
analyzed in the SPD EIS: ANL--W and Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL). As discussed previously, DOE's preferred locations for lead 
assembly fabrication and post-irradiation examination are LANL and 
ORNL, respectively.
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    \9\ The potential impacts of fabricating 10 lead assemblies and 
irradiating 8 of them were analyzed in the SPD EIS. Should fewer 
lead assemblies than analyzed be fabricated or irradiated, the 
potential impacts would be less than those described in the SPD EIS.
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    The Department also considered a No Action Alternative, as required 
by NEPA. In the No Action Alternative, surplus weapons-usable plutonium 
in storage at various DOE sites would remain at those locations. The 
vast majority of pits would continue to be stored at Pantex, and the 
remaining plutonium in various forms would continue to be stored at 
Hanford, INEEL, LLNL, LANL, Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site 
(RFETS), and SRS.

Materials Analyzed

    There are eight general categories used to describe the 50 metric 
tons of surplus plutonium analyzed in the SPD EIS, which represent the 
physical and chemical nature of the plutonium. Two of the categories--
clean metal (including pits) and clean oxide--could either be 
fabricated into MOX fuel or immobilized. The remaining six categories 
of material--impure metals, plutonium alloys, impure oxides, uranium/
plutonium oxides, alloy reactor fuel, and oxide reactor fuel--would be 
immobilized.

Preferred Alternative

    As previously noted, DOE's Preferred Alternative for the 
disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium is analyzed as 
Alternative 3 in the SPD Final EIS. The Preferred Alternative 
encompasses the following:
Pit Disassembly and Conversion at SRS (new construction)
    Construct and operate a new pit conversion facility at SRS to 
disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium metal to a 
declassified oxide form suitable for international inspection and 
disposition using either the immobilization or the MOX/reactor 
approach. SRS is preferred for the pit conversion facility because the 
site has extensive experience with plutonium processing, and the pit 
conversion facility would complement existing missions and take 
advantage of existing infrastructure.
Immobilization at SRS (new construction and the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility) 10
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    \10\ The Savannah River Site was previously designated to be 
part of DOE's preferred alternative for immobilization in the Notice 
of Intent issued in May 1997.
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    Construct and operate a new immobilization facility at SRS using 
the ceramic can-in-canister technology. This technology would 
immobilize plutonium in a ceramic form, seal it in cans, and place the 
cans in canisters filled with borosilicate glass containing intensely 
radioactive high-level waste at the existing Defense Waste Processing 
Facility (DWPF). This preferred can-in-canister approach at SRS would 
complement existing missions, take advantage of existing infrastructure 
and staff expertise, and enable DOE to use an existing facility (i.e., 
DWPF).
    Implementation of the can-in-canister approach would require the 
availability of sufficient quantities of high-activity radionuclides 
from SRS high-level waste to DWPF. Due to problems experienced with the 
In-Tank Precipitation process for separating high-activity 
radionuclides from liquid high-level waste, DWPF is currently operating 
with sludge feed, not liquid high-level waste. A thorough search for 
alternatives to the In-Tank Precipitation process has identified two 
viable processes (ion exchange and small tank precipitation) for 
separating the high-activity fraction from the liquid high-level waste 
and sending this fraction to DWPF. Extensive laboratory and bench scale 
testing has been conducted on both of these processes. Test results 
indicate that either process is capable of separating the high-activity 
radionuclides from the high-level waste and feeding those radionuclides 
to DWPF, although further research and development is 
necessary.11 DOE is

[[Page 1612]]

preparing a supplemental EIS on the proposed replacement of the In-Tank 
Precipitation process at SRS (NOI at 64 FR 8558, February 22, 1999). 
Designation of a preferred process and construction of a pilot scale 
plant for scale-up of the preferred process are the next steps planned 
to resolve this issue.
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    \11\  The National Research Council (the Council) is also 
evaluating a replacement technology for the In-Tank Precipitation 
process. The Council's study committee issued an interim report in 
October 1999. This committee recommends further research and 
development for the ion exchange and small tank precipitation 
alternatives, and for caustic side solvent extraction, a third 
process that would separate high-activity radionuclides that could 
be sent to DWPF.
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    In addition to these alternatives, the Department is analyzing the 
potential environmental impacts of another action alternative, direct 
grout, in light of technical and cost considerations. Under the direct 
grout alternative, the cesium component of the high-activity 
radionuclides would be entombed in grout rather than remain in the 
high-activity fraction provided to DWPF for vitrification and eventual 
disposal in a geologic repository. Therefore, the direct grout 
alternative would not provide the radiation barrier needed for surplus 
plutonium disposition using the can-in-canister technology at SRS. 
However, a DOE waste management requirement (DOE Manual 435.1, 
Radioactive Waste Management, Section II.B.2) provides that, for direct 
grout material to be disposed of as now being analyzed, ``key 
radionuclides would have to be removed to the maximum extent that is 
technically and economically practical.'' This criterion would not be 
met in the event that any other action alternative is determined to be 
viable after further evaluation. Therefore, DOE regards the direct 
grout alternative as reasonable only if all of the other action 
alternatives analyzed in the supplemental EIS prove not to be viable.
    In summary, although a specific method for providing the high-level 
waste needed for the can-in-canister immobilization alternatives for 
surplus plutonium disposition has not been determined, DOE is confident 
that an acceptable technical solution will be available at SRS. The 
ceramic can-in-canister approach would involve slightly lower 
environmental impacts than the homogenous approach. The ceramic can-in-
canister approach would involve better performance in a potential 
geologic repository and provide greater proliferation resistance than 
the glass can-in-canister approach.
MOX Fuel Fabrication at SRS (new construction)
    Construct and operate a new MOX facility at SRS and produce MOX 
fuel containing surplus weapons-usable plutonium for irradiation in 
existing domestic, commercial reactors. SRS is preferred for the MOX 
facility because this activity would complement existing missions and 
take advantage of existing infrastructure and staff expertise.
Lead Assembly Fabrication at LANL
    Based on consideration of the capabilities of the candidate sites 
and input from the contractor team chosen for the MOX approach, DOE 
prefers LANL for lead assembly fabrication. LANL is preferred because 
it already has fuel fabrication facilities that would not require major 
modifications, and has existing site infrastructure and staff 
experience. Additionally, the surplus plutonium dioxide needed to 
fabricate the lead assemblies would already be on site (no 
transportation required).
Post-Irradiation Examination at ORNL
    If post-irradiation examination is necessary for the purpose of 
qualifying the MOX fuel for commercial reactor use, DOE prefers to 
perform that task at ORNL. ORNL has the existing facilities and staff 
expertise needed to perform post-irradiation examination as a matter of 
its routine activities; no major modifications to facilities or 
processing capabilities would be required. In addition, ORNL is about 
500 kilometers (km) from the reactor site that would irradiate the fuel 
(one of the reactors located at the McGuire Nuclear Station in North 
Carolina).

