[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 242 (Monday, December 17, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65000-65005]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-30970]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328]
Tennessee Valley Authority; Notice of Consideration of Issuance
of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos.
DRP-77 and DRP-79 issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the
licensee) for operation of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1
and 2, located in Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee.
The proposed amendments would change Technical Specifications (TSs)
to allow SQN to provide incore irradiation services for the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE). This change would allow TVA to insert up to
2256 tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) into the reactor
cores to support DOE in maintaining its tritium inventory for national
defense purposes. Each SQN core contains 193 fuel assemblies and each
fuel assembly contains 264 fuel rods. In this amendment request, TVA
proposes to insert up to 24 TPBARs in selected fuel assemblies
(adjacent to but not in place of the 264 fuel rods). The TPBARS absorb
neutrons and are similar to (and would replace) normal burnable neutron
absorber rods that serve to shape neutron flux in the core. The TPBARs
[[Page 65001]]
contain no fissile material and will be installed in fuel assemblies
where burnable absorber rods are normally placed in selected fuel
assemblies. Therefore, the TPBARs would fill the same role as burnable
absorber rods in the operation of the reactor. However, most of the
neutron absorber (lithium) in the TPBARs still remains at the end of
core life as compared to normal burnable neutron absorbers (boron or
gadolinium). Therefore, the proposed license amendments involve (1)
revising the measurement range for the source range neutron monitors
specified in TS Table 3.3-9, (2) increasing the required boron
concentration for both the cold leg accumulators (TS 3/4.5.1) and the
refueling water storage tank (RWST) (TS 3/4.5.5), (3) deleting the
boron concentration and spent fuel storage requirements and associated
Bases for the cask pit pool in TS Section 3/4.7.14 and Section 5.6, (4)
establishing a limit on the number of TPBARs that can be irradiated in
TS Section 5.3.1, (5) providing storage requirements for spent fuel
assemblies that contain TPBARs after irradiation in TS Section 5.6 and
the Bases for TS Section 3/4.7.13, and (6) implementing a TPBAR
consolidation activity. This submittal also provides proposed revisions
to the associated TS Bases in Section 3/4.6.4 regarding combustible gas
control. Changes (1) and (2) above are necessary because the uranium-
235 (U-235) enrichment of fuel assemblies containing TPBARs must be
increased (to no more than 4.95 weight percent) to compensate for the
higher neutron absorbing properties of the lithium-7 in the TPBARs. The
NRC has previously approved maximum U-235 fuel enrichments of 4.95
0.05 weight percent for SQN Units 1 and 2. Five percent
enrichment is the NRC's upper limit for reactor licensing. Therefore,
enrichments resulting from the proposed amendments are bounded by the
current SQN Operating License and licensing basis.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration in its application
dated September 21, 2001, which is presented below:
A. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated.
1.TS Table 3.3-9--Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation--Revised
Source Range Monitor Range
The backup source range monitors are for indication of unit
shutdown conditions only and do not perform any trip or mitigation
functions. The monitors are not active components such that they
could initiate a postulated accident and are not considered a
contributor to accident generation. Therefore, the lowering of the
indication range for this monitor will not increase the probability
of an accident.
Since the monitor has only an indication function, it does not
serve to mitigate postulated accidents. While the indications from
this monitor can help to identify changing core conditions and
promote actions to prevent undesired conditions, this is not a
mitigation function credited in the accident analysis and is
considered a diverse capability of the plant instrumentation system.
Therefore, the proposed change will not impact any credited accident
mitigation functions, and by improving shutdown monitoring
capability, will not [involve a significant] increase [in] the
[probability or] consequences of an accident [previously evaluated].