Environmental Impacts of Preferred Alternative

    Chapter 4 and certain appendices of the SPD Final EIS analyze the 
potential environmental impacts of the surplus plutonium disposition 
alternatives in detail. The SPD Final EIS also evaluates the maximum 
impacts that would result at each of the potential disposition sites. 
Based on the analyses in the SPD Final EIS, including public comments 
on the SPD Draft EIS, the areas with impacts of most interest are as 
follows:
Disposition Facilities During Construction
    Socioeconomics At its peak in 2003, construction of the three new 
surplus plutonium disposition facilities at SRS under this alternative 
would require 1,968 construction workers and should generate another 
1,580 indirect jobs in the region. As the total employment increase of 
3,548 direct and indirect jobs represents only 1.3 percent of the 
projected regional economic area (REA) workforce, it should have no 
major impact on the REA. Moreover, construction under the Preferred 
Alternative should have little impact on the community services 
currently offered in the region of influence. In fact, it should help 
offset the 20 percent reduction in SRS's total workforce otherwise 
projected for the years 1997-2005.
    Facility Accidents. The construction of new surplus plutonium 
disposition facilities at SRS could result in worker injuries or 
fatalities. DOE-required industrial safety programs would be in place 
to control the risks. Given the estimated 6,166 person-years of 
construction labor and standard industrial accident rates, 
approximately 610 cases of nonfatal occupational injury or illness and 
less than one fatality could be expected. As all construction would be 
in non-radiological areas, no radiological accidents should occur.
    Cultural Resources. During conduct of the cultural resources 
impacts analysis for the Preferred Alternative, it was determined that 
construction of surplus plutonium disposition facilities at SRS could 
produce impacts on archaeological resources requiring mitigation. 
Archaeological investigations performed for the surplus plutonium 
disposition program discovered five archaeological sites in the 
proposed construction area. At least two of these sites have been 
recommended by DOE to the South Carolina State Historic Preservation 
Officer (SHPO) as eligible for nomination to the National Register of 
Historic Places. It appears that these sites were occupied during 
several different prehistoric periods, including the Late Woodland 
(A.D. 800-1000) and Mississippian (A.D. 1000-1600) Periods. These 
periods are poorly understood in the Central Savannah River Area. 
Therefore, these sites could contribute significantly to a better 
understanding of the Late Woodland and Mississippian Periods in this 
part of North America. Potential adverse impacts on these sites could 
be mitigated through either avoidance or data recovery. DOE currently 
plans to mitigate impacts by avoiding these sites.
Disposition Facilities During Operations
    Socioeconomics. After construction, startup, and testing of the new 
SRS facilities in 2007, an estimated 1,120 new workers would be 
required to operate them. This level of employment should generate an 
additional 2,003 indirect jobs in the region. As the total employment 
requirement of 3,123 direct and indirect jobs represents 1 percent of 
the projected REA, it should have no major impact on the REA. Moreover, 
these jobs would have little impact on community services currently 
offered in

[[Page 1613]]

the region of influence. In fact, they should help offset the reduction 
in SRS's total workforce otherwise projected for the years 1997-2010 of 
33 percent.
    Facility Accidents (Impact to the public and workers). The most 
severe consequences of a design basis accident for the pit conversion 
facility would be associated with a tritium release; the most severe 
consequences for the immobilization and MOX facilities would be from a 
nuclear criticality. Bounding radiological consequences for the 
Maximally Exposed Individual (MEI) 12 are from the tritium 
release, which would result in a dose of 0.028 rem, corresponding to a 
latent cancer fatality (LCF) probability of 1.4 x 10-5. A 
nuclear criticality of 10 19 fissions would result in an MEI 
dose of 0.0016 rem from an accident at the immobilization facility and 
0.016 rem from an accident at the MOX facility. Consequences of the 
tritium release accident for the general population in the environs of 
SRS would include an estimated 0.050 LCF. The frequency of either a 
tritium release or a criticality accident is estimated to be between 1 
in 10,000 and 1 in 1,000,000 per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The MEI is the hypothetical off-site person who has the 
highest exposure. This individual is assumed to be located at the 
point of maximum concentration of contaminants 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week, for the period of operations under analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The combined radiological effects from total collapse of all three 
facilities in the beyond-design-basis earthquake would be approximately 
18 LCFs. It should be emphasized that a seismic event of sufficient 
magnitude to collapse these facilities would likely cause the collapse 
of other DOE facilities, and would almost certainly cause widespread 
failure of homes, office buildings, and other structures in the 
surrounding area. The overall impact of such an event must therefore be 
seen in the context not only of the potential radiological impacts of 
these other facilities, but of hundreds, possibly thousands, of 
immediate fatalities from falling debris. The frequency of such an 
earthquake is estimated to be between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 10,000,000 
per year.
    Surplus plutonium disposition operations at SRS could result in 
worker injuries and fatalities. DOE-required industrial safety programs 
would be in place to control the risks. Given the estimated employment 
of 11,535 person-years of labor and the standard DOE occupational 
accident rates, approximately 420 cases of nonfatal occupational injury 
or illness and 0.31 fatality could be expected for the duration of 
operations. If a criticality occurred, workers within tens of meters 
could receive very high to fatal radiation exposures from the initial 
burst. The dose would strongly depend on the magnitude of the 
criticality, the distance from the criticality, and the amount of 
shielding provided by the structures and equipment between the workers 
and the accident.
    Transportation. In all, approximately 2,500 shipments of 
radioactive materials would be carried out by DOE under the Preferred 
Alternative. The total distance traveled on public roads by trucks 
carrying radioactive materials would be 4.3 million kilometers.
    The maximum foreseeable offsite transportation accident under this 
alternative (probability of occurrence: greater than 1 in 10 million 
per year) is a shipment of plutonium pits from one of DOE's storage 
locations to the pit conversion facility with a most severe (severity 
category VIII) accident in a rural population zone under neutral 
(average) weather conditions. If this accident were to occur, it could 
result in a dose of 87 person-rem to the public for an LCF risk of 
0.044 and 96 rem to the hypothetical MEI for an LCF risk of 0.096. (The 
MEI, a hypothetical member of the general public, receives a larger 
dose than the public as a whole because it is unlikely that a person 
would be in position, and remain in position, to receive this 
hypothetical maximum dose.) No fatalities would be expected to occur. 
The probability of more severe accidents--e.g., less favorable weather 
conditions at the time of accident, or occurrence in a more densely 
populated area'was also evaluated, and estimated as lower than 1 chance 
in 10 million per year.
    The total transportation accident risk was estimated by summing the 
risks (which takes account of both the probability and consequence of 
each type of accident) to the affected population from all hypothetical 
accidents. For the Preferred Alternative, that risk is as follows: a 
radiological dose to the population of 7 person-rem, resulting in a 
total population risk of 0.004 LCF; and traffic accidents resulting in 
0.053 traffic fatality.
Irradiating MOX Fuel at Reactor Sites 13
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ The operators of the proposed reactors have indicated that 
little or no new construction would be needed to support the 
irradiation of MOX fuel at the sites. As a result, land use; visual, 
cultural, and paleontological resources; geology and soils; and site 
infrastructure would not be affected by any new construction or 
other activities related to MOX fuel use. Nor would there be any 
effect on air quality and noise, ecological and water resources, or 
socioeconomics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The environmental impacts described below are based on using a 
partial MOX core (i.e., up to 40 percent MOX fuel) instead of a low 
enriched uranium (LEU) core at the Catawba Nuclear Station near York, 
South Carolina; the McGuire Nuclear Station near Huntersville, North 
Carolina; and the North Anna Power Station near Mineral, Virginia.
    Reactor Accidents. There are differences in the expected risk of 
reactor accidents from the use of MOX fuel compared to the use of low 
enriched uranium fuel. The change in consequences to the surrounding 
population due to the use of MOX fuel is estimated to range from 
9.0 x 10-4 fewer to 6.0 x 10-2 additional LCFs 
for design basis accidents, and from 7.0 fewer to 1,300 additional LCFs 
for beyond-design-basis accidents (16,900 versus 15,600 LCFs in the 
worst accident analyzed). Also, some of the beyond-design-basis 
accidents could result in prompt fatalities should they occur. The 
estimated increase in prompt fatalities due to MOX fuel being used 
during one of these accidents would range from no change to 28 
additional fatalities (843 versus 815 prompt fatalities). As a result 
of these changes in projected consequences, there would be a change in 
the risk to the public associated with these accidents. The change in 
risk (in terms of an LCF or prompt fatality) to the surrounding 
population within 80 km (50 mi) of the proposed reactors is projected 
to range from a decrease of 6 percent to an increase of 3 percent in 
the risk of additional LCFs from design basis accidents, and from a 
decrease of 4 percent to an increase of 14 percent in the risk of 
additional prompt fatalities and LCFs from beyond-design-basis 
accidents.
    The risk to the MEI would also change with the use of MOX fuel. 
Using MOX fuel during one of the design basis accidents evaluated is 
expected to change the MEI's chance of incurring an LCF from a decrease 
of 10 percent to an increase of 3 percent. The change in risk to the 
MEI of a prompt fatality or LCF as a result of using MOX fuel during 
one of the beyond-design-basis accidents evaluated is expected to range 
from a 1 percent increase to a 22 percent increase. In the most severe 
accident evaluated, an interfacing systems loss-of-coolant accident 
(ISLOCA), it is projected that the MEI would receive a fatal dose of 
radiation regardless of whether the reactor was using MOX fuel or LEU 
fuel at all of the proposed sites.
    Beyond-design-basis accidents, if they were to occur, would be 
expected to result in major impacts to the reactors and the surrounding 
communities and environment, regardless of whether the

[[Page 1614]]

reactor were using an LEU or partial MOX core. However, there is less 
than one chance in a million per year that a beyond-design-basis 
accident would actually happen, so the risk from these accidents is 
estimated to be low.
Lead Assembly and Post-Irradiation Examination Activities
    The analysis of the potential impacts of conducting the lead 
assembly activities and post-irradiation examination indicates that 
little or no new construction or operational changes would be needed to 
support these activities. As a result, land use; visual, cultural, and 
paleontological resources; geology and soils; and site infrastructure 
would not be affected by any new construction or other activities 
related to lead assembly fabrication or post-irradiation examination. 
Nor would there be any effect on air quality and noise, ecological and 
water resources, or socioeconomics.

Avoidance and Minimization of Environmental Harm

    For the Preferred Alternative, at SRS, storm water management and 
erosion control measures will be employed during construction of the 
disposition facilities. Cultural resources impacts will be mitigated 
either by avoidance or data recovery. Initial indications are the 
disposition facilities can be located in an area that will avoid 
disturbing known cultural resource areas.
    During operation of the disposition facilities, radiation doses to 
individual workers will be kept at a minimum by maintaining 
comprehensive badged monitoring and ``as low as reasonably achievable'' 
(ALARA) programs during worker rotations. The storage facilities in the 
disposition buildings will be designed and operated in accordance with 
contemporary DOE orders and/or NRC regulations to reduce risks to 
workers and the public.
    From a non-proliferation standpoint, the highest standards for 
safeguards and security will be employed during transportation, storage 
(i.e., the stored weapons standard 14) and disposition. DOE 
will coordinate the transport of surplus plutonium and fresh MOX fuel 
with State officials, consistent with contemporary policy. Although the 
actual routes will be classified, they will be selected to circumvent 
populated areas where ever possible, maximize the use of interstate 
highways, and avoid bad weather. DOE will coordinate emergency 
preparedness plans and responses with involved states through liaison 
programs. The packaging, vehicles, and transport procedures being used 
are specifically designed and tested to prevent radiological release 
under all credible accident scenarios. The NRC regulates safeguards and 
security at facilities it licenses commensurate with the type of 
facility and type and amount of fissile or radioactive material 
present. Commercial nuclear power reactors have stringent regulations 
to prevent sabotage or diversion of special nuclear materials. Physical 
protection and safeguards and security will be ensured at the reactor 
sites by continued implementation of NRC requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ The ``Stored Weapons Standard'' for weapons-usable fissile 
materials storage was initially defined in Management and 
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, National Academy of 
Sciences, 1994. DOE defines the Stored Weapons Standard as follows: 
The high standards of security and accounting for the storage of 
intact nuclear weapons should be maintained, to the extent 
practical, for weapons-usable fissile materials throughout 
dismantlement, storage, and disposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Environmentally Preferable Alternatives

    The environmentally preferable alternative is the No Action 
Alternative. Under this alternative, surplus weapons-usable plutonium 
materials in storage at various DOE sites would remain at those 
locations. The vast majority of pits would continue to be stored at 
Pantex, and the remaining plutonium in various forms would continue to 
be stored at Hanford, INEEL, LLNL, LANL, RFETS, and SRS. The No Action 
Alternative would not satisfy the purpose and need for the proposed 
action because DOE's disposition decisions in the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS ROD would not be implemented. That ROD announced that, 
consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS, DOE had decided to reduce, over time, the number of 
locations where the various forms of plutonium are stored, through a 
combination of storage and disposition alternatives. Implementation of 
much of this decision requires the movement of surplus materials to 
disposition facility locations. Without disposition facilities, only 
pits that have been moved from RFETS to Pantex would be relocated in 
accordance with the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD. All other surplus 
materials would continue to be stored indefinitely at their current 
locations, with the exception that DOE is considering leaving the 
repackaged surplus pits in Zone 4 at Pantex for long-term storage 
instead of zone 12 as originally planned. An appropriate environmental 
review will be conducted when the specific proposal for this change has 
been determined (e.g., whether additional magazines need to be air-
conditioned). The analysis in the SPD EIS assumes that the surplus pits 
are stored in Zone 12 in accordance with the ROD for the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS.
    Among the ``action'' alternatives analyzed in the SPD EIS, the 
environmentally preferable action alternative is the 50-Metric-Ton 
Immobilization Alternative with the Immobilization and Pit Conversion 
facilities located at SRS. This alternative would involve immobilizing 
all 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium at SRS. Under this alternative, 
only two facilities, the pit conversion facility and the immobilization 
facility, would be needed to accomplish the surplus plutonium 
disposition mission. Both the pit conversion and immobilization 
facilities would be new construction near the area currently designated 
for the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility in F-Area. In addition, 
the canister receipt area at DWPF in S-Area would be modified to 
accommodate receipt and processing of the canisters transferred from 
the immobilization facility for filling with vitrified high-level 
waste. The pit conversion and immobilization facilities would be the 
same as those described for the Preferred Alternative, except that all 
the plutonium dioxide produced in the pit conversion facility would be 
transferred to the immobilization facility. To accommodate the 
additional 33 metric tons of plutonium that would be received from the 
pit conversion facility, the immobilization facility would be operated 
at a higher throughput (5 metric tons per year rather than 1.7 metric 
tons per year), and the operating workforce at the immobilization 
facility would be increased.