2.TS 3/4.5.1--Cold Leg Injection Accumulators--Boron Concentration
Increase
The accumulator boron concentration does not affect any
initiating event for accidents currently evaluated in the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The increased concentrations
will not adversely affect the performance of any system or component
which is placed in contact with the accumulator water. The integrity
and operability of the stainless steel surfaces in the accumulator
and affected nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) components/systems
will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH is small and will
not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the Class 1E
instrumentation and control equipment will be maintained since the
lower sump pH, resulting from the increased boron concentrations, is
still within the applicable equipment qualification limits. These
limits are set to preclude the possibility of chloride[-]induced
stress corrosion cracking and assure that there is no significant
degradation of polymer materials. The design, material and
construction standards of all components which are placed in contact
with the accumulator water remain unaffected. Therefore, the
possibility [probability] of an accident has not been increased.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the
UFSAR will not be increased. The change in the concentrations
increase the amount of boron in the sump during a loss-of-coolant
accident (LOCA). The increased boron in the sump is sufficient to
maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Testing has indicated
that TPBARs can experience cladding breach at Large Break LOCA
(LBLOCA) conditions if the cladding temperature and internal
pressure of the TPBARs reach limiting values. Consequently, the
post-LOCA critical boron calculations account[ed] for the potential
loss of a LiAlO2 [lithium aluminate] pencil, as well as partial
leaching of lithium from the remaining pencils. Based on
conservative assumptions, the calculations confirm that the tritium
production core will remain subcritical following a LOCA. Also, a
revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will be
implemented in the plant emergency operating procedures (EOPs).
Thus, there will be no added post-LOCA long-term cooling problems
associated with boron precipitation in the core following a large
break LOCA (LBLOCA).
An evaluation of the non-LOCA events shows that the accumulators
do not actuate. An increase in accumulator boron concentration would
have no effect on either the steam line break (SLB) at hot zero
power event, the feedwater line break event, or the spurious
operation of safety injection (SI) system event (events in which an
SI signal does occur). Therefore, there is no increase in
consequences of the non-LOCA events associated with the proposed
increase in accumulator boron concentration.
The accumulators are not assumed to actuate in the steam
generator tube rupture (SGTR) event analysis, and the SLB mass and
energy (M&E) release evaluation relies on control rods for shutdown
margin and assumes a minimum boron concentration. In addition, the
increase in accumulator boron concentrations and subsequent slight
decrease in containment sump and spray pH does not impact the LOCA
dose evaluation since the analysis of record does not credit sump pH
as an input or assumption regarding volatile iodine removal
efficiencies. Therefore, the present analysis remains bounding.
Also, the slight decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH has been
evaluated to not significantly impact the corrosion rate (and
subsequent generation of hydrogen) of aluminum and zinc inside
containment. Further, the decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH
has been evaluated to not affect the amount of hydrogen generated
from the post-LOCA radiolytic decomposition of the sump and core
solution. The likelihood of containment failure due to hydrogen
deflagration is therefore not impacted by pH changes.
In view of the preceding, it is concluded that the proposed
change in accumulator boron concentration will not increase the
radiological [probability or] consequences of an accident previously
evaluated in the UFSAR.
3. TS 3/4.5.5--Refueling Water Storage Tank--Boron Concentration
Increase
The RWST boron concentration does not affect any initiating
event for accidents
[[Page 65002]]
currently evaluated in the UFSAR. The increased concentration will
not adversely affect the performance of any system or component
which is placed in contact with the RWST water. The integrity and
operability of the stainless steel surfaces in the RWST and affected
NSSS components/systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution
pH is small and will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the
integrity of the Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will
be maintained since the lower sump pH, resulting from the increased
boron concentrations, is still within the applicable equipment
qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the
possibility of chloride induced stress corrosion cracking and assure
that there is no significant degradation of polymer materials. The
design, material and construction standards of all components which
are placed in contact with the RWST water remain unaffected.
Therefore, the probability of an accident has not changed.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the
UFSAR will not be increased. The change in the RWST boron
concentration increases the amount of boron in the sump following a
LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is sufficient to maintain the
core in a subcritical condition. Testing has indicated that TPBARs
can experience cladding breach at Large Break LOCA (LBLOCA)
conditions if the cladding temperature and internal pressure of the
TPBARs reach limiting values. Consequently, the post-LOCA critical
boron calculations accounted for the potential loss of a LiAiO2
pencil, as well as partial leaching of lithium from the remaining
pencils. Based on conservative assumptions, the calculations confirm
that the tritium production core will remain subcritical following a
LOCA. Also, a revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated
and will be implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no
added post-LOCA long-term cooling problems associated with boron
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
An evaluation of the non-LOCA events indicates that an SI
initiation occurs in the SLB at hot zero power event, the feedwater
line break event, and the spurious operation of the SI system event.
An increase in the RWST boron concentration would effectively reduce
the return to power subsequent to a SLB. Boration is not credited in
the feedwater line break analysis and the proposed boron increase is
conservatively bounded by the boron inputs to the spurious SI system
operation analysis. Therefore, there is no increase in consequences
of the non-LOCA events associated with the proposed increase in RWST
boron concentration.
The SLB M&E release evaluation relies on control rods for
shutdown margin and assumes a minimum boron concentration. For the
SGTR, the boron concentration in the accumulators and the RWST are
not modeled. In addition, the increase in RWST boron concentrations
and subsequent slight decrease in containment sump and spray pH does
not impact the LOCA dose evaluation. While higher pH helps maintain
volatile iodine in solution and lower pH drives the equilibrium to
favor volatile iodine in a gaseous state, the change in sump pH is
not sufficient to result in any measurable change in post-LOCA
releases.
Furthermore, current radiological analyses do not take credit
for volatile iodine removal efficiencies based on sump pH.
Therefore, since the change in pH is minimal, and no credit is taken
in release analysis, the present analysis remains bounding. Also,
the slight decrease in sump, core and spray fluid pH has been
evaluated to not significantly impact the corrosion rate (and
subsequent generation of hydrogen) of aluminum and zinc inside
containment and the present analysis remains bounding. Further, the
decreased sump, core and spray fluid pH has been evaluated to not
affect the amount of hydrogen generated from the radiolytic
decomposition of the sump and core solution and therefore will not
challenge containment integrity.
In view of the preceding, it is concluded that the proposed
change in RWST boron concentration will not increase the
radiological [probability or] consequences of an accident previously
evaluated in the UFSAR.
4. TS 3/4.7.14 and Bases--Cask Pit Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--
Deletion of Requirements
This change removes the provisions that allow and support the
storage of spent fuel in the cask pit pool. By eliminating this
provision, the potential for criticality events associated with
stored fuel in the cask pit pool is no longer credible. Not having
boron concentration requirements for the cask pit for storage
considerations is acceptable based on the removal of TS provisions
that would allow such storage. The boron concentration requirement
is not considered a contributor to accident generation and
therefore, this deletion does not increase the potential
[probability] for accident generation because spent fuel will not be
stored in this location. Likewise, the consequences of an accident
[previously evaluated] will not be [significantly] increased because
the dose generation source, in the form of spent fuel stored in the
cask pit, will not be allowed.
5. TS 5.3.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies
The insertion of TPBARs into the SQN reactor core does not
adversely affect reactor neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance;
therefore, they do not significantly increase the probability of
accidents or equipment malfunctions while in the reactor. The
neutronic behavior of the TPBARS mimics that of standard burnable
absorbers with only slight differences which are accommodated in the
core design. The reload safety analysis performed for SQN Units 1
and 2 prior to each refueling cycle will confirm that any minor
effects of TPBARS on the reload core will be within fuel design
limits.
As described in the [Department of Energy's] tritium production
core (TPC) topical [report, NDP-98-181, Revision 1], the TPBAR
design is robust to all accident conditions except the large break
LOCA (LBLOCA) where the rods are susceptible to failure. However,
the failure of TPBARs has been determined to have an insignificant
effect on the thermal hydraulic response of the core to this event,
and analysis has shown that the core will remain subcritical
following a LOCA.