Comparison of Preferred Alternative to Other Alternatives

    The Preferred Alternative requires the construction and operation 
of three new facilities; some minor modifications to, and work at, two 
existing DOE facilities; and use of existing domestic, commercial 
nuclear reactors for MOX fuel irradiation. The other hybrid 
alternatives would require the same facilities and activities; the 
immobilization-only alternatives would require the construction and 
operation of only two facilities. The environmentally preferable 
alternative, which is the No Action Alternative, does not involve 
construction or operation of any facilities, or use of new or existing 
facilities, other than those currently in use for the continued storage 
of the surplus plutonium. Furthermore, no transportation would be 
involved for the No Action

[[Page 1615]]

Alternative, and continued storage under this alternative would not 
affect any key environmental resource area at any of the seven storage 
locations. However, there would be doses to workers and the general 
population (and associated health effects) throughout the storage 
period at all of these locations. At SRS, the health effects from 50 
years of storage under the No Action Alternative would be lower than 
those associated with implementation of the Preferred Alternative. 
Nonetheless, the Preferred Alternative would still contribute to the 
dose and associated health effects at locations where supporting 
activities like lead assembly fabrication and post-irradiation 
examination would occur.
    The environmentally preferable action alternative, which is an 
immobilization-only alternative, would require the construction and 
operation of two, rather than three, facilities. For all of the key 
environmental resource areas except transportation and worker dose, the 
potential impacts of the Preferred Alternative are greater than for the 
environmentally preferable action alternative, although for most of the 
resource areas, the difference is less than 20 percent. The estimated 
LCFs and traffic fatalities are higher for the environmentally 
preferable action alternative, although both are well below one LCF. 
Worker dose is the same for both the preferred and the environmentally 
preferable action alternatives.
    Relative ranking of the Preferred Alternative to other action 
alternatives varies by resource area. For all alternatives evaluated in 
the SPD EIS, the incremental concentrations of criteria air pollutant 
concentrations would be less than 2 percent of the applicable 
regulatory standard. The relative ranking of Preferred Alternative to 
the other action alternatives varies with the specific pollutant; for 
some, the Preferred Alternative ranks higher, for others, lower. The 
Preferred Alternative produces more, by approximately 5 to 25 percent, 
regulated waste than any of the other action alternatives.
    All of the action alternatives would generate employment 
opportunities at each of the proposed facilities. In general, the 
Preferred Alternative requires the greatest number of construction and 
operation workers of all the action alternatives. However, for one 
alternative, approximately 5 percent more construction workers would be 
needed. The amount of land that would be disturbed for implementing any 
of the alternatives is relatively small. The Preferred Alternative 
requires the most land disturbance, and could potentially affect 
cultural resource areas at SRS. However, as previously discussed in 
this ROD, DOE currently plans to mitigate impacts by avoiding sites 
that are eligible or potentially eligible for the National Register of 
Historic Places. SRS is the only candidate site at which cultural 
resource issues involving the proposed action have been identified. The 
action alternative with the least amount of land disturbance uses 
existing facilities at Hanford.
    Because of the location of the proposed facilities relative to 
other activities at the sites, radiation doses would be received by 
construction workers at both INEEL and SRS. Doses to workers from 
construction and operation activities for each of the action 
alternatives could result in approximately 2.0 LCFs, with essentially 
no difference among any of the alternatives. There will be no dose (and 
therefore, no LCFs) to the general population for any of the action 
alternatives during construction of the proposed facilities. Although 
there is a small population dose associated with each of the action 
alternatives, no LCFs are expected to occur in the general population 
from routine operations for any of the alternatives. The most severe 
nonreactor design basis accident postulated for the Preferred 
Alternative, and all but one other action alternative, is a design 
basis fire in the pit conversion facility resulting in a tritium 
release. The resulting dose is highest for the Preferred Alternative, 
however, the associated dose would not be expected to result in any 
LCFs in the general population. None of the action alternatives is 
expected to result in traffic fatalities from nonradiological accidents 
or LCFs from radiological exposures or vehicle emissions. Impacts 
estimated for routine operations and postulated accidents at the 
reactor sites would be identical for all the hybrid alternatives.

Comments on Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final EIS

    After issuing the SPD Final EIS, the Department received two 
letters. All of the issues raised in these letters have been covered in 
the body of the SPD Final EIS and in the Comment Response Document. The 
first letter contained a single comment requesting that the decision on 
a location for the lead assembly work retain the flexibility to allow 
doing the work at SRS. Based on consideration of the capabilities of 
the candidate sites and input from the team chosen for the MOX 
approach, the Department has decided to use LANL for fabrication of MOX 
fuel rods for use in fabrication of lead assemblies. LANL was selected 
because it already has facilities that will not require major 
modifications for fuel rod fabrication, and takes advantage of existing 
infrastructure and staff experience. Additionally, the surplus 
plutonium dioxide needed to fabricate the MOX fuel rods for lead 
assemblies will already be on site.
    The second letter contained numerous comments that opposed the use 
of MOX fuel in commercial power reactors. The commentor believes that 
the selection process of DCS and the commercial reactors was not opened 
to sufficient public scrutiny. The commentor repeated an earlier 
request that the Department hold additional public meetings in the 
vicinity of the three reactor sites before closing the public comment 
period, and that all information on the MOX project, including data 
submitted by DCS, DOE's Environmental Critique, and ORNL's data on 
expected radionuclide activities in MOX fuel, be made available to the 
public. During the public comment period on the Supplement to the SPD 
Draft EIS, which included specific reactor analyses, DOE held a public 
hearing in Washington, D.C., on June 15, 1999, and invited comments. 
While no additional hearings were held on the Supplement, other means 
were provided for the public to express their concerns and provide 
comments: mail; a toll-free telephone and fax line; and the Office of 
Fissile Materials Disposition Web-site. Also, at the invitation of 
South Carolina State Senator Phil Leventis, DOE attended and 
participated in a public hearing held on June 24, 1999, in Columbia, 
South Carolina.
    Most of the information in DOE's Environmental Critique was 
included in the Environmental Synopsis released for public review; only 
proprietary and business-sensitive information was removed. The Duke, 
COGEMA, and Stone & Webster (DCS) team provided DOE with analyses of 
the environmental and computer modeling data, and population 
projections, but not the input data. The ratio of low-enriched uranium 
fuel to MOX fuel, provided by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, is 
contained in the SPD Final EIS. Because the accident calculations are 
voluminous, they are not included in the SPD EIS. The calculations 
contain all of the input parameters including the MACCS2 computer 
files. Principal input parameters, such as accident source terms and 
population distributions, are included in the EIS.
    The same commentor expressed concern that experience with the use 
of MOX fuel in the United States, as well