The impacts of TPBARs on the radiological consequences for all
evaluated events are very small, and they remain within [well below]
10 CFR 100 regulatory limits. The additional offsite doses due to
tritium are small with respect to LOCA source terms and are well
within regulatory limits.
The TPBAR[s] could result in an increase in combustible gas
released to the containment in a LBLOCA. This increase was found to
be approximately 1495 scf which remains within the capability of the
recombiners.
Analysis has shown that TPBARs are not expected to fail during
Condition I through IV events [as described in Chapter 15 of the
UFSAR, Condition I being normal operation and operational
transients, Condition II being faults of moderate frequency,
Condition III being infrequent faults, and Condition IV being
limiting faults] with the exception of a LBLOCA and a fuel handling
accident. The radiological consequences of these events are [well]
within 10 CFR 100 limits. Therefore, there is no significant
increase in the [probability or] consequences of these previously
evaluated accidents.
6. TS 5.6 and TS 3/4.7.13 Bases--Design Features/Fuel Storage and Spent
Fuel Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--Revised Storage Requirements for
Fuel Assemblies Containing TPBARs
A specified amount of soluble boron is needed in the spent fuel
pool to provide margin to criticality sufficient to mitigate the
effects of the most serious spent fuel pool accident condition.
Previous spent fuel pool criticality safety analyses (for Type A
fuel) [spent fuel that has not hosted TPBARs] determined the
required amount of soluble boron to be 700 parts per million (ppm).
The new spent fuel pool criticality safety analysis accounting for
storage of Type T fuel [spent fuel that has hosted TPBARS] confirmed
that 700 ppm soluble boron still provides the required margin to
criticality. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the
consequences of previously evaluated accidents postulated for the
spent fuel pool. Additionally, the administrative controls for
loading the spent fuel pool are not changed and will continue to
maintain acceptable storage configurations consistent with the
analysis. Therefore, the proposed change will not [involve a
significant] increase [in] the probability [or consequences] of an
accident [previously evaluated].
7. TPBAR Consolidation Activity
TPBAR consolidation and associated handling activities are
designed to be consistent with the existing fuel handling and heavy
load handling processes and equipment currently utilized at the
facility, and are designed to preclude increased probability of an
accident previously evaluated.
Consequences of a fuel handling accident for fuel containing
TPBARs is evaluated and does not result in exceeding [or even
approaching]10 CFR Part 100 limits for off-site dose. All
consolidation and heavy load handling activities are designed such
that the current fuel handling accident scenario
[[Page 65003]]
remains bounding. Therefore the [probability or] consequences of an
accident previously evaluated [will not be significantly increased]
remains within acceptable limits.
B. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
1. TS Table 3.3-9--Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation--Revised
Source Range Monitor Range
The backup source range monitors are for indication of unit
shutdown conditions only and do not perform any trip or mitigation
functions. The monitors are not active components such that they
could initiate a postulated accident and are not considered a
contributor to accident generation. Therefore, the lowering of the
indication range for this monitor will not create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident [from any accident previously
evaluated].
2. TS 3/4.5.1--Cold Leg Injection Accumulators--Boron Concentration
Increase
The change to the accumulator concentration does not cause the
initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting
single failure. The change does not result in a condition where the
design, material, and construction standards of the accumulators and
other potentially affected NSSS components, that were applicable
prior to the changes, are altered. The integrity and operability of
the stainless steel surfaces in the accumulator and affected NSSS
components/systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH
is small and will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the
integrity of the Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will
be maintained during a LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting from
the increased boron concentrations, is still within the applicable
equipment qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the
possibility of chloride[-]induced stress corrosion cracking and
assure that there is no significant degradation of polymer
materials.