[[Page 1616]]

as internationally, is limited. The fabrication of MOX fuel and its use 
in commercial reactors has been accomplished in Western Europe. DOE 
would draw upon this experience in its disposition of the U.S. surplus 
plutonium. Electricite de France reactors in France have seen little or 
no impact from the use of MOX fuel on radionuclide releases in 
effluents. No change would be expected from normal operations, given 
that MOX fuel performs as well as LEU fuel and the fission products are 
retained within the fuel cladding. FRAGEMA's (a subsidiary of COGEMA 
and FRAMATOME) experience with fabricating MOX fuel indicates a fuel 
rod fission product leak rate of less than one-tenth of 1 percent. 
FRAGEMA has provided 1,253 MOX fuel assemblies, containing more than 
300,000 fuel rods, for commercial reactor use. There have been no 
failures and leaks have occurred in only 3 assemblies (a total of 4 
rods). All leaks occurred as a result of debris in the reactor coolant 
system and occurred in 1997 or earlier. French requirements for debris 
removal were changed in 1997 to alleviate these concerns. Since that 
time, there have been no leaks in MOX fuel rods. Further, as discussed 
in response DCR009-1 of the Comment Response Document, NRC would 
evaluate license applications and monitor the operations of the 
commercial reactors to ensure adequate margins of safety.
    The commentor was also concerned that human and technical errors 
may lead to safety hazards at the reactors if MOX fuel is used. 
Particular safety issues were identified at McGuire, North Anna and 
Catawba (e.g., ice condenser problems and corrosion of service water 
pipes and auxiliary feedwater pipes). While the Department acknowledges 
that there are differences in the use of MOX fuel compared to LEU fuel, 
these differences are not expected to decrease the safety of the 
reactors. NRC has not considered it necessary to restrict operation of 
any of the other reactors in the United States that use ice condenser 
containments. All of the factors discussed by the commentor were 
evaluated by the proposed reactor licensees to ensure that the 
reactors, including those with ice condensers, can continue to operate 
safely using MOX fuel, and these factors will continue to be evaluated. 
Before any MOX fuel is used in the United States, NRC would have to 
perform a comprehensive safety review that would include information 
prepared by the reactor plant operators as part of their license 
amendment applications.
    Another issue raised by the same comentor concerned the stability 
of plutonium compared to uranium and the alleged reduction in the 
ability to control the chain reaction when plutonium is added to the 
reactor in the form of MOX fuel. Differences between MOX fuel and 
uranium fuel are well characterized and can be accommodated through 
fuel and core design. All of the factors discussed by the commentor 
were evaluated by the proposed reactor licensees to ensure that the 
reactors can continue to operate safely using MOX fuel and will 
continue to be evaluated. Initial evaluations indicate that partial MOX 
fuel cores have a more negative fuel Doppler coefficient at hot zero 
power and hot full power, relative to LEU fuel cores for all times 
during the full cycle. These evaluations also indicate that partial MOX 
cores have a more negative moderator coefficient at hot zero power and 
hot full power, relative to LEU fuel cores for all times during the 
full cycle. These more negative temperature coefficients would act to 
shut the reactor down more rapidly during a heatup transient.
    The commentor expressed concern that higher energy neutrons from 
plutonium are more likely to strike reactor parts such as the stainless 
steel containment vessel and degrade the metal parts of the reactor, 
resulting in embrittlement problems. Reactor vessel embrittlement is a 
condition in which the fast neutron fluence from the reactor core 
reduces the toughness (fracture resistance) of the reactor vessel 
metal. Analyses performed for the Department indicate that the core 
average fast flux in a partial MOX fuel core is comparable, within 3 
percent, to the core average fast flux for a uranium fuel core. All of 
the reactors identified for the MOX mission have a comprehensive 
program of reactor vessel analysis and surveillance in place to ensure 
that NRC reactor vessel safety limits are not exceeded.
    The commentor was also concerned that the use of MOX fuel would 
result in additional harmful radiation exposure to the public during a 
failure of the reactor containment structure. The commentor noted a 
study by the Nuclear Control Institute estimating that the risk to the 
public near McGuire or Catawba of contracting a deadly cancer following 
a severe accident will increase by nearly 40 percent when the plants 
start using plutonium fuel. DOE believes NCI's analysis overestimates 
the risk of using MOX fuel for two reasons. NCI's analysis did not 
account for the plutonium polishing step which has been added to the 
MOX fuel fabrication process. This step eliminates nearly all of the 
americium from fresh MOX fuel, which significantly reduces the actinide 
inventory. In addition, NCI performed a generic reactor analysis while 
DOE performed plant specific analyses.
    Analyses of a 40 percent weapons-grade MOX core indicate there 
would be approximately two times more americium-241 and plutonium-239, 
and slightly less than one and a half times the curium-242 than a 
reactor using LEU fuel. There are differences in the expected risk of 
reactor accidents from the use of MOX fuel. Some accidents would be 
expected to result in lower consequences to the surrounding population, 
and lower risks, while others would be expected to result in higher 
consequences and higher risks. There is an increase in risk, about 3 
percent, for the large-break loss-of-coolant accident (the bounding 
design basis accident). The largest increase in risk for beyond-design-
basis accidents is approximately 14 percent for an interfacing systems 
loss-of-coolant accident at North Anna. In the unlikely event that this 
beyond-design-basis accident were to occur, the expected number of LCFs 
would increase from 2,980 to 3,390 with a partial MOX core and prompt 
fatalities would increase from 54 to 60. Both of these accidents have 
an extremely low probability of occurrence. At North Anna, the 
likelihood of a large-break loss-of-coolant accident occurring is 
estimated at 1 chance in 48,000 per year and the likelihood of an 
interfacing systems loss-of-coolant accident occurring is estimated at 
1 chance in 4.2 million per year.
    Another issue raised by the commentor concerned timely and adequate 
emergency response to a MOX fuel accident due to limited resources of 
volunteer first responders. The subject of emergency response and 
subsequent cleanup of an accident that involves the release of nuclear 
materials is a topic of continuing discussion and planning between DOE 
and State, local, and tribal officials. Prior to any shipment of 
hazardous material, a transportation plan will be developed which 
includes details of emergency preparedness, security, and coordination 
of DOE with local emergency response authorities. Any additional 
training or equipment needed would be provided as part of the planning 
process. In addition, DOE maintains eight regional coordinating offices 
across the country, staffed 24 hours per day, 365 days per year to 
offer advice and assistance. Radiological Assistance Program teams are 
available to provide field monitoring, sampling, decontamination, 
communication, and other services.

[[Page 1617]]

    As described in Appendix L of the SPD EIS, DOE anticipates that 
transportation required for the disposition of surplus plutonium would 
be done through DOE's Safe Secure Transport system. Since the 
establishment of the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division in 1975, 
the Safe Secure Transport system has transported DOE-owned cargo over 
more than 151 million kilometers (91 million miles) with no accidents 
causing a fatality or release of radioactive material.

Other Considerations

Cost Reports

    To assist in the preparation of this ROD, DOE's Office of Fissile 
Materials Disposition prepared two cost reports. The first is Cost 
Analysis in Support of Site Selection for Surplus Weapons-Usable 
Plutonium Disposition (DOE/MD-0009; July 1998). This report provides 
site-specific cost information and analyses to support the selection of 
a preferred siting alternative for the alternatives considered in the 
SPD EIS. The second report is Plutonium Disposition Life Cycle Costs 
and Cost-Related Comment Resolution Document (DOE/MD-0013; November 
1999). This report provides full life cycle costs for the Preferred 
Alternative as stated in the SPD EIS. It also contains the Department's 
responses to cost related comments submitted during the public review 
of the SPD Draft EIS.
Cost Analysis in Support of Site Selection
    The summary costs listed below do not include the costs that would 
be the same, independent of where the facility is sited. Therefore, the 
costs are not full life cycle costs. The costs are presented in 
constant year 1997 dollars. Cost estimates for each of the required 
disposition facilities (Pit Disassembly and Conversion; MOX Fuel 
Fabrication; and Immobilization), including the additional supporting 
infrastructure, were created for each candidate site and were 
aggregated into two cost categories (1) design and construction and (2) 
operational. The cost estimates are considered to have an accuracy of 
plus or minus 40 percent for design, construction, and decommissioning, 
and an accuracy of plus or minus 20 percent for operations.
    Hybrid Alternatives (Alternatives 2 through 10 in the SPD EIS). The 
estimated costs to design and construct the required facilities range 
from $1.21 billion to $1.40 billion, and estimated operational costs 
range from $1.40 billion to $1.58 billion. The total costs for the 
hybrid alternatives range from $2.67 billion to $2.93 billion. The 
total cost of the hybrid alternatives would be reduced by the value of 
the MOX fuel provided to the participating reactors; at the time of 
this estimate the total cost after credit for the ``fuel offset'' was 
$1.71 billion to $2.01 billion.15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility would produce nuclear 
fuel that will displace LEU fuel that utilities would otherwise 
purchase. The value of this fuel, deemed the MOX fuel offset, is 
estimated to be $920 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Immobilization-Only Alternatives (Alternatives 11 and 12 in the SPD 
EIS). The estimated costs to design and construct the required 
facilities range from $0.73 billion to $0.89 billion and the 
operational costs range from $0.97 billion to $1.0 billion. The 
Immobilization Only Alternatives range from $1.71 billion to $1.90 
billion. The cost of the alternatives differ by approximately ten 
percent, well within the uncertainty of the cost estimates.
Life Cycle Cost for the Preferred Alternative
    The summary cost listed below is the cost for the Preferred 
Alternative. The cost includes the cost of siting, construction, and 
operation of plutonium disposition facilities at DOE's Savannah River 
Site, as well as the cost associated with the irradiation of the MOX 
fuel in commercial reactors. In addition, the cost includes such costs 
as sunk (already spent) funds, and costs for developing and 
demonstrating the plutonium disposition technologies, transporting the 
plutonium and plutonium disposition products, start-up and deactivation 
and decommissioning of the three facilities. The costs are based upon 
the Cost Analysis in Support of Site Selection for Surplus Weapons-
Usable Plutonium Disposition, DOE/MD-0009, July 22, 1998.
    The total cost of implementing the Preferred Alternative is 
estimated to be $4.07 billion in constant year 2000 dollars. The 
increase in cost over the 1998 estimate is primarily attributable to 
addition of life cycle costs specifically omitted from the 1998 cost 
report, technical program changes, specifically the increased size of 
the immobilization facility and the addition of the polishing step to 
the MOX fuel fabrication process, plus other cost changes (e.g., 
inflation).

Nonproliferation Assessment

    To assist in the development of this ROD, DOE's Office of Arms 
Control and Nonproliferation, with support from the Office of Fissile 
Materials Disposition, prepared a report, Nonproliferation and Arms 
Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and 
Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (DOE/NN-0007, January 1997). The 
report was issued in draft form in October 1996, and following a public 
comment period, was issued in final form in January 1997. It analyzes 
the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the 
alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of 
excess plutonium. It is based in part on a Proliferation Vulnerability 
Red Team Report (SAND97-8203. UC-700, October 1996) prepared for the 
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition by Sandia National Laboratory. 
The assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each 
option. Some of the ``options'' and ``alternatives'' discussed in the 
Nonproliferation Assessment are listed as ``variants'' (such as can-in-
canister) in the Storage and Disposition Final PEIS. The following 
paragraphs discuss key conclusions of the report, as modified to meet 
current conditions.
Disposition of U.S. Excess Plutonium
    Each of the alternatives for disposition of excess weapons 
plutonium that meets the Spent Fuel Standard 16 would, if 
implemented appropriately, offer major nonproliferation and arms 
reduction benefits compared to leaving the material in storage in 
directly weapons-usable form. Taking into account the likely impact on 
Russian disposition activities, the no-action alternative appears to be 
by far the least desirable of the plutonium disposition options from a 
non-proliferation and arms reduction perspective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ ``Spent Fuel Standard'' is a term coined by the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS, 1994, Management and Disposition of Excess 
Weapons Plutonium, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pg 12) 
and modified by DOE (glossary from Office of Fissile Materials 
Disposition web site at http://www.doe-md.com) denoting the main 
objective of alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium: 
that such plutonium be made roughly as inaccessible and unattractive 
for weapons use as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium in 
civilian spent fuel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Carrying out disposition of excess U.S. weapons plutonium, using 
alternatives that ensured effective non-proliferation controls and 
resulted in forms meeting the Spent Fuel Standard, would:
     Reduce the likelihood that current arms reductions would 
be reversed, by significantly increasing the difficulty, cost, and 
observability of returning this plutonium to weapons;
     Increase international confidence in the arms reduction 
process,