The changes in the concentrations increase the amount of boron
in the sump following a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is
sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Also, a
revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will be
implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
All systems, structures, and components previously required for
the mitigation of an event remain capable of fulfilling their
intended design function. The proposed change has no adverse
a[e]ffect on any safety-related system or component and does not
challenge the performance or integrity of any safety[-]related
system. Therefore, the proposed increase in accumulator boron
concentration does not create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. TS 3/4.5.5--Refueling Water Storage Tank--Boron Concentration
Increase
The change to the RWST concentration does not cause the
initiation of any accident nor create any new credible limiting
single failure. The change does not result in a condition where the
design, material, and construction standards of the RWST and other
potentially affected NSSS components, that were applicable prior to
the changes, are altered. The integrity and operability of the
stainless steel surfaces in the RWST and affected NSSS components/
systems will be maintained. The decrease in solution pH is small and
will not degrade the stainless steel. Also, the integrity of the
Class 1E instrumentation and control equipment will be maintained
during a LOCA since the lower sump pH, resulting from the increased
boron concentrations, is still within the applicable equipment
qualification limits. These limits are set to preclude the
possibility of chloride[-]induced stress corrosion cracking and
assure that there is no significant degradation of polymer
materials.
The changes in the concentrations increase the amount of boron
in the sump following a LOCA. The increased boron in the sump is
sufficient to maintain the core in a subcritical condition. Also, a
revised hot leg switchover time has been calculated and will be
implemented in the plant EOPs. Thus, there will be no boron
precipitation in the core following a LOCA.
All systems, structures, and components previously required for
the mitigation of an event remain capable of fulfilling their
intended design function. The proposed change has no adverse affect
on any safety-related system or component and does not challenge the
performance or integrity of any safety[-]related system. Therefore,
the proposed increase in RWST boron concentration does not create
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any
accident previously evaluated.
4. TS 3/4.7.14 and Bases--Cask Pit Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--
Deletion of Requirements
This change removes the provisions that allow and support the
storage of spent fuel in the cask pit pool. By eliminating this
provision, the potential for criticality events associated with
stored fuel in the cask pit pool is no longer credible. The boron
concentration requirement for the cask pit pool is not considered a
contributor to accident generation and therefore, this deletion does
not increase the [possibility of] potential for [a new or different
kind of] accident [from any accident previously evaluated]
generation because spent fuel will not be stored in this location.
5. TS 5.3.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies
TPBARS have been designed to be compatible with existing fuel
assemblies supplied by Framatome-ANP and its predecessor Framatome
Cogema Fuels and with conventional Burnable Poison Rod Assembly
(BPRA) handling tools, equipment, and procedures. Therefore, no new
[or different kind of] accidents or equipment malfunctions are
created by the handling of TPBARs. * * *
TPBARs use materials with known and predictable performance
characteristics and are compatible with pressurized water reactor
coolant. The TPBAR design has specifically included material similar
to those used in standard burnable absorber rods with the exception
of internal assemblies used in the production and retention of
tritium. As described in the TPC Topical Report, these materials are
compatible with the reactor coolant system (RCS) and core design.
Therefore, no new accidents or equipment malfunctions are created by
the presence of the TPBARs in the RCS.
Mechanical design criteria have been established to ensure that
TPBARs will not fail during Condition I or II events. Analysis has
shown that TPBARs, appropriately positioned in the core, operate
within the established thermal-hydraulic criteria. Due to the
expected high reliability of TPBAR components, the frequency of
TPBAR cladding failures is very small, such that multiple adjacent
TPBAR failures in limiting locations is not considered credible. In
addition, analysis has shown that if a single TPBAR fails
catastrophically in a high power location during normal operation
and the lithium is leached out, the global reactivity increase is
negligible and the local power peaking is small enough that DNBR
[departure from nucleate boiling ratio] limits and fuel rod
integrity are not challenged. Therefore, no new [or different kind
of] accidents or equipment malfunctions are created by the presence
of the TPBARs in the reactor.
Analysis has shown that TPBARs will not fail during Condition
III and IV events with the exception of a LBLOCA and a fuel handling
accident. The radiological consequences of these events are within
10 CFR 100 limits. Therefore, there is no significant increase in
consequences of these previously evaluated accidents.
TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor neutronic [or] thermal-
hydraulic performance, therefore they do not create the possibility
of [new or different kinds of] accidents or equipment malfunctions
of a different type [of accident] than previously evaluated while in
the reactor.
6. TS 5.6 and TS 3/4.7.13 Bases--Design Features/Fuel Storage and Spent
Fuel Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--Revised Storage Requirements for
Fuel Assemblies Containing TPBARs
The storage in the spent fuel pool of spent fuel that has
contained TPBARs is not a fundamental change in the use of the spent
fuel pool. Specific provisions have been made for burnup and cooling
time requirements in allowable configurations to ensure safe
storage. The same administrative program to control storage
requirements in the spent fuel pool will be utilized to handle Type
A and Type T spent fuel. Therefore, the possibility of a new or
different [kind of] accident than [any accident] previously
evaluated has not been created.
7. TPBAR Consolidation Activity
The consolidation and handling systems are designed to preclude
the possibility of a consolidating and/or handling event which could
damage more than 24 TPBARs. Therefore, this proposed amendment does
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any [accident] previously evaluated.
[[Page 65004]]
C. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
1. TS Table 3.3-9--Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation--Revised
Source Range Monitor Range
The backup source range monitors are for indication of unit
shutdown conditions only and do not perform any trip or mitigation
functions. The lowering of the monitor's range does allow improved
indication of core conditions with the TPCs. While this monitor does
not have any trip or accident mitigation functions, this change will
improve the ability to assess the conditions of the unit such that
necessary actions can be initiated to prevent undesired conditions.
Therefore, the proposed change will not reduce [does not involve a
significant reduction in] a margin of safety.
2. TS 3/4.5.1--Cold Leg Injection Accumulators--Boron Concentration
Increase
The change does not invalidate any of the non-LOCA safety
analysis results or conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety
analysis acceptance criteria continue to be met. The licensing basis
small break LOCA (SBLOCA) analysis does not credit the accumulator
boron and is not affected by the proposed change. Therefore, there
is no reduction in the margin to the peak clad temperature (PCT)
limit for the SBLOCA. There is no increase in the LBLOCA PCT;
therefore, the ECCS acceptance criteria limit, dictated by 10 CFR
50.46, is not exceeded with regard to the LBLOCA analysis. The
increased boron concentration is sufficient to maintain
subcriticality during the LBLOCA, and a post-LOCA long-term core
cooling analysis demonstrated that the post-LOCA sump boron
concentration is sufficient to prevent recriticality. The revised
hot leg switchover time, which will be implemented in the EOPs, will
prevent long-term cooling problems associated with boron
precipitation in the reactor vessel and core. The licensing analyses
for containment, equipment qualification, and environmental
consequences remain bounding and applicable and the acceptance
criteria of the related events continue to be met. The proposed
increase in accumulator boron concentration, therefore, does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
3. TS 314.5.5--Refueling Water Storage Tank--Boron Concentration
Increase
The change does not invalidate any of the non-LOCA safety
analysis results or conclusions, and all of the non-LOCA safety
analysis acceptance criteria continue to be met. The licensing basis
SBLOCA analysis does not credit the RWST boron and is not affected
by the proposed change. Therefore, there is no reduction in the
margin to the PCT limit for the SBLOCA. There is no increase in the
LBLOCA PCT; therefore, the ECCS acceptance criteria limit, dictated
by 10 CFR 50.46, is not exceeded with regard to the LBLOCA analysis.