[[Page 1618]]

strengthening political support for the non-proliferation regime and 
providing a base for additional arms reductions, if desired;
     Reduce long-term proliferation risks posed by this 
material by further helping to ensure that weapons-usable material does 
not fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups; and
     Lay the essential foundation for parallel disposition of 
excess Russian plutonium, reducing the risks that Russia might threaten 
U.S. security by rebuilding its Cold War nuclear weapons arsenal, or 
that this material might be stolen for use by potential proliferators.
    Choosing the ``no-action alternative'' of leaving U.S. excess 
plutonium in storage in weapons-usable form indefinitely, rather than 
carrying out disposition:
     Would represent a clear reversal of the U.S. position 
seeking to reduce excess stockpiles of weapons-usable materials 
worldwide;
     Would make it impossible to achieve disposition of Russian 
excess plutonium;
     Could undermine international political support for non-
proliferation efforts by leaving open the question of whether the 
United States was maintaining an option for rapid reversal of current 
arms reductions; and
     Could undermine progress in nuclear arms reductions.
    The benefits of placing U.S. excess plutonium under international 
monitoring and then transforming it into forms that met the Spent Fuel 
Standard would be greatly increased, and the risks of these steps 
significantly decreased, if Russia took comparable steps with its own 
excess plutonium on a parallel track. The two countries need not use 
the same plutonium disposition technologies. However, as the 1994 NAS 
committee report concluded, options for disposition of U.S. excess 
weapons plutonium will provide maximum nonproliferation and arms 
control benefits if they:
     Minimize the time during which the excess plutonium is 
stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons;
     Preserve material safeguards and security during the 
disposition process, seeking to maintain to the extent possible the 
same high standards of security and accounting applied to stored 
nuclear weapons (the Stored Weapons Standard);
     Result in a form in which the plutonium would be as 
inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as the larger and growing 
quantity of plutonium in commercial spent fuel (the Spent Fuel 
Standard).
    In order to achieve the benefits of plutonium disposition as 
rapidly as possible, and to minimize the risks and negative signals 
resulting from leaving the excess plutonium in storage, it is important 
for disposition options to begin, and to complete the mission as soon 
as practicable, taking into account non-proliferation, environment, 
safety, and health, and economic constraints. Timing should be a key 
criterion in judging disposition alternatives. Beginning the 
disposition quickly is particularly important to establishing the 
credibility of the process, domestically and internationally.
    Each of the alternatives under consideration for plutonium 
disposition:
     Has its own advantages and disadvantages with respect to 
non-proliferation and arms control, but none is clearly superior to the 
others;
     Can potentially provide high levels of security and 
safeguards for nuclear materials during the disposition process, 
mitigating the risk of theft of nuclear materials; and
     Can potentially provide for effective international 
monitoring of the disposition process.
    Plutonium disposition can only reduce, not eliminate, the security 
risks posed by the existence of excess plutonium, and will involve some 
risks of its own. Because all plutonium disposition alternatives would 
take decades to complete, disposition is not a near-term solution to 
the problem of nuclear theft and smuggling. While disposition will make 
a long-term contribution, the near-term problem must be addressed 
through programs to improve security and safeguarding for nuclear 
materials, and to ensure adequate police, customs, and intelligence 
capabilities to interdict nuclear smuggling. All plutonium disposition 
alternatives under consideration would involve processing and transport 
of plutonium, which will involve more risk of theft in the short term 
than if the material had remained in heavily guarded storage, in return 
for the long-term benefit of converting the material to more 
proliferation-resistant forms.
    Both the United States and Russia will still retain substantial 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials 
after disposition of the fissile materials currently considered excess 
is complete. These weapons and materials will continue to pose a 
security challenge regardless of what is done with excess plutonium. 
None of the disposition alternatives under consideration would make it 
impossible to recover the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, or make 
it impossible to use other plutonium to rebuild a nuclear arsenal. 
Therefore, disposition will only reduce, not eliminate, the risk of 
reversal of current nuclear arms reductions. A United States decision 
to choose reactor alternatives for plutonium disposition could offer 
additional arguments and justifications to those advocating plutonium 
reprocessing and recycle in other countries. This could increase the 
proliferation risk if it in fact led to significant additional 
separation and handling of weapons-usable plutonium. On the other hand, 
if appropriately implemented, plutonium disposition might also offer an 
opportunity to develop improved procedures and technologies for 
protecting and safeguarding plutonium, which could reduce proliferation 
risks and would strengthen United States efforts to reduce the 
stockpiles of separated plutonium in other countries.
    Large-scale bulk processing of plutonium, including processes to 
convert plutonium pits to oxide and prepare other forms for 
disposition, as well as fuel fabrication or immobilization processes, 
represents the stage of the disposition process when material is most 
vulnerable to covert theft by insiders or covert diversion by the host 
state. However, such bulk processing is required for all disposition 
alternatives. In particular, initial processing of plutonium pits and 
other forms is among the most proliferation sensitive stages of the 
disposition process, but it is largely common to all the options.
    Transport of plutonium is the point in the disposition process when 
the material is most vulnerable to overt armed attacks designed to 
steal plutonium. With sufficient resources devoted to security, 
however, high levels of protection against such overt attacks can be 
provided.
Conclusions Relating to Specific Disposition Technologies
    Reactor technology will meet the Spent Fuel Standard. Reactor 
technology has some advantage over the immobilization technology with 
respect to perceived irreversibility, in that the plutonium would be 
converted from weapons-grade to reactor-grade, even though it is 
possible to produce nuclear weapons with both weapons and reactor-grade 
plutonium. However, the immobilization technology has some advantage 
over the reactor technology in avoiding the perception that the latter 
approach could potentially encourage additional separation and civilian 
use of plutonium, which itself poses

[[Page 1619]]

proliferation risks. Because reactor technology results in accountable 
``items'' (for purposes of international safeguards) whose plutonium 
content can be accurately measured, this approach offers some advantage 
in accounting to ensure that the output plutonium matches the input 
plutonium from the process. The principal uncertainty with respect to 
using excess weapons plutonium as MOX fuel in domestic reactors relates 
to the potential difficulty of gaining political and regulatory 
approvals for the various operations required.
    Immobilization technology (can-in-canister) is being refined 
resulting in an increase in the resistance to separation of the 
plutonium cans from the surrounding glass, with the goal of meeting the 
Spent Fuel Standard. The immobilization options have the potential to 
be implemented more quickly than the reactor options. They face 
somewhat less political uncertainty but somewhat more technical 
uncertainty than the reactor options.
    The ``can-in-canister'' immobilization options have a timing 
advantage over the homogeneous immobilization options, in that, by 
potentially relying on existing facilities, they could begin several 
years sooner. As noted above, however, modified systems intended to 
allow this option to meet the Spent Fuel Standard are still being 
designed.

Decisions 17
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ included in these decisions is the Department's decision to 
fulfill the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security agreement to apply 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to surplus plutonium 
as soon as it is practical. Further, consistent with a Presidential 
Directive, the Department is continuing to work towards maximizing 
the quantities of materials eligible for International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the January 1997 decision on the Storage and 
Disposition PEIS, the Department of Energy is affirming its decision to 
use a hybrid approach for the safe and secure disposition of up to 50 
metric tons of surplus plutonium using both immobilization and mixed 
oxide fuel technologies and to construct and operate three new 
facilities at its Savannah River Site. The hybrid approach allows for 
the immobilization of approximately 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium 
and the use of up to 33 metric tons as mixed oxide fuel which would be 
irradiated in commercial reactors.