The increased boron concentration is sufficient to prevent
recriticality. The revised hot leg switchover time, which will be
implemented in the EOPs, will prevent boron precipitation. The
licensing analyses for containment, equipment qualification, and
environmental consequences remain bounding and applicable and the
acceptance criteria of the related events continue to be met. The
proposed increase in RWST boron concentration, therefore, does not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
4. TS 3/4.7.14 and Bases--Cask Pit Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--
Deletion of Requirements
This change removes the provisions that allow and support the
storage of spent fuel in the cask pit pool. This change will not
alter plant systems, operating methods, or plant setpoints that
maintain the margin of safety. Boron concentration will continue to
be properly maintained for the storage of spent fuel in the spent
fuel pool as required by the analysis to control inadvertent
criticality events. Therefore, this change will not reduce [does not
involve a significant reduction in] the margin of safety.
5. TS 5.3.1--Design Features/Reactor Core/Fuel Assemblies
TPBARs have been designed to be compatible with existing fuel
assemblies. TPBARs do not adversely affect reactor neutronic or
thermal-hydraulic performance. Analysis indicates that reactor core
behavior and offsite doses remain relatively unchanged. For these
reasons, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
6. TS 5.6 and TS 3/4.7.13 Bases--Design Features/Fuel Storage and Spent
Fuel Pool Minimum Boron Concentration--Revised Storage Requirements for
Fuel Assemblies Containing TPBARs
Addition of fuel assemblies containing TPBARs to the spent fuel
pool is consistent with the pool design function. Specific
provisions have been made as a result of reanalysis of spent fuel
pool criticality safety analysis to limit storage configurations and
burnup or cooling time requirements to those that will provide for
safe storage of fresh and spent fuel. Therefore, the proposed
amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of
safety.
7. TPBAR Consolidation Activity
The changes do not affect the safety-related performance of any
plant operations, system, structures, or components. Therefore,
there is no [it does not involve a] significant reduction in the
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the no significant hazards consideration
analysis provided by TVA with respect to the three criteria listed in
10 CFR 50.92(c). The staff's safety evaluation is in its early stages
and will require several months to complete. However, in terms of 10
CFR 50.92(c), the staff finds that the TVA application addresses all
applicable accidents discussed in the UFSAR, including LOCAs, SGTRs,
and fuel handling considerations. Insertion of the TPBARS for the
purpose of producing tritium (which is sealed inside the TPBARs)
requires a higher degree of fuel enrichment with uranium-235. Because
the TPBARs neither contain fissile material nor replace normal reactor
fuel, and because the TPBARs will not adversely affect reactor
neutronic or thermal-hydraulic performance, their presence in the core
should have no effect upon the probability or consequences of
previously analyzed accidents, including fuel handling accidents. For
the same reasons, the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident would not be expected to result from irradiation of the TPBARS
in the SQN reactor cores. TVA's analysis of a possible reduction in
safety margins addressed PCT limits resulting from an SBLOCA and the
increased boron concentration to maintain subcriticality.
Based on the NRC staff's review of the analysis provided by the
licensee, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Documents may
be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the NRC's Public Document
Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By January 16, 2002, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10
[[Page 65005]]
CFR part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR
2.714, which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room,
located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland, or electronically on the Internet at the NRC Web
site http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/CFR/index.html. If there are problems in
accessing the document, contact the Public Document Room Reference
staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by E-mail to [email protected]. If
a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by
the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition;
and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. A copy of the
petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to
General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, ET 11A, 400 West Summit
Hill Drive, Knoxville, TN 37902, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
Further details with respect to this action may be found in the
application for amendment dated September 21, 2001, which is available
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, located
at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from
the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html. Persons who do not have access to
ADAMS, or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in
ADAMS, should contact the NRC Public Document Room Reference staff by
telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by E-mail to [email protected].
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of December 2001.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ronald W. Hernan,
Senior Project Manager, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-30970 Filed 12-14-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P