Construction and Operation of a Pit Disassembly and Conversion 
Facility

    Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the SPD Final EIS, the 
Department has decided to construct and operate a new pit conversion 
facility at SRS for the purpose of disassembling nuclear weapons pits 
and converting the plutonium metal to a declassified oxide form 
suitable for international inspection and disposition, using either 
immobilization or MOX/reactor approaches. SRS was selected for the pit 
conversion facility because the site has extensive experience with 
plutonium processing, and the pit conversion facility complements 
existing missions and takes advantage of existing infrastructure.

Construction and Operation of an Immobilization Facility and 
Selection of an Immobilization Technology 18
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ The Department intends to use essentially all of the 
plutonium oxide produced by the Pit Disassembly and Conversion 
Facility as feed material for mixed oxide fuel. However, some small 
amounts may be unsuitable for this purpose and will be shipped to 
the Immobilization Facility for disposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the SPD Final EIS, the 
Department has decided to construct and operate a new immobilization 
facility at SRS using the ceramic can-in-canister technology. This 
technology will be used to immobilize approximately 17 metric tons of 
surplus plutonium in a ceramic form, seal it in cans, and place the 
cans in canisters filled with borosilicate glass containing intensely 
radioactive high-level waste at the existing Defense Waste Processing 
Facility. The decision is based, in part, on the fact that the can-in-
canister approach at SRS complements existing missions, takes advantage 
of existing infrastructure and staff expertise, and enables DOE to use 
an existing facility (DWPF). The ceramic can-in-canister approach will 
also provide better performance in a geologic repository and provide 
greater proliferation resistance than the glass can-in-canister 
approach.

Construction and Operation of a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication 
Facility and Irradiation in Commercial Reactors

    Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the SPD Final EIS, the 
Department has decided to construct and operate a new facility at SRS 
to produce MOX fuel containing up to 33 metric tons of surplus weapons-
usable plutonium for irradiation in existing domestic, commercial 
reactors. The decision to use SRS is made, in part, because this 
activity complements existing missions and takes advantage of existing 
infrastructure and staff expertise. Based on this selection, the 
Department will authorize DCS to fully implement the base contract.
    As previously stated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD (62 FR 
3014, January 21, 1997), the use of MOX fuel in existing reactors will 
be undertaken in a manner that is consistent with the United States' 
policy objective on the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament 
process and the United States' policy discouraging the civilian use of 
plutonium. To this end, implementing the MOX alternative will include 
government ownership and control of the MOX fuel fabrication facility 
at a DOE site, and use of the facility only for the surplus plutonium 
disposition program. There will be no reprocessing or subsequent reuse 
of spent MOX fuel. The MOX fuel will be used in a once-through fuel 
cycle in existing reactors, with appropriate arrangements, including 
contractual or licensing provisions limiting use of MOX fuel to surplus 
plutonium disposition.

Selection of a Site for Lead Assembly Fabrication

    Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the SPD EIS, the 
Department has decided to use LANL for fabrication of MOX fuel rods for 
use in fabrication of lead assemblies. Based on consideration of the 
capabilities of the candidate sites and input from the team chosen for 
the MOX approach, LANL was selected because it already has facilities 
(i.e., Technical Area 55) that will not require major modifications in 
order to fabricate fuel rods, and takes advantage of existing 
infrastructure and staff experience. Additionally, the surplus 
plutonium dioxide needed to fabricate the MOX fuel rods for lead 
assemblies will already be on site.
    At this time, however, no decision is being made as to which 
facility at LANL will be used for final assembly of the MOX fuel rods 
into lead assemblies. DOE is currently evaluating whether there may be 
the need for additional environmental analysis to support the final 
stages of lead assembly fabrication at LANL. Pending completion of that 
review, DOE is deferring a decision as to where on the LANL site this 
final lead assembly work will be done.

Selection of a Site for Post-Irradiation Examination of Lead 
Assemblies

    If post-irradiation examination is necessary for the purpose of 
qualifying the MOX fuel for commercial reactor use, the Department has 
decided to perform that task at ORNL, consistent with the Preferred 
Alternative in the SPD Final EIS. ORNL has the existing

[[Page 1620]]

facilities and staff expertise needed to perform post-irradiation 
examination as a matter of its routine activities and no major 
modifications to facilities or processing capabilities would be 
required. In addition, ORNL is only about 500 km from the reactor site 
that would irradiate the fuel, considerably closer than ANL--W, which 
is about 3,700 km away.

Use of MOX Fuel in Canadian Uranium Deuterium Reactors

    In the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD, DOE retained the option to 
use some of the surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in Canadian Uranium 
Deuterium (CANDU) reactors, which would have been undertaken only in 
the event that a multilateral agreement were negotiated among Russia, 
Canada, and the United States. Since the SPD Draft EIS was issued, DOE 
determined that adequate reactor capacity is available in the United 
States for disposition of that portion of the U.S. surplus plutonium 
suitable for MOX fuel. Therefore, DOE is no longer actively pursuing 
the CANDU option. However, the CANDU option is still being considered 
for the disposition of Russian surplus plutonium. To assist U.S., 
Russia, and Canada in considering this option the three countries are 
jointly conducting an experiment which will involve irradiating MOX 
fuel pins that have been fabricated from U.S. and Russian surplus 
weapons plutonium in a Canadian research reactor. This effort involves 
a one-time shipment of a small quantity of weapons plutonium from the 
U.S. to Canada.

Conclusion

    The Department of Energy has decided to disposition up to 50 metric 
tons of plutonium at SRS using a hybrid approach that involves both the 
ceramic can-in-canister immobilization approach and the MOX fuel 
approach. Approximately 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be 
immobilized in a ceramic form, placed in cans, and embedded in large 
canisters containing high-level vitrified waste for ultimate disposal 
in a geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 
Approximately 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be used to 
fabricate MOX fuel, which will be irradiated in existing domestic, 
commercial reactors. The reactors are the Catawba Nuclear Station near 
York, South Carolina; the McGuire Nuclear Station near Huntersville, 
North Carolina; and the North Anna Power Station near Mineral, 
Virginia. The resulting spent fuel will be placed in a geologic 
repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Pursuing this 
hybrid approach provides the best opportunity for U.S. leadership in 
working with Russia to implement similar options for reducing Russia's 
excess plutonium in parallel. Further, it sends the strongest possible 
signal to the world of U.S. determination to reduce stockpiles of 
surplus weapons-usable plutonium as quickly as possible and in an 
irreversible manner. Pursuing both immobilization and MOX fuel 
fabrication also provides important insurance against uncertainties of 
implementing either approach by itself. The construction of new 
facilities for the disposition of surplus U.S. plutonium would not take 
place unless there is significant progress on plans for plutonium 
disposition in Russia. In the plutonium disposition effort, the United 
States will work with Russia to develop acceptable methods and 
technologies for transparency measures, including appropriate 
international verification measures and stringent standards of physical 
protection, control, and accounting for the management of surplus 
plutonium.

    Issued in Washington, DC, January 4, 2000.
Bill Richardson,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-594 Filed 1-11-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P